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Placement use cases

This document will cover key publisher use cases that will need to be handled by TURTLEDOVE or other browser-based ad placement proposals. Gatekeeper variants (e.g., SPARROW) do seem to handle at least some of these issues currently.

The current TURTLEDOVE architecture allows for the browser to decide which ad wins a specific auction based on a rank value that each ad has associated with it. That rank may be modified, but the mechanisms for that are currently unspecified. There are several publisher use cases that are clearly not yet supported:

  1. Publishers need to be able to control which ads, including interest-group-based ads, appear on their web properties.  Publishers want to control what content appears on their web property for multiple reasons:

    1. Ad quality/publisher-determined brand safety rules - there are many categories of content or specific advertising brands, categories of advertising brands, or specific ads that a given publisher would not want to appear on their site. (Related issue: Capabilities of the proposal for publishers · Issue #51 · WICG/turtledove)

    2. Malvertising - Some ads may contain (or link to) malware. If this isn't detected prior to a bundle being delivered to the browser, publishers need a mechanism to block malware from being served to their sites' users and to take appropriate action against the source of the malware.

      1. In the event that a malvertising campaign is discovered, publishers require mechanisms to block an ad from appearing on their sites.

      2. Publishers use third-party malvertising detection services to prevent malvertising from serving to their users.

      3. In the event that an ad server or DSP is compromised and may have served malware, the blocking needs to apply to bundles that may already have been cached. This could involve the publisher or a third-party service.

    3. Pausing advertising. - Marketers sometimes choose to rapidly pause their ads in all media after an adverse news event such as an airplane crash. Publishers of any web property on which the marketer's ad might appear will need to support this.

  2. Publishers need to be able to fulfill directly sold ad placements. Many publishers often secure higher-revenue advertising based on the ability to deliver guaranteed impressions. Publishers need to balance short term optimization of revenue with longer-term strategic client relationships, which means serving lower priced ads ahead of higher priced ads in certain cases. Being able to control this without a time delay is critical to publishers meeting their contractual and strategic goals.  Publishers can currently make direct and RTB work together using a variety of techniques.

    1. The highest bid should not always win. Publishers need the flexibility to be able to optimize their revenue and strategic goals by controlling which ads are delivered for given placements, which rely on configurable rules that compare direct sold ads, and indirect sold ads, regardless of why the marketer wants to engage a particular end user (e.g., contextual or interest-based targeting) Example rules include only overriding a guaranteed placement if it is over a target bid. The target amount may change over time. Related issue: Publisher ad network control over ad eligibility and auction ranking · Issue #70 · WICG/turtledove

      1. For example, the Google Ad Manager "dynamic allocation" feature (if a direct deal is pacing correctly, complete at original price, if pacing falls behind then increase bid CPM to win more often. If the direct deal is pacing ahead, then cut the bid)

      2. Direct deals that are pacing behind need to compete in the TURTLEDOVE auction at a higher effective price, and those that are pacing ahead need to compete at a lower price. The changes publishers make to rule sets must be immediately applied by TURTLEDOVE auctions.

  3. Publishers need to set floor rates based on several criteria. (Related issue: Capabilities of the proposal for publishers · Issue #51 · WICG/turtledove)

    1. A publisher may not want an ad to serve at all, if it is below a minimum "floor" set for that page, section, or site.

    2. A publisher may not want an ad from a certain brand, vertical or campaign unless it is above a minimum floor set for that brand, vertical, or campaign.

      1. For example, a publisher may set a "floor for automotive"

      2. Publishers choose to protect their direct sales business, by not allowing marketers to undercut their pricing via indirect sales channel on the open market.

  4. Publishers need to honor contractual terms preventing competitors from appearing together. If the contextual system serves an ad for one brand in one slot on the page, the decision process in other ad slots needs to know not to serve direct competitor ads. The publisher needs to control which brands are considered competitors. (For example, Amazon.com might be blocked as a direct competitor of a local bookstore ad on a book review site, while an IT site might not block Amazon.com for competing with a database ad.)

  5. The bid price set by the marketer is not necessarily the price at which it should compete in the auction. Publishers need to apply their own weighted prices, not necessarily the bid price. The "price" of a given ad is assigned by the buyer, but that price may not be what the publisher gets paid. In this case the publisher needs to apply an adjustment for auction purposes. Adjustment must be applied by the publisher in a 1st-party context. (Related issue: Ad Pricing · Issue #14 · WICG/turtledove)

    1. VAST errors: If a given ad is known to have VAST errors 20% of the time (e.g., does not serve) then it needs to have its bid price reduced by 20%, by the publisher.

    2. Post-bid brand safety blocking: If a given buyer has brand-safety controls that prevent an ad from serving on a page, the publisher ultimately does not get paid. Publishers can currently adjust for this by reducing the effective bids for impressions from a given buyer (e.g., if some ads serve, but others do not).

    3. Reporting discrepancies: For many reasons, buyer and seller reporting (and third parties) does not match, and publishers need to be able to reduce (or increase) the bid price based on those discrepancies to ensure the ads compete at a price that is equal to what the publisher actually gets paid.

  6. Publishers need to comply with regulatory requirements.

    1. For example, COPPA compliance in the US might forbid a certain interest-group ad from being served on a given page.

    2. Even if machine learning can classify underage drinkers into a cohort with legal age drinkers, they still can't get alcohol ads. How would a site signal to the auction that this given user is not eligible for alcohol ads?

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