-
Notifications
You must be signed in to change notification settings - Fork 0
/
gtmcrypt_util.c
461 lines (443 loc) · 15.3 KB
/
gtmcrypt_util.c
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111
112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123
124
125
126
127
128
129
130
131
132
133
134
135
136
137
138
139
140
141
142
143
144
145
146
147
148
149
150
151
152
153
154
155
156
157
158
159
160
161
162
163
164
165
166
167
168
169
170
171
172
173
174
175
176
177
178
179
180
181
182
183
184
185
186
187
188
189
190
191
192
193
194
195
196
197
198
199
200
201
202
203
204
205
206
207
208
209
210
211
212
213
214
215
216
217
218
219
220
221
222
223
224
225
226
227
228
229
230
231
232
233
234
235
236
237
238
239
240
241
242
243
244
245
246
247
248
249
250
251
252
253
254
255
256
257
258
259
260
261
262
263
264
265
266
267
268
269
270
271
272
273
274
275
276
277
278
279
280
281
282
283
284
285
286
287
288
289
290
291
292
293
294
295
296
297
298
299
300
301
302
303
304
305
306
307
308
309
310
311
312
313
314
315
316
317
318
319
320
321
322
323
324
325
326
327
328
329
330
331
332
333
334
335
336
337
338
339
340
341
342
343
344
345
346
347
348
349
350
351
352
353
354
355
356
357
358
359
360
361
362
363
364
365
366
367
368
369
370
371
372
373
374
375
376
377
378
379
380
381
382
383
384
385
386
387
388
389
390
391
392
393
394
395
396
397
398
399
400
401
402
403
404
405
406
407
408
409
410
411
412
413
414
415
416
417
418
419
420
421
422
423
424
425
426
427
428
429
430
431
432
433
434
435
436
437
438
439
440
441
442
443
444
445
446
447
448
449
450
451
452
453
454
455
456
457
458
459
460
461
/****************************************************************
* *
* Copyright (c) 2013-2022 Fidelity National Information *
* Services, Inc. and/or its subsidiaries. All rights reserved. *
* *
* Copyright (c) 2018-2024 YottaDB LLC and/or its subsidiaries. *
* All rights reserved. *
* *
* This source code contains the intellectual property *
* of its copyright holder(s), and is made available *
* under a license. If you do not know the terms of *
* the license, please stop and do not read further. *
* *
****************************************************************/
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <assert.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <sys/mman.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <signal.h>
#include <termios.h>
#include <gcrypt.h>
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include <openssl/err.h>
#include "gtmxc_types.h"
#include "gtmcrypt_util.h"
#include "ydbcrypt_interface.h"
#include "ydb_getenv.h"
/* Define the global error string here. Since this module gets linked into libgtmcryptutil.so, the error string global gets
* into the shared library automatically and is shared across all different libraries that comprise the encryption reference
* implementation.
*/
GBLDEF char gtmcrypt_err_string[MAX_GTMCRYPT_ERR_STRLEN + 1];
GBLDEF char *gtmtls_err_string = NULL;
#ifndef USE_SYSLIB_FUNCS
GBLDEF gtm_malloc_fnptr_t gtm_malloc_fnptr;
GBLDEF gtm_free_fnptr_t gtm_free_fnptr;
#endif
#define SIGPROCMASK(FUNC, NEWSET, OLDSET, RC) \
{ \
do \
{ \
RC = sigprocmask(FUNC, NEWSET, OLDSET); /* BYPASSOK(sigprocmask) */ \
} while ((-1 == RC) && (EINTR == errno)); \
/* See comment in gtmcrypt_util.h for why eintr_handling_check() is not used in case of EINTR */ \
}
#define Tcsetattr(FDESC, WHEN, TERMPTR, RC, ERRNO) \
{ \
sigset_t block_ttinout; \
sigset_t oldset; \
int rc; \
\
sigemptyset(&block_ttinout); \
sigaddset(&block_ttinout, SIGTTIN); \
sigaddset(&block_ttinout, SIGTTOU); \
SIGPROCMASK(SIG_BLOCK, &block_ttinout, &oldset, rc); \
do \
{ \
RC = tcsetattr(FDESC, WHEN, TERMPTR); \
} while(-1 == RC && EINTR == errno); \
/* See comment in gtmcrypt_util.h for why eintr_handling_check() is not used in case of EINTR */ \
ERRNO = errno; \
SIGPROCMASK(SIG_SETMASK, &oldset, NULL, rc); \
}
#ifdef USE_OPENSSL
#define SHA512(INBUF, INBUF_LEN, OUTBUF, RC) \
{ \
RC = EVP_Digest(INBUF, INBUF_LEN, (unsigned char *)OUTBUF, NULL, EVP_sha512(), NULL); \
if (0 >= RC) \
{ \
RC = -1; \
GC_APPEND_OPENSSL_ERROR("OpenSSL function 'EVP_sha512' failed."); \
} else \
RC = 0; \
}
#else
#define SHA512(INBUF, INBUF_LEN, OUTBUF, RC) \
{ \
/* First initialize the libgcrypt library */ \
RC = 0; \
if (NULL == gcry_check_version(GCRYPT_VERSION)) \
{ \
UPDATE_ERROR_STRING("libgcrypt version mismatch. %s or higher is required", GCRYPT_VERSION); \
RC = -1; \
} else \
gcry_md_hash_buffer(GCRY_MD_SHA512, OUTBUF, INBUF, INBUF_LEN); \
}
#endif
int gc_load_yottadb_symbols()
{
/* CYGWIN TODO: This is to fix a linker error. Undo when it is fixed. */
# if !defined(USE_SYSLIB_FUNCS) && !defined(__CYGWIN__)
gtm_malloc_fnptr = >m_malloc;
gtm_free_fnptr = >m_free;
# endif
return 0;
}
/* Libgcrypt doesn't do a good job of handling error messages and simply dumps them onto the console if
* no handler is set. One such example is when libgcrypt is doing a select on /dev/random and when it
* is interrupted due to a SIGALRM, libgcrypt dumps an error message onto the console. To avoid this,
* setup a dummy handler and swallow libgcrypt messages as long as they are not FATAL or BUG.
*/
void gtm_gcry_log_handler(void *opaque, int level, const char *fmt, va_list arg_ptr)
{
assert((GCRY_LOG_FATAL != level) && (GCRY_LOG_BUG != level));
return;
}
int gc_read_passwd(char *prompt, char *buf, int maxlen, void *tty)
{
struct termios new_tty, old_tty, *tty_copy;
int fd, status, save_errno, istty, i, rv;
char c;
/* Display the prompt */
printf("%s", prompt);
fflush(stdout); /* BYPASSOK -- cannot use FFLUSH */
/* Determine if the process has a terminal device associated with it */
fd = fileno(stdin);
if (FALSE != (istty = isatty(fd)))
{ /* Turn off terminal echo. */
status = tcgetattr(fd, &old_tty);
if (0 != status)
{
UPDATE_ERROR_STRING("Unable to set up terminal for safe password entry. Will not request passphrase. %s",
strerror(errno));
return -1;
}
if (NULL != tty)
{ /* In case a pointer was passed for the current terminal state, avoid a race condition with a potential
* interrupt by first assigning a pointer for the allocated space to a local variable and only then
* updating the passed-in pointer.
*/
tty_copy = (struct termios *)MALLOC(SIZEOF(struct termios));
assert(NULL != tty_copy);
memcpy(tty_copy, &old_tty, SIZEOF(struct termios));
*((struct termios **)tty) = tty_copy;
}
new_tty = old_tty;
new_tty.c_lflag &= ~ECHO;
/* GT.M terminal settings has ICANON and ICRNL turned-off. This causes the terminal to be treated
* in non-canonical mode and carriage-return to not take effect. Re-enable them so that input can be
* read from the user.
*/
new_tty.c_lflag |= ICANON;
new_tty.c_iflag |= ICRNL;
Tcsetattr(fd, TCSAFLUSH, &new_tty, status, save_errno);
if (-1 == status)
{
UPDATE_ERROR_STRING("Unable to set up terminal for safe password entry. Will not request passphrase. %s",
strerror(save_errno));
return -1;
}
}
/* Read the password. Note: we cannot use fgets() here as that would cause mixing of streams (buffered vs non-buffered). */
i = rv = 0;
do
{
/* See comment in gtmcrypt_util.h for why eintr_handling_check() is not used in case of EINTR */
while ((-1 == (status = read(fd, &c, 1))) && (EINTR == errno))
;
if (-1 == status)
{
save_errno = errno;
UPDATE_ERROR_STRING("Failed to obtain passphrase. %s", strerror(save_errno));
rv = -1;
break;
} else if (0 == status)
{
UPDATE_ERROR_STRING("Failed to obtain passphrase. Encountered premature EOF while reading from terminal.");
rv = -1;
break;
}
buf[i++] = c;
} while (('\n' != c) && (i < maxlen));
if (i == maxlen)
{
UPDATE_ERROR_STRING("Password too long. Maximum allowed password length is %d characters.", maxlen);
rv = -1;
}
if (-1 != rv)
{
assert('\n' == buf[i - 1]);
buf[i - 1] = '\0'; /* strip off the trailing \n */
}
if (istty)
{ /* Reset terminal settings to how it was at the function entry. */
Tcsetattr(fd, TCSAFLUSH, &old_tty, status, save_errno);
if (-1 == status)
{
UPDATE_ERROR_STRING("Unable to restore terminal settings. %s", strerror(save_errno));
return -1;
}
}
return rv;
}
/* Given a stream of characters representing the obfuscated/unobfuscated password, convert to the other form. The process requires
* an intermediate XOR_MASK.
*
* XOR MASK:
* --------
* If the ydb_obfuscation_key exists and points to a file that has readable contents, the XOR mask is the SHA-512 hash of the
* contents of that file.
* Otherwise, within a pre-zero'ed buffer (of size equal to the length of the password), the value of $USER (from the environment)
* is left-justified and the decimal representation of the inode of the mumps executable is right-justified. The XOR mask is the
* SHA-512 hash of the contents of this buffer.
* <PASSWORDLEN>
* USER0000INODE => SHA-512 => XOR mask
*
* MASKING/UNMASKING:
* ------------------
* The input character pointer (in->address) is XOR'ed with the above XOR mask and copied into out->address.
*
* The 'nparm' value is unused when called from C and is there only so that this function can be used as an external call entry-
* point for M.
*/
int gc_mask_unmask_passwd(int nparm, gtm_string_t *in, gtm_string_t *out)
{
char tmp[GTM_PASSPHRASE_MAX], mumps_exe[YDB_PATH_MAX], hash_in[GTM_PASSPHRASE_MAX], hash[GTMCRYPT_HASH_LEN];
char *ptr, *distptr, *mmap_addrs;
int passwd_len, len, i, save_errno, fd, have_hash, status, hash_off;
struct stat stat_info;
have_hash = FALSE;
passwd_len = in->length < GTM_PASSPHRASE_MAX ? in->length : GTM_PASSPHRASE_MAX;
if (NULL != (ptr = ydb_getenv(YDBENVINDX_OBFUSCATION_KEY, NULL_SUFFIX, NULL_IS_YDB_ENV_MATCH)))
{
if (-1 != (fd = open(ptr, O_RDONLY)))
{
if ((-1 != fstat(fd, &stat_info)) && S_ISREG(stat_info.st_mode))
{ /* File pointed by $ydb_obfuscation_key exists and is a regular file */
mmap_addrs = mmap(0, stat_info.st_size, PROT_READ, MAP_SHARED, fd, 0);
if (MAP_FAILED != mmap_addrs)
{
SHA512(mmap_addrs, stat_info.st_size, hash, status);
if (0 != status)
return -1;
have_hash = TRUE;
munmap(mmap_addrs, stat_info.st_size);
}
}
close(fd);
}
}
if (!have_hash)
{
if (!(distptr = ydb_getenv(YDBENVINDX_DIST, NULL_SUFFIX, NULL_IS_YDB_ENV_MATCH)))
{
UPDATE_ERROR_STRING(ENV_UNDEF_ERROR2, YDB_DIST_ENV, GTM_DIST_ENV);
return -1;
}
SNPRINTF(mumps_exe, YDB_PATH_MAX, "%s/%s", distptr, "mumps");
if (0 != stat(mumps_exe, &stat_info))
{
save_errno = errno;
UPDATE_ERROR_STRING("Cannot find MUMPS executable in %s - %s", ptr, strerror(save_errno));
return -1;
}
if (!(ptr = ydb_getenv(YDBENVINDX_GENERIC_USER, NULL_SUFFIX, NULL_IS_YDB_ENV_MATCH)))
{
UPDATE_ERROR_STRING(ENV_UNDEF_ERROR, USER_ENV);
return -1;
}
memset(hash_in, 0, SIZEOF(hash_in));
SNPRINTF(hash_in, passwd_len, "%s", ptr);
SNPRINTF(tmp, SIZEOF(tmp), "%ld", (long)stat_info.st_ino);
len = (int)STRLEN(tmp);
hash_off = 0;
if (len < passwd_len)
hash_off = passwd_len - len;
else
len = passwd_len;
memcpy(hash_in + hash_off, tmp, len);
SHA512(hash_in, passwd_len, hash, status);
if (0 != status)
return -1;
}
for (i = 0; i < passwd_len; i++)
out->address[i] = in->address[i] ^ hash[i % GTMCRYPT_HASH_LEN];
out->length = passwd_len;
return 0;
}
void gc_freeup_pwent(passwd_entry_t *pwent)
{
assert(NULL != pwent);
memset(pwent->passwd, 0, pwent->passwd_len);
if (NULL != pwent->passwd)
FREE(pwent->passwd);
if (NULL != pwent->env_value)
FREE(pwent->env_value);
FREE(pwent);
}
int gc_update_passwd(ydbenvindx_t envindx, char *suffix, passwd_entry_t **ppwent, char *prompt, int interactive)
{
char *env_value, *passwd, *lpasswd, tmp_passwd[GTM_PASSPHRASE_MAX];
char *env_name, envname1[PASSPHRASE_ENVNAME_MAX], envname2[PASSPHRASE_ENVNAME_MAX], tmpsuffix[1];
char *snprintf_suffix;
boolean_t is_ydb_env_match;
int len, status;
gtm_string_t passwd_str, tmp_passwd_str;
passwd_entry_t *pwent;
mstr mst_suffix, *mst_suffix_ptr;
if (NULL == suffix)
{
tmpsuffix[0] = '\0';
snprintf_suffix = tmpsuffix; /* Do not use NULL pointer in snprintf */
} else
snprintf_suffix = suffix;
pwent = *ppwent;
if (!(GTMCRYPT_OP_NOPWDENVVAR & interactive))
{
if (NULL != suffix)
{
mst_suffix.addr = suffix;
mst_suffix.len = STRLEN(suffix);
mst_suffix_ptr = &mst_suffix;
} else
mst_suffix_ptr = NULL;
if (!(lpasswd = ydb_getenv(envindx, mst_suffix_ptr, &is_ydb_env_match)))
{
SNPRINTF(envname1, SIZEOF(envname1), "%s%s", ydbenvname[envindx] + 1, snprintf_suffix);
SNPRINTF(envname2, SIZEOF(envname2), "%s%s", gtmenvname[envindx] + 1, snprintf_suffix);
UPDATE_ERROR_STRING(ENV_UNDEF_ERROR2, envname1, envname2);
return -1;
}
if ((NULL != pwent) && (0 == strcmp(pwent->env_value, lpasswd)))
return 0; /* No change in the environment value. Nothing more to do. */
} else
{
is_ydb_env_match = TRUE;
if ((NULL != pwent) && (NULL != pwent->env_value))
lpasswd = pwent->env_value;
else
{
SNPRINTF(envname1, SIZEOF(envname1), "%s%s", ydbenvname[envindx] + 1, snprintf_suffix);
UPDATE_ERROR_STRING("No passphrase provided for %s", envname1);
if (NULL != pwent)
gc_freeup_pwent(pwent);
return -1;
}
}
SNPRINTF(envname1, SIZEOF(envname1), "%s%s",
(char *)(is_ydb_env_match ? ydbenvname[envindx] : gtmenvname[envindx]) + 1 , snprintf_suffix);
env_name = envname1;
len = STRLEN(lpasswd);
if (0 != (len % 2))
{
UPDATE_ERROR_STRING("Environment variable %s must be a valid hexadecimal string of even length less than %d. "
"Length is odd", env_name, GTM_PASSPHRASE_MAX);
if (NULL != pwent)
gc_freeup_pwent(pwent);
return -1;
}
if ((GTM_PASSPHRASE_MAX * 2) <= len)
{
UPDATE_ERROR_STRING("Environment variable %s must be a valid hexadecimal string of even length less than %d. "
"Length is %d", env_name, GTM_PASSPHRASE_MAX, len);
if (NULL != pwent)
gc_freeup_pwent(pwent);
return -1;
}
if (!(GTMCRYPT_OP_NOPWDENVVAR & interactive))
{
if (NULL != pwent)
gc_freeup_pwent(pwent);
pwent = MALLOC(SIZEOF(passwd_entry_t));
assert(NULL != pwent);
pwent->envindx = envindx;
pwent->env_value = MALLOC(len ? len + 1 : GTM_PASSPHRASE_MAX * 2 + 1);
assert(NULL != pwent->env_value);
if (NULL != suffix)
strncpy(pwent->suffix, suffix, SIZEOF(pwent->suffix));
else
pwent->suffix[0] = '\0';
pwent->suffix[SIZEOF(pwent->suffix) - 1] = '\0';
}
pwent->passwd_len = len ? len / 2 + 1 : GTM_PASSPHRASE_MAX + 1;
pwent->passwd = MALLOC(pwent->passwd_len);
assert(NULL != pwent->passwd);
env_value = pwent->env_value;
passwd = pwent->passwd;
if (0 < len)
{
/* First, convert from hexadecimal representation to regular representation */
GC_UNHEX(lpasswd, passwd, len);
if (len < 0)
{
UPDATE_ERROR_STRING("Environment variable %s must be a valid hexadecimal string of even length "
"less than %d. '%c' is not a valid digit (0-9, a-f, or A-F)", env_name,
GTM_PASSPHRASE_MAX, passwd[0]);
if (NULL != pwent)
gc_freeup_pwent(pwent);
return -1;
}
/* Now, unobfuscate to get the real password */
passwd_str.address = passwd;
passwd_str.length = len / 2;
if (0 == (status = gc_mask_unmask_passwd(2, &passwd_str, &passwd_str)))
{
if (env_value != lpasswd)
{ /* env_value was malloc()ed for len + 1 bytes */
memcpy(env_value, lpasswd, len); /* Store the hexadecimal representation in environment */
env_value[len] = '\0';
}
passwd[len / 2] = '\0'; /* null-terminate the password string */
*ppwent = pwent;
} else
gc_freeup_pwent(pwent);
return status;
}
/* Environment variable is set to an empty string. Prompt for password. But, first check if we are running in interactive
* mode. If not, return with an error.
*/
if (!(GTMCRYPT_OP_INTERACTIVE_MODE & interactive))
{
UPDATE_ERROR_STRING("Environment variable %s set to empty string. "
"Cannot prompt for password in this mode of operation.", env_name);
gc_freeup_pwent(pwent);
return -1;
}
if (-1 == gc_read_passwd(prompt, passwd, GTM_PASSPHRASE_MAX, NULL))
{
gc_freeup_pwent(pwent);
return -1;
}
/* Obfuscate the read password and set it in the environment. */
passwd_str.address = passwd;
passwd_str.length = (int)STRLEN(passwd);
tmp_passwd_str.address = &tmp_passwd[0];
if (0 != gc_mask_unmask_passwd(2, &passwd_str, &tmp_passwd_str))
{
gc_freeup_pwent(pwent);
return -1;
}
/* Since the obfuscated password might contain un-printable characters, represent them as hexadecimal digits. */
GC_HEX(tmp_passwd, env_value, tmp_passwd_str.length * 2);
setenv(env_name, env_value, TRUE);
*ppwent = pwent;
return 0;
}