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The embedded "application manifest" specifies "requireAdministrator",
so boinc_7.8.3_windows_intelx86.exe and all the DLLs it loads are
run with administrative privileges: an attacker who is able to place
one of the above named DLLs in the user's "Downloads" directory, for
example per "drive-by download", gains elevation of privilege.
Proof of concept/demonstration:
1- Follow the instructions from
<https://skanthak.homepage.t-online.de/minesweeper.html>
and build forwarder DLLs for the DLLs named above.
2- Place these DLLs in your "Downloads" directory.
3- Download
<https://boinc.berkeley.edu/dl/boinc_7.8.3_windows_intelx86.exe>
and save it in your "Downloads" directory.
4- Start boinc_7.8.3_windows_intelx86.exe: notice the message boxes
displayed from the DLLs!
FIX:
~~~~
DUMP the vulnerable executable installer, provide an .MSI instead!
See <https://skanthak.homepage.t-online.de/!execute.html>
The text was updated successfully, but these errors were encountered:
(from a user email)
boinc_7.8.3_windows_intelx86.exe, available from
https://boinc.berkeley.edu/dl/boinc_7.8.3_windows_intelx86.exe
via http://boinc.berkeley.edu/download.php, is vulnerable to DLL
hijacking: it loads multiple Windows system DLLs from its
"application directory", typically the user's "Downloads" directory
"%USERPROFILE%\Downloads", instead from Windows "system directory"
%SystemRoot%\System32\
On a fully patched Windows 7 SP1, these are at least the following
DLLs:
uxtheme.dll or dwmapi.dll, version.dll, ntmarta.dll, msi.dll
The vulnerability and attack are well-known and well-documented:
see https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/426.html
and https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/427.html
plus https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/471.html
Also see
https://insights.sei.cmu.edu/cert/2008/09/carpet-bombing-and-directory-poisoning.html
and
http://blog.acrossecurity.com/2012/02/downloads-folder-binary-planting.html
The embedded "application manifest" specifies "requireAdministrator",
so boinc_7.8.3_windows_intelx86.exe and all the DLLs it loads are
run with administrative privileges: an attacker who is able to place
one of the above named DLLs in the user's "Downloads" directory, for
example per "drive-by download", gains elevation of privilege.
Proof of concept/demonstration:
The text was updated successfully, but these errors were encountered: