The Keep Network requires a trusted source of randomness for the process of trustless group selection. While the network requires that randomness to function correctly, the source of randomness is itself broadly applicable. This trusted source of randomness takes the form of a BLS Threshold Relay.
The threshold relay is a way of generating verifiable randomness that is resistant to bad actors both in the relay network and on the anchoring Ethereum blockchain. The basic functioning of the relay is:
-
Some number of groups exist in the relay.
-
An arbitrary seed value
v_s
counts as the first entry in the relay. -
A request
r_i
is dispatched to the chain for a new entry. -
The previous entry
v_s
is used to choose a group to produce the response to the request. -
v_s
is signed by at least a subset of the chosen group members, and the resulting signature is the entry generated in response to the request. It is published to the anchoring blockchain as the entryv_i
. -
The new entry
v_i
may trigger the formation of a new group from the set of all members in the relay. -
A group expires after a certain amount of time.
Smart contracts for the first version of the random beacon are available in
solidity-v1
directory.
The new version uses the same approach for BLS signatures as v1 but replaces
ticket-based group selection with an optimistic sortition pool call. It also
redesigns staker rewards and offers a more operator-friendly approach for
relay entry timeouts. Last but not least, most parameters for the relay are
now governable.
New groups are created with a fixed frequency of relay requests.
Instead of a v1 ticket-based approach for a signing group selection, we use
a sortition pool. Group creation start transaction is embedded into relay request
transaction and locks a sortition pool. From this moment, no operator can enter
or leave the pool. Once a new relay entry appears on the chain, all off-chain
clients perform group selection by calling RandomBeacon.selectGroup()
view
function for free. After determining group members, clients should perform
off-chain distributed key generation (DKG).
One of the group members submits the result to the chain calling
RandomBeacon.submitDkgResult(DKG.Result calldata dkgResult)
function.
Once the result is submitted, a challenge period starts.
During the challenge period, anyone can notify that the submitted DKG result is
malicious by calling RandomBeacon.challengeDkgResult(DKG.Result calldata dkgResult)
function. A malicious DKG result may contain corrupted data, group members not
selected by the pool, or incorrect supporting signatures. If such malicious
result is submitted and successfully challenged, the result submitter gets
slashed and the malicious result is immediately discarded. The address which
notified about malicious DKG result is rewarded. DKG timeout
timer is reset, and group members have another chance to submit a valid result.
Once the challenge period passes, and no valid challenge is reported, the DKG
result submitter should mark the DKG result as approved calling
RandomBeacon.approveDkgResult(DKG.Result calldata dkgResult)
.
This transaction also unlocks the sortition pool.
The submitter receives an ETH reimbursement for both submitDkgResult
and
approveDkgResult
transactions as described in
Transaction Incentives section. In case the original
submitter does not call the approveDkgResult
function within a specific number
of blocks, anyone can do that and receive the submitter’s reimbursement.
There is a timeout before which a DKG result should be submitted.
In case the DKG result was not submitted before the timeout, anyone can
notify about the timed out DKG by calling RandomBeacon.notifyDkgTimeout()
function and unlock the sortition pool as part of this transaction.
DKG timeout includes the situation when no new relay entry was produced
and sortition could not be performed.
Off-chain clients are expected to follow the submission order when submitting DKG result to avoid front-running and minimize the cost, but no ordering is enforced on-chain.
The sortition pool weights operators by their authorized stake amount and allows selecting the same operator to the wallet signing group multiple times. Off-chain DKG protocol executes in the same way as for v1 and inactive/disqualified members during the off-chain protocol are marked as ineligible for rewards for a governable period of time when the DKG result is approved.
Each group created in the system remains active for a certain period of time. A group that expired is no longer selected for any new work. Group expiration is performed in the relay request transaction.
Authorized addresses can request a new relay entry (random number) by calling
RandomBeacon.requestRelayEntry(IRandomBeaconConsumer callbackContract)
function and providing an optional callback parameter.
In requestRelayEntry
transaction, groups that reached their maximum lifetime
are getting expired and one of the remaining active groups is tasked with
producing a new relay entry. The off-chain clients are expected to monitor the
RelayEntryRequested
event. If a client is a part of a picked group they should
start the off-chain protocol to sign the previous relay entry producing a new one.
Off-chain clients are expected to follow the submission order
when submitting relay entry to avoid front-running and minimize the cost, but no
ordering is enforced on-chain. New relay entry should be submitted using
RandomBeacon.submitRelayEntry(bytes calldata entry)
function.
Random Beacon supports simple, low-gas-budget callbacks from a relay entry submit transaction.
When requesting a relay entry, it is possible to pass an optional address
parameter - this is the address of a contract implementing
IRandomBeaconConsumer
interface that should be called when a new relay entry
is submitted to the chain.
Smart contract consuming new relay entry needs to implement IRandomBeaconConsumer
interface. The gas limit for __beaconCallback
is initially set to 56k gas
which is enough to SSTORE
new relay entry, SSTORE
block height in which the entry was submitted, and to emit an event.
Failure in the callback function does not revert the relay entry transaction.
interface IRandomBeaconConsumer {
/// @notice Receives relay entry produced by Keep Random Beacon. This function
/// should be called only by Keep Random Beacon.
///
/// @param relayEntry Relay entry (random number) produced by Keep Random
/// Beacon.
/// @param blockNumber Block number at which the relay entry was submitted
/// to the chain.
function __beaconCallback(uint256 relayEntry, uint256 blockNumber) external;
}
There are two timeouts for a relay entry to be provided by a group: soft timeout and hard timeout.
If no entry was provided within the soft timeout, all operators in the group start bleeding and losing their stake. The bleeding increases linearly from 0 to the slashing amount per operator over time, until the hard timeout is reached or until a relay entry is submitted by the group.
The soft timeout is a governable parameter. This gives a chance to start with more forgiving penalties and increase them over time. In general, the slashing penalty should be proportional to rewards and the frequency of relay requests and associated risk.
When the hard timeout is reached, anyone can notify about this fact by calling
RandomBeacon.reportRelayEntryTimeout()
function and receive a
notifier reward . The group which failed to submit a relay entry
is terminated, group members are slashed, and if there are still active groups
in the beacon, another group is selected and tasked with producing a relay entry
for the given relay request.
There is a governable timeout for DKG to complete and for the result to be
submitted. DKG timeout includes the time it takes to execute off-chain protocol
to generate a key, and the time it takes to submit the result.
When DKG timeout is exceeded, anyone can call RandomBeacon.notifyDkgTimeout()
.
This function unlocks the sortition pool and clears up DKG data, but no slashing
for DKG timeout is executed and no one is marked as ineligible for rewards.
Off-chain clients are free to execute any heartbeat protocol they want to ensure group member key material is still available and nodes are operating properly.
💡
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One example of a heartbeat protocol is signing some piece of information every
n-th block and making sure this piece of information cannot be used for
RandomBeacon.reportUnauthorizedSigning() . Specifically, the signed piece of
information can not become msg.sender for reportUnauthorizedSigning call.
|
Group members can agree to punish members who are permanently inactive and issue
an operator inactivity claim. If the required threshold of group members signed
the operator inactivity claim, they can submit it to
RandomBeacon.notifyOperatorInactivity(Inactivity.Claim calldata claim, uint256 nonce, int32[] calldata groupMembers)
function and have the group members who are inactive excluded from
the sortition pool rewards for a governable time period.
This approach is theoretically susceptible to group members colluding together, but because a reasonably high number of operators is needed to sign a claim and operators signing the claim receive nothing in return, we consider this approach safe and good enough. An important advantage of this approach is that honest players can decide off-chain when it makes sense to submit an operator inactivity claim and mark someone as ineligible for rewards. For example, marking an operator ineligible for rewards for the next two weeks has a higher impact than prolonging reward ineligibility for 10 minutes for an operator that was already marked as ineligible for rewards. This approach does not increase the gas cost of a happy path and leaves some freedom to group members. They can mark as ineligible operators who turned off their nodes, operators whose nodes never participate in signing because they are misconfigured, or operators who notoriously miss their turn in submitting relay entries.
T rewards are allocated to all operators registered in the beacon sortition pool, excluding operators who were marked as ineligible for rewards as a result of being reported by other group members as inactive or as a result of being inactive or disqualified during the DKG. Rewards are allocated proportionally to the operator’s weight in the pool.
There are three types of transactions: Operator-Only, Public-Knowledge, and Punishment.
Operator-Only transactions are where only the operators have access to the information required to assemble the transaction with the right input parameters.
In order to avoid all operators racing to submit the transaction at the same time, we have an off-chain informal agreement to submit based on the operator’s position in the group (can use the hash of the group’s pubkey).
If the designated operator does not submit their transaction before a timeout expires, the duty moves to the next operator and the group can sign a transaction to mark that operator as inactive. Since there is no slashing reward, and since this transaction can only be submitted by an operator, this transaction is also Operator-Only.
In order to compensate the operator for posting the transaction, the gas spent
will be reimbursed by a DAO-funded ETH pool in the same transaction. It is
important to note, that the system has a governable cap for the gas price to
protect against malicious operators trying to drain the pool (see Reimbursable
and ReimbursementPool
smart contracts).
Operator-only transactions are submitDkgResult
, submitRelayEntry
,
notifyOperatorInactivity
, and approveDkgResult
for a certain number of
blocks, before a timeout for the original DKG result submitter to call this
function elapses.
Public-Knowledge transactions are where anyone has access to the information required to assemble the transaction and the transaction does not lead to punishment.
In order to prevent wasting gas on racing to submit, such transactions need to be executed rarely, and off-chain clients should follow the informal agreement about the submission order.
To compensate these transactions, whoever posts them will have the gas spent reimbursed by a DAO-funded ETH pool in the same transaction.
The only public knowledge transaction is notifyDkgTimeout
.
approveDkgResult
turns into a public knowledge transaction in case the
original submitter has not approved the result before the timeout.
Punishment transactions are where anyone has access to the information required to assemble the transaction (like Public-Knowledge) and the transaction leads to slashing.
In these transactions, maintaining system health is more important than
optimizing gas via preventing racing, so we offer up bounties in the form of
a notifier reward from slashed tokens to whichever submitter submits first. We
do not compensate gas. Notification rewards are distributed by Threshold Network
TokenStaking
contract.
Punishment transactions are: challengeDkgResult
, reportRelayEntryTimeout
,
and reportUnauthorizedSigning
.
Property Name | Description | Governable | Default Value |
---|---|---|---|
DKG |
|||
|
Size of a group in the threshold relay. |
No |
|
|
The minimum number of group members needed to interact according to the protocol to produce a signature |
No |
|
|
The minimum number of active and properly behaving group members during the DKG needed to accept the result. |
No |
|
|
Size in bytes of a single signature produced by operator supporting DKG result. |
No |
|
|
Time in blocks during which the submitted DKG result can be challenged. |
Yes |
|
|
Time in blocks during which a DKG result is expected to be submitted. |
Yes |
|
|
Time in blocks during which only the DKG result submitter is allowed to approve it. |
Yes |
|
Groups |
|||
|
Group lifetime in blocks. |
Yes |
|
|
The number of relay requests needed to kick off a new group creation process. |
Yes |
|
Relay Entry |
|||
|
Time in blocks during which a result is expected to be submitted. |
Yes |
|
|
Hard timeout in blocks for a group to submit the relay entry. |
Yes |
|
|
Relay entry callback gas limit. |
Yes |
|
Slashing |
|||
|
Slashing amount for submitting malicious DKG result. |
Yes |
|
|
Percentage of the staking contract malicious behavior notification reward which will be transferred to the notifier reporting about a malicious DKG result. |
Yes |
|
|
Slashing amount for not submitting relay entry. |
Yes |
|
|
Percentage of the staking contract malicious behavior notification reward which will be transferred to the notifier reporting about relay entry timeout. |
Yes |
|
|
Slashing amount when an unauthorized signing has been proved. |
Yes |
|
|
Percentage of the staking contract malicious behavior notification reward which will be transferred to the notifier reporting about unauthorized signing. |
Yes |
|
|
Duration of the sortition pool rewards ban imposed on operators who were inactive/disqualified during off-chain DKG or were voted by the group as inactive for other reasons. |
Yes |
|
Random Beacon |
|||
|
Calculated gas cost for submitting a DKG result. This will be refunded as part of the DKG approval process. |
Yes |
|
|
Gas that is meant to balance the DKG result approval’s overall cost. |
Yes |
|
|
Gas that is meant to balance the operator inactivity notification cost. |
Yes |
|
|
Gas that is meant to balance the relay entry submission cost. |
Yes |
|
|
Authorized addresses that can request a relay entry. |
Yes |
|
Authorization |
|||
|
The minimum authorization amount required so that operator can participate in the Random Beacon. |
Yes |
|
|
Delay in seconds that needs to pass between the time authorization decrease is requested and the time that request gets approved. |
Yes |
|
|
Time period in seconds before the authorization decrease delay end, during which the authorization decrease request can be overwritten. |
Yes |
|
Random beacon contracts use Hardhat development environment. To build and deploy these contracts, please follow the instructions presented below.
Please make sure you have the following prerequisites installed on your machine:
To build the smart contracts, install node packages first:
yarn install
Once packages are installed, you can build the smart contracts using:
yarn build
Compiled contracts will land in the build/
directory.