From 40fa684c181d3138d8f86c70e5933fb0b3dcbac8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Lyuma Date: Sun, 24 Sep 2023 20:04:06 -0700 Subject: [PATCH] mbedTLS: Update to new LTS v3.6.0 Keep module compatibility with mbedtls 2.x (old LTS branch). A patch has been added to allow compiling after removing all the `psa_*` files from the library folder (will look into upstreaming it). Note: mbedTLS 3.6 finally enabled TLSv1.3 by default, but it requires some module changes, and to enable PSA crypto (new "standard" API specification), so it might be best done in a separate commit/PR. --- core/crypto/SCsub | 1 + core/crypto/crypto_core.cpp | 3 + modules/mbedtls/SCsub | 32 +- modules/mbedtls/crypto_mbedtls.cpp | 46 +- modules/mbedtls/crypto_mbedtls.h | 2 + modules/mbedtls/tls_context_mbedtls.h | 1 - thirdparty/README.md | 10 +- .../include/godot_module_mbedtls_config.h | 26 +- thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/aes.h | 96 +- thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/arc4.h | 132 - thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/aria.h | 25 +- thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/asn1.h | 80 +- .../mbedtls/include/mbedtls/asn1write.h | 59 +- thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/base64.h | 6 +- thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/bignum.h | 85 +- .../mbedtls/include/mbedtls/block_cipher.h | 76 + thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/blowfish.h | 275 - .../mbedtls/include/mbedtls/build_info.h | 176 + thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/camellia.h | 21 +- thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/ccm.h | 282 +- thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/certs.h | 238 - thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/chacha20.h | 23 +- .../mbedtls/include/mbedtls/chachapoly.h | 19 +- .../mbedtls/include/mbedtls/check_config.h | 642 +- thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/cipher.h | 510 +- thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/cmac.h | 46 +- .../mbedtls/include/mbedtls/compat-1.3.h | 2533 --- .../mbedtls/include/mbedtls/compat-2.x.h | 46 + .../mbedtls/config_adjust_legacy_crypto.h | 457 + .../mbedtls/config_adjust_legacy_from_psa.h | 888 + .../mbedtls/config_adjust_psa_from_legacy.h | 349 + .../config_adjust_psa_superset_legacy.h | 142 + .../include/mbedtls/config_adjust_ssl.h | 81 + .../include/mbedtls/config_adjust_x509.h | 25 + .../mbedtls/include/mbedtls/config_psa.h | 55 + .../mbedtls/include/mbedtls/constant_time.h | 17 +- thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/ctr_drbg.h | 126 +- thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/debug.h | 176 +- thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/des.h | 15 +- thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/dhm.h | 242 +- thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/ecdh.h | 109 +- thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/ecdsa.h | 327 +- thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/ecjpake.h | 72 +- thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/ecp.h | 421 +- thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/entropy.h | 71 +- thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/error.h | 31 +- thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/gcm.h | 162 +- thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/havege.h | 67 - thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/hkdf.h | 6 +- .../mbedtls/include/mbedtls/hmac_drbg.h | 57 +- thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/lms.h | 440 + .../mbedtls/{config.h => mbedtls_config.h} | 1792 +- thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/md.h | 231 +- thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/md2.h | 292 - thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/md4.h | 297 - thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/md5.h | 135 +- .../mbedtls/include/mbedtls/md_internal.h | 77 - .../include/mbedtls/memory_buffer_alloc.h | 16 +- thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/net.h | 23 - .../mbedtls/include/mbedtls/net_sockets.h | 15 +- thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/nist_kw.h | 9 +- thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/oid.h | 147 +- thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/pem.h | 42 +- thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/pk.h | 598 +- thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/pkcs11.h | 241 - thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/pkcs12.h | 52 +- thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/pkcs5.h | 69 +- thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/pkcs7.h | 240 + thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/platform.h | 72 +- .../mbedtls/include/mbedtls/platform_time.h | 29 +- .../mbedtls/include/mbedtls/platform_util.h | 86 +- thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/poly1305.h | 27 +- .../mbedtls/include/mbedtls/private_access.h | 20 + thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/psa_util.h | 188 + .../mbedtls/include/mbedtls/ripemd160.h | 115 +- thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/rsa.h | 525 +- thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/sha1.h | 148 +- thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/sha256.h | 165 +- thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/sha3.h | 172 + thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/sha512.h | 179 +- thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/ssl.h | 2908 +++- .../mbedtls/include/mbedtls/ssl_cache.h | 90 +- .../include/mbedtls/ssl_ciphersuites.h | 340 +- .../mbedtls/include/mbedtls/ssl_cookie.h | 28 +- .../mbedtls/include/mbedtls/ssl_internal.h | 1328 -- .../mbedtls/include/mbedtls/ssl_ticket.h | 105 +- .../mbedtls/include/mbedtls/threading.h | 54 +- thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/timing.h | 71 +- thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/version.h | 30 +- thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/x509.h | 243 +- thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/x509_crl.h | 40 +- thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/x509_crt.h | 386 +- thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/x509_csr.h | 130 +- thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/xtea.h | 126 - thirdparty/mbedtls/include/psa/build_info.h | 20 + thirdparty/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto.h | 4839 ++++++ .../include/psa/crypto_adjust_auto_enabled.h | 21 + .../psa/crypto_adjust_config_key_pair_types.h | 91 + .../psa/crypto_adjust_config_synonyms.h | 39 + .../include/psa/crypto_builtin_composites.h | 214 + .../psa/crypto_builtin_key_derivation.h | 118 + .../include/psa/crypto_builtin_primitives.h | 114 + .../mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_compat.h | 230 + .../mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_config.h | 159 + .../include/psa/crypto_driver_common.h | 44 + .../psa/crypto_driver_contexts_composites.h | 151 + .../crypto_driver_contexts_key_derivation.h | 52 + .../psa/crypto_driver_contexts_primitives.h | 105 + thirdparty/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_extra.h | 1883 +++ .../mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_legacy.h | 88 + .../mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_platform.h | 102 + .../mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_se_driver.h | 1383 ++ thirdparty/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_sizes.h | 1292 ++ .../mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_struct.h | 503 + thirdparty/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_types.h | 486 + .../mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_values.h | 2783 +++ thirdparty/mbedtls/library/aes.c | 995 +- thirdparty/mbedtls/library/aesce.c | 618 + thirdparty/mbedtls/library/aesce.h | 136 + thirdparty/mbedtls/library/aesni.c | 59 +- .../{include/mbedtls => library}/aesni.h | 57 +- thirdparty/mbedtls/library/alignment.h | 684 + thirdparty/mbedtls/library/arc4.c | 180 - thirdparty/mbedtls/library/aria.c | 104 +- thirdparty/mbedtls/library/asn1parse.c | 76 +- thirdparty/mbedtls/library/asn1write.c | 185 +- thirdparty/mbedtls/library/base64.c | 44 +- thirdparty/mbedtls/library/base64_internal.h | 45 + thirdparty/mbedtls/library/bignum.c | 1349 +- thirdparty/mbedtls/library/bignum_core.c | 895 + thirdparty/mbedtls/library/bignum_core.h | 763 + thirdparty/mbedtls/library/bignum_internal.h | 71 - thirdparty/mbedtls/library/bignum_mod.c | 394 + thirdparty/mbedtls/library/bignum_mod.h | 452 + thirdparty/mbedtls/library/bignum_mod_raw.c | 276 + thirdparty/mbedtls/library/bignum_mod_raw.h | 416 + .../mbedtls/library/bignum_mod_raw_invasive.h | 34 + thirdparty/mbedtls/library/block_cipher.c | 203 + .../mbedtls/library/block_cipher_internal.h | 99 + thirdparty/mbedtls/library/blowfish.c | 644 - .../{include/mbedtls => library}/bn_mul.h | 395 +- thirdparty/mbedtls/library/camellia.c | 70 +- thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ccm.c | 635 +- thirdparty/mbedtls/library/certs.c | 1734 -- thirdparty/mbedtls/library/chacha20.c | 39 +- thirdparty/mbedtls/library/chachapoly.c | 33 - .../mbedtls/library/check_crypto_config.h | 78 +- thirdparty/mbedtls/library/cipher.c | 640 +- thirdparty/mbedtls/library/cipher_wrap.c | 1397 +- .../cipher_wrap.h} | 58 +- thirdparty/mbedtls/library/cmac.c | 100 +- thirdparty/mbedtls/library/common.h | 515 +- thirdparty/mbedtls/library/constant_time.c | 850 +- .../mbedtls/library/constant_time_impl.h | 556 + .../mbedtls/library/constant_time_internal.h | 666 +- .../mbedtls/library/constant_time_invasive.h | 39 - thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ctr.h | 35 + thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ctr_drbg.c | 230 +- thirdparty/mbedtls/library/debug.c | 104 +- thirdparty/mbedtls/library/debug_internal.h | 172 + thirdparty/mbedtls/library/des.c | 18 +- thirdparty/mbedtls/library/dhm.c | 115 +- thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ecdh.c | 63 +- thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ecdsa.c | 238 +- thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ecjpake.c | 267 +- thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ecp.c | 1376 +- thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ecp_curves.c | 4124 ++++- thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ecp_curves_new.c | 6036 +++++++ .../ecp_internal_alt.h} | 10 +- thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ecp_invasive.h | 282 +- thirdparty/mbedtls/library/entropy.c | 148 +- thirdparty/mbedtls/library/entropy_poll.c | 72 +- .../mbedtls => library}/entropy_poll.h | 36 +- thirdparty/mbedtls/library/error.c | 282 +- thirdparty/mbedtls/library/gcm.c | 762 +- .../library/godot_core_mbedtls_platform.c | 1 - thirdparty/mbedtls/library/havege.c | 226 - thirdparty/mbedtls/library/hmac_drbg.c | 39 +- thirdparty/mbedtls/library/lmots.c | 778 + thirdparty/mbedtls/library/lmots.h | 288 + thirdparty/mbedtls/library/lms.c | 761 + thirdparty/mbedtls/library/md.c | 912 +- thirdparty/mbedtls/library/md2.c | 347 - thirdparty/mbedtls/library/md4.c | 451 - thirdparty/mbedtls/library/md5.c | 74 +- thirdparty/mbedtls/library/md_psa.h | 26 + thirdparty/mbedtls/library/md_wrap.h | 46 + .../mbedtls/library/memory_buffer_alloc.c | 6 + thirdparty/mbedtls/library/mps_common.h | 4 +- thirdparty/mbedtls/library/mps_reader.c | 4 +- thirdparty/mbedtls/library/mps_trace.c | 4 +- thirdparty/mbedtls/library/net_sockets.c | 9 +- thirdparty/mbedtls/library/nist_kw.c | 251 +- thirdparty/mbedtls/library/oid.c | 713 +- thirdparty/mbedtls/library/padlock.c | 23 +- .../{include/mbedtls => library}/padlock.h | 26 +- thirdparty/mbedtls/library/pem.c | 139 +- thirdparty/mbedtls/library/pk.c | 1189 +- thirdparty/mbedtls/library/pk_ecc.c | 255 + thirdparty/mbedtls/library/pk_internal.h | 207 + thirdparty/mbedtls/library/pk_wrap.c | 1657 +- .../pk_internal.h => library/pk_wrap.h} | 54 +- thirdparty/mbedtls/library/pkcs11.c | 221 - thirdparty/mbedtls/library/pkcs12.c | 192 +- thirdparty/mbedtls/library/pkcs5.c | 115 +- thirdparty/mbedtls/library/pkcs7.c | 773 + thirdparty/mbedtls/library/pkparse.c | 979 +- thirdparty/mbedtls/library/pkwrite.c | 783 +- thirdparty/mbedtls/library/pkwrite.h | 121 + thirdparty/mbedtls/library/platform.c | 28 + thirdparty/mbedtls/library/platform_util.c | 166 +- thirdparty/mbedtls/library/poly1305.c | 19 - thirdparty/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_aead.h | 499 + .../mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_cipher.h | 316 + thirdparty/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_core.h | 961 ++ .../mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_core_common.h | 52 + .../library/psa_crypto_driver_wrappers.h | 2899 ++++ .../psa_crypto_driver_wrappers_no_static.h | 31 + thirdparty/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_ecp.h | 267 + thirdparty/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_ffdh.h | 131 + thirdparty/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_hash.h | 211 + .../mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_invasive.h | 92 + thirdparty/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_its.h | 131 + thirdparty/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_mac.h | 264 + thirdparty/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_pake.h | 159 + .../mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_random_impl.h | 135 + thirdparty/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_rsa.h | 329 + thirdparty/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_se.h | 192 + .../library/psa_crypto_slot_management.h | 285 + .../mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_storage.h | 385 + .../mbedtls/library/psa_util_internal.h | 100 + thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ripemd160.c | 80 +- thirdparty/mbedtls/library/rsa.c | 1440 +- .../{rsa_internal.c => rsa_alt_helpers.c} | 136 +- .../rsa_alt_helpers.h} | 16 +- thirdparty/mbedtls/library/rsa_internal.h | 121 + thirdparty/mbedtls/library/sha1.c | 107 +- thirdparty/mbedtls/library/sha256.c | 641 +- thirdparty/mbedtls/library/sha3.c | 721 + thirdparty/mbedtls/library/sha512.c | 753 +- thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ssl_cache.c | 423 +- thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ssl_ciphersuites.c | 2185 ++- .../library/ssl_ciphersuites_internal.h | 154 + thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ssl_client.c | 1017 ++ thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ssl_client.h | 22 + thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ssl_cookie.c | 166 +- .../mbedtls/library/ssl_debug_helpers.h | 83 + .../library/ssl_debug_helpers_generated.c | 251 + thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ssl_misc.h | 2983 ++++ thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ssl_msg.c | 2780 +-- thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ssl_ticket.c | 268 +- thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ssl_tls.c | 13941 +++++++++------- .../library/{ssl_cli.c => ssl_tls12_client.c} | 2380 +-- .../library/{ssl_srv.c => ssl_tls12_server.c} | 2515 ++- thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ssl_tls13_client.c | 3181 ++++ .../mbedtls/library/ssl_tls13_generic.c | 1853 ++ .../mbedtls/library/ssl_tls13_invasive.h | 23 + thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ssl_tls13_keys.c | 1826 +- thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ssl_tls13_keys.h | 519 +- thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ssl_tls13_server.c | 3599 ++++ thirdparty/mbedtls/library/threading.c | 38 +- thirdparty/mbedtls/library/timing.c | 437 +- thirdparty/mbedtls/library/version_features.c | 700 +- thirdparty/mbedtls/library/x509.c | 1084 +- thirdparty/mbedtls/library/x509_create.c | 265 +- thirdparty/mbedtls/library/x509_crl.c | 39 +- thirdparty/mbedtls/library/x509_crt.c | 1180 +- thirdparty/mbedtls/library/x509_csr.c | 295 +- thirdparty/mbedtls/library/x509_internal.h | 86 + thirdparty/mbedtls/library/x509write.c | 174 + thirdparty/mbedtls/library/x509write_crt.c | 249 +- thirdparty/mbedtls/library/x509write_csr.c | 53 +- thirdparty/mbedtls/library/xtea.c | 224 - .../mbedtls/patches/no-flexible-arrays.diff | 132 + .../patches/windows-arm64-hardclock.diff | 16 - .../patches/windows-entropy-bcrypt.diff | 56 - 276 files changed, 97293 insertions(+), 38624 deletions(-) delete mode 100644 thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/arc4.h create mode 100644 thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/block_cipher.h delete mode 100644 thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/blowfish.h create mode 100644 thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/build_info.h delete mode 100644 thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/certs.h delete mode 100644 thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/compat-1.3.h create mode 100644 thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/compat-2.x.h create mode 100644 thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/config_adjust_legacy_crypto.h create mode 100644 thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/config_adjust_legacy_from_psa.h create mode 100644 thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/config_adjust_psa_from_legacy.h create mode 100644 thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/config_adjust_psa_superset_legacy.h create mode 100644 thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/config_adjust_ssl.h create mode 100644 thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/config_adjust_x509.h create mode 100644 thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/config_psa.h delete mode 100644 thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/havege.h create mode 100644 thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/lms.h rename thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/{config.h => mbedtls_config.h} (76%) delete mode 100644 thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/md2.h delete mode 100644 thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/md4.h delete mode 100644 thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/md_internal.h delete mode 100644 thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/net.h delete mode 100644 thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/pkcs11.h create mode 100644 thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/pkcs7.h create mode 100644 thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/private_access.h create mode 100644 thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/psa_util.h create mode 100644 thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/sha3.h delete mode 100644 thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/ssl_internal.h delete mode 100644 thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/xtea.h create mode 100644 thirdparty/mbedtls/include/psa/build_info.h create mode 100644 thirdparty/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto.h create mode 100644 thirdparty/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_adjust_auto_enabled.h create mode 100644 thirdparty/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_adjust_config_key_pair_types.h create mode 100644 thirdparty/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_adjust_config_synonyms.h create mode 100644 thirdparty/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_builtin_composites.h create mode 100644 thirdparty/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_builtin_key_derivation.h create mode 100644 thirdparty/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_builtin_primitives.h create mode 100644 thirdparty/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_compat.h create mode 100644 thirdparty/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_config.h create mode 100644 thirdparty/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_driver_common.h create mode 100644 thirdparty/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_driver_contexts_composites.h create mode 100644 thirdparty/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_driver_contexts_key_derivation.h create mode 100644 thirdparty/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_driver_contexts_primitives.h create mode 100644 thirdparty/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_extra.h create mode 100644 thirdparty/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_legacy.h create mode 100644 thirdparty/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_platform.h create mode 100644 thirdparty/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_se_driver.h create mode 100644 thirdparty/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_sizes.h create mode 100644 thirdparty/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_struct.h create mode 100644 thirdparty/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_types.h create mode 100644 thirdparty/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_values.h create mode 100644 thirdparty/mbedtls/library/aesce.c create mode 100644 thirdparty/mbedtls/library/aesce.h rename thirdparty/mbedtls/{include/mbedtls => library}/aesni.h (79%) create mode 100644 thirdparty/mbedtls/library/alignment.h delete mode 100644 thirdparty/mbedtls/library/arc4.c create mode 100644 thirdparty/mbedtls/library/base64_internal.h create mode 100644 thirdparty/mbedtls/library/bignum_core.c create mode 100644 thirdparty/mbedtls/library/bignum_core.h delete mode 100644 thirdparty/mbedtls/library/bignum_internal.h create mode 100644 thirdparty/mbedtls/library/bignum_mod.c create mode 100644 thirdparty/mbedtls/library/bignum_mod.h create mode 100644 thirdparty/mbedtls/library/bignum_mod_raw.c create mode 100644 thirdparty/mbedtls/library/bignum_mod_raw.h create mode 100644 thirdparty/mbedtls/library/bignum_mod_raw_invasive.h create mode 100644 thirdparty/mbedtls/library/block_cipher.c create mode 100644 thirdparty/mbedtls/library/block_cipher_internal.h delete mode 100644 thirdparty/mbedtls/library/blowfish.c rename thirdparty/mbedtls/{include/mbedtls => library}/bn_mul.h (75%) delete mode 100644 thirdparty/mbedtls/library/certs.c rename thirdparty/mbedtls/{include/mbedtls/cipher_internal.h => library/cipher_wrap.h} (67%) create mode 100644 thirdparty/mbedtls/library/constant_time_impl.h delete mode 100644 thirdparty/mbedtls/library/constant_time_invasive.h create mode 100644 thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ctr.h create mode 100644 thirdparty/mbedtls/library/debug_internal.h create mode 100644 thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ecp_curves_new.c rename thirdparty/mbedtls/{include/mbedtls/ecp_internal.h => library/ecp_internal_alt.h} (98%) rename thirdparty/mbedtls/{include/mbedtls => library}/entropy_poll.h (58%) delete mode 100644 thirdparty/mbedtls/library/havege.c create mode 100644 thirdparty/mbedtls/library/lmots.c create mode 100644 thirdparty/mbedtls/library/lmots.h create mode 100644 thirdparty/mbedtls/library/lms.c delete mode 100644 thirdparty/mbedtls/library/md2.c delete mode 100644 thirdparty/mbedtls/library/md4.c create mode 100644 thirdparty/mbedtls/library/md_psa.h create mode 100644 thirdparty/mbedtls/library/md_wrap.h rename thirdparty/mbedtls/{include/mbedtls => library}/padlock.h (85%) create mode 100644 thirdparty/mbedtls/library/pk_ecc.c create mode 100644 thirdparty/mbedtls/library/pk_internal.h rename thirdparty/mbedtls/{include/mbedtls/pk_internal.h => library/pk_wrap.h} (65%) delete mode 100644 thirdparty/mbedtls/library/pkcs11.c create mode 100644 thirdparty/mbedtls/library/pkcs7.c create mode 100644 thirdparty/mbedtls/library/pkwrite.h create mode 100644 thirdparty/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_aead.h create mode 100644 thirdparty/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_cipher.h create mode 100644 thirdparty/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_core.h create mode 100644 thirdparty/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_core_common.h create mode 100644 thirdparty/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_driver_wrappers.h create mode 100644 thirdparty/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_driver_wrappers_no_static.h create mode 100644 thirdparty/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_ecp.h create mode 100644 thirdparty/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_ffdh.h create mode 100644 thirdparty/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_hash.h create mode 100644 thirdparty/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_invasive.h create mode 100644 thirdparty/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_its.h create mode 100644 thirdparty/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_mac.h create mode 100644 thirdparty/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_pake.h create mode 100644 thirdparty/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_random_impl.h create mode 100644 thirdparty/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_rsa.h create mode 100644 thirdparty/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_se.h create mode 100644 thirdparty/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_slot_management.h create mode 100644 thirdparty/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_storage.h create mode 100644 thirdparty/mbedtls/library/psa_util_internal.h rename thirdparty/mbedtls/library/{rsa_internal.c => rsa_alt_helpers.c} (99%) rename thirdparty/mbedtls/{include/mbedtls/rsa_internal.h => library/rsa_alt_helpers.h} (97%) create mode 100644 thirdparty/mbedtls/library/rsa_internal.h create mode 100644 thirdparty/mbedtls/library/sha3.c create mode 100644 thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ssl_ciphersuites_internal.h create mode 100644 thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ssl_client.c create mode 100644 thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ssl_client.h create mode 100644 thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ssl_debug_helpers.h create mode 100644 thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ssl_debug_helpers_generated.c create mode 100644 thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ssl_misc.h rename thirdparty/mbedtls/library/{ssl_cli.c => ssl_tls12_client.c} (65%) rename thirdparty/mbedtls/library/{ssl_srv.c => ssl_tls12_server.c} (69%) create mode 100644 thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ssl_tls13_client.c create mode 100644 thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ssl_tls13_generic.c create mode 100644 thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ssl_tls13_invasive.h create mode 100644 thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ssl_tls13_server.c create mode 100644 thirdparty/mbedtls/library/x509_internal.h create mode 100644 thirdparty/mbedtls/library/x509write.c delete mode 100644 thirdparty/mbedtls/library/xtea.c create mode 100644 thirdparty/mbedtls/patches/no-flexible-arrays.diff delete mode 100644 thirdparty/mbedtls/patches/windows-arm64-hardclock.diff delete mode 100644 thirdparty/mbedtls/patches/windows-entropy-bcrypt.diff diff --git a/core/crypto/SCsub b/core/crypto/SCsub index a6defdfdabc1..8cff3cf679cb 100644 --- a/core/crypto/SCsub +++ b/core/crypto/SCsub @@ -34,6 +34,7 @@ if not has_module: "constant_time.c", "ctr_drbg.c", "entropy.c", + "md.c", "md5.c", "sha1.c", "sha256.c", diff --git a/core/crypto/crypto_core.cpp b/core/crypto/crypto_core.cpp index 17b34c08e2b0..69a83284cc0c 100644 --- a/core/crypto/crypto_core.cpp +++ b/core/crypto/crypto_core.cpp @@ -39,6 +39,9 @@ #include #include #include +#if MBEDTLS_VERSION_MAJOR >= 3 +#include +#endif // RandomGenerator CryptoCore::RandomGenerator::RandomGenerator() { diff --git a/modules/mbedtls/SCsub b/modules/mbedtls/SCsub index 04d26f994240..90ce98c751cf 100644 --- a/modules/mbedtls/SCsub +++ b/modules/mbedtls/SCsub @@ -12,24 +12,24 @@ thirdparty_obj = [] if env["builtin_mbedtls"]: thirdparty_sources = [ "aes.c", + "aesce.c", "aesni.c", - "arc4.c", "aria.c", "asn1parse.c", "asn1write.c", "base64.c", "bignum.c", - "blowfish.c", + "bignum_core.c", + "bignum_mod_raw.c", "camellia.c", "ccm.c", - "certs.c", "chacha20.c", "chachapoly.c", "cipher.c", "cipher_wrap.c", "cmac.c", - "ctr_drbg.c", "constant_time.c", + "ctr_drbg.c", "debug.c", "des.c", "dhm.c", @@ -42,13 +42,10 @@ if env["builtin_mbedtls"]: "entropy_poll.c", "error.c", "gcm.c", - "havege.c", "hkdf.c", "hmac_drbg.c", - "md2.c", - "md4.c", - "md5.c", "md.c", + "md5.c", "memory_buffer_alloc.c", "mps_reader.c", "mps_trace.c", @@ -58,30 +55,37 @@ if env["builtin_mbedtls"]: "padlock.c", "pem.c", "pk.c", - "pkcs11.c", + "pk_ecc.c", + "pk_wrap.c", "pkcs12.c", "pkcs5.c", + "pkcs7.c", "pkparse.c", - "pk_wrap.c", "pkwrite.c", "platform.c", "platform_util.c", "poly1305.c", "ripemd160.c", "rsa.c", - "rsa_internal.c", + "rsa_alt_helpers.c", "sha1.c", + "sha3.c", "sha256.c", "sha512.c", "ssl_cache.c", "ssl_ciphersuites.c", - "ssl_cli.c", + "ssl_client.c", "ssl_cookie.c", + "ssl_debug_helpers_generated.c", "ssl_msg.c", - "ssl_srv.c", "ssl_ticket.c", "ssl_tls.c", + "ssl_tls12_client.c", + "ssl_tls12_server.c", + "ssl_tls13_client.c", + "ssl_tls13_generic.c", "ssl_tls13_keys.c", + "ssl_tls13_server.c", "threading.c", "timing.c", "version.c", @@ -91,9 +95,9 @@ if env["builtin_mbedtls"]: "x509_crl.c", "x509_crt.c", "x509_csr.c", + "x509write.c", "x509write_crt.c", "x509write_csr.c", - "xtea.c", ] thirdparty_dir = "#thirdparty/mbedtls/library/" diff --git a/modules/mbedtls/crypto_mbedtls.cpp b/modules/mbedtls/crypto_mbedtls.cpp index 859278d65e70..e910627b3248 100644 --- a/modules/mbedtls/crypto_mbedtls.cpp +++ b/modules/mbedtls/crypto_mbedtls.cpp @@ -69,7 +69,7 @@ Error CryptoKeyMbedTLS::load(const String &p_path, bool p_public_only) { if (p_public_only) { ret = mbedtls_pk_parse_public_key(&pkey, out.ptr(), out.size()); } else { - ret = mbedtls_pk_parse_key(&pkey, out.ptr(), out.size(), nullptr, 0); + ret = _parse_key(out.ptr(), out.size()); } // We MUST zeroize the memory for safety! mbedtls_platform_zeroize(out.ptrw(), out.size()); @@ -108,7 +108,7 @@ Error CryptoKeyMbedTLS::load_from_string(const String &p_string_key, bool p_publ if (p_public_only) { ret = mbedtls_pk_parse_public_key(&pkey, (unsigned char *)p_string_key.utf8().get_data(), p_string_key.utf8().size()); } else { - ret = mbedtls_pk_parse_key(&pkey, (unsigned char *)p_string_key.utf8().get_data(), p_string_key.utf8().size(), nullptr, 0); + ret = _parse_key((unsigned char *)p_string_key.utf8().get_data(), p_string_key.utf8().size()); } ERR_FAIL_COND_V_MSG(ret, FAILED, "Error parsing key '" + itos(ret) + "'."); @@ -134,6 +134,25 @@ String CryptoKeyMbedTLS::save_to_string(bool p_public_only) { return s; } +int CryptoKeyMbedTLS::_parse_key(const uint8_t *p_buf, int p_size) { +#if MBEDTLS_VERSION_MAJOR >= 3 + mbedtls_entropy_context rng_entropy; + mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context rng_drbg; + + mbedtls_ctr_drbg_init(&rng_drbg); + mbedtls_entropy_init(&rng_entropy); + int ret = mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed(&rng_drbg, mbedtls_entropy_func, &rng_entropy, nullptr, 0); + ERR_FAIL_COND_V_MSG(ret != 0, ret, vformat("mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed returned -0x%x\n", (unsigned int)-ret)); + + ret = mbedtls_pk_parse_key(&pkey, p_buf, p_size, nullptr, 0, mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random, &rng_drbg); + mbedtls_ctr_drbg_free(&rng_drbg); + mbedtls_entropy_free(&rng_entropy); + return ret; +#else + return mbedtls_pk_parse_key(&pkey, p_buf, p_size, nullptr, 0); +#endif +} + X509Certificate *X509CertificateMbedTLS::create() { return memnew(X509CertificateMbedTLS); } @@ -393,12 +412,17 @@ Ref CryptoMbedTLS::generate_self_signed_certificate(Ref= 3 + mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_serial_raw(&crt, rand_serial, sizeof(rand_serial)); +#else mbedtls_mpi serial; mbedtls_mpi_init(&serial); - uint8_t rand_serial[20]; - mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random(&ctr_drbg, rand_serial, 20); - ERR_FAIL_COND_V(mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(&serial, rand_serial, 20), nullptr); + ERR_FAIL_COND_V(mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(&serial, rand_serial, sizeof(rand_serial)), nullptr); mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_serial(&crt, &serial); +#endif mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_validity(&crt, p_not_before.utf8().get_data(), p_not_after.utf8().get_data()); mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_basic_constraints(&crt, 1, -1); @@ -407,7 +431,9 @@ Ref CryptoMbedTLS::generate_self_signed_certificate(Ref CryptoMbedTLS::sign(HashingContext::HashType p_hash_type, const ERR_FAIL_COND_V_MSG(!key.is_valid(), Vector(), "Invalid key provided."); ERR_FAIL_COND_V_MSG(key->is_public_only(), Vector(), "Invalid key provided. Cannot sign with public_only keys."); size_t sig_size = 0; +#if MBEDTLS_VERSION_MAJOR >= 3 + unsigned char buf[MBEDTLS_PK_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE]; +#else unsigned char buf[MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE]; +#endif Vector out; - int ret = mbedtls_pk_sign(&(key->pkey), type, p_hash.ptr(), size, buf, &sig_size, mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random, &ctr_drbg); + int ret = mbedtls_pk_sign(&(key->pkey), type, p_hash.ptr(), size, buf, +#if MBEDTLS_VERSION_MAJOR >= 3 + sizeof(buf), +#endif + &sig_size, mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random, &ctr_drbg); ERR_FAIL_COND_V_MSG(ret, out, "Error while signing: " + itos(ret)); out.resize(sig_size); memcpy(out.ptrw(), buf, sig_size); diff --git a/modules/mbedtls/crypto_mbedtls.h b/modules/mbedtls/crypto_mbedtls.h index 60a413ed7c9c..52918cedf036 100644 --- a/modules/mbedtls/crypto_mbedtls.h +++ b/modules/mbedtls/crypto_mbedtls.h @@ -46,6 +46,8 @@ class CryptoKeyMbedTLS : public CryptoKey { int locks = 0; bool public_only = true; + int _parse_key(const uint8_t *p_buf, int p_size); + public: static CryptoKey *create(); static void make_default() { CryptoKey::_create = create; } diff --git a/modules/mbedtls/tls_context_mbedtls.h b/modules/mbedtls/tls_context_mbedtls.h index 29323688fba2..b8a9e80b9fc6 100644 --- a/modules/mbedtls/tls_context_mbedtls.h +++ b/modules/mbedtls/tls_context_mbedtls.h @@ -36,7 +36,6 @@ #include "core/io/file_access.h" #include "core/object/ref_counted.h" -#include #include #include #include diff --git a/thirdparty/README.md b/thirdparty/README.md index 5ecbffac13a4..dab3c9c04a5e 100644 --- a/thirdparty/README.md +++ b/thirdparty/README.md @@ -520,18 +520,18 @@ in the MSVC debugger. ## mbedtls - Upstream: https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls -- Version: 2.28.8 (5a764e5555c64337ed17444410269ff21cb617b1, 2024) +- Version: 3.6.0 (2ca6c285a0dd3f33982dd57299012dacab1ff206, 2024) - License: Apache 2.0 File extracted from upstream release tarball: - All `.h` from `include/mbedtls/` to `thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/` - except `config_psa.h` and `psa_util.h` + and all `.h` from `include/psa/` to `thirdparty/mbedtls/include/psa/` - All `.c` and `.h` from `library/` to `thirdparty/mbedtls/library/` except - those starting with `psa_*` + for the `psa_*.c` source files - The `LICENSE` file (edited to keep only the Apache 2.0 variant) -- Applied the patch `windows-arm64-hardclock.diff` to fix Windows ARM64 build - Applied the patch `windows-entropy-bcrypt.diff` to fix Windows Store support +- Applied the patch `no-flexible-arrays.diff` to fix Windows build (see + upstream GH-9020) - Added 2 files `godot_core_mbedtls_platform.c` and `godot_core_mbedtls_config.h` providing configuration for light bundling with core - Added the file `godot_module_mbedtls_config.h` to customize the build diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/godot_module_mbedtls_config.h b/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/godot_module_mbedtls_config.h index c35f1580410a..aed276766fd6 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/godot_module_mbedtls_config.h +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/godot_module_mbedtls_config.h @@ -41,18 +41,34 @@ #else // Include default mbedTLS config. -#include +#include // Disable weak cryptography. #undef MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED #undef MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED -#undef MBEDTLS_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING -#undef MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 -#undef MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 -#undef MBEDTLS_ARC4_C #undef MBEDTLS_DES_C #undef MBEDTLS_DHM_C +#ifndef __linux__ +// ARMv8 hardware AES operations. Detection only possible on linux. +#undef MBEDTLS_AESCE_C +#endif + +// Disable deprecated +#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED + +// mbedTLS 3.6 finally enabled TLSv1.3 by default, but it requires some mobule +// changes, and to enable PSA crypto (new "standard" API specification). +// Disable it for now. +#undef MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 + +// Disable PSA Crypto. +#undef MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG +#undef MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C +#undef MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C +#undef MBEDTLS_PSA_ITS_FILE_C +#undef MBEDTLS_LMS_C + #endif // GODOT_MBEDTLS_INCLUDE_H #endif // GODOT_MODULE_MBEDTLS_CONFIG_H diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/aes.h b/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/aes.h index 2623a42fed6f..d5eb1fd5c2c1 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/aes.h +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/aes.h @@ -27,12 +27,9 @@ #ifndef MBEDTLS_AES_H #define MBEDTLS_AES_H +#include "mbedtls/private_access.h" -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "mbedtls/build_info.h" #include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" #include @@ -52,19 +49,6 @@ /** Invalid input data. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_BAD_INPUT_DATA -0x0021 -/* MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE is deprecated and should not be used. */ -/** Feature not available. For example, an unsupported AES key size. */ -#define MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE -0x0023 - -/* MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_HW_ACCEL_FAILED is deprecated and should not be used. */ -/** AES hardware accelerator failed. */ -#define MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_HW_ACCEL_FAILED -0x0025 - -#if (defined(__ARMCC_VERSION) || defined(_MSC_VER)) && \ - !defined(inline) && !defined(__cplusplus) -#define inline __inline -#endif - #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { #endif @@ -77,16 +61,22 @@ extern "C" { * \brief The AES context-type definition. */ typedef struct mbedtls_aes_context { - int nr; /*!< The number of rounds. */ - uint32_t *rk; /*!< AES round keys. */ - uint32_t buf[68]; /*!< Unaligned data buffer. This buffer can - hold 32 extra Bytes, which can be used for - one of the following purposes: -
  • Alignment if VIA padlock is - used.
    • -
  • Simplifying key expansion in the 256-bit - case by generating an extra round key. -
*/ + int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(nr); /*!< The number of rounds. */ + size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(rk_offset); /*!< The offset in array elements to AES + round keys in the buffer. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_C) + uint32_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(buf)[44]; /*!< Aligned data buffer to hold + 10 round keys for 128-bit case. */ +#else + uint32_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(buf)[68]; /*!< Unaligned data buffer. This buffer can + hold 32 extra Bytes, which can be used for + one of the following purposes: +
  • Alignment if VIA padlock is + used.
    • +
  • Simplifying key expansion in the 256-bit + case by generating an extra round key. +
*/ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH && !MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_C */ } mbedtls_aes_context; @@ -95,10 +85,10 @@ mbedtls_aes_context; * \brief The AES XTS context-type definition. */ typedef struct mbedtls_aes_xts_context { - mbedtls_aes_context crypt; /*!< The AES context to use for AES block - encryption or decryption. */ - mbedtls_aes_context tweak; /*!< The AES context used for tweak - computation. */ + mbedtls_aes_context MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(crypt); /*!< The AES context to use for AES block + encryption or decryption. */ + mbedtls_aes_context MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(tweak); /*!< The AES context used for tweak + computation. */ } mbedtls_aes_xts_context; #endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS */ @@ -165,6 +155,7 @@ MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_TYPICAL int mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc(mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, const unsigned char *key, unsigned int keybits); +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT) /** * \brief This function sets the decryption key. * @@ -183,6 +174,7 @@ int mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc(mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, const unsigned char *key, MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_TYPICAL int mbedtls_aes_setkey_dec(mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, const unsigned char *key, unsigned int keybits); +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS) /** @@ -602,6 +594,7 @@ int mbedtls_internal_aes_encrypt(mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, const unsigned char input[16], unsigned char output[16]); +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT) /** * \brief Internal AES block decryption function. This is only * exposed to allow overriding it using see @@ -617,44 +610,7 @@ MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_TYPICAL int mbedtls_internal_aes_decrypt(mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, const unsigned char input[16], unsigned char output[16]); - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING) -#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED __attribute__((deprecated)) -#else -#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED -#endif -/** - * \brief Deprecated internal AES block encryption function - * without return value. - * - * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_internal_aes_encrypt() - * - * \param ctx The AES context to use for encryption. - * \param input Plaintext block. - * \param output Output (ciphertext) block. - */ -MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_aes_encrypt(mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, - const unsigned char input[16], - unsigned char output[16]); - -/** - * \brief Deprecated internal AES block decryption function - * without return value. - * - * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_internal_aes_decrypt() - * - * \param ctx The AES context to use for decryption. - * \param input Ciphertext block. - * \param output Output (plaintext) block. - */ -MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_aes_decrypt(mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, - const unsigned char input[16], - unsigned char output[16]); - -#undef MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED -#endif /* !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ - +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) /** diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/arc4.h b/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/arc4.h deleted file mode 100644 index 1f813aa6bb6d..000000000000 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/arc4.h +++ /dev/null @@ -1,132 +0,0 @@ -/** - * \file arc4.h - * - * \brief The ARCFOUR stream cipher - * - * \warning ARC4 is considered a weak cipher and its use constitutes a - * security risk. We recommend considering stronger ciphers instead. - */ -/* - * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later - * - */ -#ifndef MBEDTLS_ARC4_H -#define MBEDTLS_ARC4_H - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif - -#include - -/* MBEDTLS_ERR_ARC4_HW_ACCEL_FAILED is deprecated and should not be used. */ -/** ARC4 hardware accelerator failed. */ -#define MBEDTLS_ERR_ARC4_HW_ACCEL_FAILED -0x0019 - -#ifdef __cplusplus -extern "C" { -#endif - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ARC4_ALT) -// Regular implementation -// - -/** - * \brief ARC4 context structure - * - * \warning ARC4 is considered a weak cipher and its use constitutes a - * security risk. We recommend considering stronger ciphers instead. - * - */ -typedef struct mbedtls_arc4_context { - int x; /*!< permutation index */ - int y; /*!< permutation index */ - unsigned char m[256]; /*!< permutation table */ -} -mbedtls_arc4_context; - -#else /* MBEDTLS_ARC4_ALT */ -#include "arc4_alt.h" -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ARC4_ALT */ - -/** - * \brief Initialize ARC4 context - * - * \param ctx ARC4 context to be initialized - * - * \warning ARC4 is considered a weak cipher and its use constitutes a - * security risk. We recommend considering stronger ciphers - * instead. - * - */ -void mbedtls_arc4_init(mbedtls_arc4_context *ctx); - -/** - * \brief Clear ARC4 context - * - * \param ctx ARC4 context to be cleared - * - * \warning ARC4 is considered a weak cipher and its use constitutes a - * security risk. We recommend considering stronger ciphers - * instead. - * - */ -void mbedtls_arc4_free(mbedtls_arc4_context *ctx); - -/** - * \brief ARC4 key schedule - * - * \param ctx ARC4 context to be setup - * \param key the secret key - * \param keylen length of the key, in bytes - * - * \warning ARC4 is considered a weak cipher and its use constitutes a - * security risk. We recommend considering stronger ciphers - * instead. - * - */ -void mbedtls_arc4_setup(mbedtls_arc4_context *ctx, const unsigned char *key, - unsigned int keylen); - -/** - * \brief ARC4 cipher function - * - * \param ctx ARC4 context - * \param length length of the input data - * \param input buffer holding the input data - * \param output buffer for the output data - * - * \return 0 if successful - * - * \warning ARC4 is considered a weak cipher and its use constitutes a - * security risk. We recommend considering stronger ciphers - * instead. - * - */ -int mbedtls_arc4_crypt(mbedtls_arc4_context *ctx, size_t length, const unsigned char *input, - unsigned char *output); - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) - -/** - * \brief Checkup routine - * - * \return 0 if successful, or 1 if the test failed - * - * \warning ARC4 is considered a weak cipher and its use constitutes a - * security risk. We recommend considering stronger ciphers - * instead. - * - */ -int mbedtls_arc4_self_test(int verbose); - -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ - -#ifdef __cplusplus -} -#endif - -#endif /* arc4.h */ diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/aria.h b/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/aria.h index e360aa64c1e4..c685fc314127 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/aria.h +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/aria.h @@ -16,12 +16,9 @@ #ifndef MBEDTLS_ARIA_H #define MBEDTLS_ARIA_H +#include "mbedtls/private_access.h" -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "mbedtls/build_info.h" #include #include @@ -35,24 +32,12 @@ #define MBEDTLS_ARIA_MAX_ROUNDS 16 /**< Maximum number of rounds in ARIA. */ #define MBEDTLS_ARIA_MAX_KEYSIZE 32 /**< Maximum size of an ARIA key in bytes. */ -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) -#define MBEDTLS_ERR_ARIA_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_NUMERIC_CONSTANT(-0x005C) -#endif /* !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ /** Bad input data. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_ARIA_BAD_INPUT_DATA -0x005C /** Invalid data input length. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_ARIA_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH -0x005E -/* MBEDTLS_ERR_ARIA_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE is deprecated and should not be used. - */ -/** Feature not available. For example, an unsupported ARIA key size. */ -#define MBEDTLS_ERR_ARIA_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE -0x005A - -/* MBEDTLS_ERR_ARIA_HW_ACCEL_FAILED is deprecated and should not be used. */ -/** ARIA hardware accelerator failed. */ -#define MBEDTLS_ERR_ARIA_HW_ACCEL_FAILED -0x0058 - #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { #endif @@ -65,9 +50,9 @@ extern "C" { * \brief The ARIA context-type definition. */ typedef struct mbedtls_aria_context { - unsigned char nr; /*!< The number of rounds (12, 14 or 16) */ + unsigned char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(nr); /*!< The number of rounds (12, 14 or 16) */ /*! The ARIA round keys. */ - uint32_t rk[MBEDTLS_ARIA_MAX_ROUNDS + 1][MBEDTLS_ARIA_BLOCKSIZE / 4]; + uint32_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(rk)[MBEDTLS_ARIA_MAX_ROUNDS + 1][MBEDTLS_ARIA_BLOCKSIZE / 4]; } mbedtls_aria_context; @@ -113,6 +98,7 @@ int mbedtls_aria_setkey_enc(mbedtls_aria_context *ctx, const unsigned char *key, unsigned int keybits); +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT) /** * \brief This function sets the decryption key. * @@ -131,6 +117,7 @@ int mbedtls_aria_setkey_enc(mbedtls_aria_context *ctx, int mbedtls_aria_setkey_dec(mbedtls_aria_context *ctx, const unsigned char *key, unsigned int keybits); +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT */ /** * \brief This function performs an ARIA single-block encryption or diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/asn1.h b/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/asn1.h index c676fd3662cd..ff019f432a3f 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/asn1.h +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/asn1.h @@ -9,12 +9,10 @@ */ #ifndef MBEDTLS_ASN1_H #define MBEDTLS_ASN1_H +#include "mbedtls/private_access.h" -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "mbedtls/build_info.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" #include @@ -29,8 +27,9 @@ /** * \name ASN1 Error codes - * These error codes are OR'ed to X509 error codes for + * These error codes are combined with other error codes for * higher error granularity. + * e.g. X.509 and PKCS #7 error codes * ASN1 is a standard to specify data structures. * \{ */ @@ -85,15 +84,14 @@ /* Slightly smaller way to check if tag is a string tag * compared to canonical implementation. */ -#define MBEDTLS_ASN1_IS_STRING_TAG(tag) \ - ((tag) < 32u && ( \ +#define MBEDTLS_ASN1_IS_STRING_TAG(tag) \ + ((unsigned int) (tag) < 32u && ( \ ((1u << (tag)) & ((1u << MBEDTLS_ASN1_BMP_STRING) | \ (1u << MBEDTLS_ASN1_UTF8_STRING) | \ (1u << MBEDTLS_ASN1_T61_STRING) | \ (1u << MBEDTLS_ASN1_IA5_STRING) | \ (1u << MBEDTLS_ASN1_UNIVERSAL_STRING) | \ - (1u << MBEDTLS_ASN1_PRINTABLE_STRING) | \ - (1u << MBEDTLS_ASN1_BIT_STRING))) != 0)) + (1u << MBEDTLS_ASN1_PRINTABLE_STRING))) != 0)) /* * Bit masks for each of the components of an ASN.1 tag as specified in @@ -162,7 +160,15 @@ mbedtls_asn1_bitstring; */ typedef struct mbedtls_asn1_sequence { mbedtls_asn1_buf buf; /**< Buffer containing the given ASN.1 item. */ - struct mbedtls_asn1_sequence *next; /**< The next entry in the sequence. */ + + /** The next entry in the sequence. + * + * The details of memory management for sequences are not documented and + * may change in future versions. Set this field to \p NULL when + * initializing a structure, and do not modify it except via Mbed TLS + * library functions. + */ + struct mbedtls_asn1_sequence *next; } mbedtls_asn1_sequence; @@ -172,11 +178,27 @@ mbedtls_asn1_sequence; typedef struct mbedtls_asn1_named_data { mbedtls_asn1_buf oid; /**< The object identifier. */ mbedtls_asn1_buf val; /**< The named value. */ - struct mbedtls_asn1_named_data *next; /**< The next entry in the sequence. */ - unsigned char next_merged; /**< Merge next item into the current one? */ + + /** The next entry in the sequence. + * + * The details of memory management for named data sequences are not + * documented and may change in future versions. Set this field to \p NULL + * when initializing a structure, and do not modify it except via Mbed TLS + * library functions. + */ + struct mbedtls_asn1_named_data *next; + + /** Merge next item into the current one? + * + * This field exists for the sake of Mbed TLS's X.509 certificate parsing + * code and may change in future versions of the library. + */ + unsigned char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(next_merged); } mbedtls_asn1_named_data; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CREATE_C) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_UTIL_HAVE_ECDSA) /** * \brief Get the length of an ASN.1 element. * Updates the pointer to immediately behind the length. @@ -223,7 +245,9 @@ int mbedtls_asn1_get_len(unsigned char **p, int mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, size_t *len, int tag); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C || MBEDTLS_X509_CREATE_C || MBEDTLS_PSA_UTIL_HAVE_ECDSA */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C) /** * \brief Retrieve a boolean ASN.1 tag and its value. * Updates the pointer to immediately behind the full tag. @@ -568,31 +592,49 @@ int mbedtls_asn1_get_alg_null(unsigned char **p, * * \return NULL if not found, or a pointer to the existing entry. */ -mbedtls_asn1_named_data *mbedtls_asn1_find_named_data(mbedtls_asn1_named_data *list, - const char *oid, size_t len); +const mbedtls_asn1_named_data *mbedtls_asn1_find_named_data(const mbedtls_asn1_named_data *list, + const char *oid, size_t len); +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) /** * \brief Free a mbedtls_asn1_named_data entry * + * \deprecated This function is deprecated and will be removed in a + * future version of the library. + * Please use mbedtls_asn1_free_named_data_list() + * or mbedtls_asn1_free_named_data_list_shallow(). + * * \param entry The named data entry to free. * This function calls mbedtls_free() on * `entry->oid.p` and `entry->val.p`. */ -void mbedtls_asn1_free_named_data(mbedtls_asn1_named_data *entry); +void MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED mbedtls_asn1_free_named_data(mbedtls_asn1_named_data *entry); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ /** * \brief Free all entries in a mbedtls_asn1_named_data list. * * \param head Pointer to the head of the list of named data entries to free. - * This function calls mbedtls_asn1_free_named_data() and - * mbedtls_free() on each list element and - * sets \c *head to \c NULL. + * This function calls mbedtls_free() on + * `entry->oid.p` and `entry->val.p` and then on `entry` + * for each list entry, and sets \c *head to \c NULL. */ void mbedtls_asn1_free_named_data_list(mbedtls_asn1_named_data **head); +/** + * \brief Free all shallow entries in a mbedtls_asn1_named_data list, + * but do not free internal pointer targets. + * + * \param name Head of the list of named data entries to free. + * This function calls mbedtls_free() on each list element. + */ +void mbedtls_asn1_free_named_data_list_shallow(mbedtls_asn1_named_data *name); + /** \} name Functions to parse ASN.1 data structures */ /** \} addtogroup asn1_module */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C */ + #ifdef __cplusplus } #endif diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/asn1write.h b/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/asn1write.h index a12bf039befc..0c5a85ac27f9 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/asn1write.h +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/asn1write.h @@ -10,11 +10,7 @@ #ifndef MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_H #define MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_H -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "mbedtls/build_info.h" #include "mbedtls/asn1.h" @@ -27,10 +23,21 @@ (g) += ret; \ } while (0) +#define MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_CLEANUP_ADD(g, f) \ + do \ + { \ + if ((ret = (f)) < 0) \ + goto cleanup; \ + else \ + (g) += ret; \ + } while (0) + #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { #endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_UTIL_HAVE_ECDSA) /** * \brief Write a length field in ASN.1 format. * @@ -43,7 +50,7 @@ extern "C" { * \return The number of bytes written to \p p on success. * \return A negative \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_XXX error code on failure. */ -int mbedtls_asn1_write_len(unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, +int mbedtls_asn1_write_len(unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *start, size_t len); /** * \brief Write an ASN.1 tag in ASN.1 format. @@ -57,9 +64,11 @@ int mbedtls_asn1_write_len(unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, * \return The number of bytes written to \p p on success. * \return A negative \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_XXX error code on failure. */ -int mbedtls_asn1_write_tag(unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, +int mbedtls_asn1_write_tag(unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *start, unsigned char tag); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_C || MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C || MBEDTLS_PSA_UTIL_HAVE_ECDSA*/ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_C) /** * \brief Write raw buffer data. * @@ -73,7 +82,7 @@ int mbedtls_asn1_write_tag(unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, * \return The number of bytes written to \p p on success. * \return A negative \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_XXX error code on failure. */ -int mbedtls_asn1_write_raw_buffer(unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, +int mbedtls_asn1_write_raw_buffer(unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *start, const unsigned char *buf, size_t size); #if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) @@ -91,7 +100,7 @@ int mbedtls_asn1_write_raw_buffer(unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, * \return The number of bytes written to \p p on success. * \return A negative \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_XXX error code on failure. */ -int mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi(unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, +int mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi(unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *start, const mbedtls_mpi *X); #endif /* MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C */ @@ -107,7 +116,7 @@ int mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi(unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, * \return The number of bytes written to \p p on success. * \return A negative \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_XXX error code on failure. */ -int mbedtls_asn1_write_null(unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start); +int mbedtls_asn1_write_null(unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *start); /** * \brief Write an OID tag (#MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID) and data @@ -123,7 +132,7 @@ int mbedtls_asn1_write_null(unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start); * \return The number of bytes written to \p p on success. * \return A negative \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_XXX error code on failure. */ -int mbedtls_asn1_write_oid(unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, +int mbedtls_asn1_write_oid(unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *start, const char *oid, size_t oid_len); /** @@ -142,7 +151,7 @@ int mbedtls_asn1_write_oid(unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, * \return A negative \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_XXX error code on failure. */ int mbedtls_asn1_write_algorithm_identifier(unsigned char **p, - unsigned char *start, + const unsigned char *start, const char *oid, size_t oid_len, size_t par_len); @@ -163,7 +172,7 @@ int mbedtls_asn1_write_algorithm_identifier(unsigned char **p, * \return A negative \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_XXX error code on failure. */ int mbedtls_asn1_write_algorithm_identifier_ext(unsigned char **p, - unsigned char *start, + const unsigned char *start, const char *oid, size_t oid_len, size_t par_len, int has_par); @@ -180,7 +189,7 @@ int mbedtls_asn1_write_algorithm_identifier_ext(unsigned char **p, * \return The number of bytes written to \p p on success. * \return A negative \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_XXX error code on failure. */ -int mbedtls_asn1_write_bool(unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, +int mbedtls_asn1_write_bool(unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *start, int boolean); /** @@ -197,7 +206,7 @@ int mbedtls_asn1_write_bool(unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, * \return The number of bytes written to \p p on success. * \return A negative \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_XXX error code on failure. */ -int mbedtls_asn1_write_int(unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, int val); +int mbedtls_asn1_write_int(unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *start, int val); /** * \brief Write an enum tag (#MBEDTLS_ASN1_ENUMERATED) and value @@ -212,7 +221,7 @@ int mbedtls_asn1_write_int(unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, int val); * \return The number of bytes written to \p p on success. * \return A negative \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_XXX error code on failure. */ -int mbedtls_asn1_write_enum(unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, int val); +int mbedtls_asn1_write_enum(unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *start, int val); /** * \brief Write a string in ASN.1 format using a specific @@ -231,7 +240,7 @@ int mbedtls_asn1_write_enum(unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, int val); * \return The number of bytes written to \p p on success. * \return A negative error code on failure. */ -int mbedtls_asn1_write_tagged_string(unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, +int mbedtls_asn1_write_tagged_string(unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *start, int tag, const char *text, size_t text_len); @@ -251,7 +260,7 @@ int mbedtls_asn1_write_tagged_string(unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, * \return A negative error code on failure. */ int mbedtls_asn1_write_printable_string(unsigned char **p, - unsigned char *start, + const unsigned char *start, const char *text, size_t text_len); /** @@ -269,7 +278,7 @@ int mbedtls_asn1_write_printable_string(unsigned char **p, * \return The number of bytes written to \p p on success. * \return A negative error code on failure. */ -int mbedtls_asn1_write_utf8_string(unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, +int mbedtls_asn1_write_utf8_string(unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *start, const char *text, size_t text_len); /** @@ -287,7 +296,7 @@ int mbedtls_asn1_write_utf8_string(unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, * \return The number of bytes written to \p p on success. * \return A negative error code on failure. */ -int mbedtls_asn1_write_ia5_string(unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, +int mbedtls_asn1_write_ia5_string(unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *start, const char *text, size_t text_len); /** @@ -304,7 +313,7 @@ int mbedtls_asn1_write_ia5_string(unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, * \return The number of bytes written to \p p on success. * \return A negative error code on failure. */ -int mbedtls_asn1_write_bitstring(unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, +int mbedtls_asn1_write_bitstring(unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *start, const unsigned char *buf, size_t bits); /** @@ -325,7 +334,7 @@ int mbedtls_asn1_write_bitstring(unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, * \return A negative error code on failure. */ int mbedtls_asn1_write_named_bitstring(unsigned char **p, - unsigned char *start, + const unsigned char *start, const unsigned char *buf, size_t bits); @@ -343,7 +352,7 @@ int mbedtls_asn1_write_named_bitstring(unsigned char **p, * \return The number of bytes written to \p p on success. * \return A negative error code on failure. */ -int mbedtls_asn1_write_octet_string(unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, +int mbedtls_asn1_write_octet_string(unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *start, const unsigned char *buf, size_t size); /** @@ -365,7 +374,7 @@ int mbedtls_asn1_write_octet_string(unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, * the existing buffer to fit \p val_len. * * \return A pointer to the new / existing entry on success. - * \return \c NULL if if there was a memory allocation error. + * \return \c NULL if there was a memory allocation error. */ mbedtls_asn1_named_data *mbedtls_asn1_store_named_data(mbedtls_asn1_named_data **list, const char *oid, size_t oid_len, @@ -376,4 +385,6 @@ mbedtls_asn1_named_data *mbedtls_asn1_store_named_data(mbedtls_asn1_named_data * } #endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_C */ + #endif /* MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_H */ diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/base64.h b/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/base64.h index cc460471daf3..8f459b74c576 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/base64.h +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/base64.h @@ -10,11 +10,7 @@ #ifndef MBEDTLS_BASE64_H #define MBEDTLS_BASE64_H -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "mbedtls/build_info.h" #include diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/bignum.h b/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/bignum.h index fb0ca15ffcc5..71d7b976726c 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/bignum.h +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/bignum.h @@ -9,12 +9,9 @@ */ #ifndef MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_H #define MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_H +#include "mbedtls/private_access.h" -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "mbedtls/build_info.h" #include #include @@ -54,15 +51,15 @@ #if !defined(MBEDTLS_MPI_WINDOW_SIZE) /* - * Maximum window size used for modular exponentiation. Default: 2 + * Maximum window size used for modular exponentiation. Default: 3 * Minimum value: 1. Maximum value: 6. * * Result is an array of ( 2 ** MBEDTLS_MPI_WINDOW_SIZE ) MPIs used - * for the sliding window calculation. (So 64 by default) + * for the sliding window calculation. (So 8 by default) * * Reduction in size, reduces speed. */ -#define MBEDTLS_MPI_WINDOW_SIZE 2 /**< Maximum window size used. */ +#define MBEDTLS_MPI_WINDOW_SIZE 3 /**< Maximum window size used. */ #endif /* !MBEDTLS_MPI_WINDOW_SIZE */ #if !defined(MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE) @@ -120,6 +117,7 @@ #endif /* !MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT64 */ typedef int64_t mbedtls_mpi_sint; typedef uint64_t mbedtls_mpi_uint; +#define MBEDTLS_MPI_UINT_MAX UINT64_MAX #elif defined(__GNUC__) && ( \ defined(__amd64__) || defined(__x86_64__) || \ defined(__ppc64__) || defined(__powerpc64__) || \ @@ -132,6 +130,7 @@ typedef uint64_t mbedtls_mpi_uint; #endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT64 */ typedef int64_t mbedtls_mpi_sint; typedef uint64_t mbedtls_mpi_uint; +#define MBEDTLS_MPI_UINT_MAX UINT64_MAX #if !defined(MBEDTLS_NO_UDBL_DIVISION) /* mbedtls_t_udbl defined as 128-bit unsigned int */ typedef unsigned int mbedtls_t_udbl __attribute__((mode(TI))); @@ -147,6 +146,7 @@ typedef unsigned int mbedtls_t_udbl __attribute__((mode(TI))); #endif /* !MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT64 */ typedef int64_t mbedtls_mpi_sint; typedef uint64_t mbedtls_mpi_uint; +#define MBEDTLS_MPI_UINT_MAX UINT64_MAX #if !defined(MBEDTLS_NO_UDBL_DIVISION) /* mbedtls_t_udbl defined as 128-bit unsigned int */ typedef __uint128_t mbedtls_t_udbl; @@ -156,6 +156,7 @@ typedef __uint128_t mbedtls_t_udbl; /* Force 64-bit integers with unknown compiler */ typedef int64_t mbedtls_mpi_sint; typedef uint64_t mbedtls_mpi_uint; +#define MBEDTLS_MPI_UINT_MAX UINT64_MAX #endif #endif /* !MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT32 */ @@ -166,12 +167,22 @@ typedef uint64_t mbedtls_mpi_uint; #endif /* !MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT32 */ typedef int32_t mbedtls_mpi_sint; typedef uint32_t mbedtls_mpi_uint; +#define MBEDTLS_MPI_UINT_MAX UINT32_MAX #if !defined(MBEDTLS_NO_UDBL_DIVISION) typedef uint64_t mbedtls_t_udbl; #define MBEDTLS_HAVE_UDBL #endif /* !MBEDTLS_NO_UDBL_DIVISION */ #endif /* !MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT64 */ +/* + * Sanity check that exactly one of MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT32 or MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT64 is defined, + * so that code elsewhere doesn't have to check. + */ +#if (!(defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT32) || defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT64))) || \ + (defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT32) && defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT64)) +#error "Only 32-bit or 64-bit limbs are supported in bignum" +#endif + /** \typedef mbedtls_mpi_uint * \brief The type of machine digits in a bignum, called _limbs_. * @@ -182,7 +193,7 @@ typedef uint64_t mbedtls_t_udbl; /** \typedef mbedtls_mpi_sint * \brief The signed type corresponding to #mbedtls_mpi_uint. * - * This is always a signed integer type with no padding bits. The size + * This is always an signed integer type with no padding bits. The size * is platform-dependent. */ @@ -194,6 +205,12 @@ extern "C" { * \brief MPI structure */ typedef struct mbedtls_mpi { + /** Pointer to limbs. + * + * This may be \c NULL if \c n is 0. + */ + mbedtls_mpi_uint *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(p); + /** Sign: -1 if the mpi is negative, 1 otherwise. * * The number 0 must be represented with `s = +1`. Although many library @@ -205,16 +222,19 @@ typedef struct mbedtls_mpi { * Note that this implies that calloc() or `... = {0}` does not create * a valid MPI representation. You must call mbedtls_mpi_init(). */ - int s; + signed short MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(s); /** Total number of limbs in \c p. */ - size_t n; - - /** Pointer to limbs. - * - * This may be \c NULL if \c n is 0. + unsigned short MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(n); + /* Make sure that MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_LIMBS fits in n. + * Use the same limit value on all platforms so that we don't have to + * think about different behavior on the rare platforms where + * unsigned short can store values larger than the minimum required by + * the C language, which is 65535. */ - mbedtls_mpi_uint *p; +#if MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_LIMBS > 65535 +#error "MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_LIMBS > 65535 is not supported" +#endif } mbedtls_mpi; @@ -585,6 +605,8 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_write_binary_le(const mbedtls_mpi *X, * \brief Perform a left-shift on an MPI: X <<= count * * \param X The MPI to shift. This must point to an initialized MPI. + * The MPI pointed by \p X may be resized to fit + * the resulting number. * \param count The number of bits to shift by. * * \return \c 0 if successful. @@ -980,37 +1002,6 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_gcd(mbedtls_mpi *G, const mbedtls_mpi *A, int mbedtls_mpi_inv_mod(mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *A, const mbedtls_mpi *N); -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING) -#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED __attribute__((deprecated)) -#else -#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED -#endif -/** - * \brief Perform a Miller-Rabin primality test with error - * probability of 2-80. - * - * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_mpi_is_prime_ext() which allows - * specifying the number of Miller-Rabin rounds. - * - * \param X The MPI to check for primality. - * This must point to an initialized MPI. - * \param f_rng The RNG function to use. This must not be \c NULL. - * \param p_rng The RNG parameter to be passed to \p f_rng. - * This may be \c NULL if \p f_rng doesn't use a - * context parameter. - * - * \return \c 0 if successful, i.e. \p X is probably prime. - * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED if a memory allocation failed. - * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NOT_ACCEPTABLE if \p X is not prime. - * \return Another negative error code on other kinds of failure. - */ -MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED int mbedtls_mpi_is_prime(const mbedtls_mpi *X, - int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), - void *p_rng); -#undef MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED -#endif /* !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ - /** * \brief Miller-Rabin primality test. * diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/block_cipher.h b/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/block_cipher.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..3f60f6f7dd41 --- /dev/null +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/block_cipher.h @@ -0,0 +1,76 @@ +/** + * \file block_cipher.h + * + * \brief Internal abstraction layer. + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ +#ifndef MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_H +#define MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_H + +#include "mbedtls/private_access.h" + +#include "mbedtls/build_info.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) +#include "mbedtls/aes.h" +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARIA_C) +#include "mbedtls/aria.h" +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C) +#include "mbedtls/camellia.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_SOME_PSA) +#include "psa/crypto_types.h" +#endif + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +typedef enum { + MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_ID_NONE = 0, /**< Unset. */ + MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_ID_AES, /**< The AES cipher. */ + MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_ID_CAMELLIA, /**< The Camellia cipher. */ + MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_ID_ARIA, /**< The Aria cipher. */ +} mbedtls_block_cipher_id_t; + +/** + * Used internally to indicate whether a context uses legacy or PSA. + * + * Internal use only. + */ +typedef enum { + MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_ENGINE_LEGACY = 0, + MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_ENGINE_PSA, +} mbedtls_block_cipher_engine_t; + +typedef struct { + mbedtls_block_cipher_id_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(id); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_SOME_PSA) + mbedtls_block_cipher_engine_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(engine); + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(psa_key_id); +#endif + union { + unsigned dummy; /* Make the union non-empty even with no supported algorithms. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) + mbedtls_aes_context MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(aes); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARIA_C) + mbedtls_aria_context MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(aria); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C) + mbedtls_camellia_context MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(camellia); +#endif + } MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(ctx); +} mbedtls_block_cipher_context_t; + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_H */ diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/blowfish.h b/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/blowfish.h deleted file mode 100644 index 7979670b7aec..000000000000 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/blowfish.h +++ /dev/null @@ -1,275 +0,0 @@ -/** - * \file blowfish.h - * - * \brief Blowfish block cipher - */ -/* - * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later - */ -#ifndef MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_H -#define MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_H - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif - -#include -#include - -#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" - -#define MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_ENCRYPT 1 -#define MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_DECRYPT 0 -#define MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_MAX_KEY_BITS 448 -#define MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_MIN_KEY_BITS 32 -#define MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_ROUNDS 16 /**< Rounds to use. When increasing this value, make sure to extend the initialisation vectors */ -#define MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_BLOCKSIZE 8 /* Blowfish uses 64 bit blocks */ - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) -#define MBEDTLS_ERR_BLOWFISH_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_NUMERIC_CONSTANT(-0x0016) -#endif /* !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ -/** Bad input data. */ -#define MBEDTLS_ERR_BLOWFISH_BAD_INPUT_DATA -0x0016 - -/** Invalid data input length. */ -#define MBEDTLS_ERR_BLOWFISH_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH -0x0018 - -/* MBEDTLS_ERR_BLOWFISH_HW_ACCEL_FAILED is deprecated and should not be used. - */ -/** Blowfish hardware accelerator failed. */ -#define MBEDTLS_ERR_BLOWFISH_HW_ACCEL_FAILED -0x0017 - -#ifdef __cplusplus -extern "C" { -#endif - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_ALT) -// Regular implementation -// - -/** - * \brief Blowfish context structure - */ -typedef struct mbedtls_blowfish_context { - uint32_t P[MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_ROUNDS + 2]; /*!< Blowfish round keys */ - uint32_t S[4][256]; /*!< key dependent S-boxes */ -} -mbedtls_blowfish_context; - -#else /* MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_ALT */ -#include "blowfish_alt.h" -#endif /* MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_ALT */ - -/** - * \brief Initialize a Blowfish context. - * - * \param ctx The Blowfish context to be initialized. - * This must not be \c NULL. - */ -void mbedtls_blowfish_init(mbedtls_blowfish_context *ctx); - -/** - * \brief Clear a Blowfish context. - * - * \param ctx The Blowfish context to be cleared. - * This may be \c NULL, in which case this function - * returns immediately. If it is not \c NULL, it must - * point to an initialized Blowfish context. - */ -void mbedtls_blowfish_free(mbedtls_blowfish_context *ctx); - -/** - * \brief Perform a Blowfish key schedule operation. - * - * \param ctx The Blowfish context to perform the key schedule on. - * \param key The encryption key. This must be a readable buffer of - * length \p keybits Bits. - * \param keybits The length of \p key in Bits. This must be between - * \c 32 and \c 448 and a multiple of \c 8. - * - * \return \c 0 if successful. - * \return A negative error code on failure. - */ -int mbedtls_blowfish_setkey(mbedtls_blowfish_context *ctx, const unsigned char *key, - unsigned int keybits); - -/** - * \brief Perform a Blowfish-ECB block encryption/decryption operation. - * - * \param ctx The Blowfish context to use. This must be initialized - * and bound to a key. - * \param mode The mode of operation. Possible values are - * #MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_ENCRYPT for encryption, or - * #MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_DECRYPT for decryption. - * \param input The input block. This must be a readable buffer - * of size \c 8 Bytes. - * \param output The output block. This must be a writable buffer - * of size \c 8 Bytes. - * - * \return \c 0 if successful. - * \return A negative error code on failure. - */ -int mbedtls_blowfish_crypt_ecb(mbedtls_blowfish_context *ctx, - int mode, - const unsigned char input[MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_BLOCKSIZE], - unsigned char output[MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_BLOCKSIZE]); - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) -/** - * \brief Perform a Blowfish-CBC buffer encryption/decryption operation. - * - * \note Upon exit, the content of the IV is updated so that you can - * call the function same function again on the following - * block(s) of data and get the same result as if it was - * encrypted in one call. This allows a "streaming" usage. - * If on the other hand you need to retain the contents of the - * IV, you should either save it manually or use the cipher - * module instead. - * - * \param ctx The Blowfish context to use. This must be initialized - * and bound to a key. - * \param mode The mode of operation. Possible values are - * #MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_ENCRYPT for encryption, or - * #MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_DECRYPT for decryption. - * \param length The length of the input data in Bytes. This must be - * multiple of \c 8. - * \param iv The initialization vector. This must be a read/write buffer - * of length \c 8 Bytes. It is updated by this function. - * \param input The input data. This must be a readable buffer of length - * \p length Bytes. - * \param output The output data. This must be a writable buffer of length - * \p length Bytes. - * - * \return \c 0 if successful. - * \return A negative error code on failure. - */ -int mbedtls_blowfish_crypt_cbc(mbedtls_blowfish_context *ctx, - int mode, - size_t length, - unsigned char iv[MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_BLOCKSIZE], - const unsigned char *input, - unsigned char *output); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB) -/** - * \brief Perform a Blowfish CFB buffer encryption/decryption operation. - * - * \note Upon exit, the content of the IV is updated so that you can - * call the function same function again on the following - * block(s) of data and get the same result as if it was - * encrypted in one call. This allows a "streaming" usage. - * If on the other hand you need to retain the contents of the - * IV, you should either save it manually or use the cipher - * module instead. - * - * \param ctx The Blowfish context to use. This must be initialized - * and bound to a key. - * \param mode The mode of operation. Possible values are - * #MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_ENCRYPT for encryption, or - * #MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_DECRYPT for decryption. - * \param length The length of the input data in Bytes. - * \param iv_off The offset in the initialization vector. - * The value pointed to must be smaller than \c 8 Bytes. - * It is updated by this function to support the aforementioned - * streaming usage. - * \param iv The initialization vector. This must be a read/write buffer - * of size \c 8 Bytes. It is updated after use. - * \param input The input data. This must be a readable buffer of length - * \p length Bytes. - * \param output The output data. This must be a writable buffer of length - * \p length Bytes. - * - * \return \c 0 if successful. - * \return A negative error code on failure. - */ -int mbedtls_blowfish_crypt_cfb64(mbedtls_blowfish_context *ctx, - int mode, - size_t length, - size_t *iv_off, - unsigned char iv[MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_BLOCKSIZE], - const unsigned char *input, - unsigned char *output); -#endif /*MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR) -/** - * \brief Perform a Blowfish-CTR buffer encryption/decryption operation. - * - * \warning You must never reuse a nonce value with the same key. Doing so - * would void the encryption for the two messages encrypted with - * the same nonce and key. - * - * There are two common strategies for managing nonces with CTR: - * - * 1. You can handle everything as a single message processed over - * successive calls to this function. In that case, you want to - * set \p nonce_counter and \p nc_off to 0 for the first call, and - * then preserve the values of \p nonce_counter, \p nc_off and \p - * stream_block across calls to this function as they will be - * updated by this function. - * - * With this strategy, you must not encrypt more than 2**64 - * blocks of data with the same key. - * - * 2. You can encrypt separate messages by dividing the \p - * nonce_counter buffer in two areas: the first one used for a - * per-message nonce, handled by yourself, and the second one - * updated by this function internally. - * - * For example, you might reserve the first 4 bytes for the - * per-message nonce, and the last 4 bytes for internal use. In that - * case, before calling this function on a new message you need to - * set the first 4 bytes of \p nonce_counter to your chosen nonce - * value, the last 4 to 0, and \p nc_off to 0 (which will cause \p - * stream_block to be ignored). That way, you can encrypt at most - * 2**32 messages of up to 2**32 blocks each with the same key. - * - * The per-message nonce (or information sufficient to reconstruct - * it) needs to be communicated with the ciphertext and must be unique. - * The recommended way to ensure uniqueness is to use a message - * counter. - * - * Note that for both strategies, sizes are measured in blocks and - * that a Blowfish block is 8 bytes. - * - * \warning Upon return, \p stream_block contains sensitive data. Its - * content must not be written to insecure storage and should be - * securely discarded as soon as it's no longer needed. - * - * \param ctx The Blowfish context to use. This must be initialized - * and bound to a key. - * \param length The length of the input data in Bytes. - * \param nc_off The offset in the current stream_block (for resuming - * within current cipher stream). The offset pointer - * should be \c 0 at the start of a stream and must be - * smaller than \c 8. It is updated by this function. - * \param nonce_counter The 64-bit nonce and counter. This must point to a - * read/write buffer of length \c 8 Bytes. - * \param stream_block The saved stream-block for resuming. This must point to - * a read/write buffer of length \c 8 Bytes. - * \param input The input data. This must be a readable buffer of - * length \p length Bytes. - * \param output The output data. This must be a writable buffer of - * length \p length Bytes. - * - * \return \c 0 if successful. - * \return A negative error code on failure. - */ -int mbedtls_blowfish_crypt_ctr(mbedtls_blowfish_context *ctx, - size_t length, - size_t *nc_off, - unsigned char nonce_counter[MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_BLOCKSIZE], - unsigned char stream_block[MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_BLOCKSIZE], - const unsigned char *input, - unsigned char *output); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR */ - -#ifdef __cplusplus -} -#endif - -#endif /* blowfish.h */ diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/build_info.h b/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/build_info.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..eab167f383e4 --- /dev/null +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/build_info.h @@ -0,0 +1,176 @@ +/** + * \file mbedtls/build_info.h + * + * \brief Build-time configuration info + * + * Include this file if you need to depend on the + * configuration options defined in mbedtls_config.h or MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +#ifndef MBEDTLS_BUILD_INFO_H +#define MBEDTLS_BUILD_INFO_H + +/* + * This set of compile-time defines can be used to determine the version number + * of the Mbed TLS library used. Run-time variables for the same can be found in + * version.h + */ + +/** + * The version number x.y.z is split into three parts. + * Major, Minor, Patchlevel + */ +#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_MAJOR 3 +#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_MINOR 6 +#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_PATCH 0 + +/** + * The single version number has the following structure: + * MMNNPP00 + * Major version | Minor version | Patch version + */ +#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_NUMBER 0x03060000 +#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_STRING "3.6.0" +#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_STRING_FULL "Mbed TLS 3.6.0" + +/* Macros for build-time platform detection */ + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ARCH_IS_ARM64) && \ + (defined(__aarch64__) || defined(_M_ARM64) || defined(_M_ARM64EC)) +#define MBEDTLS_ARCH_IS_ARM64 +#endif + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ARCH_IS_ARM32) && \ + (defined(__arm__) || defined(_M_ARM) || \ + defined(_M_ARMT) || defined(__thumb__) || defined(__thumb2__)) +#define MBEDTLS_ARCH_IS_ARM32 +#endif + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ARCH_IS_X64) && \ + (defined(__amd64__) || defined(__x86_64__) || \ + ((defined(_M_X64) || defined(_M_AMD64)) && !defined(_M_ARM64EC))) +#define MBEDTLS_ARCH_IS_X64 +#endif + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ARCH_IS_X86) && \ + (defined(__i386__) || defined(_X86_) || \ + (defined(_M_IX86) && !defined(_M_I86))) +#define MBEDTLS_ARCH_IS_X86 +#endif + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_IS_WINDOWS_ON_ARM64) && \ + (defined(_M_ARM64) || defined(_M_ARM64EC)) +#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_IS_WINDOWS_ON_ARM64 +#endif + +/* This is defined if the architecture is Armv8-A, or higher */ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ARCH_IS_ARMV8_A) +#if defined(__ARM_ARCH) && defined(__ARM_ARCH_PROFILE) +#if (__ARM_ARCH >= 8) && (__ARM_ARCH_PROFILE == 'A') +/* GCC, clang, armclang and IAR */ +#define MBEDTLS_ARCH_IS_ARMV8_A +#endif +#elif defined(__ARM_ARCH_8A) +/* Alternative defined by clang */ +#define MBEDTLS_ARCH_IS_ARMV8_A +#elif defined(_M_ARM64) || defined(_M_ARM64EC) +/* MSVC ARM64 is at least Armv8.0-A */ +#define MBEDTLS_ARCH_IS_ARMV8_A +#endif +#endif + +#if defined(__GNUC__) && !defined(__ARMCC_VERSION) && !defined(__clang__) \ + && !defined(__llvm__) && !defined(__INTEL_COMPILER) +/* Defined if the compiler really is gcc and not clang, etc */ +#define MBEDTLS_COMPILER_IS_GCC +#define MBEDTLS_GCC_VERSION \ + (__GNUC__ * 10000 + __GNUC_MINOR__ * 100 + __GNUC_PATCHLEVEL__) +#endif + +#if defined(_MSC_VER) && !defined(_CRT_SECURE_NO_DEPRECATE) +#define _CRT_SECURE_NO_DEPRECATE 1 +#endif + +/* Define `inline` on some non-C99-compliant compilers. */ +#if (defined(__ARMCC_VERSION) || defined(_MSC_VER)) && \ + !defined(inline) && !defined(__cplusplus) +#define inline __inline +#endif + +/* X.509, TLS and non-PSA crypto configuration */ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) +#include "mbedtls/mbedtls_config.h" +#else +#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_VERSION) && ( \ + MBEDTLS_CONFIG_VERSION < 0x03000000 || \ + MBEDTLS_CONFIG_VERSION > MBEDTLS_VERSION_NUMBER) +#error "Invalid config version, defined value of MBEDTLS_CONFIG_VERSION is unsupported" +#endif + +/* Target and application specific configurations + * + * Allow user to override any previous default. + * + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USER_CONFIG_FILE) +#include MBEDTLS_USER_CONFIG_FILE +#endif + +/* PSA crypto configuration */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG_FILE) +#include MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG_FILE +#else +#include "psa/crypto_config.h" +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_USER_CONFIG_FILE) +#include MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_USER_CONFIG_FILE +#endif +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG) */ + +/* Auto-enable MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY if + * MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH and MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C defined + * to ensure a 128-bit key size in CTR_DRBG. + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH) && defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C) +#define MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +#endif + +/* Auto-enable MBEDTLS_MD_C if needed by a module that didn't require it + * in a previous release, to ensure backwards compatibility. + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C) +#define MBEDTLS_MD_C +#endif + +/* PSA crypto specific configuration options + * - If config_psa.h reads a configuration option in preprocessor directive, + * this symbol should be set before its inclusion. (e.g. MBEDTLS_MD_C) + * - If config_psa.h writes a configuration option in conditional directive, + * this symbol should be consulted after its inclusion. + * (e.g. MBEDTLS_MD_LIGHT) + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG) /* PSA_WANT_xxx influences MBEDTLS_xxx */ || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) /* MBEDTLS_xxx influences PSA_WANT_xxx */ || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT) /* The same as the previous, but with separation only */ +#include "mbedtls/config_psa.h" +#endif + +#include "mbedtls/config_adjust_legacy_crypto.h" + +#include "mbedtls/config_adjust_x509.h" + +#include "mbedtls/config_adjust_ssl.h" + +/* Make sure all configuration symbols are set before including check_config.h, + * even the ones that are calculated programmatically. */ +#include "mbedtls/check_config.h" + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_BUILD_INFO_H */ diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/camellia.h b/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/camellia.h index be8c5152c514..557f47253102 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/camellia.h +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/camellia.h @@ -9,12 +9,9 @@ */ #ifndef MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_H #define MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_H +#include "mbedtls/private_access.h" -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "mbedtls/build_info.h" #include #include @@ -24,20 +21,12 @@ #define MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_ENCRYPT 1 #define MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_DECRYPT 0 -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) -#define MBEDTLS_ERR_CAMELLIA_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_NUMERIC_CONSTANT(-0x0024) -#endif /* !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ /** Bad input data. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_CAMELLIA_BAD_INPUT_DATA -0x0024 /** Invalid data input length. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_CAMELLIA_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH -0x0026 -/* MBEDTLS_ERR_CAMELLIA_HW_ACCEL_FAILED is deprecated and should not be used. - */ -/** Camellia hardware accelerator failed. */ -#define MBEDTLS_ERR_CAMELLIA_HW_ACCEL_FAILED -0x0027 - #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { #endif @@ -50,8 +39,8 @@ extern "C" { * \brief CAMELLIA context structure */ typedef struct mbedtls_camellia_context { - int nr; /*!< number of rounds */ - uint32_t rk[68]; /*!< CAMELLIA round keys */ + int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(nr); /*!< number of rounds */ + uint32_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(rk)[68]; /*!< CAMELLIA round keys */ } mbedtls_camellia_context; @@ -92,6 +81,7 @@ int mbedtls_camellia_setkey_enc(mbedtls_camellia_context *ctx, const unsigned char *key, unsigned int keybits); +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT) /** * \brief Perform a CAMELLIA key schedule operation for decryption. * @@ -107,6 +97,7 @@ int mbedtls_camellia_setkey_enc(mbedtls_camellia_context *ctx, int mbedtls_camellia_setkey_dec(mbedtls_camellia_context *ctx, const unsigned char *key, unsigned int keybits); +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT */ /** * \brief Perform a CAMELLIA-ECB block encryption/decryption operation. diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/ccm.h b/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/ccm.h index adb14cc636f9..1da57c921bf7 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/ccm.h +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/ccm.h @@ -34,24 +34,26 @@ #ifndef MBEDTLS_CCM_H #define MBEDTLS_CCM_H +#include "mbedtls/private_access.h" -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "mbedtls/build_info.h" #include "mbedtls/cipher.h" +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_C) +#include "mbedtls/block_cipher.h" +#endif + +#define MBEDTLS_CCM_DECRYPT 0 +#define MBEDTLS_CCM_ENCRYPT 1 +#define MBEDTLS_CCM_STAR_DECRYPT 2 +#define MBEDTLS_CCM_STAR_ENCRYPT 3 + /** Bad input parameters to the function. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT -0x000D /** Authenticated decryption failed. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_AUTH_FAILED -0x000F -/* MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_HW_ACCEL_FAILED is deprecated and should not be used. */ -/** CCM hardware accelerator failed. */ -#define MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_HW_ACCEL_FAILED -0x0011 - #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { #endif @@ -65,7 +67,30 @@ extern "C" { * to the APIs called. */ typedef struct mbedtls_ccm_context { - mbedtls_cipher_context_t cipher_ctx; /*!< The cipher context used. */ + unsigned char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(y)[16]; /*!< The Y working buffer */ + unsigned char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(ctr)[16]; /*!< The counter buffer */ + size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(plaintext_len); /*!< Total plaintext length */ + size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(add_len); /*!< Total authentication data length */ + size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(tag_len); /*!< Total tag length */ + size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(processed); /*!< Track how many bytes of input data + were processed (chunked input). + Used independently for both auth data + and plaintext/ciphertext. + This variable is set to zero after + auth data input is finished. */ + unsigned int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(q); /*!< The Q working value */ + unsigned int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(mode); /*!< The operation to perform: + #MBEDTLS_CCM_ENCRYPT or + #MBEDTLS_CCM_DECRYPT or + #MBEDTLS_CCM_STAR_ENCRYPT or + #MBEDTLS_CCM_STAR_DECRYPT. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_C) + mbedtls_block_cipher_context_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(block_cipher_ctx); /*!< The cipher context used. */ +#else + mbedtls_cipher_context_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(cipher_ctx); /*!< The cipher context used. */ +#endif + int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(state); /*!< Working value holding context's + state. Used for chunked data input */ } mbedtls_ccm_context; @@ -126,10 +151,10 @@ void mbedtls_ccm_free(mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx); * \param iv_len The length of the nonce in Bytes: 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, * or 13. The length L of the message length field is * 15 - \p iv_len. - * \param add The additional data field. If \p add_len is greater than - * zero, \p add must be a readable buffer of at least that + * \param ad The additional data field. If \p ad_len is greater than + * zero, \p ad must be a readable buffer of at least that * length. - * \param add_len The length of additional data in Bytes. + * \param ad_len The length of additional data in Bytes. * This must be less than `2^16 - 2^8`. * \param input The buffer holding the input data. If \p length is greater * than zero, \p input must be a readable buffer of at least @@ -147,7 +172,7 @@ void mbedtls_ccm_free(mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx); */ int mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag(mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx, size_t length, const unsigned char *iv, size_t iv_len, - const unsigned char *add, size_t add_len, + const unsigned char *ad, size_t ad_len, const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output, unsigned char *tag, size_t tag_len); @@ -167,14 +192,15 @@ int mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag(mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx, size_t length, * \param ctx The CCM context to use for encryption. This must be * initialized and bound to a key. * \param length The length of the input data in Bytes. + * For tag length = 0, input length is ignored. * \param iv The initialization vector (nonce). This must be a readable * buffer of at least \p iv_len Bytes. * \param iv_len The length of the nonce in Bytes: 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, * or 13. The length L of the message length field is * 15 - \p iv_len. - * \param add The additional data field. This must be a readable buffer of - * at least \p add_len Bytes. - * \param add_len The length of additional data in Bytes. + * \param ad The additional data field. This must be a readable buffer of + * at least \p ad_len Bytes. + * \param ad_len The length of additional data in Bytes. * This must be less than 2^16 - 2^8. * \param input The buffer holding the input data. If \p length is greater * than zero, \p input must be a readable buffer of at least @@ -195,7 +221,7 @@ int mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag(mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx, size_t length, */ int mbedtls_ccm_star_encrypt_and_tag(mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx, size_t length, const unsigned char *iv, size_t iv_len, - const unsigned char *add, size_t add_len, + const unsigned char *ad, size_t ad_len, const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output, unsigned char *tag, size_t tag_len); @@ -211,9 +237,9 @@ int mbedtls_ccm_star_encrypt_and_tag(mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx, size_t length, * \param iv_len The length of the nonce in Bytes: 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, * or 13. The length L of the message length field is * 15 - \p iv_len. - * \param add The additional data field. This must be a readable buffer - * of at least that \p add_len Bytes.. - * \param add_len The length of additional data in Bytes. + * \param ad The additional data field. This must be a readable buffer + * of at least that \p ad_len Bytes.. + * \param ad_len The length of additional data in Bytes. * This must be less than 2^16 - 2^8. * \param input The buffer holding the input data. If \p length is greater * than zero, \p input must be a readable buffer of at least @@ -232,7 +258,7 @@ int mbedtls_ccm_star_encrypt_and_tag(mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx, size_t length, */ int mbedtls_ccm_auth_decrypt(mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx, size_t length, const unsigned char *iv, size_t iv_len, - const unsigned char *add, size_t add_len, + const unsigned char *ad, size_t ad_len, const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output, const unsigned char *tag, size_t tag_len); @@ -248,14 +274,15 @@ int mbedtls_ccm_auth_decrypt(mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx, size_t length, * \param ctx The CCM context to use for decryption. This must be * initialized and bound to a key. * \param length The length of the input data in Bytes. + * For tag length = 0, input length is ignored. * \param iv The initialization vector (nonce). This must be a readable * buffer of at least \p iv_len Bytes. * \param iv_len The length of the nonce in Bytes: 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, * or 13. The length L of the message length field is * 15 - \p iv_len. - * \param add The additional data field. This must be a readable buffer of - * at least that \p add_len Bytes. - * \param add_len The length of additional data in Bytes. + * \param ad The additional data field. This must be a readable buffer of + * at least that \p ad_len Bytes. + * \param ad_len The length of additional data in Bytes. * This must be less than 2^16 - 2^8. * \param input The buffer holding the input data. If \p length is greater * than zero, \p input must be a readable buffer of at least @@ -277,11 +304,212 @@ int mbedtls_ccm_auth_decrypt(mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx, size_t length, */ int mbedtls_ccm_star_auth_decrypt(mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx, size_t length, const unsigned char *iv, size_t iv_len, - const unsigned char *add, size_t add_len, + const unsigned char *ad, size_t ad_len, const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output, const unsigned char *tag, size_t tag_len); -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) && defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) +/** + * \brief This function starts a CCM encryption or decryption + * operation. + * + * This function and mbedtls_ccm_set_lengths() must be called + * before calling mbedtls_ccm_update_ad() or + * mbedtls_ccm_update(). This function can be called before + * or after mbedtls_ccm_set_lengths(). + * + * \note This function is not implemented in Mbed TLS yet. + * + * \param ctx The CCM context. This must be initialized. + * \param mode The operation to perform: #MBEDTLS_CCM_ENCRYPT or + * #MBEDTLS_CCM_DECRYPT or #MBEDTLS_CCM_STAR_ENCRYPT or + * #MBEDTLS_CCM_STAR_DECRYPT. + * \param iv The initialization vector. This must be a readable buffer + * of at least \p iv_len Bytes. + * \param iv_len The length of the nonce in Bytes: 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, + * or 13. The length L of the message length field is + * 15 - \p iv_len. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT on failure: + * \p ctx is in an invalid state, + * \p mode is invalid, + * \p iv_len is invalid (lower than \c 7 or greater than + * \c 13). + */ +int mbedtls_ccm_starts(mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx, + int mode, + const unsigned char *iv, + size_t iv_len); + +/** + * \brief This function declares the lengths of the message + * and additional data for a CCM encryption or decryption + * operation. + * + * This function and mbedtls_ccm_starts() must be called + * before calling mbedtls_ccm_update_ad() or + * mbedtls_ccm_update(). This function can be called before + * or after mbedtls_ccm_starts(). + * + * \note This function is not implemented in Mbed TLS yet. + * + * \param ctx The CCM context. This must be initialized. + * \param total_ad_len The total length of additional data in bytes. + * This must be less than `2^16 - 2^8`. + * \param plaintext_len The length in bytes of the plaintext to encrypt or + * result of the decryption (thus not encompassing the + * additional data that are not encrypted). + * \param tag_len The length of the tag to generate in Bytes: + * 4, 6, 8, 10, 12, 14 or 16. + * For CCM*, zero is also valid. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT on failure: + * \p ctx is in an invalid state, + * \p total_ad_len is greater than \c 0xFF00. + */ +int mbedtls_ccm_set_lengths(mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx, + size_t total_ad_len, + size_t plaintext_len, + size_t tag_len); + +/** + * \brief This function feeds an input buffer as associated data + * (authenticated but not encrypted data) in a CCM + * encryption or decryption operation. + * + * You may call this function zero, one or more times + * to pass successive parts of the additional data. The + * lengths \p ad_len of the data parts should eventually add + * up exactly to the total length of additional data + * \c total_ad_len passed to mbedtls_ccm_set_lengths(). You + * may not call this function after calling + * mbedtls_ccm_update(). + * + * \note This function is not implemented in Mbed TLS yet. + * + * \param ctx The CCM context. This must have been started with + * mbedtls_ccm_starts(), the lengths of the message and + * additional data must have been declared with + * mbedtls_ccm_set_lengths() and this must not have yet + * received any input with mbedtls_ccm_update(). + * \param ad The buffer holding the additional data, or \c NULL + * if \p ad_len is \c 0. + * \param ad_len The length of the additional data. If \c 0, + * \p ad may be \c NULL. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT on failure: + * \p ctx is in an invalid state, + * total input length too long. + */ +int mbedtls_ccm_update_ad(mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *ad, + size_t ad_len); + +/** + * \brief This function feeds an input buffer into an ongoing CCM + * encryption or decryption operation. + * + * You may call this function zero, one or more times + * to pass successive parts of the input: the plaintext to + * encrypt, or the ciphertext (not including the tag) to + * decrypt. After the last part of the input, call + * mbedtls_ccm_finish(). The lengths \p input_len of the + * data parts should eventually add up exactly to the + * plaintext length \c plaintext_len passed to + * mbedtls_ccm_set_lengths(). + * + * This function may produce output in one of the following + * ways: + * - Immediate output: the output length is always equal + * to the input length. + * - Buffered output: except for the last part of input data, + * the output consists of a whole number of 16-byte blocks. + * If the total input length so far (not including + * associated data) is 16 \* *B* + *A* with *A* < 16 then + * the total output length is 16 \* *B*. + * For the last part of input data, the output length is + * equal to the input length plus the number of bytes (*A*) + * buffered in the previous call to the function (if any). + * The function uses the plaintext length + * \c plaintext_len passed to mbedtls_ccm_set_lengths() + * to detect the last part of input data. + * + * In particular: + * - It is always correct to call this function with + * \p output_size >= \p input_len + 15. + * - If \p input_len is a multiple of 16 for all the calls + * to this function during an operation (not necessary for + * the last one) then it is correct to use \p output_size + * =\p input_len. + * + * \note This function is not implemented in Mbed TLS yet. + * + * \param ctx The CCM context. This must have been started with + * mbedtls_ccm_starts() and the lengths of the message and + * additional data must have been declared with + * mbedtls_ccm_set_lengths(). + * \param input The buffer holding the input data. If \p input_len + * is greater than zero, this must be a readable buffer + * of at least \p input_len bytes. + * \param input_len The length of the input data in bytes. + * \param output The buffer for the output data. If \p output_size + * is greater than zero, this must be a writable buffer of + * at least \p output_size bytes. + * \param output_size The size of the output buffer in bytes. + * See the function description regarding the output size. + * \param output_len On success, \p *output_len contains the actual + * length of the output written in \p output. + * On failure, the content of \p *output_len is + * unspecified. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT on failure: + * \p ctx is in an invalid state, + * total input length too long, + * or \p output_size too small. + */ +int mbedtls_ccm_update(mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *input, size_t input_len, + unsigned char *output, size_t output_size, + size_t *output_len); + +/** + * \brief This function finishes the CCM operation and generates + * the authentication tag. + * + * It wraps up the CCM stream, and generates the + * tag. The tag can have a maximum length of 16 Bytes. + * + * \note This function is not implemented in Mbed TLS yet. + * + * \param ctx The CCM context. This must have been started with + * mbedtls_ccm_starts() and the lengths of the message and + * additional data must have been declared with + * mbedtls_ccm_set_lengths(). + * \param tag The buffer for holding the tag. If \p tag_len is greater + * than zero, this must be a writable buffer of at least \p + * tag_len Bytes. + * \param tag_len The length of the tag. Must match the tag length passed to + * mbedtls_ccm_set_lengths() function. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT on failure: + * \p ctx is in an invalid state, + * invalid value of \p tag_len, + * the total amount of additional data passed to + * mbedtls_ccm_update_ad() was lower than the total length of + * additional data \c total_ad_len passed to + * mbedtls_ccm_set_lengths(), + * the total amount of input data passed to + * mbedtls_ccm_update() was lower than the plaintext length + * \c plaintext_len passed to mbedtls_ccm_set_lengths(). + */ +int mbedtls_ccm_finish(mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx, + unsigned char *tag, size_t tag_len); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) && defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_GCM_CAN_AES) /** * \brief The CCM checkup routine. * diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/certs.h b/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/certs.h deleted file mode 100644 index 8a1f2935304f..000000000000 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/certs.h +++ /dev/null @@ -1,238 +0,0 @@ -/** - * \file certs.h - * - * \brief Sample certificates and DHM parameters for testing - */ -/* - * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later - */ -#ifndef MBEDTLS_CERTS_H -#define MBEDTLS_CERTS_H - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif - -#include - -#ifdef __cplusplus -extern "C" { -#endif - -/* List of all PEM-encoded CA certificates, terminated by NULL; - * PEM encoded if MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C is enabled, DER encoded - * otherwise. */ -extern const char *mbedtls_test_cas[]; -extern const size_t mbedtls_test_cas_len[]; - -/* List of all DER-encoded CA certificates, terminated by NULL */ -extern const unsigned char *mbedtls_test_cas_der[]; -extern const size_t mbedtls_test_cas_der_len[]; - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C) -/* Concatenation of all CA certificates in PEM format if available */ -extern const char mbedtls_test_cas_pem[]; -extern const size_t mbedtls_test_cas_pem_len; -#endif /* MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C */ - -/* - * CA test certificates - */ - -extern const char mbedtls_test_ca_crt_ec_pem[]; -extern const char mbedtls_test_ca_key_ec_pem[]; -extern const char mbedtls_test_ca_pwd_ec_pem[]; -extern const char mbedtls_test_ca_key_rsa_pem[]; -extern const char mbedtls_test_ca_pwd_rsa_pem[]; -extern const char mbedtls_test_ca_crt_rsa_sha1_pem[]; -extern const char mbedtls_test_ca_crt_rsa_sha256_pem[]; - -extern const unsigned char mbedtls_test_ca_crt_ec_der[]; -extern const unsigned char mbedtls_test_ca_key_ec_der[]; -extern const unsigned char mbedtls_test_ca_key_rsa_der[]; -extern const unsigned char mbedtls_test_ca_crt_rsa_sha1_der[]; -extern const unsigned char mbedtls_test_ca_crt_rsa_sha256_der[]; - -extern const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_crt_ec_pem_len; -extern const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_key_ec_pem_len; -extern const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_pwd_ec_pem_len; -extern const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_key_rsa_pem_len; -extern const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_pwd_rsa_pem_len; -extern const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_crt_rsa_sha1_pem_len; -extern const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_crt_rsa_sha256_pem_len; - -extern const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_crt_ec_der_len; -extern const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_key_ec_der_len; -extern const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_pwd_ec_der_len; -extern const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_key_rsa_der_len; -extern const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_pwd_rsa_der_len; -extern const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_crt_rsa_sha1_der_len; -extern const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_crt_rsa_sha256_der_len; - -/* Config-dependent dispatch between PEM and DER encoding - * (PEM if enabled, otherwise DER) */ - -extern const char mbedtls_test_ca_crt_ec[]; -extern const char mbedtls_test_ca_key_ec[]; -extern const char mbedtls_test_ca_pwd_ec[]; -extern const char mbedtls_test_ca_key_rsa[]; -extern const char mbedtls_test_ca_pwd_rsa[]; -extern const char mbedtls_test_ca_crt_rsa_sha1[]; -extern const char mbedtls_test_ca_crt_rsa_sha256[]; - -extern const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_crt_ec_len; -extern const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_key_ec_len; -extern const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_pwd_ec_len; -extern const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_key_rsa_len; -extern const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_pwd_rsa_len; -extern const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_crt_rsa_sha1_len; -extern const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_crt_rsa_sha256_len; - -/* Config-dependent dispatch between SHA-1 and SHA-256 - * (SHA-256 if enabled, otherwise SHA-1) */ - -extern const char mbedtls_test_ca_crt_rsa[]; -extern const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_crt_rsa_len; - -/* Config-dependent dispatch between EC and RSA - * (RSA if enabled, otherwise EC) */ - -extern const char *mbedtls_test_ca_crt; -extern const char *mbedtls_test_ca_key; -extern const char *mbedtls_test_ca_pwd; -extern const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_crt_len; -extern const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_key_len; -extern const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_pwd_len; - -/* - * Server test certificates - */ - -extern const char mbedtls_test_srv_crt_ec_pem[]; -extern const char mbedtls_test_srv_key_ec_pem[]; -extern const char mbedtls_test_srv_pwd_ec_pem[]; -extern const char mbedtls_test_srv_key_rsa_pem[]; -extern const char mbedtls_test_srv_pwd_rsa_pem[]; -extern const char mbedtls_test_srv_crt_rsa_sha1_pem[]; -extern const char mbedtls_test_srv_crt_rsa_sha256_pem[]; - -extern const unsigned char mbedtls_test_srv_crt_ec_der[]; -extern const unsigned char mbedtls_test_srv_key_ec_der[]; -extern const unsigned char mbedtls_test_srv_key_rsa_der[]; -extern const unsigned char mbedtls_test_srv_crt_rsa_sha1_der[]; -extern const unsigned char mbedtls_test_srv_crt_rsa_sha256_der[]; - -extern const size_t mbedtls_test_srv_crt_ec_pem_len; -extern const size_t mbedtls_test_srv_key_ec_pem_len; -extern const size_t mbedtls_test_srv_pwd_ec_pem_len; -extern const size_t mbedtls_test_srv_key_rsa_pem_len; -extern const size_t mbedtls_test_srv_pwd_rsa_pem_len; -extern const size_t mbedtls_test_srv_crt_rsa_sha1_pem_len; -extern const size_t mbedtls_test_srv_crt_rsa_sha256_pem_len; - -extern const size_t mbedtls_test_srv_crt_ec_der_len; -extern const size_t mbedtls_test_srv_key_ec_der_len; -extern const size_t mbedtls_test_srv_pwd_ec_der_len; -extern const size_t mbedtls_test_srv_key_rsa_der_len; -extern const size_t mbedtls_test_srv_pwd_rsa_der_len; -extern const size_t mbedtls_test_srv_crt_rsa_sha1_der_len; -extern const size_t mbedtls_test_srv_crt_rsa_sha256_der_len; - -/* Config-dependent dispatch between PEM and DER encoding - * (PEM if enabled, otherwise DER) */ - -extern const char mbedtls_test_srv_crt_ec[]; -extern const char mbedtls_test_srv_key_ec[]; -extern const char mbedtls_test_srv_pwd_ec[]; -extern const char mbedtls_test_srv_key_rsa[]; -extern const char mbedtls_test_srv_pwd_rsa[]; -extern const char mbedtls_test_srv_crt_rsa_sha1[]; -extern const char mbedtls_test_srv_crt_rsa_sha256[]; - -extern const size_t mbedtls_test_srv_crt_ec_len; -extern const size_t mbedtls_test_srv_key_ec_len; -extern const size_t mbedtls_test_srv_pwd_ec_len; -extern const size_t mbedtls_test_srv_key_rsa_len; -extern const size_t mbedtls_test_srv_pwd_rsa_len; -extern const size_t mbedtls_test_srv_crt_rsa_sha1_len; -extern const size_t mbedtls_test_srv_crt_rsa_sha256_len; - -/* Config-dependent dispatch between SHA-1 and SHA-256 - * (SHA-256 if enabled, otherwise SHA-1) */ - -extern const char mbedtls_test_srv_crt_rsa[]; -extern const size_t mbedtls_test_srv_crt_rsa_len; - -/* Config-dependent dispatch between EC and RSA - * (RSA if enabled, otherwise EC) */ - -extern const char *mbedtls_test_srv_crt; -extern const char *mbedtls_test_srv_key; -extern const char *mbedtls_test_srv_pwd; -extern const size_t mbedtls_test_srv_crt_len; -extern const size_t mbedtls_test_srv_key_len; -extern const size_t mbedtls_test_srv_pwd_len; - -/* - * Client test certificates - */ - -extern const char mbedtls_test_cli_crt_ec_pem[]; -extern const char mbedtls_test_cli_key_ec_pem[]; -extern const char mbedtls_test_cli_pwd_ec_pem[]; -extern const char mbedtls_test_cli_key_rsa_pem[]; -extern const char mbedtls_test_cli_pwd_rsa_pem[]; -extern const char mbedtls_test_cli_crt_rsa_pem[]; - -extern const unsigned char mbedtls_test_cli_crt_ec_der[]; -extern const unsigned char mbedtls_test_cli_key_ec_der[]; -extern const unsigned char mbedtls_test_cli_key_rsa_der[]; -extern const unsigned char mbedtls_test_cli_crt_rsa_der[]; - -extern const size_t mbedtls_test_cli_crt_ec_pem_len; -extern const size_t mbedtls_test_cli_key_ec_pem_len; -extern const size_t mbedtls_test_cli_pwd_ec_pem_len; -extern const size_t mbedtls_test_cli_key_rsa_pem_len; -extern const size_t mbedtls_test_cli_pwd_rsa_pem_len; -extern const size_t mbedtls_test_cli_crt_rsa_pem_len; - -extern const size_t mbedtls_test_cli_crt_ec_der_len; -extern const size_t mbedtls_test_cli_key_ec_der_len; -extern const size_t mbedtls_test_cli_key_rsa_der_len; -extern const size_t mbedtls_test_cli_crt_rsa_der_len; - -/* Config-dependent dispatch between PEM and DER encoding - * (PEM if enabled, otherwise DER) */ - -extern const char mbedtls_test_cli_crt_ec[]; -extern const char mbedtls_test_cli_key_ec[]; -extern const char mbedtls_test_cli_pwd_ec[]; -extern const char mbedtls_test_cli_key_rsa[]; -extern const char mbedtls_test_cli_pwd_rsa[]; -extern const char mbedtls_test_cli_crt_rsa[]; - -extern const size_t mbedtls_test_cli_crt_ec_len; -extern const size_t mbedtls_test_cli_key_ec_len; -extern const size_t mbedtls_test_cli_pwd_ec_len; -extern const size_t mbedtls_test_cli_key_rsa_len; -extern const size_t mbedtls_test_cli_pwd_rsa_len; -extern const size_t mbedtls_test_cli_crt_rsa_len; - -/* Config-dependent dispatch between EC and RSA - * (RSA if enabled, otherwise EC) */ - -extern const char *mbedtls_test_cli_crt; -extern const char *mbedtls_test_cli_key; -extern const char *mbedtls_test_cli_pwd; -extern const size_t mbedtls_test_cli_crt_len; -extern const size_t mbedtls_test_cli_key_len; -extern const size_t mbedtls_test_cli_pwd_len; - -#ifdef __cplusplus -} -#endif - -#endif /* certs.h */ diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/chacha20.h b/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/chacha20.h index 0c0d6a1157a2..680fe360461e 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/chacha20.h +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/chacha20.h @@ -19,12 +19,9 @@ #ifndef MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_H #define MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_H +#include "mbedtls/private_access.h" -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "mbedtls/build_info.h" #include #include @@ -32,16 +29,6 @@ /** Invalid input parameter(s). */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_CHACHA20_BAD_INPUT_DATA -0x0051 -/* MBEDTLS_ERR_CHACHA20_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE is deprecated and should not be - * used. */ -/** Feature not available. For example, s part of the API is not implemented. */ -#define MBEDTLS_ERR_CHACHA20_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE -0x0053 - -/* MBEDTLS_ERR_CHACHA20_HW_ACCEL_FAILED is deprecated and should not be used. - */ -/** Chacha20 hardware accelerator failed. */ -#define MBEDTLS_ERR_CHACHA20_HW_ACCEL_FAILED -0x0055 - #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { #endif @@ -49,9 +36,9 @@ extern "C" { #if !defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_ALT) typedef struct mbedtls_chacha20_context { - uint32_t state[16]; /*! The state (before round operations). */ - uint8_t keystream8[64]; /*! Leftover keystream bytes. */ - size_t keystream_bytes_used; /*! Number of keystream bytes already used. */ + uint32_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(state)[16]; /*! The state (before round operations). */ + uint8_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(keystream8)[64]; /*! Leftover keystream bytes. */ + size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(keystream_bytes_used); /*! Number of keystream bytes already used. */ } mbedtls_chacha20_context; diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/chachapoly.h b/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/chachapoly.h index 1156d7db81bc..3dc21e380b00 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/chachapoly.h +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/chachapoly.h @@ -19,12 +19,9 @@ #ifndef MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_H #define MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_H +#include "mbedtls/private_access.h" -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "mbedtls/build_info.h" /* for shared error codes */ #include "mbedtls/poly1305.h" @@ -49,12 +46,12 @@ mbedtls_chachapoly_mode_t; #include "mbedtls/chacha20.h" typedef struct mbedtls_chachapoly_context { - mbedtls_chacha20_context chacha20_ctx; /**< The ChaCha20 context. */ - mbedtls_poly1305_context poly1305_ctx; /**< The Poly1305 context. */ - uint64_t aad_len; /**< The length (bytes) of the Additional Authenticated Data. */ - uint64_t ciphertext_len; /**< The length (bytes) of the ciphertext. */ - int state; /**< The current state of the context. */ - mbedtls_chachapoly_mode_t mode; /**< Cipher mode (encrypt or decrypt). */ + mbedtls_chacha20_context MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(chacha20_ctx); /**< The ChaCha20 context. */ + mbedtls_poly1305_context MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(poly1305_ctx); /**< The Poly1305 context. */ + uint64_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(aad_len); /**< The length (bytes) of the Additional Authenticated Data. */ + uint64_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(ciphertext_len); /**< The length (bytes) of the ciphertext. */ + int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(state); /**< The current state of the context. */ + mbedtls_chachapoly_mode_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(mode); /**< Cipher mode (encrypt or decrypt). */ } mbedtls_chachapoly_context; diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/check_config.h b/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/check_config.h index 96081feb6a5e..b3c038dd2e93 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/check_config.h +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/check_config.h @@ -8,11 +8,6 @@ * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later */ -/* - * It is recommended to include this file from your config.h - * in order to catch dependency issues early. - */ - #ifndef MBEDTLS_CHECK_CONFIG_H #define MBEDTLS_CHECK_CONFIG_H @@ -26,23 +21,15 @@ #error "Mbed TLS requires a platform with 8-bit chars" #endif -#if defined(_WIN32) +#include + +#if defined(__MINGW32__) || (defined(_MSC_VER) && _MSC_VER <= 1900) #if !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) #error "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C is required on Windows" #endif - -/* Fix the config here. Not convenient to put an #ifdef _WIN32 in config.h as - * it would confuse config.py. */ -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SNPRINTF_ALT) && \ - !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SNPRINTF_MACRO) -#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SNPRINTF_ALT -#endif - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_VSNPRINTF_ALT) && \ - !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_VSNPRINTF_MACRO) -#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_VSNPRINTF_ALT -#endif -#endif /* _WIN32 */ +/* See auto-enabling SNPRINTF_ALT and VSNPRINTF_ALT + * in * config_adjust_legacy_crypto.h */ +#endif /* _MINGW32__ || (_MSC_VER && (_MSC_VER <= 1900)) */ #if defined(TARGET_LIKE_MBED) && defined(MBEDTLS_NET_C) #error "The NET module is not available for mbed OS - please use the network functions provided by Mbed OS" @@ -57,7 +44,49 @@ #error "MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE without MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME does not make sense" #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) +/* Limitations on ECC key types acceleration: if we have any of `PUBLIC_KEY`, + * `KEY_PAIR_BASIC`, `KEY_PAIR_IMPORT`, `KEY_PAIR_EXPORT` then we must have + * all 4 of them. + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_BASIC) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY) || \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_BASIC) || \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT) || \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT) +#error "Unsupported partial support for ECC key type acceleration, see docs/driver-only-builds.md" +#endif /* not all of public, basic, import, export */ +#endif /* one of public, basic, import, export */ + +/* Limitations on ECC curves acceleration: partial curve acceleration is only + * supported with crypto excluding PK, X.509 or TLS. + * Note: no need to check X.509 as it depends on PK. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_256) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_384) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_512) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_MONTGOMERY_255) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_MONTGOMERY_448) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_SECP_K1_192) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_SECP_K1_224) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_SECP_K1_256) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_SECP_R1_192) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_SECP_R1_224) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_SECP_R1_256) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_SECP_R1_384) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_SECP_R1_521) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ECC_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_CURVES) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_C) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C) +#error "Unsupported partial support for ECC curves acceleration, see docs/driver-only-builds.md" +#endif /* modules beyond what's supported */ +#endif /* not all curves accelerated */ +#endif /* some curve accelerated */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C) && !(defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) || \ + (defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT) && defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES) && \ + defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING))) #error "MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif @@ -65,12 +94,8 @@ #error "MBEDTLS_DHM_C defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC_COMPAT) && !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC) -#error "MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC_COMPAT defined, but not all prerequisites" -#endif - #if defined(MBEDTLS_CMAC_C) && \ - !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_DES_C) + ( !defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C ) || ( !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_DES_C) ) ) #error "MBEDTLS_CMAC_C defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif @@ -79,6 +104,36 @@ #error "MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT) && defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG) +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING) +#error "MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT and PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING cannot be defined simultaneously" +#endif +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_PKCS7) +#error "MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT and PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_PKCS7 cannot be defined simultaneously" +#endif +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING) +#error "MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT and PSA_WANT_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING cannot be defined simultaneously" +#endif +#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES) +#error "MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT and PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES cannot be defined simultaneously" +#endif +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) +#error "MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT and MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC cannot be defined simultaneously" +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS) +#error "MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT and MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS cannot be defined simultaneously" +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DES_C) +#error "MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT and MBEDTLS_DES_C cannot be defined simultaneously" +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C) +#error "MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT and MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C cannot be defined simultaneously" +#endif +#endif + #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) #error "MBEDTLS_ECDH_C defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif @@ -101,31 +156,29 @@ #error "MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_C) && \ - ( !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_MD_C) ) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SIGN) && !defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_C) +#error "MBEDTLS_PK_C with MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO needs MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_C for ECDSA signature" +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_VERIFY) && !defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C) +#error "MBEDTLS_PK_C with MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO needs MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C for ECDSA verification" +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_C && MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_C) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) #error "MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_C defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) && \ - ( defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_COMPUTE_SHARED_ALT) || \ + ( defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_COMPUTE_SHARED_ALT) || \ defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_GEN_PUBLIC_ALT) || \ defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_SIGN_ALT) || \ defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_VERIFY_ALT) || \ defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_GENKEY_ALT) || \ defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT) || \ defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_ALT) ) -#error "MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE defined, but it cannot coexist with an alternative or PSA-based ECP implementation" -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) && \ - ! defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_LEGACY_CONTEXT) -#error "MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE defined, but not MBEDTLS_ECDH_LEGACY_CONTEXT" -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_EVEREST_ENABLED) && \ - defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_LEGACY_CONTEXT) -#error "MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_EVEREST_ENABLED defined, but MBEDTLS_ECDH_LEGACY_CONTEXT not disabled" +#error "MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE defined, but it cannot coexist with an alternative ECP implementation" #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) && \ @@ -137,7 +190,7 @@ #error "MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) && ( !defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) || ( \ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_LIGHT) && ( !defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) || ( \ !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED) && \ !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED) && \ !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED) && \ @@ -151,78 +204,46 @@ !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED) && \ !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED) && \ !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED) ) ) -#error "MBEDTLS_ECP_C defined, but not all prerequisites" -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) && !( \ - defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_ALT) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG)) -#error "MBEDTLS_ECP_C requires a DRBG module unless MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG is defined or an alternative implementation is used" +#error "MBEDTLS_ECP_C defined (or a subset enabled), but not all prerequisites" #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C) -#error "MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C defined, but not all prerequisites" -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_MD_C) -#error "MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C defined, but not all prerequisites" -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C) && (!defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) && \ - !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C)) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C) && \ + !(defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA512) || defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256)) #error "MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) && \ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C) && \ defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN) && (MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN > 64) #error "MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN value too high" #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C) && \ - ( !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_FORCE_SHA256) ) \ + (defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_FORCE_SHA256) || !defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA512)) \ && defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN) && (MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN > 32) #error "MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN value too high" #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C) && \ - defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_FORCE_SHA256) && !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) + defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_FORCE_SHA256) && !defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) #error "MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_FORCE_SHA256 defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif #if defined(__has_feature) #if __has_feature(memory_sanitizer) -#define MBEDTLS_HAS_MEMSAN +#define MBEDTLS_HAS_MEMSAN // #undef at the end of this paragraph #endif #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_CONSTANT_FLOW_MEMSAN) && !defined(MBEDTLS_HAS_MEMSAN) #error "MBEDTLS_TEST_CONSTANT_FLOW_MEMSAN requires building with MemorySanitizer" #endif -#undef MBEDTLS_HAS_MEMSAN - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_NULL_ENTROPY) && \ - ( !defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_NO_DEFAULT_ENTROPY_SOURCES) ) -#error "MBEDTLS_TEST_NULL_ENTROPY defined, but not all prerequisites" -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_NULL_ENTROPY) && \ - ( defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_NV_SEED) || defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_HARDWARE_ALT) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_HAVEGE_C) ) -#error "MBEDTLS_TEST_NULL_ENTROPY defined, but entropy sources too" -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C) && ( \ - !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_ARIA_C) ) -#error "MBEDTLS_CCM_C defined, but not all prerequisites" -#endif +#undef MBEDTLS_HAS_MEMSAN // temporary macro defined above -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C) && \ + !(defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_GCM_CAN_AES) || defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_GCM_CAN_ARIA) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_GCM_CAN_CAMELLIA)) #error "MBEDTLS_CCM_C defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) && ( \ - !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_ARIA_C) ) -#error "MBEDTLS_GCM_C defined, but not all prerequisites" -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) && \ + !(defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_GCM_CAN_AES) || defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_GCM_CAN_ARIA) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_GCM_CAN_CAMELLIA)) #error "MBEDTLS_GCM_C defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif @@ -270,10 +291,6 @@ #error "MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_FALLBACK defined, but no alternative implementation enabled" #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVEGE_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_TIMING_C) -#error "MBEDTLS_HAVEGE_C defined, but not all prerequisites" -#endif - #if defined(MBEDTLS_HKDF_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_MD_C) #error "MBEDTLS_HKDF_C defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif @@ -283,13 +300,14 @@ #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED) && \ - ( !defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) || \ + ( !defined(MBEDTLS_CAN_ECDH) || \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SIGN) || \ !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) ) #error "MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED) && \ - ( !defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) || \ + ( !defined(MBEDTLS_CAN_ECDH) || !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) || \ !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) ) #error "MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif @@ -299,7 +317,7 @@ #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED) && \ - !defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) + !defined(MBEDTLS_CAN_ECDH) #error "MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif @@ -310,13 +328,14 @@ #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED) && \ - ( !defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) || \ + ( !defined(MBEDTLS_CAN_ECDH) || !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) || \ !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15) ) #error "MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED) && \ - ( !defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) || \ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED) && \ + ( !defined(MBEDTLS_CAN_ECDH) || \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SIGN) || \ !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) ) #error "MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif @@ -333,18 +352,58 @@ #error "MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) && \ - ( !defined(MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) || \ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) && \ + ( !defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_JPAKE) || \ + !defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_BASIC) || \ + !defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256) ) +#error "MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif +#else /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) && \ + ( !defined(MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_C) || \ !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED) ) #error "MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + +/* Use of EC J-PAKE in TLS requires SHA-256. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) +#error "MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) && \ - !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) && \ - ( !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) && \ - !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) && \ - !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) ) -#error "!MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE requires MBEDTLS_SHA512_C, MBEDTLS_SHA256_C or MBEDTLS_SHA1_C" + !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA512) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1) +#error "!MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE requires SHA-512, SHA-256 or SHA-1". +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_C) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_MD5) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_RIPEMD160) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA224) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA512) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA3_224) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA3_256) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA3_384) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA3_512) +#error "MBEDTLS_MD_C defined, but no hash algorithm" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_LMS_C) && \ + ! ( defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT) && defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256) ) +#error "MBEDTLS_LMS_C requires MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C and PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_LMS_PRIVATE) && \ + ( !defined(MBEDTLS_LMS_C) ) +#error "MBEDTLS_LMS_PRIVATE requires MBEDTLS_LMS_C" #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC_C) && \ @@ -360,10 +419,6 @@ #error "MBEDTLS_MEMORY_DEBUG defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM) -#error "MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_C defined, but not all prerequisites" -#endif - #if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_BASE64_C) #error "MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif @@ -373,30 +428,24 @@ #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_C) && \ - ( !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) ) + !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS) #error "MBEDTLS_PK_C defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PK_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C) && \ + (!defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C) || \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_OID_C) || \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_PK_C)) #error "MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PK_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C) && \ + (!defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_C) || \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_OID_C) || \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_PK_C)) #error "MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS11_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PK_C) -#error "MBEDTLS_PKCS11_C defined, but not all prerequisites" -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS11_C) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) -#error "MBEDTLS_PKCS11_C is deprecated and will be removed in a future version of Mbed TLS" -#elif defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING) -#warning "MBEDTLS_PKCS11_C is deprecated and will be removed in a future version of Mbed TLS" -#endif -#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS11_C */ - #if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_EXIT_ALT) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) #error "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_EXIT_ALT defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif @@ -411,6 +460,20 @@ #error "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_EXIT_MACRO and MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_EXIT/MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_EXIT_ALT cannot be defined simultaneously" #endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SETBUF_ALT) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) +#error "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SETBUF_ALT defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SETBUF_MACRO) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) +#error "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SETBUF_MACRO defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SETBUF_MACRO) &&\ + ( defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_SETBUF) ||\ + defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SETBUF_ALT) ) +#error "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SETBUF_MACRO and MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_SETBUF/MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SETBUF_ALT cannot be defined simultaneously" +#endif + #if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_TIME_ALT) &&\ ( !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) ||\ !defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) ) @@ -423,6 +486,16 @@ #error "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_TIME_MACRO defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_MS_TIME_TYPE_MACRO) &&\ + ( !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) ) +#error "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_MS_TIME_TYPE_MACRO defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_MS_TIME_ALT) && \ + ( !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) ) +#error "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_MS_TIME_ALT defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + #if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_TIME_TYPE_MACRO) &&\ ( !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) ||\ !defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) ) @@ -607,6 +680,11 @@ #error "MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C defined, but not all prerequisites (missing RNG)" #endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) && defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_BLOCK_MODE) && \ + defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_BLOCK_CIPHER) && !defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C) +#error "MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + #if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SPM) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) #error "MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SPM defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif @@ -617,6 +695,14 @@ #error "MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) +#error "MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C is deprecated and will be removed in a future version of Mbed TLS" +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING) +#warning "MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C is deprecated and will be removed in a future version of Mbed TLS" +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C */ + #if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C) && \ ! defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) #error "MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C defined, but not all prerequisites" @@ -643,22 +729,6 @@ #error "MBEDTLS_PSA_ITS_FILE_C defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_KEY_ID_ENCODES_OWNER) && \ - defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) -#error "MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_KEY_ID_ENCODES_OWNER defined, but it cannot coexist with MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO." -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && \ - !defined(MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) -#error "MBEDTLS_PK_C in configuration with MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO and \ - MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C requires MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C to be defined." -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) && \ - !( defined(MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C) ) -#error "MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C with MBEDTLS_RSA_C requires MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C and MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C" -#endif - #if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) && ( !defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) || \ !defined(MBEDTLS_OID_C) ) #error "MBEDTLS_RSA_C defined, but not all prerequisites" @@ -674,37 +744,82 @@ #error "MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384) && !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) -#error "MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 defined without MBEDTLS_SHA512_C" +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_USE_A64_CRYPTO_IF_PRESENT) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_USE_A64_CRYPTO_ONLY) +#error "Must only define one of MBEDTLS_SHA512_USE_A64_CRYPTO_*" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_USE_A64_CRYPTO_IF_PRESENT) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_USE_A64_CRYPTO_ONLY) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) +#error "MBEDTLS_SHA512_USE_A64_CRYPTO_* defined without MBEDTLS_SHA512_C" +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_ALT) || defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_PROCESS_ALT) +#error "MBEDTLS_SHA512_*ALT can't be used with MBEDTLS_SHA512_USE_A64_CRYPTO_*" +#endif + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_USE_A64_CRYPTO_IF_PRESENT || MBEDTLS_SHA512_USE_A64_CRYPTO_ONLY */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_USE_A64_CRYPTO_ONLY) && !defined(__aarch64__) +#error "MBEDTLS_SHA512_USE_A64_CRYPTO_ONLY defined on non-Aarch64 system" #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) && ( !defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C) || \ - !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) ) -#error "MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 defined, but not all prerequisites" +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_USE_ARMV8_A_CRYPTO_IF_PRESENT) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_USE_ARMV8_A_CRYPTO_ONLY) +#error "Must only define one of MBEDTLS_SHA256_USE_ARMV8_A_CRYPTO_*" #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) && ( !defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C) || \ - !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) ) -#error "MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 defined, but not all prerequisites" +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_USE_ARMV8_A_CRYPTO_IF_PRESENT) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_USE_ARMV8_A_CRYPTO_ONLY) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) +#error "MBEDTLS_SHA256_USE_ARMV8_A_CRYPTO_* defined without MBEDTLS_SHA256_C" +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_ALT) || defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_PROCESS_ALT) +#error "MBEDTLS_SHA256_*ALT can't be used with MBEDTLS_SHA256_USE_ARMV8_A_CRYPTO_*" #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) && ( !defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C) || \ - !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) ) -#error "MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && ( !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) && \ - !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) ) -#error "MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 defined, but not all prerequisites" +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_USE_ARMV8_A_CRYPTO_ONLY) && !defined(MBEDTLS_ARCH_IS_ARMV8_A) +#error "MBEDTLS_SHA256_USE_ARMV8_A_CRYPTO_ONLY defined on non-Armv8-A system" #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL) && ( !defined(MBEDTLS_HKDF_C) && \ - !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) ) -#error "MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL defined, but not all prerequisites" +/* TLS 1.3 requires separate HKDF parts from PSA, + * and at least one ciphersuite, so at least SHA-256 or SHA-384 + * from PSA to use with HKDF. + * + * Note: for dependencies common with TLS 1.2 (running handshake hash), + * see MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) && \ + !(defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT) && \ + defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT) && \ + defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF_EXPAND) && \ + (defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256) || defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384))) +#error "MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED) +#if !( (defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH) || defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH)) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) && \ + ( defined(MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SIGN) || defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21) ) ) +#error "MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED) +#if !( defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH) || defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH) ) +#error "MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif +#endif + +/* + * The current implementation of TLS 1.3 requires MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE. + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) && !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) +#error "MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 defined without MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE" #endif -#if (defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)) && \ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && \ !(defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED) || \ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \ @@ -720,8 +835,21 @@ "but no key exchange methods defined with MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_xxxx" #endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) && \ + ( !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) || \ + ( !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_ENABLED) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED) ) ) +#error "MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_EARLY_DATA_SIZE) && \ + ((MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_EARLY_DATA_SIZE < 0) || \ + (MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_EARLY_DATA_SIZE > UINT32_MAX)) +#error "MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_EARLY_DATA_SIZE must be in the range(0..UINT32_MAX)" +#endif + #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) && \ - !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) && \ !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) #error "MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif @@ -730,35 +858,36 @@ #error "MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C) && ( !defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C) || \ - !defined(MBEDTLS_MD_C) ) -#error "MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C defined, but not all prerequisites" +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE) && !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) +#error "MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C) -#error "MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C defined, but not all prerequisites" +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C) && !(defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)) +#error "MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C) && (!defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) && \ - !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) && !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) && \ - !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)) -#error "MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C defined, but no protocols are active" +/* TLS 1.2 and 1.3 require SHA-256 or SHA-384 (running handshake hash) */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +#if !(defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256) || defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384)) +#error "MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C) && (defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) && \ - defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) && !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1)) -#error "Illegal protocol selection" +#else /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_MD_C) || \ + !(defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) || defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384)) +#error "MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C) && (defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) && \ - defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1)) -#error "Illegal protocol selection" +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C) +#error "MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C) && (defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) && \ - defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && (!defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || \ - !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1))) -#error "Illegal protocol selection" +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C) && \ + !( defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) ) +#error "MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C defined, but no protocols are active" #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY) && !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) @@ -792,37 +921,48 @@ #error "MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX too large (max 255)" #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_BADMAC_LIMIT) && \ - ( !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) ) -#error "MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_BADMAC_LIMIT defined, but not all prerequisites" +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID_COMPAT) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) +#error "MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID_COMPAT defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID_COMPAT) && MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID_COMPAT != 0 +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) +#error "MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID_COMPAT is deprecated and will be removed in a future version of Mbed TLS" +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING) +#warning "MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID_COMPAT is deprecated and will be removed in a future version of Mbed TLS" +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID_COMPAT && MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID_COMPAT != 0 */ + #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) && \ - !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) && \ - !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) && \ !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) #error "MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET) && \ - !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) && \ - !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) && \ !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) #error "MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TICKET_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) +#error "MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TICKET_C) && ( !defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) ) #error "MBEDTLS_SSL_TICKET_C defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TICKET_C) && \ - !( defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C) ) + !( defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CCM) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CHACHAPOLY) ) #error "MBEDTLS_SSL_TICKET_C defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING) && \ - !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) && !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) -#error "MBEDTLS_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING defined, but not all prerequisites" +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_TICKET_NONCE_LENGTH) && \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_TICKET_NONCE_LENGTH >= 256 +#error "MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_TICKET_NONCE_LENGTH must be less than 256" #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) && \ @@ -834,22 +974,20 @@ #if !defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_IMPL) #error "MBEDTLS_THREADING_PTHREAD defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif -#define MBEDTLS_THREADING_IMPL +#define MBEDTLS_THREADING_IMPL // undef at the end of this paragraph #endif - #if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_ALT) #if !defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_IMPL) #error "MBEDTLS_THREADING_ALT defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif -#define MBEDTLS_THREADING_IMPL +#define MBEDTLS_THREADING_IMPL // undef at the end of this paragraph #endif - #if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_IMPL) #error "MBEDTLS_THREADING_C defined, single threading implementation required" #endif -#undef MBEDTLS_THREADING_IMPL +#undef MBEDTLS_THREADING_IMPL // temporary macro defined above -#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT) #error "MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif @@ -857,22 +995,20 @@ #error "MBEDTLS_VERSION_FEATURES defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C) && ( !defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) || \ - !defined(MBEDTLS_OID_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C) || \ - !defined(MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C) ) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C) && \ + (!defined(MBEDTLS_OID_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C) || \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C) || \ + ( !defined(MBEDTLS_MD_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) ) ) #error "MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CREATE_C) && ( !defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) || \ - !defined(MBEDTLS_OID_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_C) || \ - !defined(MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C) ) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CREATE_C) && \ + (!defined(MBEDTLS_OID_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_C) || \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C) || \ + ( !defined(MBEDTLS_MD_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) ) ) #error "MBEDTLS_X509_CREATE_C defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CERTS_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C) -#error "MBEDTLS_CERTS_C defined, but not all prerequisites" -#endif - #if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) && ( !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C) ) #error "MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif @@ -893,6 +1029,11 @@ #error "MBEDTLS_X509_CSR_WRITE_C defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK) && \ + ( !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) ) +#error "MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + #if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT32) && defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT64) #error "MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT32 and MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT64 cannot be defined simultaneously" #endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT32 && MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT64 */ @@ -902,30 +1043,6 @@ #error "MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT32/MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT64 and MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM cannot be defined simultaneously" #endif /* (MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT32 || MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT64) && MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) -#error "MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 is deprecated and will be removed in a future version of Mbed TLS" -#elif defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING) -#warning "MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 is deprecated and will be removed in a future version of Mbed TLS" -#endif -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_SUPPORT_SSLV2_CLIENT_HELLO) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) -#error "MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_SUPPORT_SSLV2_CLIENT_HELLO is deprecated and will be removed in a future version of Mbed TLS" -#elif defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING) -#warning "MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_SUPPORT_SSLV2_CLIENT_HELLO is deprecated and will be removed in a future version of Mbed TLS" -#endif -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_SUPPORT_SSLV2_CLIENT_HELLO */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) -#error "MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL is deprecated and will be removed in a future version of Mbed TLS" -#elif defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING) -#warning "MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL is deprecated and will be removed in a future version of Mbed TLS" -#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL */ - #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP) && ( !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) ) #error "MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif @@ -934,10 +1051,71 @@ #error "MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CONTEXT_SERIALIZATION) && !( defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C) ) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT) && ( !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) ) +#error "MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CONTEXT_SERIALIZATION) && \ + !( defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CCM) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CHACHAPOLY) ) #error "MBEDTLS_SSL_CONTEXT_SERIALIZATION defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif +/* Reject attempts to enable options that have been removed and that could + * cause a build to succeed but with features removed. */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVEGE_C) //no-check-names +#error "MBEDTLS_HAVEGE_C was removed in Mbed TLS 3.0. See https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/issues/2599" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL) //no-check-names +#error "MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL was removed in Mbed TLS 3.0. See https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/issues/4031" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) //no-check-names +#error "MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 (SSL v3.0 support) was removed in Mbed TLS 3.0. See https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/issues/4031" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_SUPPORT_SSLV2_CLIENT_HELLO) //no-check-names +#error "MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_SUPPORT_SSLV2_CLIENT_HELLO (SSL v2 ClientHello support) was removed in Mbed TLS 3.0. See https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/issues/4031" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC_COMPAT) //no-check-names +#error "MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC_COMPAT (compatibility with the buggy implementation of truncated HMAC in Mbed TLS up to 2.7) was removed in Mbed TLS 3.0. See https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/issues/4031" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TLS_DEFAULT_ALLOW_SHA1_IN_CERTIFICATES) //no-check-names +#error "MBEDTLS_TLS_DEFAULT_ALLOW_SHA1_IN_CERTIFICATES was removed in Mbed TLS 3.0. See the ChangeLog entry if you really need SHA-1-signed certificates." +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT) //no-check-names +#error "MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT was removed in Mbed TLS 3.0. See https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/issues/4031" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CHECK_PARAMS) //no-check-names +#error "MBEDTLS_CHECK_PARAMS was removed in Mbed TLS 3.0. See https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/issues/4313" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_PADDING_GRANULARITY) //no-check-names +#error "MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_PADDING_GRANULARITY was removed in Mbed TLS 3.0. See https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/issues/4335" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_PADDING_GRANULARITY) //no-check-names +#error "MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_PADDING_GRANULARITY was removed in Mbed TLS 3.0. See https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/issues/4335" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC) //no-check-names +#error "MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC was removed in Mbed TLS 3.0. See https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/issues/4341" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS7_C) && ( ( !defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C) ) || \ + ( !defined(MBEDTLS_OID_C) ) || ( !defined(MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C) ) || \ + ( !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) ) || \ + ( !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRL_PARSE_C) ) || \ + ( !defined(MBEDTLS_MD_C) ) ) +#error "MBEDTLS_PKCS7_C is defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + /* * Avoid warning from -pedantic. This is a convenient place for this * workaround since this is included by every single file before the diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/cipher.h b/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/cipher.h index db73c1b537ee..1dc31c9c2419 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/cipher.h +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/cipher.h @@ -14,12 +14,9 @@ #ifndef MBEDTLS_CIPHER_H #define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_H +#include "mbedtls/private_access.h" -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "mbedtls/build_info.h" #include #include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" @@ -32,16 +29,11 @@ #define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_WITH_PADDING #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARC4_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER) || \ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER) || \ defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_C) #define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_STREAM #endif -#if (defined(__ARMCC_VERSION) || defined(_MSC_VER)) && \ - !defined(inline) && !defined(__cplusplus) -#define inline __inline -#endif - /** The selected feature is not available. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE -0x6080 /** Bad input parameters. */ @@ -57,10 +49,6 @@ /** The context is invalid. For example, because it was freed. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_INVALID_CONTEXT -0x6380 -/* MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_HW_ACCEL_FAILED is deprecated and should not be used. */ -/** Cipher hardware accelerator failed. */ -#define MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_HW_ACCEL_FAILED -0x6400 - #define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_IV_LEN 0x01 /**< Cipher accepts IVs of variable length. */ #define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_KEY_LEN 0x02 /**< Cipher accepts keys of variable length. */ @@ -71,7 +59,7 @@ extern "C" { /** * \brief Supported cipher types. * - * \warning RC4 and DES/3DES are considered weak ciphers and their use + * \warning DES/3DES are considered weak ciphers and their use * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering stronger * ciphers instead. */ @@ -82,8 +70,6 @@ typedef enum { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_DES, /**< The DES cipher. \warning DES is considered weak. */ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_3DES, /**< The Triple DES cipher. \warning 3DES is considered weak. */ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_CAMELLIA, /**< The Camellia cipher. */ - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_BLOWFISH, /**< The Blowfish cipher. */ - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_ARC4, /**< The RC4 cipher. */ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_ARIA, /**< The Aria cipher. */ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_CHACHA20, /**< The ChaCha20 cipher. */ } mbedtls_cipher_id_t; @@ -91,7 +77,7 @@ typedef enum { /** * \brief Supported {cipher type, cipher mode} pairs. * - * \warning RC4 and DES/3DES are considered weak ciphers and their use + * \warning DES/3DES are considered weak ciphers and their use * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering stronger * ciphers instead. */ @@ -134,17 +120,18 @@ typedef enum { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE_CBC, /**< DES cipher with EDE CBC mode. \warning 3DES is considered weak. */ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_ECB, /**< DES cipher with EDE3 ECB mode. \warning 3DES is considered weak. */ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC, /**< DES cipher with EDE3 CBC mode. \warning 3DES is considered weak. */ - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_ECB, /**< Blowfish cipher with ECB mode. */ - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC, /**< Blowfish cipher with CBC mode. */ - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CFB64, /**< Blowfish cipher with CFB64 mode. */ - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CTR, /**< Blowfish cipher with CTR mode. */ - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128, /**< RC4 cipher with 128-bit mode. */ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM, /**< AES cipher with 128-bit CCM mode. */ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM, /**< AES cipher with 192-bit CCM mode. */ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM, /**< AES cipher with 256-bit CCM mode. */ + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG, /**< AES cipher with 128-bit CCM_STAR_NO_TAG mode. */ + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG, /**< AES cipher with 192-bit CCM_STAR_NO_TAG mode. */ + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG, /**< AES cipher with 256-bit CCM_STAR_NO_TAG mode. */ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CCM, /**< Camellia cipher with 128-bit CCM mode. */ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CCM, /**< Camellia cipher with 192-bit CCM mode. */ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CCM, /**< Camellia cipher with 256-bit CCM mode. */ + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG, /**< Camellia cipher with 128-bit CCM_STAR_NO_TAG mode. */ + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG, /**< Camellia cipher with 192-bit CCM_STAR_NO_TAG mode. */ + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG, /**< Camellia cipher with 256-bit CCM_STAR_NO_TAG mode. */ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_ECB, /**< Aria cipher with 128-bit key and ECB mode. */ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_ECB, /**< Aria cipher with 192-bit key and ECB mode. */ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_ECB, /**< Aria cipher with 256-bit key and ECB mode. */ @@ -163,6 +150,9 @@ typedef enum { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CCM, /**< Aria cipher with 128-bit key and CCM mode. */ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CCM, /**< Aria cipher with 192-bit key and CCM mode. */ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CCM, /**< Aria cipher with 256-bit key and CCM mode. */ + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG, /**< Aria cipher with 128-bit key and CCM_STAR_NO_TAG mode. */ + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG, /**< Aria cipher with 192-bit key and CCM_STAR_NO_TAG mode. */ + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG, /**< Aria cipher with 256-bit key and CCM_STAR_NO_TAG mode. */ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_OFB, /**< AES 128-bit cipher in OFB mode. */ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_OFB, /**< AES 192-bit cipher in OFB mode. */ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_OFB, /**< AES 256-bit cipher in OFB mode. */ @@ -189,6 +179,7 @@ typedef enum { MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM, /**< The GCM cipher mode. */ MBEDTLS_MODE_STREAM, /**< The stream cipher mode. */ MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM, /**< The CCM cipher mode. */ + MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG, /**< The CCM*-no-tag cipher mode. */ MBEDTLS_MODE_XTS, /**< The XTS cipher mode. */ MBEDTLS_MODE_CHACHAPOLY, /**< The ChaCha-Poly cipher mode. */ MBEDTLS_MODE_KW, /**< The SP800-38F KW mode */ @@ -225,13 +216,13 @@ enum { /** Maximum length of any IV, in Bytes. */ /* This should ideally be derived automatically from list of ciphers. * This should be kept in sync with MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_IV_LENGTH defined - * in ssl_internal.h. */ + * in library/ssl_misc.h. */ #define MBEDTLS_MAX_IV_LENGTH 16 /** Maximum block size of any cipher, in Bytes. */ /* This should ideally be derived automatically from list of ciphers. * This should be kept in sync with MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH defined - * in ssl_internal.h. */ + * in library/ssl_misc.h. */ #define MBEDTLS_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH 16 /** Maximum key length, in Bytes. */ @@ -239,7 +230,7 @@ enum { * For now, only check whether XTS is enabled which uses 64 Byte keys, * and use 32 Bytes as an upper bound for the maximum key length otherwise. * This should be kept in sync with MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH defined - * in ssl_internal.h, which however deliberately ignores the case of XTS + * in library/ssl_misc.h, which however deliberately ignores the case of XTS * since the latter isn't used in SSL/TLS. */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS) #define MBEDTLS_MAX_KEY_LENGTH 64 @@ -260,90 +251,110 @@ typedef struct mbedtls_cmac_context_t mbedtls_cmac_context_t; /** * Cipher information. Allows calling cipher functions * in a generic way. + * + * \note The library does not support custom cipher info structures, + * only built-in structures returned by the functions + * mbedtls_cipher_info_from_string(), + * mbedtls_cipher_info_from_type(), + * mbedtls_cipher_info_from_values(), + * mbedtls_cipher_info_from_psa(). + * + * \note Some fields store a value that has been right-shifted to save + * code-size, so should not be used directly. The accessor + * functions adjust for this and return the "natural" value. */ typedef struct mbedtls_cipher_info_t { - /** Full cipher identifier. For example, - * MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC. - */ - mbedtls_cipher_type_t type; + /** Name of the cipher. */ + const char *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(name); - /** The cipher mode. For example, MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC. */ - mbedtls_cipher_mode_t mode; + /** The block size, in bytes. */ + unsigned int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(block_size) : 5; - /** The cipher key length, in bits. This is the - * default length for variable sized ciphers. + /** IV or nonce size, in bytes (right shifted by #MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT). + * For ciphers that accept variable IV sizes, + * this is the recommended size. + */ + unsigned int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(iv_size) : 3; + + /** The cipher key length, in bits (right shifted by #MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT). + * This is the default length for variable sized ciphers. * Includes parity bits for ciphers like DES. */ - unsigned int key_bitlen; + unsigned int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(key_bitlen) : 4; - /** Name of the cipher. */ - const char *name; + /** The cipher mode (as per mbedtls_cipher_mode_t). + * For example, MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC. + */ + unsigned int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(mode) : 4; - /** IV or nonce size, in Bytes. - * For ciphers that accept variable IV sizes, - * this is the recommended size. + /** Full cipher identifier (as per mbedtls_cipher_type_t). + * For example, MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC. + * + * This could be 7 bits, but 8 bits retains byte alignment for the + * next field, which reduces code size to access that field. */ - unsigned int iv_size; + unsigned int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(type) : 8; /** Bitflag comprised of MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_IV_LEN and * MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_KEY_LEN indicating whether the * cipher supports variable IV or variable key sizes, respectively. */ - int flags; - - /** The block size, in Bytes. */ - unsigned int block_size; + unsigned int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(flags) : 2; - /** Struct for base cipher information and functions. */ - const mbedtls_cipher_base_t *base; + /** Index to LUT for base cipher information and functions. */ + unsigned int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(base_idx) : 5; } mbedtls_cipher_info_t; +/* For internal use only. + * These are used to more compactly represent the fields above. */ +#define MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT 6 +#define MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT 2 /** * Generic cipher context. */ typedef struct mbedtls_cipher_context_t { /** Information about the associated cipher. */ - const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *cipher_info; + const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(cipher_info); /** Key length to use. */ - int key_bitlen; + int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(key_bitlen); /** Operation that the key of the context has been * initialized for. */ - mbedtls_operation_t operation; + mbedtls_operation_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(operation); #if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_WITH_PADDING) /** Padding functions to use, if relevant for * the specific cipher mode. */ - void (*add_padding)(unsigned char *output, size_t olen, size_t data_len); - int (*get_padding)(unsigned char *input, size_t ilen, size_t *data_len); + void(*MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(add_padding))(unsigned char *output, size_t olen, size_t data_len); + int(*MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(get_padding))(unsigned char *input, size_t ilen, size_t *data_len); #endif /** Buffer for input that has not been processed yet. */ - unsigned char unprocessed_data[MBEDTLS_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH]; + unsigned char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(unprocessed_data)[MBEDTLS_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH]; /** Number of Bytes that have not been processed yet. */ - size_t unprocessed_len; + size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(unprocessed_len); /** Current IV or NONCE_COUNTER for CTR-mode, data unit (or sector) number * for XTS-mode. */ - unsigned char iv[MBEDTLS_MAX_IV_LENGTH]; + unsigned char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(iv)[MBEDTLS_MAX_IV_LENGTH]; /** IV size in Bytes, for ciphers with variable-length IVs. */ - size_t iv_size; + size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(iv_size); /** The cipher-specific context. */ - void *cipher_ctx; + void *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(cipher_ctx); #if defined(MBEDTLS_CMAC_C) /** CMAC-specific context. */ - mbedtls_cmac_context_t *cmac_ctx; + mbedtls_cmac_context_t *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(cmac_ctx); #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) /** Indicates whether the cipher operations should be performed * by Mbed TLS' own crypto library or an external implementation * of the PSA Crypto API. @@ -351,8 +362,8 @@ typedef struct mbedtls_cipher_context_t { * mbedtls_cipher_setup(), and set if it was established through * mbedtls_cipher_setup_psa(). */ - unsigned char psa_enabled; -#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + unsigned char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(psa_enabled); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO && !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ } mbedtls_cipher_context_t; @@ -414,6 +425,164 @@ const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *mbedtls_cipher_info_from_values(const mbedtls_ciphe int key_bitlen, const mbedtls_cipher_mode_t mode); +/** + * \brief Retrieve the identifier for a cipher info structure. + * + * \param[in] info The cipher info structure to query. + * This may be \c NULL. + * + * \return The full cipher identifier (\c MBEDTLS_CIPHER_xxx). + * \return #MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NONE if \p info is \c NULL. + */ +static inline mbedtls_cipher_type_t mbedtls_cipher_info_get_type( + const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *info) +{ + if (info == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NONE; + } else { + return (mbedtls_cipher_type_t) info->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(type); + } +} + +/** + * \brief Retrieve the operation mode for a cipher info structure. + * + * \param[in] info The cipher info structure to query. + * This may be \c NULL. + * + * \return The cipher mode (\c MBEDTLS_MODE_xxx). + * \return #MBEDTLS_MODE_NONE if \p info is \c NULL. + */ +static inline mbedtls_cipher_mode_t mbedtls_cipher_info_get_mode( + const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *info) +{ + if (info == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_MODE_NONE; + } else { + return (mbedtls_cipher_mode_t) info->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(mode); + } +} + +/** + * \brief Retrieve the key size for a cipher info structure. + * + * \param[in] info The cipher info structure to query. + * This may be \c NULL. + * + * \return The key length in bits. + * For variable-sized ciphers, this is the default length. + * For DES, this includes the parity bits. + * \return \c 0 if \p info is \c NULL. + */ +static inline size_t mbedtls_cipher_info_get_key_bitlen( + const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *info) +{ + if (info == NULL) { + return 0; + } else { + return ((size_t) info->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(key_bitlen)) << MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT; + } +} + +/** + * \brief Retrieve the human-readable name for a + * cipher info structure. + * + * \param[in] info The cipher info structure to query. + * This may be \c NULL. + * + * \return The cipher name, which is a human readable string, + * with static storage duration. + * \return \c NULL if \p info is \c NULL. + */ +static inline const char *mbedtls_cipher_info_get_name( + const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *info) +{ + if (info == NULL) { + return NULL; + } else { + return info->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(name); + } +} + +/** + * \brief This function returns the size of the IV or nonce + * for the cipher info structure, in bytes. + * + * \param info The cipher info structure. This may be \c NULL. + * + * \return The recommended IV size. + * \return \c 0 for ciphers not using an IV or a nonce. + * \return \c 0 if \p info is \c NULL. + */ +static inline size_t mbedtls_cipher_info_get_iv_size( + const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *info) +{ + if (info == NULL) { + return 0; + } + + return ((size_t) info->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(iv_size)) << MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT; +} + +/** + * \brief This function returns the block size of the given + * cipher info structure in bytes. + * + * \param info The cipher info structure. This may be \c NULL. + * + * \return The block size of the cipher. + * \return \c 1 if the cipher is a stream cipher. + * \return \c 0 if \p info is \c NULL. + */ +static inline size_t mbedtls_cipher_info_get_block_size( + const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *info) +{ + if (info == NULL) { + return 0; + } + + return (size_t) (info->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(block_size)); +} + +/** + * \brief This function returns a non-zero value if the key length for + * the given cipher is variable. + * + * \param info The cipher info structure. This may be \c NULL. + * + * \return Non-zero if the key length is variable, \c 0 otherwise. + * \return \c 0 if the given pointer is \c NULL. + */ +static inline int mbedtls_cipher_info_has_variable_key_bitlen( + const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *info) +{ + if (info == NULL) { + return 0; + } + + return info->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(flags) & MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_KEY_LEN; +} + +/** + * \brief This function returns a non-zero value if the IV size for + * the given cipher is variable. + * + * \param info The cipher info structure. This may be \c NULL. + * + * \return Non-zero if the IV size is variable, \c 0 otherwise. + * \return \c 0 if the given pointer is \c NULL. + */ +static inline int mbedtls_cipher_info_has_variable_iv_size( + const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *info) +{ + if (info == NULL) { + return 0; + } + + return info->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(flags) & MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_IV_LEN; +} + /** * \brief This function initializes a \p ctx as NONE. * @@ -437,12 +606,6 @@ void mbedtls_cipher_free(mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx); * \brief This function prepares a cipher context for * use with the given cipher primitive. * - * \warning In CBC mode, if mbedtls_cipher_set_padding_mode() is not called: - * - If MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 is enabled, the - * context will use PKCS7 padding. - * - Otherwise the context uses no padding and the input - * must be a whole number of blocks. - * * \note After calling this function, you should call * mbedtls_cipher_setkey() and, if the mode uses padding, * mbedtls_cipher_set_padding_mode(), then for each @@ -464,27 +627,29 @@ void mbedtls_cipher_free(mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx); * parameter-verification failure. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_ALLOC_FAILED if allocation of the * cipher-specific context fails. - * - * \internal Currently, the function also clears the structure. - * In future versions, the caller will be required to call - * mbedtls_cipher_init() on the structure first. */ int mbedtls_cipher_setup(mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *cipher_info); #if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) /** * \brief This function initializes a cipher context for * PSA-based use with the given cipher primitive. * + * \deprecated This function is deprecated and will be removed in a + * future version of the library. + * Please use psa_aead_xxx() / psa_cipher_xxx() directly + * instead. + * * \note See #MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO for information on PSA. * * \param ctx The context to initialize. May not be \c NULL. * \param cipher_info The cipher to use. * \param taglen For AEAD ciphers, the length in bytes of the * authentication tag to use. Subsequent uses of - * mbedtls_cipher_auth_encrypt() or - * mbedtls_cipher_auth_decrypt() must provide + * mbedtls_cipher_auth_encrypt_ext() or + * mbedtls_cipher_auth_decrypt_ext() must provide * the same tag length. * For non-AEAD ciphers, the value must be \c 0. * @@ -494,28 +659,30 @@ int mbedtls_cipher_setup(mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_ALLOC_FAILED if allocation of the * cipher-specific context fails. */ -int mbedtls_cipher_setup_psa(mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, - const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *cipher_info, - size_t taglen); +int MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED mbedtls_cipher_setup_psa(mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, + const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *cipher_info, + size_t taglen); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ /** - * \brief This function returns the block size of the given cipher. + * \brief This function returns the block size of the given cipher + * in bytes. * - * \param ctx The context of the cipher. This must be initialized. + * \param ctx The context of the cipher. * * \return The block size of the underlying cipher. + * \return \c 1 if the cipher is a stream cipher. * \return \c 0 if \p ctx has not been initialized. */ static inline unsigned int mbedtls_cipher_get_block_size( const mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx) { - MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL, 0); - if (ctx->cipher_info == NULL) { + if (ctx->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(cipher_info) == NULL) { return 0; } - return ctx->cipher_info->block_size; + return (unsigned int) ctx->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(cipher_info)->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(block_size); } /** @@ -530,12 +697,11 @@ static inline unsigned int mbedtls_cipher_get_block_size( static inline mbedtls_cipher_mode_t mbedtls_cipher_get_cipher_mode( const mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx) { - MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL, MBEDTLS_MODE_NONE); - if (ctx->cipher_info == NULL) { + if (ctx->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(cipher_info) == NULL) { return MBEDTLS_MODE_NONE; } - return ctx->cipher_info->mode; + return (mbedtls_cipher_mode_t) ctx->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(cipher_info)->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(mode); } /** @@ -551,16 +717,16 @@ static inline mbedtls_cipher_mode_t mbedtls_cipher_get_cipher_mode( static inline int mbedtls_cipher_get_iv_size( const mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx) { - MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL, 0); - if (ctx->cipher_info == NULL) { + if (ctx->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(cipher_info) == NULL) { return 0; } - if (ctx->iv_size != 0) { - return (int) ctx->iv_size; + if (ctx->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(iv_size) != 0) { + return (int) ctx->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(iv_size); } - return (int) ctx->cipher_info->iv_size; + return (int) (((int) ctx->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(cipher_info)->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(iv_size)) << + MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT); } /** @@ -574,13 +740,11 @@ static inline int mbedtls_cipher_get_iv_size( static inline mbedtls_cipher_type_t mbedtls_cipher_get_type( const mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx) { - MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE_RET( - ctx != NULL, MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NONE); - if (ctx->cipher_info == NULL) { + if (ctx->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(cipher_info) == NULL) { return MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NONE; } - return ctx->cipher_info->type; + return (mbedtls_cipher_type_t) ctx->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(cipher_info)->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(type); } /** @@ -595,12 +759,11 @@ static inline mbedtls_cipher_type_t mbedtls_cipher_get_type( static inline const char *mbedtls_cipher_get_name( const mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx) { - MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL, 0); - if (ctx->cipher_info == NULL) { + if (ctx->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(cipher_info) == NULL) { return 0; } - return ctx->cipher_info->name; + return ctx->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(cipher_info)->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(name); } /** @@ -615,13 +778,12 @@ static inline const char *mbedtls_cipher_get_name( static inline int mbedtls_cipher_get_key_bitlen( const mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx) { - MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE_RET( - ctx != NULL, MBEDTLS_KEY_LENGTH_NONE); - if (ctx->cipher_info == NULL) { + if (ctx->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(cipher_info) == NULL) { return MBEDTLS_KEY_LENGTH_NONE; } - return (int) ctx->cipher_info->key_bitlen; + return (int) ctx->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(cipher_info)->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(key_bitlen) << + MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT; } /** @@ -635,13 +797,11 @@ static inline int mbedtls_cipher_get_key_bitlen( static inline mbedtls_operation_t mbedtls_cipher_get_operation( const mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx) { - MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE_RET( - ctx != NULL, MBEDTLS_OPERATION_NONE); - if (ctx->cipher_info == NULL) { + if (ctx->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(cipher_info) == NULL) { return MBEDTLS_OPERATION_NONE; } - return ctx->operation; + return ctx->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(operation); } /** @@ -670,6 +830,7 @@ int mbedtls_cipher_setkey(mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, * \brief This function sets the padding mode, for cipher modes * that use padding. * + * * \param ctx The generic cipher context. This must be initialized and * bound to a cipher information structure. * \param mode The padding mode. @@ -691,6 +852,12 @@ int mbedtls_cipher_set_padding_mode(mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, * \note Some ciphers do not use IVs nor nonce. For these * ciphers, this function has no effect. * + * \note For #MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20, the nonce length must + * be 12, and the initial counter value is 0. + * + * \note For #MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20_POLY1305, the nonce length + * must be 12. + * * \param ctx The generic cipher context. This must be initialized and * bound to a cipher information structure. * \param iv The IV to use, or NONCE_COUNTER for CTR-mode ciphers. This @@ -725,7 +892,8 @@ int mbedtls_cipher_set_iv(mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, * 2. mbedtls_cipher_reset() * 3. mbedtls_cipher_update_ad() * 4. mbedtls_cipher_update() one or more times - * 5. mbedtls_cipher_check_tag() (for decryption) or + * 5. mbedtls_cipher_finish() + * 6. mbedtls_cipher_check_tag() (for decryption) or * mbedtls_cipher_write_tag() (for encryption). * . * This sequence can be repeated to encrypt or decrypt multiple @@ -743,8 +911,6 @@ int mbedtls_cipher_reset(mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx); /** * \brief This function adds additional data for AEAD ciphers. * Currently supported with GCM and ChaCha20+Poly1305. - * This must be called exactly once, after - * mbedtls_cipher_reset(). * * \param ctx The generic cipher context. This must be initialized. * \param ad The additional data to use. This must be a readable @@ -768,11 +934,6 @@ int mbedtls_cipher_update_ad(mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, * Exception: For MBEDTLS_MODE_ECB, expects a single block * in size. For example, 16 Bytes for AES. * - * \note If the underlying cipher is used in GCM mode, all calls - * to this function, except for the last one before - * mbedtls_cipher_finish(), must have \p ilen as a - * multiple of the block size of the cipher. - * * \param ctx The generic cipher context. This must be initialized and * bound to a key. * \param input The buffer holding the input data. This must be a @@ -897,129 +1058,6 @@ int mbedtls_cipher_crypt(mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen, unsigned char *output, size_t *olen); -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_AEAD) -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING) -#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED __attribute__((deprecated)) -#else -#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED -#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING */ -/** - * \brief The generic authenticated encryption (AEAD) function. - * - * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_cipher_auth_encrypt_ext(). - * - * \note This function only supports AEAD algorithms, not key - * wrapping algorithms such as NIST_KW; for this, see - * mbedtls_cipher_auth_encrypt_ext(). - * - * \param ctx The generic cipher context. This must be initialized and - * bound to a key associated with an AEAD algorithm. - * \param iv The nonce to use. This must be a readable buffer of - * at least \p iv_len Bytes and must not be \c NULL. - * \param iv_len The length of the nonce. This must satisfy the - * constraints imposed by the AEAD cipher used. - * \param ad The additional data to authenticate. This must be a - * readable buffer of at least \p ad_len Bytes, and may - * be \c NULL is \p ad_len is \c 0. - * \param ad_len The length of \p ad. - * \param input The buffer holding the input data. This must be a - * readable buffer of at least \p ilen Bytes, and may be - * \c NULL if \p ilen is \c 0. - * \param ilen The length of the input data. - * \param output The buffer for the output data. This must be a - * writable buffer of at least \p ilen Bytes, and must - * not be \c NULL. - * \param olen This will be filled with the actual number of Bytes - * written to the \p output buffer. This must point to a - * writable object of type \c size_t. - * \param tag The buffer for the authentication tag. This must be a - * writable buffer of at least \p tag_len Bytes. See note - * below regarding restrictions with PSA-based contexts. - * \param tag_len The desired length of the authentication tag. This - * must match the constraints imposed by the AEAD cipher - * used, and in particular must not be \c 0. - * - * \note If the context is based on PSA (that is, it was set up - * with mbedtls_cipher_setup_psa()), then it is required - * that \c tag == output + ilen. That is, the tag must be - * appended to the ciphertext as recommended by RFC 5116. - * - * \return \c 0 on success. - * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA on - * parameter-verification failure. - * \return A cipher-specific error code on failure. - */ -int MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED mbedtls_cipher_auth_encrypt( - mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, - const unsigned char *iv, size_t iv_len, - const unsigned char *ad, size_t ad_len, - const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen, - unsigned char *output, size_t *olen, - unsigned char *tag, size_t tag_len); - -/** - * \brief The generic authenticated decryption (AEAD) function. - * - * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_cipher_auth_decrypt_ext(). - * - * \note This function only supports AEAD algorithms, not key - * wrapping algorithms such as NIST_KW; for this, see - * mbedtls_cipher_auth_decrypt_ext(). - * - * \note If the data is not authentic, then the output buffer - * is zeroed out to prevent the unauthentic plaintext being - * used, making this interface safer. - * - * \param ctx The generic cipher context. This must be initialized and - * bound to a key associated with an AEAD algorithm. - * \param iv The nonce to use. This must be a readable buffer of - * at least \p iv_len Bytes and must not be \c NULL. - * \param iv_len The length of the nonce. This must satisfy the - * constraints imposed by the AEAD cipher used. - * \param ad The additional data to authenticate. This must be a - * readable buffer of at least \p ad_len Bytes, and may - * be \c NULL is \p ad_len is \c 0. - * \param ad_len The length of \p ad. - * \param input The buffer holding the input data. This must be a - * readable buffer of at least \p ilen Bytes, and may be - * \c NULL if \p ilen is \c 0. - * \param ilen The length of the input data. - * \param output The buffer for the output data. This must be a - * writable buffer of at least \p ilen Bytes, and must - * not be \c NULL. - * \param olen This will be filled with the actual number of Bytes - * written to the \p output buffer. This must point to a - * writable object of type \c size_t. - * \param tag The buffer for the authentication tag. This must be a - * readable buffer of at least \p tag_len Bytes. See note - * below regarding restrictions with PSA-based contexts. - * \param tag_len The length of the authentication tag. This must match - * the constraints imposed by the AEAD cipher used, and in - * particular must not be \c 0. - * - * \note If the context is based on PSA (that is, it was set up - * with mbedtls_cipher_setup_psa()), then it is required - * that \c tag == input + len. That is, the tag must be - * appended to the ciphertext as recommended by RFC 5116. - * - * \return \c 0 on success. - * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA on - * parameter-verification failure. - * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_AUTH_FAILED if data is not authentic. - * \return A cipher-specific error code on failure. - */ -int MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED mbedtls_cipher_auth_decrypt( - mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, - const unsigned char *iv, size_t iv_len, - const unsigned char *ad, size_t ad_len, - const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen, - unsigned char *output, size_t *olen, - const unsigned char *tag, size_t tag_len); -#undef MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED -#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_AEAD */ - #if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_AEAD) || defined(MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C) /** * \brief The authenticated encryption (AEAD/NIST_KW) function. diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/cmac.h b/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/cmac.h index 89634dc92743..97b86fc42b16 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/cmac.h +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/cmac.h @@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ * * The Cipher-based Message Authentication Code (CMAC) Mode for * Authentication is defined in RFC-4493: The AES-CMAC Algorithm. + * It is supported with AES and DES. */ /* * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors @@ -13,12 +14,9 @@ #ifndef MBEDTLS_CMAC_H #define MBEDTLS_CMAC_H +#include "mbedtls/private_access.h" -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "mbedtls/build_info.h" #include "mbedtls/cipher.h" @@ -26,23 +24,33 @@ extern "C" { #endif -/* MBEDTLS_ERR_CMAC_HW_ACCEL_FAILED is deprecated and should not be used. */ -/** CMAC hardware accelerator failed. */ -#define MBEDTLS_ERR_CMAC_HW_ACCEL_FAILED -0x007A - #define MBEDTLS_AES_BLOCK_SIZE 16 #define MBEDTLS_DES3_BLOCK_SIZE 8 - -/* Although the CMAC module does not support ARIA or CAMELLIA, we adjust the value of - * MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLKSIZE_MAX to reflect these ciphers. - * This is done to avoid confusion, given the general-purpose name of the macro. */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_ARIA_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C) -#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLKSIZE_MAX 16 /**< The longest block used by CMAC is that of AES. */ +/* We don't support Camellia or ARIA in this module */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) +#define MBEDTLS_CMAC_MAX_BLOCK_SIZE 16 /**< The longest block used by CMAC is that of AES. */ #else -#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLKSIZE_MAX 8 /**< The longest block used by CMAC is that of 3DES. */ +#define MBEDTLS_CMAC_MAX_BLOCK_SIZE 8 /**< The longest block used by CMAC is that of 3DES. */ #endif +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) +/** The longest block supported by the cipher module. + * + * \deprecated + * For the maximum block size of a cipher supported by the CMAC module, + * use #MBEDTLS_CMAC_MAX_BLOCK_SIZE. + * For the maximum block size of a cipher supported by the cipher module, + * use #MBEDTLS_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH. + */ +/* Before Mbed TLS 3.5, this was the maximum block size supported by the CMAC + * module, so it didn't take Camellia or ARIA into account. Since the name + * of the macro doesn't even convey "CMAC", this was misleading. Now the size + * is sufficient for any cipher, but the name is defined in cmac.h for + * backward compatibility. */ +#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLKSIZE_MAX MBEDTLS_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ + #if !defined(MBEDTLS_CMAC_ALT) /** @@ -50,14 +58,14 @@ extern "C" { */ struct mbedtls_cmac_context_t { /** The internal state of the CMAC algorithm. */ - unsigned char state[MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLKSIZE_MAX]; + unsigned char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(state)[MBEDTLS_CMAC_MAX_BLOCK_SIZE]; /** Unprocessed data - either data that was not block aligned and is still * pending processing, or the final block. */ - unsigned char unprocessed_block[MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLKSIZE_MAX]; + unsigned char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(unprocessed_block)[MBEDTLS_CMAC_MAX_BLOCK_SIZE]; /** The length of data pending processing. */ - size_t unprocessed_len; + size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(unprocessed_len); }; #else /* !MBEDTLS_CMAC_ALT */ diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/compat-1.3.h b/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/compat-1.3.h deleted file mode 100644 index de8f625a6218..000000000000 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/compat-1.3.h +++ /dev/null @@ -1,2533 +0,0 @@ -/** - * \file compat-1.3.h - * - * \brief Compatibility definitions for using Mbed TLS with client code written - * for the PolarSSL naming conventions. - * - * \deprecated Use the new names directly instead - */ -/* - * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later - */ - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING) -#warning "Including compat-1.3.h is deprecated" -#endif - -#ifndef MBEDTLS_COMPAT13_H -#define MBEDTLS_COMPAT13_H - -/* - * config.h options - */ -#if defined MBEDTLS_AESNI_C -#define POLARSSL_AESNI_C MBEDTLS_AESNI_C -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_AES_ALT -#define POLARSSL_AES_ALT MBEDTLS_AES_ALT -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_AES_C -#define POLARSSL_AES_C MBEDTLS_AES_C -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_AES_ROM_TABLES -#define POLARSSL_AES_ROM_TABLES MBEDTLS_AES_ROM_TABLES -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_ARC4_ALT -#define POLARSSL_ARC4_ALT MBEDTLS_ARC4_ALT -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_ARC4_C -#define POLARSSL_ARC4_C MBEDTLS_ARC4_C -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C -#define POLARSSL_ASN1_PARSE_C MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_C -#define POLARSSL_ASN1_WRITE_C MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_C -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_BASE64_C -#define POLARSSL_BASE64_C MBEDTLS_BASE64_C -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C -#define POLARSSL_BIGNUM_C MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_ALT -#define POLARSSL_BLOWFISH_ALT MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_ALT -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C -#define POLARSSL_BLOWFISH_C MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_ALT -#define POLARSSL_CAMELLIA_ALT MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_ALT -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C -#define POLARSSL_CAMELLIA_C MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_SMALL_MEMORY -#define POLARSSL_CAMELLIA_SMALL_MEMORY MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_SMALL_MEMORY -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_CCM_C -#define POLARSSL_CCM_C MBEDTLS_CCM_C -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_CERTS_C -#define POLARSSL_CERTS_C MBEDTLS_CERTS_C -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C -#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_C MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC -#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_MODE_CBC MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB -#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_MODE_CFB MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR -#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_MODE_CTR MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER -#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ONE_AND_ZEROS -#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_PADDING_ONE_AND_ZEROS MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ONE_AND_ZEROS -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 -#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ZEROS -#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_PADDING_ZEROS MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ZEROS -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ZEROS_AND_LEN -#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_PADDING_ZEROS_AND_LEN MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ZEROS_AND_LEN -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C -#define POLARSSL_CTR_DRBG_C MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C -#define POLARSSL_DEBUG_C MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED -#define POLARSSL_DEPRECATED_REMOVED MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING -#define POLARSSL_DEPRECATED_WARNING MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_DES_ALT -#define POLARSSL_DES_ALT MBEDTLS_DES_ALT -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_DES_C -#define POLARSSL_DES_C MBEDTLS_DES_C -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_DHM_C -#define POLARSSL_DHM_C MBEDTLS_DHM_C -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_ECDH_C -#define POLARSSL_ECDH_C MBEDTLS_ECDH_C -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C -#define POLARSSL_ECDSA_C MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC -#define POLARSSL_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_ECP_C -#define POLARSSL_ECP_C MBEDTLS_ECP_C -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED -#define POLARSSL_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLED -#define POLARSSL_ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLED MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLED -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED -#define POLARSSL_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED -#define POLARSSL_ECP_DP_M255_ENABLED MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED -#define POLARSSL_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED -#define POLARSSL_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED -#define POLARSSL_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED -#define POLARSSL_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED -#define POLARSSL_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED -#define POLARSSL_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED -#define POLARSSL_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED -#define POLARSSL_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_ECP_FIXED_POINT_OPTIM -#define POLARSSL_ECP_FIXED_POINT_OPTIM MBEDTLS_ECP_FIXED_POINT_OPTIM -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BITS -#define POLARSSL_ECP_MAX_BITS MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BITS -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_ECP_NIST_OPTIM -#define POLARSSL_ECP_NIST_OPTIM MBEDTLS_ECP_NIST_OPTIM -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_ECP_WINDOW_SIZE -#define POLARSSL_ECP_WINDOW_SIZE MBEDTLS_ECP_WINDOW_SIZE -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_ENABLE_WEAK_CIPHERSUITES -#define POLARSSL_ENABLE_WEAK_CIPHERSUITES MBEDTLS_ENABLE_WEAK_CIPHERSUITES -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C -#define POLARSSL_ENTROPY_C MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_FORCE_SHA256 -#define POLARSSL_ENTROPY_FORCE_SHA256 MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_FORCE_SHA256 -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_ERROR_C -#define POLARSSL_ERROR_C MBEDTLS_ERROR_C -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_ERROR_STRERROR_DUMMY -#define POLARSSL_ERROR_STRERROR_DUMMY MBEDTLS_ERROR_STRERROR_DUMMY -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_FS_IO -#define POLARSSL_FS_IO MBEDTLS_FS_IO -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_GCM_C -#define POLARSSL_GCM_C MBEDTLS_GCM_C -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_GENPRIME -#define POLARSSL_GENPRIME MBEDTLS_GENPRIME -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_HAVEGE_C -#define POLARSSL_HAVEGE_C MBEDTLS_HAVEGE_C -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM -#define POLARSSL_HAVE_ASM MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_HAVE_SSE2 -#define POLARSSL_HAVE_SSE2 MBEDTLS_HAVE_SSE2 -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME -#define POLARSSL_HAVE_TIME MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C -#define POLARSSL_HMAC_DRBG_C MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_INPUT -#define POLARSSL_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_INPUT MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_INPUT -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_REQUEST -#define POLARSSL_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_REQUEST MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_REQUEST -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT -#define POLARSSL_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_RESEED_INTERVAL -#define POLARSSL_HMAC_DRBG_RESEED_INTERVAL MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_RESEED_INTERVAL -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED -#define POLARSSL_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED -#define POLARSSL_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED -#define POLARSSL_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED -#define POLARSSL_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED -#define POLARSSL_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED -#define POLARSSL_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED -#define POLARSSL_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED -#define POLARSSL_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED -#define POLARSSL_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED -#define POLARSSL_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_MD2_ALT -#define POLARSSL_MD2_ALT MBEDTLS_MD2_ALT -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_MD2_C -#define POLARSSL_MD2_C MBEDTLS_MD2_C -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_MD2_PROCESS_ALT -#define POLARSSL_MD2_PROCESS_ALT MBEDTLS_MD2_PROCESS_ALT -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_MD4_ALT -#define POLARSSL_MD4_ALT MBEDTLS_MD4_ALT -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_MD4_C -#define POLARSSL_MD4_C MBEDTLS_MD4_C -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_MD4_PROCESS_ALT -#define POLARSSL_MD4_PROCESS_ALT MBEDTLS_MD4_PROCESS_ALT -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_MD5_ALT -#define POLARSSL_MD5_ALT MBEDTLS_MD5_ALT -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_MD5_C -#define POLARSSL_MD5_C MBEDTLS_MD5_C -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_MD5_PROCESS_ALT -#define POLARSSL_MD5_PROCESS_ALT MBEDTLS_MD5_PROCESS_ALT -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_MD_C -#define POLARSSL_MD_C MBEDTLS_MD_C -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_MEMORY_ALIGN_MULTIPLE -#define POLARSSL_MEMORY_ALIGN_MULTIPLE MBEDTLS_MEMORY_ALIGN_MULTIPLE -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BACKTRACE -#define POLARSSL_MEMORY_BACKTRACE MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BACKTRACE -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC_C -#define POLARSSL_MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC_C MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC_C -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_MEMORY_DEBUG -#define POLARSSL_MEMORY_DEBUG MBEDTLS_MEMORY_DEBUG -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE -#define POLARSSL_MPI_MAX_SIZE MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_MPI_WINDOW_SIZE -#define POLARSSL_MPI_WINDOW_SIZE MBEDTLS_MPI_WINDOW_SIZE -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_NET_C -#define POLARSSL_NET_C MBEDTLS_NET_C -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_NO_DEFAULT_ENTROPY_SOURCES -#define POLARSSL_NO_DEFAULT_ENTROPY_SOURCES MBEDTLS_NO_DEFAULT_ENTROPY_SOURCES -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_NO_PLATFORM_ENTROPY -#define POLARSSL_NO_PLATFORM_ENTROPY MBEDTLS_NO_PLATFORM_ENTROPY -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_OID_C -#define POLARSSL_OID_C MBEDTLS_OID_C -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_C -#define POLARSSL_PADLOCK_C MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_C -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C -#define POLARSSL_PEM_PARSE_C MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_PEM_WRITE_C -#define POLARSSL_PEM_WRITE_C MBEDTLS_PEM_WRITE_C -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_PKCS11_C -#define POLARSSL_PKCS11_C MBEDTLS_PKCS11_C -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C -#define POLARSSL_PKCS12_C MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 -#define POLARSSL_PKCS1_V15 MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21 -#define POLARSSL_PKCS1_V21 MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21 -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C -#define POLARSSL_PKCS5_C MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_PK_C -#define POLARSSL_PK_C MBEDTLS_PK_C -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C -#define POLARSSL_PK_PARSE_C MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_EC_EXTENDED -#define POLARSSL_PK_PARSE_EC_EXTENDED MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_EC_EXTENDED -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT_SUPPORT -#define POLARSSL_PK_RSA_ALT_SUPPORT MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT_SUPPORT -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C -#define POLARSSL_PK_WRITE_C MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C -#define POLARSSL_PLATFORM_C MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_EXIT_ALT -#define POLARSSL_PLATFORM_EXIT_ALT MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_EXIT_ALT -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_EXIT_MACRO -#define POLARSSL_PLATFORM_EXIT_MACRO MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_EXIT_MACRO -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_FPRINTF_ALT -#define POLARSSL_PLATFORM_FPRINTF_ALT MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_FPRINTF_ALT -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_FPRINTF_MACRO -#define POLARSSL_PLATFORM_FPRINTF_MACRO MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_FPRINTF_MACRO -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_FREE_MACRO -#define POLARSSL_PLATFORM_FREE_MACRO MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_FREE_MACRO -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_MEMORY -#define POLARSSL_PLATFORM_MEMORY MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_MEMORY -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NO_STD_FUNCTIONS -#define POLARSSL_PLATFORM_NO_STD_FUNCTIONS MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NO_STD_FUNCTIONS -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_PRINTF_ALT -#define POLARSSL_PLATFORM_PRINTF_ALT MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_PRINTF_ALT -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_PRINTF_MACRO -#define POLARSSL_PLATFORM_PRINTF_MACRO MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_PRINTF_MACRO -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SNPRINTF_ALT -#define POLARSSL_PLATFORM_SNPRINTF_ALT MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SNPRINTF_ALT -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SNPRINTF_MACRO -#define POLARSSL_PLATFORM_SNPRINTF_MACRO MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SNPRINTF_MACRO -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_EXIT -#define POLARSSL_PLATFORM_STD_EXIT MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_EXIT -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_FPRINTF -#define POLARSSL_PLATFORM_STD_FPRINTF MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_FPRINTF -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_FREE -#define POLARSSL_PLATFORM_STD_FREE MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_FREE -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_MEM_HDR -#define POLARSSL_PLATFORM_STD_MEM_HDR MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_MEM_HDR -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_PRINTF -#define POLARSSL_PLATFORM_STD_PRINTF MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_PRINTF -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_SNPRINTF -#define POLARSSL_PLATFORM_STD_SNPRINTF MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_SNPRINTF -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_PSK_MAX_LEN -#define POLARSSL_PSK_MAX_LEN MBEDTLS_PSK_MAX_LEN -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_REMOVE_ARC4_CIPHERSUITES -#define POLARSSL_REMOVE_ARC4_CIPHERSUITES MBEDTLS_REMOVE_ARC4_CIPHERSUITES -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_ALT -#define POLARSSL_RIPEMD160_ALT MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_ALT -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C -#define POLARSSL_RIPEMD160_C MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_PROCESS_ALT -#define POLARSSL_RIPEMD160_PROCESS_ALT MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_PROCESS_ALT -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_RSA_C -#define POLARSSL_RSA_C MBEDTLS_RSA_C -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT -#define POLARSSL_RSA_NO_CRT MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST -#define POLARSSL_SELF_TEST MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_SHA1_ALT -#define POLARSSL_SHA1_ALT MBEDTLS_SHA1_ALT -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_SHA1_C -#define POLARSSL_SHA1_C MBEDTLS_SHA1_C -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_SHA1_PROCESS_ALT -#define POLARSSL_SHA1_PROCESS_ALT MBEDTLS_SHA1_PROCESS_ALT -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_SHA256_ALT -#define POLARSSL_SHA256_ALT MBEDTLS_SHA256_ALT -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_SHA256_C -#define POLARSSL_SHA256_C MBEDTLS_SHA256_C -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_SHA256_PROCESS_ALT -#define POLARSSL_SHA256_PROCESS_ALT MBEDTLS_SHA256_PROCESS_ALT -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_SHA512_ALT -#define POLARSSL_SHA512_ALT MBEDTLS_SHA512_ALT -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_SHA512_C -#define POLARSSL_SHA512_C MBEDTLS_SHA512_C -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_SHA512_PROCESS_ALT -#define POLARSSL_SHA512_PROCESS_ALT MBEDTLS_SHA512_PROCESS_ALT -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_SSL_ALL_ALERT_MESSAGES -#define POLARSSL_SSL_ALL_ALERT_MESSAGES MBEDTLS_SSL_ALL_ALERT_MESSAGES -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN -#define POLARSSL_SSL_ALPN MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_C -#define POLARSSL_SSL_CACHE_C MBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_C -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING -#define POLARSSL_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING MBEDTLS_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C -#define POLARSSL_SSL_CLI_C MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_SSL_COOKIE_C -#define POLARSSL_SSL_COOKIE_C MBEDTLS_SSL_COOKIE_C -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_SSL_COOKIE_TIMEOUT -#define POLARSSL_SSL_COOKIE_TIMEOUT MBEDTLS_SSL_COOKIE_TIMEOUT -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ALL -#define POLARSSL_SSL_DEBUG_ALL MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ALL -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY -#define POLARSSL_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_BADMAC_LIMIT -#define POLARSSL_SSL_DTLS_BADMAC_LIMIT MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_BADMAC_LIMIT -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY -#define POLARSSL_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC -#define POLARSSL_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET -#define POLARSSL_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_SSL_FALLBACK_SCSV -#define POLARSSL_SSL_FALLBACK_SCSV MBEDTLS_SSL_FALLBACK_SCSV -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL -#define POLARSSL_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH -#define POLARSSL_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS -#define POLARSSL_SSL_PROTO_DTLS MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 -#define POLARSSL_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 -#define POLARSSL_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 -#define POLARSSL_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 -#define POLARSSL_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION -#define POLARSSL_SSL_RENEGOTIATION MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION -#define POLARSSL_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS -#define POLARSSL_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C -#define POLARSSL_SSL_SRV_C MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_RESPECT_CLIENT_PREFERENCE -#define POLARSSL_SSL_SRV_RESPECT_CLIENT_PREFERENCE MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_RESPECT_CLIENT_PREFERENCE -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_SUPPORT_SSLV2_CLIENT_HELLO -#define POLARSSL_SSL_SRV_SUPPORT_SSLV2_CLIENT_HELLO MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_SUPPORT_SSLV2_CLIENT_HELLO -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C -#define POLARSSL_SSL_TLS_C MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC -#define POLARSSL_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_THREADING_ALT -#define POLARSSL_THREADING_ALT MBEDTLS_THREADING_ALT -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_THREADING_C -#define POLARSSL_THREADING_C MBEDTLS_THREADING_C -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_THREADING_PTHREAD -#define POLARSSL_THREADING_PTHREAD MBEDTLS_THREADING_PTHREAD -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_TIMING_ALT -#define POLARSSL_TIMING_ALT MBEDTLS_TIMING_ALT -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_TIMING_C -#define POLARSSL_TIMING_C MBEDTLS_TIMING_C -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_VERSION_C -#define POLARSSL_VERSION_C MBEDTLS_VERSION_C -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_VERSION_FEATURES -#define POLARSSL_VERSION_FEATURES MBEDTLS_VERSION_FEATURES -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_X509_ALLOW_EXTENSIONS_NON_V3 -#define POLARSSL_X509_ALLOW_EXTENSIONS_NON_V3 MBEDTLS_X509_ALLOW_EXTENSIONS_NON_V3 -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_X509_ALLOW_UNSUPPORTED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION -#define POLARSSL_X509_ALLOW_UNSUPPORTED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION \ - MBEDTLS_X509_ALLOW_UNSUPPORTED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_X509_CHECK_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE -#define POLARSSL_X509_CHECK_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE MBEDTLS_X509_CHECK_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_X509_CHECK_KEY_USAGE -#define POLARSSL_X509_CHECK_KEY_USAGE MBEDTLS_X509_CHECK_KEY_USAGE -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_X509_CREATE_C -#define POLARSSL_X509_CREATE_C MBEDTLS_X509_CREATE_C -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_X509_CRL_PARSE_C -#define POLARSSL_X509_CRL_PARSE_C MBEDTLS_X509_CRL_PARSE_C -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C -#define POLARSSL_X509_CRT_PARSE_C MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_WRITE_C -#define POLARSSL_X509_CRT_WRITE_C MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_WRITE_C -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_X509_CSR_PARSE_C -#define POLARSSL_X509_CSR_PARSE_C MBEDTLS_X509_CSR_PARSE_C -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_X509_CSR_WRITE_C -#define POLARSSL_X509_CSR_WRITE_C MBEDTLS_X509_CSR_WRITE_C -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_INTERMEDIATE_CA -#define POLARSSL_X509_MAX_INTERMEDIATE_CA MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_INTERMEDIATE_CA -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT -#define POLARSSL_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C -#define POLARSSL_X509_USE_C MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_XTEA_ALT -#define POLARSSL_XTEA_ALT MBEDTLS_XTEA_ALT -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_XTEA_C -#define POLARSSL_XTEA_C MBEDTLS_XTEA_C -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT -#define POLARSSL_ZLIB_SUPPORT MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT -#endif - -/* - * Misc names (macros, types, functions, enum constants...) - */ -#define AES_DECRYPT MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT -#define AES_ENCRYPT MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT -#define ASN1_BIT_STRING MBEDTLS_ASN1_BIT_STRING -#define ASN1_BMP_STRING MBEDTLS_ASN1_BMP_STRING -#define ASN1_BOOLEAN MBEDTLS_ASN1_BOOLEAN -#define ASN1_CHK_ADD MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD -#define ASN1_CONSTRUCTED MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED -#define ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC -#define ASN1_GENERALIZED_TIME MBEDTLS_ASN1_GENERALIZED_TIME -#define ASN1_IA5_STRING MBEDTLS_ASN1_IA5_STRING -#define ASN1_INTEGER MBEDTLS_ASN1_INTEGER -#define ASN1_NULL MBEDTLS_ASN1_NULL -#define ASN1_OCTET_STRING MBEDTLS_ASN1_OCTET_STRING -#define ASN1_OID MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID -#define ASN1_PRIMITIVE MBEDTLS_ASN1_PRIMITIVE -#define ASN1_PRINTABLE_STRING MBEDTLS_ASN1_PRINTABLE_STRING -#define ASN1_SEQUENCE MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE -#define ASN1_SET MBEDTLS_ASN1_SET -#define ASN1_T61_STRING MBEDTLS_ASN1_T61_STRING -#define ASN1_UNIVERSAL_STRING MBEDTLS_ASN1_UNIVERSAL_STRING -#define ASN1_UTC_TIME MBEDTLS_ASN1_UTC_TIME -#define ASN1_UTF8_STRING MBEDTLS_ASN1_UTF8_STRING -#define BADCERT_CN_MISMATCH MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_CN_MISMATCH -#define BADCERT_EXPIRED MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_EXPIRED -#define BADCERT_FUTURE MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_FUTURE -#define BADCERT_MISSING MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_MISSING -#define BADCERT_NOT_TRUSTED MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_NOT_TRUSTED -#define BADCERT_OTHER MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_OTHER -#define BADCERT_REVOKED MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_REVOKED -#define BADCERT_SKIP_VERIFY MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_SKIP_VERIFY -#define BADCRL_EXPIRED MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_EXPIRED -#define BADCRL_FUTURE MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_FUTURE -#define BADCRL_NOT_TRUSTED MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_NOT_TRUSTED -#define BLOWFISH_BLOCKSIZE MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_BLOCKSIZE -#define BLOWFISH_DECRYPT MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_DECRYPT -#define BLOWFISH_ENCRYPT MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_ENCRYPT -#define BLOWFISH_MAX_KEY MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_MAX_KEY_BITS -#define BLOWFISH_MIN_KEY MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_MIN_KEY_BITS -#define BLOWFISH_ROUNDS MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_ROUNDS -#define CAMELLIA_DECRYPT MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_DECRYPT -#define CAMELLIA_ENCRYPT MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_ENCRYPT -#define COLLECT_SIZE MBEDTLS_HAVEGE_COLLECT_SIZE -#define CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE -#define CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN -#define CTR_DRBG_KEYBITS MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYBITS -#define CTR_DRBG_KEYSIZE MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYSIZE -#define CTR_DRBG_MAX_INPUT MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_INPUT -#define CTR_DRBG_MAX_REQUEST MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_REQUEST -#define CTR_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT -#define CTR_DRBG_PR_OFF MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_PR_OFF -#define CTR_DRBG_PR_ON MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_PR_ON -#define CTR_DRBG_RESEED_INTERVAL MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_RESEED_INTERVAL -#define CTR_DRBG_SEEDLEN MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_SEEDLEN -#define DEPRECATED MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED -#define DES_DECRYPT MBEDTLS_DES_DECRYPT -#define DES_ENCRYPT MBEDTLS_DES_ENCRYPT -#define DES_KEY_SIZE MBEDTLS_DES_KEY_SIZE -#define ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE -#define ENTROPY_MAX_GATHER MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MAX_GATHER -#define ENTROPY_MAX_SEED_SIZE MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MAX_SEED_SIZE -#define ENTROPY_MAX_SOURCES MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MAX_SOURCES -#define ENTROPY_MIN_HARDCLOCK MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MIN_HARDCLOCK -#define ENTROPY_MIN_HAVEGE MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MIN_HAVEGE -#define ENTROPY_MIN_PLATFORM MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MIN_PLATFORM -#define ENTROPY_SOURCE_MANUAL MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_SOURCE_MANUAL -#define EXT_AUTHORITY_KEY_IDENTIFIER MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_AUTHORITY_KEY_IDENTIFIER -#define EXT_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS -#define EXT_CERTIFICATE_POLICIES MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_CERTIFICATE_POLICIES -#define EXT_CRL_DISTRIBUTION_POINTS MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_CRL_DISTRIBUTION_POINTS -#define EXT_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE -#define EXT_FRESHEST_CRL MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_FRESHEST_CRL -#define EXT_INIHIBIT_ANYPOLICY MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_INIHIBIT_ANYPOLICY -#define EXT_ISSUER_ALT_NAME MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_ISSUER_ALT_NAME -#define EXT_KEY_USAGE MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_KEY_USAGE -#define EXT_NAME_CONSTRAINTS MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_NAME_CONSTRAINTS -#define EXT_NS_CERT_TYPE MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_NS_CERT_TYPE -#define EXT_POLICY_CONSTRAINTS MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_POLICY_CONSTRAINTS -#define EXT_POLICY_MAPPINGS MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_POLICY_MAPPINGS -#define EXT_SUBJECT_ALT_NAME MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_SUBJECT_ALT_NAME -#define EXT_SUBJECT_DIRECTORY_ATTRS MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_SUBJECT_DIRECTORY_ATTRS -#define EXT_SUBJECT_KEY_IDENTIFIER MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_SUBJECT_KEY_IDENTIFIER -#define GCM_DECRYPT MBEDTLS_GCM_DECRYPT -#define GCM_ENCRYPT MBEDTLS_GCM_ENCRYPT -#define KU_CRL_SIGN MBEDTLS_X509_KU_CRL_SIGN -#define KU_DATA_ENCIPHERMENT MBEDTLS_X509_KU_DATA_ENCIPHERMENT -#define KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE MBEDTLS_X509_KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE -#define KU_KEY_AGREEMENT MBEDTLS_X509_KU_KEY_AGREEMENT -#define KU_KEY_CERT_SIGN MBEDTLS_X509_KU_KEY_CERT_SIGN -#define KU_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT MBEDTLS_X509_KU_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT -#define KU_NON_REPUDIATION MBEDTLS_X509_KU_NON_REPUDIATION -#define LN_2_DIV_LN_10_SCALE100 MBEDTLS_LN_2_DIV_LN_10_SCALE100 -#define MEMORY_VERIFY_ALLOC MBEDTLS_MEMORY_VERIFY_ALLOC -#define MEMORY_VERIFY_ALWAYS MBEDTLS_MEMORY_VERIFY_ALWAYS -#define MEMORY_VERIFY_FREE MBEDTLS_MEMORY_VERIFY_FREE -#define MEMORY_VERIFY_NONE MBEDTLS_MEMORY_VERIFY_NONE -#define MPI_CHK MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK -#define NET_PROTO_TCP MBEDTLS_NET_PROTO_TCP -#define NET_PROTO_UDP MBEDTLS_NET_PROTO_UDP -#define NS_CERT_TYPE_EMAIL MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_EMAIL -#define NS_CERT_TYPE_EMAIL_CA MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_EMAIL_CA -#define NS_CERT_TYPE_OBJECT_SIGNING MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_OBJECT_SIGNING -#define NS_CERT_TYPE_OBJECT_SIGNING_CA MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_OBJECT_SIGNING_CA -#define NS_CERT_TYPE_RESERVED MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_RESERVED -#define NS_CERT_TYPE_SSL_CA MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_SSL_CA -#define NS_CERT_TYPE_SSL_CLIENT MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_SSL_CLIENT -#define NS_CERT_TYPE_SSL_SERVER MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_SSL_SERVER -#define OID_ANSI_X9_62 MBEDTLS_OID_ANSI_X9_62 -#define OID_ANSI_X9_62_FIELD_TYPE MBEDTLS_OID_ANSI_X9_62_FIELD_TYPE -#define OID_ANSI_X9_62_PRIME_FIELD MBEDTLS_OID_ANSI_X9_62_PRIME_FIELD -#define OID_ANSI_X9_62_SIG MBEDTLS_OID_ANSI_X9_62_SIG -#define OID_ANSI_X9_62_SIG_SHA2 MBEDTLS_OID_ANSI_X9_62_SIG_SHA2 -#define OID_ANY_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE MBEDTLS_OID_ANY_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE -#define OID_AT MBEDTLS_OID_AT -#define OID_AT_CN MBEDTLS_OID_AT_CN -#define OID_AT_COUNTRY MBEDTLS_OID_AT_COUNTRY -#define OID_AT_DN_QUALIFIER MBEDTLS_OID_AT_DN_QUALIFIER -#define OID_AT_GENERATION_QUALIFIER MBEDTLS_OID_AT_GENERATION_QUALIFIER -#define OID_AT_GIVEN_NAME MBEDTLS_OID_AT_GIVEN_NAME -#define OID_AT_INITIALS MBEDTLS_OID_AT_INITIALS -#define OID_AT_LOCALITY MBEDTLS_OID_AT_LOCALITY -#define OID_AT_ORGANIZATION MBEDTLS_OID_AT_ORGANIZATION -#define OID_AT_ORG_UNIT MBEDTLS_OID_AT_ORG_UNIT -#define OID_AT_POSTAL_ADDRESS MBEDTLS_OID_AT_POSTAL_ADDRESS -#define OID_AT_POSTAL_CODE MBEDTLS_OID_AT_POSTAL_CODE -#define OID_AT_PSEUDONYM MBEDTLS_OID_AT_PSEUDONYM -#define OID_AT_SERIAL_NUMBER MBEDTLS_OID_AT_SERIAL_NUMBER -#define OID_AT_STATE MBEDTLS_OID_AT_STATE -#define OID_AT_SUR_NAME MBEDTLS_OID_AT_SUR_NAME -#define OID_AT_TITLE MBEDTLS_OID_AT_TITLE -#define OID_AT_UNIQUE_IDENTIFIER MBEDTLS_OID_AT_UNIQUE_IDENTIFIER -#define OID_AUTHORITY_KEY_IDENTIFIER MBEDTLS_OID_AUTHORITY_KEY_IDENTIFIER -#define OID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS MBEDTLS_OID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS -#define OID_CERTICOM MBEDTLS_OID_CERTICOM -#define OID_CERTIFICATE_POLICIES MBEDTLS_OID_CERTIFICATE_POLICIES -#define OID_CLIENT_AUTH MBEDTLS_OID_CLIENT_AUTH -#define OID_CMP MBEDTLS_OID_CMP -#define OID_CODE_SIGNING MBEDTLS_OID_CODE_SIGNING -#define OID_COUNTRY_US MBEDTLS_OID_COUNTRY_US -#define OID_CRL_DISTRIBUTION_POINTS MBEDTLS_OID_CRL_DISTRIBUTION_POINTS -#define OID_CRL_NUMBER MBEDTLS_OID_CRL_NUMBER -#define OID_DES_CBC MBEDTLS_OID_DES_CBC -#define OID_DES_EDE3_CBC MBEDTLS_OID_DES_EDE3_CBC -#define OID_DIGEST_ALG_MD2 MBEDTLS_OID_DIGEST_ALG_MD2 -#define OID_DIGEST_ALG_MD4 MBEDTLS_OID_DIGEST_ALG_MD4 -#define OID_DIGEST_ALG_MD5 MBEDTLS_OID_DIGEST_ALG_MD5 -#define OID_DIGEST_ALG_SHA1 MBEDTLS_OID_DIGEST_ALG_SHA1 -#define OID_DIGEST_ALG_SHA224 MBEDTLS_OID_DIGEST_ALG_SHA224 -#define OID_DIGEST_ALG_SHA256 MBEDTLS_OID_DIGEST_ALG_SHA256 -#define OID_DIGEST_ALG_SHA384 MBEDTLS_OID_DIGEST_ALG_SHA384 -#define OID_DIGEST_ALG_SHA512 MBEDTLS_OID_DIGEST_ALG_SHA512 -#define OID_DOMAIN_COMPONENT MBEDTLS_OID_DOMAIN_COMPONENT -#define OID_ECDSA_SHA1 MBEDTLS_OID_ECDSA_SHA1 -#define OID_ECDSA_SHA224 MBEDTLS_OID_ECDSA_SHA224 -#define OID_ECDSA_SHA256 MBEDTLS_OID_ECDSA_SHA256 -#define OID_ECDSA_SHA384 MBEDTLS_OID_ECDSA_SHA384 -#define OID_ECDSA_SHA512 MBEDTLS_OID_ECDSA_SHA512 -#define OID_EC_ALG_ECDH MBEDTLS_OID_EC_ALG_ECDH -#define OID_EC_ALG_UNRESTRICTED MBEDTLS_OID_EC_ALG_UNRESTRICTED -#define OID_EC_BRAINPOOL_V1 MBEDTLS_OID_EC_BRAINPOOL_V1 -#define OID_EC_GRP_BP256R1 MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_BP256R1 -#define OID_EC_GRP_BP384R1 MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_BP384R1 -#define OID_EC_GRP_BP512R1 MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_BP512R1 -#define OID_EC_GRP_SECP192K1 MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP192K1 -#define OID_EC_GRP_SECP192R1 MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP192R1 -#define OID_EC_GRP_SECP224K1 MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP224K1 -#define OID_EC_GRP_SECP224R1 MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP224R1 -#define OID_EC_GRP_SECP256K1 MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP256K1 -#define OID_EC_GRP_SECP256R1 MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP256R1 -#define OID_EC_GRP_SECP384R1 MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP384R1 -#define OID_EC_GRP_SECP521R1 MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP521R1 -#define OID_EMAIL_PROTECTION MBEDTLS_OID_EMAIL_PROTECTION -#define OID_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE MBEDTLS_OID_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE -#define OID_FRESHEST_CRL MBEDTLS_OID_FRESHEST_CRL -#define OID_GOV MBEDTLS_OID_GOV -#define OID_HMAC_SHA1 MBEDTLS_OID_HMAC_SHA1 -#define OID_ID_CE MBEDTLS_OID_ID_CE -#define OID_INIHIBIT_ANYPOLICY MBEDTLS_OID_INIHIBIT_ANYPOLICY -#define OID_ISO_CCITT_DS MBEDTLS_OID_ISO_CCITT_DS -#define OID_ISO_IDENTIFIED_ORG MBEDTLS_OID_ISO_IDENTIFIED_ORG -#define OID_ISO_ITU_COUNTRY MBEDTLS_OID_ISO_ITU_COUNTRY -#define OID_ISO_ITU_US_ORG MBEDTLS_OID_ISO_ITU_US_ORG -#define OID_ISO_MEMBER_BODIES MBEDTLS_OID_ISO_MEMBER_BODIES -#define OID_ISSUER_ALT_NAME MBEDTLS_OID_ISSUER_ALT_NAME -#define OID_KEY_USAGE MBEDTLS_OID_KEY_USAGE -#define OID_KP MBEDTLS_OID_KP -#define OID_MGF1 MBEDTLS_OID_MGF1 -#define OID_NAME_CONSTRAINTS MBEDTLS_OID_NAME_CONSTRAINTS -#define OID_NETSCAPE MBEDTLS_OID_NETSCAPE -#define OID_NS_BASE_URL MBEDTLS_OID_NS_BASE_URL -#define OID_NS_CA_POLICY_URL MBEDTLS_OID_NS_CA_POLICY_URL -#define OID_NS_CA_REVOCATION_URL MBEDTLS_OID_NS_CA_REVOCATION_URL -#define OID_NS_CERT MBEDTLS_OID_NS_CERT -#define OID_NS_CERT_SEQUENCE MBEDTLS_OID_NS_CERT_SEQUENCE -#define OID_NS_CERT_TYPE MBEDTLS_OID_NS_CERT_TYPE -#define OID_NS_COMMENT MBEDTLS_OID_NS_COMMENT -#define OID_NS_DATA_TYPE MBEDTLS_OID_NS_DATA_TYPE -#define OID_NS_RENEWAL_URL MBEDTLS_OID_NS_RENEWAL_URL -#define OID_NS_REVOCATION_URL MBEDTLS_OID_NS_REVOCATION_URL -#define OID_NS_SSL_SERVER_NAME MBEDTLS_OID_NS_SSL_SERVER_NAME -#define OID_OCSP_SIGNING MBEDTLS_OID_OCSP_SIGNING -#define OID_OIW_SECSIG MBEDTLS_OID_OIW_SECSIG -#define OID_OIW_SECSIG_ALG MBEDTLS_OID_OIW_SECSIG_ALG -#define OID_OIW_SECSIG_SHA1 MBEDTLS_OID_OIW_SECSIG_SHA1 -#define OID_ORGANIZATION MBEDTLS_OID_ORGANIZATION -#define OID_ORG_ANSI_X9_62 MBEDTLS_OID_ORG_ANSI_X9_62 -#define OID_ORG_CERTICOM MBEDTLS_OID_ORG_CERTICOM -#define OID_ORG_DOD MBEDTLS_OID_ORG_DOD -#define OID_ORG_GOV MBEDTLS_OID_ORG_GOV -#define OID_ORG_NETSCAPE MBEDTLS_OID_ORG_NETSCAPE -#define OID_ORG_OIW MBEDTLS_OID_ORG_OIW -#define OID_ORG_RSA_DATA_SECURITY MBEDTLS_OID_ORG_RSA_DATA_SECURITY -#define OID_ORG_TELETRUST MBEDTLS_OID_ORG_TELETRUST -#define OID_PKCS MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS -#define OID_PKCS1 MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1 -#define OID_PKCS12 MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS12 -#define OID_PKCS12_PBE MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS12_PBE -#define OID_PKCS12_PBE_SHA1_DES2_EDE_CBC MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS12_PBE_SHA1_DES2_EDE_CBC -#define OID_PKCS12_PBE_SHA1_DES3_EDE_CBC MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS12_PBE_SHA1_DES3_EDE_CBC -#define OID_PKCS12_PBE_SHA1_RC2_128_CBC MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS12_PBE_SHA1_RC2_128_CBC -#define OID_PKCS12_PBE_SHA1_RC2_40_CBC MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS12_PBE_SHA1_RC2_40_CBC -#define OID_PKCS12_PBE_SHA1_RC4_128 MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS12_PBE_SHA1_RC4_128 -#define OID_PKCS12_PBE_SHA1_RC4_40 MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS12_PBE_SHA1_RC4_40 -#define OID_PKCS1_MD2 MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1_MD2 -#define OID_PKCS1_MD4 MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1_MD4 -#define OID_PKCS1_MD5 MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1_MD5 -#define OID_PKCS1_RSA MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1_RSA -#define OID_PKCS1_SHA1 MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1_SHA1 -#define OID_PKCS1_SHA224 MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1_SHA224 -#define OID_PKCS1_SHA256 MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1_SHA256 -#define OID_PKCS1_SHA384 MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1_SHA384 -#define OID_PKCS1_SHA512 MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1_SHA512 -#define OID_PKCS5 MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS5 -#define OID_PKCS5_PBES2 MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS5_PBES2 -#define OID_PKCS5_PBE_MD2_DES_CBC MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS5_PBE_MD2_DES_CBC -#define OID_PKCS5_PBE_MD2_RC2_CBC MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS5_PBE_MD2_RC2_CBC -#define OID_PKCS5_PBE_MD5_DES_CBC MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS5_PBE_MD5_DES_CBC -#define OID_PKCS5_PBE_MD5_RC2_CBC MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS5_PBE_MD5_RC2_CBC -#define OID_PKCS5_PBE_SHA1_DES_CBC MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS5_PBE_SHA1_DES_CBC -#define OID_PKCS5_PBE_SHA1_RC2_CBC MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS5_PBE_SHA1_RC2_CBC -#define OID_PKCS5_PBKDF2 MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS5_PBKDF2 -#define OID_PKCS5_PBMAC1 MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS5_PBMAC1 -#define OID_PKCS9 MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS9 -#define OID_PKCS9_CSR_EXT_REQ MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS9_CSR_EXT_REQ -#define OID_PKCS9_EMAIL MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS9_EMAIL -#define OID_PKIX MBEDTLS_OID_PKIX -#define OID_POLICY_CONSTRAINTS MBEDTLS_OID_POLICY_CONSTRAINTS -#define OID_POLICY_MAPPINGS MBEDTLS_OID_POLICY_MAPPINGS -#define OID_PRIVATE_KEY_USAGE_PERIOD MBEDTLS_OID_PRIVATE_KEY_USAGE_PERIOD -#define OID_RSASSA_PSS MBEDTLS_OID_RSASSA_PSS -#define OID_RSA_COMPANY MBEDTLS_OID_RSA_COMPANY -#define OID_RSA_SHA_OBS MBEDTLS_OID_RSA_SHA_OBS -#define OID_SERVER_AUTH MBEDTLS_OID_SERVER_AUTH -#define OID_SIZE MBEDTLS_OID_SIZE -#define OID_SUBJECT_ALT_NAME MBEDTLS_OID_SUBJECT_ALT_NAME -#define OID_SUBJECT_DIRECTORY_ATTRS MBEDTLS_OID_SUBJECT_DIRECTORY_ATTRS -#define OID_SUBJECT_KEY_IDENTIFIER MBEDTLS_OID_SUBJECT_KEY_IDENTIFIER -#define OID_TELETRUST MBEDTLS_OID_TELETRUST -#define OID_TIME_STAMPING MBEDTLS_OID_TIME_STAMPING -#define PADLOCK_ACE MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_ACE -#define PADLOCK_ALIGN16 MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_ALIGN16 -#define PADLOCK_PHE MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_PHE -#define PADLOCK_PMM MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_PMM -#define PADLOCK_RNG MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_RNG -#define PKCS12_DERIVE_IV MBEDTLS_PKCS12_DERIVE_IV -#define PKCS12_DERIVE_KEY MBEDTLS_PKCS12_DERIVE_KEY -#define PKCS12_DERIVE_MAC_KEY MBEDTLS_PKCS12_DERIVE_MAC_KEY -#define PKCS12_PBE_DECRYPT MBEDTLS_PKCS12_PBE_DECRYPT -#define PKCS12_PBE_ENCRYPT MBEDTLS_PKCS12_PBE_ENCRYPT -#define PKCS5_DECRYPT MBEDTLS_PKCS5_DECRYPT -#define PKCS5_ENCRYPT MBEDTLS_PKCS5_ENCRYPT -#define POLARSSL_AESNI_AES MBEDTLS_AESNI_AES -#define POLARSSL_AESNI_CLMUL MBEDTLS_AESNI_CLMUL -#define POLARSSL_AESNI_H MBEDTLS_AESNI_H -#define POLARSSL_AES_H MBEDTLS_AES_H -#define POLARSSL_ARC4_H MBEDTLS_ARC4_H -#define POLARSSL_ASN1_H MBEDTLS_ASN1_H -#define POLARSSL_ASN1_WRITE_H MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_H -#define POLARSSL_BASE64_H MBEDTLS_BASE64_H -#define POLARSSL_BIGNUM_H MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_H -#define POLARSSL_BLOWFISH_H MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_H -#define POLARSSL_BN_MUL_H MBEDTLS_BN_MUL_H -#define POLARSSL_CAMELLIA_H MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_H -#define POLARSSL_CCM_H MBEDTLS_CCM_H -#define POLARSSL_CERTS_H MBEDTLS_CERTS_H -#define POLARSSL_CHECK_CONFIG_H MBEDTLS_CHECK_CONFIG_H -#define POLARSSL_CIPHERSUITE_NODTLS MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_NODTLS -#define POLARSSL_CIPHERSUITE_SHORT_TAG MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_SHORT_TAG -#define POLARSSL_CIPHERSUITE_WEAK MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_WEAK -#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC -#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM -#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_AES_128_CFB128 MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CFB128 -#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_AES_128_CTR MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CTR -#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_AES_128_ECB MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_ECB -#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_AES_128_GCM MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_GCM -#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC -#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM -#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_AES_192_CFB128 MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CFB128 -#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_AES_192_CTR MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CTR -#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_AES_192_ECB MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_ECB -#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_AES_192_GCM MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_GCM -#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC -#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM -#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_AES_256_CFB128 MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CFB128 -#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_AES_256_CTR MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CTR -#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_AES_256_ECB MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_ECB -#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_AES_256_GCM MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_GCM -#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_ARC4_128 MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128 -#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC -#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CFB64 MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CFB64 -#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CTR MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CTR -#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_ECB MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_ECB -#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC -#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CCM MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CCM -#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CFB128 MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CFB128 -#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CTR MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CTR -#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_ECB MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_ECB -#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_GCM MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_GCM -#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC -#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CCM MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CCM -#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CFB128 MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CFB128 -#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CTR MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CTR -#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_ECB MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_ECB -#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_GCM MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_GCM -#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC -#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CCM MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CCM -#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CFB128 MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CFB128 -#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CTR MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CTR -#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_ECB MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_ECB -#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_GCM MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_GCM -#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_DES_CBC MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_CBC -#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_DES_ECB MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_ECB -#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC -#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_ECB MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_ECB -#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_DES_EDE_CBC MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE_CBC -#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_DES_EDE_ECB MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE_ECB -#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_H MBEDTLS_CIPHER_H -#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_ID_3DES MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_3DES -#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_ID_AES MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES -#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_ID_ARC4 MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_ARC4 -#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_ID_BLOWFISH MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_BLOWFISH -#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_ID_CAMELLIA MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_CAMELLIA -#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_ID_DES MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_DES -#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_ID_NONE MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_NONE -#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_ID_NULL MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_NULL -#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_MODE_AEAD MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_AEAD -#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_MODE_STREAM MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_STREAM -#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_MODE_WITH_PADDING MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_WITH_PADDING -#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_NONE MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NONE -#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_NULL MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL -#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_VARIABLE_IV_LEN MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_IV_LEN -#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_VARIABLE_KEY_LEN MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_KEY_LEN -#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_WRAP_H MBEDTLS_CIPHER_WRAP_H -#define POLARSSL_CONFIG_H MBEDTLS_CONFIG_H -#define POLARSSL_CTR_DRBG_H MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_H -#define POLARSSL_DEBUG_H MBEDTLS_DEBUG_H -#define POLARSSL_DECRYPT MBEDTLS_DECRYPT -#define POLARSSL_DES_H MBEDTLS_DES_H -#define POLARSSL_DHM_H MBEDTLS_DHM_H -#define POLARSSL_DHM_RFC3526_MODP_2048_G MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC3526_MODP_2048_G -#define POLARSSL_DHM_RFC3526_MODP_2048_P MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC3526_MODP_2048_P -#define POLARSSL_DHM_RFC3526_MODP_3072_G MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC3526_MODP_3072_G -#define POLARSSL_DHM_RFC3526_MODP_3072_P MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC3526_MODP_3072_P -#define POLARSSL_DHM_RFC5114_MODP_2048_G MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC5114_MODP_2048_G -#define POLARSSL_DHM_RFC5114_MODP_2048_P MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC5114_MODP_2048_P -#define POLARSSL_ECDH_H MBEDTLS_ECDH_H -#define POLARSSL_ECDH_OURS MBEDTLS_ECDH_OURS -#define POLARSSL_ECDH_THEIRS MBEDTLS_ECDH_THEIRS -#define POLARSSL_ECDSA_H MBEDTLS_ECDSA_H -#define POLARSSL_ECP_DP_BP256R1 MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1 -#define POLARSSL_ECP_DP_BP384R1 MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1 -#define POLARSSL_ECP_DP_BP512R1 MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1 -#define POLARSSL_ECP_DP_M255 MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519 -#define POLARSSL_ECP_DP_MAX MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_MAX -#define POLARSSL_ECP_DP_NONE MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE -#define POLARSSL_ECP_DP_SECP192K1 MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1 -#define POLARSSL_ECP_DP_SECP192R1 MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1 -#define POLARSSL_ECP_DP_SECP224K1 MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1 -#define POLARSSL_ECP_DP_SECP224R1 MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1 -#define POLARSSL_ECP_DP_SECP256K1 MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1 -#define POLARSSL_ECP_DP_SECP256R1 MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1 -#define POLARSSL_ECP_DP_SECP384R1 MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1 -#define POLARSSL_ECP_DP_SECP521R1 MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1 -#define POLARSSL_ECP_H MBEDTLS_ECP_H -#define POLARSSL_ECP_MAX_BYTES MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BYTES -#define POLARSSL_ECP_MAX_PT_LEN MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_PT_LEN -#define POLARSSL_ECP_PF_COMPRESSED MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_COMPRESSED -#define POLARSSL_ECP_PF_UNCOMPRESSED MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_UNCOMPRESSED -#define POLARSSL_ECP_TLS_NAMED_CURVE MBEDTLS_ECP_TLS_NAMED_CURVE -#define POLARSSL_ENCRYPT MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT -#define POLARSSL_ENTROPY_H MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_H -#define POLARSSL_ENTROPY_POLL_H MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_POLL_H -#define POLARSSL_ENTROPY_SHA256_ACCUMULATOR MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_SHA256_ACCUMULATOR -#define POLARSSL_ENTROPY_SHA512_ACCUMULATOR MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_SHA512_ACCUMULATOR -#define POLARSSL_ERROR_H MBEDTLS_ERROR_H -#define POLARSSL_ERR_AES_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH -#define POLARSSL_ERR_AES_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH -#define POLARSSL_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL -#define POLARSSL_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_DATA MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_DATA -#define POLARSSL_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH -#define POLARSSL_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH -#define POLARSSL_ERR_ASN1_MALLOC_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_ALLOC_FAILED -#define POLARSSL_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA -#define POLARSSL_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG -#define POLARSSL_ERR_BASE64_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL MBEDTLS_ERR_BASE64_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL -#define POLARSSL_ERR_BASE64_INVALID_CHARACTER MBEDTLS_ERR_BASE64_INVALID_CHARACTER -#define POLARSSL_ERR_BLOWFISH_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH MBEDTLS_ERR_BLOWFISH_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH -#define POLARSSL_ERR_BLOWFISH_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH MBEDTLS_ERR_BLOWFISH_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH -#define POLARSSL_ERR_CAMELLIA_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH MBEDTLS_ERR_CAMELLIA_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH -#define POLARSSL_ERR_CAMELLIA_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH MBEDTLS_ERR_CAMELLIA_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH -#define POLARSSL_ERR_CCM_AUTH_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_AUTH_FAILED -#define POLARSSL_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT -#define POLARSSL_ERR_CIPHER_ALLOC_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_ALLOC_FAILED -#define POLARSSL_ERR_CIPHER_AUTH_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_AUTH_FAILED -#define POLARSSL_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA -#define POLARSSL_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE -#define POLARSSL_ERR_CIPHER_FULL_BLOCK_EXPECTED MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FULL_BLOCK_EXPECTED -#define POLARSSL_ERR_CIPHER_INVALID_PADDING MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_INVALID_PADDING -#define POLARSSL_ERR_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED -#define POLARSSL_ERR_CTR_DRBG_FILE_IO_ERROR MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_FILE_IO_ERROR -#define POLARSSL_ERR_CTR_DRBG_INPUT_TOO_BIG MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_INPUT_TOO_BIG -#define POLARSSL_ERR_CTR_DRBG_REQUEST_TOO_BIG MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_REQUEST_TOO_BIG -#define POLARSSL_ERR_DES_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH MBEDTLS_ERR_DES_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH -#define POLARSSL_ERR_DHM_BAD_INPUT_DATA MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_BAD_INPUT_DATA -#define POLARSSL_ERR_DHM_CALC_SECRET_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_CALC_SECRET_FAILED -#define POLARSSL_ERR_DHM_FILE_IO_ERROR MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_FILE_IO_ERROR -#define POLARSSL_ERR_DHM_INVALID_FORMAT MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_INVALID_FORMAT -#define POLARSSL_ERR_DHM_MAKE_PARAMS_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_MAKE_PARAMS_FAILED -#define POLARSSL_ERR_DHM_MAKE_PUBLIC_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_MAKE_PUBLIC_FAILED -#define POLARSSL_ERR_DHM_MALLOC_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_ALLOC_FAILED -#define POLARSSL_ERR_DHM_READ_PARAMS_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_READ_PARAMS_FAILED -#define POLARSSL_ERR_DHM_READ_PUBLIC_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_READ_PUBLIC_FAILED -#define POLARSSL_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA -#define POLARSSL_ERR_ECP_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL -#define POLARSSL_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE -#define POLARSSL_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY -#define POLARSSL_ERR_ECP_MALLOC_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_ALLOC_FAILED -#define POLARSSL_ERR_ECP_RANDOM_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_RANDOM_FAILED -#define POLARSSL_ERR_ECP_SIG_LEN_MISMATCH MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_SIG_LEN_MISMATCH -#define POLARSSL_ERR_ECP_VERIFY_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_VERIFY_FAILED -#define POLARSSL_ERR_ENTROPY_FILE_IO_ERROR MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_FILE_IO_ERROR -#define POLARSSL_ERR_ENTROPY_MAX_SOURCES MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_MAX_SOURCES -#define POLARSSL_ERR_ENTROPY_NO_SOURCES_DEFINED MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_NO_SOURCES_DEFINED -#define POLARSSL_ERR_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED -#define POLARSSL_ERR_GCM_AUTH_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_AUTH_FAILED -#define POLARSSL_ERR_GCM_BAD_INPUT MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BAD_INPUT -#define POLARSSL_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED -#define POLARSSL_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_FILE_IO_ERROR MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_FILE_IO_ERROR -#define POLARSSL_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_INPUT_TOO_BIG MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_INPUT_TOO_BIG -#define POLARSSL_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_REQUEST_TOO_BIG MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_REQUEST_TOO_BIG -#define POLARSSL_ERR_MD_ALLOC_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_ALLOC_FAILED -#define POLARSSL_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA -#define POLARSSL_ERR_MD_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE -#define POLARSSL_ERR_MD_FILE_IO_ERROR MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_FILE_IO_ERROR -#define POLARSSL_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA -#define POLARSSL_ERR_MPI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL -#define POLARSSL_ERR_MPI_DIVISION_BY_ZERO MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_DIVISION_BY_ZERO -#define POLARSSL_ERR_MPI_FILE_IO_ERROR MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_FILE_IO_ERROR -#define POLARSSL_ERR_MPI_INVALID_CHARACTER MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_INVALID_CHARACTER -#define POLARSSL_ERR_MPI_MALLOC_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED -#define POLARSSL_ERR_MPI_NEGATIVE_VALUE MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NEGATIVE_VALUE -#define POLARSSL_ERR_MPI_NOT_ACCEPTABLE MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NOT_ACCEPTABLE -#define POLARSSL_ERR_NET_ACCEPT_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_ACCEPT_FAILED -#define POLARSSL_ERR_NET_BIND_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_BIND_FAILED -#define POLARSSL_ERR_NET_CONNECT_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_CONNECT_FAILED -#define POLARSSL_ERR_NET_CONN_RESET MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_CONN_RESET -#define POLARSSL_ERR_NET_LISTEN_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_LISTEN_FAILED -#define POLARSSL_ERR_NET_RECV_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_RECV_FAILED -#define POLARSSL_ERR_NET_SEND_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_SEND_FAILED -#define POLARSSL_ERR_NET_SOCKET_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_SOCKET_FAILED -#define POLARSSL_ERR_NET_TIMEOUT MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_TIMEOUT -#define POLARSSL_ERR_NET_UNKNOWN_HOST MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_UNKNOWN_HOST -#define POLARSSL_ERR_NET_WANT_READ MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ -#define POLARSSL_ERR_NET_WANT_WRITE MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE -#define POLARSSL_ERR_OID_BUF_TOO_SMALL MBEDTLS_ERR_OID_BUF_TOO_SMALL -#define POLARSSL_ERR_OID_NOT_FOUND MBEDTLS_ERR_OID_NOT_FOUND -#define POLARSSL_ERR_PADLOCK_DATA_MISALIGNED MBEDTLS_ERR_PADLOCK_DATA_MISALIGNED -#define POLARSSL_ERR_PEM_BAD_INPUT_DATA MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_BAD_INPUT_DATA -#define POLARSSL_ERR_PEM_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE -#define POLARSSL_ERR_PEM_INVALID_DATA MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_INVALID_DATA -#define POLARSSL_ERR_PEM_INVALID_ENC_IV MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_INVALID_ENC_IV -#define POLARSSL_ERR_PEM_MALLOC_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_ALLOC_FAILED -#define POLARSSL_ERR_PEM_NO_HEADER_FOOTER_PRESENT MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_NO_HEADER_FOOTER_PRESENT -#define POLARSSL_ERR_PEM_PASSWORD_MISMATCH MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_PASSWORD_MISMATCH -#define POLARSSL_ERR_PEM_PASSWORD_REQUIRED MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_PASSWORD_REQUIRED -#define POLARSSL_ERR_PEM_UNKNOWN_ENC_ALG MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_UNKNOWN_ENC_ALG -#define POLARSSL_ERR_PKCS12_BAD_INPUT_DATA MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS12_BAD_INPUT_DATA -#define POLARSSL_ERR_PKCS12_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS12_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE -#define POLARSSL_ERR_PKCS12_PASSWORD_MISMATCH MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS12_PASSWORD_MISMATCH -#define POLARSSL_ERR_PKCS12_PBE_INVALID_FORMAT MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS12_PBE_INVALID_FORMAT -#define POLARSSL_ERR_PKCS5_BAD_INPUT_DATA MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_BAD_INPUT_DATA -#define POLARSSL_ERR_PKCS5_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE -#define POLARSSL_ERR_PKCS5_INVALID_FORMAT MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_INVALID_FORMAT -#define POLARSSL_ERR_PKCS5_PASSWORD_MISMATCH MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_PASSWORD_MISMATCH -#define POLARSSL_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA -#define POLARSSL_ERR_PK_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE -#define POLARSSL_ERR_PK_FILE_IO_ERROR MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FILE_IO_ERROR -#define POLARSSL_ERR_PK_INVALID_ALG MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_ALG -#define POLARSSL_ERR_PK_INVALID_PUBKEY MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_PUBKEY -#define POLARSSL_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT -#define POLARSSL_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_VERSION MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_VERSION -#define POLARSSL_ERR_PK_MALLOC_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_ALLOC_FAILED -#define POLARSSL_ERR_PK_PASSWORD_MISMATCH MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_PASSWORD_MISMATCH -#define POLARSSL_ERR_PK_PASSWORD_REQUIRED MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_PASSWORD_REQUIRED -#define POLARSSL_ERR_PK_SIG_LEN_MISMATCH MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_SIG_LEN_MISMATCH -#define POLARSSL_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH -#define POLARSSL_ERR_PK_UNKNOWN_NAMED_CURVE MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_UNKNOWN_NAMED_CURVE -#define POLARSSL_ERR_PK_UNKNOWN_PK_ALG MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_UNKNOWN_PK_ALG -#define POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA -#define POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING -#define POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED -#define POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_KEY_GEN_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_GEN_FAILED -#define POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_OUTPUT_TOO_LARGE MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_OUTPUT_TOO_LARGE -#define POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_PRIVATE_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_PRIVATE_FAILED -#define POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_PUBLIC_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_PUBLIC_FAILED -#define POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_RNG_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_RNG_FAILED -#define POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_VERIFY_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_VERIFY_FAILED -#define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE -#define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST -#define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY -#define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC -#define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO -#define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE -#define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_CS MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_CS -#define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_RP MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_RP -#define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_FINISHED MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_FINISHED -#define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET -#define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_PROTOCOL_VERSION MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_PROTOCOL_VERSION -#define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO -#define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO_DONE MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO_DONE -#define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE -#define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA -#define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL -#define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_CA_CHAIN_REQUIRED MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CA_CHAIN_REQUIRED -#define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_CERTIFICATE_REQUIRED MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CERTIFICATE_REQUIRED -#define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_CERTIFICATE_TOO_LARGE MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CERTIFICATE_TOO_LARGE -#define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_COMPRESSION_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_COMPRESSION_FAILED -#define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_CONN_EOF MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CONN_EOF -#define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_COUNTER_WRAPPING MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_COUNTER_WRAPPING -#define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_FATAL_ALERT_MESSAGE MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FATAL_ALERT_MESSAGE -#define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE -#define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUIRED MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUIRED -#define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED -#define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FALLTHROUGH MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FALLTHROUGH -#define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR -#define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC -#define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD -#define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_MALLOC_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED -#define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_NO_CIPHER_CHOSEN MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NO_CIPHER_CHOSEN -#define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_NO_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NO_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE -#define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_NO_RNG MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NO_RNG -#define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_NO_USABLE_CIPHERSUITE MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NO_USABLE_CIPHERSUITE -#define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_PEER_CLOSE_NOTIFY MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PEER_CLOSE_NOTIFY -#define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_PEER_VERIFY_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PEER_VERIFY_FAILED -#define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH -#define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_PRIVATE_KEY_REQUIRED MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PRIVATE_KEY_REQUIRED -#define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_SESSION_TICKET_EXPIRED MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_SESSION_TICKET_EXPIRED -#define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE -#define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_UNKNOWN_CIPHER MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNKNOWN_CIPHER -#define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_UNKNOWN_IDENTITY MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNKNOWN_IDENTITY -#define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_WAITING_SERVER_HELLO_RENEGO MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WAITING_SERVER_HELLO_RENEGO -#define POLARSSL_ERR_THREADING_BAD_INPUT_DATA MBEDTLS_ERR_THREADING_BAD_INPUT_DATA -#define POLARSSL_ERR_THREADING_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE MBEDTLS_ERR_THREADING_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE -#define POLARSSL_ERR_THREADING_MUTEX_ERROR MBEDTLS_ERR_THREADING_MUTEX_ERROR -#define POLARSSL_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA -#define POLARSSL_ERR_X509_CERT_UNKNOWN_FORMAT MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_UNKNOWN_FORMAT -#define POLARSSL_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED -#define POLARSSL_ERR_X509_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE -#define POLARSSL_ERR_X509_FILE_IO_ERROR MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FILE_IO_ERROR -#define POLARSSL_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG -#define POLARSSL_ERR_X509_INVALID_DATE MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_DATE -#define POLARSSL_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS -#define POLARSSL_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT -#define POLARSSL_ERR_X509_INVALID_NAME MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_NAME -#define POLARSSL_ERR_X509_INVALID_SERIAL MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_SERIAL -#define POLARSSL_ERR_X509_INVALID_SIGNATURE MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_SIGNATURE -#define POLARSSL_ERR_X509_INVALID_VERSION MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_VERSION -#define POLARSSL_ERR_X509_MALLOC_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_ALLOC_FAILED -#define POLARSSL_ERR_X509_SIG_MISMATCH MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_SIG_MISMATCH -#define POLARSSL_ERR_X509_UNKNOWN_OID MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_UNKNOWN_OID -#define POLARSSL_ERR_X509_UNKNOWN_SIG_ALG MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_UNKNOWN_SIG_ALG -#define POLARSSL_ERR_X509_UNKNOWN_VERSION MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_UNKNOWN_VERSION -#define POLARSSL_ERR_XTEA_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH MBEDTLS_ERR_XTEA_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH -#define POLARSSL_GCM_H MBEDTLS_GCM_H -#define POLARSSL_HAVEGE_H MBEDTLS_HAVEGE_H -#define POLARSSL_HAVE_INT32 MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT32 -#define POLARSSL_HAVE_INT64 MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT64 -#define POLARSSL_HAVE_UDBL MBEDTLS_HAVE_UDBL -#define POLARSSL_HAVE_X86 MBEDTLS_HAVE_X86 -#define POLARSSL_HAVE_X86_64 MBEDTLS_HAVE_X86_64 -#define POLARSSL_HMAC_DRBG_H MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_H -#define POLARSSL_HMAC_DRBG_PR_OFF MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_PR_OFF -#define POLARSSL_HMAC_DRBG_PR_ON MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_PR_ON -#define POLARSSL_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK -#define POLARSSL_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA -#define POLARSSL_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA -#define POLARSSL_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK -#define POLARSSL_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA -#define POLARSSL_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA -#define POLARSSL_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA -#define POLARSSL_KEY_EXCHANGE_NONE MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_NONE -#define POLARSSL_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK -#define POLARSSL_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA -#define POLARSSL_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK -#define POLARSSL_KEY_EXCHANGE__SOME__ECDHE_ENABLED MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDHE_ENABLED -#define POLARSSL_KEY_EXCHANGE__SOME__PSK_ENABLED MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED -#define POLARSSL_KEY_EXCHANGE__WITH_CERT__ENABLED MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED -#define POLARSSL_KEY_LENGTH_DES MBEDTLS_KEY_LENGTH_DES -#define POLARSSL_KEY_LENGTH_DES_EDE MBEDTLS_KEY_LENGTH_DES_EDE -#define POLARSSL_KEY_LENGTH_DES_EDE3 MBEDTLS_KEY_LENGTH_DES_EDE3 -#define POLARSSL_KEY_LENGTH_NONE MBEDTLS_KEY_LENGTH_NONE -#define POLARSSL_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH MBEDTLS_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH -#define POLARSSL_MAX_IV_LENGTH MBEDTLS_MAX_IV_LENGTH -#define POLARSSL_MD2_H MBEDTLS_MD2_H -#define POLARSSL_MD4_H MBEDTLS_MD4_H -#define POLARSSL_MD5_H MBEDTLS_MD5_H -#define POLARSSL_MD_H MBEDTLS_MD_H -#define POLARSSL_MD_MAX_SIZE MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE -#define POLARSSL_MD_MD2 MBEDTLS_MD_MD2 -#define POLARSSL_MD_MD4 MBEDTLS_MD_MD4 -#define POLARSSL_MD_MD5 MBEDTLS_MD_MD5 -#define POLARSSL_MD_NONE MBEDTLS_MD_NONE -#define POLARSSL_MD_RIPEMD160 MBEDTLS_MD_RIPEMD160 -#define POLARSSL_MD_SHA1 MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1 -#define POLARSSL_MD_SHA224 MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224 -#define POLARSSL_MD_SHA256 MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256 -#define POLARSSL_MD_SHA384 MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384 -#define POLARSSL_MD_SHA512 MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512 -#define POLARSSL_MD_WRAP_H MBEDTLS_MD_WRAP_H -#define POLARSSL_MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC_H MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC_H -#define POLARSSL_MODE_CBC MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC -#define POLARSSL_MODE_CCM MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM -#define POLARSSL_MODE_CFB MBEDTLS_MODE_CFB -#define POLARSSL_MODE_CTR MBEDTLS_MODE_CTR -#define POLARSSL_MODE_ECB MBEDTLS_MODE_ECB -#define POLARSSL_MODE_GCM MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM -#define POLARSSL_MODE_NONE MBEDTLS_MODE_NONE -#define POLARSSL_MODE_OFB MBEDTLS_MODE_OFB -#define POLARSSL_MODE_STREAM MBEDTLS_MODE_STREAM -#define POLARSSL_MPI_MAX_BITS MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_BITS -#define POLARSSL_MPI_MAX_BITS_SCALE100 MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_BITS_SCALE100 -#define POLARSSL_MPI_MAX_LIMBS MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_LIMBS -#define POLARSSL_MPI_RW_BUFFER_SIZE MBEDTLS_MPI_RW_BUFFER_SIZE -#define POLARSSL_NET_H MBEDTLS_NET_SOCKETS_H -#define POLARSSL_NET_LISTEN_BACKLOG MBEDTLS_NET_LISTEN_BACKLOG -#define POLARSSL_OID_H MBEDTLS_OID_H -#define POLARSSL_OPERATION_NONE MBEDTLS_OPERATION_NONE -#define POLARSSL_PADDING_NONE MBEDTLS_PADDING_NONE -#define POLARSSL_PADDING_ONE_AND_ZEROS MBEDTLS_PADDING_ONE_AND_ZEROS -#define POLARSSL_PADDING_PKCS7 MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7 -#define POLARSSL_PADDING_ZEROS MBEDTLS_PADDING_ZEROS -#define POLARSSL_PADDING_ZEROS_AND_LEN MBEDTLS_PADDING_ZEROS_AND_LEN -#define POLARSSL_PADLOCK_H MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_H -#define POLARSSL_PEM_H MBEDTLS_PEM_H -#define POLARSSL_PKCS11_H MBEDTLS_PKCS11_H -#define POLARSSL_PKCS12_H MBEDTLS_PKCS12_H -#define POLARSSL_PKCS5_H MBEDTLS_PKCS5_H -#define POLARSSL_PK_DEBUG_ECP MBEDTLS_PK_DEBUG_ECP -#define POLARSSL_PK_DEBUG_MAX_ITEMS MBEDTLS_PK_DEBUG_MAX_ITEMS -#define POLARSSL_PK_DEBUG_MPI MBEDTLS_PK_DEBUG_MPI -#define POLARSSL_PK_DEBUG_NONE MBEDTLS_PK_DEBUG_NONE -#define POLARSSL_PK_ECDSA MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA -#define POLARSSL_PK_ECKEY MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY -#define POLARSSL_PK_ECKEY_DH MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY_DH -#define POLARSSL_PK_H MBEDTLS_PK_H -#define POLARSSL_PK_NONE MBEDTLS_PK_NONE -#define POLARSSL_PK_RSA MBEDTLS_PK_RSA -#define POLARSSL_PK_RSASSA_PSS MBEDTLS_PK_RSASSA_PSS -#define POLARSSL_PK_RSA_ALT MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT -#define POLARSSL_PK_WRAP_H MBEDTLS_PK_WRAP_H -#define POLARSSL_PLATFORM_H MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_H -#define POLARSSL_PREMASTER_SIZE MBEDTLS_PREMASTER_SIZE -#define POLARSSL_RIPEMD160_H MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_H -#define POLARSSL_RSA_H MBEDTLS_RSA_H -#define POLARSSL_SHA1_H MBEDTLS_SHA1_H -#define POLARSSL_SHA256_H MBEDTLS_SHA256_H -#define POLARSSL_SHA512_H MBEDTLS_SHA512_H -#define POLARSSL_SSL_CACHE_H MBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_H -#define POLARSSL_SSL_CIPHERSUITES_H MBEDTLS_SSL_CIPHERSUITES_H -#define POLARSSL_SSL_COOKIE_H MBEDTLS_SSL_COOKIE_H -#define POLARSSL_SSL_H MBEDTLS_SSL_H -#define POLARSSL_THREADING_H MBEDTLS_THREADING_H -#define POLARSSL_THREADING_IMPL MBEDTLS_THREADING_IMPL -#define POLARSSL_TIMING_H MBEDTLS_TIMING_H -#define POLARSSL_VERSION_H MBEDTLS_VERSION_H -#define POLARSSL_VERSION_MAJOR MBEDTLS_VERSION_MAJOR -#define POLARSSL_VERSION_MINOR MBEDTLS_VERSION_MINOR -#define POLARSSL_VERSION_NUMBER MBEDTLS_VERSION_NUMBER -#define POLARSSL_VERSION_PATCH MBEDTLS_VERSION_PATCH -#define POLARSSL_VERSION_STRING MBEDTLS_VERSION_STRING -#define POLARSSL_VERSION_STRING_FULL MBEDTLS_VERSION_STRING_FULL -#define POLARSSL_X509_CRL_H MBEDTLS_X509_CRL_H -#define POLARSSL_X509_CRT_H MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_H -#define POLARSSL_X509_CSR_H MBEDTLS_X509_CSR_H -#define POLARSSL_X509_H MBEDTLS_X509_H -#define POLARSSL_XTEA_H MBEDTLS_XTEA_H -#define RSA_CRYPT MBEDTLS_RSA_CRYPT -#define RSA_PKCS_V15 MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15 -#define RSA_PKCS_V21 MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21 -#define RSA_PRIVATE MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE -#define RSA_PUBLIC MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC -#define RSA_SALT_LEN_ANY MBEDTLS_RSA_SALT_LEN_ANY -#define RSA_SIGN MBEDTLS_RSA_SIGN -#define SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL -#define SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_WARNING MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_WARNING -#define SSL_ALERT_MSG_ACCESS_DENIED MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ACCESS_DENIED -#define SSL_ALERT_MSG_BAD_CERT MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_BAD_CERT -#define SSL_ALERT_MSG_BAD_RECORD_MAC MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_BAD_RECORD_MAC -#define SSL_ALERT_MSG_CERT_EXPIRED MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_CERT_EXPIRED -#define SSL_ALERT_MSG_CERT_REVOKED MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_CERT_REVOKED -#define SSL_ALERT_MSG_CERT_UNKNOWN MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_CERT_UNKNOWN -#define SSL_ALERT_MSG_CLOSE_NOTIFY MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_CLOSE_NOTIFY -#define SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR -#define SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE -#define SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECRYPTION_FAILED MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECRYPTION_FAILED -#define SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECRYPT_ERROR MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECRYPT_ERROR -#define SSL_ALERT_MSG_EXPORT_RESTRICTION MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_EXPORT_RESTRICTION -#define SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE -#define SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER -#define SSL_ALERT_MSG_INAPROPRIATE_FALLBACK MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_INAPROPRIATE_FALLBACK -#define SSL_ALERT_MSG_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY -#define SSL_ALERT_MSG_INTERNAL_ERROR MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_INTERNAL_ERROR -#define SSL_ALERT_MSG_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL -#define SSL_ALERT_MSG_NO_CERT MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_NO_CERT -#define SSL_ALERT_MSG_NO_RENEGOTIATION MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_NO_RENEGOTIATION -#define SSL_ALERT_MSG_PROTOCOL_VERSION MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_PROTOCOL_VERSION -#define SSL_ALERT_MSG_RECORD_OVERFLOW MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_RECORD_OVERFLOW -#define SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE -#define SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNKNOWN_CA MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNKNOWN_CA -#define SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY -#define SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME -#define SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_CERT MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_CERT -#define SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_EXT MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_EXT -#define SSL_ALERT_MSG_USER_CANCELED MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_USER_CANCELED -#define SSL_ANTI_REPLAY_DISABLED MBEDTLS_SSL_ANTI_REPLAY_DISABLED -#define SSL_ANTI_REPLAY_ENABLED MBEDTLS_SSL_ANTI_REPLAY_ENABLED -#define SSL_ARC4_DISABLED MBEDTLS_SSL_ARC4_DISABLED -#define SSL_ARC4_ENABLED MBEDTLS_SSL_ARC4_ENABLED -#define SSL_BUFFER_LEN (((MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_BUFFER_LEN) < (MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_BUFFER_LEN)) \ - ? (MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_BUFFER_LEN) : (MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_BUFFER_LEN)) -#define SSL_CACHE_DEFAULT_MAX_ENTRIES MBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_DEFAULT_MAX_ENTRIES -#define SSL_CACHE_DEFAULT_TIMEOUT MBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_DEFAULT_TIMEOUT -#define SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING_DISABLED MBEDTLS_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING_DISABLED -#define SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING_ENABLED MBEDTLS_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING_ENABLED -#define SSL_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST MBEDTLS_SSL_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST -#define SSL_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY MBEDTLS_SSL_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY -#define SSL_CERT_TYPE_ECDSA_SIGN MBEDTLS_SSL_CERT_TYPE_ECDSA_SIGN -#define SSL_CERT_TYPE_RSA_SIGN MBEDTLS_SSL_CERT_TYPE_RSA_SIGN -#define SSL_CHANNEL_INBOUND MBEDTLS_SSL_CHANNEL_INBOUND -#define SSL_CHANNEL_OUTBOUND MBEDTLS_SSL_CHANNEL_OUTBOUND -#define SSL_CIPHERSUITES MBEDTLS_SSL_CIPHERSUITES -#define SSL_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE -#define SSL_CLIENT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC -#define SSL_CLIENT_FINISHED MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_FINISHED -#define SSL_CLIENT_HELLO MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_HELLO -#define SSL_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE -#define SSL_COMPRESSION_ADD MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESSION_ADD -#define SSL_COMPRESS_DEFLATE MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_DEFLATE -#define SSL_COMPRESS_NULL MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_NULL -#define SSL_DEBUG_BUF MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF -#define SSL_DEBUG_CRT MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_CRT -#define SSL_DEBUG_ECP MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ECP -#define SSL_DEBUG_MPI MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MPI -#define SSL_DEBUG_MSG MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG -#define SSL_DEBUG_RET MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET -#define SSL_DEFAULT_TICKET_LIFETIME MBEDTLS_SSL_DEFAULT_TICKET_LIFETIME -#define SSL_DTLS_TIMEOUT_DFL_MAX MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_TIMEOUT_DFL_MAX -#define SSL_DTLS_TIMEOUT_DFL_MIN MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_TIMEOUT_DFL_MIN -#define SSL_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO MBEDTLS_SSL_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO -#define SSL_ETM_DISABLED MBEDTLS_SSL_ETM_DISABLED -#define SSL_ETM_ENABLED MBEDTLS_SSL_ETM_ENABLED -#define SSL_EXTENDED_MS_DISABLED MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MS_DISABLED -#define SSL_EXTENDED_MS_ENABLED MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MS_ENABLED -#define SSL_FALLBACK_SCSV MBEDTLS_SSL_FALLBACK_SCSV -#define SSL_FLUSH_BUFFERS MBEDTLS_SSL_FLUSH_BUFFERS -#define SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER -#define SSL_HANDSHAKE_WRAPUP MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WRAPUP -#define SSL_HASH_MD5 MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_MD5 -#define SSL_HASH_NONE MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_NONE -#define SSL_HASH_SHA1 MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA1 -#define SSL_HASH_SHA224 MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA224 -#define SSL_HASH_SHA256 MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA256 -#define SSL_HASH_SHA384 MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA384 -#define SSL_HASH_SHA512 MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA512 -#define SSL_HELLO_REQUEST MBEDTLS_SSL_HELLO_REQUEST -#define SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE -#define SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST -#define SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY -#define SSL_HS_CLIENT_HELLO MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CLIENT_HELLO -#define SSL_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE -#define SSL_HS_FINISHED MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_FINISHED -#define SSL_HS_HELLO_REQUEST MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_HELLO_REQUEST -#define SSL_HS_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST -#define SSL_HS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET -#define SSL_HS_SERVER_HELLO MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_SERVER_HELLO -#define SSL_HS_SERVER_HELLO_DONE MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_SERVER_HELLO_DONE -#define SSL_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE -#define SSL_INITIAL_HANDSHAKE MBEDTLS_SSL_INITIAL_HANDSHAKE -#define SSL_IS_CLIENT MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT -#define SSL_IS_FALLBACK MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_FALLBACK -#define SSL_IS_NOT_FALLBACK MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_NOT_FALLBACK -#define SSL_IS_SERVER MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER -#define SSL_LEGACY_ALLOW_RENEGOTIATION MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_ALLOW_RENEGOTIATION -#define SSL_LEGACY_BREAK_HANDSHAKE MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_BREAK_HANDSHAKE -#define SSL_LEGACY_NO_RENEGOTIATION MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_NO_RENEGOTIATION -#define SSL_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION -#define SSL_MAC_ADD MBEDTLS_SSL_MAC_ADD -#define SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3 MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3 -#define SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN -#define SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_1024 MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_1024 -#define SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_2048 MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_2048 -#define SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_4096 MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_4096 -#define SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_512 MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_512 -#define SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_INVALID MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_INVALID -#define SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_NONE MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_NONE -#define SSL_MAX_MAJOR_VERSION MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_MAJOR_VERSION -#define SSL_MAX_MINOR_VERSION MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_MINOR_VERSION -#define SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 -#define SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1 MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1 -#define SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2 MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2 -#define SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 -#define SSL_MIN_MAJOR_VERSION MBEDTLS_SSL_MIN_MAJOR_VERSION -#define SSL_MIN_MINOR_VERSION MBEDTLS_SSL_MIN_MINOR_VERSION -#define SSL_MSG_ALERT MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_ALERT -#define SSL_MSG_APPLICATION_DATA MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_APPLICATION_DATA -#define SSL_MSG_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC -#define SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE -#define SSL_PADDING_ADD MBEDTLS_SSL_PADDING_ADD -#define SSL_RENEGOTIATION MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION -#define SSL_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED -#define SSL_RENEGOTIATION_DONE MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_DONE -#define SSL_RENEGOTIATION_ENABLED MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_ENABLED -#define SSL_RENEGOTIATION_NOT_ENFORCED MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_NOT_ENFORCED -#define SSL_RENEGOTIATION_PENDING MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_PENDING -#define SSL_RENEGO_MAX_RECORDS_DEFAULT MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGO_MAX_RECORDS_DEFAULT -#define SSL_RETRANS_FINISHED MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_FINISHED -#define SSL_RETRANS_PREPARING MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_PREPARING -#define SSL_RETRANS_SENDING MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_SENDING -#define SSL_RETRANS_WAITING MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_WAITING -#define SSL_SECURE_RENEGOTIATION MBEDTLS_SSL_SECURE_RENEGOTIATION -#define SSL_SERVER_CERTIFICATE MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_CERTIFICATE -#define SSL_SERVER_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC -#define SSL_SERVER_FINISHED MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_FINISHED -#define SSL_SERVER_HELLO MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_HELLO -#define SSL_SERVER_HELLO_DONE MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_HELLO_DONE -#define SSL_SERVER_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_SENT MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_SENT -#define SSL_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE -#define SSL_SERVER_NEW_SESSION_TICKET MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NEW_SESSION_TICKET -#define SSL_SESSION_TICKETS_DISABLED MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS_DISABLED -#define SSL_SESSION_TICKETS_ENABLED MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS_ENABLED -#define SSL_SIG_ANON MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_ANON -#define SSL_SIG_ECDSA MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_ECDSA -#define SSL_SIG_RSA MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_RSA -#define SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM -#define SSL_TRANSPORT_STREAM MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_STREAM -#define SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC_LEN MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC_LEN -#define SSL_TRUNC_HMAC_DISABLED MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNC_HMAC_DISABLED -#define SSL_TRUNC_HMAC_ENABLED MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNC_HMAC_ENABLED -#define SSL_VERIFY_DATA_MAX_LEN MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_DATA_MAX_LEN -#define SSL_VERIFY_NONE MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_NONE -#define SSL_VERIFY_OPTIONAL MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_OPTIONAL -#define SSL_VERIFY_REQUIRED MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_REQUIRED -#define TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA -#define TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA -#define TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 -#define TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM -#define TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 -#define TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 -#define TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA -#define TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 -#define TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM -#define TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8 MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8 -#define TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 -#define TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 -#define TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 -#define TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 -#define TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 -#define TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA -#define TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256 -#define TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384 MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384 -#define TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA -#define TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA -#define TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA -#define TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 -#define TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM -#define TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 -#define TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 -#define TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA -#define TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 -#define TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM -#define TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8 MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8 -#define TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 -#define TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA -#define TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 -#define TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 -#define TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA -#define TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256 -#define TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 -#define TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA -#define TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA -#define TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA -#define TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 -#define TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM -#define TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 -#define TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 -#define TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA -#define TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 -#define TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM -#define TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8 MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8 -#define TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 -#define TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 \ - MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 -#define TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 \ - MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 -#define TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 \ - MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 -#define TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 \ - MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 -#define TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA -#define TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA -#define TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA -#define TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA -#define TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 -#define TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA -#define TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 -#define TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 \ - MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 -#define TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 \ - MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 -#define TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA -#define TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256 -#define TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384 MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384 -#define TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA -#define TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA -#define TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA -#define TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 -#define TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 -#define TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA -#define TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 -#define TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 -#define TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 \ - MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 -#define TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 \ - MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 -#define TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 \ - MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 -#define TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 \ - MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 -#define TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA -#define TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA -#define TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA -#define TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA -#define TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 -#define TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 -#define TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA -#define TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 -#define TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 -#define TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 \ - MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 -#define TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 \ - MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 -#define TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 \ - MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 -#define TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 \ - MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 -#define TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA -#define TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA -#define TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA -#define TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA -#define TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 -#define TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 -#define TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA -#define TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 -#define TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 -#define TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 -#define TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 -#define TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 -#define TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 -#define TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA -#define TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA -#define TLS_EXT_ALPN MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ALPN -#define TLS_EXT_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC -#define TLS_EXT_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET -#define TLS_EXT_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH -#define TLS_EXT_RENEGOTIATION_INFO MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_RENEGOTIATION_INFO -#define TLS_EXT_SERVERNAME MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SERVERNAME -#define TLS_EXT_SERVERNAME_HOSTNAME MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SERVERNAME_HOSTNAME -#define TLS_EXT_SESSION_TICKET MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SESSION_TICKET -#define TLS_EXT_SIG_ALG MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SIG_ALG -#define TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVES MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVES -#define TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_POINT_FORMATS MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_POINT_FORMATS -#define TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_POINT_FORMATS_PRESENT MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_POINT_FORMATS_PRESENT -#define TLS_EXT_TRUNCATED_HMAC MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_TRUNCATED_HMAC -#define TLS_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA -#define TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA -#define TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 -#define TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM -#define TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 -#define TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 -#define TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA -#define TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 -#define TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM -#define TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8 MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8 -#define TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 -#define TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 -#define TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 -#define TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 -#define TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 -#define TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA -#define TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256 -#define TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384 MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384 -#define TLS_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA -#define TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA -#define TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA -#define TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 -#define TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 -#define TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA -#define TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 -#define TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 -#define TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 -#define TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 -#define TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 -#define TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 -#define TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA -#define TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256 -#define TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384 MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384 -#define TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA -#define TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA -#define TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA -#define TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 -#define TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM -#define TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 -#define TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 -#define TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA -#define TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 -#define TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM -#define TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8 MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8 -#define TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 -#define TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA -#define TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 -#define TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 -#define TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA -#define TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256 -#define TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 -#define TLS_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA -#define TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_MD5 MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_MD5 -#define TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA -#define TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA256 -#define TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5 MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5 -#define TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA -#define X509_CRT_VERSION_1 MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_VERSION_1 -#define X509_CRT_VERSION_2 MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_VERSION_2 -#define X509_CRT_VERSION_3 MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_VERSION_3 -#define X509_FORMAT_DER MBEDTLS_X509_FORMAT_DER -#define X509_FORMAT_PEM MBEDTLS_X509_FORMAT_PEM -#define X509_MAX_DN_NAME_SIZE MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_DN_NAME_SIZE -#define X509_RFC5280_MAX_SERIAL_LEN MBEDTLS_X509_RFC5280_MAX_SERIAL_LEN -#define X509_RFC5280_UTC_TIME_LEN MBEDTLS_X509_RFC5280_UTC_TIME_LEN -#define XTEA_DECRYPT MBEDTLS_XTEA_DECRYPT -#define XTEA_ENCRYPT MBEDTLS_XTEA_ENCRYPT -#define _asn1_bitstring mbedtls_asn1_bitstring -#define _asn1_buf mbedtls_asn1_buf -#define _asn1_named_data mbedtls_asn1_named_data -#define _asn1_sequence mbedtls_asn1_sequence -#define _ssl_cache_context mbedtls_ssl_cache_context -#define _ssl_cache_entry mbedtls_ssl_cache_entry -#define _ssl_ciphersuite_t mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t -#define _ssl_context mbedtls_ssl_context -#define _ssl_flight_item mbedtls_ssl_flight_item -#define _ssl_handshake_params mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params -#define _ssl_key_cert mbedtls_ssl_key_cert -#define _ssl_premaster_secret mbedtls_ssl_premaster_secret -#define _ssl_session mbedtls_ssl_session -#define _ssl_transform mbedtls_ssl_transform -#define _x509_crl mbedtls_x509_crl -#define _x509_crl_entry mbedtls_x509_crl_entry -#define _x509_crt mbedtls_x509_crt -#define _x509_csr mbedtls_x509_csr -#define _x509_time mbedtls_x509_time -#define _x509write_cert mbedtls_x509write_cert -#define _x509write_csr mbedtls_x509write_csr -#define aes_context mbedtls_aes_context -#define aes_crypt_cbc mbedtls_aes_crypt_cbc -#define aes_crypt_cfb128 mbedtls_aes_crypt_cfb128 -#define aes_crypt_cfb8 mbedtls_aes_crypt_cfb8 -#define aes_crypt_ctr mbedtls_aes_crypt_ctr -#define aes_crypt_ecb mbedtls_aes_crypt_ecb -#define aes_free mbedtls_aes_free -#define aes_init mbedtls_aes_init -#define aes_self_test mbedtls_aes_self_test -#define aes_setkey_dec mbedtls_aes_setkey_dec -#define aes_setkey_enc mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc -#define aesni_crypt_ecb mbedtls_aesni_crypt_ecb -#define aesni_gcm_mult mbedtls_aesni_gcm_mult -#define aesni_inverse_key mbedtls_aesni_inverse_key -#define aesni_setkey_enc mbedtls_aesni_setkey_enc -#define aesni_supports mbedtls_aesni_has_support -#define alarmed mbedtls_timing_alarmed -#define arc4_context mbedtls_arc4_context -#define arc4_crypt mbedtls_arc4_crypt -#define arc4_free mbedtls_arc4_free -#define arc4_init mbedtls_arc4_init -#define arc4_self_test mbedtls_arc4_self_test -#define arc4_setup mbedtls_arc4_setup -#define asn1_bitstring mbedtls_asn1_bitstring -#define asn1_buf mbedtls_asn1_buf -#define asn1_find_named_data mbedtls_asn1_find_named_data -#define asn1_free_named_data mbedtls_asn1_free_named_data -#define asn1_free_named_data_list mbedtls_asn1_free_named_data_list -#define asn1_get_alg mbedtls_asn1_get_alg -#define asn1_get_alg_null mbedtls_asn1_get_alg_null -#define asn1_get_bitstring mbedtls_asn1_get_bitstring -#define asn1_get_bitstring_null mbedtls_asn1_get_bitstring_null -#define asn1_get_bool mbedtls_asn1_get_bool -#define asn1_get_int mbedtls_asn1_get_int -#define asn1_get_len mbedtls_asn1_get_len -#define asn1_get_mpi mbedtls_asn1_get_mpi -#define asn1_get_sequence_of mbedtls_asn1_get_sequence_of -#define asn1_get_tag mbedtls_asn1_get_tag -#define asn1_named_data mbedtls_asn1_named_data -#define asn1_sequence mbedtls_asn1_sequence -#define asn1_store_named_data mbedtls_asn1_store_named_data -#define asn1_write_algorithm_identifier mbedtls_asn1_write_algorithm_identifier -#define asn1_write_bitstring mbedtls_asn1_write_bitstring -#define asn1_write_bool mbedtls_asn1_write_bool -#define asn1_write_ia5_string mbedtls_asn1_write_ia5_string -#define asn1_write_int mbedtls_asn1_write_int -#define asn1_write_len mbedtls_asn1_write_len -#define asn1_write_mpi mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi -#define asn1_write_null mbedtls_asn1_write_null -#define asn1_write_octet_string mbedtls_asn1_write_octet_string -#define asn1_write_oid mbedtls_asn1_write_oid -#define asn1_write_printable_string mbedtls_asn1_write_printable_string -#define asn1_write_raw_buffer mbedtls_asn1_write_raw_buffer -#define asn1_write_tag mbedtls_asn1_write_tag -#define base64_decode mbedtls_base64_decode -#define base64_encode mbedtls_base64_encode -#define base64_self_test mbedtls_base64_self_test -#define blowfish_context mbedtls_blowfish_context -#define blowfish_crypt_cbc mbedtls_blowfish_crypt_cbc -#define blowfish_crypt_cfb64 mbedtls_blowfish_crypt_cfb64 -#define blowfish_crypt_ctr mbedtls_blowfish_crypt_ctr -#define blowfish_crypt_ecb mbedtls_blowfish_crypt_ecb -#define blowfish_free mbedtls_blowfish_free -#define blowfish_init mbedtls_blowfish_init -#define blowfish_setkey mbedtls_blowfish_setkey -#define camellia_context mbedtls_camellia_context -#define camellia_crypt_cbc mbedtls_camellia_crypt_cbc -#define camellia_crypt_cfb128 mbedtls_camellia_crypt_cfb128 -#define camellia_crypt_ctr mbedtls_camellia_crypt_ctr -#define camellia_crypt_ecb mbedtls_camellia_crypt_ecb -#define camellia_free mbedtls_camellia_free -#define camellia_init mbedtls_camellia_init -#define camellia_self_test mbedtls_camellia_self_test -#define camellia_setkey_dec mbedtls_camellia_setkey_dec -#define camellia_setkey_enc mbedtls_camellia_setkey_enc -#define ccm_auth_decrypt mbedtls_ccm_auth_decrypt -#define ccm_context mbedtls_ccm_context -#define ccm_encrypt_and_tag mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag -#define ccm_free mbedtls_ccm_free -#define ccm_init mbedtls_ccm_init -#define ccm_self_test mbedtls_ccm_self_test -#define cipher_auth_decrypt mbedtls_cipher_auth_decrypt -#define cipher_auth_encrypt mbedtls_cipher_auth_encrypt -#define cipher_base_t mbedtls_cipher_base_t -#define cipher_check_tag mbedtls_cipher_check_tag -#define cipher_context_t mbedtls_cipher_context_t -#define cipher_crypt mbedtls_cipher_crypt -#define cipher_definition_t mbedtls_cipher_definition_t -#define cipher_definitions mbedtls_cipher_definitions -#define cipher_finish mbedtls_cipher_finish -#define cipher_free mbedtls_cipher_free -#define cipher_get_block_size mbedtls_cipher_get_block_size -#define cipher_get_cipher_mode mbedtls_cipher_get_cipher_mode -#define cipher_get_iv_size mbedtls_cipher_get_iv_size -#define cipher_get_key_size mbedtls_cipher_get_key_bitlen -#define cipher_get_name mbedtls_cipher_get_name -#define cipher_get_operation mbedtls_cipher_get_operation -#define cipher_get_type mbedtls_cipher_get_type -#define cipher_id_t mbedtls_cipher_id_t -#define cipher_info_from_string mbedtls_cipher_info_from_string -#define cipher_info_from_type mbedtls_cipher_info_from_type -#define cipher_info_from_values mbedtls_cipher_info_from_values -#define cipher_info_t mbedtls_cipher_info_t -#define cipher_init mbedtls_cipher_init -#define cipher_init_ctx mbedtls_cipher_setup -#define cipher_list mbedtls_cipher_list -#define cipher_mode_t mbedtls_cipher_mode_t -#define cipher_padding_t mbedtls_cipher_padding_t -#define cipher_reset mbedtls_cipher_reset -#define cipher_set_iv mbedtls_cipher_set_iv -#define cipher_set_padding_mode mbedtls_cipher_set_padding_mode -#define cipher_setkey mbedtls_cipher_setkey -#define cipher_type_t mbedtls_cipher_type_t -#define cipher_update mbedtls_cipher_update -#define cipher_update_ad mbedtls_cipher_update_ad -#define cipher_write_tag mbedtls_cipher_write_tag -#define ctr_drbg_context mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context -#define ctr_drbg_free mbedtls_ctr_drbg_free -#define ctr_drbg_init mbedtls_ctr_drbg_init -#define ctr_drbg_random mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random -#define ctr_drbg_random_with_add mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random_with_add -#define ctr_drbg_reseed mbedtls_ctr_drbg_reseed -#define ctr_drbg_self_test mbedtls_ctr_drbg_self_test -#define ctr_drbg_set_entropy_len mbedtls_ctr_drbg_set_entropy_len -#define ctr_drbg_set_prediction_resistance mbedtls_ctr_drbg_set_prediction_resistance -#define ctr_drbg_set_reseed_interval mbedtls_ctr_drbg_set_reseed_interval -#define ctr_drbg_update mbedtls_ctr_drbg_update -#define ctr_drbg_update_seed_file mbedtls_ctr_drbg_update_seed_file -#define ctr_drbg_write_seed_file mbedtls_ctr_drbg_write_seed_file -#define debug_print_buf mbedtls_debug_print_buf -#define debug_print_crt mbedtls_debug_print_crt -#define debug_print_ecp mbedtls_debug_print_ecp -#define debug_print_mpi mbedtls_debug_print_mpi -#define debug_print_msg mbedtls_debug_print_msg -#define debug_print_ret mbedtls_debug_print_ret -#define debug_set_threshold mbedtls_debug_set_threshold -#define des3_context mbedtls_des3_context -#define des3_crypt_cbc mbedtls_des3_crypt_cbc -#define des3_crypt_ecb mbedtls_des3_crypt_ecb -#define des3_free mbedtls_des3_free -#define des3_init mbedtls_des3_init -#define des3_set2key_dec mbedtls_des3_set2key_dec -#define des3_set2key_enc mbedtls_des3_set2key_enc -#define des3_set3key_dec mbedtls_des3_set3key_dec -#define des3_set3key_enc mbedtls_des3_set3key_enc -#define des_context mbedtls_des_context -#define des_crypt_cbc mbedtls_des_crypt_cbc -#define des_crypt_ecb mbedtls_des_crypt_ecb -#define des_free mbedtls_des_free -#define des_init mbedtls_des_init -#define des_key_check_key_parity mbedtls_des_key_check_key_parity -#define des_key_check_weak mbedtls_des_key_check_weak -#define des_key_set_parity mbedtls_des_key_set_parity -#define des_self_test mbedtls_des_self_test -#define des_setkey_dec mbedtls_des_setkey_dec -#define des_setkey_enc mbedtls_des_setkey_enc -#define dhm_calc_secret mbedtls_dhm_calc_secret -#define dhm_context mbedtls_dhm_context -#define dhm_free mbedtls_dhm_free -#define dhm_init mbedtls_dhm_init -#define dhm_make_params mbedtls_dhm_make_params -#define dhm_make_public mbedtls_dhm_make_public -#define dhm_parse_dhm mbedtls_dhm_parse_dhm -#define dhm_parse_dhmfile mbedtls_dhm_parse_dhmfile -#define dhm_read_params mbedtls_dhm_read_params -#define dhm_read_public mbedtls_dhm_read_public -#define dhm_self_test mbedtls_dhm_self_test -#define ecdh_calc_secret mbedtls_ecdh_calc_secret -#define ecdh_compute_shared mbedtls_ecdh_compute_shared -#define ecdh_context mbedtls_ecdh_context -#define ecdh_free mbedtls_ecdh_free -#define ecdh_gen_public mbedtls_ecdh_gen_public -#define ecdh_get_params mbedtls_ecdh_get_params -#define ecdh_init mbedtls_ecdh_init -#define ecdh_make_params mbedtls_ecdh_make_params -#define ecdh_make_public mbedtls_ecdh_make_public -#define ecdh_read_params mbedtls_ecdh_read_params -#define ecdh_read_public mbedtls_ecdh_read_public -#define ecdh_side mbedtls_ecdh_side -#define ecdsa_context mbedtls_ecdsa_context -#define ecdsa_free mbedtls_ecdsa_free -#define ecdsa_from_keypair mbedtls_ecdsa_from_keypair -#define ecdsa_genkey mbedtls_ecdsa_genkey -#define ecdsa_info mbedtls_ecdsa_info -#define ecdsa_init mbedtls_ecdsa_init -#define ecdsa_read_signature mbedtls_ecdsa_read_signature -#define ecdsa_sign mbedtls_ecdsa_sign -#define ecdsa_sign_det mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det -#define ecdsa_verify mbedtls_ecdsa_verify -#define ecdsa_write_signature mbedtls_ecdsa_write_signature -#define ecdsa_write_signature_det mbedtls_ecdsa_write_signature_det -#define eckey_info mbedtls_eckey_info -#define eckeydh_info mbedtls_eckeydh_info -#define ecp_check_privkey mbedtls_ecp_check_privkey -#define ecp_check_pub_priv mbedtls_ecp_check_pub_priv -#define ecp_check_pubkey mbedtls_ecp_check_pubkey -#define ecp_copy mbedtls_ecp_copy -#define ecp_curve_info mbedtls_ecp_curve_info -#define ecp_curve_info_from_grp_id mbedtls_ecp_curve_info_from_grp_id -#define ecp_curve_info_from_name mbedtls_ecp_curve_info_from_name -#define ecp_curve_info_from_tls_id mbedtls_ecp_curve_info_from_tls_id -#define ecp_curve_list mbedtls_ecp_curve_list -#define ecp_gen_key mbedtls_ecp_gen_key -#define ecp_gen_keypair mbedtls_ecp_gen_keypair -#define ecp_group mbedtls_ecp_group -#define ecp_group_copy mbedtls_ecp_group_copy -#define ecp_group_free mbedtls_ecp_group_free -#define ecp_group_id mbedtls_ecp_group_id -#define ecp_group_init mbedtls_ecp_group_init -#define ecp_grp_id_list mbedtls_ecp_grp_id_list -#define ecp_is_zero mbedtls_ecp_is_zero -#define ecp_keypair mbedtls_ecp_keypair -#define ecp_keypair_free mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free -#define ecp_keypair_init mbedtls_ecp_keypair_init -#define ecp_mul mbedtls_ecp_mul -#define ecp_point mbedtls_ecp_point -#define ecp_point_free mbedtls_ecp_point_free -#define ecp_point_init mbedtls_ecp_point_init -#define ecp_point_read_binary mbedtls_ecp_point_read_binary -#define ecp_point_read_string mbedtls_ecp_point_read_string -#define ecp_point_write_binary mbedtls_ecp_point_write_binary -#define ecp_self_test mbedtls_ecp_self_test -#define ecp_set_zero mbedtls_ecp_set_zero -#define ecp_tls_read_group mbedtls_ecp_tls_read_group -#define ecp_tls_read_point mbedtls_ecp_tls_read_point -#define ecp_tls_write_group mbedtls_ecp_tls_write_group -#define ecp_tls_write_point mbedtls_ecp_tls_write_point -#define ecp_use_known_dp mbedtls_ecp_group_load -#define entropy_add_source mbedtls_entropy_add_source -#define entropy_context mbedtls_entropy_context -#define entropy_free mbedtls_entropy_free -#define entropy_func mbedtls_entropy_func -#define entropy_gather mbedtls_entropy_gather -#define entropy_init mbedtls_entropy_init -#define entropy_self_test mbedtls_entropy_self_test -#define entropy_update_manual mbedtls_entropy_update_manual -#define entropy_update_seed_file mbedtls_entropy_update_seed_file -#define entropy_write_seed_file mbedtls_entropy_write_seed_file -#define error_strerror mbedtls_strerror -#define f_source_ptr mbedtls_entropy_f_source_ptr -#define gcm_auth_decrypt mbedtls_gcm_auth_decrypt -#define gcm_context mbedtls_gcm_context -#define gcm_crypt_and_tag mbedtls_gcm_crypt_and_tag -#define gcm_finish mbedtls_gcm_finish -#define gcm_free mbedtls_gcm_free -#define gcm_init mbedtls_gcm_init -#define gcm_self_test mbedtls_gcm_self_test -#define gcm_starts mbedtls_gcm_starts -#define gcm_update mbedtls_gcm_update -#define get_timer mbedtls_timing_get_timer -#define hardclock mbedtls_timing_hardclock -#define hardclock_poll mbedtls_hardclock_poll -#define havege_free mbedtls_havege_free -#define havege_init mbedtls_havege_init -#define havege_poll mbedtls_havege_poll -#define havege_random mbedtls_havege_random -#define havege_state mbedtls_havege_state -#define hmac_drbg_context mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context -#define hmac_drbg_free mbedtls_hmac_drbg_free -#define hmac_drbg_init mbedtls_hmac_drbg_init -#define hmac_drbg_random mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random -#define hmac_drbg_random_with_add mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random_with_add -#define hmac_drbg_reseed mbedtls_hmac_drbg_reseed -#define hmac_drbg_self_test mbedtls_hmac_drbg_self_test -#define hmac_drbg_set_entropy_len mbedtls_hmac_drbg_set_entropy_len -#define hmac_drbg_set_prediction_resistance mbedtls_hmac_drbg_set_prediction_resistance -#define hmac_drbg_set_reseed_interval mbedtls_hmac_drbg_set_reseed_interval -#define hmac_drbg_update mbedtls_hmac_drbg_update -#define hmac_drbg_update_seed_file mbedtls_hmac_drbg_update_seed_file -#define hmac_drbg_write_seed_file mbedtls_hmac_drbg_write_seed_file -#define hr_time mbedtls_timing_hr_time -#define key_exchange_type_t mbedtls_key_exchange_type_t -#define md mbedtls_md -#define md2 mbedtls_md2 -#define md2_context mbedtls_md2_context -#define md2_finish mbedtls_md2_finish -#define md2_free mbedtls_md2_free -#define md2_info mbedtls_md2_info -#define md2_init mbedtls_md2_init -#define md2_process mbedtls_md2_process -#define md2_self_test mbedtls_md2_self_test -#define md2_starts mbedtls_md2_starts -#define md2_update mbedtls_md2_update -#define md4 mbedtls_md4 -#define md4_context mbedtls_md4_context -#define md4_finish mbedtls_md4_finish -#define md4_free mbedtls_md4_free -#define md4_info mbedtls_md4_info -#define md4_init mbedtls_md4_init -#define md4_process mbedtls_md4_process -#define md4_self_test mbedtls_md4_self_test -#define md4_starts mbedtls_md4_starts -#define md4_update mbedtls_md4_update -#define md5 mbedtls_md5 -#define md5_context mbedtls_md5_context -#define md5_finish mbedtls_md5_finish -#define md5_free mbedtls_md5_free -#define md5_info mbedtls_md5_info -#define md5_init mbedtls_md5_init -#define md5_process mbedtls_md5_process -#define md5_self_test mbedtls_md5_self_test -#define md5_starts mbedtls_md5_starts -#define md5_update mbedtls_md5_update -#define md_context_t mbedtls_md_context_t -#define md_file mbedtls_md_file -#define md_finish mbedtls_md_finish -#define md_free mbedtls_md_free -#define md_get_name mbedtls_md_get_name -#define md_get_size mbedtls_md_get_size -#define md_get_type mbedtls_md_get_type -#define md_hmac mbedtls_md_hmac -#define md_hmac_finish mbedtls_md_hmac_finish -#define md_hmac_reset mbedtls_md_hmac_reset -#define md_hmac_starts mbedtls_md_hmac_starts -#define md_hmac_update mbedtls_md_hmac_update -#define md_info_from_string mbedtls_md_info_from_string -#define md_info_from_type mbedtls_md_info_from_type -#define md_info_t mbedtls_md_info_t -#define md_init mbedtls_md_init -#define md_init_ctx mbedtls_md_init_ctx -#define md_list mbedtls_md_list -#define md_process mbedtls_md_process -#define md_starts mbedtls_md_starts -#define md_type_t mbedtls_md_type_t -#define md_update mbedtls_md_update -#define memory_buffer_alloc_cur_get mbedtls_memory_buffer_alloc_cur_get -#define memory_buffer_alloc_free mbedtls_memory_buffer_alloc_free -#define memory_buffer_alloc_init mbedtls_memory_buffer_alloc_init -#define memory_buffer_alloc_max_get mbedtls_memory_buffer_alloc_max_get -#define memory_buffer_alloc_max_reset mbedtls_memory_buffer_alloc_max_reset -#define memory_buffer_alloc_self_test mbedtls_memory_buffer_alloc_self_test -#define memory_buffer_alloc_status mbedtls_memory_buffer_alloc_status -#define memory_buffer_alloc_verify mbedtls_memory_buffer_alloc_verify -#define memory_buffer_set_verify mbedtls_memory_buffer_set_verify -#define mpi mbedtls_mpi -#define mpi_add_abs mbedtls_mpi_add_abs -#define mpi_add_int mbedtls_mpi_add_int -#define mpi_add_mpi mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi -#define mpi_cmp_abs mbedtls_mpi_cmp_abs -#define mpi_cmp_int mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int -#define mpi_cmp_mpi mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi -#define mpi_copy mbedtls_mpi_copy -#define mpi_div_int mbedtls_mpi_div_int -#define mpi_div_mpi mbedtls_mpi_div_mpi -#define mpi_exp_mod mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod -#define mpi_fill_random mbedtls_mpi_fill_random -#define mpi_free mbedtls_mpi_free -#define mpi_gcd mbedtls_mpi_gcd -#define mpi_gen_prime mbedtls_mpi_gen_prime -#define mpi_get_bit mbedtls_mpi_get_bit -#define mpi_grow mbedtls_mpi_grow -#define mpi_init mbedtls_mpi_init -#define mpi_inv_mod mbedtls_mpi_inv_mod -#define mpi_is_prime mbedtls_mpi_is_prime -#define mpi_lsb mbedtls_mpi_lsb -#define mpi_lset mbedtls_mpi_lset -#define mpi_mod_int mbedtls_mpi_mod_int -#define mpi_mod_mpi mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi -#define mpi_msb mbedtls_mpi_bitlen -#define mpi_mul_int mbedtls_mpi_mul_int -#define mpi_mul_mpi mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi -#define mpi_read_binary mbedtls_mpi_read_binary -#define mpi_read_file mbedtls_mpi_read_file -#define mpi_read_string mbedtls_mpi_read_string -#define mpi_safe_cond_assign mbedtls_mpi_safe_cond_assign -#define mpi_safe_cond_swap mbedtls_mpi_safe_cond_swap -#define mpi_self_test mbedtls_mpi_self_test -#define mpi_set_bit mbedtls_mpi_set_bit -#define mpi_shift_l mbedtls_mpi_shift_l -#define mpi_shift_r mbedtls_mpi_shift_r -#define mpi_shrink mbedtls_mpi_shrink -#define mpi_size mbedtls_mpi_size -#define mpi_sub_abs mbedtls_mpi_sub_abs -#define mpi_sub_int mbedtls_mpi_sub_int -#define mpi_sub_mpi mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi -#define mpi_swap mbedtls_mpi_swap -#define mpi_write_binary mbedtls_mpi_write_binary -#define mpi_write_file mbedtls_mpi_write_file -#define mpi_write_string mbedtls_mpi_write_string -#define net_accept mbedtls_net_accept -#define net_bind mbedtls_net_bind -#define net_close mbedtls_net_free -#define net_connect mbedtls_net_connect -#define net_recv mbedtls_net_recv -#define net_recv_timeout mbedtls_net_recv_timeout -#define net_send mbedtls_net_send -#define net_set_block mbedtls_net_set_block -#define net_set_nonblock mbedtls_net_set_nonblock -#define net_usleep mbedtls_net_usleep -#define oid_descriptor_t mbedtls_oid_descriptor_t -#define oid_get_attr_short_name mbedtls_oid_get_attr_short_name -#define oid_get_cipher_alg mbedtls_oid_get_cipher_alg -#define oid_get_ec_grp mbedtls_oid_get_ec_grp -#define oid_get_extended_key_usage mbedtls_oid_get_extended_key_usage -#define oid_get_md_alg mbedtls_oid_get_md_alg -#define oid_get_numeric_string mbedtls_oid_get_numeric_string -#define oid_get_oid_by_ec_grp mbedtls_oid_get_oid_by_ec_grp -#define oid_get_oid_by_md mbedtls_oid_get_oid_by_md -#define oid_get_oid_by_pk_alg mbedtls_oid_get_oid_by_pk_alg -#define oid_get_oid_by_sig_alg mbedtls_oid_get_oid_by_sig_alg -#define oid_get_pk_alg mbedtls_oid_get_pk_alg -#define oid_get_pkcs12_pbe_alg mbedtls_oid_get_pkcs12_pbe_alg -#define oid_get_sig_alg mbedtls_oid_get_sig_alg -#define oid_get_sig_alg_desc mbedtls_oid_get_sig_alg_desc -#define oid_get_x509_ext_type mbedtls_oid_get_x509_ext_type -#define operation_t mbedtls_operation_t -#define padlock_supports mbedtls_padlock_has_support -#define padlock_xcryptcbc mbedtls_padlock_xcryptcbc -#define padlock_xcryptecb mbedtls_padlock_xcryptecb -#define pem_context mbedtls_pem_context -#define pem_free mbedtls_pem_free -#define pem_init mbedtls_pem_init -#define pem_read_buffer mbedtls_pem_read_buffer -#define pem_write_buffer mbedtls_pem_write_buffer -#define pk_can_do mbedtls_pk_can_do -#define pk_check_pair mbedtls_pk_check_pair -#define pk_context mbedtls_pk_context -#define pk_debug mbedtls_pk_debug -#define pk_debug_item mbedtls_pk_debug_item -#define pk_debug_type mbedtls_pk_debug_type -#define pk_decrypt mbedtls_pk_decrypt -#define pk_ec mbedtls_pk_ec -#define pk_encrypt mbedtls_pk_encrypt -#define pk_free mbedtls_pk_free -#define pk_get_len mbedtls_pk_get_len -#define pk_get_name mbedtls_pk_get_name -#define pk_get_size mbedtls_pk_get_bitlen -#define pk_get_type mbedtls_pk_get_type -#define pk_info_from_type mbedtls_pk_info_from_type -#define pk_info_t mbedtls_pk_info_t -#define pk_init mbedtls_pk_init -#define pk_init_ctx mbedtls_pk_setup -#define pk_init_ctx_rsa_alt mbedtls_pk_setup_rsa_alt -#define pk_load_file mbedtls_pk_load_file -#define pk_parse_key mbedtls_pk_parse_key -#define pk_parse_keyfile mbedtls_pk_parse_keyfile -#define pk_parse_public_key mbedtls_pk_parse_public_key -#define pk_parse_public_keyfile mbedtls_pk_parse_public_keyfile -#define pk_parse_subpubkey mbedtls_pk_parse_subpubkey -#define pk_rsa mbedtls_pk_rsa -#define pk_rsa_alt_decrypt_func mbedtls_pk_rsa_alt_decrypt_func -#define pk_rsa_alt_key_len_func mbedtls_pk_rsa_alt_key_len_func -#define pk_rsa_alt_sign_func mbedtls_pk_rsa_alt_sign_func -#define pk_rsassa_pss_options mbedtls_pk_rsassa_pss_options -#define pk_sign mbedtls_pk_sign -#define pk_type_t mbedtls_pk_type_t -#define pk_verify mbedtls_pk_verify -#define pk_verify_ext mbedtls_pk_verify_ext -#define pk_write_key_der mbedtls_pk_write_key_der -#define pk_write_key_pem mbedtls_pk_write_key_pem -#define pk_write_pubkey mbedtls_pk_write_pubkey -#define pk_write_pubkey_der mbedtls_pk_write_pubkey_der -#define pk_write_pubkey_pem mbedtls_pk_write_pubkey_pem -#define pkcs11_context mbedtls_pkcs11_context -#define pkcs11_decrypt mbedtls_pkcs11_decrypt -#define pkcs11_priv_key_free mbedtls_pkcs11_priv_key_free -#define pkcs11_priv_key_init mbedtls_pkcs11_priv_key_bind -#define pkcs11_sign mbedtls_pkcs11_sign -#define pkcs11_x509_cert_init mbedtls_pkcs11_x509_cert_bind -#define pkcs12_derivation mbedtls_pkcs12_derivation -#define pkcs12_pbe mbedtls_pkcs12_pbe -#define pkcs12_pbe_sha1_rc4_128 mbedtls_pkcs12_pbe_sha1_rc4_128 -#define pkcs5_pbes2 mbedtls_pkcs5_pbes2 -#define pkcs5_pbkdf2_hmac mbedtls_pkcs5_pbkdf2_hmac -#define pkcs5_self_test mbedtls_pkcs5_self_test -#define platform_entropy_poll mbedtls_platform_entropy_poll -#define platform_set_exit mbedtls_platform_set_exit -#define platform_set_fprintf mbedtls_platform_set_fprintf -#define platform_set_printf mbedtls_platform_set_printf -#define platform_set_snprintf mbedtls_platform_set_snprintf -#define polarssl_exit mbedtls_exit -#define polarssl_fprintf mbedtls_fprintf -#define polarssl_free mbedtls_free -#define polarssl_mutex_free mbedtls_mutex_free -#define polarssl_mutex_init mbedtls_mutex_init -#define polarssl_mutex_lock mbedtls_mutex_lock -#define polarssl_mutex_unlock mbedtls_mutex_unlock -#define polarssl_printf mbedtls_printf -#define polarssl_snprintf mbedtls_snprintf -#define polarssl_strerror mbedtls_strerror -#define ripemd160 mbedtls_ripemd160 -#define ripemd160_context mbedtls_ripemd160_context -#define ripemd160_finish mbedtls_ripemd160_finish -#define ripemd160_free mbedtls_ripemd160_free -#define ripemd160_info mbedtls_ripemd160_info -#define ripemd160_init mbedtls_ripemd160_init -#define ripemd160_process mbedtls_ripemd160_process -#define ripemd160_self_test mbedtls_ripemd160_self_test -#define ripemd160_starts mbedtls_ripemd160_starts -#define ripemd160_update mbedtls_ripemd160_update -#define rsa_alt_context mbedtls_rsa_alt_context -#define rsa_alt_info mbedtls_rsa_alt_info -#define rsa_check_privkey mbedtls_rsa_check_privkey -#define rsa_check_pub_priv mbedtls_rsa_check_pub_priv -#define rsa_check_pubkey mbedtls_rsa_check_pubkey -#define rsa_context mbedtls_rsa_context -#define rsa_copy mbedtls_rsa_copy -#define rsa_free mbedtls_rsa_free -#define rsa_gen_key mbedtls_rsa_gen_key -#define rsa_info mbedtls_rsa_info -#define rsa_init mbedtls_rsa_init -#define rsa_pkcs1_decrypt mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_decrypt -#define rsa_pkcs1_encrypt mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_encrypt -#define rsa_pkcs1_sign mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_sign -#define rsa_pkcs1_verify mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_verify -#define rsa_private mbedtls_rsa_private -#define rsa_public mbedtls_rsa_public -#define rsa_rsaes_oaep_decrypt mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_oaep_decrypt -#define rsa_rsaes_oaep_encrypt mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_oaep_encrypt -#define rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_decrypt mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_decrypt -#define rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_encrypt mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_encrypt -#define rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_sign mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_sign -#define rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_verify mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_verify -#define rsa_rsassa_pss_sign mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_sign -#define rsa_rsassa_pss_verify mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_verify -#define rsa_rsassa_pss_verify_ext mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_verify_ext -#define rsa_self_test mbedtls_rsa_self_test -#define rsa_set_padding mbedtls_rsa_set_padding -#define safer_memcmp mbedtls_ssl_safer_memcmp -#define set_alarm mbedtls_set_alarm -#define sha1 mbedtls_sha1 -#define sha1_context mbedtls_sha1_context -#define sha1_finish mbedtls_sha1_finish -#define sha1_free mbedtls_sha1_free -#define sha1_info mbedtls_sha1_info -#define sha1_init mbedtls_sha1_init -#define sha1_process mbedtls_sha1_process -#define sha1_self_test mbedtls_sha1_self_test -#define sha1_starts mbedtls_sha1_starts -#define sha1_update mbedtls_sha1_update -#define sha224_info mbedtls_sha224_info -#define sha256 mbedtls_sha256 -#define sha256_context mbedtls_sha256_context -#define sha256_finish mbedtls_sha256_finish -#define sha256_free mbedtls_sha256_free -#define sha256_info mbedtls_sha256_info -#define sha256_init mbedtls_sha256_init -#define sha256_process mbedtls_sha256_process -#define sha256_self_test mbedtls_sha256_self_test -#define sha256_starts mbedtls_sha256_starts -#define sha256_update mbedtls_sha256_update -#define sha384_info mbedtls_sha384_info -#define sha512 mbedtls_sha512 -#define sha512_context mbedtls_sha512_context -#define sha512_finish mbedtls_sha512_finish -#define sha512_free mbedtls_sha512_free -#define sha512_info mbedtls_sha512_info -#define sha512_init mbedtls_sha512_init -#define sha512_process mbedtls_sha512_process -#define sha512_self_test mbedtls_sha512_self_test -#define sha512_starts mbedtls_sha512_starts -#define sha512_update mbedtls_sha512_update -#define source_state mbedtls_entropy_source_state -#define ssl_cache_context mbedtls_ssl_cache_context -#define ssl_cache_entry mbedtls_ssl_cache_entry -#define ssl_cache_free mbedtls_ssl_cache_free -#define ssl_cache_get mbedtls_ssl_cache_get -#define ssl_cache_init mbedtls_ssl_cache_init -#define ssl_cache_set mbedtls_ssl_cache_set -#define ssl_cache_set_max_entries mbedtls_ssl_cache_set_max_entries -#define ssl_cache_set_timeout mbedtls_ssl_cache_set_timeout -#define ssl_check_cert_usage mbedtls_ssl_check_cert_usage -#define ssl_ciphersuite_from_id mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_from_id -#define ssl_ciphersuite_from_string mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_from_string -#define ssl_ciphersuite_t mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t -#define ssl_ciphersuite_uses_ec mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_ec -#define ssl_ciphersuite_uses_psk mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_psk -#define ssl_close_notify mbedtls_ssl_close_notify -#define ssl_context mbedtls_ssl_context -#define ssl_cookie_check mbedtls_ssl_cookie_check -#define ssl_cookie_check_t mbedtls_ssl_cookie_check_t -#define ssl_cookie_ctx mbedtls_ssl_cookie_ctx -#define ssl_cookie_free mbedtls_ssl_cookie_free -#define ssl_cookie_init mbedtls_ssl_cookie_init -#define ssl_cookie_set_timeout mbedtls_ssl_cookie_set_timeout -#define ssl_cookie_setup mbedtls_ssl_cookie_setup -#define ssl_cookie_write mbedtls_ssl_cookie_write -#define ssl_cookie_write_t mbedtls_ssl_cookie_write_t -#define ssl_derive_keys mbedtls_ssl_derive_keys -#define ssl_dtls_replay_check mbedtls_ssl_dtls_replay_check -#define ssl_dtls_replay_update mbedtls_ssl_dtls_replay_update -#define ssl_fetch_input mbedtls_ssl_fetch_input -#define ssl_flight_item mbedtls_ssl_flight_item -#define ssl_flush_output mbedtls_ssl_flush_output -#define ssl_free mbedtls_ssl_free -#define ssl_get_alpn_protocol mbedtls_ssl_get_alpn_protocol -#define ssl_get_bytes_avail mbedtls_ssl_get_bytes_avail -#define ssl_get_ciphersuite mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite -#define ssl_get_ciphersuite_id mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_id -#define ssl_get_ciphersuite_name mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_name -#define ssl_get_ciphersuite_sig_pk_alg mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_sig_pk_alg -#define ssl_get_peer_cert mbedtls_ssl_get_peer_cert -#define ssl_get_record_expansion mbedtls_ssl_get_record_expansion -#define ssl_get_session mbedtls_ssl_get_session -#define ssl_get_verify_result mbedtls_ssl_get_verify_result -#define ssl_get_version mbedtls_ssl_get_version -#define ssl_handshake mbedtls_ssl_handshake -#define ssl_handshake_client_step mbedtls_ssl_handshake_client_step -#define ssl_handshake_free mbedtls_ssl_handshake_free -#define ssl_handshake_params mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params -#define ssl_handshake_server_step mbedtls_ssl_handshake_server_step -#define ssl_handshake_step mbedtls_ssl_handshake_step -#define ssl_handshake_wrapup mbedtls_ssl_handshake_wrapup -#define ssl_hdr_len mbedtls_ssl_hdr_len -#define ssl_hs_hdr_len mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len -#define ssl_hw_record_activate mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_activate -#define ssl_hw_record_finish mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_finish -#define ssl_hw_record_init mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_init -#define ssl_hw_record_read mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_read -#define ssl_hw_record_reset mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_reset -#define ssl_hw_record_write mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_write -#define ssl_init mbedtls_ssl_init -#define ssl_key_cert mbedtls_ssl_key_cert -#define ssl_legacy_renegotiation mbedtls_ssl_conf_legacy_renegotiation -#define ssl_list_ciphersuites mbedtls_ssl_list_ciphersuites -#define ssl_md_alg_from_hash mbedtls_ssl_md_alg_from_hash -#define ssl_optimize_checksum mbedtls_ssl_optimize_checksum -#define ssl_own_cert mbedtls_ssl_own_cert -#define ssl_own_key mbedtls_ssl_own_key -#define ssl_parse_certificate mbedtls_ssl_parse_certificate -#define ssl_parse_change_cipher_spec mbedtls_ssl_parse_change_cipher_spec -#define ssl_parse_finished mbedtls_ssl_parse_finished -#define ssl_pk_alg_from_sig mbedtls_ssl_pk_alg_from_sig -#define ssl_pkcs11_decrypt mbedtls_ssl_pkcs11_decrypt -#define ssl_pkcs11_key_len mbedtls_ssl_pkcs11_key_len -#define ssl_pkcs11_sign mbedtls_ssl_pkcs11_sign -#define ssl_psk_derive_premaster mbedtls_ssl_psk_derive_premaster -#define ssl_read mbedtls_ssl_read -#define ssl_read_record mbedtls_ssl_read_record -#define ssl_read_version mbedtls_ssl_read_version -#define ssl_recv_flight_completed mbedtls_ssl_recv_flight_completed -#define ssl_renegotiate mbedtls_ssl_renegotiate -#define ssl_resend mbedtls_ssl_resend -#define ssl_reset_checksum mbedtls_ssl_reset_checksum -#define ssl_send_alert_message mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message -#define ssl_send_fatal_handshake_failure mbedtls_ssl_send_fatal_handshake_failure -#define ssl_send_flight_completed mbedtls_ssl_send_flight_completed -#define ssl_session mbedtls_ssl_session -#define ssl_session_free mbedtls_ssl_session_free -#define ssl_session_init mbedtls_ssl_session_init -#define ssl_session_reset mbedtls_ssl_session_reset -#define ssl_set_alpn_protocols mbedtls_ssl_conf_alpn_protocols -#define ssl_set_arc4_support mbedtls_ssl_conf_arc4_support -#define ssl_set_authmode mbedtls_ssl_conf_authmode -#define ssl_set_bio mbedtls_ssl_set_bio -#define ssl_set_ca_chain mbedtls_ssl_conf_ca_chain -#define ssl_set_cbc_record_splitting mbedtls_ssl_conf_cbc_record_splitting -#define ssl_set_ciphersuites mbedtls_ssl_conf_ciphersuites -#define ssl_set_ciphersuites_for_version mbedtls_ssl_conf_ciphersuites_for_version -#define ssl_set_client_transport_id mbedtls_ssl_set_client_transport_id -#define ssl_set_curves mbedtls_ssl_conf_curves -#define ssl_set_dbg mbedtls_ssl_conf_dbg -#define ssl_set_dh_param mbedtls_ssl_conf_dh_param -#define ssl_set_dh_param_ctx mbedtls_ssl_conf_dh_param_ctx -#define ssl_set_dtls_anti_replay mbedtls_ssl_conf_dtls_anti_replay -#define ssl_set_dtls_badmac_limit mbedtls_ssl_conf_dtls_badmac_limit -#define ssl_set_dtls_cookies mbedtls_ssl_conf_dtls_cookies -#define ssl_set_encrypt_then_mac mbedtls_ssl_conf_encrypt_then_mac -#define ssl_set_endpoint mbedtls_ssl_conf_endpoint -#define ssl_set_extended_master_secret mbedtls_ssl_conf_extended_master_secret -#define ssl_set_fallback mbedtls_ssl_conf_fallback -#define ssl_set_handshake_timeout mbedtls_ssl_conf_handshake_timeout -#define ssl_set_hostname mbedtls_ssl_set_hostname -#define ssl_set_max_frag_len mbedtls_ssl_conf_max_frag_len -#define ssl_set_max_version mbedtls_ssl_conf_max_version -#define ssl_set_min_version mbedtls_ssl_conf_min_version -#define ssl_set_own_cert mbedtls_ssl_conf_own_cert -#define ssl_set_psk mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk -#define ssl_set_psk_cb mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk_cb -#define ssl_set_renegotiation mbedtls_ssl_conf_renegotiation -#define ssl_set_renegotiation_enforced mbedtls_ssl_conf_renegotiation_enforced -#define ssl_set_renegotiation_period mbedtls_ssl_conf_renegotiation_period -#define ssl_set_rng mbedtls_ssl_conf_rng -#define ssl_set_session mbedtls_ssl_set_session -#define ssl_set_session_cache mbedtls_ssl_conf_session_cache -#define ssl_set_session_tickets mbedtls_ssl_conf_session_tickets -#define ssl_set_sni mbedtls_ssl_conf_sni -#define ssl_set_transport mbedtls_ssl_conf_transport -#define ssl_set_truncated_hmac mbedtls_ssl_conf_truncated_hmac -#define ssl_set_verify mbedtls_ssl_conf_verify -#define ssl_sig_from_pk mbedtls_ssl_sig_from_pk -#define ssl_states mbedtls_ssl_states -#define ssl_transform mbedtls_ssl_transform -#define ssl_transform_free mbedtls_ssl_transform_free -#define ssl_write mbedtls_ssl_write -#define ssl_write_certificate mbedtls_ssl_write_certificate -#define ssl_write_change_cipher_spec mbedtls_ssl_write_change_cipher_spec -#define ssl_write_finished mbedtls_ssl_write_finished -#define ssl_write_record mbedtls_ssl_write_record -#define ssl_write_version mbedtls_ssl_write_version -#define supported_ciphers mbedtls_cipher_supported -#define t_sint mbedtls_mpi_sint -#define t_udbl mbedtls_t_udbl -#define t_uint mbedtls_mpi_uint -#define test_ca_crt mbedtls_test_ca_crt -#define test_ca_crt_ec mbedtls_test_ca_crt_ec -#define test_ca_crt_rsa mbedtls_test_ca_crt_rsa -#define test_ca_key mbedtls_test_ca_key -#define test_ca_key_ec mbedtls_test_ca_key_ec -#define test_ca_key_rsa mbedtls_test_ca_key_rsa -#define test_ca_list mbedtls_test_cas_pem -#define test_ca_pwd mbedtls_test_ca_pwd -#define test_ca_pwd_ec mbedtls_test_ca_pwd_ec -#define test_ca_pwd_rsa mbedtls_test_ca_pwd_rsa -#define test_cli_crt mbedtls_test_cli_crt -#define test_cli_crt_ec mbedtls_test_cli_crt_ec -#define test_cli_crt_rsa mbedtls_test_cli_crt_rsa -#define test_cli_key mbedtls_test_cli_key -#define test_cli_key_ec mbedtls_test_cli_key_ec -#define test_cli_key_rsa mbedtls_test_cli_key_rsa -#define test_srv_crt mbedtls_test_srv_crt -#define test_srv_crt_ec mbedtls_test_srv_crt_ec -#define test_srv_crt_rsa mbedtls_test_srv_crt_rsa -#define test_srv_key mbedtls_test_srv_key -#define test_srv_key_ec mbedtls_test_srv_key_ec -#define test_srv_key_rsa mbedtls_test_srv_key_rsa -#define threading_mutex_t mbedtls_threading_mutex_t -#define threading_set_alt mbedtls_threading_set_alt -#define timing_self_test mbedtls_timing_self_test -#define version_check_feature mbedtls_version_check_feature -#define version_get_number mbedtls_version_get_number -#define version_get_string mbedtls_version_get_string -#define version_get_string_full mbedtls_version_get_string_full -#define x509_bitstring mbedtls_x509_bitstring -#define x509_buf mbedtls_x509_buf -#define x509_crl mbedtls_x509_crl -#define x509_crl_entry mbedtls_x509_crl_entry -#define x509_crl_free mbedtls_x509_crl_free -#define x509_crl_info mbedtls_x509_crl_info -#define x509_crl_init mbedtls_x509_crl_init -#define x509_crl_parse mbedtls_x509_crl_parse -#define x509_crl_parse_der mbedtls_x509_crl_parse_der -#define x509_crl_parse_file mbedtls_x509_crl_parse_file -#define x509_crt mbedtls_x509_crt -#define x509_crt_check_extended_key_usage mbedtls_x509_crt_check_extended_key_usage -#define x509_crt_check_key_usage mbedtls_x509_crt_check_key_usage -#define x509_crt_free mbedtls_x509_crt_free -#define x509_crt_info mbedtls_x509_crt_info -#define x509_crt_init mbedtls_x509_crt_init -#define x509_crt_parse mbedtls_x509_crt_parse -#define x509_crt_parse_der mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der -#define x509_crt_parse_file mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_file -#define x509_crt_parse_path mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_path -#define x509_crt_revoked mbedtls_x509_crt_is_revoked -#define x509_crt_verify mbedtls_x509_crt_verify -#define x509_csr mbedtls_x509_csr -#define x509_csr_free mbedtls_x509_csr_free -#define x509_csr_info mbedtls_x509_csr_info -#define x509_csr_init mbedtls_x509_csr_init -#define x509_csr_parse mbedtls_x509_csr_parse -#define x509_csr_parse_der mbedtls_x509_csr_parse_der -#define x509_csr_parse_file mbedtls_x509_csr_parse_file -#define x509_dn_gets mbedtls_x509_dn_gets -#define x509_get_alg mbedtls_x509_get_alg -#define x509_get_alg_null mbedtls_x509_get_alg_null -#define x509_get_ext mbedtls_x509_get_ext -#define x509_get_name mbedtls_x509_get_name -#define x509_get_rsassa_pss_params mbedtls_x509_get_rsassa_pss_params -#define x509_get_serial mbedtls_x509_get_serial -#define x509_get_sig mbedtls_x509_get_sig -#define x509_get_sig_alg mbedtls_x509_get_sig_alg -#define x509_get_time mbedtls_x509_get_time -#define x509_key_size_helper mbedtls_x509_key_size_helper -#define x509_name mbedtls_x509_name -#define x509_self_test mbedtls_x509_self_test -#define x509_sequence mbedtls_x509_sequence -#define x509_serial_gets mbedtls_x509_serial_gets -#define x509_set_extension mbedtls_x509_set_extension -#define x509_sig_alg_gets mbedtls_x509_sig_alg_gets -#define x509_string_to_names mbedtls_x509_string_to_names -#define x509_time mbedtls_x509_time -#define x509_time_expired mbedtls_x509_time_is_past -#define x509_time_future mbedtls_x509_time_is_future -#define x509_write_extensions mbedtls_x509_write_extensions -#define x509_write_names mbedtls_x509_write_names -#define x509_write_sig mbedtls_x509_write_sig -#define x509write_cert mbedtls_x509write_cert -#define x509write_crt_der mbedtls_x509write_crt_der -#define x509write_crt_free mbedtls_x509write_crt_free -#define x509write_crt_init mbedtls_x509write_crt_init -#define x509write_crt_pem mbedtls_x509write_crt_pem -#define x509write_crt_set_authority_key_identifier \ - mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_authority_key_identifier -#define x509write_crt_set_basic_constraints mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_basic_constraints -#define x509write_crt_set_extension mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_extension -#define x509write_crt_set_issuer_key mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_issuer_key -#define x509write_crt_set_issuer_name mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_issuer_name -#define x509write_crt_set_key_usage mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_key_usage -#define x509write_crt_set_md_alg mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_md_alg -#define x509write_crt_set_ns_cert_type mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_ns_cert_type -#define x509write_crt_set_serial mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_serial -#define x509write_crt_set_subject_key mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_subject_key -#define x509write_crt_set_subject_key_identifier mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_subject_key_identifier -#define x509write_crt_set_subject_name mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_subject_name -#define x509write_crt_set_validity mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_validity -#define x509write_crt_set_version mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_version -#define x509write_csr mbedtls_x509write_csr -#define x509write_csr_der mbedtls_x509write_csr_der -#define x509write_csr_free mbedtls_x509write_csr_free -#define x509write_csr_init mbedtls_x509write_csr_init -#define x509write_csr_pem mbedtls_x509write_csr_pem -#define x509write_csr_set_extension mbedtls_x509write_csr_set_extension -#define x509write_csr_set_key mbedtls_x509write_csr_set_key -#define x509write_csr_set_key_usage mbedtls_x509write_csr_set_key_usage -#define x509write_csr_set_md_alg mbedtls_x509write_csr_set_md_alg -#define x509write_csr_set_ns_cert_type mbedtls_x509write_csr_set_ns_cert_type -#define x509write_csr_set_subject_name mbedtls_x509write_csr_set_subject_name -#define xtea_context mbedtls_xtea_context -#define xtea_crypt_cbc mbedtls_xtea_crypt_cbc -#define xtea_crypt_ecb mbedtls_xtea_crypt_ecb -#define xtea_free mbedtls_xtea_free -#define xtea_init mbedtls_xtea_init -#define xtea_self_test mbedtls_xtea_self_test -#define xtea_setup mbedtls_xtea_setup - -#endif /* compat-1.3.h */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/compat-2.x.h b/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/compat-2.x.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..096341ba76cd --- /dev/null +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/compat-2.x.h @@ -0,0 +1,46 @@ +/** + * \file compat-2.x.h + * + * \brief Compatibility definitions + * + * \deprecated Use the new names directly instead + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING) +#warning "Including compat-2.x.h is deprecated" +#endif + +#ifndef MBEDTLS_COMPAT2X_H +#define MBEDTLS_COMPAT2X_H + +/* + * Macros for renamed functions + */ +#define mbedtls_ctr_drbg_update_ret mbedtls_ctr_drbg_update +#define mbedtls_hmac_drbg_update_ret mbedtls_hmac_drbg_update +#define mbedtls_md5_starts_ret mbedtls_md5_starts +#define mbedtls_md5_update_ret mbedtls_md5_update +#define mbedtls_md5_finish_ret mbedtls_md5_finish +#define mbedtls_md5_ret mbedtls_md5 +#define mbedtls_ripemd160_starts_ret mbedtls_ripemd160_starts +#define mbedtls_ripemd160_update_ret mbedtls_ripemd160_update +#define mbedtls_ripemd160_finish_ret mbedtls_ripemd160_finish +#define mbedtls_ripemd160_ret mbedtls_ripemd160 +#define mbedtls_sha1_starts_ret mbedtls_sha1_starts +#define mbedtls_sha1_update_ret mbedtls_sha1_update +#define mbedtls_sha1_finish_ret mbedtls_sha1_finish +#define mbedtls_sha1_ret mbedtls_sha1 +#define mbedtls_sha256_starts_ret mbedtls_sha256_starts +#define mbedtls_sha256_update_ret mbedtls_sha256_update +#define mbedtls_sha256_finish_ret mbedtls_sha256_finish +#define mbedtls_sha256_ret mbedtls_sha256 +#define mbedtls_sha512_starts_ret mbedtls_sha512_starts +#define mbedtls_sha512_update_ret mbedtls_sha512_update +#define mbedtls_sha512_finish_ret mbedtls_sha512_finish +#define mbedtls_sha512_ret mbedtls_sha512 + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_COMPAT2X_H */ diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/config_adjust_legacy_crypto.h b/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/config_adjust_legacy_crypto.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..9b060412282f --- /dev/null +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/config_adjust_legacy_crypto.h @@ -0,0 +1,457 @@ +/** + * \file mbedtls/config_adjust_legacy_crypto.h + * \brief Adjust legacy configuration configuration + * + * Automatically enable certain dependencies. Generally, MBEDLTS_xxx + * configurations need to be explicitly enabled by the user: enabling + * MBEDTLS_xxx_A but not MBEDTLS_xxx_B when A requires B results in a + * compilation error. However, we do automatically enable certain options + * in some circumstances. One case is if MBEDTLS_xxx_B is an internal option + * used to identify parts of a module that are used by other module, and we + * don't want to make the symbol MBEDTLS_xxx_B part of the public API. + * Another case is if A didn't depend on B in earlier versions, and we + * want to use B in A but we need to preserve backward compatibility with + * configurations that explicitly activate MBEDTLS_xxx_A but not + * MBEDTLS_xxx_B. + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +#ifndef MBEDTLS_CONFIG_ADJUST_LEGACY_CRYPTO_H +#define MBEDTLS_CONFIG_ADJUST_LEGACY_CRYPTO_H + +/* Ideally, we'd set those as defaults in mbedtls_config.h, but + * putting an #ifdef _WIN32 in mbedtls_config.h would confuse config.py. + * + * So, adjust it here. + * Not related to crypto, but this is the bottom of the stack. */ +#if defined(__MINGW32__) || (defined(_MSC_VER) && _MSC_VER <= 1900) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SNPRINTF_ALT) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SNPRINTF_MACRO) +#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SNPRINTF_ALT +#endif +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_VSNPRINTF_ALT) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_VSNPRINTF_MACRO) +#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_VSNPRINTF_ALT +#endif +#endif /* _MINGW32__ || (_MSC_VER && (_MSC_VER <= 1900)) */ + +/* Auto-enable CIPHER_C when any of the unauthenticated ciphers is builtin + * in PSA. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) && \ + (defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CTR) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CFB) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_OFB) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CBC_PKCS7) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG)) +#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C +#endif + +/* Auto-enable MBEDTLS_MD_LIGHT based on MBEDTLS_MD_C. + * This allows checking for MD_LIGHT rather than MD_LIGHT || MD_C. + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_C) +#define MBEDTLS_MD_LIGHT +#endif + +/* Auto-enable MBEDTLS_MD_LIGHT if needed by a module that didn't require it + * in a previous release, to ensure backwards compatibility. + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_C) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PK_C) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CREATE_C) +#define MBEDTLS_MD_LIGHT +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_LIGHT) +/* + * - MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_xxx is defined if the md module can perform xxx. + * - MBEDTLS_MD_xxx_VIA_PSA is defined if the md module may perform xxx via PSA + * (see below). + * - MBEDTLS_MD_SOME_PSA is defined if at least one algorithm may be performed + * via PSA (see below). + * - MBEDTLS_MD_SOME_LEGACY is defined if at least one algorithm may be performed + * via a direct legacy call (see below). + * + * The md module performs an algorithm via PSA if there is a PSA hash + * accelerator and the PSA driver subsytem is initialized at the time the + * operation is started, and makes a direct legacy call otherwise. + */ + +/* PSA accelerated implementations */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_MD5) +#define MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_MD5 +#define MBEDTLS_MD_MD5_VIA_PSA +#define MBEDTLS_MD_SOME_PSA +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_SHA_1) +#define MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1 +#define MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1_VIA_PSA +#define MBEDTLS_MD_SOME_PSA +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_SHA_224) +#define MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA224 +#define MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224_VIA_PSA +#define MBEDTLS_MD_SOME_PSA +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_SHA_256) +#define MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256 +#define MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256_VIA_PSA +#define MBEDTLS_MD_SOME_PSA +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_SHA_384) +#define MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384 +#define MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384_VIA_PSA +#define MBEDTLS_MD_SOME_PSA +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_SHA_512) +#define MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA512 +#define MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512_VIA_PSA +#define MBEDTLS_MD_SOME_PSA +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_RIPEMD160) +#define MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_RIPEMD160 +#define MBEDTLS_MD_RIPEMD160_VIA_PSA +#define MBEDTLS_MD_SOME_PSA +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_SHA3_224) +#define MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA3_224 +#define MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_224_VIA_PSA +#define MBEDTLS_MD_SOME_PSA +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_SHA3_256) +#define MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA3_256 +#define MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_256_VIA_PSA +#define MBEDTLS_MD_SOME_PSA +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_SHA3_384) +#define MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA3_384 +#define MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_384_VIA_PSA +#define MBEDTLS_MD_SOME_PSA +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_SHA3_512) +#define MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA3_512 +#define MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_512_VIA_PSA +#define MBEDTLS_MD_SOME_PSA +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C */ + +/* Built-in implementations */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C) +#define MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_MD5 +#define MBEDTLS_MD_SOME_LEGACY +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) +#define MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1 +#define MBEDTLS_MD_SOME_LEGACY +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA224_C) +#define MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA224 +#define MBEDTLS_MD_SOME_LEGACY +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) +#define MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256 +#define MBEDTLS_MD_SOME_LEGACY +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C) +#define MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384 +#define MBEDTLS_MD_SOME_LEGACY +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) +#define MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA512 +#define MBEDTLS_MD_SOME_LEGACY +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA3_C) +#define MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA3_224 +#define MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA3_256 +#define MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA3_384 +#define MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA3_512 +#define MBEDTLS_MD_SOME_LEGACY +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C) +#define MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_RIPEMD160 +#define MBEDTLS_MD_SOME_LEGACY +#endif + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_LIGHT */ + +/* BLOCK_CIPHER module can dispatch to PSA when: + * - PSA is enabled and drivers have been initialized + * - desired key type is supported on the PSA side + * If the above conditions are not met, but the legacy support is enabled, then + * BLOCK_CIPHER will dynamically fallback to it. + * + * In case BLOCK_CIPHER is defined (see below) the following symbols/helpers + * can be used to define its capabilities: + * - MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_SOME_PSA: there is at least 1 key type between AES, + * ARIA and Camellia which is supported through a driver; + * - MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_xxx_VIA_PSA: xxx key type is supported through a + * driver; + * - MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_xxx_VIA_LEGACY: xxx key type is supported through + * a legacy module (i.e. MBEDTLS_xxx_C) + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_AES) +#define MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_AES_VIA_PSA +#define MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_SOME_PSA +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ARIA) +#define MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_ARIA_VIA_PSA +#define MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_SOME_PSA +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA) +#define MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_VIA_PSA +#define MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_SOME_PSA +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) +#define MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_AES_VIA_LEGACY +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARIA_C) +#define MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_ARIA_VIA_LEGACY +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C) +#define MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_VIA_LEGACY +#endif + +/* Helpers to state that BLOCK_CIPHER module supports AES, ARIA and/or Camellia + * block ciphers via either PSA or legacy. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_AES_VIA_PSA) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_AES_VIA_LEGACY) +#define MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_CAN_AES +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_ARIA_VIA_PSA) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_ARIA_VIA_LEGACY) +#define MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_CAN_ARIA +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_VIA_PSA) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_VIA_LEGACY) +#define MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_CAN_CAMELLIA +#endif + +/* GCM_C and CCM_C can either depend on (in order of preference) BLOCK_CIPHER_C + * or CIPHER_C. The former is auto-enabled when: + * - CIPHER_C is not defined, which is also the legacy solution; + * - BLOCK_CIPHER_SOME_PSA because in this case BLOCK_CIPHER can take advantage + * of the driver's acceleration. + */ +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C)) && \ + (!defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_SOME_PSA)) +#define MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_C +#endif + +/* Helpers for GCM/CCM capabilities */ +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C)) || \ + (defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_CAN_AES)) +#define MBEDTLS_CCM_GCM_CAN_AES +#endif + +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ARIA_C)) || \ + (defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_CAN_ARIA)) +#define MBEDTLS_CCM_GCM_CAN_ARIA +#endif + +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C)) || \ + (defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_CAN_CAMELLIA)) +#define MBEDTLS_CCM_GCM_CAN_CAMELLIA +#endif + +/* MBEDTLS_ECP_LIGHT is auto-enabled by the following symbols: + * - MBEDTLS_ECP_C because now it consists of MBEDTLS_ECP_LIGHT plus functions + * for curve arithmetic. As a consequence if MBEDTLS_ECP_C is required for + * some reason, then MBEDTLS_ECP_LIGHT should be enabled as well. + * - MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_EC_EXTENDED and MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_EC_COMPRESSED because + * these features are not supported in PSA so the only way to have them is + * to enable the built-in solution. + * Both of them are temporary dependencies: + * - PK_PARSE_EC_EXTENDED will be removed after #7779 and #7789 + * - support for compressed points should also be added to PSA, but in this + * case there is no associated issue to track it yet. + * - PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_DERIVE because Weierstrass key derivation + * still depends on ECP_LIGHT. + * - PK_C + USE_PSA + PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA is a temporary dependency which will + * be fixed by #7453. + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_EC_EXTENDED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_EC_COMPRESSED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_DERIVE) +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_LIGHT +#endif + +/* MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_EC_COMPRESSED is introduced in Mbed TLS version 3.5, while + * in previous version compressed points were automatically supported as long + * as PK_PARSE_C and ECP_C were enabled. As a consequence, for backward + * compatibility, we auto-enable PK_PARSE_EC_COMPRESSED when these conditions + * are met. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) +#define MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_EC_COMPRESSED +#endif + +/* Helper symbol to state that there is support for ECDH, either through + * library implementation (ECDH_C) or through PSA. */ +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH)) || \ + (!defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C)) +#define MBEDTLS_CAN_ECDH +#endif + +/* PK module can achieve ECDSA functionalities by means of either software + * implementations (ECDSA_C) or through a PSA driver. The following defines + * are meant to list these capabilities in a general way which abstracts how + * they are implemented under the hood. */ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) +#define MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SIGN +#define MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_VERIFY +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C */ +#else /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA) +#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_BASIC) +#define MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SIGN +#endif /* PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_BASIC */ +#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY) +#define MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_VERIFY +#endif /* PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY */ +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_VERIFY) || defined(MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SIGN) +#define MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SOME +#endif + +/* If MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C is defined, make sure MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT + * is defined as well to include all PSA code. + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C */ + +/* Helpers to state that each key is supported either on the builtin or PSA side. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED) || defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_521) +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP521R1 +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED) || defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_512) +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_BP512R1 +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED) || defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_MONTGOMERY_448) +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_CURVE448 +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLED) || defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_384) +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_BP384R1 +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED) || defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_384) +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP384R1 +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED) || defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_256) +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_BP256R1 +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED) || defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_256) +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP256K1 +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED) || defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256) +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP256R1 +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED) || defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_MONTGOMERY_255) +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_CURVE25519 +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED) || defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_224) +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP224K1 +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED) || defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_224) +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP224R1 +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED) || defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_192) +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP192K1 +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED) || defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_192) +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP192R1 +#endif + +/* Helper symbol to state that the PK module has support for EC keys. This + * can either be provided through the legacy ECP solution or through the + * PSA friendly MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA (see pk.h for its description). */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) || \ + (defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY)) +#define MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA || MBEDTLS_ECP_C */ + +/* Historically pkparse did not check the CBC padding when decrypting + * a key. This was a bug, which is now fixed. As a consequence, pkparse + * now needs PKCS7 padding support, but existing configurations might not + * enable it, so we enable it here. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) +#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +#endif + +/* Backwards compatibility for some macros which were renamed to reflect that + * they are related to Armv8, not aarch64. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_USE_A64_CRYPTO_IF_PRESENT) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_USE_ARMV8_A_CRYPTO_IF_PRESENT) +#define MBEDTLS_SHA256_USE_ARMV8_A_CRYPTO_IF_PRESENT +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_USE_A64_CRYPTO_ONLY) && !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_USE_ARMV8_A_CRYPTO_ONLY) +#define MBEDTLS_SHA256_USE_ARMV8_A_CRYPTO_ONLY +#endif + +/* psa_util file features some ECDSA conversion functions, to convert between + * legacy's ASN.1 DER format and PSA's raw one. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) || (defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) && \ + (defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA) || defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA))) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_UTIL_HAVE_ECDSA +#endif + +/* Some internal helpers to determine which keys are availble. */ +#if (!defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C)) || \ + (defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES)) +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_AES +#endif +#if (!defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && defined(MBEDTLS_ARIA_C)) || \ + (defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA)) +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_ARIA +#endif +#if (!defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C)) || \ + (defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA)) +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CAMELLIA +#endif + +/* Some internal helpers to determine which operation modes are availble. */ +#if (!defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC)) || \ + (defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING)) +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC +#endif + +#if (!defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C)) || \ + (defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM)) +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM +#endif + +#if (!defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C)) || \ + (defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM)) +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CCM +#endif + +#if (!defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C)) || \ + (defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305)) +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CHACHAPOLY +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CCM) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CHACHAPOLY) +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_AEAD +#endif + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CONFIG_ADJUST_LEGACY_CRYPTO_H */ diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/config_adjust_legacy_from_psa.h b/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/config_adjust_legacy_from_psa.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..0091e246b23f --- /dev/null +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/config_adjust_legacy_from_psa.h @@ -0,0 +1,888 @@ +/** + * \file mbedtls/config_adjust_legacy_from_psa.h + * \brief Adjust PSA configuration: activate legacy implementations + * + * When MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG is enabled, activate legacy implementations + * of cryptographic mechanisms as needed to fulfill the needs of the PSA + * configuration. Generally speaking, we activate a legacy mechanism if + * it's needed for a requested PSA mechanism and there is no PSA driver + * for it. + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +#ifndef MBEDTLS_CONFIG_ADJUST_LEGACY_FROM_PSA_H +#define MBEDTLS_CONFIG_ADJUST_LEGACY_FROM_PSA_H + +/* Define appropriate ACCEL macros for the p256-m driver. + * In the future, those should be generated from the drivers JSON description. + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_P256M_DRIVER_ENABLED) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_SECP_R1_256 +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_ECDSA +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_ECDH +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_BASIC +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE +#endif + +/* + * ECC: support for a feature is controlled by a triplet or a pair: + * (curve, key_type public/basic, alg) or (curve, key_type_). + * + * A triplet/pair is accelerated if all of is components are accelerated; + * otherwise each component needs to be built in. + * + * We proceed in two passes: + * 1. Check if acceleration is complete for curves, key types, algs. + * 2. Then enable built-ins for each thing that's either not accelerated of + * doesn't have complete acceleration of the other triplet/pair components. + * + * Note: this needs psa/crypto_adjust_keypair_types.h to have been included + * already, so that we know the full set of key types that are requested. + */ + +/* ECC: curves: is acceleration complete? */ +#if (defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_256) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_256)) || \ + (defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_384) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_384)) || \ + (defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_512) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_512)) || \ + (defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_192) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_SECP_R1_192)) || \ + (defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_224) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_SECP_R1_224)) || \ + (defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_SECP_R1_256)) || \ + (defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_384) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_SECP_R1_384)) || \ + (defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_521) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_SECP_R1_521)) || \ + (defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_192) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_SECP_K1_192)) || \ + (defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_224) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_SECP_K1_224)) || \ + (defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_256) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_SECP_K1_256)) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ECC_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_CURVES +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ECC_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_WEIERSTRASS_CURVES +#endif + +#if (defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_MONTGOMERY_255) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_MONTGOMERY_255)) || \ + (defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_MONTGOMERY_448) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_MONTGOMERY_448)) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ECC_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_CURVES +#endif + +/* ECC: algs: is acceleration complete? */ +#if (defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_ECDH)) || \ + (defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_ECDSA)) || \ + (defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA)) || \ + (defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_JPAKE) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_JPAKE)) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ECC_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_ALGS +#endif + +/* ECC: key types: is acceleration complete? */ +#if (defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY)) || \ + (defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_BASIC) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_BASIC)) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ECC_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_KEY_TYPES_BASIC +#endif + +/* Special case: we don't support cooked key derivation in drivers yet */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_DERIVE) +#undef MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_DERIVE +#endif + +/* Note: the condition about key derivation is always true as DERIVE can't be + * accelerated yet */ +#if (defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY)) || \ + (defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_BASIC) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_BASIC)) || \ + (defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT)) || \ + (defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT)) || \ + (defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE)) || \ + (defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_DERIVE) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_DERIVE)) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ECC_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_KEY_TYPES +#endif + +/* ECC: curves: enable built-ins as needed. + * + * We need the curve built-in: + * - if it's not accelerated, or + * - if there's a key type with missing acceleration, or + * - if there's a alg with missing acceleration. + */ +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_256) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_256) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ECC_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_KEY_TYPES) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ECC_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_ALGS) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_256 1 +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED +#endif /* missing accel */ +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_256 */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_384) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_384) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ECC_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_KEY_TYPES) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ECC_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_ALGS) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_384 1 +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLED +#endif /* missing accel */ +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_384 */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_512) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_512) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ECC_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_KEY_TYPES) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ECC_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_ALGS) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_512 1 +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED +#endif /* missing accel */ +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_512 */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_MONTGOMERY_255) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_MONTGOMERY_255) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ECC_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_KEY_TYPES) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ECC_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_ALGS) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ECC_MONTGOMERY_255 1 +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED +#endif /* missing accel */ +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ECC_MONTGOMERY_255 */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_MONTGOMERY_448) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_MONTGOMERY_448) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ECC_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_KEY_TYPES) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ECC_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_ALGS) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ECC_MONTGOMERY_448 1 +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED +#endif /* missing accel */ +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ECC_MONTGOMERY_448 */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_192) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_SECP_R1_192) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ECC_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_KEY_TYPES) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ECC_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_ALGS) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ECC_SECP_R1_192 1 +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED +#endif /* missing accel */ +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_192 */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_224) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_SECP_R1_224) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ECC_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_KEY_TYPES) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ECC_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_ALGS) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ECC_SECP_R1_224 1 +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED +#endif /* missing accel */ +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_224 */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_SECP_R1_256) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ECC_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_KEY_TYPES) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ECC_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_ALGS) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ECC_SECP_R1_256 1 +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED +#endif /* missing accel */ +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256 */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_384) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_SECP_R1_384) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ECC_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_KEY_TYPES) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ECC_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_ALGS) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ECC_SECP_R1_384 1 +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED +#endif /* missing accel */ +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_384 */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_521) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_SECP_R1_521) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ECC_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_KEY_TYPES) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ECC_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_ALGS) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ECC_SECP_R1_521 1 +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED +#endif /* missing accel */ +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_521 */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_192) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_SECP_K1_192) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ECC_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_KEY_TYPES) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ECC_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_ALGS) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ECC_SECP_K1_192 1 +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED +#endif /* missing accel */ +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_192 */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_224) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_SECP_K1_224) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ECC_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_KEY_TYPES) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ECC_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_ALGS) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ECC_SECP_K1_224 1 +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED +/* https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/issues/3541 */ +#error "SECP224K1 is buggy via the PSA API in Mbed TLS." +#endif /* missing accel */ +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_224 */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_256) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_SECP_K1_256) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ECC_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_KEY_TYPES) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ECC_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_ALGS) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ECC_SECP_K1_256 1 +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED +#endif /* missing accel */ +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_256 */ + +/* ECC: algs: enable built-ins as needed. + * + * We need the alg built-in: + * - if it's not accelerated, or + * - if there's a relevant curve (see below) with missing acceleration, or + * - if there's a key type among (public, basic) with missing acceleration. + * + * Relevant curves are: + * - all curves for ECDH + * - Weierstrass curves for (deterministic) ECDSA + * - secp256r1 for EC J-PAKE + */ +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ECC_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_WEIERSTRASS_CURVES) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ECC_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_KEY_TYPES_BASIC) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA 1 +#define MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC +#define MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C +#define MBEDTLS_MD_C +#define MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_C +#define MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C +#define MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C +#define MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_C +#endif /* missing accel */ +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_ECDH) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ECC_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_CURVES) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ECC_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_KEY_TYPES_BASIC) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDH 1 +#define MBEDTLS_ECDH_C +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_C +#define MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C +#endif /* missing accel */ +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_ECDSA) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ECC_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_WEIERSTRASS_CURVES) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ECC_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_KEY_TYPES_BASIC) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDSA 1 +#define MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_C +#define MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C +#define MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C +#define MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_C +#endif /* missing accel */ +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_JPAKE) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_JPAKE) || \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_SECP_R1_256) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ECC_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_KEY_TYPES_BASIC) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_PAKE 1 +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_JPAKE 1 +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED +#define MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_C +#define MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_C +#endif /* missing accel */ +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_JPAKE */ + +/* ECC: key types: enable built-ins as needed. + * + * We need the key type built-in: + * - if it's not accelerated, or + * - if there's a curve with missing acceleration, or + * - only for public/basic: if there's an alg with missing acceleration. + */ +#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ECC_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_CURVES) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ECC_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_ALGS) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY 1 +#endif /* missing accel */ +#endif /* PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_BASIC) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_BASIC) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ECC_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_CURVES) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ECC_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_ALGS) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_BASIC 1 +#endif /* missing accel */ +#endif /* PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_BASIC */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ECC_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_CURVES) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT 1 +#endif /* missing accel */ +#endif /* PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ECC_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_CURVES) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT 1 +#endif /* missing accel */ +#endif /* PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ECC_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_CURVES) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE 1 +#endif /* missing accel */ +#endif /* PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE */ + +/* Note: the condition is always true as DERIVE can't be accelerated yet */ +#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_DERIVE) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_DERIVE) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ECC_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_CURVES) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_DERIVE 1 +#endif /* missing accel */ +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_DERIVE */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_BASIC) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_DERIVE) +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_LIGHT +#define MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE) +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_C +#define MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C +#endif + +/* End of ECC section */ + +/* + * DH key types follow the same pattern used above for EC keys. They are defined + * by a triplet (group, key_type, alg). A triplet is accelerated if all its + * component are accelerated, otherwise each component needs to be builtin. + */ + +/* DH: groups: is acceleration complete? */ +#if (defined(PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_2048) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_DH_RFC7919_2048)) || \ + (defined(PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_3072) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_DH_RFC7919_3072)) || \ + (defined(PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_4096) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_DH_RFC7919_4096)) || \ + (defined(PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_6144) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_DH_RFC7919_6144)) || \ + (defined(PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_8192) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_DH_RFC7919_8192)) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_DH_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_GROUPS +#endif + +/* DH: algs: is acceleration complete? */ +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_FFDH) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_DH_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_ALGS +#endif + +/* DH: key types: is acceleration complete? */ +#if (defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_PUBLIC_KEY) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_DH_PUBLIC_KEY)) || \ + (defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_BASIC) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_BASIC)) || \ + (defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT)) || \ + (defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT)) || \ + (defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE)) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_DH_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_KEY_TYPES +#endif + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_2048) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_DH_RFC7919_2048) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_DH_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_ALGS) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_DH_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_KEY_TYPES) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_DH_RFC7919_2048 1 +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_DH_RFC7919_2048 */ +#endif /* PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_2048 */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_3072) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_DH_RFC7919_3072) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_DH_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_ALGS) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_DH_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_KEY_TYPES) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_DH_RFC7919_3072 1 +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_DH_RFC7919_3072 */ +#endif /* PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_3072 */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_4096) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_DH_RFC7919_4096) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_DH_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_ALGS) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_DH_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_KEY_TYPES) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_DH_RFC7919_4096 1 +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_DH_RFC7919_4096 */ +#endif /* PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_4096 */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_6144) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_DH_RFC7919_6144) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_DH_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_ALGS) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_DH_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_KEY_TYPES) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_DH_RFC7919_6144 1 +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_DH_RFC7919_6144 */ +#endif /* PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_6144 */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_8192) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_DH_RFC7919_8192) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_DH_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_ALGS) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_DH_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_KEY_TYPES) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_DH_RFC7919_8192 1 +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_DH_RFC7919_8192 */ +#endif /* PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_8192 */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_FFDH) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_DH_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_GROUPS) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_DH_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_KEY_TYPES) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_FFDH 1 +#define MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_FFDH */ +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_DH_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_GROUPS) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_DH_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_ALGS) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT 1 +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT */ +#endif /* PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_DH_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_GROUPS) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_DH_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_ALGS) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT 1 +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT */ +#endif /* PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE 1 +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE */ +#endif /* PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_BASIC) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_BASIC) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_DH_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_GROUPS) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_DH_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_ALGS) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_BASIC 1 +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_BASIC */ +#endif /* PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_BASIC */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_PUBLIC_KEY) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_DH_PUBLIC_KEY) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_DH_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_GROUPS) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_DH_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_ALGS) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_DH_PUBLIC_KEY 1 +#define MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_DH_PUBLIC_KEY */ +#endif /* PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_PUBLIC_KEY */ + +/* End of DH section */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_HKDF) +/* + * The PSA implementation has its own implementation of HKDF, separate from + * hkdf.c. No need to enable MBEDTLS_HKDF_C here. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HMAC 1 +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF 1 +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_HKDF */ +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT) +/* + * The PSA implementation has its own implementation of HKDF, separate from + * hkdf.c. No need to enable MBEDTLS_HKDF_C here. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HMAC 1 +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT 1 +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT */ +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF_EXPAND) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_HKDF_EXPAND) +/* + * The PSA implementation has its own implementation of HKDF, separate from + * hkdf.c. No need to enable MBEDTLS_HKDF_C here. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HMAC 1 +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF_EXPAND 1 +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_HKDF_EXPAND */ +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF_EXPAND */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_HMAC) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HMAC 1 +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_HMAC */ +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_MD5) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_MD5 1 +#define MBEDTLS_MD5_C +#endif + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_RIPEMD160) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RIPEMD160 1 +#define MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C +#endif + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_RSA_OAEP) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_OAEP 1 +#define MBEDTLS_RSA_C +#define MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C +#define MBEDTLS_OID_C +#define MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21 +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_RSA_OAEP */ +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT 1 +#define MBEDTLS_RSA_C +#define MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C +#define MBEDTLS_OID_C +#define MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT */ +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN 1 +#define MBEDTLS_RSA_C +#define MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C +#define MBEDTLS_OID_C +#define MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN */ +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_RSA_PSS) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PSS 1 +#define MBEDTLS_RSA_C +#define MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C +#define MBEDTLS_OID_C +#define MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21 +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_RSA_PSS */ +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_SHA_1) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_1 1 +#define MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +#endif + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_SHA_224) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_224 1 +#define MBEDTLS_SHA224_C +#endif + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_SHA_256) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_256 1 +#define MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +#endif + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_SHA_384) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_384 1 +#define MBEDTLS_SHA384_C +#endif + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_SHA_512) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_512 1 +#define MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +#endif + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA3_224) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_SHA3_224) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA3_224 1 +#define MBEDTLS_SHA3_C +#endif + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA3_256) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_SHA3_256) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA3_256 1 +#define MBEDTLS_SHA3_C +#endif + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA3_384) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_SHA3_384) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA3_384 1 +#define MBEDTLS_SHA3_C +#endif + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA3_512) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_SHA3_512) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA3_512 1 +#define MBEDTLS_SHA3_C +#endif + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_PBKDF2_HMAC) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_PBKDF2_HMAC) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_PBKDF2_HMAC 1 +#define PSA_HAVE_SOFT_PBKDF2_HMAC 1 +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_HMAC) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HMAC 1 +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_HMAC */ +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_PBKDF2_HMAC */ +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_PBKDF2_HMAC */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_TLS12_PRF) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PRF 1 +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_TLS12_PRF */ +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS 1 +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS */ +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_ECJPAKE_TO_PMS) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_TLS12_ECJPAKE_TO_PMS) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_ECJPAKE_TO_PMS 1 +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_TLS12_ECJPAKE_TO_PMS */ +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_ECJPAKE_TO_PMS */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT 1 +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT */ +#endif /* PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT 1 +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT */ +#endif /* PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE 1 +#define MBEDTLS_GENPRIME +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE */ +#endif /* PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_BASIC) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_BASIC) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_BASIC 1 +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_BASIC */ +#endif /* PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_BASIC */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY 1 +#define MBEDTLS_RSA_C +#define MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C +#define MBEDTLS_OID_C +#define MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C +#define MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_C +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY */ +#endif /* PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY */ + +/* If any of the block modes are requested that don't have an + * associated HW assist, define PSA_HAVE_SOFT_BLOCK_MODE for checking + * in the block cipher key types. */ +#if (defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_CTR) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_CTR)) || \ + (defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_CFB) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_CFB)) || \ + (defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_OFB) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_OFB)) || \ + (defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING)) || \ + (defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING)) || \ + (defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_PKCS7) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_CBC_PKCS7)) || \ + (defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_CMAC) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_CMAC)) +#define PSA_HAVE_SOFT_BLOCK_MODE 1 +#endif + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_PBKDF2_AES_CMAC_PRF_128) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_PBKDF2_AES_CMAC_PRF_128) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_PBKDF2_AES_CMAC_PRF_128 1 +#define PSA_HAVE_SOFT_PBKDF2_CMAC 1 +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_PBKDF2_AES_CMAC_PRF_128 */ +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_PBKDF2_AES_CMAC_PRF_128 */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_AES) +#define PSA_HAVE_SOFT_KEY_TYPE_AES 1 +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_AES */ +#if defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_KEY_TYPE_AES) || \ + defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_BLOCK_MODE) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_AES 1 +#define MBEDTLS_AES_C +#endif /* PSA_HAVE_SOFT_KEY_TYPE_AES || PSA_HAVE_SOFT_BLOCK_MODE */ +#endif /* PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ARIA) +#define PSA_HAVE_SOFT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA 1 +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ARIA */ +#if defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA) || \ + defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_BLOCK_MODE) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ARIA 1 +#define MBEDTLS_ARIA_C +#endif /* PSA_HAVE_SOFT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA || PSA_HAVE_SOFT_BLOCK_MODE */ +#endif /* PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA) +#define PSA_HAVE_SOFT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA 1 +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA */ +#if defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA) || \ + defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_BLOCK_MODE) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA 1 +#define MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C +#endif /* PSA_HAVE_SOFT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA || PSA_HAVE_SOFT_BLOCK_MODE */ +#endif /* PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_DES) +#define PSA_HAVE_SOFT_KEY_TYPE_DES 1 +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_DES */ +#if defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_KEY_TYPE_DES) || \ + defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_BLOCK_MODE) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_DES 1 +#define MBEDTLS_DES_C +#endif /*PSA_HAVE_SOFT_KEY_TYPE_DES || PSA_HAVE_SOFT_BLOCK_MODE */ +#endif /* PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER 1 +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER */ +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 1 +#define MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_C +#endif /*!MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 */ +#endif /* PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 */ + +/* If any of the software block ciphers are selected, define + * PSA_HAVE_SOFT_BLOCK_CIPHER, which can be used in any of these + * situations. */ +#if defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_KEY_TYPE_AES) || \ + defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA) || \ + defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_KEY_TYPE_DES) || \ + defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA) +#define PSA_HAVE_SOFT_BLOCK_CIPHER 1 +#endif + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_CBC_MAC) +#error "CBC-MAC is not yet supported via the PSA API in Mbed TLS." +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CBC_MAC 1 +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_CBC_MAC */ +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_CMAC) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_CMAC) || \ + defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_BLOCK_CIPHER) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CMAC 1 +#define MBEDTLS_CMAC_C +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_CMAC */ +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_CMAC */ + +#if defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_PBKDF2_HMAC) || \ + defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_PBKDF2_CMAC) +#define PSA_HAVE_SOFT_PBKDF2 1 +#endif /* PSA_HAVE_SOFT_PBKDF2_HMAC || PSA_HAVE_SOFT_PBKDF2_CMAC */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_CTR) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_CTR) || \ + defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_BLOCK_CIPHER) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CTR 1 +#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR +#endif +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_CTR */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_CFB) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_CFB) || \ + defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_BLOCK_CIPHER) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CFB 1 +#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB +#endif +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_CFB */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_OFB) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_OFB) || \ + defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_BLOCK_CIPHER) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_OFB 1 +#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB +#endif +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_OFB */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING 1 +#endif + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING) || \ + defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_BLOCK_CIPHER) +#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING 1 +#endif +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_PKCS7) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_CBC_PKCS7) || \ + defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_BLOCK_CIPHER) +#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CBC_PKCS7 1 +#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +#endif +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_PKCS7 */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_CCM) || \ + defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_KEY_TYPE_AES) || \ + defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA) || \ + defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CCM 1 +#define MBEDTLS_CCM_C +#endif +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG) || \ + defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_KEY_TYPE_AES) || \ + defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA) || \ + defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG 1 +#define MBEDTLS_CCM_C +#endif +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_GCM) || \ + defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_KEY_TYPE_AES) || \ + defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA) || \ + defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_GCM 1 +#define MBEDTLS_GCM_C +#endif +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305) +#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20) +#define MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C +#define MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_C +#define MBEDTLS_POLY1305_C +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305 1 +#endif /* PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 */ +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305 */ +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305 */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CONFIG_ADJUST_LEGACY_FROM_PSA_H */ diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/config_adjust_psa_from_legacy.h b/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/config_adjust_psa_from_legacy.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..3456615943a6 --- /dev/null +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/config_adjust_psa_from_legacy.h @@ -0,0 +1,349 @@ +/** + * \file mbedtls/config_adjust_psa_from_legacy.h + * \brief Adjust PSA configuration: construct PSA configuration from legacy + * + * When MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG is disabled, we automatically enable + * cryptographic mechanisms through the PSA interface when the corresponding + * legacy mechanism is enabled. In many cases, this just enables the PSA + * wrapper code around the legacy implementation, but we also do this for + * some mechanisms where PSA has its own independent implementation so + * that high-level modules that can use either cryptographic API have the + * same feature set in both cases. + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +#ifndef MBEDTLS_CONFIG_ADJUST_PSA_FROM_LEGACY_H +#define MBEDTLS_CONFIG_ADJUST_PSA_FROM_LEGACY_H + +/* + * Ensure PSA_WANT_* defines are setup properly if MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG + * is not defined + */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CCM 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM 1 +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG 1 +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CCM_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CMAC_C) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CMAC 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_CMAC 1 +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CMAC_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDH 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH 1 +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDH_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDSA 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY 1 + +// Only add in DETERMINISTIC support if ECDSA is also enabled +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA 1 +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) +#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_BASIC 1 +#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT 1 +#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT 1 +#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE 1 +/* Normally we wouldn't enable this because it's not implemented in ecp.c, + * but since it used to be available any time ECP_C was enabled, let's enable + * it anyway for the sake of backwards compatibility */ +#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_DERIVE 1 +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_BASIC 1 +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT 1 +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT 1 +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE 1 +/* See comment for PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_DERIVE above. */ +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_DERIVE 1 +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY 1 +#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY 1 +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_C) +#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_BASIC 1 +#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT 1 +#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT 1 +#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE 1 +#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_PUBLIC_KEY 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH 1 +#define PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_2048 1 +#define PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_3072 1 +#define PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_4096 1 +#define PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_6144 1 +#define PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_8192 1 +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_FFDH 1 +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_BASIC 1 +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT 1 +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT 1 +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE 1 +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_DH_PUBLIC_KEY 1 +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_DH_RFC7919_2048 1 +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_DH_RFC7919_3072 1 +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_DH_RFC7919_4096 1 +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_DH_RFC7919_6144 1 +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_DH_RFC7919_8192 1 +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DHM_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_GCM 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM 1 +#endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C */ + +/* Enable PSA HKDF algorithm if mbedtls HKDF is supported. + * PSA HKDF EXTRACT and PSA HKDF EXPAND have minimal cost when + * PSA HKDF is enabled, so enable both algorithms together + * with PSA HKDF. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HKDF_C) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HMAC 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC 1 +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF 1 +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT 1 +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF_EXPAND 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF_EXPAND 1 +#endif /* MBEDTLS_HKDF_C */ + +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HMAC 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC 1 +#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC 1 + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_C) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PRF 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF 1 +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS 1 +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_MD5 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5 1 +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_C) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_PAKE 1 +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_JPAKE 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_JPAKE 1 +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RIPEMD160 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160 1 +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT 1 +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW 1 +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_OAEP 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP 1 +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PSS 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS 1 +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_GENPRIME) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE 1 +#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE 1 +#endif /* MBEDTLS_GENPRIME */ +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_BASIC 1 +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT 1 +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT 1 +#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_BASIC 1 +#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT 1 +#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT 1 +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY 1 +#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY 1 +#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_1 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1 1 +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA224_C) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_224 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224 1 +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_256 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256 1 +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_384 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384 1 +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_512 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512 1 +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA3_C) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA3_224 1 +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA3_256 1 +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA3_384 1 +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA3_512 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA3_224 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA3_256 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA3_384 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA3_512 1 +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) +#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES 1 +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_AES 1 +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARIA_C) +#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA 1 +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ARIA 1 +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C) +#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA 1 +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA 1 +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DES_C) +#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES 1 +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_DES 1 +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_256) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_ECJPAKE_TO_PMS 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_ECJPAKE_TO_PMS 1 +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_C) +#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 1 +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 1 +/* ALG_STREAM_CIPHER requires CIPHER_C in order to be supported in PSA */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C) +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER 1 +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER 1 +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C) +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305 1 +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305 1 +#endif +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING 1 +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CBC_PKCS7 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_PKCS7 1 +#endif +#endif + +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_DES_C) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ARIA_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C)) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING 1 +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CFB 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_CFB 1 +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CTR 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_CTR 1 +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_OFB 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_OFB 1 +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_256 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_256 1 +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLED) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_384 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_384 1 +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_512 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_512 1 +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ECC_MONTGOMERY_255 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ECC_MONTGOMERY_255 1 +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ECC_MONTGOMERY_448 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ECC_MONTGOMERY_448 1 +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ECC_SECP_R1_192 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_192 1 +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ECC_SECP_R1_224 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_224 1 +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ECC_SECP_R1_256 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256 1 +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ECC_SECP_R1_384 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_384 1 +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ECC_SECP_R1_521 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_521 1 +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ECC_SECP_K1_192 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_192 1 +#endif + +/* SECP224K1 is buggy via the PSA API (https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/issues/3541) */ +#if 0 && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ECC_SECP_K1_224 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_224 1 +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ECC_SECP_K1_256 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_256 1 +#endif + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CONFIG_ADJUST_PSA_FROM_LEGACY_H */ diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/config_adjust_psa_superset_legacy.h b/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/config_adjust_psa_superset_legacy.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..3a55c3f6e196 --- /dev/null +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/config_adjust_psa_superset_legacy.h @@ -0,0 +1,142 @@ +/** + * \file mbedtls/config_adjust_psa_superset_legacy.h + * \brief Adjust PSA configuration: automatic enablement from legacy + * + * To simplify some edge cases, we automatically enable certain cryptographic + * mechanisms in the PSA API if they are enabled in the legacy API. The general + * idea is that if legacy module M uses mechanism A internally, and A has + * both a legacy and a PSA implementation, we enable A through PSA whenever + * it's enabled through legacy. This facilitates the transition to PSA + * implementations of A for users of M. + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +#ifndef MBEDTLS_CONFIG_ADJUST_PSA_SUPERSET_LEGACY_H +#define MBEDTLS_CONFIG_ADJUST_PSA_SUPERSET_LEGACY_H + +/****************************************************************/ +/* Hashes that are built in are also enabled in PSA. + * This simplifies dependency declarations especially + * for modules that obey MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO. */ +/****************************************************************/ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C) +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5 1 +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C) +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160 1 +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1 1 +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA224_C) +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224 1 +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256 1 +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C) +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384 1 +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512 1 +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA3_C) +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA3_224 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA3_256 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA3_384 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA3_512 1 +#endif + +/* Ensure that the PSA's supported curves (PSA_WANT_ECC_xxx) are always a + * superset of the builtin ones (MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_xxx). */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED) +#if !defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_256) +#define PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_256 1 +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_256 */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLED) +#if !defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_384) +#define PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_384 1 +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_384 */ +#endif /*MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED) +#if !defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_512) +#define PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_512 1 +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_512 */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED) +#if !defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_MONTGOMERY_255) +#define PSA_WANT_ECC_MONTGOMERY_255 1 +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ECC_MONTGOMERY_255 */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED) +#if !defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_MONTGOMERY_448) +#define PSA_WANT_ECC_MONTGOMERY_448 1 +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ECC_MONTGOMERY_448 */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED) +#if !defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_192) +#define PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_192 1 +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_192 */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED) +#if !defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_224) +#define PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_224 1 +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_224 */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED) +#if !defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256) +#define PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256 1 +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256 */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED) +#if !defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_384) +#define PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_384 1 +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_384 */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED) +#if !defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_521) +#define PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_521 1 +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_521 */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED) +#if !defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_192) +#define PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_192 1 +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_192 */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED */ + +/* SECP224K1 is buggy via the PSA API (https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/issues/3541) */ +#if 0 && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED) +#if !defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_224) +#define PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_224 1 +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_224 */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED) +#if !defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_256) +#define PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_256 1 +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_256 */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CONFIG_ADJUST_PSA_SUPERSET_LEGACY_H */ diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/config_adjust_ssl.h b/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/config_adjust_ssl.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..39c7b3b11760 --- /dev/null +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/config_adjust_ssl.h @@ -0,0 +1,81 @@ +/** + * \file mbedtls/config_adjust_ssl.h + * \brief Adjust TLS configuration + * + * Automatically enable certain dependencies. Generally, MBEDLTS_xxx + * configurations need to be explicitly enabled by the user: enabling + * MBEDTLS_xxx_A but not MBEDTLS_xxx_B when A requires B results in a + * compilation error. However, we do automatically enable certain options + * in some circumstances. One case is if MBEDTLS_xxx_B is an internal option + * used to identify parts of a module that are used by other module, and we + * don't want to make the symbol MBEDTLS_xxx_B part of the public API. + * Another case is if A didn't depend on B in earlier versions, and we + * want to use B in A but we need to preserve backward compatibility with + * configurations that explicitly activate MBEDTLS_xxx_A but not + * MBEDTLS_xxx_B. + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +#ifndef MBEDTLS_CONFIG_ADJUST_SSL_H +#define MBEDTLS_CONFIG_ADJUST_SSL_H + +/* The following blocks make it easier to disable all of TLS, + * or of TLS 1.2 or 1.3 or DTLS, without having to manually disable all + * key exchanges, options and extensions related to them. */ + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C) +#undef MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C +#undef MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C +#undef MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 +#undef MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 +#undef MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS +#endif + +#if !(defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS)) +#undef MBEDTLS_SSL_TICKET_C +#endif + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) +#undef MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY +#undef MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID +#undef MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID_COMPAT +#undef MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY +#undef MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP +#undef MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CLIENT_PORT_REUSE +#endif + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) +#undef MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +#undef MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET +#undef MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION +#undef MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED +#undef MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED +#undef MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED +#undef MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED +#undef MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED +#undef MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED +#undef MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED +#undef MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED +#undef MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED +#undef MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED +#undef MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED +#endif + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) +#undef MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_ENABLED +#undef MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED +#undef MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED +#undef MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA +#undef MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && \ + (defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED)) +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_2_SOME_ECC +#endif + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CONFIG_ADJUST_SSL_H */ diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/config_adjust_x509.h b/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/config_adjust_x509.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..346c8ae6d51c --- /dev/null +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/config_adjust_x509.h @@ -0,0 +1,25 @@ +/** + * \file mbedtls/config_adjust_x509.h + * \brief Adjust X.509 configuration + * + * Automatically enable certain dependencies. Generally, MBEDLTS_xxx + * configurations need to be explicitly enabled by the user: enabling + * MBEDTLS_xxx_A but not MBEDTLS_xxx_B when A requires B results in a + * compilation error. However, we do automatically enable certain options + * in some circumstances. One case is if MBEDTLS_xxx_B is an internal option + * used to identify parts of a module that are used by other module, and we + * don't want to make the symbol MBEDTLS_xxx_B part of the public API. + * Another case is if A didn't depend on B in earlier versions, and we + * want to use B in A but we need to preserve backward compatibility with + * configurations that explicitly activate MBEDTLS_xxx_A but not + * MBEDTLS_xxx_B. + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +#ifndef MBEDTLS_CONFIG_ADJUST_X509_H +#define MBEDTLS_CONFIG_ADJUST_X509_H + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CONFIG_ADJUST_X509_H */ diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/config_psa.h b/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/config_psa.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..17da61b3e8ef --- /dev/null +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/config_psa.h @@ -0,0 +1,55 @@ +/** + * \file mbedtls/config_psa.h + * \brief PSA crypto configuration options (set of defines) + * + * This set of compile-time options takes settings defined in + * include/mbedtls/mbedtls_config.h and include/psa/crypto_config.h and uses + * those definitions to define symbols used in the library code. + * + * Users and integrators should not edit this file, please edit + * include/mbedtls/mbedtls_config.h for MBEDTLS_XXX settings or + * include/psa/crypto_config.h for PSA_WANT_XXX settings. + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +#ifndef MBEDTLS_CONFIG_PSA_H +#define MBEDTLS_CONFIG_PSA_H + +#include "psa/crypto_legacy.h" + +#include "psa/crypto_adjust_config_synonyms.h" + +#include "mbedtls/config_adjust_psa_superset_legacy.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG) + +/* Require built-in implementations based on PSA requirements */ + +/* We need this to have a complete list of requirements + * before we deduce what built-ins are required. */ +#include "psa/crypto_adjust_config_key_pair_types.h" + +#include "mbedtls/config_adjust_legacy_from_psa.h" + +#else /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG */ + +/* Infer PSA requirements from Mbed TLS capabilities */ + +#include "mbedtls/config_adjust_psa_from_legacy.h" + +/* Hopefully the file above will have enabled keypair symbols in a consistent + * way, but including this here fixes them if that wasn't the case. */ +#include "psa/crypto_adjust_config_key_pair_types.h" + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_JPAKE) +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_SOME_PAKE 1 +#endif + +#include "psa/crypto_adjust_auto_enabled.h" + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CONFIG_PSA_H */ diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/constant_time.h b/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/constant_time.h index 7226ae1bcd2f..d31bff677e9d 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/constant_time.h +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/constant_time.h @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ /** * Constant-time functions - * + */ +/* * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later */ @@ -10,20 +11,22 @@ #include - /** Constant-time buffer comparison without branches. * * This is equivalent to the standard memcmp function, but is likely to be - * compiled to code using bitwise operation rather than a branch. + * compiled to code using bitwise operations rather than a branch, such that + * the time taken is constant w.r.t. the data pointed to by \p a and \p b, + * and w.r.t. whether \p a and \p b are equal or not. It is not constant-time + * w.r.t. \p n . * * This function can be used to write constant-time code by replacing branches * with bit operations using masks. * - * \param a Pointer to the first buffer. - * \param b Pointer to the second buffer. - * \param n The number of bytes to compare in the buffer. + * \param a Pointer to the first buffer, containing at least \p n bytes. May not be NULL. + * \param b Pointer to the second buffer, containing at least \p n bytes. May not be NULL. + * \param n The number of bytes to compare. * - * \return Zero if the content of the two buffer is the same, + * \return Zero if the contents of the two buffers are the same, * otherwise non-zero. */ int mbedtls_ct_memcmp(const void *a, diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/ctr_drbg.h b/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/ctr_drbg.h index eb72f9ee97c4..c00756df1b68 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/ctr_drbg.h +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/ctr_drbg.h @@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ * The security strength as defined in NIST SP 800-90A is * 128 bits when AES-128 is used (\c MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY enabled) * and 256 bits otherwise, provided that #MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN is - * kept at its default value (and not overridden in config.h) and that the + * kept at its default value (and not overridden in mbedtls_config.h) and that the * DRBG instance is set up with default parameters. * See the documentation of mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed() for more * information. @@ -28,14 +28,19 @@ #ifndef MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_H #define MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_H +#include "mbedtls/private_access.h" -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" +#include "mbedtls/build_info.h" + +/* In case AES_C is defined then it is the primary option for backward + * compatibility purposes. If that's not available, PSA is used instead */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) +#include "mbedtls/aes.h" #else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE +#include "psa/crypto.h" #endif -#include "mbedtls/aes.h" +#include "entropy.h" #if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) #include "mbedtls/threading.h" @@ -75,7 +80,7 @@ * \name SECTION: Module settings * * The configuration options you can set for this module are in this section. - * Either change them in config.h or define them using the compiler command + * Either change them in mbedtls_config.h or define them using the compiler command * line. * \{ */ @@ -85,17 +90,14 @@ * \brief The amount of entropy used per seed by default, in bytes. */ #if !defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_FORCE_SHA256) -/** This is 48 bytes because the entropy module uses SHA-512 - * (\c MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_FORCE_SHA256 is disabled). +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_SHA512_ACCUMULATOR) +/** This is 48 bytes because the entropy module uses SHA-512. */ #define MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN 48 -#else /* defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_FORCE_SHA256) */ +#else /* MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_SHA512_ACCUMULATOR */ -/** This is 32 bytes because the entropy module uses SHA-256 - * (the SHA512 module is disabled or - * \c MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_FORCE_SHA256 is enabled). +/** This is 32 bytes because the entropy module uses SHA-256. */ #if !defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY) /** \warning To achieve a 256-bit security strength, you must pass a nonce @@ -103,7 +105,7 @@ */ #endif /* !defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY) */ #define MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN 32 -#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_FORCE_SHA256) */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_SHA512_ACCUMULATOR */ #endif /* !defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN) */ #if !defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_RESEED_INTERVAL) @@ -155,40 +157,51 @@ extern "C" { #define MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_NONCE_LEN (MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN + 1) / 2 #endif +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) +typedef struct mbedtls_ctr_drbg_psa_context { + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key_id; + psa_cipher_operation_t operation; +} mbedtls_ctr_drbg_psa_context; +#endif + /** * \brief The CTR_DRBG context structure. */ typedef struct mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context { - unsigned char counter[16]; /*!< The counter (V). */ - int reseed_counter; /*!< The reseed counter. - * This is the number of requests that have - * been made since the last (re)seeding, - * minus one. - * Before the initial seeding, this field - * contains the amount of entropy in bytes - * to use as a nonce for the initial seeding, - * or -1 if no nonce length has been explicitly - * set (see mbedtls_ctr_drbg_set_nonce_len()). - */ - int prediction_resistance; /*!< This determines whether prediction - resistance is enabled, that is - whether to systematically reseed before - each random generation. */ - size_t entropy_len; /*!< The amount of entropy grabbed on each - seed or reseed operation, in bytes. */ - int reseed_interval; /*!< The reseed interval. - * This is the maximum number of requests - * that can be made between reseedings. */ - - mbedtls_aes_context aes_ctx; /*!< The AES context. */ + unsigned char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(counter)[16]; /*!< The counter (V). */ + int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(reseed_counter); /*!< The reseed counter. + * This is the number of requests that have + * been made since the last (re)seeding, + * minus one. + * Before the initial seeding, this field + * contains the amount of entropy in bytes + * to use as a nonce for the initial seeding, + * or -1 if no nonce length has been explicitly + * set (see mbedtls_ctr_drbg_set_nonce_len()). + */ + int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(prediction_resistance); /*!< This determines whether prediction + resistance is enabled, that is + whether to systematically reseed before + each random generation. */ + size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(entropy_len); /*!< The amount of entropy grabbed on each + seed or reseed operation, in bytes. */ + int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(reseed_interval); /*!< The reseed interval. + * This is the maximum number of requests + * that can be made between reseedings. */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) + mbedtls_aes_context MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(aes_ctx); /*!< The AES context. */ +#else + mbedtls_ctr_drbg_psa_context MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(psa_ctx); /*!< The PSA context. */ +#endif /* * Callbacks (Entropy) */ - int (*f_entropy)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t); + int(*MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(f_entropy))(void *, unsigned char *, size_t); /*!< The entropy callback function. */ - void *p_entropy; /*!< The context for the entropy function. */ + void *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(p_entropy); /*!< The context for the entropy function. */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) /* Invariant: the mutex is initialized if and only if f_entropy != NULL. @@ -198,7 +211,7 @@ typedef struct mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context { * Note that this invariant may change without notice. Do not rely on it * and do not access the mutex directly in application code. */ - mbedtls_threading_mutex_t mutex; + mbedtls_threading_mutex_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(mutex); #endif } mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context; @@ -453,9 +466,9 @@ int mbedtls_ctr_drbg_reseed(mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx, * #MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT. * \return An error from the underlying AES cipher on failure. */ -int mbedtls_ctr_drbg_update_ret(mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx, - const unsigned char *additional, - size_t add_len); +int mbedtls_ctr_drbg_update(mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *additional, + size_t add_len); /** * \brief This function updates a CTR_DRBG instance with additional @@ -519,35 +532,6 @@ int mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random_with_add(void *p_rng, int mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random(void *p_rng, unsigned char *output, size_t output_len); - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING) -#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED __attribute__((deprecated)) -#else -#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED -#endif -/** - * \brief This function updates the state of the CTR_DRBG context. - * - * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_ctr_drbg_update_ret() - * in 2.16.0. - * - * \note If \p add_len is greater than - * #MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT, only the first - * #MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT Bytes are used. - * The remaining Bytes are silently discarded. - * - * \param ctx The CTR_DRBG context. - * \param additional The data to update the state with. - * \param add_len Length of \p additional data. - */ -MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_ctr_drbg_update( - mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx, - const unsigned char *additional, - size_t add_len); -#undef MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED -#endif /* !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ - #if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) /** * \brief This function writes a seed file. diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/debug.h b/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/debug.h index c29c40eee7ab..424ed4b3fd98 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/debug.h +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/debug.h @@ -10,11 +10,7 @@ #ifndef MBEDTLS_DEBUG_H #define MBEDTLS_DEBUG_H -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "mbedtls/build_info.h" #include "mbedtls/ssl.h" @@ -47,9 +43,13 @@ #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_REMOVE_INFO) #define MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_CRT(level, text, crt) \ mbedtls_debug_print_crt(ssl, level, __FILE__, __LINE__, text, crt) -#endif +#else +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_CRT(level, text, crt) do { } while (0) +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_REMOVE_INFO */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) #define MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ECDH(level, ecdh, attr) \ @@ -119,6 +119,15 @@ #endif \ /* (defined(__MINGW32__) && __USE_MINGW_ANSI_STDIO == 0) || (defined(_MSC_VER) && _MSC_VER < 1800) */ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PRINTF_MS_TIME) +#include +#if !defined(PRId64) +#define MBEDTLS_PRINTF_MS_TIME MBEDTLS_PRINTF_LONGLONG +#else +#define MBEDTLS_PRINTF_MS_TIME PRId64 +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PRINTF_MS_TIME */ + #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { #endif @@ -140,161 +149,8 @@ extern "C" { */ void mbedtls_debug_set_threshold(int threshold); -/** - * \brief Print a message to the debug output. This function is always used - * through the MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG() macro, which supplies the ssl - * context, file and line number parameters. - * - * \param ssl SSL context - * \param level error level of the debug message - * \param file file the message has occurred in - * \param line line number the message has occurred at - * \param format format specifier, in printf format - * \param ... variables used by the format specifier - * - * \attention This function is intended for INTERNAL usage within the - * library only. - */ -void mbedtls_debug_print_msg(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int level, - const char *file, int line, - const char *format, ...) MBEDTLS_PRINTF_ATTRIBUTE(5, 6); - -/** - * \brief Print the return value of a function to the debug output. This - * function is always used through the MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET() macro, - * which supplies the ssl context, file and line number parameters. - * - * \param ssl SSL context - * \param level error level of the debug message - * \param file file the error has occurred in - * \param line line number the error has occurred in - * \param text the name of the function that returned the error - * \param ret the return code value - * - * \attention This function is intended for INTERNAL usage within the - * library only. - */ -void mbedtls_debug_print_ret(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int level, - const char *file, int line, - const char *text, int ret); - -/** - * \brief Output a buffer of size len bytes to the debug output. This function - * is always used through the MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF() macro, - * which supplies the ssl context, file and line number parameters. - * - * \param ssl SSL context - * \param level error level of the debug message - * \param file file the error has occurred in - * \param line line number the error has occurred in - * \param text a name or label for the buffer being dumped. Normally the - * variable or buffer name - * \param buf the buffer to be outputted - * \param len length of the buffer - * - * \attention This function is intended for INTERNAL usage within the - * library only. - */ -void mbedtls_debug_print_buf(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int level, - const char *file, int line, const char *text, - const unsigned char *buf, size_t len); - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) -/** - * \brief Print a MPI variable to the debug output. This function is always - * used through the MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MPI() macro, which supplies the - * ssl context, file and line number parameters. - * - * \param ssl SSL context - * \param level error level of the debug message - * \param file file the error has occurred in - * \param line line number the error has occurred in - * \param text a name or label for the MPI being output. Normally the - * variable name - * \param X the MPI variable - * - * \attention This function is intended for INTERNAL usage within the - * library only. - */ -void mbedtls_debug_print_mpi(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int level, - const char *file, int line, - const char *text, const mbedtls_mpi *X); -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) -/** - * \brief Print an ECP point to the debug output. This function is always - * used through the MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ECP() macro, which supplies the - * ssl context, file and line number parameters. - * - * \param ssl SSL context - * \param level error level of the debug message - * \param file file the error has occurred in - * \param line line number the error has occurred in - * \param text a name or label for the ECP point being output. Normally the - * variable name - * \param X the ECP point - * - * \attention This function is intended for INTERNAL usage within the - * library only. - */ -void mbedtls_debug_print_ecp(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int level, - const char *file, int line, - const char *text, const mbedtls_ecp_point *X); -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) -/** - * \brief Print a X.509 certificate structure to the debug output. This - * function is always used through the MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_CRT() macro, - * which supplies the ssl context, file and line number parameters. - * - * \param ssl SSL context - * \param level error level of the debug message - * \param file file the error has occurred in - * \param line line number the error has occurred in - * \param text a name or label for the certificate being output - * \param crt X.509 certificate structure - * - * \attention This function is intended for INTERNAL usage within the - * library only. - */ -void mbedtls_debug_print_crt(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int level, - const char *file, int line, - const char *text, const mbedtls_x509_crt *crt); -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) -typedef enum { - MBEDTLS_DEBUG_ECDH_Q, - MBEDTLS_DEBUG_ECDH_QP, - MBEDTLS_DEBUG_ECDH_Z, -} mbedtls_debug_ecdh_attr; - -/** - * \brief Print a field of the ECDH structure in the SSL context to the debug - * output. This function is always used through the - * MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ECDH() macro, which supplies the ssl context, file - * and line number parameters. - * - * \param ssl SSL context - * \param level error level of the debug message - * \param file file the error has occurred in - * \param line line number the error has occurred in - * \param ecdh the ECDH context - * \param attr the identifier of the attribute being output - * - * \attention This function is intended for INTERNAL usage within the - * library only. - */ -void mbedtls_debug_printf_ecdh(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int level, - const char *file, int line, - const mbedtls_ecdh_context *ecdh, - mbedtls_debug_ecdh_attr attr); -#endif - #ifdef __cplusplus } #endif -#endif /* debug.h */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEBUG_H */ diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/des.h b/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/des.h index 031b9cf27182..2b097a13dd24 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/des.h +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/des.h @@ -14,12 +14,9 @@ */ #ifndef MBEDTLS_DES_H #define MBEDTLS_DES_H +#include "mbedtls/private_access.h" -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "mbedtls/build_info.h" #include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" #include @@ -31,10 +28,6 @@ /** The data input has an invalid length. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_DES_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH -0x0032 -/* MBEDTLS_ERR_DES_HW_ACCEL_FAILED is deprecated and should not be used. */ -/** DES hardware accelerator failed. */ -#define MBEDTLS_ERR_DES_HW_ACCEL_FAILED -0x0033 - #define MBEDTLS_DES_KEY_SIZE 8 #ifdef __cplusplus @@ -53,7 +46,7 @@ extern "C" { * instead. */ typedef struct mbedtls_des_context { - uint32_t sk[32]; /*!< DES subkeys */ + uint32_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(sk)[32]; /*!< DES subkeys */ } mbedtls_des_context; @@ -65,7 +58,7 @@ mbedtls_des_context; * instead. */ typedef struct mbedtls_des3_context { - uint32_t sk[96]; /*!< 3DES subkeys */ + uint32_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(sk)[96]; /*!< 3DES subkeys */ } mbedtls_des3_context; diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/dhm.h b/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/dhm.h index b61e4d4ef951..fcba3d2af0cf 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/dhm.h +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/dhm.h @@ -50,12 +50,9 @@ #ifndef MBEDTLS_DHM_H #define MBEDTLS_DHM_H +#include "mbedtls/private_access.h" -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "mbedtls/build_info.h" #include "mbedtls/bignum.h" /* @@ -79,14 +76,19 @@ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_ALLOC_FAILED -0x3400 /** Read or write of file failed. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_FILE_IO_ERROR -0x3480 - -/* MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_HW_ACCEL_FAILED is deprecated and should not be used. */ -/** DHM hardware accelerator failed. */ -#define MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_HW_ACCEL_FAILED -0x3500 - /** Setting the modulus and generator failed. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_SET_GROUP_FAILED -0x3580 +/** Which parameter to access in mbedtls_dhm_get_value(). */ +typedef enum { + MBEDTLS_DHM_PARAM_P, /*!< The prime modulus. */ + MBEDTLS_DHM_PARAM_G, /*!< The generator. */ + MBEDTLS_DHM_PARAM_X, /*!< Our secret value. */ + MBEDTLS_DHM_PARAM_GX, /*!< Our public key = \c G^X mod \c P. */ + MBEDTLS_DHM_PARAM_GY, /*!< The public key of the peer = \c G^Y mod \c P. */ + MBEDTLS_DHM_PARAM_K, /*!< The shared secret = \c G^(XY) mod \c P. */ +} mbedtls_dhm_parameter; + #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { #endif @@ -97,17 +99,16 @@ extern "C" { * \brief The DHM context structure. */ typedef struct mbedtls_dhm_context { - size_t len; /*!< The size of \p P in Bytes. */ - mbedtls_mpi P; /*!< The prime modulus. */ - mbedtls_mpi G; /*!< The generator. */ - mbedtls_mpi X; /*!< Our secret value. */ - mbedtls_mpi GX; /*!< Our public key = \c G^X mod \c P. */ - mbedtls_mpi GY; /*!< The public key of the peer = \c G^Y mod \c P. */ - mbedtls_mpi K; /*!< The shared secret = \c G^(XY) mod \c P. */ - mbedtls_mpi RP; /*!< The cached value = \c R^2 mod \c P. */ - mbedtls_mpi Vi; /*!< The blinding value. */ - mbedtls_mpi Vf; /*!< The unblinding value. */ - mbedtls_mpi pX; /*!< The previous \c X. */ + mbedtls_mpi MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(P); /*!< The prime modulus. */ + mbedtls_mpi MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(G); /*!< The generator. */ + mbedtls_mpi MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(X); /*!< Our secret value. */ + mbedtls_mpi MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(GX); /*!< Our public key = \c G^X mod \c P. */ + mbedtls_mpi MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(GY); /*!< The public key of the peer = \c G^Y mod \c P. */ + mbedtls_mpi MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(K); /*!< The shared secret = \c G^(XY) mod \c P. */ + mbedtls_mpi MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(RP); /*!< The cached value = \c R^2 mod \c P. */ + mbedtls_mpi MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(Vi); /*!< The blinding value. */ + mbedtls_mpi MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(Vf); /*!< The unblinding value. */ + mbedtls_mpi MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(pX); /*!< The previous \c X. */ } mbedtls_dhm_context; @@ -270,10 +271,10 @@ int mbedtls_dhm_make_public(mbedtls_dhm_context *ctx, int x_size, * \param output_size The size of the destination buffer. This must be at * least the size of \c ctx->len (the size of \c P). * \param olen On exit, holds the actual number of Bytes written. - * \param f_rng The RNG function, for blinding purposes. This may - * b \c NULL if blinding isn't needed. - * \param p_rng The RNG context. This may be \c NULL if \p f_rng - * doesn't need a context argument. + * \param f_rng The RNG function. Must not be \c NULL. Used for + * blinding. + * \param p_rng The RNG context to be passed to \p f_rng. This may be + * \c NULL if \p f_rng doesn't need a context parameter. * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_XXX error code on failure. @@ -283,6 +284,42 @@ int mbedtls_dhm_calc_secret(mbedtls_dhm_context *ctx, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng); +/** + * \brief This function returns the size of the prime modulus in bits. + * + * \param ctx The DHM context to query. + * + * \return The size of the prime modulus in bits, + * i.e. the number n such that 2^(n-1) <= P < 2^n. + */ +size_t mbedtls_dhm_get_bitlen(const mbedtls_dhm_context *ctx); + +/** + * \brief This function returns the size of the prime modulus in bytes. + * + * \param ctx The DHM context to query. + * + * \return The size of the prime modulus in bytes, + * i.e. the number n such that 2^(8*(n-1)) <= P < 2^(8*n). + */ +size_t mbedtls_dhm_get_len(const mbedtls_dhm_context *ctx); + +/** + * \brief This function copies a parameter of a DHM key. + * + * \param ctx The DHM context to query. + * \param param The parameter to copy. + * \param dest The MPI object to copy the value into. It must be + * initialized. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_BAD_INPUT_DATA if \p param is invalid. + * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_XXX error code if the copy fails. + */ +int mbedtls_dhm_get_value(const mbedtls_dhm_context *ctx, + mbedtls_dhm_parameter param, + mbedtls_mpi *dest); + /** * \brief This function frees and clears the components * of a DHM context. @@ -384,161 +421,6 @@ int mbedtls_dhm_self_test(int verbose); * */ -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) - -/** - * \warning The origin of the primes in RFC 5114 is not documented and - * their use therefore constitutes a security risk! - * - * \deprecated The hex-encoded primes from RFC 5114 are deprecated and are - * likely to be removed in a future version of the library without - * replacement. - */ - -/** - * The hexadecimal presentation of the prime underlying the - * 2048-bit MODP Group with 224-bit Prime Order Subgroup, as defined - * in RFC-5114: Additional Diffie-Hellman Groups for Use with - * IETF Standards. - */ -#define MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC5114_MODP_2048_P \ - MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_STRING_CONSTANT( \ - "AD107E1E9123A9D0D660FAA79559C51FA20D64E5683B9FD1" \ - "B54B1597B61D0A75E6FA141DF95A56DBAF9A3C407BA1DF15" \ - "EB3D688A309C180E1DE6B85A1274A0A66D3F8152AD6AC212" \ - "9037C9EDEFDA4DF8D91E8FEF55B7394B7AD5B7D0B6C12207" \ - "C9F98D11ED34DBF6C6BA0B2C8BBC27BE6A00E0A0B9C49708" \ - "B3BF8A317091883681286130BC8985DB1602E714415D9330" \ - "278273C7DE31EFDC7310F7121FD5A07415987D9ADC0A486D" \ - "CDF93ACC44328387315D75E198C641A480CD86A1B9E587E8" \ - "BE60E69CC928B2B9C52172E413042E9B23F10B0E16E79763" \ - "C9B53DCF4BA80A29E3FB73C16B8E75B97EF363E2FFA31F71" \ - "CF9DE5384E71B81C0AC4DFFE0C10E64F") - -/** - * The hexadecimal presentation of the chosen generator of the 2048-bit MODP - * Group with 224-bit Prime Order Subgroup, as defined in RFC-5114: - * Additional Diffie-Hellman Groups for Use with IETF Standards. - */ -#define MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC5114_MODP_2048_G \ - MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_STRING_CONSTANT( \ - "AC4032EF4F2D9AE39DF30B5C8FFDAC506CDEBE7B89998CAF" \ - "74866A08CFE4FFE3A6824A4E10B9A6F0DD921F01A70C4AFA" \ - "AB739D7700C29F52C57DB17C620A8652BE5E9001A8D66AD7" \ - "C17669101999024AF4D027275AC1348BB8A762D0521BC98A" \ - "E247150422EA1ED409939D54DA7460CDB5F6C6B250717CBE" \ - "F180EB34118E98D119529A45D6F834566E3025E316A330EF" \ - "BB77A86F0C1AB15B051AE3D428C8F8ACB70A8137150B8EEB" \ - "10E183EDD19963DDD9E263E4770589EF6AA21E7F5F2FF381" \ - "B539CCE3409D13CD566AFBB48D6C019181E1BCFE94B30269" \ - "EDFE72FE9B6AA4BD7B5A0F1C71CFFF4C19C418E1F6EC0179" \ - "81BC087F2A7065B384B890D3191F2BFA") - -/** - * The hexadecimal presentation of the prime underlying the 2048-bit MODP - * Group, as defined in RFC-3526: More Modular Exponential (MODP) - * Diffie-Hellman groups for Internet Key Exchange (IKE). - * - * \deprecated The hex-encoded primes from RFC 3625 are deprecated and - * superseded by the corresponding macros providing them as - * binary constants. Their hex-encoded constants are likely - * to be removed in a future version of the library. - * - */ -#define MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC3526_MODP_2048_P \ - MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_STRING_CONSTANT( \ - "FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFC90FDAA22168C234C4C6628B80DC1CD1" \ - "29024E088A67CC74020BBEA63B139B22514A08798E3404DD" \ - "EF9519B3CD3A431B302B0A6DF25F14374FE1356D6D51C245" \ - "E485B576625E7EC6F44C42E9A637ED6B0BFF5CB6F406B7ED" \ - "EE386BFB5A899FA5AE9F24117C4B1FE649286651ECE45B3D" \ - "C2007CB8A163BF0598DA48361C55D39A69163FA8FD24CF5F" \ - "83655D23DCA3AD961C62F356208552BB9ED529077096966D" \ - "670C354E4ABC9804F1746C08CA18217C32905E462E36CE3B" \ - "E39E772C180E86039B2783A2EC07A28FB5C55DF06F4C52C9" \ - "DE2BCBF6955817183995497CEA956AE515D2261898FA0510" \ - "15728E5A8AACAA68FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF") - -/** - * The hexadecimal presentation of the chosen generator of the 2048-bit MODP - * Group, as defined in RFC-3526: More Modular Exponential (MODP) - * Diffie-Hellman groups for Internet Key Exchange (IKE). - */ -#define MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC3526_MODP_2048_G \ - MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_STRING_CONSTANT("02") - -/** - * The hexadecimal presentation of the prime underlying the 3072-bit MODP - * Group, as defined in RFC-3072: More Modular Exponential (MODP) - * Diffie-Hellman groups for Internet Key Exchange (IKE). - */ -#define MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC3526_MODP_3072_P \ - MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_STRING_CONSTANT( \ - "FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFC90FDAA22168C234C4C6628B80DC1CD1" \ - "29024E088A67CC74020BBEA63B139B22514A08798E3404DD" \ - "EF9519B3CD3A431B302B0A6DF25F14374FE1356D6D51C245" \ - "E485B576625E7EC6F44C42E9A637ED6B0BFF5CB6F406B7ED" \ - "EE386BFB5A899FA5AE9F24117C4B1FE649286651ECE45B3D" \ - "C2007CB8A163BF0598DA48361C55D39A69163FA8FD24CF5F" \ - "83655D23DCA3AD961C62F356208552BB9ED529077096966D" \ - "670C354E4ABC9804F1746C08CA18217C32905E462E36CE3B" \ - "E39E772C180E86039B2783A2EC07A28FB5C55DF06F4C52C9" \ - "DE2BCBF6955817183995497CEA956AE515D2261898FA0510" \ - "15728E5A8AAAC42DAD33170D04507A33A85521ABDF1CBA64" \ - "ECFB850458DBEF0A8AEA71575D060C7DB3970F85A6E1E4C7" \ - "ABF5AE8CDB0933D71E8C94E04A25619DCEE3D2261AD2EE6B" \ - "F12FFA06D98A0864D87602733EC86A64521F2B18177B200C" \ - "BBE117577A615D6C770988C0BAD946E208E24FA074E5AB31" \ - "43DB5BFCE0FD108E4B82D120A93AD2CAFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF") - -/** - * The hexadecimal presentation of the chosen generator of the 3072-bit MODP - * Group, as defined in RFC-3526: More Modular Exponential (MODP) - * Diffie-Hellman groups for Internet Key Exchange (IKE). - */ -#define MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC3526_MODP_3072_G \ - MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_STRING_CONSTANT("02") - -/** - * The hexadecimal presentation of the prime underlying the 4096-bit MODP - * Group, as defined in RFC-3526: More Modular Exponential (MODP) - * Diffie-Hellman groups for Internet Key Exchange (IKE). - */ -#define MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC3526_MODP_4096_P \ - MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_STRING_CONSTANT( \ - "FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFC90FDAA22168C234C4C6628B80DC1CD1" \ - "29024E088A67CC74020BBEA63B139B22514A08798E3404DD" \ - "EF9519B3CD3A431B302B0A6DF25F14374FE1356D6D51C245" \ - "E485B576625E7EC6F44C42E9A637ED6B0BFF5CB6F406B7ED" \ - "EE386BFB5A899FA5AE9F24117C4B1FE649286651ECE45B3D" \ - "C2007CB8A163BF0598DA48361C55D39A69163FA8FD24CF5F" \ - "83655D23DCA3AD961C62F356208552BB9ED529077096966D" \ - "670C354E4ABC9804F1746C08CA18217C32905E462E36CE3B" \ - "E39E772C180E86039B2783A2EC07A28FB5C55DF06F4C52C9" \ - "DE2BCBF6955817183995497CEA956AE515D2261898FA0510" \ - "15728E5A8AAAC42DAD33170D04507A33A85521ABDF1CBA64" \ - "ECFB850458DBEF0A8AEA71575D060C7DB3970F85A6E1E4C7" \ - "ABF5AE8CDB0933D71E8C94E04A25619DCEE3D2261AD2EE6B" \ - "F12FFA06D98A0864D87602733EC86A64521F2B18177B200C" \ - "BBE117577A615D6C770988C0BAD946E208E24FA074E5AB31" \ - "43DB5BFCE0FD108E4B82D120A92108011A723C12A787E6D7" \ - "88719A10BDBA5B2699C327186AF4E23C1A946834B6150BDA" \ - "2583E9CA2AD44CE8DBBBC2DB04DE8EF92E8EFC141FBECAA6" \ - "287C59474E6BC05D99B2964FA090C3A2233BA186515BE7ED" \ - "1F612970CEE2D7AFB81BDD762170481CD0069127D5B05AA9" \ - "93B4EA988D8FDDC186FFB7DC90A6C08F4DF435C934063199" \ - "FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF") - -/** - * The hexadecimal presentation of the chosen generator of the 4096-bit MODP - * Group, as defined in RFC-3526: More Modular Exponential (MODP) - * Diffie-Hellman groups for Internet Key Exchange (IKE). - */ -#define MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC3526_MODP_4096_G \ - MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_STRING_CONSTANT("02") - -#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ - /* * Trustworthy DHM parameters in binary form */ diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/ecdh.h b/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/ecdh.h index 6cc6cb92a77c..a0909d6b4480 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/ecdh.h +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/ecdh.h @@ -19,15 +19,31 @@ #ifndef MBEDTLS_ECDH_H #define MBEDTLS_ECDH_H +#include "mbedtls/private_access.h" -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "mbedtls/build_info.h" #include "mbedtls/ecp.h" +/* + * Mbed TLS supports two formats for ECDH contexts (#mbedtls_ecdh_context + * defined in `ecdh.h`). For most applications, the choice of format makes + * no difference, since all library functions can work with either format, + * except that the new format is incompatible with MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE. + + * The new format used when this option is disabled is smaller + * (56 bytes on a 32-bit platform). In future versions of the library, it + * will support alternative implementations of ECDH operations. + * The new format is incompatible with applications that access + * context fields directly and with restartable ECP operations. + */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) +#define MBEDTLS_ECDH_LEGACY_CONTEXT +#else +#undef MBEDTLS_ECDH_LEGACY_CONTEXT +#endif + #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_EVEREST_ENABLED) #undef MBEDTLS_ECDH_LEGACY_CONTEXT #include "everest/everest.h" @@ -68,13 +84,13 @@ typedef enum { * mbedtls_ecdh_context_mbed. */ typedef struct mbedtls_ecdh_context_mbed { - mbedtls_ecp_group grp; /*!< The elliptic curve used. */ - mbedtls_mpi d; /*!< The private key. */ - mbedtls_ecp_point Q; /*!< The public key. */ - mbedtls_ecp_point Qp; /*!< The value of the public key of the peer. */ - mbedtls_mpi z; /*!< The shared secret. */ + mbedtls_ecp_group MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(grp); /*!< The elliptic curve used. */ + mbedtls_mpi MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(d); /*!< The private key. */ + mbedtls_ecp_point MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(Q); /*!< The public key. */ + mbedtls_ecp_point MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(Qp); /*!< The value of the public key of the peer. */ + mbedtls_mpi MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(z); /*!< The shared secret. */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) - mbedtls_ecp_restart_ctx rs; /*!< The restart context for EC computations. */ + mbedtls_ecp_restart_ctx MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(rs); /*!< The restart context for EC computations. */ #endif } mbedtls_ecdh_context_mbed; #endif @@ -88,43 +104,56 @@ typedef struct mbedtls_ecdh_context_mbed { */ typedef struct mbedtls_ecdh_context { #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_LEGACY_CONTEXT) - mbedtls_ecp_group grp; /*!< The elliptic curve used. */ - mbedtls_mpi d; /*!< The private key. */ - mbedtls_ecp_point Q; /*!< The public key. */ - mbedtls_ecp_point Qp; /*!< The value of the public key of the peer. */ - mbedtls_mpi z; /*!< The shared secret. */ - int point_format; /*!< The format of point export in TLS messages. */ - mbedtls_ecp_point Vi; /*!< The blinding value. */ - mbedtls_ecp_point Vf; /*!< The unblinding value. */ - mbedtls_mpi _d; /*!< The previous \p d. */ + mbedtls_ecp_group MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(grp); /*!< The elliptic curve used. */ + mbedtls_mpi MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(d); /*!< The private key. */ + mbedtls_ecp_point MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(Q); /*!< The public key. */ + mbedtls_ecp_point MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(Qp); /*!< The value of the public key of the peer. */ + mbedtls_mpi MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(z); /*!< The shared secret. */ + int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(point_format); /*!< The format of point export in TLS messages. */ + mbedtls_ecp_point MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(Vi); /*!< The blinding value. */ + mbedtls_ecp_point MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(Vf); /*!< The unblinding value. */ + mbedtls_mpi MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(_d); /*!< The previous \p d. */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) - int restart_enabled; /*!< The flag for restartable mode. */ - mbedtls_ecp_restart_ctx rs; /*!< The restart context for EC computations. */ + int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(restart_enabled); /*!< The flag for restartable mode. */ + mbedtls_ecp_restart_ctx MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(rs); /*!< The restart context for EC computations. */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */ #else - uint8_t point_format; /*!< The format of point export in TLS messages - as defined in RFC 4492. */ - mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id;/*!< The elliptic curve used. */ - mbedtls_ecdh_variant var; /*!< The ECDH implementation/structure used. */ + uint8_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(point_format); /*!< The format of point export in TLS messages + as defined in RFC 4492. */ + mbedtls_ecp_group_id MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(grp_id);/*!< The elliptic curve used. */ + mbedtls_ecdh_variant MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(var); /*!< The ECDH implementation/structure used. */ union { - mbedtls_ecdh_context_mbed mbed_ecdh; + mbedtls_ecdh_context_mbed MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(mbed_ecdh); #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_EVEREST_ENABLED) - mbedtls_ecdh_context_everest everest_ecdh; + mbedtls_ecdh_context_everest MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(everest_ecdh); #endif - } ctx; /*!< Implementation-specific context. The - context in use is specified by the \c var - field. */ + } MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(ctx); /*!< Implementation-specific context. The + context in use is specified by the \c var + field. */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) - uint8_t restart_enabled; /*!< The flag for restartable mode. Functions of - an alternative implementation not supporting - restartable mode must return - MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED error - if this flag is set. */ + uint8_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(restart_enabled); /*!< The flag for restartable mode. Functions of + an alternative implementation not supporting + restartable mode must return + MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED error + if this flag is set. */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDH_LEGACY_CONTEXT */ } mbedtls_ecdh_context; +/** + * \brief Return the ECP group for provided context. + * + * \note To access group specific fields, users should use + * `mbedtls_ecp_curve_info_from_grp_id` or + * `mbedtls_ecp_group_load` on the extracted `group_id`. + * + * \param ctx The ECDH context to parse. This must not be \c NULL. + * + * \return The \c mbedtls_ecp_group_id of the context. + */ +mbedtls_ecp_group_id mbedtls_ecdh_get_grp_id(mbedtls_ecdh_context *ctx); + /** * \brief Check whether a given group can be used for ECDH. * @@ -185,10 +214,7 @@ int mbedtls_ecdh_gen_public(mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_mpi *d, mbedtls_ecp_ * This must be initialized. * \param d Our secret exponent (private key). * This must be initialized. - * \param f_rng The RNG function. This may be \c NULL if randomization - * of intermediate results during the ECP computations is - * not needed (discouraged). See the documentation of - * mbedtls_ecp_mul() for more. + * \param f_rng The RNG function to use. This must not be \c NULL. * \param p_rng The RNG context to be passed to \p f_rng. This may be * \c NULL if \p f_rng is \c NULL or doesn't need a * context argument. @@ -391,8 +417,7 @@ int mbedtls_ecdh_read_public(mbedtls_ecdh_context *ctx, * \param buf The buffer to write the generated shared key to. This * must be a writable buffer of size \p blen Bytes. * \param blen The length of the destination buffer \p buf in Bytes. - * \param f_rng The RNG function, for blinding purposes. This may - * b \c NULL if blinding isn't needed. + * \param f_rng The RNG function to use. This must not be \c NULL. * \param p_rng The RNG context. This may be \c NULL if \p f_rng * doesn't need a context argument. * diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/ecdsa.h b/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/ecdsa.h index 34a6b13d2e53..2ecf349115ed 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/ecdsa.h +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/ecdsa.h @@ -17,12 +17,9 @@ #ifndef MBEDTLS_ECDSA_H #define MBEDTLS_ECDSA_H +#include "mbedtls/private_access.h" -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "mbedtls/build_info.h" #include "mbedtls/ecp.h" #include "mbedtls/md.h" @@ -62,6 +59,11 @@ extern "C" { * \warning Performing multiple operations concurrently on the same * ECDSA context is not supported; objects of this type * should not be shared between multiple threads. + * + * \note pk_wrap module assumes that "ecdsa_context" is identical + * to "ecp_keypair" (see for example structure + * "mbedtls_eckey_info" where ECDSA sign/verify functions + * are used also for EC key) */ typedef mbedtls_ecp_keypair mbedtls_ecdsa_context; @@ -94,12 +96,12 @@ typedef struct mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_det mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_det_ctx; * \brief General context for resuming ECDSA operations */ typedef struct { - mbedtls_ecp_restart_ctx ecp; /*!< base context for ECP restart and - shared administrative info */ - mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_ver_ctx *ver; /*!< ecdsa_verify() sub-context */ - mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_sig_ctx *sig; /*!< ecdsa_sign() sub-context */ + mbedtls_ecp_restart_ctx MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(ecp); /*!< base context for ECP restart and + shared administrative info */ + mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_ver_ctx *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(ver); /*!< ecdsa_verify() sub-context */ + mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_sig_ctx *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(sig); /*!< ecdsa_sign() sub-context */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC) - mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_det_ctx *det; /*!< ecdsa_sign_det() sub-context */ + mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_det_ctx *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(det); /*!< ecdsa_sign_det() sub-context */ #endif } mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_ctx; @@ -125,7 +127,7 @@ int mbedtls_ecdsa_can_do(mbedtls_ecp_group_id gid); * previously-hashed message. * * \note The deterministic version implemented in - * mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det() is usually preferred. + * mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det_ext() is usually preferred. * * \note If the bitlength of the message hash is larger than the * bitlength of the group order, then the hash is truncated @@ -161,67 +163,6 @@ int mbedtls_ecdsa_sign(mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_mpi *r, mbedtls_mpi *s, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng); #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC) -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING) -#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED __attribute__((deprecated)) -#else -#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED -#endif -/** - * \brief This function computes the ECDSA signature of a - * previously-hashed message, deterministic version. - * - * For more information, see RFC-6979: Deterministic - * Usage of the Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA) and Elliptic - * Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA). - * - * \note If the bitlength of the message hash is larger than the - * bitlength of the group order, then the hash is truncated as - * defined in Standards for Efficient Cryptography Group - * (SECG): SEC1 Elliptic Curve Cryptography, section - * 4.1.3, step 5. - * - * \warning Since the output of the internal RNG is always the same for - * the same key and message, this limits the efficiency of - * blinding and leaks information through side channels. For - * secure behavior use mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det_ext() instead. - * - * (Optimally the blinding is a random value that is different - * on every execution. In this case the blinding is still - * random from the attackers perspective, but is the same on - * each execution. This means that this blinding does not - * prevent attackers from recovering secrets by combining - * several measurement traces, but may prevent some attacks - * that exploit relationships between secret data.) - * - * \see ecp.h - * - * \param grp The context for the elliptic curve to use. - * This must be initialized and have group parameters - * set, for example through mbedtls_ecp_group_load(). - * \param r The MPI context in which to store the first part - * the signature. This must be initialized. - * \param s The MPI context in which to store the second part - * the signature. This must be initialized. - * \param d The private signing key. This must be initialized - * and setup, for example through mbedtls_ecp_gen_privkey(). - * \param buf The hashed content to be signed. This must be a readable - * buffer of length \p blen Bytes. It may be \c NULL if - * \p blen is zero. - * \param blen The length of \p buf in Bytes. - * \param md_alg The hash algorithm used to hash the original data. - * - * \return \c 0 on success. - * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_XXX or \c MBEDTLS_MPI_XXX - * error code on failure. - */ -int mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det(mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_mpi *r, - mbedtls_mpi *s, const mbedtls_mpi *d, - const unsigned char *buf, size_t blen, - mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg) MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED; -#undef MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED -#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ - /** * \brief This function computes the ECDSA signature of a * previously-hashed message, deterministic version. @@ -255,8 +196,8 @@ int mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det(mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_mpi *r, * \param f_rng_blind The RNG function used for blinding. This must not be * \c NULL. * \param p_rng_blind The RNG context to be passed to \p f_rng_blind. This - * may be \c NULL if \p f_rng_blind doesn't need - * a context parameter. + * may be \c NULL if \p f_rng_blind doesn't need a context + * parameter. * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_XXX or \c MBEDTLS_MPI_XXX @@ -270,6 +211,135 @@ int mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det_ext(mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_mpi *r, void *p_rng_blind); #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC */ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_SIGN_ALT) +/** + * \brief This function computes the ECDSA signature of a + * previously-hashed message, in a restartable way. + * + * \note The deterministic version implemented in + * mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det_restartable() is usually + * preferred. + * + * \note This function is like \c mbedtls_ecdsa_sign() but + * it can return early and restart according to the + * limit set with \c mbedtls_ecp_set_max_ops() to + * reduce blocking. + * + * \note If the bitlength of the message hash is larger + * than the bitlength of the group order, then the + * hash is truncated as defined in Standards for + * Efficient Cryptography Group (SECG): SEC1 Elliptic + * Curve Cryptography, section 4.1.3, step 5. + * + * \see ecp.h + * + * \param grp The context for the elliptic curve to use. + * This must be initialized and have group parameters + * set, for example through mbedtls_ecp_group_load(). + * \param r The MPI context in which to store the first part + * the signature. This must be initialized. + * \param s The MPI context in which to store the second part + * the signature. This must be initialized. + * \param d The private signing key. This must be initialized + * and setup, for example through + * mbedtls_ecp_gen_privkey(). + * \param buf The hashed content to be signed. This must be a readable + * buffer of length \p blen Bytes. It may be \c NULL if + * \p blen is zero. + * \param blen The length of \p buf in Bytes. + * \param f_rng The RNG function. This must not be \c NULL. + * \param p_rng The RNG context to be passed to \p f_rng. This may be + * \c NULL if \p f_rng doesn't need a context parameter. + * \param f_rng_blind The RNG function used for blinding. This must not be + * \c NULL. + * \param p_rng_blind The RNG context to be passed to \p f_rng. This may be + * \c NULL if \p f_rng doesn't need a context parameter. + * \param rs_ctx The restart context to use. This may be \c NULL + * to disable restarting. If it is not \c NULL, it + * must point to an initialized restart context. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS if maximum number of + * operations was reached: see \c + * mbedtls_ecp_set_max_ops(). + * \return Another \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_XXX, \c + * MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_XXX or \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_XXX + * error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_restartable( + mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + mbedtls_mpi *r, mbedtls_mpi *s, + const mbedtls_mpi *d, + const unsigned char *buf, size_t blen, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng, + int (*f_rng_blind)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng_blind, + mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_ctx *rs_ctx); + +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_ECDSA_SIGN_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC) + +/** + * \brief This function computes the ECDSA signature of a + * previously-hashed message, in a restartable way. + * + * \note This function is like \c + * mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det_ext() but it can return + * early and restart according to the limit set with + * \c mbedtls_ecp_set_max_ops() to reduce blocking. + * + * \note If the bitlength of the message hash is larger + * than the bitlength of the group order, then the + * hash is truncated as defined in Standards for + * Efficient Cryptography Group (SECG): SEC1 Elliptic + * Curve Cryptography, section 4.1.3, step 5. + * + * \see ecp.h + * + * \param grp The context for the elliptic curve to use. + * This must be initialized and have group parameters + * set, for example through mbedtls_ecp_group_load(). + * \param r The MPI context in which to store the first part + * the signature. This must be initialized. + * \param s The MPI context in which to store the second part + * the signature. This must be initialized. + * \param d The private signing key. This must be initialized + * and setup, for example through + * mbedtls_ecp_gen_privkey(). + * \param buf The hashed content to be signed. This must be a readable + * buffer of length \p blen Bytes. It may be \c NULL if + * \p blen is zero. + * \param blen The length of \p buf in Bytes. + * \param md_alg The hash algorithm used to hash the original data. + * \param f_rng_blind The RNG function used for blinding. This must not be + * \c NULL. + * \param p_rng_blind The RNG context to be passed to \p f_rng_blind. This may be + * \c NULL if \p f_rng_blind doesn't need a context parameter. + * \param rs_ctx The restart context to use. This may be \c NULL + * to disable restarting. If it is not \c NULL, it + * must point to an initialized restart context. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS if maximum number of + * operations was reached: see \c + * mbedtls_ecp_set_max_ops(). + * \return Another \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_XXX, \c + * MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_XXX or \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_XXX + * error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det_restartable( + mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + mbedtls_mpi *r, mbedtls_mpi *s, + const mbedtls_mpi *d, const unsigned char *buf, size_t blen, + mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + int (*f_rng_blind)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng_blind, + mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_ctx *rs_ctx); + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC */ + /** * \brief This function verifies the ECDSA signature of a * previously-hashed message. @@ -305,6 +375,51 @@ int mbedtls_ecdsa_verify(mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, const mbedtls_ecp_point *Q, const mbedtls_mpi *r, const mbedtls_mpi *s); +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_VERIFY_ALT) +/** + * \brief This function verifies the ECDSA signature of a + * previously-hashed message, in a restartable manner + * + * \note If the bitlength of the message hash is larger than the + * bitlength of the group order, then the hash is truncated as + * defined in Standards for Efficient Cryptography Group + * (SECG): SEC1 Elliptic Curve Cryptography, section + * 4.1.4, step 3. + * + * \see ecp.h + * + * \param grp The ECP group to use. + * This must be initialized and have group parameters + * set, for example through mbedtls_ecp_group_load(). + * \param buf The hashed content that was signed. This must be a readable + * buffer of length \p blen Bytes. It may be \c NULL if + * \p blen is zero. + * \param blen The length of \p buf in Bytes. + * \param Q The public key to use for verification. This must be + * initialized and setup. + * \param r The first integer of the signature. + * This must be initialized. + * \param s The second integer of the signature. + * This must be initialized. + * \param rs_ctx The restart context to use. This may be \c NULL to disable + * restarting. If it is not \c NULL, it must point to an + * initialized restart context. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS if maximum number of + * operations was reached: see \c mbedtls_ecp_set_max_ops(). + * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_XXX or \c MBEDTLS_MPI_XXX + * error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_ecdsa_verify_restartable(mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + const unsigned char *buf, size_t blen, + const mbedtls_ecp_point *Q, + const mbedtls_mpi *r, + const mbedtls_mpi *s, + mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_ctx *rs_ctx); + +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_ECDSA_VERIFY_ALT */ + /** * \brief This function computes the ECDSA signature and writes it * to a buffer, serialized as defined in RFC-4492: @@ -340,6 +455,7 @@ int mbedtls_ecdsa_verify(mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, * size of the curve used, plus 9. For example, 73 Bytes if * a 256-bit curve is used. A buffer length of * #MBEDTLS_ECDSA_MAX_LEN is always safe. + * \param sig_size The size of the \p sig buffer in bytes. * \param slen The address at which to store the actual length of * the signature written. Must not be \c NULL. * \param f_rng The RNG function. This must not be \c NULL if @@ -356,7 +472,7 @@ int mbedtls_ecdsa_verify(mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, int mbedtls_ecdsa_write_signature(mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, const unsigned char *hash, size_t hlen, - unsigned char *sig, size_t *slen, + unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_size, size_t *slen, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng); @@ -382,6 +498,7 @@ int mbedtls_ecdsa_write_signature(mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ctx, * size of the curve used, plus 9. For example, 73 Bytes if * a 256-bit curve is used. A buffer length of * #MBEDTLS_ECDSA_MAX_LEN is always safe. + * \param sig_size The size of the \p sig buffer in bytes. * \param slen The address at which to store the actual length of * the signature written. Must not be \c NULL. * \param f_rng The RNG function. This must not be \c NULL if @@ -402,69 +519,11 @@ int mbedtls_ecdsa_write_signature(mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ctx, int mbedtls_ecdsa_write_signature_restartable(mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, const unsigned char *hash, size_t hlen, - unsigned char *sig, size_t *slen, + unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_size, size_t *slen, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng, mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_ctx *rs_ctx); -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC) -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING) -#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED __attribute__((deprecated)) -#else -#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED -#endif -/** - * \brief This function computes an ECDSA signature and writes - * it to a buffer, serialized as defined in RFC-4492: - * Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) Cipher Suites for - * Transport Layer Security (TLS). - * - * The deterministic version is defined in RFC-6979: - * Deterministic Usage of the Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA) - * and Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA). - * - * \warning It is not thread-safe to use the same context in - * multiple threads. - * - * \note If the bitlength of the message hash is larger than the - * bitlength of the group order, then the hash is truncated as - * defined in Standards for Efficient Cryptography Group - * (SECG): SEC1 Elliptic Curve Cryptography, section - * 4.1.3, step 5. - * - * \see ecp.h - * - * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_ecdsa_write_signature() in - * Mbed TLS version 2.0 and later. - * - * \param ctx The ECDSA context to use. This must be initialized - * and have a group and private key bound to it, for example - * via mbedtls_ecdsa_genkey() or mbedtls_ecdsa_from_keypair(). - * \param hash The message hash to be signed. This must be a readable - * buffer of length \p hlen Bytes. - * \param hlen The length of the hash \p hash in Bytes. - * \param sig The buffer to which to write the signature. This must be a - * writable buffer of length at least twice as large as the - * size of the curve used, plus 9. For example, 73 Bytes if - * a 256-bit curve is used. A buffer length of - * #MBEDTLS_ECDSA_MAX_LEN is always safe. - * \param slen The address at which to store the actual length of - * the signature written. Must not be \c NULL. - * \param md_alg The message digest that was used to hash the message. - * - * \return \c 0 on success. - * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_XXX, \c MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_XXX or - * \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_XXX error code on failure. - */ -int mbedtls_ecdsa_write_signature_det(mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ctx, - const unsigned char *hash, size_t hlen, - unsigned char *sig, size_t *slen, - mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg) MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED; -#undef MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED -#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC */ - /** * \brief This function reads and verifies an ECDSA signature. * diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/ecjpake.h b/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/ecjpake.h index 1a9844249c70..c2148a2bd191 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/ecjpake.h +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/ecjpake.h @@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ */ #ifndef MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_H #define MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_H +#include "mbedtls/private_access.h" /* * J-PAKE is a password-authenticated key exchange that allows deriving a @@ -26,11 +27,7 @@ * The payloads are serialized in a way suitable for use in TLS, but could * also be use outside TLS. */ -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "mbedtls/build_info.h" #include "mbedtls/ecp.h" #include "mbedtls/md.h" @@ -45,6 +42,7 @@ extern "C" { typedef enum { MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_CLIENT = 0, /**< Client */ MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_SERVER, /**< Server */ + MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_NONE, /**< Undefined */ } mbedtls_ecjpake_role; #if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_ALT) @@ -60,21 +58,21 @@ typedef enum { * description as a pair C: client name, S: server name */ typedef struct mbedtls_ecjpake_context { - const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info; /**< Hash to use */ - mbedtls_ecp_group grp; /**< Elliptic curve */ - mbedtls_ecjpake_role role; /**< Are we client or server? */ - int point_format; /**< Format for point export */ + mbedtls_md_type_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(md_type); /**< Hash to use */ + mbedtls_ecp_group MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(grp); /**< Elliptic curve */ + mbedtls_ecjpake_role MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(role); /**< Are we client or server? */ + int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(point_format); /**< Format for point export */ - mbedtls_ecp_point Xm1; /**< My public key 1 C: X1, S: X3 */ - mbedtls_ecp_point Xm2; /**< My public key 2 C: X2, S: X4 */ - mbedtls_ecp_point Xp1; /**< Peer public key 1 C: X3, S: X1 */ - mbedtls_ecp_point Xp2; /**< Peer public key 2 C: X4, S: X2 */ - mbedtls_ecp_point Xp; /**< Peer public key C: Xs, S: Xc */ + mbedtls_ecp_point MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(Xm1); /**< My public key 1 C: X1, S: X3 */ + mbedtls_ecp_point MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(Xm2); /**< My public key 2 C: X2, S: X4 */ + mbedtls_ecp_point MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(Xp1); /**< Peer public key 1 C: X3, S: X1 */ + mbedtls_ecp_point MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(Xp2); /**< Peer public key 2 C: X4, S: X2 */ + mbedtls_ecp_point MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(Xp); /**< Peer public key C: Xs, S: Xc */ - mbedtls_mpi xm1; /**< My private key 1 C: x1, S: x3 */ - mbedtls_mpi xm2; /**< My private key 2 C: x2, S: x4 */ + mbedtls_mpi MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(xm1); /**< My private key 1 C: x1, S: x3 */ + mbedtls_mpi MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(xm2); /**< My private key 2 C: x2, S: x4 */ - mbedtls_mpi s; /**< Pre-shared secret (passphrase) */ + mbedtls_mpi MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(s); /**< Pre-shared secret (passphrase) */ } mbedtls_ecjpake_context; #else /* MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_ALT */ @@ -103,7 +101,7 @@ void mbedtls_ecjpake_init(mbedtls_ecjpake_context *ctx); * \param curve The identifier of the elliptic curve to use, * for example #MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1. * \param secret The pre-shared secret (passphrase). This must be - * a readable buffer of length \p len Bytes. It need + * a readable not empty buffer of length \p len Bytes. It need * only be valid for the duration of this call. * \param len The length of the pre-shared secret \p secret. * @@ -117,6 +115,21 @@ int mbedtls_ecjpake_setup(mbedtls_ecjpake_context *ctx, const unsigned char *secret, size_t len); +/** + * \brief Set the point format for future reads and writes. + * + * \param ctx The ECJPAKE context to configure. + * \param point_format The point format to use: + * #MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_UNCOMPRESSED (default) + * or #MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_COMPRESSED. + * + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA if \p point_format + * is invalid. + */ +int mbedtls_ecjpake_set_point_format(mbedtls_ecjpake_context *ctx, + int point_format); + /** * \brief Check if an ECJPAKE context is ready for use. * @@ -233,6 +246,29 @@ int mbedtls_ecjpake_derive_secret(mbedtls_ecjpake_context *ctx, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng); +/** + * \brief Write the shared key material to be passed to a Key + * Derivation Function as described in RFC8236. + * + * \param ctx The ECJPAKE context to use. This must be initialized, + * set up and have performed both round one and two. + * \param buf The buffer to write the derived secret to. This must + * be a writable buffer of length \p len Bytes. + * \param len The length of \p buf in Bytes. + * \param olen The address at which to store the total number of bytes + * written to \p buf. This must not be \c NULL. + * \param f_rng The RNG function to use. This must not be \c NULL. + * \param p_rng The RNG parameter to be passed to \p f_rng. This + * may be \c NULL if \p f_rng doesn't use a context. + * + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return A negative error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_ecjpake_write_shared_key(mbedtls_ecjpake_context *ctx, + unsigned char *buf, size_t len, size_t *olen, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng); + /** * \brief This clears an ECJPAKE context and frees any * embedded data structure. diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/ecp.h b/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/ecp.h index 33ea14d7e255..d8f73ae965d8 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/ecp.h +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/ecp.h @@ -21,20 +21,13 @@ #ifndef MBEDTLS_ECP_H #define MBEDTLS_ECP_H +#include "mbedtls/private_access.h" -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "mbedtls/build_info.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" #include "mbedtls/bignum.h" -#if (defined(__ARMCC_VERSION) || defined(_MSC_VER)) && \ - !defined(inline) && !defined(__cplusplus) -#define inline __inline -#endif - /* * ECP error codes */ @@ -54,11 +47,6 @@ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY -0x4C80 /** The buffer contains a valid signature followed by more data. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_SIG_LEN_MISMATCH -0x4C00 - -/* MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_HW_ACCEL_FAILED is deprecated and should not be used. */ -/** The ECP hardware accelerator failed. */ -#define MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_HW_ACCEL_FAILED -0x4B80 - /** Operation in progress, call again with the same parameters to continue. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS -0x4B00 @@ -99,16 +87,17 @@ extern "C" { * - Add it at the end of this enum, otherwise you'll break the ABI by * changing the numerical value for existing curves. * - Increment MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_MAX below if needed. - * - Update the calculation of MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BITS_MIN below. + * - Update the calculation of MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BITS below. * - Add the corresponding MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_xxx_ENABLED macro definition to - * config.h. + * mbedtls_config.h. * - List the curve as a dependency of MBEDTLS_ECP_C and * MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C if supported in check_config.h. * - Add the curve to the appropriate curve type macro * MBEDTLS_ECP_yyy_ENABLED above. * - Add the necessary definitions to ecp_curves.c. * - Add the curve to the ecp_supported_curves array in ecp.c. - * - Add the curve to applicable profiles in x509_crt.c if applicable. + * - Add the curve to applicable profiles in x509_crt.c. + * - Add the curve to applicable presets in ssl_tls.c. */ typedef enum { MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE = 0, /*!< Curve not defined. */ @@ -129,10 +118,8 @@ typedef enum { /** * The number of supported curves, plus one for #MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE. - * - * \note Montgomery curves are currently excluded. */ -#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_MAX 12 +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_MAX 14 /* * Curve types @@ -145,6 +132,10 @@ typedef enum { /** * Curve information, for use by other modules. + * + * The fields of this structure are part of the public API and can be + * accessed directly by applications. Future versions of the library may + * add extra fields or reorder existing fields. */ typedef struct mbedtls_ecp_curve_info { mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id; /*!< An internal identifier. */ @@ -165,46 +156,12 @@ typedef struct mbedtls_ecp_curve_info { * coordinates. */ typedef struct mbedtls_ecp_point { - mbedtls_mpi X; /*!< The X coordinate of the ECP point. */ - mbedtls_mpi Y; /*!< The Y coordinate of the ECP point. */ - mbedtls_mpi Z; /*!< The Z coordinate of the ECP point. */ + mbedtls_mpi MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(X); /*!< The X coordinate of the ECP point. */ + mbedtls_mpi MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(Y); /*!< The Y coordinate of the ECP point. */ + mbedtls_mpi MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(Z); /*!< The Z coordinate of the ECP point. */ } mbedtls_ecp_point; -/* Determine the minimum safe value of MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BITS. */ -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) -#define MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BITS_MIN 0 -/* Note: the curves must be listed in DECREASING size! */ -#elif defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED) -#define MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BITS_MIN 521 -#elif defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED) -#define MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BITS_MIN 512 -#elif defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED) -#define MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BITS_MIN 448 -#elif defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLED) -#define MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BITS_MIN 384 -#elif defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED) -#define MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BITS_MIN 384 -#elif defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED) -#define MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BITS_MIN 256 -#elif defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED) -#define MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BITS_MIN 256 -#elif defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED) -#define MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BITS_MIN 256 -#elif defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED) -#define MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BITS_MIN 255 -#elif defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED) -#define MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BITS_MIN 225 // n is slightly above 2^224 -#elif defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED) -#define MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BITS_MIN 224 -#elif defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED) -#define MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BITS_MIN 192 -#elif defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED) -#define MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BITS_MIN 192 -#else -#error "MBEDTLS_ECP_C enabled, but no curve?" -#endif - #if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_ALT) /* * default Mbed TLS elliptic curve arithmetic implementation @@ -262,10 +219,16 @@ mbedtls_ecp_point; * additions or subtractions. Therefore, it is only an approximative modular * reduction. It must return 0 on success and non-zero on failure. * - * \note Alternative implementations must keep the group IDs distinct. If - * two group structures have the same ID, then they must be - * identical. - * + * \note Alternative implementations of the ECP module must obey the + * following constraints. + * * Group IDs must be distinct: if two group structures have + * the same ID, then they must be identical. + * * The fields \c id, \c P, \c A, \c B, \c G, \c N, + * \c pbits and \c nbits must have the same type and semantics + * as in the built-in implementation. + * They must be available for reading, but direct modification + * of these fields does not need to be supported. + * They do not need to be at the same offset in the structure. */ typedef struct mbedtls_ecp_group { mbedtls_ecp_group_id id; /*!< An internal group identifier. */ @@ -283,14 +246,16 @@ typedef struct mbedtls_ecp_group { size_t nbits; /*!< For Short Weierstrass: The number of bits in \p P. For Montgomery curves: the number of bits in the private keys. */ - unsigned int h; /*!< \internal 1 if the constants are static. */ - int (*modp)(mbedtls_mpi *); /*!< The function for fast pseudo-reduction - mod \p P (see above).*/ - int (*t_pre)(mbedtls_ecp_point *, void *); /*!< Unused. */ - int (*t_post)(mbedtls_ecp_point *, void *); /*!< Unused. */ - void *t_data; /*!< Unused. */ - mbedtls_ecp_point *T; /*!< Pre-computed points for ecp_mul_comb(). */ - size_t T_size; /*!< The number of pre-computed points. */ + /* End of public fields */ + + unsigned int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(h); /*!< \internal 1 if the constants are static. */ + int(*MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(modp))(mbedtls_mpi *); /*!< The function for fast pseudo-reduction + mod \p P (see above).*/ + int(*MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(t_pre))(mbedtls_ecp_point *, void *); /*!< Unused. */ + int(*MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(t_post))(mbedtls_ecp_point *, void *); /*!< Unused. */ + void *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(t_data); /*!< Unused. */ + mbedtls_ecp_point *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(T); /*!< Pre-computed points for ecp_mul_comb(). */ + size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(T_size); /*!< The number of dynamic allocated pre-computed points. */ } mbedtls_ecp_group; @@ -298,32 +263,10 @@ mbedtls_ecp_group; * \name SECTION: Module settings * * The configuration options you can set for this module are in this section. - * Either change them in config.h, or define them using the compiler command line. + * Either change them in mbedtls_config.h, or define them using the compiler command line. * \{ */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BITS) - -#if MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BITS < MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BITS_MIN -#error "MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BITS is smaller than the largest supported curve" -#endif - -#elif defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) -/** - * The maximum size of the groups, that is, of \c N and \c P. - */ -#define MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BITS MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BITS_MIN - -#else -/* MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BITS is not relevant without MBEDTLS_ECP_C, but set it - * to a nonzero value so that code that unconditionally allocates an array - * of a size based on it keeps working if built without ECC support. */ -#define MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BITS 1 -#endif - -#define MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BYTES ((MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BITS + 7) / 8) -#define MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_PT_LEN (2 * MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BYTES + 1) - #if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_WINDOW_SIZE) /* * Maximum "window" size used for point multiplication. @@ -350,15 +293,16 @@ mbedtls_ecp_group; #if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_FIXED_POINT_OPTIM) /* - * Trade memory for speed on fixed-point multiplication. + * Trade code size for speed on fixed-point multiplication. * * This speeds up repeated multiplication of the generator (that is, the * multiplication in ECDSA signatures, and half of the multiplications in * ECDSA verification and ECDHE) by a factor roughly 3 to 4. * - * The cost is increasing EC peak memory usage by a factor roughly 2. + * For each n-bit Short Weierstrass curve that is enabled, this adds 4n bytes + * of code size if n < 384 and 8n otherwise. * - * Change this value to 0 to reduce peak memory usage. + * Change this value to 0 to reduce code size. */ #define MBEDTLS_ECP_FIXED_POINT_OPTIM 1 /**< Enable fixed-point speed-up. */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_FIXED_POINT_OPTIM */ @@ -369,6 +313,47 @@ mbedtls_ecp_group; #include "ecp_alt.h" #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_ALT */ +/** + * The maximum size of the groups, that is, of \c N and \c P. + */ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_LIGHT) +/* Dummy definition to help code that has optional ECP support and + * defines an MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BYTES-sized array unconditionally. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BITS 1 +/* Note: the curves must be listed in DECREASING size! */ +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED) +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BITS 521 +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED) +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BITS 512 +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED) +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BITS 448 +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLED) +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BITS 384 +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED) +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BITS 384 +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED) +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BITS 256 +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED) +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BITS 256 +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED) +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BITS 256 +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED) +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BITS 255 +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED) +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BITS 225 // n is slightly above 2^224 +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED) +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BITS 224 +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED) +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BITS 192 +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED) +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BITS 192 +#else /* !MBEDTLS_ECP_LIGHT */ +#error "Missing definition of MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BITS" +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_ECP_LIGHT */ + +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BYTES ((MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BITS + 7) / 8) +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_PT_LEN (2 * MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BYTES + 1) + #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) /** @@ -389,10 +374,10 @@ typedef struct mbedtls_ecp_restart_muladd mbedtls_ecp_restart_muladd_ctx; * \brief General context for resuming ECC operations */ typedef struct { - unsigned ops_done; /*!< current ops count */ - unsigned depth; /*!< call depth (0 = top-level) */ - mbedtls_ecp_restart_mul_ctx *rsm; /*!< ecp_mul_comb() sub-context */ - mbedtls_ecp_restart_muladd_ctx *ma; /*!< ecp_muladd() sub-context */ + unsigned MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(ops_done); /*!< current ops count */ + unsigned MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(depth); /*!< call depth (0 = top-level) */ + mbedtls_ecp_restart_mul_ctx *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(rsm); /*!< ecp_mul_comb() sub-context */ + mbedtls_ecp_restart_muladd_ctx *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(ma); /*!< ecp_muladd() sub-context */ } mbedtls_ecp_restart_ctx; /* @@ -441,17 +426,28 @@ typedef void mbedtls_ecp_restart_ctx; * ::mbedtls_ecdsa_context structure. */ typedef struct mbedtls_ecp_keypair { - mbedtls_ecp_group grp; /*!< Elliptic curve and base point */ - mbedtls_mpi d; /*!< our secret value */ - mbedtls_ecp_point Q; /*!< our public value */ + mbedtls_ecp_group MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(grp); /*!< Elliptic curve and base point */ + mbedtls_mpi MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(d); /*!< our secret value */ + mbedtls_ecp_point MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(Q); /*!< our public value */ } mbedtls_ecp_keypair; -/* - * Point formats, from RFC 4492's enum ECPointFormat +/** + * The uncompressed point format for Short Weierstrass curves + * (MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP_XXX and MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP_XXX). + */ +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_UNCOMPRESSED 0 +/** + * The compressed point format for Short Weierstrass curves + * (MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP_XXX and MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP_XXX). + * + * \warning While this format is supported for all concerned curves for + * writing, when it comes to parsing, it is not supported for all + * curves. Specifically, parsing compressed points on + * MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1 and MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1 is not + * supported. */ -#define MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_UNCOMPRESSED 0 /**< Uncompressed point format. */ -#define MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_COMPRESSED 1 /**< Compressed point format. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_COMPRESSED 1 /* * Some other constants from RFC 4492 @@ -489,6 +485,12 @@ mbedtls_ecp_keypair; * only enabled for specific sides and key exchanges * (currently only for clients and ECDHE-ECDSA). * + * \warning Using the PSA interruptible interfaces with keys in local + * storage and no accelerator driver will also call this + * function to set the values specified via those interfaces, + * overwriting values previously set. Care should be taken if + * mixing these two interfaces. + * * \param max_ops Maximum number of basic operations done in a row. * Default: 0 (unlimited). * Lower (non-zero) values mean ECC functions will block for @@ -780,6 +782,9 @@ int mbedtls_ecp_point_write_binary(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, * belongs to the given group, see mbedtls_ecp_check_pubkey() * for that. * + * \note For compressed points, see #MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_COMPRESSED for + * limitations. + * * \param grp The group to which the point should belong. * This must be initialized and have group parameters * set, for example through mbedtls_ecp_group_load(). @@ -939,15 +944,8 @@ int mbedtls_ecp_tls_write_group(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, * \note To prevent timing attacks, this function * executes the exact same sequence of base-field * operations for any valid \p m. It avoids any if-branch or - * array index depending on the value of \p m. - * - * \note If \p f_rng is not NULL, it is used to randomize - * intermediate results to prevent potential timing attacks - * targeting these results. We recommend always providing - * a non-NULL \p f_rng. The overhead is negligible. - * Note: unless #MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG is defined, when - * \p f_rng is NULL, an internal RNG (seeded from the value - * of \p m) will be used instead. + * array index depending on the value of \p m. It also uses + * \p f_rng to randomize some intermediate results. * * \param grp The ECP group to use. * This must be initialized and have group parameters @@ -956,9 +954,9 @@ int mbedtls_ecp_tls_write_group(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, * This must be initialized. * \param m The integer by which to multiply. This must be initialized. * \param P The point to multiply. This must be initialized. - * \param f_rng The RNG function. This may be \c NULL if randomization - * of intermediate results isn't desired (discouraged). - * \param p_rng The RNG context to be passed to \p p_rng. + * \param f_rng The RNG function. This must not be \c NULL. + * \param p_rng The RNG context to be passed to \p f_rng. This may be \c + * NULL if \p f_rng doesn't need a context. * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY if \p m is not a valid private @@ -987,9 +985,9 @@ int mbedtls_ecp_mul(mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *R, * This must be initialized. * \param m The integer by which to multiply. This must be initialized. * \param P The point to multiply. This must be initialized. - * \param f_rng The RNG function. This may be \c NULL if randomization - * of intermediate results isn't desired (discouraged). - * \param p_rng The RNG context to be passed to \p p_rng. + * \param f_rng The RNG function. This must not be \c NULL. + * \param p_rng The RNG context to be passed to \p f_rng. This may be \c + * NULL if \p f_rng doesn't need a context. * \param rs_ctx The restart context (NULL disables restart). * * \return \c 0 on success. @@ -1023,7 +1021,7 @@ int mbedtls_ecp_mul_restartable(mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *R, */ static inline int mbedtls_ecp_group_a_is_minus_3(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp) { - return grp->A.p == NULL; + return grp->A.MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(p) == NULL; } /** @@ -1262,10 +1260,55 @@ int mbedtls_ecp_gen_key(mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id, mbedtls_ecp_keypair *key, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng); +/** \brief Set the public key in a key pair object. + * + * \note This function does not check that the point actually + * belongs to the given group. Call mbedtls_ecp_check_pubkey() + * on \p Q before calling this function to check that. + * + * \note This function does not check that the public key matches + * the private key that is already in \p key, if any. + * To check the consistency of the resulting key pair object, + * call mbedtls_ecp_check_pub_priv() after setting both + * the public key and the private key. + * + * \param grp_id The ECP group identifier. + * \param key The key pair object. It must be initialized. + * If its group has already been set, it must match \p grp_id. + * If its group has not been set, it will be set to \p grp_id. + * If the public key has already been set, it is overwritten. + * \param Q The public key to copy. This must be a point on the + * curve indicated by \p grp_id. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA if \p key does not + * match \p grp_id. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE if the operation for + * the group is not implemented. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED on memory-allocation failure. + * \return Another negative error code on other kinds of failure. + */ +int mbedtls_ecp_set_public_key(mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id, + mbedtls_ecp_keypair *key, + const mbedtls_ecp_point *Q); + /** * \brief This function reads an elliptic curve private key. * - * \note This function does not support Curve448 yet. + * \note This function does not set the public key in the + * key pair object. Without a public key, the key pair object + * cannot be used with operations that require the public key. + * Call mbedtls_ecp_keypair_calc_public() to set the public + * key from the private key. Alternatively, you can call + * mbedtls_ecp_set_public_key() to set the public key part, + * and then optionally mbedtls_ecp_check_pub_priv() to check + * that the private and public parts are consistent. + * + * \note If a public key has already been set in the key pair + * object, this function does not check that it is consistent + * with the private key. Call mbedtls_ecp_check_pub_priv() + * after setting both the public key and the private key + * to make that check. * * \param grp_id The ECP group identifier. * \param key The destination key. @@ -1285,10 +1328,11 @@ int mbedtls_ecp_gen_key(mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id, mbedtls_ecp_keypair *key, int mbedtls_ecp_read_key(mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id, mbedtls_ecp_keypair *key, const unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen); +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) /** * \brief This function exports an elliptic curve private key. * - * \note Note that although this function accepts an output + * \deprecated Note that although this function accepts an output * buffer that is smaller or larger than the key, most key * import interfaces require the output to have exactly * key's nominal length. It is generally simplest to @@ -1296,13 +1340,15 @@ int mbedtls_ecp_read_key(mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id, mbedtls_ecp_keypair *key, * checking that the output buffer is large enough. * See the description of the \p buflen parameter for * how to calculate the nominal length. + * To avoid this difficulty, use mbedtls_ecp_write_key_ext() + * instead. + * mbedtls_ecp_write_key() is deprecated and will be + * removed in a future version of the library. * * \note If the private key was not set in \p key, * the output is unspecified. Future versions * may return an error in that case. * - * \note This function does not support Curve448 yet. - * * \param key The private key. * \param buf The output buffer for containing the binary representation * of the key. @@ -1327,8 +1373,61 @@ int mbedtls_ecp_read_key(mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id, mbedtls_ecp_keypair *key, * representation is larger than the available space in \p buf. * \return Another negative error code on different kinds of failure. */ -int mbedtls_ecp_write_key(mbedtls_ecp_keypair *key, - unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen); +int MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED mbedtls_ecp_write_key(mbedtls_ecp_keypair *key, + unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ + +/** + * \brief This function exports an elliptic curve private key. + * + * \param key The private key. + * \param olen On success, the length of the private key. + * This is always (`grp->nbits` + 7) / 8 bytes + * where `grp->nbits` is the private key size in bits. + * \param buf The output buffer for containing the binary representation + * of the key. + * \param buflen The total length of the buffer in bytes. + * #MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BYTES is always sufficient. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL if the \p key + * representation is larger than the available space in \p buf. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA if no private key is + * set in \p key. + * \return Another negative error code on different kinds of failure. + */ +int mbedtls_ecp_write_key_ext(const mbedtls_ecp_keypair *key, + size_t *olen, unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen); + +/** + * \brief This function exports an elliptic curve public key. + * + * \note If the public key was not set in \p key, + * the output is unspecified. Future versions + * may return an error in that case. + * + * \param key The public key. + * \param format The point format. This must be either + * #MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_COMPRESSED or #MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_UNCOMPRESSED. + * (For groups without these formats, this parameter is + * ignored. But it still has to be either of the above + * values.) + * \param olen The address at which to store the length of + * the output in Bytes. This must not be \c NULL. + * \param buf The output buffer. This must be a writable buffer + * of length \p buflen Bytes. + * \param buflen The length of the output buffer \p buf in Bytes. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL if the output buffer + * is too small to hold the point. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE if the point format + * or the export for the given group is not implemented. + * \return Another negative error code on other kinds of failure. + */ +int mbedtls_ecp_write_public_key(const mbedtls_ecp_keypair *key, + int format, size_t *olen, + unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen); /** * \brief This function checks that the keypair objects @@ -1341,14 +1440,74 @@ int mbedtls_ecp_write_key(mbedtls_ecp_keypair *key, * part is ignored. * \param prv The keypair structure holding the full keypair. * This must be initialized. + * \param f_rng The RNG function. This must not be \c NULL. + * \param p_rng The RNG context to be passed to \p f_rng. This may be \c + * NULL if \p f_rng doesn't need a context. * * \return \c 0 on success, meaning that the keys are valid and match. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA if the keys are invalid or do not match. * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_XXX or an \c MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_XXX * error code on calculation failure. */ -int mbedtls_ecp_check_pub_priv(const mbedtls_ecp_keypair *pub, - const mbedtls_ecp_keypair *prv); +int mbedtls_ecp_check_pub_priv( + const mbedtls_ecp_keypair *pub, const mbedtls_ecp_keypair *prv, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng); + +/** \brief Calculate the public key from a private key in a key pair. + * + * \param key A keypair structure. It must have a private key set. + * If the public key is set, it will be overwritten. + * \param f_rng The RNG function. This must not be \c NULL. + * \param p_rng The RNG context to be passed to \p f_rng. This may be \c + * NULL if \p f_rng doesn't need a context. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. The key pair object can be used for + * operations that require the public key. + * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_XXX or an \c MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_XXX + * error code on calculation failure. + */ +int mbedtls_ecp_keypair_calc_public( + mbedtls_ecp_keypair *key, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng); + +/** \brief Query the group that a key pair belongs to. + * + * \param key The key pair to query. + * + * \return The group ID for the group registered in the key pair + * object. + * This is \c MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE if no group has been set + * in the key pair object. + */ +mbedtls_ecp_group_id mbedtls_ecp_keypair_get_group_id( + const mbedtls_ecp_keypair *key); + +/** + * \brief This function exports generic key-pair parameters. + * + * Each of the output parameters can be a null pointer + * if you do not need that parameter. + * + * \note If the private key or the public key was not set in \p key, + * the corresponding output is unspecified. Future versions + * may return an error in that case. + * + * \param key The key pair to export from. + * \param grp Slot for exported ECP group. + * It must either be null or point to an initialized ECP group. + * \param d Slot for the exported secret value. + * It must either be null or point to an initialized mpi. + * \param Q Slot for the exported public value. + * It must either be null or point to an initialized ECP point. + * + * \return \c 0 on success, + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED on memory-allocation failure. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE if key id doesn't + * correspond to a known group. + * \return Another negative error code on other kinds of failure. + */ +int mbedtls_ecp_export(const mbedtls_ecp_keypair *key, mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + mbedtls_mpi *d, mbedtls_ecp_point *Q); #if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/entropy.h b/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/entropy.h index 096bff8bcb23..20fd6872b89b 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/entropy.h +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/entropy.h @@ -9,22 +9,23 @@ */ #ifndef MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_H #define MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_H +#include "mbedtls/private_access.h" -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "mbedtls/build_info.h" #include -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_FORCE_SHA256) -#include "mbedtls/sha512.h" +#include "md.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA512) && !defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_FORCE_SHA256) #define MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_SHA512_ACCUMULATOR +#define MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MD MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512 +#define MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE 64 /**< Block size of entropy accumulator (SHA-512) */ #else -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) #define MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_SHA256_ACCUMULATOR -#include "mbedtls/sha256.h" +#define MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MD MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256 +#define MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE 32 /**< Block size of entropy accumulator (SHA-256) */ #endif #endif @@ -32,9 +33,6 @@ #include "mbedtls/threading.h" #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVEGE_C) -#include "mbedtls/havege.h" -#endif /** Critical entropy source failure. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED -0x003C @@ -51,7 +49,7 @@ * \name SECTION: Module settings * * The configuration options you can set for this module are in this section. - * Either change them in config.h or define them on the compiler command line. + * Either change them in mbedtls_config.h or define them on the compiler command line. * \{ */ @@ -65,12 +63,6 @@ /** \} name SECTION: Module settings */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_SHA512_ACCUMULATOR) -#define MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE 64 /**< Block size of entropy accumulator (SHA-512) */ -#else -#define MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE 32 /**< Block size of entropy accumulator (SHA-256) */ -#endif - #define MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MAX_SEED_SIZE 1024 /**< Maximum size of seed we read from seed file */ #define MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_SOURCE_MANUAL MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MAX_SOURCES @@ -99,11 +91,11 @@ typedef int (*mbedtls_entropy_f_source_ptr)(void *data, unsigned char *output, s * \brief Entropy source state */ typedef struct mbedtls_entropy_source_state { - mbedtls_entropy_f_source_ptr f_source; /**< The entropy source callback */ - void *p_source; /**< The callback data pointer */ - size_t size; /**< Amount received in bytes */ - size_t threshold; /**< Minimum bytes required before release */ - int strong; /**< Is the source strong? */ + mbedtls_entropy_f_source_ptr MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(f_source); /**< The entropy source callback */ + void *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(p_source); /**< The callback data pointer */ + size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(size); /**< Amount received in bytes */ + size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(threshold); /**< Minimum bytes required before release */ + int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(strong); /**< Is the source strong? */ } mbedtls_entropy_source_state; @@ -111,28 +103,29 @@ mbedtls_entropy_source_state; * \brief Entropy context structure */ typedef struct mbedtls_entropy_context { - int accumulator_started; /* 0 after init. - * 1 after the first update. - * -1 after free. */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_SHA512_ACCUMULATOR) - mbedtls_sha512_context accumulator; -#elif defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_SHA256_ACCUMULATOR) - mbedtls_sha256_context accumulator; -#endif - int source_count; /* Number of entries used in source. */ - mbedtls_entropy_source_state source[MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MAX_SOURCES]; -#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVEGE_C) - mbedtls_havege_state havege_data; -#endif + mbedtls_md_context_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(accumulator); + int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(accumulator_started); /* 0 after init. + * 1 after the first update. + * -1 after free. */ + int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(source_count); /* Number of entries used in source. */ + mbedtls_entropy_source_state MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(source)[MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MAX_SOURCES]; #if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) - mbedtls_threading_mutex_t mutex; /*!< mutex */ + mbedtls_threading_mutex_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(mutex); /*!< mutex */ #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_NV_SEED) - int initial_entropy_run; + int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(initial_entropy_run); #endif } mbedtls_entropy_context; +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_NO_PLATFORM_ENTROPY) +/** + * \brief Platform-specific entropy poll callback + */ +int mbedtls_platform_entropy_poll(void *data, + unsigned char *output, size_t len, size_t *olen); +#endif + /** * \brief Initialize the context * diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/error.h b/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/error.h index 7a183733eeb1..186589ac5bc5 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/error.h +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/error.h @@ -10,19 +10,10 @@ #ifndef MBEDTLS_ERROR_H #define MBEDTLS_ERROR_H -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "mbedtls/build_info.h" #include -#if (defined(__ARMCC_VERSION) || defined(_MSC_VER)) && \ - !defined(inline) && !defined(__cplusplus) -#define inline __inline -#endif - /** * Error code layout. * @@ -48,12 +39,10 @@ * Module Nr Codes assigned * ERROR 2 0x006E 0x0001 * MPI 7 0x0002-0x0010 - * GCM 3 0x0012-0x0014 0x0013-0x0013 - * BLOWFISH 3 0x0016-0x0018 0x0017-0x0017 + * GCM 3 0x0012-0x0016 0x0013-0x0013 * THREADING 3 0x001A-0x001E * AES 5 0x0020-0x0022 0x0021-0x0025 * CAMELLIA 3 0x0024-0x0026 0x0027-0x0027 - * XTEA 2 0x0028-0x0028 0x0029-0x0029 * BASE64 2 0x002A-0x002C * OID 1 0x002E-0x002E 0x000B-0x000B * PADLOCK 1 0x0030-0x0030 @@ -67,18 +56,17 @@ * PBKDF2 1 0x007C-0x007C * HMAC_DRBG 4 0x0003-0x0009 * CCM 3 0x000D-0x0011 - * ARC4 1 0x0019-0x0019 - * MD2 1 0x002B-0x002B - * MD4 1 0x002D-0x002D * MD5 1 0x002F-0x002F * RIPEMD160 1 0x0031-0x0031 * SHA1 1 0x0035-0x0035 0x0073-0x0073 * SHA256 1 0x0037-0x0037 0x0074-0x0074 * SHA512 1 0x0039-0x0039 0x0075-0x0075 + * SHA-3 1 0x0076-0x0076 * CHACHA20 3 0x0051-0x0055 * POLY1305 3 0x0057-0x005B * CHACHAPOLY 2 0x0054-0x0056 * PLATFORM 2 0x0070-0x0072 + * LMS 5 0x0011-0x0019 * * High-level module nr (3 bits - 0x0...-0x7...) * Name ID Nr of Errors @@ -92,10 +80,12 @@ * ECP 4 10 (Started from top) * MD 5 5 * HKDF 5 1 (Started from top) + * PKCS7 5 12 (Started from 0x5300) * SSL 5 2 (Started from 0x5F00) * CIPHER 6 8 (Started from 0x6080) - * SSL 6 24 (Started from top, plus 0x6000) - * SSL 7 32 + * SSL 6 22 (Started from top, plus 0x6000) + * SSL 7 20 (Started from 0x7000, gaps at + * 0x7380, 0x7900-0x7980, 0x7A80-0x7E80) * * Module dependent error code (5 bits 0x.00.-0x.F8.) */ @@ -109,6 +99,11 @@ extern "C" { /** This is a bug in the library */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED -0x006E +/** Hardware accelerator failed */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_HW_ACCEL_FAILED -0x0070 +/** The requested feature is not supported by the platform */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED -0x0072 + /** * \brief Combines a high-level and low-level error code together. * diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/gcm.h b/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/gcm.h index 1ad0e9e96f43..98faa436126d 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/gcm.h +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/gcm.h @@ -18,15 +18,16 @@ #ifndef MBEDTLS_GCM_H #define MBEDTLS_GCM_H +#include "mbedtls/private_access.h" -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "mbedtls/build_info.h" #include "mbedtls/cipher.h" +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_C) +#include "mbedtls/block_cipher.h" +#endif + #include #define MBEDTLS_GCM_ENCRYPT 1 @@ -34,13 +35,10 @@ /** Authenticated decryption failed. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_AUTH_FAILED -0x0012 - -/* MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_HW_ACCEL_FAILED is deprecated and should not be used. */ -/** GCM hardware accelerator failed. */ -#define MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_HW_ACCEL_FAILED -0x0013 - /** Bad input parameters to function. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BAD_INPUT -0x0014 +/** An output buffer is too small. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL -0x0016 #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { @@ -48,21 +46,31 @@ extern "C" { #if !defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_ALT) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_LARGE_TABLE) +#define MBEDTLS_GCM_HTABLE_SIZE 256 +#else +#define MBEDTLS_GCM_HTABLE_SIZE 16 +#endif + /** * \brief The GCM context structure. */ typedef struct mbedtls_gcm_context { - mbedtls_cipher_context_t cipher_ctx; /*!< The cipher context used. */ - uint64_t HL[16]; /*!< Precalculated HTable low. */ - uint64_t HH[16]; /*!< Precalculated HTable high. */ - uint64_t len; /*!< The total length of the encrypted data. */ - uint64_t add_len; /*!< The total length of the additional data. */ - unsigned char base_ectr[16]; /*!< The first ECTR for tag. */ - unsigned char y[16]; /*!< The Y working value. */ - unsigned char buf[16]; /*!< The buf working value. */ - int mode; /*!< The operation to perform: - #MBEDTLS_GCM_ENCRYPT or - #MBEDTLS_GCM_DECRYPT. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_C) + mbedtls_block_cipher_context_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(block_cipher_ctx); /*!< The cipher context used. */ +#else + mbedtls_cipher_context_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(cipher_ctx); /*!< The cipher context used. */ +#endif + uint64_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(H)[MBEDTLS_GCM_HTABLE_SIZE][2]; /*!< Precalculated HTable. */ + uint64_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(len); /*!< The total length of the encrypted data. */ + uint64_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(add_len); /*!< The total length of the additional data. */ + unsigned char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(base_ectr)[16]; /*!< The first ECTR for tag. */ + unsigned char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(y)[16]; /*!< The Y working value. */ + unsigned char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(buf)[16]; /*!< The buf working value. */ + unsigned char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(mode); /*!< The operation to perform: + #MBEDTLS_GCM_ENCRYPT or + #MBEDTLS_GCM_DECRYPT. */ + unsigned char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(acceleration); /*!< The acceleration to use. */ } mbedtls_gcm_context; @@ -221,6 +229,27 @@ int mbedtls_gcm_auth_decrypt(mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx, * \param iv The initialization vector. This must be a readable buffer of * at least \p iv_len Bytes. * \param iv_len The length of the IV. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + */ +int mbedtls_gcm_starts(mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx, + int mode, + const unsigned char *iv, + size_t iv_len); + +/** + * \brief This function feeds an input buffer as associated data + * (authenticated but not encrypted data) in a GCM + * encryption or decryption operation. + * + * Call this function after mbedtls_gcm_starts() to pass + * the associated data. If the associated data is empty, + * you do not need to call this function. You may not + * call this function after calling mbedtls_cipher_update(). + * + * \param ctx The GCM context. This must have been started with + * mbedtls_gcm_starts() and must not have yet received + * any input with mbedtls_gcm_update(). * \param add The buffer holding the additional data, or \c NULL * if \p add_len is \c 0. * \param add_len The length of the additional data. If \c 0, @@ -228,42 +257,65 @@ int mbedtls_gcm_auth_decrypt(mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx, * * \return \c 0 on success. */ -int mbedtls_gcm_starts(mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx, - int mode, - const unsigned char *iv, - size_t iv_len, - const unsigned char *add, - size_t add_len); +int mbedtls_gcm_update_ad(mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *add, + size_t add_len); /** * \brief This function feeds an input buffer into an ongoing GCM * encryption or decryption operation. * - * ` The function expects input to be a multiple of 16 - * Bytes. Only the last call before calling - * mbedtls_gcm_finish() can be less than 16 Bytes. + * You may call this function zero, one or more times + * to pass successive parts of the input: the plaintext to + * encrypt, or the ciphertext (not including the tag) to + * decrypt. After the last part of the input, call + * mbedtls_gcm_finish(). + * + * This function may produce output in one of the following + * ways: + * - Immediate output: the output length is always equal + * to the input length. + * - Buffered output: the output consists of a whole number + * of 16-byte blocks. If the total input length so far + * (not including associated data) is 16 \* *B* + *A* + * with *A* < 16 then the total output length is 16 \* *B*. + * + * In particular: + * - It is always correct to call this function with + * \p output_size >= \p input_length + 15. + * - If \p input_length is a multiple of 16 for all the calls + * to this function during an operation, then it is + * correct to use \p output_size = \p input_length. * * \note For decryption, the output buffer cannot be the same as * input buffer. If the buffers overlap, the output buffer * must trail at least 8 Bytes behind the input buffer. * - * \param ctx The GCM context. This must be initialized. - * \param length The length of the input data. This must be a multiple of - * 16 except in the last call before mbedtls_gcm_finish(). - * \param input The buffer holding the input data. If \p length is greater - * than zero, this must be a readable buffer of at least that - * size in Bytes. - * \param output The buffer for holding the output data. If \p length is - * greater than zero, this must be a writable buffer of at - * least that size in Bytes. + * \param ctx The GCM context. This must be initialized. + * \param input The buffer holding the input data. If \p input_length + * is greater than zero, this must be a readable buffer + * of at least \p input_length bytes. + * \param input_length The length of the input data in bytes. + * \param output The buffer for the output data. If \p output_size + * is greater than zero, this must be a writable buffer of + * of at least \p output_size bytes. + * \param output_size The size of the output buffer in bytes. + * See the function description regarding the output size. + * \param output_length On success, \p *output_length contains the actual + * length of the output written in \p output. + * On failure, the content of \p *output_length is + * unspecified. * * \return \c 0 on success. - * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BAD_INPUT on failure. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BAD_INPUT on failure: + * total input length too long, + * unsupported input/output buffer overlap detected, + * or \p output_size too small. */ int mbedtls_gcm_update(mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx, - size_t length, - const unsigned char *input, - unsigned char *output); + const unsigned char *input, size_t input_length, + unsigned char *output, size_t output_size, + size_t *output_length); /** * \brief This function finishes the GCM operation and generates @@ -277,13 +329,31 @@ int mbedtls_gcm_update(mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx, * buffer of at least \p tag_len Bytes. * \param tag_len The length of the tag to generate. This must be at least * four. + * \param output The buffer for the final output. + * If \p output_size is nonzero, this must be a writable + * buffer of at least \p output_size bytes. + * \param output_size The size of the \p output buffer in bytes. + * This must be large enough for the output that + * mbedtls_gcm_update() has not produced. In particular: + * - If mbedtls_gcm_update() produces immediate output, + * or if the total input size is a multiple of \c 16, + * then mbedtls_gcm_finish() never produces any output, + * so \p output_size can be \c 0. + * - \p output_size never needs to be more than \c 15. + * \param output_length On success, \p *output_length contains the actual + * length of the output written in \p output. + * On failure, the content of \p *output_length is + * unspecified. * * \return \c 0 on success. - * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BAD_INPUT on failure. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BAD_INPUT on failure: + * invalid value of \p tag_len, + * or \p output_size too small. */ int mbedtls_gcm_finish(mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx, - unsigned char *tag, - size_t tag_len); + unsigned char *output, size_t output_size, + size_t *output_length, + unsigned char *tag, size_t tag_len); /** * \brief This function clears a GCM context and the underlying diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/havege.h b/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/havege.h deleted file mode 100644 index cdaf8a89ae81..000000000000 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/havege.h +++ /dev/null @@ -1,67 +0,0 @@ -/** - * \file havege.h - * - * \brief HAVEGE: HArdware Volatile Entropy Gathering and Expansion - */ -/* - * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later - */ -#ifndef MBEDTLS_HAVEGE_H -#define MBEDTLS_HAVEGE_H - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif - -#include -#include - -#define MBEDTLS_HAVEGE_COLLECT_SIZE 1024 - -#ifdef __cplusplus -extern "C" { -#endif - -/** - * \brief HAVEGE state structure - */ -typedef struct mbedtls_havege_state { - uint32_t PT1, PT2, offset[2]; - uint32_t pool[MBEDTLS_HAVEGE_COLLECT_SIZE]; - uint32_t WALK[8192]; -} -mbedtls_havege_state; - -/** - * \brief HAVEGE initialization - * - * \param hs HAVEGE state to be initialized - */ -void mbedtls_havege_init(mbedtls_havege_state *hs); - -/** - * \brief Clear HAVEGE state - * - * \param hs HAVEGE state to be cleared - */ -void mbedtls_havege_free(mbedtls_havege_state *hs); - -/** - * \brief HAVEGE rand function - * - * \param p_rng A HAVEGE state - * \param output Buffer to fill - * \param len Length of buffer - * - * \return 0 - */ -int mbedtls_havege_random(void *p_rng, unsigned char *output, size_t len); - -#ifdef __cplusplus -} -#endif - -#endif /* havege.h */ diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/hkdf.h b/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/hkdf.h index 103f329b8fa1..930e93f32515 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/hkdf.h +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/hkdf.h @@ -13,11 +13,7 @@ #ifndef MBEDTLS_HKDF_H #define MBEDTLS_HKDF_H -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "mbedtls/build_info.h" #include "mbedtls/md.h" diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/hmac_drbg.h b/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/hmac_drbg.h index d531382f6c91..18b1b75a69f2 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/hmac_drbg.h +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/hmac_drbg.h @@ -13,12 +13,9 @@ */ #ifndef MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_H #define MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_H +#include "mbedtls/private_access.h" -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "mbedtls/build_info.h" #include "mbedtls/md.h" @@ -42,7 +39,7 @@ * \name SECTION: Module settings * * The configuration options you can set for this module are in this section. - * Either change them in config.h or define them on the compiler command line. + * Either change them in mbedtls_config.h or define them on the compiler command line. * \{ */ @@ -77,19 +74,19 @@ extern "C" { typedef struct mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context { /* Working state: the key K is not stored explicitly, * but is implied by the HMAC context */ - mbedtls_md_context_t md_ctx; /*!< HMAC context (inc. K) */ - unsigned char V[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE]; /*!< V in the spec */ - int reseed_counter; /*!< reseed counter */ + mbedtls_md_context_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(md_ctx); /*!< HMAC context (inc. K) */ + unsigned char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(V)[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE]; /*!< V in the spec */ + int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(reseed_counter); /*!< reseed counter */ /* Administrative state */ - size_t entropy_len; /*!< entropy bytes grabbed on each (re)seed */ - int prediction_resistance; /*!< enable prediction resistance (Automatic - reseed before every random generation) */ - int reseed_interval; /*!< reseed interval */ + size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(entropy_len); /*!< entropy bytes grabbed on each (re)seed */ + int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(prediction_resistance); /*!< enable prediction resistance (Automatic + reseed before every random generation) */ + int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(reseed_interval); /*!< reseed interval */ /* Callbacks */ - int (*f_entropy)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t); /*!< entropy function */ - void *p_entropy; /*!< context for the entropy function */ + int(*MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(f_entropy))(void *, unsigned char *, size_t); /*!< entropy function */ + void *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(p_entropy); /*!< context for the entropy function */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) /* Invariant: the mutex is initialized if and only if @@ -100,7 +97,7 @@ typedef struct mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context { * Note that this invariant may change without notice. Do not rely on it * and do not access the mutex directly in application code. */ - mbedtls_threading_mutex_t mutex; + mbedtls_threading_mutex_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(mutex); #endif } mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context; @@ -285,8 +282,8 @@ void mbedtls_hmac_drbg_set_reseed_interval(mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx, * \return \c 0 on success, or an error from the underlying * hash calculation. */ -int mbedtls_hmac_drbg_update_ret(mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx, - const unsigned char *additional, size_t add_len); +int mbedtls_hmac_drbg_update(mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *additional, size_t add_len); /** * \brief This function reseeds the HMAC_DRBG context, that is @@ -388,30 +385,6 @@ int mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random(void *p_rng, unsigned char *output, size_t out_len) */ void mbedtls_hmac_drbg_free(mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx); -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING) -#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED __attribute__((deprecated)) -#else -#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED -#endif -/** - * \brief This function updates the state of the HMAC_DRBG context. - * - * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_hmac_drbg_update_ret() - * in 2.16.0. - * - * \param ctx The HMAC_DRBG context. - * \param additional The data to update the state with. - * If this is \c NULL, there is no additional data. - * \param add_len Length of \p additional in bytes. - * Unused if \p additional is \c NULL. - */ -MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_hmac_drbg_update( - mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx, - const unsigned char *additional, size_t add_len); -#undef MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED -#endif /* !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ - #if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) /** * \brief This function writes a seed file. diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/lms.h b/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/lms.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..95fce21337e3 --- /dev/null +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/lms.h @@ -0,0 +1,440 @@ +/** + * \file lms.h + * + * \brief This file provides an API for the LMS post-quantum-safe stateful-hash + public-key signature scheme as defined in RFC8554 and NIST.SP.200-208. + * This implementation currently only supports a single parameter set + * MBEDTLS_LMS_SHA256_M32_H10 in order to reduce complexity. This is one + * of the signature schemes recommended by the IETF draft SUIT standard + * for IOT firmware upgrades (RFC9019). + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ +#ifndef MBEDTLS_LMS_H +#define MBEDTLS_LMS_H + +#include +#include + +#include "mbedtls/private_access.h" +#include "mbedtls/build_info.h" + +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_BAD_INPUT_DATA -0x0011 /**< Bad data has been input to an LMS function */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_OUT_OF_PRIVATE_KEYS -0x0013 /**< Specified LMS key has utilised all of its private keys */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_VERIFY_FAILED -0x0015 /**< LMS signature verification failed */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_ALLOC_FAILED -0x0017 /**< LMS failed to allocate space for a private key */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL -0x0019 /**< Input/output buffer is too small to contain requited data */ + +/* Currently only defined for SHA256, 32 is the max hash output size */ +#define MBEDTLS_LMOTS_N_HASH_LEN_MAX (32u) +#define MBEDTLS_LMOTS_P_SIG_DIGIT_COUNT_MAX (34u) +#define MBEDTLS_LMOTS_N_HASH_LEN(type) ((type) == MBEDTLS_LMOTS_SHA256_N32_W8 ? 32u : 0) +#define MBEDTLS_LMOTS_I_KEY_ID_LEN (16u) +#define MBEDTLS_LMOTS_Q_LEAF_ID_LEN (4u) +#define MBEDTLS_LMOTS_TYPE_LEN (4u) +#define MBEDTLS_LMOTS_P_SIG_DIGIT_COUNT(type) ((type) == MBEDTLS_LMOTS_SHA256_N32_W8 ? 34u : 0) +#define MBEDTLS_LMOTS_C_RANDOM_VALUE_LEN(type) (MBEDTLS_LMOTS_N_HASH_LEN(type)) + +#define MBEDTLS_LMOTS_SIG_LEN(type) (MBEDTLS_LMOTS_TYPE_LEN + \ + MBEDTLS_LMOTS_C_RANDOM_VALUE_LEN(type) + \ + (MBEDTLS_LMOTS_P_SIG_DIGIT_COUNT(type) * \ + MBEDTLS_LMOTS_N_HASH_LEN(type))) + + +#define MBEDTLS_LMS_TYPE_LEN (4) +#define MBEDTLS_LMS_H_TREE_HEIGHT(type) ((type) == MBEDTLS_LMS_SHA256_M32_H10 ? 10u : 0) + +/* The length of a hash output, Currently only implemented for SHA256. + * Max is 32 bytes. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_LMS_M_NODE_BYTES(type) ((type) == MBEDTLS_LMS_SHA256_M32_H10 ? 32 : 0) +#define MBEDTLS_LMS_M_NODE_BYTES_MAX 32 + +#define MBEDTLS_LMS_SIG_LEN(type, otstype) (MBEDTLS_LMOTS_Q_LEAF_ID_LEN + \ + MBEDTLS_LMOTS_SIG_LEN(otstype) + \ + MBEDTLS_LMS_TYPE_LEN + \ + (MBEDTLS_LMS_H_TREE_HEIGHT(type) * \ + MBEDTLS_LMS_M_NODE_BYTES(type))) + +#define MBEDTLS_LMS_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN(type) (MBEDTLS_LMS_TYPE_LEN + \ + MBEDTLS_LMOTS_TYPE_LEN + \ + MBEDTLS_LMOTS_I_KEY_ID_LEN + \ + MBEDTLS_LMS_M_NODE_BYTES(type)) + + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +/** The Identifier of the LMS parameter set, as per + * https://www.iana.org/assignments/leighton-micali-signatures/leighton-micali-signatures.xhtml + * We are only implementing a subset of the types, particularly H10, for the sake of simplicity. + */ +typedef enum { + MBEDTLS_LMS_SHA256_M32_H10 = 0x6, +} mbedtls_lms_algorithm_type_t; + +/** The Identifier of the LMOTS parameter set, as per + * https://www.iana.org/assignments/leighton-micali-signatures/leighton-micali-signatures.xhtml. + * We are only implementing a subset of the types, particularly N32_W8, for the sake of simplicity. + */ +typedef enum { + MBEDTLS_LMOTS_SHA256_N32_W8 = 4 +} mbedtls_lmots_algorithm_type_t; + +/** LMOTS parameters structure. + * + * This contains the metadata associated with an LMOTS key, detailing the + * algorithm type, the key ID, and the leaf identifier should be key be part of + * a LMS key. + */ +typedef struct { + unsigned char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(I_key_identifier[MBEDTLS_LMOTS_I_KEY_ID_LEN]); /*!< The key + identifier. */ + unsigned char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(q_leaf_identifier[MBEDTLS_LMOTS_Q_LEAF_ID_LEN]); /*!< Which + leaf of the LMS key this is. + 0 if the key is not part of an LMS key. */ + mbedtls_lmots_algorithm_type_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(type); /*!< The LM-OTS key type identifier as + per IANA. Only SHA256_N32_W8 is + currently supported. */ +} mbedtls_lmots_parameters_t; + +/** LMOTS public context structure. + * + * A LMOTS public key is a hash output, and the applicable parameter set. + * + * The context must be initialized before it is used. A public key must either + * be imported or generated from a private context. + * + * \dot + * digraph lmots_public_t { + * UNINITIALIZED -> INIT [label="init"]; + * HAVE_PUBLIC_KEY -> INIT [label="free"]; + * INIT -> HAVE_PUBLIC_KEY [label="import_public_key"]; + * INIT -> HAVE_PUBLIC_KEY [label="calculate_public_key from private key"]; + * HAVE_PUBLIC_KEY -> HAVE_PUBLIC_KEY [label="export_public_key"]; + * } + * \enddot + */ +typedef struct { + mbedtls_lmots_parameters_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(params); + unsigned char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(public_key)[MBEDTLS_LMOTS_N_HASH_LEN_MAX]; + unsigned char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(have_public_key); /*!< Whether the context contains a public key. + Boolean values only. */ +} mbedtls_lmots_public_t; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_LMS_PRIVATE) +/** LMOTS private context structure. + * + * A LMOTS private key is one hash output for each of digit of the digest + + * checksum, and the applicable parameter set. + * + * The context must be initialized before it is used. A public key must either + * be imported or generated from a private context. + * + * \dot + * digraph lmots_public_t { + * UNINITIALIZED -> INIT [label="init"]; + * HAVE_PRIVATE_KEY -> INIT [label="free"]; + * INIT -> HAVE_PRIVATE_KEY [label="generate_private_key"]; + * HAVE_PRIVATE_KEY -> INIT [label="sign"]; + * } + * \enddot + */ +typedef struct { + mbedtls_lmots_parameters_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(params); + unsigned char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(private_key)[MBEDTLS_LMOTS_P_SIG_DIGIT_COUNT_MAX][ + MBEDTLS_LMOTS_N_HASH_LEN_MAX]; + unsigned char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(have_private_key); /*!< Whether the context contains a private key. + Boolean values only. */ +} mbedtls_lmots_private_t; +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_LMS_PRIVATE) */ + + +/** LMS parameters structure. + * + * This contains the metadata associated with an LMS key, detailing the + * algorithm type, the type of the underlying OTS algorithm, and the key ID. + */ +typedef struct { + unsigned char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(I_key_identifier[MBEDTLS_LMOTS_I_KEY_ID_LEN]); /*!< The key + identifier. */ + mbedtls_lmots_algorithm_type_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(otstype); /*!< The LM-OTS key type identifier as + per IANA. Only SHA256_N32_W8 is + currently supported. */ + mbedtls_lms_algorithm_type_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(type); /*!< The LMS key type identifier as per + IANA. Only SHA256_M32_H10 is currently + supported. */ +} mbedtls_lms_parameters_t; + +/** LMS public context structure. + * + * A LMS public key is the hash output that is the root of the Merkle tree, and + * the applicable parameter set + * + * The context must be initialized before it is used. A public key must either + * be imported or generated from a private context. + * + * \dot + * digraph lms_public_t { + * UNINITIALIZED -> INIT [label="init"]; + * HAVE_PUBLIC_KEY -> INIT [label="free"]; + * INIT -> HAVE_PUBLIC_KEY [label="import_public_key"]; + * INIT -> HAVE_PUBLIC_KEY [label="calculate_public_key from private key"]; + * HAVE_PUBLIC_KEY -> HAVE_PUBLIC_KEY [label="export_public_key"]; + * } + * \enddot + */ +typedef struct { + mbedtls_lms_parameters_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(params); + unsigned char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(T_1_pub_key)[MBEDTLS_LMS_M_NODE_BYTES_MAX]; /*!< The public key, in + the form of the Merkle tree root node. */ + unsigned char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(have_public_key); /*!< Whether the context contains a public key. + Boolean values only. */ +} mbedtls_lms_public_t; + + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_LMS_PRIVATE) +/** LMS private context structure. + * + * A LMS private key is a set of LMOTS private keys, an index to the next usable + * key, and the applicable parameter set. + * + * The context must be initialized before it is used. A public key must either + * be imported or generated from a private context. + * + * \dot + * digraph lms_public_t { + * UNINITIALIZED -> INIT [label="init"]; + * HAVE_PRIVATE_KEY -> INIT [label="free"]; + * INIT -> HAVE_PRIVATE_KEY [label="generate_private_key"]; + * } + * \enddot + */ +typedef struct { + mbedtls_lms_parameters_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(params); + uint32_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(q_next_usable_key); /*!< The index of the next OTS key that has not + been used. */ + mbedtls_lmots_private_t *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(ots_private_keys); /*!< The private key material. One OTS key + for each leaf node in the Merkle tree. NULL + when have_private_key is 0 and non-NULL otherwise. + is 2^MBEDTLS_LMS_H_TREE_HEIGHT(type) in length. */ + mbedtls_lmots_public_t *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(ots_public_keys); /*!< The OTS key public keys, used to + build the Merkle tree. NULL + when have_private_key is 0 and + non-NULL otherwise. + Is 2^MBEDTLS_LMS_H_TREE_HEIGHT(type) + in length. */ + unsigned char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(have_private_key); /*!< Whether the context contains a private key. + Boolean values only. */ +} mbedtls_lms_private_t; +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_LMS_PRIVATE) */ + +/** + * \brief This function initializes an LMS public context + * + * \param ctx The uninitialized LMS context that will then be + * initialized. + */ +void mbedtls_lms_public_init(mbedtls_lms_public_t *ctx); + +/** + * \brief This function uninitializes an LMS public context + * + * \param ctx The initialized LMS context that will then be + * uninitialized. + */ +void mbedtls_lms_public_free(mbedtls_lms_public_t *ctx); + +/** + * \brief This function imports an LMS public key into a + * public LMS context. + * + * \note Before this function is called, the context must + * have been initialized. + * + * \note See IETF RFC8554 for details of the encoding of + * this public key. + * + * \param ctx The initialized LMS context store the key in. + * \param key The buffer from which the key will be read. + * #MBEDTLS_LMS_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN bytes will be read from + * this. + * \param key_size The size of the key being imported. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return A non-zero error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_lms_import_public_key(mbedtls_lms_public_t *ctx, + const unsigned char *key, size_t key_size); + +/** + * \brief This function exports an LMS public key from a + * LMS public context that already contains a public + * key. + * + * \note Before this function is called, the context must + * have been initialized and the context must contain + * a public key. + * + * \note See IETF RFC8554 for details of the encoding of + * this public key. + * + * \param ctx The initialized LMS public context that contains + * the public key. + * \param key The buffer into which the key will be output. Must + * be at least #MBEDTLS_LMS_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN in size. + * \param key_size The size of the key buffer. + * \param key_len If not NULL, will be written with the size of the + * key. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return A non-zero error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_lms_export_public_key(const mbedtls_lms_public_t *ctx, + unsigned char *key, size_t key_size, + size_t *key_len); + +/** + * \brief This function verifies a LMS signature, using a + * LMS context that contains a public key. + * + * \note Before this function is called, the context must + * have been initialized and must contain a public key + * (either by import or generation). + * + * \param ctx The initialized LMS public context from which the + * public key will be read. + * \param msg The buffer from which the message will be read. + * \param msg_size The size of the message that will be read. + * \param sig The buf from which the signature will be read. + * #MBEDTLS_LMS_SIG_LEN bytes will be read from + * this. + * \param sig_size The size of the signature to be verified. + * + * \return \c 0 on successful verification. + * \return A non-zero error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_lms_verify(const mbedtls_lms_public_t *ctx, + const unsigned char *msg, size_t msg_size, + const unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_size); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_LMS_PRIVATE) +/** + * \brief This function initializes an LMS private context + * + * \param ctx The uninitialized LMS private context that will + * then be initialized. */ +void mbedtls_lms_private_init(mbedtls_lms_private_t *ctx); + +/** + * \brief This function uninitializes an LMS private context + * + * \param ctx The initialized LMS private context that will then + * be uninitialized. + */ +void mbedtls_lms_private_free(mbedtls_lms_private_t *ctx); + +/** + * \brief This function generates an LMS private key, and + * stores in into an LMS private context. + * + * \warning This function is **not intended for use in + * production**, due to as-yet unsolved problems with + * handling stateful keys. The API for this function + * may change considerably in future versions. + * + * \note The seed must have at least 256 bits of entropy. + * + * \param ctx The initialized LMOTS context to generate the key + * into. + * \param type The LMS parameter set identifier. + * \param otstype The LMOTS parameter set identifier. + * \param f_rng The RNG function to be used to generate the key ID. + * \param p_rng The RNG context to be passed to f_rng + * \param seed The seed used to deterministically generate the + * key. + * \param seed_size The length of the seed. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return A non-zero error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_lms_generate_private_key(mbedtls_lms_private_t *ctx, + mbedtls_lms_algorithm_type_t type, + mbedtls_lmots_algorithm_type_t otstype, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng, const unsigned char *seed, + size_t seed_size); + +/** + * \brief This function calculates an LMS public key from a + * LMS context that already contains a private key. + * + * \note Before this function is called, the context must + * have been initialized and the context must contain + * a private key. + * + * \param ctx The initialized LMS public context to calculate the key + * from and store it into. + * + * \param priv_ctx The LMS private context to read the private key + * from. This must have been initialized and contain a + * private key. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return A non-zero error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_lms_calculate_public_key(mbedtls_lms_public_t *ctx, + const mbedtls_lms_private_t *priv_ctx); + +/** + * \brief This function creates a LMS signature, using a + * LMS context that contains unused private keys. + * + * \warning This function is **not intended for use in + * production**, due to as-yet unsolved problems with + * handling stateful keys. The API for this function + * may change considerably in future versions. + * + * \note Before this function is called, the context must + * have been initialized and must contain a private + * key. + * + * \note Each of the LMOTS private keys inside a LMS private + * key can only be used once. If they are reused, then + * attackers may be able to forge signatures with that + * key. This is all handled transparently, but it is + * important to not perform copy operations on LMS + * contexts that contain private key material. + * + * \param ctx The initialized LMS private context from which the + * private key will be read. + * \param f_rng The RNG function to be used for signature + * generation. + * \param p_rng The RNG context to be passed to f_rng + * \param msg The buffer from which the message will be read. + * \param msg_size The size of the message that will be read. + * \param sig The buf into which the signature will be stored. + * Must be at least #MBEDTLS_LMS_SIG_LEN in size. + * \param sig_size The size of the buffer the signature will be + * written into. + * \param sig_len If not NULL, will be written with the size of the + * signature. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return A non-zero error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_lms_sign(mbedtls_lms_private_t *ctx, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng, const unsigned char *msg, + unsigned int msg_size, unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_size, + size_t *sig_len); +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_LMS_PRIVATE) */ + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_LMS_H */ diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/config.h b/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/mbedtls_config.h similarity index 76% rename from thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/config.h rename to thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/mbedtls_config.h index 4842fd494c9b..35921412c6e6 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/config.h +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/mbedtls_config.h @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ /** - * \file config.h + * \file mbedtls_config.h * * \brief Configuration options (set of defines) * @@ -12,12 +12,14 @@ * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later */ -#ifndef MBEDTLS_CONFIG_H -#define MBEDTLS_CONFIG_H - -#if defined(_MSC_VER) && !defined(_CRT_SECURE_NO_DEPRECATE) -#define _CRT_SECURE_NO_DEPRECATE 1 -#endif +/** + * This is an optional version symbol that enables compatibility handling of + * config files. + * + * It is equal to the #MBEDTLS_VERSION_NUMBER of the Mbed TLS version that + * introduced the config format we want to be compatible with. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_CONFIG_VERSION 0x03000000 /** * \name SECTION: System support @@ -34,11 +36,14 @@ * Requires support for asm() in compiler. * * Used in: + * library/aesni.h * library/aria.c - * library/timing.c - * include/mbedtls/bn_mul.h + * library/bn_mul.h + * library/constant_time.c + * library/padlock.h * * Required by: + * MBEDTLS_AESCE_C * MBEDTLS_AESNI_C (on some platforms) * MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_C * @@ -244,6 +249,7 @@ * Uncomment a macro to enable alternate implementation of specific base * platform function */ +//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SETBUF_ALT //#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_EXIT_ALT //#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_TIME_ALT //#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_FPRINTF_ALT @@ -252,6 +258,7 @@ //#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_VSNPRINTF_ALT //#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NV_SEED_ALT //#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SETUP_TEARDOWN_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_MS_TIME_ALT /** * Uncomment the macro to let Mbed TLS use your alternate implementation of @@ -274,21 +281,24 @@ /** * Uncomment the macro to let Mbed TLS use your alternate implementation of - * mbedtls_platform_zeroize(). This replaces the default implementation in - * platform_util.c. - * - * mbedtls_platform_zeroize() is a widely used function across the library to - * zero a block of memory. The implementation is expected to be secure in the - * sense that it has been written to prevent the compiler from removing calls - * to mbedtls_platform_zeroize() as part of redundant code elimination - * optimizations. However, it is difficult to guarantee that calls to - * mbedtls_platform_zeroize() will not be optimized by the compiler as older - * versions of the C language standards do not provide a secure implementation - * of memset(). Therefore, MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_ZEROIZE_ALT enables users to - * configure their own implementation of mbedtls_platform_zeroize(), for - * example by using directives specific to their compiler, features from newer - * C standards (e.g using memset_s() in C11) or calling a secure memset() from - * their system (e.g explicit_bzero() in BSD). + * mbedtls_platform_zeroize(), to wipe sensitive data in memory. This replaces + * the default implementation in platform_util.c. + * + * By default, the library uses a system function such as memset_s() + * (optional feature of C11), explicit_bzero() (BSD and compatible), or + * SecureZeroMemory (Windows). If no such function is detected, the library + * falls back to a plain C implementation. Compilers are technically + * permitted to optimize this implementation out, meaning that the memory is + * not actually wiped. The library tries to prevent that, but the C language + * makes it impossible to guarantee that the memory will always be wiped. + * + * If your platform provides a guaranteed method to wipe memory which + * `platform_util.c` does not detect, define this macro to the name of + * a function that takes two arguments, a `void *` pointer and a length, + * and wipes that many bytes starting at the specified address. For example, + * if your platform has explicit_bzero() but `platform_util.c` does not + * detect its presence, define `MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_ZEROIZE_ALT` to be + * `explicit_bzero` to use that function as mbedtls_platform_zeroize(). */ //#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_ZEROIZE_ALT @@ -319,72 +329,6 @@ */ //#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED -/** - * \def MBEDTLS_CHECK_PARAMS - * - * This configuration option controls whether the library validates more of - * the parameters passed to it. - * - * When this flag is not defined, the library only attempts to validate an - * input parameter if: (1) they may come from the outside world (such as the - * network, the filesystem, etc.) or (2) not validating them could result in - * internal memory errors such as overflowing a buffer controlled by the - * library. On the other hand, it doesn't attempt to validate parameters whose - * values are fully controlled by the application (such as pointers). - * - * When this flag is defined, the library additionally attempts to validate - * parameters that are fully controlled by the application, and should always - * be valid if the application code is fully correct and trusted. - * - * For example, when a function accepts as input a pointer to a buffer that may - * contain untrusted data, and its documentation mentions that this pointer - * must not be NULL: - * - The pointer is checked to be non-NULL only if this option is enabled. - * - The content of the buffer is always validated. - * - * When this flag is defined, if a library function receives a parameter that - * is invalid: - * 1. The function will invoke the macro MBEDTLS_PARAM_FAILED(). - * 2. If MBEDTLS_PARAM_FAILED() did not terminate the program, the function - * will immediately return. If the function returns an Mbed TLS error code, - * the error code in this case is MBEDTLS_ERR_xxx_BAD_INPUT_DATA. - * - * When defining this flag, you also need to arrange a definition for - * MBEDTLS_PARAM_FAILED(). You can do this by any of the following methods: - * - By default, the library defines MBEDTLS_PARAM_FAILED() to call a - * function mbedtls_param_failed(), but the library does not define this - * function. If you do not make any other arrangements, you must provide - * the function mbedtls_param_failed() in your application. - * See `platform_util.h` for its prototype. - * - If you enable the macro #MBEDTLS_CHECK_PARAMS_ASSERT, then the - * library defines MBEDTLS_PARAM_FAILED(\c cond) to be `assert(cond)`. - * You can still supply an alternative definition of - * MBEDTLS_PARAM_FAILED(), which may call `assert`. - * - If you define a macro MBEDTLS_PARAM_FAILED() before including `config.h` - * or you uncomment the definition of MBEDTLS_PARAM_FAILED() in `config.h`, - * the library will call the macro that you defined and will not supply - * its own version. Note that if MBEDTLS_PARAM_FAILED() calls `assert`, - * you need to enable #MBEDTLS_CHECK_PARAMS_ASSERT so that library source - * files include ``. - * - * Uncomment to enable validation of application-controlled parameters. - */ -//#define MBEDTLS_CHECK_PARAMS - -/** - * \def MBEDTLS_CHECK_PARAMS_ASSERT - * - * Allow MBEDTLS_PARAM_FAILED() to call `assert`, and make it default to - * `assert`. This macro is only used if #MBEDTLS_CHECK_PARAMS is defined. - * - * If this macro is not defined, then MBEDTLS_PARAM_FAILED() defaults to - * calling a function mbedtls_param_failed(). See the documentation of - * #MBEDTLS_CHECK_PARAMS for details. - * - * Uncomment to allow MBEDTLS_PARAM_FAILED() to call `assert`. - */ -//#define MBEDTLS_CHECK_PARAMS_ASSERT - /** \} name SECTION: System support */ /** @@ -398,7 +342,7 @@ /** * \def MBEDTLS_TIMING_ALT * - * Uncomment to provide your own alternate implementation for mbedtls_timing_hardclock(), + * Uncomment to provide your own alternate implementation for * mbedtls_timing_get_timer(), mbedtls_set_alarm(), mbedtls_set/get_delay() * * Only works if you have MBEDTLS_TIMING_C enabled. @@ -427,16 +371,14 @@ * Uncomment a macro to enable alternate implementation of the corresponding * module. * - * \warning MD2, MD4, MD5, ARC4, DES and SHA-1 are considered weak and their + * \warning MD5, DES and SHA-1 are considered weak and their * use constitutes a security risk. If possible, we recommend * avoiding dependencies on them, and considering stronger message * digests and ciphers instead. * */ //#define MBEDTLS_AES_ALT -//#define MBEDTLS_ARC4_ALT //#define MBEDTLS_ARIA_ALT -//#define MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_ALT //#define MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_ALT //#define MBEDTLS_CCM_ALT //#define MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_ALT @@ -447,8 +389,6 @@ //#define MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_ALT //#define MBEDTLS_GCM_ALT //#define MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_ALT -//#define MBEDTLS_MD2_ALT -//#define MBEDTLS_MD4_ALT //#define MBEDTLS_MD5_ALT //#define MBEDTLS_POLY1305_ALT //#define MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_ALT @@ -456,7 +396,6 @@ //#define MBEDTLS_SHA1_ALT //#define MBEDTLS_SHA256_ALT //#define MBEDTLS_SHA512_ALT -//#define MBEDTLS_XTEA_ALT /* * When replacing the elliptic curve module, please consider, that it is @@ -470,7 +409,7 @@ //#define MBEDTLS_ECP_ALT /** - * \def MBEDTLS_MD2_PROCESS_ALT + * \def MBEDTLS_SHA256_PROCESS_ALT * * MBEDTLS__FUNCTION_NAME__ALT: Uncomment a macro to let Mbed TLS use you * alternate core implementation of symmetric crypto or hash function. Keep in @@ -485,12 +424,6 @@ * of mbedtls_sha1_context, so your implementation of mbedtls_sha1_process must be compatible * with this definition. * - * \note Because of a signature change, the core AES encryption and decryption routines are - * currently named mbedtls_aes_internal_encrypt and mbedtls_aes_internal_decrypt, - * respectively. When setting up alternative implementations, these functions should - * be overridden, but the wrapper functions mbedtls_aes_decrypt and mbedtls_aes_encrypt - * must stay untouched. - * * \note If you use the AES_xxx_ALT macros, then it is recommended to also set * MBEDTLS_AES_ROM_TABLES in order to help the linker garbage-collect the AES * tables. @@ -498,7 +431,7 @@ * Uncomment a macro to enable alternate implementation of the corresponding * function. * - * \warning MD2, MD4, MD5, DES and SHA-1 are considered weak and their use + * \warning MD5, DES and SHA-1 are considered weak and their use * constitutes a security risk. If possible, we recommend avoiding * dependencies on them, and considering stronger message digests * and ciphers instead. @@ -509,13 +442,9 @@ * alternative implementations should use the RNG only for generating * the ephemeral key and nothing else. If this is not possible, then * MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC should be disabled and an alternative - * implementation should be provided for mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det_ext() - * (and for mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det() too if backward compatibility is - * desirable). + * implementation should be provided for mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det_ext(). * */ -//#define MBEDTLS_MD2_PROCESS_ALT -//#define MBEDTLS_MD4_PROCESS_ALT //#define MBEDTLS_MD5_PROCESS_ALT //#define MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_PROCESS_ALT //#define MBEDTLS_SHA1_PROCESS_ALT @@ -599,23 +528,6 @@ //#define MBEDTLS_ECP_RANDOMIZE_MXZ_ALT //#define MBEDTLS_ECP_NORMALIZE_MXZ_ALT -/** - * \def MBEDTLS_TEST_NULL_ENTROPY - * - * Enables testing and use of Mbed TLS without any configured entropy sources. - * This permits use of the library on platforms before an entropy source has - * been integrated (see for example the MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_HARDWARE_ALT or the - * MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_NV_SEED switches). - * - * WARNING! This switch MUST be disabled in production builds, and is suitable - * only for development. - * Enabling the switch negates any security provided by the library. - * - * Requires MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C, MBEDTLS_NO_DEFAULT_ENTROPY_SOURCES - * - */ -//#define MBEDTLS_TEST_NULL_ENTROPY - /** * \def MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_HARDWARE_ALT * @@ -623,7 +535,8 @@ * hardware entropy collector. * * Your function must be called \c mbedtls_hardware_poll(), have the same - * prototype as declared in entropy_poll.h, and accept NULL as first argument. + * prototype as declared in library/entropy_poll.h, and accept NULL as first + * argument. * * Uncomment to use your own hardware entropy collector. */ @@ -645,7 +558,6 @@ * performance if ROM access is slower than RAM access. * * This option is independent of \c MBEDTLS_AES_FEWER_TABLES. - * */ //#define MBEDTLS_AES_ROM_TABLES @@ -667,10 +579,40 @@ * depends on the system and memory details. * * This option is independent of \c MBEDTLS_AES_ROM_TABLES. - * */ //#define MBEDTLS_AES_FEWER_TABLES +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH + * + * Use only 128-bit keys in AES operations to save ROM. + * + * Uncomment this macro to remove support for AES operations that use 192- + * or 256-bit keys. + * + * Uncommenting this macro reduces the size of AES code by ~300 bytes + * on v8-M/Thumb2. + * + * Module: library/aes.c + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_AES_C + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH + +/* + * Disable plain C implementation for AES. + * + * When the plain C implementation is enabled, and an implementation using a + * special CPU feature (such as MBEDTLS_AESCE_C) is also enabled, runtime + * detection will be used to select between them. + * + * If only one implementation is present, runtime detection will not be used. + * This configuration will crash at runtime if running on a CPU without the + * necessary features. It will not build unless at least one of MBEDTLS_AESCE_C + * and/or MBEDTLS_AESNI_C is enabled & present in the build. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_AES_USE_HARDWARE_ONLY + /** * \def MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_SMALL_MEMORY * @@ -745,8 +687,7 @@ * Warning: Only do so when you know what you are doing. This allows for * encryption or channels without any security! * - * Requires MBEDTLS_ENABLE_WEAK_CIPHERSUITES as well to enable - * the following ciphersuites: + * To enable the following ciphersuites: * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA @@ -790,61 +731,11 @@ /** \def MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY * * Uncomment this macro to use a 128-bit key in the CTR_DRBG module. - * By default, CTR_DRBG uses a 256-bit key. + * Without this, CTR_DRBG uses a 256-bit key + * unless \c MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH is set. */ //#define MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY -/** - * \def MBEDTLS_ENABLE_WEAK_CIPHERSUITES - * - * Enable weak ciphersuites in SSL / TLS. - * Warning: Only do so when you know what you are doing. This allows for - * channels with virtually no security at all! - * - * This enables the following ciphersuites: - * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA - * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA - * - * Uncomment this macro to enable weak ciphersuites - * - * \warning DES is considered a weak cipher and its use constitutes a - * security risk. We recommend considering stronger ciphers instead. - */ -//#define MBEDTLS_ENABLE_WEAK_CIPHERSUITES - -/** - * \def MBEDTLS_REMOVE_ARC4_CIPHERSUITES - * - * Remove RC4 ciphersuites by default in SSL / TLS. - * This flag removes the ciphersuites based on RC4 from the default list as - * returned by mbedtls_ssl_list_ciphersuites(). However, it is still possible to - * enable (some of) them with mbedtls_ssl_conf_ciphersuites() by including them - * explicitly. - * - * Uncomment this macro to remove RC4 ciphersuites by default. - */ -#define MBEDTLS_REMOVE_ARC4_CIPHERSUITES - -/** - * \def MBEDTLS_REMOVE_3DES_CIPHERSUITES - * - * Remove 3DES ciphersuites by default in SSL / TLS. - * This flag removes the ciphersuites based on 3DES from the default list as - * returned by mbedtls_ssl_list_ciphersuites(). However, it is still possible - * to enable (some of) them with mbedtls_ssl_conf_ciphersuites() by including - * them explicitly. - * - * A man-in-the-browser attacker can recover authentication tokens sent through - * a TLS connection using a 3DES based cipher suite (see "On the Practical - * (In-)Security of 64-bit Block Ciphers" by Karthikeyan Bhargavan and Gaëtan - * Leurent, see https://sweet32.info/SWEET32_CCS16.pdf). If this attack falls - * in your threat model or you are unsure, then you should keep this option - * enabled to remove 3DES based cipher suites. - * - * Comment this macro to keep 3DES in the default ciphersuite list. - */ -#define MBEDTLS_REMOVE_3DES_CIPHERSUITES - /** * Enable the verified implementations of ECDH primitives from Project Everest * (currently only Curve25519). This feature changes the layout of ECDH @@ -892,28 +783,6 @@ */ #define MBEDTLS_ECP_NIST_OPTIM -/** - * \def MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG - * - * When this option is disabled, mbedtls_ecp_mul() will make use of an - * internal RNG when called with a NULL \c f_rng argument, in order to protect - * against some side-channel attacks. - * - * This protection introduces a dependency of the ECP module on one of the - * DRBG modules. For very constrained implementations that don't require this - * protection (for example, because you're only doing signature verification, - * so not manipulating any secret, or because local/physical side-channel - * attacks are outside your threat model), it might be desirable to get rid of - * that dependency. - * - * \warning Enabling this option makes some uses of ECP vulnerable to some - * side-channel attacks. Only enable it if you know that's not a problem for - * your use case. - * - * Uncomment this macro to disable some counter-measures in ECP. - */ -//#define MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG - /** * \def MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE * @@ -943,7 +812,7 @@ * ECDHE-ECDSA key exchange (not other key exchanges) to make all ECC * computations restartable: * - ECDH operations from the key exchange, only for Short Weierstrass - * curves; + * curves, only when MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO is not enabled. * - verification of the server's key exchange signature; * - verification of the server's certificate chain; * - generation of the client's signature if client authentication is used, @@ -953,10 +822,15 @@ * mbedtls_ssl_handshake(), can now return * MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS. * + * \note When this option and MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO are both enabled, + * restartable operations in PK, X.509 and TLS (see above) are not + * using PSA. On the other hand, ECDH computations in TLS are using + * PSA, and are not restartable. These are temporary limitations that + * should be lifted in the future. + * * \note This option only works with the default software implementation of * elliptic curve functionality. It is incompatible with - * MBEDTLS_ECP_ALT, MBEDTLS_ECDH_XXX_ALT, MBEDTLS_ECDSA_XXX_ALT, - * MBEDTLS_ECDH_LEGACY_CONTEXT, and MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO. + * MBEDTLS_ECP_ALT, MBEDTLS_ECDH_XXX_ALT, MBEDTLS_ECDSA_XXX_ALT. * * Requires: MBEDTLS_ECP_C * @@ -965,32 +839,12 @@ //#define MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE /** - * \def MBEDTLS_ECDH_LEGACY_CONTEXT - * - * Use a backward compatible ECDH context. - * - * Mbed TLS supports two formats for ECDH contexts (#mbedtls_ecdh_context - * defined in `ecdh.h`). For most applications, the choice of format makes - * no difference, since all library functions can work with either format, - * except that the new format is incompatible with MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE. - - * The new format used when this option is disabled is smaller - * (56 bytes on a 32-bit platform). In future versions of the library, it - * will support alternative implementations of ECDH operations. - * The new format is incompatible with applications that access - * context fields directly and with restartable ECP operations. - * - * Define this macro if you enable MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE or if you - * want to access ECDH context fields directly. Otherwise you should - * comment out this macro definition. - * - * This option has no effect if #MBEDTLS_ECDH_C is not enabled. + * Uncomment to enable using new bignum code in the ECC modules. * - * \note This configuration option is experimental. Future versions of the - * library may modify the way the ECDH context layout is configured - * and may modify the layout of the new context type. + * \warning This is currently experimental, incomplete and therefore should not + * be used in production. */ -#define MBEDTLS_ECDH_LEGACY_CONTEXT +//#define MBEDTLS_ECP_WITH_MPI_UINT /** * \def MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC @@ -1023,8 +877,6 @@ * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 - * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA - * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA */ #define MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED @@ -1047,8 +899,6 @@ * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 - * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA - * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA * * \warning Using DHE constitutes a security risk as it * is not possible to validate custom DH parameters. @@ -1064,7 +914,7 @@ * * Enable the ECDHE-PSK based ciphersuite modes in SSL / TLS. * - * Requires: MBEDTLS_ECDH_C + * Requires: MBEDTLS_ECDH_C or (MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO and PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH) * * This enables the following ciphersuites (if other requisites are * enabled as well): @@ -1074,8 +924,6 @@ * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 - * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA - * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA */ #define MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED @@ -1099,8 +947,6 @@ * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 - * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA - * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA */ #define MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED @@ -1126,9 +972,6 @@ * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA - * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA - * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA - * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5 */ #define MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED @@ -1154,7 +997,6 @@ * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA - * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA * * \warning Using DHE constitutes a security risk as it * is not possible to validate custom DH parameters. @@ -1170,7 +1012,9 @@ * * Enable the ECDHE-RSA based ciphersuite modes in SSL / TLS. * - * Requires: MBEDTLS_ECDH_C, MBEDTLS_RSA_C, MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15, + * Requires: MBEDTLS_ECDH_C or (MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO and PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH) + * MBEDTLS_RSA_C + * MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 * MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C * * This enables the following ciphersuites (if other requisites are @@ -1185,8 +1029,6 @@ * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 - * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA - * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA */ #define MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED @@ -1195,7 +1037,9 @@ * * Enable the ECDHE-ECDSA based ciphersuite modes in SSL / TLS. * - * Requires: MBEDTLS_ECDH_C, MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C, MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C, + * Requires: MBEDTLS_ECDH_C or (MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO and PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH) + * MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C or (MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO and PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA) + * MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C * * This enables the following ciphersuites (if other requisites are * enabled as well): @@ -1209,8 +1053,6 @@ * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 - * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA - * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA */ #define MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED @@ -1219,12 +1061,12 @@ * * Enable the ECDH-ECDSA based ciphersuite modes in SSL / TLS. * - * Requires: MBEDTLS_ECDH_C, MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C, MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C + * Requires: MBEDTLS_ECDH_C or (MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO and PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH) + * MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C or (MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO and PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA) + * MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C * * This enables the following ciphersuites (if other requisites are * enabled as well): - * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA - * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 @@ -1243,12 +1085,12 @@ * * Enable the ECDH-RSA based ciphersuite modes in SSL / TLS. * - * Requires: MBEDTLS_ECDH_C, MBEDTLS_RSA_C, MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C + * Requires: MBEDTLS_ECDH_C or (MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO and PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH) + * MBEDTLS_RSA_C + * MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C * * This enables the following ciphersuites (if other requisites are * enabled as well): - * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA - * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 @@ -1271,10 +1113,14 @@ * Thread v1.0.0 specification; incompatible changes to the specification * might still happen. For this reason, this is disabled by default. * - * Requires: MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_C - * MBEDTLS_SHA256_C + * Requires: MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_C or (MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO and PSA_WANT_ALG_JPAKE) + * SHA-256 (via MBEDTLS_SHA256_C or a PSA driver) * MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED * + * \warning If SHA-256 is provided only by a PSA driver, you must call + * psa_crypto_init() before the first hanshake (even if + * MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO is disabled). + * * This enables the following ciphersuites (if other requisites are * enabled as well): * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECJPAKE_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 @@ -1295,6 +1141,19 @@ */ #define MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_EC_EXTENDED +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_EC_COMPRESSED + * + * Enable the support for parsing public keys of type Short Weierstrass + * (MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP_XXX and MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP_XXX) which are using the + * compressed point format. This parsing is done through ECP module's functions. + * + * \note As explained in the description of MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_COMPRESSED (in ecp.h) + * the only unsupported curves are MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1 and + * MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_EC_COMPRESSED + /** * \def MBEDTLS_ERROR_STRERROR_DUMMY * @@ -1329,8 +1188,7 @@ /** * \def MBEDTLS_NO_DEFAULT_ENTROPY_SOURCES * - * Do not add default entropy sources. These are the platform specific, - * mbedtls_timing_hardclock and HAVEGE based poll functions. + * Do not add default entropy sources in mbedtls_entropy_init(). * * This is useful to have more control over the added entropy sources in an * application. @@ -1402,7 +1260,7 @@ * which is currently hard-coded to be int32_t. * * Note that this option is meant for internal use only and may be removed - * without notice. It is incompatible with MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO. + * without notice. */ //#define MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_KEY_ID_ENCODES_OWNER @@ -1456,7 +1314,10 @@ * * Enable support for PKCS#1 v2.1 encoding. * - * Requires: MBEDTLS_MD_C, MBEDTLS_RSA_C + * Requires: MBEDTLS_RSA_C + * + * \warning If using a hash that is only provided by PSA drivers, you must + * call psa_crypto_init() before doing any PKCS#1 v2.1 operation. * * This enables support for RSAES-OAEP and RSASSA-PSS operations. */ @@ -1494,17 +1355,6 @@ */ //#define MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT -/** \def MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVERS - * - * Enable support for the experimental PSA crypto driver interface. - * - * Requires: MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C - * - * \warning This interface is experimental and may change or be removed - * without notice. - */ -//#define MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVERS - /** \def MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG * * Make the PSA Crypto module use an external random generator provided @@ -1551,12 +1401,60 @@ * NSPE (Non-Secure Process Environment) and an SPE (Secure Process * Environment). * + * If you enable this option, your build environment must include a header + * file `"crypto_spe.h"` (either in the `psa` subdirectory of the Mbed TLS + * header files, or in another directory on the compiler's include search + * path). Alternatively, your platform may customize the header + * `psa/crypto_platform.h`, in which case it can skip or replace the + * inclusion of `"crypto_spe.h"`. + * * Module: library/psa_crypto.c * Requires: MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C * */ //#define MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SPM +/** + * Uncomment to enable p256-m. This is an alternative implementation of + * key generation, ECDH and (randomized) ECDSA on the curve SECP256R1. + * Compared to the default implementation: + * + * - p256-m has a much smaller code size and RAM footprint. + * - p256-m is only available via the PSA API. This includes the pk module + * when #MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO is enabled. + * - p256-m does not support deterministic ECDSA, EC-JPAKE, custom protocols + * over the core arithmetic, or deterministic derivation of keys. + * + * We recommend enabling this option if your application uses the PSA API + * and the only elliptic curve support it needs is ECDH and ECDSA over + * SECP256R1. + * + * If you enable this option, you do not need to enable any ECC-related + * MBEDTLS_xxx option. You do need to separately request support for the + * cryptographic mechanisms through the PSA API: + * - #MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C and #MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG for PSA-based + * configuration; + * - #MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO if you want to use p256-m from PK, X.509 or TLS; + * - #PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256; + * - #PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH and/or #PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA as needed; + * - #PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY, #PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_BASIC, + * #PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT, + * #PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT and/or + * #PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE as needed. + * + * \note To benefit from the smaller code size of p256-m, make sure that you + * do not enable any ECC-related option not supported by p256-m: this + * would cause the built-in ECC implementation to be built as well, in + * order to provide the required option. + * Make sure #PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA, #PSA_WANT_ALG_JPAKE and + * #PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_DERIVE, and curves other than + * SECP256R1 are disabled as they are not supported by this driver. + * Also, avoid defining #MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_EC_COMPRESSED or + * #MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_EC_EXTENDED as those currently require a subset of + * the built-in ECC implementation, see docs/driver-only-builds.md. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_PSA_P256M_DRIVER_ENABLED + /** * \def MBEDTLS_PSA_INJECT_ENTROPY * @@ -1634,18 +1532,6 @@ */ //#define MBEDTLS_SHA512_SMALLER -/** - * \def MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 - * - * Disable the SHA-384 option of the SHA-512 module. Use this to save some - * code size on devices that don't use SHA-384. - * - * Requires: MBEDTLS_SHA512_C - * - * Uncomment to disable SHA-384 - */ -//#define MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 - /** * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_ALL_ALERT_MESSAGES * @@ -1660,36 +1546,18 @@ */ #define MBEDTLS_SSL_ALL_ALERT_MESSAGES -/** - * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_CHECKING - * - * Enable the function mbedtls_ssl_check_record() which can be used to check - * the validity and authenticity of an incoming record, to verify that it has - * not been seen before. These checks are performed without modifying the - * externally visible state of the SSL context. - * - * See mbedtls_ssl_check_record() for more information. - * - * Uncomment to enable support for record checking. - */ -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_CHECKING - /** * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID * - * Enable support for the DTLS Connection ID extension - * (version draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-05, - * https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-05) + * Enable support for the DTLS Connection ID (CID) extension, * which allows to identify DTLS connections across changes - * in the underlying transport. + * in the underlying transport. The CID functionality is described + * in RFC 9146. * * Setting this option enables the SSL APIs `mbedtls_ssl_set_cid()`, - * `mbedtls_ssl_get_peer_cid()` and `mbedtls_ssl_conf_cid()`. - * See the corresponding documentation for more information. - * - * \warning The Connection ID extension is still in draft state. - * We make no stability promises for the availability - * or the shape of the API controlled by this option. + * mbedtls_ssl_get_own_cid()`, `mbedtls_ssl_get_peer_cid()` and + * `mbedtls_ssl_conf_cid()`. See the corresponding documentation for + * more information. * * The maximum lengths of outgoing and incoming CIDs can be configured * through the options @@ -1700,7 +1568,30 @@ * * Uncomment to enable the Connection ID extension. */ -//#define MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID + + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID_COMPAT + * + * Defines whether RFC 9146 (default) or the legacy version + * (version draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-05, + * https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-05) + * is used. + * + * Set the value to 0 for the standard version, and + * 1 for the legacy draft version. + * + * \deprecated Support for the legacy version of the DTLS + * Connection ID feature is deprecated. Please + * switch to the standardized version defined + * in RFC 9146 enabled by utilizing + * MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID without use + * of MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID_COMPAT. + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID + */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID_COMPAT 0 /** * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE @@ -1710,6 +1601,7 @@ * module to perform private key operations instead of performing the * operation inside the library. * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ //#define MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE @@ -1768,9 +1660,7 @@ * * This only affects CBC ciphersuites, and is useless if none is defined. * - * Requires: MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 or - * MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 or - * MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 + * Requires: MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 * * Comment this macro to disable support for Encrypt-then-MAC */ @@ -1786,32 +1676,12 @@ * renegotiation), since it actually fixes a more fundamental issue in the * original SSL/TLS design, and has implications beyond Triple Handshake. * - * Requires: MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 or - * MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 or - * MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 + * Requires: MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 * * Comment this macro to disable support for Extended Master Secret. */ #define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET -/** - * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_FALLBACK_SCSV - * - * Enable support for RFC 7507: Fallback Signaling Cipher Suite Value (SCSV) - * for Preventing Protocol Downgrade Attacks. - * - * For servers, it is recommended to always enable this, unless you support - * only one version of TLS, or know for sure that none of your clients - * implements a fallback strategy. - * - * For clients, you only need this if you're using a fallback strategy, which - * is not recommended in the first place, unless you absolutely need it to - * interoperate with buggy (version-intolerant) servers. - * - * Comment this macro to disable support for FALLBACK_SCSV - */ -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_FALLBACK_SCSV - /** * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE * @@ -1829,36 +1699,13 @@ * still ensure that certificates do not change during renegotiation, * for example by keeping a hash of the peer's certificate. * + * \note This option is required if MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 is set. + * * Comment this macro to disable storing the peer's certificate * after the handshake. */ #define MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE -/** - * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL - * - * Enable hooking functions in SSL module for hardware acceleration of - * individual records. - * - * \deprecated This option is deprecated and will be removed in a future - * version of Mbed TLS. - * - * Uncomment this macro to enable hooking functions. - */ -//#define MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL - -/** - * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING - * - * Enable 1/n-1 record splitting for CBC mode in SSLv3 and TLS 1.0. - * - * This is a countermeasure to the BEAST attack, which also minimizes the risk - * of interoperability issues compared to sending 0-length records. - * - * Comment this macro to disable 1/n-1 record splitting. - */ -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING - /** * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION * @@ -1870,6 +1717,8 @@ * it has been associated with security issues in the past and is easy to * misuse/misunderstand. * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 + * * Comment this to disable support for renegotiation. * * \note Even if this option is disabled, both client and server are aware @@ -1882,117 +1731,160 @@ #define MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION /** - * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_SUPPORT_SSLV2_CLIENT_HELLO + * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH + * + * Enable support for RFC 6066 max_fragment_length extension in SSL. + * + * Comment this macro to disable support for the max_fragment_length extension + */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT * - * Enable support for receiving and parsing SSLv2 Client Hello messages for the - * SSL Server module (MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C). + * Enable support for RFC 8449 record_size_limit extension in SSL (TLS 1.3 only). * - * \deprecated This option is deprecated and will be removed in a future - * version of Mbed TLS. + * Requires: MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 * - * Uncomment this macro to enable support for SSLv2 Client Hello messages. + * Uncomment this macro to enable support for the record_size_limit extension */ -//#define MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_SUPPORT_SSLV2_CLIENT_HELLO +//#define MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT /** - * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_RESPECT_CLIENT_PREFERENCE + * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 * - * Pick the ciphersuite according to the client's preferences rather than ours - * in the SSL Server module (MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C). + * Enable support for TLS 1.2 (and DTLS 1.2 if DTLS is enabled). + * + * Requires: Without MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO: MBEDTLS_MD_C and + * (MBEDTLS_SHA256_C or MBEDTLS_SHA384_C or + * SHA-256 or SHA-512 provided by a PSA driver) + * With MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO: + * PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256 or PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384 * - * Uncomment this macro to respect client's ciphersuite order + * \warning If building with MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO, or if the hash(es) used + * are only provided by PSA drivers, you must call psa_crypto_init() before + * doing any TLS operations. + * + * Comment this macro to disable support for TLS 1.2 / DTLS 1.2 */ -//#define MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_RESPECT_CLIENT_PREFERENCE +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 /** - * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH + * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 * - * Enable support for RFC 6066 max_fragment_length extension in SSL. + * Enable support for TLS 1.3. * - * Comment this macro to disable support for the max_fragment_length extension + * \note See docs/architecture/tls13-support.md for a description of the TLS + * 1.3 support that this option enables. + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE + * Requires: MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C + * + * \note TLS 1.3 uses PSA crypto for cryptographic operations that are + * directly performed by TLS 1.3 code. As a consequence, you must + * call psa_crypto_init() before the first TLS 1.3 handshake. + * + * \note Cryptographic operations performed indirectly via another module + * (X.509, PK) or by code shared with TLS 1.2 (record protection, + * running handshake hash) only use PSA crypto if + * #MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO is enabled. + * + * Uncomment this macro to enable the support for TLS 1.3. */ -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 /** - * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 + * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE * - * Enable support for SSL 3.0. + * Enable TLS 1.3 middlebox compatibility mode. * - * Requires: MBEDTLS_MD5_C - * MBEDTLS_SHA1_C + * As specified in Section D.4 of RFC 8446, TLS 1.3 offers a compatibility + * mode to make a TLS 1.3 connection more likely to pass through middle boxes + * expecting TLS 1.2 traffic. * - * \deprecated This option is deprecated and will be removed in a future - * version of Mbed TLS. + * Turning on the compatibility mode comes at the cost of a few added bytes + * on the wire, but it doesn't affect compatibility with TLS 1.3 implementations + * that don't use it. Therefore, unless transmission bandwidth is critical and + * you know that middlebox compatibility issues won't occur, it is therefore + * recommended to set this option. + * + * Comment to disable compatibility mode for TLS 1.3. If + * MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 is not enabled, this option does not have any + * effect on the build. * - * Comment this macro to disable support for SSL 3.0 */ -//#define MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE /** - * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 + * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_ENABLED * - * Enable support for TLS 1.0. + * Enable TLS 1.3 PSK key exchange mode. * - * Requires: MBEDTLS_MD5_C - * MBEDTLS_SHA1_C + * Comment to disable support for the PSK key exchange mode in TLS 1.3. If + * MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 is not enabled, this option does not have any + * effect on the build. * - * Comment this macro to disable support for TLS 1.0 */ -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_ENABLED /** - * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 + * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED + * + * Enable TLS 1.3 ephemeral key exchange mode. * - * Enable support for TLS 1.1 (and DTLS 1.0 if DTLS is enabled). + * Requires: PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH or PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH + * MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C + * and at least one of: + * MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C or (MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO and PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA) + * MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21 * - * Requires: MBEDTLS_MD5_C - * MBEDTLS_SHA1_C + * Comment to disable support for the ephemeral key exchange mode in TLS 1.3. + * If MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 is not enabled, this option does not have any + * effect on the build. * - * Comment this macro to disable support for TLS 1.1 / DTLS 1.0 */ -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED /** - * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 + * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED * - * Enable support for TLS 1.2 (and DTLS 1.2 if DTLS is enabled). + * Enable TLS 1.3 PSK ephemeral key exchange mode. * - * Requires: MBEDTLS_SHA1_C or MBEDTLS_SHA256_C or MBEDTLS_SHA512_C - * (Depends on ciphersuites) + * Requires: PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH or PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH + * + * Comment to disable support for the PSK ephemeral key exchange mode in + * TLS 1.3. If MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 is not enabled, this option does not + * have any effect on the build. * - * Comment this macro to disable support for TLS 1.2 / DTLS 1.2 */ -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED /** - * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL + * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA + * + * Enable support for RFC 8446 TLS 1.3 early data. + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS and either + * MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_ENABLED or + * MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED * - * This macro is used to selectively enable experimental parts - * of the code that contribute to the ongoing development of - * the prototype TLS 1.3 and DTLS 1.3 implementation, and provide - * no other purpose. + * Comment this to disable support for early data. If MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 + * is not enabled, this option does not have any effect on the build. * - * \warning TLS 1.3 and DTLS 1.3 aren't yet supported in Mbed TLS, - * and no feature exposed through this macro is part of the - * public API. In particular, features under the control - * of this macro are experimental and don't come with any - * stability guarantees. + * \note The maximum amount of early data can be set with + * MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_EARLY_DATA_SIZE. * - * Uncomment this macro to enable experimental and partial - * functionality specific to TLS 1.3. */ -//#define MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL +//#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA /** * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS * * Enable support for DTLS (all available versions). * - * Enable this and MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 to enable DTLS 1.0, - * and/or this and MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 to enable DTLS 1.2. + * Enable this and MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 to enable DTLS 1.2. * - * Requires: MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 - * or MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 + * Requires: MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 * * Comment this macro to disable support for DTLS */ @@ -2054,7 +1946,7 @@ * (see Section 5 of RFC 5764), are not handled by this feature. * Instead, after successful completion of a handshake negotiating * the use of DTLS-SRTP, the extended key exporter API - * mbedtls_ssl_conf_export_keys_ext_cb() should be used to implement + * mbedtls_ssl_conf_export_keys_cb() should be used to implement * the key exporter described in Section 4.2 of RFC 5764 and RFC 5705 * (this is implemented in the SSL example programs). * The resulting key should then be passed to an SRTP stack. @@ -2087,17 +1979,6 @@ */ #define MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CLIENT_PORT_REUSE -/** - * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_BADMAC_LIMIT - * - * Enable support for a limit of records with bad MAC. - * - * See mbedtls_ssl_conf_dtls_badmac_limit(). - * - * Requires: MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS - */ -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_BADMAC_LIMIT - /** * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS * @@ -2112,16 +1993,6 @@ */ #define MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS -/** - * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_EXPORT_KEYS - * - * Enable support for exporting key block and master secret. - * This is required for certain users of TLS, e.g. EAP-TLS. - * - * Comment this macro to disable support for key export - */ -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXPORT_KEYS - /** * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION * @@ -2133,39 +2004,6 @@ */ #define MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION -/** - * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC - * - * Enable support for RFC 6066 truncated HMAC in SSL. - * - * Comment this macro to disable support for truncated HMAC in SSL - */ -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC - -/** - * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC_COMPAT - * - * Fallback to old (pre-2.7), non-conforming implementation of the truncated - * HMAC extension which also truncates the HMAC key. Note that this option is - * only meant for a transitory upgrade period and will be removed in a future - * version of the library. - * - * \warning The old implementation is non-compliant and has a security weakness - * (2^80 brute force attack on the HMAC key used for a single, - * uninterrupted connection). This should only be enabled temporarily - * when (1) the use of truncated HMAC is essential in order to save - * bandwidth, and (2) the peer is an Mbed TLS stack that doesn't use - * the fixed implementation yet (pre-2.7). - * - * \deprecated This option is deprecated and will be removed in a - * future version of Mbed TLS. - * - * Uncomment to fallback to old, non-compliant truncated HMAC implementation. - * - * Requires: MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC - */ -//#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC_COMPAT - /** * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH * @@ -2176,23 +2014,6 @@ */ //#define MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH -/** - * Allow SHA-1 in the default TLS configuration for TLS 1.2 handshake - * signature and ciphersuite selection. Without this build-time option, SHA-1 - * support must be activated explicitly through mbedtls_ssl_conf_sig_hashes. - * The use of SHA-1 in TLS <= 1.1 and in HMAC-SHA-1 is always allowed by - * default. At the time of writing, there is no practical attack on the use - * of SHA-1 in handshake signatures, hence this option is turned on by default - * to preserve compatibility with existing peers, but the general - * warning applies nonetheless: - * - * \warning SHA-1 is considered a weak message digest and its use constitutes - * a security risk. If possible, we recommend avoiding dependencies - * on it, and considering stronger message digests instead. - * - */ -//#define MBEDTLS_TLS_DEFAULT_ALLOW_SHA1_IN_KEY_EXCHANGE - /** * \def MBEDTLS_TEST_CONSTANT_FLOW_MEMSAN * @@ -2274,21 +2095,26 @@ /** * \def MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO * - * Make the X.509 and TLS library use PSA for cryptographic operations, and - * enable new APIs for using keys handled by PSA Crypto. + * Make the X.509 and TLS libraries use PSA for cryptographic operations as + * much as possible, and enable new APIs for using keys handled by PSA Crypto. * * \note Development of this option is currently in progress, and parts of Mbed * TLS's X.509 and TLS modules are not ported to PSA yet. However, these parts * will still continue to work as usual, so enabling this option should not * break backwards compatibility. * - * \note See docs/use-psa-crypto.md for a complete description of what this - * option currently does, and of parts that are not affected by it so far. + * \warning If you enable this option, you need to call `psa_crypto_init()` + * before calling any function from the SSL/TLS, X.509 or PK modules, except + * for the various mbedtls_xxx_init() functions which can be called at any time. + * + * \note An important and desirable effect of this option is that it allows + * PK, X.509 and TLS to take advantage of PSA drivers. For example, enabling + * this option is what allows use of drivers for ECDSA, ECDH and EC J-PAKE in + * those modules. However, note that even with this option disabled, some code + * in PK, X.509, TLS or the crypto library might still use PSA drivers, if it + * can determine it's safe to do so; currently that's the case for hashes. * - * \warning This option enables new Mbed TLS APIs which are currently - * considered experimental and may change in incompatible ways at any time. - * That is, the APIs enabled by this option are not covered by the usual - * promises of API stability. + * \note See docs/use-psa-crypto.md for a complete description this option. * * Requires: MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C. * @@ -2311,17 +2137,20 @@ * include/psa/crypto_config.h. The corresponding `MBEDTLS_XXX` settings are * automatically enabled if required (i.e. if no PSA driver provides the * mechanism). You may still freely enable additional `MBEDTLS_XXX` symbols - * in config.h. + * in mbedtls_config.h. * * If the symbol #MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG_FILE is defined, it specifies * an alternative header to include instead of include/psa/crypto_config.h. * - * If you enable this option and write your own configuration file, you must - * include mbedtls/config_psa.h in your configuration file. The default - * provided mbedtls/config.h contains the necessary inclusion. - * - * This feature is still experimental and is not ready for production since - * it is not completed. + * \warning This option is experimental, in that the set of `PSA_WANT_XXX` + * symbols is not completely finalized yet, and the configuration + * tooling is not ideally adapted to having two separate configuration + * files. + * Future minor releases of Mbed TLS may make minor changes to those + * symbols, but we will endeavor to provide a transition path. + * Nonetheless, this option is considered mature enough to use in + * production, as long as you accept that you may need to make + * minor changes to psa/crypto_config.h when upgrading Mbed TLS. */ //#define MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG @@ -2338,28 +2167,6 @@ */ #define MBEDTLS_VERSION_FEATURES -/** - * \def MBEDTLS_X509_ALLOW_EXTENSIONS_NON_V3 - * - * If set, the X509 parser will not break-off when parsing an X509 certificate - * and encountering an extension in a v1 or v2 certificate. - * - * Uncomment to prevent an error. - */ -//#define MBEDTLS_X509_ALLOW_EXTENSIONS_NON_V3 - -/** - * \def MBEDTLS_X509_ALLOW_UNSUPPORTED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION - * - * If set, the X509 parser will not break-off when parsing an X509 certificate - * and encountering an unknown critical extension. - * - * \warning Depending on your PKI use, enabling this can be a security risk! - * - * Uncomment to prevent an error. - */ -//#define MBEDTLS_X509_ALLOW_UNSUPPORTED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION - /** * \def MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK * @@ -2375,36 +2182,22 @@ * See the documentation of `mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_with_ca_cb()` and * `mbedtls_ssl_conf_ca_cb()` for more information. * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C + * * Uncomment to enable trusted certificate callbacks. */ //#define MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK /** - * \def MBEDTLS_X509_CHECK_KEY_USAGE - * - * Enable verification of the keyUsage extension (CA and leaf certificates). - * - * Disabling this avoids problems with mis-issued and/or misused - * (intermediate) CA and leaf certificates. - * - * \warning Depending on your PKI use, disabling this can be a security risk! - * - * Comment to skip keyUsage checking for both CA and leaf certificates. - */ -#define MBEDTLS_X509_CHECK_KEY_USAGE - -/** - * \def MBEDTLS_X509_CHECK_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE - * - * Enable verification of the extendedKeyUsage extension (leaf certificates). + * \def MBEDTLS_X509_REMOVE_INFO * - * Disabling this avoids problems with mis-issued and/or misused certificates. + * Disable mbedtls_x509_*_info() and related APIs. * - * \warning Depending on your PKI use, disabling this can be a security risk! - * - * Comment to skip extendedKeyUsage checking for certificates. + * Uncomment to omit mbedtls_x509_*_info(), as well as mbedtls_debug_print_crt() + * and other functions/constants only used by these functions, thus reducing + * the code footprint by several KB. */ -#define MBEDTLS_X509_CHECK_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE +//#define MBEDTLS_X509_REMOVE_INFO /** * \def MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT @@ -2412,34 +2205,11 @@ * Enable parsing and verification of X.509 certificates, CRLs and CSRS * signed with RSASSA-PSS (aka PKCS#1 v2.1). * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21 + * * Comment this macro to disallow using RSASSA-PSS in certificates. */ #define MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT - -/** - * \def MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT - * - * If set, the SSL/TLS module uses ZLIB to support compression and - * decompression of packet data. - * - * \warning TLS-level compression MAY REDUCE SECURITY! See for example the - * CRIME attack. Before enabling this option, you should examine with care if - * CRIME or similar exploits may be applicable to your use case. - * - * \note Currently compression can't be used with DTLS. - * - * \deprecated This feature is deprecated and will be removed - * in the next major revision of the library. - * - * Used in: library/ssl_tls.c - * library/ssl_cli.c - * library/ssl_srv.c - * - * This feature requires zlib library and headers to be present. - * - * Uncomment to enable use of ZLIB - */ -//#define MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT /** \} name SECTION: Mbed TLS feature support */ /** @@ -2455,7 +2225,7 @@ * Enable AES-NI support on x86-64 or x86-32. * * \note AESNI is only supported with certain compilers and target options: - * - Visual Studio 2013: supported. + * - Visual Studio: supported * - GCC, x86-64, target not explicitly supporting AESNI: * requires MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM. * - GCC, x86-32, target not explicitly supporting AESNI: @@ -2482,12 +2252,38 @@ #define MBEDTLS_AESNI_C /** - * \def MBEDTLS_AES_C + * \def MBEDTLS_AESCE_C * - * Enable the AES block cipher. + * Enable AES cryptographic extension support on Armv8. * - * Module: library/aes.c - * Caller: library/cipher.c + * Module: library/aesce.c + * Caller: library/aes.c + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_AES_C + * + * \warning Runtime detection only works on Linux. For non-Linux operating + * system, Armv8-A Cryptographic Extensions must be supported by + * the CPU when this option is enabled. + * + * \note Minimum compiler versions for this feature when targeting aarch64 + * are Clang 4.0; armclang 6.6; GCC 6.0; or MSVC 2019 version 16.11.2. + * Minimum compiler versions for this feature when targeting 32-bit + * Arm or Thumb are Clang 11.0; armclang 6.20; or GCC 6.0. + * + * \note \c CFLAGS must be set to a minimum of \c -march=armv8-a+crypto for + * armclang <= 6.9 + * + * This module adds support for the AES Armv8-A Cryptographic Extensions on Armv8 systems. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_AESCE_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_AES_C + * + * Enable the AES block cipher. + * + * Module: library/aes.c + * Caller: library/cipher.c * library/pem.c * library/ctr_drbg.c * @@ -2556,34 +2352,6 @@ */ #define MBEDTLS_AES_C -/** - * \def MBEDTLS_ARC4_C - * - * Enable the ARCFOUR stream cipher. - * - * Module: library/arc4.c - * Caller: library/cipher.c - * - * This module enables the following ciphersuites (if other requisites are - * enabled as well): - * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA - * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA - * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA - * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA - * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA - * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA - * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA - * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5 - * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA - * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA - * - * \warning ARC4 is considered a weak cipher and its use constitutes a - * security risk. If possible, we recommend avoiding dependencies on - * it, and considering stronger ciphers instead. - * - */ -#define MBEDTLS_ARC4_C - /** * \def MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C * @@ -2624,32 +2392,48 @@ */ #define MBEDTLS_BASE64_C +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT + * + * Remove decryption operation for AES, ARIA and Camellia block cipher. + * + * \note This feature is incompatible with insecure block cipher, + * MBEDTLS_DES_C, and cipher modes which always require decryption + * operation, MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC, MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS and + * MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C. When #MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG is enabled, + * this feature is incompatible with following supported PSA equivalence, + * PSA_WANT_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING, PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING, + * PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_PKCS7 and PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES. + * + * Module: library/aes.c + * library/aesce.c + * library/aesni.c + * library/aria.c + * library/camellia.c + * library/cipher.c + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT + /** * \def MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C * * Enable the multi-precision integer library. * * Module: library/bignum.c + * library/bignum_core.c + * library/bignum_mod.c + * library/bignum_mod_raw.c * Caller: library/dhm.c * library/ecp.c * library/ecdsa.c * library/rsa.c - * library/rsa_internal.c + * library/rsa_alt_helpers.c * library/ssl_tls.c * * This module is required for RSA, DHM and ECC (ECDH, ECDSA) support. */ #define MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C -/** - * \def MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C - * - * Enable the Blowfish block cipher. - * - * Module: library/blowfish.c - */ -#define MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C - /** * \def MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C * @@ -2755,7 +2539,7 @@ * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256 * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384 */ -//#define MBEDTLS_ARIA_C +#define MBEDTLS_ARIA_C /** * \def MBEDTLS_CCM_C @@ -2764,25 +2548,14 @@ * * Module: library/ccm.c * - * Requires: MBEDTLS_AES_C or MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C + * Requires: MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C, MBEDTLS_AES_C or MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C or + * MBEDTLS_ARIA_C * * This module enables the AES-CCM ciphersuites, if other requisites are * enabled as well. */ #define MBEDTLS_CCM_C -/** - * \def MBEDTLS_CERTS_C - * - * Enable the test certificates. - * - * Module: library/certs.c - * Caller: - * - * This module is used for testing (ssl_client/server). - */ -#define MBEDTLS_CERTS_C - /** * \def MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_C * @@ -2809,7 +2582,19 @@ * Enable the generic cipher layer. * * Module: library/cipher.c - * Caller: library/ssl_tls.c + * Caller: library/ccm.c + * library/cmac.c + * library/gcm.c + * library/nist_kw.c + * library/pkcs12.c + * library/pkcs5.c + * library/psa_crypto_aead.c + * library/psa_crypto_mac.c + * library/ssl_ciphersuites.c + * library/ssl_msg.c + * library/ssl_ticket.c (unless MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO is enabled) + * Auto-enabled by: MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C depending on which ciphers are enabled + * (see the documentation of that option for details). * * Uncomment to enable generic cipher wrappers. */ @@ -2828,10 +2613,10 @@ * * Module: library/cmac.c * - * Requires: MBEDTLS_AES_C or MBEDTLS_DES_C + * Requires: MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C, MBEDTLS_AES_C or MBEDTLS_DES_C * */ -//#define MBEDTLS_CMAC_C +#define MBEDTLS_CMAC_C /** * \def MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C @@ -2840,6 +2625,15 @@ * The CTR_DRBG generator uses AES-256 by default. * To use AES-128 instead, enable \c MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY above. * + * AES support can either be achived through builtin (MBEDTLS_AES_C) or PSA. + * Builtin is the default option when MBEDTLS_AES_C is defined otherwise PSA + * is used. + * + * \warning When using PSA, the user should call `psa_crypto_init()` before + * using any CTR_DRBG operation (except `mbedtls_ctr_drbg_init()`). + * + * \note AES-128 will be used if \c MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH is set. + * * \note To achieve a 256-bit security strength with CTR_DRBG, * you must use AES-256 *and* use sufficient entropy. * See ctr_drbg.h for more details. @@ -2847,7 +2641,9 @@ * Module: library/ctr_drbg.c * Caller: * - * Requires: MBEDTLS_AES_C + * Requires: MBEDTLS_AES_C or + * (PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES and PSA_WANT_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING and + * MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) * * This module provides the CTR_DRBG AES random number generator. */ @@ -2859,9 +2655,10 @@ * Enable the debug functions. * * Module: library/debug.c - * Caller: library/ssl_cli.c - * library/ssl_srv.c + * Caller: library/ssl_msg.c * library/ssl_tls.c + * library/ssl_tls12_*.c + * library/ssl_tls13_*.c * * This module provides debugging functions. */ @@ -2876,19 +2673,6 @@ * Caller: library/pem.c * library/cipher.c * - * This module enables the following ciphersuites (if other requisites are - * enabled as well): - * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA - * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA - * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA - * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA - * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA - * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA - * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA - * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA - * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA - * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA - * * PEM_PARSE uses DES/3DES for decrypting encrypted keys. * * \warning DES/3DES are considered weak ciphers and their use constitutes a @@ -2902,8 +2686,9 @@ * Enable the Diffie-Hellman-Merkle module. * * Module: library/dhm.c - * Caller: library/ssl_cli.c - * library/ssl_srv.c + * Caller: library/ssl_tls.c + * library/ssl*_client.c + * library/ssl*_server.c * * This module is used by the following key exchanges: * DHE-RSA, DHE-PSK @@ -2923,8 +2708,10 @@ * Enable the elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman library. * * Module: library/ecdh.c - * Caller: library/ssl_cli.c - * library/ssl_srv.c + * Caller: library/psa_crypto.c + * library/ssl_tls.c + * library/ssl*_client.c + * library/ssl*_server.c * * This module is used by the following key exchanges: * ECDHE-ECDSA, ECDHE-RSA, DHE-PSK @@ -2955,9 +2742,9 @@ * * Enable the elliptic curve J-PAKE library. * - * \warning This is currently experimental. EC J-PAKE support is based on the - * Thread v1.0.0 specification; incompatible changes to the specification - * might still happen. For this reason, this is disabled by default. + * \note EC J-PAKE support is based on the Thread v1.0.0 specification. + * It has not been reviewed for compliance with newer standards such as + * Thread v1.1 or RFC 8236. * * Module: library/ecjpake.c * Caller: @@ -2965,9 +2752,12 @@ * This module is used by the following key exchanges: * ECJPAKE * - * Requires: MBEDTLS_ECP_C, MBEDTLS_MD_C + * Requires: MBEDTLS_ECP_C and either MBEDTLS_MD_C or MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C + * + * \warning If using a hash that is only provided by PSA drivers, you must + * call psa_crypto_init() before doing any EC J-PAKE operations. */ -//#define MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_C +#define MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_C /** * \def MBEDTLS_ECP_C @@ -3016,7 +2806,8 @@ * * Module: library/gcm.c * - * Requires: MBEDTLS_AES_C or MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C or MBEDTLS_ARIA_C + * Requires: MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C, MBEDTLS_AES_C or MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C or + * MBEDTLS_ARIA_C * * This module enables the AES-GCM and CAMELLIA-GCM ciphersuites, if other * requisites are enabled as well. @@ -3024,27 +2815,20 @@ #define MBEDTLS_GCM_C /** - * \def MBEDTLS_HAVEGE_C + * \def MBEDTLS_GCM_LARGE_TABLE * - * Enable the HAVEGE random generator. + * Enable large pre-computed tables for Galois/Counter Mode (GCM). + * Can significantly increase throughput on systems without GCM hardware + * acceleration (e.g., AESNI, AESCE). * - * Warning: the HAVEGE random generator is not suitable for virtualized - * environments + * The mbedtls_gcm_context size will increase by 3840 bytes. + * The code size will increase by roughly 344 bytes. * - * Warning: the HAVEGE random generator is dependent on timing and specific - * processor traits. It is therefore not advised to use HAVEGE as - * your applications primary random generator or primary entropy pool - * input. As a secondary input to your entropy pool, it IS able add - * the (limited) extra entropy it provides. - * - * Module: library/havege.c - * Caller: - * - * Requires: MBEDTLS_TIMING_C + * Module: library/gcm.c * - * Uncomment to enable the HAVEGE random generator. + * Requires: MBEDTLS_GCM_C */ -//#define MBEDTLS_HAVEGE_C +//#define MBEDTLS_GCM_LARGE_TABLE /** * \def MBEDTLS_HKDF_C @@ -3076,63 +2860,76 @@ #define MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C /** - * \def MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C + * \def MBEDTLS_LMS_C * - * Enable the Key Wrapping mode for 128-bit block ciphers, - * as defined in NIST SP 800-38F. Only KW and KWP modes - * are supported. At the moment, only AES is approved by NIST. + * Enable the LMS stateful-hash asymmetric signature algorithm. * - * Module: library/nist_kw.c + * Module: library/lms.c + * Caller: * - * Requires: MBEDTLS_AES_C and MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C + * Requires: MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C + * + * Uncomment to enable the LMS verification algorithm and public key operations. */ -//#define MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C +#define MBEDTLS_LMS_C /** - * \def MBEDTLS_MD_C + * \def MBEDTLS_LMS_PRIVATE * - * Enable the generic message digest layer. + * Enable LMS private-key operations and signing code. Functions enabled by this + * option are experimental, and should not be used in production. * - * Module: library/md.c - * Caller: + * Requires: MBEDTLS_LMS_C * - * Uncomment to enable generic message digest wrappers. + * Uncomment to enable the LMS signature algorithm and private key operations. */ -#define MBEDTLS_MD_C +//#define MBEDTLS_LMS_PRIVATE /** - * \def MBEDTLS_MD2_C - * - * Enable the MD2 hash algorithm. - * - * Module: library/md2.c - * Caller: + * \def MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C * - * Uncomment to enable support for (rare) MD2-signed X.509 certs. + * Enable the Key Wrapping mode for 128-bit block ciphers, + * as defined in NIST SP 800-38F. Only KW and KWP modes + * are supported. At the moment, only AES is approved by NIST. * - * \warning MD2 is considered a weak message digest and its use constitutes a - * security risk. If possible, we recommend avoiding dependencies on - * it, and considering stronger message digests instead. + * Module: library/nist_kw.c * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_AES_C and MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C */ -//#define MBEDTLS_MD2_C +#define MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C /** - * \def MBEDTLS_MD4_C - * - * Enable the MD4 hash algorithm. - * - * Module: library/md4.c - * Caller: + * \def MBEDTLS_MD_C * - * Uncomment to enable support for (rare) MD4-signed X.509 certs. + * Enable the generic layer for message digest (hashing) and HMAC. * - * \warning MD4 is considered a weak message digest and its use constitutes a - * security risk. If possible, we recommend avoiding dependencies on - * it, and considering stronger message digests instead. + * Requires: one of: MBEDTLS_MD5_C, MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C, MBEDTLS_SHA1_C, + * MBEDTLS_SHA224_C, MBEDTLS_SHA256_C, MBEDTLS_SHA384_C, + * MBEDTLS_SHA512_C, or MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C with at least + * one hash. + * Module: library/md.c + * Caller: library/constant_time.c + * library/ecdsa.c + * library/ecjpake.c + * library/hkdf.c + * library/hmac_drbg.c + * library/pk.c + * library/pkcs5.c + * library/pkcs12.c + * library/psa_crypto_ecp.c + * library/psa_crypto_rsa.c + * library/rsa.c + * library/ssl_cookie.c + * library/ssl_msg.c + * library/ssl_tls.c + * library/x509.c + * library/x509_crt.c + * library/x509write_crt.c + * library/x509write_csr.c * + * Uncomment to enable generic message digest wrappers. */ -//#define MBEDTLS_MD4_C +#define MBEDTLS_MD_C /** * \def MBEDTLS_MD5_C @@ -3144,10 +2941,9 @@ * library/pem.c * library/ssl_tls.c * - * This module is required for SSL/TLS up to version 1.1, and for TLS 1.2 - * depending on the handshake parameters. Further, it is used for checking - * MD5-signed certificates, and for PBKDF1 when decrypting PEM-encoded - * encrypted keys. + * This module is required for TLS 1.2 depending on the handshake parameters. + * Further, it is used for checking MD5-signed certificates, and for PBKDF1 + * when decrypting PEM-encoded encrypted keys. * * \warning MD5 is considered a weak message digest and its use constitutes a * security risk. If possible, we recommend avoiding dependencies on @@ -3241,6 +3037,10 @@ * library/x509_csr.c * * Requires: MBEDTLS_BASE64_C + * optionally MBEDTLS_MD5_C, or PSA Crypto with MD5 (see below) + * + * \warning When parsing password-protected files, if MD5 is provided only by + * a PSA driver, you must call psa_crypto_init() before the first file. * * This modules adds support for decoding / parsing PEM files. */ @@ -3268,11 +3068,13 @@ * Enable the generic public (asymmetric) key layer. * * Module: library/pk.c - * Caller: library/ssl_tls.c - * library/ssl_cli.c - * library/ssl_srv.c + * Caller: library/psa_crypto_rsa.c + * library/ssl_tls.c + * library/ssl*_client.c + * library/ssl*_server.c + * library/x509.c * - * Requires: MBEDTLS_RSA_C or MBEDTLS_ECP_C + * Requires: MBEDTLS_MD_C, MBEDTLS_RSA_C or MBEDTLS_ECP_C * * Uncomment to enable generic public key wrappers. */ @@ -3287,7 +3089,7 @@ * Caller: library/x509_crt.c * library/x509_csr.c * - * Requires: MBEDTLS_PK_C + * Requires: MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C, MBEDTLS_OID_C, MBEDTLS_PK_C * * Uncomment to enable generic public key parse functions. */ @@ -3301,7 +3103,7 @@ * Module: library/pkwrite.c * Caller: library/x509write.c * - * Requires: MBEDTLS_PK_C + * Requires: MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_C, MBEDTLS_OID_C, MBEDTLS_PK_C * * Uncomment to enable generic public key write functions. */ @@ -3314,29 +3116,30 @@ * * Module: library/pkcs5.c * - * Requires: MBEDTLS_MD_C + * Auto-enables: MBEDTLS_MD_C + * + * \warning If using a hash that is only provided by PSA drivers, you must + * call psa_crypto_init() before doing any PKCS5 operations. * * This module adds support for the PKCS#5 functions. */ #define MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C /** - * \def MBEDTLS_PKCS11_C + * \def MBEDTLS_PKCS7_C * - * Enable wrapper for PKCS#11 smartcard support via the pkcs11-helper library. + * Enable PKCS #7 core for using PKCS #7-formatted signatures. + * RFC Link - https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2315 * - * \deprecated This option is deprecated and will be removed in a future - * version of Mbed TLS. + * Module: library/pkcs7.c * - * Module: library/pkcs11.c - * Caller: library/pk.c + * Requires: MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C, MBEDTLS_OID_C, MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C, + * MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C MBEDTLS_X509_CRL_PARSE_C, + * MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C, MBEDTLS_MD_C * - * Requires: MBEDTLS_PK_C - * - * This module enables SSL/TLS PKCS #11 smartcard support. - * Requires the presence of the PKCS#11 helper library (libpkcs11-helper) + * This module is required for the PKCS #7 parsing modules. */ -//#define MBEDTLS_PKCS11_C +#define MBEDTLS_PKCS7_C /** * \def MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C @@ -3347,8 +3150,11 @@ * Module: library/pkcs12.c * Caller: library/pkparse.c * - * Requires: MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C, MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C, MBEDTLS_MD_C - * Can use: MBEDTLS_ARC4_C + * Requires: MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C and either MBEDTLS_MD_C or + * MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C. + * + * \warning If using a hash that is only provided by PSA drivers, you must + * call psa_crypto_init() before doing any PKCS12 operations. * * This module enables PKCS#12 functions. */ @@ -3365,7 +3171,7 @@ * above to be specified at runtime or compile time respectively. * * \note This abstraction layer must be enabled on Windows (including MSYS2) - * as other module rely on it for a fixed snprintf implementation. + * as other modules rely on it for a fixed snprintf implementation. * * Module: library/platform.c * Caller: Most other .c files @@ -3394,18 +3200,23 @@ * Requires: either MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C and MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C, * or MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C and MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C, * or MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG. - * + * Auto-enables: MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C if any unauthenticated (ie, non-AEAD) cipher + * is enabled in PSA (unless it's fully accelerated, see + * docs/driver-only-builds.md about that). */ #define MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C /** * \def MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C * - * Enable secure element support in the Platform Security Architecture + * Enable dynamic secure element support in the Platform Security Architecture * cryptography API. * - * \warning This feature is not yet suitable for production. It is provided - * for API evaluation and testing purposes only. + * \deprecated This feature is deprecated. Please switch to the PSA driver + * interface. + * + * \warning This feature is not thread-safe, and should not be used in a + * multi-threaded environment. * * Module: library/psa_crypto_se.c * @@ -3456,11 +3267,12 @@ * Enable the RSA public-key cryptosystem. * * Module: library/rsa.c - * library/rsa_internal.c - * Caller: library/ssl_cli.c - * library/ssl_srv.c + * library/rsa_alt_helpers.c + * Caller: library/pk.c + * library/psa_crypto.c * library/ssl_tls.c - * library/x509.c + * library/ssl*_client.c + * library/ssl*_server.c * * This module is used by the following key exchanges: * RSA, DHE-RSA, ECDHE-RSA, RSA-PSK @@ -3476,13 +3288,10 @@ * * Module: library/sha1.c * Caller: library/md.c - * library/ssl_cli.c - * library/ssl_srv.c - * library/ssl_tls.c - * library/x509write_crt.c + * library/psa_crypto_hash.c * - * This module is required for SSL/TLS up to version 1.1, for TLS 1.2 - * depending on the handshake parameters, and for SHA1-signed certificates. + * This module is required for TLS 1.2 depending on the handshake parameters, + * and for SHA1-signed certificates. * * \warning SHA-1 is considered a weak message digest and its use constitutes * a security risk. If possible, we recommend avoiding dependencies @@ -3491,38 +3300,216 @@ */ #define MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_SHA224_C + * + * Enable the SHA-224 cryptographic hash algorithm. + * + * Module: library/sha256.c + * Caller: library/md.c + * library/ssl_cookie.c + * + * This module adds support for SHA-224. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_SHA224_C + /** * \def MBEDTLS_SHA256_C * - * Enable the SHA-224 and SHA-256 cryptographic hash algorithms. + * Enable the SHA-256 cryptographic hash algorithm. * * Module: library/sha256.c * Caller: library/entropy.c * library/md.c - * library/ssl_cli.c - * library/ssl_srv.c * library/ssl_tls.c + * library/ssl*_client.c + * library/ssl*_server.c * - * This module adds support for SHA-224 and SHA-256. + * This module adds support for SHA-256. * This module is required for the SSL/TLS 1.2 PRF function. */ #define MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_SHA256_USE_ARMV8_A_CRYPTO_IF_PRESENT + * + * Enable acceleration of the SHA-256 and SHA-224 cryptographic hash algorithms + * with the ARMv8 cryptographic extensions if they are available at runtime. + * If not, the library will fall back to the C implementation. + * + * \note If MBEDTLS_SHA256_USE_ARMV8_A_CRYPTO_IF_PRESENT is defined when building + * for a non-Armv8-A build it will be silently ignored. + * + * \note Minimum compiler versions for this feature are Clang 4.0, + * armclang 6.6 or GCC 6.0. + * + * \note \c CFLAGS must be set to a minimum of \c -march=armv8-a+crypto for + * armclang <= 6.9 + * + * \note This was previously known as MBEDTLS_SHA256_USE_A64_CRYPTO_IF_PRESENT. + * That name is deprecated, but may still be used as an alternative form for this + * option. + * + * \warning MBEDTLS_SHA256_USE_ARMV8_A_CRYPTO_IF_PRESENT cannot be defined at the + * same time as MBEDTLS_SHA256_USE_ARMV8_A_CRYPTO_ONLY. + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_SHA256_C. + * + * Module: library/sha256.c + * + * Uncomment to have the library check for the Armv8-A SHA-256 crypto extensions + * and use them if available. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_SHA256_USE_ARMV8_A_CRYPTO_IF_PRESENT + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_SHA256_USE_A64_CRYPTO_IF_PRESENT + * + * \deprecated This is now known as MBEDTLS_SHA256_USE_ARMV8_A_CRYPTO_IF_PRESENT. + * This name is now deprecated, but may still be used as an alternative form for + * this option. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_SHA256_USE_A64_CRYPTO_IF_PRESENT + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_SHA256_USE_ARMV8_A_CRYPTO_ONLY + * + * Enable acceleration of the SHA-256 and SHA-224 cryptographic hash algorithms + * with the ARMv8 cryptographic extensions, which must be available at runtime + * or else an illegal instruction fault will occur. + * + * \note This allows builds with a smaller code size than with + * MBEDTLS_SHA256_USE_ARMV8_A_CRYPTO_IF_PRESENT + * + * \note Minimum compiler versions for this feature are Clang 4.0, + * armclang 6.6 or GCC 6.0. + * + * \note \c CFLAGS must be set to a minimum of \c -march=armv8-a+crypto for + * armclang <= 6.9 + * + * \note This was previously known as MBEDTLS_SHA256_USE_A64_CRYPTO_ONLY. + * That name is deprecated, but may still be used as an alternative form for this + * option. + * + * \warning MBEDTLS_SHA256_USE_ARMV8_A_CRYPTO_ONLY cannot be defined at the same + * time as MBEDTLS_SHA256_USE_ARMV8_A_CRYPTO_IF_PRESENT. + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_SHA256_C. + * + * Module: library/sha256.c + * + * Uncomment to have the library use the Armv8-A SHA-256 crypto extensions + * unconditionally. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_SHA256_USE_ARMV8_A_CRYPTO_ONLY + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_SHA256_USE_A64_CRYPTO_ONLY + * + * \deprecated This is now known as MBEDTLS_SHA256_USE_ARMV8_A_CRYPTO_ONLY. + * This name is now deprecated, but may still be used as an alternative form for + * this option. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_SHA256_USE_A64_CRYPTO_ONLY + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_SHA384_C + * + * Enable the SHA-384 cryptographic hash algorithm. + * + * Module: library/sha512.c + * Caller: library/md.c + * library/psa_crypto_hash.c + * library/ssl_tls.c + * library/ssl*_client.c + * library/ssl*_server.c + * + * Comment to disable SHA-384 + */ +#define MBEDTLS_SHA384_C + /** * \def MBEDTLS_SHA512_C * - * Enable the SHA-384 and SHA-512 cryptographic hash algorithms. + * Enable SHA-512 cryptographic hash algorithms. * * Module: library/sha512.c * Caller: library/entropy.c * library/md.c - * library/ssl_cli.c - * library/ssl_srv.c + * library/ssl_tls.c + * library/ssl_cookie.c * - * This module adds support for SHA-384 and SHA-512. + * This module adds support for SHA-512. */ #define MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_SHA3_C + * + * Enable the SHA3 cryptographic hash algorithm. + * + * Module: library/sha3.c + * + * This module adds support for SHA3. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_SHA3_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_SHA512_USE_A64_CRYPTO_IF_PRESENT + * + * Enable acceleration of the SHA-512 and SHA-384 cryptographic hash algorithms + * with the ARMv8 cryptographic extensions if they are available at runtime. + * If not, the library will fall back to the C implementation. + * + * \note If MBEDTLS_SHA512_USE_A64_CRYPTO_IF_PRESENT is defined when building + * for a non-Aarch64 build it will be silently ignored. + * + * \note Minimum compiler versions for this feature are Clang 7.0, + * armclang 6.9 or GCC 8.0. + * + * \note \c CFLAGS must be set to a minimum of \c -march=armv8.2-a+sha3 for + * armclang 6.9 + * + * \warning MBEDTLS_SHA512_USE_A64_CRYPTO_IF_PRESENT cannot be defined at the + * same time as MBEDTLS_SHA512_USE_A64_CRYPTO_ONLY. + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_SHA512_C. + * + * Module: library/sha512.c + * + * Uncomment to have the library check for the A64 SHA-512 crypto extensions + * and use them if available. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_SHA512_USE_A64_CRYPTO_IF_PRESENT + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_SHA512_USE_A64_CRYPTO_ONLY + * + * Enable acceleration of the SHA-512 and SHA-384 cryptographic hash algorithms + * with the ARMv8 cryptographic extensions, which must be available at runtime + * or else an illegal instruction fault will occur. + * + * \note This allows builds with a smaller code size than with + * MBEDTLS_SHA512_USE_A64_CRYPTO_IF_PRESENT + * + * \note Minimum compiler versions for this feature are Clang 7.0, + * armclang 6.9 or GCC 8.0. + * + * \note \c CFLAGS must be set to a minimum of \c -march=armv8.2-a+sha3 for + * armclang 6.9 + * + * \warning MBEDTLS_SHA512_USE_A64_CRYPTO_ONLY cannot be defined at the same + * time as MBEDTLS_SHA512_USE_A64_CRYPTO_IF_PRESENT. + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_SHA512_C. + * + * Module: library/sha512.c + * + * Uncomment to have the library use the A64 SHA-512 crypto extensions + * unconditionally. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_SHA512_USE_A64_CRYPTO_ONLY + /** * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_C * @@ -3553,8 +3540,8 @@ * Module: library/ssl_ticket.c * Caller: * - * Requires: MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C && - * ( MBEDTLS_GCM_C || MBEDTLS_CCM_C || MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C ) + * Requires: (MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C || MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && + * (MBEDTLS_GCM_C || MBEDTLS_CCM_C || MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C) */ #define MBEDTLS_SSL_TICKET_C @@ -3563,7 +3550,7 @@ * * Enable the SSL/TLS client code. * - * Module: library/ssl_cli.c + * Module: library/ssl*_client.c * Caller: * * Requires: MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C @@ -3577,7 +3564,7 @@ * * Enable the SSL/TLS server code. * - * Module: library/ssl_srv.c + * Module: library/ssl*_server.c * Caller: * * Requires: MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C @@ -3592,8 +3579,8 @@ * Enable the generic SSL/TLS code. * * Module: library/ssl_tls.c - * Caller: library/ssl_cli.c - * library/ssl_srv.c + * Caller: library/ssl*_client.c + * library/ssl*_server.c * * Requires: MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C, MBEDTLS_MD_C * and at least one of the MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_XXX defines @@ -3645,9 +3632,6 @@ * https://mbed-tls.readthedocs.io/en/latest/kb/how-to/how-do-i-port-mbed-tls-to-a-new-environment-OS * * Module: library/timing.c - * Caller: library/havege.c - * - * This module is used by the HAVEGE random number generator. */ #define MBEDTLS_TIMING_C @@ -3672,8 +3656,11 @@ * library/x509_crt.c * library/x509_csr.c * - * Requires: MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C, MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C, MBEDTLS_OID_C, - * MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C + * Requires: MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C, MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C, MBEDTLS_OID_C, MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C, + * (MBEDTLS_MD_C or MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + * + * \warning If building with MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO, you must call + * psa_crypto_init() before doing any X.509 operation. * * This module is required for the X.509 parsing modules. */ @@ -3685,9 +3672,9 @@ * Enable X.509 certificate parsing. * * Module: library/x509_crt.c - * Caller: library/ssl_cli.c - * library/ssl_srv.c - * library/ssl_tls.c + * Caller: library/ssl_tls.c + * library/ssl*_client.c + * library/ssl*_server.c * * Requires: MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C * @@ -3730,7 +3717,11 @@ * * Module: library/x509_create.c * - * Requires: MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C, MBEDTLS_OID_C, MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C + * Requires: MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C, MBEDTLS_OID_C, MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C, + * (MBEDTLS_MD_C or MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + * + * \warning If building with MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO, you must call + * psa_crypto_init() before doing any X.509 create operation. * * This module is the basis for creating X.509 certificates and CSRs. */ @@ -3762,16 +3753,6 @@ */ #define MBEDTLS_X509_CSR_WRITE_C -/** - * \def MBEDTLS_XTEA_C - * - * Enable the XTEA block cipher. - * - * Module: library/xtea.c - * Caller: - */ -#define MBEDTLS_XTEA_C - /** \} name SECTION: Mbed TLS modules */ /** @@ -3787,10 +3768,11 @@ * \def MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE * * If defined, this is a header which will be included instead of - * `"mbedtls/config.h"`. + * `"mbedtls/mbedtls_config.h"`. * This header file specifies the compile-time configuration of Mbed TLS. * Unlike other configuration options, this one must be defined on the - * compiler command line: a definition in `config.h` would have no effect. + * compiler command line: a definition in `mbedtls_config.h` would have + * no effect. * * This macro is expanded after an \#include directive. This is a popular but * non-standard feature of the C language, so this feature is only available @@ -3799,13 +3781,13 @@ * The value of this symbol is typically a path in double quotes, either * absolute or relative to a directory on the include search path. */ -//#define MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE "mbedtls/config.h" +//#define MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE "mbedtls/mbedtls_config.h" /** * \def MBEDTLS_USER_CONFIG_FILE * * If defined, this is a header which will be included after - * `"mbedtls/config.h"` or #MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE. + * `"mbedtls/mbedtls_config.h"` or #MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE. * This allows you to modify the default configuration, including the ability * to undefine options that are enabled by default. * @@ -3853,6 +3835,53 @@ */ //#define MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_USER_CONFIG_FILE "/dev/null" +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_PLATFORM_FILE + * + * If defined, this is a header which will be included instead of + * `"psa/crypto_platform.h"`. This file should declare the same identifiers + * as the one in Mbed TLS, but with definitions adapted to the platform on + * which the library code will run. + * + * \note The required content of this header can vary from one version of + * Mbed TLS to the next. Integrators who provide an alternative file + * should review the changes in the original file whenever they + * upgrade Mbed TLS. + * + * This macro is expanded after an \#include directive. This is a popular but + * non-standard feature of the C language, so this feature is only available + * with compilers that perform macro expansion on an \#include line. + * + * The value of this symbol is typically a path in double quotes, either + * absolute or relative to a directory on the include search path. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_PLATFORM_FILE "psa/crypto_platform_alt.h" + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STRUCT_FILE + * + * If defined, this is a header which will be included instead of + * `"psa/crypto_struct.h"`. This file should declare the same identifiers + * as the one in Mbed TLS, but with definitions adapted to the environment + * in which the library code will run. The typical use for this feature + * is to provide alternative type definitions on the client side in + * client-server integrations of PSA crypto, where operation structures + * contain handles instead of cryptographic data. + * + * \note The required content of this header can vary from one version of + * Mbed TLS to the next. Integrators who provide an alternative file + * should review the changes in the original file whenever they + * upgrade Mbed TLS. + * + * This macro is expanded after an \#include directive. This is a popular but + * non-standard feature of the C language, so this feature is only available + * with compilers that perform macro expansion on an \#include line. + * + * The value of this symbol is typically a path in double quotes, either + * absolute or relative to a directory on the include search path. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STRUCT_FILE "psa/crypto_struct_alt.h" + /** \} name SECTION: General configuration options */ /** @@ -3892,7 +3921,6 @@ //#define MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT 384 /**< Maximum size of (re)seed buffer */ /* ECP options */ -//#define MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BITS 521 /**< Maximum bit size of groups. Normally determined automatically from the configured curves. */ //#define MBEDTLS_ECP_WINDOW_SIZE 4 /**< Maximum window size used */ //#define MBEDTLS_ECP_FIXED_POINT_OPTIM 1 /**< Enable fixed-point speed-up */ @@ -3929,6 +3957,7 @@ * See the description of #MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_MEMORY for more details (same principles as for MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_CALLOC apply). */ //#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_FREE free +//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_SETBUF setbuf /**< Default setbuf to use, can be undefined */ //#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_EXIT exit /**< Default exit to use, can be undefined */ //#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_TIME time /**< Default time to use, can be undefined. MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME must be enabled */ //#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_FPRINTF fprintf /**< Default fprintf to use, can be undefined */ @@ -3946,6 +3975,7 @@ //#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_CALLOC_MACRO calloc /**< Default allocator macro to use, can be undefined. See MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_CALLOC for requirements. */ //#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_FREE_MACRO free /**< Default free macro to use, can be undefined. See MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_FREE for requirements. */ //#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_EXIT_MACRO exit /**< Default exit macro to use, can be undefined */ +//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SETBUF_MACRO setbuf /**< Default setbuf macro to use, can be undefined */ //#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_TIME_MACRO time /**< Default time macro to use, can be undefined. MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME must be enabled */ //#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_TIME_TYPE_MACRO time_t /**< Default time macro to use, can be undefined. MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME must be enabled */ //#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_FPRINTF_MACRO fprintf /**< Default fprintf macro to use, can be undefined */ @@ -3955,42 +3985,8 @@ //#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_VSNPRINTF_MACRO vsnprintf /**< Default vsnprintf macro to use, can be undefined */ //#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NV_SEED_READ_MACRO mbedtls_platform_std_nv_seed_read /**< Default nv_seed_read function to use, can be undefined */ //#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NV_SEED_WRITE_MACRO mbedtls_platform_std_nv_seed_write /**< Default nv_seed_write function to use, can be undefined */ - -/** - * \brief This macro is invoked by the library when an invalid parameter - * is detected that is only checked with #MBEDTLS_CHECK_PARAMS - * (see the documentation of that option for context). - * - * When you leave this undefined here, the library provides - * a default definition. If the macro #MBEDTLS_CHECK_PARAMS_ASSERT - * is defined, the default definition is `assert(cond)`, - * otherwise the default definition calls a function - * mbedtls_param_failed(). This function is declared in - * `platform_util.h` for the benefit of the library, but - * you need to define in your application. - * - * When you define this here, this replaces the default - * definition in platform_util.h (which no longer declares the - * function mbedtls_param_failed()) and it is your responsibility - * to make sure this macro expands to something suitable (in - * particular, that all the necessary declarations are visible - * from within the library - you can ensure that by providing - * them in this file next to the macro definition). - * If you define this macro to call `assert`, also define - * #MBEDTLS_CHECK_PARAMS_ASSERT so that library source files - * include ``. - * - * Note that you may define this macro to expand to nothing, in - * which case you don't have to worry about declarations or - * definitions. However, you will then be notified about invalid - * parameters only in non-void functions, and void function will - * just silently return early on invalid parameters, which - * partially negates the benefits of enabling - * #MBEDTLS_CHECK_PARAMS in the first place, so is discouraged. - * - * \param cond The expression that should evaluate to true, but doesn't. - */ -//#define MBEDTLS_PARAM_FAILED( cond ) assert( cond ) +//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_MS_TIME_TYPE_MACRO int64_t //#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_MS_TIME_TYPE_MACRO int64_t /**< Default milliseconds time macro to use, can be undefined. MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME must be enabled. It must be signed, and at least 64 bits. If it is changed from the default, MBEDTLS_PRINTF_MS_TIME must be updated to match.*/ +//#define MBEDTLS_PRINTF_MS_TIME PRId64 /**< Default fmt for printf. That's avoid compiler warning if mbedtls_ms_time_t is redefined */ /** \def MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN * @@ -4039,38 +4035,15 @@ */ //#define MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_SLOT_COUNT 32 +/* RSA OPTIONS */ +//#define MBEDTLS_RSA_GEN_KEY_MIN_BITS 1024 /**< Minimum RSA key size that can be generated in bits (Minimum possible value is 128 bits) */ + /* SSL Cache options */ //#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_DEFAULT_TIMEOUT 86400 /**< 1 day */ //#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_DEFAULT_MAX_ENTRIES 50 /**< Maximum entries in cache */ /* SSL options */ -/** \def MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN - * - * Maximum length (in bytes) of incoming and outgoing plaintext fragments. - * - * This determines the size of both the incoming and outgoing TLS I/O buffers - * in such a way that both are capable of holding the specified amount of - * plaintext data, regardless of the protection mechanism used. - * - * To configure incoming and outgoing I/O buffers separately, use - * #MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN and #MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN, - * which overwrite the value set by this option. - * - * \note When using a value less than the default of 16KB on the client, it is - * recommended to use the Maximum Fragment Length (MFL) extension to - * inform the server about this limitation. On the server, there - * is no supported, standardized way of informing the client about - * restriction on the maximum size of incoming messages, and unless - * the limitation has been communicated by other means, it is recommended - * to only change the outgoing buffer size #MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN - * while keeping the default value of 16KB for the incoming buffer. - * - * Uncomment to set the maximum plaintext size of both - * incoming and outgoing I/O buffers. - */ -//#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN 16384 - /** \def MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN * * Maximum length (in bytes) of incoming plaintext fragments. @@ -4079,9 +4052,6 @@ * that it is capable of holding the specified amount of plaintext data, * regardless of the protection mechanism used. * - * If this option is undefined, it inherits its value from - * #MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN. - * * \note When using a value less than the default of 16KB on the client, it is * recommended to use the Maximum Fragment Length (MFL) extension to * inform the server about this limitation. On the server, there @@ -4091,8 +4061,7 @@ * to only change the outgoing buffer size #MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN * while keeping the default value of 16KB for the incoming buffer. * - * Uncomment to set the maximum plaintext size of the incoming I/O buffer - * independently of the outgoing I/O buffer. + * Uncomment to set the maximum plaintext size of the incoming I/O buffer. */ //#define MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN 16384 @@ -4110,27 +4079,10 @@ */ //#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX 32 -/** \def MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_PADDING_GRANULARITY - * - * This option controls the use of record plaintext padding - * when using the Connection ID extension in DTLS 1.2. - * - * The padding will always be chosen so that the length of the - * padded plaintext is a multiple of the value of this option. - * - * Note: A value of \c 1 means that no padding will be used - * for outgoing records. - * - * Note: On systems lacking division instructions, - * a power of two should be preferred. - * - */ -//#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_PADDING_GRANULARITY 16 - -/** \def MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_PADDING_GRANULARITY +/** \def MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_TLS1_3_PADDING_GRANULARITY * * This option controls the use of record plaintext padding - * in TLS 1.3. + * in TLS 1.3 and when using the Connection ID extension in DTLS 1.2. * * The padding will always be chosen so that the length of the * padded plaintext is a multiple of the value of this option. @@ -4141,7 +4093,7 @@ * Note: On systems lacking division instructions, * a power of two should be preferred. */ -//#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_PADDING_GRANULARITY 1 +//#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_TLS1_3_PADDING_GRANULARITY 16 /** \def MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN * @@ -4151,9 +4103,6 @@ * that it is capable of holding the specified amount of plaintext data, * regardless of the protection mechanism used. * - * If this option undefined, it inherits its value from - * #MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN. - * * It is possible to save RAM by setting a smaller outward buffer, while keeping * the default inward 16384 byte buffer to conform to the TLS specification. * @@ -4162,8 +4111,7 @@ * The specific size requirement depends on the configured ciphers and any * certificate data which is sent during the handshake. * - * Uncomment to set the maximum plaintext size of the outgoing I/O buffer - * independently of the incoming I/O buffer. + * Uncomment to set the maximum plaintext size of the outgoing I/O buffer. */ //#define MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN 16384 @@ -4184,21 +4132,9 @@ */ //#define MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_MAX_BUFFERING 32768 -//#define MBEDTLS_SSL_DEFAULT_TICKET_LIFETIME 86400 /**< Lifetime of session tickets (if enabled) */ -//#define MBEDTLS_PSK_MAX_LEN 32 /**< Max size of TLS pre-shared keys, in bytes (default 256 bits) */ +//#define MBEDTLS_PSK_MAX_LEN 32 /**< Max size of TLS pre-shared keys, in bytes (default 256 or 384 bits) */ //#define MBEDTLS_SSL_COOKIE_TIMEOUT 60 /**< Default expiration delay of DTLS cookies, in seconds if HAVE_TIME, or in number of cookies issued */ -/** \def MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_CID - * - * At the time of writing, the CID extension has not been assigned its - * final value. Set this configuration option to make Mbed TLS use a - * different value. - * - * A future minor revision of Mbed TLS may change the default value of - * this option to match evolving standards and usage. - */ -//#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_CID 254 - /** * Complete list of ciphersuites to use, in order of preference. * @@ -4213,25 +4149,63 @@ */ //#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CIPHERSUITES MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 -/* X509 options */ -//#define MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_INTERMEDIATE_CA 8 /**< Maximum number of intermediate CAs in a verification chain. */ -//#define MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_FILE_PATH_LEN 512 /**< Maximum length of a path/filename string in bytes including the null terminator character ('\0'). */ +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_EARLY_DATA_SIZE + * + * The default maximum amount of 0-RTT data. See the documentation of + * \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_max_early_data_size() for more information. + * + * It must be positive and smaller than UINT32_MAX. + * + * If MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA is not defined, this default value does not + * have any impact on the build. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_EARLY_DATA_SIZE 1024 -/** \} name SECTION: Module configuration options */ +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_TICKET_AGE_TOLERANCE + * + * Maximum allowed ticket age difference in milliseconds tolerated between + * server and client. Default value is 6000. This is not used in TLS 1.2. + * + * - The client ticket age is the time difference between the time when the + * client proposes to the server to use the ticket and the time the client + * received the ticket from the server. + * - The server ticket age is the time difference between the time when the + * server receives a proposition from the client to use the ticket and the + * time when the ticket was created by the server. + * + * The ages might be different due to the client and server clocks not running + * at the same pace. The typical accuracy of an RTC crystal is ±100 to ±20 parts + * per million (360 to 72 milliseconds per hour). Default tolerance window is + * 6s, thus in the worst case clients and servers must sync up their system time + * every 6000/360/2~=8 hours. + * + * See section 8.3 of the TLS 1.3 specification(RFC 8446) for more information. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_TICKET_AGE_TOLERANCE 6000 -/* Target and application specific configurations +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_TICKET_NONCE_LENGTH * - * Allow user to override any previous default. + * Size in bytes of a ticket nonce. This is not used in TLS 1.2. * + * This must be less than 256. */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_USER_CONFIG_FILE) -#include MBEDTLS_USER_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +//#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_TICKET_NONCE_LENGTH 32 -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG) -#include "mbedtls/config_psa.h" -#endif +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_DEFAULT_NEW_SESSION_TICKETS + * + * Default number of NewSessionTicket messages to be sent by a TLS 1.3 server + * after handshake completion. This is not used in TLS 1.2 and relevant only if + * the MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS option is enabled. + * + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_DEFAULT_NEW_SESSION_TICKETS 1 -#include "mbedtls/check_config.h" +/* X509 options */ +//#define MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_INTERMEDIATE_CA 8 /**< Maximum number of intermediate CAs in a verification chain. */ +//#define MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_FILE_PATH_LEN 512 /**< Maximum length of a path/filename string in bytes including the null terminator character ('\0'). */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CONFIG_H */ +/** \} name SECTION: Module configuration options */ diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/md.h b/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/md.h index 7b4311307ce8..478e9f766701 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/md.h +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/md.h @@ -1,7 +1,8 @@ /** * \file md.h * - * \brief This file contains the generic message-digest wrapper. + * \brief This file contains the generic functions for message-digest + * (hashing) and HMAC. * * \author Adriaan de Jong */ @@ -12,14 +13,11 @@ #ifndef MBEDTLS_MD_H #define MBEDTLS_MD_H +#include "mbedtls/private_access.h" #include -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "mbedtls/build_info.h" #include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" /** The selected feature is not available. */ @@ -31,10 +29,6 @@ /** Opening or reading of file failed. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_FILE_IO_ERROR -0x5200 -/* MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_HW_ACCEL_FAILED is deprecated and should not be used. */ -/** MD hardware accelerator failed. */ -#define MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_HW_ACCEL_FAILED -0x5280 - #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { #endif @@ -42,79 +36,107 @@ extern "C" { /** * \brief Supported message digests. * - * \warning MD2, MD4, MD5 and SHA-1 are considered weak message digests and + * \warning MD5 and SHA-1 are considered weak message digests and * their use constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering * stronger message digests instead. * */ +/* Note: these are aligned with the definitions of PSA_ALG_ macros for hashes, + * in order to enable an efficient implementation of conversion functions. + * This is tested by md_to_from_psa() in test_suite_md. */ typedef enum { MBEDTLS_MD_NONE=0, /**< None. */ - MBEDTLS_MD_MD2, /**< The MD2 message digest. */ - MBEDTLS_MD_MD4, /**< The MD4 message digest. */ - MBEDTLS_MD_MD5, /**< The MD5 message digest. */ - MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, /**< The SHA-1 message digest. */ - MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224, /**< The SHA-224 message digest. */ - MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, /**< The SHA-256 message digest. */ - MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, /**< The SHA-384 message digest. */ - MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512, /**< The SHA-512 message digest. */ - MBEDTLS_MD_RIPEMD160, /**< The RIPEMD-160 message digest. */ + MBEDTLS_MD_MD5=0x03, /**< The MD5 message digest. */ + MBEDTLS_MD_RIPEMD160=0x04, /**< The RIPEMD-160 message digest. */ + MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1=0x05, /**< The SHA-1 message digest. */ + MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224=0x08, /**< The SHA-224 message digest. */ + MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256=0x09, /**< The SHA-256 message digest. */ + MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384=0x0a, /**< The SHA-384 message digest. */ + MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512=0x0b, /**< The SHA-512 message digest. */ + MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_224=0x10, /**< The SHA3-224 message digest. */ + MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_256=0x11, /**< The SHA3-256 message digest. */ + MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_384=0x12, /**< The SHA3-384 message digest. */ + MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_512=0x13, /**< The SHA3-512 message digest. */ } mbedtls_md_type_t; -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) +/* Note: this should always be >= PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE + * in all builds with both CRYPTO_C and MD_LIGHT. + * + * This is to make things easier for modules such as TLS that may define a + * buffer size using MD_MAX_SIZE in a part of the code that's common to PSA + * and legacy, then assume the buffer's size is PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE in another + * part of the code based on PSA. + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA512) || defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA3_512) #define MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE 64 /* longest known is SHA512 */ +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) || defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA3_384) +#define MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE 48 /* longest known is SHA384 */ +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) || defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA3_256) +#define MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE 32 /* longest known is SHA256 */ +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA224) || defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA3_224) +#define MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE 28 /* longest known is SHA224 */ #else -#define MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE 32 /* longest known is SHA256 or less */ +#define MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE 20 /* longest known is SHA1 or RIPE MD-160 + or smaller (MD5 and earlier) */ #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA3_224) +#define MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_BLOCK_SIZE 144 /* the longest known is SHA3-224 */ +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA3_256) +#define MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_BLOCK_SIZE 136 +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA512) || defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) #define MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_BLOCK_SIZE 128 +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA3_384) +#define MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_BLOCK_SIZE 104 +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA3_512) +#define MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_BLOCK_SIZE 72 #else #define MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_BLOCK_SIZE 64 #endif /** - * Opaque struct defined in md_internal.h. + * Opaque struct. + * + * Constructed using either #mbedtls_md_info_from_string or + * #mbedtls_md_info_from_type. + * + * Fields can be accessed with #mbedtls_md_get_size, + * #mbedtls_md_get_type and #mbedtls_md_get_name. */ +/* Defined internally in library/md_wrap.h. */ typedef struct mbedtls_md_info_t mbedtls_md_info_t; +/** + * Used internally to indicate whether a context uses legacy or PSA. + * + * Internal use only. + */ +typedef enum { + MBEDTLS_MD_ENGINE_LEGACY = 0, + MBEDTLS_MD_ENGINE_PSA, +} mbedtls_md_engine_t; + /** * The generic message-digest context. */ typedef struct mbedtls_md_context_t { /** Information about the associated message digest. */ - const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info; + const mbedtls_md_info_t *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(md_info); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_SOME_PSA) + /** Are hash operations dispatched to PSA or legacy? */ + mbedtls_md_engine_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(engine); +#endif - /** The digest-specific context. */ - void *md_ctx; + /** The digest-specific context (legacy) or the PSA operation. */ + void *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(md_ctx); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_C) /** The HMAC part of the context. */ - void *hmac_ctx; + void *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(hmac_ctx); +#endif } mbedtls_md_context_t; -/** - * \brief This function returns the list of digests supported by the - * generic digest module. - * - * \note The list starts with the strongest available hashes. - * - * \return A statically allocated array of digests. Each element - * in the returned list is an integer belonging to the - * message-digest enumeration #mbedtls_md_type_t. - * The last entry is 0. - */ -const int *mbedtls_md_list(void); - -/** - * \brief This function returns the message-digest information - * associated with the given digest name. - * - * \param md_name The name of the digest to search for. - * - * \return The message-digest information associated with \p md_name. - * \return NULL if the associated message-digest information is not found. - */ -const mbedtls_md_info_t *mbedtls_md_info_from_string(const char *md_name); - /** * \brief This function returns the message-digest information * associated with the given digest type. @@ -151,34 +173,6 @@ void mbedtls_md_init(mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx); */ void mbedtls_md_free(mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx); -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING) -#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED __attribute__((deprecated)) -#else -#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED -#endif -/** - * \brief This function selects the message digest algorithm to use, - * and allocates internal structures. - * - * It should be called after mbedtls_md_init() or mbedtls_md_free(). - * Makes it necessary to call mbedtls_md_free() later. - * - * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_md_setup() in 2.0.0 - * - * \param ctx The context to set up. - * \param md_info The information structure of the message-digest algorithm - * to use. - * - * \return \c 0 on success. - * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA on parameter-verification - * failure. - * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_ALLOC_FAILED on memory-allocation failure. - */ -int mbedtls_md_init_ctx(mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx, - const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info) MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED; -#undef MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED -#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ /** * \brief This function selects the message digest algorithm to use, @@ -220,6 +214,10 @@ int mbedtls_md_setup(mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx, const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA on parameter-verification failure. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE if both contexts are + * not using the same engine. This can be avoided by moving + * the call to psa_crypto_init() before the first call to + * mbedtls_md_setup(). */ MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_TYPICAL int mbedtls_md_clone(mbedtls_md_context_t *dst, @@ -237,26 +235,29 @@ int mbedtls_md_clone(mbedtls_md_context_t *dst, unsigned char mbedtls_md_get_size(const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info); /** - * \brief This function extracts the message-digest type from the - * message-digest information structure. + * \brief This function gives the message-digest size associated to + * message-digest type. * - * \param md_info The information structure of the message-digest algorithm - * to use. + * \param md_type The message-digest type. * - * \return The type of the message digest. + * \return The size of the message-digest output in Bytes, + * or 0 if the message-digest type is not known. */ -mbedtls_md_type_t mbedtls_md_get_type(const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info); +static inline unsigned char mbedtls_md_get_size_from_type(mbedtls_md_type_t md_type) +{ + return mbedtls_md_get_size(mbedtls_md_info_from_type(md_type)); +} /** - * \brief This function extracts the message-digest name from the + * \brief This function extracts the message-digest type from the * message-digest information structure. * * \param md_info The information structure of the message-digest algorithm * to use. * - * \return The name of the message digest. + * \return The type of the message digest. */ -const char *mbedtls_md_get_name(const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info); +mbedtls_md_type_t mbedtls_md_get_type(const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info); /** * \brief This function starts a message-digest computation. @@ -336,6 +337,54 @@ MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_TYPICAL int mbedtls_md(const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info, const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen, unsigned char *output); +/** + * \brief This function returns the list of digests supported by the + * generic digest module. + * + * \note The list starts with the strongest available hashes. + * + * \return A statically allocated array of digests. Each element + * in the returned list is an integer belonging to the + * message-digest enumeration #mbedtls_md_type_t. + * The last entry is 0. + */ +const int *mbedtls_md_list(void); + +/** + * \brief This function returns the message-digest information + * associated with the given digest name. + * + * \param md_name The name of the digest to search for. + * + * \return The message-digest information associated with \p md_name. + * \return NULL if the associated message-digest information is not found. + */ +const mbedtls_md_info_t *mbedtls_md_info_from_string(const char *md_name); + +/** + * \brief This function returns the name of the message digest for + * the message-digest information structure given. + * + * \param md_info The information structure of the message-digest algorithm + * to use. + * + * \return The name of the message digest. + */ +const char *mbedtls_md_get_name(const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info); + +/** + * \brief This function returns the message-digest information + * from the given context. + * + * \param ctx The context from which to extract the information. + * This must be initialized (or \c NULL). + * + * \return The message-digest information associated with \p ctx. + * \return \c NULL if \p ctx is \c NULL. + */ +const mbedtls_md_info_t *mbedtls_md_info_from_ctx( + const mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx); + #if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) /** * \brief This function calculates the message-digest checksum @@ -470,10 +519,6 @@ int mbedtls_md_hmac(const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info, const unsigned char *key, const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen, unsigned char *output); -/* Internal use */ -MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_TYPICAL -int mbedtls_md_process(mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx, const unsigned char *data); - #ifdef __cplusplus } #endif diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/md2.h b/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/md2.h deleted file mode 100644 index afcf3a3ee2a6..000000000000 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/md2.h +++ /dev/null @@ -1,292 +0,0 @@ -/** - * \file md2.h - * - * \brief MD2 message digest algorithm (hash function) - * - * \warning MD2 is considered a weak message digest and its use constitutes a - * security risk. We recommend considering stronger message digests - * instead. - */ -/* - * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later - * - */ -#ifndef MBEDTLS_MD2_H -#define MBEDTLS_MD2_H - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif - -#include - -/* MBEDTLS_ERR_MD2_HW_ACCEL_FAILED is deprecated and should not be used. */ -/** MD2 hardware accelerator failed */ -#define MBEDTLS_ERR_MD2_HW_ACCEL_FAILED -0x002B - -#ifdef __cplusplus -extern "C" { -#endif - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_MD2_ALT) -// Regular implementation -// - -/** - * \brief MD2 context structure - * - * \warning MD2 is considered a weak message digest and its use - * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering - * stronger message digests instead. - * - */ -typedef struct mbedtls_md2_context { - unsigned char cksum[16]; /*!< checksum of the data block */ - unsigned char state[48]; /*!< intermediate digest state */ - unsigned char buffer[16]; /*!< data block being processed */ - size_t left; /*!< amount of data in buffer */ -} -mbedtls_md2_context; - -#else /* MBEDTLS_MD2_ALT */ -#include "md2_alt.h" -#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD2_ALT */ - -/** - * \brief Initialize MD2 context - * - * \param ctx MD2 context to be initialized - * - * \warning MD2 is considered a weak message digest and its use - * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering - * stronger message digests instead. - * - */ -void mbedtls_md2_init(mbedtls_md2_context *ctx); - -/** - * \brief Clear MD2 context - * - * \param ctx MD2 context to be cleared - * - * \warning MD2 is considered a weak message digest and its use - * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering - * stronger message digests instead. - * - */ -void mbedtls_md2_free(mbedtls_md2_context *ctx); - -/** - * \brief Clone (the state of) an MD2 context - * - * \param dst The destination context - * \param src The context to be cloned - * - * \warning MD2 is considered a weak message digest and its use - * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering - * stronger message digests instead. - * - */ -void mbedtls_md2_clone(mbedtls_md2_context *dst, - const mbedtls_md2_context *src); - -/** - * \brief MD2 context setup - * - * \param ctx context to be initialized - * - * \return 0 if successful - * - * \warning MD2 is considered a weak message digest and its use - * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering - * stronger message digests instead. - * - */ -int mbedtls_md2_starts_ret(mbedtls_md2_context *ctx); - -/** - * \brief MD2 process buffer - * - * \param ctx MD2 context - * \param input buffer holding the data - * \param ilen length of the input data - * - * \return 0 if successful - * - * \warning MD2 is considered a weak message digest and its use - * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering - * stronger message digests instead. - * - */ -int mbedtls_md2_update_ret(mbedtls_md2_context *ctx, - const unsigned char *input, - size_t ilen); - -/** - * \brief MD2 final digest - * - * \param ctx MD2 context - * \param output MD2 checksum result - * - * \return 0 if successful - * - * \warning MD2 is considered a weak message digest and its use - * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering - * stronger message digests instead. - * - */ -int mbedtls_md2_finish_ret(mbedtls_md2_context *ctx, - unsigned char output[16]); - -/** - * \brief MD2 process data block (internal use only) - * - * \param ctx MD2 context - * - * \return 0 if successful - * - * \warning MD2 is considered a weak message digest and its use - * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering - * stronger message digests instead. - * - */ -int mbedtls_internal_md2_process(mbedtls_md2_context *ctx); - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING) -#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED __attribute__((deprecated)) -#else -#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED -#endif -/** - * \brief MD2 context setup - * - * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_md2_starts_ret() in 2.7.0 - * - * \param ctx context to be initialized - * - * \warning MD2 is considered a weak message digest and its use - * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering - * stronger message digests instead. - * - */ -MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_md2_starts(mbedtls_md2_context *ctx); - -/** - * \brief MD2 process buffer - * - * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_md2_update_ret() in 2.7.0 - * - * \param ctx MD2 context - * \param input buffer holding the data - * \param ilen length of the input data - * - * \warning MD2 is considered a weak message digest and its use - * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering - * stronger message digests instead. - * - */ -MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_md2_update(mbedtls_md2_context *ctx, - const unsigned char *input, - size_t ilen); - -/** - * \brief MD2 final digest - * - * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_md2_finish_ret() in 2.7.0 - * - * \param ctx MD2 context - * \param output MD2 checksum result - * - * \warning MD2 is considered a weak message digest and its use - * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering - * stronger message digests instead. - * - */ -MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_md2_finish(mbedtls_md2_context *ctx, - unsigned char output[16]); - -/** - * \brief MD2 process data block (internal use only) - * - * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_internal_md2_process() in 2.7.0 - * - * \param ctx MD2 context - * - * \warning MD2 is considered a weak message digest and its use - * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering - * stronger message digests instead. - * - */ -MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_md2_process(mbedtls_md2_context *ctx); - -#undef MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED -#endif /* !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ - -/** - * \brief Output = MD2( input buffer ) - * - * \param input buffer holding the data - * \param ilen length of the input data - * \param output MD2 checksum result - * - * \warning MD2 is considered a weak message digest and its use - * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering - * stronger message digests instead. - * - */ -int mbedtls_md2_ret(const unsigned char *input, - size_t ilen, - unsigned char output[16]); - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING) -#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED __attribute__((deprecated)) -#else -#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED -#endif -/** - * \brief Output = MD2( input buffer ) - * - * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_md2_ret() in 2.7.0 - * - * \param input buffer holding the data - * \param ilen length of the input data - * \param output MD2 checksum result - * - * \warning MD2 is considered a weak message digest and its use - * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering - * stronger message digests instead. - * - */ -MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_md2(const unsigned char *input, - size_t ilen, - unsigned char output[16]); - -#undef MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED -#endif /* !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) - -/** - * \brief Checkup routine - * - * \return 0 if successful, or 1 if the test failed - * - * \warning MD2 is considered a weak message digest and its use - * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering - * stronger message digests instead. - * - */ -int mbedtls_md2_self_test(int verbose); - -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ - -#ifdef __cplusplus -} -#endif - -#endif /* mbedtls_md2.h */ diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/md4.h b/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/md4.h deleted file mode 100644 index b827ffecb15d..000000000000 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/md4.h +++ /dev/null @@ -1,297 +0,0 @@ -/** - * \file md4.h - * - * \brief MD4 message digest algorithm (hash function) - * - * \warning MD4 is considered a weak message digest and its use constitutes a - * security risk. We recommend considering stronger message digests - * instead. - */ -/* - * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later - * - */ -#ifndef MBEDTLS_MD4_H -#define MBEDTLS_MD4_H - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif - -#include -#include - -/* MBEDTLS_ERR_MD4_HW_ACCEL_FAILED is deprecated and should not be used. */ -/** MD4 hardware accelerator failed */ -#define MBEDTLS_ERR_MD4_HW_ACCEL_FAILED -0x002D - -#ifdef __cplusplus -extern "C" { -#endif - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_MD4_ALT) -// Regular implementation -// - -/** - * \brief MD4 context structure - * - * \warning MD4 is considered a weak message digest and its use - * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering - * stronger message digests instead. - * - */ -typedef struct mbedtls_md4_context { - uint32_t total[2]; /*!< number of bytes processed */ - uint32_t state[4]; /*!< intermediate digest state */ - unsigned char buffer[64]; /*!< data block being processed */ -} -mbedtls_md4_context; - -#else /* MBEDTLS_MD4_ALT */ -#include "md4_alt.h" -#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD4_ALT */ - -/** - * \brief Initialize MD4 context - * - * \param ctx MD4 context to be initialized - * - * \warning MD4 is considered a weak message digest and its use - * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering - * stronger message digests instead. - * - */ -void mbedtls_md4_init(mbedtls_md4_context *ctx); - -/** - * \brief Clear MD4 context - * - * \param ctx MD4 context to be cleared - * - * \warning MD4 is considered a weak message digest and its use - * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering - * stronger message digests instead. - * - */ -void mbedtls_md4_free(mbedtls_md4_context *ctx); - -/** - * \brief Clone (the state of) an MD4 context - * - * \param dst The destination context - * \param src The context to be cloned - * - * \warning MD4 is considered a weak message digest and its use - * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering - * stronger message digests instead. - * - */ -void mbedtls_md4_clone(mbedtls_md4_context *dst, - const mbedtls_md4_context *src); - -/** - * \brief MD4 context setup - * - * \param ctx context to be initialized - * - * \return 0 if successful - * - * \warning MD4 is considered a weak message digest and its use - * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering - * stronger message digests instead. - */ -int mbedtls_md4_starts_ret(mbedtls_md4_context *ctx); - -/** - * \brief MD4 process buffer - * - * \param ctx MD4 context - * \param input buffer holding the data - * \param ilen length of the input data - * - * \return 0 if successful - * - * \warning MD4 is considered a weak message digest and its use - * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering - * stronger message digests instead. - * - */ -int mbedtls_md4_update_ret(mbedtls_md4_context *ctx, - const unsigned char *input, - size_t ilen); - -/** - * \brief MD4 final digest - * - * \param ctx MD4 context - * \param output MD4 checksum result - * - * \return 0 if successful - * - * \warning MD4 is considered a weak message digest and its use - * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering - * stronger message digests instead. - * - */ -int mbedtls_md4_finish_ret(mbedtls_md4_context *ctx, - unsigned char output[16]); - -/** - * \brief MD4 process data block (internal use only) - * - * \param ctx MD4 context - * \param data buffer holding one block of data - * - * \return 0 if successful - * - * \warning MD4 is considered a weak message digest and its use - * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering - * stronger message digests instead. - * - */ -int mbedtls_internal_md4_process(mbedtls_md4_context *ctx, - const unsigned char data[64]); - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING) -#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED __attribute__((deprecated)) -#else -#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED -#endif -/** - * \brief MD4 context setup - * - * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_md4_starts_ret() in 2.7.0 - * - * \param ctx context to be initialized - * - * \warning MD4 is considered a weak message digest and its use - * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering - * stronger message digests instead. - * - */ -MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_md4_starts(mbedtls_md4_context *ctx); - -/** - * \brief MD4 process buffer - * - * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_md4_update_ret() in 2.7.0 - * - * \param ctx MD4 context - * \param input buffer holding the data - * \param ilen length of the input data - * - * \warning MD4 is considered a weak message digest and its use - * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering - * stronger message digests instead. - * - */ -MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_md4_update(mbedtls_md4_context *ctx, - const unsigned char *input, - size_t ilen); - -/** - * \brief MD4 final digest - * - * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_md4_finish_ret() in 2.7.0 - * - * \param ctx MD4 context - * \param output MD4 checksum result - * - * \warning MD4 is considered a weak message digest and its use - * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering - * stronger message digests instead. - * - */ -MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_md4_finish(mbedtls_md4_context *ctx, - unsigned char output[16]); - -/** - * \brief MD4 process data block (internal use only) - * - * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_internal_md4_process() in 2.7.0 - * - * \param ctx MD4 context - * \param data buffer holding one block of data - * - * \warning MD4 is considered a weak message digest and its use - * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering - * stronger message digests instead. - * - */ -MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_md4_process(mbedtls_md4_context *ctx, - const unsigned char data[64]); - -#undef MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED -#endif /* !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ - -/** - * \brief Output = MD4( input buffer ) - * - * \param input buffer holding the data - * \param ilen length of the input data - * \param output MD4 checksum result - * - * \return 0 if successful - * - * \warning MD4 is considered a weak message digest and its use - * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering - * stronger message digests instead. - * - */ -int mbedtls_md4_ret(const unsigned char *input, - size_t ilen, - unsigned char output[16]); - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING) -#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED __attribute__((deprecated)) -#else -#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED -#endif -/** - * \brief Output = MD4( input buffer ) - * - * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_md4_ret() in 2.7.0 - * - * \param input buffer holding the data - * \param ilen length of the input data - * \param output MD4 checksum result - * - * \warning MD4 is considered a weak message digest and its use - * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering - * stronger message digests instead. - * - */ -MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_md4(const unsigned char *input, - size_t ilen, - unsigned char output[16]); - -#undef MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED -#endif /* !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) - -/** - * \brief Checkup routine - * - * \return 0 if successful, or 1 if the test failed - * - * \warning MD4 is considered a weak message digest and its use - * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering - * stronger message digests instead. - * - */ -int mbedtls_md4_self_test(int verbose); - -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ - -#ifdef __cplusplus -} -#endif - -#endif /* mbedtls_md4.h */ diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/md5.h b/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/md5.h index fdc530a16b30..6bf0754a4a68 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/md5.h +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/md5.h @@ -13,20 +13,13 @@ */ #ifndef MBEDTLS_MD5_H #define MBEDTLS_MD5_H +#include "mbedtls/private_access.h" -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "mbedtls/build_info.h" #include #include -/* MBEDTLS_ERR_MD5_HW_ACCEL_FAILED is deprecated and should not be used. */ -/** MD5 hardware accelerator failed */ -#define MBEDTLS_ERR_MD5_HW_ACCEL_FAILED -0x002F - #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { #endif @@ -44,9 +37,9 @@ extern "C" { * */ typedef struct mbedtls_md5_context { - uint32_t total[2]; /*!< number of bytes processed */ - uint32_t state[4]; /*!< intermediate digest state */ - unsigned char buffer[64]; /*!< data block being processed */ + uint32_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(total)[2]; /*!< number of bytes processed */ + uint32_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(state)[4]; /*!< intermediate digest state */ + unsigned char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(buffer)[64]; /*!< data block being processed */ } mbedtls_md5_context; @@ -104,7 +97,7 @@ void mbedtls_md5_clone(mbedtls_md5_context *dst, * stronger message digests instead. * */ -int mbedtls_md5_starts_ret(mbedtls_md5_context *ctx); +int mbedtls_md5_starts(mbedtls_md5_context *ctx); /** * \brief MD5 process buffer @@ -120,9 +113,9 @@ int mbedtls_md5_starts_ret(mbedtls_md5_context *ctx); * stronger message digests instead. * */ -int mbedtls_md5_update_ret(mbedtls_md5_context *ctx, - const unsigned char *input, - size_t ilen); +int mbedtls_md5_update(mbedtls_md5_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *input, + size_t ilen); /** * \brief MD5 final digest @@ -137,8 +130,8 @@ int mbedtls_md5_update_ret(mbedtls_md5_context *ctx, * stronger message digests instead. * */ -int mbedtls_md5_finish_ret(mbedtls_md5_context *ctx, - unsigned char output[16]); +int mbedtls_md5_finish(mbedtls_md5_context *ctx, + unsigned char output[16]); /** * \brief MD5 process data block (internal use only) @@ -156,79 +149,6 @@ int mbedtls_md5_finish_ret(mbedtls_md5_context *ctx, int mbedtls_internal_md5_process(mbedtls_md5_context *ctx, const unsigned char data[64]); -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING) -#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED __attribute__((deprecated)) -#else -#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED -#endif -/** - * \brief MD5 context setup - * - * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_md5_starts_ret() in 2.7.0 - * - * \param ctx context to be initialized - * - * \warning MD5 is considered a weak message digest and its use - * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering - * stronger message digests instead. - * - */ -MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_md5_starts(mbedtls_md5_context *ctx); - -/** - * \brief MD5 process buffer - * - * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_md5_update_ret() in 2.7.0 - * - * \param ctx MD5 context - * \param input buffer holding the data - * \param ilen length of the input data - * - * \warning MD5 is considered a weak message digest and its use - * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering - * stronger message digests instead. - * - */ -MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_md5_update(mbedtls_md5_context *ctx, - const unsigned char *input, - size_t ilen); - -/** - * \brief MD5 final digest - * - * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_md5_finish_ret() in 2.7.0 - * - * \param ctx MD5 context - * \param output MD5 checksum result - * - * \warning MD5 is considered a weak message digest and its use - * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering - * stronger message digests instead. - * - */ -MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_md5_finish(mbedtls_md5_context *ctx, - unsigned char output[16]); - -/** - * \brief MD5 process data block (internal use only) - * - * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_internal_md5_process() in 2.7.0 - * - * \param ctx MD5 context - * \param data buffer holding one block of data - * - * \warning MD5 is considered a weak message digest and its use - * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering - * stronger message digests instead. - * - */ -MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_md5_process(mbedtls_md5_context *ctx, - const unsigned char data[64]); - -#undef MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED -#endif /* !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ - /** * \brief Output = MD5( input buffer ) * @@ -243,36 +163,9 @@ MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_md5_process(mbedtls_md5_context *ctx, * stronger message digests instead. * */ -int mbedtls_md5_ret(const unsigned char *input, - size_t ilen, - unsigned char output[16]); - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING) -#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED __attribute__((deprecated)) -#else -#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED -#endif -/** - * \brief Output = MD5( input buffer ) - * - * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_md5_ret() in 2.7.0 - * - * \param input buffer holding the data - * \param ilen length of the input data - * \param output MD5 checksum result - * - * \warning MD5 is considered a weak message digest and its use - * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering - * stronger message digests instead. - * - */ -MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_md5(const unsigned char *input, - size_t ilen, - unsigned char output[16]); - -#undef MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED -#endif /* !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ +int mbedtls_md5(const unsigned char *input, + size_t ilen, + unsigned char output[16]); #if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/md_internal.h b/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/md_internal.h deleted file mode 100644 index 239fdd9ba235..000000000000 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/md_internal.h +++ /dev/null @@ -1,77 +0,0 @@ -/** - * \file md_internal.h - * - * \brief Message digest wrappers. - * - * \warning This in an internal header. Do not include directly. - * - * \author Adriaan de Jong - */ -/* - * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later - */ -#ifndef MBEDTLS_MD_WRAP_H -#define MBEDTLS_MD_WRAP_H - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif - -#include "mbedtls/md.h" - -#ifdef __cplusplus -extern "C" { -#endif - -/** - * Message digest information. - * Allows message digest functions to be called in a generic way. - */ -struct mbedtls_md_info_t { - /** Name of the message digest */ - const char *name; - - /** Digest identifier */ - mbedtls_md_type_t type; - - /** Output length of the digest function in bytes */ - unsigned char size; - - /** Block length of the digest function in bytes */ - unsigned char block_size; -}; - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD2_C) -extern const mbedtls_md_info_t mbedtls_md2_info; -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD4_C) -extern const mbedtls_md_info_t mbedtls_md4_info; -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C) -extern const mbedtls_md_info_t mbedtls_md5_info; -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C) -extern const mbedtls_md_info_t mbedtls_ripemd160_info; -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) -extern const mbedtls_md_info_t mbedtls_sha1_info; -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) -extern const mbedtls_md_info_t mbedtls_sha224_info; -extern const mbedtls_md_info_t mbedtls_sha256_info; -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384) -extern const mbedtls_md_info_t mbedtls_sha384_info; -#endif -extern const mbedtls_md_info_t mbedtls_sha512_info; -#endif - -#ifdef __cplusplus -} -#endif - -#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_WRAP_H */ diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/memory_buffer_alloc.h b/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/memory_buffer_alloc.h index 34013b9bc436..b527d9b66503 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/memory_buffer_alloc.h +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/memory_buffer_alloc.h @@ -10,11 +10,7 @@ #ifndef MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC_H #define MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC_H -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "mbedtls/build_info.h" #include @@ -22,7 +18,7 @@ * \name SECTION: Module settings * * The configuration options you can set for this module are in this section. - * Either change them in config.h or define them on the compiler command line. + * Either change them in mbedtls_config.h or define them on the compiler command line. * \{ */ @@ -83,6 +79,14 @@ void mbedtls_memory_buffer_set_verify(int verify); */ void mbedtls_memory_buffer_alloc_status(void); +/** + * \brief Get the number of alloc/free so far. + * + * \param alloc_count Number of allocations. + * \param free_count Number of frees. + */ +void mbedtls_memory_buffer_alloc_count_get(size_t *alloc_count, size_t *free_count); + /** * \brief Get the peak heap usage so far * diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/net.h b/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/net.h deleted file mode 100644 index 805ce339da2e..000000000000 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/net.h +++ /dev/null @@ -1,23 +0,0 @@ -/** - * \file net.h - * - * \brief Deprecated header file that includes net_sockets.h - * - * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls/net_sockets.h - */ -/* - * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later - */ -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) -#include "mbedtls/net_sockets.h" -#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING) -#warning "Deprecated header file: Superseded by mbedtls/net_sockets.h" -#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING */ -#endif /* !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/net_sockets.h b/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/net_sockets.h index 1a12c9c80340..85c11971d800 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/net_sockets.h +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/net_sockets.h @@ -25,12 +25,9 @@ */ #ifndef MBEDTLS_NET_SOCKETS_H #define MBEDTLS_NET_SOCKETS_H +#include "mbedtls/private_access.h" -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "mbedtls/build_info.h" #include "mbedtls/ssl.h" @@ -84,7 +81,13 @@ extern "C" { * structures for hand-made UDP demultiplexing). */ typedef struct mbedtls_net_context { - int fd; /**< The underlying file descriptor */ + /** The underlying file descriptor. + * + * This field is only guaranteed to be present on POSIX/Unix-like platforms. + * On other platforms, it may have a different type, have a different + * meaning, or be absent altogether. + */ + int fd; } mbedtls_net_context; diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/nist_kw.h b/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/nist_kw.h index a2479b01762e..d353f3d1a8a6 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/nist_kw.h +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/nist_kw.h @@ -22,12 +22,9 @@ #ifndef MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_H #define MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_H +#include "mbedtls/private_access.h" -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "mbedtls/build_info.h" #include "mbedtls/cipher.h" @@ -52,7 +49,7 @@ typedef enum { * Don't make any assumptions on this context! */ typedef struct { - mbedtls_cipher_context_t cipher_ctx; /*!< The cipher context used. */ + mbedtls_cipher_context_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(cipher_ctx); /*!< The cipher context used. */ } mbedtls_nist_kw_context; #else /* MBEDTLS_NIST_key wrapping_ALT */ diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/oid.h b/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/oid.h index 8da1ce852aad..fdc25ebf8856 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/oid.h +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/oid.h @@ -9,12 +9,9 @@ */ #ifndef MBEDTLS_OID_H #define MBEDTLS_OID_H +#include "mbedtls/private_access.h" -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "mbedtls/build_info.h" #include "mbedtls/asn1.h" #include "mbedtls/pk.h" @@ -25,9 +22,7 @@ #include "mbedtls/cipher.h" #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_C) #include "mbedtls/md.h" -#endif /** OID is not found. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_OID_NOT_FOUND -0x002E @@ -56,6 +51,11 @@ #define MBEDTLS_OID_X509_EXT_FRESHEST_CRL (1 << 14) #define MBEDTLS_OID_X509_EXT_NS_CERT_TYPE (1 << 16) +/* + * Maximum number of OID components allowed + */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_MAX_COMPONENTS 128 + /* * Top level OID tuples */ @@ -83,6 +83,9 @@ #define MBEDTLS_OID_OIW_SECSIG MBEDTLS_OID_ORG_OIW "\x03" #define MBEDTLS_OID_OIW_SECSIG_ALG MBEDTLS_OID_OIW_SECSIG "\x02" #define MBEDTLS_OID_OIW_SECSIG_SHA1 MBEDTLS_OID_OIW_SECSIG_ALG "\x1a" +#define MBEDTLS_OID_ORG_THAWTE "\x65" /* thawte(101) */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_THAWTE MBEDTLS_OID_ISO_IDENTIFIED_ORG \ + MBEDTLS_OID_ORG_THAWTE #define MBEDTLS_OID_ORG_CERTICOM "\x81\x04" /* certicom(132) */ #define MBEDTLS_OID_CERTICOM MBEDTLS_OID_ISO_IDENTIFIED_ORG \ MBEDTLS_OID_ORG_CERTICOM @@ -139,6 +142,7 @@ #define MBEDTLS_OID_AT_DN_QUALIFIER MBEDTLS_OID_AT "\x2E" /**< id-at-dnQualifier AttributeType:= {id-at 46} */ #define MBEDTLS_OID_AT_PSEUDONYM MBEDTLS_OID_AT "\x41" /**< id-at-pseudonym AttributeType:= {id-at 65} */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_UID "\x09\x92\x26\x89\x93\xF2\x2C\x64\x01\x01" /** id-domainComponent AttributeType:= {itu-t(0) data(9) pss(2342) ucl(19200300) pilot(100) pilotAttributeType(1) uid(1)} */ #define MBEDTLS_OID_DOMAIN_COMPONENT "\x09\x92\x26\x89\x93\xF2\x2C\x64\x01\x19" /** id-domainComponent AttributeType:= {itu-t(0) data(9) pss(2342) ucl(19200300) pilot(100) pilotAttributeType(1) domainComponent(25)} */ /* @@ -216,6 +220,7 @@ #define MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS MBEDTLS_OID_RSA_COMPANY "\x01" /**< pkcs OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) 1 } */ #define MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1 MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS "\x01" /**< pkcs-1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) 1 } */ #define MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS5 MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS "\x05" /**< pkcs-5 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) 5 } */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS7 MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS "\x07" /**< pkcs-7 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) 7 } */ #define MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS9 MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS "\x09" /**< pkcs-9 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) 9 } */ #define MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS12 MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS "\x0c" /**< pkcs-12 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) 12 } */ @@ -223,8 +228,6 @@ * PKCS#1 OIDs */ #define MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1_RSA MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1 "\x01" /**< rsaEncryption OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { pkcs-1 1 } */ -#define MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1_MD2 MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1 "\x02" /**< md2WithRSAEncryption ::= { pkcs-1 2 } */ -#define MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1_MD4 MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1 "\x03" /**< md4WithRSAEncryption ::= { pkcs-1 3 } */ #define MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1_MD5 MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1 "\x04" /**< md5WithRSAEncryption ::= { pkcs-1 4 } */ #define MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1_SHA1 MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1 "\x05" /**< sha1WithRSAEncryption ::= { pkcs-1 5 } */ #define MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1_SHA224 MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1 "\x0e" /**< sha224WithRSAEncryption ::= { pkcs-1 14 } */ @@ -243,8 +246,6 @@ /* * Digest algorithms */ -#define MBEDTLS_OID_DIGEST_ALG_MD2 MBEDTLS_OID_RSA_COMPANY "\x02\x02" /**< id-mbedtls_md2 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) digestAlgorithm(2) 2 } */ -#define MBEDTLS_OID_DIGEST_ALG_MD4 MBEDTLS_OID_RSA_COMPANY "\x02\x04" /**< id-mbedtls_md4 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) digestAlgorithm(2) 4 } */ #define MBEDTLS_OID_DIGEST_ALG_MD5 MBEDTLS_OID_RSA_COMPANY "\x02\x05" /**< id-mbedtls_md5 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) digestAlgorithm(2) 5 } */ #define MBEDTLS_OID_DIGEST_ALG_SHA1 MBEDTLS_OID_ISO_IDENTIFIED_ORG \ MBEDTLS_OID_OIW_SECSIG_SHA1 /**< id-mbedtls_sha1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) identified-organization(3) oiw(14) secsig(3) algorithms(2) 26 } */ @@ -257,6 +258,15 @@ #define MBEDTLS_OID_DIGEST_ALG_RIPEMD160 MBEDTLS_OID_TELETRUST "\x03\x02\x01" /**< id-ripemd160 OBJECT IDENTIFIER :: { iso(1) identified-organization(3) teletrust(36) algorithm(3) hashAlgorithm(2) ripemd160(1) } */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_DIGEST_ALG_SHA3_224 MBEDTLS_OID_NIST_ALG "\x02\x07" /**< id-sha3-224 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) nistAlgorithms(4) hashalgs(2) sha3-224(7) } */ + +#define MBEDTLS_OID_DIGEST_ALG_SHA3_256 MBEDTLS_OID_NIST_ALG "\x02\x08" /**< id-sha3-256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) nistAlgorithms(4) hashalgs(2) sha3-256(8) } */ + +#define MBEDTLS_OID_DIGEST_ALG_SHA3_384 MBEDTLS_OID_NIST_ALG "\x02\x09" /**< id-sha3-384 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) nistAlgorithms(4) hashalgs(2) sha3-384(9) } */ + +#define MBEDTLS_OID_DIGEST_ALG_SHA3_512 MBEDTLS_OID_NIST_ALG "\x02\x0a" /**< id-sha3-512 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) nistAlgorithms(4) hashalgs(2) sha3-512(10) } */ + + #define MBEDTLS_OID_HMAC_SHA1 MBEDTLS_OID_RSA_COMPANY "\x02\x07" /**< id-hmacWithSHA1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) digestAlgorithm(2) 7 } */ #define MBEDTLS_OID_HMAC_SHA224 MBEDTLS_OID_RSA_COMPANY "\x02\x08" /**< id-hmacWithSHA224 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) digestAlgorithm(2) 8 } */ @@ -267,13 +277,28 @@ #define MBEDTLS_OID_HMAC_SHA512 MBEDTLS_OID_RSA_COMPANY "\x02\x0B" /**< id-hmacWithSHA512 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) digestAlgorithm(2) 11 } */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_HMAC_SHA3_224 MBEDTLS_OID_NIST_ALG "\x02\x0d" /**< id-hmacWithSHA3-512 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) nistAlgorithms(4) hashalgs(2) hmacWithSHA3-224(13) } */ + +#define MBEDTLS_OID_HMAC_SHA3_256 MBEDTLS_OID_NIST_ALG "\x02\x0e" /**< id-hmacWithSHA3-512 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) nistAlgorithms(4) hashalgs(2) hmacWithSHA3-256(14) } */ + +#define MBEDTLS_OID_HMAC_SHA3_384 MBEDTLS_OID_NIST_ALG "\x02\x0f" /**< id-hmacWithSHA3-512 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) nistAlgorithms(4) hashalgs(2) hmacWithSHA3-384(15) } */ + +#define MBEDTLS_OID_HMAC_SHA3_512 MBEDTLS_OID_NIST_ALG "\x02\x10" /**< id-hmacWithSHA3-512 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) nistAlgorithms(4) hashalgs(2) hmacWithSHA3-512(16) } */ + +#define MBEDTLS_OID_HMAC_RIPEMD160 MBEDTLS_OID_INTERNET "\x05\x05\x08\x01\x04" /**< id-hmacWithSHA1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {iso(1) iso-identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) ipsec(8) isakmpOakley(1) hmacRIPEMD160(4)} */ + /* - * Encryption algorithms + * Encryption algorithms, + * the following standardized object identifiers are specified at + * https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8018#appendix-C. */ #define MBEDTLS_OID_DES_CBC MBEDTLS_OID_ISO_IDENTIFIED_ORG \ MBEDTLS_OID_OIW_SECSIG_ALG "\x07" /**< desCBC OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) identified-organization(3) oiw(14) secsig(3) algorithms(2) 7 } */ #define MBEDTLS_OID_DES_EDE3_CBC MBEDTLS_OID_RSA_COMPANY "\x03\x07" /**< des-ede3-cbc OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) -- us(840) rsadsi(113549) encryptionAlgorithm(3) 7 } */ #define MBEDTLS_OID_AES MBEDTLS_OID_NIST_ALG "\x01" /** aes OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) nistAlgorithm(4) 1 } */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_AES_128_CBC MBEDTLS_OID_AES "\x02" /** aes128-cbc-pad OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) nistAlgorithms(4) aes(1) aes128-CBC-PAD(2) } */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_AES_192_CBC MBEDTLS_OID_AES "\x16" /** aes192-cbc-pad OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) nistAlgorithms(4) aes(1) aes192-CBC-PAD(22) } */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_AES_256_CBC MBEDTLS_OID_AES "\x2a" /** aes256-cbc-pad OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) nistAlgorithms(4) aes(1) aes256-CBC-PAD(42) } */ /* * Key Wrapping algorithms @@ -297,13 +322,21 @@ /* * PKCS#5 PBES1 algorithms */ -#define MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS5_PBE_MD2_DES_CBC MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS5 "\x01" /**< pbeWithMD2AndDES-CBC OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {pkcs-5 1} */ -#define MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS5_PBE_MD2_RC2_CBC MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS5 "\x04" /**< pbeWithMD2AndRC2-CBC OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {pkcs-5 4} */ #define MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS5_PBE_MD5_DES_CBC MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS5 "\x03" /**< pbeWithMD5AndDES-CBC OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {pkcs-5 3} */ #define MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS5_PBE_MD5_RC2_CBC MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS5 "\x06" /**< pbeWithMD5AndRC2-CBC OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {pkcs-5 6} */ #define MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS5_PBE_SHA1_DES_CBC MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS5 "\x0a" /**< pbeWithSHA1AndDES-CBC OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {pkcs-5 10} */ #define MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS5_PBE_SHA1_RC2_CBC MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS5 "\x0b" /**< pbeWithSHA1AndRC2-CBC OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {pkcs-5 11} */ +/* + * PKCS#7 OIDs + */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS7_DATA MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS7 "\x01" /**< Content type is Data OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {pkcs-7 1} */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS7_SIGNED_DATA MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS7 "\x02" /**< Content type is Signed Data OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {pkcs-7 2} */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS7_ENVELOPED_DATA MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS7 "\x03" /**< Content type is Enveloped Data OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {pkcs-7 3} */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS7_SIGNED_AND_ENVELOPED_DATA MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS7 "\x04" /**< Content type is Signed and Enveloped Data OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {pkcs-7 4} */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS7_DIGESTED_DATA MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS7 "\x05" /**< Content type is Digested Data OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {pkcs-7 5} */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS7_ENCRYPTED_DATA MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS7 "\x06" /**< Content type is Encrypted Data OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {pkcs-7 6} */ + /* * PKCS#8 OIDs */ @@ -314,8 +347,6 @@ */ #define MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS12_PBE MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS12 "\x01" /**< pkcs-12PbeIds OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {pkcs-12 1} */ -#define MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS12_PBE_SHA1_RC4_128 MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS12_PBE "\x01" /**< pbeWithSHAAnd128BitRC4 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {pkcs-12PbeIds 1} */ -#define MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS12_PBE_SHA1_RC4_40 MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS12_PBE "\x02" /**< pbeWithSHAAnd40BitRC4 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {pkcs-12PbeIds 2} */ #define MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS12_PBE_SHA1_DES3_EDE_CBC MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS12_PBE "\x03" /**< pbeWithSHAAnd3-KeyTripleDES-CBC OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {pkcs-12PbeIds 3} */ #define MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS12_PBE_SHA1_DES2_EDE_CBC MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS12_PBE "\x04" /**< pbeWithSHAAnd2-KeyTripleDES-CBC OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {pkcs-12PbeIds 4} */ #define MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS12_PBE_SHA1_RC2_128_CBC MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS12_PBE "\x05" /**< pbeWithSHAAnd128BitRC2-CBC OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {pkcs-12PbeIds 5} */ @@ -426,6 +457,15 @@ * ecdsa-with-SHA2(3) 4 } */ #define MBEDTLS_OID_ECDSA_SHA512 MBEDTLS_OID_ANSI_X9_62_SIG_SHA2 "\x04" +/* + * EC key algorithms from RFC 8410 + */ + +#define MBEDTLS_OID_X25519 MBEDTLS_OID_THAWTE "\x6e" /**< id-X25519 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { 1 3 101 110 } */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_X448 MBEDTLS_OID_THAWTE "\x6f" /**< id-X448 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { 1 3 101 111 } */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_ED25519 MBEDTLS_OID_THAWTE "\x70" /**< id-Ed25519 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { 1 3 101 112 } */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_ED448 MBEDTLS_OID_THAWTE "\x71" /**< id-Ed448 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { 1 3 101 113 } */ + #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { #endif @@ -434,10 +474,12 @@ extern "C" { * \brief Base OID descriptor structure */ typedef struct mbedtls_oid_descriptor_t { - const char *asn1; /*!< OID ASN.1 representation */ - size_t asn1_len; /*!< length of asn1 */ - const char *name; /*!< official name (e.g. from RFC) */ - const char *description; /*!< human friendly description */ + const char *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(asn1); /*!< OID ASN.1 representation */ + size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(asn1_len); /*!< length of asn1 */ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_REMOVE_INFO) + const char *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(name); /*!< official name (e.g. from RFC) */ + const char *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(description); /*!< human friendly description */ +#endif } mbedtls_oid_descriptor_t; /** @@ -453,6 +495,25 @@ typedef struct mbedtls_oid_descriptor_t { */ int mbedtls_oid_get_numeric_string(char *buf, size_t size, const mbedtls_asn1_buf *oid); +/** + * \brief Translate a string containing a dotted-decimal + * representation of an ASN.1 OID into its encoded form + * (e.g. "1.2.840.113549" into "\x2A\x86\x48\x86\xF7\x0D"). + * On success, this function allocates oid->buf from the + * heap. It must be freed by the caller using mbedtls_free(). + * + * \param oid #mbedtls_asn1_buf to populate with the DER-encoded OID + * \param oid_str string representation of the OID to parse + * \param size length of the OID string, not including any null terminator + * + * \return 0 if successful + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_DATA if \p oid_str does not + * represent a valid OID + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_ALLOC_FAILED if the function fails to + * allocate oid->buf + */ +int mbedtls_oid_from_numeric_string(mbedtls_asn1_buf *oid, const char *oid_str, size_t size); + /** * \brief Translate an X.509 extension OID into local values * @@ -496,7 +557,7 @@ int mbedtls_oid_get_pk_alg(const mbedtls_asn1_buf *oid, mbedtls_pk_type_t *pk_al int mbedtls_oid_get_oid_by_pk_alg(mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_alg, const char **oid, size_t *olen); -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS) /** * \brief Translate NamedCurve OID into an EC group identifier * @@ -518,9 +579,32 @@ int mbedtls_oid_get_ec_grp(const mbedtls_asn1_buf *oid, mbedtls_ecp_group_id *gr */ int mbedtls_oid_get_oid_by_ec_grp(mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id, const char **oid, size_t *olen); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_C) +/** + * \brief Translate AlgorithmIdentifier OID into an EC group identifier, + * for curves that are directly encoded at this level + * + * \param oid OID to use + * \param grp_id place to store group id + * + * \return 0 if successful, or MBEDTLS_ERR_OID_NOT_FOUND + */ +int mbedtls_oid_get_ec_grp_algid(const mbedtls_asn1_buf *oid, mbedtls_ecp_group_id *grp_id); + +/** + * \brief Translate EC group identifier into AlgorithmIdentifier OID, + * for curves that are directly encoded at this level + * + * \param grp_id EC group identifier + * \param oid place to store ASN.1 OID string pointer + * \param olen length of the OID + * + * \return 0 if successful, or MBEDTLS_ERR_OID_NOT_FOUND + */ +int mbedtls_oid_get_oid_by_ec_grp_algid(mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id, + const char **oid, size_t *olen); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS */ + /** * \brief Translate SignatureAlgorithm OID into md_type and pk_type * @@ -557,26 +641,26 @@ int mbedtls_oid_get_oid_by_sig_alg(mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_alg, mbedtls_md_type_t m const char **oid, size_t *olen); /** - * \brief Translate hash algorithm OID into md_type + * \brief Translate hmac algorithm OID into md_type * * \param oid OID to use - * \param md_alg place to store message digest algorithm + * \param md_hmac place to store message hmac algorithm * * \return 0 if successful, or MBEDTLS_ERR_OID_NOT_FOUND */ -int mbedtls_oid_get_md_alg(const mbedtls_asn1_buf *oid, mbedtls_md_type_t *md_alg); +int mbedtls_oid_get_md_hmac(const mbedtls_asn1_buf *oid, mbedtls_md_type_t *md_hmac); /** - * \brief Translate hmac algorithm OID into md_type + * \brief Translate hash algorithm OID into md_type * * \param oid OID to use - * \param md_hmac place to store message hmac algorithm + * \param md_alg place to store message digest algorithm * * \return 0 if successful, or MBEDTLS_ERR_OID_NOT_FOUND */ -int mbedtls_oid_get_md_hmac(const mbedtls_asn1_buf *oid, mbedtls_md_type_t *md_hmac); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_C */ +int mbedtls_oid_get_md_alg(const mbedtls_asn1_buf *oid, mbedtls_md_type_t *md_alg); +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_REMOVE_INFO) /** * \brief Translate Extended Key Usage OID into description * @@ -586,6 +670,7 @@ int mbedtls_oid_get_md_hmac(const mbedtls_asn1_buf *oid, mbedtls_md_type_t *md_h * \return 0 if successful, or MBEDTLS_ERR_OID_NOT_FOUND */ int mbedtls_oid_get_extended_key_usage(const mbedtls_asn1_buf *oid, const char **desc); +#endif /** * \brief Translate certificate policies OID into description @@ -618,7 +703,6 @@ int mbedtls_oid_get_oid_by_md(mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, const char **oid, size_t * \return 0 if successful, or MBEDTLS_ERR_OID_NOT_FOUND */ int mbedtls_oid_get_cipher_alg(const mbedtls_asn1_buf *oid, mbedtls_cipher_type_t *cipher_alg); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C) /** @@ -634,6 +718,7 @@ int mbedtls_oid_get_cipher_alg(const mbedtls_asn1_buf *oid, mbedtls_cipher_type_ int mbedtls_oid_get_pkcs12_pbe_alg(const mbedtls_asn1_buf *oid, mbedtls_md_type_t *md_alg, mbedtls_cipher_type_t *cipher_alg); #endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C */ #ifdef __cplusplus } diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/pem.h b/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/pem.h index ffe6e473dada..3c6a28d98d95 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/pem.h +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/pem.h @@ -9,12 +9,9 @@ */ #ifndef MBEDTLS_PEM_H #define MBEDTLS_PEM_H +#include "mbedtls/private_access.h" -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "mbedtls/build_info.h" #include @@ -53,9 +50,9 @@ extern "C" { * \brief PEM context structure */ typedef struct mbedtls_pem_context { - unsigned char *buf; /*!< buffer for decoded data */ - size_t buflen; /*!< length of the buffer */ - unsigned char *info; /*!< buffer for extra header information */ + unsigned char *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(buf); /*!< buffer for decoded data */ + size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(buflen); /*!< length of the buffer */ + unsigned char *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(info); /*!< buffer for extra header information */ } mbedtls_pem_context; @@ -76,16 +73,20 @@ void mbedtls_pem_init(mbedtls_pem_context *ctx); * \param data source data to look in (must be nul-terminated) * \param pwd password for decryption (can be NULL) * \param pwdlen length of password - * \param use_len destination for total length used (set after header is - * correctly read, so unless you get + * \param use_len destination for total length used from data buffer. It is + * set after header is correctly read, so unless you get * MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_BAD_INPUT_DATA or * MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_NO_HEADER_FOOTER_PRESENT, use_len is - * the length to skip) + * the length to skip. * * \note Attempts to check password correctness by verifying if * the decrypted text starts with an ASN.1 sequence of * appropriate length * + * \note \c mbedtls_pem_free must be called on PEM context before + * the PEM context can be reused in another call to + * \c mbedtls_pem_read_buffer + * * \return 0 on success, or a specific PEM error code */ int mbedtls_pem_read_buffer(mbedtls_pem_context *ctx, const char *header, const char *footer, @@ -93,6 +94,25 @@ int mbedtls_pem_read_buffer(mbedtls_pem_context *ctx, const char *header, const const unsigned char *pwd, size_t pwdlen, size_t *use_len); +/** + * \brief Get the pointer to the decoded binary data in a PEM context. + * + * \param ctx PEM context to access. + * \param buflen On success, this will contain the length of the binary data. + * This must be a valid (non-null) pointer. + * + * \return A pointer to the decoded binary data. + * + * \note The returned pointer remains valid only until \p ctx is + modified or freed. + */ +static inline const unsigned char *mbedtls_pem_get_buffer(mbedtls_pem_context *ctx, size_t *buflen) +{ + *buflen = ctx->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(buflen); + return ctx->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(buf); +} + + /** * \brief PEM context memory freeing * diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/pk.h b/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/pk.h index a8c0c377e9bf..fde302f87206 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/pk.h +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/pk.h @@ -10,12 +10,9 @@ #ifndef MBEDTLS_PK_H #define MBEDTLS_PK_H +#include "mbedtls/private_access.h" -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "mbedtls/build_info.h" #include "mbedtls/md.h" @@ -31,15 +28,10 @@ #include "mbedtls/ecdsa.h" #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT) #include "psa/crypto.h" #endif -#if (defined(__ARMCC_VERSION) || defined(_MSC_VER)) && \ - !defined(inline) && !defined(__cplusplus) -#define inline __inline -#endif - /** Memory allocation failed. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_ALLOC_FAILED -0x3F80 /** Type mismatch, eg attempt to encrypt with an ECDSA key */ @@ -68,10 +60,8 @@ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE -0x3980 /** The buffer contains a valid signature followed by more data. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_SIG_LEN_MISMATCH -0x3900 - -/* MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_HW_ACCEL_FAILED is deprecated and should not be used. */ -/** PK hardware accelerator failed. */ -#define MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_HW_ACCEL_FAILED -0x3880 +/** The output buffer is too small. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL -0x3880 #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { @@ -96,7 +86,23 @@ typedef enum { * See \c mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_verify_ext() */ typedef struct mbedtls_pk_rsassa_pss_options { + /** The digest to use for MGF1 in PSS. + * + * \note When #MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO is enabled and #MBEDTLS_RSA_C is + * disabled, this must be equal to the \c md_alg argument passed + * to mbedtls_pk_verify_ext(). In a future version of the library, + * this constraint may apply whenever #MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO is + * enabled regardless of the status of #MBEDTLS_RSA_C. + */ mbedtls_md_type_t mgf1_hash_id; + + /** The expected length of the salt, in bytes. This may be + * #MBEDTLS_RSA_SALT_LEN_ANY to accept any salt length. + * + * \note When #MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO is enabled, only + * #MBEDTLS_RSA_SALT_LEN_ANY is valid. Any other value may be + * ignored (allowing any salt length). + */ int expected_salt_len; } mbedtls_pk_rsassa_pss_options; @@ -120,7 +126,7 @@ typedef struct mbedtls_pk_rsassa_pss_options { /* For RSA, the signature can be as large as the bignum module allows. * For RSA_ALT, the signature size is not necessarily tied to what the * bignum module can do, but in the absence of any specific setting, - * we use that (rsa_alt_sign_wrap in pk_wrap will check). */ + * we use that (rsa_alt_sign_wrap in library/pk_wrap.h will check). */ #undef MBEDTLS_PK_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE #define MBEDTLS_PK_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE #endif @@ -153,6 +159,28 @@ typedef struct mbedtls_pk_rsassa_pss_options { #endif #endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) */ +/* Internal helper to define which fields in the pk_context structure below + * should be used for EC keys: legacy ecp_keypair or the raw (PSA friendly) + * format. It should be noted that this only affects how data is stored, not + * which functions are used for various operations. The overall picture looks + * like this: + * - if USE_PSA is not defined and ECP_C is defined then use ecp_keypair data + * structure and legacy functions + * - if USE_PSA is defined and + * - if ECP_C then use ecp_keypair structure, convert data to a PSA friendly + * format and use PSA functions + * - if !ECP_C then use new raw data and PSA functions directly. + * + * The main reason for the "intermediate" (USE_PSA + ECP_C) above is that as long + * as ECP_C is defined mbedtls_pk_ec() gives the user a read/write access to the + * ecp_keypair structure inside the pk_context so they can modify it using + * ECP functions which are not under PK module's control. + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) +#define MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA +#endif + /** * \brief Types for interfacing with the debug module */ @@ -160,15 +188,16 @@ typedef enum { MBEDTLS_PK_DEBUG_NONE = 0, MBEDTLS_PK_DEBUG_MPI, MBEDTLS_PK_DEBUG_ECP, + MBEDTLS_PK_DEBUG_PSA_EC, } mbedtls_pk_debug_type; /** * \brief Item to send to the debug module */ typedef struct mbedtls_pk_debug_item { - mbedtls_pk_debug_type type; - const char *name; - void *value; + mbedtls_pk_debug_type MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(type); + const char *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(name); + void *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(value); } mbedtls_pk_debug_item; /** Maximum number of item send for debugging, plus 1 */ @@ -176,15 +205,63 @@ typedef struct mbedtls_pk_debug_item { /** * \brief Public key information and operations + * + * \note The library does not support custom pk info structures, + * only built-in structures returned by + * mbedtls_cipher_info_from_type(). */ typedef struct mbedtls_pk_info_t mbedtls_pk_info_t; +#define MBEDTLS_PK_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_RAW_LEN \ + PSA_KEY_EXPORT_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE(PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS) /** * \brief Public key container */ typedef struct mbedtls_pk_context { - const mbedtls_pk_info_t *pk_info; /**< Public key information */ - void *pk_ctx; /**< Underlying public key context */ + const mbedtls_pk_info_t *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(pk_info); /**< Public key information */ + void *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(pk_ctx); /**< Underlying public key context */ + /* The following field is used to store the ID of a private key in the + * following cases: + * - opaque key when MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO is defined + * - normal key when MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA is defined. In this case: + * - the pk_ctx above is not not used to store the private key anymore. + * Actually that field not populated at all in this case because also + * the public key will be stored in raw format as explained below + * - this ID is used for all private key operations (ex: sign, check + * key pair, key write, etc) using PSA functions + * + * Note: this private key storing solution only affects EC keys, not the + * other ones. The latters still use the pk_ctx to store their own + * context. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(priv_id); /**< Key ID for opaque keys */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + /* The following fields are meant for storing the public key in raw format + * which is handy for: + * - easily importing it into the PSA context + * - reducing the ECP module dependencies in the PK one. + * + * When MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA is enabled: + * - the pk_ctx above is not used anymore for storing the public key + * inside the ecp_keypair structure + * - the following fields are used for all public key operations: signature + * verify, key pair check and key write. + * - For a key pair, priv_id contains the private key. For a public key, + * priv_id is null. + * Of course, when MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA is not enabled, the legacy + * ecp_keypair structure is used for storing the public key and performing + * all the operations. + * + * Note: This new public key storing solution only works for EC keys, not + * other ones. The latters still use pk_ctx to store their own + * context. + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA) + uint8_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(pub_raw)[MBEDTLS_PK_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_RAW_LEN]; /**< Raw public key */ + size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(pub_raw_len); /**< Valid bytes in "pub_raw" */ + psa_ecc_family_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(ec_family); /**< EC family of pk */ + size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(ec_bits); /**< Curve's bits of pk */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA */ } mbedtls_pk_context; #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) @@ -192,8 +269,8 @@ typedef struct mbedtls_pk_context { * \brief Context for resuming operations */ typedef struct { - const mbedtls_pk_info_t *pk_info; /**< Public key information */ - void *rs_ctx; /**< Underlying restart context */ + const mbedtls_pk_info_t *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(pk_info); /**< Public key information */ + void *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(rs_ctx); /**< Underlying restart context */ } mbedtls_pk_restart_ctx; #else /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C && MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */ /* Now we can declare functions that take a pointer to that */ @@ -204,14 +281,13 @@ typedef void mbedtls_pk_restart_ctx; /** * \brief Types for RSA-alt abstraction */ -typedef int (*mbedtls_pk_rsa_alt_decrypt_func)(void *ctx, int mode, size_t *olen, +typedef int (*mbedtls_pk_rsa_alt_decrypt_func)(void *ctx, size_t *olen, const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output, size_t output_max_len); typedef int (*mbedtls_pk_rsa_alt_sign_func)(void *ctx, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng, - int mode, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, - unsigned int hashlen, + mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, unsigned int hashlen, const unsigned char *hash, unsigned char *sig); typedef size_t (*mbedtls_pk_rsa_alt_key_len_func)(void *ctx); #endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT_SUPPORT */ @@ -290,8 +366,8 @@ int mbedtls_pk_setup(mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, const mbedtls_pk_info_t *info); * storing and manipulating the key material directly. * * \param ctx The context to initialize. It must be empty (type NONE). - * \param key The PSA key to wrap, which must hold an ECC key pair - * (see notes below). + * \param key The PSA key to wrap, which must hold an ECC or RSA key + * pair (see notes below). * * \note The wrapped key must remain valid as long as the * wrapping PK context is in use, that is at least between @@ -299,8 +375,8 @@ int mbedtls_pk_setup(mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, const mbedtls_pk_info_t *info); * mbedtls_pk_free() is called on this context. The wrapped * key might then be independently used or destroyed. * - * \note This function is currently only available for ECC key - * pairs (that is, ECC keys containing private key material). + * \note This function is currently only available for ECC or RSA + * key pairs (that is, keys containing private key material). * Support for other key types may be added later. * * \return \c 0 on success. @@ -311,7 +387,7 @@ int mbedtls_pk_setup(mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, const mbedtls_pk_info_t *info); * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_ALLOC_FAILED on allocation failure. */ int mbedtls_pk_setup_opaque(mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, - const psa_key_id_t key); + const mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key); #endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT_SUPPORT) @@ -371,34 +447,298 @@ static inline size_t mbedtls_pk_get_len(const mbedtls_pk_context *ctx) */ int mbedtls_pk_can_do(const mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, mbedtls_pk_type_t type); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +/** + * \brief Tell if context can do the operation given by PSA algorithm + * + * \param ctx The context to query. It must have been initialized. + * \param alg PSA algorithm to check against, the following are allowed: + * PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(hash), + * PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(hash), + * PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT, + * PSA_ALG_ECDSA(hash), + * PSA_ALG_ECDH, where hash is a specific hash. + * \param usage PSA usage flag to check against, must be composed of: + * PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH + * PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT + * PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE. + * Context key must match all passed usage flags. + * + * \warning Since the set of allowed algorithms and usage flags may be + * expanded in the future, the return value \c 0 should not + * be taken in account for non-allowed algorithms and usage + * flags. + * + * \return 1 if the context can do operations on the given type. + * \return 0 if the context cannot do the operations on the given + * type, for non-allowed algorithms and usage flags, or + * for a context that has been initialized but not set up + * or that has been cleared with mbedtls_pk_free(). + */ +int mbedtls_pk_can_do_ext(const mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, psa_algorithm_t alg, + psa_key_usage_t usage); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT) +/** + * \brief Determine valid PSA attributes that can be used to + * import a key into PSA. + * + * The attributes determined by this function are suitable + * for calling mbedtls_pk_import_into_psa() to create + * a PSA key with the same key material. + * + * The typical flow of operations involving this function is + * ``` + * psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + * int ret = mbedtls_pk_get_psa_attributes(pk, &attributes); + * if (ret != 0) ...; // error handling omitted + * // Tweak attributes if desired + * psa_key_id_t key_id = 0; + * ret = mbedtls_pk_import_into_psa(pk, &attributes, &key_id); + * if (ret != 0) ...; // error handling omitted + * ``` + * + * \note This function does not support RSA-alt contexts + * (set up with mbedtls_pk_setup_rsa_alt()). + * + * \param[in] pk The PK context to use. It must have been set up. + * It can either contain a key pair or just a public key. + * \param usage A single `PSA_KEY_USAGE_xxx` flag among the following: + * - #PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT: \p pk must contain a + * key pair. The output \p attributes will contain a + * key pair type, and the usage policy will allow + * #PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT as well as + * #PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT. + * - #PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE: \p pk must contain a + * key pair. The output \p attributes will contain a + * key pair type. + * - #PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT: The output + * \p attributes will contain a public key type. + * - #PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH: \p pk must contain a + * key pair. The output \p attributes will contain a + * key pair type, and the usage policy will allow + * #PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH as well as + * #PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH. + * - #PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE: \p pk must contain a + * key pair. The output \p attributes will contain a + * key pair type, and the usage policy will allow + * #PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE as well as + * #PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE. + * - #PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH: The output + * \p attributes will contain a public key type. + * - #PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE: The output + * \p attributes will contain a public key type. + * \param[out] attributes + * On success, valid attributes to import the key into PSA. + * - The lifetime and key identifier are unchanged. If the + * attribute structure was initialized or reset before + * calling this function, this will result in a volatile + * key. Call psa_set_key_identifier() before or after this + * function if you wish to create a persistent key. Call + * psa_set_key_lifetime() before or after this function if + * you wish to import the key in a secure element. + * - The key type and bit-size are determined by the contents + * of the PK context. If the PK context contains a key + * pair, the key type can be either a key pair type or + * the corresponding public key type, depending on + * \p usage. If the PK context contains a public key, + * the key type is a public key type. + * - The key's policy is determined by the key type and + * the \p usage parameter. The usage always allows + * \p usage, exporting and copying the key, and + * possibly other permissions as documented for the + * \p usage parameter. + * The permitted algorithm policy is determined as follows + * based on the #mbedtls_pk_type_t type of \p pk, + * the chosen \p usage and other factors: + * - #MBEDTLS_PK_RSA whose underlying + * #mbedtls_rsa_context has the padding mode + * #MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15: + * #PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(#PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH) + * if \p usage is SIGN/VERIFY, and + * #PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT + * if \p usage is ENCRYPT/DECRYPT. + * - #MBEDTLS_PK_RSA whose underlying + * #mbedtls_rsa_context has the padding mode + * #MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21 and the digest type + * corresponding to the PSA algorithm \c hash: + * #PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(#PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH) + * if \p usage is SIGN/VERIFY, and + * #PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(\c hash) + * if \p usage is ENCRYPT/DECRYPT. + * - #MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT: not supported. + * - #MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA or #MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY + * if \p usage is SIGN/VERIFY: + * #PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(#PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH) + * if #MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC is enabled, + * otherwise #PSA_ALG_ECDSA(#PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH). + * - #MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY_DH or #MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY + * if \p usage is DERIVE: + * #PSA_ALG_ECDH. + * - #MBEDTLS_PK_OPAQUE: same as the primary algorithm + * set for the underlying PSA key, except that + * sign/decrypt flags are removed if the type is + * set to a public key type. + * The underlying key must allow \p usage. + * Note that the enrollment algorithm set with + * psa_set_key_enrollment_algorithm() is not copied. + * + * \return 0 on success. + * #MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH if \p pk does not contain + * a key of the type identified in \p attributes. + * Another error code on other failures. + */ +int mbedtls_pk_get_psa_attributes(const mbedtls_pk_context *pk, + psa_key_usage_t usage, + psa_key_attributes_t *attributes); + +/** + * \brief Import a key into the PSA key store. + * + * This function is equivalent to calling psa_import_key() + * with the key material from \p pk. + * + * The typical way to use this function is: + * -# Call mbedtls_pk_get_psa_attributes() to obtain + * attributes for the given key. + * -# If desired, modify the attributes, for example: + * - To create a persistent key, call + * psa_set_key_identifier() and optionally + * psa_set_key_lifetime(). + * - To import only the public part of a key pair: + * + * psa_set_key_type(&attributes, + * PSA_KEY_TYPE_PUBLIC_KEY_OF_KEY_PAIR( + * psa_get_key_type(&attributes))); + * - Restrict the key usage if desired. + * -# Call mbedtls_pk_import_into_psa(). + * + * \note This function does not support RSA-alt contexts + * (set up with mbedtls_pk_setup_rsa_alt()). + * + * \param[in] pk The PK context to use. It must have been set up. + * It can either contain a key pair or just a public key. + * \param[in] attributes + * The attributes to use for the new key. They must be + * compatible with \p pk. In particular, the key type + * must match the content of \p pk. + * If \p pk contains a key pair, the key type in + * attributes can be either the key pair type or the + * corresponding public key type (to import only the + * public part). + * \param[out] key_id + * On success, the identifier of the newly created key. + * On error, this is #MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT. + * + * \return 0 on success. + * #MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH if \p pk does not contain + * a key of the type identified in \p attributes. + * Another error code on other failures. + */ +int mbedtls_pk_import_into_psa(const mbedtls_pk_context *pk, + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t *key_id); + +/** + * \brief Create a PK context starting from a key stored in PSA. + * This key: + * - must be exportable and + * - must be an RSA or EC key pair or public key (FFDH is not supported in PK). + * + * The resulting PK object will be a transparent type: + * - #MBEDTLS_PK_RSA for RSA keys or + * - #MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY for EC keys. + * + * Once this functions returns the PK object will be completely + * independent from the original PSA key that it was generated + * from. + * Calling mbedtls_pk_sign(), mbedtls_pk_verify(), + * mbedtls_pk_encrypt(), mbedtls_pk_decrypt() on the resulting + * PK context will perform the corresponding algorithm for that + * PK context type. + * * For ECDSA, the choice of deterministic vs randomized will + * be based on the compile-time setting #MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC. + * * For an RSA key, the output PK context will allow both + * encrypt/decrypt and sign/verify regardless of the original + * key's policy. + * The original key's policy determines the output key's padding + * mode: PCKS1 v2.1 is set if the PSA key policy is OAEP or PSS, + * otherwise PKCS1 v1.5 is set. + * + * \param key_id The key identifier of the key stored in PSA. + * \param pk The PK context that will be filled. It must be initialized, + * but not set up. + * + * \return 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA in case the provided input + * parameters are not correct. + */ +int mbedtls_pk_copy_from_psa(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key_id, mbedtls_pk_context *pk); + +/** + * \brief Create a PK context for the public key of a PSA key. + * + * The key must be an RSA or ECC key. It can be either a + * public key or a key pair, and only the public key is copied. + * The resulting PK object will be a transparent type: + * - #MBEDTLS_PK_RSA for RSA keys or + * - #MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY for EC keys. + * + * Once this functions returns the PK object will be completely + * independent from the original PSA key that it was generated + * from. + * Calling mbedtls_pk_verify() or + * mbedtls_pk_encrypt() on the resulting + * PK context will perform the corresponding algorithm for that + * PK context type. + * + * For an RSA key, the output PK context will allow both + * encrypt and verify regardless of the original key's policy. + * The original key's policy determines the output key's padding + * mode: PCKS1 v2.1 is set if the PSA key policy is OAEP or PSS, + * otherwise PKCS1 v1.5 is set. + * + * \param key_id The key identifier of the key stored in PSA. + * \param pk The PK context that will be filled. It must be initialized, + * but not set up. + * + * \return 0 on success. + * \return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA in case the provided input + * parameters are not correct. + */ +int mbedtls_pk_copy_public_from_psa(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key_id, mbedtls_pk_context *pk); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT */ + /** * \brief Verify signature (including padding if relevant). * * \param ctx The PK context to use. It must have been set up. - * \param md_alg Hash algorithm used (see notes) + * \param md_alg Hash algorithm used. + * This can be #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE if the signature algorithm + * does not rely on a hash algorithm (non-deterministic + * ECDSA, RSA PKCS#1 v1.5). + * For PKCS#1 v1.5, if \p md_alg is #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, then + * \p hash is the DigestInfo structure used by RFC 8017 + * §9.2 steps 3–6. If \p md_alg is a valid hash + * algorithm then \p hash is the digest itself, and this + * function calculates the DigestInfo encoding internally. * \param hash Hash of the message to sign - * \param hash_len Hash length or 0 (see notes) + * \param hash_len Hash length * \param sig Signature to verify * \param sig_len Signature length * + * \note For keys of type #MBEDTLS_PK_RSA, the signature algorithm is + * either PKCS#1 v1.5 or PSS (accepting any salt length), + * depending on the padding mode in the underlying RSA context. + * For a pk object constructed by parsing, this is PKCS#1 v1.5 + * by default. Use mbedtls_pk_verify_ext() to explicitly select + * a different algorithm. + * * \return 0 on success (signature is valid), * #MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_SIG_LEN_MISMATCH if there is a valid * signature in \p sig but its length is less than \p sig_len, * or a specific error code. - * - * \note For RSA keys, the default padding type is PKCS#1 v1.5. - * Use \c mbedtls_pk_verify_ext( MBEDTLS_PK_RSASSA_PSS, ... ) - * to verify RSASSA_PSS signatures. - * - * \note If #MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO is enabled, the PSA crypto - * subsystem must have been initialized by calling - * psa_crypto_init() before calling this function, - * if the key might be an ECC (ECDSA) key. - * - * \note If hash_len is 0, then the length associated with md_alg - * is used instead, or an error returned if it is invalid. - * - * \note md_alg may be MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, only if hash_len != 0 */ int mbedtls_pk_verify(mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len, @@ -457,7 +797,9 @@ int mbedtls_pk_verify_restartable(mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, * * \note If type is MBEDTLS_PK_RSASSA_PSS, then options must point * to a mbedtls_pk_rsassa_pss_options structure, - * otherwise it must be NULL. + * otherwise it must be NULL. Note that if + * #MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO is defined, the salt length is not + * verified as PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT is used. */ int mbedtls_pk_verify_ext(mbedtls_pk_type_t type, const void *options, mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, @@ -471,34 +813,73 @@ int mbedtls_pk_verify_ext(mbedtls_pk_type_t type, const void *options, * with a private key. * \param md_alg Hash algorithm used (see notes) * \param hash Hash of the message to sign - * \param hash_len Hash length or 0 (see notes) + * \param hash_len Hash length * \param sig Place to write the signature. * It must have enough room for the signature. * #MBEDTLS_PK_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE is always enough. * You may use a smaller buffer if it is large enough * given the key type. + * \param sig_size The size of the \p sig buffer in bytes. * \param sig_len On successful return, * the number of bytes written to \p sig. - * \param f_rng RNG function + * \param f_rng RNG function, must not be \c NULL. * \param p_rng RNG parameter * - * \return 0 on success, or a specific error code. - * - * \note For RSA keys, the default padding type is PKCS#1 v1.5. - * There is no interface in the PK module to make RSASSA-PSS - * signatures yet. + * \note For keys of type #MBEDTLS_PK_RSA, the signature algorithm is + * either PKCS#1 v1.5 or PSS (using the largest possible salt + * length up to the hash length), depending on the padding mode + * in the underlying RSA context. For a pk object constructed + * by parsing, this is PKCS#1 v1.5 by default. Use + * mbedtls_pk_verify_ext() to explicitly select a different + * algorithm. * - * \note If hash_len is 0, then the length associated with md_alg - * is used instead, or an error returned if it is invalid. + * \return 0 on success, or a specific error code. * * \note For RSA, md_alg may be MBEDTLS_MD_NONE if hash_len != 0. * For ECDSA, md_alg may never be MBEDTLS_MD_NONE. */ int mbedtls_pk_sign(mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len, - unsigned char *sig, size_t *sig_len, + unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_size, size_t *sig_len, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng); +/** + * \brief Make signature given a signature type. + * + * \param pk_type Signature type. + * \param ctx The PK context to use. It must have been set up + * with a private key. + * \param md_alg Hash algorithm used (see notes) + * \param hash Hash of the message to sign + * \param hash_len Hash length + * \param sig Place to write the signature. + * It must have enough room for the signature. + * #MBEDTLS_PK_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE is always enough. + * You may use a smaller buffer if it is large enough + * given the key type. + * \param sig_size The size of the \p sig buffer in bytes. + * \param sig_len On successful return, + * the number of bytes written to \p sig. + * \param f_rng RNG function, must not be \c NULL. + * \param p_rng RNG parameter + * + * \return 0 on success, or a specific error code. + * + * \note When \p pk_type is #MBEDTLS_PK_RSASSA_PSS, + * see #PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS for a description of PSS options used. + * + * \note For RSA, md_alg may be MBEDTLS_MD_NONE if hash_len != 0. + * For ECDSA, md_alg may never be MBEDTLS_MD_NONE. + * + */ +int mbedtls_pk_sign_ext(mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_type, + mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, + mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len, + unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_size, size_t *sig_len, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng); + /** * \brief Restartable version of \c mbedtls_pk_sign() * @@ -511,15 +892,16 @@ int mbedtls_pk_sign(mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, * with a private key. * \param md_alg Hash algorithm used (see notes for mbedtls_pk_sign()) * \param hash Hash of the message to sign - * \param hash_len Hash length or 0 (see notes for mbedtls_pk_sign()) + * \param hash_len Hash length * \param sig Place to write the signature. * It must have enough room for the signature. * #MBEDTLS_PK_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE is always enough. * You may use a smaller buffer if it is large enough * given the key type. + * \param sig_size The size of the \p sig buffer in bytes. * \param sig_len On successful return, * the number of bytes written to \p sig. - * \param f_rng RNG function + * \param f_rng RNG function, must not be \c NULL. * \param p_rng RNG parameter * \param rs_ctx Restart context (NULL to disable restart) * @@ -530,7 +912,7 @@ int mbedtls_pk_sign(mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, int mbedtls_pk_sign_restartable(mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len, - unsigned char *sig, size_t *sig_len, + unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_size, size_t *sig_len, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng, mbedtls_pk_restart_ctx *rs_ctx); @@ -544,10 +926,13 @@ int mbedtls_pk_sign_restartable(mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, * \param output Decrypted output * \param olen Decrypted message length * \param osize Size of the output buffer - * \param f_rng RNG function + * \param f_rng RNG function, must not be \c NULL. * \param p_rng RNG parameter * - * \note For RSA keys, the default padding type is PKCS#1 v1.5. + * \note For keys of type #MBEDTLS_PK_RSA, the signature algorithm is + * either PKCS#1 v1.5 or OAEP, depending on the padding mode in + * the underlying RSA context. For a pk object constructed by + * parsing, this is PKCS#1 v1.5 by default. * * \return 0 on success, or a specific error code. */ @@ -565,10 +950,15 @@ int mbedtls_pk_decrypt(mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, * \param output Encrypted output * \param olen Encrypted output length * \param osize Size of the output buffer - * \param f_rng RNG function + * \param f_rng RNG function, must not be \c NULL. * \param p_rng RNG parameter * - * \note For RSA keys, the default padding type is PKCS#1 v1.5. + * \note For keys of type #MBEDTLS_PK_RSA, the signature algorithm is + * either PKCS#1 v1.5 or OAEP, depending on the padding mode in + * the underlying RSA context. For a pk object constructed by + * parsing, this is PKCS#1 v1.5 by default. + * + * \note \p f_rng is used for padding generation. * * \return 0 on success, or a specific error code. */ @@ -582,6 +972,8 @@ int mbedtls_pk_encrypt(mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, * * \param pub Context holding a public key. * \param prv Context holding a private (and public) key. + * \param f_rng RNG function, must not be \c NULL. + * \param p_rng RNG parameter * * \return \c 0 on success (keys were checked and match each other). * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE if the keys could not @@ -589,7 +981,10 @@ int mbedtls_pk_encrypt(mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA if a context is invalid. * \return Another non-zero value if the keys do not match. */ -int mbedtls_pk_check_pair(const mbedtls_pk_context *pub, const mbedtls_pk_context *prv); +int mbedtls_pk_check_pair(const mbedtls_pk_context *pub, + const mbedtls_pk_context *prv, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng); /** * \brief Export debug information @@ -635,7 +1030,7 @@ static inline mbedtls_rsa_context *mbedtls_pk_rsa(const mbedtls_pk_context pk) { switch (mbedtls_pk_get_type(&pk)) { case MBEDTLS_PK_RSA: - return (mbedtls_rsa_context *) (pk).pk_ctx; + return (mbedtls_rsa_context *) (pk).MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(pk_ctx); default: return NULL; } @@ -660,7 +1055,7 @@ static inline mbedtls_ecp_keypair *mbedtls_pk_ec(const mbedtls_pk_context pk) case MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY: case MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY_DH: case MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA: - return (mbedtls_ecp_keypair *) (pk).pk_ctx; + return (mbedtls_ecp_keypair *) (pk).MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(pk_ctx); default: return NULL; } @@ -672,6 +1067,10 @@ static inline mbedtls_ecp_keypair *mbedtls_pk_ec(const mbedtls_pk_context pk) /** * \brief Parse a private key in PEM or DER format * + * \note If #MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO is enabled, the PSA crypto + * subsystem must have been initialized by calling + * psa_crypto_init() before calling this function. + * * \param ctx The PK context to fill. It must have been initialized * but not set up. * \param key Input buffer to parse. @@ -688,6 +1087,8 @@ static inline mbedtls_ecp_keypair *mbedtls_pk_ec(const mbedtls_pk_context pk) * The empty password is not supported. * \param pwdlen Size of the password in bytes. * Ignored if \p pwd is \c NULL. + * \param f_rng RNG function, must not be \c NULL. Used for blinding. + * \param p_rng RNG parameter * * \note On entry, ctx must be empty, either freshly initialised * with mbedtls_pk_init() or reset with mbedtls_pk_free(). If you need a @@ -699,12 +1100,17 @@ static inline mbedtls_ecp_keypair *mbedtls_pk_ec(const mbedtls_pk_context pk) */ int mbedtls_pk_parse_key(mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, const unsigned char *key, size_t keylen, - const unsigned char *pwd, size_t pwdlen); + const unsigned char *pwd, size_t pwdlen, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng); /** \ingroup pk_module */ /** * \brief Parse a public key in PEM or DER format * + * \note If #MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO is enabled, the PSA crypto + * subsystem must have been initialized by calling + * psa_crypto_init() before calling this function. + * * \param ctx The PK context to fill. It must have been initialized * but not set up. * \param key Input buffer to parse. @@ -719,6 +1125,9 @@ int mbedtls_pk_parse_key(mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, * with mbedtls_pk_init() or reset with mbedtls_pk_free(). If you need a * specific key type, check the result with mbedtls_pk_can_do(). * + * \note For compressed points, see #MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_COMPRESSED for + * limitations. + * * \note The key is also checked for correctness. * * \return 0 if successful, or a specific PK or PEM error code @@ -731,6 +1140,10 @@ int mbedtls_pk_parse_public_key(mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, /** * \brief Load and parse a private key * + * \note If #MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO is enabled, the PSA crypto + * subsystem must have been initialized by calling + * psa_crypto_init() before calling this function. + * * \param ctx The PK context to fill. It must have been initialized * but not set up. * \param path filename to read the private key from @@ -739,6 +1152,8 @@ int mbedtls_pk_parse_public_key(mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, * Pass a null-terminated string if expecting an encrypted * key; a non-encrypted key will also be accepted. * The empty password is not supported. + * \param f_rng RNG function, must not be \c NULL. Used for blinding. + * \param p_rng RNG parameter * * \note On entry, ctx must be empty, either freshly initialised * with mbedtls_pk_init() or reset with mbedtls_pk_free(). If you need a @@ -749,7 +1164,8 @@ int mbedtls_pk_parse_public_key(mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, * \return 0 if successful, or a specific PK or PEM error code */ int mbedtls_pk_parse_keyfile(mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, - const char *path, const char *password); + const char *path, const char *password, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng); /** \ingroup pk_module */ /** @@ -786,7 +1202,7 @@ int mbedtls_pk_parse_public_keyfile(mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, const char *path); * \return length of data written if successful, or a specific * error code */ -int mbedtls_pk_write_key_der(mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, unsigned char *buf, size_t size); +int mbedtls_pk_write_key_der(const mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, unsigned char *buf, size_t size); /** * \brief Write a public key to a SubjectPublicKeyInfo DER structure @@ -801,7 +1217,7 @@ int mbedtls_pk_write_key_der(mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, unsigned char *buf, size_t * \return length of data written if successful, or a specific * error code */ -int mbedtls_pk_write_pubkey_der(mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, unsigned char *buf, size_t size); +int mbedtls_pk_write_pubkey_der(const mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, unsigned char *buf, size_t size); #if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_WRITE_C) /** @@ -814,7 +1230,7 @@ int mbedtls_pk_write_pubkey_der(mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, unsigned char *buf, siz * * \return 0 if successful, or a specific error code */ -int mbedtls_pk_write_pubkey_pem(mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, unsigned char *buf, size_t size); +int mbedtls_pk_write_pubkey_pem(const mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, unsigned char *buf, size_t size); /** * \brief Write a private key to a PKCS#1 or SEC1 PEM string @@ -826,7 +1242,7 @@ int mbedtls_pk_write_pubkey_pem(mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, unsigned char *buf, siz * * \return 0 if successful, or a specific error code */ -int mbedtls_pk_write_key_pem(mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, unsigned char *buf, size_t size); +int mbedtls_pk_write_key_pem(const mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, unsigned char *buf, size_t size); #endif /* MBEDTLS_PEM_WRITE_C */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C */ @@ -865,40 +1281,6 @@ int mbedtls_pk_write_pubkey(unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, const mbedtls_pk_context *key); #endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C */ -/* - * Internal module functions. You probably do not want to use these unless you - * know you do. - */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) -int mbedtls_pk_load_file(const char *path, unsigned char **buf, size_t *n); -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) -/** - * \brief Turn an EC key into an opaque one. - * - * \warning This is a temporary utility function for tests. It might - * change or be removed at any time without notice. - * - * \note Only ECDSA keys are supported so far. Signing with the - * specified hash is the only allowed use of that key. - * - * \param pk Input: the EC key to import to a PSA key. - * Output: a PK context wrapping that PSA key. - * \param key Output: a PSA key identifier. - * It's the caller's responsibility to call - * psa_destroy_key() on that key identifier after calling - * mbedtls_pk_free() on the PK context. - * \param hash_alg The hash algorithm to allow for use with that key. - * - * \return \c 0 if successful. - * \return An Mbed TLS error code otherwise. - */ -int mbedtls_pk_wrap_as_opaque(mbedtls_pk_context *pk, - psa_key_id_t *key, - psa_algorithm_t hash_alg); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ - #ifdef __cplusplus } #endif diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/pkcs11.h b/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/pkcs11.h deleted file mode 100644 index 25d1dd1edd24..000000000000 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/pkcs11.h +++ /dev/null @@ -1,241 +0,0 @@ -/** - * \file pkcs11.h - * - * \brief Wrapper for PKCS#11 library libpkcs11-helper - * - * \author Adriaan de Jong - */ -/* - * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later - */ -#ifndef MBEDTLS_PKCS11_H -#define MBEDTLS_PKCS11_H - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS11_C) - -#include "mbedtls/x509_crt.h" - -#include - -#if (defined(__ARMCC_VERSION) || defined(_MSC_VER)) && \ - !defined(inline) && !defined(__cplusplus) -#define inline __inline -#endif - -#ifdef __cplusplus -extern "C" { -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) - -/** - * Context for PKCS #11 private keys. - */ -typedef struct mbedtls_pkcs11_context { - pkcs11h_certificate_t pkcs11h_cert; - int len; -} mbedtls_pkcs11_context; - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING) -#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED __attribute__((deprecated)) -#else -#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED -#endif - -/** - * Initialize a mbedtls_pkcs11_context. - * (Just making memory references valid.) - * - * \deprecated This function is deprecated and will be removed in a - * future version of the library. - */ -MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_pkcs11_init(mbedtls_pkcs11_context *ctx); - -/** - * Fill in a Mbed TLS certificate, based on the given PKCS11 helper certificate. - * - * \deprecated This function is deprecated and will be removed in a - * future version of the library. - * - * \param cert X.509 certificate to fill - * \param pkcs11h_cert PKCS #11 helper certificate - * - * \return 0 on success. - */ -MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED int mbedtls_pkcs11_x509_cert_bind(mbedtls_x509_crt *cert, - pkcs11h_certificate_t pkcs11h_cert); - -/** - * Set up a mbedtls_pkcs11_context storing the given certificate. Note that the - * mbedtls_pkcs11_context will take over control of the certificate, freeing it when - * done. - * - * \deprecated This function is deprecated and will be removed in a - * future version of the library. - * - * \param priv_key Private key structure to fill. - * \param pkcs11_cert PKCS #11 helper certificate - * - * \return 0 on success - */ -MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED int mbedtls_pkcs11_priv_key_bind( - mbedtls_pkcs11_context *priv_key, - pkcs11h_certificate_t pkcs11_cert); - -/** - * Free the contents of the given private key context. Note that the structure - * itself is not freed. - * - * \deprecated This function is deprecated and will be removed in a - * future version of the library. - * - * \param priv_key Private key structure to cleanup - */ -MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_pkcs11_priv_key_free( - mbedtls_pkcs11_context *priv_key); - -/** - * \brief Do an RSA private key decrypt, then remove the message - * padding - * - * \deprecated This function is deprecated and will be removed in a future - * version of the library. - * - * \param ctx PKCS #11 context - * \param mode must be MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE, for compatibility with rsa.c's signature - * \param input buffer holding the encrypted data - * \param output buffer that will hold the plaintext - * \param olen will contain the plaintext length - * \param output_max_len maximum length of the output buffer - * - * \return 0 if successful, or an MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_XXX error code - * - * \note The output buffer must be as large as the size - * of ctx->N (eg. 128 bytes if RSA-1024 is used) otherwise - * an error is thrown. - */ -MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED int mbedtls_pkcs11_decrypt(mbedtls_pkcs11_context *ctx, - int mode, size_t *olen, - const unsigned char *input, - unsigned char *output, - size_t output_max_len); - -/** - * \brief Do a private RSA to sign a message digest - * - * \deprecated This function is deprecated and will be removed in a future - * version of the library. - * - * \param ctx PKCS #11 context - * \param mode must be MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE, for compatibility with rsa.c's signature - * \param md_alg a MBEDTLS_MD_XXX (use MBEDTLS_MD_NONE for signing raw data) - * \param hashlen message digest length (for MBEDTLS_MD_NONE only) - * \param hash buffer holding the message digest - * \param sig buffer that will hold the ciphertext - * - * \return 0 if the signing operation was successful, - * or an MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_XXX error code - * - * \note The "sig" buffer must be as large as the size - * of ctx->N (eg. 128 bytes if RSA-1024 is used). - */ -MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED int mbedtls_pkcs11_sign(mbedtls_pkcs11_context *ctx, - int mode, - mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, - unsigned int hashlen, - const unsigned char *hash, - unsigned char *sig); - -/** - * SSL/TLS wrappers for PKCS#11 functions - * - * \deprecated This function is deprecated and will be removed in a future - * version of the library. - */ -MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED static inline int mbedtls_ssl_pkcs11_decrypt(void *ctx, - int mode, - size_t *olen, - const unsigned char *input, - unsigned char *output, - size_t output_max_len) -{ - return mbedtls_pkcs11_decrypt((mbedtls_pkcs11_context *) ctx, mode, olen, input, output, - output_max_len); -} - -/** - * \brief This function signs a message digest using RSA. - * - * \deprecated This function is deprecated and will be removed in a future - * version of the library. - * - * \param ctx The PKCS #11 context. - * \param f_rng The RNG function. This parameter is unused. - * \param p_rng The RNG context. This parameter is unused. - * \param mode The operation to run. This must be set to - * MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE, for compatibility with rsa.c's - * signature. - * \param md_alg The message digest algorithm. One of the MBEDTLS_MD_XXX - * must be passed to this function and MBEDTLS_MD_NONE can be - * used for signing raw data. - * \param hashlen The message digest length (for MBEDTLS_MD_NONE only). - * \param hash The buffer holding the message digest. - * \param sig The buffer that will hold the ciphertext. - * - * \return \c 0 if the signing operation was successful. - * \return A non-zero error code on failure. - * - * \note The \p sig buffer must be as large as the size of - * ctx->N. For example, 128 bytes if RSA-1024 is - * used. - */ -MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED static inline int mbedtls_ssl_pkcs11_sign(void *ctx, - int (*f_rng)(void *, - unsigned char *, - size_t), - void *p_rng, - int mode, - mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, - unsigned int hashlen, - const unsigned char *hash, - unsigned char *sig) -{ - ((void) f_rng); - ((void) p_rng); - return mbedtls_pkcs11_sign((mbedtls_pkcs11_context *) ctx, mode, md_alg, - hashlen, hash, sig); -} - -/** - * This function gets the length of the private key. - * - * \deprecated This function is deprecated and will be removed in a future - * version of the library. - * - * \param ctx The PKCS #11 context. - * - * \return The length of the private key. - */ -MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED static inline size_t mbedtls_ssl_pkcs11_key_len(void *ctx) -{ - return ((mbedtls_pkcs11_context *) ctx)->len; -} - -#undef MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED - -#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ - -#ifdef __cplusplus -} -#endif - -#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS11_C */ - -#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS11_H */ diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/pkcs12.h b/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/pkcs12.h index 2ad5e9c3ff23..87f7681f29a7 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/pkcs12.h +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/pkcs12.h @@ -10,11 +10,7 @@ #ifndef MBEDTLS_PKCS12_H #define MBEDTLS_PKCS12_H -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "mbedtls/build_info.h" #include "mbedtls/md.h" #include "mbedtls/cipher.h" @@ -35,34 +31,16 @@ #define MBEDTLS_PKCS12_DERIVE_IV 2 /**< initialization vector */ #define MBEDTLS_PKCS12_DERIVE_MAC_KEY 3 /**< integrity / MAC key */ -#define MBEDTLS_PKCS12_PBE_DECRYPT 0 -#define MBEDTLS_PKCS12_PBE_ENCRYPT 1 +#define MBEDTLS_PKCS12_PBE_DECRYPT MBEDTLS_DECRYPT +#define MBEDTLS_PKCS12_PBE_ENCRYPT MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C) - -/** - * \brief PKCS12 Password Based function (encryption / decryption) - * for pbeWithSHAAnd128BitRC4 - * - * \param pbe_params an ASN1 buffer containing the pkcs-12PbeParams structure - * \param mode either MBEDTLS_PKCS12_PBE_ENCRYPT or MBEDTLS_PKCS12_PBE_DECRYPT - * \param pwd the password used (may be NULL if no password is used) - * \param pwdlen length of the password (may be 0) - * \param input the input data - * \param len data length - * \param output the output buffer - * - * \return 0 if successful, or a MBEDTLS_ERR_XXX code - */ -int mbedtls_pkcs12_pbe_sha1_rc4_128(mbedtls_asn1_buf *pbe_params, int mode, - const unsigned char *pwd, size_t pwdlen, - const unsigned char *input, size_t len, - unsigned char *output); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) /** * \brief PKCS12 Password Based function (encryption / decryption) * for cipher-based and mbedtls_md-based PBE's @@ -70,6 +48,10 @@ int mbedtls_pkcs12_pbe_sha1_rc4_128(mbedtls_asn1_buf *pbe_params, int mode, * \note When encrypting, #MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 must * be enabled at compile time. * + * \deprecated This function is deprecated and will be removed in a + * future version of the library. + * Please use mbedtls_pkcs12_pbe_ext() instead. + * * \warning When decrypting: * - if #MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 is enabled at compile * time, this function validates the CBC padding and returns @@ -104,11 +86,13 @@ int mbedtls_pkcs12_pbe_sha1_rc4_128(mbedtls_asn1_buf *pbe_params, int mode, * * \return 0 if successful, or a MBEDTLS_ERR_XXX code */ -int mbedtls_pkcs12_pbe(mbedtls_asn1_buf *pbe_params, int mode, - mbedtls_cipher_type_t cipher_type, mbedtls_md_type_t md_type, - const unsigned char *pwd, size_t pwdlen, - const unsigned char *data, size_t len, - unsigned char *output); +int MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED mbedtls_pkcs12_pbe(mbedtls_asn1_buf *pbe_params, int mode, + mbedtls_cipher_type_t cipher_type, + mbedtls_md_type_t md_type, + const unsigned char *pwd, size_t pwdlen, + const unsigned char *data, size_t len, + unsigned char *output); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7) @@ -161,7 +145,7 @@ int mbedtls_pkcs12_pbe_ext(mbedtls_asn1_buf *pbe_params, int mode, #endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C && MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C */ /** * \brief The PKCS#12 derivation function uses a password and a salt @@ -179,7 +163,7 @@ int mbedtls_pkcs12_pbe_ext(mbedtls_asn1_buf *pbe_params, int mode, * no byte order mark and with a null terminator (i.e. the * last two bytes should be 0x00 0x00). * \param pwdlen length of the password (may be 0). - * \param salt Salt buffer to use This may only be \c NULL when + * \param salt Salt buffer to use. This may only be \c NULL when * \p saltlen is 0. * \param saltlen length of the salt (may be zero) * \param mbedtls_md mbedtls_md type to use during the derivation diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/pkcs5.h b/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/pkcs5.h index 05bea484f17a..9ba5689d4a25 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/pkcs5.h +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/pkcs5.h @@ -12,14 +12,12 @@ #ifndef MBEDTLS_PKCS5_H #define MBEDTLS_PKCS5_H -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "mbedtls/build_info.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" #include "mbedtls/asn1.h" #include "mbedtls/md.h" +#include "mbedtls/cipher.h" #include #include @@ -33,21 +31,26 @@ /** Given private key password does not allow for correct decryption. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_PASSWORD_MISMATCH -0x2e00 -#define MBEDTLS_PKCS5_DECRYPT 0 -#define MBEDTLS_PKCS5_ENCRYPT 1 +#define MBEDTLS_PKCS5_DECRYPT MBEDTLS_DECRYPT +#define MBEDTLS_PKCS5_ENCRYPT MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) /** * \brief PKCS#5 PBES2 function * * \note When encrypting, #MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 must * be enabled at compile time. * + * \deprecated This function is deprecated and will be removed in a + * future version of the library. + * Please use mbedtls_pkcs5_pbes2_ext() instead. + * * \warning When decrypting: * - if #MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 is enabled at compile * time, this function validates the CBC padding and returns @@ -78,10 +81,11 @@ extern "C" { * * \returns 0 on success, or a MBEDTLS_ERR_XXX code if verification fails. */ -int mbedtls_pkcs5_pbes2(const mbedtls_asn1_buf *pbe_params, int mode, - const unsigned char *pwd, size_t pwdlen, - const unsigned char *data, size_t datalen, - unsigned char *output); +int MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED mbedtls_pkcs5_pbes2(const mbedtls_asn1_buf *pbe_params, int mode, + const unsigned char *pwd, size_t pwdlen, + const unsigned char *data, size_t datalen, + unsigned char *output); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7) @@ -126,11 +130,35 @@ int mbedtls_pkcs5_pbes2_ext(const mbedtls_asn1_buf *pbe_params, int mode, #endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C && MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C*/ +/** + * \brief PKCS#5 PBKDF2 using HMAC without using the HMAC context + * + * \param md_type Hash algorithm used + * \param password Password to use when generating key + * \param plen Length of password + * \param salt Salt to use when generating key + * \param slen Length of salt + * \param iteration_count Iteration count + * \param key_length Length of generated key in bytes + * \param output Generated key. Must be at least as big as key_length + * + * \returns 0 on success, or a MBEDTLS_ERR_XXX code if verification fails. + */ +int mbedtls_pkcs5_pbkdf2_hmac_ext(mbedtls_md_type_t md_type, + const unsigned char *password, + size_t plen, const unsigned char *salt, size_t slen, + unsigned int iteration_count, + uint32_t key_length, unsigned char *output); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_C) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) /** * \brief PKCS#5 PBKDF2 using HMAC * + * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_pkcs5_pbkdf2_hmac_ext(). + * * \param ctx Generic HMAC context * \param password Password to use when generating key * \param plen Length of password @@ -142,11 +170,16 @@ int mbedtls_pkcs5_pbes2_ext(const mbedtls_asn1_buf *pbe_params, int mode, * * \returns 0 on success, or a MBEDTLS_ERR_XXX code if verification fails. */ -int mbedtls_pkcs5_pbkdf2_hmac(mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx, const unsigned char *password, - size_t plen, const unsigned char *salt, size_t slen, - unsigned int iteration_count, - uint32_t key_length, unsigned char *output); - +int MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED mbedtls_pkcs5_pbkdf2_hmac(mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx, + const unsigned char *password, + size_t plen, + const unsigned char *salt, + size_t slen, + unsigned int iteration_count, + uint32_t key_length, + unsigned char *output); +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) /** diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/pkcs7.h b/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/pkcs7.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..e9b482208e6e --- /dev/null +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/pkcs7.h @@ -0,0 +1,240 @@ +/** + * \file pkcs7.h + * + * \brief PKCS #7 generic defines and structures + * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2315 + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +/** + * Note: For the time being, this implementation of the PKCS #7 cryptographic + * message syntax is a partial implementation of RFC 2315. + * Differences include: + * - The RFC specifies 6 different content types. The only type currently + * supported in Mbed TLS is the signed-data content type. + * - The only supported PKCS #7 Signed Data syntax version is version 1 + * - The RFC specifies support for BER. This implementation is limited to + * DER only. + * - The RFC specifies that multiple digest algorithms can be specified + * in the Signed Data type. Only one digest algorithm is supported in Mbed TLS. + * - The RFC specifies the Signed Data type can contain multiple X.509 or PKCS #6 extended + * certificates. In Mbed TLS, this list can only contain 0 or 1 certificates + * and they must be in X.509 format. + * - The RFC specifies the Signed Data type can contain + * certificate-revocation lists (CRLs). This implementation has no support + * for CRLs so it is assumed to be an empty list. + * - The RFC allows for SignerInfo structure to optionally contain + * unauthenticatedAttributes and authenticatedAttributes. In Mbed TLS it is + * assumed these fields are empty. + * - The RFC allows for the signed Data type to contain contentInfo. This + * implementation assumes the type is DATA and the content is empty. + */ + +#ifndef MBEDTLS_PKCS7_H +#define MBEDTLS_PKCS7_H + +#include "mbedtls/private_access.h" + +#include "mbedtls/build_info.h" + +#include "mbedtls/asn1.h" +#include "mbedtls/x509_crt.h" + +/** + * \name PKCS #7 Module Error codes + * \{ + */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_INVALID_FORMAT -0x5300 /**< The format is invalid, e.g. different type expected. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE -0x5380 /**< Unavailable feature, e.g. anything other than signed data. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_INVALID_VERSION -0x5400 /**< The PKCS #7 version element is invalid or cannot be parsed. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_INVALID_CONTENT_INFO -0x5480 /**< The PKCS #7 content info is invalid or cannot be parsed. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_INVALID_ALG -0x5500 /**< The algorithm tag or value is invalid or cannot be parsed. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_INVALID_CERT -0x5580 /**< The certificate tag or value is invalid or cannot be parsed. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_INVALID_SIGNATURE -0x5600 /**< Error parsing the signature */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_INVALID_SIGNER_INFO -0x5680 /**< Error parsing the signer's info */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_BAD_INPUT_DATA -0x5700 /**< Input invalid. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_ALLOC_FAILED -0x5780 /**< Allocation of memory failed. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_VERIFY_FAIL -0x5800 /**< Verification Failed */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_CERT_DATE_INVALID -0x5880 /**< The PKCS #7 date issued/expired dates are invalid */ +/* \} name */ + +/** + * \name PKCS #7 Supported Version + * \{ + */ +#define MBEDTLS_PKCS7_SUPPORTED_VERSION 0x01 +/* \} name */ + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +/** + * Type-length-value structure that allows for ASN.1 using DER. + */ +typedef mbedtls_asn1_buf mbedtls_pkcs7_buf; + +/** + * Container for ASN.1 named information objects. + * It allows for Relative Distinguished Names (e.g. cn=localhost,ou=code,etc.). + */ +typedef mbedtls_asn1_named_data mbedtls_pkcs7_name; + +/** + * Container for a sequence of ASN.1 items + */ +typedef mbedtls_asn1_sequence mbedtls_pkcs7_sequence; + +/** + * PKCS #7 types + */ +typedef enum { + MBEDTLS_PKCS7_NONE=0, + MBEDTLS_PKCS7_DATA, + MBEDTLS_PKCS7_SIGNED_DATA, + MBEDTLS_PKCS7_ENVELOPED_DATA, + MBEDTLS_PKCS7_SIGNED_AND_ENVELOPED_DATA, + MBEDTLS_PKCS7_DIGESTED_DATA, + MBEDTLS_PKCS7_ENCRYPTED_DATA, +} +mbedtls_pkcs7_type; + +/** + * Structure holding PKCS #7 signer info + */ +typedef struct mbedtls_pkcs7_signer_info { + int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(version); + mbedtls_x509_buf MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(serial); + mbedtls_x509_name MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(issuer); + mbedtls_x509_buf MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(issuer_raw); + mbedtls_x509_buf MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(alg_identifier); + mbedtls_x509_buf MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(sig_alg_identifier); + mbedtls_x509_buf MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(sig); + struct mbedtls_pkcs7_signer_info *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(next); +} +mbedtls_pkcs7_signer_info; + +/** + * Structure holding the signed data section + */ +typedef struct mbedtls_pkcs7_signed_data { + int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(version); + mbedtls_pkcs7_buf MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(digest_alg_identifiers); + int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(no_of_certs); + mbedtls_x509_crt MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(certs); + int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(no_of_crls); + mbedtls_x509_crl MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(crl); + int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(no_of_signers); + mbedtls_pkcs7_signer_info MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(signers); +} +mbedtls_pkcs7_signed_data; + +/** + * Structure holding PKCS #7 structure, only signed data for now + */ +typedef struct mbedtls_pkcs7 { + mbedtls_pkcs7_buf MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(raw); + mbedtls_pkcs7_signed_data MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(signed_data); +} +mbedtls_pkcs7; + +/** + * \brief Initialize mbedtls_pkcs7 structure. + * + * \param pkcs7 mbedtls_pkcs7 structure. + */ +void mbedtls_pkcs7_init(mbedtls_pkcs7 *pkcs7); + +/** + * \brief Parse a single DER formatted PKCS #7 detached signature. + * + * \param pkcs7 The mbedtls_pkcs7 structure to be filled by the parser. + * \param buf The buffer holding only the DER encoded PKCS #7 content. + * \param buflen The size in bytes of \p buf. The size must be exactly the + * length of the DER encoded PKCS #7 content. + * + * \note This function makes an internal copy of the PKCS #7 buffer + * \p buf. In particular, \p buf may be destroyed or reused + * after this call returns. + * \note Signatures with internal data are not supported. + * + * \return The \c mbedtls_pkcs7_type of \p buf, if successful. + * \return A negative error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_pkcs7_parse_der(mbedtls_pkcs7 *pkcs7, const unsigned char *buf, + const size_t buflen); + +/** + * \brief Verification of PKCS #7 signature against a caller-supplied + * certificate. + * + * For each signer in the PKCS structure, this function computes + * a signature over the supplied data, using the supplied + * certificate and the same digest algorithm as specified by the + * signer. It then compares this signature against the + * signer's signature; verification succeeds if any comparison + * matches. + * + * This function does not use the certificates held within the + * PKCS #7 structure itself, and does not check that the + * certificate is signed by a trusted certification authority. + * + * \param pkcs7 mbedtls_pkcs7 structure containing signature. + * \param cert Certificate containing key to verify signature. + * \param data Plain data on which signature has to be verified. + * \param datalen Length of the data. + * + * \note This function internally calculates the hash on the supplied + * plain data for signature verification. + * + * \return 0 if the signature verifies, or a negative error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_pkcs7_signed_data_verify(mbedtls_pkcs7 *pkcs7, + const mbedtls_x509_crt *cert, + const unsigned char *data, + size_t datalen); + +/** + * \brief Verification of PKCS #7 signature against a caller-supplied + * certificate. + * + * For each signer in the PKCS structure, this function + * validates a signature over the supplied hash, using the + * supplied certificate and the same digest algorithm as + * specified by the signer. Verification succeeds if any + * signature is good. + * + * This function does not use the certificates held within the + * PKCS #7 structure itself, and does not check that the + * certificate is signed by a trusted certification authority. + * + * \param pkcs7 PKCS #7 structure containing signature. + * \param cert Certificate containing key to verify signature. + * \param hash Hash of the plain data on which signature has to be verified. + * \param hashlen Length of the hash. + * + * \note This function is different from mbedtls_pkcs7_signed_data_verify() + * in that it is directly passed the hash of the data. + * + * \return 0 if the signature verifies, or a negative error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_pkcs7_signed_hash_verify(mbedtls_pkcs7 *pkcs7, + const mbedtls_x509_crt *cert, + const unsigned char *hash, size_t hashlen); + +/** + * \brief Unallocate all PKCS #7 data and zeroize the memory. + * It doesn't free \p pkcs7 itself. This should be done by the caller. + * + * \param pkcs7 mbedtls_pkcs7 structure to free. + */ +void mbedtls_pkcs7_free(mbedtls_pkcs7 *pkcs7); + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* pkcs7.h */ diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/platform.h b/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/platform.h index 17639542b679..de3d71d9dc5b 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/platform.h +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/platform.h @@ -25,22 +25,14 @@ */ #ifndef MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_H #define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_H +#include "mbedtls/private_access.h" -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "mbedtls/build_info.h" #if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) #include "mbedtls/platform_time.h" #endif -/** Hardware accelerator failed */ -#define MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_HW_ACCEL_FAILED -0x0070 -/** The requested feature is not supported by the platform */ -#define MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED -0x0072 - #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { #endif @@ -49,7 +41,7 @@ extern "C" { * \name SECTION: Module settings * * The configuration options you can set for this module are in this section. - * Either change them in config.h or define them on the compiler command line. + * Either change them in mbedtls_config.h or define them on the compiler command line. * \{ */ @@ -94,6 +86,9 @@ extern "C" { #if !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_FREE) #define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_FREE free /**< The default \c free function to use. */ #endif +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_SETBUF) +#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_SETBUF setbuf /**< The default \c setbuf function to use. */ +#endif #if !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_EXIT) #define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_EXIT exit /**< The default \c exit function to use. */ #endif @@ -298,6 +293,59 @@ int mbedtls_platform_set_vsnprintf(int (*vsnprintf_func)(char *s, size_t n, #endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_VSNPRINTF_MACRO */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_VSNPRINTF_ALT */ +/* + * The function pointers for setbuf + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SETBUF_ALT) +#include +/** + * \brief Function pointer to call for `setbuf()` functionality + * (changing the internal buffering on stdio calls). + * + * \note The library calls this function to disable + * buffering when reading or writing sensitive data, + * to avoid having extra copies of sensitive data + * remaining in stdio buffers after the file is + * closed. If this is not a concern, for example if + * your platform's stdio doesn't have any buffering, + * you can set mbedtls_setbuf to a function that + * does nothing. + * + * The library always calls this function with + * `buf` equal to `NULL`. + */ +extern void (*mbedtls_setbuf)(FILE *stream, char *buf); + +/** + * \brief Dynamically configure the function that is called + * when the mbedtls_setbuf() function is called by the + * library. + * + * \param setbuf_func The \c setbuf function implementation + * + * \return \c 0 + */ +int mbedtls_platform_set_setbuf(void (*setbuf_func)( + FILE *stream, char *buf)); +#else +#undef mbedtls_setbuf +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SETBUF_MACRO) +/** + * \brief Macro defining the function for the library to + * call for `setbuf` functionality (changing the + * internal buffering on stdio calls). + * + * \note See extra comments on the mbedtls_setbuf() function + * pointer above. + * + * \return \c 0 on success, negative on error. + */ +#define mbedtls_setbuf MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SETBUF_MACRO +#else +#define mbedtls_setbuf setbuf +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SETBUF_MACRO */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SETBUF_ALT */ + /* * The function pointers for exit */ @@ -390,7 +438,7 @@ int mbedtls_platform_set_nv_seed( * setup or teardown operations. */ typedef struct mbedtls_platform_context { - char dummy; /**< A placeholder member, as empty structs are not portable. */ + char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(dummy); /**< A placeholder member, as empty structs are not portable. */ } mbedtls_platform_context; diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/platform_time.h b/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/platform_time.h index 9671c88d09ec..97f1963abaad 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/platform_time.h +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/platform_time.h @@ -10,11 +10,7 @@ #ifndef MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_TIME_H #define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_TIME_H -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "mbedtls/build_info.h" #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { @@ -31,6 +27,29 @@ typedef MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_TIME_TYPE_MACRO mbedtls_time_t; typedef time_t mbedtls_time_t; #endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_TIME_TYPE_MACRO */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_MS_TIME_TYPE_MACRO) +typedef MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_MS_TIME_TYPE_MACRO mbedtls_ms_time_t; +#else +#include +#include +typedef int64_t mbedtls_ms_time_t; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_MS_TIME_TYPE_MACRO */ + +/** + * \brief Get time in milliseconds. + * + * \return Monotonically-increasing current time in milliseconds. + * + * \note Define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_MS_TIME_ALT to be able to provide an + * alternative implementation + * + * \warning This function returns a monotonically-increasing time value from a + * start time that will differ from platform to platform, and possibly + * from run to run of the process. + * + */ +mbedtls_ms_time_t mbedtls_ms_time(void); + /* * The function pointers for time */ diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/platform_util.h b/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/platform_util.h index 74e2a1db6cc9..1b371ef3f465 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/platform_util.h +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/platform_util.h @@ -11,11 +11,7 @@ #ifndef MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_UTIL_H #define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_UTIL_H -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "mbedtls/build_info.h" #include #if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE) @@ -27,85 +23,9 @@ extern "C" { #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CHECK_PARAMS) - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CHECK_PARAMS_ASSERT) -/* Allow the user to define MBEDTLS_PARAM_FAILED to something like assert - * (which is what our config.h suggests). */ -#include -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CHECK_PARAMS_ASSERT */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PARAM_FAILED) -/** An alternative definition of MBEDTLS_PARAM_FAILED has been set in config.h. - * - * This flag can be used to check whether it is safe to assume that - * MBEDTLS_PARAM_FAILED() will expand to a call to mbedtls_param_failed(). - */ -#define MBEDTLS_PARAM_FAILED_ALT - -#elif defined(MBEDTLS_CHECK_PARAMS_ASSERT) -#define MBEDTLS_PARAM_FAILED(cond) assert(cond) -#define MBEDTLS_PARAM_FAILED_ALT - -#else /* MBEDTLS_PARAM_FAILED */ -#define MBEDTLS_PARAM_FAILED(cond) \ - mbedtls_param_failed( #cond, __FILE__, __LINE__) - -/** - * \brief User supplied callback function for parameter validation failure. - * See #MBEDTLS_CHECK_PARAMS for context. - * - * This function will be called unless an alternative treatment - * is defined through the #MBEDTLS_PARAM_FAILED macro. - * - * This function can return, and the operation will be aborted, or - * alternatively, through use of setjmp()/longjmp() can resume - * execution in the application code. - * - * \param failure_condition The assertion that didn't hold. - * \param file The file where the assertion failed. - * \param line The line in the file where the assertion failed. - */ -void mbedtls_param_failed(const char *failure_condition, - const char *file, - int line); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_PARAM_FAILED */ - -/* Internal macro meant to be called only from within the library. */ -#define MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE_RET(cond, ret) \ - do { \ - if (!(cond)) \ - { \ - MBEDTLS_PARAM_FAILED(cond); \ - return ret; \ - } \ - } while (0) - -/* Internal macro meant to be called only from within the library. */ -#define MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE(cond) \ - do { \ - if (!(cond)) \ - { \ - MBEDTLS_PARAM_FAILED(cond); \ - return; \ - } \ - } while (0) - -#else /* MBEDTLS_CHECK_PARAMS */ - -/* Internal macros meant to be called only from within the library. */ -#define MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE_RET(cond, ret) do { } while (0) -#define MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE(cond) do { } while (0) - -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CHECK_PARAMS */ - /* Internal helper macros for deprecating API constants. */ #if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) #if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING) -/* Deliberately don't (yet) export MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED here - * to avoid conflict with other headers which define and use - * it, too. We might want to move all these definitions here at - * some point for uniformity. */ #define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED __attribute__((deprecated)) MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED typedef char const *mbedtls_deprecated_string_constant_t; #define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_STRING_CONSTANT(VAL) \ @@ -113,15 +33,15 @@ MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED typedef char const *mbedtls_deprecated_string_constant_t; MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED typedef int mbedtls_deprecated_numeric_constant_t; #define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_NUMERIC_CONSTANT(VAL) \ ((mbedtls_deprecated_numeric_constant_t) (VAL)) -#undef MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED #else /* MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING */ +#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED #define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_STRING_CONSTANT(VAL) VAL #define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_NUMERIC_CONSTANT(VAL) VAL #endif /* MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ /* Implementation of the check-return facility. - * See the user documentation in config.h. + * See the user documentation in mbedtls_config.h. * * Do not use this macro directly to annotate function: instead, * use one of MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL or MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_TYPICAL diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/poly1305.h b/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/poly1305.h index ecbd98487942..61bcaa6b6465 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/poly1305.h +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/poly1305.h @@ -19,12 +19,9 @@ #ifndef MBEDTLS_POLY1305_H #define MBEDTLS_POLY1305_H +#include "mbedtls/private_access.h" -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "mbedtls/build_info.h" #include #include @@ -32,16 +29,6 @@ /** Invalid input parameter(s). */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_POLY1305_BAD_INPUT_DATA -0x0057 -/* MBEDTLS_ERR_POLY1305_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE is deprecated and should not be - * used. */ -/** Feature not available. For example, s part of the API is not implemented. */ -#define MBEDTLS_ERR_POLY1305_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE -0x0059 - -/* MBEDTLS_ERR_POLY1305_HW_ACCEL_FAILED is deprecated and should not be used. - */ -/** Poly1305 hardware accelerator failed. */ -#define MBEDTLS_ERR_POLY1305_HW_ACCEL_FAILED -0x005B - #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { #endif @@ -49,11 +36,11 @@ extern "C" { #if !defined(MBEDTLS_POLY1305_ALT) typedef struct mbedtls_poly1305_context { - uint32_t r[4]; /** The value for 'r' (low 128 bits of the key). */ - uint32_t s[4]; /** The value for 's' (high 128 bits of the key). */ - uint32_t acc[5]; /** The accumulator number. */ - uint8_t queue[16]; /** The current partial block of data. */ - size_t queue_len; /** The number of bytes stored in 'queue'. */ + uint32_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(r)[4]; /** The value for 'r' (low 128 bits of the key). */ + uint32_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(s)[4]; /** The value for 's' (high 128 bits of the key). */ + uint32_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(acc)[5]; /** The accumulator number. */ + uint8_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(queue)[16]; /** The current partial block of data. */ + size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(queue_len); /** The number of bytes stored in 'queue'. */ } mbedtls_poly1305_context; diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/private_access.h b/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/private_access.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..580f3eb44695 --- /dev/null +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/private_access.h @@ -0,0 +1,20 @@ +/** + * \file private_access.h + * + * \brief Macro wrapper for struct's members. + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +#ifndef MBEDTLS_PRIVATE_ACCESS_H +#define MBEDTLS_PRIVATE_ACCESS_H + +#ifndef MBEDTLS_ALLOW_PRIVATE_ACCESS +#define MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(member) private_##member +#else +#define MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(member) member +#endif + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PRIVATE_ACCESS_H */ diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/psa_util.h b/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/psa_util.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..c78cc2333359 --- /dev/null +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/psa_util.h @@ -0,0 +1,188 @@ +/** + * \file psa_util.h + * + * \brief Utility functions for the use of the PSA Crypto library. + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +#ifndef MBEDTLS_PSA_UTIL_H +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_UTIL_H +#include "mbedtls/private_access.h" + +#include "mbedtls/build_info.h" + +#include "psa/crypto.h" + +/* ASN1 defines used in the ECDSA conversion functions. + * Note: intentionally not adding MBEDTLS_ASN1_[PARSE|WRITE]_C guards here + * otherwise error codes would be unknown in test_suite_psa_crypto_util.data.*/ +#include + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT) + +/** The random generator function for the PSA subsystem. + * + * This function is suitable as the `f_rng` random generator function + * parameter of many `mbedtls_xxx` functions. + * + * The implementation of this function depends on the configuration of the + * library. + * + * \note This function may only be used if the PSA crypto subsystem is active. + * This means that you must call psa_crypto_init() before any call to + * this function, and you must not call this function after calling + * mbedtls_psa_crypto_free(). + * + * \param p_rng This parameter is only kept for backward compatibility + * reasons with legacy `f_rng` functions and it's ignored. + * Set to #MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_STATE or NULL. + * \param output The buffer to fill. It must have room for + * \c output_size bytes. + * \param output_size The number of bytes to write to \p output. + * This function may fail if \p output_size is too + * large. It is guaranteed to accept any output size + * requested by Mbed TLS library functions. The + * maximum request size depends on the library + * configuration. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return An `MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_xxx`, + * `MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_xxx, + * `MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_xxx` or + * `MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_xxx` on error. + */ +int mbedtls_psa_get_random(void *p_rng, + unsigned char *output, + size_t output_size); + +/** The random generator state for the PSA subsystem. + * + * This macro always expands to NULL because the `p_rng` parameter is unused + * in mbedtls_psa_get_random(), but it's kept for interface's backward + * compatibility. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_STATE NULL + +/** \defgroup psa_tls_helpers TLS helper functions + * @{ + */ +#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY) +#include + +/** Convert an ECC curve identifier from the Mbed TLS encoding to PSA. + * + * \param grpid An Mbed TLS elliptic curve identifier + * (`MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_xxx`). + * \param[out] bits On success the bit size of the curve; 0 on failure. + * + * \return If the curve is supported in the PSA API, this function + * returns the proper PSA curve identifier + * (`PSA_ECC_FAMILY_xxx`). This holds even if the curve is + * not supported by the ECP module. + * \return \c 0 if the curve is not supported in the PSA API. + */ +psa_ecc_family_t mbedtls_ecc_group_to_psa(mbedtls_ecp_group_id grpid, + size_t *bits); + +/** Convert an ECC curve identifier from the PSA encoding to Mbed TLS. + * + * \param family A PSA elliptic curve family identifier + * (`PSA_ECC_FAMILY_xxx`). + * \param bits The bit-length of a private key on \p curve. + * + * \return If the curve is supported in the PSA API, this function + * returns the corresponding Mbed TLS elliptic curve + * identifier (`MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_xxx`). + * \return #MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE if the combination of \c curve + * and \p bits is not supported. + */ +mbedtls_ecp_group_id mbedtls_ecc_group_from_psa(psa_ecc_family_t family, + size_t bits); +#endif /* PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY */ + +/** + * \brief This function returns the PSA algorithm identifier + * associated with the given digest type. + * + * \param md_type The type of digest to search for. Must not be NONE. + * + * \warning If \p md_type is \c MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, this function will + * not return \c PSA_ALG_NONE, but an invalid algorithm. + * + * \warning This function does not check if the algorithm is + * supported, it always returns the corresponding identifier. + * + * \return The PSA algorithm identifier associated with \p md_type, + * regardless of whether it is supported or not. + */ +static inline psa_algorithm_t mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type(mbedtls_md_type_t md_type) +{ + return PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_HASH | (psa_algorithm_t) md_type; +} + +/** + * \brief This function returns the given digest type + * associated with the PSA algorithm identifier. + * + * \param psa_alg The PSA algorithm identifier to search for. + * + * \warning This function does not check if the algorithm is + * supported, it always returns the corresponding identifier. + * + * \return The MD type associated with \p psa_alg, + * regardless of whether it is supported or not. + */ +static inline mbedtls_md_type_t mbedtls_md_type_from_psa_alg(psa_algorithm_t psa_alg) +{ + return (mbedtls_md_type_t) (psa_alg & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_UTIL_HAVE_ECDSA) + +/** Convert an ECDSA signature from raw format to DER ASN.1 format. + * + * \param bits Size of each coordinate in bits. + * \param raw Buffer that contains the signature in raw format. + * \param raw_len Length of \p raw in bytes. This must be + * PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(bits) bytes. + * \param[out] der Buffer that will be filled with the converted DER + * output. It can overlap with raw buffer. + * \param der_size Size of \p der in bytes. It is enough if \p der_size + * is at least the size of the actual output. (The size + * of the output can vary depending on the presence of + * leading zeros in the data.) You can use + * #MBEDTLS_ECDSA_MAX_SIG_LEN(\p bits) to determine a + * size that is large enough for all signatures for a + * given value of \p bits. + * \param[out] der_len On success it contains the amount of valid data + * (in bytes) written to \p der. It's undefined + * in case of failure. + */ +int mbedtls_ecdsa_raw_to_der(size_t bits, const unsigned char *raw, size_t raw_len, + unsigned char *der, size_t der_size, size_t *der_len); + +/** Convert an ECDSA signature from DER ASN.1 format to raw format. + * + * \param bits Size of each coordinate in bits. + * \param der Buffer that contains the signature in DER format. + * \param der_len Size of \p der in bytes. + * \param[out] raw Buffer that will be filled with the converted raw + * signature. It can overlap with der buffer. + * \param raw_size Size of \p raw in bytes. Must be at least + * 2 * PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(bits) bytes. + * \param[out] raw_len On success it is updated with the amount of valid + * data (in bytes) written to \p raw. It's undefined + * in case of failure. + */ +int mbedtls_ecdsa_der_to_raw(size_t bits, const unsigned char *der, size_t der_len, + unsigned char *raw, size_t raw_size, size_t *raw_len); + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_UTIL_HAVE_ECDSA */ + +/**@}*/ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_UTIL_H */ diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/ripemd160.h b/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/ripemd160.h index 38318a2b880d..279f92b5121e 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/ripemd160.h +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/ripemd160.h @@ -9,21 +9,13 @@ */ #ifndef MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_H #define MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_H +#include "mbedtls/private_access.h" -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "mbedtls/build_info.h" #include #include -/* MBEDTLS_ERR_RIPEMD160_HW_ACCEL_FAILED is deprecated and should not be used. - */ -/** RIPEMD160 hardware accelerator failed */ -#define MBEDTLS_ERR_RIPEMD160_HW_ACCEL_FAILED -0x0031 - #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { #endif @@ -36,9 +28,9 @@ extern "C" { * \brief RIPEMD-160 context structure */ typedef struct mbedtls_ripemd160_context { - uint32_t total[2]; /*!< number of bytes processed */ - uint32_t state[5]; /*!< intermediate digest state */ - unsigned char buffer[64]; /*!< data block being processed */ + uint32_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(total)[2]; /*!< number of bytes processed */ + uint32_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(state)[5]; /*!< intermediate digest state */ + unsigned char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(buffer)[64]; /*!< data block being processed */ } mbedtls_ripemd160_context; @@ -76,7 +68,7 @@ void mbedtls_ripemd160_clone(mbedtls_ripemd160_context *dst, * * \return 0 if successful */ -int mbedtls_ripemd160_starts_ret(mbedtls_ripemd160_context *ctx); +int mbedtls_ripemd160_starts(mbedtls_ripemd160_context *ctx); /** * \brief RIPEMD-160 process buffer @@ -87,9 +79,9 @@ int mbedtls_ripemd160_starts_ret(mbedtls_ripemd160_context *ctx); * * \return 0 if successful */ -int mbedtls_ripemd160_update_ret(mbedtls_ripemd160_context *ctx, - const unsigned char *input, - size_t ilen); +int mbedtls_ripemd160_update(mbedtls_ripemd160_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *input, + size_t ilen); /** * \brief RIPEMD-160 final digest @@ -99,8 +91,8 @@ int mbedtls_ripemd160_update_ret(mbedtls_ripemd160_context *ctx, * * \return 0 if successful */ -int mbedtls_ripemd160_finish_ret(mbedtls_ripemd160_context *ctx, - unsigned char output[20]); +int mbedtls_ripemd160_finish(mbedtls_ripemd160_context *ctx, + unsigned char output[20]); /** * \brief RIPEMD-160 process data block (internal use only) @@ -113,63 +105,6 @@ int mbedtls_ripemd160_finish_ret(mbedtls_ripemd160_context *ctx, int mbedtls_internal_ripemd160_process(mbedtls_ripemd160_context *ctx, const unsigned char data[64]); -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING) -#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED __attribute__((deprecated)) -#else -#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED -#endif -/** - * \brief RIPEMD-160 context setup - * - * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_ripemd160_starts_ret() in 2.7.0 - * - * \param ctx context to be initialized - */ -MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_ripemd160_starts( - mbedtls_ripemd160_context *ctx); - -/** - * \brief RIPEMD-160 process buffer - * - * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_ripemd160_update_ret() in 2.7.0 - * - * \param ctx RIPEMD-160 context - * \param input buffer holding the data - * \param ilen length of the input data - */ -MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_ripemd160_update( - mbedtls_ripemd160_context *ctx, - const unsigned char *input, - size_t ilen); - -/** - * \brief RIPEMD-160 final digest - * - * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_ripemd160_finish_ret() in 2.7.0 - * - * \param ctx RIPEMD-160 context - * \param output RIPEMD-160 checksum result - */ -MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_ripemd160_finish( - mbedtls_ripemd160_context *ctx, - unsigned char output[20]); - -/** - * \brief RIPEMD-160 process data block (internal use only) - * - * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_internal_ripemd160_process() in 2.7.0 - * - * \param ctx RIPEMD-160 context - * \param data buffer holding one block of data - */ -MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_ripemd160_process( - mbedtls_ripemd160_context *ctx, - const unsigned char data[64]); - -#undef MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED -#endif /* !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ - /** * \brief Output = RIPEMD-160( input buffer ) * @@ -179,31 +114,9 @@ MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_ripemd160_process( * * \return 0 if successful */ -int mbedtls_ripemd160_ret(const unsigned char *input, - size_t ilen, - unsigned char output[20]); - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING) -#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED __attribute__((deprecated)) -#else -#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED -#endif -/** - * \brief Output = RIPEMD-160( input buffer ) - * - * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_ripemd160_ret() in 2.7.0 - * - * \param input buffer holding the data - * \param ilen length of the input data - * \param output RIPEMD-160 checksum result - */ -MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_ripemd160(const unsigned char *input, - size_t ilen, - unsigned char output[20]); - -#undef MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED -#endif /* !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ +int mbedtls_ripemd160(const unsigned char *input, + size_t ilen, + unsigned char output[20]); #if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/rsa.h b/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/rsa.h index 1779775155f3..c1e76b3927ed 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/rsa.h +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/rsa.h @@ -15,12 +15,9 @@ */ #ifndef MBEDTLS_RSA_H #define MBEDTLS_RSA_H +#include "mbedtls/private_access.h" -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "mbedtls/build_info.h" #include "mbedtls/bignum.h" #include "mbedtls/md.h" @@ -51,20 +48,9 @@ /** The random generator failed to generate non-zeros. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_RNG_FAILED -0x4480 -/* MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_UNSUPPORTED_OPERATION is deprecated and should not be used. - */ -/** The implementation does not offer the requested operation, for example, because of security violations or lack of functionality. */ -#define MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_UNSUPPORTED_OPERATION -0x4500 - -/* MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_HW_ACCEL_FAILED is deprecated and should not be used. */ -/** RSA hardware accelerator failed. */ -#define MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_HW_ACCEL_FAILED -0x4580 - /* * RSA constants */ -#define MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC 0 /**< Request private key operation. */ -#define MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE 1 /**< Request public key operation. */ #define MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15 0 /**< Use PKCS#1 v1.5 encoding. */ #define MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21 1 /**< Use PKCS#1 v2.1 encoding. */ @@ -87,49 +73,51 @@ extern "C" { // Regular implementation // +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_GEN_KEY_MIN_BITS) +#define MBEDTLS_RSA_GEN_KEY_MIN_BITS 1024 +#elif MBEDTLS_RSA_GEN_KEY_MIN_BITS < 128 +#error "MBEDTLS_RSA_GEN_KEY_MIN_BITS must be at least 128 bits" +#endif + /** * \brief The RSA context structure. - * - * \note Direct manipulation of the members of this structure - * is deprecated. All manipulation should instead be done through - * the public interface functions. */ typedef struct mbedtls_rsa_context { - int ver; /*!< Reserved for internal purposes. - * Do not set this field in application - * code. Its meaning might change without - * notice. */ - size_t len; /*!< The size of \p N in Bytes. */ + int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(ver); /*!< Reserved for internal purposes. + * Do not set this field in application + * code. Its meaning might change without + * notice. */ + size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(len); /*!< The size of \p N in Bytes. */ - mbedtls_mpi N; /*!< The public modulus. */ - mbedtls_mpi E; /*!< The public exponent. */ + mbedtls_mpi MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(N); /*!< The public modulus. */ + mbedtls_mpi MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(E); /*!< The public exponent. */ - mbedtls_mpi D; /*!< The private exponent. */ - mbedtls_mpi P; /*!< The first prime factor. */ - mbedtls_mpi Q; /*!< The second prime factor. */ + mbedtls_mpi MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(D); /*!< The private exponent. */ + mbedtls_mpi MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(P); /*!< The first prime factor. */ + mbedtls_mpi MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(Q); /*!< The second prime factor. */ - mbedtls_mpi DP; /*!< D % (P - 1). */ - mbedtls_mpi DQ; /*!< D % (Q - 1). */ - mbedtls_mpi QP; /*!< 1 / (Q % P). */ + mbedtls_mpi MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(DP); /*!< D % (P - 1). */ + mbedtls_mpi MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(DQ); /*!< D % (Q - 1). */ + mbedtls_mpi MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(QP); /*!< 1 / (Q % P). */ - mbedtls_mpi RN; /*!< cached R^2 mod N. */ + mbedtls_mpi MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(RN); /*!< cached R^2 mod N. */ - mbedtls_mpi RP; /*!< cached R^2 mod P. */ - mbedtls_mpi RQ; /*!< cached R^2 mod Q. */ + mbedtls_mpi MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(RP); /*!< cached R^2 mod P. */ + mbedtls_mpi MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(RQ); /*!< cached R^2 mod Q. */ - mbedtls_mpi Vi; /*!< The cached blinding value. */ - mbedtls_mpi Vf; /*!< The cached un-blinding value. */ + mbedtls_mpi MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(Vi); /*!< The cached blinding value. */ + mbedtls_mpi MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(Vf); /*!< The cached un-blinding value. */ - int padding; /*!< Selects padding mode: - #MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15 for 1.5 padding and - #MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21 for OAEP or PSS. */ - int hash_id; /*!< Hash identifier of mbedtls_md_type_t type, - as specified in md.h for use in the MGF - mask generating function used in the - EME-OAEP and EMSA-PSS encodings. */ + int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(padding); /*!< Selects padding mode: + #MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15 for 1.5 padding and + #MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21 for OAEP or PSS. */ + int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(hash_id); /*!< Hash identifier of mbedtls_md_type_t type, + as specified in md.h for use in the MGF + mask generating function used in the + EME-OAEP and EMSA-PSS encodings. */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) /* Invariant: the mutex is initialized iff ver != 0. */ - mbedtls_threading_mutex_t mutex; /*!< Thread-safety mutex. */ + mbedtls_threading_mutex_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(mutex); /*!< Thread-safety mutex. */ #endif } mbedtls_rsa_context; @@ -141,33 +129,73 @@ mbedtls_rsa_context; /** * \brief This function initializes an RSA context. * + * \note This function initializes the padding and the hash + * identifier to respectively #MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15 and + * #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE. See mbedtls_rsa_set_padding() for more + * information about those parameters. + * + * \param ctx The RSA context to initialize. This must not be \c NULL. + */ +void mbedtls_rsa_init(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx); + +/** + * \brief This function sets padding for an already initialized RSA + * context. + * * \note Set padding to #MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21 for the RSAES-OAEP * encryption scheme and the RSASSA-PSS signature scheme. * * \note The \p hash_id parameter is ignored when using * #MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15 padding. * - * \note The choice of padding mode is strictly enforced for private key - * operations, since there might be security concerns in + * \note The choice of padding mode is strictly enforced for private + * key operations, since there might be security concerns in * mixing padding modes. For public key operations it is * a default value, which can be overridden by calling specific - * \c rsa_rsaes_xxx or \c rsa_rsassa_xxx functions. + * \c mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_xxx or \c mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_xxx + * functions. * * \note The hash selected in \p hash_id is always used for OEAP * encryption. For PSS signatures, it is always used for * making signatures, but can be overridden for verifying them. * If set to #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, it is always overridden. * - * \param ctx The RSA context to initialize. This must not be \c NULL. + * \param ctx The initialized RSA context to be configured. * \param padding The padding mode to use. This must be either * #MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15 or #MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21. - * \param hash_id The hash identifier of ::mbedtls_md_type_t type, if - * \p padding is #MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21. It is unused - * otherwise. + * \param hash_id The hash identifier for PSS or OAEP, if \p padding is + * #MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21. #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE is accepted by this + * function but may be not suitable for some operations. + * Ignored if \p padding is #MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING failure: + * \p padding or \p hash_id is invalid. + */ +int mbedtls_rsa_set_padding(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, int padding, + mbedtls_md_type_t hash_id); + +/** + * \brief This function retrieves padding mode of initialized + * RSA context. + * + * \param ctx The initialized RSA context. + * + * \return RSA padding mode. + * */ -void mbedtls_rsa_init(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, - int padding, - int hash_id); +int mbedtls_rsa_get_padding_mode(const mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx); + +/** + * \brief This function retrieves hash identifier of mbedtls_md_type_t + * type. + * + * \param ctx The initialized RSA context. + * + * \return Hash identifier of mbedtls_md_type_t type. + * + */ +int mbedtls_rsa_get_md_alg(const mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx); /** * \brief This function imports a set of core parameters into an @@ -226,7 +254,7 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_import(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, * \param N The RSA modulus. This may be \c NULL. * \param N_len The Byte length of \p N; it is ignored if \p N == NULL. * \param P The first prime factor of \p N. This may be \c NULL. - * \param P_len The Byte length of \p P; it ns ignored if \p P == NULL. + * \param P_len The Byte length of \p P; it is ignored if \p P == NULL. * \param Q The second prime factor of \p N. This may be \c NULL. * \param Q_len The Byte length of \p Q; it is ignored if \p Q == NULL. * \param D The private exponent. This may be \c NULL. @@ -399,16 +427,14 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_export_crt(const mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, mbedtls_mpi *DP, mbedtls_mpi *DQ, mbedtls_mpi *QP); /** - * \brief This function sets padding for an already initialized RSA - * context. See mbedtls_rsa_init() for details. + * \brief This function retrieves the length of the RSA modulus in bits. + * + * \param ctx The initialized RSA context. + * + * \return The length of the RSA modulus in bits. * - * \param ctx The initialized RSA context to be configured. - * \param padding The padding mode to use. This must be either - * #MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15 or #MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21. - * \param hash_id The #MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21 hash identifier. */ -void mbedtls_rsa_set_padding(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, int padding, - int hash_id); +size_t mbedtls_rsa_get_bitlen(const mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx); /** * \brief This function retrieves the length of RSA modulus in Bytes. @@ -428,7 +454,7 @@ size_t mbedtls_rsa_get_len(const mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx); * * \param ctx The initialized RSA context used to hold the key. * \param f_rng The RNG function to be used for key generation. - * This must not be \c NULL. + * This is mandatory and must not be \c NULL. * \param p_rng The RNG context to be passed to \p f_rng. * This may be \c NULL if \p f_rng doesn't need a context. * \param nbits The size of the public key in bits. @@ -549,11 +575,9 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_public(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, * of a PRNG. * * \param ctx The initialized RSA context to use. - * \param f_rng The RNG function, used for blinding. It is discouraged - * and deprecated to pass \c NULL here, in which case - * blinding will be omitted. + * \param f_rng The RNG function, used for blinding. It is mandatory. * \param p_rng The RNG context to pass to \p f_rng. This may be \c NULL - * if \p f_rng is \c NULL or if \p f_rng doesn't need a context. + * if \p f_rng doesn't need a context. * \param input The input buffer. This must be a readable buffer * of length \c ctx->len Bytes. For example, \c 256 Bytes * for an 2048-bit RSA modulus. @@ -576,29 +600,13 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_private(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, * operation. * * It is the generic wrapper for performing a PKCS#1 encryption - * operation using the \p mode from the context. - * - * \deprecated It is deprecated and discouraged to call this function - * in #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE mode. Future versions of the library - * are likely to remove the \p mode argument and have it - * implicitly set to #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC. - * - * \note Alternative implementations of RSA need not support - * mode being set to #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE and might instead - * return #MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED. + * operation. * * \param ctx The initialized RSA context to use. - * \param f_rng The RNG to use. It is mandatory for PKCS#1 v2.1 padding - * encoding, and for PKCS#1 v1.5 padding encoding when used - * with \p mode set to #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC. For PKCS#1 v1.5 - * padding encoding and \p mode set to #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE, - * it is used for blinding and should be provided in this - * case; see mbedtls_rsa_private() for more. + * \param f_rng The RNG to use. It is used for padding generation + * and it is mandatory. * \param p_rng The RNG context to be passed to \p f_rng. May be - * \c NULL if \p f_rng is \c NULL or if \p f_rng doesn't - * need a context argument. - * \param mode The mode of operation. This must be either - * #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC or #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE (deprecated). + * \c NULL if \p f_rng doesn't need a context argument. * \param ilen The length of the plaintext in Bytes. * \param input The input data to encrypt. This must be a readable * buffer of size \p ilen Bytes. It may be \c NULL if @@ -613,7 +621,7 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_private(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, int mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_encrypt(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng, - int mode, size_t ilen, + size_t ilen, const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output); @@ -621,25 +629,11 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_encrypt(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, * \brief This function performs a PKCS#1 v1.5 encryption operation * (RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5-ENCRYPT). * - * \deprecated It is deprecated and discouraged to call this function - * in #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE mode. Future versions of the library - * are likely to remove the \p mode argument and have it - * implicitly set to #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC. - * - * \note Alternative implementations of RSA need not support - * mode being set to #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE and might instead - * return #MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED. - * * \param ctx The initialized RSA context to use. - * \param f_rng The RNG function to use. It is needed for padding generation - * if \p mode is #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC. If \p mode is - * #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE (discouraged), it is used for - * blinding and should be provided; see mbedtls_rsa_private(). + * \param f_rng The RNG function to use. It is mandatory and used for + * padding generation. * \param p_rng The RNG context to be passed to \p f_rng. This may - * be \c NULL if \p f_rng is \c NULL or if \p f_rng - * doesn't need a context argument. - * \param mode The mode of operation. This must be either - * #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC or #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE (deprecated). + * be \c NULL if \p f_rng doesn't need a context argument. * \param ilen The length of the plaintext in Bytes. * \param input The input data to encrypt. This must be a readable * buffer of size \p ilen Bytes. It may be \c NULL if @@ -654,7 +648,7 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_encrypt(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_encrypt(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng, - int mode, size_t ilen, + size_t ilen, const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output); @@ -665,22 +659,11 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_encrypt(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, * \note The output buffer must be as large as the size * of ctx->N. For example, 128 Bytes if RSA-1024 is used. * - * \deprecated It is deprecated and discouraged to call this function - * in #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE mode. Future versions of the library - * are likely to remove the \p mode argument and have it - * implicitly set to #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC. - * - * \note Alternative implementations of RSA need not support - * mode being set to #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE and might instead - * return #MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED. - * * \param ctx The initialized RSA context to use. * \param f_rng The RNG function to use. This is needed for padding - * generation and must be provided. + * generation and is mandatory. * \param p_rng The RNG context to be passed to \p f_rng. This may * be \c NULL if \p f_rng doesn't need a context argument. - * \param mode The mode of operation. This must be either - * #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC or #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE (deprecated). * \param label The buffer holding the custom label to use. * This must be a readable buffer of length \p label_len * Bytes. It may be \c NULL if \p label_len is \c 0. @@ -699,7 +682,6 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_encrypt(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_oaep_encrypt(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng, - int mode, const unsigned char *label, size_t label_len, size_t ilen, const unsigned char *input, @@ -710,7 +692,7 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_oaep_encrypt(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, * message padding. * * It is the generic wrapper for performing a PKCS#1 decryption - * operation using the \p mode from the context. + * operation. * * \warning When \p ctx->padding is set to #MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15, * mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_decrypt() is called, which is an @@ -723,24 +705,11 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_oaep_encrypt(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, * hold the decryption of the particular ciphertext provided, * the function returns \c MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_OUTPUT_TOO_LARGE. * - * \deprecated It is deprecated and discouraged to call this function - * in #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC mode. Future versions of the library - * are likely to remove the \p mode argument and have it - * implicitly set to #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE. - * - * \note Alternative implementations of RSA need not support - * mode being set to #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC and might instead - * return #MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED. - * * \param ctx The initialized RSA context to use. - * \param f_rng The RNG function. If \p mode is #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE, - * this is used for blinding and should be provided; see - * mbedtls_rsa_private() for more. If \p mode is - * #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC, it is ignored. + * \param f_rng The RNG function. This is used for blinding and is + * mandatory; see mbedtls_rsa_private() for more. * \param p_rng The RNG context to be passed to \p f_rng. This may be - * \c NULL if \p f_rng is \c NULL or doesn't need a context. - * \param mode The mode of operation. This must be either - * #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE or #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC (deprecated). + * \c NULL if \p f_rng doesn't need a context. * \param olen The address at which to store the length of * the plaintext. This must not be \c NULL. * \param input The ciphertext buffer. This must be a readable buffer @@ -756,7 +725,7 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_oaep_encrypt(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, int mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_decrypt(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng, - int mode, size_t *olen, + size_t *olen, const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output, size_t output_max_len); @@ -777,24 +746,11 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_decrypt(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, * hold the decryption of the particular ciphertext provided, * the function returns #MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_OUTPUT_TOO_LARGE. * - * \deprecated It is deprecated and discouraged to call this function - * in #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC mode. Future versions of the library - * are likely to remove the \p mode argument and have it - * implicitly set to #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE. - * - * \note Alternative implementations of RSA need not support - * mode being set to #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC and might instead - * return #MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED. - * * \param ctx The initialized RSA context to use. - * \param f_rng The RNG function. If \p mode is #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE, - * this is used for blinding and should be provided; see - * mbedtls_rsa_private() for more. If \p mode is - * #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC, it is ignored. + * \param f_rng The RNG function. This is used for blinding and is + * mandatory; see mbedtls_rsa_private() for more. * \param p_rng The RNG context to be passed to \p f_rng. This may be - * \c NULL if \p f_rng is \c NULL or doesn't need a context. - * \param mode The mode of operation. This must be either - * #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE or #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC (deprecated). + * \c NULL if \p f_rng doesn't need a context. * \param olen The address at which to store the length of * the plaintext. This must not be \c NULL. * \param input The ciphertext buffer. This must be a readable buffer @@ -811,7 +767,7 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_decrypt(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_decrypt(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng, - int mode, size_t *olen, + size_t *olen, const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output, size_t output_max_len); @@ -828,24 +784,11 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_decrypt(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, * ciphertext provided, the function returns * #MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_OUTPUT_TOO_LARGE. * - * \deprecated It is deprecated and discouraged to call this function - * in #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC mode. Future versions of the library - * are likely to remove the \p mode argument and have it - * implicitly set to #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE. - * - * \note Alternative implementations of RSA need not support - * mode being set to #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC and might instead - * return #MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED. - * * \param ctx The initialized RSA context to use. - * \param f_rng The RNG function. If \p mode is #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE, - * this is used for blinding and should be provided; see - * mbedtls_rsa_private() for more. If \p mode is - * #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC, it is ignored. + * \param f_rng The RNG function. This is used for blinding and is + * mandatory. * \param p_rng The RNG context to be passed to \p f_rng. This may be - * \c NULL if \p f_rng is \c NULL or doesn't need a context. - * \param mode The mode of operation. This must be either - * #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE or #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC (deprecated). + * \c NULL if \p f_rng doesn't need a context. * \param label The buffer holding the custom label to use. * This must be a readable buffer of length \p label_len * Bytes. It may be \c NULL if \p label_len is \c 0. @@ -865,7 +808,6 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_decrypt(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_oaep_decrypt(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng, - int mode, const unsigned char *label, size_t label_len, size_t *olen, const unsigned char *input, @@ -877,7 +819,7 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_oaep_decrypt(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, * a message digest using PKCS#1. * * It is the generic wrapper for performing a PKCS#1 - * signature using the \p mode from the context. + * signature. * * \note The \p sig buffer must be as large as the size * of \p ctx->N. For example, 128 Bytes if RSA-1024 is used. @@ -886,34 +828,18 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_oaep_decrypt(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, * mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_sign() for details on * \p md_alg and \p hash_id. * - * \deprecated It is deprecated and discouraged to call this function - * in #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC mode. Future versions of the library - * are likely to remove the \p mode argument and have it - * implicitly set to #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE. - * - * \note Alternative implementations of RSA need not support - * mode being set to #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC and might instead - * return #MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED. - * * \param ctx The initialized RSA context to use. - * \param f_rng The RNG function to use. If the padding mode is PKCS#1 v2.1, - * this must be provided. If the padding mode is PKCS#1 v1.5 and - * \p mode is #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE, it is used for blinding - * and should be provided; see mbedtls_rsa_private() for more - * more. It is ignored otherwise. + * \param f_rng The RNG function to use. This is mandatory and + * must not be \c NULL. * \param p_rng The RNG context to be passed to \p f_rng. This may be \c NULL - * if \p f_rng is \c NULL or doesn't need a context argument. - * \param mode The mode of operation. This must be either - * #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE or #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC (deprecated). + * if \p f_rng doesn't need a context argument. * \param md_alg The message-digest algorithm used to hash the original data. * Use #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE for signing raw data. - * \param hashlen The length of the message digest. - * Ths is only used if \p md_alg is #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE. + * \param hashlen The length of the message digest or raw data in Bytes. + * If \p md_alg is not #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, this must match the + * output length of the corresponding hash algorithm. * \param hash The buffer holding the message digest or raw data. - * If \p md_alg is #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, this must be a readable - * buffer of length \p hashlen Bytes. If \p md_alg is not - * #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, it must be a readable buffer of length - * the size of the hash corresponding to \p md_alg. + * This must be a readable buffer of at least \p hashlen Bytes. * \param sig The buffer to hold the signature. This must be a writable * buffer of length \c ctx->len Bytes. For example, \c 256 Bytes * for an 2048-bit RSA modulus. A buffer length of @@ -925,7 +851,6 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_oaep_decrypt(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, int mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_sign(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng, - int mode, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, unsigned int hashlen, const unsigned char *hash, @@ -935,33 +860,18 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_sign(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, * \brief This function performs a PKCS#1 v1.5 signature * operation (RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5-SIGN). * - * \deprecated It is deprecated and discouraged to call this function - * in #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC mode. Future versions of the library - * are likely to remove the \p mode argument and have it - * implicitly set to #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE. - * - * \note Alternative implementations of RSA need not support - * mode being set to #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC and might instead - * return #MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED. - * * \param ctx The initialized RSA context to use. - * \param f_rng The RNG function. If \p mode is #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE, - * this is used for blinding and should be provided; see - * mbedtls_rsa_private() for more. If \p mode is - * #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC, it is ignored. + * \param f_rng The RNG function. This is used for blinding and is + * mandatory; see mbedtls_rsa_private() for more. * \param p_rng The RNG context to be passed to \p f_rng. This may be \c NULL - * if \p f_rng is \c NULL or doesn't need a context argument. - * \param mode The mode of operation. This must be either - * #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE or #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC (deprecated). + * if \p f_rng doesn't need a context argument. * \param md_alg The message-digest algorithm used to hash the original data. * Use #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE for signing raw data. - * \param hashlen The length of the message digest. - * Ths is only used if \p md_alg is #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE. + * \param hashlen The length of the message digest or raw data in Bytes. + * If \p md_alg is not #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, this must match the + * output length of the corresponding hash algorithm. * \param hash The buffer holding the message digest or raw data. - * If \p md_alg is #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, this must be a readable - * buffer of length \p hashlen Bytes. If \p md_alg is not - * #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, it must be a readable buffer of length - * the size of the hash corresponding to \p md_alg. + * This must be a readable buffer of at least \p hashlen Bytes. * \param sig The buffer to hold the signature. This must be a writable * buffer of length \c ctx->len Bytes. For example, \c 256 Bytes * for an 2048-bit RSA modulus. A buffer length of @@ -973,19 +883,18 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_sign(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_sign(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng, - int mode, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, unsigned int hashlen, const unsigned char *hash, unsigned char *sig); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21) /** * \brief This function performs a PKCS#1 v2.1 PSS signature * operation (RSASSA-PSS-SIGN). * - * \note The \c hash_id set in \p ctx (when calling - * mbedtls_rsa_init() or by calling mbedtls_rsa_set_padding() - * afterwards) selects the hash used for the + * \note The \c hash_id set in \p ctx by calling + * mbedtls_rsa_set_padding() selects the hash used for the * encoding operation and for the mask generation function * (MGF1). For more details on the encoding operation and the * mask generation function, consult RFC-3447: Public-Key @@ -1000,18 +909,16 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_sign(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, * #MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA. * * \param ctx The initialized RSA context to use. - * \param f_rng The RNG function. It must not be \c NULL. + * \param f_rng The RNG function. It is mandatory and must not be \c NULL. * \param p_rng The RNG context to be passed to \p f_rng. This may be \c NULL * if \p f_rng doesn't need a context argument. * \param md_alg The message-digest algorithm used to hash the original data. * Use #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE for signing raw data. - * \param hashlen The length of the message digest. - * Ths is only used if \p md_alg is #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE. + * \param hashlen The length of the message digest or raw data in Bytes. + * If \p md_alg is not #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, this must match the + * output length of the corresponding hash algorithm. * \param hash The buffer holding the message digest or raw data. - * If \p md_alg is #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, this must be a readable - * buffer of length \p hashlen Bytes. If \p md_alg is not - * #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, it must be a readable buffer of length - * the size of the hash corresponding to \p md_alg. + * This must be a readable buffer of at least \p hashlen Bytes. * \param saltlen The length of the salt that should be used. * If passed #MBEDTLS_RSA_SALT_LEN_ANY, the function will use * the largest possible salt length up to the hash length, @@ -1038,9 +945,8 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_sign_ext(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, * \brief This function performs a PKCS#1 v2.1 PSS signature * operation (RSASSA-PSS-SIGN). * - * \note The \c hash_id set in \p ctx (when calling - * mbedtls_rsa_init() or by calling mbedtls_rsa_set_padding() - * afterwards) selects the hash used for the + * \note The \c hash_id set in \p ctx by calling + * mbedtls_rsa_set_padding() selects the hash used for the * encoding operation and for the mask generation function * (MGF1). For more details on the encoding operation and the * mask generation function, consult RFC-3447: Public-Key @@ -1057,30 +963,17 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_sign_ext(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, * the key size in bytes), this function returns * #MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA. * - * \deprecated It is deprecated and discouraged to call this function - * in #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC mode. Future versions of the library - * are likely to remove the \p mode argument and have it - * implicitly set to #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE. - * - * \note Alternative implementations of RSA need not support - * mode being set to #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC and might instead - * return #MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED. - * * \param ctx The initialized RSA context to use. - * \param f_rng The RNG function. It must not be \c NULL. + * \param f_rng The RNG function. It is mandatory and must not be \c NULL. * \param p_rng The RNG context to be passed to \p f_rng. This may be \c NULL * if \p f_rng doesn't need a context argument. - * \param mode The mode of operation. This must be either - * #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE or #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC (deprecated). * \param md_alg The message-digest algorithm used to hash the original data. * Use #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE for signing raw data. - * \param hashlen The length of the message digest. - * This is only used if \p md_alg is #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE. + * \param hashlen The length of the message digest or raw data in Bytes. + * If \p md_alg is not #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, this must match the + * output length of the corresponding hash algorithm. * \param hash The buffer holding the message digest or raw data. - * If \p md_alg is #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, this must be a readable - * buffer of length \p hashlen Bytes. If \p md_alg is not - * #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, it must be a readable buffer of length - * the size of the hash corresponding to \p md_alg. + * This must be a readable buffer of at least \p hashlen Bytes. * \param sig The buffer to hold the signature. This must be a writable * buffer of length \c ctx->len Bytes. For example, \c 256 Bytes * for an 2048-bit RSA modulus. A buffer length of @@ -1092,49 +985,31 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_sign_ext(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_sign(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng, - int mode, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, unsigned int hashlen, const unsigned char *hash, unsigned char *sig); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21 */ /** * \brief This function performs a public RSA operation and checks * the message digest. * * This is the generic wrapper for performing a PKCS#1 - * verification using the mode from the context. + * verification. * * \note For PKCS#1 v2.1 encoding, see comments on * mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_verify() about \c md_alg and * \c hash_id. * - * \deprecated It is deprecated and discouraged to call this function - * in #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE mode. Future versions of the library - * are likely to remove the \p mode argument and have it - * set to #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC. - * - * \note Alternative implementations of RSA need not support - * mode being set to #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE and might instead - * return #MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED. - * * \param ctx The initialized RSA public key context to use. - * \param f_rng The RNG function to use. If \p mode is #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE, - * this is used for blinding and should be provided; see - * mbedtls_rsa_private() for more. Otherwise, it is ignored. - * \param p_rng The RNG context to be passed to \p f_rng. This may be - * \c NULL if \p f_rng is \c NULL or doesn't need a context. - * \param mode The mode of operation. This must be either - * #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC or #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE (deprecated). * \param md_alg The message-digest algorithm used to hash the original data. * Use #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE for signing raw data. - * \param hashlen The length of the message digest. - * This is only used if \p md_alg is #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE. + * \param hashlen The length of the message digest or raw data in Bytes. + * If \p md_alg is not #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, this must match the + * output length of the corresponding hash algorithm. * \param hash The buffer holding the message digest or raw data. - * If \p md_alg is #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, this must be a readable - * buffer of length \p hashlen Bytes. If \p md_alg is not - * #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, it must be a readable buffer of length - * the size of the hash corresponding to \p md_alg. + * This must be a readable buffer of at least \p hashlen Bytes. * \param sig The buffer holding the signature. This must be a readable * buffer of length \c ctx->len Bytes. For example, \c 256 Bytes * for an 2048-bit RSA modulus. @@ -1143,9 +1018,6 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_sign(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_XXX error code on failure. */ int mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_verify(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, - int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), - void *p_rng, - int mode, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, unsigned int hashlen, const unsigned char *hash, @@ -1155,32 +1027,14 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_verify(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, * \brief This function performs a PKCS#1 v1.5 verification * operation (RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5-VERIFY). * - * \deprecated It is deprecated and discouraged to call this function - * in #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE mode. Future versions of the library - * are likely to remove the \p mode argument and have it - * set to #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC. - * - * \note Alternative implementations of RSA need not support - * mode being set to #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE and might instead - * return #MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED. - * * \param ctx The initialized RSA public key context to use. - * \param f_rng The RNG function to use. If \p mode is #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE, - * this is used for blinding and should be provided; see - * mbedtls_rsa_private() for more. Otherwise, it is ignored. - * \param p_rng The RNG context to be passed to \p f_rng. This may be - * \c NULL if \p f_rng is \c NULL or doesn't need a context. - * \param mode The mode of operation. This must be either - * #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC or #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE (deprecated). * \param md_alg The message-digest algorithm used to hash the original data. * Use #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE for signing raw data. - * \param hashlen The length of the message digest. - * This is only used if \p md_alg is #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE. + * \param hashlen The length of the message digest or raw data in Bytes. + * If \p md_alg is not #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, this must match the + * output length of the corresponding hash algorithm. * \param hash The buffer holding the message digest or raw data. - * If \p md_alg is #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, this must be a readable - * buffer of length \p hashlen Bytes. If \p md_alg is not - * #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, it must be a readable buffer of length - * the size of the hash corresponding to \p md_alg. + * This must be a readable buffer of at least \p hashlen Bytes. * \param sig The buffer holding the signature. This must be a readable * buffer of length \c ctx->len Bytes. For example, \c 256 Bytes * for an 2048-bit RSA modulus. @@ -1189,9 +1043,6 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_verify(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_XXX error code on failure. */ int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_verify(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, - int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), - void *p_rng, - int mode, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, unsigned int hashlen, const unsigned char *hash, @@ -1201,42 +1052,24 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_verify(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, * \brief This function performs a PKCS#1 v2.1 PSS verification * operation (RSASSA-PSS-VERIFY). * - * \note The \c hash_id set in \p ctx (when calling - * mbedtls_rsa_init() or by calling mbedtls_rsa_set_padding() - * afterwards) selects the hash used for the + * \note The \c hash_id set in \p ctx by calling + * mbedtls_rsa_set_padding() selects the hash used for the * encoding operation and for the mask generation function * (MGF1). For more details on the encoding operation and the * mask generation function, consult RFC-3447: Public-Key * Cryptography Standards (PKCS) #1 v2.1: RSA Cryptography - * Specifications. If the \c hash_id set in \p ctx is - * #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, the \p md_alg parameter is used. - * - * \deprecated It is deprecated and discouraged to call this function - * in #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE mode. Future versions of the library - * are likely to remove the \p mode argument and have it - * implicitly set to #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC. - * - * \note Alternative implementations of RSA need not support - * mode being set to #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE and might instead - * return #MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED. + * Specifications. If the \c hash_id set in \p ctx by + * mbedtls_rsa_set_padding() is #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, the \p md_alg + * parameter is used. * * \param ctx The initialized RSA public key context to use. - * \param f_rng The RNG function to use. If \p mode is #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE, - * this is used for blinding and should be provided; see - * mbedtls_rsa_private() for more. Otherwise, it is ignored. - * \param p_rng The RNG context to be passed to \p f_rng. This may be - * \c NULL if \p f_rng is \c NULL or doesn't need a context. - * \param mode The mode of operation. This must be either - * #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC or #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE (deprecated). * \param md_alg The message-digest algorithm used to hash the original data. * Use #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE for signing raw data. - * \param hashlen The length of the message digest. - * This is only used if \p md_alg is #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE. + * \param hashlen The length of the message digest or raw data in Bytes. + * If \p md_alg is not #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, this must match the + * output length of the corresponding hash algorithm. * \param hash The buffer holding the message digest or raw data. - * If \p md_alg is #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, this must be a readable - * buffer of length \p hashlen Bytes. If \p md_alg is not - * #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, it must be a readable buffer of length - * the size of the hash corresponding to \p md_alg. + * This must be a readable buffer of at least \p hashlen Bytes. * \param sig The buffer holding the signature. This must be a readable * buffer of length \c ctx->len Bytes. For example, \c 256 Bytes * for an 2048-bit RSA modulus. @@ -1245,9 +1078,6 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_verify(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_XXX error code on failure. */ int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_verify(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, - int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), - void *p_rng, - int mode, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, unsigned int hashlen, const unsigned char *hash, @@ -1260,27 +1090,17 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_verify(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, * \note The \p sig buffer must be as large as the size * of \p ctx->N. For example, 128 Bytes if RSA-1024 is used. * - * \note The \c hash_id set in \p ctx (when calling - * mbedtls_rsa_init() or by calling mbedtls_rsa_set_padding() - * afterwards) is ignored. + * \note The \c hash_id set in \p ctx by mbedtls_rsa_set_padding() is + * ignored. * * \param ctx The initialized RSA public key context to use. - * \param f_rng The RNG function to use. If \p mode is #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE, - * this is used for blinding and should be provided; see - * mbedtls_rsa_private() for more. Otherwise, it is ignored. - * \param p_rng The RNG context to be passed to \p f_rng. This may be - * \c NULL if \p f_rng is \c NULL or doesn't need a context. - * \param mode The mode of operation. This must be either - * #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC or #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE. * \param md_alg The message-digest algorithm used to hash the original data. * Use #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE for signing raw data. - * \param hashlen The length of the message digest. - * This is only used if \p md_alg is #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE. + * \param hashlen The length of the message digest or raw data in Bytes. + * If \p md_alg is not #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, this must match the + * output length of the corresponding hash algorithm. * \param hash The buffer holding the message digest or raw data. - * If \p md_alg is #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, this must be a readable - * buffer of length \p hashlen Bytes. If \p md_alg is not - * #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, it must be a readable buffer of length - * the size of the hash corresponding to \p md_alg. + * This must be a readable buffer of at least \p hashlen Bytes. * \param mgf1_hash_id The message digest algorithm used for the * verification operation and the mask generation * function (MGF1). For more details on the encoding @@ -1298,9 +1118,6 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_verify(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_XXX error code on failure. */ int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_verify_ext(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, - int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), - void *p_rng, - int mode, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, unsigned int hashlen, const unsigned char *hash, diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/sha1.h b/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/sha1.h index 61d81f168d72..592ffd13f244 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/sha1.h +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/sha1.h @@ -16,19 +16,13 @@ */ #ifndef MBEDTLS_SHA1_H #define MBEDTLS_SHA1_H +#include "mbedtls/private_access.h" -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "mbedtls/build_info.h" #include #include -/* MBEDTLS_ERR_SHA1_HW_ACCEL_FAILED is deprecated and should not be used. */ -/** SHA-1 hardware accelerator failed */ -#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SHA1_HW_ACCEL_FAILED -0x0035 /** SHA-1 input data was malformed. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_SHA1_BAD_INPUT_DATA -0x0073 @@ -49,9 +43,9 @@ extern "C" { * */ typedef struct mbedtls_sha1_context { - uint32_t total[2]; /*!< The number of Bytes processed. */ - uint32_t state[5]; /*!< The intermediate digest state. */ - unsigned char buffer[64]; /*!< The data block being processed. */ + uint32_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(total)[2]; /*!< The number of Bytes processed. */ + uint32_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(state)[5]; /*!< The intermediate digest state. */ + unsigned char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(buffer)[64]; /*!< The data block being processed. */ } mbedtls_sha1_context; @@ -114,7 +108,7 @@ void mbedtls_sha1_clone(mbedtls_sha1_context *dst, * \return A negative error code on failure. * */ -int mbedtls_sha1_starts_ret(mbedtls_sha1_context *ctx); +int mbedtls_sha1_starts(mbedtls_sha1_context *ctx); /** * \brief This function feeds an input buffer into an ongoing SHA-1 @@ -133,9 +127,9 @@ int mbedtls_sha1_starts_ret(mbedtls_sha1_context *ctx); * \return \c 0 on success. * \return A negative error code on failure. */ -int mbedtls_sha1_update_ret(mbedtls_sha1_context *ctx, - const unsigned char *input, - size_t ilen); +int mbedtls_sha1_update(mbedtls_sha1_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *input, + size_t ilen); /** * \brief This function finishes the SHA-1 operation, and writes @@ -153,8 +147,8 @@ int mbedtls_sha1_update_ret(mbedtls_sha1_context *ctx, * \return \c 0 on success. * \return A negative error code on failure. */ -int mbedtls_sha1_finish_ret(mbedtls_sha1_context *ctx, - unsigned char output[20]); +int mbedtls_sha1_finish(mbedtls_sha1_context *ctx, + unsigned char output[20]); /** * \brief SHA-1 process data block (internal use only). @@ -174,85 +168,6 @@ int mbedtls_sha1_finish_ret(mbedtls_sha1_context *ctx, int mbedtls_internal_sha1_process(mbedtls_sha1_context *ctx, const unsigned char data[64]); -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING) -#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED __attribute__((deprecated)) -#else -#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED -#endif -/** - * \brief This function starts a SHA-1 checksum calculation. - * - * \warning SHA-1 is considered a weak message digest and its use - * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering - * stronger message digests instead. - * - * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_sha1_starts_ret() in 2.7.0. - * - * \param ctx The SHA-1 context to initialize. This must be initialized. - * - */ -MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_sha1_starts(mbedtls_sha1_context *ctx); - -/** - * \brief This function feeds an input buffer into an ongoing SHA-1 - * checksum calculation. - * - * \warning SHA-1 is considered a weak message digest and its use - * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering - * stronger message digests instead. - * - * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_sha1_update_ret() in 2.7.0. - * - * \param ctx The SHA-1 context. This must be initialized and - * have a hash operation started. - * \param input The buffer holding the input data. - * This must be a readable buffer of length \p ilen Bytes. - * \param ilen The length of the input data \p input in Bytes. - * - */ -MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_sha1_update(mbedtls_sha1_context *ctx, - const unsigned char *input, - size_t ilen); - -/** - * \brief This function finishes the SHA-1 operation, and writes - * the result to the output buffer. - * - * \warning SHA-1 is considered a weak message digest and its use - * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering - * stronger message digests instead. - * - * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_sha1_finish_ret() in 2.7.0. - * - * \param ctx The SHA-1 context. This must be initialized and - * have a hash operation started. - * \param output The SHA-1 checksum result. - * This must be a writable buffer of length \c 20 Bytes. - */ -MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_sha1_finish(mbedtls_sha1_context *ctx, - unsigned char output[20]); - -/** - * \brief SHA-1 process data block (internal use only). - * - * \warning SHA-1 is considered a weak message digest and its use - * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering - * stronger message digests instead. - * - * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_internal_sha1_process() in 2.7.0. - * - * \param ctx The SHA-1 context. This must be initialized. - * \param data The data block being processed. - * This must be a readable buffer of length \c 64 bytes. - * - */ -MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_sha1_process(mbedtls_sha1_context *ctx, - const unsigned char data[64]); - -#undef MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED -#endif /* !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ - /** * \brief This function calculates the SHA-1 checksum of a buffer. * @@ -276,44 +191,9 @@ MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_sha1_process(mbedtls_sha1_context *ctx, * \return A negative error code on failure. * */ -int mbedtls_sha1_ret(const unsigned char *input, - size_t ilen, - unsigned char output[20]); - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING) -#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED __attribute__((deprecated)) -#else -#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED -#endif -/** - * \brief This function calculates the SHA-1 checksum of a buffer. - * - * The function allocates the context, performs the - * calculation, and frees the context. - * - * The SHA-1 result is calculated as - * output = SHA-1(input buffer). - * - * \warning SHA-1 is considered a weak message digest and its use - * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering - * stronger message digests instead. - * - * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_sha1_ret() in 2.7.0 - * - * \param input The buffer holding the input data. - * This must be a readable buffer of length \p ilen Bytes. - * \param ilen The length of the input data \p input in Bytes. - * \param output The SHA-1 checksum result. This must be a writable - * buffer of size \c 20 Bytes. - * - */ -MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_sha1(const unsigned char *input, - size_t ilen, - unsigned char output[20]); - -#undef MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED -#endif /* !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ +int mbedtls_sha1(const unsigned char *input, + size_t ilen, + unsigned char output[20]); #if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/sha256.h b/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/sha256.h index d4c3e6468a74..ca568e291ea7 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/sha256.h +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/sha256.h @@ -12,19 +12,13 @@ */ #ifndef MBEDTLS_SHA256_H #define MBEDTLS_SHA256_H +#include "mbedtls/private_access.h" -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "mbedtls/build_info.h" #include #include -/* MBEDTLS_ERR_SHA256_HW_ACCEL_FAILED is deprecated and should not be used. */ -/** SHA-256 hardware accelerator failed */ -#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SHA256_HW_ACCEL_FAILED -0x0037 /** SHA-256 input data was malformed. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_SHA256_BAD_INPUT_DATA -0x0074 @@ -41,14 +35,16 @@ extern "C" { * * The structure is used both for SHA-256 and for SHA-224 * checksum calculations. The choice between these two is - * made in the call to mbedtls_sha256_starts_ret(). + * made in the call to mbedtls_sha256_starts(). */ typedef struct mbedtls_sha256_context { - uint32_t total[2]; /*!< The number of Bytes processed. */ - uint32_t state[8]; /*!< The intermediate digest state. */ - unsigned char buffer[64]; /*!< The data block being processed. */ - int is224; /*!< Determines which function to use: - 0: Use SHA-256, or 1: Use SHA-224. */ + unsigned char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(buffer)[64]; /*!< The data block being processed. */ + uint32_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(total)[2]; /*!< The number of Bytes processed. */ + uint32_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(state)[8]; /*!< The intermediate digest state. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA224_C) + int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(is224); /*!< Determines which function to use: + 0: Use SHA-256, or 1: Use SHA-224. */ +#endif } mbedtls_sha256_context; @@ -89,10 +85,14 @@ void mbedtls_sha256_clone(mbedtls_sha256_context *dst, * \param is224 This determines which function to use. This must be * either \c 0 for SHA-256, or \c 1 for SHA-224. * + * \note is224 must be defined accordingly to the enabled + * MBEDTLS_SHA224_C/MBEDTLS_SHA256_C symbols otherwise the + * function will return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SHA512_BAD_INPUT_DATA. + * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return A negative error code on failure. */ -int mbedtls_sha256_starts_ret(mbedtls_sha256_context *ctx, int is224); +int mbedtls_sha256_starts(mbedtls_sha256_context *ctx, int is224); /** * \brief This function feeds an input buffer into an ongoing @@ -107,9 +107,9 @@ int mbedtls_sha256_starts_ret(mbedtls_sha256_context *ctx, int is224); * \return \c 0 on success. * \return A negative error code on failure. */ -int mbedtls_sha256_update_ret(mbedtls_sha256_context *ctx, - const unsigned char *input, - size_t ilen); +int mbedtls_sha256_update(mbedtls_sha256_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *input, + size_t ilen); /** * \brief This function finishes the SHA-256 operation, and writes @@ -118,13 +118,14 @@ int mbedtls_sha256_update_ret(mbedtls_sha256_context *ctx, * \param ctx The SHA-256 context. This must be initialized * and have a hash operation started. * \param output The SHA-224 or SHA-256 checksum result. - * This must be a writable buffer of length \c 32 Bytes. + * This must be a writable buffer of length \c 32 bytes + * for SHA-256, \c 28 bytes for SHA-224. * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return A negative error code on failure. */ -int mbedtls_sha256_finish_ret(mbedtls_sha256_context *ctx, - unsigned char output[32]); +int mbedtls_sha256_finish(mbedtls_sha256_context *ctx, + unsigned char *output); /** * \brief This function processes a single data block within @@ -141,72 +142,6 @@ int mbedtls_sha256_finish_ret(mbedtls_sha256_context *ctx, int mbedtls_internal_sha256_process(mbedtls_sha256_context *ctx, const unsigned char data[64]); -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING) -#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED __attribute__((deprecated)) -#else -#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED -#endif -/** - * \brief This function starts a SHA-224 or SHA-256 checksum - * calculation. - * - * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_sha256_starts_ret() in 2.7.0. - * - * \param ctx The context to use. This must be initialized. - * \param is224 Determines which function to use. This must be - * either \c 0 for SHA-256, or \c 1 for SHA-224. - */ -MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_sha256_starts(mbedtls_sha256_context *ctx, - int is224); - -/** - * \brief This function feeds an input buffer into an ongoing - * SHA-256 checksum calculation. - * - * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_sha256_update_ret() in 2.7.0. - * - * \param ctx The SHA-256 context to use. This must be - * initialized and have a hash operation started. - * \param input The buffer holding the data. This must be a readable - * buffer of length \p ilen Bytes. - * \param ilen The length of the input data in Bytes. - */ -MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_sha256_update(mbedtls_sha256_context *ctx, - const unsigned char *input, - size_t ilen); - -/** - * \brief This function finishes the SHA-256 operation, and writes - * the result to the output buffer. - * - * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_sha256_finish_ret() in 2.7.0. - * - * \param ctx The SHA-256 context. This must be initialized and - * have a hash operation started. - * \param output The SHA-224 or SHA-256 checksum result. This must be - * a writable buffer of length \c 32 Bytes. - */ -MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_sha256_finish(mbedtls_sha256_context *ctx, - unsigned char output[32]); - -/** - * \brief This function processes a single data block within - * the ongoing SHA-256 computation. This function is for - * internal use only. - * - * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_internal_sha256_process() in 2.7.0. - * - * \param ctx The SHA-256 context. This must be initialized. - * \param data The buffer holding one block of data. This must be - * a readable buffer of size \c 64 Bytes. - */ -MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_sha256_process(mbedtls_sha256_context *ctx, - const unsigned char data[64]); - -#undef MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED -#endif /* !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ - /** * \brief This function calculates the SHA-224 or SHA-256 * checksum of a buffer. @@ -220,63 +155,41 @@ MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_sha256_process(mbedtls_sha256_context *ctx, * \param input The buffer holding the data. This must be a readable * buffer of length \p ilen Bytes. * \param ilen The length of the input data in Bytes. - * \param output The SHA-224 or SHA-256 checksum result. This must - * be a writable buffer of length \c 32 Bytes. + * \param output The SHA-224 or SHA-256 checksum result. + * This must be a writable buffer of length \c 32 bytes + * for SHA-256, \c 28 bytes for SHA-224. * \param is224 Determines which function to use. This must be * either \c 0 for SHA-256, or \c 1 for SHA-224. * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return A negative error code on failure. */ -int mbedtls_sha256_ret(const unsigned char *input, - size_t ilen, - unsigned char output[32], - int is224); +int mbedtls_sha256(const unsigned char *input, + size_t ilen, + unsigned char *output, + int is224); -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING) -#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED __attribute__((deprecated)) -#else -#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED -#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA224_C) /** - * \brief This function calculates the SHA-224 or SHA-256 checksum - * of a buffer. + * \brief The SHA-224 checkup routine. * - * The function allocates the context, performs the - * calculation, and frees the context. - * - * The SHA-256 result is calculated as - * output = SHA-256(input buffer). - * - * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_sha256_ret() in 2.7.0. - * - * \param input The buffer holding the data. This must be a readable - * buffer of length \p ilen Bytes. - * \param ilen The length of the input data in Bytes. - * \param output The SHA-224 or SHA-256 checksum result. This must be - * a writable buffer of length \c 32 Bytes. - * \param is224 Determines which function to use. This must be either - * \c 0 for SHA-256, or \c 1 for SHA-224. + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return \c 1 on failure. */ -MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_sha256(const unsigned char *input, - size_t ilen, - unsigned char output[32], - int is224); - -#undef MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED -#endif /* !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) +int mbedtls_sha224_self_test(int verbose); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA224_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) /** - * \brief The SHA-224 and SHA-256 checkup routine. + * \brief The SHA-256 checkup routine. * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return \c 1 on failure. */ int mbedtls_sha256_self_test(int verbose); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/sha3.h b/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/sha3.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..3eeee65e66bf --- /dev/null +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/sha3.h @@ -0,0 +1,172 @@ +/** + * \file sha3.h + * + * \brief This file contains SHA-3 definitions and functions. + * + * The Secure Hash Algorithms cryptographic + * hash functions are defined in FIPS 202: SHA-3 Standard: + * Permutation-Based Hash and Extendable-Output Functions . + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +#ifndef MBEDTLS_SHA3_H +#define MBEDTLS_SHA3_H +#include "mbedtls/private_access.h" + +#include "mbedtls/build_info.h" + +#include +#include + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +/** SHA-3 input data was malformed. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SHA3_BAD_INPUT_DATA -0x0076 + +/** + * SHA-3 family id. + * + * It identifies the family (SHA3-256, SHA3-512, etc.) + */ + +typedef enum { + MBEDTLS_SHA3_NONE = 0, /*!< Operation not defined. */ + MBEDTLS_SHA3_224, /*!< SHA3-224 */ + MBEDTLS_SHA3_256, /*!< SHA3-256 */ + MBEDTLS_SHA3_384, /*!< SHA3-384 */ + MBEDTLS_SHA3_512, /*!< SHA3-512 */ +} mbedtls_sha3_id; + +/** + * \brief The SHA-3 context structure. + * + * The structure is used SHA-3 checksum calculations. + */ +typedef struct { + uint64_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(state[25]); + uint32_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(index); + uint16_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(olen); + uint16_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(max_block_size); +} +mbedtls_sha3_context; + +/** + * \brief This function initializes a SHA-3 context. + * + * \param ctx The SHA-3 context to initialize. This must not be \c NULL. + */ +void mbedtls_sha3_init(mbedtls_sha3_context *ctx); + +/** + * \brief This function clears a SHA-3 context. + * + * \param ctx The SHA-3 context to clear. This may be \c NULL, in which + * case this function returns immediately. If it is not \c NULL, + * it must point to an initialized SHA-3 context. + */ +void mbedtls_sha3_free(mbedtls_sha3_context *ctx); + +/** + * \brief This function clones the state of a SHA-3 context. + * + * \param dst The destination context. This must be initialized. + * \param src The context to clone. This must be initialized. + */ +void mbedtls_sha3_clone(mbedtls_sha3_context *dst, + const mbedtls_sha3_context *src); + +/** + * \brief This function starts a SHA-3 checksum + * calculation. + * + * \param ctx The context to use. This must be initialized. + * \param id The id of the SHA-3 family. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return A negative error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_sha3_starts(mbedtls_sha3_context *ctx, mbedtls_sha3_id id); + +/** + * \brief This function feeds an input buffer into an ongoing + * SHA-3 checksum calculation. + * + * \param ctx The SHA-3 context. This must be initialized + * and have a hash operation started. + * \param input The buffer holding the data. This must be a readable + * buffer of length \p ilen Bytes. + * \param ilen The length of the input data in Bytes. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return A negative error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_sha3_update(mbedtls_sha3_context *ctx, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t ilen); + +/** + * \brief This function finishes the SHA-3 operation, and writes + * the result to the output buffer. + * + * \param ctx The SHA-3 context. This must be initialized + * and have a hash operation started. + * \param output The SHA-3 checksum result. + * This must be a writable buffer of length \c olen bytes. + * \param olen Defines the length of output buffer (in bytes). For SHA-3 224, SHA-3 256, + * SHA-3 384 and SHA-3 512 \c olen must equal to 28, 32, 48 and 64, + * respectively. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return A negative error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_sha3_finish(mbedtls_sha3_context *ctx, + uint8_t *output, size_t olen); + +/** + * \brief This function calculates the SHA-3 + * checksum of a buffer. + * + * The function allocates the context, performs the + * calculation, and frees the context. + * + * The SHA-3 result is calculated as + * output = SHA-3(id, input buffer, d). + * + * \param id The id of the SHA-3 family. + * \param input The buffer holding the data. This must be a readable + * buffer of length \p ilen Bytes. + * \param ilen The length of the input data in Bytes. + * \param output The SHA-3 checksum result. + * This must be a writable buffer of length \c olen bytes. + * \param olen Defines the length of output buffer (in bytes). For SHA-3 224, SHA-3 256, + * SHA-3 384 and SHA-3 512 \c olen must equal to 28, 32, 48 and 64, + * respectively. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return A negative error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_sha3(mbedtls_sha3_id id, const uint8_t *input, + size_t ilen, + uint8_t *output, + size_t olen); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) +/** + * \brief Checkup routine for the algorithms implemented + * by this module: SHA3-224, SHA3-256, SHA3-384, SHA3-512. + * + * \return 0 if successful, or 1 if the test failed. + */ +int mbedtls_sha3_self_test(int verbose); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* mbedtls_sha3.h */ diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/sha512.h b/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/sha512.h index c9e01690ac70..1c20e4c228d7 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/sha512.h +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/sha512.h @@ -11,19 +11,13 @@ */ #ifndef MBEDTLS_SHA512_H #define MBEDTLS_SHA512_H +#include "mbedtls/private_access.h" -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "mbedtls/build_info.h" #include #include -/* MBEDTLS_ERR_SHA512_HW_ACCEL_FAILED is deprecated and should not be used. */ -/** SHA-512 hardware accelerator failed */ -#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SHA512_HW_ACCEL_FAILED -0x0039 /** SHA-512 input data was malformed. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_SHA512_BAD_INPUT_DATA -0x0075 @@ -40,15 +34,15 @@ extern "C" { * * The structure is used both for SHA-384 and for SHA-512 * checksum calculations. The choice between these two is - * made in the call to mbedtls_sha512_starts_ret(). + * made in the call to mbedtls_sha512_starts(). */ typedef struct mbedtls_sha512_context { - uint64_t total[2]; /*!< The number of Bytes processed. */ - uint64_t state[8]; /*!< The intermediate digest state. */ - unsigned char buffer[128]; /*!< The data block being processed. */ -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384) - int is384; /*!< Determines which function to use: - 0: Use SHA-512, or 1: Use SHA-384. */ + uint64_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(total)[2]; /*!< The number of Bytes processed. */ + uint64_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(state)[8]; /*!< The intermediate digest state. */ + unsigned char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(buffer)[128]; /*!< The data block being processed. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C) + int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(is384); /*!< Determines which function to use: + 0: Use SHA-512, or 1: Use SHA-384. */ #endif } mbedtls_sha512_context; @@ -92,14 +86,14 @@ void mbedtls_sha512_clone(mbedtls_sha512_context *dst, * \param is384 Determines which function to use. This must be * either \c 0 for SHA-512, or \c 1 for SHA-384. * - * \note When \c MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 is defined, \p is384 must - * be \c 0, or the function will return - * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SHA512_BAD_INPUT_DATA. + * \note is384 must be defined accordingly to the enabled + * MBEDTLS_SHA384_C/MBEDTLS_SHA512_C symbols otherwise the + * function will return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SHA512_BAD_INPUT_DATA. * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return A negative error code on failure. */ -int mbedtls_sha512_starts_ret(mbedtls_sha512_context *ctx, int is384); +int mbedtls_sha512_starts(mbedtls_sha512_context *ctx, int is384); /** * \brief This function feeds an input buffer into an ongoing @@ -114,9 +108,9 @@ int mbedtls_sha512_starts_ret(mbedtls_sha512_context *ctx, int is384); * \return \c 0 on success. * \return A negative error code on failure. */ -int mbedtls_sha512_update_ret(mbedtls_sha512_context *ctx, - const unsigned char *input, - size_t ilen); +int mbedtls_sha512_update(mbedtls_sha512_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *input, + size_t ilen); /** * \brief This function finishes the SHA-512 operation, and writes @@ -125,13 +119,14 @@ int mbedtls_sha512_update_ret(mbedtls_sha512_context *ctx, * \param ctx The SHA-512 context. This must be initialized * and have a hash operation started. * \param output The SHA-384 or SHA-512 checksum result. - * This must be a writable buffer of length \c 64 Bytes. + * This must be a writable buffer of length \c 64 bytes + * for SHA-512, \c 48 bytes for SHA-384. * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return A negative error code on failure. */ -int mbedtls_sha512_finish_ret(mbedtls_sha512_context *ctx, - unsigned char output[64]); +int mbedtls_sha512_finish(mbedtls_sha512_context *ctx, + unsigned char *output); /** * \brief This function processes a single data block within @@ -147,75 +142,6 @@ int mbedtls_sha512_finish_ret(mbedtls_sha512_context *ctx, */ int mbedtls_internal_sha512_process(mbedtls_sha512_context *ctx, const unsigned char data[128]); -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING) -#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED __attribute__((deprecated)) -#else -#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED -#endif -/** - * \brief This function starts a SHA-384 or SHA-512 checksum - * calculation. - * - * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_sha512_starts_ret() in 2.7.0 - * - * \param ctx The SHA-512 context to use. This must be initialized. - * \param is384 Determines which function to use. This must be either - * \c 0 for SHA-512 or \c 1 for SHA-384. - * - * \note When \c MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 is defined, \p is384 must - * be \c 0, or the function will fail to work. - */ -MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_sha512_starts(mbedtls_sha512_context *ctx, - int is384); - -/** - * \brief This function feeds an input buffer into an ongoing - * SHA-512 checksum calculation. - * - * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_sha512_update_ret() in 2.7.0. - * - * \param ctx The SHA-512 context. This must be initialized - * and have a hash operation started. - * \param input The buffer holding the data. This must be a readable - * buffer of length \p ilen Bytes. - * \param ilen The length of the input data in Bytes. - */ -MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_sha512_update(mbedtls_sha512_context *ctx, - const unsigned char *input, - size_t ilen); - -/** - * \brief This function finishes the SHA-512 operation, and writes - * the result to the output buffer. - * - * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_sha512_finish_ret() in 2.7.0. - * - * \param ctx The SHA-512 context. This must be initialized - * and have a hash operation started. - * \param output The SHA-384 or SHA-512 checksum result. This must - * be a writable buffer of size \c 64 Bytes. - */ -MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_sha512_finish(mbedtls_sha512_context *ctx, - unsigned char output[64]); - -/** - * \brief This function processes a single data block within - * the ongoing SHA-512 computation. This function is for - * internal use only. - * - * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_internal_sha512_process() in 2.7.0. - * - * \param ctx The SHA-512 context. This must be initialized. - * \param data The buffer holding one block of data. This must be - * a readable buffer of length \c 128 Bytes. - */ -MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_sha512_process( - mbedtls_sha512_context *ctx, - const unsigned char data[128]); - -#undef MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED -#endif /* !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ /** * \brief This function calculates the SHA-512 or SHA-384 @@ -231,69 +157,48 @@ MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_sha512_process( * a readable buffer of length \p ilen Bytes. * \param ilen The length of the input data in Bytes. * \param output The SHA-384 or SHA-512 checksum result. - * This must be a writable buffer of length \c 64 Bytes. + * This must be a writable buffer of length \c 64 bytes + * for SHA-512, \c 48 bytes for SHA-384. * \param is384 Determines which function to use. This must be either * \c 0 for SHA-512, or \c 1 for SHA-384. * - * \note When \c MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 is defined, \p is384 must - * be \c 0, or the function will return + * \note is384 must be defined accordingly with the supported + * symbols in the config file. If: + * - is384 is 0, but \c MBEDTLS_SHA384_C is not defined, or + * - is384 is 1, but \c MBEDTLS_SHA512_C is not defined + * then the function will return * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SHA512_BAD_INPUT_DATA. * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return A negative error code on failure. */ -int mbedtls_sha512_ret(const unsigned char *input, - size_t ilen, - unsigned char output[64], - int is384); +int mbedtls_sha512(const unsigned char *input, + size_t ilen, + unsigned char *output, + int is384); -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING) -#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED __attribute__((deprecated)) -#else -#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED -#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C) /** - * \brief This function calculates the SHA-512 or SHA-384 - * checksum of a buffer. - * - * The function allocates the context, performs the - * calculation, and frees the context. - * - * The SHA-512 result is calculated as - * output = SHA-512(input buffer). + * \brief The SHA-384 checkup routine. * - * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_sha512_ret() in 2.7.0 - * - * \param input The buffer holding the data. This must be a - * readable buffer of length \p ilen Bytes. - * \param ilen The length of the input data in Bytes. - * \param output The SHA-384 or SHA-512 checksum result. This must - * be a writable buffer of length \c 64 Bytes. - * \param is384 Determines which function to use. This must be either - * \c 0 for SHA-512, or \c 1 for SHA-384. - * - * \note When \c MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 is defined, \p is384 must - * be \c 0, or the function will fail to work. + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return \c 1 on failure. */ -MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_sha512(const unsigned char *input, - size_t ilen, - unsigned char output[64], - int is384); - -#undef MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED -#endif /* !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) +int mbedtls_sha384_self_test(int verbose); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA384_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) /** - * \brief The SHA-384 or SHA-512 checkup routine. + * \brief The SHA-512 checkup routine. * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return \c 1 on failure. */ int mbedtls_sha512_self_test(int verbose); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_C */ + #endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ #ifdef __cplusplus diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/ssl.h b/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/ssl.h index 9cdf3a3ebbac..172d4693b2f5 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/ssl.h +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/ssl.h @@ -9,12 +9,10 @@ */ #ifndef MBEDTLS_SSL_H #define MBEDTLS_SSL_H +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" +#include "mbedtls/private_access.h" -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "mbedtls/build_info.h" #include "mbedtls/bignum.h" #include "mbedtls/ecp.h" @@ -30,41 +28,23 @@ #include "mbedtls/dhm.h" #endif -/* Adding guard for MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C to ensure no compile errors due - * to guards also being in ssl_srv.c and ssl_cli.c. There is a gap - * in functionality that access to ecdh_ctx structure is needed for - * MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C which does not seem correct. - */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) -#include "mbedtls/ecdh.h" -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT) +#include "mbedtls/md.h" -#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING) -#warning \ - "Record compression support via MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT is deprecated and will be removed in the next major revision of the library" -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) -#error \ - "Record compression support via MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT is deprecated and cannot be used if MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED is set" -#endif - -#include "zlib.h" +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDH_OR_ECDHE_ANY_ENABLED) +#include "mbedtls/ecdh.h" #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) #include "mbedtls/platform_time.h" #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) #include "psa/crypto.h" -#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ /* * SSL Error codes */ +/** A cryptographic operation is in progress. Try again later. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS -0x7000 /** The requested feature is not available. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE -0x7080 /** Bad input parameters to function. */ @@ -75,18 +55,17 @@ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD -0x7200 /** The connection indicated an EOF. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CONN_EOF -0x7280 -/** An unknown cipher was received. */ -#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNKNOWN_CIPHER -0x7300 -/** The server has no ciphersuites in common with the client. */ -#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NO_CIPHER_CHOSEN -0x7380 +/** A message could not be parsed due to a syntactic error. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR -0x7300 +/* Error space gap */ /** No RNG was provided to the SSL module. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NO_RNG -0x7400 /** No client certification received from the client, but required by the authentication mode. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NO_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE -0x7480 -/** Our own certificate(s) is/are too large to send in an SSL message. */ -#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CERTIFICATE_TOO_LARGE -0x7500 -/** The own certificate is not set, but needed by the server. */ -#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CERTIFICATE_REQUIRED -0x7580 +/** Client received an extended server hello containing an unsupported extension */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION -0x7500 +/** No ALPN protocols supported that the client advertises */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL -0x7580 /** The own private key or pre-shared key is not set, but needed. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PRIVATE_KEY_REQUIRED -0x7600 /** No CA Chain is set, but required to operate. */ @@ -95,46 +74,50 @@ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE -0x7700 /** A fatal alert message was received from our peer. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FATAL_ALERT_MESSAGE -0x7780 -/** Verification of our peer failed. */ -#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PEER_VERIFY_FAILED -0x7800 +/** No server could be identified matching the client's SNI. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME -0x7800 /** The peer notified us that the connection is going to be closed. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PEER_CLOSE_NOTIFY -0x7880 -/** Processing of the ClientHello handshake message failed. */ -#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO -0x7900 -/** Processing of the ServerHello handshake message failed. */ -#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO -0x7980 +/* Error space gap */ +/* Error space gap */ /** Processing of the Certificate handshake message failed. */ -#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE -0x7A00 -/** Processing of the CertificateRequest handshake message failed. */ -#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST -0x7A80 -/** Processing of the ServerKeyExchange handshake message failed. */ -#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE -0x7B00 -/** Processing of the ServerHelloDone handshake message failed. */ -#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO_DONE -0x7B80 -/** Processing of the ClientKeyExchange handshake message failed. */ -#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE -0x7C00 -/** Processing of the ClientKeyExchange handshake message failed in DHM / ECDH Read Public. */ -#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_RP -0x7C80 -/** Processing of the ClientKeyExchange handshake message failed in DHM / ECDH Calculate Secret. */ -#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_CS -0x7D00 -/** Processing of the CertificateVerify handshake message failed. */ -#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY -0x7D80 -/** Processing of the ChangeCipherSpec handshake message failed. */ -#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC -0x7E00 -/** Processing of the Finished handshake message failed. */ -#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_FINISHED -0x7E80 +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_CERTIFICATE -0x7A00 +/* Error space gap */ +/** + * Received NewSessionTicket Post Handshake Message. + * This error code is experimental and may be changed or removed without notice. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_RECEIVED_NEW_SESSION_TICKET -0x7B00 +/** Not possible to read early data */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CANNOT_READ_EARLY_DATA -0x7B80 +/** + * Early data has been received as part of an on-going handshake. + * This error code can be returned only on server side if and only if early + * data has been enabled by means of the mbedtls_ssl_conf_early_data() API. + * This error code can then be returned by mbedtls_ssl_handshake(), + * mbedtls_ssl_handshake_step(), mbedtls_ssl_read() or mbedtls_ssl_write() if + * early data has been received as part of the handshake sequence they + * triggered. To read the early data, call mbedtls_ssl_read_early_data(). + */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_RECEIVED_EARLY_DATA -0x7C00 +/** Not possible to write early data */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CANNOT_WRITE_EARLY_DATA -0x7C80 +/* Error space gap */ +/* Error space gap */ +/* Error space gap */ +/* Error space gap */ +/** Cache entry not found */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CACHE_ENTRY_NOT_FOUND -0x7E80 /** Memory allocation failed */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED -0x7F00 /** Hardware acceleration function returned with error */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED -0x7F80 /** Hardware acceleration function skipped / left alone data */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FALLTHROUGH -0x6F80 -/** Processing of the compression / decompression failed */ -#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_COMPRESSION_FAILED -0x6F00 /** Handshake protocol not within min/max boundaries */ -#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_PROTOCOL_VERSION -0x6E80 -/** Processing of the NewSessionTicket handshake message failed. */ -#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET -0x6E00 +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION -0x6E80 +/** The handshake negotiation failed. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE -0x6E00 /** Session ticket has expired. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_SESSION_TICKET_EXPIRED -0x6D80 /** Public key type mismatch (eg, asked for RSA key exchange and presented EC key) */ @@ -151,8 +134,7 @@ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUIRED -0x6A80 /** A buffer is too small to receive or write a message */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL -0x6A00 -/** None of the common ciphersuites is usable (eg, no suitable certificate, see debug messages). */ -#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NO_USABLE_CIPHERSUITE -0x6980 +/* Error space gap */ /** No data of requested type currently available on underlying transport. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ -0x6900 /** Connection requires a write call. */ @@ -165,34 +147,123 @@ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_RECORD -0x6700 /** The alert message received indicates a non-fatal error. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NON_FATAL -0x6680 -/** Couldn't set the hash for verifying CertificateVerify */ -#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_VERIFY_HASH -0x6600 +/** A field in a message was incorrect or inconsistent with other fields. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER -0x6600 /** Internal-only message signaling that further message-processing should be done */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CONTINUE_PROCESSING -0x6580 /** The asynchronous operation is not completed yet. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ASYNC_IN_PROGRESS -0x6500 /** Internal-only message signaling that a message arrived early. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_EARLY_MESSAGE -0x6480 +/* Error space gap */ +/* Error space gap */ +/* Error space gap */ +/* Error space gap */ +/* Error space gap */ +/* Error space gap */ +/* Error space gap */ +/* Error space gap */ /** An encrypted DTLS-frame with an unexpected CID was received. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_CID -0x6000 /** An operation failed due to an unexpected version or configuration. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_VERSION_MISMATCH -0x5F00 -/** A cryptographic operation is in progress. Try again later. */ -#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS -0x7000 /** Invalid value in SSL config */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_CONFIG -0x5E80 -/** Cache entry not found */ -#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CACHE_ENTRY_NOT_FOUND -0x5E00 + +/* + * Constants from RFC 8446 for TLS 1.3 PSK modes + * + * Those are used in the Pre-Shared Key Exchange Modes extension. + * See Section 4.2.9 in RFC 8446. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_PSK_MODE_PURE 0 /* Pure PSK-based exchange */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_PSK_MODE_ECDHE 1 /* PSK+ECDHE-based exchange */ + +/* + * TLS 1.3 NamedGroup values + * + * From RF 8446 + * enum { + * // Elliptic Curve Groups (ECDHE) + * secp256r1(0x0017), secp384r1(0x0018), secp521r1(0x0019), + * x25519(0x001D), x448(0x001E), + * // Finite Field Groups (DHE) + * ffdhe2048(0x0100), ffdhe3072(0x0101), ffdhe4096(0x0102), + * ffdhe6144(0x0103), ffdhe8192(0x0104), + * // Reserved Code Points + * ffdhe_private_use(0x01FC..0x01FF), + * ecdhe_private_use(0xFE00..0xFEFF), + * (0xFFFF) + * } NamedGroup; + * + */ + +/* Elliptic Curve Groups (ECDHE) */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_NONE 0 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_SECP192K1 0x0012 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_SECP192R1 0x0013 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_SECP224K1 0x0014 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_SECP224R1 0x0015 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_SECP256K1 0x0016 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_SECP256R1 0x0017 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_SECP384R1 0x0018 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_SECP521R1 0x0019 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_BP256R1 0x001A +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_BP384R1 0x001B +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_BP512R1 0x001C +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_X25519 0x001D +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_X448 0x001E +/* Finite Field Groups (DHE) */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_FFDHE2048 0x0100 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_FFDHE3072 0x0101 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_FFDHE4096 0x0102 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_FFDHE6144 0x0103 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_FFDHE8192 0x0104 + +/* + * TLS 1.3 Key Exchange Modes + * + * Mbed TLS internal identifiers for use with the SSL configuration API + * mbedtls_ssl_conf_tls13_key_exchange_modes(). + */ + +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK (1u << 0) /*!< Pure-PSK TLS 1.3 key exchange, + * encompassing both externally agreed PSKs + * as well as resumption PSKs. */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL (1u << 1) /*!< Pure-Ephemeral TLS 1.3 key exchanges, + * including for example ECDHE and DHE + * key exchanges. */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_EPHEMERAL (1u << 2) /*!< PSK-Ephemeral TLS 1.3 key exchanges, + * using both a PSK and an ephemeral + * key exchange. */ + +/* Convenience macros for sets of key exchanges. */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_ALL \ + (MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK | \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_EPHEMERAL | \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL) /*!< All TLS 1.3 key exchanges */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_ALL \ + (MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK | \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_EPHEMERAL) /*!< All PSK-based TLS 1.3 key exchanges */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ALL \ + (MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL | \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_EPHEMERAL) /*!< All ephemeral TLS 1.3 key exchanges */ + +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_NONE (0) /* * Various constants */ + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) +/* These are the high and low bytes of ProtocolVersion as defined by: + * - RFC 5246: ProtocolVersion version = { 3, 3 }; // TLS v1.2 + * - RFC 8446: see section 4.2.1 + */ #define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3 3 -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 0 /*!< SSL v3.0 */ -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1 1 /*!< TLS v1.0 */ -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2 2 /*!< TLS v1.1 */ #define MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 3 /*!< TLS v1.2 */ -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_4 4 /*!< TLS v1.3 (experimental) */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_4 4 /*!< TLS v1.3 */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ #define MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_STREAM 0 /*!< TLS */ #define MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM 1 /*!< DTLS */ @@ -214,9 +285,6 @@ #define MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT 0 #define MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER 1 -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_NOT_FALLBACK 0 -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_FALLBACK 1 - #define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MS_DISABLED 0 #define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MS_ENABLED 1 @@ -227,7 +295,6 @@ #define MBEDTLS_SSL_ETM_ENABLED 1 #define MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_NULL 0 -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_DEFLATE 1 #define MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_NONE 0 #define MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_OPTIONAL 1 @@ -257,21 +324,28 @@ #define MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS_DISABLED 0 #define MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS_ENABLED 1 -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING_DISABLED 0 -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING_ENABLED 1 - -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_ARC4_ENABLED 0 -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_ARC4_DISABLED 1 - #define MBEDTLS_SSL_PRESET_DEFAULT 0 #define MBEDTLS_SSL_PRESET_SUITEB 2 #define MBEDTLS_SSL_CERT_REQ_CA_LIST_ENABLED 1 #define MBEDTLS_SSL_CERT_REQ_CA_LIST_DISABLED 0 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_DISABLED 0 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_ENABLED 1 + #define MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP_MKI_UNSUPPORTED 0 #define MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP_MKI_SUPPORTED 1 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_CIPHERSUITE_ORDER_CLIENT 1 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_CIPHERSUITE_ORDER_SERVER 0 + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384) +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_TICKET_RESUMPTION_KEY_LEN 48 +#elif defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256) +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_TICKET_RESUMPTION_KEY_LEN 32 +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 && MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */ /* * Default range for DTLS retransmission timer value, in milliseconds. * RFC 6347 4.2.4.1 says from 1 second to 60 seconds. @@ -279,18 +353,34 @@ #define MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_TIMEOUT_DFL_MIN 1000 #define MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_TIMEOUT_DFL_MAX 60000 +/* + * Whether early data record should be discarded or not and how. + * + * The client has indicated early data and the server has rejected them. + * The server has then to skip past early data by either: + * - attempting to deprotect received records using the handshake traffic + * key, discarding records which fail deprotection (up to the configured + * max_early_data_size). Once a record is deprotected successfully, + * it is treated as the start of the client's second flight and the + * server proceeds as with an ordinary 1-RTT handshake. + * - skipping all records with an external content type of + * "application_data" (indicating that they are encrypted), up to the + * configured max_early_data_size. This is the expected behavior if the + * server has sent an HelloRetryRequest message. The server ignores + * application data message before 2nd ClientHello. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_NO_DISCARD 0 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_TRY_TO_DEPROTECT_AND_DISCARD 1 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_DISCARD 2 + /** * \name SECTION: Module settings * * The configuration options you can set for this module are in this section. - * Either change them in config.h or define them on the compiler command line. + * Either change them in mbedtls_config.h or define them on the compiler command line. * \{ */ -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DEFAULT_TICKET_LIFETIME) -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_DEFAULT_TICKET_LIFETIME 86400 /**< Lifetime of session tickets (if enabled) */ -#endif - /* * Maximum fragment length in bytes, * determines the size of each of the two internal I/O buffers. @@ -302,16 +392,12 @@ * if you're using the Max Fragment Length extension and you know all your * peers are using it too! */ -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN) -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN 16384 /**< Size of the input / output buffer */ -#endif - #if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN) -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN 16384 #endif #if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN) -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN 16384 #endif /* @@ -333,30 +419,45 @@ #define MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX 32 #endif -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_PADDING_GRANULARITY) -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_PADDING_GRANULARITY 16 +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_TLS1_3_PADDING_GRANULARITY) +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_TLS1_3_PADDING_GRANULARITY 16 +#endif + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_EARLY_DATA_SIZE) +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_EARLY_DATA_SIZE 1024 #endif -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_PADDING_GRANULARITY) -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_PADDING_GRANULARITY 1 +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_TICKET_AGE_TOLERANCE) +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_TICKET_AGE_TOLERANCE 6000 +#endif + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_TICKET_NONCE_LENGTH) +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_TICKET_NONCE_LENGTH 32 +#endif + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_DEFAULT_NEW_SESSION_TICKETS) +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_DEFAULT_NEW_SESSION_TICKETS 1 #endif /** \} name SECTION: Module settings */ +/* + * Default to standard CID mode + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID_COMPAT) +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID_COMPAT 0 +#endif + /* * Length of the verify data for secure renegotiation */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_DATA_MAX_LEN 36 -#else #define MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_DATA_MAX_LEN 12 -#endif /* * Signaling ciphersuite values (SCSV) */ #define MBEDTLS_SSL_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO 0xFF /**< renegotiation info ext */ -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_FALLBACK_SCSV_VALUE 0x5600 /**< RFC 7507 section 2 */ /* * Supported Signature and Hash algorithms (For TLS 1.2) @@ -374,6 +475,41 @@ #define MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_RSA 1 #define MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_ECDSA 3 +/* + * TLS 1.3 signature algorithms + * RFC 8446, Section 4.2.3 + */ + +/* RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 algorithms */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PKCS1_SHA256 0x0401 +#define MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PKCS1_SHA384 0x0501 +#define MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PKCS1_SHA512 0x0601 + +/* ECDSA algorithms */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_ECDSA_SECP256R1_SHA256 0x0403 +#define MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_ECDSA_SECP384R1_SHA384 0x0503 +#define MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_ECDSA_SECP521R1_SHA512 0x0603 + +/* RSASSA-PSS algorithms with public key OID rsaEncryption */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PSS_RSAE_SHA256 0x0804 +#define MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PSS_RSAE_SHA384 0x0805 +#define MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PSS_RSAE_SHA512 0x0806 + +/* EdDSA algorithms */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_ED25519 0x0807 +#define MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_ED448 0x0808 + +/* RSASSA-PSS algorithms with public key OID RSASSA-PSS */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PSS_PSS_SHA256 0x0809 +#define MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PSS_PSS_SHA384 0x080A +#define MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PSS_PSS_SHA512 0x080B + +/* LEGACY ALGORITHMS */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PKCS1_SHA1 0x0201 +#define MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_ECDSA_SHA1 0x0203 + +#define MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_NONE 0x0 + /* * Client Certificate Types * RFC 5246 section 7.4.4 plus RFC 4492 section 5.5 @@ -418,9 +554,11 @@ #define MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_INAPROPRIATE_FALLBACK 86 /* 0x56 */ #define MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_USER_CANCELED 90 /* 0x5A */ #define MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_NO_RENEGOTIATION 100 /* 0x64 */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_MISSING_EXTENSION 109 /* 0x6d -- new in TLS 1.3 */ #define MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_EXT 110 /* 0x6E */ #define MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME 112 /* 0x70 */ #define MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY 115 /* 0x73 */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_CERT_REQUIRED 116 /* 0x74 */ #define MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL 120 /* 0x78 */ #define MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_HELLO_REQUEST 0 @@ -428,6 +566,8 @@ #define MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_SERVER_HELLO 2 #define MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST 3 #define MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET 4 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_END_OF_EARLY_DATA 5 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS 8 #define MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE 11 #define MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE 12 #define MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST 13 @@ -435,6 +575,7 @@ #define MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY 15 #define MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE 16 #define MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_FINISHED 20 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_MESSAGE_HASH 254 /* * TLS extensions @@ -445,30 +586,44 @@ #define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH 1 #define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_TRUNCATED_HMAC 4 +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_STATUS_REQUEST 5 /* RFC 6066 TLS 1.2 and 1.3 */ #define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVES 10 +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_GROUPS 10 /* RFC 8422,7919 TLS 1.2 and 1.3 */ #define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_POINT_FORMATS 11 -#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SIG_ALG 13 - +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SIG_ALG 13 /* RFC 8446 TLS 1.3 */ #define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_USE_SRTP 14 - +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_HEARTBEAT 15 /* RFC 6520 TLS 1.2 and 1.3 */ #define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ALPN 16 +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SCT 18 /* RFC 6962 TLS 1.2 and 1.3 */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_CLI_CERT_TYPE 19 /* RFC 7250 TLS 1.2 and 1.3 */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SERV_CERT_TYPE 20 /* RFC 7250 TLS 1.2 and 1.3 */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_PADDING 21 /* RFC 7685 TLS 1.2 and 1.3 */ #define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC 22 /* 0x16 */ #define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET 0x0017 /* 23 */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT 28 /* RFC 8449 (implemented for TLS 1.3 only) */ + #define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SESSION_TICKET 35 -/* The value of the CID extension is still TBD as of - * draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-05 - * (https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-05). - * - * A future minor revision of Mbed TLS may change the default value of - * this option to match evolving standards and usage. - */ -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_CID) -#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_CID 254 /* TBD */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_PRE_SHARED_KEY 41 /* RFC 8446 TLS 1.3 */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_EARLY_DATA 42 /* RFC 8446 TLS 1.3 */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS 43 /* RFC 8446 TLS 1.3 */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_COOKIE 44 /* RFC 8446 TLS 1.3 */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_PSK_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODES 45 /* RFC 8446 TLS 1.3 */ + +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_CERT_AUTH 47 /* RFC 8446 TLS 1.3 */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_OID_FILTERS 48 /* RFC 8446 TLS 1.3 */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_POST_HANDSHAKE_AUTH 49 /* RFC 8446 TLS 1.3 */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SIG_ALG_CERT 50 /* RFC 8446 TLS 1.3 */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_KEY_SHARE 51 /* RFC 8446 TLS 1.3 */ + +#if MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID_COMPAT == 0 +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_CID 54 /* RFC 9146 DTLS 1.2 CID */ +#else +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_CID 254 /* Pre-RFC 9146 DTLS 1.2 CID */ #endif #define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ECJPAKE_KKPP 256 /* experimental */ @@ -479,8 +634,22 @@ * Size defines */ #if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSK_MAX_LEN) -#define MBEDTLS_PSK_MAX_LEN 32 /* 256 bits */ +/* + * If the library supports TLS 1.3 tickets and the cipher suite + * TLS1-3-AES-256-GCM-SHA384, set the PSK maximum length to 48 instead of 32. + * That way, the TLS 1.3 client and server are able to resume sessions where + * the cipher suite is TLS1-3-AES-256-GCM-SHA384 (pre-shared keys are 48 + * bytes long in that case). + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_AES) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) +#define MBEDTLS_PSK_MAX_LEN 48 /* 384 bits */ +#else +#define MBEDTLS_PSK_MAX_LEN 32 /* 256 bits */ #endif +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSK_MAX_LEN */ /* Dummy type used only for its size */ union mbedtls_ssl_premaster_secret { @@ -518,6 +687,12 @@ union mbedtls_ssl_premaster_secret { #define MBEDTLS_PREMASTER_SIZE sizeof(union mbedtls_ssl_premaster_secret) +#define MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_MD_MAX_SIZE PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE + + +/* Length in number of bytes of the TLS sequence number */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_SEQUENCE_NUMBER_LEN 8 + #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { #endif @@ -542,23 +717,38 @@ typedef enum { MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_FINISHED, MBEDTLS_SSL_FLUSH_BUFFERS, MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WRAPUP, - MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER, - MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, + MBEDTLS_SSL_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_SENT, + MBEDTLS_SSL_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS, + MBEDTLS_SSL_END_OF_EARLY_DATA, + MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY, + MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CCS_AFTER_SERVER_FINISHED, + MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CCS_BEFORE_2ND_CLIENT_HELLO, + MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_CCS_AFTER_SERVER_HELLO, + MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CCS_AFTER_CLIENT_HELLO, + MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_CCS_AFTER_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST, + MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER, + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET_FLUSH, } mbedtls_ssl_states; /* - * The tls_prf function types. + * Early data status, client side only. */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) typedef enum { - MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_PRF_NONE, - MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_PRF_SSL3, - MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_PRF_TLS1, - MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_PRF_SHA384, - MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_PRF_SHA256 -} -mbedtls_tls_prf_types; +/* + * See documentation of mbedtls_ssl_get_early_data_status(). + */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_NOT_INDICATED, + MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_ACCEPTED, + MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_REJECTED, +} mbedtls_ssl_early_data_status; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA && MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */ + /** * \brief Callback type: send data on the network. * @@ -674,7 +864,7 @@ typedef struct mbedtls_ssl_session mbedtls_ssl_session; typedef struct mbedtls_ssl_context mbedtls_ssl_context; typedef struct mbedtls_ssl_config mbedtls_ssl_config; -/* Defined in ssl_internal.h */ +/* Defined in library/ssl_misc.h */ typedef struct mbedtls_ssl_transform mbedtls_ssl_transform; typedef struct mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params; typedef struct mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_t mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_t; @@ -685,6 +875,69 @@ typedef struct mbedtls_ssl_key_cert mbedtls_ssl_key_cert; typedef struct mbedtls_ssl_flight_item mbedtls_ssl_flight_item; #endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_TICKET_ALLOW_PSK_RESUMPTION \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK /* 1U << 0 */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_TICKET_ALLOW_PSK_EPHEMERAL_RESUMPTION \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_EPHEMERAL /* 1U << 2 */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_TICKET_ALLOW_EARLY_DATA (1U << 3) + +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_TICKET_FLAGS_MASK \ + (MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_TICKET_ALLOW_PSK_RESUMPTION | \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_TICKET_ALLOW_PSK_EPHEMERAL_RESUMPTION | \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_TICKET_ALLOW_EARLY_DATA) +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 && MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */ + +/** + * \brief Callback type: server-side session cache getter + * + * The session cache is logically a key value store, with + * keys being session IDs and values being instances of + * mbedtls_ssl_session. + * + * This callback retrieves an entry in this key-value store. + * + * \param data The address of the session cache structure to query. + * \param session_id The buffer holding the session ID to query. + * \param session_id_len The length of \p session_id in Bytes. + * \param session The address of the session structure to populate. + * It is initialized with mbdtls_ssl_session_init(), + * and the callback must always leave it in a state + * where it can safely be freed via + * mbedtls_ssl_session_free() independent of the + * return code of this function. + * + * \return \c 0 on success + * \return A non-zero return value on failure. + * + */ +typedef int mbedtls_ssl_cache_get_t(void *data, + unsigned char const *session_id, + size_t session_id_len, + mbedtls_ssl_session *session); +/** + * \brief Callback type: server-side session cache setter + * + * The session cache is logically a key value store, with + * keys being session IDs and values being instances of + * mbedtls_ssl_session. + * + * This callback sets an entry in this key-value store. + * + * \param data The address of the session cache structure to modify. + * \param session_id The buffer holding the session ID to query. + * \param session_id_len The length of \p session_id in Bytes. + * \param session The address of the session to be stored in the + * session cache. + * + * \return \c 0 on success + * \return A non-zero return value on failure. + */ +typedef int mbedtls_ssl_cache_set_t(void *data, + unsigned char const *session_id, + size_t session_id_len, + const mbedtls_ssl_session *session); + #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE) #if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) /** @@ -900,13 +1153,13 @@ typedef void mbedtls_ssl_async_cancel_t(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) && \ !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) #define MBEDTLS_SSL_PEER_CERT_DIGEST_MAX_LEN 48 -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) #define MBEDTLS_SSL_PEER_CERT_DIGEST_DFL_TYPE MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256 #define MBEDTLS_SSL_PEER_CERT_DIGEST_DFL_LEN 32 -#elif defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) #define MBEDTLS_SSL_PEER_CERT_DIGEST_DFL_TYPE MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384 #define MBEDTLS_SSL_PEER_CERT_DIGEST_DFL_LEN 48 -#elif defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1) #define MBEDTLS_SSL_PEER_CERT_DIGEST_DFL_TYPE MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1 #define MBEDTLS_SSL_PEER_CERT_DIGEST_DFL_LEN 20 #else @@ -916,6 +1169,13 @@ typedef void mbedtls_ssl_async_cancel_t(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED && !MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ +typedef struct { + unsigned char client_application_traffic_secret_N[MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_MD_MAX_SIZE]; + unsigned char server_application_traffic_secret_N[MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_MD_MAX_SIZE]; + unsigned char exporter_master_secret[MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_MD_MAX_SIZE]; + unsigned char resumption_master_secret[MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_MD_MAX_SIZE]; +} mbedtls_ssl_tls13_application_secrets; + #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP) #define MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_MAX_MKI_LENGTH 255 @@ -940,16 +1200,23 @@ typedef uint16_t mbedtls_ssl_srtp_profile; typedef struct mbedtls_dtls_srtp_info_t { /*! The SRTP profile that was negotiated. */ - mbedtls_ssl_srtp_profile chosen_dtls_srtp_profile; + mbedtls_ssl_srtp_profile MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(chosen_dtls_srtp_profile); /*! The length of mki_value. */ - uint16_t mki_len; + uint16_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(mki_len); /*! The mki_value used, with max size of 256 bytes. */ - unsigned char mki_value[MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_MAX_MKI_LENGTH]; + unsigned char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(mki_value)[MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_MAX_MKI_LENGTH]; } mbedtls_dtls_srtp_info; #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP */ +/** Human-friendly representation of the (D)TLS protocol version. */ +typedef enum { + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_UNKNOWN, /*!< Context not in use or version not yet negotiated. */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 = 0x0303, /*!< (D)TLS 1.2 */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_3 = 0x0304, /*!< (D)TLS 1.3 */ +} mbedtls_ssl_protocol_version; + /* * This structure is used for storing current session data. * @@ -963,60 +1230,192 @@ mbedtls_dtls_srtp_info; */ struct mbedtls_ssl_session { #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH) - unsigned char mfl_code; /*!< MaxFragmentLength negotiated by peer */ + unsigned char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(mfl_code); /*!< MaxFragmentLength negotiated by peer */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH */ +/*!< RecordSizeLimit received from the peer */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT) + uint16_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(record_size_limit); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT */ + + unsigned char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(exported); + uint8_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(endpoint); /*!< 0: client, 1: server */ + + /** TLS version negotiated in the session. Used if and when renegotiating + * or resuming a session instead of the configured minor TLS version. + */ + mbedtls_ssl_protocol_version MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(tls_version); + #if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) - mbedtls_time_t start; /*!< starting time */ + mbedtls_time_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(start); /*!< start time of current session */ #endif - int ciphersuite; /*!< chosen ciphersuite */ - int compression; /*!< chosen compression */ - size_t id_len; /*!< session id length */ - unsigned char id[32]; /*!< session identifier */ - unsigned char master[48]; /*!< the master secret */ + int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(ciphersuite); /*!< chosen ciphersuite */ + size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(id_len); /*!< session id length */ + unsigned char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(id)[32]; /*!< session identifier */ + unsigned char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(master)[48]; /*!< the master secret */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) - mbedtls_x509_crt *peer_cert; /*!< peer X.509 cert chain */ + mbedtls_x509_crt *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(peer_cert); /*!< peer X.509 cert chain */ #else /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ /*! The digest of the peer's end-CRT. This must be kept to detect CRT * changes during renegotiation, mitigating the triple handshake attack. */ - unsigned char *peer_cert_digest; - size_t peer_cert_digest_len; - mbedtls_md_type_t peer_cert_digest_type; + unsigned char *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(peer_cert_digest); + size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(peer_cert_digest_len); + mbedtls_md_type_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(peer_cert_digest_type); #endif /* !MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ - uint32_t verify_result; /*!< verification result */ + uint32_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(verify_result); /*!< verification result */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) - unsigned char *ticket; /*!< RFC 5077 session ticket */ - size_t ticket_len; /*!< session ticket length */ - uint32_t ticket_lifetime; /*!< ticket lifetime hint */ + unsigned char *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(ticket); /*!< RFC 5077 session ticket */ + size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(ticket_len); /*!< session ticket length */ + uint32_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(ticket_lifetime); /*!< ticket lifetime hint */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS && MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC) - int trunc_hmac; /*!< flag for truncated hmac activation */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) + /*! When a ticket is created by a TLS server as part of an established TLS + * session, the ticket creation time may need to be saved for the ticket + * module to be able to check the ticket age when the ticket is used. + * That's the purpose of this field. + * Before creating a new ticket, an Mbed TLS server set this field with + * its current time in milliseconds. This time may then be saved in the + * session ticket data by the session ticket writing function and + * recovered by the ticket parsing function later when the ticket is used. + * The ticket module may then use this time to compute the ticket age and + * determine if it has expired or not. + * The Mbed TLS implementations of the session ticket writing and parsing + * functions save and retrieve the ticket creation time as part of the + * session ticket data. The session ticket parsing function relies on + * the mbedtls_ssl_session_get_ticket_creation_time() API to get the + * ticket creation time from the session ticket data. + */ + mbedtls_ms_time_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(ticket_creation_time); +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) + uint32_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(ticket_age_add); /*!< Randomly generated value used to obscure the age of the ticket */ + uint8_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(ticket_flags); /*!< Ticket flags */ + uint8_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(resumption_key_len); /*!< resumption_key length */ + unsigned char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(resumption_key)[MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_TICKET_RESUMPTION_KEY_LEN]; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) + char *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(hostname); /*!< host name binded with tickets */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION && MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) + char *ticket_alpn; /*!< ALPN negotiated in the session + during which the ticket was generated. */ +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) + /*! Time in milliseconds when the last ticket was received. */ + mbedtls_ms_time_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(ticket_reception_time); +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 && MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) + uint32_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(max_early_data_size); /*!< maximum amount of early data in tickets */ +#endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) - int encrypt_then_mac; /*!< flag for EtM activation */ + int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(encrypt_then_mac); /*!< flag for EtM activation */ +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) + mbedtls_ssl_tls13_application_secrets MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(app_secrets); #endif }; +/* + * Identifiers for PRFs used in various versions of TLS. + */ +typedef enum { + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_PRF_NONE, + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_PRF_SHA384, + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_PRF_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_SSL_HKDF_EXPAND_SHA384, + MBEDTLS_SSL_HKDF_EXPAND_SHA256 +} +mbedtls_tls_prf_types; + +typedef enum { + MBEDTLS_SSL_KEY_EXPORT_TLS12_MASTER_SECRET = 0, +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) + MBEDTLS_SSL_KEY_EXPORT_TLS1_3_CLIENT_EARLY_SECRET, + MBEDTLS_SSL_KEY_EXPORT_TLS1_3_EARLY_EXPORTER_SECRET, + MBEDTLS_SSL_KEY_EXPORT_TLS1_3_CLIENT_HANDSHAKE_TRAFFIC_SECRET, + MBEDTLS_SSL_KEY_EXPORT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HANDSHAKE_TRAFFIC_SECRET, + MBEDTLS_SSL_KEY_EXPORT_TLS1_3_CLIENT_APPLICATION_TRAFFIC_SECRET, + MBEDTLS_SSL_KEY_EXPORT_TLS1_3_SERVER_APPLICATION_TRAFFIC_SECRET, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 */ +} mbedtls_ssl_key_export_type; + +/** + * \brief Callback type: Export key alongside random values for + * session identification, and PRF for + * implementation of TLS key exporters. + * + * \param p_expkey Context for the callback. + * \param type The type of the key that is being exported. + * \param secret The address of the buffer holding the secret + * that's being exporterd. + * \param secret_len The length of \p secret in bytes. + * \param client_random The client random bytes. + * \param server_random The server random bytes. + * \param tls_prf_type The identifier for the PRF used in the handshake + * to which the key belongs. + */ +typedef void mbedtls_ssl_export_keys_t(void *p_expkey, + mbedtls_ssl_key_export_type type, + const unsigned char *secret, + size_t secret_len, + const unsigned char client_random[32], + const unsigned char server_random[32], + mbedtls_tls_prf_types tls_prf_type); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) +/** + * \brief Callback type: generic handshake callback + * + * \note Callbacks may use user_data funcs to set/get app user data. + * See \c mbedtls_ssl_get_user_data_p() + * \c mbedtls_ssl_get_user_data_n() + * \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_get_user_data_p() + * \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_get_user_data_n() + * + * \param ssl \c mbedtls_ssl_context on which the callback is run + * + * \return The return value of the callback is 0 if successful, + * or a specific MBEDTLS_ERR_XXX code, which will cause + * the handshake to be aborted. + */ +typedef int (*mbedtls_ssl_hs_cb_t)(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); +#endif + +/* A type for storing user data in a library structure. + * + * The representation of type may change in future versions of the library. + * Only the behaviors guaranteed by documented accessor functions are + * guaranteed to remain stable. + */ +typedef union { + uintptr_t n; /* typically a handle to an associated object */ + void *p; /* typically a pointer to extra data */ +} mbedtls_ssl_user_data_t; + /** * SSL/TLS configuration to be shared between mbedtls_ssl_context structures. */ struct mbedtls_ssl_config { - /* Group items by size and reorder them to maximize usage of immediate offset access. */ - - /* - * Numerical settings (char) - */ + /* Group items mostly by size. This helps to reduce memory wasted to + * padding. It also helps to keep smaller fields early in the structure, + * so that elements tend to be in the 128-element direct access window + * on Arm Thumb, which reduces the code size. */ - unsigned char max_major_ver; /*!< max. major version used */ - unsigned char max_minor_ver; /*!< max. minor version used */ - unsigned char min_major_ver; /*!< min. major version used */ - unsigned char min_minor_ver; /*!< min. minor version used */ + mbedtls_ssl_protocol_version MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(max_tls_version); /*!< max. TLS version used */ + mbedtls_ssl_protocol_version MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(min_tls_version); /*!< min. TLS version used */ /* * Flags (could be bit-fields to save RAM, but separate bytes make @@ -1024,418 +1423,494 @@ struct mbedtls_ssl_config { * byte access). */ - uint8_t endpoint /*bool*/; /*!< 0: client, 1: server */ - uint8_t transport /*bool*/; /*!< stream (TLS) or datagram (DTLS) */ - uint8_t authmode /*2 bits*/; /*!< MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_XXX */ + uint8_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(endpoint); /*!< 0: client, 1: server */ + uint8_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(transport); /*!< 0: stream (TLS), 1: datagram (DTLS) */ + uint8_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(authmode); /*!< MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_XXX */ /* needed even with renego disabled for LEGACY_BREAK_HANDSHAKE */ - uint8_t allow_legacy_renegotiation /*2 bits*/; /*!< MBEDTLS_LEGACY_XXX */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARC4_C) - uint8_t arc4_disabled /*bool*/; /*!< blacklist RC4 ciphersuites? */ -#endif + uint8_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(allow_legacy_renegotiation); /*!< MBEDTLS_LEGACY_XXX */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH) - uint8_t mfl_code /*3 bits*/; /*!< desired fragment length */ + uint8_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(mfl_code); /*!< desired fragment length indicator + (MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_XXX) */ #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) - uint8_t encrypt_then_mac /*bool*/; /*!< negotiate encrypt-then-mac? */ + uint8_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(encrypt_then_mac); /*!< negotiate encrypt-then-mac? */ #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET) - uint8_t extended_ms /*bool*/; /*!< negotiate extended master secret? */ + uint8_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(extended_ms); /*!< negotiate extended master secret? */ #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY) - uint8_t anti_replay /*bool*/; /*!< detect and prevent replay? */ -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING) - uint8_t cbc_record_splitting /*bool*/; /*!< do cbc record splitting */ + uint8_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(anti_replay); /*!< detect and prevent replay? */ #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) - uint8_t disable_renegotiation /*bool*/; /*!< disable renegotiation? */ -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC) - uint8_t trunc_hmac /*bool*/; /*!< negotiate truncated hmac? */ + uint8_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(disable_renegotiation); /*!< disable renegotiation? */ #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) - uint8_t session_tickets /*bool*/; /*!< use session tickets? */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) + uint8_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(session_tickets); /*!< use session tickets? */ #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_FALLBACK_SCSV) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) - uint8_t fallback /*bool*/; /*!< is this a fallback? */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) + uint16_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(new_session_tickets_count); /*!< number of NewSessionTicket */ #endif + #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) - uint8_t cert_req_ca_list /*bool*/; /*!< enable sending CA list in - Certificate Request messages? */ + uint8_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(cert_req_ca_list); /*!< enable sending CA list in + Certificate Request messages? */ + uint8_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(respect_cli_pref); /*!< pick the ciphersuite according to + the client's preferences rather + than ours? */ #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) - uint8_t ignore_unexpected_cid /*bool*/; /*!< Determines whether DTLS - * record with unexpected CID - * should lead to failure. */ + uint8_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(ignore_unexpected_cid); /*!< Should DTLS record with + * unexpected CID + * lead to failure? */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP) - uint8_t dtls_srtp_mki_support /*bool*/; /*!< support having mki_value - in the use_srtp extension? */ -#endif - - /* - * Numerical settings (int or larger) - */ - - uint32_t read_timeout; /*!< timeout for mbedtls_ssl_read (ms) */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) - uint32_t hs_timeout_min; /*!< initial value of the handshake - retransmission timeout (ms) */ - uint32_t hs_timeout_max; /*!< maximum value of the handshake - retransmission timeout (ms) */ -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) - int renego_max_records; /*!< grace period for renegotiation */ - unsigned char renego_period[8]; /*!< value of the record counters - that triggers renegotiation */ -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_BADMAC_LIMIT) - unsigned int badmac_limit; /*!< limit of records with a bad MAC */ -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) - unsigned int dhm_min_bitlen; /*!< min. bit length of the DHM prime */ + uint8_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(dtls_srtp_mki_support); /* support having mki_value + in the use_srtp extension? */ #endif /* * Pointers */ - const int *ciphersuite_list[4]; /*!< allowed ciphersuites per version */ + /** Allowed ciphersuites for (D)TLS 1.2 (0-terminated) */ + const int *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(ciphersuite_list); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) + /** Allowed TLS 1.3 key exchange modes. */ + int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(tls13_kex_modes); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 */ /** Callback for printing debug output */ - void (*f_dbg)(void *, int, const char *, int, const char *); - void *p_dbg; /*!< context for the debug function */ + void(*MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(f_dbg))(void *, int, const char *, int, const char *); + void *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(p_dbg); /*!< context for the debug function */ /** Callback for getting (pseudo-)random numbers */ - int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t); - void *p_rng; /*!< context for the RNG function */ + int(*MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(f_rng))(void *, unsigned char *, size_t); + void *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(p_rng); /*!< context for the RNG function */ /** Callback to retrieve a session from the cache */ - int (*f_get_cache)(void *, mbedtls_ssl_session *); + mbedtls_ssl_cache_get_t *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(f_get_cache); /** Callback to store a session into the cache */ - int (*f_set_cache)(void *, const mbedtls_ssl_session *); - void *p_cache; /*!< context for cache callbacks */ + mbedtls_ssl_cache_set_t *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(f_set_cache); + void *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(p_cache); /*!< context for cache callbacks */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) /** Callback for setting cert according to SNI extension */ - int (*f_sni)(void *, mbedtls_ssl_context *, const unsigned char *, size_t); - void *p_sni; /*!< context for SNI callback */ + int(*MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(f_sni))(void *, mbedtls_ssl_context *, const unsigned char *, size_t); + void *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(p_sni); /*!< context for SNI callback */ #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) /** Callback to customize X.509 certificate chain verification */ - int (*f_vrfy)(void *, mbedtls_x509_crt *, int, uint32_t *); - void *p_vrfy; /*!< context for X.509 verify calllback */ + int(*MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(f_vrfy))(void *, mbedtls_x509_crt *, int, uint32_t *); + void *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(p_vrfy); /*!< context for X.509 verify calllback */ #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_PSK_ENABLED) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) /** Callback to retrieve PSK key from identity */ - int (*f_psk)(void *, mbedtls_ssl_context *, const unsigned char *, size_t); - void *p_psk; /*!< context for PSK callback */ + int(*MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(f_psk))(void *, mbedtls_ssl_context *, const unsigned char *, size_t); + void *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(p_psk); /*!< context for PSK callback */ +#endif #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) /** Callback to create & write a cookie for ClientHello verification */ - int (*f_cookie_write)(void *, unsigned char **, unsigned char *, - const unsigned char *, size_t); + int(*MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(f_cookie_write))(void *, unsigned char **, unsigned char *, + const unsigned char *, size_t); /** Callback to verify validity of a ClientHello cookie */ - int (*f_cookie_check)(void *, const unsigned char *, size_t, - const unsigned char *, size_t); - void *p_cookie; /*!< context for the cookie callbacks */ + int(*MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(f_cookie_check))(void *, const unsigned char *, size_t, + const unsigned char *, size_t); + void *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(p_cookie); /*!< context for the cookie callbacks */ #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) /** Callback to create & write a session ticket */ - int (*f_ticket_write)(void *, const mbedtls_ssl_session *, - unsigned char *, const unsigned char *, size_t *, uint32_t *); + int(*MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(f_ticket_write))(void *, const mbedtls_ssl_session *, + unsigned char *, const unsigned char *, size_t *, + uint32_t *); /** Callback to parse a session ticket into a session structure */ - int (*f_ticket_parse)(void *, mbedtls_ssl_session *, unsigned char *, size_t); - void *p_ticket; /*!< context for the ticket callbacks */ + int(*MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(f_ticket_parse))(void *, mbedtls_ssl_session *, unsigned char *, size_t); + void *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(p_ticket); /*!< context for the ticket callbacks */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS && MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXPORT_KEYS) - /** Callback to export key block and master secret */ - int (*f_export_keys)(void *, const unsigned char *, - const unsigned char *, size_t, size_t, size_t); - /** Callback to export key block, master secret, - * tls_prf and random bytes. Should replace f_export_keys */ - int (*f_export_keys_ext)(void *, const unsigned char *, - const unsigned char *, size_t, size_t, size_t, - const unsigned char[32], const unsigned char[32], - mbedtls_tls_prf_types); - void *p_export_keys; /*!< context for key export callback */ -#endif - #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) - size_t cid_len; /*!< The length of CIDs for incoming DTLS records. */ + size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(cid_len); /*!< The length of CIDs for incoming DTLS records. */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) - const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile *cert_profile; /*!< verification profile */ - mbedtls_ssl_key_cert *key_cert; /*!< own certificate/key pair(s) */ - mbedtls_x509_crt *ca_chain; /*!< trusted CAs */ - mbedtls_x509_crl *ca_crl; /*!< trusted CAs CRLs */ + const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(cert_profile); /*!< verification profile */ + mbedtls_ssl_key_cert *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(key_cert); /*!< own certificate/key pair(s) */ + mbedtls_x509_crt *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(ca_chain); /*!< trusted CAs */ + mbedtls_x509_crl *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(ca_crl); /*!< trusted CAs CRLs */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK) - mbedtls_x509_crt_ca_cb_t f_ca_cb; - void *p_ca_cb; + mbedtls_x509_crt_ca_cb_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(f_ca_cb); + void *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(p_ca_cb); #endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE) #if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) - mbedtls_ssl_async_sign_t *f_async_sign_start; /*!< start asynchronous signature operation */ - mbedtls_ssl_async_decrypt_t *f_async_decrypt_start; /*!< start asynchronous decryption operation */ + mbedtls_ssl_async_sign_t *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(f_async_sign_start); /*!< start asynchronous signature operation */ + mbedtls_ssl_async_decrypt_t *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(f_async_decrypt_start); /*!< start asynchronous decryption operation */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ - mbedtls_ssl_async_resume_t *f_async_resume; /*!< resume asynchronous operation */ - mbedtls_ssl_async_cancel_t *f_async_cancel; /*!< cancel asynchronous operation */ - void *p_async_config_data; /*!< Configuration data set by mbedtls_ssl_conf_async_private_cb(). */ + mbedtls_ssl_async_resume_t *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(f_async_resume); /*!< resume asynchronous operation */ + mbedtls_ssl_async_cancel_t *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(f_async_cancel); /*!< cancel asynchronous operation */ + void *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(p_async_config_data); /*!< Configuration data set by mbedtls_ssl_conf_async_private_cb(). */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) - const int *sig_hashes; /*!< allowed signature hashes */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) + const int *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(sig_hashes); /*!< allowed signature hashes */ #endif + const uint16_t *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(sig_algs); /*!< allowed signature algorithms */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) - const mbedtls_ecp_group_id *curve_list; /*!< allowed curves */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) + const mbedtls_ecp_group_id *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(curve_list); /*!< allowed curves */ #endif + const uint16_t *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(group_list); /*!< allowed IANA NamedGroups */ + #if defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_C) - mbedtls_mpi dhm_P; /*!< prime modulus for DHM */ - mbedtls_mpi dhm_G; /*!< generator for DHM */ + mbedtls_mpi MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(dhm_P); /*!< prime modulus for DHM */ + mbedtls_mpi MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(dhm_G); /*!< generator for DHM */ #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_PSK_ENABLED) #if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) - psa_key_id_t psk_opaque; /*!< PSA key slot holding opaque PSK. This field - * should only be set via - * mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk_opaque(). - * If either no PSK or a raw PSK have been - * configured, this has value \c 0. - */ + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(psk_opaque); /*!< PSA key slot holding opaque PSK. This field + * should only be set via + * mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk_opaque(). + * If either no PSK or a raw PSK have been + * configured, this has value \c 0. + */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + unsigned char *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(psk); /*!< The raw pre-shared key. This field should + * only be set via mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk(). + * If either no PSK or an opaque PSK + * have been configured, this has value NULL. */ + size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(psk_len); /*!< The length of the raw pre-shared key. + * This field should only be set via + * mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk(). + * Its value is non-zero if and only if + * \c psk is not \c NULL. */ + + unsigned char *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(psk_identity); /*!< The PSK identity for PSK negotiation. + * This field should only be set via + * mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk(). + * This is set if and only if either + * \c psk or \c psk_opaque are set. */ + size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(psk_identity_len);/*!< The length of PSK identity. + * This field should only be set via + * mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk(). + * Its value is non-zero if and only if + * \c psk is not \c NULL or \c psk_opaque + * is not \c 0. */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_PSK_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) + int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(early_data_enabled); /*!< Early data enablement: + * - MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_DISABLED, + * - MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_ENABLED */ - unsigned char *psk; /*!< The raw pre-shared key. This field should - * only be set via mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk(). - * If either no PSK or an opaque PSK - * have been configured, this has value NULL. */ - size_t psk_len; /*!< The length of the raw pre-shared key. - * This field should only be set via - * mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk(). - * Its value is non-zero if and only if - * \c psk is not \c NULL. */ - - unsigned char *psk_identity; /*!< The PSK identity for PSK negotiation. - * This field should only be set via - * mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk(). - * This is set if and only if either - * \c psk or \c psk_opaque are set. */ - size_t psk_identity_len;/*!< The length of PSK identity. - * This field should only be set via - * mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk(). - * Its value is non-zero if and only if - * \c psk is not \c NULL or \c psk_opaque - * is not \c 0. */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) + /* The maximum amount of 0-RTT data. RFC 8446 section 4.6.1 */ + uint32_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(max_early_data_size); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN) - const char **alpn_list; /*!< ordered list of protocols */ + const char **MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(alpn_list); /*!< ordered list of protocols */ #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP) /*! ordered list of supported srtp profile */ - const mbedtls_ssl_srtp_profile *dtls_srtp_profile_list; + const mbedtls_ssl_srtp_profile *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(dtls_srtp_profile_list); /*! number of supported profiles */ - size_t dtls_srtp_profile_list_len; + size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(dtls_srtp_profile_list_len); #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP */ + + /* + * Numerical settings (int) + */ + + uint32_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(read_timeout); /*!< timeout for mbedtls_ssl_read (ms) */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + uint32_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(hs_timeout_min); /*!< initial value of the handshake + retransmission timeout (ms) */ + uint32_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(hs_timeout_max); /*!< maximum value of the handshake + retransmission timeout (ms) */ +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) + int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(renego_max_records); /*!< grace period for renegotiation */ + unsigned char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(renego_period)[8]; /*!< value of the record counters + that triggers renegotiation */ +#endif + + unsigned int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(badmac_limit); /*!< limit of records with a bad MAC */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) + unsigned int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(dhm_min_bitlen); /*!< min. bit length of the DHM prime */ +#endif + + /** User data pointer or handle. + * + * The library sets this to \p 0 when creating a context and does not + * access it afterwards. + */ + mbedtls_ssl_user_data_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(user_data); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) + mbedtls_ssl_hs_cb_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(f_cert_cb); /*!< certificate selection callback */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED) + const mbedtls_x509_crt *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(dn_hints);/*!< acceptable client cert issuers */ +#endif }; struct mbedtls_ssl_context { - const mbedtls_ssl_config *conf; /*!< configuration information */ + const mbedtls_ssl_config *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(conf); /*!< configuration information */ /* * Miscellaneous */ - int state; /*!< SSL handshake: current state */ + int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(state); /*!< SSL handshake: current state */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) - int renego_status; /*!< Initial, in progress, pending? */ - int renego_records_seen; /*!< Records since renego request, or with DTLS, - number of retransmissions of request if - renego_max_records is < 0 */ + int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(renego_status); /*!< Initial, in progress, pending? */ + int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(renego_records_seen); /*!< Records since renego request, or with DTLS, + number of retransmissions of request if + renego_max_records is < 0 */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */ - int major_ver; /*!< equal to MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3 */ - int minor_ver; /*!< either 0 (SSL3) or 1 (TLS1.0) */ + /** + * Maximum TLS version to be negotiated, then negotiated TLS version. + * + * It is initialized as the configured maximum TLS version to be + * negotiated by mbedtls_ssl_setup(). + * + * When renegotiating or resuming a session, it is overwritten in the + * ClientHello writing preparation stage with the previously negotiated + * TLS version. + * + * On client side, it is updated to the TLS version selected by the server + * for the handshake when the ServerHello is received. + * + * On server side, it is updated to the TLS version the server selects for + * the handshake when the ClientHello is received. + */ + mbedtls_ssl_protocol_version MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(tls_version); -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_BADMAC_LIMIT) - unsigned badmac_seen; /*!< records with a bad MAC received */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_BADMAC_LIMIT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) + /** + * State of the negotiation and transfer of early data. Reset to + * MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATE_IDLE when the context is reset. + */ + int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(early_data_state); +#endif + + unsigned MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(badmac_seen); /*!< records with a bad MAC received */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) /** Callback to customize X.509 certificate chain verification */ - int (*f_vrfy)(void *, mbedtls_x509_crt *, int, uint32_t *); - void *p_vrfy; /*!< context for X.509 verify callback */ + int(*MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(f_vrfy))(void *, mbedtls_x509_crt *, int, uint32_t *); + void *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(p_vrfy); /*!< context for X.509 verify callback */ #endif - mbedtls_ssl_send_t *f_send; /*!< Callback for network send */ - mbedtls_ssl_recv_t *f_recv; /*!< Callback for network receive */ - mbedtls_ssl_recv_timeout_t *f_recv_timeout; + mbedtls_ssl_send_t *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(f_send); /*!< Callback for network send */ + mbedtls_ssl_recv_t *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(f_recv); /*!< Callback for network receive */ + mbedtls_ssl_recv_timeout_t *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(f_recv_timeout); /*!< Callback for network receive with timeout */ - void *p_bio; /*!< context for I/O operations */ + void *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(p_bio); /*!< context for I/O operations */ /* * Session layer */ - mbedtls_ssl_session *session_in; /*!< current session data (in) */ - mbedtls_ssl_session *session_out; /*!< current session data (out) */ - mbedtls_ssl_session *session; /*!< negotiated session data */ - mbedtls_ssl_session *session_negotiate; /*!< session data in negotiation */ + mbedtls_ssl_session *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(session_in); /*!< current session data (in) */ + mbedtls_ssl_session *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(session_out); /*!< current session data (out) */ + mbedtls_ssl_session *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(session); /*!< negotiated session data */ + mbedtls_ssl_session *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(session_negotiate); /*!< session data in negotiation */ - mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *handshake; /*!< params required only during - the handshake process */ + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(handshake); /*!< params required only during + the handshake process */ /* * Record layer transformations */ - mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform_in; /*!< current transform params (in) */ - mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform_out; /*!< current transform params (in) */ - mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform; /*!< negotiated transform params */ - mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform_negotiate; /*!< transform params in negotiation */ + mbedtls_ssl_transform *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(transform_in); /*!< current transform params (in) + * This is always a reference, + * never an owning pointer. */ + mbedtls_ssl_transform *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(transform_out); /*!< current transform params (out) + * This is always a reference, + * never an owning pointer. */ + mbedtls_ssl_transform *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(transform); /*!< negotiated transform params + * This pointer owns the transform + * it references. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) + mbedtls_ssl_transform *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(transform_negotiate); /*!< transform params in negotiation + * This pointer owns the transform + * it references. */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) + /*! The application data transform in TLS 1.3. + * This pointer owns the transform it references. */ + mbedtls_ssl_transform *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(transform_application); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 */ /* * Timers */ - void *p_timer; /*!< context for the timer callbacks */ + void *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(p_timer); /*!< context for the timer callbacks */ - mbedtls_ssl_set_timer_t *f_set_timer; /*!< set timer callback */ - mbedtls_ssl_get_timer_t *f_get_timer; /*!< get timer callback */ + mbedtls_ssl_set_timer_t *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(f_set_timer); /*!< set timer callback */ + mbedtls_ssl_get_timer_t *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(f_get_timer); /*!< get timer callback */ /* * Record layer (incoming data) */ - unsigned char *in_buf; /*!< input buffer */ - unsigned char *in_ctr; /*!< 64-bit incoming message counter - TLS: maintained by us - DTLS: read from peer */ - unsigned char *in_hdr; /*!< start of record header */ + unsigned char *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(in_buf); /*!< input buffer */ + unsigned char *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(in_ctr); /*!< 64-bit incoming message counter + TLS: maintained by us + DTLS: read from peer */ + unsigned char *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(in_hdr); /*!< start of record header */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) - unsigned char *in_cid; /*!< The start of the CID; - * (the end is marked by in_len). */ + unsigned char *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(in_cid); /*!< The start of the CID; + * (the end is marked by in_len). */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ - unsigned char *in_len; /*!< two-bytes message length field */ - unsigned char *in_iv; /*!< ivlen-byte IV */ - unsigned char *in_msg; /*!< message contents (in_iv+ivlen) */ - unsigned char *in_offt; /*!< read offset in application data */ - - int in_msgtype; /*!< record header: message type */ - size_t in_msglen; /*!< record header: message length */ - size_t in_left; /*!< amount of data read so far */ + unsigned char *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(in_len); /*!< two-bytes message length field */ + unsigned char *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(in_iv); /*!< ivlen-byte IV */ + unsigned char *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(in_msg); /*!< message contents (in_iv+ivlen) */ + unsigned char *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(in_offt); /*!< read offset in application data */ + + int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(in_msgtype); /*!< record header: message type */ + size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(in_msglen); /*!< record header: message length */ + size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(in_left); /*!< amount of data read so far */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH) - size_t in_buf_len; /*!< length of input buffer */ + size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(in_buf_len); /*!< length of input buffer */ #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) - uint16_t in_epoch; /*!< DTLS epoch for incoming records */ - size_t next_record_offset; /*!< offset of the next record in datagram - (equal to in_left if none) */ + uint16_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(in_epoch); /*!< DTLS epoch for incoming records */ + size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(next_record_offset); /*!< offset of the next record in datagram + (equal to in_left if none) */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY) - uint64_t in_window_top; /*!< last validated record seq_num */ - uint64_t in_window; /*!< bitmask for replay detection */ + uint64_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(in_window_top); /*!< last validated record seq_num */ + uint64_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(in_window); /*!< bitmask for replay detection */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY */ - size_t in_hslen; /*!< current handshake message length, - including the handshake header */ - int nb_zero; /*!< # of 0-length encrypted messages */ + size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(in_hslen); /*!< current handshake message length, + including the handshake header */ + int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(nb_zero); /*!< # of 0-length encrypted messages */ + + int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(keep_current_message); /*!< drop or reuse current message + on next call to record layer? */ - int keep_current_message; /*!< drop or reuse current message - on next call to record layer? */ + /* The following three variables indicate if and, if yes, + * what kind of alert is pending to be sent. + */ + unsigned char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(send_alert); /*!< Determines if a fatal alert + should be sent. Values: + - \c 0 , no alert is to be sent. + - \c 1 , alert is to be sent. */ + unsigned char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(alert_type); /*!< Type of alert if send_alert + != 0 */ + int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(alert_reason); /*!< The error code to be returned + to the user once the fatal alert + has been sent. */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) - uint8_t disable_datagram_packing; /*!< Disable packing multiple records - * within a single datagram. */ + uint8_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(disable_datagram_packing); /*!< Disable packing multiple records + * within a single datagram. */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) + /* + * One of: + * MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_NO_DISCARD + * MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_TRY_TO_DEPROTECT_AND_DISCARD + * MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_DISCARD + */ + uint8_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(discard_early_data_record); +#endif + uint32_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(total_early_data_size); /*!< Number of received/written early data bytes */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA */ + /* * Record layer (outgoing data) */ - unsigned char *out_buf; /*!< output buffer */ - unsigned char *out_ctr; /*!< 64-bit outgoing message counter */ - unsigned char *out_hdr; /*!< start of record header */ + unsigned char *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(out_buf); /*!< output buffer */ + unsigned char *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(out_ctr); /*!< 64-bit outgoing message counter */ + unsigned char *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(out_hdr); /*!< start of record header */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) - unsigned char *out_cid; /*!< The start of the CID; - * (the end is marked by in_len). */ + unsigned char *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(out_cid); /*!< The start of the CID; + * (the end is marked by in_len). */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ - unsigned char *out_len; /*!< two-bytes message length field */ - unsigned char *out_iv; /*!< ivlen-byte IV */ - unsigned char *out_msg; /*!< message contents (out_iv+ivlen) */ + unsigned char *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(out_len); /*!< two-bytes message length field */ + unsigned char *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(out_iv); /*!< ivlen-byte IV */ + unsigned char *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(out_msg); /*!< message contents (out_iv+ivlen) */ - int out_msgtype; /*!< record header: message type */ - size_t out_msglen; /*!< record header: message length */ - size_t out_left; /*!< amount of data not yet written */ + int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(out_msgtype); /*!< record header: message type */ + size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(out_msglen); /*!< record header: message length */ + size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(out_left); /*!< amount of data not yet written */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH) - size_t out_buf_len; /*!< length of output buffer */ + size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(out_buf_len); /*!< length of output buffer */ #endif - unsigned char cur_out_ctr[8]; /*!< Outgoing record sequence number. */ + unsigned char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(cur_out_ctr)[MBEDTLS_SSL_SEQUENCE_NUMBER_LEN]; /*!< Outgoing record sequence number. */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) - uint16_t mtu; /*!< path mtu, used to fragment outgoing messages */ + uint16_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(mtu); /*!< path mtu, used to fragment outgoing messages */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT) - unsigned char *compress_buf; /*!< zlib data buffer */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING) - signed char split_done; /*!< current record already split? */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING */ - - /* - * PKI layer - */ - int client_auth; /*!< flag for client auth. */ - /* * User settings */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) - char *hostname; /*!< expected peer CN for verification - (and SNI if available) */ + char *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(hostname); /*!< expected peer CN for verification + (and SNI if available) */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN) - const char *alpn_chosen; /*!< negotiated protocol */ + const char *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(alpn_chosen); /*!< negotiated protocol */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP) /* * use_srtp extension */ - mbedtls_dtls_srtp_info dtls_srtp_info; + mbedtls_dtls_srtp_info MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(dtls_srtp_info); #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP */ /* * Information for DTLS hello verify */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) - unsigned char *cli_id; /*!< transport-level ID of the client */ - size_t cli_id_len; /*!< length of cli_id */ + unsigned char *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(cli_id); /*!< transport-level ID of the client */ + size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(cli_id_len); /*!< length of cli_id */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY && MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ /* * Secure renegotiation */ /* needed to know when to send extension on server */ - int secure_renegotiation; /*!< does peer support legacy or - secure renegotiation */ + int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(secure_renegotiation); /*!< does peer support legacy or + secure renegotiation */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) - size_t verify_data_len; /*!< length of verify data stored */ - char own_verify_data[MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_DATA_MAX_LEN]; /*!< previous handshake verify data */ - char peer_verify_data[MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_DATA_MAX_LEN]; /*!< previous handshake verify data */ + size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(verify_data_len); /*!< length of verify data stored */ + char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(own_verify_data)[MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_DATA_MAX_LEN]; /*!< previous handshake verify data */ + char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(peer_verify_data)[MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_DATA_MAX_LEN]; /*!< previous handshake verify data */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) @@ -1445,52 +1920,29 @@ struct mbedtls_ssl_context { * all subsequent handshakes. This may be different from the * CID currently used in case the user has re-configured the CID * after an initial handshake. */ - unsigned char own_cid[MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_IN_LEN_MAX]; - uint8_t own_cid_len; /*!< The length of \c own_cid. */ - uint8_t negotiate_cid; /*!< This indicates whether the CID extension should - * be negotiated in the next handshake or not. - * Possible values are #MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_ENABLED - * and #MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_DISABLED. */ + unsigned char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(own_cid)[MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_IN_LEN_MAX]; + uint8_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(own_cid_len); /*!< The length of \c own_cid. */ + uint8_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(negotiate_cid); /*!< This indicates whether the CID extension should + * be negotiated in the next handshake or not. + * Possible values are #MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_ENABLED + * and #MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_DISABLED. */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ -}; - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL) - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) - -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CHANNEL_OUTBOUND MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_NUMERIC_CONSTANT(0) -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CHANNEL_INBOUND MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_NUMERIC_CONSTANT(1) - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING) -#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED __attribute__((deprecated)) -#else -#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED -#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING */ - -MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED extern int (*mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_init)( - mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - const unsigned char *key_enc, const unsigned char *key_dec, - size_t keylen, - const unsigned char *iv_enc, const unsigned char *iv_dec, - size_t ivlen, - const unsigned char *mac_enc, const unsigned char *mac_dec, - size_t maclen); -MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED extern int (*mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_activate)( - mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - int direction); -MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED extern int (*mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_reset)( - mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); -MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED extern int (*mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_write)( - mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); -MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED extern int (*mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_read)( - mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); -MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED extern int (*mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_finish)( - mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); -#undef MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED -#endif /* !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ - -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL */ + /** Callback to export key block and master secret */ + mbedtls_ssl_export_keys_t *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(f_export_keys); + void *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(p_export_keys); /*!< context for key export callback */ + + /** User data pointer or handle. + * + * The library sets this to \p 0 when creating a context and does not + * access it afterwards. + * + * \warning Serializing and restoring an SSL context with + * mbedtls_ssl_context_save() and mbedtls_ssl_context_load() + * does not currently restore the user data. + */ + mbedtls_ssl_user_data_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(user_data); +}; /** * \brief Return the name of the ciphersuite associated with the @@ -1554,9 +2006,8 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_setup(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, * pointers and data. * * \param ssl SSL context - * \return 0 if successful, or MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED, - MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED or - * MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_COMPRESSION_FAILED + * \return 0 if successful, or MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED or + MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED */ int mbedtls_ssl_session_reset(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); @@ -1568,6 +2019,19 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_session_reset(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); */ void mbedtls_ssl_conf_endpoint(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, int endpoint); +/** + * \brief Get the current endpoint type + * + * \param conf SSL configuration + * + * \return Endpoint type, either MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT + * or MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER + */ +static inline int mbedtls_ssl_conf_get_endpoint(const mbedtls_ssl_config *conf) +{ + return conf->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(endpoint); +} + /** * \brief Set the transport type (TLS or DTLS). * Default: TLS @@ -1612,6 +2076,67 @@ void mbedtls_ssl_conf_transport(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, int transport); */ void mbedtls_ssl_conf_authmode(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, int authmode); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) +/** + * \brief Set the early data mode + * Default: disabled on server and client + * + * \param conf The SSL configuration to use. + * \param early_data_enabled can be: + * + * MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_DISABLED: + * Early data functionality is disabled. This is the default on client and + * server. + * + * MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_ENABLED: + * Early data functionality is enabled and may be negotiated in the handshake. + * Application using early data functionality needs to be aware that the + * security properties for early data (also refered to as 0-RTT data) are + * weaker than those for other kinds of TLS data. See the documentation of + * mbedtls_ssl_write_early_data() and mbedtls_ssl_read_early_data() for more + * information. + * When early data functionality is enabled on server and only in that case, + * the call to one of the APIs that trigger or resume an handshake sequence, + * namely mbedtls_ssl_handshake(), mbedtls_ssl_handshake_step(), + * mbedtls_ssl_read() or mbedtls_ssl_write() may return with the error code + * MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_RECEIVED_EARLY_DATA indicating that some early data have + * been received. To read the early data, call mbedtls_ssl_read_early_data() + * before calling the original function again. + */ +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_early_data(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + int early_data_enabled); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) +/** + * \brief Set the maximum amount of 0-RTT data in bytes + * Default: #MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_EARLY_DATA_SIZE + * + * This function sets the value of the max_early_data_size + * field of the early data indication extension included in + * the NewSessionTicket messages that the server may send. + * + * The value defines the maximum amount of 0-RTT data + * in bytes that a client will be allowed to send when using + * one of the tickets defined by the NewSessionTicket messages. + * + * \note When resuming a session using a ticket, if the server receives more + * early data than allowed for the ticket, it terminates the connection. + * The maximum amount of 0-RTT data should thus be large enough + * to allow a minimum of early data to be exchanged. + * + * \param[in] conf The SSL configuration to use. + * \param[in] max_early_data_size The maximum amount of 0-RTT data. + * + * \warning This interface DOES NOT influence/limit the amount of early data + * that can be received through previously created and issued tickets, + * which clients may have stored. + */ +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_max_early_data_size( + mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, uint32_t max_early_data_size); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA */ + #if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) /** * \brief Set the verification callback (Optional). @@ -1637,7 +2162,7 @@ void mbedtls_ssl_conf_verify(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, * \brief Set the random number generator callback * * \param conf SSL configuration - * \param f_rng RNG function + * \param f_rng RNG function (mandatory) * \param p_rng RNG parameter */ void mbedtls_ssl_conf_rng(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, @@ -1662,6 +2187,22 @@ void mbedtls_ssl_conf_dbg(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, void (*f_dbg)(void *, int, const char *, int, const char *), void *p_dbg); +/** + * \brief Return the SSL configuration structure associated + * with the given SSL context. + * + * \note The pointer returned by this function is guaranteed to + * remain valid until the context is freed. + * + * \param ssl The SSL context to query. + * \return Pointer to the SSL configuration associated with \p ssl. + */ +static inline const mbedtls_ssl_config *mbedtls_ssl_context_get_config( + const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + return ssl->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(conf); +} + /** * \brief Set the underlying BIO callbacks for write, read and * read-with-timeout. @@ -1707,8 +2248,9 @@ void mbedtls_ssl_set_bio(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, * \brief Configure the use of the Connection ID (CID) * extension in the next handshake. * - * Reference: draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-05 + * Reference: RFC 9146 (or draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-05 * https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-05 + * for legacy version) * * The DTLS CID extension allows the reliable association of * DTLS records to DTLS connections across changes in the @@ -1765,7 +2307,7 @@ void mbedtls_ssl_set_bio(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, * the `ServerHello` contains the CID extension, too, * the CID extension will actually be put to use. * - On the Server, enabling the use of the CID through - * this call implies that that the server will look for + * this call implies that the server will look for * the CID extension in a `ClientHello` from the client, * and, if present, reply with a CID extension in its * `ServerHello`. @@ -1791,6 +2333,40 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_set_cid(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char const *own_cid, size_t own_cid_len); +/** + * \brief Get information about our request for usage of the CID + * extension in the current connection. + * + * \param ssl The SSL context to query. + * \param enabled The address at which to store whether the CID extension + * is requested to be used or not. If the CID is + * requested, `*enabled` is set to + * MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_ENABLED; otherwise, it is set to + * MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_DISABLED. + * \param own_cid The address of the buffer in which to store our own + * CID (if the CID extension is requested). This may be + * \c NULL in case the value of our CID isn't needed. If + * it is not \c NULL, \p own_cid_len must not be \c NULL. + * \param own_cid_len The address at which to store the size of our own CID + * (if the CID extension is requested). This is also the + * number of Bytes in \p own_cid that have been written. + * This may be \c NULL in case the length of our own CID + * isn't needed. If it is \c NULL, \p own_cid must be + * \c NULL, too. + * + *\note If we are requesting an empty CID this function sets + * `*enabled` to #MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_DISABLED (the rationale + * for this is that the resulting outcome is the + * same as if the CID extensions wasn't requested). + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return A negative error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_get_own_cid(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + int *enabled, + unsigned char own_cid[MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX], + size_t *own_cid_len); + /** * \brief Get information about the use of the CID extension * in the current connection. @@ -1871,9 +2447,6 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_get_peer_cid(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, * \note Values lower than the current record layer expansion will * result in an error when trying to send data. * - * \note Using record compression together with a non-zero MTU value - * will result in an error when trying to send data. - * * \param ssl SSL context * \param mtu Value of the path MTU in bytes */ @@ -1922,7 +2495,6 @@ void mbedtls_ssl_set_verify(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, */ void mbedtls_ssl_conf_read_timeout(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, uint32_t timeout); -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_CHECKING) /** * \brief Check whether a buffer contains a valid and authentic record * that has not been seen before. (DTLS only). @@ -1970,7 +2542,6 @@ void mbedtls_ssl_conf_read_timeout(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, uint32_t timeout); int mbedtls_ssl_check_record(mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl, unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_CHECKING */ /** * \brief Set the timer callbacks (Mandatory for DTLS.) @@ -1997,6 +2568,24 @@ void mbedtls_ssl_set_timer_cb(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, mbedtls_ssl_set_timer_t *f_set_timer, mbedtls_ssl_get_timer_t *f_get_timer); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) +/** + * \brief Set the certificate selection callback (server-side only). + * + * If set, the callback is always called for each handshake, + * after `ClientHello` processing has finished. + * + * \param conf The SSL configuration to register the callback with. + * \param f_cert_cb The callback for selecting server certificate after + * `ClientHello` processing has finished. + */ +static inline void mbedtls_ssl_conf_cert_cb(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + mbedtls_ssl_hs_cb_t f_cert_cb) +{ + conf->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(f_cert_cb) = f_cert_cb; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ + /** * \brief Callback type: generate and write session ticket * @@ -2023,70 +2612,6 @@ typedef int mbedtls_ssl_ticket_write_t(void *p_ticket, size_t *tlen, uint32_t *lifetime); -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXPORT_KEYS) -/** - * \brief Callback type: Export key block and master secret - * - * \note This is required for certain uses of TLS, e.g. EAP-TLS - * (RFC 5216) and Thread. The key pointers are ephemeral and - * therefore must not be stored. The master secret and keys - * should not be used directly except as an input to a key - * derivation function. - * - * \param p_expkey Context for the callback - * \param ms Pointer to master secret (fixed length: 48 bytes) - * \param kb Pointer to key block, see RFC 5246 section 6.3 - * (variable length: 2 * maclen + 2 * keylen + 2 * ivlen). - * \param maclen MAC length - * \param keylen Key length - * \param ivlen IV length - * - * \return 0 if successful, or - * a specific MBEDTLS_ERR_XXX code. - */ -typedef int mbedtls_ssl_export_keys_t(void *p_expkey, - const unsigned char *ms, - const unsigned char *kb, - size_t maclen, - size_t keylen, - size_t ivlen); - -/** - * \brief Callback type: Export key block, master secret, - * handshake randbytes and the tls_prf function - * used to derive keys. - * - * \note This is required for certain uses of TLS, e.g. EAP-TLS - * (RFC 5216) and Thread. The key pointers are ephemeral and - * therefore must not be stored. The master secret and keys - * should not be used directly except as an input to a key - * derivation function. - * - * \param p_expkey Context for the callback. - * \param ms Pointer to master secret (fixed length: 48 bytes). - * \param kb Pointer to key block, see RFC 5246 section 6.3. - * (variable length: 2 * maclen + 2 * keylen + 2 * ivlen). - * \param maclen MAC length. - * \param keylen Key length. - * \param ivlen IV length. - * \param client_random The client random bytes. - * \param server_random The server random bytes. - * \param tls_prf_type The tls_prf enum type. - * - * \return 0 if successful, or - * a specific MBEDTLS_ERR_XXX code. - */ -typedef int mbedtls_ssl_export_keys_ext_t(void *p_expkey, - const unsigned char *ms, - const unsigned char *kb, - size_t maclen, - size_t keylen, - size_t ivlen, - const unsigned char client_random[32], - const unsigned char server_random[32], - mbedtls_tls_prf_types tls_prf_type); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EXPORT_KEYS */ - /** * \brief Callback type: parse and load session ticket * @@ -2134,39 +2659,220 @@ void mbedtls_ssl_conf_session_tickets_cb(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, mbedtls_ssl_ticket_write_t *f_ticket_write, mbedtls_ssl_ticket_parse_t *f_ticket_parse, void *p_ticket); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) +/** + * \brief Get the creation time of a session ticket. + * + * \note See the documentation of \c ticket_creation_time for information about + * the intended usage of this function. + * + * \param session SSL session + * \param ticket_creation_time On exit, holds the ticket creation time in + * milliseconds. + * + * \return 0 on success, + * MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA if an input is not valid. + */ +static inline int mbedtls_ssl_session_get_ticket_creation_time( + mbedtls_ssl_session *session, mbedtls_ms_time_t *ticket_creation_time) +{ + if (session == NULL || ticket_creation_time == NULL || + session->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(endpoint) != MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + *ticket_creation_time = session->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(ticket_creation_time); + + return 0; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS && MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXPORT_KEYS) /** - * \brief Configure key export callback. - * (Default: none.) + * \brief Get the session-id buffer. * - * \note See \c mbedtls_ssl_export_keys_t. + * \param session SSL session. * - * \param conf SSL configuration context - * \param f_export_keys Callback for exporting keys - * \param p_export_keys Context for the callback + * \return The address of the session-id buffer. */ -void mbedtls_ssl_conf_export_keys_cb(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, - mbedtls_ssl_export_keys_t *f_export_keys, - void *p_export_keys); +static inline unsigned const char (*mbedtls_ssl_session_get_id(const mbedtls_ssl_session * + session))[32] +{ + return &session->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(id); +} /** - * \brief Configure extended key export callback. - * (Default: none.) + * \brief Get the size of the session-id. * - * \note See \c mbedtls_ssl_export_keys_ext_t. - * \warning Exported key material must not be used for any purpose - * before the (D)TLS handshake is completed + * \param session SSL session. * - * \param conf SSL configuration context - * \param f_export_keys_ext Callback for exporting keys - * \param p_export_keys Context for the callback + * \return size_t size of session-id buffer. + */ +static inline size_t mbedtls_ssl_session_get_id_len(const mbedtls_ssl_session *session) +{ + return session->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(id_len); +} + +/** + * \brief Get the ciphersuite-id. + * + * \param session SSL session. + * + * \return int represetation for ciphersuite. + */ +static inline int mbedtls_ssl_session_get_ciphersuite_id(const mbedtls_ssl_session *session) +{ + return session->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(ciphersuite); +} + +/** + * \brief Configure a key export callback. + * (Default: none.) + * + * This API can be used for two purposes: + * - Debugging: Use this API to e.g. generate an NSSKeylog + * file and use it to inspect encrypted traffic in tools + * such as Wireshark. + * - Application-specific export: Use this API to implement + * key exporters, e.g. for EAP-TLS or DTLS-SRTP. + * + * + * \param ssl The SSL context to which the export + * callback should be attached. + * \param f_export_keys The callback for the key export. + * \param p_export_keys The opaque context pointer to be passed to the + * callback \p f_export_keys. + */ +void mbedtls_ssl_set_export_keys_cb(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + mbedtls_ssl_export_keys_t *f_export_keys, + void *p_export_keys); + +/** \brief Set the user data in an SSL configuration to a pointer. + * + * You can retrieve this value later with mbedtls_ssl_conf_get_user_data_p(). + * + * \note The library stores \c p without accessing it. It is the responsibility + * of the caller to ensure that the pointer remains valid. + * + * \param conf The SSL configuration context to modify. + * \param p The new value of the user data. + */ +static inline void mbedtls_ssl_conf_set_user_data_p( + mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + void *p) +{ + conf->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(user_data).p = p; +} + +/** \brief Set the user data in an SSL configuration to an integer. + * + * You can retrieve this value later with mbedtls_ssl_conf_get_user_data_n(). + * + * \param conf The SSL configuration context to modify. + * \param n The new value of the user data. + */ +static inline void mbedtls_ssl_conf_set_user_data_n( + mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + uintptr_t n) +{ + conf->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(user_data).n = n; +} + +/** \brief Retrieve the user data in an SSL configuration as a pointer. + * + * This is the value last set with mbedtls_ssl_conf_set_user_data_p(), or + * \c NULL if mbedtls_ssl_conf_set_user_data_p() has not previously been + * called. The value is undefined if mbedtls_ssl_conf_set_user_data_n() has + * been called without a subsequent call to mbedtls_ssl_conf_set_user_data_p(). + * + * \param conf The SSL configuration context to modify. + * \return The current value of the user data. + */ +static inline void *mbedtls_ssl_conf_get_user_data_p( + mbedtls_ssl_config *conf) +{ + return conf->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(user_data).p; +} + +/** \brief Retrieve the user data in an SSL configuration as an integer. + * + * This is the value last set with mbedtls_ssl_conf_set_user_data_n(), or + * \c 0 if mbedtls_ssl_conf_set_user_data_n() has not previously been + * called. The value is undefined if mbedtls_ssl_conf_set_user_data_p() has + * been called without a subsequent call to mbedtls_ssl_conf_set_user_data_n(). + * + * \param conf The SSL configuration context to modify. + * \return The current value of the user data. + */ +static inline uintptr_t mbedtls_ssl_conf_get_user_data_n( + mbedtls_ssl_config *conf) +{ + return conf->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(user_data).n; +} + +/** \brief Set the user data in an SSL context to a pointer. + * + * You can retrieve this value later with mbedtls_ssl_get_user_data_p(). + * + * \note The library stores \c p without accessing it. It is the responsibility + * of the caller to ensure that the pointer remains valid. + * + * \param ssl The SSL context to modify. + * \param p The new value of the user data. + */ +static inline void mbedtls_ssl_set_user_data_p( + mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + void *p) +{ + ssl->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(user_data).p = p; +} + +/** \brief Set the user data in an SSL context to an integer. + * + * You can retrieve this value later with mbedtls_ssl_get_user_data_n(). + * + * \param ssl The SSL context to modify. + * \param n The new value of the user data. + */ +static inline void mbedtls_ssl_set_user_data_n( + mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + uintptr_t n) +{ + ssl->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(user_data).n = n; +} + +/** \brief Retrieve the user data in an SSL context as a pointer. + * + * This is the value last set with mbedtls_ssl_set_user_data_p(), or + * \c NULL if mbedtls_ssl_set_user_data_p() has not previously been + * called. The value is undefined if mbedtls_ssl_set_user_data_n() has + * been called without a subsequent call to mbedtls_ssl_set_user_data_p(). + * + * \param ssl The SSL context to modify. + * \return The current value of the user data. */ -void mbedtls_ssl_conf_export_keys_ext_cb(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, - mbedtls_ssl_export_keys_ext_t *f_export_keys_ext, - void *p_export_keys); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EXPORT_KEYS */ +static inline void *mbedtls_ssl_get_user_data_p( + mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + return ssl->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(user_data).p; +} + +/** \brief Retrieve the user data in an SSL context as an integer. + * + * This is the value last set with mbedtls_ssl_set_user_data_n(), or + * \c 0 if mbedtls_ssl_set_user_data_n() has not previously been + * called. The value is undefined if mbedtls_ssl_set_user_data_p() has + * been called without a subsequent call to mbedtls_ssl_set_user_data_n(). + * + * \param ssl The SSL context to modify. + * \return The current value of the user data. + */ +static inline uintptr_t mbedtls_ssl_get_user_data_n( + mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + return ssl->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(user_data).n; +} #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE) /** @@ -2360,7 +3066,6 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_set_client_transport_id(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, void mbedtls_ssl_conf_dtls_anti_replay(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, char mode); #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_BADMAC_LIMIT) /** * \brief Set a limit on the number of records with a bad MAC * before terminating the connection. @@ -2385,7 +3090,6 @@ void mbedtls_ssl_conf_dtls_anti_replay(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, char mode); * many bogus packets. */ void mbedtls_ssl_conf_dtls_badmac_limit(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, unsigned limit); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_BADMAC_LIMIT */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) @@ -2494,24 +3198,55 @@ void mbedtls_ssl_conf_handshake_timeout(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, uint32_t min, */ void mbedtls_ssl_conf_session_cache(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, void *p_cache, - int (*f_get_cache)(void *, mbedtls_ssl_session *), - int (*f_set_cache)(void *, const mbedtls_ssl_session *)); + mbedtls_ssl_cache_get_t *f_get_cache, + mbedtls_ssl_cache_set_t *f_set_cache); #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) /** - * \brief Request resumption of session (client-side only) - * Session data is copied from presented session structure. + * \brief Load a session for session resumption. + * + * Sessions loaded through this call will be considered + * for session resumption in the next handshake. + * + * \note Even if this call succeeds, it is not guaranteed that + * the next handshake will indeed be shortened through the + * use of session resumption: The server is always free + * to reject any attempt for resumption and fall back to + * a full handshake. + * + * \note This function can handle a variety of mechanisms for session + * resumption: For TLS 1.2, both session ID-based resumption and + * ticket-based resumption will be considered. For TLS 1.3, + * once implemented, sessions equate to tickets, and loading + * one or more sessions via this call will lead to their + * corresponding tickets being advertised as resumption PSKs + * by the client. + * + * \note Calling this function multiple times will only be useful + * once TLS 1.3 is supported. For TLS 1.2 connections, this + * function should be called at most once. + * + * \param ssl The SSL context representing the connection which should + * be attempted to be setup using session resumption. This + * must be initialized via mbedtls_ssl_init() and bound to + * an SSL configuration via mbedtls_ssl_setup(), but + * the handshake must not yet have been started. + * \param session The session to be considered for session resumption. + * This must be a session previously exported via + * mbedtls_ssl_get_session(), and potentially serialized and + * deserialized through mbedtls_ssl_session_save() and + * mbedtls_ssl_session_load() in the meantime. * - * \param ssl SSL context - * \param session session context - * - * \return 0 if successful, - * MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED if memory allocation failed, - * MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA if used server-side or - * arguments are otherwise invalid + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return \c MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE if the session + * could not be loaded because of an implementation limitation. + * This error is non-fatal, and has no observable effect on + * the SSL context or the session that was attempted to be loaded. + * \return Another negative error code on other kinds of failure. * * \sa mbedtls_ssl_get_session() + * \sa mbedtls_ssl_session_load() */ int mbedtls_ssl_set_session(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, const mbedtls_ssl_session *session); #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */ @@ -2560,7 +3295,6 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_session_load(mbedtls_ssl_session *session, * of session cache or session tickets. * * \see mbedtls_ssl_session_load() - * \see mbedtls_ssl_get_session_pointer() * * \param session The session structure to be saved. * \param buf The buffer to write the serialized data to. It must be a @@ -2583,41 +3317,97 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_session_save(const mbedtls_ssl_session *session, size_t buf_len, size_t *olen); -/** - * \brief Get a pointer to the current session structure, for example - * to serialize it. - * - * \warning Ownership of the session remains with the SSL context, and - * the returned pointer is only guaranteed to be valid until - * the next API call operating on the same \p ssl context. - * - * \see mbedtls_ssl_session_save() - * - * \param ssl The SSL context. - * - * \return A pointer to the current session if successful. - * \return \c NULL if no session is active. - */ -const mbedtls_ssl_session *mbedtls_ssl_get_session_pointer(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); - /** * \brief Set the list of allowed ciphersuites and the preference * order. First in the list has the highest preference. - * (Overrides all version-specific lists) - * - * The ciphersuites array is not copied, and must remain - * valid for the lifetime of the ssl_config. * - * Note: The server uses its own preferences - * over the preference of the client unless - * MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_RESPECT_CLIENT_PREFERENCE is defined! + * For TLS 1.2, the notion of ciphersuite determines both + * the key exchange mechanism and the suite of symmetric + * algorithms to be used during and after the handshake. + * + * For TLS 1.3 (in development), the notion of ciphersuite + * only determines the suite of symmetric algorithms to be + * used during and after the handshake, while key exchange + * mechanisms are configured separately. + * + * In Mbed TLS, ciphersuites for both TLS 1.2 and TLS 1.3 + * are configured via this function. For users of TLS 1.3, + * there will be separate API for the configuration of key + * exchange mechanisms. + * + * The list of ciphersuites passed to this function may + * contain a mixture of TLS 1.2 and TLS 1.3 ciphersuite + * identifiers. This is useful if negotiation of TLS 1.3 + * should be attempted, but a fallback to TLS 1.2 would + * be tolerated. + * + * \note By default, the server chooses its preferred + * ciphersuite among those that the client supports. If + * mbedtls_ssl_conf_preference_order() is called to prefer + * the client's preferences, the server instead chooses + * the client's preferred ciphersuite among those that + * the server supports. + * + * \warning The ciphersuites array \p ciphersuites is not copied. + * It must remain valid for the lifetime of the SSL + * configuration \p conf. * - * \param conf SSL configuration - * \param ciphersuites 0-terminated list of allowed ciphersuites + * \param conf The SSL configuration to modify. + * \param ciphersuites A 0-terminated list of IANA identifiers of supported + * ciphersuites, accessible through \c MBEDTLS_TLS_XXX + * and \c MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_XXX macros defined in + * ssl_ciphersuites.h. */ void mbedtls_ssl_conf_ciphersuites(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, const int *ciphersuites); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) +/** + * \brief Set the supported key exchange modes for TLS 1.3 connections. + * + * In contrast to TLS 1.2, the ciphersuite concept in TLS 1.3 does not + * include the choice of key exchange mechanism. It is therefore not + * covered by the API mbedtls_ssl_conf_ciphersuites(). See the + * documentation of mbedtls_ssl_conf_ciphersuites() for more + * information on the ciphersuite concept in TLS 1.2 and TLS 1.3. + * + * The present function is specific to TLS 1.3 and allows users to + * configure the set of supported key exchange mechanisms in TLS 1.3. + * + * \param conf The SSL configuration the change should apply to. + * \param kex_modes A bitwise combination of one or more of the following: + * - MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK + * This flag enables pure-PSK key exchanges. + * - MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_EPHEMERAL + * This flag enables combined PSK-ephemeral key exchanges. + * - MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL + * This flag enables pure-ephemeral key exchanges. + * For convenience, the following pre-defined macros are + * available for combinations of the above: + * - MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_ALL + * Includes all of pure-PSK, PSK-ephemeral and pure-ephemeral. + * - MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_ALL + * Includes both pure-PSK and combined PSK-ephemeral + * key exchanges, but excludes pure-ephemeral key exchanges. + * - MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ALL + * Includes both pure-ephemeral and combined PSK-ephemeral + * key exchanges. + * + * \note If a PSK-based key exchange mode shall be supported, applications + * must also use the APIs mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk() or + * mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk_cb() or mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk_opaque() + * to configure the PSKs to be used. + * + * \note If a pure-ephemeral key exchange mode shall be supported, + * server-side applications must also provide a certificate via + * mbedtls_ssl_conf_own_cert(). + * + */ + +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_tls13_key_exchange_modes(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + const int kex_modes); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 */ + #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) #define MBEDTLS_SSL_UNEXPECTED_CID_IGNORE 0 #define MBEDTLS_SSL_UNEXPECTED_CID_FAIL 1 @@ -2657,29 +3447,6 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_conf_cid(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, size_t len, int ignore_other_cids); #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ -/** - * \brief Set the list of allowed ciphersuites and the - * preference order for a specific version of the protocol. - * (Only useful on the server side) - * - * The ciphersuites array is not copied, and must remain - * valid for the lifetime of the ssl_config. - * - * \param conf SSL configuration - * \param ciphersuites 0-terminated list of allowed ciphersuites - * \param major Major version number (only MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3 - * supported) - * \param minor Minor version number (MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0, - * MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1 and MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2, - * MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 supported) - * - * \note With DTLS, use MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2 for DTLS 1.0 - * and MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 for DTLS 1.2 - */ -void mbedtls_ssl_conf_ciphersuites_for_version(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, - const int *ciphersuites, - int major, int minor); - #if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) /** * \brief Set the X.509 security profile used for verification @@ -2709,6 +3476,26 @@ void mbedtls_ssl_conf_ca_chain(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, mbedtls_x509_crt *ca_chain, mbedtls_x509_crl *ca_crl); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED) +/** + * \brief Set DN hints sent to client in CertificateRequest message + * + * \note If not set, subject distinguished names (DNs) are taken + * from \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_ca_chain() + * or \c mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_ca_chain()) + * + * \param conf SSL configuration + * \param crt crt chain whose subject DNs are issuer DNs of client certs + * from which the client should select client peer certificate. + */ +static inline +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_dn_hints(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + const mbedtls_x509_crt *crt) +{ + conf->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(dn_hints) = crt; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED */ + #if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK) /** * \brief Set the trusted certificate callback. @@ -2807,10 +3594,16 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_conf_own_cert(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, mbedtls_pk_context *pk_key); #endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_PSK_ENABLED) /** - * \brief Configure a pre-shared key (PSK) and identity - * to be used in PSK-based ciphersuites. + * \brief Configure pre-shared keys (PSKs) and their + * identities to be used in PSK-based ciphersuites. + * + * Only one PSK can be registered, through either + * mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk() or mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk_opaque(). + * If you attempt to register more than one PSK, this function + * fails, though this may change in future versions, which + * may add support for multiple PSKs. * * \note This is mainly useful for clients. Servers will usually * want to use \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk_cb() instead. @@ -2818,13 +3611,6 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_conf_own_cert(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, * \note A PSK set by \c mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_psk() in the PSK callback * takes precedence over a PSK configured by this function. * - * \warning Currently, clients can only register a single pre-shared key. - * Calling this function or mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk_opaque() more - * than once will overwrite values configured in previous calls. - * Support for setting multiple PSKs on clients and selecting - * one based on the identity hint is not a planned feature, - * but feedback is welcomed. - * * \param conf The SSL configuration to register the PSK with. * \param psk The pointer to the pre-shared key to use. * \param psk_len The length of the pre-shared key in bytes. @@ -2837,7 +3623,9 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_conf_own_cert(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, * of the SSL configuration. * * \return \c 0 if successful. - * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_XXX error code on failure. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE if no more PSKs + * can be configured. In this case, the old PSK(s) remain intact. + * \return Another negative error code on other kinds of failure. */ int mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, const unsigned char *psk, size_t psk_len, @@ -2845,8 +3633,14 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, #if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) /** - * \brief Configure an opaque pre-shared key (PSK) and identity - * to be used in PSK-based ciphersuites. + * \brief Configure one or more opaque pre-shared keys (PSKs) and + * their identities to be used in PSK-based ciphersuites. + * + * Only one PSK can be registered, through either + * mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk() or mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk_opaque(). + * If you attempt to register more than one PSK, this function + * fails, though this may change in future versions, which + * may add support for multiple PSKs. * * \note This is mainly useful for clients. Servers will usually * want to use \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk_cb() instead. @@ -2855,13 +3649,6 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, * the PSK callback takes precedence over an opaque PSK * configured by this function. * - * \warning Currently, clients can only register a single pre-shared key. - * Calling this function or mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk() more than - * once will overwrite values configured in previous calls. - * Support for setting multiple PSKs on clients and selecting - * one based on the identity hint is not a planned feature, - * but feedback is welcomed. - * * \param conf The SSL configuration to register the PSK with. * \param psk The identifier of the key slot holding the PSK. * Until \p conf is destroyed or this function is successfully @@ -2878,10 +3665,12 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, * SSL configuration. * * \return \c 0 if successful. - * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_XXX error code on failure. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE if no more PSKs + * can be configured. In this case, the old PSK(s) remain intact. + * \return Another negative error code on other kinds of failure. */ int mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk_opaque(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, - psa_key_id_t psk, + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t psk, const unsigned char *psk_identity, size_t psk_identity_len); #endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ @@ -2927,9 +3716,10 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_psk(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_XXX error code on failure. */ int mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_psk_opaque(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - psa_key_id_t psk); + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t psk); #endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) /** * \brief Set the PSK callback (server-side only). * @@ -2972,37 +3762,10 @@ void mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk_cb(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, int (*f_psk)(void *, mbedtls_ssl_context *, const unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_psk); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_PSK_ENABLED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING) -#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED __attribute__((deprecated)) -#else -#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED -#endif - -/** - * \brief Set the Diffie-Hellman public P and G values, - * read as hexadecimal strings (server-side only) - * (Default values: MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC3526_MODP_2048_[PG]) - * - * \param conf SSL configuration - * \param dhm_P Diffie-Hellman-Merkle modulus - * \param dhm_G Diffie-Hellman-Merkle generator - * - * \deprecated Superseded by \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_dh_param_bin. - * - * \return 0 if successful - */ -MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED int mbedtls_ssl_conf_dh_param(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, - const char *dhm_P, - const char *dhm_G); - -#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ - /** * \brief Set the Diffie-Hellman public P and G values * from big-endian binary presentations. @@ -3046,11 +3809,9 @@ void mbedtls_ssl_conf_dhm_min_bitlen(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, #endif /* MBEDTLS_DHM_C && MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) /** * \brief Set the allowed curves in order of preference. - * (Default: all defined curves in order of decreasing size, - * except that Montgomery curves come last. This order - * is likely to change in a future version.) * * On server: this only affects selection of the ECDHE curve; * the curves used for ECDH and ECDSA are determined by the @@ -3062,6 +3823,8 @@ void mbedtls_ssl_conf_dhm_min_bitlen(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, * Both sides: limits the set of curves accepted for use in * ECDHE and in the peer's end-entity certificate. * + * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_ssl_conf_groups(). + * * \note This has no influence on which curves are allowed inside the * certificate chains, see \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_cert_profile() * for that. For the end-entity certificate however, the key @@ -3071,20 +3834,72 @@ void mbedtls_ssl_conf_dhm_min_bitlen(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, * \note This list should be ordered by decreasing preference * (preferred curve first). * + * \note The default list is the same set of curves that + * #mbedtls_x509_crt_profile_default allows, plus + * ECDHE-only curves selected according to the same criteria. + * The order favors curves with the lowest resource usage. + * + * \note New minor versions of Mbed TLS may extend this list, + * for example if new curves are added to the library. + * New minor versions of Mbed TLS will not remove items + * from this list unless serious security concerns require it. + * New minor versions of Mbed TLS may change the order in + * keeping with the general principle of favoring the lowest + * resource usage. + * * \param conf SSL configuration * \param curves Ordered list of allowed curves, * terminated by MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE. */ -void mbedtls_ssl_conf_curves(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, - const mbedtls_ecp_group_id *curves); +void MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED mbedtls_ssl_conf_curves(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + const mbedtls_ecp_group_id *curves); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) +/** + * \brief Set the allowed groups in order of preference. + * + * On server: This only affects the choice of key agreement mechanism + * + * On client: this affects the list of groups offered for any + * use. The server can override our preference order. + * + * Both sides: limits the set of groups accepted for use in + * key sharing. + * + * \note This function replaces the deprecated mbedtls_ssl_conf_curves(), + * which only allows ECP curves to be configured. + * + * \note The most recent invocation of either mbedtls_ssl_conf_curves() + * or mbedtls_ssl_conf_groups() nullifies all previous invocations + * of both. + * + * \note This list should be ordered by decreasing preference + * (preferred group first). + * + * \note When this function is not called, a default list is used, + * consisting of all supported curves at 255 bits and above, + * and all supported finite fields at 2048 bits and above. + * The order favors groups with the lowest resource usage. + * + * \note New minor versions of Mbed TLS will not remove items + * from the default list unless serious security concerns require it. + * New minor versions of Mbed TLS may change the order in + * keeping with the general principle of favoring the lowest + * resource usage. + * + * \param conf SSL configuration + * \param groups List of allowed groups ordered by preference, terminated by 0. + * Must contain valid IANA NamedGroup IDs (provided via either an integer + * or using MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_NAMED_GROUP_XXX macros). + */ +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_groups(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + const uint16_t *groups); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) /** * \brief Set the allowed hashes for signatures during the handshake. - * (Default: all SHA-2 hashes, largest first. Also SHA-1 if - * the compile-time option - * `MBEDTLS_TLS_DEFAULT_ALLOW_SHA1_IN_KEY_EXCHANGE` is enabled.) * * \note This only affects which hashes are offered and can be used * for signatures during the handshake. Hashes for message @@ -3093,16 +3908,46 @@ void mbedtls_ssl_conf_curves(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, * used for certificate signature are controlled by the * verification profile, see \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_cert_profile(). * + * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_ssl_conf_sig_algs(). + * * \note This list should be ordered by decreasing preference * (preferred hash first). * + * \note By default, all supported hashes whose length is at least + * 256 bits are allowed. This is the same set as the default + * for certificate verification + * (#mbedtls_x509_crt_profile_default). + * The preference order is currently unspecified and may + * change in future versions. + * + * \note New minor versions of Mbed TLS may extend this list, + * for example if new curves are added to the library. + * New minor versions of Mbed TLS will not remove items + * from this list unless serious security concerns require it. + * * \param conf SSL configuration * \param hashes Ordered list of allowed signature hashes, * terminated by \c MBEDTLS_MD_NONE. */ -void mbedtls_ssl_conf_sig_hashes(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, - const int *hashes); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */ +void MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED mbedtls_ssl_conf_sig_hashes(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + const int *hashes); +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED && MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ + +/** + * \brief Configure allowed signature algorithms for use in TLS + * + * \param conf The SSL configuration to use. + * \param sig_algs List of allowed IANA values for TLS 1.3 signature algorithms, + * terminated by #MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_NONE. The list must remain + * available throughout the lifetime of the conf object. + * - For TLS 1.3, values of \c MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_XXXX should be + * used. + * - For TLS 1.2, values should be given as + * "(HashAlgorithm << 8) | SignatureAlgorithm". + */ +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_sig_algs(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + const uint16_t *sig_algs); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) /** @@ -3124,14 +3969,53 @@ void mbedtls_ssl_conf_sig_hashes(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, * On too long input failure, old hostname is unchanged. */ int mbedtls_ssl_set_hostname(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, const char *hostname); + +/** + * \brief Get the hostname that checked against the received + * server certificate. It is used to set the ServerName + * TLS extension, too, if that extension is enabled. + * (client-side only) + * + * \param ssl SSL context + * + * \return const pointer to the hostname value + */ +static inline const char *mbedtls_ssl_get_hostname(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + return ssl->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(hostname); +} #endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) +/** + * \brief Retrieve SNI extension value for the current handshake. + * Available in \c f_cert_cb of \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_cert_cb(), + * this is the same value passed to \c f_sni callback of + * \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_sni() and may be used instead of + * \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_sni(). + * + * \param ssl SSL context + * \param name_len pointer into which to store length of returned value. + * 0 if SNI extension is not present or not yet processed. + * + * \return const pointer to SNI extension value. + * - value is valid only when called in \c f_cert_cb + * registered with \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_cert_cb(). + * - value is NULL if SNI extension is not present. + * - value is not '\0'-terminated. Use \c name_len for len. + * - value must not be freed. + */ +const unsigned char *mbedtls_ssl_get_hs_sni(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + size_t *name_len); + /** * \brief Set own certificate and key for the current handshake * * \note Same as \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_own_cert() but for use within - * the SNI callback. + * the SNI callback or the certificate selection callback. + * + * \note Passing null \c own_cert clears the certificate list for + * the current handshake. * * \param ssl SSL context * \param own_cert own public certificate chain @@ -3148,7 +4032,7 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_own_cert(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, * current handshake * * \note Same as \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_ca_chain() but for use within - * the SNI callback. + * the SNI callback or the certificate selection callback. * * \param ssl SSL context * \param ca_chain trusted CA chain (meaning all fully trusted top-level CAs) @@ -3158,11 +4042,26 @@ void mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_ca_chain(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, mbedtls_x509_crt *ca_chain, mbedtls_x509_crl *ca_crl); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED) +/** + * \brief Set DN hints sent to client in CertificateRequest message + * + * \note Same as \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_dn_hints() but for use within + * the SNI callback or the certificate selection callback. + * + * \param ssl SSL context + * \param crt crt chain whose subject DNs are issuer DNs of client certs + * from which the client should select client peer certificate. + */ +void mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_dn_hints(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const mbedtls_x509_crt *crt); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED */ + /** * \brief Set authmode for the current handshake. * * \note Same as \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_authmode() but for use within - * the SNI callback. + * the SNI callback or the certificate selection callback. * * \param ssl SSL context * \param authmode MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_NONE, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_OPTIONAL or @@ -3187,8 +4086,7 @@ void mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_authmode(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, * mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_ca_chain() as well as the client * authentication mode with \c mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_authmode(), * then must return 0. If no matching name is found, the - * callback must either set a default cert, or - * return non-zero to abort the handshake at this point. + * callback may return non-zero to abort the handshake. * * \param conf SSL configuration * \param f_sni verification function @@ -3211,9 +4109,10 @@ void mbedtls_ssl_conf_sni(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, * \note The SSL context needs to be already set up. The right place * to call this function is between \c mbedtls_ssl_setup() or * \c mbedtls_ssl_reset() and \c mbedtls_ssl_handshake(). + * Password cannot be empty (see RFC 8236). * * \param ssl SSL context - * \param pw EC J-PAKE password (pre-shared secret) + * \param pw EC J-PAKE password (pre-shared secret). It cannot be empty * \param pw_len length of pw in bytes * * \return 0 on success, or a negative error code. @@ -3221,6 +4120,23 @@ void mbedtls_ssl_conf_sni(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, int mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_ecjpake_password(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, const unsigned char *pw, size_t pw_len); + +/** + * \brief Set the EC J-PAKE opaque password for current handshake. + * + * \note The key must remain valid until the handshake is over. + * + * \note The SSL context needs to be already set up. The right place + * to call this function is between \c mbedtls_ssl_setup() or + * \c mbedtls_ssl_reset() and \c mbedtls_ssl_handshake(). + * + * \param ssl SSL context + * \param pwd EC J-PAKE opaque password + * + * \return 0 on success, or a negative error code. + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_ecjpake_password_opaque(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t pwd); #endif /*MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN) @@ -3348,66 +4264,102 @@ void mbedtls_ssl_get_dtls_srtp_negotiation_result(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl mbedtls_dtls_srtp_info *dtls_srtp_info); #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP */ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) /** * \brief Set the maximum supported version sent from the client side - * and/or accepted at the server side - * (Default: MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_MAJOR_VERSION, MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_MINOR_VERSION) + * and/or accepted at the server side. + * + * See also the documentation of mbedtls_ssl_conf_min_version(). * * \note This ignores ciphersuites from higher versions. * - * \note With DTLS, use MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2 for DTLS 1.0 and - * MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 for DTLS 1.2 + * \note This function is deprecated and has been replaced by + * \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_max_tls_version(). * * \param conf SSL configuration - * \param major Major version number (only MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3 supported) - * \param minor Minor version number (MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0, - * MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1 and MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2, - * MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 supported) + * \param major Major version number (#MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3) + * \param minor Minor version number + * (#MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 for (D)TLS 1.2, + * #MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_4 for TLS 1.3) + */ +void MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED mbedtls_ssl_conf_max_version(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, int major, + int minor); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ + +/** + * \brief Set the maximum supported version sent from the client side + * and/or accepted at the server side. + * + * \note After the handshake, you can call + * mbedtls_ssl_get_version_number() to see what version was + * negotiated. + * + * \param conf SSL configuration + * \param tls_version TLS protocol version number (\c mbedtls_ssl_protocol_version) + * (#MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_UNKNOWN is not valid) */ -void mbedtls_ssl_conf_max_version(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, int major, int minor); +static inline void mbedtls_ssl_conf_max_tls_version(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + mbedtls_ssl_protocol_version tls_version) +{ + conf->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(max_tls_version) = tls_version; +} +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) /** * \brief Set the minimum accepted SSL/TLS protocol version - * (Default: TLS 1.0) + * + * \note By default, all supported versions are accepted. + * Future versions of the library may disable older + * protocol versions by default if they become deprecated. + * + * \note The following versions are supported (if enabled at + * compile time): + * - (D)TLS 1.2: \p major = #MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, + * \p minor = #MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 + * - TLS 1.3: \p major = #MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, + * \p minor = #MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_4 + * + * Note that the numbers in the constant names are the + * TLS internal protocol numbers, and the minor versions + * differ by one from the human-readable versions! * * \note Input outside of the SSL_MAX_XXXXX_VERSION and * SSL_MIN_XXXXX_VERSION range is ignored. * - * \note MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 (SSL v3) should be avoided. + * \note After the handshake, you can call + * mbedtls_ssl_get_version_number() to see what version was + * negotiated. * - * \note With DTLS, use MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2 for DTLS 1.0 and - * MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 for DTLS 1.2 + * \note This function is deprecated and has been replaced by + * \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_min_tls_version(). * * \param conf SSL configuration - * \param major Major version number (only MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3 supported) - * \param minor Minor version number (MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0, - * MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1 and MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2, - * MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 supported) + * \param major Major version number (#MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3) + * \param minor Minor version number + * (#MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 for (D)TLS 1.2, + * #MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_4 for TLS 1.3) */ -void mbedtls_ssl_conf_min_version(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, int major, int minor); +void MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED mbedtls_ssl_conf_min_version(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, int major, + int minor); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_FALLBACK_SCSV) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) /** - * \brief Set the fallback flag (client-side only). - * (Default: MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_NOT_FALLBACK). + * \brief Set the minimum supported version sent from the client side + * and/or accepted at the server side. * - * \note Set to MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_FALLBACK when preparing a fallback - * connection, that is a connection with max_version set to a - * lower value than the value you're willing to use. Such - * fallback connections are not recommended but are sometimes - * necessary to interoperate with buggy (version-intolerant) - * servers. + * \note After the handshake, you can call + * mbedtls_ssl_get_version_number() to see what version was + * negotiated. * - * \warning You should NOT set this to MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_FALLBACK for - * non-fallback connections! This would appear to work for a - * while, then cause failures when the server is upgraded to - * support a newer TLS version. - * - * \param conf SSL configuration - * \param fallback MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_NOT_FALLBACK or MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_FALLBACK + * \param conf SSL configuration + * \param tls_version TLS protocol version number (\c mbedtls_ssl_protocol_version) + * (#MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_UNKNOWN is not valid) */ -void mbedtls_ssl_conf_fallback(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, char fallback); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_FALLBACK_SCSV && MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */ +static inline void mbedtls_ssl_conf_min_tls_version(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + mbedtls_ssl_protocol_version tls_version) +{ + conf->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(min_tls_version) = tls_version; +} #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) /** @@ -3439,25 +4391,6 @@ void mbedtls_ssl_conf_encrypt_then_mac(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, char etm); void mbedtls_ssl_conf_extended_master_secret(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, char ems); #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARC4_C) -/** - * \brief Disable or enable support for RC4 - * (Default: MBEDTLS_SSL_ARC4_DISABLED) - * - * \warning Use of RC4 in DTLS/TLS has been prohibited by RFC 7465 - * for security reasons. Use at your own risk. - * - * \note This function is deprecated and will be removed in - * a future version of the library. - * RC4 is disabled by default at compile time and needs to be - * actively enabled for use with legacy systems. - * - * \param conf SSL configuration - * \param arc4 MBEDTLS_SSL_ARC4_ENABLED or MBEDTLS_SSL_ARC4_DISABLED - */ -void mbedtls_ssl_conf_arc4_support(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, char arc4); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ARC4_C */ - #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) /** * \brief Whether to send a list of acceptable CAs in @@ -3510,34 +4443,21 @@ void mbedtls_ssl_conf_cert_req_ca_list(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, int mbedtls_ssl_conf_max_frag_len(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, unsigned char mfl_code); #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC) -/** - * \brief Activate negotiation of truncated HMAC - * (Default: MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNC_HMAC_DISABLED) - * - * \param conf SSL configuration - * \param truncate Enable or disable (MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNC_HMAC_ENABLED or - * MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNC_HMAC_DISABLED) - */ -void mbedtls_ssl_conf_truncated_hmac(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, int truncate); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) /** - * \brief Enable / Disable 1/n-1 record splitting - * (Default: MBEDTLS_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING_ENABLED) - * - * \note Only affects SSLv3 and TLS 1.0, not higher versions. - * Does not affect non-CBC ciphersuites in any version. + * \brief Pick the ciphersuites order according to the second parameter + * in the SSL Server module (MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C). + * (Default, if never called: MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_CIPHERSUITE_ORDER_SERVER) * * \param conf SSL configuration - * \param split MBEDTLS_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING_ENABLED or - * MBEDTLS_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING_DISABLED + * \param order Server or client (MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_CIPHERSUITE_ORDER_SERVER + * or MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_CIPHERSUITE_ORDER_CLIENT) */ -void mbedtls_ssl_conf_cbc_record_splitting(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, char split); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING */ +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_preference_order(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, int order); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) /** * \brief Enable / Disable session tickets (client only). * (Default: MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS_ENABLED.) @@ -3549,7 +4469,34 @@ void mbedtls_ssl_conf_cbc_record_splitting(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, char split) * MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS_DISABLED) */ void mbedtls_ssl_conf_session_tickets(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, int use_tickets); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS && MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS && + MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) +/** + * \brief Number of NewSessionTicket messages for the server to send + * after handshake completion. + * + * \note The default value is + * \c MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_DEFAULT_NEW_SESSION_TICKETS. + * + * \note In case of a session resumption, this setting only partially apply. + * At most one ticket is sent in that case to just renew the pool of + * tickets of the client. The rationale is to avoid the number of + * tickets on the server to become rapidly out of control when the + * server has the same configuration for all its connection instances. + * + * \param conf SSL configuration + * \param num_tickets Number of NewSessionTicket. + * + */ +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_new_session_tickets(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + uint16_t num_tickets); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS && + MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C && + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3*/ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) /** @@ -3742,103 +4689,69 @@ size_t mbedtls_ssl_get_bytes_avail(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); uint32_t mbedtls_ssl_get_verify_result(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); /** - * \brief Return the name of the current ciphersuite + * \brief Return the id of the current ciphersuite * * \param ssl SSL context * - * \return a string containing the ciphersuite name + * \return a ciphersuite id */ -const char *mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); +int mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_id_from_ssl(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); /** - * \brief Return the current SSL version (SSLv3/TLSv1/etc) + * \brief Return the name of the current ciphersuite * * \param ssl SSL context * - * \return a string containing the SSL version + * \return a string containing the ciphersuite name */ -const char *mbedtls_ssl_get_version(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); +const char *mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); -/** - * \brief Return the (maximum) number of bytes added by the record - * layer: header + encryption/MAC overhead (inc. padding) - * - * \note This function is not available (always returns an error) - * when record compression is enabled. - * - * \param ssl SSL context - * - * \return Current maximum record expansion in bytes, or - * MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE if compression is - * enabled, which makes expansion much less predictable - */ -int mbedtls_ssl_get_record_expansion(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH) /** - * \brief Return the maximum fragment length (payload, in bytes) for - * the output buffer. For the client, this is the configured - * value. For the server, it is the minimum of two - the - * configured value and the negotiated one. + * \brief Return the (D)TLS protocol version negotiated in the + * given connection. * - * \sa mbedtls_ssl_conf_max_frag_len() - * \sa mbedtls_ssl_get_max_record_payload() - * - * \param ssl SSL context + * \note If you call this function too early during the initial + * handshake, before the two sides have agreed on a version, + * this function returns #MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_UNKNOWN. * - * \return Current maximum fragment length for the output buffer. + * \param ssl The SSL context to query. + * \return The negotiated protocol version. */ -size_t mbedtls_ssl_get_output_max_frag_len(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); +static inline mbedtls_ssl_protocol_version mbedtls_ssl_get_version_number( + const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + return ssl->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(tls_version); +} /** - * \brief Return the maximum fragment length (payload, in bytes) for - * the input buffer. This is the negotiated maximum fragment - * length, or, if there is none, MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN. - * If it is not defined either, the value is 2^14. This function - * works as its predecessor, \c mbedtls_ssl_get_max_frag_len(). - * - * \sa mbedtls_ssl_conf_max_frag_len() - * \sa mbedtls_ssl_get_max_record_payload() + * \brief Return the current TLS version * * \param ssl SSL context * - * \return Current maximum fragment length for the output buffer. + * \return a string containing the TLS version */ -size_t mbedtls_ssl_get_input_max_frag_len(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING) -#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED __attribute__((deprecated)) -#else -#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED -#endif +const char *mbedtls_ssl_get_version(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); /** - * \brief This function is a deprecated approach to getting the max - * fragment length. Its an alias for - * \c mbedtls_ssl_get_output_max_frag_len(), as the behaviour - * is the same. See \c mbedtls_ssl_get_output_max_frag_len() for - * more detail. - * - * \sa mbedtls_ssl_get_input_max_frag_len() - * \sa mbedtls_ssl_get_output_max_frag_len() + * \brief Return the (maximum) number of bytes added by the record + * layer: header + encryption/MAC overhead (inc. padding) * * \param ssl SSL context * - * \return Current maximum fragment length for the output buffer. + * \return Current maximum record expansion in bytes */ -MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED size_t mbedtls_ssl_get_max_frag_len( - const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH */ +int mbedtls_ssl_get_record_expansion(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); /** * \brief Return the current maximum outgoing record payload in bytes. - * This takes into account the config.h setting \c - * MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN, the configured and negotiated - * max fragment length extension if used, and for DTLS the - * path MTU as configured and current record expansion. + * + * \note The logic to determine the maximum outgoing record payload is + * version-specific. It takes into account various factors, such as + * the mbedtls_config.h setting \c MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN, extensions + * such as the max fragment length or record size limit extension if + * used, and for DTLS the path MTU as configured and current + * record expansion. * * \note With DTLS, \c mbedtls_ssl_write() will return an error if * called with a larger length value. @@ -3847,12 +4760,7 @@ MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED size_t mbedtls_ssl_get_max_frag_len( * to the caller to call \c mbedtls_ssl_write() again in * order to send the remaining bytes if any. * - * \note This function is not available (always returns an error) - * when record compression is enabled. - * - * \sa mbedtls_ssl_set_mtu() - * \sa mbedtls_ssl_get_output_max_frag_len() - * \sa mbedtls_ssl_get_input_max_frag_len() + * \sa mbedtls_ssl_get_max_out_record_payload() * \sa mbedtls_ssl_get_record_expansion() * * \param ssl SSL context @@ -3862,6 +4770,26 @@ MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED size_t mbedtls_ssl_get_max_frag_len( */ int mbedtls_ssl_get_max_out_record_payload(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); +/** + * \brief Return the current maximum incoming record payload in bytes. + * + * \note The logic to determine the maximum incoming record payload is + * version-specific. It takes into account various factors, such as + * the mbedtls_config.h setting \c MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN, extensions + * such as the max fragment length extension or record size limit + * extension if used, and the current record expansion. + * + * \sa mbedtls_ssl_set_mtu() + * \sa mbedtls_ssl_get_max_in_record_payload() + * \sa mbedtls_ssl_get_record_expansion() + * + * \param ssl SSL context + * + * \return Current maximum payload for an incoming record, + * or a negative error code. + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_get_max_in_record_payload(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); + #if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) /** * \brief Return the peer certificate from the current connection. @@ -3898,32 +4826,41 @@ const mbedtls_x509_crt *mbedtls_ssl_get_peer_cert(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) /** - * \brief Save session in order to resume it later (client-side only) - * Session data is copied to presented session structure. - * - * - * \param ssl SSL context - * \param session session context - * - * \return 0 if successful, - * MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED if memory allocation failed, - * MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA if used server-side or - * arguments are otherwise invalid. - * - * \note Only the server certificate is copied, and not the full chain, - * so you should not attempt to validate the certificate again - * by calling \c mbedtls_x509_crt_verify() on it. - * Instead, you should use the results from the verification - * in the original handshake by calling \c mbedtls_ssl_get_verify_result() - * after loading the session again into a new SSL context - * using \c mbedtls_ssl_set_session(). - * - * \note Once the session object is not needed anymore, you should - * free it by calling \c mbedtls_ssl_session_free(). + * \brief Export a session in order to resume it later. + * + * \param ssl The SSL context representing the connection for which to + * to export a session structure for later resumption. + * \param session The target structure in which to store the exported session. + * This must have been initialized with mbedtls_ssl_session_init() + * but otherwise be unused. + * + * \note This function can handle a variety of mechanisms for session + * resumption: For TLS 1.2, both session ID-based resumption and + * ticket-based resumption will be considered. For TLS 1.3, + * once implemented, sessions equate to tickets, and calling + * this function multiple times will export the available + * tickets one a time until no further tickets are available, + * in which case MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE will + * be returned. + * + * \note Calling this function multiple times will only be useful + * once TLS 1.3 is supported. For TLS 1.2 connections, this + * function should be called at most once. + * + * \return \c 0 if successful. In this case, \p session can be used for + * session resumption by passing it to mbedtls_ssl_set_session(), + * and serialized for storage via mbedtls_ssl_session_save(). + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE if no further session + * is available for export. + * This error is a non-fatal, and has no observable effect on + * the SSL context or the destination session. + * \return Another negative error code on other kinds of failure. * * \sa mbedtls_ssl_set_session() + * \sa mbedtls_ssl_session_save() */ -int mbedtls_ssl_get_session(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, mbedtls_ssl_session *session); +int mbedtls_ssl_get_session(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + mbedtls_ssl_session *session); #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */ /** @@ -3948,6 +4885,13 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_get_session(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, mbedtls_ssl_session * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUIRED if DTLS is in use * and the client did not demonstrate reachability yet - in * this case you must stop using the context (see below). + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_RECEIVED_EARLY_DATA if early data, as + * defined in RFC 8446 (TLS 1.3 specification), has been + * received as part of the handshake. This is server specific + * and may occur only if the early data feature has been + * enabled on server (see mbedtls_ssl_conf_early_data() + * documentation). You must call mbedtls_ssl_read_early_data() + * to read the early data before resuming the handshake. * \return Another SSL error code - in this case you must stop using * the context (see below). * @@ -3956,7 +4900,8 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_get_session(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, mbedtls_ssl_session * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ, * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE, * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ASYNC_IN_PROGRESS or - * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS, + * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS or + * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_RECEIVED_EARLY_DATA, * you must stop using the SSL context for reading or writing, * and either free it or call \c mbedtls_ssl_session_reset() * on it before re-using it for a new connection; the current @@ -3976,18 +4921,48 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_get_session(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, mbedtls_ssl_session * currently being processed might or might not contain further * DTLS records. * - * \note If #MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO is enabled, the PSA crypto + * \note If the context is configured to allow TLS 1.3, or if + * #MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO is enabled, the PSA crypto * subsystem must have been initialized by calling * psa_crypto_init() before calling this function. */ int mbedtls_ssl_handshake(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); +/** + * \brief After calling mbedtls_ssl_handshake() to start the SSL + * handshake you can call this function to check whether the + * handshake is over for a given SSL context. This function + * should be also used to determine when to stop calling + * mbedtls_handshake_step() for that context. + * + * \param ssl SSL context + * + * \return \c 1 if handshake is over, \c 0 if it is still ongoing. + */ +static inline int mbedtls_ssl_is_handshake_over(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + return ssl->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(state) >= MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER; +} + /** * \brief Perform a single step of the SSL handshake * * \note The state of the context (ssl->state) will be at * the next state after this function returns \c 0. Do not - * call this function if state is MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER. + * call this function if mbedtls_ssl_is_handshake_over() + * returns \c 1. + * + * \warning Whilst in the past you may have used direct access to the + * context state (ssl->state) in order to ascertain when to + * stop calling this function and although you can still do + * so with something like ssl->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(state) or by + * defining MBEDTLS_ALLOW_PRIVATE_ACCESS, this is now + * considered deprecated and could be broken in any future + * release. If you still find you have good reason for such + * direct access, then please do contact the team to explain + * this (raise an issue or post to the mailing list), so that + * we can add a solution to your problem that will be + * guaranteed to work in the future. * * \param ssl SSL context * @@ -3995,8 +4970,9 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_handshake(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); * * \warning If this function returns something other than \c 0, * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ, #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE, - * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ASYNC_IN_PROGRESS or - * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS, you must stop using + * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ASYNC_IN_PROGRESS, + * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS or + * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_RECEIVED_EARLY_DATA, you must stop using * the SSL context for reading or writing, and either free it * or call \c mbedtls_ssl_session_reset() on it before * re-using it for a new connection; the current connection @@ -4064,6 +5040,13 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_renegotiate(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CLIENT_RECONNECT if we're at the server * side of a DTLS connection and the client is initiating a * new connection using the same source port. See below. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_RECEIVED_EARLY_DATA if early data, as + * defined in RFC 8446 (TLS 1.3 specification), has been + * received as part of the handshake. This is server specific + * and may occur only if the early data feature has been + * enabled on server (see mbedtls_ssl_conf_early_data() + * documentation). You must call mbedtls_ssl_read_early_data() + * to read the early data before resuming the handshake. * \return Another SSL error code - in this case you must stop using * the context (see below). * @@ -4072,8 +5055,9 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_renegotiate(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ, * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE, * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ASYNC_IN_PROGRESS, - * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS or - * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CLIENT_RECONNECT, + * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS, + * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CLIENT_RECONNECT or + * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_RECEIVED_EARLY_DATA, * you must stop using the SSL context for reading or writing, * and either free it or call \c mbedtls_ssl_session_reset() * on it before re-using it for a new connection; the current @@ -4138,6 +5122,13 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_read(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char *buf, size_t len); * operation is in progress (see mbedtls_ecp_set_max_ops()) - * in this case you must call this function again to complete * the handshake when you're done attending other tasks. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_RECEIVED_EARLY_DATA if early data, as + * defined in RFC 8446 (TLS 1.3 specification), has been + * received as part of the handshake. This is server specific + * and may occur only if the early data feature has been + * enabled on server (see mbedtls_ssl_conf_early_data() + * documentation). You must call mbedtls_ssl_read_early_data() + * to read the early data before resuming the handshake. * \return Another SSL error code - in this case you must stop using * the context (see below). * @@ -4145,8 +5136,9 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_read(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char *buf, size_t len); * a non-negative value, * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ, * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE, - * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ASYNC_IN_PROGRESS or - * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS, + * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ASYNC_IN_PROGRESS, + * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS or + * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_RECEIVED_EARLY_DATA, * you must stop using the SSL context for reading or writing, * and either free it or call \c mbedtls_ssl_session_reset() * on it before re-using it for a new connection; the current @@ -4154,7 +5146,7 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_read(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char *buf, size_t len); * * \note When this function returns #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE/READ, * it must be called later with the *same* arguments, - * until it returns a value greater that or equal to 0. When + * until it returns a value greater than or equal to 0. When * the function returns #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE there may be * some partial data in the output buffer, however this is not * yet sent. @@ -4164,7 +5156,7 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_read(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char *buf, size_t len); * or negotiated with the peer), then: * - with TLS, less bytes than requested are written. * - with DTLS, MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA is returned. - * \c mbedtls_ssl_get_output_max_frag_len() may be used to + * \c mbedtls_ssl_get_max_out_record_payload() may be used to * query the active maximum fragment length. * * \note Attempting to write 0 bytes will result in an empty TLS @@ -4206,6 +5198,179 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, */ int mbedtls_ssl_close_notify(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) +/** + * \brief Read at most 'len' bytes of early data + * + * \note This API is server specific. + * + * \warning Early data is defined in the TLS 1.3 specification, RFC 8446. + * IMPORTANT NOTE from section 2.3 of the specification: + * + * The security properties for 0-RTT data are weaker than + * those for other kinds of TLS data. Specifically: + * - This data is not forward secret, as it is encrypted + * solely under keys derived using the offered PSK. + * - There are no guarantees of non-replay between connections. + * Protection against replay for ordinary TLS 1.3 1-RTT data + * is provided via the server's Random value, but 0-RTT data + * does not depend on the ServerHello and therefore has + * weaker guarantees. This is especially relevant if the + * data is authenticated either with TLS client + * authentication or inside the application protocol. The + * same warnings apply to any use of the + * early_exporter_master_secret. + * + * \warning Mbed TLS does not implement any of the anti-replay defenses + * defined in section 8 of the TLS 1.3 specification: + * single-use of tickets or ClientHello recording within a + * given time window. + * + * \note This function is used in conjunction with + * mbedtls_ssl_handshake(), mbedtls_ssl_handshake_step(), + * mbedtls_ssl_read() and mbedtls_ssl_write() to read early + * data when these functions return + * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_RECEIVED_EARLY_DATA. + * + * \param ssl SSL context, it must have been initialized and set up. + * \param buf buffer that will hold the data + * \param len maximum number of bytes to read + * + * \return The (positive) number of bytes read if successful. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA if input data is invalid. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CANNOT_READ_EARLY_DATA if it is not + * possible to read early data for the SSL context \p ssl. Note + * that this function is intended to be called for an SSL + * context \p ssl only after a call to mbedtls_ssl_handshake(), + * mbedtls_ssl_handshake_step(), mbedtls_ssl_read() or + * mbedtls_ssl_write() for \p ssl that has returned + * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_RECEIVED_EARLY_DATA. + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_read_early_data(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *buf, size_t len); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) +/** + * \brief Try to write exactly 'len' application data bytes while + * performing the handshake (early data). + * + * \warning Early data is defined in the TLS 1.3 specification, RFC 8446. + * IMPORTANT NOTE from section 2.3 of the specification: + * + * The security properties for 0-RTT data are weaker than + * those for other kinds of TLS data. Specifically: + * - This data is not forward secret, as it is encrypted + * solely under keys derived using the offered PSK. + * - There are no guarantees of non-replay between connections. + * Protection against replay for ordinary TLS 1.3 1-RTT data + * is provided via the server's Random value, but 0-RTT data + * does not depend on the ServerHello and therefore has + * weaker guarantees. This is especially relevant if the + * data is authenticated either with TLS client + * authentication or inside the application protocol. The + * same warnings apply to any use of the + * early_exporter_master_secret. + * + * \note This function behaves mainly as mbedtls_ssl_write(). The + * specification of mbedtls_ssl_write() relevant to TLS 1.3 + * (thus not the parts specific to (D)TLS1.2) applies to this + * function and the present documentation is mainly restricted + * to the differences with mbedtls_ssl_write(). One noticeable + * difference though is that mbedtls_ssl_write() aims to + * complete the handshake before to write application data + * while mbedtls_ssl_write_early() aims to drive the handshake + * just past the point where it is not possible to send early + * data anymore. + * + * \param ssl SSL context + * \param buf buffer holding the data + * \param len how many bytes must be written + * + * \return The (non-negative) number of bytes actually written if + * successful (may be less than \p len). + * + * \return One additional specific error code compared to + * mbedtls_ssl_write(): + * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CANNOT_WRITE_EARLY_DATA. + * + * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CANNOT_WRITE_EARLY_DATA is returned when it + * is not possible to write early data for the SSL context + * \p ssl. + * + * It may have been possible and it is not possible + * anymore because the client received the server Finished + * message, the server rejected early data or the maximum + * number of allowed early data for the PSK in use has been + * reached. + * + * It may never have been possible and will never be possible + * for the SSL context \p ssl because the use of early data + * is disabled for that context or more generally the context + * is not suitably configured to enable early data or the first + * call to the function was done while the handshake was + * already completed. + * + * It is not possible to write early data for the SSL context + * \p ssl and any subsequent call to this API will return this + * error code. But this does not preclude for using it with + * mbedtls_ssl_write(), mbedtls_ssl_read() or + * mbedtls_ssl_handshake() and the handshake can be + * completed by calling one of these APIs. + * + * \note This function may write early data only if the SSL context + * has been configured for the handshake with a PSK for which + * early data is allowed. + * + * \note To maximize the number of early data that can be written in + * the course of the handshake, it is expected that this + * function starts the handshake for the SSL context \p ssl. + * But this is not mandatory. + * + * \note This function does not provide any information on whether + * the server has accepted or will accept early data or not. + * When it returns a positive value, it just means that it + * has written early data to the server. To know whether the + * server has accepted early data or not, you should call + * mbedtls_ssl_get_early_data_status() with the handshake + * completed. + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_write_early_data(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *buf, size_t len); + +/** + * \brief Get the status of the negotiation of the use of early data. + * + * \param ssl The SSL context to query + * + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA if this function is called + * from the server-side. + * + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA if this function is called + * prior to completion of the handshake. + * + * \return #MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_NOT_INDICATED if the client + * has not indicated the use of early data to the server. + * + * \return #MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_ACCEPTED if the client has + * indicated the use of early data and the server has accepted + * it. + * + * \return #MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_REJECTED if the client has + * indicated the use of early data but the server has rejected + * it. In this situation, the client may want to re-send the + * early data it may have tried to send by calling + * mbedtls_ssl_write_early_data() as ordinary post-handshake + * application data by calling mbedtls_ssl_write(). + * + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_get_early_data_status(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA */ + /** * \brief Free referenced items in an SSL context and clear memory * @@ -4222,6 +5387,14 @@ void mbedtls_ssl_free(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); * * \see mbedtls_ssl_context_load() * + * \note The serialized data only contains the data that is + * necessary to resume the connection: negotiated protocol + * options, session identifier, keys, etc. + * Loading a saved SSL context does not restore settings and + * state related to how the application accesses the context, + * such as configured callback functions, user data, pending + * incoming or outgoing data, etc. + * * \note This feature is currently only available under certain * conditions, see the documentation of the return value * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA for details. @@ -4300,8 +5473,11 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_context_save(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, * (unless they were already set before calling * mbedtls_ssl_session_reset() and the values are suitable for * the present connection). Specifically, you want to call - * at least mbedtls_ssl_set_bio() and - * mbedtls_ssl_set_timer_cb(). All other SSL setter functions + * at least mbedtls_ssl_set_bio(), + * mbedtls_ssl_set_timer_cb(), and + * mbedtls_ssl_set_user_data_n() or + * mbedtls_ssl_set_user_data_p() if they were set originally. + * All other SSL setter functions * are not necessary to call, either because they're only used * in handshakes, or because the setting is already saved. You * might choose to call them anyway, for example in order to diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/ssl_cache.h b/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/ssl_cache.h index cadb30c18a06..a1307b450876 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/ssl_cache.h +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/ssl_cache.h @@ -9,12 +9,9 @@ */ #ifndef MBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_H #define MBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_H +#include "mbedtls/private_access.h" -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "mbedtls/build_info.h" #include "mbedtls/ssl.h" @@ -26,7 +23,7 @@ * \name SECTION: Module settings * * The configuration options you can set for this module are in this section. - * Either change them in config.h or define them on the compiler command line. + * Either change them in mbedtls_config.h or define them on the compiler command line. * \{ */ @@ -52,25 +49,27 @@ typedef struct mbedtls_ssl_cache_entry mbedtls_ssl_cache_entry; */ struct mbedtls_ssl_cache_entry { #if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) - mbedtls_time_t timestamp; /*!< entry timestamp */ -#endif - mbedtls_ssl_session session; /*!< entry session */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) && \ - defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) - mbedtls_x509_buf peer_cert; /*!< entry peer_cert */ + mbedtls_time_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(timestamp); /*!< entry timestamp */ #endif - mbedtls_ssl_cache_entry *next; /*!< chain pointer */ + + unsigned char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(session_id)[32]; /*!< session ID */ + size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(session_id_len); + + unsigned char *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(session); /*!< serialized session */ + size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(session_len); + + mbedtls_ssl_cache_entry *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(next); /*!< chain pointer */ }; /** * \brief Cache context */ struct mbedtls_ssl_cache_context { - mbedtls_ssl_cache_entry *chain; /*!< start of the chain */ - int timeout; /*!< cache entry timeout */ - int max_entries; /*!< maximum entries */ + mbedtls_ssl_cache_entry *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(chain); /*!< start of the chain */ + int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(timeout); /*!< cache entry timeout */ + int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(max_entries); /*!< maximum entries */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) - mbedtls_threading_mutex_t mutex; /*!< mutex */ + mbedtls_threading_mutex_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(mutex); /*!< mutex */ #endif }; @@ -85,27 +84,58 @@ void mbedtls_ssl_cache_init(mbedtls_ssl_cache_context *cache); * \brief Cache get callback implementation * (Thread-safe if MBEDTLS_THREADING_C is enabled) * - * \param data SSL cache context - * \param session session to retrieve entry for + * \param data The SSL cache context to use. + * \param session_id The pointer to the buffer holding the session ID + * for the session to load. + * \param session_id_len The length of \p session_id in bytes. + * \param session The address at which to store the session + * associated with \p session_id, if present. * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CACHE_ENTRY_NOT_FOUND if there is * no cache entry with specified session ID found, or * any other negative error code for other failures. */ -int mbedtls_ssl_cache_get(void *data, mbedtls_ssl_session *session); +int mbedtls_ssl_cache_get(void *data, + unsigned char const *session_id, + size_t session_id_len, + mbedtls_ssl_session *session); /** * \brief Cache set callback implementation * (Thread-safe if MBEDTLS_THREADING_C is enabled) * - * \param data SSL cache context - * \param session session to store entry for + * \param data The SSL cache context to use. + * \param session_id The pointer to the buffer holding the session ID + * associated to \p session. + * \param session_id_len The length of \p session_id in bytes. + * \param session The session to store. * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return A negative error code on failure. */ -int mbedtls_ssl_cache_set(void *data, const mbedtls_ssl_session *session); +int mbedtls_ssl_cache_set(void *data, + unsigned char const *session_id, + size_t session_id_len, + const mbedtls_ssl_session *session); + +/** + * \brief Remove the cache entry by the session ID + * (Thread-safe if MBEDTLS_THREADING_C is enabled) + * + * \param data The SSL cache context to use. + * \param session_id The pointer to the buffer holding the session ID + * associated to session. + * \param session_id_len The length of \p session_id in bytes. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. This indicates the cache entry for + * the session with provided ID is removed or does not + * exist. + * \return A negative error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_cache_remove(void *data, + unsigned char const *session_id, + size_t session_id_len); #if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) /** @@ -118,6 +148,20 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_cache_set(void *data, const mbedtls_ssl_session *session); * \param timeout cache entry timeout in seconds */ void mbedtls_ssl_cache_set_timeout(mbedtls_ssl_cache_context *cache, int timeout); + +/** + * \brief Get the cache timeout + * + * A timeout of 0 indicates no timeout. + * + * \param cache SSL cache context + * + * \return cache entry timeout in seconds + */ +static inline int mbedtls_ssl_cache_get_timeout(mbedtls_ssl_cache_context *cache) +{ + return cache->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(timeout); +} #endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME */ /** diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/ssl_ciphersuites.h b/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/ssl_ciphersuites.h index 199014f5086e..12d446200f3b 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/ssl_ciphersuites.h +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/ssl_ciphersuites.h @@ -9,12 +9,9 @@ */ #ifndef MBEDTLS_SSL_CIPHERSUITES_H #define MBEDTLS_SSL_CIPHERSUITES_H +#include "mbedtls/private_access.h" -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "mbedtls/build_info.h" #include "mbedtls/pk.h" #include "mbedtls/cipher.h" @@ -30,15 +27,6 @@ extern "C" { #define MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_MD5 0x01 /**< Weak! */ #define MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA 0x02 /**< Weak! */ -#define MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5 0x04 -#define MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA 0x05 -#define MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA 0x09 /**< Weak! Not in TLS 1.2 */ - -#define MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA 0x0A - -#define MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA 0x15 /**< Weak! Not in TLS 1.2 */ -#define MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA 0x16 - #define MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA 0x2C /**< Weak! */ #define MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA 0x2D /**< Weak! */ #define MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA 0x2E /**< Weak! */ @@ -61,18 +49,12 @@ extern "C" { #define MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA 0x84 #define MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA 0x88 -#define MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA 0x8A -#define MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA 0x8B #define MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA 0x8C #define MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA 0x8D -#define MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA 0x8E -#define MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA 0x8F #define MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA 0x90 #define MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA 0x91 -#define MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA 0x92 -#define MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA 0x93 #define MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA 0x94 #define MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA 0x95 @@ -110,28 +92,20 @@ extern "C" { #define MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256 0xC4 /**< TLS 1.2 */ #define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA 0xC001 /**< Weak! */ -#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA 0xC002 /**< Not in SSL3! */ -#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA 0xC003 /**< Not in SSL3! */ -#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA 0xC004 /**< Not in SSL3! */ -#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA 0xC005 /**< Not in SSL3! */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA 0xC004 +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA 0xC005 #define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA 0xC006 /**< Weak! */ -#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA 0xC007 /**< Not in SSL3! */ -#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA 0xC008 /**< Not in SSL3! */ -#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA 0xC009 /**< Not in SSL3! */ -#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA 0xC00A /**< Not in SSL3! */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA 0xC009 +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA 0xC00A #define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA 0xC00B /**< Weak! */ -#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA 0xC00C /**< Not in SSL3! */ -#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA 0xC00D /**< Not in SSL3! */ -#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA 0xC00E /**< Not in SSL3! */ -#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA 0xC00F /**< Not in SSL3! */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA 0xC00E +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA 0xC00F #define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA 0xC010 /**< Weak! */ -#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA 0xC011 /**< Not in SSL3! */ -#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA 0xC012 /**< Not in SSL3! */ -#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA 0xC013 /**< Not in SSL3! */ -#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA 0xC014 /**< Not in SSL3! */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA 0xC013 +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA 0xC014 #define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 0xC023 /**< TLS 1.2 */ #define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 0xC024 /**< TLS 1.2 */ @@ -151,15 +125,13 @@ extern "C" { #define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 0xC031 /**< TLS 1.2 */ #define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 0xC032 /**< TLS 1.2 */ -#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA 0xC033 /**< Not in SSL3! */ -#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA 0xC034 /**< Not in SSL3! */ -#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA 0xC035 /**< Not in SSL3! */ -#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA 0xC036 /**< Not in SSL3! */ -#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 0xC037 /**< Not in SSL3! */ -#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 0xC038 /**< Not in SSL3! */ -#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA 0xC039 /**< Weak! No SSL3! */ -#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256 0xC03A /**< Weak! No SSL3! */ -#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384 0xC03B /**< Weak! No SSL3! */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA 0xC035 +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA 0xC036 +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 0xC037 +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 0xC038 +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA 0xC039 +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256 0xC03A +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384 0xC03B #define MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256 0xC03C /**< TLS 1.2 */ #define MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384 0xC03D /**< TLS 1.2 */ @@ -200,14 +172,14 @@ extern "C" { #define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256 0xC070 /**< TLS 1.2 */ #define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384 0xC071 /**< TLS 1.2 */ -#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 0xC072 /**< Not in SSL3! */ -#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 0xC073 /**< Not in SSL3! */ -#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 0xC074 /**< Not in SSL3! */ -#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 0xC075 /**< Not in SSL3! */ -#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 0xC076 /**< Not in SSL3! */ -#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 0xC077 /**< Not in SSL3! */ -#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 0xC078 /**< Not in SSL3! */ -#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 0xC079 /**< Not in SSL3! */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 0xC072 +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 0xC073 +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 0xC074 +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 0xC075 +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 0xC076 +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 0xC077 +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 0xC078 +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 0xC079 #define MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 0xC07A /**< TLS 1.2 */ #define MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 0xC07B /**< TLS 1.2 */ @@ -235,8 +207,8 @@ extern "C" { #define MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 0xC097 #define MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 0xC098 #define MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 0xC099 -#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 0xC09A /**< Not in SSL3! */ -#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 0xC09B /**< Not in SSL3! */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 0xC09A +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 0xC09B #define MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM 0xC09C /**< TLS 1.2 */ #define MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM 0xC09D /**< TLS 1.2 */ @@ -272,6 +244,13 @@ extern "C" { #define MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 0xCCAD /**< TLS 1.2 */ #define MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 0xCCAE /**< TLS 1.2 */ +/* RFC 8446, Appendix B.4 */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 0x1301 /**< TLS 1.3 */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 0x1302 /**< TLS 1.3 */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 0x1303 /**< TLS 1.3 */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_AES_128_CCM_SHA256 0x1304 /**< TLS 1.3 */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_AES_128_CCM_8_SHA256 0x1305 /**< TLS 1.3 */ + /* Reminder: update mbedtls_ssl_premaster_secret when adding a new key exchange. * Reminder: update MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__xxx below */ @@ -301,16 +280,49 @@ typedef enum { #define MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED #endif -/* Key exchanges allowing client certificate requests */ +/* Key exchanges in either TLS 1.2 or 1.3 which are using an ECDSA + * signature */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED) +#define MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_ECDSA_ANY_ENABLED +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED) +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED +#endif + +/* Key exchanges allowing client certificate requests. + * + * Note: that's almost the same as MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED + * above, except RSA-PSK uses a server certificate but no client cert. + * + * Note: this difference is specific to TLS 1.2, as with TLS 1.3, things are + * more symmetrical: client certs and server certs are either both allowed + * (Ephemeral mode) or both disallowed (PSK and PKS-Ephemeral modes). + */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED) || \ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED) || \ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED) || \ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED) + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED) #define MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED #endif +/* Helper to state that certificate-based client authentication through ECDSA + * is supported in TLS 1.2 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SIGN) && defined(MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_VERIFY) +#define MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDSA_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED +#endif + +/* ECDSA required for certificates in either TLS 1.2 or 1.3 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDSA_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED) +#define MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDSA_CERT_REQ_ANY_ALLOWED_ENABLED +#endif + /* Key exchanges involving server signature in ServerKeyExchange */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \ @@ -363,6 +375,62 @@ typedef enum { #define MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDHE_ENABLED #endif +/* TLS 1.2 key exchanges using ECDH or ECDHE*/ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDH_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDHE_ENABLED) +#define MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDH_OR_ECDHE_1_2_ENABLED +#endif + +/* TLS 1.3 PSK key exchanges */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED) +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED +#endif + +/* TLS 1.2 or 1.3 key exchanges with PSK */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED) +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_PSK_ENABLED +#endif + +/* TLS 1.3 ephemeral key exchanges */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED) +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED +#endif + +/* TLS 1.3 key exchanges using ECDHE */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED) && \ + defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH) +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_ECDHE_ENABLED +#endif + +/* TLS 1.2 or 1.3 key exchanges using ECDH or ECDHE */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDH_OR_ECDHE_1_2_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_ECDHE_ENABLED) +#define MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDH_OR_ECDHE_ANY_ENABLED +#endif + +/* TLS 1.2 XXDH key exchanges: ECDH or ECDHE or FFDH */ +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDH_OR_ECDHE_1_2_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_DHE_ENABLED)) +#define MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_XXDH_1_2_ENABLED +#endif + +/* The handshake params structure has a set of fields called xxdh_psa which are used: + * - by TLS 1.2 with `USE_PSA` to do ECDH or ECDHE; + * - by TLS 1.3 to do ECDHE or FFDHE. + * The following macros can be used to guard their declaration and use. + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDH_OR_ECDHE_1_2_ENABLED) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +#define MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_XXDH_PSA_1_2_ENABLED +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_XXDH_PSA_1_2_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED) +#define MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_XXDH_PSA_ANY_ENABLED +#endif + typedef struct mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t; #define MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_WEAK 0x01 /**< Weak ciphersuite flag */ @@ -372,21 +440,22 @@ typedef struct mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t; /** * \brief This structure is used for storing ciphersuite information + * + * \note members are defined using integral types instead of enums + * in order to pack structure and reduce memory usage by internal + * \c ciphersuite_definitions[] */ struct mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t { - int id; - const char *name; + int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(id); + const char *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(name); - mbedtls_cipher_type_t cipher; - mbedtls_md_type_t mac; - mbedtls_key_exchange_type_t key_exchange; + uint8_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(cipher); /* mbedtls_cipher_type_t */ + uint8_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(mac); /* mbedtls_md_type_t */ + uint8_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(key_exchange); /* mbedtls_key_exchange_type_t */ + uint8_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(flags); - int min_major_ver; - int min_minor_ver; - int max_major_ver; - int max_minor_ver; - - unsigned char flags; + uint16_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(min_tls_version); /* mbedtls_ssl_protocol_version */ + uint16_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(max_tls_version); /* mbedtls_ssl_protocol_version */ }; const int *mbedtls_ssl_list_ciphersuites(void); @@ -394,140 +463,17 @@ const int *mbedtls_ssl_list_ciphersuites(void); const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_from_string(const char *ciphersuite_name); const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_from_id(int ciphersuite_id); -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_C) -mbedtls_pk_type_t mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_sig_pk_alg(const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *info); -mbedtls_pk_type_t mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_sig_alg(const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *info); -#endif - -int mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_ec(const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *info); -int mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_psk(const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *info); - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PFS_ENABLED) -static inline int mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_has_pfs(const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *info) -{ - switch (info->key_exchange) { - case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA: - case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK: - case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA: - case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK: - case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA: - case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE: - return 1; - - default: - return 0; - } -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PFS_ENABLED */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_NON_PFS_ENABLED) -static inline int mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_no_pfs(const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *info) +static inline const char *mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_get_name(const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *info) { - switch (info->key_exchange) { - case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA: - case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA: - case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA: - case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK: - case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK: - return 1; - - default: - return 0; - } + return info->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(name); } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_NON_PFS_ENABLED */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDH_ENABLED) -static inline int mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_ecdh(const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *info) +static inline int mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_get_id(const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *info) { - switch (info->key_exchange) { - case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA: - case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA: - return 1; - - default: - return 0; - } + return info->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(id); } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDH_ENABLED */ -static inline int mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_cert_req_allowed(const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *info) -{ - switch (info->key_exchange) { - case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA: - case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA: - case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA: - case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA: - case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA: - case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA: - return 1; - - default: - return 0; - } -} - -static inline int mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_srv_cert(const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *info) -{ - switch (info->key_exchange) { - case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA: - case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK: - case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA: - case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA: - case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA: - case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA: - case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA: - return 1; - - default: - return 0; - } -} - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_DHE_ENABLED) -static inline int mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_dhe(const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *info) -{ - switch (info->key_exchange) { - case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA: - case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK: - return 1; - - default: - return 0; - } -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_DHE_ENABLED) */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDHE_ENABLED) -static inline int mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_ecdhe(const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *info) -{ - switch (info->key_exchange) { - case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA: - case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA: - case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK: - return 1; - - default: - return 0; - } -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDHE_ENABLED) */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE_ENABLED) -static inline int mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_server_signature( - const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *info) -{ - switch (info->key_exchange) { - case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA: - case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA: - case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA: - return 1; - - default: - return 0; - } -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE_ENABLED */ +size_t mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_get_cipher_key_bitlen(const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *info); #ifdef __cplusplus } diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/ssl_cookie.h b/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/ssl_cookie.h index 85a1b4ac1447..71c258ea48d6 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/ssl_cookie.h +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/ssl_cookie.h @@ -9,24 +9,23 @@ */ #ifndef MBEDTLS_SSL_COOKIE_H #define MBEDTLS_SSL_COOKIE_H +#include "mbedtls/private_access.h" -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "mbedtls/build_info.h" #include "mbedtls/ssl.h" +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) #if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) #include "mbedtls/threading.h" #endif +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ /** * \name SECTION: Module settings * * The configuration options you can set for this module are in this section. - * Either change them in config.h or define them on the compiler command line. + * Either change them in mbedtls_config.h or define them on the compiler command line. * \{ */ #ifndef MBEDTLS_SSL_COOKIE_TIMEOUT @@ -43,16 +42,23 @@ extern "C" { * \brief Context for the default cookie functions. */ typedef struct mbedtls_ssl_cookie_ctx { - mbedtls_md_context_t hmac_ctx; /*!< context for the HMAC portion */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(psa_hmac_key); /*!< key id for the HMAC portion */ + psa_algorithm_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(psa_hmac_alg); /*!< key algorithm for the HMAC portion */ +#else + mbedtls_md_context_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(hmac_ctx); /*!< context for the HMAC portion */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ #if !defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) - unsigned long serial; /*!< serial number for expiration */ + unsigned long MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(serial); /*!< serial number for expiration */ #endif - unsigned long timeout; /*!< timeout delay, in seconds if HAVE_TIME, - or in number of tickets issued */ + unsigned long MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(timeout); /*!< timeout delay, in seconds if HAVE_TIME, + or in number of tickets issued */ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) #if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) - mbedtls_threading_mutex_t mutex; + mbedtls_threading_mutex_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(mutex); #endif +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ } mbedtls_ssl_cookie_ctx; /** diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/ssl_internal.h b/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/ssl_internal.h deleted file mode 100644 index 3a40b4ba2fa3..000000000000 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/ssl_internal.h +++ /dev/null @@ -1,1328 +0,0 @@ -/** - * \file ssl_internal.h - * - * \brief Internal functions shared by the SSL modules - */ -/* - * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later - */ -#ifndef MBEDTLS_SSL_INTERNAL_H -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_INTERNAL_H - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif - -#include "mbedtls/ssl.h" -#include "mbedtls/cipher.h" - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) -#include "psa/crypto.h" -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C) -#include "mbedtls/md5.h" -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) -#include "mbedtls/sha1.h" -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) -#include "mbedtls/sha256.h" -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) -#include "mbedtls/sha512.h" -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) -#include "mbedtls/ecjpake.h" -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) -#include "psa/crypto.h" -#include "mbedtls/psa_util.h" -#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ - -#if (defined(__ARMCC_VERSION) || defined(_MSC_VER)) && \ - !defined(inline) && !defined(__cplusplus) -#define inline __inline -#endif - -/* Determine minimum supported version */ -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MIN_MAJOR_VERSION MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3 - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MIN_MINOR_VERSION MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 -#else -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MIN_MINOR_VERSION MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1 -#else -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MIN_MINOR_VERSION MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2 -#else -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MIN_MINOR_VERSION MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 */ - -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MIN_VALID_MINOR_VERSION MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1 -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MIN_VALID_MAJOR_VERSION MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3 - -/* Determine maximum supported version */ -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_MAJOR_VERSION MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3 - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_MINOR_VERSION MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 -#else -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_MINOR_VERSION MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2 -#else -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_MINOR_VERSION MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1 -#else -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_MINOR_VERSION MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ - -/* Shorthand for restartable ECC */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) && \ - defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) && \ - defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && \ - defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED) -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED -#endif - -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_INITIAL_HANDSHAKE 0 -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_IN_PROGRESS 1 /* In progress */ -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_DONE 2 /* Done or aborted */ -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_PENDING 3 /* Requested (server only) */ - -/* - * DTLS retransmission states, see RFC 6347 4.2.4 - * - * The SENDING state is merged in PREPARING for initial sends, - * but is distinct for resends. - * - * Note: initial state is wrong for server, but is not used anyway. - */ -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_PREPARING 0 -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_SENDING 1 -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_WAITING 2 -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_FINISHED 3 - -/* - * Allow extra bytes for record, authentication and encryption overhead: - * counter (8) + header (5) + IV(16) + MAC (16-48) + padding (0-256) - * and allow for a maximum of 1024 of compression expansion if - * enabled. - */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT) -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESSION_ADD 1024 -#else -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESSION_ADD 0 -#endif - -/* This macro determines whether CBC is supported. */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) && \ - (defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_ARIA_C) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_DES_C)) -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_CBC -#endif - -/* This macro determines whether the CBC construct used in TLS 1.0-1.2 (as - * opposed to the very different CBC construct used in SSLv3) is supported. */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_CBC) && \ - (defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)) -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_TLS_CBC -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARC4_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_CBC) -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_MODES_USE_MAC -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_MODES_USE_MAC) -/* Ciphersuites using HMAC */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAC_ADD 48 /* SHA-384 used for HMAC */ -#elif defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAC_ADD 32 /* SHA-256 used for HMAC */ -#else -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAC_ADD 20 /* SHA-1 used for HMAC */ -#endif -#else /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_MODES_USE_MAC */ -/* AEAD ciphersuites: GCM and CCM use a 128 bits tag */ -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAC_ADD 16 -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_PADDING_ADD 256 -#else -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_PADDING_ADD 0 -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CID_EXPANSION MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_PADDING_GRANULARITY -#else -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CID_EXPANSION 0 -#endif - -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_PAYLOAD_OVERHEAD (MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESSION_ADD + \ - MBEDTLS_MAX_IV_LENGTH + \ - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAC_ADD + \ - MBEDTLS_SSL_PADDING_ADD + \ - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CID_EXPANSION \ - ) - -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_PAYLOAD_LEN (MBEDTLS_SSL_PAYLOAD_OVERHEAD + \ - (MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN)) - -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_PAYLOAD_LEN (MBEDTLS_SSL_PAYLOAD_OVERHEAD + \ - (MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN)) - -/* The maximum number of buffered handshake messages. */ -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_BUFFERED_HS 4 - -/* Maximum length we can advertise as our max content length for - RFC 6066 max_fragment_length extension negotiation purposes - (the lesser of both sizes, if they are unequal.) - */ -#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ADV_CONTENT_LEN ( \ - (MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN > MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN) \ - ? (MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN) \ - : (MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN) \ - ) - -/* Maximum size in bytes of list in sig-hash algorithm ext., RFC 5246 */ -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_SIG_HASH_ALG_LIST_LEN 65534 - -/* Maximum size in bytes of list in supported elliptic curve ext., RFC 4492 */ -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CURVE_LIST_LEN 65535 - -/* - * Check that we obey the standard's message size bounds - */ - -#if MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN > 16384 -#error "Bad configuration - record content too large." -#endif - -#if MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN > MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN -#error \ - "Bad configuration - incoming record content should not be larger than MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN." -#endif - -#if MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN > MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN -#error \ - "Bad configuration - outgoing record content should not be larger than MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN." -#endif - -#if MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_PAYLOAD_LEN > MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN + 2048 -#error "Bad configuration - incoming protected record payload too large." -#endif - -#if MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_PAYLOAD_LEN > MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN + 2048 -#error "Bad configuration - outgoing protected record payload too large." -#endif - -/* Calculate buffer sizes */ - -/* Note: Even though the TLS record header is only 5 bytes - long, we're internally using 8 bytes to store the - implicit sequence number. */ -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_HEADER_LEN 13 - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_BUFFER_LEN \ - ((MBEDTLS_SSL_HEADER_LEN) + (MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_PAYLOAD_LEN)) -#else -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_BUFFER_LEN \ - ((MBEDTLS_SSL_HEADER_LEN) + (MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_PAYLOAD_LEN) \ - + (MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_IN_LEN_MAX)) -#endif - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_BUFFER_LEN \ - ((MBEDTLS_SSL_HEADER_LEN) + (MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_PAYLOAD_LEN)) -#else -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_BUFFER_LEN \ - ((MBEDTLS_SSL_HEADER_LEN) + (MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_PAYLOAD_LEN) \ - + (MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX)) -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH) -static inline size_t mbedtls_ssl_get_output_buflen(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ctx) -{ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) - return mbedtls_ssl_get_output_max_frag_len(ctx) - + MBEDTLS_SSL_HEADER_LEN + MBEDTLS_SSL_PAYLOAD_OVERHEAD - + MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX; -#else - return mbedtls_ssl_get_output_max_frag_len(ctx) - + MBEDTLS_SSL_HEADER_LEN + MBEDTLS_SSL_PAYLOAD_OVERHEAD; -#endif -} - -static inline size_t mbedtls_ssl_get_input_buflen(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ctx) -{ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) - return mbedtls_ssl_get_input_max_frag_len(ctx) - + MBEDTLS_SSL_HEADER_LEN + MBEDTLS_SSL_PAYLOAD_OVERHEAD - + MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_IN_LEN_MAX; -#else - return mbedtls_ssl_get_input_max_frag_len(ctx) - + MBEDTLS_SSL_HEADER_LEN + MBEDTLS_SSL_PAYLOAD_OVERHEAD; -#endif -} -#endif - -#ifdef MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT -/* Compression buffer holds both IN and OUT buffers, so should be size of the larger */ -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_BUFFER_LEN ( \ - (MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_BUFFER_LEN > MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_BUFFER_LEN) \ - ? MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_BUFFER_LEN \ - : MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_BUFFER_LEN \ - ) -#endif - -/* - * TLS extension flags (for extensions with outgoing ServerHello content - * that need it (e.g. for RENEGOTIATION_INFO the server already knows because - * of state of the renegotiation flag, so no indicator is required) - */ -#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_POINT_FORMATS_PRESENT (1 << 0) -#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ECJPAKE_KKPP_OK (1 << 1) - -/** - * \brief This function checks if the remaining size in a buffer is - * greater or equal than a needed space. - * - * \param cur Pointer to the current position in the buffer. - * \param end Pointer to one past the end of the buffer. - * \param need Needed space in bytes. - * - * \return Zero if the needed space is available in the buffer, non-zero - * otherwise. - */ -static inline int mbedtls_ssl_chk_buf_ptr(const uint8_t *cur, - const uint8_t *end, size_t need) -{ - return (cur > end) || (need > (size_t) (end - cur)); -} - -/** - * \brief This macro checks if the remaining size in a buffer is - * greater or equal than a needed space. If it is not the case, - * it returns an SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL error. - * - * \param cur Pointer to the current position in the buffer. - * \param end Pointer to one past the end of the buffer. - * \param need Needed space in bytes. - * - */ -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR(cur, end, need) \ - do { \ - if (mbedtls_ssl_chk_buf_ptr((cur), (end), (need)) != 0) \ - { \ - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; \ - } \ - } while (0) - -#ifdef __cplusplus -extern "C" { -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && \ - defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) -/* - * Abstraction for a grid of allowed signature-hash-algorithm pairs. - */ -struct mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_t { - /* At the moment, we only need to remember a single suitable - * hash algorithm per signature algorithm. As long as that's - * the case - and we don't need a general lookup function - - * we can implement the sig-hash-set as a map from signatures - * to hash algorithms. */ - mbedtls_md_type_t rsa; - mbedtls_md_type_t ecdsa; -}; -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 && - MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */ - -typedef int mbedtls_ssl_tls_prf_cb(const unsigned char *secret, size_t slen, - const char *label, - const unsigned char *random, size_t rlen, - unsigned char *dstbuf, size_t dlen); - -/* cipher.h exports the maximum IV, key and block length from - * all ciphers enabled in the config, regardless of whether those - * ciphers are actually usable in SSL/TLS. Notably, XTS is enabled - * in the default configuration and uses 64 Byte keys, but it is - * not used for record protection in SSL/TLS. - * - * In order to prevent unnecessary inflation of key structures, - * we introduce SSL-specific variants of the max-{key,block,IV} - * macros here which are meant to only take those ciphers into - * account which can be negotiated in SSL/TLS. - * - * Since the current definitions of MBEDTLS_MAX_{KEY|BLOCK|IV}_LENGTH - * in cipher.h are rough overapproximations of the real maxima, here - * we content ourselves with replicating those overapproximations - * for the maximum block and IV length, and excluding XTS from the - * computation of the maximum key length. */ -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH 16 -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_IV_LENGTH 16 -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_KEY_LENGTH 32 - -/** - * \brief The data structure holding the cryptographic material (key and IV) - * used for record protection in TLS 1.3. - */ -struct mbedtls_ssl_key_set { - /*! The key for client->server records. */ - unsigned char client_write_key[MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_KEY_LENGTH]; - /*! The key for server->client records. */ - unsigned char server_write_key[MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_KEY_LENGTH]; - /*! The IV for client->server records. */ - unsigned char client_write_iv[MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_IV_LENGTH]; - /*! The IV for server->client records. */ - unsigned char server_write_iv[MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_IV_LENGTH]; - - size_t key_len; /*!< The length of client_write_key and - * server_write_key, in Bytes. */ - size_t iv_len; /*!< The length of client_write_iv and - * server_write_iv, in Bytes. */ -}; -typedef struct mbedtls_ssl_key_set mbedtls_ssl_key_set; - -/* - * This structure contains the parameters only needed during handshake. - */ -struct mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params { - /* - * Handshake specific crypto variables - */ - - uint8_t max_major_ver; /*!< max. major version client*/ - uint8_t max_minor_ver; /*!< max. minor version client*/ - uint8_t resume; /*!< session resume indicator*/ - uint8_t cli_exts; /*!< client extension presence*/ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) && \ - defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) - uint8_t sni_authmode; /*!< authmode from SNI callback */ -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) - uint8_t new_session_ticket; /*!< use NewSessionTicket? */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET) - uint8_t extended_ms; /*!< use Extended Master Secret? */ -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE) - uint8_t async_in_progress; /*!< an asynchronous operation is in progress */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) - unsigned char retransmit_state; /*!< Retransmission state */ -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED) - uint8_t ecrs_enabled; /*!< Handshake supports EC restart? */ - enum { /* this complements ssl->state with info on intra-state operations */ - ssl_ecrs_none = 0, /*!< nothing going on (yet) */ - ssl_ecrs_crt_verify, /*!< Certificate: crt_verify() */ - ssl_ecrs_ske_start_processing, /*!< ServerKeyExchange: pk_verify() */ - ssl_ecrs_cke_ecdh_calc_secret, /*!< ClientKeyExchange: ECDH step 2 */ - ssl_ecrs_crt_vrfy_sign, /*!< CertificateVerify: pk_sign() */ - } ecrs_state; /*!< current (or last) operation */ - mbedtls_x509_crt *ecrs_peer_cert; /*!< The peer's CRT chain. */ - size_t ecrs_n; /*!< place for saving a length */ -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && \ - defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) - mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_t hash_algs; /*!< Set of suitable sig-hash pairs */ -#endif - - size_t pmslen; /*!< premaster length */ - - mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t const *ciphersuite_info; - - void (*update_checksum)(mbedtls_ssl_context *, const unsigned char *, size_t); - void (*calc_verify)(const mbedtls_ssl_context *, unsigned char *, size_t *); - void (*calc_finished)(mbedtls_ssl_context *, unsigned char *, int); - mbedtls_ssl_tls_prf_cb *tls_prf; - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_C) - mbedtls_dhm_context dhm_ctx; /*!< DHM key exchange */ -#endif - -/* Adding guard for MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C to ensure no compile errors due - * to guards also being in ssl_srv.c and ssl_cli.c. There is a gap - * in functionality that access to ecdh_ctx structure is needed for - * MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C which does not seem correct. - */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) - mbedtls_ecdh_context ecdh_ctx; /*!< ECDH key exchange */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) - psa_key_type_t ecdh_psa_type; - uint16_t ecdh_bits; - psa_key_id_t ecdh_psa_privkey; - unsigned char ecdh_psa_peerkey[MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_LENGTH]; - size_t ecdh_psa_peerkey_len; -#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDH_C || MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) - mbedtls_ecjpake_context ecjpake_ctx; /*!< EC J-PAKE key exchange */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) - unsigned char *ecjpake_cache; /*!< Cache for ClientHello ext */ - size_t ecjpake_cache_len; /*!< Length of cached data */ -#endif -#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) - const mbedtls_ecp_curve_info **curves; /*!< Supported elliptic curves */ -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) - psa_key_id_t psk_opaque; /*!< Opaque PSK from the callback */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ - unsigned char *psk; /*!< PSK from the callback */ - size_t psk_len; /*!< Length of PSK from callback */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) - mbedtls_ssl_key_cert *key_cert; /*!< chosen key/cert pair (server) */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) - mbedtls_ssl_key_cert *sni_key_cert; /*!< key/cert list from SNI */ - mbedtls_x509_crt *sni_ca_chain; /*!< trusted CAs from SNI callback */ - mbedtls_x509_crl *sni_ca_crl; /*!< trusted CAs CRLs from SNI */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED) - mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_ctx ecrs_ctx; /*!< restart context */ -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) && \ - !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) - mbedtls_pk_context peer_pubkey; /*!< The public key from the peer. */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C && !MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) - struct { - size_t total_bytes_buffered; /*!< Cumulative size of heap allocated - * buffers used for message buffering. */ - - uint8_t seen_ccs; /*!< Indicates if a CCS message has - * been seen in the current flight. */ - - struct mbedtls_ssl_hs_buffer { - unsigned is_valid : 1; - unsigned is_fragmented : 1; - unsigned is_complete : 1; - unsigned char *data; - size_t data_len; - } hs[MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_BUFFERED_HS]; - - struct { - unsigned char *data; - size_t len; - unsigned epoch; - } future_record; - - } buffering; - - unsigned int out_msg_seq; /*!< Outgoing handshake sequence number */ - unsigned int in_msg_seq; /*!< Incoming handshake sequence number */ - - unsigned char *verify_cookie; /*!< Cli: HelloVerifyRequest cookie - Srv: unused */ - unsigned char verify_cookie_len; /*!< Cli: cookie length - Srv: flag for sending a cookie */ - - uint32_t retransmit_timeout; /*!< Current value of timeout */ - mbedtls_ssl_flight_item *flight; /*!< Current outgoing flight */ - mbedtls_ssl_flight_item *cur_msg; /*!< Current message in flight */ - unsigned char *cur_msg_p; /*!< Position in current message */ - unsigned int in_flight_start_seq; /*!< Minimum message sequence in the - flight being received */ - mbedtls_ssl_transform *alt_transform_out; /*!< Alternative transform for - resending messages */ - unsigned char alt_out_ctr[8]; /*!< Alternative record epoch/counter - for resending messages */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) - /* The state of CID configuration in this handshake. */ - - uint8_t cid_in_use; /*!< This indicates whether the use of the CID extension - * has been negotiated. Possible values are - * #MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_ENABLED and - * #MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_DISABLED. */ - unsigned char peer_cid[MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX]; /*! The peer's CID */ - uint8_t peer_cid_len; /*!< The length of - * \c peer_cid. */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ - - uint16_t mtu; /*!< Handshake mtu, used to fragment outgoing messages */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ - - /* - * Checksum contexts - */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) - mbedtls_md5_context fin_md5; - mbedtls_sha1_context fin_sha1; -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) - psa_hash_operation_t fin_sha256_psa; -#else - mbedtls_sha256_context fin_sha256; -#endif -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) - psa_hash_operation_t fin_sha384_psa; -#else - mbedtls_sha512_context fin_sha512; -#endif -#endif -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ - - unsigned char randbytes[64]; /*!< random bytes */ - unsigned char premaster[MBEDTLS_PREMASTER_SIZE]; - /*!< premaster secret */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE) - /** Asynchronous operation context. This field is meant for use by the - * asynchronous operation callbacks (mbedtls_ssl_config::f_async_sign_start, - * mbedtls_ssl_config::f_async_decrypt_start, - * mbedtls_ssl_config::f_async_resume, mbedtls_ssl_config::f_async_cancel). - * The library does not use it internally. */ - void *user_async_ctx; -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE */ -}; - -typedef struct mbedtls_ssl_hs_buffer mbedtls_ssl_hs_buffer; - -/* - * Representation of decryption/encryption transformations on records - * - * There are the following general types of record transformations: - * - Stream transformations (TLS versions <= 1.2 only) - * Transformation adding a MAC and applying a stream-cipher - * to the authenticated message. - * - CBC block cipher transformations ([D]TLS versions <= 1.2 only) - * In addition to the distinction of the order of encryption and - * authentication, there's a fundamental difference between the - * handling in SSL3 & TLS 1.0 and TLS 1.1 and TLS 1.2: For SSL3 - * and TLS 1.0, the final IV after processing a record is used - * as the IV for the next record. No explicit IV is contained - * in an encrypted record. The IV for the first record is extracted - * at key extraction time. In contrast, for TLS 1.1 and 1.2, no - * IV is generated at key extraction time, but every encrypted - * record is explicitly prefixed by the IV with which it was encrypted. - * - AEAD transformations ([D]TLS versions >= 1.2 only) - * These come in two fundamentally different versions, the first one - * used in TLS 1.2, excluding ChaChaPoly ciphersuites, and the second - * one used for ChaChaPoly ciphersuites in TLS 1.2 as well as for TLS 1.3. - * In the first transformation, the IV to be used for a record is obtained - * as the concatenation of an explicit, static 4-byte IV and the 8-byte - * record sequence number, and explicitly prepending this sequence number - * to the encrypted record. In contrast, in the second transformation - * the IV is obtained by XOR'ing a static IV obtained at key extraction - * time with the 8-byte record sequence number, without prepending the - * latter to the encrypted record. - * - * Additionally, DTLS 1.2 + CID as well as TLS 1.3 use an inner plaintext - * which allows to add flexible length padding and to hide a record's true - * content type. - * - * In addition to type and version, the following parameters are relevant: - * - The symmetric cipher algorithm to be used. - * - The (static) encryption/decryption keys for the cipher. - * - For stream/CBC, the type of message digest to be used. - * - For stream/CBC, (static) encryption/decryption keys for the digest. - * - For AEAD transformations, the size (potentially 0) of an explicit, - * random initialization vector placed in encrypted records. - * - For some transformations (currently AEAD and CBC in SSL3 and TLS 1.0) - * an implicit IV. It may be static (e.g. AEAD) or dynamic (e.g. CBC) - * and (if present) is combined with the explicit IV in a transformation- - * dependent way (e.g. appending in TLS 1.2 and XOR'ing in TLS 1.3). - * - For stream/CBC, a flag determining the order of encryption and MAC. - * - The details of the transformation depend on the SSL/TLS version. - * - The length of the authentication tag. - * - * Note: Except for CBC in SSL3 and TLS 1.0, these parameters are - * constant across multiple encryption/decryption operations. - * For CBC, the implicit IV needs to be updated after each - * operation. - * - * The struct below refines this abstract view as follows: - * - The cipher underlying the transformation is managed in - * cipher contexts cipher_ctx_{enc/dec}, which must have the - * same cipher type. The mode of these cipher contexts determines - * the type of the transformation in the sense above: e.g., if - * the type is MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC resp. MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_GCM - * then the transformation has type CBC resp. AEAD. - * - The cipher keys are never stored explicitly but - * are maintained within cipher_ctx_{enc/dec}. - * - For stream/CBC transformations, the message digest contexts - * used for the MAC's are stored in md_ctx_{enc/dec}. These contexts - * are unused for AEAD transformations. - * - For stream/CBC transformations and versions > SSL3, the - * MAC keys are not stored explicitly but maintained within - * md_ctx_{enc/dec}. - * - For stream/CBC transformations and version SSL3, the MAC - * keys are stored explicitly in mac_enc, mac_dec and have - * a fixed size of 20 bytes. These fields are unused for - * AEAD transformations or transformations >= TLS 1.0. - * - For transformations using an implicit IV maintained within - * the transformation context, its contents are stored within - * iv_{enc/dec}. - * - The value of ivlen indicates the length of the IV. - * This is redundant in case of stream/CBC transformations - * which always use 0 resp. the cipher's block length as the - * IV length, but is needed for AEAD ciphers and may be - * different from the underlying cipher's block length - * in this case. - * - The field fixed_ivlen is nonzero for AEAD transformations only - * and indicates the length of the static part of the IV which is - * constant throughout the communication, and which is stored in - * the first fixed_ivlen bytes of the iv_{enc/dec} arrays. - * Note: For CBC in SSL3 and TLS 1.0, the fields iv_{enc/dec} - * still store IV's for continued use across multiple transformations, - * so it is not true that fixed_ivlen == 0 means that iv_{enc/dec} are - * not being used! - * - minor_ver denotes the SSL/TLS version - * - For stream/CBC transformations, maclen denotes the length of the - * authentication tag, while taglen is unused and 0. - * - For AEAD transformations, taglen denotes the length of the - * authentication tag, while maclen is unused and 0. - * - For CBC transformations, encrypt_then_mac determines the - * order of encryption and authentication. This field is unused - * in other transformations. - * - */ -struct mbedtls_ssl_transform { - /* - * Session specific crypto layer - */ - size_t minlen; /*!< min. ciphertext length */ - size_t ivlen; /*!< IV length */ - size_t fixed_ivlen; /*!< Fixed part of IV (AEAD) */ - size_t maclen; /*!< MAC(CBC) len */ - size_t taglen; /*!< TAG(AEAD) len */ - - unsigned char iv_enc[16]; /*!< IV (encryption) */ - unsigned char iv_dec[16]; /*!< IV (decryption) */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_MODES_USE_MAC) - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) - /* Needed only for SSL v3.0 secret */ - unsigned char mac_enc[20]; /*!< SSL v3.0 secret (enc) */ - unsigned char mac_dec[20]; /*!< SSL v3.0 secret (dec) */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 */ - - mbedtls_md_context_t md_ctx_enc; /*!< MAC (encryption) */ - mbedtls_md_context_t md_ctx_dec; /*!< MAC (decryption) */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) - int encrypt_then_mac; /*!< flag for EtM activation */ -#endif - -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_MODES_USE_MAC */ - - mbedtls_cipher_context_t cipher_ctx_enc; /*!< encryption context */ - mbedtls_cipher_context_t cipher_ctx_dec; /*!< decryption context */ - int minor_ver; - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) - uint8_t in_cid_len; - uint8_t out_cid_len; - unsigned char in_cid[MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_IN_LEN_MAX]; - unsigned char out_cid[MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX]; -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ - - /* - * Session specific compression layer - */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT) - z_stream ctx_deflate; /*!< compression context */ - z_stream ctx_inflate; /*!< decompression context */ -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CONTEXT_SERIALIZATION) - /* We need the Hello random bytes in order to re-derive keys from the - * Master Secret and other session info, see ssl_populate_transform() */ - unsigned char randbytes[64]; /*!< ServerHello.random+ClientHello.random */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CONTEXT_SERIALIZATION */ -}; - -/* - * Return 1 if the transform uses an AEAD cipher, 0 otherwise. - * Equivalently, return 0 if a separate MAC is used, 1 otherwise. - */ -static inline int mbedtls_ssl_transform_uses_aead( - const mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform) -{ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_MODES_USE_MAC) - return transform->maclen == 0 && transform->taglen != 0; -#else - (void) transform; - return 1; -#endif -} - -/* - * Internal representation of record frames - * - * Instances come in two flavors: - * (1) Encrypted - * These always have data_offset = 0 - * (2) Unencrypted - * These have data_offset set to the amount of - * pre-expansion during record protection. Concretely, - * this is the length of the fixed part of the explicit IV - * used for encryption, or 0 if no explicit IV is used - * (e.g. for CBC in TLS 1.0, or stream ciphers). - * - * The reason for the data_offset in the unencrypted case - * is to allow for in-place conversion of an unencrypted to - * an encrypted record. If the offset wasn't included, the - * encrypted content would need to be shifted afterwards to - * make space for the fixed IV. - * - */ -#if MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX > MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_IN_LEN_MAX -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_LEN_MAX MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX -#else -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_LEN_MAX MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_IN_LEN_MAX -#endif - -typedef struct { - uint8_t ctr[8]; /* In TLS: The implicit record sequence number. - * In DTLS: The 2-byte epoch followed by - * the 6-byte sequence number. - * This is stored as a raw big endian byte array - * as opposed to a uint64_t because we rarely - * need to perform arithmetic on this, but do - * need it as a Byte array for the purpose of - * MAC computations. */ - uint8_t type; /* The record content type. */ - uint8_t ver[2]; /* SSL/TLS version as present on the wire. - * Convert to internal presentation of versions - * using mbedtls_ssl_read_version() and - * mbedtls_ssl_write_version(). - * Keep wire-format for MAC computations. */ - - unsigned char *buf; /* Memory buffer enclosing the record content */ - size_t buf_len; /* Buffer length */ - size_t data_offset; /* Offset of record content */ - size_t data_len; /* Length of record content */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) - uint8_t cid_len; /* Length of the CID (0 if not present) */ - unsigned char cid[MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_LEN_MAX]; /* The CID */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ -} mbedtls_record; - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) -/* - * List of certificate + private key pairs - */ -struct mbedtls_ssl_key_cert { - mbedtls_x509_crt *cert; /*!< cert */ - mbedtls_pk_context *key; /*!< private key */ - mbedtls_ssl_key_cert *next; /*!< next key/cert pair */ -}; -#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) -/* - * List of handshake messages kept around for resending - */ -struct mbedtls_ssl_flight_item { - unsigned char *p; /*!< message, including handshake headers */ - size_t len; /*!< length of p */ - unsigned char type; /*!< type of the message: handshake or CCS */ - mbedtls_ssl_flight_item *next; /*!< next handshake message(s) */ -}; -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && \ - defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) - -/* Find an entry in a signature-hash set matching a given hash algorithm. */ -mbedtls_md_type_t mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_find(mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_t *set, - mbedtls_pk_type_t sig_alg); -/* Add a signature-hash-pair to a signature-hash set */ -void mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_add(mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_t *set, - mbedtls_pk_type_t sig_alg, - mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg); -/* Allow exactly one hash algorithm for each signature. */ -void mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_const_hash(mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_t *set, - mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg); - -/* Setup an empty signature-hash set */ -static inline void mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_init(mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_t *set) -{ - mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_const_hash(set, MBEDTLS_MD_NONE); -} - -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && - MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */ - -/** - * \brief Free referenced items in an SSL transform context and clear - * memory - * - * \param transform SSL transform context - */ -void mbedtls_ssl_transform_free(mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform); - -/** - * \brief Free referenced items in an SSL handshake context and clear - * memory - * - * \param ssl SSL context - */ -void mbedtls_ssl_handshake_free(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); - -MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL -int mbedtls_ssl_handshake_client_step(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); -MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL -int mbedtls_ssl_handshake_server_step(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); -void mbedtls_ssl_handshake_wrapup(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); - -MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL -int mbedtls_ssl_send_fatal_handshake_failure(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); - -void mbedtls_ssl_reset_checksum(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); -MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL -int mbedtls_ssl_derive_keys(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); - -MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL -int mbedtls_ssl_handle_message_type(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); -MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL -int mbedtls_ssl_prepare_handshake_record(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); -void mbedtls_ssl_update_handshake_status(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); - -/** - * \brief Update record layer - * - * This function roughly separates the implementation - * of the logic of (D)TLS from the implementation - * of the secure transport. - * - * \param ssl The SSL context to use. - * \param update_hs_digest This indicates if the handshake digest - * should be automatically updated in case - * a handshake message is found. - * - * \return 0 or non-zero error code. - * - * \note A clarification on what is called 'record layer' here - * is in order, as many sensible definitions are possible: - * - * The record layer takes as input an untrusted underlying - * transport (stream or datagram) and transforms it into - * a serially multiplexed, secure transport, which - * conceptually provides the following: - * - * (1) Three datagram based, content-agnostic transports - * for handshake, alert and CCS messages. - * (2) One stream- or datagram-based transport - * for application data. - * (3) Functionality for changing the underlying transform - * securing the contents. - * - * The interface to this functionality is given as follows: - * - * a Updating - * [Currently implemented by mbedtls_ssl_read_record] - * - * Check if and on which of the four 'ports' data is pending: - * Nothing, a controlling datagram of type (1), or application - * data (2). In any case data is present, internal buffers - * provide access to the data for the user to process it. - * Consumption of type (1) datagrams is done automatically - * on the next update, invalidating that the internal buffers - * for previous datagrams, while consumption of application - * data (2) is user-controlled. - * - * b Reading of application data - * [Currently manual adaption of ssl->in_offt pointer] - * - * As mentioned in the last paragraph, consumption of data - * is different from the automatic consumption of control - * datagrams (1) because application data is treated as a stream. - * - * c Tracking availability of application data - * [Currently manually through decreasing ssl->in_msglen] - * - * For efficiency and to retain datagram semantics for - * application data in case of DTLS, the record layer - * provides functionality for checking how much application - * data is still available in the internal buffer. - * - * d Changing the transformation securing the communication. - * - * Given an opaque implementation of the record layer in the - * above sense, it should be possible to implement the logic - * of (D)TLS on top of it without the need to know anything - * about the record layer's internals. This is done e.g. - * in all the handshake handling functions, and in the - * application data reading function mbedtls_ssl_read. - * - * \note The above tries to give a conceptual picture of the - * record layer, but the current implementation deviates - * from it in some places. For example, our implementation of - * the update functionality through mbedtls_ssl_read_record - * discards datagrams depending on the current state, which - * wouldn't fall under the record layer's responsibility - * following the above definition. - * - */ -MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL -int mbedtls_ssl_read_record(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - unsigned update_hs_digest); -MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL -int mbedtls_ssl_fetch_input(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, size_t nb_want); - -MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL -int mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); -MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL -int mbedtls_ssl_write_record(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, uint8_t force_flush); -MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL -int mbedtls_ssl_flush_output(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); - -MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL -int mbedtls_ssl_parse_certificate(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); -MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL -int mbedtls_ssl_write_certificate(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); - -MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL -int mbedtls_ssl_parse_change_cipher_spec(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); -MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL -int mbedtls_ssl_write_change_cipher_spec(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); - -MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL -int mbedtls_ssl_parse_finished(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); -MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL -int mbedtls_ssl_write_finished(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); - -void mbedtls_ssl_optimize_checksum(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info); - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED) -MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL -int mbedtls_ssl_psk_derive_premaster(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, mbedtls_key_exchange_type_t key_ex); - -/** - * Get the first defined PSK by order of precedence: - * 1. handshake PSK set by \c mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_psk() in the PSK callback - * 2. static PSK configured by \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk() - * Return a code and update the pair (PSK, PSK length) passed to this function - */ -static inline int mbedtls_ssl_get_psk(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - const unsigned char **psk, size_t *psk_len) -{ - if (ssl->handshake->psk != NULL && ssl->handshake->psk_len > 0) { - *psk = ssl->handshake->psk; - *psk_len = ssl->handshake->psk_len; - } else if (ssl->conf->psk != NULL && ssl->conf->psk_len > 0) { - *psk = ssl->conf->psk; - *psk_len = ssl->conf->psk_len; - } else { - *psk = NULL; - *psk_len = 0; - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PRIVATE_KEY_REQUIRED; - } - - return 0; -} - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) -/** - * Get the first defined opaque PSK by order of precedence: - * 1. handshake PSK set by \c mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_psk_opaque() in the PSK - * callback - * 2. static PSK configured by \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk_opaque() - * Return an opaque PSK - */ -static inline psa_key_id_t mbedtls_ssl_get_opaque_psk( - const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) -{ - if (!mbedtls_svc_key_id_is_null(ssl->handshake->psk_opaque)) { - return ssl->handshake->psk_opaque; - } - - if (!mbedtls_svc_key_id_is_null(ssl->conf->psk_opaque)) { - return ssl->conf->psk_opaque; - } - - return MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ - -#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_C) -unsigned char mbedtls_ssl_sig_from_pk(mbedtls_pk_context *pk); -unsigned char mbedtls_ssl_sig_from_pk_alg(mbedtls_pk_type_t type); -mbedtls_pk_type_t mbedtls_ssl_pk_alg_from_sig(unsigned char sig); -#endif - -mbedtls_md_type_t mbedtls_ssl_md_alg_from_hash(unsigned char hash); -unsigned char mbedtls_ssl_hash_from_md_alg(int md); -MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL -int mbedtls_ssl_set_calc_verify_md(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int md); - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) -MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL -int mbedtls_ssl_check_curve(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id); -MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL -int mbedtls_ssl_check_curve_tls_id(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, uint16_t tls_id); -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) -MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL -int mbedtls_ssl_check_sig_hash(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - mbedtls_md_type_t md); -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP) -static inline mbedtls_ssl_srtp_profile mbedtls_ssl_check_srtp_profile_value - (const uint16_t srtp_profile_value) -{ - switch (srtp_profile_value) { - case MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_AES128_CM_HMAC_SHA1_80: - case MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_AES128_CM_HMAC_SHA1_32: - case MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_NULL_HMAC_SHA1_80: - case MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_NULL_HMAC_SHA1_32: - return srtp_profile_value; - default: break; - } - return MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_UNSET; -} -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) -static inline mbedtls_pk_context *mbedtls_ssl_own_key(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) -{ - mbedtls_ssl_key_cert *key_cert; - - if (ssl->handshake != NULL && ssl->handshake->key_cert != NULL) { - key_cert = ssl->handshake->key_cert; - } else { - key_cert = ssl->conf->key_cert; - } - - return key_cert == NULL ? NULL : key_cert->key; -} - -static inline mbedtls_x509_crt *mbedtls_ssl_own_cert(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) -{ - mbedtls_ssl_key_cert *key_cert; - - if (ssl->handshake != NULL && ssl->handshake->key_cert != NULL) { - key_cert = ssl->handshake->key_cert; - } else { - key_cert = ssl->conf->key_cert; - } - - return key_cert == NULL ? NULL : key_cert->cert; -} - -/* - * Check usage of a certificate wrt extensions: - * keyUsage, extendedKeyUsage (later), and nSCertType (later). - * - * Warning: cert_endpoint is the endpoint of the cert (ie, of our peer when we - * check a cert we received from them)! - * - * Return 0 if everything is OK, -1 if not. - */ -MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL -int mbedtls_ssl_check_cert_usage(const mbedtls_x509_crt *cert, - const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite, - int cert_endpoint, - uint32_t *flags); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ - -void mbedtls_ssl_write_version(int major, int minor, int transport, - unsigned char ver[2]); -void mbedtls_ssl_read_version(int *major, int *minor, int transport, - const unsigned char ver[2]); - -static inline size_t mbedtls_ssl_in_hdr_len(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) -{ -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) - ((void) ssl); -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) - if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM) { - return 13; - } else -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ - { - return 5; - } -} - -static inline size_t mbedtls_ssl_out_hdr_len(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) -{ - return (size_t) (ssl->out_iv - ssl->out_hdr); -} - -static inline size_t mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) -{ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) - if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM) { - return 12; - } -#else - ((void) ssl); -#endif - return 4; -} - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) -void mbedtls_ssl_send_flight_completed(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); -void mbedtls_ssl_recv_flight_completed(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); -MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL -int mbedtls_ssl_resend(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); -MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL -int mbedtls_ssl_flight_transmit(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); -#endif - -/* Visible for testing purposes only */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY) -MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL -int mbedtls_ssl_dtls_replay_check(mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl); -void mbedtls_ssl_dtls_replay_update(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); -#endif - -MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL -int mbedtls_ssl_session_copy(mbedtls_ssl_session *dst, - const mbedtls_ssl_session *src); - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) -MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL -int mbedtls_ssl_get_key_exchange_md_ssl_tls(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - unsigned char *output, - unsigned char *data, size_t data_len); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 || MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 || \ - MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) -/* The hash buffer must have at least MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE bytes of length. */ -MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL -int mbedtls_ssl_get_key_exchange_md_tls1_2(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - unsigned char *hash, size_t *hashlen, - unsigned char *data, size_t data_len, - mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 || MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 || \ - MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ - -#ifdef __cplusplus -} -#endif - -void mbedtls_ssl_transform_init(mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform); -MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL -int mbedtls_ssl_encrypt_buf(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform, - mbedtls_record *rec, - int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), - void *p_rng); -MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL -int mbedtls_ssl_decrypt_buf(mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl, - mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform, - mbedtls_record *rec); - -/* Length of the "epoch" field in the record header */ -static inline size_t mbedtls_ssl_ep_len(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) -{ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) - if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM) { - return 2; - } -#else - ((void) ssl); -#endif - return 0; -} - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) -MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL -int mbedtls_ssl_resend_hello_request(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ - -void mbedtls_ssl_set_timer(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, uint32_t millisecs); -MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL -int mbedtls_ssl_check_timer(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); - -void mbedtls_ssl_reset_in_out_pointers(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); -void mbedtls_ssl_update_out_pointers(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform); -void mbedtls_ssl_update_in_pointers(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); - -MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL -int mbedtls_ssl_session_reset_int(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int partial); - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY) -void mbedtls_ssl_dtls_replay_reset(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); -#endif - -void mbedtls_ssl_handshake_wrapup_free_hs_transform(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) -MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL -int mbedtls_ssl_start_renegotiation(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) -size_t mbedtls_ssl_get_current_mtu(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); -void mbedtls_ssl_buffering_free(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); -void mbedtls_ssl_flight_free(mbedtls_ssl_flight_item *flight); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS) -int mbedtls_ssl_check_dtls_clihlo_cookie( - mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - const unsigned char *cli_id, size_t cli_id_len, - const unsigned char *in, size_t in_len, - unsigned char *obuf, size_t buf_len, size_t *olen); -#endif - -#endif /* ssl_internal.h */ diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/ssl_ticket.h b/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/ssl_ticket.h index ad1592357b2c..2ee140021037 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/ssl_ticket.h +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/ssl_ticket.h @@ -9,12 +9,9 @@ */ #ifndef MBEDTLS_SSL_TICKET_H #define MBEDTLS_SSL_TICKET_H +#include "mbedtls/private_access.h" -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "mbedtls/build_info.h" /* * This implementation of the session ticket callbacks includes key @@ -25,6 +22,14 @@ #include "mbedtls/ssl.h" #include "mbedtls/cipher.h" +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) +#include "mbedtls/platform_time.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +#include "psa/crypto.h" +#endif + #if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) #include "mbedtls/threading.h" #endif @@ -33,13 +38,30 @@ extern "C" { #endif +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TICKET_MAX_KEY_BYTES 32 /*!< Max supported key length in bytes */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TICKET_KEY_NAME_BYTES 4 /*!< key name length in bytes */ + /** * \brief Information for session ticket protection */ typedef struct mbedtls_ssl_ticket_key { - unsigned char name[4]; /*!< random key identifier */ - uint32_t generation_time; /*!< key generation timestamp (seconds) */ - mbedtls_cipher_context_t ctx; /*!< context for auth enc/decryption */ + unsigned char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(name)[MBEDTLS_SSL_TICKET_KEY_NAME_BYTES]; + /*!< random key identifier */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) + mbedtls_time_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(generation_time); /*!< key generation timestamp (seconds) */ +#endif + /*! Lifetime of the key in seconds. This is also the lifetime of the + * tickets created under that key. + */ + uint32_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(lifetime); +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + mbedtls_cipher_context_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(ctx); /*!< context for auth enc/decryption */ +#else + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(key); /*!< key used for auth enc/decryption */ + psa_algorithm_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(alg); /*!< algorithm of auth enc/decryption */ + psa_key_type_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(key_type); /*!< key type */ + size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(key_bits); /*!< key length in bits */ +#endif } mbedtls_ssl_ticket_key; @@ -47,17 +69,17 @@ mbedtls_ssl_ticket_key; * \brief Context for session ticket handling functions */ typedef struct mbedtls_ssl_ticket_context { - mbedtls_ssl_ticket_key keys[2]; /*!< ticket protection keys */ - unsigned char active; /*!< index of the currently active key */ + mbedtls_ssl_ticket_key MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(keys)[2]; /*!< ticket protection keys */ + unsigned char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(active); /*!< index of the currently active key */ - uint32_t ticket_lifetime; /*!< lifetime of tickets in seconds */ + uint32_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(ticket_lifetime); /*!< lifetime of tickets in seconds */ /** Callback for getting (pseudo-)random numbers */ - int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t); - void *p_rng; /*!< context for the RNG function */ + int(*MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(f_rng))(void *, unsigned char *, size_t); + void *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(p_rng); /*!< context for the RNG function */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) - mbedtls_threading_mutex_t mutex; + mbedtls_threading_mutex_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(mutex); #endif } mbedtls_ssl_ticket_context; @@ -75,7 +97,7 @@ void mbedtls_ssl_ticket_init(mbedtls_ssl_ticket_context *ctx); * \brief Prepare context to be actually used * * \param ctx Context to be set up - * \param f_rng RNG callback function + * \param f_rng RNG callback function (mandatory) * \param p_rng RNG callback context * \param cipher AEAD cipher to use for ticket protection. * Recommended value: MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_GCM. @@ -86,10 +108,16 @@ void mbedtls_ssl_ticket_init(mbedtls_ssl_ticket_context *ctx); * least as strong as the strongest ciphersuite * supported. Usually that means a 256-bit key. * - * \note The lifetime of the keys is twice the lifetime of tickets. - * It is recommended to pick a reasonable lifetime so as not + * \note It is recommended to pick a reasonable lifetime so as not * to negate the benefits of forward secrecy. * + * \note The TLS 1.3 specification states that ticket lifetime must + * be smaller than seven days. If ticket lifetime has been + * set to a value greater than seven days in this module then + * if the TLS 1.3 is configured to send tickets after the + * handshake it will fail the connection when trying to send + * the first ticket. + * * \return 0 if successful, * or a specific MBEDTLS_ERR_XXX error code */ @@ -98,6 +126,49 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_ticket_setup(mbedtls_ssl_ticket_context *ctx, mbedtls_cipher_type_t cipher, uint32_t lifetime); +/** + * \brief Rotate session ticket encryption key to new specified key. + * Provides for external control of session ticket encryption + * key rotation, e.g. for synchronization between different + * machines. If this function is not used, or if not called + * before ticket lifetime expires, then a new session ticket + * encryption key is generated internally in order to avoid + * unbounded session ticket encryption key lifetimes. + * + * \param ctx Context to be set up + * \param name Session ticket encryption key name + * \param nlength Session ticket encryption key name length in bytes + * \param k Session ticket encryption key + * \param klength Session ticket encryption key length in bytes + * \param lifetime Tickets lifetime in seconds + * Recommended value: 86400 (one day). + * + * \note \c name and \c k are recommended to be cryptographically + * random data. + * + * \note \c nlength must match sizeof( ctx->name ) + * + * \note \c klength must be sufficient for use by cipher specified + * to \c mbedtls_ssl_ticket_setup + * + * \note It is recommended to pick a reasonable lifetime so as not + * to negate the benefits of forward secrecy. + * + * \note The TLS 1.3 specification states that ticket lifetime must + * be smaller than seven days. If ticket lifetime has been + * set to a value greater than seven days in this module then + * if the TLS 1.3 is configured to send tickets after the + * handshake it will fail the connection when trying to send + * the first ticket. + * + * \return 0 if successful, + * or a specific MBEDTLS_ERR_XXX error code + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_ticket_rotate(mbedtls_ssl_ticket_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *name, size_t nlength, + const unsigned char *k, size_t klength, + uint32_t lifetime); + /** * \brief Implementation of the ticket write callback * diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/threading.h b/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/threading.h index 2a03afeef9c3..d50d04ead105 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/threading.h +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/threading.h @@ -9,12 +9,9 @@ */ #ifndef MBEDTLS_THREADING_H #define MBEDTLS_THREADING_H +#include "mbedtls/private_access.h" -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "mbedtls/build_info.h" #include @@ -22,11 +19,6 @@ extern "C" { #endif -/* MBEDTLS_ERR_THREADING_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE is deprecated and should not be - * used. */ -/** The selected feature is not available. */ -#define MBEDTLS_ERR_THREADING_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE -0x001A - /** Bad input parameters to function. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_THREADING_BAD_INPUT_DATA -0x001C /** Locking / unlocking / free failed with error code. */ @@ -35,11 +27,15 @@ extern "C" { #if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_PTHREAD) #include typedef struct mbedtls_threading_mutex_t { - pthread_mutex_t mutex; - /* is_valid is 0 after a failed init or a free, and nonzero after a - * successful init. This field is not considered part of the public - * API of Mbed TLS and may change without notice. */ - char is_valid; + pthread_mutex_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(mutex); + + /* WARNING - state should only be accessed when holding the mutex lock in + * tests/src/threading_helpers.c, otherwise corruption can occur. + * state will be 0 after a failed init or a free, and nonzero after a + * successful init. This field is for testing only and thus not considered + * part of the public API of Mbed TLS and may change without notice.*/ + char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(state); + } mbedtls_threading_mutex_t; #endif @@ -104,6 +100,34 @@ extern mbedtls_threading_mutex_t mbedtls_threading_readdir_mutex; extern mbedtls_threading_mutex_t mbedtls_threading_gmtime_mutex; #endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE && !MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_GMTIME_R_ALT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) +/* + * A mutex used to make the PSA subsystem thread safe. + * + * key_slot_mutex protects the registered_readers and + * state variable for all key slots in &global_data.key_slots. + * + * This mutex must be held when any read from or write to a state or + * registered_readers field is performed, i.e. when calling functions: + * psa_key_slot_state_transition(), psa_register_read(), psa_unregister_read(), + * psa_key_slot_has_readers() and psa_wipe_key_slot(). */ +extern mbedtls_threading_mutex_t mbedtls_threading_key_slot_mutex; + +/* + * A mutex used to make the non-rng PSA global_data struct members thread safe. + * + * This mutex must be held when reading or writing to any of the PSA global_data + * structure members, other than the rng_state or rng struct. */ +extern mbedtls_threading_mutex_t mbedtls_threading_psa_globaldata_mutex; + +/* + * A mutex used to make the PSA global_data rng data thread safe. + * + * This mutex must be held when reading or writing to the PSA + * global_data rng_state or rng struct members. */ +extern mbedtls_threading_mutex_t mbedtls_threading_psa_rngdata_mutex; +#endif + #endif /* MBEDTLS_THREADING_C */ #ifdef __cplusplus diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/timing.h b/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/timing.h index bbc8fff7630c..62ae1022d91d 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/timing.h +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/timing.h @@ -9,12 +9,9 @@ */ #ifndef MBEDTLS_TIMING_H #define MBEDTLS_TIMING_H +#include "mbedtls/private_access.h" -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "mbedtls/build_info.h" #include @@ -30,67 +27,25 @@ extern "C" { * \brief timer structure */ struct mbedtls_timing_hr_time { - unsigned char opaque[32]; + uint64_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(opaque)[4]; }; /** * \brief Context for mbedtls_timing_set/get_delay() */ typedef struct mbedtls_timing_delay_context { - struct mbedtls_timing_hr_time timer; - uint32_t int_ms; - uint32_t fin_ms; + struct mbedtls_timing_hr_time MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(timer); + uint32_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(int_ms); + uint32_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(fin_ms); } mbedtls_timing_delay_context; #else /* MBEDTLS_TIMING_ALT */ #include "timing_alt.h" #endif /* MBEDTLS_TIMING_ALT */ -extern volatile int mbedtls_timing_alarmed; - -/** - * \brief Return the CPU cycle counter value - * - * \warning This is only a best effort! Do not rely on this! - * In particular, it is known to be unreliable on virtual - * machines. - * - * \note This value starts at an unspecified origin and - * may wrap around. - */ -unsigned long mbedtls_timing_hardclock(void); - -/** - * \brief Return the elapsed time in milliseconds - * - * \param val points to a timer structure - * \param reset If 0, query the elapsed time. Otherwise (re)start the timer. - * - * \return Elapsed time since the previous reset in ms. When - * restarting, this is always 0. - * - * \note To initialize a timer, call this function with reset=1. - * - * Determining the elapsed time and resetting the timer is not - * atomic on all platforms, so after the sequence - * `{ get_timer(1); ...; time1 = get_timer(1); ...; time2 = - * get_timer(0) }` the value time1+time2 is only approximately - * the delay since the first reset. - */ +/* Internal use */ unsigned long mbedtls_timing_get_timer(struct mbedtls_timing_hr_time *val, int reset); -/** - * \brief Setup an alarm clock - * - * \param seconds delay before the "mbedtls_timing_alarmed" flag is set - * (must be >=0) - * - * \warning Only one alarm at a time is supported. In a threaded - * context, this means one for the whole process, not one per - * thread. - */ -void mbedtls_set_alarm(int seconds); - /** * \brief Set a pair of delays to watch * (See \c mbedtls_timing_get_delay().) @@ -121,14 +76,16 @@ void mbedtls_timing_set_delay(void *data, uint32_t int_ms, uint32_t fin_ms); */ int mbedtls_timing_get_delay(void *data); -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) /** - * \brief Checkup routine + * \brief Get the final timing delay * - * \return 0 if successful, or 1 if a test failed + * \param data Pointer to timing data + * Must point to a valid \c mbedtls_timing_delay_context struct. + * + * \return Final timing delay in milliseconds. */ -int mbedtls_timing_self_test(int verbose); -#endif +uint32_t mbedtls_timing_get_final_delay( + const mbedtls_timing_delay_context *data); #ifdef __cplusplus } diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/version.h b/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/version.h index bbe76b173929..637f9d38bf6d 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/version.h +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/version.h @@ -8,34 +8,14 @@ * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later */ /* - * This set of compile-time defines and run-time variables can be used to - * determine the version number of the Mbed TLS library used. + * This set of run-time variables can be used to determine the version number of + * the Mbed TLS library used. Compile-time version defines for the same can be + * found in build_info.h */ #ifndef MBEDTLS_VERSION_H #define MBEDTLS_VERSION_H -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif - -/** - * The version number x.y.z is split into three parts. - * Major, Minor, Patchlevel - */ -#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_MAJOR 2 -#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_MINOR 28 -#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_PATCH 8 - -/** - * The single version number has the following structure: - * MMNNPP00 - * Major version | Minor version | Patch version - */ -#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_NUMBER 0x021C0800 -#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_STRING "2.28.8" -#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_STRING_FULL "Mbed TLS 2.28.8" +#include "mbedtls/build_info.h" #if defined(MBEDTLS_VERSION_C) @@ -78,7 +58,7 @@ void mbedtls_version_get_string_full(char *string); * * \note only checks against defines in the sections "System * support", "Mbed TLS modules" and "Mbed TLS feature - * support" in config.h + * support" in mbedtls_config.h * * \param feature The string for the define to check (e.g. "MBEDTLS_AES_C") * diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/x509.h b/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/x509.h index bde998c34f9f..453f598c746b 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/x509.h +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/x509.h @@ -9,12 +9,9 @@ */ #ifndef MBEDTLS_X509_H #define MBEDTLS_X509_H +#include "mbedtls/private_access.h" -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "mbedtls/build_info.h" #include "mbedtls/asn1.h" #include "mbedtls/pk.h" @@ -139,7 +136,7 @@ /* * X.509 v3 Key Usage Extension flags - * Reminder: update x509_info_key_usage() when adding new flags. + * Reminder: update mbedtls_x509_info_key_usage() when adding new flags. */ #define MBEDTLS_X509_KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE (0x80) /* bit 0 */ #define MBEDTLS_X509_KU_NON_REPUDIATION (0x40) /* bit 1 */ @@ -234,6 +231,17 @@ typedef mbedtls_asn1_named_data mbedtls_x509_name; */ typedef mbedtls_asn1_sequence mbedtls_x509_sequence; +/* + * Container for the fields of the Authority Key Identifier object + */ +typedef struct mbedtls_x509_authority { + mbedtls_x509_buf keyIdentifier; + mbedtls_x509_sequence authorityCertIssuer; + mbedtls_x509_buf authorityCertSerialNumber; + mbedtls_x509_buf raw; +} +mbedtls_x509_authority; + /** Container for date and time (precision in seconds). */ typedef struct mbedtls_x509_time { int year, mon, day; /**< Date. */ @@ -241,7 +249,65 @@ typedef struct mbedtls_x509_time { } mbedtls_x509_time; +/** + * From RFC 5280 section 4.2.1.6: + * OtherName ::= SEQUENCE { + * type-id OBJECT IDENTIFIER, + * value [0] EXPLICIT ANY DEFINED BY type-id } + * + * Future versions of the library may add new fields to this structure or + * to its embedded union and structure. + */ +typedef struct mbedtls_x509_san_other_name { + /** + * The type_id is an OID as defined in RFC 5280. + * To check the value of the type id, you should use + * \p MBEDTLS_OID_CMP with a known OID mbedtls_x509_buf. + */ + mbedtls_x509_buf type_id; /**< The type id. */ + union { + /** + * From RFC 4108 section 5: + * HardwareModuleName ::= SEQUENCE { + * hwType OBJECT IDENTIFIER, + * hwSerialNum OCTET STRING } + */ + struct { + mbedtls_x509_buf oid; /**< The object identifier. */ + mbedtls_x509_buf val; /**< The named value. */ + } + hardware_module_name; + } + value; +} +mbedtls_x509_san_other_name; + +/** + * A structure for holding the parsed Subject Alternative Name, + * according to type. + * + * Future versions of the library may add new fields to this structure or + * to its embedded union and structure. + */ +typedef struct mbedtls_x509_subject_alternative_name { + int type; /**< The SAN type, value of MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_XXX. */ + union { + mbedtls_x509_san_other_name other_name; + mbedtls_x509_name directory_name; + mbedtls_x509_buf unstructured_name; /**< The buffer for the unstructured types. rfc822Name, dnsName and uniformResourceIdentifier are currently supported. */ + } + san; /**< A union of the supported SAN types */ +} +mbedtls_x509_subject_alternative_name; + +typedef struct mbedtls_x509_san_list { + mbedtls_x509_subject_alternative_name node; + struct mbedtls_x509_san_list *next; +} +mbedtls_x509_san_list; + /** \} name Structures for parsing X.509 certificates, CRLs and CSRs */ +/** \} addtogroup x509_module */ /** * \brief Store the certificate DN in printable form into buf; @@ -256,6 +322,43 @@ mbedtls_x509_time; */ int mbedtls_x509_dn_gets(char *buf, size_t size, const mbedtls_x509_name *dn); +/** + * \brief Convert the certificate DN string \p name into + * a linked list of mbedtls_x509_name (equivalent to + * mbedtls_asn1_named_data). + * + * \note This function allocates a linked list, and places the head + * pointer in \p head. This list must later be freed by a + * call to mbedtls_asn1_free_named_data_list(). + * + * \param[out] head Address in which to store the pointer to the head of the + * allocated list of mbedtls_x509_name + * \param[in] name The string representation of a DN to convert + * + * \return 0 on success, or a negative error code. + */ +int mbedtls_x509_string_to_names(mbedtls_asn1_named_data **head, const char *name); + +/** + * \brief Return the next relative DN in an X509 name. + * + * \note Intended use is to compare function result to dn->next + * in order to detect boundaries of multi-valued RDNs. + * + * \param dn Current node in the X509 name + * + * \return Pointer to the first attribute-value pair of the + * next RDN in sequence, or NULL if end is reached. + */ +static inline mbedtls_x509_name *mbedtls_x509_dn_get_next( + mbedtls_x509_name *dn) +{ + while (dn->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(next_merged) && dn->next != NULL) { + dn = dn->next; + } + return dn->next; +} + /** * \brief Store the certificate serial in printable form into buf; * no more than size characters will be written. @@ -269,6 +372,31 @@ int mbedtls_x509_dn_gets(char *buf, size_t size, const mbedtls_x509_name *dn); */ int mbedtls_x509_serial_gets(char *buf, size_t size, const mbedtls_x509_buf *serial); +/** + * \brief Compare pair of mbedtls_x509_time. + * + * \param t1 mbedtls_x509_time to compare + * \param t2 mbedtls_x509_time to compare + * + * \return < 0 if t1 is before t2 + * 0 if t1 equals t2 + * > 0 if t1 is after t2 + */ +int mbedtls_x509_time_cmp(const mbedtls_x509_time *t1, const mbedtls_x509_time *t2); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE) +/** + * \brief Fill mbedtls_x509_time with provided mbedtls_time_t. + * + * \param tt mbedtls_time_t to convert + * \param now mbedtls_x509_time to fill with converted mbedtls_time_t + * + * \return \c 0 on success + * \return A non-zero return value on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_x509_time_gmtime(mbedtls_time_t tt, mbedtls_x509_time *now); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE */ + /** * \brief Check a given mbedtls_x509_time against the system time * and tell if it's in the past. @@ -297,60 +425,63 @@ int mbedtls_x509_time_is_past(const mbedtls_x509_time *to); */ int mbedtls_x509_time_is_future(const mbedtls_x509_time *from); -/** \} addtogroup x509_module */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) - /** - * \brief Checkup routine + * \brief This function parses an item in the SubjectAlternativeNames + * extension. Please note that this function might allocate + * additional memory for a subject alternative name, thus + * mbedtls_x509_free_subject_alt_name has to be called + * to dispose of this additional memory afterwards. * - * \return 0 if successful, or 1 if the test failed + * \param san_buf The buffer holding the raw data item of the subject + * alternative name. + * \param san The target structure to populate with the parsed presentation + * of the subject alternative name encoded in \p san_buf. + * + * \note Supported GeneralName types, as defined in RFC 5280: + * "rfc822Name", "dnsName", "directoryName", + * "uniformResourceIdentifier" and "hardware_module_name" + * of type "otherName", as defined in RFC 4108. + * + * \note This function should be called on a single raw data of + * subject alternative name. For example, after successful + * certificate parsing, one must iterate on every item in the + * \c crt->subject_alt_names sequence, and pass it to + * this function. + * + * \warning The target structure contains pointers to the raw data of the + * parsed certificate, and its lifetime is restricted by the + * lifetime of the certificate. + * + * \return \c 0 on success + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE for an unsupported + * SAN type. + * \return Another negative value for any other failure. */ -int mbedtls_x509_self_test(int verbose); - -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ +int mbedtls_x509_parse_subject_alt_name(const mbedtls_x509_buf *san_buf, + mbedtls_x509_subject_alternative_name *san); +/** + * \brief Unallocate all data related to subject alternative name + * + * \param san SAN structure - extra memory owned by this structure will be freed + */ +void mbedtls_x509_free_subject_alt_name(mbedtls_x509_subject_alternative_name *san); -/* - * Internal module functions. You probably do not want to use these unless you - * know you do. +/** + * \brief This function parses a CN string as an IP address. + * + * \param cn The CN string to parse. CN string MUST be null-terminated. + * \param dst The target buffer to populate with the binary IP address. + * The buffer MUST be 16 bytes to save IPv6, and should be + * 4-byte aligned if the result will be used as struct in_addr. + * e.g. uint32_t dst[4] + * + * \note \p cn is parsed as an IPv6 address if string contains ':', + * else \p cn is parsed as an IPv4 address. + * + * \return Length of binary IP address; num bytes written to target. + * \return \c 0 on failure to parse CN string as an IP address. */ -int mbedtls_x509_get_name(unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, - mbedtls_x509_name *cur); -int mbedtls_x509_get_alg_null(unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, - mbedtls_x509_buf *alg); -int mbedtls_x509_get_alg(unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, - mbedtls_x509_buf *alg, mbedtls_x509_buf *params); -#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT) -int mbedtls_x509_get_rsassa_pss_params(const mbedtls_x509_buf *params, - mbedtls_md_type_t *md_alg, mbedtls_md_type_t *mgf_md, - int *salt_len); -#endif -int mbedtls_x509_get_sig(unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, mbedtls_x509_buf *sig); -int mbedtls_x509_get_sig_alg(const mbedtls_x509_buf *sig_oid, const mbedtls_x509_buf *sig_params, - mbedtls_md_type_t *md_alg, mbedtls_pk_type_t *pk_alg, - void **sig_opts); -int mbedtls_x509_get_time(unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, - mbedtls_x509_time *t); -int mbedtls_x509_get_serial(unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, - mbedtls_x509_buf *serial); -int mbedtls_x509_get_ext(unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, - mbedtls_x509_buf *ext, int tag); -int mbedtls_x509_sig_alg_gets(char *buf, size_t size, const mbedtls_x509_buf *sig_oid, - mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_alg, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, - const void *sig_opts); -int mbedtls_x509_key_size_helper(char *buf, size_t buf_size, const char *name); -int mbedtls_x509_string_to_names(mbedtls_asn1_named_data **head, const char *name); -int mbedtls_x509_set_extension(mbedtls_asn1_named_data **head, const char *oid, size_t oid_len, - int critical, const unsigned char *val, - size_t val_len); -int mbedtls_x509_write_extensions(unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, - mbedtls_asn1_named_data *first); -int mbedtls_x509_write_names(unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, - mbedtls_asn1_named_data *first); -int mbedtls_x509_write_sig(unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, - const char *oid, size_t oid_len, - unsigned char *sig, size_t size, - mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_alg); +size_t mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_cn_inet_pton(const char *cn, void *dst); #define MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF \ do { \ @@ -365,4 +496,4 @@ int mbedtls_x509_write_sig(unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, } #endif -#endif /* x509.h */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_H */ diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/x509_crl.h b/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/x509_crl.h index 9f755f8535c5..6625a44f468c 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/x509_crl.h +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/x509_crl.h @@ -9,12 +9,9 @@ */ #ifndef MBEDTLS_X509_CRL_H #define MBEDTLS_X509_CRL_H +#include "mbedtls/private_access.h" -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "mbedtls/build_info.h" #include "mbedtls/x509.h" @@ -34,16 +31,28 @@ extern "C" { /** * Certificate revocation list entry. * Contains the CA-specific serial numbers and revocation dates. + * + * Some fields of this structure are publicly readable. Do not modify + * them except via Mbed TLS library functions: the effect of modifying + * those fields or the data that those fields points to is unspecified. */ typedef struct mbedtls_x509_crl_entry { + /** Direct access to the whole entry inside the containing buffer. */ mbedtls_x509_buf raw; - + /** The serial number of the revoked certificate. */ mbedtls_x509_buf serial; - + /** The revocation date of this entry. */ mbedtls_x509_time revocation_date; - + /** Direct access to the list of CRL entry extensions + * (an ASN.1 constructed sequence). + * + * If there are no extensions, `entry_ext.len == 0` and + * `entry_ext.p == NULL`. */ mbedtls_x509_buf entry_ext; + /** Next element in the linked list of entries. + * \p NULL indicates the end of the list. + * Do not modify this field directly. */ struct mbedtls_x509_crl_entry *next; } mbedtls_x509_crl_entry; @@ -70,12 +79,15 @@ typedef struct mbedtls_x509_crl { mbedtls_x509_buf crl_ext; - mbedtls_x509_buf sig_oid2; - mbedtls_x509_buf sig; - mbedtls_md_type_t sig_md; /**< Internal representation of the MD algorithm of the signature algorithm, e.g. MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256 */ - mbedtls_pk_type_t sig_pk; /**< Internal representation of the Public Key algorithm of the signature algorithm, e.g. MBEDTLS_PK_RSA */ - void *sig_opts; /**< Signature options to be passed to mbedtls_pk_verify_ext(), e.g. for RSASSA-PSS */ + mbedtls_x509_buf MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(sig_oid2); + mbedtls_x509_buf MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(sig); + mbedtls_md_type_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(sig_md); /**< Internal representation of the MD algorithm of the signature algorithm, e.g. MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256 */ + mbedtls_pk_type_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(sig_pk); /**< Internal representation of the Public Key algorithm of the signature algorithm, e.g. MBEDTLS_PK_RSA */ + void *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(sig_opts); /**< Signature options to be passed to mbedtls_pk_verify_ext(), e.g. for RSASSA-PSS */ + /** Next element in the linked list of CRL. + * \p NULL indicates the end of the list. + * Do not modify this field directly. */ struct mbedtls_x509_crl *next; } mbedtls_x509_crl; @@ -132,6 +144,7 @@ int mbedtls_x509_crl_parse(mbedtls_x509_crl *chain, const unsigned char *buf, si int mbedtls_x509_crl_parse_file(mbedtls_x509_crl *chain, const char *path); #endif /* MBEDTLS_FS_IO */ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_REMOVE_INFO) /** * \brief Returns an informational string about the CRL. * @@ -145,6 +158,7 @@ int mbedtls_x509_crl_parse_file(mbedtls_x509_crl *chain, const char *path); */ int mbedtls_x509_crl_info(char *buf, size_t size, const char *prefix, const mbedtls_x509_crl *crl); +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_X509_REMOVE_INFO */ /** * \brief Initialize a CRL (chain) diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/x509_crt.h b/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/x509_crt.h index e6d6a2cc1080..1ce0d23619f5 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/x509_crt.h +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/x509_crt.h @@ -9,12 +9,9 @@ */ #ifndef MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_H #define MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_H +#include "mbedtls/private_access.h" -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "mbedtls/build_info.h" #include "mbedtls/x509.h" #include "mbedtls/x509_crl.h" @@ -36,10 +33,14 @@ extern "C" { /** * Container for an X.509 certificate. The certificate may be chained. + * + * Some fields of this structure are publicly readable. Do not modify + * them except via Mbed TLS library functions: the effect of modifying + * those fields or the data that those fields points to is unspecified. */ typedef struct mbedtls_x509_crt { - int own_buffer; /**< Indicates if \c raw is owned - * by the structure or not. */ + int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(own_buffer); /**< Indicates if \c raw is owned + * by the structure or not. */ mbedtls_x509_buf raw; /**< The raw certificate data (DER). */ mbedtls_x509_buf tbs; /**< The raw certificate body (DER). The part that is To Be Signed. */ @@ -62,72 +63,34 @@ typedef struct mbedtls_x509_crt { mbedtls_x509_buf issuer_id; /**< Optional X.509 v2/v3 issuer unique identifier. */ mbedtls_x509_buf subject_id; /**< Optional X.509 v2/v3 subject unique identifier. */ mbedtls_x509_buf v3_ext; /**< Optional X.509 v3 extensions. */ - mbedtls_x509_sequence subject_alt_names; /**< Optional list of raw entries of Subject Alternative Names extension (currently only dNSName and OtherName are listed). */ + mbedtls_x509_sequence subject_alt_names; /**< Optional list of raw entries of Subject Alternative Names extension. These can be later parsed by mbedtls_x509_parse_subject_alt_name. */ + mbedtls_x509_buf subject_key_id; /**< Optional X.509 v3 extension subject key identifier. */ + mbedtls_x509_authority authority_key_id; /**< Optional X.509 v3 extension authority key identifier. */ mbedtls_x509_sequence certificate_policies; /**< Optional list of certificate policies (Only anyPolicy is printed and enforced, however the rest of the policies are still listed). */ - int ext_types; /**< Bit string containing detected and parsed extensions */ - int ca_istrue; /**< Optional Basic Constraint extension value: 1 if this certificate belongs to a CA, 0 otherwise. */ - int max_pathlen; /**< Optional Basic Constraint extension value: The maximum path length to the root certificate. Path length is 1 higher than RFC 5280 'meaning', so 1+ */ + int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(ext_types); /**< Bit string containing detected and parsed extensions */ + int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(ca_istrue); /**< Optional Basic Constraint extension value: 1 if this certificate belongs to a CA, 0 otherwise. */ + int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(max_pathlen); /**< Optional Basic Constraint extension value: The maximum path length to the root certificate. Path length is 1 higher than RFC 5280 'meaning', so 1+ */ - unsigned int key_usage; /**< Optional key usage extension value: See the values in x509.h */ + unsigned int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(key_usage); /**< Optional key usage extension value: See the values in x509.h */ mbedtls_x509_sequence ext_key_usage; /**< Optional list of extended key usage OIDs. */ - unsigned char ns_cert_type; /**< Optional Netscape certificate type extension value: See the values in x509.h */ + unsigned char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(ns_cert_type); /**< Optional Netscape certificate type extension value: See the values in x509.h */ - mbedtls_x509_buf sig; /**< Signature: hash of the tbs part signed with the private key. */ - mbedtls_md_type_t sig_md; /**< Internal representation of the MD algorithm of the signature algorithm, e.g. MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256 */ - mbedtls_pk_type_t sig_pk; /**< Internal representation of the Public Key algorithm of the signature algorithm, e.g. MBEDTLS_PK_RSA */ - void *sig_opts; /**< Signature options to be passed to mbedtls_pk_verify_ext(), e.g. for RSASSA-PSS */ + mbedtls_x509_buf MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(sig); /**< Signature: hash of the tbs part signed with the private key. */ + mbedtls_md_type_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(sig_md); /**< Internal representation of the MD algorithm of the signature algorithm, e.g. MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256 */ + mbedtls_pk_type_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(sig_pk); /**< Internal representation of the Public Key algorithm of the signature algorithm, e.g. MBEDTLS_PK_RSA */ + void *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(sig_opts); /**< Signature options to be passed to mbedtls_pk_verify_ext(), e.g. for RSASSA-PSS */ - struct mbedtls_x509_crt *next; /**< Next certificate in the CA-chain. */ + /** Next certificate in the linked list that constitutes the CA chain. + * \p NULL indicates the end of the list. + * Do not modify this field directly. */ + struct mbedtls_x509_crt *next; } mbedtls_x509_crt; -/** - * From RFC 5280 section 4.2.1.6: - * OtherName ::= SEQUENCE { - * type-id OBJECT IDENTIFIER, - * value [0] EXPLICIT ANY DEFINED BY type-id } - */ -typedef struct mbedtls_x509_san_other_name { - /** - * The type_id is an OID as defined in RFC 5280. - * To check the value of the type id, you should use - * \p MBEDTLS_OID_CMP with a known OID mbedtls_x509_buf. - */ - mbedtls_x509_buf type_id; /**< The type id. */ - union { - /** - * From RFC 4108 section 5: - * HardwareModuleName ::= SEQUENCE { - * hwType OBJECT IDENTIFIER, - * hwSerialNum OCTET STRING } - */ - struct { - mbedtls_x509_buf oid; /**< The object identifier. */ - mbedtls_x509_buf val; /**< The named value. */ - } - hardware_module_name; - } - value; -} -mbedtls_x509_san_other_name; - -/** - * A structure for holding the parsed Subject Alternative Name, according to type - */ -typedef struct mbedtls_x509_subject_alternative_name { - int type; /**< The SAN type, value of MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_XXX. */ - union { - mbedtls_x509_san_other_name other_name; /**< The otherName supported type. */ - mbedtls_x509_buf unstructured_name; /**< The buffer for the un constructed types. Only dnsName currently supported */ - } - san; /**< A union of the supported SAN types */ -} -mbedtls_x509_subject_alternative_name; - /** * Build flag from an algorithm/curve identifier (pk, md, ecp) * Since 0 is always XXX_NONE, ignore it. @@ -138,6 +101,26 @@ mbedtls_x509_subject_alternative_name; * Security profile for certificate verification. * * All lists are bitfields, built by ORing flags from MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG(). + * + * The fields of this structure are part of the public API and can be + * manipulated directly by applications. Future versions of the library may + * add extra fields or reorder existing fields. + * + * You can create custom profiles by starting from a copy of + * an existing profile, such as mbedtls_x509_crt_profile_default or + * mbedtls_x509_ctr_profile_none and then tune it to your needs. + * + * For example to allow SHA-224 in addition to the default: + * + * mbedtls_x509_crt_profile my_profile = mbedtls_x509_crt_profile_default; + * my_profile.allowed_mds |= MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG( MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224 ); + * + * Or to allow only RSA-3072+ with SHA-256: + * + * mbedtls_x509_crt_profile my_profile = mbedtls_x509_crt_profile_none; + * my_profile.allowed_mds = MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG( MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256 ); + * my_profile.allowed_pks = MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG( MBEDTLS_PK_RSA ); + * my_profile.rsa_min_bitlen = 3072; */ typedef struct mbedtls_x509_crt_profile { uint32_t allowed_mds; /**< MDs for signatures */ @@ -153,36 +136,120 @@ mbedtls_x509_crt_profile; #define MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_VERSION_2 1 #define MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_VERSION_3 2 -#define MBEDTLS_X509_RFC5280_MAX_SERIAL_LEN 32 +#define MBEDTLS_X509_RFC5280_MAX_SERIAL_LEN 20 #define MBEDTLS_X509_RFC5280_UTC_TIME_LEN 15 #if !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_FILE_PATH_LEN) #define MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_FILE_PATH_LEN 512 #endif +/* This macro unfolds to the concatenation of macro invocations + * X509_CRT_ERROR_INFO( error code, + * error code as string, + * human readable description ) + * where X509_CRT_ERROR_INFO is defined by the user. + * See x509_crt.c for an example of how to use this. */ +#define MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_ERROR_INFO_LIST \ + X509_CRT_ERROR_INFO(MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_EXPIRED, \ + "MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_EXPIRED", \ + "The certificate validity has expired") \ + X509_CRT_ERROR_INFO(MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_REVOKED, \ + "MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_REVOKED", \ + "The certificate has been revoked (is on a CRL)") \ + X509_CRT_ERROR_INFO(MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_CN_MISMATCH, \ + "MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_CN_MISMATCH", \ + "The certificate Common Name (CN) does not match with the expected CN") \ + X509_CRT_ERROR_INFO(MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_NOT_TRUSTED, \ + "MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_NOT_TRUSTED", \ + "The certificate is not correctly signed by the trusted CA") \ + X509_CRT_ERROR_INFO(MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_NOT_TRUSTED, \ + "MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_NOT_TRUSTED", \ + "The CRL is not correctly signed by the trusted CA") \ + X509_CRT_ERROR_INFO(MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_EXPIRED, \ + "MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_EXPIRED", \ + "The CRL is expired") \ + X509_CRT_ERROR_INFO(MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_MISSING, \ + "MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_MISSING", \ + "Certificate was missing") \ + X509_CRT_ERROR_INFO(MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_SKIP_VERIFY, \ + "MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_SKIP_VERIFY", \ + "Certificate verification was skipped") \ + X509_CRT_ERROR_INFO(MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_OTHER, \ + "MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_OTHER", \ + "Other reason (can be used by verify callback)") \ + X509_CRT_ERROR_INFO(MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_FUTURE, \ + "MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_FUTURE", \ + "The certificate validity starts in the future") \ + X509_CRT_ERROR_INFO(MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_FUTURE, \ + "MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_FUTURE", \ + "The CRL is from the future") \ + X509_CRT_ERROR_INFO(MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_KEY_USAGE, \ + "MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_KEY_USAGE", \ + "Usage does not match the keyUsage extension") \ + X509_CRT_ERROR_INFO(MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_EXT_KEY_USAGE, \ + "MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_EXT_KEY_USAGE", \ + "Usage does not match the extendedKeyUsage extension") \ + X509_CRT_ERROR_INFO(MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_NS_CERT_TYPE, \ + "MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_NS_CERT_TYPE", \ + "Usage does not match the nsCertType extension") \ + X509_CRT_ERROR_INFO(MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_MD, \ + "MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_MD", \ + "The certificate is signed with an unacceptable hash.") \ + X509_CRT_ERROR_INFO(MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_PK, \ + "MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_PK", \ + "The certificate is signed with an unacceptable PK alg (eg RSA vs ECDSA).") \ + X509_CRT_ERROR_INFO(MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_KEY, \ + "MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_KEY", \ + "The certificate is signed with an unacceptable key (eg bad curve, RSA too short).") \ + X509_CRT_ERROR_INFO(MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_BAD_MD, \ + "MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_BAD_MD", \ + "The CRL is signed with an unacceptable hash.") \ + X509_CRT_ERROR_INFO(MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_BAD_PK, \ + "MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_BAD_PK", \ + "The CRL is signed with an unacceptable PK alg (eg RSA vs ECDSA).") \ + X509_CRT_ERROR_INFO(MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_BAD_KEY, \ + "MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_BAD_KEY", \ + "The CRL is signed with an unacceptable key (eg bad curve, RSA too short).") + /** * Container for writing a certificate (CRT) */ typedef struct mbedtls_x509write_cert { - int version; - mbedtls_mpi serial; - mbedtls_pk_context *subject_key; - mbedtls_pk_context *issuer_key; - mbedtls_asn1_named_data *subject; - mbedtls_asn1_named_data *issuer; - mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg; - char not_before[MBEDTLS_X509_RFC5280_UTC_TIME_LEN + 1]; - char not_after[MBEDTLS_X509_RFC5280_UTC_TIME_LEN + 1]; - mbedtls_asn1_named_data *extensions; + int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(version); + unsigned char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(serial)[MBEDTLS_X509_RFC5280_MAX_SERIAL_LEN]; + size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(serial_len); + mbedtls_pk_context *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(subject_key); + mbedtls_pk_context *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(issuer_key); + mbedtls_asn1_named_data *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(subject); + mbedtls_asn1_named_data *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(issuer); + mbedtls_md_type_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(md_alg); + char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(not_before)[MBEDTLS_X509_RFC5280_UTC_TIME_LEN + 1]; + char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(not_after)[MBEDTLS_X509_RFC5280_UTC_TIME_LEN + 1]; + mbedtls_asn1_named_data *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(extensions); } mbedtls_x509write_cert; +/** + * \brief Set Subject Alternative Name + * + * \param ctx Certificate context to use + * \param san_list List of SAN values + * + * \return 0 if successful, or MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_ALLOC_FAILED + * + * \note "dnsName", "uniformResourceIdentifier", "IP address", + * "otherName", and "DirectoryName", as defined in RFC 5280, + * are supported. + */ +int mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_subject_alternative_name(mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx, + const mbedtls_x509_san_list *san_list); + /** * Item in a verification chain: cert and flags for it */ typedef struct { - mbedtls_x509_crt *crt; - uint32_t flags; + mbedtls_x509_crt *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(crt); + uint32_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(flags); } mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_chain_item; /** @@ -194,15 +261,15 @@ typedef struct { * Verification chain as built by \c mbedtls_crt_verify_chain() */ typedef struct { - mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_chain_item items[MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_VERIFY_CHAIN_SIZE]; - unsigned len; + mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_chain_item MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(items)[MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_VERIFY_CHAIN_SIZE]; + unsigned MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(len); #if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK) /* This stores the list of potential trusted signers obtained from * the CA callback used for the CRT verification, if configured. * We must track it somewhere because the callback passes its * ownership to the caller. */ - mbedtls_x509_crt *trust_ca_cb_result; + mbedtls_x509_crt *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(trust_ca_cb_result); #endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK */ } mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_chain; @@ -213,23 +280,23 @@ typedef struct { */ typedef struct { /* for check_signature() */ - mbedtls_pk_restart_ctx pk; + mbedtls_pk_restart_ctx MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(pk); /* for find_parent_in() */ - mbedtls_x509_crt *parent; /* non-null iff parent_in in progress */ - mbedtls_x509_crt *fallback_parent; - int fallback_signature_is_good; + mbedtls_x509_crt *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(parent); /* non-null iff parent_in in progress */ + mbedtls_x509_crt *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(fallback_parent); + int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(fallback_signature_is_good); /* for find_parent() */ - int parent_is_trusted; /* -1 if find_parent is not in progress */ + int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(parent_is_trusted); /* -1 if find_parent is not in progress */ /* for verify_chain() */ enum { x509_crt_rs_none, x509_crt_rs_find_parent, - } in_progress; /* none if no operation is in progress */ - int self_cnt; - mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_chain ver_chain; + } MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(in_progress); /* none if no operation is in progress */ + int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(self_cnt); + mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_chain MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(ver_chain); } mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_ctx; @@ -246,12 +313,12 @@ typedef void mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_ctx; * and compatibility with current deployments. * * This profile permits: - * - SHA2 hashes. - * - All supported elliptic curves. + * - SHA2 hashes with at least 256 bits: SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512. + * - Elliptic curves with 255 bits and above except secp256k1. * - RSA with 2048 bits and above. * * New minor versions of Mbed TLS may extend this profile, for example if - * new curves are added to the library. New minor versions of Mbed TLS will + * new algorithms are added to the library. New minor versions of Mbed TLS will * not reduce this profile unless serious security concerns require it. */ extern const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile mbedtls_x509_crt_profile_default; @@ -259,6 +326,7 @@ extern const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile mbedtls_x509_crt_profile_default; /** * Expected next default profile. Recommended for new deployments. * Currently targets a 128-bit security level, except for allowing RSA-2048. + * This profile may change at any time. */ extern const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile mbedtls_x509_crt_profile_next; @@ -267,6 +335,12 @@ extern const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile mbedtls_x509_crt_profile_next; */ extern const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile mbedtls_x509_crt_profile_suiteb; +/** + * Empty profile that allows nothing. Useful as a basis for constructing + * custom profiles. + */ +extern const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile mbedtls_x509_crt_profile_none; + /** * \brief Parse a single DER formatted certificate and add it * to the end of the provided chained list. @@ -400,7 +474,7 @@ int mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der_with_ext_cb(mbedtls_x509_crt *chain, * mbedtls_x509_crt_init(). * \param buf The address of the readable buffer holding the DER encoded * certificate to use. On success, this buffer must be - * retained and not be changed for the liftetime of the + * retained and not be changed for the lifetime of the * CRT chain \p chain, that is, until \p chain is destroyed * through a call to mbedtls_x509_crt_free(). * \param buflen The size in Bytes of \p buf. @@ -490,35 +564,8 @@ int mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_file(mbedtls_x509_crt *chain, const char *path); int mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_path(mbedtls_x509_crt *chain, const char *path); #endif /* MBEDTLS_FS_IO */ -/** - * \brief This function parses an item in the SubjectAlternativeNames - * extension. - * - * \param san_buf The buffer holding the raw data item of the subject - * alternative name. - * \param san The target structure to populate with the parsed presentation - * of the subject alternative name encoded in \p san_buf. - * - * \note Only "dnsName" and "otherName" of type hardware_module_name - * as defined in RFC 4180 is supported. - * - * \note This function should be called on a single raw data of - * subject alternative name. For example, after successful - * certificate parsing, one must iterate on every item in the - * \c crt->subject_alt_names sequence, and pass it to - * this function. - * - * \warning The target structure contains pointers to the raw data of the - * parsed certificate, and its lifetime is restricted by the - * lifetime of the certificate. - * - * \return \c 0 on success - * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE for an unsupported - * SAN type. - * \return Another negative value for any other failure. - */ -int mbedtls_x509_parse_subject_alt_name(const mbedtls_x509_buf *san_buf, - mbedtls_x509_subject_alternative_name *san); + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_REMOVE_INFO) /** * \brief Returns an informational string about the * certificate. @@ -548,6 +595,7 @@ int mbedtls_x509_crt_info(char *buf, size_t size, const char *prefix, */ int mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_info(char *buf, size_t size, const char *prefix, uint32_t flags); +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_X509_REMOVE_INFO */ /** * \brief Verify a chain of certificates. @@ -596,8 +644,12 @@ int mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_info(char *buf, size_t size, const char *prefix, * \param cn The expected Common Name. This will be checked to be * present in the certificate's subjectAltNames extension or, * if this extension is absent, as a CN component in its - * Subject name. Currently only DNS names are supported. This - * may be \c NULL if the CN need not be verified. + * Subject name. DNS names and IP addresses are fully + * supported, while the URI subtype is partially supported: + * only exact matching, without any normalization procedures + * described in 7.4 of RFC5280, will result in a positive + * URI verification. + * This may be \c NULL if the CN need not be verified. * \param flags The address at which to store the result of the verification. * If the verification couldn't be completed, the flag value is * set to (uint32_t) -1. @@ -766,7 +818,6 @@ int mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_with_ca_cb(mbedtls_x509_crt *crt, #endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CHECK_KEY_USAGE) /** * \brief Check usage of certificate against keyUsage extension. * @@ -790,9 +841,7 @@ int mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_with_ca_cb(mbedtls_x509_crt *crt, */ int mbedtls_x509_crt_check_key_usage(const mbedtls_x509_crt *crt, unsigned int usage); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CHECK_KEY_USAGE) */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CHECK_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE) /** * \brief Check usage of certificate against extendedKeyUsage. * @@ -809,7 +858,6 @@ int mbedtls_x509_crt_check_key_usage(const mbedtls_x509_crt *crt, int mbedtls_x509_crt_check_extended_key_usage(const mbedtls_x509_crt *crt, const char *usage_oid, size_t usage_len); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CHECK_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRL_PARSE_C) /** @@ -851,6 +899,35 @@ void mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_free(mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_ctx *ctx); #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C && MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ +/** + * \brief Query certificate for given extension type + * + * \param[in] ctx Certificate context to be queried, must not be \c NULL + * \param ext_type Extension type being queried for, must be a valid + * extension type. Must be one of the MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_XXX + * values + * + * \return 0 if the given extension type is not present, + * non-zero otherwise + */ +static inline int mbedtls_x509_crt_has_ext_type(const mbedtls_x509_crt *ctx, + int ext_type) +{ + return ctx->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(ext_types) & ext_type; +} + +/** + * \brief Access the ca_istrue field + * + * \param[in] crt Certificate to be queried, must not be \c NULL + * + * \return \c 1 if this a CA certificate \c 0 otherwise. + * \return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS if the certificate does not contain + * the Optional Basic Constraint extension. + * + */ +int mbedtls_x509_crt_get_ca_istrue(const mbedtls_x509_crt *crt); + /** \} name Structures and functions for parsing and writing X.509 certificates */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_WRITE_C) @@ -871,15 +948,43 @@ void mbedtls_x509write_crt_init(mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx); */ void mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_version(mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx, int version); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) /** * \brief Set the serial number for a Certificate. * + * \deprecated This function is deprecated and will be removed in a + * future version of the library. Please use + * mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_serial_raw() instead. + * + * \note Even though the MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C guard looks redundant since + * X509 depends on PK and PK depends on BIGNUM, this emphasizes + * a direct dependency between X509 and BIGNUM which is going + * to be deprecated in the future. + * * \param ctx CRT context to use * \param serial serial number to set * * \return 0 if successful */ -int mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_serial(mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx, const mbedtls_mpi *serial); +int MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_serial( + mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx, const mbedtls_mpi *serial); +#endif // MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C && !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED + +/** + * \brief Set the serial number for a Certificate. + * + * \param ctx CRT context to use + * \param serial A raw array of bytes containing the serial number in big + * endian format + * \param serial_len Length of valid bytes (expressed in bytes) in \p serial + * input buffer + * + * \return 0 if successful, or + * MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA if the provided input buffer + * is too big (longer than MBEDTLS_X509_RFC5280_MAX_SERIAL_LEN) + */ +int mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_serial_raw(mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx, + unsigned char *serial, size_t serial_len); /** * \brief Set the validity period for a Certificate @@ -985,7 +1090,7 @@ int mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_extension(mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx, int mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_basic_constraints(mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx, int is_ca, int max_pathlen); -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1) /** * \brief Set the subjectKeyIdentifier extension for a CRT * Requires that mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_subject_key() has been @@ -1007,7 +1112,7 @@ int mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_subject_key_identifier(mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx * \return 0 if successful, or a MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_ALLOC_FAILED */ int mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_authority_key_identifier(mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1 */ /** * \brief Set the Key Usage Extension flags @@ -1021,6 +1126,19 @@ int mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_authority_key_identifier(mbedtls_x509write_cert *c int mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_key_usage(mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx, unsigned int key_usage); +/** + * \brief Set the Extended Key Usage Extension + * (e.g. MBEDTLS_OID_SERVER_AUTH) + * + * \param ctx CRT context to use + * \param exts extended key usage extensions to set, a sequence of + * MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID objects + * + * \return 0 if successful, or MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_ALLOC_FAILED + */ +int mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_ext_key_usage(mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx, + const mbedtls_asn1_sequence *exts); + /** * \brief Set the Netscape Cert Type flags * (e.g. MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_SSL_CLIENT | MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_EMAIL) @@ -1049,16 +1167,13 @@ void mbedtls_x509write_crt_free(mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx); * \param ctx certificate to write away * \param buf buffer to write to * \param size size of the buffer - * \param f_rng RNG function (for signature, see note) + * \param f_rng RNG function. This must not be \c NULL. * \param p_rng RNG parameter * * \return length of data written if successful, or a specific * error code * - * \note f_rng may be NULL if RSA is used for signature and the - * signature is made offline (otherwise f_rng is desirable - * for countermeasures against timing attacks). - * ECDSA signatures always require a non-NULL f_rng. + * \note \p f_rng is used for the signature operation. */ int mbedtls_x509write_crt_der(mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx, unsigned char *buf, size_t size, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), @@ -1071,15 +1186,12 @@ int mbedtls_x509write_crt_der(mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx, unsigned char *buf, s * \param ctx certificate to write away * \param buf buffer to write to * \param size size of the buffer - * \param f_rng RNG function (for signature, see note) + * \param f_rng RNG function. This must not be \c NULL. * \param p_rng RNG parameter * * \return 0 if successful, or a specific error code * - * \note f_rng may be NULL if RSA is used for signature and the - * signature is made offline (otherwise f_rng is desirable - * for countermeasures against timing attacks). - * ECDSA signatures always require a non-NULL f_rng. + * \note \p f_rng is used for the signature operation. */ int mbedtls_x509write_crt_pem(mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx, unsigned char *buf, size_t size, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/x509_csr.h b/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/x509_csr.h index 97a9db44c75e..8c31c09af4c3 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/x509_csr.h +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/x509_csr.h @@ -9,12 +9,9 @@ */ #ifndef MBEDTLS_X509_CSR_H #define MBEDTLS_X509_CSR_H +#include "mbedtls/private_access.h" -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "mbedtls/build_info.h" #include "mbedtls/x509.h" @@ -33,6 +30,10 @@ extern "C" { /** * Certificate Signing Request (CSR) structure. + * + * Some fields of this structure are publicly readable. Do not modify + * them except via Mbed TLS library functions: the effect of modifying + * those fields or the data that those fields point to is unspecified. */ typedef struct mbedtls_x509_csr { mbedtls_x509_buf raw; /**< The raw CSR data (DER). */ @@ -45,11 +46,17 @@ typedef struct mbedtls_x509_csr { mbedtls_pk_context pk; /**< Container for the public key context. */ + unsigned int key_usage; /**< Optional key usage extension value: See the values in x509.h */ + unsigned char ns_cert_type; /**< Optional Netscape certificate type extension value: See the values in x509.h */ + mbedtls_x509_sequence subject_alt_names; /**< Optional list of raw entries of Subject Alternative Names extension. These can be later parsed by mbedtls_x509_parse_subject_alt_name. */ + + int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(ext_types); /**< Bit string containing detected and parsed extensions */ + mbedtls_x509_buf sig_oid; - mbedtls_x509_buf sig; - mbedtls_md_type_t sig_md; /**< Internal representation of the MD algorithm of the signature algorithm, e.g. MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256 */ - mbedtls_pk_type_t sig_pk; /**< Internal representation of the Public Key algorithm of the signature algorithm, e.g. MBEDTLS_PK_RSA */ - void *sig_opts; /**< Signature options to be passed to mbedtls_pk_verify_ext(), e.g. for RSASSA-PSS */ + mbedtls_x509_buf MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(sig); + mbedtls_md_type_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(sig_md); /**< Internal representation of the MD algorithm of the signature algorithm, e.g. MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256 */ + mbedtls_pk_type_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(sig_pk); /**< Internal representation of the Public Key algorithm of the signature algorithm, e.g. MBEDTLS_PK_RSA */ + void *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(sig_opts); /**< Signature options to be passed to mbedtls_pk_verify_ext(), e.g. for RSASSA-PSS */ } mbedtls_x509_csr; @@ -57,10 +64,10 @@ mbedtls_x509_csr; * Container for writing a CSR */ typedef struct mbedtls_x509write_csr { - mbedtls_pk_context *key; - mbedtls_asn1_named_data *subject; - mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg; - mbedtls_asn1_named_data *extensions; + mbedtls_pk_context *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(key); + mbedtls_asn1_named_data *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(subject); + mbedtls_md_type_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(md_alg); + mbedtls_asn1_named_data *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(extensions); } mbedtls_x509write_csr; @@ -68,7 +75,9 @@ mbedtls_x509write_csr; /** * \brief Load a Certificate Signing Request (CSR) in DER format * - * \note CSR attributes (if any) are currently silently ignored. + * \note Any unsupported requested extensions are silently + * ignored, unless the critical flag is set, in which case + * the CSR is rejected. * * \note If #MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO is enabled, the PSA crypto * subsystem must have been initialized by calling @@ -83,6 +92,67 @@ mbedtls_x509write_csr; int mbedtls_x509_csr_parse_der(mbedtls_x509_csr *csr, const unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen); +/** + * \brief The type of certificate extension callbacks. + * + * Callbacks of this type are passed to and used by the + * mbedtls_x509_csr_parse_der_with_ext_cb() routine when + * it encounters either an unsupported extension. + * Future versions of the library may invoke the callback + * in other cases, if and when the need arises. + * + * \param p_ctx An opaque context passed to the callback. + * \param csr The CSR being parsed. + * \param oid The OID of the extension. + * \param critical Whether the extension is critical. + * \param p Pointer to the start of the extension value + * (the content of the OCTET STRING). + * \param end End of extension value. + * + * \note The callback must fail and return a negative error code + * if it can not parse or does not support the extension. + * When the callback fails to parse a critical extension + * mbedtls_x509_csr_parse_der_with_ext_cb() also fails. + * When the callback fails to parse a non critical extension + * mbedtls_x509_csr_parse_der_with_ext_cb() simply skips + * the extension and continues parsing. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return A negative error code on failure. + */ +typedef int (*mbedtls_x509_csr_ext_cb_t)(void *p_ctx, + mbedtls_x509_csr const *csr, + mbedtls_x509_buf const *oid, + int critical, + const unsigned char *p, + const unsigned char *end); + +/** + * \brief Load a Certificate Signing Request (CSR) in DER format + * + * \note Any unsupported requested extensions are silently + * ignored, unless the critical flag is set, in which case + * the result of the callback function decides whether + * CSR is rejected. + * + * \note If #MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO is enabled, the PSA crypto + * subsystem must have been initialized by calling + * psa_crypto_init() before calling this function. + * + * \param csr CSR context to fill + * \param buf buffer holding the CRL data + * \param buflen size of the buffer + * \param cb A callback invoked for every unsupported certificate + * extension. + * \param p_ctx An opaque context passed to the callback. + * + * \return 0 if successful, or a specific X509 error code + */ +int mbedtls_x509_csr_parse_der_with_ext_cb(mbedtls_x509_csr *csr, + const unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen, + mbedtls_x509_csr_ext_cb_t cb, + void *p_ctx); + /** * \brief Load a Certificate Signing Request (CSR), DER or PEM format * @@ -115,6 +185,7 @@ int mbedtls_x509_csr_parse(mbedtls_x509_csr *csr, const unsigned char *buf, size int mbedtls_x509_csr_parse_file(mbedtls_x509_csr *csr, const char *path); #endif /* MBEDTLS_FS_IO */ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_REMOVE_INFO) /** * \brief Returns an informational string about the * CSR. @@ -129,6 +200,7 @@ int mbedtls_x509_csr_parse_file(mbedtls_x509_csr *csr, const char *path); */ int mbedtls_x509_csr_info(char *buf, size_t size, const char *prefix, const mbedtls_x509_csr *csr); +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_X509_REMOVE_INFO */ /** * \brief Initialize a CSR @@ -207,6 +279,20 @@ void mbedtls_x509write_csr_set_md_alg(mbedtls_x509write_csr *ctx, mbedtls_md_typ */ int mbedtls_x509write_csr_set_key_usage(mbedtls_x509write_csr *ctx, unsigned char key_usage); +/** + * \brief Set Subject Alternative Name + * + * \param ctx CSR context to use + * \param san_list List of SAN values + * + * \return 0 if successful, or MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_ALLOC_FAILED + * + * \note Only "dnsName", "uniformResourceIdentifier" and "otherName", + * as defined in RFC 5280, are supported. + */ +int mbedtls_x509write_csr_set_subject_alternative_name(mbedtls_x509write_csr *ctx, + const mbedtls_x509_san_list *san_list); + /** * \brief Set the Netscape Cert Type flags * (e.g. MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_SSL_CLIENT | MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_EMAIL) @@ -226,6 +312,7 @@ int mbedtls_x509write_csr_set_ns_cert_type(mbedtls_x509write_csr *ctx, * \param ctx CSR context to use * \param oid OID of the extension * \param oid_len length of the OID + * \param critical Set to 1 to mark the extension as critical, 0 otherwise. * \param val value of the extension OCTET STRING * \param val_len length of the value data * @@ -233,6 +320,7 @@ int mbedtls_x509write_csr_set_ns_cert_type(mbedtls_x509write_csr *ctx, */ int mbedtls_x509write_csr_set_extension(mbedtls_x509write_csr *ctx, const char *oid, size_t oid_len, + int critical, const unsigned char *val, size_t val_len); /** @@ -252,16 +340,13 @@ void mbedtls_x509write_csr_free(mbedtls_x509write_csr *ctx); * \param ctx CSR to write away * \param buf buffer to write to * \param size size of the buffer - * \param f_rng RNG function (for signature, see note) + * \param f_rng RNG function. This must not be \c NULL. * \param p_rng RNG parameter * * \return length of data written if successful, or a specific * error code * - * \note f_rng may be NULL if RSA is used for signature and the - * signature is made offline (otherwise f_rng is desirable - * for countermeasures against timing attacks). - * ECDSA signatures always require a non-NULL f_rng. + * \note \p f_rng is used for the signature operation. */ int mbedtls_x509write_csr_der(mbedtls_x509write_csr *ctx, unsigned char *buf, size_t size, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), @@ -275,15 +360,12 @@ int mbedtls_x509write_csr_der(mbedtls_x509write_csr *ctx, unsigned char *buf, si * \param ctx CSR to write away * \param buf buffer to write to * \param size size of the buffer - * \param f_rng RNG function (for signature, see note) + * \param f_rng RNG function. This must not be \c NULL. * \param p_rng RNG parameter * * \return 0 if successful, or a specific error code * - * \note f_rng may be NULL if RSA is used for signature and the - * signature is made offline (otherwise f_rng is desirable - * for countermeasures against timing attacks). - * ECDSA signatures always require a non-NULL f_rng. + * \note \p f_rng is used for the signature operation. */ int mbedtls_x509write_csr_pem(mbedtls_x509write_csr *ctx, unsigned char *buf, size_t size, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/xtea.h b/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/xtea.h deleted file mode 100644 index b7242c74f03d..000000000000 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/xtea.h +++ /dev/null @@ -1,126 +0,0 @@ -/** - * \file xtea.h - * - * \brief XTEA block cipher (32-bit) - */ -/* - * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later - */ -#ifndef MBEDTLS_XTEA_H -#define MBEDTLS_XTEA_H - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif - -#include -#include - -#define MBEDTLS_XTEA_ENCRYPT 1 -#define MBEDTLS_XTEA_DECRYPT 0 - -/** The data input has an invalid length. */ -#define MBEDTLS_ERR_XTEA_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH -0x0028 - -/* MBEDTLS_ERR_XTEA_HW_ACCEL_FAILED is deprecated and should not be used. */ -/** XTEA hardware accelerator failed. */ -#define MBEDTLS_ERR_XTEA_HW_ACCEL_FAILED -0x0029 - -#ifdef __cplusplus -extern "C" { -#endif - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_XTEA_ALT) -// Regular implementation -// - -/** - * \brief XTEA context structure - */ -typedef struct mbedtls_xtea_context { - uint32_t k[4]; /*!< key */ -} -mbedtls_xtea_context; - -#else /* MBEDTLS_XTEA_ALT */ -#include "xtea_alt.h" -#endif /* MBEDTLS_XTEA_ALT */ - -/** - * \brief Initialize XTEA context - * - * \param ctx XTEA context to be initialized - */ -void mbedtls_xtea_init(mbedtls_xtea_context *ctx); - -/** - * \brief Clear XTEA context - * - * \param ctx XTEA context to be cleared - */ -void mbedtls_xtea_free(mbedtls_xtea_context *ctx); - -/** - * \brief XTEA key schedule - * - * \param ctx XTEA context to be initialized - * \param key the secret key - */ -void mbedtls_xtea_setup(mbedtls_xtea_context *ctx, const unsigned char key[16]); - -/** - * \brief XTEA cipher function - * - * \param ctx XTEA context - * \param mode MBEDTLS_XTEA_ENCRYPT or MBEDTLS_XTEA_DECRYPT - * \param input 8-byte input block - * \param output 8-byte output block - * - * \return 0 if successful - */ -int mbedtls_xtea_crypt_ecb(mbedtls_xtea_context *ctx, - int mode, - const unsigned char input[8], - unsigned char output[8]); - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) -/** - * \brief XTEA CBC cipher function - * - * \param ctx XTEA context - * \param mode MBEDTLS_XTEA_ENCRYPT or MBEDTLS_XTEA_DECRYPT - * \param length the length of input, multiple of 8 - * \param iv initialization vector for CBC mode - * \param input input block - * \param output output block - * - * \return 0 if successful, - * MBEDTLS_ERR_XTEA_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH if the length % 8 != 0 - */ -int mbedtls_xtea_crypt_cbc(mbedtls_xtea_context *ctx, - int mode, - size_t length, - unsigned char iv[8], - const unsigned char *input, - unsigned char *output); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) - -/** - * \brief Checkup routine - * - * \return 0 if successful, or 1 if the test failed - */ -int mbedtls_xtea_self_test(int verbose); - -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ - -#ifdef __cplusplus -} -#endif - -#endif /* xtea.h */ diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/psa/build_info.h b/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/psa/build_info.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..3ee6cd7b1bca --- /dev/null +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/psa/build_info.h @@ -0,0 +1,20 @@ +/** + * \file psa/build_info.h + * + * \brief Build-time PSA configuration info + * + * Include this file if you need to depend on the + * configuration options defined in mbedtls_config.h or MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE + * in PSA cryptography core specific files. + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +#ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_BUILD_INFO_H +#define PSA_CRYPTO_BUILD_INFO_H + +#include "mbedtls/build_info.h" + +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_BUILD_INFO_H */ diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto.h b/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..92f9c824e921 --- /dev/null +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto.h @@ -0,0 +1,4839 @@ +/** + * \file psa/crypto.h + * \brief Platform Security Architecture cryptography module + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +#ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_H +#define PSA_CRYPTO_H + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_PLATFORM_FILE) +#include MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_PLATFORM_FILE +#else +#include "crypto_platform.h" +#endif + +#include + +#ifdef __DOXYGEN_ONLY__ +/* This __DOXYGEN_ONLY__ block contains mock definitions for things that + * must be defined in the crypto_platform.h header. These mock definitions + * are present in this file as a convenience to generate pretty-printed + * documentation that includes those definitions. */ + +/** \defgroup platform Implementation-specific definitions + * @{ + */ + +/**@}*/ +#endif /* __DOXYGEN_ONLY__ */ + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +/* The file "crypto_types.h" declares types that encode errors, + * algorithms, key types, policies, etc. */ +#include "crypto_types.h" + +/** \defgroup version API version + * @{ + */ + +/** + * The major version of this implementation of the PSA Crypto API + */ +#define PSA_CRYPTO_API_VERSION_MAJOR 1 + +/** + * The minor version of this implementation of the PSA Crypto API + */ +#define PSA_CRYPTO_API_VERSION_MINOR 0 + +/**@}*/ + +/* The file "crypto_values.h" declares macros to build and analyze values + * of integral types defined in "crypto_types.h". */ +#include "crypto_values.h" + +/** \defgroup initialization Library initialization + * @{ + */ + +/** + * \brief Library initialization. + * + * Applications must call this function before calling any other + * function in this module. + * + * Applications may call this function more than once. Once a call + * succeeds, subsequent calls are guaranteed to succeed. + * + * If the application calls other functions before calling psa_crypto_init(), + * the behavior is undefined. Implementations are encouraged to either perform + * the operation as if the library had been initialized or to return + * #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE or some other applicable error. In particular, + * implementations should not return a success status if the lack of + * initialization may have security implications, for example due to improper + * seeding of the random number generator. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_STORAGE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT \emptydescription + */ +psa_status_t psa_crypto_init(void); + +/**@}*/ + +/** \addtogroup attributes + * @{ + */ + +/** \def PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT + * + * This macro returns a suitable initializer for a key attribute structure + * of type #psa_key_attributes_t. + */ + +/** Return an initial value for a key attributes structure. + */ +static psa_key_attributes_t psa_key_attributes_init(void); + +/** Declare a key as persistent and set its key identifier. + * + * If the attribute structure currently declares the key as volatile (which + * is the default content of an attribute structure), this function sets + * the lifetime attribute to #PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_PERSISTENT. + * + * This function does not access storage, it merely stores the given + * value in the structure. + * The persistent key will be written to storage when the attribute + * structure is passed to a key creation function such as + * psa_import_key(), psa_generate_key(), psa_generate_key_ext(), + * psa_key_derivation_output_key(), psa_key_derivation_output_key_ext() + * or psa_copy_key(). + * + * This function may be declared as `static` (i.e. without external + * linkage). This function may be provided as a function-like macro, + * but in this case it must evaluate each of its arguments exactly once. + * + * \param[out] attributes The attribute structure to write to. + * \param key The persistent identifier for the key. + */ +static void psa_set_key_id(psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key); + +#ifdef MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_KEY_ID_ENCODES_OWNER +/** Set the owner identifier of a key. + * + * When key identifiers encode key owner identifiers, psa_set_key_id() does + * not allow to define in key attributes the owner of volatile keys as + * psa_set_key_id() enforces the key to be persistent. + * + * This function allows to set in key attributes the owner identifier of a + * key. It is intended to be used for volatile keys. For persistent keys, + * it is recommended to use the PSA Cryptography API psa_set_key_id() to define + * the owner of a key. + * + * \param[out] attributes The attribute structure to write to. + * \param owner The key owner identifier. + */ +static void mbedtls_set_key_owner_id(psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + mbedtls_key_owner_id_t owner); +#endif + +/** Set the location of a persistent key. + * + * To make a key persistent, you must give it a persistent key identifier + * with psa_set_key_id(). By default, a key that has a persistent identifier + * is stored in the default storage area identifier by + * #PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_PERSISTENT. Call this function to choose a storage + * area, or to explicitly declare the key as volatile. + * + * This function does not access storage, it merely stores the given + * value in the structure. + * The persistent key will be written to storage when the attribute + * structure is passed to a key creation function such as + * psa_import_key(), psa_generate_key(), psa_generate_key_ext(), + * psa_key_derivation_output_key(), psa_key_derivation_output_key_ext() + * or psa_copy_key(). + * + * This function may be declared as `static` (i.e. without external + * linkage). This function may be provided as a function-like macro, + * but in this case it must evaluate each of its arguments exactly once. + * + * \param[out] attributes The attribute structure to write to. + * \param lifetime The lifetime for the key. + * If this is #PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_VOLATILE, the + * key will be volatile, and the key identifier + * attribute is reset to 0. + */ +static void psa_set_key_lifetime(psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + psa_key_lifetime_t lifetime); + +/** Retrieve the key identifier from key attributes. + * + * This function may be declared as `static` (i.e. without external + * linkage). This function may be provided as a function-like macro, + * but in this case it must evaluate its argument exactly once. + * + * \param[in] attributes The key attribute structure to query. + * + * \return The persistent identifier stored in the attribute structure. + * This value is unspecified if the attribute structure declares + * the key as volatile. + */ +static mbedtls_svc_key_id_t psa_get_key_id( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes); + +/** Retrieve the lifetime from key attributes. + * + * This function may be declared as `static` (i.e. without external + * linkage). This function may be provided as a function-like macro, + * but in this case it must evaluate its argument exactly once. + * + * \param[in] attributes The key attribute structure to query. + * + * \return The lifetime value stored in the attribute structure. + */ +static psa_key_lifetime_t psa_get_key_lifetime( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes); + +/** Declare usage flags for a key. + * + * Usage flags are part of a key's usage policy. They encode what + * kind of operations are permitted on the key. For more details, + * refer to the documentation of the type #psa_key_usage_t. + * + * This function overwrites any usage flags + * previously set in \p attributes. + * + * This function may be declared as `static` (i.e. without external + * linkage). This function may be provided as a function-like macro, + * but in this case it must evaluate each of its arguments exactly once. + * + * \param[out] attributes The attribute structure to write to. + * \param usage_flags The usage flags to write. + */ +static void psa_set_key_usage_flags(psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + psa_key_usage_t usage_flags); + +/** Retrieve the usage flags from key attributes. + * + * This function may be declared as `static` (i.e. without external + * linkage). This function may be provided as a function-like macro, + * but in this case it must evaluate its argument exactly once. + * + * \param[in] attributes The key attribute structure to query. + * + * \return The usage flags stored in the attribute structure. + */ +static psa_key_usage_t psa_get_key_usage_flags( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes); + +/** Declare the permitted algorithm policy for a key. + * + * The permitted algorithm policy of a key encodes which algorithm or + * algorithms are permitted to be used with this key. The following + * algorithm policies are supported: + * - 0 does not allow any cryptographic operation with the key. The key + * may be used for non-cryptographic actions such as exporting (if + * permitted by the usage flags). + * - An algorithm value permits this particular algorithm. + * - An algorithm wildcard built from #PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH allows the specified + * signature scheme with any hash algorithm. + * - An algorithm built from #PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC allows + * any MAC algorithm from the same base class (e.g. CMAC) which + * generates/verifies a MAC length greater than or equal to the length + * encoded in the wildcard algorithm. + * - An algorithm built from #PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG + * allows any AEAD algorithm from the same base class (e.g. CCM) which + * generates/verifies a tag length greater than or equal to the length + * encoded in the wildcard algorithm. + * + * This function overwrites any algorithm policy + * previously set in \p attributes. + * + * This function may be declared as `static` (i.e. without external + * linkage). This function may be provided as a function-like macro, + * but in this case it must evaluate each of its arguments exactly once. + * + * \param[out] attributes The attribute structure to write to. + * \param alg The permitted algorithm policy to write. + */ +static void psa_set_key_algorithm(psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + psa_algorithm_t alg); + + +/** Retrieve the algorithm policy from key attributes. + * + * This function may be declared as `static` (i.e. without external + * linkage). This function may be provided as a function-like macro, + * but in this case it must evaluate its argument exactly once. + * + * \param[in] attributes The key attribute structure to query. + * + * \return The algorithm stored in the attribute structure. + */ +static psa_algorithm_t psa_get_key_algorithm( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes); + +/** Declare the type of a key. + * + * This function overwrites any key type + * previously set in \p attributes. + * + * This function may be declared as `static` (i.e. without external + * linkage). This function may be provided as a function-like macro, + * but in this case it must evaluate each of its arguments exactly once. + * + * \param[out] attributes The attribute structure to write to. + * \param type The key type to write. + * If this is 0, the key type in \p attributes + * becomes unspecified. + */ +static void psa_set_key_type(psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + psa_key_type_t type); + + +/** Declare the size of a key. + * + * This function overwrites any key size previously set in \p attributes. + * + * This function may be declared as `static` (i.e. without external + * linkage). This function may be provided as a function-like macro, + * but in this case it must evaluate each of its arguments exactly once. + * + * \param[out] attributes The attribute structure to write to. + * \param bits The key size in bits. + * If this is 0, the key size in \p attributes + * becomes unspecified. Keys of size 0 are + * not supported. + */ +static void psa_set_key_bits(psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + size_t bits); + +/** Retrieve the key type from key attributes. + * + * This function may be declared as `static` (i.e. without external + * linkage). This function may be provided as a function-like macro, + * but in this case it must evaluate its argument exactly once. + * + * \param[in] attributes The key attribute structure to query. + * + * \return The key type stored in the attribute structure. + */ +static psa_key_type_t psa_get_key_type(const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes); + +/** Retrieve the key size from key attributes. + * + * This function may be declared as `static` (i.e. without external + * linkage). This function may be provided as a function-like macro, + * but in this case it must evaluate its argument exactly once. + * + * \param[in] attributes The key attribute structure to query. + * + * \return The key size stored in the attribute structure, in bits. + */ +static size_t psa_get_key_bits(const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes); + +/** Retrieve the attributes of a key. + * + * This function first resets the attribute structure as with + * psa_reset_key_attributes(). It then copies the attributes of + * the given key into the given attribute structure. + * + * \note This function may allocate memory or other resources. + * Once you have called this function on an attribute structure, + * you must call psa_reset_key_attributes() to free these resources. + * + * \param[in] key Identifier of the key to query. + * \param[in,out] attributes On success, the attributes of the key. + * On failure, equivalent to a + * freshly-initialized structure. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_get_key_attributes(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + psa_key_attributes_t *attributes); + +/** Reset a key attribute structure to a freshly initialized state. + * + * You must initialize the attribute structure as described in the + * documentation of the type #psa_key_attributes_t before calling this + * function. Once the structure has been initialized, you may call this + * function at any time. + * + * This function frees any auxiliary resources that the structure + * may contain. + * + * \param[in,out] attributes The attribute structure to reset. + */ +void psa_reset_key_attributes(psa_key_attributes_t *attributes); + +/**@}*/ + +/** \defgroup key_management Key management + * @{ + */ + +/** Remove non-essential copies of key material from memory. + * + * If the key identifier designates a volatile key, this functions does not do + * anything and returns successfully. + * + * If the key identifier designates a persistent key, then this function will + * free all resources associated with the key in volatile memory. The key + * data in persistent storage is not affected and the key can still be used. + * + * \param key Identifier of the key to purge. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * The key material will have been removed from memory if it is not + * currently required. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * \p key is not a valid key identifier. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_purge_key(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key); + +/** Make a copy of a key. + * + * Copy key material from one location to another. + * + * This function is primarily useful to copy a key from one location + * to another, since it populates a key using the material from + * another key which may have a different lifetime. + * + * This function may be used to share a key with a different party, + * subject to implementation-defined restrictions on key sharing. + * + * The policy on the source key must have the usage flag + * #PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY set. + * This flag is sufficient to permit the copy if the key has the lifetime + * #PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_VOLATILE or #PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_PERSISTENT. + * Some secure elements do not provide a way to copy a key without + * making it extractable from the secure element. If a key is located + * in such a secure element, then the key must have both usage flags + * #PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY and #PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT in order to make + * a copy of the key outside the secure element. + * + * The resulting key may only be used in a way that conforms to + * both the policy of the original key and the policy specified in + * the \p attributes parameter: + * - The usage flags on the resulting key are the bitwise-and of the + * usage flags on the source policy and the usage flags in \p attributes. + * - If both allow the same algorithm or wildcard-based + * algorithm policy, the resulting key has the same algorithm policy. + * - If either of the policies allows an algorithm and the other policy + * allows a wildcard-based algorithm policy that includes this algorithm, + * the resulting key allows the same algorithm. + * - If the policies do not allow any algorithm in common, this function + * fails with the status #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT. + * + * The effect of this function on implementation-defined attributes is + * implementation-defined. + * + * \param source_key The key to copy. It must allow the usage + * #PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY. If a private or secret key is + * being copied outside of a secure element it must + * also allow #PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT. + * \param[in] attributes The attributes for the new key. + * They are used as follows: + * - The key type and size may be 0. If either is + * nonzero, it must match the corresponding + * attribute of the source key. + * - The key location (the lifetime and, for + * persistent keys, the key identifier) is + * used directly. + * - The policy constraints (usage flags and + * algorithm policy) are combined from + * the source key and \p attributes so that + * both sets of restrictions apply, as + * described in the documentation of this function. + * \param[out] target_key On success, an identifier for the newly created + * key. For persistent keys, this is the key + * identifier defined in \p attributes. + * \c 0 on failure. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE + * \p source_key is invalid. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS + * This is an attempt to create a persistent key, and there is + * already a persistent key with the given identifier. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * The lifetime or identifier in \p attributes are invalid, or + * the policy constraints on the source and specified in + * \p attributes are incompatible, or + * \p attributes specifies a key type or key size + * which does not match the attributes of the source key. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED + * The source key does not have the #PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY usage flag, or + * the source key is not exportable and its lifetime does not + * allow copying it to the target's lifetime. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_STORAGE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_copy_key(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t source_key, + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t *target_key); + + +/** + * \brief Destroy a key. + * + * This function destroys a key from both volatile + * memory and, if applicable, non-volatile storage. Implementations shall + * make a best effort to ensure that the key material cannot be recovered. + * + * This function also erases any metadata such as policies and frees + * resources associated with the key. + * + * If a key is currently in use in a multipart operation, then destroying the + * key will cause the multipart operation to fail. + * + * \warning We can only guarantee that the the key material will + * eventually be wiped from memory. With threading enabled + * and during concurrent execution, copies of the key material may + * still exist until all threads have finished using the key. + * + * \param key Identifier of the key to erase. If this is \c 0, do nothing and + * return #PSA_SUCCESS. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * \p key was a valid identifier and the key material that it + * referred to has been erased. Alternatively, \p key is \c 0. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED + * The key cannot be erased because it is + * read-only, either due to a policy or due to physical restrictions. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE + * \p key is not a valid identifier nor \c 0. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE + * There was a failure in communication with the cryptoprocessor. + * The key material may still be present in the cryptoprocessor. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID + * This error is typically a result of either storage corruption on a + * cleartext storage backend, or an attempt to read data that was + * written by an incompatible version of the library. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE + * The storage is corrupted. Implementations shall make a best effort + * to erase key material even in this stage, however applications + * should be aware that it may be impossible to guarantee that the + * key material is not recoverable in such cases. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * An unexpected condition which is not a storage corruption or + * a communication failure occurred. The cryptoprocessor may have + * been compromised. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_destroy_key(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key); + +/**@}*/ + +/** \defgroup import_export Key import and export + * @{ + */ + +/** + * \brief Import a key in binary format. + * + * This function supports any output from psa_export_key(). Refer to the + * documentation of psa_export_public_key() for the format of public keys + * and to the documentation of psa_export_key() for the format for + * other key types. + * + * The key data determines the key size. The attributes may optionally + * specify a key size; in this case it must match the size determined + * from the key data. A key size of 0 in \p attributes indicates that + * the key size is solely determined by the key data. + * + * Implementations must reject an attempt to import a key of size 0. + * + * This specification supports a single format for each key type. + * Implementations may support other formats as long as the standard + * format is supported. Implementations that support other formats + * should ensure that the formats are clearly unambiguous so as to + * minimize the risk that an invalid input is accidentally interpreted + * according to a different format. + * + * \param[in] attributes The attributes for the new key. + * The key size is always determined from the + * \p data buffer. + * If the key size in \p attributes is nonzero, + * it must be equal to the size from \p data. + * \param[out] key On success, an identifier to the newly created key. + * For persistent keys, this is the key identifier + * defined in \p attributes. + * \c 0 on failure. + * \param[in] data Buffer containing the key data. The content of this + * buffer is interpreted according to the type declared + * in \p attributes. + * All implementations must support at least the format + * described in the documentation + * of psa_export_key() or psa_export_public_key() for + * the chosen type. Implementations may allow other + * formats, but should be conservative: implementations + * should err on the side of rejecting content if it + * may be erroneous (e.g. wrong type or truncated data). + * \param data_length Size of the \p data buffer in bytes. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * If the key is persistent, the key material and the key's metadata + * have been saved to persistent storage. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS + * This is an attempt to create a persistent key, and there is + * already a persistent key with the given identifier. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * The key type or key size is not supported, either by the + * implementation in general or in this particular persistent location. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * The key attributes, as a whole, are invalid, or + * the key data is not correctly formatted, or + * the size in \p attributes is nonzero and does not match the size + * of the key data. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_STORAGE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_import_key(const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *data, + size_t data_length, + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t *key); + + + +/** + * \brief Export a key in binary format. + * + * The output of this function can be passed to psa_import_key() to + * create an equivalent object. + * + * If the implementation of psa_import_key() supports other formats + * beyond the format specified here, the output from psa_export_key() + * must use the representation specified here, not the original + * representation. + * + * For standard key types, the output format is as follows: + * + * - For symmetric keys (including MAC keys), the format is the + * raw bytes of the key. + * - For DES, the key data consists of 8 bytes. The parity bits must be + * correct. + * - For Triple-DES, the format is the concatenation of the + * two or three DES keys. + * - For RSA key pairs (#PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR), the format + * is the non-encrypted DER encoding of the representation defined by + * PKCS\#1 (RFC 8017) as `RSAPrivateKey`, version 0. + * ``` + * RSAPrivateKey ::= SEQUENCE { + * version INTEGER, -- must be 0 + * modulus INTEGER, -- n + * publicExponent INTEGER, -- e + * privateExponent INTEGER, -- d + * prime1 INTEGER, -- p + * prime2 INTEGER, -- q + * exponent1 INTEGER, -- d mod (p-1) + * exponent2 INTEGER, -- d mod (q-1) + * coefficient INTEGER, -- (inverse of q) mod p + * } + * ``` + * - For elliptic curve key pairs (key types for which + * #PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC_KEY_PAIR is true), the format is + * a representation of the private value as a `ceiling(m/8)`-byte string + * where `m` is the bit size associated with the curve, i.e. the bit size + * of the order of the curve's coordinate field. This byte string is + * in little-endian order for Montgomery curves (curve types + * `PSA_ECC_FAMILY_CURVEXXX`), and in big-endian order for Weierstrass + * curves (curve types `PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECTXXX`, `PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECPXXX` + * and `PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_PXXX`). + * For Weierstrass curves, this is the content of the `privateKey` field of + * the `ECPrivateKey` format defined by RFC 5915. For Montgomery curves, + * the format is defined by RFC 7748, and output is masked according to §5. + * For twisted Edwards curves, the private key is as defined by RFC 8032 + * (a 32-byte string for Edwards25519, a 57-byte string for Edwards448). + * - For Diffie-Hellman key exchange key pairs (key types for which + * #PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_DH_KEY_PAIR is true), the + * format is the representation of the private key `x` as a big-endian byte + * string. The length of the byte string is the private key size in bytes + * (leading zeroes are not stripped). + * - For public keys (key types for which #PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_PUBLIC_KEY is + * true), the format is the same as for psa_export_public_key(). + * + * The policy on the key must have the usage flag #PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT set. + * + * \param key Identifier of the key to export. It must allow the + * usage #PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT, unless it is a public + * key. + * \param[out] data Buffer where the key data is to be written. + * \param data_size Size of the \p data buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] data_length On success, the number of bytes + * that make up the key data. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED + * The key does not have the #PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT flag. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL + * The size of the \p data buffer is too small. You can determine a + * sufficient buffer size by calling + * #PSA_EXPORT_KEY_OUTPUT_SIZE(\c type, \c bits) + * where \c type is the key type + * and \c bits is the key size in bits. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_export_key(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + uint8_t *data, + size_t data_size, + size_t *data_length); + +/** + * \brief Export a public key or the public part of a key pair in binary format. + * + * The output of this function can be passed to psa_import_key() to + * create an object that is equivalent to the public key. + * + * This specification supports a single format for each key type. + * Implementations may support other formats as long as the standard + * format is supported. Implementations that support other formats + * should ensure that the formats are clearly unambiguous so as to + * minimize the risk that an invalid input is accidentally interpreted + * according to a different format. + * + * For standard key types, the output format is as follows: + * - For RSA public keys (#PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY), the DER encoding of + * the representation defined by RFC 3279 §2.3.1 as `RSAPublicKey`. + * ``` + * RSAPublicKey ::= SEQUENCE { + * modulus INTEGER, -- n + * publicExponent INTEGER } -- e + * ``` + * - For elliptic curve keys on a twisted Edwards curve (key types for which + * #PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY is true and #PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_GET_FAMILY + * returns #PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS), the public key is as defined + * by RFC 8032 + * (a 32-byte string for Edwards25519, a 57-byte string for Edwards448). + * - For other elliptic curve public keys (key types for which + * #PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY is true), the format is the uncompressed + * representation defined by SEC1 §2.3.3 as the content of an ECPoint. + * Let `m` be the bit size associated with the curve, i.e. the bit size of + * `q` for a curve over `F_q`. The representation consists of: + * - The byte 0x04; + * - `x_P` as a `ceiling(m/8)`-byte string, big-endian; + * - `y_P` as a `ceiling(m/8)`-byte string, big-endian. + * - For Diffie-Hellman key exchange public keys (key types for which + * #PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_DH_PUBLIC_KEY is true), + * the format is the representation of the public key `y = g^x mod p` as a + * big-endian byte string. The length of the byte string is the length of the + * base prime `p` in bytes. + * + * Exporting a public key object or the public part of a key pair is + * always permitted, regardless of the key's usage flags. + * + * \param key Identifier of the key to export. + * \param[out] data Buffer where the key data is to be written. + * \param data_size Size of the \p data buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] data_length On success, the number of bytes + * that make up the key data. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * The key is neither a public key nor a key pair. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL + * The size of the \p data buffer is too small. You can determine a + * sufficient buffer size by calling + * #PSA_EXPORT_KEY_OUTPUT_SIZE(#PSA_KEY_TYPE_PUBLIC_KEY_OF_KEY_PAIR(\c type), \c bits) + * where \c type is the key type + * and \c bits is the key size in bits. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_export_public_key(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + uint8_t *data, + size_t data_size, + size_t *data_length); + + + +/**@}*/ + +/** \defgroup hash Message digests + * @{ + */ + +/** Calculate the hash (digest) of a message. + * + * \note To verify the hash of a message against an + * expected value, use psa_hash_compare() instead. + * + * \param alg The hash algorithm to compute (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value + * such that #PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(\p alg) is true). + * \param[in] input Buffer containing the message to hash. + * \param input_length Size of the \p input buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] hash Buffer where the hash is to be written. + * \param hash_size Size of the \p hash buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] hash_length On success, the number of bytes + * that make up the hash value. This is always + * #PSA_HASH_LENGTH(\p alg). + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * \p alg is not supported or is not a hash algorithm. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL + * \p hash_size is too small + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_hash_compute(psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length, + uint8_t *hash, + size_t hash_size, + size_t *hash_length); + +/** Calculate the hash (digest) of a message and compare it with a + * reference value. + * + * \param alg The hash algorithm to compute (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value + * such that #PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(\p alg) is true). + * \param[in] input Buffer containing the message to hash. + * \param input_length Size of the \p input buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] hash Buffer containing the expected hash value. + * \param hash_length Size of the \p hash buffer in bytes. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * The expected hash is identical to the actual hash of the input. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE + * The hash of the message was calculated successfully, but it + * differs from the expected hash. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * \p alg is not supported or is not a hash algorithm. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * \p input_length or \p hash_length do not match the hash size for \p alg + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_hash_compare(psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length, + const uint8_t *hash, + size_t hash_length); + +/** The type of the state data structure for multipart hash operations. + * + * Before calling any function on a hash operation object, the application must + * initialize it by any of the following means: + * - Set the structure to all-bits-zero, for example: + * \code + * psa_hash_operation_t operation; + * memset(&operation, 0, sizeof(operation)); + * \endcode + * - Initialize the structure to logical zero values, for example: + * \code + * psa_hash_operation_t operation = {0}; + * \endcode + * - Initialize the structure to the initializer #PSA_HASH_OPERATION_INIT, + * for example: + * \code + * psa_hash_operation_t operation = PSA_HASH_OPERATION_INIT; + * \endcode + * - Assign the result of the function psa_hash_operation_init() + * to the structure, for example: + * \code + * psa_hash_operation_t operation; + * operation = psa_hash_operation_init(); + * \endcode + * + * This is an implementation-defined \c struct. Applications should not + * make any assumptions about the content of this structure. + * Implementation details can change in future versions without notice. */ +typedef struct psa_hash_operation_s psa_hash_operation_t; + +/** \def PSA_HASH_OPERATION_INIT + * + * This macro returns a suitable initializer for a hash operation object + * of type #psa_hash_operation_t. + */ + +/** Return an initial value for a hash operation object. + */ +static psa_hash_operation_t psa_hash_operation_init(void); + +/** Set up a multipart hash operation. + * + * The sequence of operations to calculate a hash (message digest) + * is as follows: + * -# Allocate an operation object which will be passed to all the functions + * listed here. + * -# Initialize the operation object with one of the methods described in the + * documentation for #psa_hash_operation_t, e.g. #PSA_HASH_OPERATION_INIT. + * -# Call psa_hash_setup() to specify the algorithm. + * -# Call psa_hash_update() zero, one or more times, passing a fragment + * of the message each time. The hash that is calculated is the hash + * of the concatenation of these messages in order. + * -# To calculate the hash, call psa_hash_finish(). + * To compare the hash with an expected value, call psa_hash_verify(). + * + * If an error occurs at any step after a call to psa_hash_setup(), the + * operation will need to be reset by a call to psa_hash_abort(). The + * application may call psa_hash_abort() at any time after the operation + * has been initialized. + * + * After a successful call to psa_hash_setup(), the application must + * eventually terminate the operation. The following events terminate an + * operation: + * - A successful call to psa_hash_finish() or psa_hash_verify(). + * - A call to psa_hash_abort(). + * + * \param[in,out] operation The operation object to set up. It must have + * been initialized as per the documentation for + * #psa_hash_operation_t and not yet in use. + * \param alg The hash algorithm to compute (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value + * such that #PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(\p alg) is true). + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * \p alg is not a supported hash algorithm. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * \p alg is not a hash algorithm. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The operation state is not valid (it must be inactive), or + * the library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_hash_setup(psa_hash_operation_t *operation, + psa_algorithm_t alg); + +/** Add a message fragment to a multipart hash operation. + * + * The application must call psa_hash_setup() before calling this function. + * + * If this function returns an error status, the operation enters an error + * state and must be aborted by calling psa_hash_abort(). + * + * \param[in,out] operation Active hash operation. + * \param[in] input Buffer containing the message fragment to hash. + * \param input_length Size of the \p input buffer in bytes. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The operation state is not valid (it must be active), or + * the library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_hash_update(psa_hash_operation_t *operation, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length); + +/** Finish the calculation of the hash of a message. + * + * The application must call psa_hash_setup() before calling this function. + * This function calculates the hash of the message formed by concatenating + * the inputs passed to preceding calls to psa_hash_update(). + * + * When this function returns successfully, the operation becomes inactive. + * If this function returns an error status, the operation enters an error + * state and must be aborted by calling psa_hash_abort(). + * + * \warning Applications should not call this function if they expect + * a specific value for the hash. Call psa_hash_verify() instead. + * Beware that comparing integrity or authenticity data such as + * hash values with a function such as \c memcmp is risky + * because the time taken by the comparison may leak information + * about the hashed data which could allow an attacker to guess + * a valid hash and thereby bypass security controls. + * + * \param[in,out] operation Active hash operation. + * \param[out] hash Buffer where the hash is to be written. + * \param hash_size Size of the \p hash buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] hash_length On success, the number of bytes + * that make up the hash value. This is always + * #PSA_HASH_LENGTH(\c alg) where \c alg is the + * hash algorithm that is calculated. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL + * The size of the \p hash buffer is too small. You can determine a + * sufficient buffer size by calling #PSA_HASH_LENGTH(\c alg) + * where \c alg is the hash algorithm that is calculated. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The operation state is not valid (it must be active), or + * the library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_hash_finish(psa_hash_operation_t *operation, + uint8_t *hash, + size_t hash_size, + size_t *hash_length); + +/** Finish the calculation of the hash of a message and compare it with + * an expected value. + * + * The application must call psa_hash_setup() before calling this function. + * This function calculates the hash of the message formed by concatenating + * the inputs passed to preceding calls to psa_hash_update(). It then + * compares the calculated hash with the expected hash passed as a + * parameter to this function. + * + * When this function returns successfully, the operation becomes inactive. + * If this function returns an error status, the operation enters an error + * state and must be aborted by calling psa_hash_abort(). + * + * \note Implementations shall make the best effort to ensure that the + * comparison between the actual hash and the expected hash is performed + * in constant time. + * + * \param[in,out] operation Active hash operation. + * \param[in] hash Buffer containing the expected hash value. + * \param hash_length Size of the \p hash buffer in bytes. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * The expected hash is identical to the actual hash of the message. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE + * The hash of the message was calculated successfully, but it + * differs from the expected hash. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The operation state is not valid (it must be active), or + * the library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_hash_verify(psa_hash_operation_t *operation, + const uint8_t *hash, + size_t hash_length); + +/** Abort a hash operation. + * + * Aborting an operation frees all associated resources except for the + * \p operation structure itself. Once aborted, the operation object + * can be reused for another operation by calling + * psa_hash_setup() again. + * + * You may call this function any time after the operation object has + * been initialized by one of the methods described in #psa_hash_operation_t. + * + * In particular, calling psa_hash_abort() after the operation has been + * terminated by a call to psa_hash_abort(), psa_hash_finish() or + * psa_hash_verify() is safe and has no effect. + * + * \param[in,out] operation Initialized hash operation. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_hash_abort(psa_hash_operation_t *operation); + +/** Clone a hash operation. + * + * This function copies the state of an ongoing hash operation to + * a new operation object. In other words, this function is equivalent + * to calling psa_hash_setup() on \p target_operation with the same + * algorithm that \p source_operation was set up for, then + * psa_hash_update() on \p target_operation with the same input that + * that was passed to \p source_operation. After this function returns, the + * two objects are independent, i.e. subsequent calls involving one of + * the objects do not affect the other object. + * + * \param[in] source_operation The active hash operation to clone. + * \param[in,out] target_operation The operation object to set up. + * It must be initialized but not active. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The \p source_operation state is not valid (it must be active), or + * the \p target_operation state is not valid (it must be inactive), or + * the library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_hash_clone(const psa_hash_operation_t *source_operation, + psa_hash_operation_t *target_operation); + +/**@}*/ + +/** \defgroup MAC Message authentication codes + * @{ + */ + +/** Calculate the MAC (message authentication code) of a message. + * + * \note To verify the MAC of a message against an + * expected value, use psa_mac_verify() instead. + * Beware that comparing integrity or authenticity data such as + * MAC values with a function such as \c memcmp is risky + * because the time taken by the comparison may leak information + * about the MAC value which could allow an attacker to guess + * a valid MAC and thereby bypass security controls. + * + * \param key Identifier of the key to use for the operation. It + * must allow the usage PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE. + * \param alg The MAC algorithm to compute (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value + * such that #PSA_ALG_IS_MAC(\p alg) is true). + * \param[in] input Buffer containing the input message. + * \param input_length Size of the \p input buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] mac Buffer where the MAC value is to be written. + * \param mac_size Size of the \p mac buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] mac_length On success, the number of bytes + * that make up the MAC value. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * \p key is not compatible with \p alg. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * \p alg is not supported or is not a MAC algorithm. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL + * \p mac_size is too small + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE + * The key could not be retrieved from storage. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_mac_compute(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length, + uint8_t *mac, + size_t mac_size, + size_t *mac_length); + +/** Calculate the MAC of a message and compare it with a reference value. + * + * \param key Identifier of the key to use for the operation. It + * must allow the usage PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE. + * \param alg The MAC algorithm to compute (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value + * such that #PSA_ALG_IS_MAC(\p alg) is true). + * \param[in] input Buffer containing the input message. + * \param input_length Size of the \p input buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] mac Buffer containing the expected MAC value. + * \param mac_length Size of the \p mac buffer in bytes. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * The expected MAC is identical to the actual MAC of the input. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE + * The MAC of the message was calculated successfully, but it + * differs from the expected value. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * \p key is not compatible with \p alg. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * \p alg is not supported or is not a MAC algorithm. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE + * The key could not be retrieved from storage. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_mac_verify(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length, + const uint8_t *mac, + size_t mac_length); + +/** The type of the state data structure for multipart MAC operations. + * + * Before calling any function on a MAC operation object, the application must + * initialize it by any of the following means: + * - Set the structure to all-bits-zero, for example: + * \code + * psa_mac_operation_t operation; + * memset(&operation, 0, sizeof(operation)); + * \endcode + * - Initialize the structure to logical zero values, for example: + * \code + * psa_mac_operation_t operation = {0}; + * \endcode + * - Initialize the structure to the initializer #PSA_MAC_OPERATION_INIT, + * for example: + * \code + * psa_mac_operation_t operation = PSA_MAC_OPERATION_INIT; + * \endcode + * - Assign the result of the function psa_mac_operation_init() + * to the structure, for example: + * \code + * psa_mac_operation_t operation; + * operation = psa_mac_operation_init(); + * \endcode + * + * + * This is an implementation-defined \c struct. Applications should not + * make any assumptions about the content of this structure. + * Implementation details can change in future versions without notice. */ +typedef struct psa_mac_operation_s psa_mac_operation_t; + +/** \def PSA_MAC_OPERATION_INIT + * + * This macro returns a suitable initializer for a MAC operation object of type + * #psa_mac_operation_t. + */ + +/** Return an initial value for a MAC operation object. + */ +static psa_mac_operation_t psa_mac_operation_init(void); + +/** Set up a multipart MAC calculation operation. + * + * This function sets up the calculation of the MAC + * (message authentication code) of a byte string. + * To verify the MAC of a message against an + * expected value, use psa_mac_verify_setup() instead. + * + * The sequence of operations to calculate a MAC is as follows: + * -# Allocate an operation object which will be passed to all the functions + * listed here. + * -# Initialize the operation object with one of the methods described in the + * documentation for #psa_mac_operation_t, e.g. #PSA_MAC_OPERATION_INIT. + * -# Call psa_mac_sign_setup() to specify the algorithm and key. + * -# Call psa_mac_update() zero, one or more times, passing a fragment + * of the message each time. The MAC that is calculated is the MAC + * of the concatenation of these messages in order. + * -# At the end of the message, call psa_mac_sign_finish() to finish + * calculating the MAC value and retrieve it. + * + * If an error occurs at any step after a call to psa_mac_sign_setup(), the + * operation will need to be reset by a call to psa_mac_abort(). The + * application may call psa_mac_abort() at any time after the operation + * has been initialized. + * + * After a successful call to psa_mac_sign_setup(), the application must + * eventually terminate the operation through one of the following methods: + * - A successful call to psa_mac_sign_finish(). + * - A call to psa_mac_abort(). + * + * \param[in,out] operation The operation object to set up. It must have + * been initialized as per the documentation for + * #psa_mac_operation_t and not yet in use. + * \param key Identifier of the key to use for the operation. It + * must remain valid until the operation terminates. + * It must allow the usage PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE. + * \param alg The MAC algorithm to compute (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value + * such that #PSA_ALG_IS_MAC(\p alg) is true). + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * \p key is not compatible with \p alg. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * \p alg is not supported or is not a MAC algorithm. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE + * The key could not be retrieved from storage. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The operation state is not valid (it must be inactive), or + * the library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_mac_sign_setup(psa_mac_operation_t *operation, + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + psa_algorithm_t alg); + +/** Set up a multipart MAC verification operation. + * + * This function sets up the verification of the MAC + * (message authentication code) of a byte string against an expected value. + * + * The sequence of operations to verify a MAC is as follows: + * -# Allocate an operation object which will be passed to all the functions + * listed here. + * -# Initialize the operation object with one of the methods described in the + * documentation for #psa_mac_operation_t, e.g. #PSA_MAC_OPERATION_INIT. + * -# Call psa_mac_verify_setup() to specify the algorithm and key. + * -# Call psa_mac_update() zero, one or more times, passing a fragment + * of the message each time. The MAC that is calculated is the MAC + * of the concatenation of these messages in order. + * -# At the end of the message, call psa_mac_verify_finish() to finish + * calculating the actual MAC of the message and verify it against + * the expected value. + * + * If an error occurs at any step after a call to psa_mac_verify_setup(), the + * operation will need to be reset by a call to psa_mac_abort(). The + * application may call psa_mac_abort() at any time after the operation + * has been initialized. + * + * After a successful call to psa_mac_verify_setup(), the application must + * eventually terminate the operation through one of the following methods: + * - A successful call to psa_mac_verify_finish(). + * - A call to psa_mac_abort(). + * + * \param[in,out] operation The operation object to set up. It must have + * been initialized as per the documentation for + * #psa_mac_operation_t and not yet in use. + * \param key Identifier of the key to use for the operation. It + * must remain valid until the operation terminates. + * It must allow the usage + * PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE. + * \param alg The MAC algorithm to compute (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value + * such that #PSA_ALG_IS_MAC(\p alg) is true). + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * \c key is not compatible with \c alg. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * \c alg is not supported or is not a MAC algorithm. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE + * The key could not be retrieved from storage. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The operation state is not valid (it must be inactive), or + * the library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_mac_verify_setup(psa_mac_operation_t *operation, + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + psa_algorithm_t alg); + +/** Add a message fragment to a multipart MAC operation. + * + * The application must call psa_mac_sign_setup() or psa_mac_verify_setup() + * before calling this function. + * + * If this function returns an error status, the operation enters an error + * state and must be aborted by calling psa_mac_abort(). + * + * \param[in,out] operation Active MAC operation. + * \param[in] input Buffer containing the message fragment to add to + * the MAC calculation. + * \param input_length Size of the \p input buffer in bytes. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The operation state is not valid (it must be active), or + * the library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_mac_update(psa_mac_operation_t *operation, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length); + +/** Finish the calculation of the MAC of a message. + * + * The application must call psa_mac_sign_setup() before calling this function. + * This function calculates the MAC of the message formed by concatenating + * the inputs passed to preceding calls to psa_mac_update(). + * + * When this function returns successfully, the operation becomes inactive. + * If this function returns an error status, the operation enters an error + * state and must be aborted by calling psa_mac_abort(). + * + * \warning Applications should not call this function if they expect + * a specific value for the MAC. Call psa_mac_verify_finish() instead. + * Beware that comparing integrity or authenticity data such as + * MAC values with a function such as \c memcmp is risky + * because the time taken by the comparison may leak information + * about the MAC value which could allow an attacker to guess + * a valid MAC and thereby bypass security controls. + * + * \param[in,out] operation Active MAC operation. + * \param[out] mac Buffer where the MAC value is to be written. + * \param mac_size Size of the \p mac buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] mac_length On success, the number of bytes + * that make up the MAC value. This is always + * #PSA_MAC_LENGTH(\c key_type, \c key_bits, \c alg) + * where \c key_type and \c key_bits are the type and + * bit-size respectively of the key and \c alg is the + * MAC algorithm that is calculated. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL + * The size of the \p mac buffer is too small. You can determine a + * sufficient buffer size by calling PSA_MAC_LENGTH(). + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The operation state is not valid (it must be an active mac sign + * operation), or the library has not been previously initialized + * by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_mac_sign_finish(psa_mac_operation_t *operation, + uint8_t *mac, + size_t mac_size, + size_t *mac_length); + +/** Finish the calculation of the MAC of a message and compare it with + * an expected value. + * + * The application must call psa_mac_verify_setup() before calling this function. + * This function calculates the MAC of the message formed by concatenating + * the inputs passed to preceding calls to psa_mac_update(). It then + * compares the calculated MAC with the expected MAC passed as a + * parameter to this function. + * + * When this function returns successfully, the operation becomes inactive. + * If this function returns an error status, the operation enters an error + * state and must be aborted by calling psa_mac_abort(). + * + * \note Implementations shall make the best effort to ensure that the + * comparison between the actual MAC and the expected MAC is performed + * in constant time. + * + * \param[in,out] operation Active MAC operation. + * \param[in] mac Buffer containing the expected MAC value. + * \param mac_length Size of the \p mac buffer in bytes. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * The expected MAC is identical to the actual MAC of the message. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE + * The MAC of the message was calculated successfully, but it + * differs from the expected MAC. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The operation state is not valid (it must be an active mac verify + * operation), or the library has not been previously initialized + * by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_mac_verify_finish(psa_mac_operation_t *operation, + const uint8_t *mac, + size_t mac_length); + +/** Abort a MAC operation. + * + * Aborting an operation frees all associated resources except for the + * \p operation structure itself. Once aborted, the operation object + * can be reused for another operation by calling + * psa_mac_sign_setup() or psa_mac_verify_setup() again. + * + * You may call this function any time after the operation object has + * been initialized by one of the methods described in #psa_mac_operation_t. + * + * In particular, calling psa_mac_abort() after the operation has been + * terminated by a call to psa_mac_abort(), psa_mac_sign_finish() or + * psa_mac_verify_finish() is safe and has no effect. + * + * \param[in,out] operation Initialized MAC operation. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_mac_abort(psa_mac_operation_t *operation); + +/**@}*/ + +/** \defgroup cipher Symmetric ciphers + * @{ + */ + +/** Encrypt a message using a symmetric cipher. + * + * This function encrypts a message with a random IV (initialization + * vector). Use the multipart operation interface with a + * #psa_cipher_operation_t object to provide other forms of IV. + * + * \param key Identifier of the key to use for the operation. + * It must allow the usage #PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT. + * \param alg The cipher algorithm to compute + * (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that + * #PSA_ALG_IS_CIPHER(\p alg) is true). + * \param[in] input Buffer containing the message to encrypt. + * \param input_length Size of the \p input buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] output Buffer where the output is to be written. + * The output contains the IV followed by + * the ciphertext proper. + * \param output_size Size of the \p output buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] output_length On success, the number of bytes + * that make up the output. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * \p key is not compatible with \p alg. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * \p alg is not supported or is not a cipher algorithm. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_cipher_encrypt(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length, + uint8_t *output, + size_t output_size, + size_t *output_length); + +/** Decrypt a message using a symmetric cipher. + * + * This function decrypts a message encrypted with a symmetric cipher. + * + * \param key Identifier of the key to use for the operation. + * It must remain valid until the operation + * terminates. It must allow the usage + * #PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT. + * \param alg The cipher algorithm to compute + * (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that + * #PSA_ALG_IS_CIPHER(\p alg) is true). + * \param[in] input Buffer containing the message to decrypt. + * This consists of the IV followed by the + * ciphertext proper. + * \param input_length Size of the \p input buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] output Buffer where the plaintext is to be written. + * \param output_size Size of the \p output buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] output_length On success, the number of bytes + * that make up the output. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * \p key is not compatible with \p alg. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * \p alg is not supported or is not a cipher algorithm. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_cipher_decrypt(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length, + uint8_t *output, + size_t output_size, + size_t *output_length); + +/** The type of the state data structure for multipart cipher operations. + * + * Before calling any function on a cipher operation object, the application + * must initialize it by any of the following means: + * - Set the structure to all-bits-zero, for example: + * \code + * psa_cipher_operation_t operation; + * memset(&operation, 0, sizeof(operation)); + * \endcode + * - Initialize the structure to logical zero values, for example: + * \code + * psa_cipher_operation_t operation = {0}; + * \endcode + * - Initialize the structure to the initializer #PSA_CIPHER_OPERATION_INIT, + * for example: + * \code + * psa_cipher_operation_t operation = PSA_CIPHER_OPERATION_INIT; + * \endcode + * - Assign the result of the function psa_cipher_operation_init() + * to the structure, for example: + * \code + * psa_cipher_operation_t operation; + * operation = psa_cipher_operation_init(); + * \endcode + * + * This is an implementation-defined \c struct. Applications should not + * make any assumptions about the content of this structure. + * Implementation details can change in future versions without notice. */ +typedef struct psa_cipher_operation_s psa_cipher_operation_t; + +/** \def PSA_CIPHER_OPERATION_INIT + * + * This macro returns a suitable initializer for a cipher operation object of + * type #psa_cipher_operation_t. + */ + +/** Return an initial value for a cipher operation object. + */ +static psa_cipher_operation_t psa_cipher_operation_init(void); + +/** Set the key for a multipart symmetric encryption operation. + * + * The sequence of operations to encrypt a message with a symmetric cipher + * is as follows: + * -# Allocate an operation object which will be passed to all the functions + * listed here. + * -# Initialize the operation object with one of the methods described in the + * documentation for #psa_cipher_operation_t, e.g. + * #PSA_CIPHER_OPERATION_INIT. + * -# Call psa_cipher_encrypt_setup() to specify the algorithm and key. + * -# Call either psa_cipher_generate_iv() or psa_cipher_set_iv() to + * generate or set the IV (initialization vector). You should use + * psa_cipher_generate_iv() unless the protocol you are implementing + * requires a specific IV value. + * -# Call psa_cipher_update() zero, one or more times, passing a fragment + * of the message each time. + * -# Call psa_cipher_finish(). + * + * If an error occurs at any step after a call to psa_cipher_encrypt_setup(), + * the operation will need to be reset by a call to psa_cipher_abort(). The + * application may call psa_cipher_abort() at any time after the operation + * has been initialized. + * + * After a successful call to psa_cipher_encrypt_setup(), the application must + * eventually terminate the operation. The following events terminate an + * operation: + * - A successful call to psa_cipher_finish(). + * - A call to psa_cipher_abort(). + * + * \param[in,out] operation The operation object to set up. It must have + * been initialized as per the documentation for + * #psa_cipher_operation_t and not yet in use. + * \param key Identifier of the key to use for the operation. + * It must remain valid until the operation + * terminates. It must allow the usage + * #PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT. + * \param alg The cipher algorithm to compute + * (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that + * #PSA_ALG_IS_CIPHER(\p alg) is true). + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * \p key is not compatible with \p alg. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * \p alg is not supported or is not a cipher algorithm. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The operation state is not valid (it must be inactive), or + * the library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_cipher_encrypt_setup(psa_cipher_operation_t *operation, + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + psa_algorithm_t alg); + +/** Set the key for a multipart symmetric decryption operation. + * + * The sequence of operations to decrypt a message with a symmetric cipher + * is as follows: + * -# Allocate an operation object which will be passed to all the functions + * listed here. + * -# Initialize the operation object with one of the methods described in the + * documentation for #psa_cipher_operation_t, e.g. + * #PSA_CIPHER_OPERATION_INIT. + * -# Call psa_cipher_decrypt_setup() to specify the algorithm and key. + * -# Call psa_cipher_set_iv() with the IV (initialization vector) for the + * decryption. If the IV is prepended to the ciphertext, you can call + * psa_cipher_update() on a buffer containing the IV followed by the + * beginning of the message. + * -# Call psa_cipher_update() zero, one or more times, passing a fragment + * of the message each time. + * -# Call psa_cipher_finish(). + * + * If an error occurs at any step after a call to psa_cipher_decrypt_setup(), + * the operation will need to be reset by a call to psa_cipher_abort(). The + * application may call psa_cipher_abort() at any time after the operation + * has been initialized. + * + * After a successful call to psa_cipher_decrypt_setup(), the application must + * eventually terminate the operation. The following events terminate an + * operation: + * - A successful call to psa_cipher_finish(). + * - A call to psa_cipher_abort(). + * + * \param[in,out] operation The operation object to set up. It must have + * been initialized as per the documentation for + * #psa_cipher_operation_t and not yet in use. + * \param key Identifier of the key to use for the operation. + * It must remain valid until the operation + * terminates. It must allow the usage + * #PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT. + * \param alg The cipher algorithm to compute + * (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that + * #PSA_ALG_IS_CIPHER(\p alg) is true). + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * \p key is not compatible with \p alg. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * \p alg is not supported or is not a cipher algorithm. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The operation state is not valid (it must be inactive), or + * the library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_cipher_decrypt_setup(psa_cipher_operation_t *operation, + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + psa_algorithm_t alg); + +/** Generate an IV for a symmetric encryption operation. + * + * This function generates a random IV (initialization vector), nonce + * or initial counter value for the encryption operation as appropriate + * for the chosen algorithm, key type and key size. + * + * The application must call psa_cipher_encrypt_setup() before + * calling this function. + * + * If this function returns an error status, the operation enters an error + * state and must be aborted by calling psa_cipher_abort(). + * + * \param[in,out] operation Active cipher operation. + * \param[out] iv Buffer where the generated IV is to be written. + * \param iv_size Size of the \p iv buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] iv_length On success, the number of bytes of the + * generated IV. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL + * The size of the \p iv buffer is too small. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The operation state is not valid (it must be active, with no IV set), + * or the library has not been previously initialized + * by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_cipher_generate_iv(psa_cipher_operation_t *operation, + uint8_t *iv, + size_t iv_size, + size_t *iv_length); + +/** Set the IV for a symmetric encryption or decryption operation. + * + * This function sets the IV (initialization vector), nonce + * or initial counter value for the encryption or decryption operation. + * + * The application must call psa_cipher_encrypt_setup() before + * calling this function. + * + * If this function returns an error status, the operation enters an error + * state and must be aborted by calling psa_cipher_abort(). + * + * \note When encrypting, applications should use psa_cipher_generate_iv() + * instead of this function, unless implementing a protocol that requires + * a non-random IV. + * + * \param[in,out] operation Active cipher operation. + * \param[in] iv Buffer containing the IV to use. + * \param iv_length Size of the IV in bytes. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * The size of \p iv is not acceptable for the chosen algorithm, + * or the chosen algorithm does not use an IV. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The operation state is not valid (it must be an active cipher + * encrypt operation, with no IV set), or the library has not been + * previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_cipher_set_iv(psa_cipher_operation_t *operation, + const uint8_t *iv, + size_t iv_length); + +/** Encrypt or decrypt a message fragment in an active cipher operation. + * + * Before calling this function, you must: + * 1. Call either psa_cipher_encrypt_setup() or psa_cipher_decrypt_setup(). + * The choice of setup function determines whether this function + * encrypts or decrypts its input. + * 2. If the algorithm requires an IV, call psa_cipher_generate_iv() + * (recommended when encrypting) or psa_cipher_set_iv(). + * + * If this function returns an error status, the operation enters an error + * state and must be aborted by calling psa_cipher_abort(). + * + * \param[in,out] operation Active cipher operation. + * \param[in] input Buffer containing the message fragment to + * encrypt or decrypt. + * \param input_length Size of the \p input buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] output Buffer where the output is to be written. + * \param output_size Size of the \p output buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] output_length On success, the number of bytes + * that make up the returned output. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL + * The size of the \p output buffer is too small. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The operation state is not valid (it must be active, with an IV set + * if required for the algorithm), or the library has not been + * previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_cipher_update(psa_cipher_operation_t *operation, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length, + uint8_t *output, + size_t output_size, + size_t *output_length); + +/** Finish encrypting or decrypting a message in a cipher operation. + * + * The application must call psa_cipher_encrypt_setup() or + * psa_cipher_decrypt_setup() before calling this function. The choice + * of setup function determines whether this function encrypts or + * decrypts its input. + * + * This function finishes the encryption or decryption of the message + * formed by concatenating the inputs passed to preceding calls to + * psa_cipher_update(). + * + * When this function returns successfully, the operation becomes inactive. + * If this function returns an error status, the operation enters an error + * state and must be aborted by calling psa_cipher_abort(). + * + * \param[in,out] operation Active cipher operation. + * \param[out] output Buffer where the output is to be written. + * \param output_size Size of the \p output buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] output_length On success, the number of bytes + * that make up the returned output. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * The total input size passed to this operation is not valid for + * this particular algorithm. For example, the algorithm is a based + * on block cipher and requires a whole number of blocks, but the + * total input size is not a multiple of the block size. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_PADDING + * This is a decryption operation for an algorithm that includes + * padding, and the ciphertext does not contain valid padding. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL + * The size of the \p output buffer is too small. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The operation state is not valid (it must be active, with an IV set + * if required for the algorithm), or the library has not been + * previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_cipher_finish(psa_cipher_operation_t *operation, + uint8_t *output, + size_t output_size, + size_t *output_length); + +/** Abort a cipher operation. + * + * Aborting an operation frees all associated resources except for the + * \p operation structure itself. Once aborted, the operation object + * can be reused for another operation by calling + * psa_cipher_encrypt_setup() or psa_cipher_decrypt_setup() again. + * + * You may call this function any time after the operation object has + * been initialized as described in #psa_cipher_operation_t. + * + * In particular, calling psa_cipher_abort() after the operation has been + * terminated by a call to psa_cipher_abort() or psa_cipher_finish() + * is safe and has no effect. + * + * \param[in,out] operation Initialized cipher operation. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_cipher_abort(psa_cipher_operation_t *operation); + +/**@}*/ + +/** \defgroup aead Authenticated encryption with associated data (AEAD) + * @{ + */ + +/** Process an authenticated encryption operation. + * + * \param key Identifier of the key to use for the + * operation. It must allow the usage + * #PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT. + * \param alg The AEAD algorithm to compute + * (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that + * #PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD(\p alg) is true). + * \param[in] nonce Nonce or IV to use. + * \param nonce_length Size of the \p nonce buffer in bytes. + * \param[in] additional_data Additional data that will be authenticated + * but not encrypted. + * \param additional_data_length Size of \p additional_data in bytes. + * \param[in] plaintext Data that will be authenticated and + * encrypted. + * \param plaintext_length Size of \p plaintext in bytes. + * \param[out] ciphertext Output buffer for the authenticated and + * encrypted data. The additional data is not + * part of this output. For algorithms where the + * encrypted data and the authentication tag + * are defined as separate outputs, the + * authentication tag is appended to the + * encrypted data. + * \param ciphertext_size Size of the \p ciphertext buffer in bytes. + * This must be appropriate for the selected + * algorithm and key: + * - A sufficient output size is + * #PSA_AEAD_ENCRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE(\c key_type, + * \p alg, \p plaintext_length) where + * \c key_type is the type of \p key. + * - #PSA_AEAD_ENCRYPT_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE(\p + * plaintext_length) evaluates to the maximum + * ciphertext size of any supported AEAD + * encryption. + * \param[out] ciphertext_length On success, the size of the output + * in the \p ciphertext buffer. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * \p key is not compatible with \p alg. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * \p alg is not supported or is not an AEAD algorithm. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL + * \p ciphertext_size is too small. + * #PSA_AEAD_ENCRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE(\c key_type, \p alg, + * \p plaintext_length) or + * #PSA_AEAD_ENCRYPT_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE(\p plaintext_length) can be used to + * determine the required buffer size. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_aead_encrypt(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *nonce, + size_t nonce_length, + const uint8_t *additional_data, + size_t additional_data_length, + const uint8_t *plaintext, + size_t plaintext_length, + uint8_t *ciphertext, + size_t ciphertext_size, + size_t *ciphertext_length); + +/** Process an authenticated decryption operation. + * + * \param key Identifier of the key to use for the + * operation. It must allow the usage + * #PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT. + * \param alg The AEAD algorithm to compute + * (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that + * #PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD(\p alg) is true). + * \param[in] nonce Nonce or IV to use. + * \param nonce_length Size of the \p nonce buffer in bytes. + * \param[in] additional_data Additional data that has been authenticated + * but not encrypted. + * \param additional_data_length Size of \p additional_data in bytes. + * \param[in] ciphertext Data that has been authenticated and + * encrypted. For algorithms where the + * encrypted data and the authentication tag + * are defined as separate inputs, the buffer + * must contain the encrypted data followed + * by the authentication tag. + * \param ciphertext_length Size of \p ciphertext in bytes. + * \param[out] plaintext Output buffer for the decrypted data. + * \param plaintext_size Size of the \p plaintext buffer in bytes. + * This must be appropriate for the selected + * algorithm and key: + * - A sufficient output size is + * #PSA_AEAD_DECRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE(\c key_type, + * \p alg, \p ciphertext_length) where + * \c key_type is the type of \p key. + * - #PSA_AEAD_DECRYPT_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE(\p + * ciphertext_length) evaluates to the maximum + * plaintext size of any supported AEAD + * decryption. + * \param[out] plaintext_length On success, the size of the output + * in the \p plaintext buffer. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE + * The ciphertext is not authentic. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * \p key is not compatible with \p alg. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * \p alg is not supported or is not an AEAD algorithm. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL + * \p plaintext_size is too small. + * #PSA_AEAD_DECRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE(\c key_type, \p alg, + * \p ciphertext_length) or + * #PSA_AEAD_DECRYPT_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE(\p ciphertext_length) can be used + * to determine the required buffer size. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_aead_decrypt(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *nonce, + size_t nonce_length, + const uint8_t *additional_data, + size_t additional_data_length, + const uint8_t *ciphertext, + size_t ciphertext_length, + uint8_t *plaintext, + size_t plaintext_size, + size_t *plaintext_length); + +/** The type of the state data structure for multipart AEAD operations. + * + * Before calling any function on an AEAD operation object, the application + * must initialize it by any of the following means: + * - Set the structure to all-bits-zero, for example: + * \code + * psa_aead_operation_t operation; + * memset(&operation, 0, sizeof(operation)); + * \endcode + * - Initialize the structure to logical zero values, for example: + * \code + * psa_aead_operation_t operation = {0}; + * \endcode + * - Initialize the structure to the initializer #PSA_AEAD_OPERATION_INIT, + * for example: + * \code + * psa_aead_operation_t operation = PSA_AEAD_OPERATION_INIT; + * \endcode + * - Assign the result of the function psa_aead_operation_init() + * to the structure, for example: + * \code + * psa_aead_operation_t operation; + * operation = psa_aead_operation_init(); + * \endcode + * + * This is an implementation-defined \c struct. Applications should not + * make any assumptions about the content of this structure. + * Implementation details can change in future versions without notice. */ +typedef struct psa_aead_operation_s psa_aead_operation_t; + +/** \def PSA_AEAD_OPERATION_INIT + * + * This macro returns a suitable initializer for an AEAD operation object of + * type #psa_aead_operation_t. + */ + +/** Return an initial value for an AEAD operation object. + */ +static psa_aead_operation_t psa_aead_operation_init(void); + +/** Set the key for a multipart authenticated encryption operation. + * + * The sequence of operations to encrypt a message with authentication + * is as follows: + * -# Allocate an operation object which will be passed to all the functions + * listed here. + * -# Initialize the operation object with one of the methods described in the + * documentation for #psa_aead_operation_t, e.g. + * #PSA_AEAD_OPERATION_INIT. + * -# Call psa_aead_encrypt_setup() to specify the algorithm and key. + * -# If needed, call psa_aead_set_lengths() to specify the length of the + * inputs to the subsequent calls to psa_aead_update_ad() and + * psa_aead_update(). See the documentation of psa_aead_set_lengths() + * for details. + * -# Call either psa_aead_generate_nonce() or psa_aead_set_nonce() to + * generate or set the nonce. You should use + * psa_aead_generate_nonce() unless the protocol you are implementing + * requires a specific nonce value. + * -# Call psa_aead_update_ad() zero, one or more times, passing a fragment + * of the non-encrypted additional authenticated data each time. + * -# Call psa_aead_update() zero, one or more times, passing a fragment + * of the message to encrypt each time. + * -# Call psa_aead_finish(). + * + * If an error occurs at any step after a call to psa_aead_encrypt_setup(), + * the operation will need to be reset by a call to psa_aead_abort(). The + * application may call psa_aead_abort() at any time after the operation + * has been initialized. + * + * After a successful call to psa_aead_encrypt_setup(), the application must + * eventually terminate the operation. The following events terminate an + * operation: + * - A successful call to psa_aead_finish(). + * - A call to psa_aead_abort(). + * + * \param[in,out] operation The operation object to set up. It must have + * been initialized as per the documentation for + * #psa_aead_operation_t and not yet in use. + * \param key Identifier of the key to use for the operation. + * It must remain valid until the operation + * terminates. It must allow the usage + * #PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT. + * \param alg The AEAD algorithm to compute + * (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that + * #PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD(\p alg) is true). + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The operation state is not valid (it must be inactive), or + * the library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * \p key is not compatible with \p alg. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * \p alg is not supported or is not an AEAD algorithm. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE + * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_aead_encrypt_setup(psa_aead_operation_t *operation, + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + psa_algorithm_t alg); + +/** Set the key for a multipart authenticated decryption operation. + * + * The sequence of operations to decrypt a message with authentication + * is as follows: + * -# Allocate an operation object which will be passed to all the functions + * listed here. + * -# Initialize the operation object with one of the methods described in the + * documentation for #psa_aead_operation_t, e.g. + * #PSA_AEAD_OPERATION_INIT. + * -# Call psa_aead_decrypt_setup() to specify the algorithm and key. + * -# If needed, call psa_aead_set_lengths() to specify the length of the + * inputs to the subsequent calls to psa_aead_update_ad() and + * psa_aead_update(). See the documentation of psa_aead_set_lengths() + * for details. + * -# Call psa_aead_set_nonce() with the nonce for the decryption. + * -# Call psa_aead_update_ad() zero, one or more times, passing a fragment + * of the non-encrypted additional authenticated data each time. + * -# Call psa_aead_update() zero, one or more times, passing a fragment + * of the ciphertext to decrypt each time. + * -# Call psa_aead_verify(). + * + * If an error occurs at any step after a call to psa_aead_decrypt_setup(), + * the operation will need to be reset by a call to psa_aead_abort(). The + * application may call psa_aead_abort() at any time after the operation + * has been initialized. + * + * After a successful call to psa_aead_decrypt_setup(), the application must + * eventually terminate the operation. The following events terminate an + * operation: + * - A successful call to psa_aead_verify(). + * - A call to psa_aead_abort(). + * + * \param[in,out] operation The operation object to set up. It must have + * been initialized as per the documentation for + * #psa_aead_operation_t and not yet in use. + * \param key Identifier of the key to use for the operation. + * It must remain valid until the operation + * terminates. It must allow the usage + * #PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT. + * \param alg The AEAD algorithm to compute + * (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that + * #PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD(\p alg) is true). + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * \p key is not compatible with \p alg. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * \p alg is not supported or is not an AEAD algorithm. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The operation state is not valid (it must be inactive), or the + * library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_aead_decrypt_setup(psa_aead_operation_t *operation, + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + psa_algorithm_t alg); + +/** Generate a random nonce for an authenticated encryption operation. + * + * This function generates a random nonce for the authenticated encryption + * operation with an appropriate size for the chosen algorithm, key type + * and key size. + * + * The application must call psa_aead_encrypt_setup() before + * calling this function. + * + * If this function returns an error status, the operation enters an error + * state and must be aborted by calling psa_aead_abort(). + * + * \param[in,out] operation Active AEAD operation. + * \param[out] nonce Buffer where the generated nonce is to be + * written. + * \param nonce_size Size of the \p nonce buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] nonce_length On success, the number of bytes of the + * generated nonce. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL + * The size of the \p nonce buffer is too small. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The operation state is not valid (it must be an active aead encrypt + * operation, with no nonce set), or the library has not been + * previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_aead_generate_nonce(psa_aead_operation_t *operation, + uint8_t *nonce, + size_t nonce_size, + size_t *nonce_length); + +/** Set the nonce for an authenticated encryption or decryption operation. + * + * This function sets the nonce for the authenticated + * encryption or decryption operation. + * + * The application must call psa_aead_encrypt_setup() or + * psa_aead_decrypt_setup() before calling this function. + * + * If this function returns an error status, the operation enters an error + * state and must be aborted by calling psa_aead_abort(). + * + * \note When encrypting, applications should use psa_aead_generate_nonce() + * instead of this function, unless implementing a protocol that requires + * a non-random IV. + * + * \param[in,out] operation Active AEAD operation. + * \param[in] nonce Buffer containing the nonce to use. + * \param nonce_length Size of the nonce in bytes. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * The size of \p nonce is not acceptable for the chosen algorithm. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The operation state is not valid (it must be active, with no nonce + * set), or the library has not been previously initialized + * by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_aead_set_nonce(psa_aead_operation_t *operation, + const uint8_t *nonce, + size_t nonce_length); + +/** Declare the lengths of the message and additional data for AEAD. + * + * The application must call this function before calling + * psa_aead_update_ad() or psa_aead_update() if the algorithm for + * the operation requires it. If the algorithm does not require it, + * calling this function is optional, but if this function is called + * then the implementation must enforce the lengths. + * + * You may call this function before or after setting the nonce with + * psa_aead_set_nonce() or psa_aead_generate_nonce(). + * + * - For #PSA_ALG_CCM, calling this function is required. + * - For the other AEAD algorithms defined in this specification, calling + * this function is not required. + * - For vendor-defined algorithm, refer to the vendor documentation. + * + * If this function returns an error status, the operation enters an error + * state and must be aborted by calling psa_aead_abort(). + * + * \param[in,out] operation Active AEAD operation. + * \param ad_length Size of the non-encrypted additional + * authenticated data in bytes. + * \param plaintext_length Size of the plaintext to encrypt in bytes. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * At least one of the lengths is not acceptable for the chosen + * algorithm. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The operation state is not valid (it must be active, and + * psa_aead_update_ad() and psa_aead_update() must not have been + * called yet), or the library has not been previously initialized + * by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_aead_set_lengths(psa_aead_operation_t *operation, + size_t ad_length, + size_t plaintext_length); + +/** Pass additional data to an active AEAD operation. + * + * Additional data is authenticated, but not encrypted. + * + * You may call this function multiple times to pass successive fragments + * of the additional data. You may not call this function after passing + * data to encrypt or decrypt with psa_aead_update(). + * + * Before calling this function, you must: + * 1. Call either psa_aead_encrypt_setup() or psa_aead_decrypt_setup(). + * 2. Set the nonce with psa_aead_generate_nonce() or psa_aead_set_nonce(). + * + * If this function returns an error status, the operation enters an error + * state and must be aborted by calling psa_aead_abort(). + * + * \warning When decrypting, until psa_aead_verify() has returned #PSA_SUCCESS, + * there is no guarantee that the input is valid. Therefore, until + * you have called psa_aead_verify() and it has returned #PSA_SUCCESS, + * treat the input as untrusted and prepare to undo any action that + * depends on the input if psa_aead_verify() returns an error status. + * + * \param[in,out] operation Active AEAD operation. + * \param[in] input Buffer containing the fragment of + * additional data. + * \param input_length Size of the \p input buffer in bytes. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * The total input length overflows the additional data length that + * was previously specified with psa_aead_set_lengths(). + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The operation state is not valid (it must be active, have a nonce + * set, have lengths set if required by the algorithm, and + * psa_aead_update() must not have been called yet), or the library + * has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_aead_update_ad(psa_aead_operation_t *operation, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length); + +/** Encrypt or decrypt a message fragment in an active AEAD operation. + * + * Before calling this function, you must: + * 1. Call either psa_aead_encrypt_setup() or psa_aead_decrypt_setup(). + * The choice of setup function determines whether this function + * encrypts or decrypts its input. + * 2. Set the nonce with psa_aead_generate_nonce() or psa_aead_set_nonce(). + * 3. Call psa_aead_update_ad() to pass all the additional data. + * + * If this function returns an error status, the operation enters an error + * state and must be aborted by calling psa_aead_abort(). + * + * \warning When decrypting, until psa_aead_verify() has returned #PSA_SUCCESS, + * there is no guarantee that the input is valid. Therefore, until + * you have called psa_aead_verify() and it has returned #PSA_SUCCESS: + * - Do not use the output in any way other than storing it in a + * confidential location. If you take any action that depends + * on the tentative decrypted data, this action will need to be + * undone if the input turns out not to be valid. Furthermore, + * if an adversary can observe that this action took place + * (for example through timing), they may be able to use this + * fact as an oracle to decrypt any message encrypted with the + * same key. + * - In particular, do not copy the output anywhere but to a + * memory or storage space that you have exclusive access to. + * + * This function does not require the input to be aligned to any + * particular block boundary. If the implementation can only process + * a whole block at a time, it must consume all the input provided, but + * it may delay the end of the corresponding output until a subsequent + * call to psa_aead_update(), psa_aead_finish() or psa_aead_verify() + * provides sufficient input. The amount of data that can be delayed + * in this way is bounded by #PSA_AEAD_UPDATE_OUTPUT_SIZE. + * + * \param[in,out] operation Active AEAD operation. + * \param[in] input Buffer containing the message fragment to + * encrypt or decrypt. + * \param input_length Size of the \p input buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] output Buffer where the output is to be written. + * \param output_size Size of the \p output buffer in bytes. + * This must be appropriate for the selected + * algorithm and key: + * - A sufficient output size is + * #PSA_AEAD_UPDATE_OUTPUT_SIZE(\c key_type, + * \c alg, \p input_length) where + * \c key_type is the type of key and \c alg is + * the algorithm that were used to set up the + * operation. + * - #PSA_AEAD_UPDATE_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE(\p + * input_length) evaluates to the maximum + * output size of any supported AEAD + * algorithm. + * \param[out] output_length On success, the number of bytes + * that make up the returned output. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL + * The size of the \p output buffer is too small. + * #PSA_AEAD_UPDATE_OUTPUT_SIZE(\c key_type, \c alg, \p input_length) or + * #PSA_AEAD_UPDATE_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE(\p input_length) can be used to + * determine the required buffer size. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * The total length of input to psa_aead_update_ad() so far is + * less than the additional data length that was previously + * specified with psa_aead_set_lengths(), or + * the total input length overflows the plaintext length that + * was previously specified with psa_aead_set_lengths(). + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The operation state is not valid (it must be active, have a nonce + * set, and have lengths set if required by the algorithm), or the + * library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_aead_update(psa_aead_operation_t *operation, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length, + uint8_t *output, + size_t output_size, + size_t *output_length); + +/** Finish encrypting a message in an AEAD operation. + * + * The operation must have been set up with psa_aead_encrypt_setup(). + * + * This function finishes the authentication of the additional data + * formed by concatenating the inputs passed to preceding calls to + * psa_aead_update_ad() with the plaintext formed by concatenating the + * inputs passed to preceding calls to psa_aead_update(). + * + * This function has two output buffers: + * - \p ciphertext contains trailing ciphertext that was buffered from + * preceding calls to psa_aead_update(). + * - \p tag contains the authentication tag. + * + * When this function returns successfully, the operation becomes inactive. + * If this function returns an error status, the operation enters an error + * state and must be aborted by calling psa_aead_abort(). + * + * \param[in,out] operation Active AEAD operation. + * \param[out] ciphertext Buffer where the last part of the ciphertext + * is to be written. + * \param ciphertext_size Size of the \p ciphertext buffer in bytes. + * This must be appropriate for the selected + * algorithm and key: + * - A sufficient output size is + * #PSA_AEAD_FINISH_OUTPUT_SIZE(\c key_type, + * \c alg) where \c key_type is the type of key + * and \c alg is the algorithm that were used to + * set up the operation. + * - #PSA_AEAD_FINISH_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE evaluates to + * the maximum output size of any supported AEAD + * algorithm. + * \param[out] ciphertext_length On success, the number of bytes of + * returned ciphertext. + * \param[out] tag Buffer where the authentication tag is + * to be written. + * \param tag_size Size of the \p tag buffer in bytes. + * This must be appropriate for the selected + * algorithm and key: + * - The exact tag size is #PSA_AEAD_TAG_LENGTH(\c + * key_type, \c key_bits, \c alg) where + * \c key_type and \c key_bits are the type and + * bit-size of the key, and \c alg is the + * algorithm that were used in the call to + * psa_aead_encrypt_setup(). + * - #PSA_AEAD_TAG_MAX_SIZE evaluates to the + * maximum tag size of any supported AEAD + * algorithm. + * \param[out] tag_length On success, the number of bytes + * that make up the returned tag. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL + * The size of the \p ciphertext or \p tag buffer is too small. + * #PSA_AEAD_FINISH_OUTPUT_SIZE(\c key_type, \c alg) or + * #PSA_AEAD_FINISH_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE can be used to determine the + * required \p ciphertext buffer size. #PSA_AEAD_TAG_LENGTH(\c key_type, + * \c key_bits, \c alg) or #PSA_AEAD_TAG_MAX_SIZE can be used to + * determine the required \p tag buffer size. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * The total length of input to psa_aead_update_ad() so far is + * less than the additional data length that was previously + * specified with psa_aead_set_lengths(), or + * the total length of input to psa_aead_update() so far is + * less than the plaintext length that was previously + * specified with psa_aead_set_lengths(). + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The operation state is not valid (it must be an active encryption + * operation with a nonce set), or the library has not been previously + * initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_aead_finish(psa_aead_operation_t *operation, + uint8_t *ciphertext, + size_t ciphertext_size, + size_t *ciphertext_length, + uint8_t *tag, + size_t tag_size, + size_t *tag_length); + +/** Finish authenticating and decrypting a message in an AEAD operation. + * + * The operation must have been set up with psa_aead_decrypt_setup(). + * + * This function finishes the authenticated decryption of the message + * components: + * + * - The additional data consisting of the concatenation of the inputs + * passed to preceding calls to psa_aead_update_ad(). + * - The ciphertext consisting of the concatenation of the inputs passed to + * preceding calls to psa_aead_update(). + * - The tag passed to this function call. + * + * If the authentication tag is correct, this function outputs any remaining + * plaintext and reports success. If the authentication tag is not correct, + * this function returns #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE. + * + * When this function returns successfully, the operation becomes inactive. + * If this function returns an error status, the operation enters an error + * state and must be aborted by calling psa_aead_abort(). + * + * \note Implementations shall make the best effort to ensure that the + * comparison between the actual tag and the expected tag is performed + * in constant time. + * + * \param[in,out] operation Active AEAD operation. + * \param[out] plaintext Buffer where the last part of the plaintext + * is to be written. This is the remaining data + * from previous calls to psa_aead_update() + * that could not be processed until the end + * of the input. + * \param plaintext_size Size of the \p plaintext buffer in bytes. + * This must be appropriate for the selected algorithm and key: + * - A sufficient output size is + * #PSA_AEAD_VERIFY_OUTPUT_SIZE(\c key_type, + * \c alg) where \c key_type is the type of key + * and \c alg is the algorithm that were used to + * set up the operation. + * - #PSA_AEAD_VERIFY_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE evaluates to + * the maximum output size of any supported AEAD + * algorithm. + * \param[out] plaintext_length On success, the number of bytes of + * returned plaintext. + * \param[in] tag Buffer containing the authentication tag. + * \param tag_length Size of the \p tag buffer in bytes. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE + * The calculations were successful, but the authentication tag is + * not correct. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL + * The size of the \p plaintext buffer is too small. + * #PSA_AEAD_VERIFY_OUTPUT_SIZE(\c key_type, \c alg) or + * #PSA_AEAD_VERIFY_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE can be used to determine the + * required buffer size. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * The total length of input to psa_aead_update_ad() so far is + * less than the additional data length that was previously + * specified with psa_aead_set_lengths(), or + * the total length of input to psa_aead_update() so far is + * less than the plaintext length that was previously + * specified with psa_aead_set_lengths(). + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The operation state is not valid (it must be an active decryption + * operation with a nonce set), or the library has not been previously + * initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_aead_verify(psa_aead_operation_t *operation, + uint8_t *plaintext, + size_t plaintext_size, + size_t *plaintext_length, + const uint8_t *tag, + size_t tag_length); + +/** Abort an AEAD operation. + * + * Aborting an operation frees all associated resources except for the + * \p operation structure itself. Once aborted, the operation object + * can be reused for another operation by calling + * psa_aead_encrypt_setup() or psa_aead_decrypt_setup() again. + * + * You may call this function any time after the operation object has + * been initialized as described in #psa_aead_operation_t. + * + * In particular, calling psa_aead_abort() after the operation has been + * terminated by a call to psa_aead_abort(), psa_aead_finish() or + * psa_aead_verify() is safe and has no effect. + * + * \param[in,out] operation Initialized AEAD operation. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_aead_abort(psa_aead_operation_t *operation); + +/**@}*/ + +/** \defgroup asymmetric Asymmetric cryptography + * @{ + */ + +/** + * \brief Sign a message with a private key. For hash-and-sign algorithms, + * this includes the hashing step. + * + * \note To perform a multi-part hash-and-sign signature algorithm, first use + * a multi-part hash operation and then pass the resulting hash to + * psa_sign_hash(). PSA_ALG_GET_HASH(\p alg) can be used to determine the + * hash algorithm to use. + * + * \param[in] key Identifier of the key to use for the operation. + * It must be an asymmetric key pair. The key must + * allow the usage #PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE. + * \param[in] alg An asymmetric signature algorithm (PSA_ALG_XXX + * value such that #PSA_ALG_IS_SIGN_MESSAGE(\p alg) + * is true), that is compatible with the type of + * \p key. + * \param[in] input The input message to sign. + * \param[in] input_length Size of the \p input buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] signature Buffer where the signature is to be written. + * \param[in] signature_size Size of the \p signature buffer in bytes. This + * must be appropriate for the selected + * algorithm and key: + * - The required signature size is + * #PSA_SIGN_OUTPUT_SIZE(\c key_type, \c key_bits, \p alg) + * where \c key_type and \c key_bits are the type and + * bit-size respectively of key. + * - #PSA_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE evaluates to the + * maximum signature size of any supported + * signature algorithm. + * \param[out] signature_length On success, the number of bytes that make up + * the returned signature value. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED + * The key does not have the #PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE flag, + * or it does not permit the requested algorithm. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL + * The size of the \p signature buffer is too small. You can + * determine a sufficient buffer size by calling + * #PSA_SIGN_OUTPUT_SIZE(\c key_type, \c key_bits, \p alg) + * where \c key_type and \c key_bits are the type and bit-size + * respectively of \p key. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_sign_message(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length, + uint8_t *signature, + size_t signature_size, + size_t *signature_length); + +/** \brief Verify the signature of a message with a public key, using + * a hash-and-sign verification algorithm. + * + * \note To perform a multi-part hash-and-sign signature verification + * algorithm, first use a multi-part hash operation to hash the message + * and then pass the resulting hash to psa_verify_hash(). + * PSA_ALG_GET_HASH(\p alg) can be used to determine the hash algorithm + * to use. + * + * \param[in] key Identifier of the key to use for the operation. + * It must be a public key or an asymmetric key + * pair. The key must allow the usage + * #PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE. + * \param[in] alg An asymmetric signature algorithm (PSA_ALG_XXX + * value such that #PSA_ALG_IS_SIGN_MESSAGE(\p alg) + * is true), that is compatible with the type of + * \p key. + * \param[in] input The message whose signature is to be verified. + * \param[in] input_length Size of the \p input buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] signature Buffer containing the signature to verify. + * \param[in] signature_length Size of the \p signature buffer in bytes. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED + * The key does not have the #PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE flag, + * or it does not permit the requested algorithm. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE + * The calculation was performed successfully, but the passed signature + * is not a valid signature. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_verify_message(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length, + const uint8_t *signature, + size_t signature_length); + +/** + * \brief Sign a hash or short message with a private key. + * + * Note that to perform a hash-and-sign signature algorithm, you must + * first calculate the hash by calling psa_hash_setup(), psa_hash_update() + * and psa_hash_finish(), or alternatively by calling psa_hash_compute(). + * Then pass the resulting hash as the \p hash + * parameter to this function. You can use #PSA_ALG_SIGN_GET_HASH(\p alg) + * to determine the hash algorithm to use. + * + * \param key Identifier of the key to use for the operation. + * It must be an asymmetric key pair. The key must + * allow the usage #PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH. + * \param alg A signature algorithm (PSA_ALG_XXX + * value such that #PSA_ALG_IS_SIGN_HASH(\p alg) + * is true), that is compatible with + * the type of \p key. + * \param[in] hash The hash or message to sign. + * \param hash_length Size of the \p hash buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] signature Buffer where the signature is to be written. + * \param signature_size Size of the \p signature buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] signature_length On success, the number of bytes + * that make up the returned signature value. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL + * The size of the \p signature buffer is too small. You can + * determine a sufficient buffer size by calling + * #PSA_SIGN_OUTPUT_SIZE(\c key_type, \c key_bits, \p alg) + * where \c key_type and \c key_bits are the type and bit-size + * respectively of \p key. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_sign_hash(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *hash, + size_t hash_length, + uint8_t *signature, + size_t signature_size, + size_t *signature_length); + +/** + * \brief Verify the signature of a hash or short message using a public key. + * + * Note that to perform a hash-and-sign signature algorithm, you must + * first calculate the hash by calling psa_hash_setup(), psa_hash_update() + * and psa_hash_finish(), or alternatively by calling psa_hash_compute(). + * Then pass the resulting hash as the \p hash + * parameter to this function. You can use #PSA_ALG_SIGN_GET_HASH(\p alg) + * to determine the hash algorithm to use. + * + * \param key Identifier of the key to use for the operation. It + * must be a public key or an asymmetric key pair. The + * key must allow the usage + * #PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH. + * \param alg A signature algorithm (PSA_ALG_XXX + * value such that #PSA_ALG_IS_SIGN_HASH(\p alg) + * is true), that is compatible with + * the type of \p key. + * \param[in] hash The hash or message whose signature is to be + * verified. + * \param hash_length Size of the \p hash buffer in bytes. + * \param[in] signature Buffer containing the signature to verify. + * \param signature_length Size of the \p signature buffer in bytes. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * The signature is valid. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE + * The calculation was performed successfully, but the passed + * signature is not a valid signature. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_verify_hash(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *hash, + size_t hash_length, + const uint8_t *signature, + size_t signature_length); + +/** + * \brief Encrypt a short message with a public key. + * + * \param key Identifier of the key to use for the operation. + * It must be a public key or an asymmetric key + * pair. It must allow the usage + * #PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT. + * \param alg An asymmetric encryption algorithm that is + * compatible with the type of \p key. + * \param[in] input The message to encrypt. + * \param input_length Size of the \p input buffer in bytes. + * \param[in] salt A salt or label, if supported by the + * encryption algorithm. + * If the algorithm does not support a + * salt, pass \c NULL. + * If the algorithm supports an optional + * salt and you do not want to pass a salt, + * pass \c NULL. + * + * - For #PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT, no salt is + * supported. + * \param salt_length Size of the \p salt buffer in bytes. + * If \p salt is \c NULL, pass 0. + * \param[out] output Buffer where the encrypted message is to + * be written. + * \param output_size Size of the \p output buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] output_length On success, the number of bytes + * that make up the returned output. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL + * The size of the \p output buffer is too small. You can + * determine a sufficient buffer size by calling + * #PSA_ASYMMETRIC_ENCRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE(\c key_type, \c key_bits, \p alg) + * where \c key_type and \c key_bits are the type and bit-size + * respectively of \p key. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_asymmetric_encrypt(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length, + const uint8_t *salt, + size_t salt_length, + uint8_t *output, + size_t output_size, + size_t *output_length); + +/** + * \brief Decrypt a short message with a private key. + * + * \param key Identifier of the key to use for the operation. + * It must be an asymmetric key pair. It must + * allow the usage #PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT. + * \param alg An asymmetric encryption algorithm that is + * compatible with the type of \p key. + * \param[in] input The message to decrypt. + * \param input_length Size of the \p input buffer in bytes. + * \param[in] salt A salt or label, if supported by the + * encryption algorithm. + * If the algorithm does not support a + * salt, pass \c NULL. + * If the algorithm supports an optional + * salt and you do not want to pass a salt, + * pass \c NULL. + * + * - For #PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT, no salt is + * supported. + * \param salt_length Size of the \p salt buffer in bytes. + * If \p salt is \c NULL, pass 0. + * \param[out] output Buffer where the decrypted message is to + * be written. + * \param output_size Size of the \c output buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] output_length On success, the number of bytes + * that make up the returned output. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL + * The size of the \p output buffer is too small. You can + * determine a sufficient buffer size by calling + * #PSA_ASYMMETRIC_DECRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE(\c key_type, \c key_bits, \p alg) + * where \c key_type and \c key_bits are the type and bit-size + * respectively of \p key. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_PADDING \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_asymmetric_decrypt(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length, + const uint8_t *salt, + size_t salt_length, + uint8_t *output, + size_t output_size, + size_t *output_length); + +/**@}*/ + +/** \defgroup key_derivation Key derivation and pseudorandom generation + * @{ + */ + +/** The type of the state data structure for key derivation operations. + * + * Before calling any function on a key derivation operation object, the + * application must initialize it by any of the following means: + * - Set the structure to all-bits-zero, for example: + * \code + * psa_key_derivation_operation_t operation; + * memset(&operation, 0, sizeof(operation)); + * \endcode + * - Initialize the structure to logical zero values, for example: + * \code + * psa_key_derivation_operation_t operation = {0}; + * \endcode + * - Initialize the structure to the initializer #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_OPERATION_INIT, + * for example: + * \code + * psa_key_derivation_operation_t operation = PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_OPERATION_INIT; + * \endcode + * - Assign the result of the function psa_key_derivation_operation_init() + * to the structure, for example: + * \code + * psa_key_derivation_operation_t operation; + * operation = psa_key_derivation_operation_init(); + * \endcode + * + * This is an implementation-defined \c struct. Applications should not + * make any assumptions about the content of this structure. + * Implementation details can change in future versions without notice. + */ +typedef struct psa_key_derivation_s psa_key_derivation_operation_t; + +/** \def PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_OPERATION_INIT + * + * This macro returns a suitable initializer for a key derivation operation + * object of type #psa_key_derivation_operation_t. + */ + +/** Return an initial value for a key derivation operation object. + */ +static psa_key_derivation_operation_t psa_key_derivation_operation_init(void); + +/** Set up a key derivation operation. + * + * A key derivation algorithm takes some inputs and uses them to generate + * a byte stream in a deterministic way. + * This byte stream can be used to produce keys and other + * cryptographic material. + * + * To derive a key: + * -# Start with an initialized object of type #psa_key_derivation_operation_t. + * -# Call psa_key_derivation_setup() to select the algorithm. + * -# Provide the inputs for the key derivation by calling + * psa_key_derivation_input_bytes() or psa_key_derivation_input_key() + * as appropriate. Which inputs are needed, in what order, and whether + * they may be keys and if so of what type depends on the algorithm. + * -# Optionally set the operation's maximum capacity with + * psa_key_derivation_set_capacity(). You may do this before, in the middle + * of or after providing inputs. For some algorithms, this step is mandatory + * because the output depends on the maximum capacity. + * -# To derive a key, call psa_key_derivation_output_key() or + * psa_key_derivation_output_key_ext(). + * To derive a byte string for a different purpose, call + * psa_key_derivation_output_bytes(). + * Successive calls to these functions use successive output bytes + * calculated by the key derivation algorithm. + * -# Clean up the key derivation operation object with + * psa_key_derivation_abort(). + * + * If this function returns an error, the key derivation operation object is + * not changed. + * + * If an error occurs at any step after a call to psa_key_derivation_setup(), + * the operation will need to be reset by a call to psa_key_derivation_abort(). + * + * Implementations must reject an attempt to derive a key of size 0. + * + * \param[in,out] operation The key derivation operation object + * to set up. It must + * have been initialized but not set up yet. + * \param alg The key derivation algorithm to compute + * (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that + * #PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_DERIVATION(\p alg) is true). + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * \c alg is not a key derivation algorithm. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * \c alg is not supported or is not a key derivation algorithm. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The operation state is not valid (it must be inactive), or + * the library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_setup( + psa_key_derivation_operation_t *operation, + psa_algorithm_t alg); + +/** Retrieve the current capacity of a key derivation operation. + * + * The capacity of a key derivation is the maximum number of bytes that it can + * return. When you get *N* bytes of output from a key derivation operation, + * this reduces its capacity by *N*. + * + * \param[in] operation The operation to query. + * \param[out] capacity On success, the capacity of the operation. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The operation state is not valid (it must be active), or + * the library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_get_capacity( + const psa_key_derivation_operation_t *operation, + size_t *capacity); + +/** Set the maximum capacity of a key derivation operation. + * + * The capacity of a key derivation operation is the maximum number of bytes + * that the key derivation operation can return from this point onwards. + * + * \param[in,out] operation The key derivation operation object to modify. + * \param capacity The new capacity of the operation. + * It must be less or equal to the operation's + * current capacity. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * \p capacity is larger than the operation's current capacity. + * In this case, the operation object remains valid and its capacity + * remains unchanged. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The operation state is not valid (it must be active), or the + * library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_set_capacity( + psa_key_derivation_operation_t *operation, + size_t capacity); + +/** Use the maximum possible capacity for a key derivation operation. + * + * Use this value as the capacity argument when setting up a key derivation + * to indicate that the operation should have the maximum possible capacity. + * The value of the maximum possible capacity depends on the key derivation + * algorithm. + */ +#define PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_UNLIMITED_CAPACITY ((size_t) (-1)) + +/** Provide an input for key derivation or key agreement. + * + * Which inputs are required and in what order depends on the algorithm. + * Refer to the documentation of each key derivation or key agreement + * algorithm for information. + * + * This function passes direct inputs, which is usually correct for + * non-secret inputs. To pass a secret input, which should be in a key + * object, call psa_key_derivation_input_key() instead of this function. + * Refer to the documentation of individual step types + * (`PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_xxx` values of type ::psa_key_derivation_step_t) + * for more information. + * + * If this function returns an error status, the operation enters an error + * state and must be aborted by calling psa_key_derivation_abort(). + * + * \param[in,out] operation The key derivation operation object to use. + * It must have been set up with + * psa_key_derivation_setup() and must not + * have produced any output yet. + * \param step Which step the input data is for. + * \param[in] data Input data to use. + * \param data_length Size of the \p data buffer in bytes. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * \c step is not compatible with the operation's algorithm, or + * \c step does not allow direct inputs. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The operation state is not valid for this input \p step, or + * the library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_input_bytes( + psa_key_derivation_operation_t *operation, + psa_key_derivation_step_t step, + const uint8_t *data, + size_t data_length); + +/** Provide a numeric input for key derivation or key agreement. + * + * Which inputs are required and in what order depends on the algorithm. + * However, when an algorithm requires a particular order, numeric inputs + * usually come first as they tend to be configuration parameters. + * Refer to the documentation of each key derivation or key agreement + * algorithm for information. + * + * This function is used for inputs which are fixed-size non-negative + * integers. + * + * If this function returns an error status, the operation enters an error + * state and must be aborted by calling psa_key_derivation_abort(). + * + * \param[in,out] operation The key derivation operation object to use. + * It must have been set up with + * psa_key_derivation_setup() and must not + * have produced any output yet. + * \param step Which step the input data is for. + * \param[in] value The value of the numeric input. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * \c step is not compatible with the operation's algorithm, or + * \c step does not allow numeric inputs. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The operation state is not valid for this input \p step, or + * the library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_input_integer( + psa_key_derivation_operation_t *operation, + psa_key_derivation_step_t step, + uint64_t value); + +/** Provide an input for key derivation in the form of a key. + * + * Which inputs are required and in what order depends on the algorithm. + * Refer to the documentation of each key derivation or key agreement + * algorithm for information. + * + * This function obtains input from a key object, which is usually correct for + * secret inputs or for non-secret personalization strings kept in the key + * store. To pass a non-secret parameter which is not in the key store, + * call psa_key_derivation_input_bytes() instead of this function. + * Refer to the documentation of individual step types + * (`PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_xxx` values of type ::psa_key_derivation_step_t) + * for more information. + * + * If this function returns an error status, the operation enters an error + * state and must be aborted by calling psa_key_derivation_abort(). + * + * \param[in,out] operation The key derivation operation object to use. + * It must have been set up with + * psa_key_derivation_setup() and must not + * have produced any output yet. + * \param step Which step the input data is for. + * \param key Identifier of the key. It must have an + * appropriate type for step and must allow the + * usage #PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE or + * #PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_DERIVATION (see note) + * and the algorithm used by the operation. + * + * \note Once all inputs steps are completed, the operations will allow: + * - psa_key_derivation_output_bytes() if each input was either a direct input + * or a key with #PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE set; + * - psa_key_derivation_output_key() or psa_key_derivation_output_key_ext() + * if the input for step + * #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET or #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_PASSWORD + * was from a key slot with #PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE and each other input was + * either a direct input or a key with #PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE set; + * - psa_key_derivation_verify_bytes() if each input was either a direct input + * or a key with #PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_DERIVATION set; + * - psa_key_derivation_verify_key() under the same conditions as + * psa_key_derivation_verify_bytes(). + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED + * The key allows neither #PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE nor + * #PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_DERIVATION, or it doesn't allow this + * algorithm. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * \c step is not compatible with the operation's algorithm, or + * \c step does not allow key inputs of the given type + * or does not allow key inputs at all. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The operation state is not valid for this input \p step, or + * the library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_input_key( + psa_key_derivation_operation_t *operation, + psa_key_derivation_step_t step, + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key); + +/** Perform a key agreement and use the shared secret as input to a key + * derivation. + * + * A key agreement algorithm takes two inputs: a private key \p private_key + * a public key \p peer_key. + * The result of this function is passed as input to a key derivation. + * The output of this key derivation can be extracted by reading from the + * resulting operation to produce keys and other cryptographic material. + * + * If this function returns an error status, the operation enters an error + * state and must be aborted by calling psa_key_derivation_abort(). + * + * \param[in,out] operation The key derivation operation object to use. + * It must have been set up with + * psa_key_derivation_setup() with a + * key agreement and derivation algorithm + * \c alg (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that + * #PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_AGREEMENT(\c alg) is true + * and #PSA_ALG_IS_RAW_KEY_AGREEMENT(\c alg) + * is false). + * The operation must be ready for an + * input of the type given by \p step. + * \param step Which step the input data is for. + * \param private_key Identifier of the private key to use. It must + * allow the usage #PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE. + * \param[in] peer_key Public key of the peer. The peer key must be in the + * same format that psa_import_key() accepts for the + * public key type corresponding to the type of + * private_key. That is, this function performs the + * equivalent of + * #psa_import_key(..., + * `peer_key`, `peer_key_length`) where + * with key attributes indicating the public key + * type corresponding to the type of `private_key`. + * For example, for EC keys, this means that peer_key + * is interpreted as a point on the curve that the + * private key is on. The standard formats for public + * keys are documented in the documentation of + * psa_export_public_key(). + * \param peer_key_length Size of \p peer_key in bytes. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * \c private_key is not compatible with \c alg, + * or \p peer_key is not valid for \c alg or not compatible with + * \c private_key, or \c step does not allow an input resulting + * from a key agreement. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * \c alg is not supported or is not a key derivation algorithm. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The operation state is not valid for this key agreement \p step, + * or the library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_key_agreement( + psa_key_derivation_operation_t *operation, + psa_key_derivation_step_t step, + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t private_key, + const uint8_t *peer_key, + size_t peer_key_length); + +/** Read some data from a key derivation operation. + * + * This function calculates output bytes from a key derivation algorithm and + * return those bytes. + * If you view the key derivation's output as a stream of bytes, this + * function destructively reads the requested number of bytes from the + * stream. + * The operation's capacity decreases by the number of bytes read. + * + * If this function returns an error status other than + * #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_DATA, the operation enters an error + * state and must be aborted by calling psa_key_derivation_abort(). + * + * \param[in,out] operation The key derivation operation object to read from. + * \param[out] output Buffer where the output will be written. + * \param output_length Number of bytes to output. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED + * One of the inputs was a key whose policy didn't allow + * #PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_DATA + * The operation's capacity was less than + * \p output_length bytes. Note that in this case, + * no output is written to the output buffer. + * The operation's capacity is set to 0, thus + * subsequent calls to this function will not + * succeed, even with a smaller output buffer. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The operation state is not valid (it must be active and completed + * all required input steps), or the library has not been previously + * initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_output_bytes( + psa_key_derivation_operation_t *operation, + uint8_t *output, + size_t output_length); + +/** Derive a key from an ongoing key derivation operation. + * + * This function calculates output bytes from a key derivation algorithm + * and uses those bytes to generate a key deterministically. + * The key's location, usage policy, type and size are taken from + * \p attributes. + * + * If you view the key derivation's output as a stream of bytes, this + * function destructively reads as many bytes as required from the + * stream. + * The operation's capacity decreases by the number of bytes read. + * + * If this function returns an error status other than + * #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_DATA, the operation enters an error + * state and must be aborted by calling psa_key_derivation_abort(). + * + * How much output is produced and consumed from the operation, and how + * the key is derived, depends on the key type and on the key size + * (denoted \c bits below): + * + * - For key types for which the key is an arbitrary sequence of bytes + * of a given size, this function is functionally equivalent to + * calling #psa_key_derivation_output_bytes + * and passing the resulting output to #psa_import_key. + * However, this function has a security benefit: + * if the implementation provides an isolation boundary then + * the key material is not exposed outside the isolation boundary. + * As a consequence, for these key types, this function always consumes + * exactly (\c bits / 8) bytes from the operation. + * The following key types defined in this specification follow this scheme: + * + * - #PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES; + * - #PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA; + * - #PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA; + * - #PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE; + * - #PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC; + * - #PSA_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD_HASH. + * + * - For ECC keys on a Montgomery elliptic curve + * (#PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(\c curve) where \c curve designates a + * Montgomery curve), this function always draws a byte string whose + * length is determined by the curve, and sets the mandatory bits + * accordingly. That is: + * + * - Curve25519 (#PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY, 255 bits): draw a 32-byte + * string and process it as specified in RFC 7748 §5. + * - Curve448 (#PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY, 448 bits): draw a 56-byte + * string and process it as specified in RFC 7748 §5. + * + * - For key types for which the key is represented by a single sequence of + * \c bits bits with constraints as to which bit sequences are acceptable, + * this function draws a byte string of length (\c bits / 8) bytes rounded + * up to the nearest whole number of bytes. If the resulting byte string + * is acceptable, it becomes the key, otherwise the drawn bytes are discarded. + * This process is repeated until an acceptable byte string is drawn. + * The byte string drawn from the operation is interpreted as specified + * for the output produced by psa_export_key(). + * The following key types defined in this specification follow this scheme: + * + * - #PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES. + * Force-set the parity bits, but discard forbidden weak keys. + * For 2-key and 3-key triple-DES, the three keys are generated + * successively (for example, for 3-key triple-DES, + * if the first 8 bytes specify a weak key and the next 8 bytes do not, + * discard the first 8 bytes, use the next 8 bytes as the first key, + * and continue reading output from the operation to derive the other + * two keys). + * - Finite-field Diffie-Hellman keys (#PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR(\c group) + * where \c group designates any Diffie-Hellman group) and + * ECC keys on a Weierstrass elliptic curve + * (#PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(\c curve) where \c curve designates a + * Weierstrass curve). + * For these key types, interpret the byte string as integer + * in big-endian order. Discard it if it is not in the range + * [0, *N* - 2] where *N* is the boundary of the private key domain + * (the prime *p* for Diffie-Hellman, the subprime *q* for DSA, + * or the order of the curve's base point for ECC). + * Add 1 to the resulting integer and use this as the private key *x*. + * This method allows compliance to NIST standards, specifically + * the methods titled "key-pair generation by testing candidates" + * in NIST SP 800-56A §5.6.1.1.4 for Diffie-Hellman, + * in FIPS 186-4 §B.1.2 for DSA, and + * in NIST SP 800-56A §5.6.1.2.2 or + * FIPS 186-4 §B.4.2 for elliptic curve keys. + * + * - For other key types, including #PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR, + * the way in which the operation output is consumed is + * implementation-defined. + * + * In all cases, the data that is read is discarded from the operation. + * The operation's capacity is decreased by the number of bytes read. + * + * For algorithms that take an input step #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET, + * the input to that step must be provided with psa_key_derivation_input_key(). + * Future versions of this specification may include additional restrictions + * on the derived key based on the attributes and strength of the secret key. + * + * \note This function is equivalent to calling + * psa_key_derivation_output_key_ext() + * with the production parameters #PSA_KEY_PRODUCTION_PARAMETERS_INIT + * and `params_data_length == 0` (i.e. `params->data` is empty). + * + * \param[in] attributes The attributes for the new key. + * If the key type to be created is + * #PSA_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD_HASH then the algorithm in + * the policy must be the same as in the current + * operation. + * \param[in,out] operation The key derivation operation object to read from. + * \param[out] key On success, an identifier for the newly created + * key. For persistent keys, this is the key + * identifier defined in \p attributes. + * \c 0 on failure. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * If the key is persistent, the key material and the key's metadata + * have been saved to persistent storage. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS + * This is an attempt to create a persistent key, and there is + * already a persistent key with the given identifier. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_DATA + * There was not enough data to create the desired key. + * Note that in this case, no output is written to the output buffer. + * The operation's capacity is set to 0, thus subsequent calls to + * this function will not succeed, even with a smaller output buffer. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * The key type or key size is not supported, either by the + * implementation in general or in this particular location. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * The provided key attributes are not valid for the operation. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED + * The #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET or + * #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_PASSWORD input was not provided through a + * key; or one of the inputs was a key whose policy didn't allow + * #PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_STORAGE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The operation state is not valid (it must be active and completed + * all required input steps), or the library has not been previously + * initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_output_key( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + psa_key_derivation_operation_t *operation, + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t *key); + +/** Derive a key from an ongoing key derivation operation with custom + * production parameters. + * + * See the description of psa_key_derivation_out_key() for the operation of + * this function with the default production parameters. + * Mbed TLS currently does not currently support any non-default production + * parameters. + * + * \note This function is experimental and may change in future minor + * versions of Mbed TLS. + * + * \param[in] attributes The attributes for the new key. + * If the key type to be created is + * #PSA_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD_HASH then the algorithm in + * the policy must be the same as in the current + * operation. + * \param[in,out] operation The key derivation operation object to read from. + * \param[in] params Customization parameters for the key derivation. + * When this is #PSA_KEY_PRODUCTION_PARAMETERS_INIT + * with \p params_data_length = 0, + * this function is equivalent to + * psa_key_derivation_output_key(). + * Mbed TLS currently only supports the default + * production parameters, i.e. + * #PSA_KEY_PRODUCTION_PARAMETERS_INIT, + * for all key types. + * \param params_data_length + * Length of `params->data` in bytes. + * \param[out] key On success, an identifier for the newly created + * key. For persistent keys, this is the key + * identifier defined in \p attributes. + * \c 0 on failure. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * If the key is persistent, the key material and the key's metadata + * have been saved to persistent storage. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS + * This is an attempt to create a persistent key, and there is + * already a persistent key with the given identifier. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_DATA + * There was not enough data to create the desired key. + * Note that in this case, no output is written to the output buffer. + * The operation's capacity is set to 0, thus subsequent calls to + * this function will not succeed, even with a smaller output buffer. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * The key type or key size is not supported, either by the + * implementation in general or in this particular location. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * The provided key attributes are not valid for the operation. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED + * The #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET or + * #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_PASSWORD input was not provided through a + * key; or one of the inputs was a key whose policy didn't allow + * #PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_STORAGE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The operation state is not valid (it must be active and completed + * all required input steps), or the library has not been previously + * initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +#ifndef __cplusplus +psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_output_key_ext( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + psa_key_derivation_operation_t *operation, + const psa_key_production_parameters_t *params, + size_t params_data_length, + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t *key); +#endif + +/** Compare output data from a key derivation operation to an expected value. + * + * This function calculates output bytes from a key derivation algorithm and + * compares those bytes to an expected value in constant time. + * If you view the key derivation's output as a stream of bytes, this + * function destructively reads the expected number of bytes from the + * stream before comparing them. + * The operation's capacity decreases by the number of bytes read. + * + * This is functionally equivalent to the following code: + * \code + * psa_key_derivation_output_bytes(operation, tmp, output_length); + * if (memcmp(output, tmp, output_length) != 0) + * return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE; + * \endcode + * except (1) it works even if the key's policy does not allow outputting the + * bytes, and (2) the comparison will be done in constant time. + * + * If this function returns an error status other than + * #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_DATA or #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE, + * the operation enters an error state and must be aborted by calling + * psa_key_derivation_abort(). + * + * \param[in,out] operation The key derivation operation object to read from. + * \param[in] expected_output Buffer containing the expected derivation output. + * \param output_length Length of the expected output; this is also the + * number of bytes that will be read. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE + * The output was read successfully, but it differs from the expected + * output. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED + * One of the inputs was a key whose policy didn't allow + * #PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_DERIVATION. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_DATA + * The operation's capacity was less than + * \p output_length bytes. Note that in this case, + * the operation's capacity is set to 0, thus + * subsequent calls to this function will not + * succeed, even with a smaller expected output. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The operation state is not valid (it must be active and completed + * all required input steps), or the library has not been previously + * initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_verify_bytes( + psa_key_derivation_operation_t *operation, + const uint8_t *expected_output, + size_t output_length); + +/** Compare output data from a key derivation operation to an expected value + * stored in a key object. + * + * This function calculates output bytes from a key derivation algorithm and + * compares those bytes to an expected value, provided as key of type + * #PSA_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD_HASH. + * If you view the key derivation's output as a stream of bytes, this + * function destructively reads the number of bytes corresponding to the + * length of the expected value from the stream before comparing them. + * The operation's capacity decreases by the number of bytes read. + * + * This is functionally equivalent to exporting the key and calling + * psa_key_derivation_verify_bytes() on the result, except that it + * works even if the key cannot be exported. + * + * If this function returns an error status other than + * #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_DATA or #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE, + * the operation enters an error state and must be aborted by calling + * psa_key_derivation_abort(). + * + * \param[in,out] operation The key derivation operation object to read from. + * \param[in] expected A key of type #PSA_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD_HASH + * containing the expected output. Its policy must + * include the #PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_DERIVATION flag + * and the permitted algorithm must match the + * operation. The value of this key was likely + * computed by a previous call to + * psa_key_derivation_output_key() or + * psa_key_derivation_output_key_ext(). + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE + * The output was read successfully, but if differs from the expected + * output. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE + * The key passed as the expected value does not exist. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * The key passed as the expected value has an invalid type. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED + * The key passed as the expected value does not allow this usage or + * this algorithm; or one of the inputs was a key whose policy didn't + * allow #PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_DERIVATION. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_DATA + * The operation's capacity was less than + * the length of the expected value. In this case, + * the operation's capacity is set to 0, thus + * subsequent calls to this function will not + * succeed, even with a smaller expected output. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The operation state is not valid (it must be active and completed + * all required input steps), or the library has not been previously + * initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_verify_key( + psa_key_derivation_operation_t *operation, + psa_key_id_t expected); + +/** Abort a key derivation operation. + * + * Aborting an operation frees all associated resources except for the \c + * operation structure itself. Once aborted, the operation object can be reused + * for another operation by calling psa_key_derivation_setup() again. + * + * This function may be called at any time after the operation + * object has been initialized as described in #psa_key_derivation_operation_t. + * + * In particular, it is valid to call psa_key_derivation_abort() twice, or to + * call psa_key_derivation_abort() on an operation that has not been set up. + * + * \param[in,out] operation The operation to abort. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_abort( + psa_key_derivation_operation_t *operation); + +/** Perform a key agreement and return the raw shared secret. + * + * \warning The raw result of a key agreement algorithm such as finite-field + * Diffie-Hellman or elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman has biases and should + * not be used directly as key material. It should instead be passed as + * input to a key derivation algorithm. To chain a key agreement with + * a key derivation, use psa_key_derivation_key_agreement() and other + * functions from the key derivation interface. + * + * \param alg The key agreement algorithm to compute + * (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that + * #PSA_ALG_IS_RAW_KEY_AGREEMENT(\p alg) + * is true). + * \param private_key Identifier of the private key to use. It must + * allow the usage #PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE. + * \param[in] peer_key Public key of the peer. It must be + * in the same format that psa_import_key() + * accepts. The standard formats for public + * keys are documented in the documentation + * of psa_export_public_key(). + * \param peer_key_length Size of \p peer_key in bytes. + * \param[out] output Buffer where the decrypted message is to + * be written. + * \param output_size Size of the \c output buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] output_length On success, the number of bytes + * that make up the returned output. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * \p alg is not a key agreement algorithm, or + * \p private_key is not compatible with \p alg, + * or \p peer_key is not valid for \p alg or not compatible with + * \p private_key. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL + * \p output_size is too small + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * \p alg is not a supported key agreement algorithm. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_raw_key_agreement(psa_algorithm_t alg, + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t private_key, + const uint8_t *peer_key, + size_t peer_key_length, + uint8_t *output, + size_t output_size, + size_t *output_length); + +/**@}*/ + +/** \defgroup random Random generation + * @{ + */ + +/** + * \brief Generate random bytes. + * + * \warning This function **can** fail! Callers MUST check the return status + * and MUST NOT use the content of the output buffer if the return + * status is not #PSA_SUCCESS. + * + * \note To generate a key, use psa_generate_key() instead. + * + * \param[out] output Output buffer for the generated data. + * \param output_size Number of bytes to generate and output. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_generate_random(uint8_t *output, + size_t output_size); + +/** + * \brief Generate a key or key pair. + * + * The key is generated randomly. + * Its location, usage policy, type and size are taken from \p attributes. + * + * Implementations must reject an attempt to generate a key of size 0. + * + * The following type-specific considerations apply: + * - For RSA keys (#PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR), + * the public exponent is 65537. + * The modulus is a product of two probabilistic primes + * between 2^{n-1} and 2^n where n is the bit size specified in the + * attributes. + * + * \note This function is equivalent to calling psa_generate_key_ext() + * with the production parameters #PSA_KEY_PRODUCTION_PARAMETERS_INIT + * and `params_data_length == 0` (i.e. `params->data` is empty). + * + * \param[in] attributes The attributes for the new key. + * \param[out] key On success, an identifier for the newly created + * key. For persistent keys, this is the key + * identifier defined in \p attributes. + * \c 0 on failure. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * If the key is persistent, the key material and the key's metadata + * have been saved to persistent storage. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS + * This is an attempt to create a persistent key, and there is + * already a persistent key with the given identifier. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_STORAGE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_generate_key(const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t *key); + +/** + * \brief Generate a key or key pair using custom production parameters. + * + * See the description of psa_generate_key() for the operation of this + * function with the default production parameters. In addition, this function + * supports the following production customizations, described in more detail + * in the documentation of ::psa_key_production_parameters_t: + * + * - RSA keys: generation with a custom public exponent. + * + * \note This function is experimental and may change in future minor + * versions of Mbed TLS. + * + * \param[in] attributes The attributes for the new key. + * \param[in] params Customization parameters for the key generation. + * When this is #PSA_KEY_PRODUCTION_PARAMETERS_INIT + * with \p params_data_length = 0, + * this function is equivalent to + * psa_generate_key(). + * \param params_data_length + * Length of `params->data` in bytes. + * \param[out] key On success, an identifier for the newly created + * key. For persistent keys, this is the key + * identifier defined in \p attributes. + * \c 0 on failure. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * If the key is persistent, the key material and the key's metadata + * have been saved to persistent storage. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS + * This is an attempt to create a persistent key, and there is + * already a persistent key with the given identifier. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_STORAGE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +#ifndef __cplusplus +psa_status_t psa_generate_key_ext(const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const psa_key_production_parameters_t *params, + size_t params_data_length, + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t *key); +#endif + +/**@}*/ + +/** \defgroup interruptible_hash Interruptible sign/verify hash + * @{ + */ + +/** The type of the state data structure for interruptible hash + * signing operations. + * + * Before calling any function on a sign hash operation object, the + * application must initialize it by any of the following means: + * - Set the structure to all-bits-zero, for example: + * \code + * psa_sign_hash_interruptible_operation_t operation; + * memset(&operation, 0, sizeof(operation)); + * \endcode + * - Initialize the structure to logical zero values, for example: + * \code + * psa_sign_hash_interruptible_operation_t operation = {0}; + * \endcode + * - Initialize the structure to the initializer + * #PSA_SIGN_HASH_INTERRUPTIBLE_OPERATION_INIT, for example: + * \code + * psa_sign_hash_interruptible_operation_t operation = + * PSA_SIGN_HASH_INTERRUPTIBLE_OPERATION_INIT; + * \endcode + * - Assign the result of the function + * psa_sign_hash_interruptible_operation_init() to the structure, for + * example: + * \code + * psa_sign_hash_interruptible_operation_t operation; + * operation = psa_sign_hash_interruptible_operation_init(); + * \endcode + * + * This is an implementation-defined \c struct. Applications should not + * make any assumptions about the content of this structure. + * Implementation details can change in future versions without notice. */ +typedef struct psa_sign_hash_interruptible_operation_s psa_sign_hash_interruptible_operation_t; + +/** The type of the state data structure for interruptible hash + * verification operations. + * + * Before calling any function on a sign hash operation object, the + * application must initialize it by any of the following means: + * - Set the structure to all-bits-zero, for example: + * \code + * psa_verify_hash_interruptible_operation_t operation; + * memset(&operation, 0, sizeof(operation)); + * \endcode + * - Initialize the structure to logical zero values, for example: + * \code + * psa_verify_hash_interruptible_operation_t operation = {0}; + * \endcode + * - Initialize the structure to the initializer + * #PSA_VERIFY_HASH_INTERRUPTIBLE_OPERATION_INIT, for example: + * \code + * psa_verify_hash_interruptible_operation_t operation = + * PSA_VERIFY_HASH_INTERRUPTIBLE_OPERATION_INIT; + * \endcode + * - Assign the result of the function + * psa_verify_hash_interruptible_operation_init() to the structure, for + * example: + * \code + * psa_verify_hash_interruptible_operation_t operation; + * operation = psa_verify_hash_interruptible_operation_init(); + * \endcode + * + * This is an implementation-defined \c struct. Applications should not + * make any assumptions about the content of this structure. + * Implementation details can change in future versions without notice. */ +typedef struct psa_verify_hash_interruptible_operation_s psa_verify_hash_interruptible_operation_t; + +/** + * \brief Set the maximum number of ops allowed to be + * executed by an interruptible function in a + * single call. + * + * \warning This is a beta API, and thus subject to change + * at any point. It is not bound by the usual + * interface stability promises. + * + * \note The time taken to execute a single op is + * implementation specific and depends on + * software, hardware, the algorithm, key type and + * curve chosen. Even within a single operation, + * successive ops can take differing amounts of + * time. The only guarantee is that lower values + * for \p max_ops means functions will block for a + * lesser maximum amount of time. The functions + * \c psa_sign_interruptible_get_num_ops() and + * \c psa_verify_interruptible_get_num_ops() are + * provided to help with tuning this value. + * + * \note This value defaults to + * #PSA_INTERRUPTIBLE_MAX_OPS_UNLIMITED, which + * means the whole operation will be done in one + * go, regardless of the number of ops required. + * + * \note If more ops are needed to complete a + * computation, #PSA_OPERATION_INCOMPLETE will be + * returned by the function performing the + * computation. It is then the caller's + * responsibility to either call again with the + * same operation context until it returns 0 or an + * error code; or to call the relevant abort + * function if the answer is no longer required. + * + * \note The interpretation of \p max_ops is also + * implementation defined. On a hard real time + * system, this can indicate a hard deadline, as a + * real-time system needs a guarantee of not + * spending more than X time, however care must be + * taken in such an implementation to avoid the + * situation whereby calls just return, not being + * able to do any actual work within the allotted + * time. On a non-real-time system, the + * implementation can be more relaxed, but again + * whether this number should be interpreted as as + * hard or soft limit or even whether a less than + * or equals as regards to ops executed in a + * single call is implementation defined. + * + * \note For keys in local storage when no accelerator + * driver applies, please see also the + * documentation for \c mbedtls_ecp_set_max_ops(), + * which is the internal implementation in these + * cases. + * + * \warning With implementations that interpret this number + * as a hard limit, setting this number too small + * may result in an infinite loop, whereby each + * call results in immediate return with no ops + * done (as there is not enough time to execute + * any), and thus no result will ever be achieved. + * + * \note This only applies to functions whose + * documentation mentions they may return + * #PSA_OPERATION_INCOMPLETE. + * + * \param max_ops The maximum number of ops to be executed in a + * single call. This can be a number from 0 to + * #PSA_INTERRUPTIBLE_MAX_OPS_UNLIMITED, where 0 + * is the least amount of work done per call. + */ +void psa_interruptible_set_max_ops(uint32_t max_ops); + +/** + * \brief Get the maximum number of ops allowed to be + * executed by an interruptible function in a + * single call. This will return the last + * value set by + * \c psa_interruptible_set_max_ops() or + * #PSA_INTERRUPTIBLE_MAX_OPS_UNLIMITED if + * that function has never been called. + * + * \warning This is a beta API, and thus subject to change + * at any point. It is not bound by the usual + * interface stability promises. + * + * \return Maximum number of ops allowed to be + * executed by an interruptible function in a + * single call. + */ +uint32_t psa_interruptible_get_max_ops(void); + +/** + * \brief Get the number of ops that a hash signing + * operation has taken so far. If the operation + * has completed, then this will represent the + * number of ops required for the entire + * operation. After initialization or calling + * \c psa_sign_hash_interruptible_abort() on + * the operation, a value of 0 will be returned. + * + * \note This interface is guaranteed re-entrant and + * thus may be called from driver code. + * + * \warning This is a beta API, and thus subject to change + * at any point. It is not bound by the usual + * interface stability promises. + * + * This is a helper provided to help you tune the + * value passed to \c + * psa_interruptible_set_max_ops(). + * + * \param operation The \c psa_sign_hash_interruptible_operation_t + * to use. This must be initialized first. + * + * \return Number of ops that the operation has taken so + * far. + */ +uint32_t psa_sign_hash_get_num_ops( + const psa_sign_hash_interruptible_operation_t *operation); + +/** + * \brief Get the number of ops that a hash verification + * operation has taken so far. If the operation + * has completed, then this will represent the + * number of ops required for the entire + * operation. After initialization or calling \c + * psa_verify_hash_interruptible_abort() on the + * operation, a value of 0 will be returned. + * + * \warning This is a beta API, and thus subject to change + * at any point. It is not bound by the usual + * interface stability promises. + * + * This is a helper provided to help you tune the + * value passed to \c + * psa_interruptible_set_max_ops(). + * + * \param operation The \c + * psa_verify_hash_interruptible_operation_t to + * use. This must be initialized first. + * + * \return Number of ops that the operation has taken so + * far. + */ +uint32_t psa_verify_hash_get_num_ops( + const psa_verify_hash_interruptible_operation_t *operation); + +/** + * \brief Start signing a hash or short message with a + * private key, in an interruptible manner. + * + * \see \c psa_sign_hash_complete() + * + * \warning This is a beta API, and thus subject to change + * at any point. It is not bound by the usual + * interface stability promises. + * + * \note This function combined with \c + * psa_sign_hash_complete() is equivalent to + * \c psa_sign_hash() but + * \c psa_sign_hash_complete() can return early and + * resume according to the limit set with \c + * psa_interruptible_set_max_ops() to reduce the + * maximum time spent in a function call. + * + * \note Users should call \c psa_sign_hash_complete() + * repeatedly on the same context after a + * successful call to this function until \c + * psa_sign_hash_complete() either returns 0 or an + * error. \c psa_sign_hash_complete() will return + * #PSA_OPERATION_INCOMPLETE if there is more work + * to do. Alternatively users can call + * \c psa_sign_hash_abort() at any point if they no + * longer want the result. + * + * \note If this function returns an error status, the + * operation enters an error state and must be + * aborted by calling \c psa_sign_hash_abort(). + * + * \param[in, out] operation The \c psa_sign_hash_interruptible_operation_t + * to use. This must be initialized first. + * + * \param key Identifier of the key to use for the operation. + * It must be an asymmetric key pair. The key must + * allow the usage #PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH. + * \param alg A signature algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX + * value such that #PSA_ALG_IS_SIGN_HASH(\p alg) + * is true), that is compatible with + * the type of \p key. + * \param[in] hash The hash or message to sign. + * \param hash_length Size of the \p hash buffer in bytes. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * The operation started successfully - call \c psa_sign_hash_complete() + * with the same context to complete the operation + * + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED + * The key does not have the #PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH flag, or it does + * not permit the requested algorithm. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * An operation has previously been started on this context, and is + * still in progress. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_sign_hash_start( + psa_sign_hash_interruptible_operation_t *operation, + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *hash, size_t hash_length); + +/** + * \brief Continue and eventually complete the action of + * signing a hash or short message with a private + * key, in an interruptible manner. + * + * \see \c psa_sign_hash_start() + * + * \warning This is a beta API, and thus subject to change + * at any point. It is not bound by the usual + * interface stability promises. + * + * \note This function combined with \c + * psa_sign_hash_start() is equivalent to + * \c psa_sign_hash() but this function can return + * early and resume according to the limit set with + * \c psa_interruptible_set_max_ops() to reduce the + * maximum time spent in a function call. + * + * \note Users should call this function on the same + * operation object repeatedly until it either + * returns 0 or an error. This function will return + * #PSA_OPERATION_INCOMPLETE if there is more work + * to do. Alternatively users can call + * \c psa_sign_hash_abort() at any point if they no + * longer want the result. + * + * \note When this function returns successfully, the + * operation becomes inactive. If this function + * returns an error status, the operation enters an + * error state and must be aborted by calling + * \c psa_sign_hash_abort(). + * + * \param[in, out] operation The \c psa_sign_hash_interruptible_operation_t + * to use. This must be initialized first, and have + * had \c psa_sign_hash_start() called with it + * first. + * + * \param[out] signature Buffer where the signature is to be written. + * \param signature_size Size of the \p signature buffer in bytes. This + * must be appropriate for the selected + * algorithm and key: + * - The required signature size is + * #PSA_SIGN_OUTPUT_SIZE(\c key_type, \c + * key_bits, \c alg) where \c key_type and \c + * key_bits are the type and bit-size + * respectively of key. + * - #PSA_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE evaluates to the + * maximum signature size of any supported + * signature algorithm. + * \param[out] signature_length On success, the number of bytes that make up + * the returned signature value. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Operation completed successfully + * + * \retval #PSA_OPERATION_INCOMPLETE + * Operation was interrupted due to the setting of \c + * psa_interruptible_set_max_ops(). There is still work to be done. + * Call this function again with the same operation object. + * + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL + * The size of the \p signature buffer is too small. You can + * determine a sufficient buffer size by calling + * #PSA_SIGN_OUTPUT_SIZE(\c key_type, \c key_bits, \c alg) + * where \c key_type and \c key_bits are the type and bit-size + * respectively of \c key. + * + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * An operation was not previously started on this context via + * \c psa_sign_hash_start(). + * + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The library has either not been previously initialized by + * psa_crypto_init() or you did not previously call + * psa_sign_hash_start() with this operation object. It is + * implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize results in + * this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_sign_hash_complete( + psa_sign_hash_interruptible_operation_t *operation, + uint8_t *signature, size_t signature_size, + size_t *signature_length); + +/** + * \brief Abort a sign hash operation. + * + * \warning This is a beta API, and thus subject to change + * at any point. It is not bound by the usual + * interface stability promises. + * + * \note This function is the only function that clears + * the number of ops completed as part of the + * operation. Please ensure you copy this value via + * \c psa_sign_hash_get_num_ops() if required + * before calling. + * + * \note Aborting an operation frees all associated + * resources except for the \p operation structure + * itself. Once aborted, the operation object can + * be reused for another operation by calling \c + * psa_sign_hash_start() again. + * + * \note You may call this function any time after the + * operation object has been initialized. In + * particular, calling \c psa_sign_hash_abort() + * after the operation has already been terminated + * by a call to \c psa_sign_hash_abort() or + * psa_sign_hash_complete() is safe. + * + * \param[in,out] operation Initialized sign hash operation. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * The operation was aborted successfully. + * + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_sign_hash_abort( + psa_sign_hash_interruptible_operation_t *operation); + +/** + * \brief Start reading and verifying a hash or short + * message, in an interruptible manner. + * + * \see \c psa_verify_hash_complete() + * + * \warning This is a beta API, and thus subject to change + * at any point. It is not bound by the usual + * interface stability promises. + * + * \note This function combined with \c + * psa_verify_hash_complete() is equivalent to + * \c psa_verify_hash() but \c + * psa_verify_hash_complete() can return early and + * resume according to the limit set with \c + * psa_interruptible_set_max_ops() to reduce the + * maximum time spent in a function. + * + * \note Users should call \c psa_verify_hash_complete() + * repeatedly on the same operation object after a + * successful call to this function until \c + * psa_verify_hash_complete() either returns 0 or + * an error. \c psa_verify_hash_complete() will + * return #PSA_OPERATION_INCOMPLETE if there is + * more work to do. Alternatively users can call + * \c psa_verify_hash_abort() at any point if they + * no longer want the result. + * + * \note If this function returns an error status, the + * operation enters an error state and must be + * aborted by calling \c psa_verify_hash_abort(). + * + * \param[in, out] operation The \c psa_verify_hash_interruptible_operation_t + * to use. This must be initialized first. + * + * \param key Identifier of the key to use for the operation. + * The key must allow the usage + * #PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH. + * \param alg A signature algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX + * value such that #PSA_ALG_IS_SIGN_HASH(\p alg) + * is true), that is compatible with + * the type of \p key. + * \param[in] hash The hash whose signature is to be verified. + * \param hash_length Size of the \p hash buffer in bytes. + * \param[in] signature Buffer containing the signature to verify. + * \param signature_length Size of the \p signature buffer in bytes. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * The operation started successfully - please call \c + * psa_verify_hash_complete() with the same context to complete the + * operation. + * + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * Another operation has already been started on this context, and is + * still in progress. + * + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED + * The key does not have the #PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH flag, or it does + * not permit the requested algorithm. + * + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT \emptydescription + * \retval PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_verify_hash_start( + psa_verify_hash_interruptible_operation_t *operation, + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *hash, size_t hash_length, + const uint8_t *signature, size_t signature_length); + +/** + * \brief Continue and eventually complete the action of + * reading and verifying a hash or short message + * signed with a private key, in an interruptible + * manner. + * + * \see \c psa_verify_hash_start() + * + * \warning This is a beta API, and thus subject to change + * at any point. It is not bound by the usual + * interface stability promises. + * + * \note This function combined with \c + * psa_verify_hash_start() is equivalent to + * \c psa_verify_hash() but this function can + * return early and resume according to the limit + * set with \c psa_interruptible_set_max_ops() to + * reduce the maximum time spent in a function + * call. + * + * \note Users should call this function on the same + * operation object repeatedly until it either + * returns 0 or an error. This function will return + * #PSA_OPERATION_INCOMPLETE if there is more work + * to do. Alternatively users can call + * \c psa_verify_hash_abort() at any point if they + * no longer want the result. + * + * \note When this function returns successfully, the + * operation becomes inactive. If this function + * returns an error status, the operation enters an + * error state and must be aborted by calling + * \c psa_verify_hash_abort(). + * + * \param[in, out] operation The \c psa_verify_hash_interruptible_operation_t + * to use. This must be initialized first, and have + * had \c psa_verify_hash_start() called with it + * first. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Operation completed successfully, and the passed signature is valid. + * + * \retval #PSA_OPERATION_INCOMPLETE + * Operation was interrupted due to the setting of \c + * psa_interruptible_set_max_ops(). There is still work to be done. + * Call this function again with the same operation object. + * + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE + * The calculation was performed successfully, but the passed + * signature is not a valid signature. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * An operation was not previously started on this context via + * \c psa_verify_hash_start(). + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The library has either not been previously initialized by + * psa_crypto_init() or you did not previously call + * psa_verify_hash_start() on this object. It is + * implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize results in + * this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_verify_hash_complete( + psa_verify_hash_interruptible_operation_t *operation); + +/** + * \brief Abort a verify hash operation. + * + * \warning This is a beta API, and thus subject to change at + * any point. It is not bound by the usual interface + * stability promises. + * + * \note This function is the only function that clears the + * number of ops completed as part of the operation. + * Please ensure you copy this value via + * \c psa_verify_hash_get_num_ops() if required + * before calling. + * + * \note Aborting an operation frees all associated + * resources except for the operation structure + * itself. Once aborted, the operation object can be + * reused for another operation by calling \c + * psa_verify_hash_start() again. + * + * \note You may call this function any time after the + * operation object has been initialized. + * In particular, calling \c psa_verify_hash_abort() + * after the operation has already been terminated by + * a call to \c psa_verify_hash_abort() or + * psa_verify_hash_complete() is safe. + * + * \param[in,out] operation Initialized verify hash operation. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * The operation was aborted successfully. + * + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_verify_hash_abort( + psa_verify_hash_interruptible_operation_t *operation); + + +/**@}*/ + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +/* The file "crypto_sizes.h" contains definitions for size calculation + * macros whose definitions are implementation-specific. */ +#include "crypto_sizes.h" + +/* The file "crypto_struct.h" contains definitions for + * implementation-specific structs that are declared above. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STRUCT_FILE) +#include MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STRUCT_FILE +#else +#include "crypto_struct.h" +#endif + +/* The file "crypto_extra.h" contains vendor-specific definitions. This + * can include vendor-defined algorithms, extra functions, etc. */ +#include "crypto_extra.h" + +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_H */ diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_adjust_auto_enabled.h b/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_adjust_auto_enabled.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..63fb29e85bf1 --- /dev/null +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_adjust_auto_enabled.h @@ -0,0 +1,21 @@ +/** + * \file psa/crypto_adjust_auto_enabled.h + * \brief Adjust PSA configuration: enable always-on features + * + * Always enable certain features which require a negligible amount of code + * to implement, to avoid some edge cases in the configuration combinatorics. + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +#ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_ADJUST_AUTO_ENABLED_H +#define PSA_CRYPTO_ADJUST_AUTO_ENABLED_H + +#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE 1 +#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD 1 +#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD_HASH 1 +#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA 1 + +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ADJUST_AUTO_ENABLED_H */ diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_adjust_config_key_pair_types.h b/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_adjust_config_key_pair_types.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..63afc0e402c6 --- /dev/null +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_adjust_config_key_pair_types.h @@ -0,0 +1,91 @@ +/** + * \file psa/crypto_adjust_config_key_pair_types.h + * \brief Adjust PSA configuration for key pair types. + * + * See docs/proposed/psa-conditional-inclusion-c.md. + * - Support non-basic operations in a keypair type implicitly enables basic + * support for that keypair type. + * - Support for a keypair type implicitly enables the corresponding public + * key type. + * - Basic support for a keypair type implicilty enables import/export support + * for that keypair type. Warning: this is implementation-specific (mainly + * for the benefit of testing) and may change in the future! + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +#ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_ADJUST_KEYPAIR_TYPES_H +#define PSA_CRYPTO_ADJUST_KEYPAIR_TYPES_H + +/***************************************************************** + * ANYTHING -> BASIC + ****************************************************************/ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT) || \ + defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT) || \ + defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE) || \ + defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_DERIVE) +#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_BASIC 1 +#endif + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT) || \ + defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT) || \ + defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE) || \ + defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_DERIVE) +#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_BASIC 1 +#endif + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT) || \ + defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT) || \ + defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE) || \ + defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_DERIVE) +#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_BASIC 1 +#endif + +/***************************************************************** + * BASIC -> corresponding PUBLIC + ****************************************************************/ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_BASIC) +#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY 1 +#endif + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_BASIC) +#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY 1 +#endif + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_BASIC) +#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_PUBLIC_KEY 1 +#endif + +/***************************************************************** + * BASIC -> IMPORT+EXPORT + * + * (Implementation-specific, may change in the future.) + ****************************************************************/ + +/* Even though KEY_PAIR symbols' feature several level of support (BASIC, IMPORT, + * EXPORT, GENERATE, DERIVE) we're not planning to have support only for BASIC + * without IMPORT/EXPORT since these last 2 features are strongly used in tests. + * In general it is allowed to include more feature than what is strictly + * requested. + * As a consequence IMPORT and EXPORT features will be automatically enabled + * as soon as the BASIC one is. */ +#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_BASIC) +#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT 1 +#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT 1 +#endif + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_BASIC) +#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT 1 +#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT 1 +#endif + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_BASIC) +#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT 1 +#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT 1 +#endif + +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ADJUST_KEYPAIR_TYPES_H */ diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_adjust_config_synonyms.h b/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_adjust_config_synonyms.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..332b622c9b1e --- /dev/null +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_adjust_config_synonyms.h @@ -0,0 +1,39 @@ +/** + * \file psa/crypto_adjust_config_synonyms.h + * \brief Adjust PSA configuration: enable quasi-synonyms + * + * When two features require almost the same code, we automatically enable + * both when either one is requested, to reduce the combinatorics of + * possible configurations. + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +#ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_ADJUST_CONFIG_SYNONYMS_H +#define PSA_CRYPTO_ADJUST_CONFIG_SYNONYMS_H + +/****************************************************************/ +/* De facto synonyms */ +/****************************************************************/ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY) && !defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA) +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY +#elif !defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY) && defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA) +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA +#endif + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW) && !defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN) +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW +#elif !defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW) && defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN) +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN +#endif + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT) && !defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS) +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT +#elif !defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT) && defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS) +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS +#endif + +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ADJUST_CONFIG_SYNONYMS_H */ diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_builtin_composites.h b/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_builtin_composites.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..c14f5dd110f5 --- /dev/null +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_builtin_composites.h @@ -0,0 +1,214 @@ +/* + * Context structure declaration of the Mbed TLS software-based PSA drivers + * called through the PSA Crypto driver dispatch layer. + * This file contains the context structures of those algorithms which need to + * rely on other algorithms, i.e. are 'composite' algorithms. + * + * \note This file may not be included directly. Applications must + * include psa/crypto.h. + * + * \note This header and its content are not part of the Mbed TLS API and + * applications must not depend on it. Its main purpose is to define the + * multi-part state objects of the Mbed TLS software-based PSA drivers. The + * definitions of these objects are then used by crypto_struct.h to define the + * implementation-defined types of PSA multi-part state objects. + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +#ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_BUILTIN_COMPOSITES_H +#define PSA_CRYPTO_BUILTIN_COMPOSITES_H +#include "mbedtls/private_access.h" + +#include + +#include "mbedtls/cmac.h" +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_GCM) +#include "mbedtls/gcm.h" +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CCM) +#include "mbedtls/ccm.h" +#endif +#include "mbedtls/chachapoly.h" + +/* + * MAC multi-part operation definitions. + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CMAC) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HMAC) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_MAC +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HMAC) || defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) +typedef struct { + /** The HMAC algorithm in use */ + psa_algorithm_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(alg); + /** The hash context. */ + struct psa_hash_operation_s hash_ctx; + /** The HMAC part of the context. */ + uint8_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(opad)[PSA_HMAC_MAX_HASH_BLOCK_SIZE]; +} mbedtls_psa_hmac_operation_t; + +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_HMAC_OPERATION_INIT { 0, PSA_HASH_OPERATION_INIT, { 0 } } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HMAC */ + +typedef struct { + psa_algorithm_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(alg); + union { + unsigned MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(dummy); /* Make the union non-empty even with no supported algorithms. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HMAC) || defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + mbedtls_psa_hmac_operation_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(hmac); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HMAC */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CMAC) || defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + mbedtls_cipher_context_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(cmac); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CMAC */ + } MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(ctx); +} mbedtls_psa_mac_operation_t; + +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_MAC_OPERATION_INIT { 0, { 0 } } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_GCM) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CCM) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_AEAD 1 +#endif + +/* Context structure for the Mbed TLS AEAD implementation. */ +typedef struct { + psa_algorithm_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(alg); + psa_key_type_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(key_type); + + unsigned int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(is_encrypt) : 1; + + uint8_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(tag_length); + + union { + unsigned dummy; /* Enable easier initializing of the union. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CCM) + mbedtls_ccm_context MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(ccm); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CCM */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_GCM) + mbedtls_gcm_context MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(gcm); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_GCM */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305) + mbedtls_chachapoly_context MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(chachapoly); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305 */ + + } ctx; + +} mbedtls_psa_aead_operation_t; + +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_AEAD_OPERATION_INIT { 0, 0, 0, 0, { 0 } } + +#include "mbedtls/ecdsa.h" + +/* Context structure for the Mbed TLS interruptible sign hash implementation. */ +typedef struct { +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDSA) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA)) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + mbedtls_ecdsa_context *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(ctx); + mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_ctx MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(restart_ctx); + + uint32_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(num_ops); + + size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(coordinate_bytes); + psa_algorithm_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(alg); + mbedtls_md_type_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(md_alg); + uint8_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(hash)[PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS)]; + size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(hash_length); + +#else + /* Make the struct non-empty if algs not supported. */ + unsigned MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(dummy); + +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDSA) || + * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA) && + * defined( MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE ) */ +} mbedtls_psa_sign_hash_interruptible_operation_t; + +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDSA) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA)) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_SIGN_HASH_INTERRUPTIBLE_OPERATION_INIT { { 0 }, { 0 }, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 } +#else +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_SIGN_HASH_INTERRUPTIBLE_OPERATION_INIT { 0 } +#endif + +/* Context structure for the Mbed TLS interruptible verify hash + * implementation.*/ +typedef struct { +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDSA) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA)) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + + mbedtls_ecdsa_context *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(ctx); + mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_ctx MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(restart_ctx); + + uint32_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(num_ops); + + uint8_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(hash)[PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS)]; + size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(hash_length); + + mbedtls_mpi MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(r); + mbedtls_mpi MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(s); + +#else + /* Make the struct non-empty if algs not supported. */ + unsigned MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(dummy); + +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDSA) || + * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA) && + * defined( MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE ) */ + +} mbedtls_psa_verify_hash_interruptible_operation_t; + +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDSA) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA)) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) +#define MBEDTLS_VERIFY_SIGN_HASH_INTERRUPTIBLE_OPERATION_INIT { { 0 }, { 0 }, 0, 0, 0, 0, { 0 }, \ + { 0 } } +#else +#define MBEDTLS_VERIFY_SIGN_HASH_INTERRUPTIBLE_OPERATION_INIT { 0 } +#endif + + +/* EC-JPAKE operation definitions */ + +#include "mbedtls/ecjpake.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_JPAKE) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_PAKE 1 +#endif + +/* Note: the format for mbedtls_ecjpake_read/write function has an extra + * length byte for each step, plus an extra 3 bytes for ECParameters in the + * server's 2nd round. */ +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_JPAKE_BUFFER_SIZE ((3 + 1 + 65 + 1 + 65 + 1 + 32) * 2) + +typedef struct { + psa_algorithm_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(alg); + + uint8_t *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(password); + size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(password_len); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_JPAKE) + mbedtls_ecjpake_role MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(role); + uint8_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(buffer[MBEDTLS_PSA_JPAKE_BUFFER_SIZE]); + size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(buffer_length); + size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(buffer_offset); +#endif + /* Context structure for the Mbed TLS EC-JPAKE implementation. */ + union { + unsigned int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(dummy); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_JPAKE) + mbedtls_ecjpake_context MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(jpake); +#endif + } MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(ctx); + +} mbedtls_psa_pake_operation_t; + +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_PAKE_OPERATION_INIT { { 0 } } + +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_BUILTIN_COMPOSITES_H */ diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_builtin_key_derivation.h b/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_builtin_key_derivation.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..6b91ae73f1e2 --- /dev/null +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_builtin_key_derivation.h @@ -0,0 +1,118 @@ +/* + * Context structure declaration of the Mbed TLS software-based PSA drivers + * called through the PSA Crypto driver dispatch layer. + * This file contains the context structures of key derivation algorithms + * which need to rely on other algorithms. + * + * \note This file may not be included directly. Applications must + * include psa/crypto.h. + * + * \note This header and its content are not part of the Mbed TLS API and + * applications must not depend on it. Its main purpose is to define the + * multi-part state objects of the Mbed TLS software-based PSA drivers. The + * definitions of these objects are then used by crypto_struct.h to define the + * implementation-defined types of PSA multi-part state objects. + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +#ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_BUILTIN_KEY_DERIVATION_H +#define PSA_CRYPTO_BUILTIN_KEY_DERIVATION_H +#include "mbedtls/private_access.h" + +#include + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF_EXPAND) +typedef struct { + uint8_t *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(info); + size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(info_length); +#if PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE > 0xff +#error "PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE does not fit in uint8_t" +#endif + uint8_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(offset_in_block); + uint8_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(block_number); + unsigned int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(state) : 2; + unsigned int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(info_set) : 1; + uint8_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(output_block)[PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE]; + uint8_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(prk)[PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE]; + struct psa_mac_operation_s MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(hmac); +} psa_hkdf_key_derivation_t; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF || + MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT || + MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF_EXPAND */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_ECJPAKE_TO_PMS) +typedef struct { + uint8_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(data)[PSA_TLS12_ECJPAKE_TO_PMS_DATA_SIZE]; +} psa_tls12_ecjpake_to_pms_t; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_ECJPAKE_TO_PMS */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PRF) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS) +typedef enum { + PSA_TLS12_PRF_STATE_INIT, /* no input provided */ + PSA_TLS12_PRF_STATE_SEED_SET, /* seed has been set */ + PSA_TLS12_PRF_STATE_OTHER_KEY_SET, /* other key has been set - optional */ + PSA_TLS12_PRF_STATE_KEY_SET, /* key has been set */ + PSA_TLS12_PRF_STATE_LABEL_SET, /* label has been set */ + PSA_TLS12_PRF_STATE_OUTPUT /* output has been started */ +} psa_tls12_prf_key_derivation_state_t; + +typedef struct psa_tls12_prf_key_derivation_s { +#if PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE > 0xff +#error "PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE does not fit in uint8_t" +#endif + + /* Indicates how many bytes in the current HMAC block have + * not yet been read by the user. */ + uint8_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(left_in_block); + + /* The 1-based number of the block. */ + uint8_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(block_number); + + psa_tls12_prf_key_derivation_state_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(state); + + uint8_t *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(secret); + size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(secret_length); + uint8_t *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(seed); + size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(seed_length); + uint8_t *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(label); + size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(label_length); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS) + uint8_t *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(other_secret); + size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(other_secret_length); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS */ + + uint8_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(Ai)[PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE]; + + /* `HMAC_hash( prk, A( i ) + seed )` in the notation of RFC 5246, Sect. 5. */ + uint8_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(output_block)[PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE]; +} psa_tls12_prf_key_derivation_t; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PRF) || + * MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS */ +#if defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_PBKDF2) +typedef enum { + PSA_PBKDF2_STATE_INIT, /* no input provided */ + PSA_PBKDF2_STATE_INPUT_COST_SET, /* input cost has been set */ + PSA_PBKDF2_STATE_SALT_SET, /* salt has been set */ + PSA_PBKDF2_STATE_PASSWORD_SET, /* password has been set */ + PSA_PBKDF2_STATE_OUTPUT /* output has been started */ +} psa_pbkdf2_key_derivation_state_t; + +typedef struct { + psa_pbkdf2_key_derivation_state_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(state); + uint64_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(input_cost); + uint8_t *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(salt); + size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(salt_length); + uint8_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(password)[PSA_HMAC_MAX_HASH_BLOCK_SIZE]; + size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(password_length); + uint8_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(output_block)[PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE]; + uint8_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(bytes_used); + uint32_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(block_number); +} psa_pbkdf2_key_derivation_t; +#endif /* PSA_HAVE_SOFT_PBKDF2 */ + +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_BUILTIN_KEY_DERIVATION_H */ diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_builtin_primitives.h b/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_builtin_primitives.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..98ab4d333983 --- /dev/null +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_builtin_primitives.h @@ -0,0 +1,114 @@ +/* + * Context structure declaration of the Mbed TLS software-based PSA drivers + * called through the PSA Crypto driver dispatch layer. + * This file contains the context structures of those algorithms which do not + * rely on other algorithms, i.e. are 'primitive' algorithms. + * + * \note This file may not be included directly. Applications must + * include psa/crypto.h. + * + * \note This header and its content are not part of the Mbed TLS API and + * applications must not depend on it. Its main purpose is to define the + * multi-part state objects of the Mbed TLS software-based PSA drivers. The + * definitions of these objects are then used by crypto_struct.h to define the + * implementation-defined types of PSA multi-part state objects. + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +#ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_BUILTIN_PRIMITIVES_H +#define PSA_CRYPTO_BUILTIN_PRIMITIVES_H +#include "mbedtls/private_access.h" + +#include + +/* + * Hash multi-part operation definitions. + */ + +#include "mbedtls/md5.h" +#include "mbedtls/ripemd160.h" +#include "mbedtls/sha1.h" +#include "mbedtls/sha256.h" +#include "mbedtls/sha512.h" +#include "mbedtls/sha3.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_MD5) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RIPEMD160) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_1) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_224) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_256) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_384) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_512) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA3_224) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA3_256) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA3_384) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA3_512) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_HASH +#endif + +typedef struct { + psa_algorithm_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(alg); + union { + unsigned dummy; /* Make the union non-empty even with no supported algorithms. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_MD5) + mbedtls_md5_context md5; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RIPEMD160) + mbedtls_ripemd160_context ripemd160; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_1) + mbedtls_sha1_context sha1; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_256) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_224) + mbedtls_sha256_context sha256; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_512) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_384) + mbedtls_sha512_context sha512; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA3_224) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA3_256) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA3_384) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA3_512) + mbedtls_sha3_context sha3; +#endif + } MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(ctx); +} mbedtls_psa_hash_operation_t; + +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_HASH_OPERATION_INIT { 0, { 0 } } + +/* + * Cipher multi-part operation definitions. + */ + +#include "mbedtls/cipher.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CTR) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CFB) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_OFB) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CBC_PKCS7) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_CIPHER 1 +#endif + +typedef struct { + /* Context structure for the Mbed TLS cipher implementation. */ + psa_algorithm_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(alg); + uint8_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(iv_length); + uint8_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(block_length); + union { + unsigned int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(dummy); + mbedtls_cipher_context_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(cipher); + } MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(ctx); +} mbedtls_psa_cipher_operation_t; + +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_CIPHER_OPERATION_INIT { 0, 0, 0, { 0 } } + +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_BUILTIN_PRIMITIVES_H */ diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_compat.h b/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_compat.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..2a226c01a890 --- /dev/null +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_compat.h @@ -0,0 +1,230 @@ +/** + * \file psa/crypto_compat.h + * + * \brief PSA cryptography module: Backward compatibility aliases + * + * This header declares alternative names for macro and functions. + * New application code should not use these names. + * These names may be removed in a future version of Mbed TLS. + * + * \note This file may not be included directly. Applications must + * include psa/crypto.h. + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +#ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_COMPAT_H +#define PSA_CRYPTO_COMPAT_H + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +/* + * To support both openless APIs and psa_open_key() temporarily, define + * psa_key_handle_t to be equal to mbedtls_svc_key_id_t. Do not mark the + * type and its utility macros and functions deprecated yet. This will be done + * in a subsequent phase. + */ +typedef mbedtls_svc_key_id_t psa_key_handle_t; + +#define PSA_KEY_HANDLE_INIT MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT + +/** Check whether a handle is null. + * + * \param handle Handle + * + * \return Non-zero if the handle is null, zero otherwise. + */ +static inline int psa_key_handle_is_null(psa_key_handle_t handle) +{ + return mbedtls_svc_key_id_is_null(handle); +} + +/** Open a handle to an existing persistent key. + * + * Open a handle to a persistent key. A key is persistent if it was created + * with a lifetime other than #PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_VOLATILE. A persistent key + * always has a nonzero key identifier, set with psa_set_key_id() when + * creating the key. Implementations may provide additional pre-provisioned + * keys that can be opened with psa_open_key(). Such keys have an application + * key identifier in the vendor range, as documented in the description of + * #psa_key_id_t. + * + * The application must eventually close the handle with psa_close_key() or + * psa_destroy_key() to release associated resources. If the application dies + * without calling one of these functions, the implementation should perform + * the equivalent of a call to psa_close_key(). + * + * Some implementations permit an application to open the same key multiple + * times. If this is successful, each call to psa_open_key() will return a + * different key handle. + * + * \note This API is not part of the PSA Cryptography API Release 1.0.0 + * specification. It was defined in the 1.0 Beta 3 version of the + * specification but was removed in the 1.0.0 released version. This API is + * kept for the time being to not break applications relying on it. It is not + * deprecated yet but will be in the near future. + * + * \note Applications that rely on opening a key multiple times will not be + * portable to implementations that only permit a single key handle to be + * opened. See also :ref:\`key-handles\`. + * + * + * \param key The persistent identifier of the key. + * \param[out] handle On success, a handle to the key. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. The application can now use the value of `*handle` + * to access the key. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * The implementation does not have sufficient resources to open the + * key. This can be due to reaching an implementation limit on the + * number of open keys, the number of open key handles, or available + * memory. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST + * There is no persistent key with key identifier \p key. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * \p key is not a valid persistent key identifier. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED + * The specified key exists, but the application does not have the + * permission to access it. Note that this specification does not + * define any way to create such a key, but it may be possible + * through implementation-specific means. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_open_key(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + psa_key_handle_t *handle); + +/** Close a key handle. + * + * If the handle designates a volatile key, this will destroy the key material + * and free all associated resources, just like psa_destroy_key(). + * + * If this is the last open handle to a persistent key, then closing the handle + * will free all resources associated with the key in volatile memory. The key + * data in persistent storage is not affected and can be opened again later + * with a call to psa_open_key(). + * + * Closing the key handle makes the handle invalid, and the key handle + * must not be used again by the application. + * + * \note This API is not part of the PSA Cryptography API Release 1.0.0 + * specification. It was defined in the 1.0 Beta 3 version of the + * specification but was removed in the 1.0.0 released version. This API is + * kept for the time being to not break applications relying on it. It is not + * deprecated yet but will be in the near future. + * + * \note If the key handle was used to set up an active + * :ref:\`multipart operation \`, then closing the + * key handle can cause the multipart operation to fail. Applications should + * maintain the key handle until after the multipart operation has finished. + * + * \param handle The key handle to close. + * If this is \c 0, do nothing and return \c PSA_SUCCESS. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * \p handle was a valid handle or \c 0. It is now closed. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE + * \p handle is not a valid handle nor \c 0. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_close_key(psa_key_handle_t handle); + +/** \addtogroup attributes + * @{ + */ + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) +/** Custom Diffie-Hellman group. + * + * Mbed TLS does not support custom DH groups. + * + * \deprecated This value is not useful, so this macro will be removed in + * a future version of the library. + */ +#define PSA_DH_FAMILY_CUSTOM \ + ((psa_dh_family_t) MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_NUMERIC_CONSTANT(0x7e)) + +/** + * \brief Set domain parameters for a key. + * + * \deprecated Mbed TLS no longer supports any domain parameters. + * This function only does the equivalent of + * psa_set_key_type() and will be removed in a future version + * of the library. + * + * \param[in,out] attributes Attribute structure where \p type will be set. + * \param type Key type (a \c PSA_KEY_TYPE_XXX value). + * \param[in] data Ignored. + * \param data_length Must be 0. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED \emptydescription + */ +static inline psa_status_t MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED psa_set_key_domain_parameters( + psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + psa_key_type_t type, const uint8_t *data, size_t data_length) +{ + (void) data; + if (data_length != 0) { + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + } + psa_set_key_type(attributes, type); + return PSA_SUCCESS; +} + +/** + * \brief Get domain parameters for a key. + * + * \deprecated Mbed TLS no longer supports any domain parameters. + * This function alwaya has an empty output and will be + * removed in a future version of the library. + + * \param[in] attributes Ignored. + * \param[out] data Ignored. + * \param data_size Ignored. + * \param[out] data_length Set to 0. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS \emptydescription + */ +static inline psa_status_t MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED psa_get_key_domain_parameters( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + uint8_t *data, size_t data_size, size_t *data_length) +{ + (void) attributes; + (void) data; + (void) data_size; + *data_length = 0; + return PSA_SUCCESS; +} + +/** Safe output buffer size for psa_get_key_domain_parameters(). + * + */ +#define PSA_KEY_DOMAIN_PARAMETERS_SIZE(key_type, key_bits) \ + MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_NUMERIC_CONSTANT(1u) +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ + +/**@}*/ + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_COMPAT_H */ diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_config.h b/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_config.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..36e937ad35d2 --- /dev/null +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_config.h @@ -0,0 +1,159 @@ +/** + * \file psa/crypto_config.h + * \brief PSA crypto configuration options (set of defines) + * + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG) +/** + * When #MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG is enabled in mbedtls_config.h, + * this file determines which cryptographic mechanisms are enabled + * through the PSA Cryptography API (\c psa_xxx() functions). + * + * To enable a cryptographic mechanism, uncomment the definition of + * the corresponding \c PSA_WANT_xxx preprocessor symbol. + * To disable a cryptographic mechanism, comment out the definition of + * the corresponding \c PSA_WANT_xxx preprocessor symbol. + * The names of cryptographic mechanisms correspond to values + * defined in psa/crypto_values.h, with the prefix \c PSA_WANT_ instead + * of \c PSA_. + * + * Note that many cryptographic mechanisms involve two symbols: one for + * the key type (\c PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_xxx) and one for the algorithm + * (\c PSA_WANT_ALG_xxx). Mechanisms with additional parameters may involve + * additional symbols. + */ +#else +/** + * When \c MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG is disabled in mbedtls_config.h, + * this file is not used, and cryptographic mechanisms are supported + * through the PSA API if and only if they are supported through the + * mbedtls_xxx API. + */ +#endif +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +#ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG_H +#define PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG_H + +/* + * CBC-MAC is not yet supported via the PSA API in Mbed TLS. + */ +//#define PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_PKCS7 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_CMAC 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_CFB 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_CTR 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_JPAKE 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF_EXPAND 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_OFB 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_PBKDF2_HMAC 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_PBKDF2_AES_CMAC_PRF_128 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA3_224 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA3_256 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA3_384 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA3_512 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_ECJPAKE_TO_PMS 1 + +/* XTS is not yet supported via the PSA API in Mbed TLS. + * Note: when adding support, also adjust include/mbedtls/config_psa.h */ +//#define PSA_WANT_ALG_XTS 1 + +#define PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_256 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_384 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_512 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ECC_MONTGOMERY_255 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ECC_MONTGOMERY_448 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_192 1 +/* + * SECP224K1 is buggy via the PSA API in Mbed TLS + * (https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/issues/3541). Thus, do not enable it by + * default. + */ +//#define PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_224 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_256 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_192 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_224 1 +/* For secp256r1, consider enabling #MBEDTLS_PSA_P256M_DRIVER_ENABLED + * (see the description in mbedtls/mbedtls_config.h for details). */ +#define PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_384 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_521 1 + +#define PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_2048 1 +#define PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_3072 1 +#define PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_4096 1 +#define PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_6144 1 +#define PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_8192 1 + +#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE 1 +#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD 1 +#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD_HASH 1 +#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC 1 +#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES 1 +#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA 1 +#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA 1 +#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 1 +#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES 1 +//#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR 1 /* Deprecated */ +#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY 1 +#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_PUBLIC_KEY 1 +#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA 1 +//#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR 1 /* Deprecated */ +#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY 1 + +/* + * The following symbols extend and deprecate the legacy + * PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_xxx_KEY_PAIR ones. They include the usage of that key in + * the name's suffix. "_USE" is the most generic and it can be used to describe + * a generic suport, whereas other ones add more features on top of that and + * they are more specific. + */ +#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_BASIC 1 +#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT 1 +#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT 1 +#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE 1 +#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_DERIVE 1 + +#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_BASIC 1 +#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT 1 +#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT 1 +#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE 1 +//#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_DERIVE 1 /* Not supported */ + +#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_BASIC 1 +#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT 1 +#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT 1 +#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE 1 +//#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_DERIVE 1 /* Not supported */ + +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG_H */ diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_driver_common.h b/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_driver_common.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..cc11d3b9a2d5 --- /dev/null +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_driver_common.h @@ -0,0 +1,44 @@ +/** + * \file psa/crypto_driver_common.h + * \brief Definitions for all PSA crypto drivers + * + * This file contains common definitions shared by all PSA crypto drivers. + * Do not include it directly: instead, include the header file(s) for + * the type(s) of driver that you are implementing. For example, if + * you are writing a dynamically registered driver for a secure element, + * include `psa/crypto_se_driver.h`. + * + * This file is part of the PSA Crypto Driver Model, containing functions for + * driver developers to implement to enable hardware to be called in a + * standardized way by a PSA Cryptographic API implementation. The functions + * comprising the driver model, which driver authors implement, are not + * intended to be called by application developers. + */ + +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ +#ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_COMMON_H +#define PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_COMMON_H + +#include +#include + +/* Include type definitions (psa_status_t, psa_algorithm_t, + * psa_key_type_t, etc.) and macros to build and analyze values + * of these types. */ +#include "crypto_types.h" +#include "crypto_values.h" +/* Include size definitions which are used to size some arrays in operation + * structures. */ +#include + +/** For encrypt-decrypt functions, whether the operation is an encryption + * or a decryption. */ +typedef enum { + PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_DECRYPT, + PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_ENCRYPT +} psa_encrypt_or_decrypt_t; + +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_COMMON_H */ diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_driver_contexts_composites.h b/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_driver_contexts_composites.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..d717c519091a --- /dev/null +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_driver_contexts_composites.h @@ -0,0 +1,151 @@ +/* + * Declaration of context structures for use with the PSA driver wrapper + * interface. This file contains the context structures for 'composite' + * operations, i.e. those operations which need to make use of other operations + * from the primitives (crypto_driver_contexts_primitives.h) + * + * Warning: This file will be auto-generated in the future. + * + * \note This file may not be included directly. Applications must + * include psa/crypto.h. + * + * \note This header and its content are not part of the Mbed TLS API and + * applications must not depend on it. Its main purpose is to define the + * multi-part state objects of the PSA drivers included in the cryptographic + * library. The definitions of these objects are then used by crypto_struct.h + * to define the implementation-defined types of PSA multi-part state objects. + */ +/* Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +#ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_CONTEXTS_COMPOSITES_H +#define PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_CONTEXTS_COMPOSITES_H + +#include "psa/crypto_driver_common.h" + +/* Include the context structure definitions for the Mbed TLS software drivers */ +#include "psa/crypto_builtin_composites.h" + +/* Include the context structure definitions for those drivers that were + * declared during the autogeneration process. */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_LIBTESTDRIVER1) +#include +#endif + +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_LIBTESTDRIVER1) && \ + defined(LIBTESTDRIVER1_MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_MAC) +typedef libtestdriver1_mbedtls_psa_mac_operation_t + mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_mac_operation_t; +typedef libtestdriver1_mbedtls_psa_mac_operation_t + mbedtls_opaque_test_driver_mac_operation_t; + +#define MBEDTLS_TRANSPARENT_TEST_DRIVER_MAC_OPERATION_INIT \ + LIBTESTDRIVER1_MBEDTLS_PSA_MAC_OPERATION_INIT +#define MBEDTLS_OPAQUE_TEST_DRIVER_MAC_OPERATION_INIT \ + LIBTESTDRIVER1_MBEDTLS_PSA_MAC_OPERATION_INIT + +#else +typedef mbedtls_psa_mac_operation_t + mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_mac_operation_t; +typedef mbedtls_psa_mac_operation_t + mbedtls_opaque_test_driver_mac_operation_t; + +#define MBEDTLS_TRANSPARENT_TEST_DRIVER_MAC_OPERATION_INIT \ + MBEDTLS_PSA_MAC_OPERATION_INIT +#define MBEDTLS_OPAQUE_TEST_DRIVER_MAC_OPERATION_INIT \ + MBEDTLS_PSA_MAC_OPERATION_INIT + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_TEST_LIBTESTDRIVER1 && LIBTESTDRIVER1_MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_MAC */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_LIBTESTDRIVER1) && \ + defined(LIBTESTDRIVER1_MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_AEAD) +typedef libtestdriver1_mbedtls_psa_aead_operation_t + mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_aead_operation_t; + +#define MBEDTLS_TRANSPARENT_TEST_DRIVER_AEAD_OPERATION_INIT \ + LIBTESTDRIVER1_MBEDTLS_PSA_AEAD_OPERATION_INIT +#else +typedef mbedtls_psa_aead_operation_t + mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_aead_operation_t; + +#define MBEDTLS_TRANSPARENT_TEST_DRIVER_AEAD_OPERATION_INIT \ + MBEDTLS_PSA_AEAD_OPERATION_INIT + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_TEST_LIBTESTDRIVER1 && LIBTESTDRIVER1_MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_AEAD */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_LIBTESTDRIVER1) && \ + defined(LIBTESTDRIVER1_MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_PAKE) + +typedef libtestdriver1_mbedtls_psa_pake_operation_t + mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_pake_operation_t; +typedef libtestdriver1_mbedtls_psa_pake_operation_t + mbedtls_opaque_test_driver_pake_operation_t; + +#define MBEDTLS_TRANSPARENT_TEST_DRIVER_PAKE_OPERATION_INIT \ + LIBTESTDRIVER1_MBEDTLS_PSA_PAKE_OPERATION_INIT +#define MBEDTLS_OPAQUE_TEST_DRIVER_PAKE_OPERATION_INIT \ + LIBTESTDRIVER1_MBEDTLS_PSA_PAKE_OPERATION_INIT + +#else +typedef mbedtls_psa_pake_operation_t + mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_pake_operation_t; +typedef mbedtls_psa_pake_operation_t + mbedtls_opaque_test_driver_pake_operation_t; + +#define MBEDTLS_TRANSPARENT_TEST_DRIVER_PAKE_OPERATION_INIT \ + MBEDTLS_PSA_PAKE_OPERATION_INIT +#define MBEDTLS_OPAQUE_TEST_DRIVER_PAKE_OPERATION_INIT \ + MBEDTLS_PSA_PAKE_OPERATION_INIT + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_TEST_LIBTESTDRIVER1 && LIBTESTDRIVER1_MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_PAKE */ + +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ + +/* Define the context to be used for an operation that is executed through the + * PSA Driver wrapper layer as the union of all possible driver's contexts. + * + * The union members are the driver's context structures, and the member names + * are formatted as `'drivername'_ctx`. This allows for procedural generation + * of both this file and the content of psa_crypto_driver_wrappers.h */ + +typedef union { + unsigned dummy; /* Make sure this union is always non-empty */ + mbedtls_psa_mac_operation_t mbedtls_ctx; +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_mac_operation_t transparent_test_driver_ctx; + mbedtls_opaque_test_driver_mac_operation_t opaque_test_driver_ctx; +#endif +} psa_driver_mac_context_t; + +typedef union { + unsigned dummy; /* Make sure this union is always non-empty */ + mbedtls_psa_aead_operation_t mbedtls_ctx; +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_aead_operation_t transparent_test_driver_ctx; +#endif +} psa_driver_aead_context_t; + +typedef union { + unsigned dummy; /* Make sure this union is always non-empty */ + mbedtls_psa_sign_hash_interruptible_operation_t mbedtls_ctx; +} psa_driver_sign_hash_interruptible_context_t; + +typedef union { + unsigned dummy; /* Make sure this union is always non-empty */ + mbedtls_psa_verify_hash_interruptible_operation_t mbedtls_ctx; +} psa_driver_verify_hash_interruptible_context_t; + +typedef union { + unsigned dummy; /* Make sure this union is always non-empty */ + mbedtls_psa_pake_operation_t mbedtls_ctx; +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_pake_operation_t transparent_test_driver_ctx; + mbedtls_opaque_test_driver_pake_operation_t opaque_test_driver_ctx; +#endif +} psa_driver_pake_context_t; + +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_CONTEXTS_COMPOSITES_H */ +/* End of automatically generated file. */ diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_driver_contexts_key_derivation.h b/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_driver_contexts_key_derivation.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..21190515cee7 --- /dev/null +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_driver_contexts_key_derivation.h @@ -0,0 +1,52 @@ +/* + * Declaration of context structures for use with the PSA driver wrapper + * interface. This file contains the context structures for key derivation + * operations. + * + * Warning: This file will be auto-generated in the future. + * + * \note This file may not be included directly. Applications must + * include psa/crypto.h. + * + * \note This header and its content are not part of the Mbed TLS API and + * applications must not depend on it. Its main purpose is to define the + * multi-part state objects of the PSA drivers included in the cryptographic + * library. The definitions of these objects are then used by crypto_struct.h + * to define the implementation-defined types of PSA multi-part state objects. + */ +/* Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +#ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_CONTEXTS_KEY_DERIVATION_H +#define PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_CONTEXTS_KEY_DERIVATION_H + +#include "psa/crypto_driver_common.h" + +/* Include the context structure definitions for the Mbed TLS software drivers */ +#include "psa/crypto_builtin_key_derivation.h" + +/* Include the context structure definitions for those drivers that were + * declared during the autogeneration process. */ + +typedef union { + unsigned dummy; /* Make sure this union is always non-empty */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF_EXPAND) + psa_hkdf_key_derivation_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(hkdf); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PRF) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS) + psa_tls12_prf_key_derivation_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(tls12_prf); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_ECJPAKE_TO_PMS) + psa_tls12_ecjpake_to_pms_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(tls12_ecjpake_to_pms); +#endif +#if defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_PBKDF2) + psa_pbkdf2_key_derivation_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(pbkdf2); +#endif +} psa_driver_key_derivation_context_t; + +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_CONTEXTS_KEY_DERIVATION_H */ +/* End of automatically generated file. */ diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_driver_contexts_primitives.h b/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_driver_contexts_primitives.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..c90a5fbe7426 --- /dev/null +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_driver_contexts_primitives.h @@ -0,0 +1,105 @@ +/* + * Declaration of context structures for use with the PSA driver wrapper + * interface. This file contains the context structures for 'primitive' + * operations, i.e. those operations which do not rely on other contexts. + * + * Warning: This file will be auto-generated in the future. + * + * \note This file may not be included directly. Applications must + * include psa/crypto.h. + * + * \note This header and its content are not part of the Mbed TLS API and + * applications must not depend on it. Its main purpose is to define the + * multi-part state objects of the PSA drivers included in the cryptographic + * library. The definitions of these objects are then used by crypto_struct.h + * to define the implementation-defined types of PSA multi-part state objects. + */ +/* Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +#ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_CONTEXTS_PRIMITIVES_H +#define PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_CONTEXTS_PRIMITIVES_H + +#include "psa/crypto_driver_common.h" + +/* Include the context structure definitions for the Mbed TLS software drivers */ +#include "psa/crypto_builtin_primitives.h" + +/* Include the context structure definitions for those drivers that were + * declared during the autogeneration process. */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_LIBTESTDRIVER1) +#include +#endif + +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_LIBTESTDRIVER1) && \ + defined(LIBTESTDRIVER1_MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_CIPHER) +typedef libtestdriver1_mbedtls_psa_cipher_operation_t + mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_cipher_operation_t; + +#define MBEDTLS_TRANSPARENT_TEST_DRIVER_CIPHER_OPERATION_INIT \ + LIBTESTDRIVER1_MBEDTLS_PSA_CIPHER_OPERATION_INIT +#else +typedef mbedtls_psa_cipher_operation_t + mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_cipher_operation_t; + +#define MBEDTLS_TRANSPARENT_TEST_DRIVER_CIPHER_OPERATION_INIT \ + MBEDTLS_PSA_CIPHER_OPERATION_INIT +#endif /* MBEDTLS_TEST_LIBTESTDRIVER1 && + LIBTESTDRIVER1_MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_CIPHER */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_LIBTESTDRIVER1) && \ + defined(LIBTESTDRIVER1_MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_HASH) +typedef libtestdriver1_mbedtls_psa_hash_operation_t + mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_hash_operation_t; + +#define MBEDTLS_TRANSPARENT_TEST_DRIVER_HASH_OPERATION_INIT \ + LIBTESTDRIVER1_MBEDTLS_PSA_HASH_OPERATION_INIT +#else +typedef mbedtls_psa_hash_operation_t + mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_hash_operation_t; + +#define MBEDTLS_TRANSPARENT_TEST_DRIVER_HASH_OPERATION_INIT \ + MBEDTLS_PSA_HASH_OPERATION_INIT +#endif /* MBEDTLS_TEST_LIBTESTDRIVER1 && + LIBTESTDRIVER1_MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_HASH */ + +typedef struct { + unsigned int initialised : 1; + mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_cipher_operation_t ctx; +} mbedtls_opaque_test_driver_cipher_operation_t; + +#define MBEDTLS_OPAQUE_TEST_DRIVER_CIPHER_OPERATION_INIT \ + { 0, MBEDTLS_TRANSPARENT_TEST_DRIVER_CIPHER_OPERATION_INIT } + +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ + +/* Define the context to be used for an operation that is executed through the + * PSA Driver wrapper layer as the union of all possible driver's contexts. + * + * The union members are the driver's context structures, and the member names + * are formatted as `'drivername'_ctx`. This allows for procedural generation + * of both this file and the content of psa_crypto_driver_wrappers.h */ + +typedef union { + unsigned dummy; /* Make sure this union is always non-empty */ + mbedtls_psa_hash_operation_t mbedtls_ctx; +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_hash_operation_t test_driver_ctx; +#endif +} psa_driver_hash_context_t; + +typedef union { + unsigned dummy; /* Make sure this union is always non-empty */ + mbedtls_psa_cipher_operation_t mbedtls_ctx; +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_cipher_operation_t transparent_test_driver_ctx; + mbedtls_opaque_test_driver_cipher_operation_t opaque_test_driver_ctx; +#endif +} psa_driver_cipher_context_t; + +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_CONTEXTS_PRIMITIVES_H */ +/* End of automatically generated file. */ diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_extra.h b/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_extra.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..6ed1f6c43a17 --- /dev/null +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_extra.h @@ -0,0 +1,1883 @@ +/** + * \file psa/crypto_extra.h + * + * \brief PSA cryptography module: Mbed TLS vendor extensions + * + * \note This file may not be included directly. Applications must + * include psa/crypto.h. + * + * This file is reserved for vendor-specific definitions. + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +#ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_EXTRA_H +#define PSA_CRYPTO_EXTRA_H +#include "mbedtls/private_access.h" + +#include "crypto_types.h" +#include "crypto_compat.h" + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +/* UID for secure storage seed */ +#define PSA_CRYPTO_ITS_RANDOM_SEED_UID 0xFFFFFF52 + +/* See mbedtls_config.h for definition */ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_SLOT_COUNT) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_SLOT_COUNT 32 +#endif + +/** \addtogroup attributes + * @{ + */ + +/** \brief Declare the enrollment algorithm for a key. + * + * An operation on a key may indifferently use the algorithm set with + * psa_set_key_algorithm() or with this function. + * + * \param[out] attributes The attribute structure to write to. + * \param alg2 A second algorithm that the key may be used + * for, in addition to the algorithm set with + * psa_set_key_algorithm(). + * + * \warning Setting an enrollment algorithm is not recommended, because + * using the same key with different algorithms can allow some + * attacks based on arithmetic relations between different + * computations made with the same key, or can escalate harmless + * side channels into exploitable ones. Use this function only + * if it is necessary to support a protocol for which it has been + * verified that the usage of the key with multiple algorithms + * is safe. + */ +static inline void psa_set_key_enrollment_algorithm( + psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + psa_algorithm_t alg2) +{ + attributes->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(policy).MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(alg2) = alg2; +} + +/** Retrieve the enrollment algorithm policy from key attributes. + * + * \param[in] attributes The key attribute structure to query. + * + * \return The enrollment algorithm stored in the attribute structure. + */ +static inline psa_algorithm_t psa_get_key_enrollment_algorithm( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes) +{ + return attributes->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(policy).MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(alg2); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C) + +/** Retrieve the slot number where a key is stored. + * + * A slot number is only defined for keys that are stored in a secure + * element. + * + * This information is only useful if the secure element is not entirely + * managed through the PSA Cryptography API. It is up to the secure + * element driver to decide how PSA slot numbers map to any other interface + * that the secure element may have. + * + * \param[in] attributes The key attribute structure to query. + * \param[out] slot_number On success, the slot number containing the key. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * The key is located in a secure element, and \p *slot_number + * indicates the slot number that contains it. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED + * The caller is not permitted to query the slot number. + * Mbed TLS currently does not return this error. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * The key is not located in a secure element. + */ +psa_status_t psa_get_key_slot_number( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + psa_key_slot_number_t *slot_number); + +/** Choose the slot number where a key is stored. + * + * This function declares a slot number in the specified attribute + * structure. + * + * A slot number is only meaningful for keys that are stored in a secure + * element. It is up to the secure element driver to decide how PSA slot + * numbers map to any other interface that the secure element may have. + * + * \note Setting a slot number in key attributes for a key creation can + * cause the following errors when creating the key: + * - #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED if the selected secure element does + * not support choosing a specific slot number. + * - #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED if the caller is not permitted to + * choose slot numbers in general or to choose this specific slot. + * - #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT if the chosen slot number is not + * valid in general or not valid for this specific key. + * - #PSA_ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS if there is already a key in the + * selected slot. + * + * \param[out] attributes The attribute structure to write to. + * \param slot_number The slot number to set. + */ +static inline void psa_set_key_slot_number( + psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + psa_key_slot_number_t slot_number) +{ + attributes->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(has_slot_number) = 1; + attributes->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(slot_number) = slot_number; +} + +/** Remove the slot number attribute from a key attribute structure. + * + * This function undoes the action of psa_set_key_slot_number(). + * + * \param[out] attributes The attribute structure to write to. + */ +static inline void psa_clear_key_slot_number( + psa_key_attributes_t *attributes) +{ + attributes->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(has_slot_number) = 0; +} + +/** Register a key that is already present in a secure element. + * + * The key must be located in a secure element designated by the + * lifetime field in \p attributes, in the slot set with + * psa_set_key_slot_number() in the attribute structure. + * This function makes the key available through the key identifier + * specified in \p attributes. + * + * \param[in] attributes The attributes of the existing key. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * The key was successfully registered. + * Note that depending on the design of the driver, this may or may + * not guarantee that a key actually exists in the designated slot + * and is compatible with the specified attributes. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS + * There is already a key with the identifier specified in + * \p attributes. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * The secure element driver for the specified lifetime does not + * support registering a key. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * The identifier in \p attributes is invalid, namely the identifier is + * not in the user range, or + * \p attributes specifies a lifetime which is not located + * in a secure element, or no slot number is specified in \p attributes, + * or the specified slot number is not valid. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED + * The caller is not authorized to register the specified key slot. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_STORAGE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_register_se_key( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes); + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C */ + +/**@}*/ + +/** + * \brief Library deinitialization. + * + * This function clears all data associated with the PSA layer, + * including the whole key store. + * This function is not thread safe, it wipes every key slot regardless of + * state and reader count. It should only be called when no slot is in use. + * + * This is an Mbed TLS extension. + */ +void mbedtls_psa_crypto_free(void); + +/** \brief Statistics about + * resource consumption related to the PSA keystore. + * + * \note The content of this structure is not part of the stable API and ABI + * of Mbed TLS and may change arbitrarily from version to version. + */ +typedef struct mbedtls_psa_stats_s { + /** Number of slots containing key material for a volatile key. */ + size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(volatile_slots); + /** Number of slots containing key material for a key which is in + * internal persistent storage. */ + size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(persistent_slots); + /** Number of slots containing a reference to a key in a + * secure element. */ + size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(external_slots); + /** Number of slots which are occupied, but do not contain + * key material yet. */ + size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(half_filled_slots); + /** Number of slots that contain cache data. */ + size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(cache_slots); + /** Number of slots that are not used for anything. */ + size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(empty_slots); + /** Number of slots that are locked. */ + size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(locked_slots); + /** Largest key id value among open keys in internal persistent storage. */ + psa_key_id_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(max_open_internal_key_id); + /** Largest key id value among open keys in secure elements. */ + psa_key_id_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(max_open_external_key_id); +} mbedtls_psa_stats_t; + +/** \brief Get statistics about + * resource consumption related to the PSA keystore. + * + * \note When Mbed TLS is built as part of a service, with isolation + * between the application and the keystore, the service may or + * may not expose this function. + */ +void mbedtls_psa_get_stats(mbedtls_psa_stats_t *stats); + +/** + * \brief Inject an initial entropy seed for the random generator into + * secure storage. + * + * This function injects data to be used as a seed for the random generator + * used by the PSA Crypto implementation. On devices that lack a trusted + * entropy source (preferably a hardware random number generator), + * the Mbed PSA Crypto implementation uses this value to seed its + * random generator. + * + * On devices without a trusted entropy source, this function must be + * called exactly once in the lifetime of the device. On devices with + * a trusted entropy source, calling this function is optional. + * In all cases, this function may only be called before calling any + * other function in the PSA Crypto API, including psa_crypto_init(). + * + * When this function returns successfully, it populates a file in + * persistent storage. Once the file has been created, this function + * can no longer succeed. + * + * If any error occurs, this function does not change the system state. + * You can call this function again after correcting the reason for the + * error if possible. + * + * \warning This function **can** fail! Callers MUST check the return status. + * + * \warning If you use this function, you should use it as part of a + * factory provisioning process. The value of the injected seed + * is critical to the security of the device. It must be + * *secret*, *unpredictable* and (statistically) *unique per device*. + * You should be generate it randomly using a cryptographically + * secure random generator seeded from trusted entropy sources. + * You should transmit it securely to the device and ensure + * that its value is not leaked or stored anywhere beyond the + * needs of transmitting it from the point of generation to + * the call of this function, and erase all copies of the value + * once this function returns. + * + * This is an Mbed TLS extension. + * + * \note This function is only available on the following platforms: + * * If the compile-time option MBEDTLS_PSA_INJECT_ENTROPY is enabled. + * Note that you must provide compatible implementations of + * mbedtls_nv_seed_read and mbedtls_nv_seed_write. + * * In a client-server integration of PSA Cryptography, on the client side, + * if the server supports this feature. + * \param[in] seed Buffer containing the seed value to inject. + * \param[in] seed_size Size of the \p seed buffer. + * The size of the seed in bytes must be greater + * or equal to both #MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE + * and the value of \c MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MIN_PLATFORM + * in `library/entropy_poll.h` in the Mbed TLS source + * code. + * It must be less or equal to + * #MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MAX_SEED_SIZE. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * The seed value was injected successfully. The random generator + * of the PSA Crypto implementation is now ready for use. + * You may now call psa_crypto_init() and use the PSA Crypto + * implementation. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * \p seed_size is out of range. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE + * There was a failure reading or writing from storage. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED + * The library has already been initialized. It is no longer + * possible to call this function. + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_inject_entropy(const uint8_t *seed, + size_t seed_size); + +/** \addtogroup crypto_types + * @{ + */ + +/** DSA public key. + * + * The import and export format is the + * representation of the public key `y = g^x mod p` as a big-endian byte + * string. The length of the byte string is the length of the base prime `p` + * in bytes. + */ +#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_DSA_PUBLIC_KEY ((psa_key_type_t) 0x4002) + +/** DSA key pair (private and public key). + * + * The import and export format is the + * representation of the private key `x` as a big-endian byte string. The + * length of the byte string is the private key size in bytes (leading zeroes + * are not stripped). + * + * Deterministic DSA key derivation with psa_generate_derived_key follows + * FIPS 186-4 §B.1.2: interpret the byte string as integer + * in big-endian order. Discard it if it is not in the range + * [0, *N* - 2] where *N* is the boundary of the private key domain + * (the prime *p* for Diffie-Hellman, the subprime *q* for DSA, + * or the order of the curve's base point for ECC). + * Add 1 to the resulting integer and use this as the private key *x*. + * + */ +#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_DSA_KEY_PAIR ((psa_key_type_t) 0x7002) + +/** Whether a key type is a DSA key (pair or public-only). */ +#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_DSA(type) \ + (PSA_KEY_TYPE_PUBLIC_KEY_OF_KEY_PAIR(type) == PSA_KEY_TYPE_DSA_PUBLIC_KEY) + +#define PSA_ALG_DSA_BASE ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x06000400) +/** DSA signature with hashing. + * + * This is the signature scheme defined by FIPS 186-4, + * with a random per-message secret number (*k*). + * + * \param hash_alg A hash algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that + * #PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(\p hash_alg) is true). + * This includes #PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH + * when specifying the algorithm in a usage policy. + * + * \return The corresponding DSA signature algorithm. + * \return Unspecified if \p hash_alg is not a supported + * hash algorithm. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_DSA(hash_alg) \ + (PSA_ALG_DSA_BASE | ((hash_alg) & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK)) +#define PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA_BASE ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x06000500) +#define PSA_ALG_DSA_DETERMINISTIC_FLAG PSA_ALG_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC_FLAG +/** Deterministic DSA signature with hashing. + * + * This is the deterministic variant defined by RFC 6979 of + * the signature scheme defined by FIPS 186-4. + * + * \param hash_alg A hash algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that + * #PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(\p hash_alg) is true). + * This includes #PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH + * when specifying the algorithm in a usage policy. + * + * \return The corresponding DSA signature algorithm. + * \return Unspecified if \p hash_alg is not a supported + * hash algorithm. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(hash_alg) \ + (PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA_BASE | ((hash_alg) & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK)) +#define PSA_ALG_IS_DSA(alg) \ + (((alg) & ~PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK & ~PSA_ALG_DSA_DETERMINISTIC_FLAG) == \ + PSA_ALG_DSA_BASE) +#define PSA_ALG_DSA_IS_DETERMINISTIC(alg) \ + (((alg) & PSA_ALG_DSA_DETERMINISTIC_FLAG) != 0) +#define PSA_ALG_IS_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(alg) \ + (PSA_ALG_IS_DSA(alg) && PSA_ALG_DSA_IS_DETERMINISTIC(alg)) +#define PSA_ALG_IS_RANDOMIZED_DSA(alg) \ + (PSA_ALG_IS_DSA(alg) && !PSA_ALG_DSA_IS_DETERMINISTIC(alg)) + + +/* We need to expand the sample definition of this macro from + * the API definition. */ +#undef PSA_ALG_IS_VENDOR_HASH_AND_SIGN +#define PSA_ALG_IS_VENDOR_HASH_AND_SIGN(alg) \ + PSA_ALG_IS_DSA(alg) + +/**@}*/ + +/** \addtogroup attributes + * @{ + */ + +/** PAKE operation stages. */ +#define PSA_PAKE_OPERATION_STAGE_SETUP 0 +#define PSA_PAKE_OPERATION_STAGE_COLLECT_INPUTS 1 +#define PSA_PAKE_OPERATION_STAGE_COMPUTATION 2 + +/**@}*/ + + +/** \defgroup psa_external_rng External random generator + * @{ + */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG) +/** External random generator function, implemented by the platform. + * + * When the compile-time option #MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG is enabled, + * this function replaces Mbed TLS's entropy and DRBG modules for all + * random generation triggered via PSA crypto interfaces. + * + * \note This random generator must deliver random numbers with cryptographic + * quality and high performance. It must supply unpredictable numbers + * with a uniform distribution. The implementation of this function + * is responsible for ensuring that the random generator is seeded + * with sufficient entropy. If you have a hardware TRNG which is slow + * or delivers non-uniform output, declare it as an entropy source + * with mbedtls_entropy_add_source() instead of enabling this option. + * + * \param[in,out] context Pointer to the random generator context. + * This is all-bits-zero on the first call + * and preserved between successive calls. + * \param[out] output Output buffer. On success, this buffer + * contains random data with a uniform + * distribution. + * \param output_size The size of the \p output buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] output_length On success, set this value to \p output_size. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. The output buffer contains \p output_size bytes of + * cryptographic-quality random data, and \c *output_length is + * set to \p output_size. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY + * The random generator requires extra entropy and there is no + * way to obtain entropy under current environment conditions. + * This error should not happen under normal circumstances since + * this function is responsible for obtaining as much entropy as + * it needs. However implementations of this function may return + * #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY if there is no way to obtain + * entropy without blocking indefinitely. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE + * A failure of the random generator hardware that isn't covered + * by #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY. + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_external_get_random( + mbedtls_psa_external_random_context_t *context, + uint8_t *output, size_t output_size, size_t *output_length); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG */ + +/**@}*/ + +/** \defgroup psa_builtin_keys Built-in keys + * @{ + */ + +/** The minimum value for a key identifier that is built into the + * implementation. + * + * The range of key identifiers from #MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_ID_BUILTIN_MIN + * to #MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_ID_BUILTIN_MAX within the range from + * #PSA_KEY_ID_VENDOR_MIN and #PSA_KEY_ID_VENDOR_MAX and must not intersect + * with any other set of implementation-chosen key identifiers. + * + * This value is part of the library's ABI since changing it would invalidate + * the values of built-in key identifiers in applications. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_ID_BUILTIN_MIN ((psa_key_id_t) 0x7fff0000) + +/** The maximum value for a key identifier that is built into the + * implementation. + * + * See #MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_ID_BUILTIN_MIN for more information. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_ID_BUILTIN_MAX ((psa_key_id_t) 0x7fffefff) + +/** A slot number identifying a key in a driver. + * + * Values of this type are used to identify built-in keys. + */ +typedef uint64_t psa_drv_slot_number_t; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_BUILTIN_KEYS) +/** Test whether a key identifier belongs to the builtin key range. + * + * \param key_id Key identifier to test. + * + * \retval 1 + * The key identifier is a builtin key identifier. + * \retval 0 + * The key identifier is not a builtin key identifier. + */ +static inline int psa_key_id_is_builtin(psa_key_id_t key_id) +{ + return (key_id >= MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_ID_BUILTIN_MIN) && + (key_id <= MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_ID_BUILTIN_MAX); +} + +/** Platform function to obtain the location and slot number of a built-in key. + * + * An application-specific implementation of this function must be provided if + * #MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_BUILTIN_KEYS is enabled. This would typically be provided + * as part of a platform's system image. + * + * #MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_GET_KEY_ID(\p key_id) needs to be in the range from + * #MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_ID_BUILTIN_MIN to #MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_ID_BUILTIN_MAX. + * + * In a multi-application configuration + * (\c MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_KEY_ID_ENCODES_OWNER is defined), + * this function should check that #MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_GET_OWNER_ID(\p key_id) + * is allowed to use the given key. + * + * \param key_id The key ID for which to retrieve the + * location and slot attributes. + * \param[out] lifetime On success, the lifetime associated with the key + * corresponding to \p key_id. Lifetime is a + * combination of which driver contains the key, + * and with what persistence level the key is + * intended to be used. If the platform + * implementation does not contain specific + * information about the intended key persistence + * level, the persistence level may be reported as + * #PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_DEFAULT. + * \param[out] slot_number On success, the slot number known to the driver + * registered at the lifetime location reported + * through \p lifetime which corresponds to the + * requested built-in key. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * The requested key identifier designates a built-in key. + * In a multi-application configuration, the requested owner + * is allowed to access it. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST + * The requested key identifier is not a built-in key which is known + * to this function. If a key exists in the key storage with this + * identifier, the data from the storage will be used. + * \return (any other error) + * Any other error is propagated to the function that requested the key. + * Common errors include: + * - #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED: the key exists but the requested owner + * is not allowed to access it. + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_platform_get_builtin_key( + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key_id, + psa_key_lifetime_t *lifetime, + psa_drv_slot_number_t *slot_number); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_BUILTIN_KEYS */ + +/** @} */ + +/** \addtogroup crypto_types + * @{ + */ + +#define PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_PAKE ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x0a000000) + +/** Whether the specified algorithm is a password-authenticated key exchange. + * + * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t). + * + * \return 1 if \p alg is a password-authenticated key exchange (PAKE) + * algorithm, 0 otherwise. + * This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \p alg is not a supported + * algorithm identifier. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_IS_PAKE(alg) \ + (((alg) & PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_MASK) == PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_PAKE) + +/** The Password-authenticated key exchange by juggling (J-PAKE) algorithm. + * + * This is J-PAKE as defined by RFC 8236, instantiated with the following + * parameters: + * + * - The group can be either an elliptic curve or defined over a finite field. + * - Schnorr NIZK proof as defined by RFC 8235 and using the same group as the + * J-PAKE algorithm. + * - A cryptographic hash function. + * + * To select these parameters and set up the cipher suite, call these functions + * in any order: + * + * \code + * psa_pake_cs_set_algorithm(cipher_suite, PSA_ALG_JPAKE); + * psa_pake_cs_set_primitive(cipher_suite, + * PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE(type, family, bits)); + * psa_pake_cs_set_hash(cipher_suite, hash); + * \endcode + * + * For more information on how to set a specific curve or field, refer to the + * documentation of the individual \c PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE_TYPE_XXX constants. + * + * After initializing a J-PAKE operation, call + * + * \code + * psa_pake_setup(operation, cipher_suite); + * psa_pake_set_user(operation, ...); + * psa_pake_set_peer(operation, ...); + * psa_pake_set_password_key(operation, ...); + * \endcode + * + * The password is provided as a key. This can be the password text itself, + * in an agreed character encoding, or some value derived from the password + * as required by a higher level protocol. + * + * (The implementation converts the key material to a number as described in + * Section 2.3.8 of _SEC 1: Elliptic Curve Cryptography_ + * (https://www.secg.org/sec1-v2.pdf), before reducing it modulo \c q. Here + * \c q is order of the group defined by the primitive set in the cipher suite. + * The \c psa_pake_set_password_key() function returns an error if the result + * of the reduction is 0.) + * + * The key exchange flow for J-PAKE is as follows: + * -# To get the first round data that needs to be sent to the peer, call + * \code + * // Get g1 + * psa_pake_output(operation, #PSA_PAKE_STEP_KEY_SHARE, ...); + * // Get the ZKP public key for x1 + * psa_pake_output(operation, #PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PUBLIC, ...); + * // Get the ZKP proof for x1 + * psa_pake_output(operation, #PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PROOF, ...); + * // Get g2 + * psa_pake_output(operation, #PSA_PAKE_STEP_KEY_SHARE, ...); + * // Get the ZKP public key for x2 + * psa_pake_output(operation, #PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PUBLIC, ...); + * // Get the ZKP proof for x2 + * psa_pake_output(operation, #PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PROOF, ...); + * \endcode + * -# To provide the first round data received from the peer to the operation, + * call + * \code + * // Set g3 + * psa_pake_input(operation, #PSA_PAKE_STEP_KEY_SHARE, ...); + * // Set the ZKP public key for x3 + * psa_pake_input(operation, #PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PUBLIC, ...); + * // Set the ZKP proof for x3 + * psa_pake_input(operation, #PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PROOF, ...); + * // Set g4 + * psa_pake_input(operation, #PSA_PAKE_STEP_KEY_SHARE, ...); + * // Set the ZKP public key for x4 + * psa_pake_input(operation, #PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PUBLIC, ...); + * // Set the ZKP proof for x4 + * psa_pake_input(operation, #PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PROOF, ...); + * \endcode + * -# To get the second round data that needs to be sent to the peer, call + * \code + * // Get A + * psa_pake_output(operation, #PSA_PAKE_STEP_KEY_SHARE, ...); + * // Get ZKP public key for x2*s + * psa_pake_output(operation, #PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PUBLIC, ...); + * // Get ZKP proof for x2*s + * psa_pake_output(operation, #PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PROOF, ...); + * \endcode + * -# To provide the second round data received from the peer to the operation, + * call + * \code + * // Set B + * psa_pake_input(operation, #PSA_PAKE_STEP_KEY_SHARE, ...); + * // Set ZKP public key for x4*s + * psa_pake_input(operation, #PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PUBLIC, ...); + * // Set ZKP proof for x4*s + * psa_pake_input(operation, #PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PROOF, ...); + * \endcode + * -# To access the shared secret call + * \code + * // Get Ka=Kb=K + * psa_pake_get_implicit_key() + * \endcode + * + * For more information consult the documentation of the individual + * \c PSA_PAKE_STEP_XXX constants. + * + * At this point there is a cryptographic guarantee that only the authenticated + * party who used the same password is able to compute the key. But there is no + * guarantee that the peer is the party it claims to be and was able to do so. + * + * That is, the authentication is only implicit (the peer is not authenticated + * at this point, and no action should be taken that assume that they are - like + * for example accessing restricted files). + * + * To make the authentication explicit there are various methods, see Section 5 + * of RFC 8236 for two examples. + * + */ +#define PSA_ALG_JPAKE ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x0a000100) + +/** @} */ + +/** \defgroup pake Password-authenticated key exchange (PAKE) + * + * This is a proposed PAKE interface for the PSA Crypto API. It is not part of + * the official PSA Crypto API yet. + * + * \note The content of this section is not part of the stable API and ABI + * of Mbed TLS and may change arbitrarily from version to version. + * Same holds for the corresponding macros #PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_PAKE and + * #PSA_ALG_JPAKE. + * @{ + */ + +/** \brief Encoding of the application role of PAKE + * + * Encodes the application's role in the algorithm is being executed. For more + * information see the documentation of individual \c PSA_PAKE_ROLE_XXX + * constants. + */ +typedef uint8_t psa_pake_role_t; + +/** Encoding of input and output indicators for PAKE. + * + * Some PAKE algorithms need to exchange more data than just a single key share. + * This type is for encoding additional input and output data for such + * algorithms. + */ +typedef uint8_t psa_pake_step_t; + +/** Encoding of the type of the PAKE's primitive. + * + * Values defined by this standard will never be in the range 0x80-0xff. + * Vendors who define additional types must use an encoding in this range. + * + * For more information see the documentation of individual + * \c PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE_TYPE_XXX constants. + */ +typedef uint8_t psa_pake_primitive_type_t; + +/** \brief Encoding of the family of the primitive associated with the PAKE. + * + * For more information see the documentation of individual + * \c PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE_TYPE_XXX constants. + */ +typedef uint8_t psa_pake_family_t; + +/** \brief Encoding of the primitive associated with the PAKE. + * + * For more information see the documentation of the #PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE macro. + */ +typedef uint32_t psa_pake_primitive_t; + +/** A value to indicate no role in a PAKE algorithm. + * This value can be used in a call to psa_pake_set_role() for symmetric PAKE + * algorithms which do not assign roles. + */ +#define PSA_PAKE_ROLE_NONE ((psa_pake_role_t) 0x00) + +/** The first peer in a balanced PAKE. + * + * Although balanced PAKE algorithms are symmetric, some of them needs an + * ordering of peers for the transcript calculations. If the algorithm does not + * need this, both #PSA_PAKE_ROLE_FIRST and #PSA_PAKE_ROLE_SECOND are + * accepted. + */ +#define PSA_PAKE_ROLE_FIRST ((psa_pake_role_t) 0x01) + +/** The second peer in a balanced PAKE. + * + * Although balanced PAKE algorithms are symmetric, some of them needs an + * ordering of peers for the transcript calculations. If the algorithm does not + * need this, either #PSA_PAKE_ROLE_FIRST or #PSA_PAKE_ROLE_SECOND are + * accepted. + */ +#define PSA_PAKE_ROLE_SECOND ((psa_pake_role_t) 0x02) + +/** The client in an augmented PAKE. + * + * Augmented PAKE algorithms need to differentiate between client and server. + */ +#define PSA_PAKE_ROLE_CLIENT ((psa_pake_role_t) 0x11) + +/** The server in an augmented PAKE. + * + * Augmented PAKE algorithms need to differentiate between client and server. + */ +#define PSA_PAKE_ROLE_SERVER ((psa_pake_role_t) 0x12) + +/** The PAKE primitive type indicating the use of elliptic curves. + * + * The values of the \c family and \c bits fields of the cipher suite identify a + * specific elliptic curve, using the same mapping that is used for ECC + * (::psa_ecc_family_t) keys. + * + * (Here \c family means the value returned by psa_pake_cs_get_family() and + * \c bits means the value returned by psa_pake_cs_get_bits().) + * + * Input and output during the operation can involve group elements and scalar + * values: + * -# The format for group elements is the same as for public keys on the + * specific curve would be. For more information, consult the documentation of + * psa_export_public_key(). + * -# The format for scalars is the same as for private keys on the specific + * curve would be. For more information, consult the documentation of + * psa_export_key(). + */ +#define PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE_TYPE_ECC ((psa_pake_primitive_type_t) 0x01) + +/** The PAKE primitive type indicating the use of Diffie-Hellman groups. + * + * The values of the \c family and \c bits fields of the cipher suite identify + * a specific Diffie-Hellman group, using the same mapping that is used for + * Diffie-Hellman (::psa_dh_family_t) keys. + * + * (Here \c family means the value returned by psa_pake_cs_get_family() and + * \c bits means the value returned by psa_pake_cs_get_bits().) + * + * Input and output during the operation can involve group elements and scalar + * values: + * -# The format for group elements is the same as for public keys on the + * specific group would be. For more information, consult the documentation of + * psa_export_public_key(). + * -# The format for scalars is the same as for private keys on the specific + * group would be. For more information, consult the documentation of + * psa_export_key(). + */ +#define PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE_TYPE_DH ((psa_pake_primitive_type_t) 0x02) + +/** Construct a PAKE primitive from type, family and bit-size. + * + * \param pake_type The type of the primitive + * (value of type ::psa_pake_primitive_type_t). + * \param pake_family The family of the primitive + * (the type and interpretation of this parameter depends + * on \p pake_type, for more information consult the + * documentation of individual ::psa_pake_primitive_type_t + * constants). + * \param pake_bits The bit-size of the primitive + * (Value of type \c size_t. The interpretation + * of this parameter depends on \p pake_family, for more + * information consult the documentation of individual + * ::psa_pake_primitive_type_t constants). + * + * \return The constructed primitive value of type ::psa_pake_primitive_t. + * Return 0 if the requested primitive can't be encoded as + * ::psa_pake_primitive_t. + */ +#define PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE(pake_type, pake_family, pake_bits) \ + ((pake_bits & 0xFFFF) != pake_bits) ? 0 : \ + ((psa_pake_primitive_t) (((pake_type) << 24 | \ + (pake_family) << 16) | (pake_bits))) + +/** The key share being sent to or received from the peer. + * + * The format for both input and output at this step is the same as for public + * keys on the group determined by the primitive (::psa_pake_primitive_t) would + * be. + * + * For more information on the format, consult the documentation of + * psa_export_public_key(). + * + * For information regarding how the group is determined, consult the + * documentation #PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE. + */ +#define PSA_PAKE_STEP_KEY_SHARE ((psa_pake_step_t) 0x01) + +/** A Schnorr NIZKP public key. + * + * This is the ephemeral public key in the Schnorr Non-Interactive + * Zero-Knowledge Proof (the value denoted by the letter 'V' in RFC 8235). + * + * The format for both input and output at this step is the same as for public + * keys on the group determined by the primitive (::psa_pake_primitive_t) would + * be. + * + * For more information on the format, consult the documentation of + * psa_export_public_key(). + * + * For information regarding how the group is determined, consult the + * documentation #PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE. + */ +#define PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PUBLIC ((psa_pake_step_t) 0x02) + +/** A Schnorr NIZKP proof. + * + * This is the proof in the Schnorr Non-Interactive Zero-Knowledge Proof (the + * value denoted by the letter 'r' in RFC 8235). + * + * Both for input and output, the value at this step is an integer less than + * the order of the group selected in the cipher suite. The format depends on + * the group as well: + * + * - For Montgomery curves, the encoding is little endian. + * - For everything else the encoding is big endian (see Section 2.3.8 of + * _SEC 1: Elliptic Curve Cryptography_ at https://www.secg.org/sec1-v2.pdf). + * + * In both cases leading zeroes are allowed as long as the length in bytes does + * not exceed the byte length of the group order. + * + * For information regarding how the group is determined, consult the + * documentation #PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE. + */ +#define PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PROOF ((psa_pake_step_t) 0x03) + +/** The type of the data structure for PAKE cipher suites. + * + * This is an implementation-defined \c struct. Applications should not + * make any assumptions about the content of this structure. + * Implementation details can change in future versions without notice. + */ +typedef struct psa_pake_cipher_suite_s psa_pake_cipher_suite_t; + +/** Return an initial value for a PAKE cipher suite object. + */ +static psa_pake_cipher_suite_t psa_pake_cipher_suite_init(void); + +/** Retrieve the PAKE algorithm from a PAKE cipher suite. + * + * \param[in] cipher_suite The cipher suite structure to query. + * + * \return The PAKE algorithm stored in the cipher suite structure. + */ +static psa_algorithm_t psa_pake_cs_get_algorithm( + const psa_pake_cipher_suite_t *cipher_suite); + +/** Declare the PAKE algorithm for the cipher suite. + * + * This function overwrites any PAKE algorithm + * previously set in \p cipher_suite. + * + * \param[out] cipher_suite The cipher suite structure to write to. + * \param algorithm The PAKE algorithm to write. + * (`PSA_ALG_XXX` values of type ::psa_algorithm_t + * such that #PSA_ALG_IS_PAKE(\c alg) is true.) + * If this is 0, the PAKE algorithm in + * \p cipher_suite becomes unspecified. + */ +static void psa_pake_cs_set_algorithm(psa_pake_cipher_suite_t *cipher_suite, + psa_algorithm_t algorithm); + +/** Retrieve the primitive from a PAKE cipher suite. + * + * \param[in] cipher_suite The cipher suite structure to query. + * + * \return The primitive stored in the cipher suite structure. + */ +static psa_pake_primitive_t psa_pake_cs_get_primitive( + const psa_pake_cipher_suite_t *cipher_suite); + +/** Declare the primitive for a PAKE cipher suite. + * + * This function overwrites any primitive previously set in \p cipher_suite. + * + * \param[out] cipher_suite The cipher suite structure to write to. + * \param primitive The primitive to write. If this is 0, the + * primitive type in \p cipher_suite becomes + * unspecified. + */ +static void psa_pake_cs_set_primitive(psa_pake_cipher_suite_t *cipher_suite, + psa_pake_primitive_t primitive); + +/** Retrieve the PAKE family from a PAKE cipher suite. + * + * \param[in] cipher_suite The cipher suite structure to query. + * + * \return The PAKE family stored in the cipher suite structure. + */ +static psa_pake_family_t psa_pake_cs_get_family( + const psa_pake_cipher_suite_t *cipher_suite); + +/** Retrieve the PAKE primitive bit-size from a PAKE cipher suite. + * + * \param[in] cipher_suite The cipher suite structure to query. + * + * \return The PAKE primitive bit-size stored in the cipher suite structure. + */ +static uint16_t psa_pake_cs_get_bits( + const psa_pake_cipher_suite_t *cipher_suite); + +/** Retrieve the hash algorithm from a PAKE cipher suite. + * + * \param[in] cipher_suite The cipher suite structure to query. + * + * \return The hash algorithm stored in the cipher suite structure. The return + * value is 0 if the PAKE is not parametrised by a hash algorithm or if + * the hash algorithm is not set. + */ +static psa_algorithm_t psa_pake_cs_get_hash( + const psa_pake_cipher_suite_t *cipher_suite); + +/** Declare the hash algorithm for a PAKE cipher suite. + * + * This function overwrites any hash algorithm + * previously set in \p cipher_suite. + * + * Refer to the documentation of individual PAKE algorithm types (`PSA_ALG_XXX` + * values of type ::psa_algorithm_t such that #PSA_ALG_IS_PAKE(\c alg) is true) + * for more information. + * + * \param[out] cipher_suite The cipher suite structure to write to. + * \param hash The hash involved in the cipher suite. + * (`PSA_ALG_XXX` values of type ::psa_algorithm_t + * such that #PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(\c alg) is true.) + * If this is 0, the hash algorithm in + * \p cipher_suite becomes unspecified. + */ +static void psa_pake_cs_set_hash(psa_pake_cipher_suite_t *cipher_suite, + psa_algorithm_t hash); + +/** The type of the state data structure for PAKE operations. + * + * Before calling any function on a PAKE operation object, the application + * must initialize it by any of the following means: + * - Set the structure to all-bits-zero, for example: + * \code + * psa_pake_operation_t operation; + * memset(&operation, 0, sizeof(operation)); + * \endcode + * - Initialize the structure to logical zero values, for example: + * \code + * psa_pake_operation_t operation = {0}; + * \endcode + * - Initialize the structure to the initializer #PSA_PAKE_OPERATION_INIT, + * for example: + * \code + * psa_pake_operation_t operation = PSA_PAKE_OPERATION_INIT; + * \endcode + * - Assign the result of the function psa_pake_operation_init() + * to the structure, for example: + * \code + * psa_pake_operation_t operation; + * operation = psa_pake_operation_init(); + * \endcode + * + * This is an implementation-defined \c struct. Applications should not + * make any assumptions about the content of this structure. + * Implementation details can change in future versions without notice. */ +typedef struct psa_pake_operation_s psa_pake_operation_t; + +/** The type of input values for PAKE operations. */ +typedef struct psa_crypto_driver_pake_inputs_s psa_crypto_driver_pake_inputs_t; + +/** The type of computation stage for J-PAKE operations. */ +typedef struct psa_jpake_computation_stage_s psa_jpake_computation_stage_t; + +/** Return an initial value for a PAKE operation object. + */ +static psa_pake_operation_t psa_pake_operation_init(void); + +/** Get the length of the password in bytes from given inputs. + * + * \param[in] inputs Operation inputs. + * \param[out] password_len Password length. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * Password hasn't been set yet. + */ +psa_status_t psa_crypto_driver_pake_get_password_len( + const psa_crypto_driver_pake_inputs_t *inputs, + size_t *password_len); + +/** Get the password from given inputs. + * + * \param[in] inputs Operation inputs. + * \param[out] buffer Return buffer for password. + * \param buffer_size Size of the return buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] buffer_length Actual size of the password in bytes. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * Password hasn't been set yet. + */ +psa_status_t psa_crypto_driver_pake_get_password( + const psa_crypto_driver_pake_inputs_t *inputs, + uint8_t *buffer, size_t buffer_size, size_t *buffer_length); + +/** Get the length of the user id in bytes from given inputs. + * + * \param[in] inputs Operation inputs. + * \param[out] user_len User id length. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * User id hasn't been set yet. + */ +psa_status_t psa_crypto_driver_pake_get_user_len( + const psa_crypto_driver_pake_inputs_t *inputs, + size_t *user_len); + +/** Get the length of the peer id in bytes from given inputs. + * + * \param[in] inputs Operation inputs. + * \param[out] peer_len Peer id length. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * Peer id hasn't been set yet. + */ +psa_status_t psa_crypto_driver_pake_get_peer_len( + const psa_crypto_driver_pake_inputs_t *inputs, + size_t *peer_len); + +/** Get the user id from given inputs. + * + * \param[in] inputs Operation inputs. + * \param[out] user_id User id. + * \param user_id_size Size of \p user_id in bytes. + * \param[out] user_id_len Size of the user id in bytes. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * User id hasn't been set yet. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL + * The size of the \p user_id is too small. + */ +psa_status_t psa_crypto_driver_pake_get_user( + const psa_crypto_driver_pake_inputs_t *inputs, + uint8_t *user_id, size_t user_id_size, size_t *user_id_len); + +/** Get the peer id from given inputs. + * + * \param[in] inputs Operation inputs. + * \param[out] peer_id Peer id. + * \param peer_id_size Size of \p peer_id in bytes. + * \param[out] peer_id_length Size of the peer id in bytes. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * Peer id hasn't been set yet. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL + * The size of the \p peer_id is too small. + */ +psa_status_t psa_crypto_driver_pake_get_peer( + const psa_crypto_driver_pake_inputs_t *inputs, + uint8_t *peer_id, size_t peer_id_size, size_t *peer_id_length); + +/** Get the cipher suite from given inputs. + * + * \param[in] inputs Operation inputs. + * \param[out] cipher_suite Return buffer for role. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * Cipher_suite hasn't been set yet. + */ +psa_status_t psa_crypto_driver_pake_get_cipher_suite( + const psa_crypto_driver_pake_inputs_t *inputs, + psa_pake_cipher_suite_t *cipher_suite); + +/** Set the session information for a password-authenticated key exchange. + * + * The sequence of operations to set up a password-authenticated key exchange + * is as follows: + * -# Allocate an operation object which will be passed to all the functions + * listed here. + * -# Initialize the operation object with one of the methods described in the + * documentation for #psa_pake_operation_t, e.g. + * #PSA_PAKE_OPERATION_INIT. + * -# Call psa_pake_setup() to specify the cipher suite. + * -# Call \c psa_pake_set_xxx() functions on the operation to complete the + * setup. The exact sequence of \c psa_pake_set_xxx() functions that needs + * to be called depends on the algorithm in use. + * + * Refer to the documentation of individual PAKE algorithm types (`PSA_ALG_XXX` + * values of type ::psa_algorithm_t such that #PSA_ALG_IS_PAKE(\c alg) is true) + * for more information. + * + * A typical sequence of calls to perform a password-authenticated key + * exchange: + * -# Call psa_pake_output(operation, #PSA_PAKE_STEP_KEY_SHARE, ...) to get the + * key share that needs to be sent to the peer. + * -# Call psa_pake_input(operation, #PSA_PAKE_STEP_KEY_SHARE, ...) to provide + * the key share that was received from the peer. + * -# Depending on the algorithm additional calls to psa_pake_output() and + * psa_pake_input() might be necessary. + * -# Call psa_pake_get_implicit_key() for accessing the shared secret. + * + * Refer to the documentation of individual PAKE algorithm types (`PSA_ALG_XXX` + * values of type ::psa_algorithm_t such that #PSA_ALG_IS_PAKE(\c alg) is true) + * for more information. + * + * If an error occurs at any step after a call to psa_pake_setup(), + * the operation will need to be reset by a call to psa_pake_abort(). The + * application may call psa_pake_abort() at any time after the operation + * has been initialized. + * + * After a successful call to psa_pake_setup(), the application must + * eventually terminate the operation. The following events terminate an + * operation: + * - A call to psa_pake_abort(). + * - A successful call to psa_pake_get_implicit_key(). + * + * \param[in,out] operation The operation object to set up. It must have + * been initialized but not set up yet. + * \param[in] cipher_suite The cipher suite to use. (A cipher suite fully + * characterizes a PAKE algorithm and determines + * the algorithm as well.) + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * The algorithm in \p cipher_suite is not a PAKE algorithm, or the + * PAKE primitive in \p cipher_suite is not compatible with the + * PAKE algorithm, or the hash algorithm in \p cipher_suite is invalid + * or not compatible with the PAKE algorithm and primitive. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * The algorithm in \p cipher_suite is not a supported PAKE algorithm, + * or the PAKE primitive in \p cipher_suite is not supported or not + * compatible with the PAKE algorithm, or the hash algorithm in + * \p cipher_suite is not supported or not compatible with the PAKE + * algorithm and primitive. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The operation state is not valid, or + * the library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_pake_setup(psa_pake_operation_t *operation, + const psa_pake_cipher_suite_t *cipher_suite); + +/** Set the password for a password-authenticated key exchange from key ID. + * + * Call this function when the password, or a value derived from the password, + * is already present in the key store. + * + * \param[in,out] operation The operation object to set the password for. It + * must have been set up by psa_pake_setup() and + * not yet in use (neither psa_pake_output() nor + * psa_pake_input() has been called yet). It must + * be on operation for which the password hasn't + * been set yet (psa_pake_set_password_key() + * hasn't been called yet). + * \param password Identifier of the key holding the password or a + * value derived from the password (eg. by a + * memory-hard function). It must remain valid + * until the operation terminates. It must be of + * type #PSA_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD or + * #PSA_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD_HASH. It has to allow + * the usage #PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE + * \p password is not a valid key identifier. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED + * The key does not have the #PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE flag, or it does not + * permit the \p operation's algorithm. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * The key type for \p password is not #PSA_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD or + * #PSA_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD_HASH, or \p password is not compatible with + * the \p operation's cipher suite. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * The key type or key size of \p password is not supported with the + * \p operation's cipher suite. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The operation state is not valid (it must have been set up.), or + * the library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_pake_set_password_key(psa_pake_operation_t *operation, + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t password); + +/** Set the user ID for a password-authenticated key exchange. + * + * Call this function to set the user ID. For PAKE algorithms that associate a + * user identifier with each side of the session you need to call + * psa_pake_set_peer() as well. For PAKE algorithms that associate a single + * user identifier with the session, call psa_pake_set_user() only. + * + * Refer to the documentation of individual PAKE algorithm types (`PSA_ALG_XXX` + * values of type ::psa_algorithm_t such that #PSA_ALG_IS_PAKE(\c alg) is true) + * for more information. + * + * \param[in,out] operation The operation object to set the user ID for. It + * must have been set up by psa_pake_setup() and + * not yet in use (neither psa_pake_output() nor + * psa_pake_input() has been called yet). It must + * be on operation for which the user ID hasn't + * been set (psa_pake_set_user() hasn't been + * called yet). + * \param[in] user_id The user ID to authenticate with. + * \param user_id_len Size of the \p user_id buffer in bytes. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * \p user_id is not valid for the \p operation's algorithm and cipher + * suite. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * The value of \p user_id is not supported by the implementation. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The operation state is not valid, or + * the library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_pake_set_user(psa_pake_operation_t *operation, + const uint8_t *user_id, + size_t user_id_len); + +/** Set the peer ID for a password-authenticated key exchange. + * + * Call this function in addition to psa_pake_set_user() for PAKE algorithms + * that associate a user identifier with each side of the session. For PAKE + * algorithms that associate a single user identifier with the session, call + * psa_pake_set_user() only. + * + * Refer to the documentation of individual PAKE algorithm types (`PSA_ALG_XXX` + * values of type ::psa_algorithm_t such that #PSA_ALG_IS_PAKE(\c alg) is true) + * for more information. + * + * \param[in,out] operation The operation object to set the peer ID for. It + * must have been set up by psa_pake_setup() and + * not yet in use (neither psa_pake_output() nor + * psa_pake_input() has been called yet). It must + * be on operation for which the peer ID hasn't + * been set (psa_pake_set_peer() hasn't been + * called yet). + * \param[in] peer_id The peer's ID to authenticate. + * \param peer_id_len Size of the \p peer_id buffer in bytes. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * \p peer_id is not valid for the \p operation's algorithm and cipher + * suite. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * The algorithm doesn't associate a second identity with the session. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * Calling psa_pake_set_peer() is invalid with the \p operation's + * algorithm, the operation state is not valid, or the library has not + * been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_pake_set_peer(psa_pake_operation_t *operation, + const uint8_t *peer_id, + size_t peer_id_len); + +/** Set the application role for a password-authenticated key exchange. + * + * Not all PAKE algorithms need to differentiate the communicating entities. + * It is optional to call this function for PAKEs that don't require a role + * to be specified. For such PAKEs the application role parameter is ignored, + * or #PSA_PAKE_ROLE_NONE can be passed as \c role. + * + * Refer to the documentation of individual PAKE algorithm types (`PSA_ALG_XXX` + * values of type ::psa_algorithm_t such that #PSA_ALG_IS_PAKE(\c alg) is true) + * for more information. + * + * \param[in,out] operation The operation object to specify the + * application's role for. It must have been set up + * by psa_pake_setup() and not yet in use (neither + * psa_pake_output() nor psa_pake_input() has been + * called yet). It must be on operation for which + * the application's role hasn't been specified + * (psa_pake_set_role() hasn't been called yet). + * \param role A value of type ::psa_pake_role_t indicating the + * application's role in the PAKE the algorithm + * that is being set up. For more information see + * the documentation of \c PSA_PAKE_ROLE_XXX + * constants. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * The \p role is not a valid PAKE role in the \p operation’s algorithm. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * The \p role for this algorithm is not supported or is not valid. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The operation state is not valid, or + * the library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_pake_set_role(psa_pake_operation_t *operation, + psa_pake_role_t role); + +/** Get output for a step of a password-authenticated key exchange. + * + * Depending on the algorithm being executed, you might need to call this + * function several times or you might not need to call this at all. + * + * The exact sequence of calls to perform a password-authenticated key + * exchange depends on the algorithm in use. Refer to the documentation of + * individual PAKE algorithm types (`PSA_ALG_XXX` values of type + * ::psa_algorithm_t such that #PSA_ALG_IS_PAKE(\c alg) is true) for more + * information. + * + * If this function returns an error status, the operation enters an error + * state and must be aborted by calling psa_pake_abort(). + * + * \param[in,out] operation Active PAKE operation. + * \param step The step of the algorithm for which the output is + * requested. + * \param[out] output Buffer where the output is to be written in the + * format appropriate for this \p step. Refer to + * the documentation of the individual + * \c PSA_PAKE_STEP_XXX constants for more + * information. + * \param output_size Size of the \p output buffer in bytes. This must + * be at least #PSA_PAKE_OUTPUT_SIZE(\c alg, \c + * primitive, \p output_step) where \c alg and + * \p primitive are the PAKE algorithm and primitive + * in the operation's cipher suite, and \p step is + * the output step. + * + * \param[out] output_length On success, the number of bytes of the returned + * output. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL + * The size of the \p output buffer is too small. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * \p step is not compatible with the operation's algorithm. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * \p step is not supported with the operation's algorithm. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The operation state is not valid (it must be active, and fully set + * up, and this call must conform to the algorithm's requirements + * for ordering of input and output steps), or + * the library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_pake_output(psa_pake_operation_t *operation, + psa_pake_step_t step, + uint8_t *output, + size_t output_size, + size_t *output_length); + +/** Provide input for a step of a password-authenticated key exchange. + * + * Depending on the algorithm being executed, you might need to call this + * function several times or you might not need to call this at all. + * + * The exact sequence of calls to perform a password-authenticated key + * exchange depends on the algorithm in use. Refer to the documentation of + * individual PAKE algorithm types (`PSA_ALG_XXX` values of type + * ::psa_algorithm_t such that #PSA_ALG_IS_PAKE(\c alg) is true) for more + * information. + * + * If this function returns an error status, the operation enters an error + * state and must be aborted by calling psa_pake_abort(). + * + * \param[in,out] operation Active PAKE operation. + * \param step The step for which the input is provided. + * \param[in] input Buffer containing the input in the format + * appropriate for this \p step. Refer to the + * documentation of the individual + * \c PSA_PAKE_STEP_XXX constants for more + * information. + * \param input_length Size of the \p input buffer in bytes. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE + * The verification fails for a #PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PROOF input step. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * \p input_length is not compatible with the \p operation’s algorithm, + * or the \p input is not valid for the \p operation's algorithm, + * cipher suite or \p step. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * \p step p is not supported with the \p operation's algorithm, or the + * \p input is not supported for the \p operation's algorithm, cipher + * suite or \p step. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The operation state is not valid (it must be active, and fully set + * up, and this call must conform to the algorithm's requirements + * for ordering of input and output steps), or + * the library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_pake_input(psa_pake_operation_t *operation, + psa_pake_step_t step, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length); + +/** Get implicitly confirmed shared secret from a PAKE. + * + * At this point there is a cryptographic guarantee that only the authenticated + * party who used the same password is able to compute the key. But there is no + * guarantee that the peer is the party it claims to be and was able to do so. + * + * That is, the authentication is only implicit. Since the peer is not + * authenticated yet, no action should be taken yet that assumes that the peer + * is who it claims to be. For example, do not access restricted files on the + * peer's behalf until an explicit authentication has succeeded. + * + * This function can be called after the key exchange phase of the operation + * has completed. It imports the shared secret output of the PAKE into the + * provided derivation operation. The input step + * #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET is used when placing the shared key + * material in the key derivation operation. + * + * The exact sequence of calls to perform a password-authenticated key + * exchange depends on the algorithm in use. Refer to the documentation of + * individual PAKE algorithm types (`PSA_ALG_XXX` values of type + * ::psa_algorithm_t such that #PSA_ALG_IS_PAKE(\c alg) is true) for more + * information. + * + * When this function returns successfully, \p operation becomes inactive. + * If this function returns an error status, both \p operation + * and \c key_derivation operations enter an error state and must be aborted by + * calling psa_pake_abort() and psa_key_derivation_abort() respectively. + * + * \param[in,out] operation Active PAKE operation. + * \param[out] output A key derivation operation that is ready + * for an input step of type + * #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET is not compatible with the + * algorithm in the \p output key derivation operation. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * Input from a PAKE is not supported by the algorithm in the \p output + * key derivation operation. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The PAKE operation state is not valid (it must be active, but beyond + * that validity is specific to the algorithm), or + * the library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(), + * or the state of \p output is not valid for + * the #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET step. This can happen if the + * step is out of order or the application has done this step already + * and it may not be repeated. + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_pake_get_implicit_key(psa_pake_operation_t *operation, + psa_key_derivation_operation_t *output); + +/** Abort a PAKE operation. + * + * Aborting an operation frees all associated resources except for the \c + * operation structure itself. Once aborted, the operation object can be reused + * for another operation by calling psa_pake_setup() again. + * + * This function may be called at any time after the operation + * object has been initialized as described in #psa_pake_operation_t. + * + * In particular, calling psa_pake_abort() after the operation has been + * terminated by a call to psa_pake_abort() or psa_pake_get_implicit_key() + * is safe and has no effect. + * + * \param[in,out] operation The operation to abort. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_pake_abort(psa_pake_operation_t *operation); + +/**@}*/ + +/** A sufficient output buffer size for psa_pake_output(). + * + * If the size of the output buffer is at least this large, it is guaranteed + * that psa_pake_output() will not fail due to an insufficient output buffer + * size. The actual size of the output might be smaller in any given call. + * + * See also #PSA_PAKE_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE + * + * \param alg A PAKE algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that + * #PSA_ALG_IS_PAKE(\p alg) is true). + * \param primitive A primitive of type ::psa_pake_primitive_t that is + * compatible with algorithm \p alg. + * \param output_step A value of type ::psa_pake_step_t that is valid for the + * algorithm \p alg. + * \return A sufficient output buffer size for the specified + * PAKE algorithm, primitive, and output step. If the + * PAKE algorithm, primitive, or output step is not + * recognized, or the parameters are incompatible, + * return 0. + */ +#define PSA_PAKE_OUTPUT_SIZE(alg, primitive, output_step) \ + (alg == PSA_ALG_JPAKE && \ + primitive == PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE(PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE_TYPE_ECC, \ + PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1, 256) ? \ + ( \ + output_step == PSA_PAKE_STEP_KEY_SHARE ? 65 : \ + output_step == PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PUBLIC ? 65 : \ + 32 \ + ) : \ + 0) + +/** A sufficient input buffer size for psa_pake_input(). + * + * The value returned by this macro is guaranteed to be large enough for any + * valid input to psa_pake_input() in an operation with the specified + * parameters. + * + * See also #PSA_PAKE_INPUT_MAX_SIZE + * + * \param alg A PAKE algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that + * #PSA_ALG_IS_PAKE(\p alg) is true). + * \param primitive A primitive of type ::psa_pake_primitive_t that is + * compatible with algorithm \p alg. + * \param input_step A value of type ::psa_pake_step_t that is valid for the + * algorithm \p alg. + * \return A sufficient input buffer size for the specified + * input, cipher suite and algorithm. If the cipher suite, + * the input type or PAKE algorithm is not recognized, or + * the parameters are incompatible, return 0. + */ +#define PSA_PAKE_INPUT_SIZE(alg, primitive, input_step) \ + (alg == PSA_ALG_JPAKE && \ + primitive == PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE(PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE_TYPE_ECC, \ + PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1, 256) ? \ + ( \ + input_step == PSA_PAKE_STEP_KEY_SHARE ? 65 : \ + input_step == PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PUBLIC ? 65 : \ + 32 \ + ) : \ + 0) + +/** Output buffer size for psa_pake_output() for any of the supported PAKE + * algorithm and primitive suites and output step. + * + * This macro must expand to a compile-time constant integer. + * + * The value of this macro must be at least as large as the largest value + * returned by PSA_PAKE_OUTPUT_SIZE() + * + * See also #PSA_PAKE_OUTPUT_SIZE(\p alg, \p primitive, \p output_step). + */ +#define PSA_PAKE_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE 65 + +/** Input buffer size for psa_pake_input() for any of the supported PAKE + * algorithm and primitive suites and input step. + * + * This macro must expand to a compile-time constant integer. + * + * The value of this macro must be at least as large as the largest value + * returned by PSA_PAKE_INPUT_SIZE() + * + * See also #PSA_PAKE_INPUT_SIZE(\p alg, \p primitive, \p output_step). + */ +#define PSA_PAKE_INPUT_MAX_SIZE 65 + +/** Returns a suitable initializer for a PAKE cipher suite object of type + * psa_pake_cipher_suite_t. + */ +#define PSA_PAKE_CIPHER_SUITE_INIT { PSA_ALG_NONE, 0, 0, 0, PSA_ALG_NONE } + +/** Returns a suitable initializer for a PAKE operation object of type + * psa_pake_operation_t. + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) +#define PSA_PAKE_OPERATION_INIT { 0 } +#else +#define PSA_PAKE_OPERATION_INIT { 0, PSA_ALG_NONE, 0, PSA_PAKE_OPERATION_STAGE_SETUP, \ + { 0 }, { { 0 } } } +#endif + +struct psa_pake_cipher_suite_s { + psa_algorithm_t algorithm; + psa_pake_primitive_type_t type; + psa_pake_family_t family; + uint16_t bits; + psa_algorithm_t hash; +}; + +static inline psa_algorithm_t psa_pake_cs_get_algorithm( + const psa_pake_cipher_suite_t *cipher_suite) +{ + return cipher_suite->algorithm; +} + +static inline void psa_pake_cs_set_algorithm( + psa_pake_cipher_suite_t *cipher_suite, + psa_algorithm_t algorithm) +{ + if (!PSA_ALG_IS_PAKE(algorithm)) { + cipher_suite->algorithm = 0; + } else { + cipher_suite->algorithm = algorithm; + } +} + +static inline psa_pake_primitive_t psa_pake_cs_get_primitive( + const psa_pake_cipher_suite_t *cipher_suite) +{ + return PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE(cipher_suite->type, cipher_suite->family, + cipher_suite->bits); +} + +static inline void psa_pake_cs_set_primitive( + psa_pake_cipher_suite_t *cipher_suite, + psa_pake_primitive_t primitive) +{ + cipher_suite->type = (psa_pake_primitive_type_t) (primitive >> 24); + cipher_suite->family = (psa_pake_family_t) (0xFF & (primitive >> 16)); + cipher_suite->bits = (uint16_t) (0xFFFF & primitive); +} + +static inline psa_pake_family_t psa_pake_cs_get_family( + const psa_pake_cipher_suite_t *cipher_suite) +{ + return cipher_suite->family; +} + +static inline uint16_t psa_pake_cs_get_bits( + const psa_pake_cipher_suite_t *cipher_suite) +{ + return cipher_suite->bits; +} + +static inline psa_algorithm_t psa_pake_cs_get_hash( + const psa_pake_cipher_suite_t *cipher_suite) +{ + return cipher_suite->hash; +} + +static inline void psa_pake_cs_set_hash(psa_pake_cipher_suite_t *cipher_suite, + psa_algorithm_t hash) +{ + if (!PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(hash)) { + cipher_suite->hash = 0; + } else { + cipher_suite->hash = hash; + } +} + +struct psa_crypto_driver_pake_inputs_s { + uint8_t *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(password); + size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(password_len); + uint8_t *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(user); + size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(user_len); + uint8_t *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(peer); + size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(peer_len); + psa_key_attributes_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(attributes); + psa_pake_cipher_suite_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(cipher_suite); +}; + +typedef enum psa_crypto_driver_pake_step { + PSA_JPAKE_STEP_INVALID = 0, /* Invalid step */ + PSA_JPAKE_X1_STEP_KEY_SHARE = 1, /* Round 1: input/output key share (for ephemeral private key X1).*/ + PSA_JPAKE_X1_STEP_ZK_PUBLIC = 2, /* Round 1: input/output Schnorr NIZKP public key for the X1 key */ + PSA_JPAKE_X1_STEP_ZK_PROOF = 3, /* Round 1: input/output Schnorr NIZKP proof for the X1 key */ + PSA_JPAKE_X2_STEP_KEY_SHARE = 4, /* Round 1: input/output key share (for ephemeral private key X2).*/ + PSA_JPAKE_X2_STEP_ZK_PUBLIC = 5, /* Round 1: input/output Schnorr NIZKP public key for the X2 key */ + PSA_JPAKE_X2_STEP_ZK_PROOF = 6, /* Round 1: input/output Schnorr NIZKP proof for the X2 key */ + PSA_JPAKE_X2S_STEP_KEY_SHARE = 7, /* Round 2: output X2S key (our key) */ + PSA_JPAKE_X2S_STEP_ZK_PUBLIC = 8, /* Round 2: output Schnorr NIZKP public key for the X2S key (our key) */ + PSA_JPAKE_X2S_STEP_ZK_PROOF = 9, /* Round 2: output Schnorr NIZKP proof for the X2S key (our key) */ + PSA_JPAKE_X4S_STEP_KEY_SHARE = 10, /* Round 2: input X4S key (from peer) */ + PSA_JPAKE_X4S_STEP_ZK_PUBLIC = 11, /* Round 2: input Schnorr NIZKP public key for the X4S key (from peer) */ + PSA_JPAKE_X4S_STEP_ZK_PROOF = 12 /* Round 2: input Schnorr NIZKP proof for the X4S key (from peer) */ +} psa_crypto_driver_pake_step_t; + +typedef enum psa_jpake_round { + PSA_JPAKE_FIRST = 0, + PSA_JPAKE_SECOND = 1, + PSA_JPAKE_FINISHED = 2 +} psa_jpake_round_t; + +typedef enum psa_jpake_io_mode { + PSA_JPAKE_INPUT = 0, + PSA_JPAKE_OUTPUT = 1 +} psa_jpake_io_mode_t; + +struct psa_jpake_computation_stage_s { + /* The J-PAKE round we are currently on */ + psa_jpake_round_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(round); + /* The 'mode' we are currently in (inputting or outputting) */ + psa_jpake_io_mode_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(io_mode); + /* The number of completed inputs so far this round */ + uint8_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(inputs); + /* The number of completed outputs so far this round */ + uint8_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(outputs); + /* The next expected step (KEY_SHARE, ZK_PUBLIC or ZK_PROOF) */ + psa_pake_step_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(step); +}; + +#define PSA_JPAKE_EXPECTED_INPUTS(round) ((round) == PSA_JPAKE_FINISHED ? 0 : \ + ((round) == PSA_JPAKE_FIRST ? 2 : 1)) +#define PSA_JPAKE_EXPECTED_OUTPUTS(round) ((round) == PSA_JPAKE_FINISHED ? 0 : \ + ((round) == PSA_JPAKE_FIRST ? 2 : 1)) + +struct psa_pake_operation_s { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) + mbedtls_psa_client_handle_t handle; +#else + /** Unique ID indicating which driver got assigned to do the + * operation. Since driver contexts are driver-specific, swapping + * drivers halfway through the operation is not supported. + * ID values are auto-generated in psa_crypto_driver_wrappers.h + * ID value zero means the context is not valid or not assigned to + * any driver (i.e. none of the driver contexts are active). */ + unsigned int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(id); + /* Algorithm of the PAKE operation */ + psa_algorithm_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(alg); + /* A primitive of type compatible with algorithm */ + psa_pake_primitive_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(primitive); + /* Stage of the PAKE operation: waiting for the setup, collecting inputs + * or computing. */ + uint8_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(stage); + /* Holds computation stage of the PAKE algorithms. */ + union { + uint8_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(dummy); +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_JPAKE) + psa_jpake_computation_stage_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(jpake); +#endif + } MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(computation_stage); + union { + psa_driver_pake_context_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(ctx); + psa_crypto_driver_pake_inputs_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(inputs); + } MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(data); +#endif +}; + +static inline struct psa_pake_cipher_suite_s psa_pake_cipher_suite_init(void) +{ + const struct psa_pake_cipher_suite_s v = PSA_PAKE_CIPHER_SUITE_INIT; + return v; +} + +static inline struct psa_pake_operation_s psa_pake_operation_init(void) +{ + const struct psa_pake_operation_s v = PSA_PAKE_OPERATION_INIT; + return v; +} + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_EXTRA_H */ diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_legacy.h b/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_legacy.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..7df3614d6a7d --- /dev/null +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_legacy.h @@ -0,0 +1,88 @@ +/** + * \file psa/crypto_legacy.h + * + * \brief Add temporary suppport for deprecated symbols before they are + * removed from the library. + * + * PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_xxx_KEY_PAIR and MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_xxx_KEY_PAIR + * symbols are deprecated. + * New symols add a suffix to that base name in order to clearly state what is + * the expected use for the key (use, import, export, generate, derive). + * Here we define some backward compatibility support for uses stil using + * the legacy symbols. + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +#ifndef MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_LEGACY_H +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_LEGACY_H + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR) //no-check-names +#if !defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_BASIC) +#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_BASIC 1 +#endif +#if !defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT) +#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT 1 +#endif +#if !defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT) +#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT 1 +#endif +#if !defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE) +#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE 1 +#endif +#if !defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_DERIVE) +#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_DERIVE 1 +#endif +#endif + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR) //no-check-names +#if !defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_BASIC) +#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_BASIC 1 +#endif +#if !defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT) +#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT 1 +#endif +#if !defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT) +#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT 1 +#endif +#if !defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE) +#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE 1 +#endif +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR) //no-check-names +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_BASIC) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_BASIC +#endif +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT +#endif +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT +#endif +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE +#endif +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_DERIVE) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_DERIVE +#endif +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR) //no-check-names +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_BASIC) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_BASIC +#endif +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT +#endif +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT +#endif +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE +#endif +#endif + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_LEGACY_H */ diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_platform.h b/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_platform.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..a871ee12468c --- /dev/null +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_platform.h @@ -0,0 +1,102 @@ +/** + * \file psa/crypto_platform.h + * + * \brief PSA cryptography module: Mbed TLS platform definitions + * + * \note This file may not be included directly. Applications must + * include psa/crypto.h. + * + * This file contains platform-dependent type definitions. + * + * In implementations with isolation between the application and the + * cryptography module, implementers should take care to ensure that + * the definitions that are exposed to applications match what the + * module implements. + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +#ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_PLATFORM_H +#define PSA_CRYPTO_PLATFORM_H +#include "mbedtls/private_access.h" + +/* + * Include the build-time configuration information header. Here, we do not + * include `"mbedtls/build_info.h"` directly but `"psa/build_info.h"`, which + * is basically just an alias to it. This is to ease the maintenance of the + * TF-PSA-Crypto repository which has a different build system and + * configuration. + */ +#include "psa/build_info.h" + +/* PSA requires several types which C99 provides in stdint.h. */ +#include + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_KEY_ID_ENCODES_OWNER) + +/* Building for the PSA Crypto service on a PSA platform, a key owner is a PSA + * partition identifier. + * + * The function psa_its_identifier_of_slot() in psa_crypto_storage.c that + * translates a key identifier to a key storage file name assumes that + * mbedtls_key_owner_id_t is a 32-bit integer. This function thus needs + * reworking if mbedtls_key_owner_id_t is not defined as a 32-bit integer + * here anymore. + */ +typedef int32_t mbedtls_key_owner_id_t; + +/** Compare two key owner identifiers. + * + * \param id1 First key owner identifier. + * \param id2 Second key owner identifier. + * + * \return Non-zero if the two key owner identifiers are equal, zero otherwise. + */ +static inline int mbedtls_key_owner_id_equal(mbedtls_key_owner_id_t id1, + mbedtls_key_owner_id_t id2) +{ + return id1 == id2; +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_KEY_ID_ENCODES_OWNER */ + +/* + * When MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SPM is defined, the code is being built for SPM + * (Secure Partition Manager) integration which separates the code into two + * parts: NSPE (Non-Secure Processing Environment) and SPE (Secure Processing + * Environment). When building for the SPE, an additional header file should be + * included. + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SPM) +#define PSA_CRYPTO_SECURE 1 +#include "crypto_spe.h" +#endif // MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SPM + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG) +/** The type of the context passed to mbedtls_psa_external_get_random(). + * + * Mbed TLS initializes the context to all-bits-zero before calling + * mbedtls_psa_external_get_random() for the first time. + * + * The definition of this type in the Mbed TLS source code is for + * demonstration purposes. Implementers of mbedtls_psa_external_get_random() + * are expected to replace it with a custom definition. + */ +typedef struct { + uintptr_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(opaque)[2]; +} mbedtls_psa_external_random_context_t; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) +/** The type of the client handle used in context structures + * + * When a client view of the multipart context structures is required, + * this handle is used to keep a mapping with the service side of the + * context which contains the actual data. + */ +typedef uint32_t mbedtls_psa_client_handle_t; +#endif + +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_PLATFORM_H */ diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_se_driver.h b/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_se_driver.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..9ce14bba621c --- /dev/null +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_se_driver.h @@ -0,0 +1,1383 @@ +/** + * \file psa/crypto_se_driver.h + * \brief PSA external cryptoprocessor driver module + * + * This header declares types and function signatures for cryptography + * drivers that access key material via opaque references. + * This is meant for cryptoprocessors that have a separate key storage from the + * space in which the PSA Crypto implementation runs, typically secure + * elements (SEs). + * + * This file is part of the PSA Crypto Driver HAL (hardware abstraction layer), + * containing functions for driver developers to implement to enable hardware + * to be called in a standardized way by a PSA Cryptography API + * implementation. The functions comprising the driver HAL, which driver + * authors implement, are not intended to be called by application developers. + */ + +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ +#ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_SE_DRIVER_H +#define PSA_CRYPTO_SE_DRIVER_H +#include "mbedtls/private_access.h" + +#include "crypto_driver_common.h" + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +/** \defgroup se_init Secure element driver initialization + */ +/**@{*/ + +/** \brief Driver context structure + * + * Driver functions receive a pointer to this structure. + * Each registered driver has one instance of this structure. + * + * Implementations must include the fields specified here and + * may include other fields. + */ +typedef struct { + /** A read-only pointer to the driver's persistent data. + * + * Drivers typically use this persistent data to keep track of + * which slot numbers are available. This is only a guideline: + * drivers may use the persistent data for any purpose, keeping + * in mind the restrictions on when the persistent data is saved + * to storage: the persistent data is only saved after calling + * certain functions that receive a writable pointer to the + * persistent data. + * + * The core allocates a memory buffer for the persistent data. + * The pointer is guaranteed to be suitably aligned for any data type, + * like a pointer returned by `malloc` (but the core can use any + * method to allocate the buffer, not necessarily `malloc`). + * + * The size of this buffer is in the \c persistent_data_size field of + * this structure. + * + * Before the driver is initialized for the first time, the content of + * the persistent data is all-bits-zero. After a driver upgrade, if the + * size of the persistent data has increased, the original data is padded + * on the right with zeros; if the size has decreased, the original data + * is truncated to the new size. + * + * This pointer is to read-only data. Only a few driver functions are + * allowed to modify the persistent data. These functions receive a + * writable pointer. These functions are: + * - psa_drv_se_t::p_init + * - psa_drv_se_key_management_t::p_allocate + * - psa_drv_se_key_management_t::p_destroy + * + * The PSA Cryptography core saves the persistent data from one + * session to the next. It does this before returning from API functions + * that call a driver method that is allowed to modify the persistent + * data, specifically: + * - psa_crypto_init() causes a call to psa_drv_se_t::p_init, and may call + * psa_drv_se_key_management_t::p_destroy to complete an action + * that was interrupted by a power failure. + * - Key creation functions cause a call to + * psa_drv_se_key_management_t::p_allocate, and may cause a call to + * psa_drv_se_key_management_t::p_destroy in case an error occurs. + * - psa_destroy_key() causes a call to + * psa_drv_se_key_management_t::p_destroy. + */ + const void *const MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(persistent_data); + + /** The size of \c persistent_data in bytes. + * + * This is always equal to the value of the `persistent_data_size` field + * of the ::psa_drv_se_t structure when the driver is registered. + */ + const size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(persistent_data_size); + + /** Driver transient data. + * + * The core initializes this value to 0 and does not read or modify it + * afterwards. The driver may store whatever it wants in this field. + */ + uintptr_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(transient_data); +} psa_drv_se_context_t; + +/** \brief A driver initialization function. + * + * \param[in,out] drv_context The driver context structure. + * \param[in,out] persistent_data A pointer to the persistent data + * that allows writing. + * \param location The location value for which this driver + * is registered. The driver will be invoked + * for all keys whose lifetime is in this + * location. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * The driver is operational. + * The core will update the persistent data in storage. + * \return + * Any other return value prevents the driver from being used in + * this session. + * The core will NOT update the persistent data in storage. + */ +typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_se_init_t)(psa_drv_se_context_t *drv_context, + void *persistent_data, + psa_key_location_t location); + +#if defined(__DOXYGEN_ONLY__) || !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C) +/* Mbed TLS with secure element support enabled defines this type in + * crypto_types.h because it is also visible to applications through an + * implementation-specific extension. + * For the PSA Cryptography specification, this type is only visible + * via crypto_se_driver.h. */ +/** An internal designation of a key slot between the core part of the + * PSA Crypto implementation and the driver. The meaning of this value + * is driver-dependent. */ +typedef uint64_t psa_key_slot_number_t; +#endif /* __DOXYGEN_ONLY__ || !MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C */ + +/**@}*/ + +/** \defgroup se_mac Secure Element Message Authentication Codes + * Generation and authentication of Message Authentication Codes (MACs) using + * a secure element can be done either as a single function call (via the + * `psa_drv_se_mac_generate_t` or `psa_drv_se_mac_verify_t` functions), or in + * parts using the following sequence: + * - `psa_drv_se_mac_setup_t` + * - `psa_drv_se_mac_update_t` + * - `psa_drv_se_mac_update_t` + * - ... + * - `psa_drv_se_mac_finish_t` or `psa_drv_se_mac_finish_verify_t` + * + * If a previously started secure element MAC operation needs to be terminated, + * it should be done so by the `psa_drv_se_mac_abort_t`. Failure to do so may + * result in allocated resources not being freed or in other undefined + * behavior. + */ +/**@{*/ +/** \brief A function that starts a secure element MAC operation for a PSA + * Crypto Driver implementation + * + * \param[in,out] drv_context The driver context structure. + * \param[in,out] op_context A structure that will contain the + * hardware-specific MAC context + * \param[in] key_slot The slot of the key to be used for the + * operation + * \param[in] algorithm The algorithm to be used to underly the MAC + * operation + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + */ +typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_se_mac_setup_t)(psa_drv_se_context_t *drv_context, + void *op_context, + psa_key_slot_number_t key_slot, + psa_algorithm_t algorithm); + +/** \brief A function that continues a previously started secure element MAC + * operation + * + * \param[in,out] op_context A hardware-specific structure for the + * previously-established MAC operation to be + * updated + * \param[in] p_input A buffer containing the message to be appended + * to the MAC operation + * \param[in] input_length The size in bytes of the input message buffer + */ +typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_se_mac_update_t)(void *op_context, + const uint8_t *p_input, + size_t input_length); + +/** \brief a function that completes a previously started secure element MAC + * operation by returning the resulting MAC. + * + * \param[in,out] op_context A hardware-specific structure for the + * previously started MAC operation to be + * finished + * \param[out] p_mac A buffer where the generated MAC will be + * placed + * \param[in] mac_size The size in bytes of the buffer that has been + * allocated for the `output` buffer + * \param[out] p_mac_length After completion, will contain the number of + * bytes placed in the `p_mac` buffer + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + */ +typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_se_mac_finish_t)(void *op_context, + uint8_t *p_mac, + size_t mac_size, + size_t *p_mac_length); + +/** \brief A function that completes a previously started secure element MAC + * operation by comparing the resulting MAC against a provided value + * + * \param[in,out] op_context A hardware-specific structure for the previously + * started MAC operation to be finished + * \param[in] p_mac The MAC value against which the resulting MAC + * will be compared against + * \param[in] mac_length The size in bytes of the value stored in `p_mac` + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * The operation completed successfully and the MACs matched each + * other + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE + * The operation completed successfully, but the calculated MAC did + * not match the provided MAC + */ +typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_se_mac_finish_verify_t)(void *op_context, + const uint8_t *p_mac, + size_t mac_length); + +/** \brief A function that aborts a previous started secure element MAC + * operation + * + * \param[in,out] op_context A hardware-specific structure for the previously + * started MAC operation to be aborted + */ +typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_se_mac_abort_t)(void *op_context); + +/** \brief A function that performs a secure element MAC operation in one + * command and returns the calculated MAC + * + * \param[in,out] drv_context The driver context structure. + * \param[in] p_input A buffer containing the message to be MACed + * \param[in] input_length The size in bytes of `p_input` + * \param[in] key_slot The slot of the key to be used + * \param[in] alg The algorithm to be used to underlie the MAC + * operation + * \param[out] p_mac A buffer where the generated MAC will be + * placed + * \param[in] mac_size The size in bytes of the `p_mac` buffer + * \param[out] p_mac_length After completion, will contain the number of + * bytes placed in the `output` buffer + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + */ +typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_se_mac_generate_t)(psa_drv_se_context_t *drv_context, + const uint8_t *p_input, + size_t input_length, + psa_key_slot_number_t key_slot, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + uint8_t *p_mac, + size_t mac_size, + size_t *p_mac_length); + +/** \brief A function that performs a secure element MAC operation in one + * command and compares the resulting MAC against a provided value + * + * \param[in,out] drv_context The driver context structure. + * \param[in] p_input A buffer containing the message to be MACed + * \param[in] input_length The size in bytes of `input` + * \param[in] key_slot The slot of the key to be used + * \param[in] alg The algorithm to be used to underlie the MAC + * operation + * \param[in] p_mac The MAC value against which the resulting MAC will + * be compared against + * \param[in] mac_length The size in bytes of `mac` + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * The operation completed successfully and the MACs matched each + * other + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE + * The operation completed successfully, but the calculated MAC did + * not match the provided MAC + */ +typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_se_mac_verify_t)(psa_drv_se_context_t *drv_context, + const uint8_t *p_input, + size_t input_length, + psa_key_slot_number_t key_slot, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *p_mac, + size_t mac_length); + +/** \brief A struct containing all of the function pointers needed to + * perform secure element MAC operations + * + * PSA Crypto API implementations should populate the table as appropriate + * upon startup. + * + * If one of the functions is not implemented (such as + * `psa_drv_se_mac_generate_t`), it should be set to NULL. + * + * Driver implementers should ensure that they implement all of the functions + * that make sense for their hardware, and that they provide a full solution + * (for example, if they support `p_setup`, they should also support + * `p_update` and at least one of `p_finish` or `p_finish_verify`). + * + */ +typedef struct { + /**The size in bytes of the hardware-specific secure element MAC context + * structure + */ + size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(context_size); + /** Function that performs a MAC setup operation + */ + psa_drv_se_mac_setup_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(p_setup); + /** Function that performs a MAC update operation + */ + psa_drv_se_mac_update_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(p_update); + /** Function that completes a MAC operation + */ + psa_drv_se_mac_finish_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(p_finish); + /** Function that completes a MAC operation with a verify check + */ + psa_drv_se_mac_finish_verify_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(p_finish_verify); + /** Function that aborts a previously started MAC operation + */ + psa_drv_se_mac_abort_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(p_abort); + /** Function that performs a MAC operation in one call + */ + psa_drv_se_mac_generate_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(p_mac); + /** Function that performs a MAC and verify operation in one call + */ + psa_drv_se_mac_verify_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(p_mac_verify); +} psa_drv_se_mac_t; +/**@}*/ + +/** \defgroup se_cipher Secure Element Symmetric Ciphers + * + * Encryption and Decryption using secure element keys in block modes other + * than ECB must be done in multiple parts, using the following flow: + * - `psa_drv_se_cipher_setup_t` + * - `psa_drv_se_cipher_set_iv_t` (optional depending upon block mode) + * - `psa_drv_se_cipher_update_t` + * - `psa_drv_se_cipher_update_t` + * - ... + * - `psa_drv_se_cipher_finish_t` + * + * If a previously started secure element Cipher operation needs to be + * terminated, it should be done so by the `psa_drv_se_cipher_abort_t`. Failure + * to do so may result in allocated resources not being freed or in other + * undefined behavior. + * + * In situations where a PSA Cryptographic API implementation is using a block + * mode not-supported by the underlying hardware or driver, it can construct + * the block mode itself, while calling the `psa_drv_se_cipher_ecb_t` function + * for the cipher operations. + */ +/**@{*/ + +/** \brief A function that provides the cipher setup function for a + * secure element driver + * + * \param[in,out] drv_context The driver context structure. + * \param[in,out] op_context A structure that will contain the + * hardware-specific cipher context. + * \param[in] key_slot The slot of the key to be used for the + * operation + * \param[in] algorithm The algorithm to be used in the cipher + * operation + * \param[in] direction Indicates whether the operation is an encrypt + * or decrypt + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED \emptydescription + */ +typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_se_cipher_setup_t)(psa_drv_se_context_t *drv_context, + void *op_context, + psa_key_slot_number_t key_slot, + psa_algorithm_t algorithm, + psa_encrypt_or_decrypt_t direction); + +/** \brief A function that sets the initialization vector (if + * necessary) for a secure element cipher operation + * + * Rationale: The `psa_se_cipher_*` operation in the PSA Cryptographic API has + * two IV functions: one to set the IV, and one to generate it internally. The + * generate function is not necessary for the drivers to implement as the PSA + * Crypto implementation can do the generation using its RNG features. + * + * \param[in,out] op_context A structure that contains the previously set up + * hardware-specific cipher context + * \param[in] p_iv A buffer containing the initialization vector + * \param[in] iv_length The size (in bytes) of the `p_iv` buffer + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS \emptydescription + */ +typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_se_cipher_set_iv_t)(void *op_context, + const uint8_t *p_iv, + size_t iv_length); + +/** \brief A function that continues a previously started secure element cipher + * operation + * + * \param[in,out] op_context A hardware-specific structure for the + * previously started cipher operation + * \param[in] p_input A buffer containing the data to be + * encrypted/decrypted + * \param[in] input_size The size in bytes of the buffer pointed to + * by `p_input` + * \param[out] p_output The caller-allocated buffer where the + * output will be placed + * \param[in] output_size The allocated size in bytes of the + * `p_output` buffer + * \param[out] p_output_length After completion, will contain the number + * of bytes placed in the `p_output` buffer + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS \emptydescription + */ +typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_se_cipher_update_t)(void *op_context, + const uint8_t *p_input, + size_t input_size, + uint8_t *p_output, + size_t output_size, + size_t *p_output_length); + +/** \brief A function that completes a previously started secure element cipher + * operation + * + * \param[in,out] op_context A hardware-specific structure for the + * previously started cipher operation + * \param[out] p_output The caller-allocated buffer where the output + * will be placed + * \param[in] output_size The allocated size in bytes of the `p_output` + * buffer + * \param[out] p_output_length After completion, will contain the number of + * bytes placed in the `p_output` buffer + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS \emptydescription + */ +typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_se_cipher_finish_t)(void *op_context, + uint8_t *p_output, + size_t output_size, + size_t *p_output_length); + +/** \brief A function that aborts a previously started secure element cipher + * operation + * + * \param[in,out] op_context A hardware-specific structure for the + * previously started cipher operation + */ +typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_se_cipher_abort_t)(void *op_context); + +/** \brief A function that performs the ECB block mode for secure element + * cipher operations + * + * Note: this function should only be used with implementations that do not + * provide a needed higher-level operation. + * + * \param[in,out] drv_context The driver context structure. + * \param[in] key_slot The slot of the key to be used for the operation + * \param[in] algorithm The algorithm to be used in the cipher operation + * \param[in] direction Indicates whether the operation is an encrypt or + * decrypt + * \param[in] p_input A buffer containing the data to be + * encrypted/decrypted + * \param[in] input_size The size in bytes of the buffer pointed to by + * `p_input` + * \param[out] p_output The caller-allocated buffer where the output + * will be placed + * \param[in] output_size The allocated size in bytes of the `p_output` + * buffer + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED \emptydescription + */ +typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_se_cipher_ecb_t)(psa_drv_se_context_t *drv_context, + psa_key_slot_number_t key_slot, + psa_algorithm_t algorithm, + psa_encrypt_or_decrypt_t direction, + const uint8_t *p_input, + size_t input_size, + uint8_t *p_output, + size_t output_size); + +/** + * \brief A struct containing all of the function pointers needed to implement + * cipher operations using secure elements. + * + * PSA Crypto API implementations should populate instances of the table as + * appropriate upon startup or at build time. + * + * If one of the functions is not implemented (such as + * `psa_drv_se_cipher_ecb_t`), it should be set to NULL. + */ +typedef struct { + /** The size in bytes of the hardware-specific secure element cipher + * context structure + */ + size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(context_size); + /** Function that performs a cipher setup operation */ + psa_drv_se_cipher_setup_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(p_setup); + /** Function that sets a cipher IV (if necessary) */ + psa_drv_se_cipher_set_iv_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(p_set_iv); + /** Function that performs a cipher update operation */ + psa_drv_se_cipher_update_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(p_update); + /** Function that completes a cipher operation */ + psa_drv_se_cipher_finish_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(p_finish); + /** Function that aborts a cipher operation */ + psa_drv_se_cipher_abort_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(p_abort); + /** Function that performs ECB mode for a cipher operation + * (Danger: ECB mode should not be used directly by clients of the PSA + * Crypto Client API) + */ + psa_drv_se_cipher_ecb_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(p_ecb); +} psa_drv_se_cipher_t; + +/**@}*/ + +/** \defgroup se_asymmetric Secure Element Asymmetric Cryptography + * + * Since the amount of data that can (or should) be encrypted or signed using + * asymmetric keys is limited by the key size, asymmetric key operations using + * keys in a secure element must be done in single function calls. + */ +/**@{*/ + +/** + * \brief A function that signs a hash or short message with a private key in + * a secure element + * + * \param[in,out] drv_context The driver context structure. + * \param[in] key_slot Key slot of an asymmetric key pair + * \param[in] alg A signature algorithm that is compatible + * with the type of `key` + * \param[in] p_hash The hash to sign + * \param[in] hash_length Size of the `p_hash` buffer in bytes + * \param[out] p_signature Buffer where the signature is to be written + * \param[in] signature_size Size of the `p_signature` buffer in bytes + * \param[out] p_signature_length On success, the number of bytes + * that make up the returned signature value + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS \emptydescription + */ +typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_se_asymmetric_sign_t)(psa_drv_se_context_t *drv_context, + psa_key_slot_number_t key_slot, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *p_hash, + size_t hash_length, + uint8_t *p_signature, + size_t signature_size, + size_t *p_signature_length); + +/** + * \brief A function that verifies the signature a hash or short message using + * an asymmetric public key in a secure element + * + * \param[in,out] drv_context The driver context structure. + * \param[in] key_slot Key slot of a public key or an asymmetric key + * pair + * \param[in] alg A signature algorithm that is compatible with + * the type of `key` + * \param[in] p_hash The hash whose signature is to be verified + * \param[in] hash_length Size of the `p_hash` buffer in bytes + * \param[in] p_signature Buffer containing the signature to verify + * \param[in] signature_length Size of the `p_signature` buffer in bytes + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * The signature is valid. + */ +typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_se_asymmetric_verify_t)(psa_drv_se_context_t *drv_context, + psa_key_slot_number_t key_slot, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *p_hash, + size_t hash_length, + const uint8_t *p_signature, + size_t signature_length); + +/** + * \brief A function that encrypts a short message with an asymmetric public + * key in a secure element + * + * \param[in,out] drv_context The driver context structure. + * \param[in] key_slot Key slot of a public key or an asymmetric key + * pair + * \param[in] alg An asymmetric encryption algorithm that is + * compatible with the type of `key` + * \param[in] p_input The message to encrypt + * \param[in] input_length Size of the `p_input` buffer in bytes + * \param[in] p_salt A salt or label, if supported by the + * encryption algorithm + * If the algorithm does not support a + * salt, pass `NULL`. + * If the algorithm supports an optional + * salt and you do not want to pass a salt, + * pass `NULL`. + * For #PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT, no salt is + * supported. + * \param[in] salt_length Size of the `p_salt` buffer in bytes + * If `p_salt` is `NULL`, pass 0. + * \param[out] p_output Buffer where the encrypted message is to + * be written + * \param[in] output_size Size of the `p_output` buffer in bytes + * \param[out] p_output_length On success, the number of bytes that make up + * the returned output + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS \emptydescription + */ +typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_se_asymmetric_encrypt_t)(psa_drv_se_context_t *drv_context, + psa_key_slot_number_t key_slot, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *p_input, + size_t input_length, + const uint8_t *p_salt, + size_t salt_length, + uint8_t *p_output, + size_t output_size, + size_t *p_output_length); + +/** + * \brief A function that decrypts a short message with an asymmetric private + * key in a secure element. + * + * \param[in,out] drv_context The driver context structure. + * \param[in] key_slot Key slot of an asymmetric key pair + * \param[in] alg An asymmetric encryption algorithm that is + * compatible with the type of `key` + * \param[in] p_input The message to decrypt + * \param[in] input_length Size of the `p_input` buffer in bytes + * \param[in] p_salt A salt or label, if supported by the + * encryption algorithm + * If the algorithm does not support a + * salt, pass `NULL`. + * If the algorithm supports an optional + * salt and you do not want to pass a salt, + * pass `NULL`. + * For #PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT, no salt is + * supported. + * \param[in] salt_length Size of the `p_salt` buffer in bytes + * If `p_salt` is `NULL`, pass 0. + * \param[out] p_output Buffer where the decrypted message is to + * be written + * \param[in] output_size Size of the `p_output` buffer in bytes + * \param[out] p_output_length On success, the number of bytes + * that make up the returned output + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS \emptydescription + */ +typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_se_asymmetric_decrypt_t)(psa_drv_se_context_t *drv_context, + psa_key_slot_number_t key_slot, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *p_input, + size_t input_length, + const uint8_t *p_salt, + size_t salt_length, + uint8_t *p_output, + size_t output_size, + size_t *p_output_length); + +/** + * \brief A struct containing all of the function pointers needed to implement + * asymmetric cryptographic operations using secure elements. + * + * PSA Crypto API implementations should populate instances of the table as + * appropriate upon startup or at build time. + * + * If one of the functions is not implemented, it should be set to NULL. + */ +typedef struct { + /** Function that performs an asymmetric sign operation */ + psa_drv_se_asymmetric_sign_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(p_sign); + /** Function that performs an asymmetric verify operation */ + psa_drv_se_asymmetric_verify_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(p_verify); + /** Function that performs an asymmetric encrypt operation */ + psa_drv_se_asymmetric_encrypt_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(p_encrypt); + /** Function that performs an asymmetric decrypt operation */ + psa_drv_se_asymmetric_decrypt_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(p_decrypt); +} psa_drv_se_asymmetric_t; + +/**@}*/ + +/** \defgroup se_aead Secure Element Authenticated Encryption with Additional Data + * Authenticated Encryption with Additional Data (AEAD) operations with secure + * elements must be done in one function call. While this creates a burden for + * implementers as there must be sufficient space in memory for the entire + * message, it prevents decrypted data from being made available before the + * authentication operation is complete and the data is known to be authentic. + */ +/**@{*/ + +/** \brief A function that performs a secure element authenticated encryption + * operation + * + * \param[in,out] drv_context The driver context structure. + * \param[in] key_slot Slot containing the key to use. + * \param[in] algorithm The AEAD algorithm to compute + * (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that + * #PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD(`alg`) is true) + * \param[in] p_nonce Nonce or IV to use + * \param[in] nonce_length Size of the `p_nonce` buffer in bytes + * \param[in] p_additional_data Additional data that will be + * authenticated but not encrypted + * \param[in] additional_data_length Size of `p_additional_data` in bytes + * \param[in] p_plaintext Data that will be authenticated and + * encrypted + * \param[in] plaintext_length Size of `p_plaintext` in bytes + * \param[out] p_ciphertext Output buffer for the authenticated and + * encrypted data. The additional data is + * not part of this output. For algorithms + * where the encrypted data and the + * authentication tag are defined as + * separate outputs, the authentication + * tag is appended to the encrypted data. + * \param[in] ciphertext_size Size of the `p_ciphertext` buffer in + * bytes + * \param[out] p_ciphertext_length On success, the size of the output in + * the `p_ciphertext` buffer + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + */ +typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_se_aead_encrypt_t)(psa_drv_se_context_t *drv_context, + psa_key_slot_number_t key_slot, + psa_algorithm_t algorithm, + const uint8_t *p_nonce, + size_t nonce_length, + const uint8_t *p_additional_data, + size_t additional_data_length, + const uint8_t *p_plaintext, + size_t plaintext_length, + uint8_t *p_ciphertext, + size_t ciphertext_size, + size_t *p_ciphertext_length); + +/** A function that performs a secure element authenticated decryption operation + * + * \param[in,out] drv_context The driver context structure. + * \param[in] key_slot Slot containing the key to use + * \param[in] algorithm The AEAD algorithm to compute + * (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that + * #PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD(`alg`) is true) + * \param[in] p_nonce Nonce or IV to use + * \param[in] nonce_length Size of the `p_nonce` buffer in bytes + * \param[in] p_additional_data Additional data that has been + * authenticated but not encrypted + * \param[in] additional_data_length Size of `p_additional_data` in bytes + * \param[in] p_ciphertext Data that has been authenticated and + * encrypted. + * For algorithms where the encrypted data + * and the authentication tag are defined + * as separate inputs, the buffer must + * contain the encrypted data followed by + * the authentication tag. + * \param[in] ciphertext_length Size of `p_ciphertext` in bytes + * \param[out] p_plaintext Output buffer for the decrypted data + * \param[in] plaintext_size Size of the `p_plaintext` buffer in + * bytes + * \param[out] p_plaintext_length On success, the size of the output in + * the `p_plaintext` buffer + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + */ +typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_se_aead_decrypt_t)(psa_drv_se_context_t *drv_context, + psa_key_slot_number_t key_slot, + psa_algorithm_t algorithm, + const uint8_t *p_nonce, + size_t nonce_length, + const uint8_t *p_additional_data, + size_t additional_data_length, + const uint8_t *p_ciphertext, + size_t ciphertext_length, + uint8_t *p_plaintext, + size_t plaintext_size, + size_t *p_plaintext_length); + +/** + * \brief A struct containing all of the function pointers needed to implement + * secure element Authenticated Encryption with Additional Data operations + * + * PSA Crypto API implementations should populate instances of the table as + * appropriate upon startup. + * + * If one of the functions is not implemented, it should be set to NULL. + */ +typedef struct { + /** Function that performs the AEAD encrypt operation */ + psa_drv_se_aead_encrypt_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(p_encrypt); + /** Function that performs the AEAD decrypt operation */ + psa_drv_se_aead_decrypt_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(p_decrypt); +} psa_drv_se_aead_t; +/**@}*/ + +/** \defgroup se_key_management Secure Element Key Management + * Currently, key management is limited to importing keys in the clear, + * destroying keys, and exporting keys in the clear. + * Whether a key may be exported is determined by the key policies in place + * on the key slot. + */ +/**@{*/ + +/** An enumeration indicating how a key is created. + */ +typedef enum { + PSA_KEY_CREATION_IMPORT, /**< During psa_import_key() */ + PSA_KEY_CREATION_GENERATE, /**< During psa_generate_key() */ + PSA_KEY_CREATION_DERIVE, /**< During psa_key_derivation_output_key() */ + PSA_KEY_CREATION_COPY, /**< During psa_copy_key() */ + +#ifndef __DOXYGEN_ONLY__ + /** A key is being registered with mbedtls_psa_register_se_key(). + * + * The core only passes this value to + * psa_drv_se_key_management_t::p_validate_slot_number, not to + * psa_drv_se_key_management_t::p_allocate. The call to + * `p_validate_slot_number` is not followed by any other call to the + * driver: the key is considered successfully registered if the call to + * `p_validate_slot_number` succeeds, or if `p_validate_slot_number` is + * null. + * + * With this creation method, the driver must return #PSA_SUCCESS if + * the given attributes are compatible with the existing key in the slot, + * and #PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST if the driver can determine that there + * is no key with the specified slot number. + * + * This is an Mbed TLS extension. + */ + PSA_KEY_CREATION_REGISTER, +#endif +} psa_key_creation_method_t; + +/** \brief A function that allocates a slot for a key. + * + * To create a key in a specific slot in a secure element, the core + * first calls this function to determine a valid slot number, + * then calls a function to create the key material in that slot. + * In nominal conditions (that is, if no error occurs), + * the effect of a call to a key creation function in the PSA Cryptography + * API with a lifetime that places the key in a secure element is the + * following: + * -# The core calls psa_drv_se_key_management_t::p_allocate + * (or in some implementations + * psa_drv_se_key_management_t::p_validate_slot_number). The driver + * selects (or validates) a suitable slot number given the key attributes + * and the state of the secure element. + * -# The core calls a key creation function in the driver. + * + * The key creation functions in the PSA Cryptography API are: + * - psa_import_key(), which causes + * a call to `p_allocate` with \p method = #PSA_KEY_CREATION_IMPORT + * then a call to psa_drv_se_key_management_t::p_import. + * - psa_generate_key(), which causes + * a call to `p_allocate` with \p method = #PSA_KEY_CREATION_GENERATE + * then a call to psa_drv_se_key_management_t::p_import. + * - psa_key_derivation_output_key(), which causes + * a call to `p_allocate` with \p method = #PSA_KEY_CREATION_DERIVE + * then a call to psa_drv_se_key_derivation_t::p_derive. + * - psa_copy_key(), which causes + * a call to `p_allocate` with \p method = #PSA_KEY_CREATION_COPY + * then a call to psa_drv_se_key_management_t::p_export. + * + * In case of errors, other behaviors are possible. + * - If the PSA Cryptography subsystem dies after the first step, + * for example because the device has lost power abruptly, + * the second step may never happen, or may happen after a reset + * and re-initialization. Alternatively, after a reset and + * re-initialization, the core may call + * psa_drv_se_key_management_t::p_destroy on the slot number that + * was allocated (or validated) instead of calling a key creation function. + * - If an error occurs, the core may call + * psa_drv_se_key_management_t::p_destroy on the slot number that + * was allocated (or validated) instead of calling a key creation function. + * + * Errors and system resets also have an impact on the driver's persistent + * data. If a reset happens before the overall key creation process is + * completed (before or after the second step above), it is unspecified + * whether the persistent data after the reset is identical to what it + * was before or after the call to `p_allocate` (or `p_validate_slot_number`). + * + * \param[in,out] drv_context The driver context structure. + * \param[in,out] persistent_data A pointer to the persistent data + * that allows writing. + * \param[in] attributes Attributes of the key. + * \param method The way in which the key is being created. + * \param[out] key_slot Slot where the key will be stored. + * This must be a valid slot for a key of the + * chosen type. It must be unoccupied. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * The core will record \c *key_slot as the key slot where the key + * is stored and will update the persistent data in storage. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_STORAGE \emptydescription + */ +typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_se_allocate_key_t)( + psa_drv_se_context_t *drv_context, + void *persistent_data, + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + psa_key_creation_method_t method, + psa_key_slot_number_t *key_slot); + +/** \brief A function that determines whether a slot number is valid + * for a key. + * + * To create a key in a specific slot in a secure element, the core + * first calls this function to validate the choice of slot number, + * then calls a function to create the key material in that slot. + * See the documentation of #psa_drv_se_allocate_key_t for more details. + * + * As of the PSA Cryptography API specification version 1.0, there is no way + * for applications to trigger a call to this function. However some + * implementations offer the capability to create or declare a key in + * a specific slot via implementation-specific means, generally for the + * sake of initial device provisioning or onboarding. Such a mechanism may + * be added to a future version of the PSA Cryptography API specification. + * + * This function may update the driver's persistent data through + * \p persistent_data. The core will save the updated persistent data at the + * end of the key creation process. See the description of + * ::psa_drv_se_allocate_key_t for more information. + * + * \param[in,out] drv_context The driver context structure. + * \param[in,out] persistent_data A pointer to the persistent data + * that allows writing. + * \param[in] attributes Attributes of the key. + * \param method The way in which the key is being created. + * \param[in] key_slot Slot where the key is to be stored. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * The given slot number is valid for a key with the given + * attributes. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * The given slot number is not valid for a key with the + * given attributes. This includes the case where the slot + * number is not valid at all. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS + * There is already a key with the specified slot number. + * Drivers may choose to return this error from the key + * creation function instead. + */ +typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_se_validate_slot_number_t)( + psa_drv_se_context_t *drv_context, + void *persistent_data, + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + psa_key_creation_method_t method, + psa_key_slot_number_t key_slot); + +/** \brief A function that imports a key into a secure element in binary format + * + * This function can support any output from psa_export_key(). Refer to the + * documentation of psa_export_key() for the format for each key type. + * + * \param[in,out] drv_context The driver context structure. + * \param key_slot Slot where the key will be stored. + * This must be a valid slot for a key of the + * chosen type. It must be unoccupied. + * \param[in] attributes The key attributes, including the lifetime, + * the key type and the usage policy. + * Drivers should not access the key size stored + * in the attributes: it may not match the + * data passed in \p data. + * Drivers can call psa_get_key_lifetime(), + * psa_get_key_type(), + * psa_get_key_usage_flags() and + * psa_get_key_algorithm() to access this + * information. + * \param[in] data Buffer containing the key data. + * \param[in] data_length Size of the \p data buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] bits On success, the key size in bits. The driver + * must determine this value after parsing the + * key according to the key type. + * This value is not used if the function fails. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + */ +typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_se_import_key_t)( + psa_drv_se_context_t *drv_context, + psa_key_slot_number_t key_slot, + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *data, + size_t data_length, + size_t *bits); + +/** + * \brief A function that destroys a secure element key and restore the slot to + * its default state + * + * This function destroys the content of the key from a secure element. + * Implementations shall make a best effort to ensure that any previous content + * of the slot is unrecoverable. + * + * This function returns the specified slot to its default state. + * + * \param[in,out] drv_context The driver context structure. + * \param[in,out] persistent_data A pointer to the persistent data + * that allows writing. + * \param key_slot The key slot to erase. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * The slot's content, if any, has been erased. + */ +typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_se_destroy_key_t)( + psa_drv_se_context_t *drv_context, + void *persistent_data, + psa_key_slot_number_t key_slot); + +/** + * \brief A function that exports a secure element key in binary format + * + * The output of this function can be passed to psa_import_key() to + * create an equivalent object. + * + * If a key is created with `psa_import_key()` and then exported with + * this function, it is not guaranteed that the resulting data is + * identical: the implementation may choose a different representation + * of the same key if the format permits it. + * + * This function should generate output in the same format that + * `psa_export_key()` does. Refer to the + * documentation of `psa_export_key()` for the format for each key type. + * + * \param[in,out] drv_context The driver context structure. + * \param[in] key Slot whose content is to be exported. This must + * be an occupied key slot. + * \param[out] p_data Buffer where the key data is to be written. + * \param[in] data_size Size of the `p_data` buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] p_data_length On success, the number of bytes + * that make up the key data. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription + */ +typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_se_export_key_t)(psa_drv_se_context_t *drv_context, + psa_key_slot_number_t key, + uint8_t *p_data, + size_t data_size, + size_t *p_data_length); + +/** + * \brief A function that generates a symmetric or asymmetric key on a secure + * element + * + * If the key type \c type recorded in \p attributes + * is asymmetric (#PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ASYMMETRIC(\c type) = 1), + * the driver may export the public key at the time of generation, + * in the format documented for psa_export_public_key() by writing it + * to the \p pubkey buffer. + * This is optional, intended for secure elements that output the + * public key at generation time and that cannot export the public key + * later. Drivers that do not need this feature should leave + * \p *pubkey_length set to 0 and should + * implement the psa_drv_key_management_t::p_export_public function. + * Some implementations do not support this feature, in which case + * \p pubkey is \c NULL and \p pubkey_size is 0. + * + * \param[in,out] drv_context The driver context structure. + * \param key_slot Slot where the key will be stored. + * This must be a valid slot for a key of the + * chosen type. It must be unoccupied. + * \param[in] attributes The key attributes, including the lifetime, + * the key type and size, and the usage policy. + * Drivers can call psa_get_key_lifetime(), + * psa_get_key_type(), psa_get_key_bits(), + * psa_get_key_usage_flags() and + * psa_get_key_algorithm() to access this + * information. + * \param[out] pubkey A buffer where the driver can write the + * public key, when generating an asymmetric + * key pair. + * This is \c NULL when generating a symmetric + * key or if the core does not support + * exporting the public key at generation time. + * \param pubkey_size The size of the `pubkey` buffer in bytes. + * This is 0 when generating a symmetric + * key or if the core does not support + * exporting the public key at generation time. + * \param[out] pubkey_length On entry, this is always 0. + * On success, the number of bytes written to + * \p pubkey. If this is 0 or unchanged on return, + * the core will not read the \p pubkey buffer, + * and will instead call the driver's + * psa_drv_key_management_t::p_export_public + * function to export the public key when needed. + */ +typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_se_generate_key_t)( + psa_drv_se_context_t *drv_context, + psa_key_slot_number_t key_slot, + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + uint8_t *pubkey, size_t pubkey_size, size_t *pubkey_length); + +/** + * \brief A struct containing all of the function pointers needed to for secure + * element key management + * + * PSA Crypto API implementations should populate instances of the table as + * appropriate upon startup or at build time. + * + * If one of the functions is not implemented, it should be set to NULL. + */ +typedef struct { + /** Function that allocates a slot for a key. */ + psa_drv_se_allocate_key_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(p_allocate); + /** Function that checks the validity of a slot for a key. */ + psa_drv_se_validate_slot_number_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(p_validate_slot_number); + /** Function that performs a key import operation */ + psa_drv_se_import_key_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(p_import); + /** Function that performs a generation */ + psa_drv_se_generate_key_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(p_generate); + /** Function that performs a key destroy operation */ + psa_drv_se_destroy_key_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(p_destroy); + /** Function that performs a key export operation */ + psa_drv_se_export_key_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(p_export); + /** Function that performs a public key export operation */ + psa_drv_se_export_key_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(p_export_public); +} psa_drv_se_key_management_t; + +/**@}*/ + +/** \defgroup driver_derivation Secure Element Key Derivation and Agreement + * Key derivation is the process of generating new key material using an + * existing key and additional parameters, iterating through a basic + * cryptographic function, such as a hash. + * Key agreement is a part of cryptographic protocols that allows two parties + * to agree on the same key value, but starting from different original key + * material. + * The flows are similar, and the PSA Crypto Driver Model uses the same functions + * for both of the flows. + * + * There are two different final functions for the flows, + * `psa_drv_se_key_derivation_derive` and `psa_drv_se_key_derivation_export`. + * `psa_drv_se_key_derivation_derive` is used when the key material should be + * placed in a slot on the hardware and not exposed to the caller. + * `psa_drv_se_key_derivation_export` is used when the key material should be + * returned to the PSA Cryptographic API implementation. + * + * Different key derivation algorithms require a different number of inputs. + * Instead of having an API that takes as input variable length arrays, which + * can be problematic to manage on embedded platforms, the inputs are passed + * to the driver via a function, `psa_drv_se_key_derivation_collateral`, that + * is called multiple times with different `collateral_id`s. Thus, for a key + * derivation algorithm that required 3 parameter inputs, the flow would look + * something like: + * ~~~~~~~~~~~~~{.c} + * psa_drv_se_key_derivation_setup(kdf_algorithm, source_key, dest_key_size_bytes); + * psa_drv_se_key_derivation_collateral(kdf_algorithm_collateral_id_0, + * p_collateral_0, + * collateral_0_size); + * psa_drv_se_key_derivation_collateral(kdf_algorithm_collateral_id_1, + * p_collateral_1, + * collateral_1_size); + * psa_drv_se_key_derivation_collateral(kdf_algorithm_collateral_id_2, + * p_collateral_2, + * collateral_2_size); + * psa_drv_se_key_derivation_derive(); + * ~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + * + * key agreement example: + * ~~~~~~~~~~~~~{.c} + * psa_drv_se_key_derivation_setup(alg, source_key. dest_key_size_bytes); + * psa_drv_se_key_derivation_collateral(DHE_PUBKEY, p_pubkey, pubkey_size); + * psa_drv_se_key_derivation_export(p_session_key, + * session_key_size, + * &session_key_length); + * ~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + */ +/**@{*/ + +/** \brief A function that Sets up a secure element key derivation operation by + * specifying the algorithm and the source key sot + * + * \param[in,out] drv_context The driver context structure. + * \param[in,out] op_context A hardware-specific structure containing any + * context information for the implementation + * \param[in] kdf_alg The algorithm to be used for the key derivation + * \param[in] source_key The key to be used as the source material for + * the key derivation + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS \emptydescription + */ +typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_se_key_derivation_setup_t)(psa_drv_se_context_t *drv_context, + void *op_context, + psa_algorithm_t kdf_alg, + psa_key_slot_number_t source_key); + +/** \brief A function that provides collateral (parameters) needed for a secure + * element key derivation or key agreement operation + * + * Since many key derivation algorithms require multiple parameters, it is + * expected that this function may be called multiple times for the same + * operation, each with a different algorithm-specific `collateral_id` + * + * \param[in,out] op_context A hardware-specific structure containing any + * context information for the implementation + * \param[in] collateral_id An ID for the collateral being provided + * \param[in] p_collateral A buffer containing the collateral data + * \param[in] collateral_size The size in bytes of the collateral + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS \emptydescription + */ +typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_se_key_derivation_collateral_t)(void *op_context, + uint32_t collateral_id, + const uint8_t *p_collateral, + size_t collateral_size); + +/** \brief A function that performs the final secure element key derivation + * step and place the generated key material in a slot + * + * \param[in,out] op_context A hardware-specific structure containing any + * context information for the implementation + * \param[in] dest_key The slot where the generated key material + * should be placed + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS \emptydescription + */ +typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_se_key_derivation_derive_t)(void *op_context, + psa_key_slot_number_t dest_key); + +/** \brief A function that performs the final step of a secure element key + * agreement and place the generated key material in a buffer + * + * \param[out] p_output Buffer in which to place the generated key + * material + * \param[in] output_size The size in bytes of `p_output` + * \param[out] p_output_length Upon success, contains the number of bytes of + * key material placed in `p_output` + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS \emptydescription + */ +typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_se_key_derivation_export_t)(void *op_context, + uint8_t *p_output, + size_t output_size, + size_t *p_output_length); + +/** + * \brief A struct containing all of the function pointers needed to for secure + * element key derivation and agreement + * + * PSA Crypto API implementations should populate instances of the table as + * appropriate upon startup. + * + * If one of the functions is not implemented, it should be set to NULL. + */ +typedef struct { + /** The driver-specific size of the key derivation context */ + size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(context_size); + /** Function that performs a key derivation setup */ + psa_drv_se_key_derivation_setup_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(p_setup); + /** Function that sets key derivation collateral */ + psa_drv_se_key_derivation_collateral_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(p_collateral); + /** Function that performs a final key derivation step */ + psa_drv_se_key_derivation_derive_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(p_derive); + /** Function that performs a final key derivation or agreement and + * exports the key */ + psa_drv_se_key_derivation_export_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(p_export); +} psa_drv_se_key_derivation_t; + +/**@}*/ + +/** \defgroup se_registration Secure element driver registration + */ +/**@{*/ + +/** A structure containing pointers to all the entry points of a + * secure element driver. + * + * Future versions of this specification may add extra substructures at + * the end of this structure. + */ +typedef struct { + /** The version of the driver HAL that this driver implements. + * This is a protection against loading driver binaries built against + * a different version of this specification. + * Use #PSA_DRV_SE_HAL_VERSION. + */ + uint32_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(hal_version); + + /** The size of the driver's persistent data in bytes. + * + * This can be 0 if the driver does not need persistent data. + * + * See the documentation of psa_drv_se_context_t::persistent_data + * for more information about why and how a driver can use + * persistent data. + */ + size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(persistent_data_size); + + /** The driver initialization function. + * + * This function is called once during the initialization of the + * PSA Cryptography subsystem, before any other function of the + * driver is called. If this function returns a failure status, + * the driver will be unusable, at least until the next system reset. + * + * If this field is \c NULL, it is equivalent to a function that does + * nothing and returns #PSA_SUCCESS. + */ + psa_drv_se_init_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(p_init); + + const psa_drv_se_key_management_t *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(key_management); + const psa_drv_se_mac_t *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(mac); + const psa_drv_se_cipher_t *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(cipher); + const psa_drv_se_aead_t *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(aead); + const psa_drv_se_asymmetric_t *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(asymmetric); + const psa_drv_se_key_derivation_t *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(derivation); +} psa_drv_se_t; + +/** The current version of the secure element driver HAL. + */ +/* 0.0.0 patchlevel 5 */ +#define PSA_DRV_SE_HAL_VERSION 0x00000005 + +/** Register an external cryptoprocessor (secure element) driver. + * + * This function is only intended to be used by driver code, not by + * application code. In implementations with separation between the + * PSA cryptography module and applications, this function should + * only be available to callers that run in the same memory space as + * the cryptography module, and should not be exposed to applications + * running in a different memory space. + * + * This function may be called before psa_crypto_init(). It is + * implementation-defined whether this function may be called + * after psa_crypto_init(). + * + * \note Implementations store metadata about keys including the lifetime + * value, which contains the driver's location indicator. Therefore, + * from one instantiation of the PSA Cryptography + * library to the next one, if there is a key in storage with a certain + * lifetime value, you must always register the same driver (or an + * updated version that communicates with the same secure element) + * with the same location value. + * + * \param location The location value through which this driver will + * be exposed to applications. + * This driver will be used for all keys such that + * `location == #PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION( lifetime )`. + * The value #PSA_KEY_LOCATION_LOCAL_STORAGE is reserved + * and may not be used for drivers. Implementations + * may reserve other values. + * \param[in] methods The method table of the driver. This structure must + * remain valid for as long as the cryptography + * module keeps running. It is typically a global + * constant. + * + * \return #PSA_SUCCESS + * The driver was successfully registered. Applications can now + * use \p location to access keys through the methods passed to + * this function. + * \return #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * This function was called after the initialization of the + * cryptography module, and this implementation does not support + * driver registration at this stage. + * \return #PSA_ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS + * There is already a registered driver for this value of \p location. + * \return #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * \p location is a reserved value. + * \return #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * `methods->hal_version` is not supported by this implementation. + * \return #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \return #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED + * \return #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE + * \return #PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT + */ +psa_status_t psa_register_se_driver( + psa_key_location_t location, + const psa_drv_se_t *methods); + +/**@}*/ + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_SE_DRIVER_H */ diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_sizes.h b/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_sizes.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..635ee98f8028 --- /dev/null +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_sizes.h @@ -0,0 +1,1292 @@ +/** + * \file psa/crypto_sizes.h + * + * \brief PSA cryptography module: Mbed TLS buffer size macros + * + * \note This file may not be included directly. Applications must + * include psa/crypto.h. + * + * This file contains the definitions of macros that are useful to + * compute buffer sizes. The signatures and semantics of these macros + * are standardized, but the definitions are not, because they depend on + * the available algorithms and, in some cases, on permitted tolerances + * on buffer sizes. + * + * In implementations with isolation between the application and the + * cryptography module, implementers should take care to ensure that + * the definitions that are exposed to applications match what the + * module implements. + * + * Macros that compute sizes whose values do not depend on the + * implementation are in crypto.h. + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +#ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_SIZES_H +#define PSA_CRYPTO_SIZES_H + +/* + * Include the build-time configuration information header. Here, we do not + * include `"mbedtls/build_info.h"` directly but `"psa/build_info.h"`, which + * is basically just an alias to it. This is to ease the maintenance of the + * TF-PSA-Crypto repository which has a different build system and + * configuration. + */ +#include "psa/build_info.h" + +#define PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(bits) (((bits) + 7u) / 8u) +#define PSA_BYTES_TO_BITS(bytes) ((bytes) * 8u) +#define PSA_MAX_OF_THREE(a, b, c) ((a) <= (b) ? (b) <= (c) ? \ + (c) : (b) : (a) <= (c) ? (c) : (a)) + +#define PSA_ROUND_UP_TO_MULTIPLE(block_size, length) \ + (((length) + (block_size) - 1) / (block_size) * (block_size)) + +/** The size of the output of psa_hash_finish(), in bytes. + * + * This is also the hash size that psa_hash_verify() expects. + * + * \param alg A hash algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that + * #PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(\p alg) is true), or an HMAC algorithm + * (#PSA_ALG_HMAC(\c hash_alg) where \c hash_alg is a + * hash algorithm). + * + * \return The hash size for the specified hash algorithm. + * If the hash algorithm is not recognized, return 0. + */ +#define PSA_HASH_LENGTH(alg) \ + ( \ + PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_MD5 ? 16u : \ + PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160 ? 20u : \ + PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_SHA_1 ? 20u : \ + PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_SHA_224 ? 28u : \ + PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_SHA_256 ? 32u : \ + PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_SHA_384 ? 48u : \ + PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_SHA_512 ? 64u : \ + PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_SHA_512_224 ? 28u : \ + PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_SHA_512_256 ? 32u : \ + PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_SHA3_224 ? 28u : \ + PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_SHA3_256 ? 32u : \ + PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_SHA3_384 ? 48u : \ + PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_SHA3_512 ? 64u : \ + 0u) + +/** The input block size of a hash algorithm, in bytes. + * + * Hash algorithms process their input data in blocks. Hash operations will + * retain any partial blocks until they have enough input to fill the block or + * until the operation is finished. + * This affects the output from psa_hash_suspend(). + * + * \param alg A hash algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that + * PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(\p alg) is true). + * + * \return The block size in bytes for the specified hash algorithm. + * If the hash algorithm is not recognized, return 0. + * An implementation can return either 0 or the correct size for a + * hash algorithm that it recognizes, but does not support. + */ +#define PSA_HASH_BLOCK_LENGTH(alg) \ + ( \ + PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_MD5 ? 64u : \ + PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160 ? 64u : \ + PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_SHA_1 ? 64u : \ + PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_SHA_224 ? 64u : \ + PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_SHA_256 ? 64u : \ + PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_SHA_384 ? 128u : \ + PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_SHA_512 ? 128u : \ + PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_SHA_512_224 ? 128u : \ + PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_SHA_512_256 ? 128u : \ + PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_SHA3_224 ? 144u : \ + PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_SHA3_256 ? 136u : \ + PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_SHA3_384 ? 104u : \ + PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_SHA3_512 ? 72u : \ + 0u) + +/** \def PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE + * + * Maximum size of a hash. + * + * This macro expands to a compile-time constant integer. This value + * is the maximum size of a hash in bytes. + */ +/* Note: for HMAC-SHA-3, the block size is 144 bytes for HMAC-SHA3-224, + * 136 bytes for HMAC-SHA3-256, 104 bytes for SHA3-384, 72 bytes for + * HMAC-SHA3-512. */ +/* Note: PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE should be kept in sync with MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE, + * see the note on MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE for details. */ +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA3_224) +#define PSA_HMAC_MAX_HASH_BLOCK_SIZE 144u +#elif defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA3_256) +#define PSA_HMAC_MAX_HASH_BLOCK_SIZE 136u +#elif defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512) +#define PSA_HMAC_MAX_HASH_BLOCK_SIZE 128u +#elif defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384) +#define PSA_HMAC_MAX_HASH_BLOCK_SIZE 128u +#elif defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA3_384) +#define PSA_HMAC_MAX_HASH_BLOCK_SIZE 104u +#elif defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA3_512) +#define PSA_HMAC_MAX_HASH_BLOCK_SIZE 72u +#elif defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256) +#define PSA_HMAC_MAX_HASH_BLOCK_SIZE 64u +#elif defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224) +#define PSA_HMAC_MAX_HASH_BLOCK_SIZE 64u +#else /* SHA-1 or smaller */ +#define PSA_HMAC_MAX_HASH_BLOCK_SIZE 64u +#endif + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512) || defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA3_512) +#define PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE 64u +#elif defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384) || defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA3_384) +#define PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE 48u +#elif defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256) || defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA3_256) +#define PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE 32u +#elif defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224) || defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA3_224) +#define PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE 28u +#else /* SHA-1 or smaller */ +#define PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE 20u +#endif + +/** \def PSA_MAC_MAX_SIZE + * + * Maximum size of a MAC. + * + * This macro expands to a compile-time constant integer. This value + * is the maximum size of a MAC in bytes. + */ +/* All non-HMAC MACs have a maximum size that's smaller than the + * minimum possible value of PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE in this implementation. */ +/* Note that the encoding of truncated MAC algorithms limits this value + * to 64 bytes. + */ +#define PSA_MAC_MAX_SIZE PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE + +/** The length of a tag for an AEAD algorithm, in bytes. + * + * This macro can be used to allocate a buffer of sufficient size to store the + * tag output from psa_aead_finish(). + * + * See also #PSA_AEAD_TAG_MAX_SIZE. + * + * \param key_type The type of the AEAD key. + * \param key_bits The size of the AEAD key in bits. + * \param alg An AEAD algorithm + * (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that + * #PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD(\p alg) is true). + * + * \return The tag length for the specified algorithm and key. + * If the AEAD algorithm does not have an identified + * tag that can be distinguished from the rest of + * the ciphertext, return 0. + * If the key type or AEAD algorithm is not + * recognized, or the parameters are incompatible, + * return 0. + */ +#define PSA_AEAD_TAG_LENGTH(key_type, key_bits, alg) \ + (PSA_AEAD_NONCE_LENGTH(key_type, alg) != 0 ? \ + PSA_ALG_AEAD_GET_TAG_LENGTH(alg) : \ + ((void) (key_bits), 0u)) + +/** The maximum tag size for all supported AEAD algorithms, in bytes. + * + * See also #PSA_AEAD_TAG_LENGTH(\p key_type, \p key_bits, \p alg). + */ +#define PSA_AEAD_TAG_MAX_SIZE 16u + +/* The maximum size of an RSA key on this implementation, in bits. + * This is a vendor-specific macro. + * + * Mbed TLS does not set a hard limit on the size of RSA keys: any key + * whose parameters fit in a bignum is accepted. However large keys can + * induce a large memory usage and long computation times. Unlike other + * auxiliary macros in this file and in crypto.h, which reflect how the + * library is configured, this macro defines how the library is + * configured. This implementation refuses to import or generate an + * RSA key whose size is larger than the value defined here. + * + * Note that an implementation may set different size limits for different + * operations, and does not need to accept all key sizes up to the limit. */ +#define PSA_VENDOR_RSA_MAX_KEY_BITS 4096u + +/* The minimum size of an RSA key on this implementation, in bits. + * This is a vendor-specific macro. + * + * Limits RSA key generation to a minimum due to avoid accidental misuse. + * This value cannot be less than 128 bits. + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_GEN_KEY_MIN_BITS) +#define PSA_VENDOR_RSA_GENERATE_MIN_KEY_BITS MBEDTLS_RSA_GEN_KEY_MIN_BITS +#else +#define PSA_VENDOR_RSA_GENERATE_MIN_KEY_BITS 1024 +#endif + +/* The maximum size of an DH key on this implementation, in bits. + * This is a vendor-specific macro.*/ +#if defined(PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_8192) +#define PSA_VENDOR_FFDH_MAX_KEY_BITS 8192u +#elif defined(PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_6144) +#define PSA_VENDOR_FFDH_MAX_KEY_BITS 6144u +#elif defined(PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_4096) +#define PSA_VENDOR_FFDH_MAX_KEY_BITS 4096u +#elif defined(PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_3072) +#define PSA_VENDOR_FFDH_MAX_KEY_BITS 3072u +#elif defined(PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_2048) +#define PSA_VENDOR_FFDH_MAX_KEY_BITS 2048u +#else +#define PSA_VENDOR_FFDH_MAX_KEY_BITS 0u +#endif + +/* The maximum size of an ECC key on this implementation, in bits. + * This is a vendor-specific macro. */ +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_521) +#define PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS 521u +#elif defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_512) +#define PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS 512u +#elif defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_MONTGOMERY_448) +#define PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS 448u +#elif defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_384) +#define PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS 384u +#elif defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_384) +#define PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS 384u +#elif defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256) +#define PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS 256u +#elif defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_256) +#define PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS 256u +#elif defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_256) +#define PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS 256u +#elif defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_MONTGOMERY_255) +#define PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS 255u +#elif defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_224) +#define PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS 224u +#elif defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_224) +#define PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS 224u +#elif defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_192) +#define PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS 192u +#elif defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_192) +#define PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS 192u +#else +#define PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS 0u +#endif + +/** This macro returns the maximum supported length of the PSK for the + * TLS-1.2 PSK-to-MS key derivation + * (#PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(\c hash_alg)). + * + * The maximum supported length does not depend on the chosen hash algorithm. + * + * Quoting RFC 4279, Sect 5.3: + * TLS implementations supporting these ciphersuites MUST support + * arbitrary PSK identities up to 128 octets in length, and arbitrary + * PSKs up to 64 octets in length. Supporting longer identities and + * keys is RECOMMENDED. + * + * Therefore, no implementation should define a value smaller than 64 + * for #PSA_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS_PSK_MAX_SIZE. + */ +#define PSA_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS_PSK_MAX_SIZE 128u + +/* The expected size of input passed to psa_tls12_ecjpake_to_pms_input, + * which is expected to work with P-256 curve only. */ +#define PSA_TLS12_ECJPAKE_TO_PMS_INPUT_SIZE 65u + +/* The size of a serialized K.X coordinate to be used in + * psa_tls12_ecjpake_to_pms_input. This function only accepts the P-256 + * curve. */ +#define PSA_TLS12_ECJPAKE_TO_PMS_DATA_SIZE 32u + +/* The maximum number of iterations for PBKDF2 on this implementation, in bits. + * This is a vendor-specific macro. This can be configured if necessary */ +#define PSA_VENDOR_PBKDF2_MAX_ITERATIONS 0xffffffffU + +/** The maximum size of a block cipher. */ +#define PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_MAX_SIZE 16u + +/** The size of the output of psa_mac_sign_finish(), in bytes. + * + * This is also the MAC size that psa_mac_verify_finish() expects. + * + * \warning This macro may evaluate its arguments multiple times or + * zero times, so you should not pass arguments that contain + * side effects. + * + * \param key_type The type of the MAC key. + * \param key_bits The size of the MAC key in bits. + * \param alg A MAC algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that + * #PSA_ALG_IS_MAC(\p alg) is true). + * + * \return The MAC size for the specified algorithm with + * the specified key parameters. + * \return 0 if the MAC algorithm is not recognized. + * \return Either 0 or the correct size for a MAC algorithm that + * the implementation recognizes, but does not support. + * \return Unspecified if the key parameters are not consistent + * with the algorithm. + */ +#define PSA_MAC_LENGTH(key_type, key_bits, alg) \ + ((alg) & PSA_ALG_MAC_TRUNCATION_MASK ? PSA_MAC_TRUNCATED_LENGTH(alg) : \ + PSA_ALG_IS_HMAC(alg) ? PSA_HASH_LENGTH(PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg)) : \ + PSA_ALG_IS_BLOCK_CIPHER_MAC(alg) ? PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_LENGTH(key_type) : \ + ((void) (key_type), (void) (key_bits), 0u)) + +/** The maximum size of the output of psa_aead_encrypt(), in bytes. + * + * If the size of the ciphertext buffer is at least this large, it is + * guaranteed that psa_aead_encrypt() will not fail due to an + * insufficient buffer size. Depending on the algorithm, the actual size of + * the ciphertext may be smaller. + * + * See also #PSA_AEAD_ENCRYPT_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE(\p plaintext_length). + * + * \warning This macro may evaluate its arguments multiple times or + * zero times, so you should not pass arguments that contain + * side effects. + * + * \param key_type A symmetric key type that is + * compatible with algorithm \p alg. + * \param alg An AEAD algorithm + * (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that + * #PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD(\p alg) is true). + * \param plaintext_length Size of the plaintext in bytes. + * + * \return The AEAD ciphertext size for the specified + * algorithm. + * If the key type or AEAD algorithm is not + * recognized, or the parameters are incompatible, + * return 0. + */ +#define PSA_AEAD_ENCRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE(key_type, alg, plaintext_length) \ + (PSA_AEAD_NONCE_LENGTH(key_type, alg) != 0 ? \ + (plaintext_length) + PSA_ALG_AEAD_GET_TAG_LENGTH(alg) : \ + 0u) + +/** A sufficient output buffer size for psa_aead_encrypt(), for any of the + * supported key types and AEAD algorithms. + * + * If the size of the ciphertext buffer is at least this large, it is guaranteed + * that psa_aead_encrypt() will not fail due to an insufficient buffer size. + * + * \note This macro returns a compile-time constant if its arguments are + * compile-time constants. + * + * See also #PSA_AEAD_ENCRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE(\p key_type, \p alg, + * \p plaintext_length). + * + * \param plaintext_length Size of the plaintext in bytes. + * + * \return A sufficient output buffer size for any of the + * supported key types and AEAD algorithms. + * + */ +#define PSA_AEAD_ENCRYPT_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE(plaintext_length) \ + ((plaintext_length) + PSA_AEAD_TAG_MAX_SIZE) + + +/** The maximum size of the output of psa_aead_decrypt(), in bytes. + * + * If the size of the plaintext buffer is at least this large, it is + * guaranteed that psa_aead_decrypt() will not fail due to an + * insufficient buffer size. Depending on the algorithm, the actual size of + * the plaintext may be smaller. + * + * See also #PSA_AEAD_DECRYPT_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE(\p ciphertext_length). + * + * \warning This macro may evaluate its arguments multiple times or + * zero times, so you should not pass arguments that contain + * side effects. + * + * \param key_type A symmetric key type that is + * compatible with algorithm \p alg. + * \param alg An AEAD algorithm + * (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that + * #PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD(\p alg) is true). + * \param ciphertext_length Size of the plaintext in bytes. + * + * \return The AEAD ciphertext size for the specified + * algorithm. + * If the key type or AEAD algorithm is not + * recognized, or the parameters are incompatible, + * return 0. + */ +#define PSA_AEAD_DECRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE(key_type, alg, ciphertext_length) \ + (PSA_AEAD_NONCE_LENGTH(key_type, alg) != 0 && \ + (ciphertext_length) > PSA_ALG_AEAD_GET_TAG_LENGTH(alg) ? \ + (ciphertext_length) - PSA_ALG_AEAD_GET_TAG_LENGTH(alg) : \ + 0u) + +/** A sufficient output buffer size for psa_aead_decrypt(), for any of the + * supported key types and AEAD algorithms. + * + * If the size of the plaintext buffer is at least this large, it is guaranteed + * that psa_aead_decrypt() will not fail due to an insufficient buffer size. + * + * \note This macro returns a compile-time constant if its arguments are + * compile-time constants. + * + * See also #PSA_AEAD_DECRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE(\p key_type, \p alg, + * \p ciphertext_length). + * + * \param ciphertext_length Size of the ciphertext in bytes. + * + * \return A sufficient output buffer size for any of the + * supported key types and AEAD algorithms. + * + */ +#define PSA_AEAD_DECRYPT_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE(ciphertext_length) \ + (ciphertext_length) + +/** The default nonce size for an AEAD algorithm, in bytes. + * + * This macro can be used to allocate a buffer of sufficient size to + * store the nonce output from #psa_aead_generate_nonce(). + * + * See also #PSA_AEAD_NONCE_MAX_SIZE. + * + * \note This is not the maximum size of nonce supported as input to + * #psa_aead_set_nonce(), #psa_aead_encrypt() or #psa_aead_decrypt(), + * just the default size that is generated by #psa_aead_generate_nonce(). + * + * \warning This macro may evaluate its arguments multiple times or + * zero times, so you should not pass arguments that contain + * side effects. + * + * \param key_type A symmetric key type that is compatible with + * algorithm \p alg. + * + * \param alg An AEAD algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that + * #PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD(\p alg) is true). + * + * \return The default nonce size for the specified key type and algorithm. + * If the key type or AEAD algorithm is not recognized, + * or the parameters are incompatible, return 0. + */ +#define PSA_AEAD_NONCE_LENGTH(key_type, alg) \ + (PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_LENGTH(key_type) == 16 ? \ + MBEDTLS_PSA_ALG_AEAD_EQUAL(alg, PSA_ALG_CCM) ? 13u : \ + MBEDTLS_PSA_ALG_AEAD_EQUAL(alg, PSA_ALG_GCM) ? 12u : \ + 0u : \ + (key_type) == PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 && \ + MBEDTLS_PSA_ALG_AEAD_EQUAL(alg, PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305) ? 12u : \ + 0u) + +/** The maximum default nonce size among all supported pairs of key types and + * AEAD algorithms, in bytes. + * + * This is equal to or greater than any value that #PSA_AEAD_NONCE_LENGTH() + * may return. + * + * \note This is not the maximum size of nonce supported as input to + * #psa_aead_set_nonce(), #psa_aead_encrypt() or #psa_aead_decrypt(), + * just the largest size that may be generated by + * #psa_aead_generate_nonce(). + */ +#define PSA_AEAD_NONCE_MAX_SIZE 13u + +/** A sufficient output buffer size for psa_aead_update(). + * + * If the size of the output buffer is at least this large, it is + * guaranteed that psa_aead_update() will not fail due to an + * insufficient buffer size. The actual size of the output may be smaller + * in any given call. + * + * See also #PSA_AEAD_UPDATE_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE(\p input_length). + * + * \warning This macro may evaluate its arguments multiple times or + * zero times, so you should not pass arguments that contain + * side effects. + * + * \param key_type A symmetric key type that is + * compatible with algorithm \p alg. + * \param alg An AEAD algorithm + * (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that + * #PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD(\p alg) is true). + * \param input_length Size of the input in bytes. + * + * \return A sufficient output buffer size for the specified + * algorithm. + * If the key type or AEAD algorithm is not + * recognized, or the parameters are incompatible, + * return 0. + */ +/* For all the AEAD modes defined in this specification, it is possible + * to emit output without delay. However, hardware may not always be + * capable of this. So for modes based on a block cipher, allow the + * implementation to delay the output until it has a full block. */ +#define PSA_AEAD_UPDATE_OUTPUT_SIZE(key_type, alg, input_length) \ + (PSA_AEAD_NONCE_LENGTH(key_type, alg) != 0 ? \ + PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD_ON_BLOCK_CIPHER(alg) ? \ + PSA_ROUND_UP_TO_MULTIPLE(PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_LENGTH(key_type), (input_length)) : \ + (input_length) : \ + 0u) + +/** A sufficient output buffer size for psa_aead_update(), for any of the + * supported key types and AEAD algorithms. + * + * If the size of the output buffer is at least this large, it is guaranteed + * that psa_aead_update() will not fail due to an insufficient buffer size. + * + * See also #PSA_AEAD_UPDATE_OUTPUT_SIZE(\p key_type, \p alg, \p input_length). + * + * \param input_length Size of the input in bytes. + */ +#define PSA_AEAD_UPDATE_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE(input_length) \ + (PSA_ROUND_UP_TO_MULTIPLE(PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_MAX_SIZE, (input_length))) + +/** A sufficient ciphertext buffer size for psa_aead_finish(). + * + * If the size of the ciphertext buffer is at least this large, it is + * guaranteed that psa_aead_finish() will not fail due to an + * insufficient ciphertext buffer size. The actual size of the output may + * be smaller in any given call. + * + * See also #PSA_AEAD_FINISH_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE. + * + * \param key_type A symmetric key type that is + compatible with algorithm \p alg. + * \param alg An AEAD algorithm + * (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that + * #PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD(\p alg) is true). + * + * \return A sufficient ciphertext buffer size for the + * specified algorithm. + * If the key type or AEAD algorithm is not + * recognized, or the parameters are incompatible, + * return 0. + */ +#define PSA_AEAD_FINISH_OUTPUT_SIZE(key_type, alg) \ + (PSA_AEAD_NONCE_LENGTH(key_type, alg) != 0 && \ + PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD_ON_BLOCK_CIPHER(alg) ? \ + PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_LENGTH(key_type) : \ + 0u) + +/** A sufficient ciphertext buffer size for psa_aead_finish(), for any of the + * supported key types and AEAD algorithms. + * + * See also #PSA_AEAD_FINISH_OUTPUT_SIZE(\p key_type, \p alg). + */ +#define PSA_AEAD_FINISH_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE (PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_MAX_SIZE) + +/** A sufficient plaintext buffer size for psa_aead_verify(). + * + * If the size of the plaintext buffer is at least this large, it is + * guaranteed that psa_aead_verify() will not fail due to an + * insufficient plaintext buffer size. The actual size of the output may + * be smaller in any given call. + * + * See also #PSA_AEAD_VERIFY_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE. + * + * \param key_type A symmetric key type that is + * compatible with algorithm \p alg. + * \param alg An AEAD algorithm + * (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that + * #PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD(\p alg) is true). + * + * \return A sufficient plaintext buffer size for the + * specified algorithm. + * If the key type or AEAD algorithm is not + * recognized, or the parameters are incompatible, + * return 0. + */ +#define PSA_AEAD_VERIFY_OUTPUT_SIZE(key_type, alg) \ + (PSA_AEAD_NONCE_LENGTH(key_type, alg) != 0 && \ + PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD_ON_BLOCK_CIPHER(alg) ? \ + PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_LENGTH(key_type) : \ + 0u) + +/** A sufficient plaintext buffer size for psa_aead_verify(), for any of the + * supported key types and AEAD algorithms. + * + * See also #PSA_AEAD_VERIFY_OUTPUT_SIZE(\p key_type, \p alg). + */ +#define PSA_AEAD_VERIFY_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE (PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_MAX_SIZE) + +#define PSA_RSA_MINIMUM_PADDING_SIZE(alg) \ + (PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_OAEP(alg) ? \ + 2u * PSA_HASH_LENGTH(PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP_GET_HASH(alg)) + 1u : \ + 11u /*PKCS#1v1.5*/) + +/** + * \brief ECDSA signature size for a given curve bit size + * + * \param curve_bits Curve size in bits. + * \return Signature size in bytes. + * + * \note This macro returns a compile-time constant if its argument is one. + */ +#define PSA_ECDSA_SIGNATURE_SIZE(curve_bits) \ + (PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(curve_bits) * 2u) + +/** Sufficient signature buffer size for psa_sign_hash(). + * + * This macro returns a sufficient buffer size for a signature using a key + * of the specified type and size, with the specified algorithm. + * Note that the actual size of the signature may be smaller + * (some algorithms produce a variable-size signature). + * + * \warning This function may call its arguments multiple times or + * zero times, so you should not pass arguments that contain + * side effects. + * + * \param key_type An asymmetric key type (this may indifferently be a + * key pair type or a public key type). + * \param key_bits The size of the key in bits. + * \param alg The signature algorithm. + * + * \return If the parameters are valid and supported, return + * a buffer size in bytes that guarantees that + * psa_sign_hash() will not fail with + * #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL. + * If the parameters are a valid combination that is not supported, + * return either a sensible size or 0. + * If the parameters are not valid, the + * return value is unspecified. + */ +#define PSA_SIGN_OUTPUT_SIZE(key_type, key_bits, alg) \ + (PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_RSA(key_type) ? ((void) alg, PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(key_bits)) : \ + PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC(key_type) ? PSA_ECDSA_SIGNATURE_SIZE(key_bits) : \ + ((void) alg, 0u)) + +#define PSA_VENDOR_ECDSA_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE \ + PSA_ECDSA_SIGNATURE_SIZE(PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS) + +/** \def PSA_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE + * + * Maximum size of an asymmetric signature. + * + * This macro expands to a compile-time constant integer. This value + * is the maximum size of a signature in bytes. + */ +#define PSA_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE 1 + +#if (defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA) || defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA)) && \ + (PSA_VENDOR_ECDSA_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE > PSA_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE) +#undef PSA_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE +#define PSA_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE PSA_VENDOR_ECDSA_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE +#endif +#if (defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN) || defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS)) && \ + (PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(PSA_VENDOR_RSA_MAX_KEY_BITS) > PSA_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE) +#undef PSA_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE +#define PSA_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(PSA_VENDOR_RSA_MAX_KEY_BITS) +#endif + +/** Sufficient output buffer size for psa_asymmetric_encrypt(). + * + * This macro returns a sufficient buffer size for a ciphertext produced using + * a key of the specified type and size, with the specified algorithm. + * Note that the actual size of the ciphertext may be smaller, depending + * on the algorithm. + * + * \warning This function may call its arguments multiple times or + * zero times, so you should not pass arguments that contain + * side effects. + * + * \param key_type An asymmetric key type (this may indifferently be a + * key pair type or a public key type). + * \param key_bits The size of the key in bits. + * \param alg The asymmetric encryption algorithm. + * + * \return If the parameters are valid and supported, return + * a buffer size in bytes that guarantees that + * psa_asymmetric_encrypt() will not fail with + * #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL. + * If the parameters are a valid combination that is not supported, + * return either a sensible size or 0. + * If the parameters are not valid, the + * return value is unspecified. + */ +#define PSA_ASYMMETRIC_ENCRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE(key_type, key_bits, alg) \ + (PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_RSA(key_type) ? \ + ((void) alg, PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(key_bits)) : \ + 0u) + +/** A sufficient output buffer size for psa_asymmetric_encrypt(), for any + * supported asymmetric encryption. + * + * See also #PSA_ASYMMETRIC_ENCRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE(\p key_type, \p key_bits, \p alg). + */ +/* This macro assumes that RSA is the only supported asymmetric encryption. */ +#define PSA_ASYMMETRIC_ENCRYPT_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE \ + (PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(PSA_VENDOR_RSA_MAX_KEY_BITS)) + +/** Sufficient output buffer size for psa_asymmetric_decrypt(). + * + * This macro returns a sufficient buffer size for a plaintext produced using + * a key of the specified type and size, with the specified algorithm. + * Note that the actual size of the plaintext may be smaller, depending + * on the algorithm. + * + * \warning This function may call its arguments multiple times or + * zero times, so you should not pass arguments that contain + * side effects. + * + * \param key_type An asymmetric key type (this may indifferently be a + * key pair type or a public key type). + * \param key_bits The size of the key in bits. + * \param alg The asymmetric encryption algorithm. + * + * \return If the parameters are valid and supported, return + * a buffer size in bytes that guarantees that + * psa_asymmetric_decrypt() will not fail with + * #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL. + * If the parameters are a valid combination that is not supported, + * return either a sensible size or 0. + * If the parameters are not valid, the + * return value is unspecified. + */ +#define PSA_ASYMMETRIC_DECRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE(key_type, key_bits, alg) \ + (PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_RSA(key_type) ? \ + PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(key_bits) - PSA_RSA_MINIMUM_PADDING_SIZE(alg) : \ + 0u) + +/** A sufficient output buffer size for psa_asymmetric_decrypt(), for any + * supported asymmetric decryption. + * + * This macro assumes that RSA is the only supported asymmetric encryption. + * + * See also #PSA_ASYMMETRIC_DECRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE(\p key_type, \p key_bits, \p alg). + */ +#define PSA_ASYMMETRIC_DECRYPT_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE \ + (PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(PSA_VENDOR_RSA_MAX_KEY_BITS)) + +/* Maximum size of the ASN.1 encoding of an INTEGER with the specified + * number of bits. + * + * This definition assumes that bits <= 2^19 - 9 so that the length field + * is at most 3 bytes. The length of the encoding is the length of the + * bit string padded to a whole number of bytes plus: + * - 1 type byte; + * - 1 to 3 length bytes; + * - 0 to 1 bytes of leading 0 due to the sign bit. + */ +#define PSA_KEY_EXPORT_ASN1_INTEGER_MAX_SIZE(bits) \ + ((bits) / 8u + 5u) + +/* Maximum size of the export encoding of an RSA public key. + * Assumes that the public exponent is less than 2^32. + * + * RSAPublicKey ::= SEQUENCE { + * modulus INTEGER, -- n + * publicExponent INTEGER } -- e + * + * - 4 bytes of SEQUENCE overhead; + * - n : INTEGER; + * - 7 bytes for the public exponent. + */ +#define PSA_KEY_EXPORT_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE(key_bits) \ + (PSA_KEY_EXPORT_ASN1_INTEGER_MAX_SIZE(key_bits) + 11u) + +/* Maximum size of the export encoding of an RSA key pair. + * Assumes that the public exponent is less than 2^32 and that the size + * difference between the two primes is at most 1 bit. + * + * RSAPrivateKey ::= SEQUENCE { + * version Version, -- 0 + * modulus INTEGER, -- N-bit + * publicExponent INTEGER, -- 32-bit + * privateExponent INTEGER, -- N-bit + * prime1 INTEGER, -- N/2-bit + * prime2 INTEGER, -- N/2-bit + * exponent1 INTEGER, -- N/2-bit + * exponent2 INTEGER, -- N/2-bit + * coefficient INTEGER, -- N/2-bit + * } + * + * - 4 bytes of SEQUENCE overhead; + * - 3 bytes of version; + * - 7 half-size INTEGERs plus 2 full-size INTEGERs, + * overapproximated as 9 half-size INTEGERS; + * - 7 bytes for the public exponent. + */ +#define PSA_KEY_EXPORT_RSA_KEY_PAIR_MAX_SIZE(key_bits) \ + (9u * PSA_KEY_EXPORT_ASN1_INTEGER_MAX_SIZE((key_bits) / 2u + 1u) + 14u) + +/* Maximum size of the export encoding of a DSA public key. + * + * SubjectPublicKeyInfo ::= SEQUENCE { + * algorithm AlgorithmIdentifier, + * subjectPublicKey BIT STRING } -- contains DSAPublicKey + * AlgorithmIdentifier ::= SEQUENCE { + * algorithm OBJECT IDENTIFIER, + * parameters Dss-Params } -- SEQUENCE of 3 INTEGERs + * DSAPublicKey ::= INTEGER -- public key, Y + * + * - 3 * 4 bytes of SEQUENCE overhead; + * - 1 + 1 + 7 bytes of algorithm (DSA OID); + * - 4 bytes of BIT STRING overhead; + * - 3 full-size INTEGERs (p, g, y); + * - 1 + 1 + 32 bytes for 1 sub-size INTEGER (q <= 256 bits). + */ +#define PSA_KEY_EXPORT_DSA_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE(key_bits) \ + (PSA_KEY_EXPORT_ASN1_INTEGER_MAX_SIZE(key_bits) * 3u + 59u) + +/* Maximum size of the export encoding of a DSA key pair. + * + * DSAPrivateKey ::= SEQUENCE { + * version Version, -- 0 + * prime INTEGER, -- p + * subprime INTEGER, -- q + * generator INTEGER, -- g + * public INTEGER, -- y + * private INTEGER, -- x + * } + * + * - 4 bytes of SEQUENCE overhead; + * - 3 bytes of version; + * - 3 full-size INTEGERs (p, g, y); + * - 2 * (1 + 1 + 32) bytes for 2 sub-size INTEGERs (q, x <= 256 bits). + */ +#define PSA_KEY_EXPORT_DSA_KEY_PAIR_MAX_SIZE(key_bits) \ + (PSA_KEY_EXPORT_ASN1_INTEGER_MAX_SIZE(key_bits) * 3u + 75u) + +/* Maximum size of the export encoding of an ECC public key. + * + * The representation of an ECC public key is: + * - The byte 0x04; + * - `x_P` as a `ceiling(m/8)`-byte string, big-endian; + * - `y_P` as a `ceiling(m/8)`-byte string, big-endian; + * - where m is the bit size associated with the curve. + * + * - 1 byte + 2 * point size. + */ +#define PSA_KEY_EXPORT_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE(key_bits) \ + (2u * PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(key_bits) + 1u) + +/* Maximum size of the export encoding of an ECC key pair. + * + * An ECC key pair is represented by the secret value. + */ +#define PSA_KEY_EXPORT_ECC_KEY_PAIR_MAX_SIZE(key_bits) \ + (PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(key_bits)) + +/* Maximum size of the export encoding of an DH key pair. + * + * An DH key pair is represented by the secret value. + */ +#define PSA_KEY_EXPORT_FFDH_KEY_PAIR_MAX_SIZE(key_bits) \ + (PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(key_bits)) + +/* Maximum size of the export encoding of an DH public key. + */ +#define PSA_KEY_EXPORT_FFDH_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE(key_bits) \ + (PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(key_bits)) + +/** Sufficient output buffer size for psa_export_key() or + * psa_export_public_key(). + * + * This macro returns a compile-time constant if its arguments are + * compile-time constants. + * + * \warning This macro may evaluate its arguments multiple times or + * zero times, so you should not pass arguments that contain + * side effects. + * + * The following code illustrates how to allocate enough memory to export + * a key by querying the key type and size at runtime. + * \code{c} + * psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + * psa_status_t status; + * status = psa_get_key_attributes(key, &attributes); + * if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) handle_error(...); + * psa_key_type_t key_type = psa_get_key_type(&attributes); + * size_t key_bits = psa_get_key_bits(&attributes); + * size_t buffer_size = PSA_EXPORT_KEY_OUTPUT_SIZE(key_type, key_bits); + * psa_reset_key_attributes(&attributes); + * uint8_t *buffer = malloc(buffer_size); + * if (buffer == NULL) handle_error(...); + * size_t buffer_length; + * status = psa_export_key(key, buffer, buffer_size, &buffer_length); + * if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) handle_error(...); + * \endcode + * + * \param key_type A supported key type. + * \param key_bits The size of the key in bits. + * + * \return If the parameters are valid and supported, return + * a buffer size in bytes that guarantees that + * psa_export_key() or psa_export_public_key() will not fail with + * #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL. + * If the parameters are a valid combination that is not supported, + * return either a sensible size or 0. + * If the parameters are not valid, the return value is unspecified. + */ +#define PSA_EXPORT_KEY_OUTPUT_SIZE(key_type, key_bits) \ + (PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_UNSTRUCTURED(key_type) ? PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(key_bits) : \ + PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_DH(key_type) ? PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(key_bits) : \ + (key_type) == PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR ? PSA_KEY_EXPORT_RSA_KEY_PAIR_MAX_SIZE(key_bits) : \ + (key_type) == PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY ? PSA_KEY_EXPORT_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE(key_bits) : \ + (key_type) == PSA_KEY_TYPE_DSA_KEY_PAIR ? PSA_KEY_EXPORT_DSA_KEY_PAIR_MAX_SIZE(key_bits) : \ + (key_type) == PSA_KEY_TYPE_DSA_PUBLIC_KEY ? PSA_KEY_EXPORT_DSA_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE(key_bits) : \ + PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC_KEY_PAIR(key_type) ? PSA_KEY_EXPORT_ECC_KEY_PAIR_MAX_SIZE(key_bits) : \ + PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(key_type) ? PSA_KEY_EXPORT_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE(key_bits) : \ + 0u) + +/** Sufficient output buffer size for psa_export_public_key(). + * + * This macro returns a compile-time constant if its arguments are + * compile-time constants. + * + * \warning This macro may evaluate its arguments multiple times or + * zero times, so you should not pass arguments that contain + * side effects. + * + * The following code illustrates how to allocate enough memory to export + * a public key by querying the key type and size at runtime. + * \code{c} + * psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + * psa_status_t status; + * status = psa_get_key_attributes(key, &attributes); + * if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) handle_error(...); + * psa_key_type_t key_type = psa_get_key_type(&attributes); + * size_t key_bits = psa_get_key_bits(&attributes); + * size_t buffer_size = PSA_EXPORT_PUBLIC_KEY_OUTPUT_SIZE(key_type, key_bits); + * psa_reset_key_attributes(&attributes); + * uint8_t *buffer = malloc(buffer_size); + * if (buffer == NULL) handle_error(...); + * size_t buffer_length; + * status = psa_export_public_key(key, buffer, buffer_size, &buffer_length); + * if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) handle_error(...); + * \endcode + * + * \param key_type A public key or key pair key type. + * \param key_bits The size of the key in bits. + * + * \return If the parameters are valid and supported, return + * a buffer size in bytes that guarantees that + * psa_export_public_key() will not fail with + * #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL. + * If the parameters are a valid combination that is not + * supported, return either a sensible size or 0. + * If the parameters are not valid, + * the return value is unspecified. + * + * If the parameters are valid and supported, + * return the same result as + * #PSA_EXPORT_KEY_OUTPUT_SIZE( + * \p #PSA_KEY_TYPE_PUBLIC_KEY_OF_KEY_PAIR(\p key_type), + * \p key_bits). + */ +#define PSA_EXPORT_PUBLIC_KEY_OUTPUT_SIZE(key_type, key_bits) \ + (PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_RSA(key_type) ? PSA_KEY_EXPORT_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE(key_bits) : \ + PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC(key_type) ? PSA_KEY_EXPORT_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE(key_bits) : \ + PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_DH(key_type) ? PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(key_bits) : \ + 0u) + +/** Sufficient buffer size for exporting any asymmetric key pair. + * + * This macro expands to a compile-time constant integer. This value is + * a sufficient buffer size when calling psa_export_key() to export any + * asymmetric key pair, regardless of the exact key type and key size. + * + * See also #PSA_EXPORT_KEY_OUTPUT_SIZE(\p key_type, \p key_bits). + */ +#define PSA_EXPORT_KEY_PAIR_MAX_SIZE 1 + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_BASIC) && \ + (PSA_KEY_EXPORT_ECC_KEY_PAIR_MAX_SIZE(PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS) > \ + PSA_EXPORT_KEY_PAIR_MAX_SIZE) +#undef PSA_EXPORT_KEY_PAIR_MAX_SIZE +#define PSA_EXPORT_KEY_PAIR_MAX_SIZE \ + PSA_KEY_EXPORT_ECC_KEY_PAIR_MAX_SIZE(PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS) +#endif +#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_BASIC) && \ + (PSA_KEY_EXPORT_RSA_KEY_PAIR_MAX_SIZE(PSA_VENDOR_RSA_MAX_KEY_BITS) > \ + PSA_EXPORT_KEY_PAIR_MAX_SIZE) +#undef PSA_EXPORT_KEY_PAIR_MAX_SIZE +#define PSA_EXPORT_KEY_PAIR_MAX_SIZE \ + PSA_KEY_EXPORT_RSA_KEY_PAIR_MAX_SIZE(PSA_VENDOR_RSA_MAX_KEY_BITS) +#endif +#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_BASIC) && \ + (PSA_KEY_EXPORT_FFDH_KEY_PAIR_MAX_SIZE(PSA_VENDOR_FFDH_MAX_KEY_BITS) > \ + PSA_EXPORT_KEY_PAIR_MAX_SIZE) +#undef PSA_EXPORT_KEY_PAIR_MAX_SIZE +#define PSA_EXPORT_KEY_PAIR_MAX_SIZE \ + PSA_KEY_EXPORT_FFDH_KEY_PAIR_MAX_SIZE(PSA_VENDOR_FFDH_MAX_KEY_BITS) +#endif + +/** Sufficient buffer size for exporting any asymmetric public key. + * + * This macro expands to a compile-time constant integer. This value is + * a sufficient buffer size when calling psa_export_key() or + * psa_export_public_key() to export any asymmetric public key, + * regardless of the exact key type and key size. + * + * See also #PSA_EXPORT_PUBLIC_KEY_OUTPUT_SIZE(\p key_type, \p key_bits). + */ +#define PSA_EXPORT_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE 1 + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY) && \ + (PSA_KEY_EXPORT_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE(PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS) > \ + PSA_EXPORT_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE) +#undef PSA_EXPORT_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE +#define PSA_EXPORT_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE \ + PSA_KEY_EXPORT_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE(PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS) +#endif +#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY) && \ + (PSA_KEY_EXPORT_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE(PSA_VENDOR_RSA_MAX_KEY_BITS) > \ + PSA_EXPORT_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE) +#undef PSA_EXPORT_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE +#define PSA_EXPORT_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE \ + PSA_KEY_EXPORT_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE(PSA_VENDOR_RSA_MAX_KEY_BITS) +#endif +#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_PUBLIC_KEY) && \ + (PSA_KEY_EXPORT_FFDH_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE(PSA_VENDOR_FFDH_MAX_KEY_BITS) > \ + PSA_EXPORT_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE) +#undef PSA_EXPORT_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE +#define PSA_EXPORT_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE \ + PSA_KEY_EXPORT_FFDH_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE(PSA_VENDOR_FFDH_MAX_KEY_BITS) +#endif + +/** Sufficient output buffer size for psa_raw_key_agreement(). + * + * This macro returns a compile-time constant if its arguments are + * compile-time constants. + * + * \warning This macro may evaluate its arguments multiple times or + * zero times, so you should not pass arguments that contain + * side effects. + * + * See also #PSA_RAW_KEY_AGREEMENT_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE. + * + * \param key_type A supported key type. + * \param key_bits The size of the key in bits. + * + * \return If the parameters are valid and supported, return + * a buffer size in bytes that guarantees that + * psa_raw_key_agreement() will not fail with + * #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL. + * If the parameters are a valid combination that + * is not supported, return either a sensible size or 0. + * If the parameters are not valid, + * the return value is unspecified. + */ +#define PSA_RAW_KEY_AGREEMENT_OUTPUT_SIZE(key_type, key_bits) \ + ((PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC_KEY_PAIR(key_type) || \ + PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_DH_KEY_PAIR(key_type)) ? PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(key_bits) : 0u) + +/** Maximum size of the output from psa_raw_key_agreement(). + * + * This macro expands to a compile-time constant integer. This value is the + * maximum size of the output any raw key agreement algorithm, in bytes. + * + * See also #PSA_RAW_KEY_AGREEMENT_OUTPUT_SIZE(\p key_type, \p key_bits). + */ +#define PSA_RAW_KEY_AGREEMENT_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE 1 + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH) && \ + (PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS) > PSA_RAW_KEY_AGREEMENT_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE) +#undef PSA_RAW_KEY_AGREEMENT_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE +#define PSA_RAW_KEY_AGREEMENT_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS) +#endif +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH) && \ + (PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(PSA_VENDOR_FFDH_MAX_KEY_BITS) > PSA_RAW_KEY_AGREEMENT_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE) +#undef PSA_RAW_KEY_AGREEMENT_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE +#define PSA_RAW_KEY_AGREEMENT_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(PSA_VENDOR_FFDH_MAX_KEY_BITS) +#endif + +/** The default IV size for a cipher algorithm, in bytes. + * + * The IV that is generated as part of a call to #psa_cipher_encrypt() is always + * the default IV length for the algorithm. + * + * This macro can be used to allocate a buffer of sufficient size to + * store the IV output from #psa_cipher_generate_iv() when using + * a multi-part cipher operation. + * + * See also #PSA_CIPHER_IV_MAX_SIZE. + * + * \warning This macro may evaluate its arguments multiple times or + * zero times, so you should not pass arguments that contain + * side effects. + * + * \param key_type A symmetric key type that is compatible with algorithm \p alg. + * + * \param alg A cipher algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that #PSA_ALG_IS_CIPHER(\p alg) is true). + * + * \return The default IV size for the specified key type and algorithm. + * If the algorithm does not use an IV, return 0. + * If the key type or cipher algorithm is not recognized, + * or the parameters are incompatible, return 0. + */ +#define PSA_CIPHER_IV_LENGTH(key_type, alg) \ + (PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_LENGTH(key_type) > 1 && \ + ((alg) == PSA_ALG_CTR || \ + (alg) == PSA_ALG_CFB || \ + (alg) == PSA_ALG_OFB || \ + (alg) == PSA_ALG_XTS || \ + (alg) == PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING || \ + (alg) == PSA_ALG_CBC_PKCS7) ? PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_LENGTH(key_type) : \ + (key_type) == PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 && \ + (alg) == PSA_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER ? 12u : \ + (alg) == PSA_ALG_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG ? 13u : \ + 0u) + +/** The maximum IV size for all supported cipher algorithms, in bytes. + * + * See also #PSA_CIPHER_IV_LENGTH(). + */ +#define PSA_CIPHER_IV_MAX_SIZE 16u + +/** The maximum size of the output of psa_cipher_encrypt(), in bytes. + * + * If the size of the output buffer is at least this large, it is guaranteed + * that psa_cipher_encrypt() will not fail due to an insufficient buffer size. + * Depending on the algorithm, the actual size of the output might be smaller. + * + * See also #PSA_CIPHER_ENCRYPT_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE(\p input_length). + * + * \warning This macro may evaluate its arguments multiple times or + * zero times, so you should not pass arguments that contain + * side effects. + * + * \param key_type A symmetric key type that is compatible with algorithm + * alg. + * \param alg A cipher algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that + * #PSA_ALG_IS_CIPHER(\p alg) is true). + * \param input_length Size of the input in bytes. + * + * \return A sufficient output size for the specified key type and + * algorithm. If the key type or cipher algorithm is not + * recognized, or the parameters are incompatible, + * return 0. + */ +#define PSA_CIPHER_ENCRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE(key_type, alg, input_length) \ + (alg == PSA_ALG_CBC_PKCS7 ? \ + (PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_LENGTH(key_type) != 0 ? \ + PSA_ROUND_UP_TO_MULTIPLE(PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_LENGTH(key_type), \ + (input_length) + 1u) + \ + PSA_CIPHER_IV_LENGTH((key_type), (alg)) : 0u) : \ + (PSA_ALG_IS_CIPHER(alg) ? \ + (input_length) + PSA_CIPHER_IV_LENGTH((key_type), (alg)) : \ + 0u)) + +/** A sufficient output buffer size for psa_cipher_encrypt(), for any of the + * supported key types and cipher algorithms. + * + * If the size of the output buffer is at least this large, it is guaranteed + * that psa_cipher_encrypt() will not fail due to an insufficient buffer size. + * + * See also #PSA_CIPHER_ENCRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE(\p key_type, \p alg, \p input_length). + * + * \param input_length Size of the input in bytes. + * + */ +#define PSA_CIPHER_ENCRYPT_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE(input_length) \ + (PSA_ROUND_UP_TO_MULTIPLE(PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_MAX_SIZE, \ + (input_length) + 1u) + \ + PSA_CIPHER_IV_MAX_SIZE) + +/** The maximum size of the output of psa_cipher_decrypt(), in bytes. + * + * If the size of the output buffer is at least this large, it is guaranteed + * that psa_cipher_decrypt() will not fail due to an insufficient buffer size. + * Depending on the algorithm, the actual size of the output might be smaller. + * + * See also #PSA_CIPHER_DECRYPT_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE(\p input_length). + * + * \param key_type A symmetric key type that is compatible with algorithm + * alg. + * \param alg A cipher algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that + * #PSA_ALG_IS_CIPHER(\p alg) is true). + * \param input_length Size of the input in bytes. + * + * \return A sufficient output size for the specified key type and + * algorithm. If the key type or cipher algorithm is not + * recognized, or the parameters are incompatible, + * return 0. + */ +#define PSA_CIPHER_DECRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE(key_type, alg, input_length) \ + (PSA_ALG_IS_CIPHER(alg) && \ + ((key_type) & PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_MASK) == PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_SYMMETRIC ? \ + (input_length) : \ + 0u) + +/** A sufficient output buffer size for psa_cipher_decrypt(), for any of the + * supported key types and cipher algorithms. + * + * If the size of the output buffer is at least this large, it is guaranteed + * that psa_cipher_decrypt() will not fail due to an insufficient buffer size. + * + * See also #PSA_CIPHER_DECRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE(\p key_type, \p alg, \p input_length). + * + * \param input_length Size of the input in bytes. + */ +#define PSA_CIPHER_DECRYPT_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE(input_length) \ + (input_length) + +/** A sufficient output buffer size for psa_cipher_update(). + * + * If the size of the output buffer is at least this large, it is guaranteed + * that psa_cipher_update() will not fail due to an insufficient buffer size. + * The actual size of the output might be smaller in any given call. + * + * See also #PSA_CIPHER_UPDATE_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE(\p input_length). + * + * \param key_type A symmetric key type that is compatible with algorithm + * alg. + * \param alg A cipher algorithm (PSA_ALG_XXX value such that + * #PSA_ALG_IS_CIPHER(\p alg) is true). + * \param input_length Size of the input in bytes. + * + * \return A sufficient output size for the specified key type and + * algorithm. If the key type or cipher algorithm is not + * recognized, or the parameters are incompatible, return 0. + */ +#define PSA_CIPHER_UPDATE_OUTPUT_SIZE(key_type, alg, input_length) \ + (PSA_ALG_IS_CIPHER(alg) ? \ + (PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_LENGTH(key_type) != 0 ? \ + (((alg) == PSA_ALG_CBC_PKCS7 || \ + (alg) == PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING || \ + (alg) == PSA_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING) ? \ + PSA_ROUND_UP_TO_MULTIPLE(PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_LENGTH(key_type), \ + input_length) : \ + (input_length)) : 0u) : \ + 0u) + +/** A sufficient output buffer size for psa_cipher_update(), for any of the + * supported key types and cipher algorithms. + * + * If the size of the output buffer is at least this large, it is guaranteed + * that psa_cipher_update() will not fail due to an insufficient buffer size. + * + * See also #PSA_CIPHER_UPDATE_OUTPUT_SIZE(\p key_type, \p alg, \p input_length). + * + * \param input_length Size of the input in bytes. + */ +#define PSA_CIPHER_UPDATE_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE(input_length) \ + (PSA_ROUND_UP_TO_MULTIPLE(PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_MAX_SIZE, input_length)) + +/** A sufficient ciphertext buffer size for psa_cipher_finish(). + * + * If the size of the ciphertext buffer is at least this large, it is + * guaranteed that psa_cipher_finish() will not fail due to an insufficient + * ciphertext buffer size. The actual size of the output might be smaller in + * any given call. + * + * See also #PSA_CIPHER_FINISH_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE(). + * + * \param key_type A symmetric key type that is compatible with algorithm + * alg. + * \param alg A cipher algorithm (PSA_ALG_XXX value such that + * #PSA_ALG_IS_CIPHER(\p alg) is true). + * \return A sufficient output size for the specified key type and + * algorithm. If the key type or cipher algorithm is not + * recognized, or the parameters are incompatible, return 0. + */ +#define PSA_CIPHER_FINISH_OUTPUT_SIZE(key_type, alg) \ + (PSA_ALG_IS_CIPHER(alg) ? \ + (alg == PSA_ALG_CBC_PKCS7 ? \ + PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_LENGTH(key_type) : \ + 0u) : \ + 0u) + +/** A sufficient ciphertext buffer size for psa_cipher_finish(), for any of the + * supported key types and cipher algorithms. + * + * See also #PSA_CIPHER_FINISH_OUTPUT_SIZE(\p key_type, \p alg). + */ +#define PSA_CIPHER_FINISH_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE \ + (PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_MAX_SIZE) + +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_SIZES_H */ diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_struct.h b/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_struct.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..e2c227b2ebb7 --- /dev/null +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_struct.h @@ -0,0 +1,503 @@ +/** + * \file psa/crypto_struct.h + * + * \brief PSA cryptography module: Mbed TLS structured type implementations + * + * \note This file may not be included directly. Applications must + * include psa/crypto.h. + * + * This file contains the definitions of some data structures with + * implementation-specific definitions. + * + * In implementations with isolation between the application and the + * cryptography module, it is expected that the front-end and the back-end + * would have different versions of this file. + * + *

Design notes about multipart operation structures

+ * + * For multipart operations without driver delegation support, each multipart + * operation structure contains a `psa_algorithm_t alg` field which indicates + * which specific algorithm the structure is for. When the structure is not in + * use, `alg` is 0. Most of the structure consists of a union which is + * discriminated by `alg`. + * + * For multipart operations with driver delegation support, each multipart + * operation structure contains an `unsigned int id` field indicating which + * driver got assigned to do the operation. When the structure is not in use, + * 'id' is 0. The structure contains also a driver context which is the union + * of the contexts of all drivers able to handle the type of multipart + * operation. + * + * Note that when `alg` or `id` is 0, the content of other fields is undefined. + * In particular, it is not guaranteed that a freshly-initialized structure + * is all-zero: we initialize structures to something like `{0, 0}`, which + * is only guaranteed to initializes the first member of the union; + * GCC and Clang initialize the whole structure to 0 (at the time of writing), + * but MSVC and CompCert don't. + * + * In Mbed TLS, multipart operation structures live independently from + * the key. This allows Mbed TLS to free the key objects when destroying + * a key slot. If a multipart operation needs to remember the key after + * the setup function returns, the operation structure needs to contain a + * copy of the key. + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +#ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_STRUCT_H +#define PSA_CRYPTO_STRUCT_H +#include "mbedtls/private_access.h" + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +/* + * Include the build-time configuration information header. Here, we do not + * include `"mbedtls/build_info.h"` directly but `"psa/build_info.h"`, which + * is basically just an alias to it. This is to ease the maintenance of the + * TF-PSA-Crypto repository which has a different build system and + * configuration. + */ +#include "psa/build_info.h" + +/* Include the context definition for the compiled-in drivers for the primitive + * algorithms. */ +#include "psa/crypto_driver_contexts_primitives.h" + +struct psa_hash_operation_s { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) + mbedtls_psa_client_handle_t handle; +#else + /** Unique ID indicating which driver got assigned to do the + * operation. Since driver contexts are driver-specific, swapping + * drivers halfway through the operation is not supported. + * ID values are auto-generated in psa_driver_wrappers.h. + * ID value zero means the context is not valid or not assigned to + * any driver (i.e. the driver context is not active, in use). */ + unsigned int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(id); + psa_driver_hash_context_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(ctx); +#endif +}; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) +#define PSA_HASH_OPERATION_INIT { 0 } +#else +#define PSA_HASH_OPERATION_INIT { 0, { 0 } } +#endif +static inline struct psa_hash_operation_s psa_hash_operation_init(void) +{ + const struct psa_hash_operation_s v = PSA_HASH_OPERATION_INIT; + return v; +} + +struct psa_cipher_operation_s { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) + mbedtls_psa_client_handle_t handle; +#else + /** Unique ID indicating which driver got assigned to do the + * operation. Since driver contexts are driver-specific, swapping + * drivers halfway through the operation is not supported. + * ID values are auto-generated in psa_crypto_driver_wrappers.h + * ID value zero means the context is not valid or not assigned to + * any driver (i.e. none of the driver contexts are active). */ + unsigned int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(id); + + unsigned int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(iv_required) : 1; + unsigned int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(iv_set) : 1; + + uint8_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(default_iv_length); + + psa_driver_cipher_context_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(ctx); +#endif +}; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) +#define PSA_CIPHER_OPERATION_INIT { 0 } +#else +#define PSA_CIPHER_OPERATION_INIT { 0, 0, 0, 0, { 0 } } +#endif +static inline struct psa_cipher_operation_s psa_cipher_operation_init(void) +{ + const struct psa_cipher_operation_s v = PSA_CIPHER_OPERATION_INIT; + return v; +} + +/* Include the context definition for the compiled-in drivers for the composite + * algorithms. */ +#include "psa/crypto_driver_contexts_composites.h" + +struct psa_mac_operation_s { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) + mbedtls_psa_client_handle_t handle; +#else + /** Unique ID indicating which driver got assigned to do the + * operation. Since driver contexts are driver-specific, swapping + * drivers halfway through the operation is not supported. + * ID values are auto-generated in psa_driver_wrappers.h + * ID value zero means the context is not valid or not assigned to + * any driver (i.e. none of the driver contexts are active). */ + unsigned int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(id); + uint8_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(mac_size); + unsigned int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(is_sign) : 1; + psa_driver_mac_context_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(ctx); +#endif +}; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) +#define PSA_MAC_OPERATION_INIT { 0 } +#else +#define PSA_MAC_OPERATION_INIT { 0, 0, 0, { 0 } } +#endif +static inline struct psa_mac_operation_s psa_mac_operation_init(void) +{ + const struct psa_mac_operation_s v = PSA_MAC_OPERATION_INIT; + return v; +} + +struct psa_aead_operation_s { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) + mbedtls_psa_client_handle_t handle; +#else + /** Unique ID indicating which driver got assigned to do the + * operation. Since driver contexts are driver-specific, swapping + * drivers halfway through the operation is not supported. + * ID values are auto-generated in psa_crypto_driver_wrappers.h + * ID value zero means the context is not valid or not assigned to + * any driver (i.e. none of the driver contexts are active). */ + unsigned int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(id); + + psa_algorithm_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(alg); + psa_key_type_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(key_type); + + size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(ad_remaining); + size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(body_remaining); + + unsigned int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(nonce_set) : 1; + unsigned int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(lengths_set) : 1; + unsigned int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(ad_started) : 1; + unsigned int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(body_started) : 1; + unsigned int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(is_encrypt) : 1; + + psa_driver_aead_context_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(ctx); +#endif +}; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) +#define PSA_AEAD_OPERATION_INIT { 0 } +#else +#define PSA_AEAD_OPERATION_INIT { 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, { 0 } } +#endif +static inline struct psa_aead_operation_s psa_aead_operation_init(void) +{ + const struct psa_aead_operation_s v = PSA_AEAD_OPERATION_INIT; + return v; +} + +/* Include the context definition for the compiled-in drivers for the key + * derivation algorithms. */ +#include "psa/crypto_driver_contexts_key_derivation.h" + +struct psa_key_derivation_s { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) + mbedtls_psa_client_handle_t handle; +#else + psa_algorithm_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(alg); + unsigned int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(can_output_key) : 1; + size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(capacity); + psa_driver_key_derivation_context_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(ctx); +#endif +}; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) +#define PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_OPERATION_INIT { 0 } +#else +/* This only zeroes out the first byte in the union, the rest is unspecified. */ +#define PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_OPERATION_INIT { 0, 0, 0, { 0 } } +#endif +static inline struct psa_key_derivation_s psa_key_derivation_operation_init( + void) +{ + const struct psa_key_derivation_s v = PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_OPERATION_INIT; + return v; +} + +#ifndef __cplusplus +struct psa_key_production_parameters_s { + /* Future versions may add other fields in this structure. */ + uint32_t flags; + uint8_t data[]; +}; +#endif + +/** The default production parameters for key generation or key derivation. + * + * Calling psa_generate_key_ext() or psa_key_derivation_output_key_ext() + * with `params=PSA_KEY_PRODUCTION_PARAMETERS_INIT` and + * `params_data_length == 0` is equivalent to + * calling psa_generate_key() or psa_key_derivation_output_key() + * respectively. + */ +#define PSA_KEY_PRODUCTION_PARAMETERS_INIT { 0 } + +struct psa_key_policy_s { + psa_key_usage_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(usage); + psa_algorithm_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(alg); + psa_algorithm_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(alg2); +}; +typedef struct psa_key_policy_s psa_key_policy_t; + +#define PSA_KEY_POLICY_INIT { 0, 0, 0 } +static inline struct psa_key_policy_s psa_key_policy_init(void) +{ + const struct psa_key_policy_s v = PSA_KEY_POLICY_INIT; + return v; +} + +/* The type used internally for key sizes. + * Public interfaces use size_t, but internally we use a smaller type. */ +typedef uint16_t psa_key_bits_t; +/* The maximum value of the type used to represent bit-sizes. + * This is used to mark an invalid key size. */ +#define PSA_KEY_BITS_TOO_LARGE ((psa_key_bits_t) -1) +/* The maximum size of a key in bits. + * Currently defined as the maximum that can be represented, rounded down + * to a whole number of bytes. + * This is an uncast value so that it can be used in preprocessor + * conditionals. */ +#define PSA_MAX_KEY_BITS 0xfff8 + +struct psa_key_attributes_s { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C) + psa_key_slot_number_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(slot_number); + int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(has_slot_number); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C */ + psa_key_type_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(type); + psa_key_bits_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(bits); + psa_key_lifetime_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(lifetime); + psa_key_policy_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(policy); + /* This type has a different layout in the client view wrt the + * service view of the key id, i.e. in service view usually is + * expected to have MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_KEY_ID_ENCODES_OWNER defined + * thus adding an owner field to the standard psa_key_id_t. For + * implementations with client/service separation, this means the + * object will be marshalled through a transport channel and + * interpreted differently at each side of the transport. Placing + * it at the end of structures allows to interpret the structure + * at the client without reorganizing the memory layout of the + * struct + */ + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(id); +}; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C) +#define PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_MAYBE_SLOT_NUMBER 0, 0, +#else +#define PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_MAYBE_SLOT_NUMBER +#endif +#define PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT { PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_MAYBE_SLOT_NUMBER \ + PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE, 0, \ + PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_VOLATILE, \ + PSA_KEY_POLICY_INIT, \ + MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT } + +static inline struct psa_key_attributes_s psa_key_attributes_init(void) +{ + const struct psa_key_attributes_s v = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + return v; +} + +static inline void psa_set_key_id(psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key) +{ + psa_key_lifetime_t lifetime = attributes->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(lifetime); + + attributes->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(id) = key; + + if (PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_IS_VOLATILE(lifetime)) { + attributes->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(lifetime) = + PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_FROM_PERSISTENCE_AND_LOCATION( + PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_PERSISTENT, + PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION(lifetime)); + } +} + +static inline mbedtls_svc_key_id_t psa_get_key_id( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes) +{ + return attributes->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(id); +} + +#ifdef MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_KEY_ID_ENCODES_OWNER +static inline void mbedtls_set_key_owner_id(psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + mbedtls_key_owner_id_t owner) +{ + attributes->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(id).MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(owner) = owner; +} +#endif + +static inline void psa_set_key_lifetime(psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + psa_key_lifetime_t lifetime) +{ + attributes->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(lifetime) = lifetime; + if (PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_IS_VOLATILE(lifetime)) { +#ifdef MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_KEY_ID_ENCODES_OWNER + attributes->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(id).MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(key_id) = 0; +#else + attributes->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(id) = 0; +#endif + } +} + +static inline psa_key_lifetime_t psa_get_key_lifetime( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes) +{ + return attributes->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(lifetime); +} + +static inline void psa_extend_key_usage_flags(psa_key_usage_t *usage_flags) +{ + if (*usage_flags & PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH) { + *usage_flags |= PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE; + } + + if (*usage_flags & PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH) { + *usage_flags |= PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE; + } +} + +static inline void psa_set_key_usage_flags(psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + psa_key_usage_t usage_flags) +{ + psa_extend_key_usage_flags(&usage_flags); + attributes->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(policy).MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(usage) = usage_flags; +} + +static inline psa_key_usage_t psa_get_key_usage_flags( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes) +{ + return attributes->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(policy).MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(usage); +} + +static inline void psa_set_key_algorithm(psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + psa_algorithm_t alg) +{ + attributes->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(policy).MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(alg) = alg; +} + +static inline psa_algorithm_t psa_get_key_algorithm( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes) +{ + return attributes->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(policy).MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(alg); +} + +static inline void psa_set_key_type(psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + psa_key_type_t type) +{ + attributes->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(type) = type; +} + +static inline psa_key_type_t psa_get_key_type( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes) +{ + return attributes->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(type); +} + +static inline void psa_set_key_bits(psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + size_t bits) +{ + if (bits > PSA_MAX_KEY_BITS) { + attributes->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(bits) = PSA_KEY_BITS_TOO_LARGE; + } else { + attributes->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(bits) = (psa_key_bits_t) bits; + } +} + +static inline size_t psa_get_key_bits( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes) +{ + return attributes->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(bits); +} + +/** + * \brief The context for PSA interruptible hash signing. + */ +struct psa_sign_hash_interruptible_operation_s { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) + mbedtls_psa_client_handle_t handle; +#else + /** Unique ID indicating which driver got assigned to do the + * operation. Since driver contexts are driver-specific, swapping + * drivers halfway through the operation is not supported. + * ID values are auto-generated in psa_crypto_driver_wrappers.h + * ID value zero means the context is not valid or not assigned to + * any driver (i.e. none of the driver contexts are active). */ + unsigned int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(id); + + psa_driver_sign_hash_interruptible_context_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(ctx); + + unsigned int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(error_occurred) : 1; + + uint32_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(num_ops); +#endif +}; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) +#define PSA_SIGN_HASH_INTERRUPTIBLE_OPERATION_INIT { 0 } +#else +#define PSA_SIGN_HASH_INTERRUPTIBLE_OPERATION_INIT { 0, { 0 }, 0, 0 } +#endif + +static inline struct psa_sign_hash_interruptible_operation_s +psa_sign_hash_interruptible_operation_init(void) +{ + const struct psa_sign_hash_interruptible_operation_s v = + PSA_SIGN_HASH_INTERRUPTIBLE_OPERATION_INIT; + + return v; +} + +/** + * \brief The context for PSA interruptible hash verification. + */ +struct psa_verify_hash_interruptible_operation_s { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) + mbedtls_psa_client_handle_t handle; +#else + /** Unique ID indicating which driver got assigned to do the + * operation. Since driver contexts are driver-specific, swapping + * drivers halfway through the operation is not supported. + * ID values are auto-generated in psa_crypto_driver_wrappers.h + * ID value zero means the context is not valid or not assigned to + * any driver (i.e. none of the driver contexts are active). */ + unsigned int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(id); + + psa_driver_verify_hash_interruptible_context_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(ctx); + + unsigned int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(error_occurred) : 1; + + uint32_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(num_ops); +#endif +}; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) +#define PSA_VERIFY_HASH_INTERRUPTIBLE_OPERATION_INIT { 0 } +#else +#define PSA_VERIFY_HASH_INTERRUPTIBLE_OPERATION_INIT { 0, { 0 }, 0, 0 } +#endif + +static inline struct psa_verify_hash_interruptible_operation_s +psa_verify_hash_interruptible_operation_init(void) +{ + const struct psa_verify_hash_interruptible_operation_s v = + PSA_VERIFY_HASH_INTERRUPTIBLE_OPERATION_INIT; + + return v; +} + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_STRUCT_H */ diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_types.h b/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_types.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..a36b6ee65d33 --- /dev/null +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_types.h @@ -0,0 +1,486 @@ +/** + * \file psa/crypto_types.h + * + * \brief PSA cryptography module: type aliases. + * + * \note This file may not be included directly. Applications must + * include psa/crypto.h. Drivers must include the appropriate driver + * header file. + * + * This file contains portable definitions of integral types for properties + * of cryptographic keys, designations of cryptographic algorithms, and + * error codes returned by the library. + * + * This header file does not declare any function. + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +#ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_TYPES_H +#define PSA_CRYPTO_TYPES_H + +/* + * Include the build-time configuration information header. Here, we do not + * include `"mbedtls/build_info.h"` directly but `"psa/build_info.h"`, which + * is basically just an alias to it. This is to ease the maintenance of the + * TF-PSA-Crypto repository which has a different build system and + * configuration. + */ +#include "psa/build_info.h" + +/* Define the MBEDTLS_PRIVATE macro. */ +#include "mbedtls/private_access.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_PLATFORM_FILE) +#include MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_PLATFORM_FILE +#else +#include "crypto_platform.h" +#endif + +#include + +/** \defgroup error Error codes + * @{ + */ + +/** + * \brief Function return status. + * + * This is either #PSA_SUCCESS (which is zero), indicating success, + * or a small negative value indicating that an error occurred. Errors are + * encoded as one of the \c PSA_ERROR_xxx values defined here. */ +/* If #PSA_SUCCESS is already defined, it means that #psa_status_t + * is also defined in an external header, so prevent its multiple + * definition. + */ +#ifndef PSA_SUCCESS +typedef int32_t psa_status_t; +#endif + +/**@}*/ + +/** \defgroup crypto_types Key and algorithm types + * @{ + */ + +/** \brief Encoding of a key type. + * + * Values of this type are generally constructed by macros called + * `PSA_KEY_TYPE_xxx`. + * + * \note Values of this type are encoded in the persistent key store. + * Any changes to existing values will require bumping the storage + * format version and providing a translation when reading the old + * format. + */ +typedef uint16_t psa_key_type_t; + +/** The type of PSA elliptic curve family identifiers. + * + * Values of this type are generally constructed by macros called + * `PSA_ECC_FAMILY_xxx`. + * + * The curve identifier is required to create an ECC key using the + * PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR() or PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY() + * macros. + * + * Values defined by this standard will never be in the range 0x80-0xff. + * Vendors who define additional families must use an encoding in this range. + * + * \note Values of this type are encoded in the persistent key store. + * Any changes to existing values will require bumping the storage + * format version and providing a translation when reading the old + * format. + */ +typedef uint8_t psa_ecc_family_t; + +/** The type of PSA Diffie-Hellman group family identifiers. + * + * Values of this type are generally constructed by macros called + * `PSA_DH_FAMILY_xxx`. + * + * The group identifier is required to create a Diffie-Hellman key using the + * PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR() or PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_PUBLIC_KEY() + * macros. + * + * Values defined by this standard will never be in the range 0x80-0xff. + * Vendors who define additional families must use an encoding in this range. + * + * \note Values of this type are encoded in the persistent key store. + * Any changes to existing values will require bumping the storage + * format version and providing a translation when reading the old + * format. + */ +typedef uint8_t psa_dh_family_t; + +/** \brief Encoding of a cryptographic algorithm. + * + * Values of this type are generally constructed by macros called + * `PSA_ALG_xxx`. + * + * For algorithms that can be applied to multiple key types, this type + * does not encode the key type. For example, for symmetric ciphers + * based on a block cipher, #psa_algorithm_t encodes the block cipher + * mode and the padding mode while the block cipher itself is encoded + * via #psa_key_type_t. + * + * \note Values of this type are encoded in the persistent key store. + * Any changes to existing values will require bumping the storage + * format version and providing a translation when reading the old + * format. + */ +typedef uint32_t psa_algorithm_t; + +/**@}*/ + +/** \defgroup key_lifetimes Key lifetimes + * @{ + */ + +/** Encoding of key lifetimes. + * + * The lifetime of a key indicates where it is stored and what system actions + * may create and destroy it. + * + * Lifetime values have the following structure: + * - Bits 0-7 (#PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_PERSISTENCE(\c lifetime)): + * persistence level. This value indicates what device management + * actions can cause it to be destroyed. In particular, it indicates + * whether the key is _volatile_ or _persistent_. + * See ::psa_key_persistence_t for more information. + * - Bits 8-31 (#PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION(\c lifetime)): + * location indicator. This value indicates which part of the system + * has access to the key material and can perform operations using the key. + * See ::psa_key_location_t for more information. + * + * Volatile keys are automatically destroyed when the application instance + * terminates or on a power reset of the device. Persistent keys are + * preserved until the application explicitly destroys them or until an + * integration-specific device management event occurs (for example, + * a factory reset). + * + * Persistent keys have a key identifier of type #mbedtls_svc_key_id_t. + * This identifier remains valid throughout the lifetime of the key, + * even if the application instance that created the key terminates. + * The application can call psa_open_key() to open a persistent key that + * it created previously. + * + * The default lifetime of a key is #PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_VOLATILE. The lifetime + * #PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_PERSISTENT is supported if persistent storage is + * available. Other lifetime values may be supported depending on the + * library configuration. + * + * Values of this type are generally constructed by macros called + * `PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_xxx`. + * + * \note Values of this type are encoded in the persistent key store. + * Any changes to existing values will require bumping the storage + * format version and providing a translation when reading the old + * format. + */ +typedef uint32_t psa_key_lifetime_t; + +/** Encoding of key persistence levels. + * + * What distinguishes different persistence levels is what device management + * events may cause keys to be destroyed. _Volatile_ keys are destroyed + * by a power reset. Persistent keys may be destroyed by events such as + * a transfer of ownership or a factory reset. What management events + * actually affect persistent keys at different levels is outside the + * scope of the PSA Cryptography specification. + * + * The PSA Cryptography specification defines the following values of + * persistence levels: + * - \c 0 = #PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_VOLATILE: volatile key. + * A volatile key is automatically destroyed by the implementation when + * the application instance terminates. In particular, a volatile key + * is automatically destroyed on a power reset of the device. + * - \c 1 = #PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_DEFAULT: + * persistent key with a default lifetime. + * - \c 2-254: currently not supported by Mbed TLS. + * - \c 255 = #PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_READ_ONLY: + * read-only or write-once key. + * A key with this persistence level cannot be destroyed. + * Mbed TLS does not currently offer a way to create such keys, but + * integrations of Mbed TLS can use it for built-in keys that the + * application cannot modify (for example, a hardware unique key (HUK)). + * + * \note Key persistence levels are 8-bit values. Key management + * interfaces operate on lifetimes (type ::psa_key_lifetime_t) which + * encode the persistence as the lower 8 bits of a 32-bit value. + * + * \note Values of this type are encoded in the persistent key store. + * Any changes to existing values will require bumping the storage + * format version and providing a translation when reading the old + * format. + */ +typedef uint8_t psa_key_persistence_t; + +/** Encoding of key location indicators. + * + * If an integration of Mbed TLS can make calls to external + * cryptoprocessors such as secure elements, the location of a key + * indicates which secure element performs the operations on the key. + * Depending on the design of the secure element, the key + * material may be stored either in the secure element, or + * in wrapped (encrypted) form alongside the key metadata in the + * primary local storage. + * + * The PSA Cryptography API specification defines the following values of + * location indicators: + * - \c 0: primary local storage. + * This location is always available. + * The primary local storage is typically the same storage area that + * contains the key metadata. + * - \c 1: primary secure element. + * Integrations of Mbed TLS should support this value if there is a secure + * element attached to the operating environment. + * As a guideline, secure elements may provide higher resistance against + * side channel and physical attacks than the primary local storage, but may + * have restrictions on supported key types, sizes, policies and operations + * and may have different performance characteristics. + * - \c 2-0x7fffff: other locations defined by a PSA specification. + * The PSA Cryptography API does not currently assign any meaning to these + * locations, but future versions of that specification or other PSA + * specifications may do so. + * - \c 0x800000-0xffffff: vendor-defined locations. + * No PSA specification will assign a meaning to locations in this range. + * + * \note Key location indicators are 24-bit values. Key management + * interfaces operate on lifetimes (type ::psa_key_lifetime_t) which + * encode the location as the upper 24 bits of a 32-bit value. + * + * \note Values of this type are encoded in the persistent key store. + * Any changes to existing values will require bumping the storage + * format version and providing a translation when reading the old + * format. + */ +typedef uint32_t psa_key_location_t; + +/** Encoding of identifiers of persistent keys. + * + * - Applications may freely choose key identifiers in the range + * #PSA_KEY_ID_USER_MIN to #PSA_KEY_ID_USER_MAX. + * - The implementation may define additional key identifiers in the range + * #PSA_KEY_ID_VENDOR_MIN to #PSA_KEY_ID_VENDOR_MAX. + * - 0 is reserved as an invalid key identifier. + * - Key identifiers outside these ranges are reserved for future use. + * + * \note Values of this type are encoded in the persistent key store. + * Any changes to how values are allocated must require careful + * consideration to allow backward compatibility. + */ +typedef uint32_t psa_key_id_t; + +/** Encoding of key identifiers as seen inside the PSA Crypto implementation. + * + * When PSA Crypto is built as a library inside an application, this type + * is identical to #psa_key_id_t. When PSA Crypto is built as a service + * that can store keys on behalf of multiple clients, this type + * encodes the #psa_key_id_t value seen by each client application as + * well as extra information that identifies the client that owns + * the key. + * + * \note Values of this type are encoded in the persistent key store. + * Any changes to existing values will require bumping the storage + * format version and providing a translation when reading the old + * format. + */ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_KEY_ID_ENCODES_OWNER) +typedef psa_key_id_t mbedtls_svc_key_id_t; + +#else /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_KEY_ID_ENCODES_OWNER */ +/* Implementation-specific: The Mbed TLS library can be built as + * part of a multi-client service that exposes the PSA Cryptography API in each + * client and encodes the client identity in the key identifier argument of + * functions such as psa_open_key(). + */ +typedef struct { + psa_key_id_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(key_id); + mbedtls_key_owner_id_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(owner); +} mbedtls_svc_key_id_t; + +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_KEY_ID_ENCODES_OWNER */ + +/**@}*/ + +/** \defgroup policy Key policies + * @{ + */ + +/** \brief Encoding of permitted usage on a key. + * + * Values of this type are generally constructed as bitwise-ors of macros + * called `PSA_KEY_USAGE_xxx`. + * + * \note Values of this type are encoded in the persistent key store. + * Any changes to existing values will require bumping the storage + * format version and providing a translation when reading the old + * format. + */ +typedef uint32_t psa_key_usage_t; + +/**@}*/ + +/** \defgroup attributes Key attributes + * @{ + */ + +/** The type of a structure containing key attributes. + * + * This is an opaque structure that can represent the metadata of a key + * object. Metadata that can be stored in attributes includes: + * - The location of the key in storage, indicated by its key identifier + * and its lifetime. + * - The key's policy, comprising usage flags and a specification of + * the permitted algorithm(s). + * - Information about the key itself: the key type and its size. + * - Additional implementation-defined attributes. + * + * The actual key material is not considered an attribute of a key. + * Key attributes do not contain information that is generally considered + * highly confidential. + * + * An attribute structure works like a simple data structure where each function + * `psa_set_key_xxx` sets a field and the corresponding function + * `psa_get_key_xxx` retrieves the value of the corresponding field. + * However, a future version of the library may report values that are + * equivalent to the original one, but have a different encoding. Invalid + * values may be mapped to different, also invalid values. + * + * An attribute structure may contain references to auxiliary resources, + * for example pointers to allocated memory or indirect references to + * pre-calculated values. In order to free such resources, the application + * must call psa_reset_key_attributes(). As an exception, calling + * psa_reset_key_attributes() on an attribute structure is optional if + * the structure has only been modified by the following functions + * since it was initialized or last reset with psa_reset_key_attributes(): + * - psa_set_key_id() + * - psa_set_key_lifetime() + * - psa_set_key_type() + * - psa_set_key_bits() + * - psa_set_key_usage_flags() + * - psa_set_key_algorithm() + * + * Before calling any function on a key attribute structure, the application + * must initialize it by any of the following means: + * - Set the structure to all-bits-zero, for example: + * \code + * psa_key_attributes_t attributes; + * memset(&attributes, 0, sizeof(attributes)); + * \endcode + * - Initialize the structure to logical zero values, for example: + * \code + * psa_key_attributes_t attributes = {0}; + * \endcode + * - Initialize the structure to the initializer #PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT, + * for example: + * \code + * psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + * \endcode + * - Assign the result of the function psa_key_attributes_init() + * to the structure, for example: + * \code + * psa_key_attributes_t attributes; + * attributes = psa_key_attributes_init(); + * \endcode + * + * A freshly initialized attribute structure contains the following + * values: + * + * - lifetime: #PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_VOLATILE. + * - key identifier: 0 (which is not a valid key identifier). + * - type: \c 0 (meaning that the type is unspecified). + * - key size: \c 0 (meaning that the size is unspecified). + * - usage flags: \c 0 (which allows no usage except exporting a public key). + * - algorithm: \c 0 (which allows no cryptographic usage, but allows + * exporting). + * + * A typical sequence to create a key is as follows: + * -# Create and initialize an attribute structure. + * -# If the key is persistent, call psa_set_key_id(). + * Also call psa_set_key_lifetime() to place the key in a non-default + * location. + * -# Set the key policy with psa_set_key_usage_flags() and + * psa_set_key_algorithm(). + * -# Set the key type with psa_set_key_type(). + * Skip this step if copying an existing key with psa_copy_key(). + * -# When generating a random key with psa_generate_key() or deriving a key + * with psa_key_derivation_output_key(), set the desired key size with + * psa_set_key_bits(). + * -# Call a key creation function: psa_import_key(), psa_generate_key(), + * psa_key_derivation_output_key() or psa_copy_key(). This function reads + * the attribute structure, creates a key with these attributes, and + * outputs a key identifier to the newly created key. + * -# The attribute structure is now no longer necessary. + * You may call psa_reset_key_attributes(), although this is optional + * with the workflow presented here because the attributes currently + * defined in this specification do not require any additional resources + * beyond the structure itself. + * + * A typical sequence to query a key's attributes is as follows: + * -# Call psa_get_key_attributes(). + * -# Call `psa_get_key_xxx` functions to retrieve the attribute(s) that + * you are interested in. + * -# Call psa_reset_key_attributes() to free any resources that may be + * used by the attribute structure. + * + * Once a key has been created, it is impossible to change its attributes. + */ +typedef struct psa_key_attributes_s psa_key_attributes_t; + + +#ifndef __DOXYGEN_ONLY__ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C) +/* Mbed TLS defines this type in crypto_types.h because it is also + * visible to applications through an implementation-specific extension. + * For the PSA Cryptography specification, this type is only visible + * via crypto_se_driver.h. */ +typedef uint64_t psa_key_slot_number_t; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C */ +#endif /* !__DOXYGEN_ONLY__ */ + +/**@}*/ + +/** \defgroup derivation Key derivation + * @{ + */ + +/** \brief Encoding of the step of a key derivation. + * + * Values of this type are generally constructed by macros called + * `PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_xxx`. + */ +typedef uint16_t psa_key_derivation_step_t; + +/** \brief Custom parameters for key generation or key derivation. + * + * This is a structure type with at least the following fields: + * + * - \c flags: an unsigned integer type. 0 for the default production parameters. + * - \c data: a flexible array of bytes. + * + * The interpretation of this structure depend on the type of the + * created key. + * + * - #PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR: + * - \c flags: must be 0. + * - \c data: the public exponent, in little-endian order. + * This must be an odd integer and must not be 1. + * Implementations must support 65537, should support 3 and may + * support other values. + * When not using a driver, Mbed TLS supports values up to \c INT_MAX. + * If this is empty or if the custom production parameters are omitted + * altogether, the default value 65537 is used. + * - Other key types: reserved for future use. \c flags must be 0. + * + */ +#ifndef __cplusplus +typedef struct psa_key_production_parameters_s psa_key_production_parameters_t; +#endif + +/**@}*/ + +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_TYPES_H */ diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_values.h b/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_values.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..1d678dbfc29c --- /dev/null +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_values.h @@ -0,0 +1,2783 @@ +/** + * \file psa/crypto_values.h + * + * \brief PSA cryptography module: macros to build and analyze integer values. + * + * \note This file may not be included directly. Applications must + * include psa/crypto.h. Drivers must include the appropriate driver + * header file. + * + * This file contains portable definitions of macros to build and analyze + * values of integral types that encode properties of cryptographic keys, + * designations of cryptographic algorithms, and error codes returned by + * the library. + * + * Note that many of the constants defined in this file are embedded in + * the persistent key store, as part of key metadata (including usage + * policies). As a consequence, they must not be changed (unless the storage + * format version changes). + * + * This header file only defines preprocessor macros. + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +#ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_VALUES_H +#define PSA_CRYPTO_VALUES_H +#include "mbedtls/private_access.h" + +/** \defgroup error Error codes + * @{ + */ + +/* PSA error codes */ + +/* Error codes are standardized across PSA domains (framework, crypto, storage, + * etc.). Do not change the values in this section or even the expansions + * of each macro: it must be possible to `#include` both this header + * and some other PSA component's headers in the same C source, + * which will lead to duplicate definitions of the `PSA_SUCCESS` and + * `PSA_ERROR_xxx` macros, which is ok if and only if the macros expand + * to the same sequence of tokens. + * + * If you must add a new + * value, check with the Arm PSA framework group to pick one that other + * domains aren't already using. */ + +/* Tell uncrustify not to touch the constant definitions, otherwise + * it might change the spacing to something that is not PSA-compliant + * (e.g. adding a space after casts). + * + * *INDENT-OFF* + */ + +/** The action was completed successfully. */ +#define PSA_SUCCESS ((psa_status_t)0) + +/** An error occurred that does not correspond to any defined + * failure cause. + * + * Implementations may use this error code if none of the other standard + * error codes are applicable. */ +#define PSA_ERROR_GENERIC_ERROR ((psa_status_t)-132) + +/** The requested operation or a parameter is not supported + * by this implementation. + * + * Implementations should return this error code when an enumeration + * parameter such as a key type, algorithm, etc. is not recognized. + * If a combination of parameters is recognized and identified as + * not valid, return #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT instead. */ +#define PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ((psa_status_t)-134) + +/** The requested action is denied by a policy. + * + * Implementations should return this error code when the parameters + * are recognized as valid and supported, and a policy explicitly + * denies the requested operation. + * + * If a subset of the parameters of a function call identify a + * forbidden operation, and another subset of the parameters are + * not valid or not supported, it is unspecified whether the function + * returns #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED, #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED or + * #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT. */ +#define PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED ((psa_status_t)-133) + +/** An output buffer is too small. + * + * Applications can call the \c PSA_xxx_SIZE macro listed in the function + * description to determine a sufficient buffer size. + * + * Implementations should preferably return this error code only + * in cases when performing the operation with a larger output + * buffer would succeed. However implementations may return this + * error if a function has invalid or unsupported parameters in addition + * to the parameters that determine the necessary output buffer size. */ +#define PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ((psa_status_t)-138) + +/** Asking for an item that already exists + * + * Implementations should return this error, when attempting + * to write an item (like a key) that already exists. */ +#define PSA_ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS ((psa_status_t)-139) + +/** Asking for an item that doesn't exist + * + * Implementations should return this error, if a requested item (like + * a key) does not exist. */ +#define PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST ((psa_status_t)-140) + +/** The requested action cannot be performed in the current state. + * + * Multipart operations return this error when one of the + * functions is called out of sequence. Refer to the function + * descriptions for permitted sequencing of functions. + * + * Implementations shall not return this error code to indicate + * that a key either exists or not, + * but shall instead return #PSA_ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS or #PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST + * as applicable. + * + * Implementations shall not return this error code to indicate that a + * key identifier is invalid, but shall return #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE + * instead. */ +#define PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE ((psa_status_t)-137) + +/** The parameters passed to the function are invalid. + * + * Implementations may return this error any time a parameter or + * combination of parameters are recognized as invalid. + * + * Implementations shall not return this error code to indicate that a + * key identifier is invalid, but shall return #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE + * instead. + */ +#define PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ((psa_status_t)-135) + +/** There is not enough runtime memory. + * + * If the action is carried out across multiple security realms, this + * error can refer to available memory in any of the security realms. */ +#define PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY ((psa_status_t)-141) + +/** There is not enough persistent storage. + * + * Functions that modify the key storage return this error code if + * there is insufficient storage space on the host media. In addition, + * many functions that do not otherwise access storage may return this + * error code if the implementation requires a mandatory log entry for + * the requested action and the log storage space is full. */ +#define PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_STORAGE ((psa_status_t)-142) + +/** There was a communication failure inside the implementation. + * + * This can indicate a communication failure between the application + * and an external cryptoprocessor or between the cryptoprocessor and + * an external volatile or persistent memory. A communication failure + * may be transient or permanent depending on the cause. + * + * \warning If a function returns this error, it is undetermined + * whether the requested action has completed or not. Implementations + * should return #PSA_SUCCESS on successful completion whenever + * possible, however functions may return #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE + * if the requested action was completed successfully in an external + * cryptoprocessor but there was a breakdown of communication before + * the cryptoprocessor could report the status to the application. + */ +#define PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE ((psa_status_t)-145) + +/** There was a storage failure that may have led to data loss. + * + * This error indicates that some persistent storage is corrupted. + * It should not be used for a corruption of volatile memory + * (use #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED), for a communication error + * between the cryptoprocessor and its external storage (use + * #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE), or when the storage is + * in a valid state but is full (use #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_STORAGE). + * + * Note that a storage failure does not indicate that any data that was + * previously read is invalid. However this previously read data may no + * longer be readable from storage. + * + * When a storage failure occurs, it is no longer possible to ensure + * the global integrity of the keystore. Depending on the global + * integrity guarantees offered by the implementation, access to other + * data may or may not fail even if the data is still readable but + * its integrity cannot be guaranteed. + * + * Implementations should only use this error code to report a + * permanent storage corruption. However application writers should + * keep in mind that transient errors while reading the storage may be + * reported using this error code. */ +#define PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE ((psa_status_t)-146) + +/** A hardware failure was detected. + * + * A hardware failure may be transient or permanent depending on the + * cause. */ +#define PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE ((psa_status_t)-147) + +/** A tampering attempt was detected. + * + * If an application receives this error code, there is no guarantee + * that previously accessed or computed data was correct and remains + * confidential. Applications should not perform any security function + * and should enter a safe failure state. + * + * Implementations may return this error code if they detect an invalid + * state that cannot happen during normal operation and that indicates + * that the implementation's security guarantees no longer hold. Depending + * on the implementation architecture and on its security and safety goals, + * the implementation may forcibly terminate the application. + * + * This error code is intended as a last resort when a security breach + * is detected and it is unsure whether the keystore data is still + * protected. Implementations shall only return this error code + * to report an alarm from a tampering detector, to indicate that + * the confidentiality of stored data can no longer be guaranteed, + * or to indicate that the integrity of previously returned data is now + * considered compromised. Implementations shall not use this error code + * to indicate a hardware failure that merely makes it impossible to + * perform the requested operation (use #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE, + * #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE, #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE, + * #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY or other applicable error code + * instead). + * + * This error indicates an attack against the application. Implementations + * shall not return this error code as a consequence of the behavior of + * the application itself. */ +#define PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED ((psa_status_t)-151) + +/** There is not enough entropy to generate random data needed + * for the requested action. + * + * This error indicates a failure of a hardware random generator. + * Application writers should note that this error can be returned not + * only by functions whose purpose is to generate random data, such + * as key, IV or nonce generation, but also by functions that execute + * an algorithm with a randomized result, as well as functions that + * use randomization of intermediate computations as a countermeasure + * to certain attacks. + * + * Implementations should avoid returning this error after psa_crypto_init() + * has succeeded. Implementations should generate sufficient + * entropy during initialization and subsequently use a cryptographically + * secure pseudorandom generator (PRNG). However implementations may return + * this error at any time if a policy requires the PRNG to be reseeded + * during normal operation. */ +#define PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY ((psa_status_t)-148) + +/** The signature, MAC or hash is incorrect. + * + * Verification functions return this error if the verification + * calculations completed successfully, and the value to be verified + * was determined to be incorrect. + * + * If the value to verify has an invalid size, implementations may return + * either #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT or #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE. */ +#define PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE ((psa_status_t)-149) + +/** The decrypted padding is incorrect. + * + * \warning In some protocols, when decrypting data, it is essential that + * the behavior of the application does not depend on whether the padding + * is correct, down to precise timing. Applications should prefer + * protocols that use authenticated encryption rather than plain + * encryption. If the application must perform a decryption of + * unauthenticated data, the application writer should take care not + * to reveal whether the padding is invalid. + * + * Implementations should strive to make valid and invalid padding + * as close as possible to indistinguishable to an external observer. + * In particular, the timing of a decryption operation should not + * depend on the validity of the padding. */ +#define PSA_ERROR_INVALID_PADDING ((psa_status_t)-150) + +/** Return this error when there's insufficient data when attempting + * to read from a resource. */ +#define PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_DATA ((psa_status_t)-143) + +/** This can be returned if a function can no longer operate correctly. + * For example, if an essential initialization operation failed or + * a mutex operation failed. */ +#define PSA_ERROR_SERVICE_FAILURE ((psa_status_t)-144) + +/** The key identifier is not valid. See also :ref:\`key-handles\`. + */ +#define PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE ((psa_status_t)-136) + +/** Stored data has been corrupted. + * + * This error indicates that some persistent storage has suffered corruption. + * It does not indicate the following situations, which have specific error + * codes: + * + * - A corruption of volatile memory - use #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED. + * - A communication error between the cryptoprocessor and its external + * storage - use #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE. + * - When the storage is in a valid state but is full - use + * #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_STORAGE. + * - When the storage fails for other reasons - use + * #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE. + * - When the stored data is not valid - use #PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID. + * + * \note A storage corruption does not indicate that any data that was + * previously read is invalid. However this previously read data might no + * longer be readable from storage. + * + * When a storage failure occurs, it is no longer possible to ensure the + * global integrity of the keystore. + */ +#define PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT ((psa_status_t)-152) + +/** Data read from storage is not valid for the implementation. + * + * This error indicates that some data read from storage does not have a valid + * format. It does not indicate the following situations, which have specific + * error codes: + * + * - When the storage or stored data is corrupted - use #PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT + * - When the storage fails for other reasons - use #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE + * - An invalid argument to the API - use #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * + * This error is typically a result of either storage corruption on a + * cleartext storage backend, or an attempt to read data that was + * written by an incompatible version of the library. + */ +#define PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID ((psa_status_t)-153) + +/** The function that returns this status is defined as interruptible and + * still has work to do, thus the user should call the function again with the + * same operation context until it either returns #PSA_SUCCESS or any other + * error. This is not an error per se, more a notification of status. + */ +#define PSA_OPERATION_INCOMPLETE ((psa_status_t)-248) + +/* *INDENT-ON* */ + +/**@}*/ + +/** \defgroup crypto_types Key and algorithm types + * @{ + */ + +/* Note that key type values, including ECC family and DH group values, are + * embedded in the persistent key store, as part of key metadata. As a + * consequence, they must not be changed (unless the storage format version + * changes). + */ + +/** An invalid key type value. + * + * Zero is not the encoding of any key type. + */ +#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE ((psa_key_type_t) 0x0000) + +/** Vendor-defined key type flag. + * + * Key types defined by this standard will never have the + * #PSA_KEY_TYPE_VENDOR_FLAG bit set. Vendors who define additional key types + * must use an encoding with the #PSA_KEY_TYPE_VENDOR_FLAG bit set and should + * respect the bitwise structure used by standard encodings whenever practical. + */ +#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_VENDOR_FLAG ((psa_key_type_t) 0x8000) + +#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_MASK ((psa_key_type_t) 0x7000) +#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_RAW ((psa_key_type_t) 0x1000) +#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_SYMMETRIC ((psa_key_type_t) 0x2000) +#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_PUBLIC_KEY ((psa_key_type_t) 0x4000) +#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_KEY_PAIR ((psa_key_type_t) 0x7000) + +#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_FLAG_PAIR ((psa_key_type_t) 0x3000) + +/** Whether a key type is vendor-defined. + * + * See also #PSA_KEY_TYPE_VENDOR_FLAG. + */ +#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_VENDOR_DEFINED(type) \ + (((type) & PSA_KEY_TYPE_VENDOR_FLAG) != 0) + +/** Whether a key type is an unstructured array of bytes. + * + * This encompasses both symmetric keys and non-key data. + */ +#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_UNSTRUCTURED(type) \ + (((type) & PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_MASK) == PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_RAW || \ + ((type) & PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_MASK) == PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_SYMMETRIC) + +/** Whether a key type is asymmetric: either a key pair or a public key. */ +#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ASYMMETRIC(type) \ + (((type) & PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_MASK \ + & ~PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_FLAG_PAIR) == \ + PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_PUBLIC_KEY) +/** Whether a key type is the public part of a key pair. */ +#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_PUBLIC_KEY(type) \ + (((type) & PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_MASK) == PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_PUBLIC_KEY) +/** Whether a key type is a key pair containing a private part and a public + * part. */ +#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_KEY_PAIR(type) \ + (((type) & PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_MASK) == PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_KEY_PAIR) +/** The key pair type corresponding to a public key type. + * + * You may also pass a key pair type as \p type, it will be left unchanged. + * + * \param type A public key type or key pair type. + * + * \return The corresponding key pair type. + * If \p type is not a public key or a key pair, + * the return value is undefined. + */ +#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_KEY_PAIR_OF_PUBLIC_KEY(type) \ + ((type) | PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_FLAG_PAIR) +/** The public key type corresponding to a key pair type. + * + * You may also pass a public key type as \p type, it will be left unchanged. + * + * \param type A public key type or key pair type. + * + * \return The corresponding public key type. + * If \p type is not a public key or a key pair, + * the return value is undefined. + */ +#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_PUBLIC_KEY_OF_KEY_PAIR(type) \ + ((type) & ~PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_FLAG_PAIR) + +/** Raw data. + * + * A "key" of this type cannot be used for any cryptographic operation. + * Applications may use this type to store arbitrary data in the keystore. */ +#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA ((psa_key_type_t) 0x1001) + +/** HMAC key. + * + * The key policy determines which underlying hash algorithm the key can be + * used for. + * + * HMAC keys should generally have the same size as the underlying hash. + * This size can be calculated with #PSA_HASH_LENGTH(\c alg) where + * \c alg is the HMAC algorithm or the underlying hash algorithm. */ +#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC ((psa_key_type_t) 0x1100) + +/** A secret for key derivation. + * + * This key type is for high-entropy secrets only. For low-entropy secrets, + * #PSA_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD should be used instead. + * + * These keys can be used as the #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET or + * #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_PASSWORD input of key derivation algorithms. + * + * The key policy determines which key derivation algorithm the key + * can be used for. + */ +#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE ((psa_key_type_t) 0x1200) + +/** A low-entropy secret for password hashing or key derivation. + * + * This key type is suitable for passwords and passphrases which are typically + * intended to be memorizable by humans, and have a low entropy relative to + * their size. It can be used for randomly generated or derived keys with + * maximum or near-maximum entropy, but #PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE is more suitable + * for such keys. It is not suitable for passwords with extremely low entropy, + * such as numerical PINs. + * + * These keys can be used as the #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_PASSWORD input of + * key derivation algorithms. Algorithms that accept such an input were + * designed to accept low-entropy secret and are known as password hashing or + * key stretching algorithms. + * + * These keys cannot be used as the #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET input of + * key derivation algorithms, as the algorithms that take such an input expect + * it to be high-entropy. + * + * The key policy determines which key derivation algorithm the key can be + * used for, among the permissible subset defined above. + */ +#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD ((psa_key_type_t) 0x1203) + +/** A secret value that can be used to verify a password hash. + * + * The key policy determines which key derivation algorithm the key + * can be used for, among the same permissible subset as for + * #PSA_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD. + */ +#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD_HASH ((psa_key_type_t) 0x1205) + +/** A secret value that can be used in when computing a password hash. + * + * The key policy determines which key derivation algorithm the key + * can be used for, among the subset of algorithms that can use pepper. + */ +#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_PEPPER ((psa_key_type_t) 0x1206) + +/** Key for a cipher, AEAD or MAC algorithm based on the AES block cipher. + * + * The size of the key can be 16 bytes (AES-128), 24 bytes (AES-192) or + * 32 bytes (AES-256). + */ +#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES ((psa_key_type_t) 0x2400) + +/** Key for a cipher, AEAD or MAC algorithm based on the + * ARIA block cipher. */ +#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA ((psa_key_type_t) 0x2406) + +/** Key for a cipher or MAC algorithm based on DES or 3DES (Triple-DES). + * + * The size of the key can be 64 bits (single DES), 128 bits (2-key 3DES) or + * 192 bits (3-key 3DES). + * + * Note that single DES and 2-key 3DES are weak and strongly + * deprecated and should only be used to decrypt legacy data. 3-key 3DES + * is weak and deprecated and should only be used in legacy protocols. + */ +#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES ((psa_key_type_t) 0x2301) + +/** Key for a cipher, AEAD or MAC algorithm based on the + * Camellia block cipher. */ +#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA ((psa_key_type_t) 0x2403) + +/** Key for the ChaCha20 stream cipher or the Chacha20-Poly1305 AEAD algorithm. + * + * ChaCha20 and the ChaCha20_Poly1305 construction are defined in RFC 7539. + * + * \note For ChaCha20 and ChaCha20_Poly1305, Mbed TLS only supports + * 12-byte nonces. + * + * \note For ChaCha20, the initial counter value is 0. To encrypt or decrypt + * with the initial counter value 1, you can process and discard a + * 64-byte block before the real data. + */ +#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 ((psa_key_type_t) 0x2004) + +/** RSA public key. + * + * The size of an RSA key is the bit size of the modulus. + */ +#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY ((psa_key_type_t) 0x4001) +/** RSA key pair (private and public key). + * + * The size of an RSA key is the bit size of the modulus. + */ +#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR ((psa_key_type_t) 0x7001) +/** Whether a key type is an RSA key (pair or public-only). */ +#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_RSA(type) \ + (PSA_KEY_TYPE_PUBLIC_KEY_OF_KEY_PAIR(type) == PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY) + +#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY_BASE ((psa_key_type_t) 0x4100) +#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_BASE ((psa_key_type_t) 0x7100) +#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_CURVE_MASK ((psa_key_type_t) 0x00ff) +/** Elliptic curve key pair. + * + * The size of an elliptic curve key is the bit size associated with the curve, + * i.e. the bit size of *q* for a curve over a field *Fq*. + * See the documentation of `PSA_ECC_FAMILY_xxx` curve families for details. + * + * \param curve A value of type ::psa_ecc_family_t that + * identifies the ECC curve to be used. + */ +#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(curve) \ + (PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_BASE | (curve)) +/** Elliptic curve public key. + * + * The size of an elliptic curve public key is the same as the corresponding + * private key (see #PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR and the documentation of + * `PSA_ECC_FAMILY_xxx` curve families). + * + * \param curve A value of type ::psa_ecc_family_t that + * identifies the ECC curve to be used. + */ +#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(curve) \ + (PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY_BASE | (curve)) + +/** Whether a key type is an elliptic curve key (pair or public-only). */ +#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC(type) \ + ((PSA_KEY_TYPE_PUBLIC_KEY_OF_KEY_PAIR(type) & \ + ~PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_CURVE_MASK) == PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY_BASE) +/** Whether a key type is an elliptic curve key pair. */ +#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC_KEY_PAIR(type) \ + (((type) & ~PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_CURVE_MASK) == \ + PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_BASE) +/** Whether a key type is an elliptic curve public key. */ +#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(type) \ + (((type) & ~PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_CURVE_MASK) == \ + PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY_BASE) + +/** Extract the curve from an elliptic curve key type. */ +#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_GET_FAMILY(type) \ + ((psa_ecc_family_t) (PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC(type) ? \ + ((type) & PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_CURVE_MASK) : \ + 0)) + +/** Check if the curve of given family is Weierstrass elliptic curve. */ +#define PSA_ECC_FAMILY_IS_WEIERSTRASS(family) ((family & 0xc0) == 0) + +/** SEC Koblitz curves over prime fields. + * + * This family comprises the following curves: + * secp192k1, secp224k1, secp256k1. + * They are defined in _Standards for Efficient Cryptography_, + * _SEC 2: Recommended Elliptic Curve Domain Parameters_. + * https://www.secg.org/sec2-v2.pdf + * + * \note For secp224k1, the bit-size is 225 (size of a private value). + * + * \note Mbed TLS only supports secp192k1 and secp256k1. + */ +#define PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1 ((psa_ecc_family_t) 0x17) + +/** SEC random curves over prime fields. + * + * This family comprises the following curves: + * secp192r1, secp224r1, secp256r1, secp384r1, secp521r1. + * They are defined in _Standards for Efficient Cryptography_, + * _SEC 2: Recommended Elliptic Curve Domain Parameters_. + * https://www.secg.org/sec2-v2.pdf + */ +#define PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1 ((psa_ecc_family_t) 0x12) +/* SECP160R2 (SEC2 v1, obsolete, not supported in Mbed TLS) */ +#define PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2 ((psa_ecc_family_t) 0x1b) + +/** SEC Koblitz curves over binary fields. + * + * This family comprises the following curves: + * sect163k1, sect233k1, sect239k1, sect283k1, sect409k1, sect571k1. + * They are defined in _Standards for Efficient Cryptography_, + * _SEC 2: Recommended Elliptic Curve Domain Parameters_. + * https://www.secg.org/sec2-v2.pdf + * + * \note Mbed TLS does not support any curve in this family. + */ +#define PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1 ((psa_ecc_family_t) 0x27) + +/** SEC random curves over binary fields. + * + * This family comprises the following curves: + * sect163r1, sect233r1, sect283r1, sect409r1, sect571r1. + * They are defined in _Standards for Efficient Cryptography_, + * _SEC 2: Recommended Elliptic Curve Domain Parameters_. + * https://www.secg.org/sec2-v2.pdf + * + * \note Mbed TLS does not support any curve in this family. + */ +#define PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1 ((psa_ecc_family_t) 0x22) + +/** SEC additional random curves over binary fields. + * + * This family comprises the following curve: + * sect163r2. + * It is defined in _Standards for Efficient Cryptography_, + * _SEC 2: Recommended Elliptic Curve Domain Parameters_. + * https://www.secg.org/sec2-v2.pdf + * + * \note Mbed TLS does not support any curve in this family. + */ +#define PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2 ((psa_ecc_family_t) 0x2b) + +/** Brainpool P random curves. + * + * This family comprises the following curves: + * brainpoolP160r1, brainpoolP192r1, brainpoolP224r1, brainpoolP256r1, + * brainpoolP320r1, brainpoolP384r1, brainpoolP512r1. + * It is defined in RFC 5639. + * + * \note Mbed TLS only supports the 256-bit, 384-bit and 512-bit curves + * in this family. + */ +#define PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1 ((psa_ecc_family_t) 0x30) + +/** Curve25519 and Curve448. + * + * This family comprises the following Montgomery curves: + * - 255-bit: Bernstein et al., + * _Curve25519: new Diffie-Hellman speed records_, LNCS 3958, 2006. + * The algorithm #PSA_ALG_ECDH performs X25519 when used with this curve. + * - 448-bit: Hamburg, + * _Ed448-Goldilocks, a new elliptic curve_, NIST ECC Workshop, 2015. + * The algorithm #PSA_ALG_ECDH performs X448 when used with this curve. + */ +#define PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY ((psa_ecc_family_t) 0x41) + +/** The twisted Edwards curves Ed25519 and Ed448. + * + * These curves are suitable for EdDSA (#PSA_ALG_PURE_EDDSA for both curves, + * #PSA_ALG_ED25519PH for the 255-bit curve, + * #PSA_ALG_ED448PH for the 448-bit curve). + * + * This family comprises the following twisted Edwards curves: + * - 255-bit: Edwards25519, the twisted Edwards curve birationally equivalent + * to Curve25519. + * Bernstein et al., _Twisted Edwards curves_, Africacrypt 2008. + * - 448-bit: Edwards448, the twisted Edwards curve birationally equivalent + * to Curve448. + * Hamburg, _Ed448-Goldilocks, a new elliptic curve_, NIST ECC Workshop, 2015. + * + * \note Mbed TLS does not support Edwards curves yet. + */ +#define PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS ((psa_ecc_family_t) 0x42) + +#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_PUBLIC_KEY_BASE ((psa_key_type_t) 0x4200) +#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_BASE ((psa_key_type_t) 0x7200) +#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_GROUP_MASK ((psa_key_type_t) 0x00ff) +/** Diffie-Hellman key pair. + * + * \param group A value of type ::psa_dh_family_t that identifies the + * Diffie-Hellman group to be used. + */ +#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR(group) \ + (PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_BASE | (group)) +/** Diffie-Hellman public key. + * + * \param group A value of type ::psa_dh_family_t that identifies the + * Diffie-Hellman group to be used. + */ +#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_PUBLIC_KEY(group) \ + (PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_PUBLIC_KEY_BASE | (group)) + +/** Whether a key type is a Diffie-Hellman key (pair or public-only). */ +#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_DH(type) \ + ((PSA_KEY_TYPE_PUBLIC_KEY_OF_KEY_PAIR(type) & \ + ~PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_GROUP_MASK) == PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_PUBLIC_KEY_BASE) +/** Whether a key type is a Diffie-Hellman key pair. */ +#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_DH_KEY_PAIR(type) \ + (((type) & ~PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_GROUP_MASK) == \ + PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_BASE) +/** Whether a key type is a Diffie-Hellman public key. */ +#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_DH_PUBLIC_KEY(type) \ + (((type) & ~PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_GROUP_MASK) == \ + PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_PUBLIC_KEY_BASE) + +/** Extract the group from a Diffie-Hellman key type. */ +#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_GET_FAMILY(type) \ + ((psa_dh_family_t) (PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_DH(type) ? \ + ((type) & PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_GROUP_MASK) : \ + 0)) + +/** Diffie-Hellman groups defined in RFC 7919 Appendix A. + * + * This family includes groups with the following key sizes (in bits): + * 2048, 3072, 4096, 6144, 8192. A given implementation may support + * all of these sizes or only a subset. + */ +#define PSA_DH_FAMILY_RFC7919 ((psa_dh_family_t) 0x03) + +#define PSA_GET_KEY_TYPE_BLOCK_SIZE_EXPONENT(type) \ + (((type) >> 8) & 7) +/** The block size of a block cipher. + * + * \param type A cipher key type (value of type #psa_key_type_t). + * + * \return The block size for a block cipher, or 1 for a stream cipher. + * The return value is undefined if \p type is not a supported + * cipher key type. + * + * \note It is possible to build stream cipher algorithms on top of a block + * cipher, for example CTR mode (#PSA_ALG_CTR). + * This macro only takes the key type into account, so it cannot be + * used to determine the size of the data that #psa_cipher_update() + * might buffer for future processing in general. + * + * \note This macro returns a compile-time constant if its argument is one. + * + * \warning This macro may evaluate its argument multiple times. + */ +#define PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_LENGTH(type) \ + (((type) & PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_MASK) == PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_SYMMETRIC ? \ + 1u << PSA_GET_KEY_TYPE_BLOCK_SIZE_EXPONENT(type) : \ + 0u) + +/* Note that algorithm values are embedded in the persistent key store, + * as part of key metadata. As a consequence, they must not be changed + * (unless the storage format version changes). + */ + +/** Vendor-defined algorithm flag. + * + * Algorithms defined by this standard will never have the #PSA_ALG_VENDOR_FLAG + * bit set. Vendors who define additional algorithms must use an encoding with + * the #PSA_ALG_VENDOR_FLAG bit set and should respect the bitwise structure + * used by standard encodings whenever practical. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_VENDOR_FLAG ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x80000000) + +#define PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_MASK ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x7f000000) +#define PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_HASH ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x02000000) +#define PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_MAC ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x03000000) +#define PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_CIPHER ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x04000000) +#define PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_AEAD ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x05000000) +#define PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_SIGN ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x06000000) +#define PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_ASYMMETRIC_ENCRYPTION ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x07000000) +#define PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_KEY_DERIVATION ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x08000000) +#define PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_KEY_AGREEMENT ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x09000000) + +/** Whether an algorithm is vendor-defined. + * + * See also #PSA_ALG_VENDOR_FLAG. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_IS_VENDOR_DEFINED(alg) \ + (((alg) & PSA_ALG_VENDOR_FLAG) != 0) + +/** Whether the specified algorithm is a hash algorithm. + * + * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t). + * + * \return 1 if \p alg is a hash algorithm, 0 otherwise. + * This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \p alg is not a supported + * algorithm identifier. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(alg) \ + (((alg) & PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_MASK) == PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_HASH) + +/** Whether the specified algorithm is a MAC algorithm. + * + * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t). + * + * \return 1 if \p alg is a MAC algorithm, 0 otherwise. + * This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \p alg is not a supported + * algorithm identifier. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_IS_MAC(alg) \ + (((alg) & PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_MASK) == PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_MAC) + +/** Whether the specified algorithm is a symmetric cipher algorithm. + * + * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t). + * + * \return 1 if \p alg is a symmetric cipher algorithm, 0 otherwise. + * This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \p alg is not a supported + * algorithm identifier. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_IS_CIPHER(alg) \ + (((alg) & PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_MASK) == PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_CIPHER) + +/** Whether the specified algorithm is an authenticated encryption + * with associated data (AEAD) algorithm. + * + * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t). + * + * \return 1 if \p alg is an AEAD algorithm, 0 otherwise. + * This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \p alg is not a supported + * algorithm identifier. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD(alg) \ + (((alg) & PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_MASK) == PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_AEAD) + +/** Whether the specified algorithm is an asymmetric signature algorithm, + * also known as public-key signature algorithm. + * + * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t). + * + * \return 1 if \p alg is an asymmetric signature algorithm, 0 otherwise. + * This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \p alg is not a supported + * algorithm identifier. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_IS_SIGN(alg) \ + (((alg) & PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_MASK) == PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_SIGN) + +/** Whether the specified algorithm is an asymmetric encryption algorithm, + * also known as public-key encryption algorithm. + * + * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t). + * + * \return 1 if \p alg is an asymmetric encryption algorithm, 0 otherwise. + * This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \p alg is not a supported + * algorithm identifier. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_IS_ASYMMETRIC_ENCRYPTION(alg) \ + (((alg) & PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_MASK) == PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_ASYMMETRIC_ENCRYPTION) + +/** Whether the specified algorithm is a key agreement algorithm. + * + * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t). + * + * \return 1 if \p alg is a key agreement algorithm, 0 otherwise. + * This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \p alg is not a supported + * algorithm identifier. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_AGREEMENT(alg) \ + (((alg) & PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_MASK) == PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_KEY_AGREEMENT) + +/** Whether the specified algorithm is a key derivation algorithm. + * + * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t). + * + * \return 1 if \p alg is a key derivation algorithm, 0 otherwise. + * This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \p alg is not a supported + * algorithm identifier. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_DERIVATION(alg) \ + (((alg) & PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_MASK) == PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_KEY_DERIVATION) + +/** Whether the specified algorithm is a key stretching / password hashing + * algorithm. + * + * A key stretching / password hashing algorithm is a key derivation algorithm + * that is suitable for use with a low-entropy secret such as a password. + * Equivalently, it's a key derivation algorithm that uses a + * #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_PASSWORD input step. + * + * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t). + * + * \return 1 if \p alg is a key stretching / password hashing algorithm, 0 + * otherwise. This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \p alg is not a + * supported algorithm identifier. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_DERIVATION_STRETCHING(alg) \ + (PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_DERIVATION(alg) && \ + (alg) & PSA_ALG_KEY_DERIVATION_STRETCHING_FLAG) + +/** An invalid algorithm identifier value. */ +/* *INDENT-OFF* (https://github.com/ARM-software/psa-arch-tests/issues/337) */ +#define PSA_ALG_NONE ((psa_algorithm_t)0) +/* *INDENT-ON* */ + +#define PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x000000ff) +/** MD5 */ +#define PSA_ALG_MD5 ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x02000003) +/** PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160 */ +#define PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160 ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x02000004) +/** SHA1 */ +#define PSA_ALG_SHA_1 ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x02000005) +/** SHA2-224 */ +#define PSA_ALG_SHA_224 ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x02000008) +/** SHA2-256 */ +#define PSA_ALG_SHA_256 ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x02000009) +/** SHA2-384 */ +#define PSA_ALG_SHA_384 ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x0200000a) +/** SHA2-512 */ +#define PSA_ALG_SHA_512 ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x0200000b) +/** SHA2-512/224 */ +#define PSA_ALG_SHA_512_224 ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x0200000c) +/** SHA2-512/256 */ +#define PSA_ALG_SHA_512_256 ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x0200000d) +/** SHA3-224 */ +#define PSA_ALG_SHA3_224 ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x02000010) +/** SHA3-256 */ +#define PSA_ALG_SHA3_256 ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x02000011) +/** SHA3-384 */ +#define PSA_ALG_SHA3_384 ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x02000012) +/** SHA3-512 */ +#define PSA_ALG_SHA3_512 ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x02000013) +/** The first 512 bits (64 bytes) of the SHAKE256 output. + * + * This is the prehashing for Ed448ph (see #PSA_ALG_ED448PH). For other + * scenarios where a hash function based on SHA3/SHAKE is desired, SHA3-512 + * has the same output size and a (theoretically) higher security strength. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_SHAKE256_512 ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x02000015) + +/** In a hash-and-sign algorithm policy, allow any hash algorithm. + * + * This value may be used to form the algorithm usage field of a policy + * for a signature algorithm that is parametrized by a hash. The key + * may then be used to perform operations using the same signature + * algorithm parametrized with any supported hash. + * + * That is, suppose that `PSA_xxx_SIGNATURE` is one of the following macros: + * - #PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN, #PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS, #PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT, + * - #PSA_ALG_ECDSA, #PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA. + * Then you may create and use a key as follows: + * - Set the key usage field using #PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH, for example: + * ``` + * psa_set_key_usage_flags(&attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH); // or VERIFY + * psa_set_key_algorithm(&attributes, PSA_xxx_SIGNATURE(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH)); + * ``` + * - Import or generate key material. + * - Call psa_sign_hash() or psa_verify_hash(), passing + * an algorithm built from `PSA_xxx_SIGNATURE` and a specific hash. Each + * call to sign or verify a message may use a different hash. + * ``` + * psa_sign_hash(key, PSA_xxx_SIGNATURE(PSA_ALG_SHA_256), ...); + * psa_sign_hash(key, PSA_xxx_SIGNATURE(PSA_ALG_SHA_512), ...); + * psa_sign_hash(key, PSA_xxx_SIGNATURE(PSA_ALG_SHA3_256), ...); + * ``` + * + * This value may not be used to build other algorithms that are + * parametrized over a hash. For any valid use of this macro to build + * an algorithm \c alg, #PSA_ALG_IS_HASH_AND_SIGN(\c alg) is true. + * + * This value may not be used to build an algorithm specification to + * perform an operation. It is only valid to build policies. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x020000ff) + +#define PSA_ALG_MAC_SUBCATEGORY_MASK ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x00c00000) +#define PSA_ALG_HMAC_BASE ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x03800000) +/** Macro to build an HMAC algorithm. + * + * For example, #PSA_ALG_HMAC(#PSA_ALG_SHA_256) is HMAC-SHA-256. + * + * \param hash_alg A hash algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that + * #PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(\p hash_alg) is true). + * + * \return The corresponding HMAC algorithm. + * \return Unspecified if \p hash_alg is not a supported + * hash algorithm. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_HMAC(hash_alg) \ + (PSA_ALG_HMAC_BASE | ((hash_alg) & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK)) + +#define PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(hmac_alg) \ + (PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_HASH | ((hmac_alg) & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK)) + +/** Whether the specified algorithm is an HMAC algorithm. + * + * HMAC is a family of MAC algorithms that are based on a hash function. + * + * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t). + * + * \return 1 if \p alg is an HMAC algorithm, 0 otherwise. + * This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \p alg is not a supported + * algorithm identifier. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_IS_HMAC(alg) \ + (((alg) & (PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_MASK | PSA_ALG_MAC_SUBCATEGORY_MASK)) == \ + PSA_ALG_HMAC_BASE) + +/* In the encoding of a MAC algorithm, the bits corresponding to + * PSA_ALG_MAC_TRUNCATION_MASK encode the length to which the MAC is + * truncated. As an exception, the value 0 means the untruncated algorithm, + * whatever its length is. The length is encoded in 6 bits, so it can + * reach up to 63; the largest MAC is 64 bytes so its trivial truncation + * to full length is correctly encoded as 0 and any non-trivial truncation + * is correctly encoded as a value between 1 and 63. */ +#define PSA_ALG_MAC_TRUNCATION_MASK ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x003f0000) +#define PSA_MAC_TRUNCATION_OFFSET 16 + +/* In the encoding of a MAC algorithm, the bit corresponding to + * #PSA_ALG_MAC_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_FLAG encodes the fact that the algorithm + * is a wildcard algorithm. A key with such wildcard algorithm as permitted + * algorithm policy can be used with any algorithm corresponding to the + * same base class and having a (potentially truncated) MAC length greater or + * equal than the one encoded in #PSA_ALG_MAC_TRUNCATION_MASK. */ +#define PSA_ALG_MAC_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_FLAG ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x00008000) + +/** Macro to build a truncated MAC algorithm. + * + * A truncated MAC algorithm is identical to the corresponding MAC + * algorithm except that the MAC value for the truncated algorithm + * consists of only the first \p mac_length bytes of the MAC value + * for the untruncated algorithm. + * + * \note This macro may allow constructing algorithm identifiers that + * are not valid, either because the specified length is larger + * than the untruncated MAC or because the specified length is + * smaller than permitted by the implementation. + * + * \note It is implementation-defined whether a truncated MAC that + * is truncated to the same length as the MAC of the untruncated + * algorithm is considered identical to the untruncated algorithm + * for policy comparison purposes. + * + * \param mac_alg A MAC algorithm identifier (value of type + * #psa_algorithm_t such that #PSA_ALG_IS_MAC(\p mac_alg) + * is true). This may be a truncated or untruncated + * MAC algorithm. + * \param mac_length Desired length of the truncated MAC in bytes. + * This must be at most the full length of the MAC + * and must be at least an implementation-specified + * minimum. The implementation-specified minimum + * shall not be zero. + * + * \return The corresponding MAC algorithm with the specified + * length. + * \return Unspecified if \p mac_alg is not a supported + * MAC algorithm or if \p mac_length is too small or + * too large for the specified MAC algorithm. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(mac_alg, mac_length) \ + (((mac_alg) & ~(PSA_ALG_MAC_TRUNCATION_MASK | \ + PSA_ALG_MAC_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_FLAG)) | \ + ((mac_length) << PSA_MAC_TRUNCATION_OFFSET & PSA_ALG_MAC_TRUNCATION_MASK)) + +/** Macro to build the base MAC algorithm corresponding to a truncated + * MAC algorithm. + * + * \param mac_alg A MAC algorithm identifier (value of type + * #psa_algorithm_t such that #PSA_ALG_IS_MAC(\p mac_alg) + * is true). This may be a truncated or untruncated + * MAC algorithm. + * + * \return The corresponding base MAC algorithm. + * \return Unspecified if \p mac_alg is not a supported + * MAC algorithm. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_FULL_LENGTH_MAC(mac_alg) \ + ((mac_alg) & ~(PSA_ALG_MAC_TRUNCATION_MASK | \ + PSA_ALG_MAC_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_FLAG)) + +/** Length to which a MAC algorithm is truncated. + * + * \param mac_alg A MAC algorithm identifier (value of type + * #psa_algorithm_t such that #PSA_ALG_IS_MAC(\p mac_alg) + * is true). + * + * \return Length of the truncated MAC in bytes. + * \return 0 if \p mac_alg is a non-truncated MAC algorithm. + * \return Unspecified if \p mac_alg is not a supported + * MAC algorithm. + */ +#define PSA_MAC_TRUNCATED_LENGTH(mac_alg) \ + (((mac_alg) & PSA_ALG_MAC_TRUNCATION_MASK) >> PSA_MAC_TRUNCATION_OFFSET) + +/** Macro to build a MAC minimum-MAC-length wildcard algorithm. + * + * A minimum-MAC-length MAC wildcard algorithm permits all MAC algorithms + * sharing the same base algorithm, and where the (potentially truncated) MAC + * length of the specific algorithm is equal to or larger then the wildcard + * algorithm's minimum MAC length. + * + * \note When setting the minimum required MAC length to less than the + * smallest MAC length allowed by the base algorithm, this effectively + * becomes an 'any-MAC-length-allowed' policy for that base algorithm. + * + * \param mac_alg A MAC algorithm identifier (value of type + * #psa_algorithm_t such that #PSA_ALG_IS_MAC(\p mac_alg) + * is true). + * \param min_mac_length Desired minimum length of the message authentication + * code in bytes. This must be at most the untruncated + * length of the MAC and must be at least 1. + * + * \return The corresponding MAC wildcard algorithm with the + * specified minimum length. + * \return Unspecified if \p mac_alg is not a supported MAC + * algorithm or if \p min_mac_length is less than 1 or + * too large for the specified MAC algorithm. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(mac_alg, min_mac_length) \ + (PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(mac_alg, min_mac_length) | \ + PSA_ALG_MAC_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_FLAG) + +#define PSA_ALG_CIPHER_MAC_BASE ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x03c00000) +/** The CBC-MAC construction over a block cipher + * + * \warning CBC-MAC is insecure in many cases. + * A more secure mode, such as #PSA_ALG_CMAC, is recommended. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x03c00100) +/** The CMAC construction over a block cipher */ +#define PSA_ALG_CMAC ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x03c00200) + +/** Whether the specified algorithm is a MAC algorithm based on a block cipher. + * + * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t). + * + * \return 1 if \p alg is a MAC algorithm based on a block cipher, 0 otherwise. + * This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \p alg is not a supported + * algorithm identifier. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_IS_BLOCK_CIPHER_MAC(alg) \ + (((alg) & (PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_MASK | PSA_ALG_MAC_SUBCATEGORY_MASK)) == \ + PSA_ALG_CIPHER_MAC_BASE) + +#define PSA_ALG_CIPHER_STREAM_FLAG ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x00800000) +#define PSA_ALG_CIPHER_FROM_BLOCK_FLAG ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x00400000) + +/** Whether the specified algorithm is a stream cipher. + * + * A stream cipher is a symmetric cipher that encrypts or decrypts messages + * by applying a bitwise-xor with a stream of bytes that is generated + * from a key. + * + * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t). + * + * \return 1 if \p alg is a stream cipher algorithm, 0 otherwise. + * This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \p alg is not a supported + * algorithm identifier or if it is not a symmetric cipher algorithm. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_IS_STREAM_CIPHER(alg) \ + (((alg) & (PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_MASK | PSA_ALG_CIPHER_STREAM_FLAG)) == \ + (PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_CIPHER | PSA_ALG_CIPHER_STREAM_FLAG)) + +/** The stream cipher mode of a stream cipher algorithm. + * + * The underlying stream cipher is determined by the key type. + * - To use ChaCha20, use a key type of #PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x04800100) + +/** The CTR stream cipher mode. + * + * CTR is a stream cipher which is built from a block cipher. + * The underlying block cipher is determined by the key type. + * For example, to use AES-128-CTR, use this algorithm with + * a key of type #PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES and a length of 128 bits (16 bytes). + */ +#define PSA_ALG_CTR ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x04c01000) + +/** The CFB stream cipher mode. + * + * The underlying block cipher is determined by the key type. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_CFB ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x04c01100) + +/** The OFB stream cipher mode. + * + * The underlying block cipher is determined by the key type. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_OFB ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x04c01200) + +/** The XTS cipher mode. + * + * XTS is a cipher mode which is built from a block cipher. It requires at + * least one full block of input, but beyond this minimum the input + * does not need to be a whole number of blocks. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_XTS ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x0440ff00) + +/** The Electronic Code Book (ECB) mode of a block cipher, with no padding. + * + * \warning ECB mode does not protect the confidentiality of the encrypted data + * except in extremely narrow circumstances. It is recommended that applications + * only use ECB if they need to construct an operating mode that the + * implementation does not provide. Implementations are encouraged to provide + * the modes that applications need in preference to supporting direct access + * to ECB. + * + * The underlying block cipher is determined by the key type. + * + * This symmetric cipher mode can only be used with messages whose lengths are a + * multiple of the block size of the chosen block cipher. + * + * ECB mode does not accept an initialization vector (IV). When using a + * multi-part cipher operation with this algorithm, psa_cipher_generate_iv() + * and psa_cipher_set_iv() must not be called. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x04404400) + +/** The CBC block cipher chaining mode, with no padding. + * + * The underlying block cipher is determined by the key type. + * + * This symmetric cipher mode can only be used with messages whose lengths + * are whole number of blocks for the chosen block cipher. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x04404000) + +/** The CBC block cipher chaining mode with PKCS#7 padding. + * + * The underlying block cipher is determined by the key type. + * + * This is the padding method defined by PKCS#7 (RFC 2315) §10.3. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_CBC_PKCS7 ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x04404100) + +#define PSA_ALG_AEAD_FROM_BLOCK_FLAG ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x00400000) + +/** Whether the specified algorithm is an AEAD mode on a block cipher. + * + * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t). + * + * \return 1 if \p alg is an AEAD algorithm which is an AEAD mode based on + * a block cipher, 0 otherwise. + * This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \p alg is not a supported + * algorithm identifier. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD_ON_BLOCK_CIPHER(alg) \ + (((alg) & (PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_MASK | PSA_ALG_AEAD_FROM_BLOCK_FLAG)) == \ + (PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_AEAD | PSA_ALG_AEAD_FROM_BLOCK_FLAG)) + +/** The CCM authenticated encryption algorithm. + * + * The underlying block cipher is determined by the key type. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_CCM ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x05500100) + +/** The CCM* cipher mode without authentication. + * + * This is CCM* as specified in IEEE 802.15.4 §7, with a tag length of 0. + * For CCM* with a nonzero tag length, use the AEAD algorithm #PSA_ALG_CCM. + * + * The underlying block cipher is determined by the key type. + * + * Currently only 13-byte long IV's are supported. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x04c01300) + +/** The GCM authenticated encryption algorithm. + * + * The underlying block cipher is determined by the key type. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_GCM ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x05500200) + +/** The Chacha20-Poly1305 AEAD algorithm. + * + * The ChaCha20_Poly1305 construction is defined in RFC 7539. + * + * Implementations must support 12-byte nonces, may support 8-byte nonces, + * and should reject other sizes. + * + * Implementations must support 16-byte tags and should reject other sizes. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305 ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x05100500) + +/* In the encoding of an AEAD algorithm, the bits corresponding to + * PSA_ALG_AEAD_TAG_LENGTH_MASK encode the length of the AEAD tag. + * The constants for default lengths follow this encoding. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_AEAD_TAG_LENGTH_MASK ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x003f0000) +#define PSA_AEAD_TAG_LENGTH_OFFSET 16 + +/* In the encoding of an AEAD algorithm, the bit corresponding to + * #PSA_ALG_AEAD_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_FLAG encodes the fact that the algorithm + * is a wildcard algorithm. A key with such wildcard algorithm as permitted + * algorithm policy can be used with any algorithm corresponding to the + * same base class and having a tag length greater than or equal to the one + * encoded in #PSA_ALG_AEAD_TAG_LENGTH_MASK. */ +#define PSA_ALG_AEAD_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_FLAG ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x00008000) + +/** Macro to build a shortened AEAD algorithm. + * + * A shortened AEAD algorithm is similar to the corresponding AEAD + * algorithm, but has an authentication tag that consists of fewer bytes. + * Depending on the algorithm, the tag length may affect the calculation + * of the ciphertext. + * + * \param aead_alg An AEAD algorithm identifier (value of type + * #psa_algorithm_t such that #PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD(\p aead_alg) + * is true). + * \param tag_length Desired length of the authentication tag in bytes. + * + * \return The corresponding AEAD algorithm with the specified + * length. + * \return Unspecified if \p aead_alg is not a supported + * AEAD algorithm or if \p tag_length is not valid + * for the specified AEAD algorithm. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(aead_alg, tag_length) \ + (((aead_alg) & ~(PSA_ALG_AEAD_TAG_LENGTH_MASK | \ + PSA_ALG_AEAD_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_FLAG)) | \ + ((tag_length) << PSA_AEAD_TAG_LENGTH_OFFSET & \ + PSA_ALG_AEAD_TAG_LENGTH_MASK)) + +/** Retrieve the tag length of a specified AEAD algorithm + * + * \param aead_alg An AEAD algorithm identifier (value of type + * #psa_algorithm_t such that #PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD(\p aead_alg) + * is true). + * + * \return The tag length specified by the input algorithm. + * \return Unspecified if \p aead_alg is not a supported + * AEAD algorithm. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_AEAD_GET_TAG_LENGTH(aead_alg) \ + (((aead_alg) & PSA_ALG_AEAD_TAG_LENGTH_MASK) >> \ + PSA_AEAD_TAG_LENGTH_OFFSET) + +/** Calculate the corresponding AEAD algorithm with the default tag length. + * + * \param aead_alg An AEAD algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that + * #PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD(\p aead_alg) is true). + * + * \return The corresponding AEAD algorithm with the default + * tag length for that algorithm. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_DEFAULT_LENGTH_TAG(aead_alg) \ + ( \ + PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_DEFAULT_LENGTH_TAG_CASE(aead_alg, PSA_ALG_CCM) \ + PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_DEFAULT_LENGTH_TAG_CASE(aead_alg, PSA_ALG_GCM) \ + PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_DEFAULT_LENGTH_TAG_CASE(aead_alg, PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305) \ + 0) +#define PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_DEFAULT_LENGTH_TAG_CASE(aead_alg, ref) \ + PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(aead_alg, 0) == \ + PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(ref, 0) ? \ + ref : + +/** Macro to build an AEAD minimum-tag-length wildcard algorithm. + * + * A minimum-tag-length AEAD wildcard algorithm permits all AEAD algorithms + * sharing the same base algorithm, and where the tag length of the specific + * algorithm is equal to or larger then the minimum tag length specified by the + * wildcard algorithm. + * + * \note When setting the minimum required tag length to less than the + * smallest tag length allowed by the base algorithm, this effectively + * becomes an 'any-tag-length-allowed' policy for that base algorithm. + * + * \param aead_alg An AEAD algorithm identifier (value of type + * #psa_algorithm_t such that + * #PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD(\p aead_alg) is true). + * \param min_tag_length Desired minimum length of the authentication tag in + * bytes. This must be at least 1 and at most the largest + * allowed tag length of the algorithm. + * + * \return The corresponding AEAD wildcard algorithm with the + * specified minimum length. + * \return Unspecified if \p aead_alg is not a supported + * AEAD algorithm or if \p min_tag_length is less than 1 + * or too large for the specified AEAD algorithm. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(aead_alg, min_tag_length) \ + (PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(aead_alg, min_tag_length) | \ + PSA_ALG_AEAD_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_FLAG) + +#define PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_BASE ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x06000200) +/** RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 signature with hashing. + * + * This is the signature scheme defined by RFC 8017 + * (PKCS#1: RSA Cryptography Specifications) under the name + * RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5. + * + * \param hash_alg A hash algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that + * #PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(\p hash_alg) is true). + * This includes #PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH + * when specifying the algorithm in a usage policy. + * + * \return The corresponding RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 signature algorithm. + * \return Unspecified if \p hash_alg is not a supported + * hash algorithm. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(hash_alg) \ + (PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_BASE | ((hash_alg) & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK)) +/** Raw PKCS#1 v1.5 signature. + * + * The input to this algorithm is the DigestInfo structure used by + * RFC 8017 (PKCS#1: RSA Cryptography Specifications), §9.2 + * steps 3–6. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_BASE +#define PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(alg) \ + (((alg) & ~PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK) == PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_BASE) + +#define PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_BASE ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x06000300) +#define PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT_BASE ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x06001300) +/** RSA PSS signature with hashing. + * + * This is the signature scheme defined by RFC 8017 + * (PKCS#1: RSA Cryptography Specifications) under the name + * RSASSA-PSS, with the message generation function MGF1, and with + * a salt length equal to the length of the hash, or the largest + * possible salt length for the algorithm and key size if that is + * smaller than the hash length. The specified hash algorithm is + * used to hash the input message, to create the salted hash, and + * for the mask generation. + * + * \param hash_alg A hash algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that + * #PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(\p hash_alg) is true). + * This includes #PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH + * when specifying the algorithm in a usage policy. + * + * \return The corresponding RSA PSS signature algorithm. + * \return Unspecified if \p hash_alg is not a supported + * hash algorithm. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(hash_alg) \ + (PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_BASE | ((hash_alg) & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK)) + +/** RSA PSS signature with hashing with relaxed verification. + * + * This algorithm has the same behavior as #PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS when signing, + * but allows an arbitrary salt length (including \c 0) when verifying a + * signature. + * + * \param hash_alg A hash algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that + * #PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(\p hash_alg) is true). + * This includes #PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH + * when specifying the algorithm in a usage policy. + * + * \return The corresponding RSA PSS signature algorithm. + * \return Unspecified if \p hash_alg is not a supported + * hash algorithm. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(hash_alg) \ + (PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT_BASE | ((hash_alg) & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK)) + +/** Whether the specified algorithm is RSA PSS with standard salt. + * + * \param alg An algorithm value or an algorithm policy wildcard. + * + * \return 1 if \p alg is of the form + * #PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(\c hash_alg), + * where \c hash_alg is a hash algorithm or + * #PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH. 0 otherwise. + * This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \p alg is not + * a supported algorithm identifier or policy. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_PSS_STANDARD_SALT(alg) \ + (((alg) & ~PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK) == PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_BASE) + +/** Whether the specified algorithm is RSA PSS with any salt. + * + * \param alg An algorithm value or an algorithm policy wildcard. + * + * \return 1 if \p alg is of the form + * #PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT_BASE(\c hash_alg), + * where \c hash_alg is a hash algorithm or + * #PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH. 0 otherwise. + * This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \p alg is not + * a supported algorithm identifier or policy. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(alg) \ + (((alg) & ~PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK) == PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT_BASE) + +/** Whether the specified algorithm is RSA PSS. + * + * This includes any of the RSA PSS algorithm variants, regardless of the + * constraints on salt length. + * + * \param alg An algorithm value or an algorithm policy wildcard. + * + * \return 1 if \p alg is of the form + * #PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(\c hash_alg) or + * #PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT_BASE(\c hash_alg), + * where \c hash_alg is a hash algorithm or + * #PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH. 0 otherwise. + * This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \p alg is not + * a supported algorithm identifier or policy. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_PSS(alg) \ + (PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_PSS_STANDARD_SALT(alg) || \ + PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(alg)) + +#define PSA_ALG_ECDSA_BASE ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x06000600) +/** ECDSA signature with hashing. + * + * This is the ECDSA signature scheme defined by ANSI X9.62, + * with a random per-message secret number (*k*). + * + * The representation of the signature as a byte string consists of + * the concatenation of the signature values *r* and *s*. Each of + * *r* and *s* is encoded as an *N*-octet string, where *N* is the length + * of the base point of the curve in octets. Each value is represented + * in big-endian order (most significant octet first). + * + * \param hash_alg A hash algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that + * #PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(\p hash_alg) is true). + * This includes #PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH + * when specifying the algorithm in a usage policy. + * + * \return The corresponding ECDSA signature algorithm. + * \return Unspecified if \p hash_alg is not a supported + * hash algorithm. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_ECDSA(hash_alg) \ + (PSA_ALG_ECDSA_BASE | ((hash_alg) & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK)) +/** ECDSA signature without hashing. + * + * This is the same signature scheme as #PSA_ALG_ECDSA(), but + * without specifying a hash algorithm. This algorithm may only be + * used to sign or verify a sequence of bytes that should be an + * already-calculated hash. Note that the input is padded with + * zeros on the left or truncated on the left as required to fit + * the curve size. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY PSA_ALG_ECDSA_BASE +#define PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA_BASE ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x06000700) +/** Deterministic ECDSA signature with hashing. + * + * This is the deterministic ECDSA signature scheme defined by RFC 6979. + * + * The representation of a signature is the same as with #PSA_ALG_ECDSA(). + * + * Note that when this algorithm is used for verification, signatures + * made with randomized ECDSA (#PSA_ALG_ECDSA(\p hash_alg)) with the + * same private key are accepted. In other words, + * #PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(\p hash_alg) differs from + * #PSA_ALG_ECDSA(\p hash_alg) only for signature, not for verification. + * + * \param hash_alg A hash algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that + * #PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(\p hash_alg) is true). + * This includes #PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH + * when specifying the algorithm in a usage policy. + * + * \return The corresponding deterministic ECDSA signature + * algorithm. + * \return Unspecified if \p hash_alg is not a supported + * hash algorithm. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(hash_alg) \ + (PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA_BASE | ((hash_alg) & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK)) +#define PSA_ALG_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC_FLAG ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x00000100) +#define PSA_ALG_IS_ECDSA(alg) \ + (((alg) & ~PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK & ~PSA_ALG_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC_FLAG) == \ + PSA_ALG_ECDSA_BASE) +#define PSA_ALG_ECDSA_IS_DETERMINISTIC(alg) \ + (((alg) & PSA_ALG_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC_FLAG) != 0) +#define PSA_ALG_IS_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(alg) \ + (PSA_ALG_IS_ECDSA(alg) && PSA_ALG_ECDSA_IS_DETERMINISTIC(alg)) +#define PSA_ALG_IS_RANDOMIZED_ECDSA(alg) \ + (PSA_ALG_IS_ECDSA(alg) && !PSA_ALG_ECDSA_IS_DETERMINISTIC(alg)) + +/** Edwards-curve digital signature algorithm without prehashing (PureEdDSA), + * using standard parameters. + * + * Contexts are not supported in the current version of this specification + * because there is no suitable signature interface that can take the + * context as a parameter. A future version of this specification may add + * suitable functions and extend this algorithm to support contexts. + * + * PureEdDSA requires an elliptic curve key on a twisted Edwards curve. + * In this specification, the following curves are supported: + * - #PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS, 255-bit: Ed25519 as specified + * in RFC 8032. + * The curve is Edwards25519. + * The hash function used internally is SHA-512. + * - #PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS, 448-bit: Ed448 as specified + * in RFC 8032. + * The curve is Edwards448. + * The hash function used internally is the first 114 bytes of the + * SHAKE256 output. + * + * This algorithm can be used with psa_sign_message() and + * psa_verify_message(). Since there is no prehashing, it cannot be used + * with psa_sign_hash() or psa_verify_hash(). + * + * The signature format is the concatenation of R and S as defined by + * RFC 8032 §5.1.6 and §5.2.6 (a 64-byte string for Ed25519, a 114-byte + * string for Ed448). + */ +#define PSA_ALG_PURE_EDDSA ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x06000800) + +#define PSA_ALG_HASH_EDDSA_BASE ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x06000900) +#define PSA_ALG_IS_HASH_EDDSA(alg) \ + (((alg) & ~PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK) == PSA_ALG_HASH_EDDSA_BASE) + +/** Edwards-curve digital signature algorithm with prehashing (HashEdDSA), + * using SHA-512 and the Edwards25519 curve. + * + * See #PSA_ALG_PURE_EDDSA regarding context support and the signature format. + * + * This algorithm is Ed25519 as specified in RFC 8032. + * The curve is Edwards25519. + * The prehash is SHA-512. + * The hash function used internally is SHA-512. + * + * This is a hash-and-sign algorithm: to calculate a signature, + * you can either: + * - call psa_sign_message() on the message; + * - or calculate the SHA-512 hash of the message + * with psa_hash_compute() + * or with a multi-part hash operation started with psa_hash_setup(), + * using the hash algorithm #PSA_ALG_SHA_512, + * then sign the calculated hash with psa_sign_hash(). + * Verifying a signature is similar, using psa_verify_message() or + * psa_verify_hash() instead of the signature function. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_ED25519PH \ + (PSA_ALG_HASH_EDDSA_BASE | (PSA_ALG_SHA_512 & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK)) + +/** Edwards-curve digital signature algorithm with prehashing (HashEdDSA), + * using SHAKE256 and the Edwards448 curve. + * + * See #PSA_ALG_PURE_EDDSA regarding context support and the signature format. + * + * This algorithm is Ed448 as specified in RFC 8032. + * The curve is Edwards448. + * The prehash is the first 64 bytes of the SHAKE256 output. + * The hash function used internally is the first 114 bytes of the + * SHAKE256 output. + * + * This is a hash-and-sign algorithm: to calculate a signature, + * you can either: + * - call psa_sign_message() on the message; + * - or calculate the first 64 bytes of the SHAKE256 output of the message + * with psa_hash_compute() + * or with a multi-part hash operation started with psa_hash_setup(), + * using the hash algorithm #PSA_ALG_SHAKE256_512, + * then sign the calculated hash with psa_sign_hash(). + * Verifying a signature is similar, using psa_verify_message() or + * psa_verify_hash() instead of the signature function. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_ED448PH \ + (PSA_ALG_HASH_EDDSA_BASE | (PSA_ALG_SHAKE256_512 & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK)) + +/* Default definition, to be overridden if the library is extended with + * more hash-and-sign algorithms that we want to keep out of this header + * file. */ +#define PSA_ALG_IS_VENDOR_HASH_AND_SIGN(alg) 0 + +/** Whether the specified algorithm is a signature algorithm that can be used + * with psa_sign_hash() and psa_verify_hash(). + * + * This encompasses all strict hash-and-sign algorithms categorized by + * PSA_ALG_IS_HASH_AND_SIGN(), as well as algorithms that follow the + * paradigm more loosely: + * - #PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW (expects its input to be an encoded hash) + * - #PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY (doesn't specify what kind of hash the input is) + * + * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type psa_algorithm_t). + * + * \return 1 if alg is a signature algorithm that can be used to sign a + * hash. 0 if alg is a signature algorithm that can only be used + * to sign a message. 0 if alg is not a signature algorithm. + * This macro can return either 0 or 1 if alg is not a + * supported algorithm identifier. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_IS_SIGN_HASH(alg) \ + (PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_PSS(alg) || PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(alg) || \ + PSA_ALG_IS_ECDSA(alg) || PSA_ALG_IS_HASH_EDDSA(alg) || \ + PSA_ALG_IS_VENDOR_HASH_AND_SIGN(alg)) + +/** Whether the specified algorithm is a signature algorithm that can be used + * with psa_sign_message() and psa_verify_message(). + * + * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t). + * + * \return 1 if alg is a signature algorithm that can be used to sign a + * message. 0 if \p alg is a signature algorithm that can only be used + * to sign an already-calculated hash. 0 if \p alg is not a signature + * algorithm. This macro can return either 0 or 1 if \p alg is not a + * supported algorithm identifier. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_IS_SIGN_MESSAGE(alg) \ + (PSA_ALG_IS_SIGN_HASH(alg) || (alg) == PSA_ALG_PURE_EDDSA) + +/** Whether the specified algorithm is a hash-and-sign algorithm. + * + * Hash-and-sign algorithms are asymmetric (public-key) signature algorithms + * structured in two parts: first the calculation of a hash in a way that + * does not depend on the key, then the calculation of a signature from the + * hash value and the key. Hash-and-sign algorithms encode the hash + * used for the hashing step, and you can call #PSA_ALG_SIGN_GET_HASH + * to extract this algorithm. + * + * Thus, for a hash-and-sign algorithm, + * `psa_sign_message(key, alg, input, ...)` is equivalent to + * ``` + * psa_hash_compute(PSA_ALG_SIGN_GET_HASH(alg), input, ..., hash, ...); + * psa_sign_hash(key, alg, hash, ..., signature, ...); + * ``` + * Most usefully, separating the hash from the signature allows the hash + * to be calculated in multiple steps with psa_hash_setup(), psa_hash_update() + * and psa_hash_finish(). Likewise psa_verify_message() is equivalent to + * calculating the hash and then calling psa_verify_hash(). + * + * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t). + * + * \return 1 if \p alg is a hash-and-sign algorithm, 0 otherwise. + * This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \p alg is not a supported + * algorithm identifier. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_IS_HASH_AND_SIGN(alg) \ + (PSA_ALG_IS_SIGN_HASH(alg) && \ + ((alg) & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK) != 0) + +/** Get the hash used by a hash-and-sign signature algorithm. + * + * A hash-and-sign algorithm is a signature algorithm which is + * composed of two phases: first a hashing phase which does not use + * the key and produces a hash of the input message, then a signing + * phase which only uses the hash and the key and not the message + * itself. + * + * \param alg A signature algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that + * #PSA_ALG_IS_SIGN(\p alg) is true). + * + * \return The underlying hash algorithm if \p alg is a hash-and-sign + * algorithm. + * \return 0 if \p alg is a signature algorithm that does not + * follow the hash-and-sign structure. + * \return Unspecified if \p alg is not a signature algorithm or + * if it is not supported by the implementation. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_SIGN_GET_HASH(alg) \ + (PSA_ALG_IS_HASH_AND_SIGN(alg) ? \ + ((alg) & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK) | PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_HASH : \ + 0) + +/** RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 encryption. + * + * \warning Calling psa_asymmetric_decrypt() with this algorithm as a + * parameter is considered an inherently dangerous function + * (CWE-242). Unless it is used in a side channel free and safe + * way (eg. implementing the TLS protocol as per 7.4.7.1 of + * RFC 5246), the calling code is vulnerable. + * + */ +#define PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x07000200) + +#define PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP_BASE ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x07000300) +/** RSA OAEP encryption. + * + * This is the encryption scheme defined by RFC 8017 + * (PKCS#1: RSA Cryptography Specifications) under the name + * RSAES-OAEP, with the message generation function MGF1. + * + * \param hash_alg The hash algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that + * #PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(\p hash_alg) is true) to use + * for MGF1. + * + * \return The corresponding RSA OAEP encryption algorithm. + * \return Unspecified if \p hash_alg is not a supported + * hash algorithm. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(hash_alg) \ + (PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP_BASE | ((hash_alg) & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK)) +#define PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_OAEP(alg) \ + (((alg) & ~PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK) == PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP_BASE) +#define PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP_GET_HASH(alg) \ + (PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_OAEP(alg) ? \ + ((alg) & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK) | PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_HASH : \ + 0) + +#define PSA_ALG_HKDF_BASE ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x08000100) +/** Macro to build an HKDF algorithm. + * + * For example, `PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)` is HKDF using HMAC-SHA-256. + * + * This key derivation algorithm uses the following inputs: + * - #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SALT is the salt used in the "extract" step. + * It is optional; if omitted, the derivation uses an empty salt. + * - #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET is the secret key used in the "extract" step. + * - #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_INFO is the info string used in the "expand" step. + * You must pass #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SALT before #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET. + * You may pass #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_INFO at any time after steup and before + * starting to generate output. + * + * \warning HKDF processes the salt as follows: first hash it with hash_alg + * if the salt is longer than the block size of the hash algorithm; then + * pad with null bytes up to the block size. As a result, it is possible + * for distinct salt inputs to result in the same outputs. To ensure + * unique outputs, it is recommended to use a fixed length for salt values. + * + * \param hash_alg A hash algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that + * #PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(\p hash_alg) is true). + * + * \return The corresponding HKDF algorithm. + * \return Unspecified if \p hash_alg is not a supported + * hash algorithm. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_HKDF(hash_alg) \ + (PSA_ALG_HKDF_BASE | ((hash_alg) & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK)) +/** Whether the specified algorithm is an HKDF algorithm. + * + * HKDF is a family of key derivation algorithms that are based on a hash + * function and the HMAC construction. + * + * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t). + * + * \return 1 if \c alg is an HKDF algorithm, 0 otherwise. + * This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \c alg is not a supported + * key derivation algorithm identifier. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_IS_HKDF(alg) \ + (((alg) & ~PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK) == PSA_ALG_HKDF_BASE) +#define PSA_ALG_HKDF_GET_HASH(hkdf_alg) \ + (PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_HASH | ((hkdf_alg) & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK)) + +#define PSA_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT_BASE ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x08000400) +/** Macro to build an HKDF-Extract algorithm. + * + * For example, `PSA_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)` is + * HKDF-Extract using HMAC-SHA-256. + * + * This key derivation algorithm uses the following inputs: + * - PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SALT is the salt. + * - PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET is the input keying material used in the + * "extract" step. + * The inputs are mandatory and must be passed in the order above. + * Each input may only be passed once. + * + * \warning HKDF-Extract is not meant to be used on its own. PSA_ALG_HKDF + * should be used instead if possible. PSA_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT is provided + * as a separate algorithm for the sake of protocols that use it as a + * building block. It may also be a slight performance optimization + * in applications that use HKDF with the same salt and key but many + * different info strings. + * + * \warning HKDF processes the salt as follows: first hash it with hash_alg + * if the salt is longer than the block size of the hash algorithm; then + * pad with null bytes up to the block size. As a result, it is possible + * for distinct salt inputs to result in the same outputs. To ensure + * unique outputs, it is recommended to use a fixed length for salt values. + * + * \param hash_alg A hash algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that + * #PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(\p hash_alg) is true). + * + * \return The corresponding HKDF-Extract algorithm. + * \return Unspecified if \p hash_alg is not a supported + * hash algorithm. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT(hash_alg) \ + (PSA_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT_BASE | ((hash_alg) & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK)) +/** Whether the specified algorithm is an HKDF-Extract algorithm. + * + * HKDF-Extract is a family of key derivation algorithms that are based + * on a hash function and the HMAC construction. + * + * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t). + * + * \return 1 if \c alg is an HKDF-Extract algorithm, 0 otherwise. + * This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \c alg is not a supported + * key derivation algorithm identifier. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_IS_HKDF_EXTRACT(alg) \ + (((alg) & ~PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK) == PSA_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT_BASE) + +#define PSA_ALG_HKDF_EXPAND_BASE ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x08000500) +/** Macro to build an HKDF-Expand algorithm. + * + * For example, `PSA_ALG_HKDF_EXPAND(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)` is + * HKDF-Expand using HMAC-SHA-256. + * + * This key derivation algorithm uses the following inputs: + * - PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET is the pseudorandom key (PRK). + * - PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_INFO is the info string. + * + * The inputs are mandatory and must be passed in the order above. + * Each input may only be passed once. + * + * \warning HKDF-Expand is not meant to be used on its own. `PSA_ALG_HKDF` + * should be used instead if possible. `PSA_ALG_HKDF_EXPAND` is provided as + * a separate algorithm for the sake of protocols that use it as a building + * block. It may also be a slight performance optimization in applications + * that use HKDF with the same salt and key but many different info strings. + * + * \param hash_alg A hash algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that + * #PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(\p hash_alg) is true). + * + * \return The corresponding HKDF-Expand algorithm. + * \return Unspecified if \p hash_alg is not a supported + * hash algorithm. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_HKDF_EXPAND(hash_alg) \ + (PSA_ALG_HKDF_EXPAND_BASE | ((hash_alg) & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK)) +/** Whether the specified algorithm is an HKDF-Expand algorithm. + * + * HKDF-Expand is a family of key derivation algorithms that are based + * on a hash function and the HMAC construction. + * + * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t). + * + * \return 1 if \c alg is an HKDF-Expand algorithm, 0 otherwise. + * This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \c alg is not a supported + * key derivation algorithm identifier. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_IS_HKDF_EXPAND(alg) \ + (((alg) & ~PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK) == PSA_ALG_HKDF_EXPAND_BASE) + +/** Whether the specified algorithm is an HKDF or HKDF-Extract or + * HKDF-Expand algorithm. + * + * + * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t). + * + * \return 1 if \c alg is any HKDF type algorithm, 0 otherwise. + * This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \c alg is not a supported + * key derivation algorithm identifier. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_IS_ANY_HKDF(alg) \ + (((alg) & ~PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK) == PSA_ALG_HKDF_BASE || \ + ((alg) & ~PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK) == PSA_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT_BASE || \ + ((alg) & ~PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK) == PSA_ALG_HKDF_EXPAND_BASE) + +#define PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF_BASE ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x08000200) +/** Macro to build a TLS-1.2 PRF algorithm. + * + * TLS 1.2 uses a custom pseudorandom function (PRF) for key schedule, + * specified in Section 5 of RFC 5246. It is based on HMAC and can be + * used with either SHA-256 or SHA-384. + * + * This key derivation algorithm uses the following inputs, which must be + * passed in the order given here: + * - #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SEED is the seed. + * - #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET is the secret key. + * - #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_LABEL is the label. + * + * For the application to TLS-1.2 key expansion, the seed is the + * concatenation of ServerHello.Random + ClientHello.Random, + * and the label is "key expansion". + * + * For example, `PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)` represents the + * TLS 1.2 PRF using HMAC-SHA-256. + * + * \param hash_alg A hash algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that + * #PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(\p hash_alg) is true). + * + * \return The corresponding TLS-1.2 PRF algorithm. + * \return Unspecified if \p hash_alg is not a supported + * hash algorithm. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(hash_alg) \ + (PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF_BASE | ((hash_alg) & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK)) + +/** Whether the specified algorithm is a TLS-1.2 PRF algorithm. + * + * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t). + * + * \return 1 if \c alg is a TLS-1.2 PRF algorithm, 0 otherwise. + * This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \c alg is not a supported + * key derivation algorithm identifier. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_IS_TLS12_PRF(alg) \ + (((alg) & ~PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK) == PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF_BASE) +#define PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF_GET_HASH(hkdf_alg) \ + (PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_HASH | ((hkdf_alg) & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK)) + +#define PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS_BASE ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x08000300) +/** Macro to build a TLS-1.2 PSK-to-MasterSecret algorithm. + * + * In a pure-PSK handshake in TLS 1.2, the master secret is derived + * from the PreSharedKey (PSK) through the application of padding + * (RFC 4279, Section 2) and the TLS-1.2 PRF (RFC 5246, Section 5). + * The latter is based on HMAC and can be used with either SHA-256 + * or SHA-384. + * + * This key derivation algorithm uses the following inputs, which must be + * passed in the order given here: + * - #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SEED is the seed. + * - #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_OTHER_SECRET is the other secret for the + * computation of the premaster secret. This input is optional; + * if omitted, it defaults to a string of null bytes with the same length + * as the secret (PSK) input. + * - #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET is the secret key. + * - #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_LABEL is the label. + * + * For the application to TLS-1.2, the seed (which is + * forwarded to the TLS-1.2 PRF) is the concatenation of the + * ClientHello.Random + ServerHello.Random, + * the label is "master secret" or "extended master secret" and + * the other secret depends on the key exchange specified in the cipher suite: + * - for a plain PSK cipher suite (RFC 4279, Section 2), omit + * PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_OTHER_SECRET + * - for a DHE-PSK (RFC 4279, Section 3) or ECDHE-PSK cipher suite + * (RFC 5489, Section 2), the other secret should be the output of the + * PSA_ALG_FFDH or PSA_ALG_ECDH key agreement performed with the peer. + * The recommended way to pass this input is to use a key derivation + * algorithm constructed as + * PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(ka_alg, PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(hash_alg)) + * and to call psa_key_derivation_key_agreement(). Alternatively, + * this input may be an output of `psa_raw_key_agreement()` passed with + * psa_key_derivation_input_bytes(), or an equivalent input passed with + * psa_key_derivation_input_bytes() or psa_key_derivation_input_key(). + * - for a RSA-PSK cipher suite (RFC 4279, Section 4), the other secret + * should be the 48-byte client challenge (the PreMasterSecret of + * (RFC 5246, Section 7.4.7.1)) concatenation of the TLS version and + * a 46-byte random string chosen by the client. On the server, this is + * typically an output of psa_asymmetric_decrypt() using + * PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT, passed to the key derivation operation + * with `psa_key_derivation_input_bytes()`. + * + * For example, `PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)` represents the + * TLS-1.2 PSK to MasterSecret derivation PRF using HMAC-SHA-256. + * + * \param hash_alg A hash algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that + * #PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(\p hash_alg) is true). + * + * \return The corresponding TLS-1.2 PSK to MS algorithm. + * \return Unspecified if \p hash_alg is not a supported + * hash algorithm. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(hash_alg) \ + (PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS_BASE | ((hash_alg) & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK)) + +/** Whether the specified algorithm is a TLS-1.2 PSK to MS algorithm. + * + * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t). + * + * \return 1 if \c alg is a TLS-1.2 PSK to MS algorithm, 0 otherwise. + * This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \c alg is not a supported + * key derivation algorithm identifier. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_IS_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(alg) \ + (((alg) & ~PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK) == PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS_BASE) +#define PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS_GET_HASH(hkdf_alg) \ + (PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_HASH | ((hkdf_alg) & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK)) + +/* The TLS 1.2 ECJPAKE-to-PMS KDF. It takes the shared secret K (an EC point + * in case of EC J-PAKE) and calculates SHA256(K.X) that the rest of TLS 1.2 + * will use to derive the session secret, as defined by step 2 of + * https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-cragie-tls-ecjpake-01#section-8.7. + * Uses PSA_ALG_SHA_256. + * This function takes a single input: + * #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET is the shared secret K from EC J-PAKE. + * The only supported curve is secp256r1 (the 256-bit curve in + * #PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1), so the input must be exactly 65 bytes. + * The output has to be read as a single chunk of 32 bytes, defined as + * PSA_TLS12_ECJPAKE_TO_PMS_DATA_SIZE. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_TLS12_ECJPAKE_TO_PMS ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x08000609) + +/* This flag indicates whether the key derivation algorithm is suitable for + * use on low-entropy secrets such as password - these algorithms are also + * known as key stretching or password hashing schemes. These are also the + * algorithms that accepts inputs of type #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_PASSWORD. + * + * Those algorithms cannot be combined with a key agreement algorithm. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_KEY_DERIVATION_STRETCHING_FLAG ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x00800000) + +#define PSA_ALG_PBKDF2_HMAC_BASE ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x08800100) +/** Macro to build a PBKDF2-HMAC password hashing / key stretching algorithm. + * + * PBKDF2 is defined by PKCS#5, republished as RFC 8018 (section 5.2). + * This macro specifies the PBKDF2 algorithm constructed using a PRF based on + * HMAC with the specified hash. + * For example, `PSA_ALG_PBKDF2_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)` specifies PBKDF2 + * using the PRF HMAC-SHA-256. + * + * This key derivation algorithm uses the following inputs, which must be + * provided in the following order: + * - #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_COST is the iteration count. + * This input step must be used exactly once. + * - #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SALT is the salt. + * This input step must be used one or more times; if used several times, the + * inputs will be concatenated. This can be used to build the final salt + * from multiple sources, both public and secret (also known as pepper). + * - #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_PASSWORD is the password to be hashed. + * This input step must be used exactly once. + * + * \param hash_alg A hash algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that + * #PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(\p hash_alg) is true). + * + * \return The corresponding PBKDF2-HMAC-XXX algorithm. + * \return Unspecified if \p hash_alg is not a supported + * hash algorithm. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_PBKDF2_HMAC(hash_alg) \ + (PSA_ALG_PBKDF2_HMAC_BASE | ((hash_alg) & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK)) + +/** Whether the specified algorithm is a PBKDF2-HMAC algorithm. + * + * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t). + * + * \return 1 if \c alg is a PBKDF2-HMAC algorithm, 0 otherwise. + * This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \c alg is not a supported + * key derivation algorithm identifier. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_IS_PBKDF2_HMAC(alg) \ + (((alg) & ~PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK) == PSA_ALG_PBKDF2_HMAC_BASE) +#define PSA_ALG_PBKDF2_HMAC_GET_HASH(pbkdf2_alg) \ + (PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_HASH | ((pbkdf2_alg) & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK)) +/** The PBKDF2-AES-CMAC-PRF-128 password hashing / key stretching algorithm. + * + * PBKDF2 is defined by PKCS#5, republished as RFC 8018 (section 5.2). + * This macro specifies the PBKDF2 algorithm constructed using the + * AES-CMAC-PRF-128 PRF specified by RFC 4615. + * + * This key derivation algorithm uses the same inputs as + * #PSA_ALG_PBKDF2_HMAC() with the same constraints. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_PBKDF2_AES_CMAC_PRF_128 ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x08800200) + +#define PSA_ALG_IS_PBKDF2(kdf_alg) \ + (PSA_ALG_IS_PBKDF2_HMAC(kdf_alg) || \ + ((kdf_alg) == PSA_ALG_PBKDF2_AES_CMAC_PRF_128)) + +#define PSA_ALG_KEY_DERIVATION_MASK ((psa_algorithm_t) 0xfe00ffff) +#define PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT_MASK ((psa_algorithm_t) 0xffff0000) + +/** Macro to build a combined algorithm that chains a key agreement with + * a key derivation. + * + * \param ka_alg A key agreement algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such + * that #PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_AGREEMENT(\p ka_alg) is true). + * \param kdf_alg A key derivation algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such + * that #PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_DERIVATION(\p kdf_alg) is true). + * + * \return The corresponding key agreement and derivation + * algorithm. + * \return Unspecified if \p ka_alg is not a supported + * key agreement algorithm or \p kdf_alg is not a + * supported key derivation algorithm. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(ka_alg, kdf_alg) \ + ((ka_alg) | (kdf_alg)) + +#define PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT_GET_KDF(alg) \ + (((alg) & PSA_ALG_KEY_DERIVATION_MASK) | PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_KEY_DERIVATION) + +#define PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT_GET_BASE(alg) \ + (((alg) & PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT_MASK) | PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_KEY_AGREEMENT) + +/** Whether the specified algorithm is a raw key agreement algorithm. + * + * A raw key agreement algorithm is one that does not specify + * a key derivation function. + * Usually, raw key agreement algorithms are constructed directly with + * a \c PSA_ALG_xxx macro while non-raw key agreement algorithms are + * constructed with #PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(). + * + * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t). + * + * \return 1 if \p alg is a raw key agreement algorithm, 0 otherwise. + * This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \p alg is not a supported + * algorithm identifier. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_IS_RAW_KEY_AGREEMENT(alg) \ + (PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_AGREEMENT(alg) && \ + PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT_GET_KDF(alg) == PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_KEY_DERIVATION) + +#define PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_DERIVATION_OR_AGREEMENT(alg) \ + ((PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_DERIVATION(alg) || PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_AGREEMENT(alg))) + +/** The finite-field Diffie-Hellman (DH) key agreement algorithm. + * + * The shared secret produced by key agreement is + * `g^{ab}` in big-endian format. + * It is `ceiling(m / 8)` bytes long where `m` is the size of the prime `p` + * in bits. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_FFDH ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x09010000) + +/** Whether the specified algorithm is a finite field Diffie-Hellman algorithm. + * + * This includes the raw finite field Diffie-Hellman algorithm as well as + * finite-field Diffie-Hellman followed by any supporter key derivation + * algorithm. + * + * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t). + * + * \return 1 if \c alg is a finite field Diffie-Hellman algorithm, 0 otherwise. + * This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \c alg is not a supported + * key agreement algorithm identifier. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_IS_FFDH(alg) \ + (PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT_GET_BASE(alg) == PSA_ALG_FFDH) + +/** The elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) key agreement algorithm. + * + * The shared secret produced by key agreement is the x-coordinate of + * the shared secret point. It is always `ceiling(m / 8)` bytes long where + * `m` is the bit size associated with the curve, i.e. the bit size of the + * order of the curve's coordinate field. When `m` is not a multiple of 8, + * the byte containing the most significant bit of the shared secret + * is padded with zero bits. The byte order is either little-endian + * or big-endian depending on the curve type. + * + * - For Montgomery curves (curve types `PSA_ECC_FAMILY_CURVEXXX`), + * the shared secret is the x-coordinate of `d_A Q_B = d_B Q_A` + * in little-endian byte order. + * The bit size is 448 for Curve448 and 255 for Curve25519. + * - For Weierstrass curves over prime fields (curve types + * `PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECPXXX` and `PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_PXXX`), + * the shared secret is the x-coordinate of `d_A Q_B = d_B Q_A` + * in big-endian byte order. + * The bit size is `m = ceiling(log_2(p))` for the field `F_p`. + * - For Weierstrass curves over binary fields (curve types + * `PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECTXXX`), + * the shared secret is the x-coordinate of `d_A Q_B = d_B Q_A` + * in big-endian byte order. + * The bit size is `m` for the field `F_{2^m}`. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_ECDH ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x09020000) + +/** Whether the specified algorithm is an elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman + * algorithm. + * + * This includes the raw elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman algorithm as well as + * elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman followed by any supporter key derivation + * algorithm. + * + * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t). + * + * \return 1 if \c alg is an elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman algorithm, + * 0 otherwise. + * This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \c alg is not a supported + * key agreement algorithm identifier. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_IS_ECDH(alg) \ + (PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT_GET_BASE(alg) == PSA_ALG_ECDH) + +/** Whether the specified algorithm encoding is a wildcard. + * + * Wildcard values may only be used to set the usage algorithm field in + * a policy, not to perform an operation. + * + * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t). + * + * \return 1 if \c alg is a wildcard algorithm encoding. + * \return 0 if \c alg is a non-wildcard algorithm encoding (suitable for + * an operation). + * \return This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \c alg is not a supported + * algorithm identifier. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_IS_WILDCARD(alg) \ + (PSA_ALG_IS_HASH_AND_SIGN(alg) ? \ + PSA_ALG_SIGN_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH : \ + PSA_ALG_IS_MAC(alg) ? \ + (alg & PSA_ALG_MAC_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_FLAG) != 0 : \ + PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD(alg) ? \ + (alg & PSA_ALG_AEAD_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_FLAG) != 0 : \ + (alg) == PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH) + +/** Get the hash used by a composite algorithm. + * + * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t). + * + * \return The underlying hash algorithm if alg is a composite algorithm that + * uses a hash algorithm. + * + * \return \c 0 if alg is not a composite algorithm that uses a hash. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_GET_HASH(alg) \ + (((alg) & 0x000000ff) == 0 ? ((psa_algorithm_t) 0) : 0x02000000 | ((alg) & 0x000000ff)) + +/**@}*/ + +/** \defgroup key_lifetimes Key lifetimes + * @{ + */ + +/* Note that location and persistence level values are embedded in the + * persistent key store, as part of key metadata. As a consequence, they + * must not be changed (unless the storage format version changes). + */ + +/** The default lifetime for volatile keys. + * + * A volatile key only exists as long as the identifier to it is not destroyed. + * The key material is guaranteed to be erased on a power reset. + * + * A key with this lifetime is typically stored in the RAM area of the + * PSA Crypto subsystem. However this is an implementation choice. + * If an implementation stores data about the key in a non-volatile memory, + * it must release all the resources associated with the key and erase the + * key material if the calling application terminates. + */ +#define PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_VOLATILE ((psa_key_lifetime_t) 0x00000000) + +/** The default lifetime for persistent keys. + * + * A persistent key remains in storage until it is explicitly destroyed or + * until the corresponding storage area is wiped. This specification does + * not define any mechanism to wipe a storage area, but integrations may + * provide their own mechanism (for example to perform a factory reset, + * to prepare for device refurbishment, or to uninstall an application). + * + * This lifetime value is the default storage area for the calling + * application. Integrations of Mbed TLS may support other persistent lifetimes. + * See ::psa_key_lifetime_t for more information. + */ +#define PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_PERSISTENT ((psa_key_lifetime_t) 0x00000001) + +/** The persistence level of volatile keys. + * + * See ::psa_key_persistence_t for more information. + */ +#define PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_VOLATILE ((psa_key_persistence_t) 0x00) + +/** The default persistence level for persistent keys. + * + * See ::psa_key_persistence_t for more information. + */ +#define PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_DEFAULT ((psa_key_persistence_t) 0x01) + +/** A persistence level indicating that a key is never destroyed. + * + * See ::psa_key_persistence_t for more information. + */ +#define PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_READ_ONLY ((psa_key_persistence_t) 0xff) + +#define PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_PERSISTENCE(lifetime) \ + ((psa_key_persistence_t) ((lifetime) & 0x000000ff)) + +#define PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION(lifetime) \ + ((psa_key_location_t) ((lifetime) >> 8)) + +/** Whether a key lifetime indicates that the key is volatile. + * + * A volatile key is automatically destroyed by the implementation when + * the application instance terminates. In particular, a volatile key + * is automatically destroyed on a power reset of the device. + * + * A key that is not volatile is persistent. Persistent keys are + * preserved until the application explicitly destroys them or until an + * implementation-specific device management event occurs (for example, + * a factory reset). + * + * \param lifetime The lifetime value to query (value of type + * ::psa_key_lifetime_t). + * + * \return \c 1 if the key is volatile, otherwise \c 0. + */ +#define PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_IS_VOLATILE(lifetime) \ + (PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_PERSISTENCE(lifetime) == \ + PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_VOLATILE) + +/** Whether a key lifetime indicates that the key is read-only. + * + * Read-only keys cannot be created or destroyed through the PSA Crypto API. + * They must be created through platform-specific means that bypass the API. + * + * Some platforms may offer ways to destroy read-only keys. For example, + * consider a platform with multiple levels of privilege, where a + * low-privilege application can use a key but is not allowed to destroy + * it, and the platform exposes the key to the application with a read-only + * lifetime. High-privilege code can destroy the key even though the + * application sees the key as read-only. + * + * \param lifetime The lifetime value to query (value of type + * ::psa_key_lifetime_t). + * + * \return \c 1 if the key is read-only, otherwise \c 0. + */ +#define PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_IS_READ_ONLY(lifetime) \ + (PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_PERSISTENCE(lifetime) == \ + PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_READ_ONLY) + +/** Construct a lifetime from a persistence level and a location. + * + * \param persistence The persistence level + * (value of type ::psa_key_persistence_t). + * \param location The location indicator + * (value of type ::psa_key_location_t). + * + * \return The constructed lifetime value. + */ +#define PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_FROM_PERSISTENCE_AND_LOCATION(persistence, location) \ + ((location) << 8 | (persistence)) + +/** The local storage area for persistent keys. + * + * This storage area is available on all systems that can store persistent + * keys without delegating the storage to a third-party cryptoprocessor. + * + * See ::psa_key_location_t for more information. + */ +#define PSA_KEY_LOCATION_LOCAL_STORAGE ((psa_key_location_t) 0x000000) + +#define PSA_KEY_LOCATION_VENDOR_FLAG ((psa_key_location_t) 0x800000) + +/* Note that key identifier values are embedded in the + * persistent key store, as part of key metadata. As a consequence, they + * must not be changed (unless the storage format version changes). + */ + +/** The null key identifier. + */ +/* *INDENT-OFF* (https://github.com/ARM-software/psa-arch-tests/issues/337) */ +#define PSA_KEY_ID_NULL ((psa_key_id_t)0) +/* *INDENT-ON* */ +/** The minimum value for a key identifier chosen by the application. + */ +#define PSA_KEY_ID_USER_MIN ((psa_key_id_t) 0x00000001) +/** The maximum value for a key identifier chosen by the application. + */ +#define PSA_KEY_ID_USER_MAX ((psa_key_id_t) 0x3fffffff) +/** The minimum value for a key identifier chosen by the implementation. + */ +#define PSA_KEY_ID_VENDOR_MIN ((psa_key_id_t) 0x40000000) +/** The maximum value for a key identifier chosen by the implementation. + */ +#define PSA_KEY_ID_VENDOR_MAX ((psa_key_id_t) 0x7fffffff) + + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_KEY_ID_ENCODES_OWNER) + +#define MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT ((psa_key_id_t) 0) +#define MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_GET_KEY_ID(id) (id) +#define MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_GET_OWNER_ID(id) (0) + +/** Utility to initialize a key identifier at runtime. + * + * \param unused Unused parameter. + * \param key_id Identifier of the key. + */ +static inline mbedtls_svc_key_id_t mbedtls_svc_key_id_make( + unsigned int unused, psa_key_id_t key_id) +{ + (void) unused; + + return key_id; +} + +/** Compare two key identifiers. + * + * \param id1 First key identifier. + * \param id2 Second key identifier. + * + * \return Non-zero if the two key identifier are equal, zero otherwise. + */ +static inline int mbedtls_svc_key_id_equal(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t id1, + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t id2) +{ + return id1 == id2; +} + +/** Check whether a key identifier is null. + * + * \param key Key identifier. + * + * \return Non-zero if the key identifier is null, zero otherwise. + */ +static inline int mbedtls_svc_key_id_is_null(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key) +{ + return key == 0; +} + +#else /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_KEY_ID_ENCODES_OWNER */ + +#define MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT ((mbedtls_svc_key_id_t){ 0, 0 }) +#define MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_GET_KEY_ID(id) ((id).MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(key_id)) +#define MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_GET_OWNER_ID(id) ((id).MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(owner)) + +/** Utility to initialize a key identifier at runtime. + * + * \param owner_id Identifier of the key owner. + * \param key_id Identifier of the key. + */ +static inline mbedtls_svc_key_id_t mbedtls_svc_key_id_make( + mbedtls_key_owner_id_t owner_id, psa_key_id_t key_id) +{ + return (mbedtls_svc_key_id_t){ .MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(key_id) = key_id, + .MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(owner) = owner_id }; +} + +/** Compare two key identifiers. + * + * \param id1 First key identifier. + * \param id2 Second key identifier. + * + * \return Non-zero if the two key identifier are equal, zero otherwise. + */ +static inline int mbedtls_svc_key_id_equal(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t id1, + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t id2) +{ + return (id1.MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(key_id) == id2.MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(key_id)) && + mbedtls_key_owner_id_equal(id1.MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(owner), id2.MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(owner)); +} + +/** Check whether a key identifier is null. + * + * \param key Key identifier. + * + * \return Non-zero if the key identifier is null, zero otherwise. + */ +static inline int mbedtls_svc_key_id_is_null(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key) +{ + return key.MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(key_id) == 0; +} + +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_KEY_ID_ENCODES_OWNER */ + +/**@}*/ + +/** \defgroup policy Key policies + * @{ + */ + +/* Note that key usage flags are embedded in the + * persistent key store, as part of key metadata. As a consequence, they + * must not be changed (unless the storage format version changes). + */ + +/** Whether the key may be exported. + * + * A public key or the public part of a key pair may always be exported + * regardless of the value of this permission flag. + * + * If a key does not have export permission, implementations shall not + * allow the key to be exported in plain form from the cryptoprocessor, + * whether through psa_export_key() or through a proprietary interface. + * The key may however be exportable in a wrapped form, i.e. in a form + * where it is encrypted by another key. + */ +#define PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT ((psa_key_usage_t) 0x00000001) + +/** Whether the key may be copied. + * + * This flag allows the use of psa_copy_key() to make a copy of the key + * with the same policy or a more restrictive policy. + * + * For lifetimes for which the key is located in a secure element which + * enforce the non-exportability of keys, copying a key outside the secure + * element also requires the usage flag #PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT. + * Copying the key inside the secure element is permitted with just + * #PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY if the secure element supports it. + * For keys with the lifetime #PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_VOLATILE or + * #PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_PERSISTENT, the usage flag #PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY + * is sufficient to permit the copy. + */ +#define PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY ((psa_key_usage_t) 0x00000002) + +/** Whether the key may be used to encrypt a message. + * + * This flag allows the key to be used for a symmetric encryption operation, + * for an AEAD encryption-and-authentication operation, + * or for an asymmetric encryption operation, + * if otherwise permitted by the key's type and policy. + * + * For a key pair, this concerns the public key. + */ +#define PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT ((psa_key_usage_t) 0x00000100) + +/** Whether the key may be used to decrypt a message. + * + * This flag allows the key to be used for a symmetric decryption operation, + * for an AEAD decryption-and-verification operation, + * or for an asymmetric decryption operation, + * if otherwise permitted by the key's type and policy. + * + * For a key pair, this concerns the private key. + */ +#define PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT ((psa_key_usage_t) 0x00000200) + +/** Whether the key may be used to sign a message. + * + * This flag allows the key to be used for a MAC calculation operation or for + * an asymmetric message signature operation, if otherwise permitted by the + * key’s type and policy. + * + * For a key pair, this concerns the private key. + */ +#define PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE ((psa_key_usage_t) 0x00000400) + +/** Whether the key may be used to verify a message. + * + * This flag allows the key to be used for a MAC verification operation or for + * an asymmetric message signature verification operation, if otherwise + * permitted by the key’s type and policy. + * + * For a key pair, this concerns the public key. + */ +#define PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE ((psa_key_usage_t) 0x00000800) + +/** Whether the key may be used to sign a message. + * + * This flag allows the key to be used for a MAC calculation operation + * or for an asymmetric signature operation, + * if otherwise permitted by the key's type and policy. + * + * For a key pair, this concerns the private key. + */ +#define PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH ((psa_key_usage_t) 0x00001000) + +/** Whether the key may be used to verify a message signature. + * + * This flag allows the key to be used for a MAC verification operation + * or for an asymmetric signature verification operation, + * if otherwise permitted by the key's type and policy. + * + * For a key pair, this concerns the public key. + */ +#define PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH ((psa_key_usage_t) 0x00002000) + +/** Whether the key may be used to derive other keys or produce a password + * hash. + * + * This flag allows the key to be used for a key derivation operation or for + * a key agreement operation, if otherwise permitted by the key's type and + * policy. + * + * If this flag is present on all keys used in calls to + * psa_key_derivation_input_key() for a key derivation operation, then it + * permits calling psa_key_derivation_output_bytes() or + * psa_key_derivation_output_key() at the end of the operation. + */ +#define PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE ((psa_key_usage_t) 0x00004000) + +/** Whether the key may be used to verify the result of a key derivation, + * including password hashing. + * + * This flag allows the key to be used: + * + * This flag allows the key to be used in a key derivation operation, if + * otherwise permitted by the key's type and policy. + * + * If this flag is present on all keys used in calls to + * psa_key_derivation_input_key() for a key derivation operation, then it + * permits calling psa_key_derivation_verify_bytes() or + * psa_key_derivation_verify_key() at the end of the operation. + */ +#define PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_DERIVATION ((psa_key_usage_t) 0x00008000) + +/**@}*/ + +/** \defgroup derivation Key derivation + * @{ + */ + +/* Key input steps are not embedded in the persistent storage, so you can + * change them if needed: it's only an ABI change. */ + +/** A secret input for key derivation. + * + * This should be a key of type #PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE + * (passed to psa_key_derivation_input_key()) + * or the shared secret resulting from a key agreement + * (obtained via psa_key_derivation_key_agreement()). + * + * The secret can also be a direct input (passed to + * key_derivation_input_bytes()). In this case, the derivation operation + * may not be used to derive keys: the operation will only allow + * psa_key_derivation_output_bytes(), + * psa_key_derivation_verify_bytes(), or + * psa_key_derivation_verify_key(), but not + * psa_key_derivation_output_key(). + */ +#define PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET ((psa_key_derivation_step_t) 0x0101) + +/** A low-entropy secret input for password hashing / key stretching. + * + * This is usually a key of type #PSA_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD (passed to + * psa_key_derivation_input_key()) or a direct input (passed to + * psa_key_derivation_input_bytes()) that is a password or passphrase. It can + * also be high-entropy secret such as a key of type #PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE or + * the shared secret resulting from a key agreement. + * + * The secret can also be a direct input (passed to + * key_derivation_input_bytes()). In this case, the derivation operation + * may not be used to derive keys: the operation will only allow + * psa_key_derivation_output_bytes(), + * psa_key_derivation_verify_bytes(), or + * psa_key_derivation_verify_key(), but not + * psa_key_derivation_output_key(). + */ +#define PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_PASSWORD ((psa_key_derivation_step_t) 0x0102) + +/** A high-entropy additional secret input for key derivation. + * + * This is typically the shared secret resulting from a key agreement obtained + * via `psa_key_derivation_key_agreement()`. It may alternatively be a key of + * type `PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE` passed to `psa_key_derivation_input_key()`, or + * a direct input passed to `psa_key_derivation_input_bytes()`. + */ +#define PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_OTHER_SECRET \ + ((psa_key_derivation_step_t) 0x0103) + +/** A label for key derivation. + * + * This should be a direct input. + * It can also be a key of type #PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA. + */ +#define PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_LABEL ((psa_key_derivation_step_t) 0x0201) + +/** A salt for key derivation. + * + * This should be a direct input. + * It can also be a key of type #PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA or + * #PSA_KEY_TYPE_PEPPER. + */ +#define PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SALT ((psa_key_derivation_step_t) 0x0202) + +/** An information string for key derivation. + * + * This should be a direct input. + * It can also be a key of type #PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA. + */ +#define PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_INFO ((psa_key_derivation_step_t) 0x0203) + +/** A seed for key derivation. + * + * This should be a direct input. + * It can also be a key of type #PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA. + */ +#define PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SEED ((psa_key_derivation_step_t) 0x0204) + +/** A cost parameter for password hashing / key stretching. + * + * This must be a direct input, passed to psa_key_derivation_input_integer(). + */ +#define PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_COST ((psa_key_derivation_step_t) 0x0205) + +/**@}*/ + +/** \defgroup helper_macros Helper macros + * @{ + */ + +/* Helper macros */ + +/** Check if two AEAD algorithm identifiers refer to the same AEAD algorithm + * regardless of the tag length they encode. + * + * \param aead_alg_1 An AEAD algorithm identifier. + * \param aead_alg_2 An AEAD algorithm identifier. + * + * \return 1 if both identifiers refer to the same AEAD algorithm, + * 0 otherwise. + * Unspecified if neither \p aead_alg_1 nor \p aead_alg_2 are + * a supported AEAD algorithm. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ALG_AEAD_EQUAL(aead_alg_1, aead_alg_2) \ + (!(((aead_alg_1) ^ (aead_alg_2)) & \ + ~(PSA_ALG_AEAD_TAG_LENGTH_MASK | PSA_ALG_AEAD_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_FLAG))) + +/**@}*/ + +/**@}*/ + +/** \defgroup interruptible Interruptible operations + * @{ + */ + +/** Maximum value for use with \c psa_interruptible_set_max_ops() to determine + * the maximum number of ops allowed to be executed by an interruptible + * function in a single call. + */ +#define PSA_INTERRUPTIBLE_MAX_OPS_UNLIMITED UINT32_MAX + +/**@}*/ + +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_VALUES_H */ diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/aes.c b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/aes.c index 836367cea749..b1a5c3ed1048 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/aes.c +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/aes.c @@ -21,22 +21,51 @@ #include "mbedtls/platform.h" #include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" #include "mbedtls/error.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_USE_HARDWARE_ONLY) +#if !((defined(MBEDTLS_ARCH_IS_ARMV8_A) && defined(MBEDTLS_AESCE_C)) || \ + (defined(MBEDTLS_ARCH_IS_X64) && defined(MBEDTLS_AESNI_C)) || \ + (defined(MBEDTLS_ARCH_IS_X86) && defined(MBEDTLS_AESNI_C))) +#error "MBEDTLS_AES_USE_HARDWARE_ONLY defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARCH_IS_X86) #if defined(MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_C) -#include "mbedtls/padlock.h" +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM) +#error "MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_C defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_USE_HARDWARE_ONLY) +#error "MBEDTLS_AES_USE_HARDWARE_ONLY cannot be defined when " \ + "MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_C is set" +#endif +#endif +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_C) +#include "padlock.h" #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_AESNI_C) -#include "mbedtls/aesni.h" +#include "aesni.h" +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AESCE_C) +#include "aesce.h" #endif #include "mbedtls/platform.h" +#include "ctr.h" -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ALT) +/* + * This is a convenience shorthand macro to check if we need reverse S-box and + * reverse tables. It's private and only defined in this file. + */ +#if (!defined(MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT_ALT) || \ + (!defined(MBEDTLS_AES_SETKEY_DEC_ALT) && !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_USE_HARDWARE_ONLY))) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT) +#define MBEDTLS_AES_NEED_REVERSE_TABLES +#endif -/* Parameter validation macros based on platform_util.h */ -#define AES_VALIDATE_RET(cond) \ - MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE_RET(cond, MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_BAD_INPUT_DATA) -#define AES_VALIDATE(cond) \ - MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE(cond) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ALT) #if defined(MBEDTLS_VIA_PADLOCK_HAVE_CODE) static int aes_padlock_ace = -1; @@ -46,9 +75,7 @@ static int aes_padlock_ace = -1; /* * Forward S-box */ -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT_ALT) || !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_SETKEY_ENC_ALT) || \ - !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_SETKEY_DEC_ALT) -static const unsigned char FSb[256] = +MBEDTLS_MAYBE_UNUSED static const unsigned char FSb[256] = { 0x63, 0x7C, 0x77, 0x7B, 0xF2, 0x6B, 0x6F, 0xC5, 0x30, 0x01, 0x67, 0x2B, 0xFE, 0xD7, 0xAB, 0x76, @@ -83,8 +110,6 @@ static const unsigned char FSb[256] = 0x8C, 0xA1, 0x89, 0x0D, 0xBF, 0xE6, 0x42, 0x68, 0x41, 0x99, 0x2D, 0x0F, 0xB0, 0x54, 0xBB, 0x16 }; -#endif /* !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT_ALT) || !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_SETKEY_ENC_ALT) || \ - !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_SETKEY_DEC_ALT) */ /* * Forward tables @@ -156,36 +181,28 @@ static const unsigned char FSb[256] = V(C3, 41, 41, 82), V(B0, 99, 99, 29), V(77, 2D, 2D, 5A), V(11, 0F, 0F, 1E), \ V(CB, B0, B0, 7B), V(FC, 54, 54, A8), V(D6, BB, BB, 6D), V(3A, 16, 16, 2C) -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT_ALT) #define V(a, b, c, d) 0x##a##b##c##d -static const uint32_t FT0[256] = { FT }; +MBEDTLS_MAYBE_UNUSED static const uint32_t FT0[256] = { FT }; #undef V -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_FEWER_TABLES) - #define V(a, b, c, d) 0x##b##c##d##a -static const uint32_t FT1[256] = { FT }; +MBEDTLS_MAYBE_UNUSED static const uint32_t FT1[256] = { FT }; #undef V #define V(a, b, c, d) 0x##c##d##a##b -static const uint32_t FT2[256] = { FT }; +MBEDTLS_MAYBE_UNUSED static const uint32_t FT2[256] = { FT }; #undef V #define V(a, b, c, d) 0x##d##a##b##c -static const uint32_t FT3[256] = { FT }; +MBEDTLS_MAYBE_UNUSED static const uint32_t FT3[256] = { FT }; #undef V -#endif /* !MBEDTLS_AES_FEWER_TABLES */ - -#endif /* !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT_ALT) */ - #undef FT -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT_ALT) /* * Reverse S-box */ -static const unsigned char RSb[256] = +MBEDTLS_MAYBE_UNUSED static const unsigned char RSb[256] = { 0x52, 0x09, 0x6A, 0xD5, 0x30, 0x36, 0xA5, 0x38, 0xBF, 0x40, 0xA3, 0x9E, 0x81, 0xF3, 0xD7, 0xFB, @@ -220,7 +237,6 @@ static const unsigned char RSb[256] = 0x17, 0x2B, 0x04, 0x7E, 0xBA, 0x77, 0xD6, 0x26, 0xE1, 0x69, 0x14, 0x63, 0x55, 0x21, 0x0C, 0x7D }; -#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT_ALT)) */ /* * Reverse tables @@ -292,84 +308,60 @@ static const unsigned char RSb[256] = V(71, 01, A8, 39), V(DE, B3, 0C, 08), V(9C, E4, B4, D8), V(90, C1, 56, 64), \ V(61, 84, CB, 7B), V(70, B6, 32, D5), V(74, 5C, 6C, 48), V(42, 57, B8, D0) -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT_ALT) || !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_SETKEY_DEC_ALT) #define V(a, b, c, d) 0x##a##b##c##d -static const uint32_t RT0[256] = { RT }; +MBEDTLS_MAYBE_UNUSED static const uint32_t RT0[256] = { RT }; #undef V -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_FEWER_TABLES) - #define V(a, b, c, d) 0x##b##c##d##a -static const uint32_t RT1[256] = { RT }; +MBEDTLS_MAYBE_UNUSED static const uint32_t RT1[256] = { RT }; #undef V #define V(a, b, c, d) 0x##c##d##a##b -static const uint32_t RT2[256] = { RT }; +MBEDTLS_MAYBE_UNUSED static const uint32_t RT2[256] = { RT }; #undef V #define V(a, b, c, d) 0x##d##a##b##c -static const uint32_t RT3[256] = { RT }; +MBEDTLS_MAYBE_UNUSED static const uint32_t RT3[256] = { RT }; #undef V -#endif /* !MBEDTLS_AES_FEWER_TABLES */ - -#endif /* !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT_ALT) || !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_SETKEY_DEC_ALT) */ - #undef RT -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_SETKEY_ENC_ALT) /* * Round constants */ -static const uint32_t round_constants[10] = +MBEDTLS_MAYBE_UNUSED static const uint32_t round_constants[10] = { 0x00000001, 0x00000002, 0x00000004, 0x00000008, 0x00000010, 0x00000020, 0x00000040, 0x00000080, 0x0000001B, 0x00000036 }; -#endif /* !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_SETKEY_ENC_ALT) */ #else /* MBEDTLS_AES_ROM_TABLES */ /* * Forward S-box & tables */ -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT_ALT) || !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_SETKEY_ENC_ALT) || \ - !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_SETKEY_DEC_ALT) -static unsigned char FSb[256]; -#endif /* !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT_ALT) || !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_SETKEY_ENC_ALT) || \ - !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_SETKEY_DEC_ALT) */ -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT_ALT) || !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_SETKEY_ENC_ALT) -static uint32_t FT0[256]; -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_FEWER_TABLES) -static uint32_t FT1[256]; -static uint32_t FT2[256]; -static uint32_t FT3[256]; -#endif /* !MBEDTLS_AES_FEWER_TABLES */ -#endif /* !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT_ALT) || !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_SETKEY_ENC_ALT) */ +MBEDTLS_MAYBE_UNUSED static unsigned char FSb[256]; +MBEDTLS_MAYBE_UNUSED static uint32_t FT0[256]; +MBEDTLS_MAYBE_UNUSED static uint32_t FT1[256]; +MBEDTLS_MAYBE_UNUSED static uint32_t FT2[256]; +MBEDTLS_MAYBE_UNUSED static uint32_t FT3[256]; /* * Reverse S-box & tables */ -#if !(defined(MBEDTLS_AES_SETKEY_ENC_ALT) && defined(MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT_ALT)) -static unsigned char RSb[256]; -#endif /* !(defined(MBEDTLS_AES_SETKEY_ENC_ALT) && defined(MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT_ALT)) */ +MBEDTLS_MAYBE_UNUSED static unsigned char RSb[256]; -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT_ALT) || !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_SETKEY_DEC_ALT) -static uint32_t RT0[256]; -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_FEWER_TABLES) -static uint32_t RT1[256]; -static uint32_t RT2[256]; -static uint32_t RT3[256]; -#endif /* !MBEDTLS_AES_FEWER_TABLES */ -#endif /* !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT_ALT) || !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_SETKEY_DEC_ALT) */ +MBEDTLS_MAYBE_UNUSED static uint32_t RT0[256]; +MBEDTLS_MAYBE_UNUSED static uint32_t RT1[256]; +MBEDTLS_MAYBE_UNUSED static uint32_t RT2[256]; +MBEDTLS_MAYBE_UNUSED static uint32_t RT3[256]; -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_SETKEY_ENC_ALT) /* * Round constants */ -static uint32_t round_constants[10]; +MBEDTLS_MAYBE_UNUSED static uint32_t round_constants[10]; /* * Tables generation code @@ -378,48 +370,53 @@ static uint32_t round_constants[10]; #define XTIME(x) (((x) << 1) ^ (((x) & 0x80) ? 0x1B : 0x00)) #define MUL(x, y) (((x) && (y)) ? pow[(log[(x)]+log[(y)]) % 255] : 0) -static int aes_init_done = 0; +MBEDTLS_MAYBE_UNUSED static int aes_init_done = 0; -static void aes_gen_tables(void) +MBEDTLS_MAYBE_UNUSED static void aes_gen_tables(void) { - int i, x, y, z; - int pow[256]; - int log[256]; + int i; + uint8_t x, y, z; + uint8_t pow[256]; + uint8_t log[256]; /* * compute pow and log tables over GF(2^8) */ for (i = 0, x = 1; i < 256; i++) { pow[i] = x; - log[x] = i; - x = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(x ^ XTIME(x)); + log[x] = (uint8_t) i; + x ^= XTIME(x); } /* * calculate the round constants */ for (i = 0, x = 1; i < 10; i++) { - round_constants[i] = (uint32_t) x; - x = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(XTIME(x)); + round_constants[i] = x; + x = XTIME(x); } /* * generate the forward and reverse S-boxes */ FSb[0x00] = 0x63; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_NEED_REVERSE_TABLES) RSb[0x63] = 0x00; +#endif for (i = 1; i < 256; i++) { x = pow[255 - log[i]]; - y = x; y = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0((y << 1) | (y >> 7)); - x ^= y; y = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0((y << 1) | (y >> 7)); - x ^= y; y = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0((y << 1) | (y >> 7)); - x ^= y; y = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0((y << 1) | (y >> 7)); + y = x; y = (y << 1) | (y >> 7); + x ^= y; y = (y << 1) | (y >> 7); + x ^= y; y = (y << 1) | (y >> 7); + x ^= y; y = (y << 1) | (y >> 7); x ^= y ^ 0x63; - FSb[i] = (unsigned char) x; + FSb[i] = x; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_NEED_REVERSE_TABLES) RSb[x] = (unsigned char) i; +#endif } /* @@ -427,8 +424,8 @@ static void aes_gen_tables(void) */ for (i = 0; i < 256; i++) { x = FSb[i]; - y = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(XTIME(x)); - z = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(y ^ x); + y = XTIME(x); + z = y ^ x; FT0[i] = ((uint32_t) y) ^ ((uint32_t) x << 8) ^ @@ -441,9 +438,9 @@ static void aes_gen_tables(void) FT3[i] = ROTL8(FT2[i]); #endif /* !MBEDTLS_AES_FEWER_TABLES */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_NEED_REVERSE_TABLES) x = RSb[i]; -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT_ALT) || !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_SETKEY_DEC_ALT) RT0[i] = ((uint32_t) MUL(0x0E, x)) ^ ((uint32_t) MUL(0x09, x) << 8) ^ ((uint32_t) MUL(0x0D, x) << 16) ^ @@ -454,12 +451,10 @@ static void aes_gen_tables(void) RT2[i] = ROTL8(RT1[i]); RT3[i] = ROTL8(RT2[i]); #endif /* !MBEDTLS_AES_FEWER_TABLES */ -#endif /* !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT_ALT) || !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_SETKEY_DEC_ALT) */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_AES_NEED_REVERSE_TABLES */ } } -#endif /* !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_SETKEY_ENC_ALT) */ - #undef ROTL8 #endif /* MBEDTLS_AES_ROM_TABLES */ @@ -496,8 +491,6 @@ static void aes_gen_tables(void) void mbedtls_aes_init(mbedtls_aes_context *ctx) { - AES_VALIDATE(ctx != NULL); - memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_aes_context)); } @@ -513,8 +506,6 @@ void mbedtls_aes_free(mbedtls_aes_context *ctx) #if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS) void mbedtls_aes_xts_init(mbedtls_aes_xts_context *ctx) { - AES_VALIDATE(ctx != NULL); - mbedtls_aes_init(&ctx->crypt); mbedtls_aes_init(&ctx->tweak); } @@ -536,14 +527,12 @@ void mbedtls_aes_xts_free(mbedtls_aes_xts_context *ctx) * Note that the offset is in units of elements of buf, i.e. 32-bit words, * i.e. an offset of 1 means 4 bytes and so on. */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_VIA_PADLOCK_HAVE_CODE) || \ +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_VIA_PADLOCK_HAVE_CODE)) || \ (defined(MBEDTLS_AESNI_C) && MBEDTLS_AESNI_HAVE_CODE == 2) #define MAY_NEED_TO_ALIGN #endif -#if defined(MAY_NEED_TO_ALIGN) || !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_SETKEY_DEC_ALT) || \ - !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_SETKEY_ENC_ALT) -static unsigned mbedtls_aes_rk_offset(uint32_t *buf) +MBEDTLS_MAYBE_UNUSED static unsigned mbedtls_aes_rk_offset(uint32_t *buf) { #if defined(MAY_NEED_TO_ALIGN) int align_16_bytes = 0; @@ -579,8 +568,6 @@ static unsigned mbedtls_aes_rk_offset(uint32_t *buf) return 0; } -#endif /* defined(MAY_NEED_TO_ALIGN) || !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_SETKEY_DEC_ALT) || \ - !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_SETKEY_ENC_ALT) */ /* * AES key schedule (encryption) @@ -589,16 +576,14 @@ static unsigned mbedtls_aes_rk_offset(uint32_t *buf) int mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc(mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, const unsigned char *key, unsigned int keybits) { - unsigned int i; uint32_t *RK; - AES_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - AES_VALIDATE_RET(key != NULL); - switch (keybits) { case 128: ctx->nr = 10; break; +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH) case 192: ctx->nr = 12; break; case 256: ctx->nr = 14; break; +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH */ default: return MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH; } @@ -609,22 +594,30 @@ int mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc(mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, const unsigned char *key, } #endif - ctx->rk = RK = ctx->buf + mbedtls_aes_rk_offset(ctx->buf); + ctx->rk_offset = mbedtls_aes_rk_offset(ctx->buf); + RK = ctx->buf + ctx->rk_offset; #if defined(MBEDTLS_AESNI_HAVE_CODE) if (mbedtls_aesni_has_support(MBEDTLS_AESNI_AES)) { - return mbedtls_aesni_setkey_enc((unsigned char *) ctx->rk, key, keybits); + return mbedtls_aesni_setkey_enc((unsigned char *) RK, key, keybits); } #endif - for (i = 0; i < (keybits >> 5); i++) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AESCE_HAVE_CODE) + if (MBEDTLS_AESCE_HAS_SUPPORT()) { + return mbedtls_aesce_setkey_enc((unsigned char *) RK, key, keybits); + } +#endif + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_USE_HARDWARE_ONLY) + for (unsigned int i = 0; i < (keybits >> 5); i++) { RK[i] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE(key, i << 2); } switch (ctx->nr) { case 10: - for (i = 0; i < 10; i++, RK += 4) { + for (unsigned int i = 0; i < 10; i++, RK += 4) { RK[4] = RK[0] ^ round_constants[i] ^ ((uint32_t) FSb[MBEDTLS_BYTE_1(RK[3])]) ^ ((uint32_t) FSb[MBEDTLS_BYTE_2(RK[3])] << 8) ^ @@ -637,9 +630,10 @@ int mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc(mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, const unsigned char *key, } break; +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH) case 12: - for (i = 0; i < 8; i++, RK += 6) { + for (unsigned int i = 0; i < 8; i++, RK += 6) { RK[6] = RK[0] ^ round_constants[i] ^ ((uint32_t) FSb[MBEDTLS_BYTE_1(RK[5])]) ^ ((uint32_t) FSb[MBEDTLS_BYTE_2(RK[5])] << 8) ^ @@ -656,7 +650,7 @@ int mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc(mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, const unsigned char *key, case 14: - for (i = 0; i < 7; i++, RK += 8) { + for (unsigned int i = 0; i < 7; i++, RK += 8) { RK[8] = RK[0] ^ round_constants[i] ^ ((uint32_t) FSb[MBEDTLS_BYTE_1(RK[7])]) ^ ((uint32_t) FSb[MBEDTLS_BYTE_2(RK[7])] << 8) ^ @@ -678,30 +672,33 @@ int mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc(mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, const unsigned char *key, RK[15] = RK[7] ^ RK[14]; } break; +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH */ } return 0; +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_AES_USE_HARDWARE_ONLY */ } #endif /* !MBEDTLS_AES_SETKEY_ENC_ALT */ /* * AES key schedule (decryption) */ -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_SETKEY_DEC_ALT) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_SETKEY_DEC_ALT) && !defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT) int mbedtls_aes_setkey_dec(mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, const unsigned char *key, unsigned int keybits) { - int i, j, ret; +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_USE_HARDWARE_ONLY) + uint32_t *SK; +#endif + int ret; mbedtls_aes_context cty; uint32_t *RK; - uint32_t *SK; - AES_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - AES_VALIDATE_RET(key != NULL); mbedtls_aes_init(&cty); - ctx->rk = RK = ctx->buf + mbedtls_aes_rk_offset(ctx->buf); + ctx->rk_offset = mbedtls_aes_rk_offset(ctx->buf); + RK = ctx->buf + ctx->rk_offset; /* Also checks keybits */ if ((ret = mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc(&cty, key, keybits)) != 0) { @@ -712,21 +709,32 @@ int mbedtls_aes_setkey_dec(mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, const unsigned char *key, #if defined(MBEDTLS_AESNI_HAVE_CODE) if (mbedtls_aesni_has_support(MBEDTLS_AESNI_AES)) { - mbedtls_aesni_inverse_key((unsigned char *) ctx->rk, - (const unsigned char *) cty.rk, ctx->nr); + mbedtls_aesni_inverse_key((unsigned char *) RK, + (const unsigned char *) (cty.buf + cty.rk_offset), ctx->nr); + goto exit; + } +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AESCE_HAVE_CODE) + if (MBEDTLS_AESCE_HAS_SUPPORT()) { + mbedtls_aesce_inverse_key( + (unsigned char *) RK, + (const unsigned char *) (cty.buf + cty.rk_offset), + ctx->nr); goto exit; } #endif - SK = cty.rk + cty.nr * 4; +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_USE_HARDWARE_ONLY) + SK = cty.buf + cty.rk_offset + cty.nr * 4; *RK++ = *SK++; *RK++ = *SK++; *RK++ = *SK++; *RK++ = *SK++; - - for (i = ctx->nr - 1, SK -= 8; i > 0; i--, SK -= 8) { - for (j = 0; j < 4; j++, SK++) { + SK -= 8; + for (int i = ctx->nr - 1; i > 0; i--, SK -= 8) { + for (int j = 0; j < 4; j++, SK++) { *RK++ = AES_RT0(FSb[MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(*SK)]) ^ AES_RT1(FSb[MBEDTLS_BYTE_1(*SK)]) ^ AES_RT2(FSb[MBEDTLS_BYTE_2(*SK)]) ^ @@ -738,13 +746,13 @@ int mbedtls_aes_setkey_dec(mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, const unsigned char *key, *RK++ = *SK++; *RK++ = *SK++; *RK++ = *SK++; - +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_AES_USE_HARDWARE_ONLY */ exit: mbedtls_aes_free(&cty); return ret; } -#endif /* !MBEDTLS_AES_SETKEY_DEC_ALT */ +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_AES_SETKEY_DEC_ALT && !MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS) static int mbedtls_aes_xts_decode_keys(const unsigned char *key, @@ -779,9 +787,6 @@ int mbedtls_aes_xts_setkey_enc(mbedtls_aes_xts_context *ctx, const unsigned char *key1, *key2; unsigned int key1bits, key2bits; - AES_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - AES_VALIDATE_RET(key != NULL); - ret = mbedtls_aes_xts_decode_keys(key, keybits, &key1, &key1bits, &key2, &key2bits); if (ret != 0) { @@ -806,9 +811,6 @@ int mbedtls_aes_xts_setkey_dec(mbedtls_aes_xts_context *ctx, const unsigned char *key1, *key2; unsigned int key1bits, key2bits; - AES_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - AES_VALIDATE_RET(key != NULL); - ret = mbedtls_aes_xts_decode_keys(key, keybits, &key1, &key1bits, &key2, &key2bits); if (ret != 0) { @@ -883,7 +885,7 @@ int mbedtls_internal_aes_encrypt(mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, unsigned char output[16]) { int i; - uint32_t *RK = ctx->rk; + uint32_t *RK = ctx->buf + ctx->rk_offset; struct { uint32_t X[4]; uint32_t Y[4]; @@ -936,25 +938,16 @@ int mbedtls_internal_aes_encrypt(mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, } #endif /* !MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT_ALT */ -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) -void mbedtls_aes_encrypt(mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, - const unsigned char input[16], - unsigned char output[16]) -{ - MBEDTLS_IGNORE_RETURN(mbedtls_internal_aes_encrypt(ctx, input, output)); -} -#endif /* !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ - /* * AES-ECB block decryption */ -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT_ALT) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT_ALT) && !defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT) int mbedtls_internal_aes_decrypt(mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, const unsigned char input[16], unsigned char output[16]) { int i; - uint32_t *RK = ctx->rk; + uint32_t *RK = ctx->buf + ctx->rk_offset; struct { uint32_t X[4]; uint32_t Y[4]; @@ -1005,40 +998,25 @@ int mbedtls_internal_aes_decrypt(mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, return 0; } -#endif /* !MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT_ALT */ - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) -void mbedtls_aes_decrypt(mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, - const unsigned char input[16], - unsigned char output[16]) -{ - MBEDTLS_IGNORE_RETURN(mbedtls_internal_aes_decrypt(ctx, input, output)); -} -#endif /* !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT_ALT && !MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT */ -#if defined(MAY_NEED_TO_ALIGN) /* VIA Padlock and our intrinsics-based implementation of AESNI require * the round keys to be aligned on a 16-byte boundary. We take care of this * before creating them, but the AES context may have moved (this can happen * if the library is called from a language with managed memory), and in later * calls it might have a different alignment with respect to 16-byte memory. * So we may need to realign. - * NOTE: In the LTS branch, the context contains a pointer to within itself, - * so if it has been moved, things will probably go pear-shaped. We keep this - * code for compatibility with the development branch, in case of future changes. */ -static void aes_maybe_realign(mbedtls_aes_context *ctx) +MBEDTLS_MAYBE_UNUSED static void aes_maybe_realign(mbedtls_aes_context *ctx) { - unsigned current_offset = (unsigned) (ctx->rk - ctx->buf); unsigned new_offset = mbedtls_aes_rk_offset(ctx->buf); - if (new_offset != current_offset) { + if (new_offset != ctx->rk_offset) { memmove(ctx->buf + new_offset, // new address - ctx->buf + current_offset, // current address + ctx->buf + ctx->rk_offset, // current address (ctx->nr + 1) * 16); // number of round keys * bytes per rk - ctx->rk = ctx->buf + new_offset; + ctx->rk_offset = new_offset; } } -#endif /* * AES-ECB block encryption/decryption @@ -1048,11 +1026,9 @@ int mbedtls_aes_crypt_ecb(mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, const unsigned char input[16], unsigned char output[16]) { - AES_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - AES_VALIDATE_RET(input != NULL); - AES_VALIDATE_RET(output != NULL); - AES_VALIDATE_RET(mode == MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT || - mode == MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT); + if (mode != MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT && mode != MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } #if defined(MAY_NEED_TO_ALIGN) aes_maybe_realign(ctx); @@ -1064,20 +1040,32 @@ int mbedtls_aes_crypt_ecb(mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, } #endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AESCE_HAVE_CODE) + if (MBEDTLS_AESCE_HAS_SUPPORT()) { + return mbedtls_aesce_crypt_ecb(ctx, mode, input, output); + } +#endif + #if defined(MBEDTLS_VIA_PADLOCK_HAVE_CODE) - if (aes_padlock_ace) { + if (aes_padlock_ace > 0) { return mbedtls_padlock_xcryptecb(ctx, mode, input, output); } #endif - if (mode == MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT) { - return mbedtls_internal_aes_encrypt(ctx, input, output); - } else { +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_USE_HARDWARE_ONLY) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT) + if (mode == MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT) { return mbedtls_internal_aes_decrypt(ctx, input, output); + } else +#endif + { + return mbedtls_internal_aes_encrypt(ctx, input, output); } +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_AES_USE_HARDWARE_ONLY */ } #if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) + /* * AES-CBC buffer encryption/decryption */ @@ -1088,23 +1076,24 @@ int mbedtls_aes_crypt_cbc(mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output) { - int i; int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; unsigned char temp[16]; - AES_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - AES_VALIDATE_RET(mode == MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT || - mode == MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT); - AES_VALIDATE_RET(iv != NULL); - AES_VALIDATE_RET(input != NULL); - AES_VALIDATE_RET(output != NULL); + if (mode != MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT && mode != MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + /* Nothing to do if length is zero. */ + if (length == 0) { + return 0; + } if (length % 16) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH; } #if defined(MBEDTLS_VIA_PADLOCK_HAVE_CODE) - if (aes_padlock_ace) { + if (aes_padlock_ace > 0) { if (mbedtls_padlock_xcryptcbc(ctx, mode, length, iv, input, output) == 0) { return 0; } @@ -1115,6 +1104,8 @@ int mbedtls_aes_crypt_cbc(mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, } #endif + const unsigned char *ivp = iv; + if (mode == MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT) { while (length > 0) { memcpy(temp, input, 16); @@ -1122,10 +1113,10 @@ int mbedtls_aes_crypt_cbc(mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, if (ret != 0) { goto exit; } - - for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) { - output[i] = (unsigned char) (output[i] ^ iv[i]); - } + /* Avoid using the NEON implementation of mbedtls_xor. Because of the dependency on + * the result for the next block in CBC, and the cost of transferring that data from + * NEON registers, NEON is slower on aarch64. */ + mbedtls_xor_no_simd(output, output, iv, 16); memcpy(iv, temp, 16); @@ -1135,20 +1126,19 @@ int mbedtls_aes_crypt_cbc(mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, } } else { while (length > 0) { - for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) { - output[i] = (unsigned char) (input[i] ^ iv[i]); - } + mbedtls_xor_no_simd(output, input, ivp, 16); ret = mbedtls_aes_crypt_ecb(ctx, mode, output, output); if (ret != 0) { goto exit; } - memcpy(iv, output, 16); + ivp = output; input += 16; output += 16; length -= 16; } + memcpy(iv, ivp, 16); } ret = 0; @@ -1169,8 +1159,11 @@ typedef unsigned char mbedtls_be128[16]; * for machine endianness and hence works correctly on both big and little * endian machines. */ -static void mbedtls_gf128mul_x_ble(unsigned char r[16], - const unsigned char x[16]) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AESCE_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_AESNI_C) +MBEDTLS_OPTIMIZE_FOR_PERFORMANCE +#endif +static inline void mbedtls_gf128mul_x_ble(unsigned char r[16], + const unsigned char x[16]) { uint64_t a, b, ra, rb; @@ -1186,7 +1179,13 @@ static void mbedtls_gf128mul_x_ble(unsigned char r[16], /* * AES-XTS buffer encryption/decryption + * + * Use of MBEDTLS_OPTIMIZE_FOR_PERFORMANCE here and for mbedtls_gf128mul_x_ble() + * is a 3x performance improvement for gcc -Os, if we have hardware AES support. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AESCE_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_AESNI_C) +MBEDTLS_OPTIMIZE_FOR_PERFORMANCE +#endif int mbedtls_aes_crypt_xts(mbedtls_aes_xts_context *ctx, int mode, size_t length, @@ -1201,12 +1200,9 @@ int mbedtls_aes_crypt_xts(mbedtls_aes_xts_context *ctx, unsigned char prev_tweak[16]; unsigned char tmp[16]; - AES_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - AES_VALIDATE_RET(mode == MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT || - mode == MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT); - AES_VALIDATE_RET(data_unit != NULL); - AES_VALIDATE_RET(input != NULL); - AES_VALIDATE_RET(output != NULL); + if (mode != MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT && mode != MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } /* Data units must be at least 16 bytes long. */ if (length < 16) { @@ -1226,9 +1222,7 @@ int mbedtls_aes_crypt_xts(mbedtls_aes_xts_context *ctx, } while (blocks--) { - size_t i; - - if (leftover && (mode == MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT) && blocks == 0) { + if (MBEDTLS_UNLIKELY(leftover && (mode == MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT) && blocks == 0)) { /* We are on the last block in a decrypt operation that has * leftover bytes, so we need to use the next tweak for this block, * and this tweak for the leftover bytes. Save the current tweak for @@ -1238,18 +1232,14 @@ int mbedtls_aes_crypt_xts(mbedtls_aes_xts_context *ctx, mbedtls_gf128mul_x_ble(tweak, tweak); } - for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) { - tmp[i] = input[i] ^ tweak[i]; - } + mbedtls_xor(tmp, input, tweak, 16); ret = mbedtls_aes_crypt_ecb(&ctx->crypt, mode, tmp, tmp); if (ret != 0) { return ret; } - for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) { - output[i] = tmp[i] ^ tweak[i]; - } + mbedtls_xor(output, tmp, tweak, 16); /* Update the tweak for the next block. */ mbedtls_gf128mul_x_ble(tweak, tweak); @@ -1269,19 +1259,17 @@ int mbedtls_aes_crypt_xts(mbedtls_aes_xts_context *ctx, unsigned char *prev_output = output - 16; /* Copy ciphertext bytes from the previous block to our output for each - * byte of ciphertext we won't steal. At the same time, copy the - * remainder of the input for this final round (since the loop bounds - * are the same). */ + * byte of ciphertext we won't steal. */ for (i = 0; i < leftover; i++) { output[i] = prev_output[i]; - tmp[i] = input[i] ^ t[i]; } + /* Copy the remainder of the input for this final round. */ + mbedtls_xor(tmp, input, t, leftover); + /* Copy ciphertext bytes from the previous block for input in this * round. */ - for (; i < 16; i++) { - tmp[i] = prev_output[i] ^ t[i]; - } + mbedtls_xor(tmp + i, prev_output + i, t + i, 16 - i); ret = mbedtls_aes_crypt_ecb(&ctx->crypt, mode, tmp, tmp); if (ret != 0) { @@ -1290,9 +1278,7 @@ int mbedtls_aes_crypt_xts(mbedtls_aes_xts_context *ctx, /* Write the result back to the previous block, overriding the previous * output we copied. */ - for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) { - prev_output[i] = tmp[i] ^ t[i]; - } + mbedtls_xor(prev_output, tmp, t, 16); } return 0; @@ -1315,13 +1301,9 @@ int mbedtls_aes_crypt_cfb128(mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t n; - AES_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - AES_VALIDATE_RET(mode == MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT || - mode == MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT); - AES_VALIDATE_RET(iv_off != NULL); - AES_VALIDATE_RET(iv != NULL); - AES_VALIDATE_RET(input != NULL); - AES_VALIDATE_RET(output != NULL); + if (mode != MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT && mode != MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } n = *iv_off; @@ -1380,12 +1362,9 @@ int mbedtls_aes_crypt_cfb8(mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, unsigned char c; unsigned char ov[17]; - AES_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - AES_VALIDATE_RET(mode == MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT || - mode == MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT); - AES_VALIDATE_RET(iv != NULL); - AES_VALIDATE_RET(input != NULL); - AES_VALIDATE_RET(output != NULL); + if (mode != MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT && mode != MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } while (length--) { memcpy(ov, iv, 16); ret = mbedtls_aes_crypt_ecb(ctx, MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT, iv, iv); @@ -1426,12 +1405,6 @@ int mbedtls_aes_crypt_ofb(mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, int ret = 0; size_t n; - AES_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - AES_VALIDATE_RET(iv_off != NULL); - AES_VALIDATE_RET(iv != NULL); - AES_VALIDATE_RET(input != NULL); - AES_VALIDATE_RET(output != NULL); - n = *iv_off; if (n > 15) { @@ -1469,43 +1442,38 @@ int mbedtls_aes_crypt_ctr(mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output) { - int c, i; int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - size_t n; - - AES_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - AES_VALIDATE_RET(nc_off != NULL); - AES_VALIDATE_RET(nonce_counter != NULL); - AES_VALIDATE_RET(stream_block != NULL); - AES_VALIDATE_RET(input != NULL); - AES_VALIDATE_RET(output != NULL); - n = *nc_off; + size_t offset = *nc_off; - if (n > 0x0F) { + if (offset > 0x0F) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } - while (length--) { - if (n == 0) { + for (size_t i = 0; i < length;) { + size_t n = 16; + if (offset == 0) { ret = mbedtls_aes_crypt_ecb(ctx, MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT, nonce_counter, stream_block); if (ret != 0) { goto exit; } - - for (i = 16; i > 0; i--) { - if (++nonce_counter[i - 1] != 0) { - break; - } - } + mbedtls_ctr_increment_counter(nonce_counter); + } else { + n -= offset; } - c = *input++; - *output++ = (unsigned char) (c ^ stream_block[n]); - n = (n + 1) & 0x0F; + if (n > (length - i)) { + n = (length - i); + } + mbedtls_xor(&output[i], &input[i], &stream_block[offset], n); + // offset might be non-zero for the last block, but in that case, we don't use it again + offset = 0; + i += n; } - *nc_off = n; + // capture offset for future resumption + *nc_off = (*nc_off + length) % 16; + ret = 0; exit: @@ -1521,45 +1489,55 @@ int mbedtls_aes_crypt_ctr(mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, * * http://csrc.nist.gov/archive/aes/rijndael/rijndael-vals.zip */ -static const unsigned char aes_test_ecb_dec[3][16] = +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT) +static const unsigned char aes_test_ecb_dec[][16] = { { 0x44, 0x41, 0x6A, 0xC2, 0xD1, 0xF5, 0x3C, 0x58, 0x33, 0x03, 0x91, 0x7E, 0x6B, 0xE9, 0xEB, 0xE0 }, +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH) { 0x48, 0xE3, 0x1E, 0x9E, 0x25, 0x67, 0x18, 0xF2, 0x92, 0x29, 0x31, 0x9C, 0x19, 0xF1, 0x5B, 0xA4 }, { 0x05, 0x8C, 0xCF, 0xFD, 0xBB, 0xCB, 0x38, 0x2D, 0x1F, 0x6F, 0x56, 0x58, 0x5D, 0x8A, 0x4A, 0xDE } +#endif }; +#endif -static const unsigned char aes_test_ecb_enc[3][16] = +static const unsigned char aes_test_ecb_enc[][16] = { { 0xC3, 0x4C, 0x05, 0x2C, 0xC0, 0xDA, 0x8D, 0x73, 0x45, 0x1A, 0xFE, 0x5F, 0x03, 0xBE, 0x29, 0x7F }, +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH) { 0xF3, 0xF6, 0x75, 0x2A, 0xE8, 0xD7, 0x83, 0x11, 0x38, 0xF0, 0x41, 0x56, 0x06, 0x31, 0xB1, 0x14 }, { 0x8B, 0x79, 0xEE, 0xCC, 0x93, 0xA0, 0xEE, 0x5D, 0xFF, 0x30, 0xB4, 0xEA, 0x21, 0x63, 0x6D, 0xA4 } +#endif }; #if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) -static const unsigned char aes_test_cbc_dec[3][16] = +static const unsigned char aes_test_cbc_dec[][16] = { { 0xFA, 0xCA, 0x37, 0xE0, 0xB0, 0xC8, 0x53, 0x73, 0xDF, 0x70, 0x6E, 0x73, 0xF7, 0xC9, 0xAF, 0x86 }, +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH) { 0x5D, 0xF6, 0x78, 0xDD, 0x17, 0xBA, 0x4E, 0x75, 0xB6, 0x17, 0x68, 0xC6, 0xAD, 0xEF, 0x7C, 0x7B }, { 0x48, 0x04, 0xE1, 0x81, 0x8F, 0xE6, 0x29, 0x75, 0x19, 0xA3, 0xE8, 0x8C, 0x57, 0x31, 0x04, 0x13 } +#endif }; -static const unsigned char aes_test_cbc_enc[3][16] = +static const unsigned char aes_test_cbc_enc[][16] = { { 0x8A, 0x05, 0xFC, 0x5E, 0x09, 0x5A, 0xF4, 0x84, 0x8A, 0x08, 0xD3, 0x28, 0xD3, 0x68, 0x8E, 0x3D }, +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH) { 0x7B, 0xD9, 0x66, 0xD5, 0x3A, 0xD8, 0xC1, 0xBB, 0x85, 0xD2, 0xAD, 0xFA, 0xE8, 0x7B, 0xB1, 0x04 }, { 0xFE, 0x3C, 0x53, 0x65, 0x3E, 0x2F, 0x45, 0xB5, 0x6F, 0xCD, 0x88, 0xB2, 0xCC, 0x89, 0x8F, 0xF0 } +#endif }; #endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ @@ -1569,10 +1547,11 @@ static const unsigned char aes_test_cbc_enc[3][16] = * * http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-38a/sp800-38a.pdf */ -static const unsigned char aes_test_cfb128_key[3][32] = +static const unsigned char aes_test_cfb128_key[][32] = { { 0x2B, 0x7E, 0x15, 0x16, 0x28, 0xAE, 0xD2, 0xA6, 0xAB, 0xF7, 0x15, 0x88, 0x09, 0xCF, 0x4F, 0x3C }, +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH) { 0x8E, 0x73, 0xB0, 0xF7, 0xDA, 0x0E, 0x64, 0x52, 0xC8, 0x10, 0xF3, 0x2B, 0x80, 0x90, 0x79, 0xE5, 0x62, 0xF8, 0xEA, 0xD2, 0x52, 0x2C, 0x6B, 0x7B }, @@ -1580,6 +1559,7 @@ static const unsigned char aes_test_cfb128_key[3][32] = 0x2B, 0x73, 0xAE, 0xF0, 0x85, 0x7D, 0x77, 0x81, 0x1F, 0x35, 0x2C, 0x07, 0x3B, 0x61, 0x08, 0xD7, 0x2D, 0x98, 0x10, 0xA3, 0x09, 0x14, 0xDF, 0xF4 } +#endif }; static const unsigned char aes_test_cfb128_iv[16] = @@ -1600,7 +1580,7 @@ static const unsigned char aes_test_cfb128_pt[64] = 0xAD, 0x2B, 0x41, 0x7B, 0xE6, 0x6C, 0x37, 0x10 }; -static const unsigned char aes_test_cfb128_ct[3][64] = +static const unsigned char aes_test_cfb128_ct[][64] = { { 0x3B, 0x3F, 0xD9, 0x2E, 0xB7, 0x2D, 0xAD, 0x20, 0x33, 0x34, 0x49, 0xF8, 0xE8, 0x3C, 0xFB, 0x4A, @@ -1610,6 +1590,7 @@ static const unsigned char aes_test_cfb128_ct[3][64] = 0xB1, 0x80, 0x8C, 0xF1, 0x87, 0xA4, 0xF4, 0xDF, 0xC0, 0x4B, 0x05, 0x35, 0x7C, 0x5D, 0x1C, 0x0E, 0xEA, 0xC4, 0xC6, 0x6F, 0x9F, 0xF7, 0xF2, 0xE6 }, +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH) { 0xCD, 0xC8, 0x0D, 0x6F, 0xDD, 0xF1, 0x8C, 0xAB, 0x34, 0xC2, 0x59, 0x09, 0xC9, 0x9A, 0x41, 0x74, 0x67, 0xCE, 0x7F, 0x7F, 0x81, 0x17, 0x36, 0x21, @@ -1626,6 +1607,7 @@ static const unsigned char aes_test_cfb128_ct[3][64] = 0xA1, 0x3E, 0xD0, 0xA8, 0x26, 0x7A, 0xE2, 0xF9, 0x75, 0xA3, 0x85, 0x74, 0x1A, 0xB9, 0xCE, 0xF8, 0x20, 0x31, 0x62, 0x3D, 0x55, 0xB1, 0xE4, 0x71 } +#endif }; #endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB */ @@ -1635,10 +1617,11 @@ static const unsigned char aes_test_cfb128_ct[3][64] = * * https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/sp/800-38a/final */ -static const unsigned char aes_test_ofb_key[3][32] = +static const unsigned char aes_test_ofb_key[][32] = { { 0x2B, 0x7E, 0x15, 0x16, 0x28, 0xAE, 0xD2, 0xA6, 0xAB, 0xF7, 0x15, 0x88, 0x09, 0xCF, 0x4F, 0x3C }, +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH) { 0x8E, 0x73, 0xB0, 0xF7, 0xDA, 0x0E, 0x64, 0x52, 0xC8, 0x10, 0xF3, 0x2B, 0x80, 0x90, 0x79, 0xE5, 0x62, 0xF8, 0xEA, 0xD2, 0x52, 0x2C, 0x6B, 0x7B }, @@ -1646,6 +1629,7 @@ static const unsigned char aes_test_ofb_key[3][32] = 0x2B, 0x73, 0xAE, 0xF0, 0x85, 0x7D, 0x77, 0x81, 0x1F, 0x35, 0x2C, 0x07, 0x3B, 0x61, 0x08, 0xD7, 0x2D, 0x98, 0x10, 0xA3, 0x09, 0x14, 0xDF, 0xF4 } +#endif }; static const unsigned char aes_test_ofb_iv[16] = @@ -1666,7 +1650,7 @@ static const unsigned char aes_test_ofb_pt[64] = 0xAD, 0x2B, 0x41, 0x7B, 0xE6, 0x6C, 0x37, 0x10 }; -static const unsigned char aes_test_ofb_ct[3][64] = +static const unsigned char aes_test_ofb_ct[][64] = { { 0x3B, 0x3F, 0xD9, 0x2E, 0xB7, 0x2D, 0xAD, 0x20, 0x33, 0x34, 0x49, 0xF8, 0xE8, 0x3C, 0xFB, 0x4A, @@ -1676,6 +1660,7 @@ static const unsigned char aes_test_ofb_ct[3][64] = 0x43, 0x44, 0xf7, 0xa8, 0x22, 0x60, 0xed, 0xcc, 0x30, 0x4c, 0x65, 0x28, 0xf6, 0x59, 0xc7, 0x78, 0x66, 0xa5, 0x10, 0xd9, 0xc1, 0xd6, 0xae, 0x5e }, +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH) { 0xCD, 0xC8, 0x0D, 0x6F, 0xDD, 0xF1, 0x8C, 0xAB, 0x34, 0xC2, 0x59, 0x09, 0xC9, 0x9A, 0x41, 0x74, 0xfc, 0xc2, 0x8b, 0x8d, 0x4c, 0x63, 0x83, 0x7c, @@ -1692,6 +1677,7 @@ static const unsigned char aes_test_ofb_ct[3][64] = 0xf3, 0x9d, 0x1c, 0x5b, 0xba, 0x97, 0xc4, 0x08, 0x01, 0x26, 0x14, 0x1d, 0x67, 0xf3, 0x7b, 0xe8, 0x53, 0x8f, 0x5a, 0x8b, 0xe7, 0x40, 0xe4, 0x84 } +#endif }; #endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB */ @@ -1702,7 +1688,7 @@ static const unsigned char aes_test_ofb_ct[3][64] = * http://www.faqs.org/rfcs/rfc3686.html */ -static const unsigned char aes_test_ctr_key[3][16] = +static const unsigned char aes_test_ctr_key[][16] = { { 0xAE, 0x68, 0x52, 0xF8, 0x12, 0x10, 0x67, 0xCC, 0x4B, 0xF7, 0xA5, 0x76, 0x55, 0x77, 0xF3, 0x9E }, @@ -1712,7 +1698,7 @@ static const unsigned char aes_test_ctr_key[3][16] = 0xAC, 0x6E, 0x61, 0x85, 0x29, 0xF9, 0xA0, 0xDC } }; -static const unsigned char aes_test_ctr_nonce_counter[3][16] = +static const unsigned char aes_test_ctr_nonce_counter[][16] = { { 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x30, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01 }, @@ -1722,11 +1708,10 @@ static const unsigned char aes_test_ctr_nonce_counter[3][16] = 0x4A, 0x17, 0x86, 0xF0, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01 } }; -static const unsigned char aes_test_ctr_pt[3][48] = +static const unsigned char aes_test_ctr_pt[][48] = { { 0x53, 0x69, 0x6E, 0x67, 0x6C, 0x65, 0x20, 0x62, 0x6C, 0x6F, 0x63, 0x6B, 0x20, 0x6D, 0x73, 0x67 }, - { 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, 0x08, 0x09, 0x0A, 0x0B, 0x0C, 0x0D, 0x0E, 0x0F, 0x10, 0x11, 0x12, 0x13, 0x14, 0x15, 0x16, 0x17, @@ -1739,7 +1724,7 @@ static const unsigned char aes_test_ctr_pt[3][48] = 0x20, 0x21, 0x22, 0x23 } }; -static const unsigned char aes_test_ctr_ct[3][48] = +static const unsigned char aes_test_ctr_ct[][48] = { { 0xE4, 0x09, 0x5D, 0x4F, 0xB7, 0xA7, 0xB3, 0x79, 0x2D, 0x61, 0x75, 0xA3, 0x26, 0x13, 0x11, 0xB8 }, @@ -1863,315 +1848,359 @@ int mbedtls_aes_self_test(int verbose) #if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ALT) mbedtls_printf(" AES note: alternative implementation.\n"); #else /* MBEDTLS_AES_ALT */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_VIA_PADLOCK_HAVE_CODE) - if (mbedtls_padlock_has_support(MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_ACE)) { - mbedtls_printf(" AES note: using VIA Padlock.\n"); - } else -#endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_AESNI_HAVE_CODE) - if (mbedtls_aesni_has_support(MBEDTLS_AESNI_AES)) { - mbedtls_printf(" AES note: using AESNI via "); #if MBEDTLS_AESNI_HAVE_CODE == 1 - mbedtls_printf("assembly"); + mbedtls_printf(" AES note: AESNI code present (assembly implementation).\n"); #elif MBEDTLS_AESNI_HAVE_CODE == 2 - mbedtls_printf("intrinsics"); + mbedtls_printf(" AES note: AESNI code present (intrinsics implementation).\n"); #else - mbedtls_printf("(unknown)"); +#error "Unrecognised value for MBEDTLS_AESNI_HAVE_CODE" #endif - mbedtls_printf(".\n"); + if (mbedtls_aesni_has_support(MBEDTLS_AESNI_AES)) { + mbedtls_printf(" AES note: using AESNI.\n"); } else #endif - mbedtls_printf(" AES note: built-in implementation.\n"); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_VIA_PADLOCK_HAVE_CODE) + if (mbedtls_padlock_has_support(MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_ACE)) { + mbedtls_printf(" AES note: using VIA Padlock.\n"); + } else +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AESCE_HAVE_CODE) + if (MBEDTLS_AESCE_HAS_SUPPORT()) { + mbedtls_printf(" AES note: using AESCE.\n"); + } else +#endif + { +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_USE_HARDWARE_ONLY) + mbedtls_printf(" AES note: built-in implementation.\n"); +#endif + } #endif /* MBEDTLS_AES_ALT */ } /* * ECB mode */ - for (i = 0; i < 6; i++) { - u = i >> 1; - keybits = 128 + u * 64; - mode = i & 1; + { + static const int num_tests = + sizeof(aes_test_ecb_enc) / sizeof(*aes_test_ecb_enc); - if (verbose != 0) { - mbedtls_printf(" AES-ECB-%3u (%s): ", keybits, - (mode == MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT) ? "dec" : "enc"); - } + for (i = 0; i < num_tests << 1; i++) { + u = i >> 1; + keybits = 128 + u * 64; + mode = i & 1; - memset(buf, 0, 16); + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf(" AES-ECB-%3u (%s): ", keybits, + (mode == MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT) ? "dec" : "enc"); + } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT) + if (mode == MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT) { + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf("skipped\n"); + } + continue; + } +#endif - if (mode == MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT) { - ret = mbedtls_aes_setkey_dec(&ctx, key, keybits); - aes_tests = aes_test_ecb_dec[u]; - } else { - ret = mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc(&ctx, key, keybits); - aes_tests = aes_test_ecb_enc[u]; - } + memset(buf, 0, 16); - /* - * AES-192 is an optional feature that may be unavailable when - * there is an alternative underlying implementation i.e. when - * MBEDTLS_AES_ALT is defined. - */ - if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED && keybits == 192) { - mbedtls_printf("skipped\n"); - continue; - } else if (ret != 0) { - goto exit; - } +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT) + if (mode == MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT) { + ret = mbedtls_aes_setkey_dec(&ctx, key, keybits); + aes_tests = aes_test_ecb_dec[u]; + } else +#endif + { + ret = mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc(&ctx, key, keybits); + aes_tests = aes_test_ecb_enc[u]; + } - for (j = 0; j < 10000; j++) { - ret = mbedtls_aes_crypt_ecb(&ctx, mode, buf, buf); - if (ret != 0) { + /* + * AES-192 is an optional feature that may be unavailable when + * there is an alternative underlying implementation i.e. when + * MBEDTLS_AES_ALT is defined. + */ + if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED && keybits == 192) { + mbedtls_printf("skipped\n"); + continue; + } else if (ret != 0) { goto exit; } - } - if (memcmp(buf, aes_tests, 16) != 0) { - ret = 1; - goto exit; + for (j = 0; j < 10000; j++) { + ret = mbedtls_aes_crypt_ecb(&ctx, mode, buf, buf); + if (ret != 0) { + goto exit; + } + } + + if (memcmp(buf, aes_tests, 16) != 0) { + ret = 1; + goto exit; + } + + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf("passed\n"); + } } if (verbose != 0) { - mbedtls_printf("passed\n"); + mbedtls_printf("\n"); } } - if (verbose != 0) { - mbedtls_printf("\n"); - } - #if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) /* * CBC mode */ - for (i = 0; i < 6; i++) { - u = i >> 1; - keybits = 128 + u * 64; - mode = i & 1; + { + static const int num_tests = + sizeof(aes_test_cbc_dec) / sizeof(*aes_test_cbc_dec); - if (verbose != 0) { - mbedtls_printf(" AES-CBC-%3u (%s): ", keybits, - (mode == MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT) ? "dec" : "enc"); - } + for (i = 0; i < num_tests << 1; i++) { + u = i >> 1; + keybits = 128 + u * 64; + mode = i & 1; - memset(iv, 0, 16); - memset(prv, 0, 16); - memset(buf, 0, 16); + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf(" AES-CBC-%3u (%s): ", keybits, + (mode == MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT) ? "dec" : "enc"); + } - if (mode == MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT) { - ret = mbedtls_aes_setkey_dec(&ctx, key, keybits); - aes_tests = aes_test_cbc_dec[u]; - } else { - ret = mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc(&ctx, key, keybits); - aes_tests = aes_test_cbc_enc[u]; - } + memset(iv, 0, 16); + memset(prv, 0, 16); + memset(buf, 0, 16); - /* - * AES-192 is an optional feature that may be unavailable when - * there is an alternative underlying implementation i.e. when - * MBEDTLS_AES_ALT is defined. - */ - if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED && keybits == 192) { - mbedtls_printf("skipped\n"); - continue; - } else if (ret != 0) { - goto exit; - } + if (mode == MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT) { + ret = mbedtls_aes_setkey_dec(&ctx, key, keybits); + aes_tests = aes_test_cbc_dec[u]; + } else { + ret = mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc(&ctx, key, keybits); + aes_tests = aes_test_cbc_enc[u]; + } + + /* + * AES-192 is an optional feature that may be unavailable when + * there is an alternative underlying implementation i.e. when + * MBEDTLS_AES_ALT is defined. + */ + if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED && keybits == 192) { + mbedtls_printf("skipped\n"); + continue; + } else if (ret != 0) { + goto exit; + } + + for (j = 0; j < 10000; j++) { + if (mode == MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT) { + unsigned char tmp[16]; + + memcpy(tmp, prv, 16); + memcpy(prv, buf, 16); + memcpy(buf, tmp, 16); + } - for (j = 0; j < 10000; j++) { - if (mode == MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT) { - unsigned char tmp[16]; + ret = mbedtls_aes_crypt_cbc(&ctx, mode, 16, iv, buf, buf); + if (ret != 0) { + goto exit; + } - memcpy(tmp, prv, 16); - memcpy(prv, buf, 16); - memcpy(buf, tmp, 16); } - ret = mbedtls_aes_crypt_cbc(&ctx, mode, 16, iv, buf, buf); - if (ret != 0) { + if (memcmp(buf, aes_tests, 16) != 0) { + ret = 1; goto exit; } - } - - if (memcmp(buf, aes_tests, 16) != 0) { - ret = 1; - goto exit; + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf("passed\n"); + } } if (verbose != 0) { - mbedtls_printf("passed\n"); + mbedtls_printf("\n"); } } - - if (verbose != 0) { - mbedtls_printf("\n"); - } #endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB) /* * CFB128 mode */ - for (i = 0; i < 6; i++) { - u = i >> 1; - keybits = 128 + u * 64; - mode = i & 1; + { + static const int num_tests = + sizeof(aes_test_cfb128_key) / sizeof(*aes_test_cfb128_key); - if (verbose != 0) { - mbedtls_printf(" AES-CFB128-%3u (%s): ", keybits, - (mode == MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT) ? "dec" : "enc"); - } + for (i = 0; i < num_tests << 1; i++) { + u = i >> 1; + keybits = 128 + u * 64; + mode = i & 1; - memcpy(iv, aes_test_cfb128_iv, 16); - memcpy(key, aes_test_cfb128_key[u], keybits / 8); + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf(" AES-CFB128-%3u (%s): ", keybits, + (mode == MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT) ? "dec" : "enc"); + } - offset = 0; - ret = mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc(&ctx, key, keybits); - /* - * AES-192 is an optional feature that may be unavailable when - * there is an alternative underlying implementation i.e. when - * MBEDTLS_AES_ALT is defined. - */ - if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED && keybits == 192) { - mbedtls_printf("skipped\n"); - continue; - } else if (ret != 0) { - goto exit; - } + memcpy(iv, aes_test_cfb128_iv, 16); + memcpy(key, aes_test_cfb128_key[u], keybits / 8); - if (mode == MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT) { - memcpy(buf, aes_test_cfb128_ct[u], 64); - aes_tests = aes_test_cfb128_pt; - } else { - memcpy(buf, aes_test_cfb128_pt, 64); - aes_tests = aes_test_cfb128_ct[u]; - } + offset = 0; + ret = mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc(&ctx, key, keybits); + /* + * AES-192 is an optional feature that may be unavailable when + * there is an alternative underlying implementation i.e. when + * MBEDTLS_AES_ALT is defined. + */ + if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED && keybits == 192) { + mbedtls_printf("skipped\n"); + continue; + } else if (ret != 0) { + goto exit; + } - ret = mbedtls_aes_crypt_cfb128(&ctx, mode, 64, &offset, iv, buf, buf); - if (ret != 0) { - goto exit; - } + if (mode == MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT) { + memcpy(buf, aes_test_cfb128_ct[u], 64); + aes_tests = aes_test_cfb128_pt; + } else { + memcpy(buf, aes_test_cfb128_pt, 64); + aes_tests = aes_test_cfb128_ct[u]; + } - if (memcmp(buf, aes_tests, 64) != 0) { - ret = 1; - goto exit; + ret = mbedtls_aes_crypt_cfb128(&ctx, mode, 64, &offset, iv, buf, buf); + if (ret != 0) { + goto exit; + } + + if (memcmp(buf, aes_tests, 64) != 0) { + ret = 1; + goto exit; + } + + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf("passed\n"); + } } if (verbose != 0) { - mbedtls_printf("passed\n"); + mbedtls_printf("\n"); } } - - if (verbose != 0) { - mbedtls_printf("\n"); - } #endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB) /* * OFB mode */ - for (i = 0; i < 6; i++) { - u = i >> 1; - keybits = 128 + u * 64; - mode = i & 1; + { + static const int num_tests = + sizeof(aes_test_ofb_key) / sizeof(*aes_test_ofb_key); - if (verbose != 0) { - mbedtls_printf(" AES-OFB-%3u (%s): ", keybits, - (mode == MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT) ? "dec" : "enc"); - } + for (i = 0; i < num_tests << 1; i++) { + u = i >> 1; + keybits = 128 + u * 64; + mode = i & 1; - memcpy(iv, aes_test_ofb_iv, 16); - memcpy(key, aes_test_ofb_key[u], keybits / 8); + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf(" AES-OFB-%3u (%s): ", keybits, + (mode == MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT) ? "dec" : "enc"); + } - offset = 0; - ret = mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc(&ctx, key, keybits); - /* - * AES-192 is an optional feature that may be unavailable when - * there is an alternative underlying implementation i.e. when - * MBEDTLS_AES_ALT is defined. - */ - if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED && keybits == 192) { - mbedtls_printf("skipped\n"); - continue; - } else if (ret != 0) { - goto exit; - } + memcpy(iv, aes_test_ofb_iv, 16); + memcpy(key, aes_test_ofb_key[u], keybits / 8); - if (mode == MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT) { - memcpy(buf, aes_test_ofb_ct[u], 64); - aes_tests = aes_test_ofb_pt; - } else { - memcpy(buf, aes_test_ofb_pt, 64); - aes_tests = aes_test_ofb_ct[u]; - } + offset = 0; + ret = mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc(&ctx, key, keybits); + /* + * AES-192 is an optional feature that may be unavailable when + * there is an alternative underlying implementation i.e. when + * MBEDTLS_AES_ALT is defined. + */ + if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED && keybits == 192) { + mbedtls_printf("skipped\n"); + continue; + } else if (ret != 0) { + goto exit; + } - ret = mbedtls_aes_crypt_ofb(&ctx, 64, &offset, iv, buf, buf); - if (ret != 0) { - goto exit; - } + if (mode == MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT) { + memcpy(buf, aes_test_ofb_ct[u], 64); + aes_tests = aes_test_ofb_pt; + } else { + memcpy(buf, aes_test_ofb_pt, 64); + aes_tests = aes_test_ofb_ct[u]; + } - if (memcmp(buf, aes_tests, 64) != 0) { - ret = 1; - goto exit; + ret = mbedtls_aes_crypt_ofb(&ctx, 64, &offset, iv, buf, buf); + if (ret != 0) { + goto exit; + } + + if (memcmp(buf, aes_tests, 64) != 0) { + ret = 1; + goto exit; + } + + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf("passed\n"); + } } if (verbose != 0) { - mbedtls_printf("passed\n"); + mbedtls_printf("\n"); } } - - if (verbose != 0) { - mbedtls_printf("\n"); - } #endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR) /* * CTR mode */ - for (i = 0; i < 6; i++) { - u = i >> 1; - mode = i & 1; + { + static const int num_tests = + sizeof(aes_test_ctr_key) / sizeof(*aes_test_ctr_key); - if (verbose != 0) { - mbedtls_printf(" AES-CTR-128 (%s): ", - (mode == MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT) ? "dec" : "enc"); - } + for (i = 0; i < num_tests << 1; i++) { + u = i >> 1; + mode = i & 1; - memcpy(nonce_counter, aes_test_ctr_nonce_counter[u], 16); - memcpy(key, aes_test_ctr_key[u], 16); + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf(" AES-CTR-128 (%s): ", + (mode == MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT) ? "dec" : "enc"); + } - offset = 0; - if ((ret = mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc(&ctx, key, 128)) != 0) { - goto exit; - } + memcpy(nonce_counter, aes_test_ctr_nonce_counter[u], 16); + memcpy(key, aes_test_ctr_key[u], 16); - len = aes_test_ctr_len[u]; + offset = 0; + if ((ret = mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc(&ctx, key, 128)) != 0) { + goto exit; + } - if (mode == MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT) { - memcpy(buf, aes_test_ctr_ct[u], len); - aes_tests = aes_test_ctr_pt[u]; - } else { - memcpy(buf, aes_test_ctr_pt[u], len); - aes_tests = aes_test_ctr_ct[u]; - } + len = aes_test_ctr_len[u]; - ret = mbedtls_aes_crypt_ctr(&ctx, len, &offset, nonce_counter, - stream_block, buf, buf); - if (ret != 0) { - goto exit; - } + if (mode == MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT) { + memcpy(buf, aes_test_ctr_ct[u], len); + aes_tests = aes_test_ctr_pt[u]; + } else { + memcpy(buf, aes_test_ctr_pt[u], len); + aes_tests = aes_test_ctr_ct[u]; + } - if (memcmp(buf, aes_tests, len) != 0) { - ret = 1; - goto exit; - } + ret = mbedtls_aes_crypt_ctr(&ctx, len, &offset, nonce_counter, + stream_block, buf, buf); + if (ret != 0) { + goto exit; + } - if (verbose != 0) { - mbedtls_printf("passed\n"); + if (memcmp(buf, aes_tests, len) != 0) { + ret = 1; + goto exit; + } + + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf("passed\n"); + } } } @@ -2181,14 +2210,14 @@ int mbedtls_aes_self_test(int verbose) #endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS) + /* + * XTS mode + */ { static const int num_tests = sizeof(aes_test_xts_key) / sizeof(*aes_test_xts_key); mbedtls_aes_xts_context ctx_xts; - /* - * XTS mode - */ mbedtls_aes_xts_init(&ctx_xts); for (i = 0; i < num_tests << 1; i++) { diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/aesce.c b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/aesce.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..6a9e0a1c6bd0 --- /dev/null +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/aesce.c @@ -0,0 +1,618 @@ +/* + * Armv8-A Cryptographic Extension support functions for Aarch64 + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +#if defined(__clang__) && (__clang_major__ >= 4) + +/* Ideally, we would simply use MBEDTLS_ARCH_IS_ARMV8_A in the following #if, + * but that is defined by build_info.h, and we need this block to happen first. */ +#if defined(__ARM_ARCH) +#if __ARM_ARCH >= 8 +#define MBEDTLS_AESCE_ARCH_IS_ARMV8_A +#endif +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AESCE_ARCH_IS_ARMV8_A) && !defined(__ARM_FEATURE_CRYPTO) +/* TODO: Re-consider above after https://reviews.llvm.org/D131064 merged. + * + * The intrinsic declaration are guarded by predefined ACLE macros in clang: + * these are normally only enabled by the -march option on the command line. + * By defining the macros ourselves we gain access to those declarations without + * requiring -march on the command line. + * + * `arm_neon.h` is included by common.h, so we put these defines + * at the top of this file, before any includes. + */ +#define __ARM_FEATURE_CRYPTO 1 +/* See: https://arm-software.github.io/acle/main/acle.html#cryptographic-extensions + * + * `__ARM_FEATURE_CRYPTO` is deprecated, but we need to continue to specify it + * for older compilers. + */ +#define __ARM_FEATURE_AES 1 +#define MBEDTLS_ENABLE_ARM_CRYPTO_EXTENSIONS_COMPILER_FLAG +#endif + +#endif /* defined(__clang__) && (__clang_major__ >= 4) */ + +#include +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AESCE_C) + +#include "aesce.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AESCE_HAVE_CODE) + +/* Compiler version checks. */ +#if defined(__clang__) +# if defined(MBEDTLS_ARCH_IS_ARM32) && (__clang_major__ < 11) +# error "Minimum version of Clang for MBEDTLS_AESCE_C on 32-bit Arm or Thumb is 11.0." +# elif defined(MBEDTLS_ARCH_IS_ARM64) && (__clang_major__ < 4) +# error "Minimum version of Clang for MBEDTLS_AESCE_C on aarch64 is 4.0." +# endif +#elif defined(__GNUC__) +# if __GNUC__ < 6 +# error "Minimum version of GCC for MBEDTLS_AESCE_C is 6.0." +# endif +#elif defined(_MSC_VER) +/* TODO: We haven't verified MSVC from 1920 to 1928. If someone verified that, + * please update this and document of `MBEDTLS_AESCE_C` in + * `mbedtls_config.h`. */ +# if _MSC_VER < 1929 +# error "Minimum version of MSVC for MBEDTLS_AESCE_C is 2019 version 16.11.2." +# endif +#elif defined(__ARMCC_VERSION) +# if defined(MBEDTLS_ARCH_IS_ARM32) && (__ARMCC_VERSION < 6200002) +/* TODO: We haven't verified armclang for 32-bit Arm/Thumb prior to 6.20. + * If someone verified that, please update this and document of + * `MBEDTLS_AESCE_C` in `mbedtls_config.h`. */ +# error "Minimum version of armclang for MBEDTLS_AESCE_C on 32-bit Arm is 6.20." +# elif defined(MBEDTLS_ARCH_IS_ARM64) && (__ARMCC_VERSION < 6060000) +# error "Minimum version of armclang for MBEDTLS_AESCE_C on aarch64 is 6.6." +# endif +#endif + +#if !(defined(__ARM_FEATURE_CRYPTO) || defined(__ARM_FEATURE_AES)) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ENABLE_ARM_CRYPTO_EXTENSIONS_COMPILER_FLAG) +# if defined(__ARMCOMPILER_VERSION) +# if __ARMCOMPILER_VERSION <= 6090000 +# error "Must use minimum -march=armv8-a+crypto for MBEDTLS_AESCE_C" +# else +# pragma clang attribute push (__attribute__((target("aes"))), apply_to=function) +# define MBEDTLS_POP_TARGET_PRAGMA +# endif +# elif defined(__clang__) +# pragma clang attribute push (__attribute__((target("aes"))), apply_to=function) +# define MBEDTLS_POP_TARGET_PRAGMA +# elif defined(__GNUC__) +# pragma GCC push_options +# pragma GCC target ("+crypto") +# define MBEDTLS_POP_TARGET_PRAGMA +# elif defined(_MSC_VER) +# error "Required feature(__ARM_FEATURE_AES) is not enabled." +# endif +#endif /* !(__ARM_FEATURE_CRYPTO || __ARM_FEATURE_AES) || + MBEDTLS_ENABLE_ARM_CRYPTO_EXTENSIONS_COMPILER_FLAG */ + +#if defined(__linux__) && !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_USE_HARDWARE_ONLY) + +#include +#if !defined(HWCAP_NEON) +#define HWCAP_NEON (1 << 12) +#endif +#if !defined(HWCAP2_AES) +#define HWCAP2_AES (1 << 0) +#endif +#if !defined(HWCAP_AES) +#define HWCAP_AES (1 << 3) +#endif +#if !defined(HWCAP_ASIMD) +#define HWCAP_ASIMD (1 << 1) +#endif + +signed char mbedtls_aesce_has_support_result = -1; + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_USE_HARDWARE_ONLY) +/* + * AES instruction support detection routine + */ +int mbedtls_aesce_has_support_impl(void) +{ + /* To avoid many calls to getauxval, cache the result. This is + * thread-safe, because we store the result in a char so cannot + * be vulnerable to non-atomic updates. + * It is possible that we could end up setting result more than + * once, but that is harmless. + */ + if (mbedtls_aesce_has_support_result == -1) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARCH_IS_ARM32) + unsigned long auxval = getauxval(AT_HWCAP); + unsigned long auxval2 = getauxval(AT_HWCAP2); + if (((auxval & HWCAP_NEON) == HWCAP_NEON) && + ((auxval2 & HWCAP2_AES) == HWCAP2_AES)) { + mbedtls_aesce_has_support_result = 1; + } else { + mbedtls_aesce_has_support_result = 0; + } +#else + unsigned long auxval = getauxval(AT_HWCAP); + if ((auxval & (HWCAP_ASIMD | HWCAP_AES)) == + (HWCAP_ASIMD | HWCAP_AES)) { + mbedtls_aesce_has_support_result = 1; + } else { + mbedtls_aesce_has_support_result = 0; + } +#endif + } + return mbedtls_aesce_has_support_result; +} +#endif + +#endif /* defined(__linux__) && !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_USE_HARDWARE_ONLY) */ + +/* Single round of AESCE encryption */ +#define AESCE_ENCRYPT_ROUND \ + block = vaeseq_u8(block, vld1q_u8(keys)); \ + block = vaesmcq_u8(block); \ + keys += 16 +/* Two rounds of AESCE encryption */ +#define AESCE_ENCRYPT_ROUND_X2 AESCE_ENCRYPT_ROUND; AESCE_ENCRYPT_ROUND + +MBEDTLS_OPTIMIZE_FOR_PERFORMANCE +static uint8x16_t aesce_encrypt_block(uint8x16_t block, + unsigned char *keys, + int rounds) +{ + /* 10, 12 or 14 rounds. Unroll loop. */ + if (rounds == 10) { + goto rounds_10; + } + if (rounds == 12) { + goto rounds_12; + } + AESCE_ENCRYPT_ROUND_X2; +rounds_12: + AESCE_ENCRYPT_ROUND_X2; +rounds_10: + AESCE_ENCRYPT_ROUND_X2; + AESCE_ENCRYPT_ROUND_X2; + AESCE_ENCRYPT_ROUND_X2; + AESCE_ENCRYPT_ROUND_X2; + AESCE_ENCRYPT_ROUND; + + /* AES AddRoundKey for the previous round. + * SubBytes, ShiftRows for the final round. */ + block = vaeseq_u8(block, vld1q_u8(keys)); + keys += 16; + + /* Final round: no MixColumns */ + + /* Final AddRoundKey */ + block = veorq_u8(block, vld1q_u8(keys)); + + return block; +} + +/* Single round of AESCE decryption + * + * AES AddRoundKey, SubBytes, ShiftRows + * + * block = vaesdq_u8(block, vld1q_u8(keys)); + * + * AES inverse MixColumns for the next round. + * + * This means that we switch the order of the inverse AddRoundKey and + * inverse MixColumns operations. We have to do this as AddRoundKey is + * done in an atomic instruction together with the inverses of SubBytes + * and ShiftRows. + * + * It works because MixColumns is a linear operation over GF(2^8) and + * AddRoundKey is an exclusive or, which is equivalent to addition over + * GF(2^8). (The inverse of MixColumns needs to be applied to the + * affected round keys separately which has been done when the + * decryption round keys were calculated.) + * + * block = vaesimcq_u8(block); + */ +#define AESCE_DECRYPT_ROUND \ + block = vaesdq_u8(block, vld1q_u8(keys)); \ + block = vaesimcq_u8(block); \ + keys += 16 +/* Two rounds of AESCE decryption */ +#define AESCE_DECRYPT_ROUND_X2 AESCE_DECRYPT_ROUND; AESCE_DECRYPT_ROUND + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT) +static uint8x16_t aesce_decrypt_block(uint8x16_t block, + unsigned char *keys, + int rounds) +{ + /* 10, 12 or 14 rounds. Unroll loop. */ + if (rounds == 10) { + goto rounds_10; + } + if (rounds == 12) { + goto rounds_12; + } + AESCE_DECRYPT_ROUND_X2; +rounds_12: + AESCE_DECRYPT_ROUND_X2; +rounds_10: + AESCE_DECRYPT_ROUND_X2; + AESCE_DECRYPT_ROUND_X2; + AESCE_DECRYPT_ROUND_X2; + AESCE_DECRYPT_ROUND_X2; + AESCE_DECRYPT_ROUND; + + /* The inverses of AES AddRoundKey, SubBytes, ShiftRows finishing up the + * last full round. */ + block = vaesdq_u8(block, vld1q_u8(keys)); + keys += 16; + + /* Inverse AddRoundKey for inverting the initial round key addition. */ + block = veorq_u8(block, vld1q_u8(keys)); + + return block; +} +#endif + +/* + * AES-ECB block en(de)cryption + */ +int mbedtls_aesce_crypt_ecb(mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, + int mode, + const unsigned char input[16], + unsigned char output[16]) +{ + uint8x16_t block = vld1q_u8(&input[0]); + unsigned char *keys = (unsigned char *) (ctx->buf + ctx->rk_offset); + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT) + if (mode == MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT) { + block = aesce_decrypt_block(block, keys, ctx->nr); + } else +#else + (void) mode; +#endif + { + block = aesce_encrypt_block(block, keys, ctx->nr); + } + vst1q_u8(&output[0], block); + + return 0; +} + +/* + * Compute decryption round keys from encryption round keys + */ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT) +void mbedtls_aesce_inverse_key(unsigned char *invkey, + const unsigned char *fwdkey, + int nr) +{ + int i, j; + j = nr; + vst1q_u8(invkey, vld1q_u8(fwdkey + j * 16)); + for (i = 1, j--; j > 0; i++, j--) { + vst1q_u8(invkey + i * 16, + vaesimcq_u8(vld1q_u8(fwdkey + j * 16))); + } + vst1q_u8(invkey + i * 16, vld1q_u8(fwdkey + j * 16)); + +} +#endif + +static inline uint32_t aes_rot_word(uint32_t word) +{ + return (word << (32 - 8)) | (word >> 8); +} + +static inline uint32_t aes_sub_word(uint32_t in) +{ + uint8x16_t v = vreinterpretq_u8_u32(vdupq_n_u32(in)); + uint8x16_t zero = vdupq_n_u8(0); + + /* vaeseq_u8 does both SubBytes and ShiftRows. Taking the first row yields + * the correct result as ShiftRows doesn't change the first row. */ + v = vaeseq_u8(zero, v); + return vgetq_lane_u32(vreinterpretq_u32_u8(v), 0); +} + +/* + * Key expansion function + */ +static void aesce_setkey_enc(unsigned char *rk, + const unsigned char *key, + const size_t key_bit_length) +{ + static uint8_t const rcon[] = { 0x01, 0x02, 0x04, 0x08, 0x10, + 0x20, 0x40, 0x80, 0x1b, 0x36 }; + /* See https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/NIST.FIPS.197.pdf + * - Section 5, Nr = Nk + 6 + * - Section 5.2, the length of round keys is Nb*(Nr+1) + */ + const size_t key_len_in_words = key_bit_length / 32; /* Nk */ + const size_t round_key_len_in_words = 4; /* Nb */ + const size_t rounds_needed = key_len_in_words + 6; /* Nr */ + const size_t round_keys_len_in_words = + round_key_len_in_words * (rounds_needed + 1); /* Nb*(Nr+1) */ + const uint32_t *rko_end = (uint32_t *) rk + round_keys_len_in_words; + + memcpy(rk, key, key_len_in_words * 4); + + for (uint32_t *rki = (uint32_t *) rk; + rki + key_len_in_words < rko_end; + rki += key_len_in_words) { + + size_t iteration = (size_t) (rki - (uint32_t *) rk) / key_len_in_words; + uint32_t *rko; + rko = rki + key_len_in_words; + rko[0] = aes_rot_word(aes_sub_word(rki[key_len_in_words - 1])); + rko[0] ^= rcon[iteration] ^ rki[0]; + rko[1] = rko[0] ^ rki[1]; + rko[2] = rko[1] ^ rki[2]; + rko[3] = rko[2] ^ rki[3]; + if (rko + key_len_in_words > rko_end) { + /* Do not write overflow words.*/ + continue; + } +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH) + switch (key_bit_length) { + case 128: + break; + case 192: + rko[4] = rko[3] ^ rki[4]; + rko[5] = rko[4] ^ rki[5]; + break; + case 256: + rko[4] = aes_sub_word(rko[3]) ^ rki[4]; + rko[5] = rko[4] ^ rki[5]; + rko[6] = rko[5] ^ rki[6]; + rko[7] = rko[6] ^ rki[7]; + break; + } +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH */ + } +} + +/* + * Key expansion, wrapper + */ +int mbedtls_aesce_setkey_enc(unsigned char *rk, + const unsigned char *key, + size_t bits) +{ + switch (bits) { + case 128: + case 192: + case 256: + aesce_setkey_enc(rk, key, bits); + break; + default: + return MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH; + } + + return 0; +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARCH_IS_ARM32) + +#if defined(__clang__) +/* On clang for A32/T32, work around some missing intrinsics and types which are listed in + * [ACLE](https://arm-software.github.io/acle/neon_intrinsics/advsimd.html#polynomial-1) + * These are only required for GCM. + */ +#define vreinterpretq_u64_p64(a) ((uint64x2_t) a) + +typedef uint8x16_t poly128_t; + +static inline poly128_t vmull_p64(poly64_t a, poly64_t b) +{ + poly128_t r; + asm ("vmull.p64 %[r], %[a], %[b]" : [r] "=w" (r) : [a] "w" (a), [b] "w" (b) :); + return r; +} + +/* This is set to cause some more missing intrinsics to be defined below */ +#define COMMON_MISSING_INTRINSICS + +static inline poly128_t vmull_high_p64(poly64x2_t a, poly64x2_t b) +{ + return vmull_p64((poly64_t) (vget_high_u64((uint64x2_t) a)), + (poly64_t) (vget_high_u64((uint64x2_t) b))); +} + +#endif /* defined(__clang__) */ + +static inline uint8x16_t vrbitq_u8(uint8x16_t x) +{ + /* There is no vrbitq_u8 instruction in A32/T32, so provide + * an equivalent non-Neon implementation. Reverse bit order in each + * byte with 4x rbit, rev. */ + asm ("ldm %[p], { r2-r5 } \n\t" + "rbit r2, r2 \n\t" + "rev r2, r2 \n\t" + "rbit r3, r3 \n\t" + "rev r3, r3 \n\t" + "rbit r4, r4 \n\t" + "rev r4, r4 \n\t" + "rbit r5, r5 \n\t" + "rev r5, r5 \n\t" + "stm %[p], { r2-r5 } \n\t" + : + /* Output: 16 bytes of memory pointed to by &x */ + "+m" (*(uint8_t(*)[16]) &x) + : + [p] "r" (&x) + : + "r2", "r3", "r4", "r5" + ); + return x; +} + +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_ARCH_IS_ARM32) */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_COMPILER_IS_GCC) && __GNUC__ == 5 +/* Some intrinsics are not available for GCC 5.X. */ +#define COMMON_MISSING_INTRINSICS +#endif /* MBEDTLS_COMPILER_IS_GCC && __GNUC__ == 5 */ + + +#if defined(COMMON_MISSING_INTRINSICS) + +/* Missing intrinsics common to both GCC 5, and Clang on 32-bit */ + +#define vreinterpretq_p64_u8(a) ((poly64x2_t) a) +#define vreinterpretq_u8_p128(a) ((uint8x16_t) a) + +static inline poly64x1_t vget_low_p64(poly64x2_t a) +{ + uint64x1_t r = vget_low_u64(vreinterpretq_u64_p64(a)); + return (poly64x1_t) r; + +} + +#endif /* COMMON_MISSING_INTRINSICS */ + +/* vmull_p64/vmull_high_p64 wrappers. + * + * Older compilers miss some intrinsic functions for `poly*_t`. We use + * uint8x16_t and uint8x16x3_t as input/output parameters. + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_COMPILER_IS_GCC) +/* GCC reports incompatible type error without cast. GCC think poly64_t and + * poly64x1_t are different, that is different with MSVC and Clang. */ +#define MBEDTLS_VMULL_P64(a, b) vmull_p64((poly64_t) a, (poly64_t) b) +#else +/* MSVC reports `error C2440: 'type cast'` with cast. Clang does not report + * error with/without cast. And I think poly64_t and poly64x1_t are same, no + * cast for clang also. */ +#define MBEDTLS_VMULL_P64(a, b) vmull_p64(a, b) +#endif /* MBEDTLS_COMPILER_IS_GCC */ + +static inline uint8x16_t pmull_low(uint8x16_t a, uint8x16_t b) +{ + + return vreinterpretq_u8_p128( + MBEDTLS_VMULL_P64( + (poly64_t) vget_low_p64(vreinterpretq_p64_u8(a)), + (poly64_t) vget_low_p64(vreinterpretq_p64_u8(b)) + )); +} + +static inline uint8x16_t pmull_high(uint8x16_t a, uint8x16_t b) +{ + return vreinterpretq_u8_p128( + vmull_high_p64(vreinterpretq_p64_u8(a), + vreinterpretq_p64_u8(b))); +} + +/* GHASH does 128b polynomial multiplication on block in GF(2^128) defined by + * `x^128 + x^7 + x^2 + x + 1`. + * + * Arm64 only has 64b->128b polynomial multipliers, we need to do 4 64b + * multiplies to generate a 128b. + * + * `poly_mult_128` executes polynomial multiplication and outputs 256b that + * represented by 3 128b due to code size optimization. + * + * Output layout: + * | | | | + * |------------|-------------|-------------| + * | ret.val[0] | h3:h2:00:00 | high 128b | + * | ret.val[1] | :m2:m1:00 | middle 128b | + * | ret.val[2] | : :l1:l0 | low 128b | + */ +static inline uint8x16x3_t poly_mult_128(uint8x16_t a, uint8x16_t b) +{ + uint8x16x3_t ret; + uint8x16_t h, m, l; /* retval high/middle/low */ + uint8x16_t c, d, e; + + h = pmull_high(a, b); /* h3:h2:00:00 = a1*b1 */ + l = pmull_low(a, b); /* : :l1:l0 = a0*b0 */ + c = vextq_u8(b, b, 8); /* :c1:c0 = b0:b1 */ + d = pmull_high(a, c); /* :d2:d1:00 = a1*b0 */ + e = pmull_low(a, c); /* :e2:e1:00 = a0*b1 */ + m = veorq_u8(d, e); /* :m2:m1:00 = d + e */ + + ret.val[0] = h; + ret.val[1] = m; + ret.val[2] = l; + return ret; +} + +/* + * Modulo reduction. + * + * See: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/285612706_Implementing_GCM_on_ARMv8 + * + * Section 4.3 + * + * Modular reduction is slightly more complex. Write the GCM modulus as f(z) = + * z^128 +r(z), where r(z) = z^7+z^2+z+ 1. The well known approach is to + * consider that z^128 ≡r(z) (mod z^128 +r(z)), allowing us to write the 256-bit + * operand to be reduced as a(z) = h(z)z^128 +l(z)≡h(z)r(z) + l(z). That is, we + * simply multiply the higher part of the operand by r(z) and add it to l(z). If + * the result is still larger than 128 bits, we reduce again. + */ +static inline uint8x16_t poly_mult_reduce(uint8x16x3_t input) +{ + uint8x16_t const ZERO = vdupq_n_u8(0); + + uint64x2_t r = vreinterpretq_u64_u8(vdupq_n_u8(0x87)); +#if defined(__GNUC__) + /* use 'asm' as an optimisation barrier to prevent loading MODULO from + * memory. It is for GNUC compatible compilers. + */ + asm volatile ("" : "+w" (r)); +#endif + uint8x16_t const MODULO = vreinterpretq_u8_u64(vshrq_n_u64(r, 64 - 8)); + uint8x16_t h, m, l; /* input high/middle/low 128b */ + uint8x16_t c, d, e, f, g, n, o; + h = input.val[0]; /* h3:h2:00:00 */ + m = input.val[1]; /* :m2:m1:00 */ + l = input.val[2]; /* : :l1:l0 */ + c = pmull_high(h, MODULO); /* :c2:c1:00 = reduction of h3 */ + d = pmull_low(h, MODULO); /* : :d1:d0 = reduction of h2 */ + e = veorq_u8(c, m); /* :e2:e1:00 = m2:m1:00 + c2:c1:00 */ + f = pmull_high(e, MODULO); /* : :f1:f0 = reduction of e2 */ + g = vextq_u8(ZERO, e, 8); /* : :g1:00 = e1:00 */ + n = veorq_u8(d, l); /* : :n1:n0 = d1:d0 + l1:l0 */ + o = veorq_u8(n, f); /* o1:o0 = f1:f0 + n1:n0 */ + return veorq_u8(o, g); /* = o1:o0 + g1:00 */ +} + +/* + * GCM multiplication: c = a times b in GF(2^128) + */ +void mbedtls_aesce_gcm_mult(unsigned char c[16], + const unsigned char a[16], + const unsigned char b[16]) +{ + uint8x16_t va, vb, vc; + va = vrbitq_u8(vld1q_u8(&a[0])); + vb = vrbitq_u8(vld1q_u8(&b[0])); + vc = vrbitq_u8(poly_mult_reduce(poly_mult_128(va, vb))); + vst1q_u8(&c[0], vc); +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_POP_TARGET_PRAGMA) +#if defined(__clang__) +#pragma clang attribute pop +#elif defined(__GNUC__) +#pragma GCC pop_options +#endif +#undef MBEDTLS_POP_TARGET_PRAGMA +#endif + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_AESCE_HAVE_CODE */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_AESCE_C */ diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/aesce.h b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/aesce.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..a14d085efa28 --- /dev/null +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/aesce.h @@ -0,0 +1,136 @@ +/** + * \file aesce.h + * + * \brief Support hardware AES acceleration on Armv8-A processors with + * the Armv8-A Cryptographic Extension. + * + * \warning These functions are only for internal use by other library + * functions; you must not call them directly. + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ +#ifndef MBEDTLS_AESCE_H +#define MBEDTLS_AESCE_H + +#include "mbedtls/build_info.h" +#include "common.h" + +#include "mbedtls/aes.h" + + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AESCE_C) \ + && defined(MBEDTLS_ARCH_IS_ARMV8_A) && defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_NEON_INTRINSICS) \ + && (defined(MBEDTLS_COMPILER_IS_GCC) || defined(__clang__) || defined(MSC_VER)) + +/* MBEDTLS_AESCE_HAVE_CODE is defined if we have a suitable target platform, and a + * potentially suitable compiler (compiler version & flags are not checked when defining + * this). */ +#define MBEDTLS_AESCE_HAVE_CODE + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +#if defined(__linux__) && !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_USE_HARDWARE_ONLY) + +extern signed char mbedtls_aesce_has_support_result; + +/** + * \brief Internal function to detect the crypto extension in CPUs. + * + * \return 1 if CPU has support for the feature, 0 otherwise + */ +int mbedtls_aesce_has_support_impl(void); + +#define MBEDTLS_AESCE_HAS_SUPPORT() (mbedtls_aesce_has_support_result == -1 ? \ + mbedtls_aesce_has_support_impl() : \ + mbedtls_aesce_has_support_result) + +#else /* defined(__linux__) && !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_USE_HARDWARE_ONLY) */ + +/* If we are not on Linux, we can't detect support so assume that it's supported. + * Similarly, assume support if MBEDTLS_AES_USE_HARDWARE_ONLY is set. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_AESCE_HAS_SUPPORT() 1 + +#endif /* defined(__linux__) && !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_USE_HARDWARE_ONLY) */ + +/** + * \brief Internal AES-ECB block encryption and decryption + * + * \warning This assumes that the context specifies either 10, 12 or 14 + * rounds and will behave incorrectly if this is not the case. + * + * \param ctx AES context + * \param mode MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT or MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT + * \param input 16-byte input block + * \param output 16-byte output block + * + * \return 0 on success (cannot fail) + */ +int mbedtls_aesce_crypt_ecb(mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, + int mode, + const unsigned char input[16], + unsigned char output[16]); + +/** + * \brief Internal GCM multiplication: c = a * b in GF(2^128) + * + * \note This function is only for internal use by other library + * functions; you must not call it directly. + * + * \param c Result + * \param a First operand + * \param b Second operand + * + * \note Both operands and result are bit strings interpreted as + * elements of GF(2^128) as per the GCM spec. + */ +void mbedtls_aesce_gcm_mult(unsigned char c[16], + const unsigned char a[16], + const unsigned char b[16]); + + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT) +/** + * \brief Internal round key inversion. This function computes + * decryption round keys from the encryption round keys. + * + * \param invkey Round keys for the equivalent inverse cipher + * \param fwdkey Original round keys (for encryption) + * \param nr Number of rounds (that is, number of round keys minus one) + */ +void mbedtls_aesce_inverse_key(unsigned char *invkey, + const unsigned char *fwdkey, + int nr); +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT */ + +/** + * \brief Internal key expansion for encryption + * + * \param rk Destination buffer where the round keys are written + * \param key Encryption key + * \param bits Key size in bits (must be 128, 192 or 256) + * + * \return 0 if successful, or MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH + */ +int mbedtls_aesce_setkey_enc(unsigned char *rk, + const unsigned char *key, + size_t bits); + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#else + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_USE_HARDWARE_ONLY) && defined(MBEDTLS_ARCH_IS_ARMV8_A) +#error "AES hardware acceleration not supported on this platform / compiler" +#endif + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_AESCE_C && MBEDTLS_ARCH_IS_ARMV8_A && MBEDTLS_HAVE_NEON_INTRINSICS && + (MBEDTLS_COMPILER_IS_GCC || __clang__ || MSC_VER) */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_AESCE_H */ diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/aesni.c b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/aesni.c index 74bae91f5e3c..8e5bd55ab906 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/aesni.c +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/aesni.c @@ -14,16 +14,10 @@ #if defined(MBEDTLS_AESNI_C) -#include "mbedtls/aesni.h" +#include "aesni.h" #include -/* *INDENT-OFF* */ -#ifndef asm -#define asm __asm -#endif -/* *INDENT-ON* */ - #if defined(MBEDTLS_AESNI_HAVE_CODE) #if MBEDTLS_AESNI_HAVE_CODE == 2 @@ -37,6 +31,18 @@ #include #endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARCH_IS_X86) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_COMPILER_IS_GCC) +#pragma GCC push_options +#pragma GCC target ("pclmul,sse2,aes") +#define MBEDTLS_POP_TARGET_PRAGMA +#elif defined(__clang__) && (__clang_major__ >= 5) +#pragma clang attribute push (__attribute__((target("pclmul,sse2,aes"))), apply_to=function) +#define MBEDTLS_POP_TARGET_PRAGMA +#endif +#endif + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_USE_HARDWARE_ONLY) /* * AES-NI support detection routine */ @@ -66,6 +72,7 @@ int mbedtls_aesni_has_support(unsigned int what) return (c & what) != 0; } +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_AES_USE_HARDWARE_ONLY */ #if MBEDTLS_AESNI_HAVE_CODE == 2 @@ -77,7 +84,7 @@ int mbedtls_aesni_crypt_ecb(mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, const unsigned char input[16], unsigned char output[16]) { - const __m128i *rk = (const __m128i *) (ctx->rk); + const __m128i *rk = (const __m128i *) (ctx->buf + ctx->rk_offset); unsigned nr = ctx->nr; // Number of remaining rounds // Load round key 0 @@ -87,14 +94,19 @@ int mbedtls_aesni_crypt_ecb(mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, ++rk; --nr; - if (mode == 0) { +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT) + if (mode == MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT) { while (nr != 0) { state = _mm_aesdec_si128(state, *rk); ++rk; --nr; } state = _mm_aesdeclast_si128(state, *rk); - } else { + } else +#else + (void) mode; +#endif + { while (nr != 0) { state = _mm_aesenc_si128(state, *rk); ++rk; @@ -211,6 +223,7 @@ void mbedtls_aesni_gcm_mult(unsigned char c[16], /* * Compute decryption round keys from encryption round keys */ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT) void mbedtls_aesni_inverse_key(unsigned char *invkey, const unsigned char *fwdkey, int nr) { @@ -223,6 +236,7 @@ void mbedtls_aesni_inverse_key(unsigned char *invkey, } *ik = *fk; } +#endif /* * Key expansion, 128-bit case @@ -271,6 +285,7 @@ static void aesni_setkey_enc_128(unsigned char *rk_bytes, /* * Key expansion, 192-bit case */ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH) static void aesni_set_rk_192(__m128i *state0, __m128i *state1, __m128i xword, unsigned char *rk) { @@ -325,10 +340,12 @@ static void aesni_setkey_enc_192(unsigned char *rk, aesni_set_rk_192(&state0, &state1, _mm_aeskeygenassist_si128(state1, 0x40), rk + 24 * 7); aesni_set_rk_192(&state0, &state1, _mm_aeskeygenassist_si128(state1, 0x80), rk + 24 * 8); } +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH */ /* * Key expansion, 256-bit case */ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH) static void aesni_set_rk_256(__m128i state0, __m128i state1, __m128i xword, __m128i *rk0, __m128i *rk1) { @@ -385,6 +402,16 @@ static void aesni_setkey_enc_256(unsigned char *rk_bytes, aesni_set_rk_256(rk[10], rk[11], _mm_aeskeygenassist_si128(rk[11], 0x20), &rk[12], &rk[13]); aesni_set_rk_256(rk[12], rk[13], _mm_aeskeygenassist_si128(rk[13], 0x40), &rk[14], &rk[15]); } +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_POP_TARGET_PRAGMA) +#if defined(__clang__) +#pragma clang attribute pop +#elif defined(__GNUC__) +#pragma GCC pop_options +#endif +#undef MBEDTLS_POP_TARGET_PRAGMA +#endif #else /* MBEDTLS_AESNI_HAVE_CODE == 1 */ @@ -445,6 +472,7 @@ int mbedtls_aesni_crypt_ecb(mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, "jnz 1b \n\t" "movdqu (%1), %%xmm1 \n\t" // load round key AESENCLAST(xmm1_xmm0) // last round +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT) "jmp 3f \n\t" "2: \n\t" // decryption loop @@ -455,11 +483,12 @@ int mbedtls_aesni_crypt_ecb(mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, "jnz 2b \n\t" "movdqu (%1), %%xmm1 \n\t" // load round key AESDECLAST(xmm1_xmm0) // last round +#endif "3: \n\t" "movdqu %%xmm0, (%4) \n\t" // export output : - : "r" (ctx->nr), "r" (ctx->rk), "r" (mode), "r" (input), "r" (output) + : "r" (ctx->nr), "r" (ctx->buf + ctx->rk_offset), "r" (mode), "r" (input), "r" (output) : "memory", "cc", "xmm0", "xmm1"); @@ -581,6 +610,7 @@ void mbedtls_aesni_gcm_mult(unsigned char c[16], /* * Compute decryption round keys from encryption round keys */ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT) void mbedtls_aesni_inverse_key(unsigned char *invkey, const unsigned char *fwdkey, int nr) { @@ -600,6 +630,7 @@ void mbedtls_aesni_inverse_key(unsigned char *invkey, memcpy(ik, fk, 16); } +#endif /* * Key expansion, 128-bit case @@ -654,6 +685,7 @@ static void aesni_setkey_enc_128(unsigned char *rk, /* * Key expansion, 192-bit case */ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH) static void aesni_setkey_enc_192(unsigned char *rk, const unsigned char *key) { @@ -707,10 +739,12 @@ static void aesni_setkey_enc_192(unsigned char *rk, : "r" (rk), "r" (key) : "memory", "cc", "0"); } +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH */ /* * Key expansion, 256-bit case */ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH) static void aesni_setkey_enc_256(unsigned char *rk, const unsigned char *key) { @@ -773,6 +807,7 @@ static void aesni_setkey_enc_256(unsigned char *rk, : "r" (rk), "r" (key) : "memory", "cc", "0"); } +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_AESNI_HAVE_CODE */ @@ -785,8 +820,10 @@ int mbedtls_aesni_setkey_enc(unsigned char *rk, { switch (bits) { case 128: aesni_setkey_enc_128(rk, key); break; +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH) case 192: aesni_setkey_enc_192(rk, key); break; case 256: aesni_setkey_enc_256(rk, key); break; +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH */ default: return MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH; } diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/aesni.h b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/aesni.h similarity index 79% rename from thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/aesni.h rename to thirdparty/mbedtls/library/aesni.h index 93f067304d89..59e27afd3ec6 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/aesni.h +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/aesni.h @@ -13,37 +13,18 @@ #ifndef MBEDTLS_AESNI_H #define MBEDTLS_AESNI_H -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "mbedtls/build_info.h" #include "mbedtls/aes.h" #define MBEDTLS_AESNI_AES 0x02000000u #define MBEDTLS_AESNI_CLMUL 0x00000002u -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_X86_64) && \ - (defined(__amd64__) || defined(__x86_64__) || \ - defined(_M_X64) || defined(_M_AMD64)) && \ - !defined(_M_ARM64EC) -#define MBEDTLS_HAVE_X86_64 -#endif - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_X86) && \ - (defined(__i386__) || defined(_M_IX86)) -#define MBEDTLS_HAVE_X86 -#endif - #if defined(MBEDTLS_AESNI_C) && \ - (defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_X86_64) || defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_X86)) + (defined(MBEDTLS_ARCH_IS_X64) || defined(MBEDTLS_ARCH_IS_X86)) /* Can we do AESNI with intrinsics? * (Only implemented with certain compilers, only for certain targets.) - * - * NOTE: MBEDTLS_AESNI_HAVE_INTRINSICS and MBEDTLS_AESNI_HAVE_CODE are internal - * macros that may change in future releases. */ #undef MBEDTLS_AESNI_HAVE_INTRINSICS #if defined(_MSC_VER) && !defined(__clang__) @@ -57,21 +38,27 @@ #if (defined(__GNUC__) || defined(__clang__)) && defined(__AES__) && defined(__PCLMUL__) #define MBEDTLS_AESNI_HAVE_INTRINSICS #endif +/* For 32-bit, we only support intrinsics */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARCH_IS_X86) && (defined(__GNUC__) || defined(__clang__)) +#define MBEDTLS_AESNI_HAVE_INTRINSICS +#endif -/* Choose the implementation of AESNI, if one is available. */ -#undef MBEDTLS_AESNI_HAVE_CODE -/* To minimize disruption when releasing the intrinsics-based implementation, - * favor the assembly-based implementation if it's available. We intend to - * revise this in a later release of Mbed TLS 3.x. In the long run, we will - * likely remove the assembly implementation. */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM) && \ - defined(__GNUC__) && defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_X86_64) +/* Choose the implementation of AESNI, if one is available. + * + * Favor the intrinsics-based implementation if it's available, for better + * maintainability. + * Performance is about the same (see #7380). + * In the long run, we will likely remove the assembly implementation. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AESNI_HAVE_INTRINSICS) +#define MBEDTLS_AESNI_HAVE_CODE 2 // via intrinsics +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM) && \ + (defined(__GNUC__) || defined(__clang__)) && defined(MBEDTLS_ARCH_IS_X64) /* Can we do AESNI with inline assembly? * (Only implemented with gas syntax, only for 64-bit.) */ #define MBEDTLS_AESNI_HAVE_CODE 1 // via assembly -#elif defined(MBEDTLS_AESNI_HAVE_INTRINSICS) -#define MBEDTLS_AESNI_HAVE_CODE 2 // via intrinsics +#else +#error "MBEDTLS_AESNI_C defined, but neither intrinsics nor assembly available" #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_AESNI_HAVE_CODE) @@ -91,7 +78,11 @@ extern "C" { * * \return 1 if CPU has support for the feature, 0 otherwise */ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_USE_HARDWARE_ONLY) int mbedtls_aesni_has_support(unsigned int what); +#else +#define mbedtls_aesni_has_support(what) 1 +#endif /** * \brief Internal AES-NI AES-ECB block encryption and decryption @@ -128,6 +119,7 @@ void mbedtls_aesni_gcm_mult(unsigned char c[16], const unsigned char a[16], const unsigned char b[16]); +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT) /** * \brief Internal round key inversion. This function computes * decryption round keys from the encryption round keys. @@ -142,6 +134,7 @@ void mbedtls_aesni_gcm_mult(unsigned char c[16], void mbedtls_aesni_inverse_key(unsigned char *invkey, const unsigned char *fwdkey, int nr); +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT */ /** * \brief Internal key expansion for encryption @@ -164,6 +157,6 @@ int mbedtls_aesni_setkey_enc(unsigned char *rk, #endif #endif /* MBEDTLS_AESNI_HAVE_CODE */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_AESNI_C && (MBEDTLS_HAVE_X86_64 || MBEDTLS_HAVE_X86) */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_AESNI_C && (MBEDTLS_ARCH_IS_X64 || MBEDTLS_ARCH_IS_X86) */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_AESNI_H */ diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/alignment.h b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/alignment.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..a17001dd91b1 --- /dev/null +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/alignment.h @@ -0,0 +1,684 @@ +/** + * \file alignment.h + * + * \brief Utility code for dealing with unaligned memory accesses + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +#ifndef MBEDTLS_LIBRARY_ALIGNMENT_H +#define MBEDTLS_LIBRARY_ALIGNMENT_H + +#include +#include +#include + +/* + * Define MBEDTLS_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS for architectures where unaligned memory + * accesses are known to be efficient. + * + * All functions defined here will behave correctly regardless, but might be less + * efficient when this is not defined. + */ +#if defined(__ARM_FEATURE_UNALIGNED) \ + || defined(MBEDTLS_ARCH_IS_X86) || defined(MBEDTLS_ARCH_IS_X64) \ + || defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_IS_WINDOWS_ON_ARM64) +/* + * __ARM_FEATURE_UNALIGNED is defined where appropriate by armcc, gcc 7, clang 9 + * (and later versions) for Arm v7 and later; all x86 platforms should have + * efficient unaligned access. + * + * https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/cpp/build/arm64-windows-abi-conventions?view=msvc-170#alignment + * specifies that on Windows-on-Arm64, unaligned access is safe (except for uncached + * device memory). + */ +#define MBEDTLS_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS +#endif + +#if defined(__IAR_SYSTEMS_ICC__) && \ + (defined(MBEDTLS_ARCH_IS_ARM64) || defined(MBEDTLS_ARCH_IS_ARM32) \ + || defined(__ICCRX__) || defined(__ICCRL78__) || defined(__ICCRISCV__)) +#pragma language=save +#pragma language=extended +#define MBEDTLS_POP_IAR_LANGUAGE_PRAGMA +/* IAR recommend this technique for accessing unaligned data in + * https://www.iar.com/knowledge/support/technical-notes/compiler/accessing-unaligned-data + * This results in a single load / store instruction (if unaligned access is supported). + * According to that document, this is only supported on certain architectures. + */ + #define UINT_UNALIGNED +typedef uint16_t __packed mbedtls_uint16_unaligned_t; +typedef uint32_t __packed mbedtls_uint32_unaligned_t; +typedef uint64_t __packed mbedtls_uint64_unaligned_t; +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_COMPILER_IS_GCC) && (MBEDTLS_GCC_VERSION >= 40504) && \ + ((MBEDTLS_GCC_VERSION < 60300) || (!defined(MBEDTLS_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS))) +/* + * gcc may generate a branch to memcpy for calls like `memcpy(dest, src, 4)` rather than + * generating some LDR or LDRB instructions (similar for stores). + * + * This is architecture dependent: x86-64 seems fine even with old gcc; 32-bit Arm + * is affected. To keep it simple, we enable for all architectures. + * + * For versions of gcc < 5.4.0 this issue always happens. + * For gcc < 6.3.0, this issue happens at -O0 + * For all versions, this issue happens iff unaligned access is not supported. + * + * For gcc 4.x, this implementation will generate byte-by-byte loads even if unaligned access is + * supported, which is correct but not optimal. + * + * For performance (and code size, in some cases), we want to avoid the branch and just generate + * some inline load/store instructions since the access is small and constant-size. + * + * The manual states: + * "The packed attribute specifies that a variable or structure field should have the smallest + * possible alignment—one byte for a variable" + * https://gcc.gnu.org/onlinedocs/gcc-4.5.4/gcc/Variable-Attributes.html + * + * Previous implementations used __attribute__((__aligned__(1)), but had issues with a gcc bug: + * https://gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=94662 + * + * Tested with several versions of GCC from 4.5.0 up to 13.2.0 + * We don't enable for older than 4.5.0 as this has not been tested. + */ + #define UINT_UNALIGNED_STRUCT +typedef struct { + uint16_t x; +} __attribute__((packed)) mbedtls_uint16_unaligned_t; +typedef struct { + uint32_t x; +} __attribute__((packed)) mbedtls_uint32_unaligned_t; +typedef struct { + uint64_t x; +} __attribute__((packed)) mbedtls_uint64_unaligned_t; + #endif + +/* + * We try to force mbedtls_(get|put)_unaligned_uintXX to be always inline, because this results + * in code that is both smaller and faster. IAR and gcc both benefit from this when optimising + * for size. + */ + +/** + * Read the unsigned 16 bits integer from the given address, which need not + * be aligned. + * + * \param p pointer to 2 bytes of data + * \return Data at the given address + */ +#if defined(__IAR_SYSTEMS_ICC__) +#pragma inline = forced +#elif defined(__GNUC__) +__attribute__((always_inline)) +#endif +static inline uint16_t mbedtls_get_unaligned_uint16(const void *p) +{ + uint16_t r; +#if defined(UINT_UNALIGNED) + mbedtls_uint16_unaligned_t *p16 = (mbedtls_uint16_unaligned_t *) p; + r = *p16; +#elif defined(UINT_UNALIGNED_STRUCT) + mbedtls_uint16_unaligned_t *p16 = (mbedtls_uint16_unaligned_t *) p; + r = p16->x; +#else + memcpy(&r, p, sizeof(r)); +#endif + return r; +} + +/** + * Write the unsigned 16 bits integer to the given address, which need not + * be aligned. + * + * \param p pointer to 2 bytes of data + * \param x data to write + */ +#if defined(__IAR_SYSTEMS_ICC__) +#pragma inline = forced +#elif defined(__GNUC__) +__attribute__((always_inline)) +#endif +static inline void mbedtls_put_unaligned_uint16(void *p, uint16_t x) +{ +#if defined(UINT_UNALIGNED) + mbedtls_uint16_unaligned_t *p16 = (mbedtls_uint16_unaligned_t *) p; + *p16 = x; +#elif defined(UINT_UNALIGNED_STRUCT) + mbedtls_uint16_unaligned_t *p16 = (mbedtls_uint16_unaligned_t *) p; + p16->x = x; +#else + memcpy(p, &x, sizeof(x)); +#endif +} + +/** + * Read the unsigned 32 bits integer from the given address, which need not + * be aligned. + * + * \param p pointer to 4 bytes of data + * \return Data at the given address + */ +#if defined(__IAR_SYSTEMS_ICC__) +#pragma inline = forced +#elif defined(__GNUC__) +__attribute__((always_inline)) +#endif +static inline uint32_t mbedtls_get_unaligned_uint32(const void *p) +{ + uint32_t r; +#if defined(UINT_UNALIGNED) + mbedtls_uint32_unaligned_t *p32 = (mbedtls_uint32_unaligned_t *) p; + r = *p32; +#elif defined(UINT_UNALIGNED_STRUCT) + mbedtls_uint32_unaligned_t *p32 = (mbedtls_uint32_unaligned_t *) p; + r = p32->x; +#else + memcpy(&r, p, sizeof(r)); +#endif + return r; +} + +/** + * Write the unsigned 32 bits integer to the given address, which need not + * be aligned. + * + * \param p pointer to 4 bytes of data + * \param x data to write + */ +#if defined(__IAR_SYSTEMS_ICC__) +#pragma inline = forced +#elif defined(__GNUC__) +__attribute__((always_inline)) +#endif +static inline void mbedtls_put_unaligned_uint32(void *p, uint32_t x) +{ +#if defined(UINT_UNALIGNED) + mbedtls_uint32_unaligned_t *p32 = (mbedtls_uint32_unaligned_t *) p; + *p32 = x; +#elif defined(UINT_UNALIGNED_STRUCT) + mbedtls_uint32_unaligned_t *p32 = (mbedtls_uint32_unaligned_t *) p; + p32->x = x; +#else + memcpy(p, &x, sizeof(x)); +#endif +} + +/** + * Read the unsigned 64 bits integer from the given address, which need not + * be aligned. + * + * \param p pointer to 8 bytes of data + * \return Data at the given address + */ +#if defined(__IAR_SYSTEMS_ICC__) +#pragma inline = forced +#elif defined(__GNUC__) +__attribute__((always_inline)) +#endif +static inline uint64_t mbedtls_get_unaligned_uint64(const void *p) +{ + uint64_t r; +#if defined(UINT_UNALIGNED) + mbedtls_uint64_unaligned_t *p64 = (mbedtls_uint64_unaligned_t *) p; + r = *p64; +#elif defined(UINT_UNALIGNED_STRUCT) + mbedtls_uint64_unaligned_t *p64 = (mbedtls_uint64_unaligned_t *) p; + r = p64->x; +#else + memcpy(&r, p, sizeof(r)); +#endif + return r; +} + +/** + * Write the unsigned 64 bits integer to the given address, which need not + * be aligned. + * + * \param p pointer to 8 bytes of data + * \param x data to write + */ +#if defined(__IAR_SYSTEMS_ICC__) +#pragma inline = forced +#elif defined(__GNUC__) +__attribute__((always_inline)) +#endif +static inline void mbedtls_put_unaligned_uint64(void *p, uint64_t x) +{ +#if defined(UINT_UNALIGNED) + mbedtls_uint64_unaligned_t *p64 = (mbedtls_uint64_unaligned_t *) p; + *p64 = x; +#elif defined(UINT_UNALIGNED_STRUCT) + mbedtls_uint64_unaligned_t *p64 = (mbedtls_uint64_unaligned_t *) p; + p64->x = x; +#else + memcpy(p, &x, sizeof(x)); +#endif +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_POP_IAR_LANGUAGE_PRAGMA) +#pragma language=restore +#endif + +/** Byte Reading Macros + * + * Given a multi-byte integer \p x, MBEDTLS_BYTE_n retrieves the n-th + * byte from x, where byte 0 is the least significant byte. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(x) ((uint8_t) ((x) & 0xff)) +#define MBEDTLS_BYTE_1(x) ((uint8_t) (((x) >> 8) & 0xff)) +#define MBEDTLS_BYTE_2(x) ((uint8_t) (((x) >> 16) & 0xff)) +#define MBEDTLS_BYTE_3(x) ((uint8_t) (((x) >> 24) & 0xff)) +#define MBEDTLS_BYTE_4(x) ((uint8_t) (((x) >> 32) & 0xff)) +#define MBEDTLS_BYTE_5(x) ((uint8_t) (((x) >> 40) & 0xff)) +#define MBEDTLS_BYTE_6(x) ((uint8_t) (((x) >> 48) & 0xff)) +#define MBEDTLS_BYTE_7(x) ((uint8_t) (((x) >> 56) & 0xff)) + +/* + * Detect GCC built-in byteswap routines + */ +#if defined(__GNUC__) && defined(__GNUC_PREREQ) +#if __GNUC_PREREQ(4, 8) +#define MBEDTLS_BSWAP16 __builtin_bswap16 +#endif /* __GNUC_PREREQ(4,8) */ +#if __GNUC_PREREQ(4, 3) +#define MBEDTLS_BSWAP32 __builtin_bswap32 +#define MBEDTLS_BSWAP64 __builtin_bswap64 +#endif /* __GNUC_PREREQ(4,3) */ +#endif /* defined(__GNUC__) && defined(__GNUC_PREREQ) */ + +/* + * Detect Clang built-in byteswap routines + */ +#if defined(__clang__) && defined(__has_builtin) +#if __has_builtin(__builtin_bswap16) && !defined(MBEDTLS_BSWAP16) +#define MBEDTLS_BSWAP16 __builtin_bswap16 +#endif /* __has_builtin(__builtin_bswap16) */ +#if __has_builtin(__builtin_bswap32) && !defined(MBEDTLS_BSWAP32) +#define MBEDTLS_BSWAP32 __builtin_bswap32 +#endif /* __has_builtin(__builtin_bswap32) */ +#if __has_builtin(__builtin_bswap64) && !defined(MBEDTLS_BSWAP64) +#define MBEDTLS_BSWAP64 __builtin_bswap64 +#endif /* __has_builtin(__builtin_bswap64) */ +#endif /* defined(__clang__) && defined(__has_builtin) */ + +/* + * Detect MSVC built-in byteswap routines + */ +#if defined(_MSC_VER) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_BSWAP16) +#define MBEDTLS_BSWAP16 _byteswap_ushort +#endif +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_BSWAP32) +#define MBEDTLS_BSWAP32 _byteswap_ulong +#endif +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_BSWAP64) +#define MBEDTLS_BSWAP64 _byteswap_uint64 +#endif +#endif /* defined(_MSC_VER) */ + +/* Detect armcc built-in byteswap routine */ +#if defined(__ARMCC_VERSION) && (__ARMCC_VERSION >= 410000) && !defined(MBEDTLS_BSWAP32) +#if defined(__ARM_ACLE) /* ARM Compiler 6 - earlier versions don't need a header */ +#include +#endif +#define MBEDTLS_BSWAP32 __rev +#endif + +/* Detect IAR built-in byteswap routine */ +#if defined(__IAR_SYSTEMS_ICC__) +#if defined(__ARM_ACLE) +#include +#define MBEDTLS_BSWAP16(x) ((uint16_t) __rev16((uint32_t) (x))) +#define MBEDTLS_BSWAP32 __rev +#define MBEDTLS_BSWAP64 __revll +#endif +#endif + +/* + * Where compiler built-ins are not present, fall back to C code that the + * compiler may be able to detect and transform into the relevant bswap or + * similar instruction. + */ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_BSWAP16) +static inline uint16_t mbedtls_bswap16(uint16_t x) +{ + return + (x & 0x00ff) << 8 | + (x & 0xff00) >> 8; +} +#define MBEDTLS_BSWAP16 mbedtls_bswap16 +#endif /* !defined(MBEDTLS_BSWAP16) */ + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_BSWAP32) +static inline uint32_t mbedtls_bswap32(uint32_t x) +{ + return + (x & 0x000000ff) << 24 | + (x & 0x0000ff00) << 8 | + (x & 0x00ff0000) >> 8 | + (x & 0xff000000) >> 24; +} +#define MBEDTLS_BSWAP32 mbedtls_bswap32 +#endif /* !defined(MBEDTLS_BSWAP32) */ + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_BSWAP64) +static inline uint64_t mbedtls_bswap64(uint64_t x) +{ + return + (x & 0x00000000000000ffULL) << 56 | + (x & 0x000000000000ff00ULL) << 40 | + (x & 0x0000000000ff0000ULL) << 24 | + (x & 0x00000000ff000000ULL) << 8 | + (x & 0x000000ff00000000ULL) >> 8 | + (x & 0x0000ff0000000000ULL) >> 24 | + (x & 0x00ff000000000000ULL) >> 40 | + (x & 0xff00000000000000ULL) >> 56; +} +#define MBEDTLS_BSWAP64 mbedtls_bswap64 +#endif /* !defined(MBEDTLS_BSWAP64) */ + +#if !defined(__BYTE_ORDER__) + +#if defined(__LITTLE_ENDIAN__) +/* IAR defines __xxx_ENDIAN__, but not __BYTE_ORDER__ */ +#define MBEDTLS_IS_BIG_ENDIAN 0 +#elif defined(__BIG_ENDIAN__) +#define MBEDTLS_IS_BIG_ENDIAN 1 +#else +static const uint16_t mbedtls_byte_order_detector = { 0x100 }; +#define MBEDTLS_IS_BIG_ENDIAN (*((unsigned char *) (&mbedtls_byte_order_detector)) == 0x01) +#endif + +#else + +#if (__BYTE_ORDER__) == (__ORDER_BIG_ENDIAN__) +#define MBEDTLS_IS_BIG_ENDIAN 1 +#else +#define MBEDTLS_IS_BIG_ENDIAN 0 +#endif + +#endif /* !defined(__BYTE_ORDER__) */ + +/** + * Get the unsigned 32 bits integer corresponding to four bytes in + * big-endian order (MSB first). + * + * \param data Base address of the memory to get the four bytes from. + * \param offset Offset from \p data of the first and most significant + * byte of the four bytes to build the 32 bits unsigned + * integer from. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE(data, offset) \ + ((MBEDTLS_IS_BIG_ENDIAN) \ + ? mbedtls_get_unaligned_uint32((data) + (offset)) \ + : MBEDTLS_BSWAP32(mbedtls_get_unaligned_uint32((data) + (offset))) \ + ) + +/** + * Put in memory a 32 bits unsigned integer in big-endian order. + * + * \param n 32 bits unsigned integer to put in memory. + * \param data Base address of the memory where to put the 32 + * bits unsigned integer in. + * \param offset Offset from \p data where to put the most significant + * byte of the 32 bits unsigned integer \p n. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE(n, data, offset) \ + { \ + if (MBEDTLS_IS_BIG_ENDIAN) \ + { \ + mbedtls_put_unaligned_uint32((data) + (offset), (uint32_t) (n)); \ + } \ + else \ + { \ + mbedtls_put_unaligned_uint32((data) + (offset), MBEDTLS_BSWAP32((uint32_t) (n))); \ + } \ + } + +/** + * Get the unsigned 32 bits integer corresponding to four bytes in + * little-endian order (LSB first). + * + * \param data Base address of the memory to get the four bytes from. + * \param offset Offset from \p data of the first and least significant + * byte of the four bytes to build the 32 bits unsigned + * integer from. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE(data, offset) \ + ((MBEDTLS_IS_BIG_ENDIAN) \ + ? MBEDTLS_BSWAP32(mbedtls_get_unaligned_uint32((data) + (offset))) \ + : mbedtls_get_unaligned_uint32((data) + (offset)) \ + ) + + +/** + * Put in memory a 32 bits unsigned integer in little-endian order. + * + * \param n 32 bits unsigned integer to put in memory. + * \param data Base address of the memory where to put the 32 + * bits unsigned integer in. + * \param offset Offset from \p data where to put the least significant + * byte of the 32 bits unsigned integer \p n. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_LE(n, data, offset) \ + { \ + if (MBEDTLS_IS_BIG_ENDIAN) \ + { \ + mbedtls_put_unaligned_uint32((data) + (offset), MBEDTLS_BSWAP32((uint32_t) (n))); \ + } \ + else \ + { \ + mbedtls_put_unaligned_uint32((data) + (offset), ((uint32_t) (n))); \ + } \ + } + +/** + * Get the unsigned 16 bits integer corresponding to two bytes in + * little-endian order (LSB first). + * + * \param data Base address of the memory to get the two bytes from. + * \param offset Offset from \p data of the first and least significant + * byte of the two bytes to build the 16 bits unsigned + * integer from. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_LE(data, offset) \ + ((MBEDTLS_IS_BIG_ENDIAN) \ + ? MBEDTLS_BSWAP16(mbedtls_get_unaligned_uint16((data) + (offset))) \ + : mbedtls_get_unaligned_uint16((data) + (offset)) \ + ) + +/** + * Put in memory a 16 bits unsigned integer in little-endian order. + * + * \param n 16 bits unsigned integer to put in memory. + * \param data Base address of the memory where to put the 16 + * bits unsigned integer in. + * \param offset Offset from \p data where to put the least significant + * byte of the 16 bits unsigned integer \p n. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_LE(n, data, offset) \ + { \ + if (MBEDTLS_IS_BIG_ENDIAN) \ + { \ + mbedtls_put_unaligned_uint16((data) + (offset), MBEDTLS_BSWAP16((uint16_t) (n))); \ + } \ + else \ + { \ + mbedtls_put_unaligned_uint16((data) + (offset), (uint16_t) (n)); \ + } \ + } + +/** + * Get the unsigned 16 bits integer corresponding to two bytes in + * big-endian order (MSB first). + * + * \param data Base address of the memory to get the two bytes from. + * \param offset Offset from \p data of the first and most significant + * byte of the two bytes to build the 16 bits unsigned + * integer from. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(data, offset) \ + ((MBEDTLS_IS_BIG_ENDIAN) \ + ? mbedtls_get_unaligned_uint16((data) + (offset)) \ + : MBEDTLS_BSWAP16(mbedtls_get_unaligned_uint16((data) + (offset))) \ + ) + +/** + * Put in memory a 16 bits unsigned integer in big-endian order. + * + * \param n 16 bits unsigned integer to put in memory. + * \param data Base address of the memory where to put the 16 + * bits unsigned integer in. + * \param offset Offset from \p data where to put the most significant + * byte of the 16 bits unsigned integer \p n. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(n, data, offset) \ + { \ + if (MBEDTLS_IS_BIG_ENDIAN) \ + { \ + mbedtls_put_unaligned_uint16((data) + (offset), (uint16_t) (n)); \ + } \ + else \ + { \ + mbedtls_put_unaligned_uint16((data) + (offset), MBEDTLS_BSWAP16((uint16_t) (n))); \ + } \ + } + +/** + * Get the unsigned 24 bits integer corresponding to three bytes in + * big-endian order (MSB first). + * + * \param data Base address of the memory to get the three bytes from. + * \param offset Offset from \p data of the first and most significant + * byte of the three bytes to build the 24 bits unsigned + * integer from. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_GET_UINT24_BE(data, offset) \ + ( \ + ((uint32_t) (data)[(offset)] << 16) \ + | ((uint32_t) (data)[(offset) + 1] << 8) \ + | ((uint32_t) (data)[(offset) + 2]) \ + ) + +/** + * Put in memory a 24 bits unsigned integer in big-endian order. + * + * \param n 24 bits unsigned integer to put in memory. + * \param data Base address of the memory where to put the 24 + * bits unsigned integer in. + * \param offset Offset from \p data where to put the most significant + * byte of the 24 bits unsigned integer \p n. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT24_BE(n, data, offset) \ + { \ + (data)[(offset)] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_2(n); \ + (data)[(offset) + 1] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_1(n); \ + (data)[(offset) + 2] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(n); \ + } + +/** + * Get the unsigned 24 bits integer corresponding to three bytes in + * little-endian order (LSB first). + * + * \param data Base address of the memory to get the three bytes from. + * \param offset Offset from \p data of the first and least significant + * byte of the three bytes to build the 24 bits unsigned + * integer from. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_GET_UINT24_LE(data, offset) \ + ( \ + ((uint32_t) (data)[(offset)]) \ + | ((uint32_t) (data)[(offset) + 1] << 8) \ + | ((uint32_t) (data)[(offset) + 2] << 16) \ + ) + +/** + * Put in memory a 24 bits unsigned integer in little-endian order. + * + * \param n 24 bits unsigned integer to put in memory. + * \param data Base address of the memory where to put the 24 + * bits unsigned integer in. + * \param offset Offset from \p data where to put the least significant + * byte of the 24 bits unsigned integer \p n. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT24_LE(n, data, offset) \ + { \ + (data)[(offset)] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(n); \ + (data)[(offset) + 1] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_1(n); \ + (data)[(offset) + 2] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_2(n); \ + } + +/** + * Get the unsigned 64 bits integer corresponding to eight bytes in + * big-endian order (MSB first). + * + * \param data Base address of the memory to get the eight bytes from. + * \param offset Offset from \p data of the first and most significant + * byte of the eight bytes to build the 64 bits unsigned + * integer from. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_GET_UINT64_BE(data, offset) \ + ((MBEDTLS_IS_BIG_ENDIAN) \ + ? mbedtls_get_unaligned_uint64((data) + (offset)) \ + : MBEDTLS_BSWAP64(mbedtls_get_unaligned_uint64((data) + (offset))) \ + ) + +/** + * Put in memory a 64 bits unsigned integer in big-endian order. + * + * \param n 64 bits unsigned integer to put in memory. + * \param data Base address of the memory where to put the 64 + * bits unsigned integer in. + * \param offset Offset from \p data where to put the most significant + * byte of the 64 bits unsigned integer \p n. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT64_BE(n, data, offset) \ + { \ + if (MBEDTLS_IS_BIG_ENDIAN) \ + { \ + mbedtls_put_unaligned_uint64((data) + (offset), (uint64_t) (n)); \ + } \ + else \ + { \ + mbedtls_put_unaligned_uint64((data) + (offset), MBEDTLS_BSWAP64((uint64_t) (n))); \ + } \ + } + +/** + * Get the unsigned 64 bits integer corresponding to eight bytes in + * little-endian order (LSB first). + * + * \param data Base address of the memory to get the eight bytes from. + * \param offset Offset from \p data of the first and least significant + * byte of the eight bytes to build the 64 bits unsigned + * integer from. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_GET_UINT64_LE(data, offset) \ + ((MBEDTLS_IS_BIG_ENDIAN) \ + ? MBEDTLS_BSWAP64(mbedtls_get_unaligned_uint64((data) + (offset))) \ + : mbedtls_get_unaligned_uint64((data) + (offset)) \ + ) + +/** + * Put in memory a 64 bits unsigned integer in little-endian order. + * + * \param n 64 bits unsigned integer to put in memory. + * \param data Base address of the memory where to put the 64 + * bits unsigned integer in. + * \param offset Offset from \p data where to put the least significant + * byte of the 64 bits unsigned integer \p n. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT64_LE(n, data, offset) \ + { \ + if (MBEDTLS_IS_BIG_ENDIAN) \ + { \ + mbedtls_put_unaligned_uint64((data) + (offset), MBEDTLS_BSWAP64((uint64_t) (n))); \ + } \ + else \ + { \ + mbedtls_put_unaligned_uint64((data) + (offset), (uint64_t) (n)); \ + } \ + } + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_LIBRARY_ALIGNMENT_H */ diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/arc4.c b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/arc4.c deleted file mode 100644 index 7ff747d04048..000000000000 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/arc4.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,180 +0,0 @@ -/* - * An implementation of the ARCFOUR algorithm - * - * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later - */ -/* - * The ARCFOUR algorithm was publicly disclosed on 94/09. - * - * http://groups.google.com/group/sci.crypt/msg/10a300c9d21afca0 - */ - -#include "common.h" - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARC4_C) - -#include "mbedtls/arc4.h" -#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" - -#include - -#include "mbedtls/platform.h" - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ARC4_ALT) - -void mbedtls_arc4_init(mbedtls_arc4_context *ctx) -{ - memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_arc4_context)); -} - -void mbedtls_arc4_free(mbedtls_arc4_context *ctx) -{ - if (ctx == NULL) { - return; - } - - mbedtls_platform_zeroize(ctx, sizeof(mbedtls_arc4_context)); -} - -/* - * ARC4 key schedule - */ -void mbedtls_arc4_setup(mbedtls_arc4_context *ctx, const unsigned char *key, - unsigned int keylen) -{ - int i, j, a; - unsigned int k; - unsigned char *m; - - ctx->x = 0; - ctx->y = 0; - m = ctx->m; - - for (i = 0; i < 256; i++) { - m[i] = (unsigned char) i; - } - - j = k = 0; - - for (i = 0; i < 256; i++, k++) { - if (k >= keylen) { - k = 0; - } - - a = m[i]; - j = (j + a + key[k]) & 0xFF; - m[i] = m[j]; - m[j] = (unsigned char) a; - } -} - -/* - * ARC4 cipher function - */ -int mbedtls_arc4_crypt(mbedtls_arc4_context *ctx, size_t length, const unsigned char *input, - unsigned char *output) -{ - int x, y, a, b; - size_t i; - unsigned char *m; - - x = ctx->x; - y = ctx->y; - m = ctx->m; - - for (i = 0; i < length; i++) { - x = (x + 1) & 0xFF; a = m[x]; - y = (y + a) & 0xFF; b = m[y]; - - m[x] = (unsigned char) b; - m[y] = (unsigned char) a; - - output[i] = (unsigned char) - (input[i] ^ m[(unsigned char) (a + b)]); - } - - ctx->x = x; - ctx->y = y; - - return 0; -} - -#endif /* !MBEDTLS_ARC4_ALT */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) -/* - * ARC4 tests vectors as posted by Eric Rescorla in sep. 1994: - * - * http://groups.google.com/group/comp.security.misc/msg/10a300c9d21afca0 - */ -static const unsigned char arc4_test_key[3][8] = -{ - { 0x01, 0x23, 0x45, 0x67, 0x89, 0xAB, 0xCD, 0xEF }, - { 0x01, 0x23, 0x45, 0x67, 0x89, 0xAB, 0xCD, 0xEF }, - { 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 } -}; - -static const unsigned char arc4_test_pt[3][8] = -{ - { 0x01, 0x23, 0x45, 0x67, 0x89, 0xAB, 0xCD, 0xEF }, - { 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 }, - { 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 } -}; - -static const unsigned char arc4_test_ct[3][8] = -{ - { 0x75, 0xB7, 0x87, 0x80, 0x99, 0xE0, 0xC5, 0x96 }, - { 0x74, 0x94, 0xC2, 0xE7, 0x10, 0x4B, 0x08, 0x79 }, - { 0xDE, 0x18, 0x89, 0x41, 0xA3, 0x37, 0x5D, 0x3A } -}; - -/* - * Checkup routine - */ -int mbedtls_arc4_self_test(int verbose) -{ - int i, ret = 0; - unsigned char ibuf[8]; - unsigned char obuf[8]; - mbedtls_arc4_context ctx; - - mbedtls_arc4_init(&ctx); - - for (i = 0; i < 3; i++) { - if (verbose != 0) { - mbedtls_printf(" ARC4 test #%d: ", i + 1); - } - - memcpy(ibuf, arc4_test_pt[i], 8); - - mbedtls_arc4_setup(&ctx, arc4_test_key[i], 8); - mbedtls_arc4_crypt(&ctx, 8, ibuf, obuf); - - if (memcmp(obuf, arc4_test_ct[i], 8) != 0) { - if (verbose != 0) { - mbedtls_printf("failed\n"); - } - - ret = 1; - goto exit; - } - - if (verbose != 0) { - mbedtls_printf("passed\n"); - } - } - - if (verbose != 0) { - mbedtls_printf("\n"); - } - -exit: - mbedtls_arc4_free(&ctx); - - return ret; -} - -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ - -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ARC4_C */ diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/aria.c b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/aria.c index c9441057c687..d9f84cc59d78 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/aria.c +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/aria.c @@ -25,12 +25,6 @@ #include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" -/* Parameter validation macros */ -#define ARIA_VALIDATE_RET(cond) \ - MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE_RET(cond, MBEDTLS_ERR_ARIA_BAD_INPUT_DATA) -#define ARIA_VALIDATE(cond) \ - MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE(cond) - /* * modify byte order: ( A B C D ) -> ( B A D C ), i.e. swap pairs of bytes * @@ -86,47 +80,8 @@ static inline uint32_t aria_p1(uint32_t x) * modify byte order: ( A B C D ) -> ( D C B A ), i.e. change endianness * * This is submatrix P3 in [1] Appendix B.1 - * - * Some compilers fail to translate this to a single instruction, - * so let's provide asm versions for common platforms with C fallback. */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM) -#if defined(__arm__) /* rev available from v6 up */ -/* armcc5 --gnu defines __GNUC__ but doesn't support GNU's extended asm */ -#if defined(__GNUC__) && \ - (!defined(__ARMCC_VERSION) || __ARMCC_VERSION >= 6000000) && \ - __ARM_ARCH >= 6 -static inline uint32_t aria_p3(uint32_t x) -{ - uint32_t r; - __asm("rev %0, %1" : "=l" (r) : "l" (x)); - return r; -} -#define ARIA_P3 aria_p3 -#elif defined(__ARMCC_VERSION) && __ARMCC_VERSION < 6000000 && \ - (__TARGET_ARCH_ARM >= 6 || __TARGET_ARCH_THUMB >= 3) -static inline uint32_t aria_p3(uint32_t x) -{ - uint32_t r; - __asm("rev r, x"); - return r; -} -#define ARIA_P3 aria_p3 -#endif -#endif /* arm */ -#if defined(__GNUC__) && \ - defined(__i386__) || defined(__amd64__) || defined(__x86_64__) -static inline uint32_t aria_p3(uint32_t x) -{ - __asm("bswap %0" : "=r" (x) : "0" (x)); - return x; -} -#define ARIA_P3 aria_p3 -#endif /* x86 gnuc */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM && GNUC */ -#if !defined(ARIA_P3) -#define ARIA_P3(x) ARIA_P2(ARIA_P1(x)) -#endif +#define ARIA_P3(x) MBEDTLS_BSWAP32(x) /* * ARIA Affine Transform @@ -402,8 +357,6 @@ int mbedtls_aria_setkey_enc(mbedtls_aria_context *ctx, int i; uint32_t w[4][4], *w2; - ARIA_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - ARIA_VALIDATE_RET(key != NULL); if (keybits != 128 && keybits != 192 && keybits != 256) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_ARIA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; @@ -452,12 +405,11 @@ int mbedtls_aria_setkey_enc(mbedtls_aria_context *ctx, /* * Set decryption key */ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT) int mbedtls_aria_setkey_dec(mbedtls_aria_context *ctx, const unsigned char *key, unsigned int keybits) { int i, j, k, ret; - ARIA_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - ARIA_VALIDATE_RET(key != NULL); ret = mbedtls_aria_setkey_enc(ctx, key, keybits); if (ret != 0) { @@ -481,6 +433,7 @@ int mbedtls_aria_setkey_dec(mbedtls_aria_context *ctx, return 0; } +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT */ /* * Encrypt a block @@ -492,9 +445,6 @@ int mbedtls_aria_crypt_ecb(mbedtls_aria_context *ctx, int i; uint32_t a, b, c, d; - ARIA_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - ARIA_VALIDATE_RET(input != NULL); - ARIA_VALIDATE_RET(output != NULL); a = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE(input, 0); b = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE(input, 4); @@ -542,7 +492,6 @@ int mbedtls_aria_crypt_ecb(mbedtls_aria_context *ctx, /* Initialize context */ void mbedtls_aria_init(mbedtls_aria_context *ctx) { - ARIA_VALIDATE(ctx != NULL); memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_aria_context)); } @@ -567,15 +516,11 @@ int mbedtls_aria_crypt_cbc(mbedtls_aria_context *ctx, const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output) { - int i; unsigned char temp[MBEDTLS_ARIA_BLOCKSIZE]; - ARIA_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - ARIA_VALIDATE_RET(mode == MBEDTLS_ARIA_ENCRYPT || - mode == MBEDTLS_ARIA_DECRYPT); - ARIA_VALIDATE_RET(length == 0 || input != NULL); - ARIA_VALIDATE_RET(length == 0 || output != NULL); - ARIA_VALIDATE_RET(iv != NULL); + if ((mode != MBEDTLS_ARIA_ENCRYPT) && (mode != MBEDTLS_ARIA_DECRYPT)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ARIA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } if (length % MBEDTLS_ARIA_BLOCKSIZE) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_ARIA_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH; @@ -586,9 +531,7 @@ int mbedtls_aria_crypt_cbc(mbedtls_aria_context *ctx, memcpy(temp, input, MBEDTLS_ARIA_BLOCKSIZE); mbedtls_aria_crypt_ecb(ctx, input, output); - for (i = 0; i < MBEDTLS_ARIA_BLOCKSIZE; i++) { - output[i] = (unsigned char) (output[i] ^ iv[i]); - } + mbedtls_xor(output, output, iv, MBEDTLS_ARIA_BLOCKSIZE); memcpy(iv, temp, MBEDTLS_ARIA_BLOCKSIZE); @@ -598,9 +541,7 @@ int mbedtls_aria_crypt_cbc(mbedtls_aria_context *ctx, } } else { while (length > 0) { - for (i = 0; i < MBEDTLS_ARIA_BLOCKSIZE; i++) { - output[i] = (unsigned char) (input[i] ^ iv[i]); - } + mbedtls_xor(output, input, iv, MBEDTLS_ARIA_BLOCKSIZE); mbedtls_aria_crypt_ecb(ctx, output, output); memcpy(iv, output, MBEDTLS_ARIA_BLOCKSIZE); @@ -630,19 +571,14 @@ int mbedtls_aria_crypt_cfb128(mbedtls_aria_context *ctx, unsigned char c; size_t n; - ARIA_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - ARIA_VALIDATE_RET(mode == MBEDTLS_ARIA_ENCRYPT || - mode == MBEDTLS_ARIA_DECRYPT); - ARIA_VALIDATE_RET(length == 0 || input != NULL); - ARIA_VALIDATE_RET(length == 0 || output != NULL); - ARIA_VALIDATE_RET(iv != NULL); - ARIA_VALIDATE_RET(iv_off != NULL); + if ((mode != MBEDTLS_ARIA_ENCRYPT) && (mode != MBEDTLS_ARIA_DECRYPT)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ARIA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } n = *iv_off; /* An overly large value of n can lead to an unlimited - * buffer overflow. Therefore, guard against this - * outside of parameter validation. */ + * buffer overflow. */ if (n >= MBEDTLS_ARIA_BLOCKSIZE) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_ARIA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } @@ -692,17 +628,9 @@ int mbedtls_aria_crypt_ctr(mbedtls_aria_context *ctx, int c, i; size_t n; - ARIA_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - ARIA_VALIDATE_RET(length == 0 || input != NULL); - ARIA_VALIDATE_RET(length == 0 || output != NULL); - ARIA_VALIDATE_RET(nonce_counter != NULL); - ARIA_VALIDATE_RET(stream_block != NULL); - ARIA_VALIDATE_RET(nc_off != NULL); - n = *nc_off; /* An overly large value of n can lead to an unlimited - * buffer overflow. Therefore, guard against this - * outside of parameter validation. */ + * buffer overflow. */ if (n >= MBEDTLS_ARIA_BLOCKSIZE) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_ARIA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } @@ -916,12 +844,18 @@ int mbedtls_aria_self_test(int verbose) /* test ECB decryption */ if (verbose) { mbedtls_printf(" ARIA-ECB-%d (dec): ", 128 + 64 * i); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT) + mbedtls_printf("skipped\n"); +#endif } + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT) mbedtls_aria_setkey_dec(&ctx, aria_test1_ecb_key, 128 + 64 * i); mbedtls_aria_crypt_ecb(&ctx, aria_test1_ecb_ct[i], blk); ARIA_SELF_TEST_ASSERT( memcmp(blk, aria_test1_ecb_pt, MBEDTLS_ARIA_BLOCKSIZE) != 0); +#endif } if (verbose) { mbedtls_printf("\n"); diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/asn1parse.c b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/asn1parse.c index c7f7f0b33a5b..e33fdf71da65 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/asn1parse.c +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/asn1parse.c @@ -7,7 +7,8 @@ #include "common.h" -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CREATE_C) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_UTIL_HAVE_ECDSA) #include "mbedtls/asn1.h" #include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" @@ -35,47 +36,18 @@ int mbedtls_asn1_get_len(unsigned char **p, if ((**p & 0x80) == 0) { *len = *(*p)++; } else { - switch (**p & 0x7F) { - case 1: - if ((end - *p) < 2) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA; - } - - *len = (*p)[1]; - (*p) += 2; - break; - - case 2: - if ((end - *p) < 3) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA; - } - - *len = ((size_t) (*p)[1] << 8) | (*p)[2]; - (*p) += 3; - break; - - case 3: - if ((end - *p) < 4) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA; - } - - *len = ((size_t) (*p)[1] << 16) | - ((size_t) (*p)[2] << 8) | (*p)[3]; - (*p) += 4; - break; - - case 4: - if ((end - *p) < 5) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA; - } - - *len = ((size_t) (*p)[1] << 24) | ((size_t) (*p)[2] << 16) | - ((size_t) (*p)[3] << 8) | (*p)[4]; - (*p) += 5; - break; - - default: - return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH; + int n = (**p) & 0x7F; + if (n == 0 || n > 4) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH; + } + if ((end - *p) <= n) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA; + } + *len = 0; + (*p)++; + while (n--) { + *len = (*len << 8) | **p; + (*p)++; } } @@ -102,7 +74,9 @@ int mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(unsigned char **p, return mbedtls_asn1_get_len(p, end, len); } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C || MBEDTLS_X509_CREATE_C || MBEDTLS_PSA_UTIL_HAVE_ECDSA */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C) int mbedtls_asn1_get_bool(unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, int *val) @@ -320,7 +294,6 @@ void mbedtls_asn1_sequence_free(mbedtls_asn1_sequence *seq) { while (seq != NULL) { mbedtls_asn1_sequence *next = seq->next; - mbedtls_platform_zeroize(seq, sizeof(*seq)); mbedtls_free(seq); seq = next; } @@ -443,6 +416,7 @@ int mbedtls_asn1_get_alg_null(unsigned char **p, return 0; } +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) void mbedtls_asn1_free_named_data(mbedtls_asn1_named_data *cur) { if (cur == NULL) { @@ -454,6 +428,7 @@ void mbedtls_asn1_free_named_data(mbedtls_asn1_named_data *cur) mbedtls_platform_zeroize(cur, sizeof(mbedtls_asn1_named_data)); } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ void mbedtls_asn1_free_named_data_list(mbedtls_asn1_named_data **head) { @@ -461,13 +436,22 @@ void mbedtls_asn1_free_named_data_list(mbedtls_asn1_named_data **head) while ((cur = *head) != NULL) { *head = cur->next; - mbedtls_asn1_free_named_data(cur); + mbedtls_free(cur->oid.p); + mbedtls_free(cur->val.p); mbedtls_free(cur); } } -mbedtls_asn1_named_data *mbedtls_asn1_find_named_data(mbedtls_asn1_named_data *list, - const char *oid, size_t len) +void mbedtls_asn1_free_named_data_list_shallow(mbedtls_asn1_named_data *name) +{ + for (mbedtls_asn1_named_data *next; name != NULL; name = next) { + next = name->next; + mbedtls_free(name); + } +} + +const mbedtls_asn1_named_data *mbedtls_asn1_find_named_data(const mbedtls_asn1_named_data *list, + const char *oid, size_t len) { while (list != NULL) { if (list->oid.len == len && diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/asn1write.c b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/asn1write.c index 0147c49f688a..775a9ef530fb 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/asn1write.c +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/asn1write.c @@ -7,7 +7,8 @@ #include "common.h" -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_UTIL_HAVE_ECDSA) #include "mbedtls/asn1write.h" #include "mbedtls/error.h" @@ -16,71 +17,43 @@ #include "mbedtls/platform.h" -int mbedtls_asn1_write_len(unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, size_t len) -{ - if (len < 0x80) { - if (*p - start < 1) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL; - } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C) +#include "mbedtls/asn1.h" +#endif - *--(*p) = (unsigned char) len; - return 1; +int mbedtls_asn1_write_len(unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *start, size_t len) +{ +#if SIZE_MAX > 0xFFFFFFFF + if (len > 0xFFFFFFFF) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH; } +#endif - if (len <= 0xFF) { - if (*p - start < 2) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL; - } - - *--(*p) = (unsigned char) len; - *--(*p) = 0x81; - return 2; - } + int required = 1; - if (len <= 0xFFFF) { - if (*p - start < 3) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL; + if (len >= 0x80) { + for (size_t l = len; l != 0; l >>= 8) { + required++; } - - *--(*p) = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(len); - *--(*p) = MBEDTLS_BYTE_1(len); - *--(*p) = 0x82; - return 3; } - if (len <= 0xFFFFFF) { - if (*p - start < 4) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL; - } - - *--(*p) = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(len); - *--(*p) = MBEDTLS_BYTE_1(len); - *--(*p) = MBEDTLS_BYTE_2(len); - *--(*p) = 0x83; - return 4; + if (required > (*p - start)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL; } - int len_is_valid = 1; -#if SIZE_MAX > 0xFFFFFFFF - len_is_valid = (len <= 0xFFFFFFFF); -#endif - if (len_is_valid) { - if (*p - start < 5) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL; - } - + do { *--(*p) = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(len); - *--(*p) = MBEDTLS_BYTE_1(len); - *--(*p) = MBEDTLS_BYTE_2(len); - *--(*p) = MBEDTLS_BYTE_3(len); - *--(*p) = 0x84; - return 5; + len >>= 8; + } while (len); + + if (required > 1) { + *--(*p) = (unsigned char) (0x80 + required - 1); } - return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH; + return required; } -int mbedtls_asn1_write_tag(unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, unsigned char tag) +int mbedtls_asn1_write_tag(unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *start, unsigned char tag) { if (*p - start < 1) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL; @@ -90,8 +63,23 @@ int mbedtls_asn1_write_tag(unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, unsigned cha return 1; } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_C || MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C || MBEDTLS_PSA_UTIL_HAVE_ECDSA */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_C) +static int mbedtls_asn1_write_len_and_tag(unsigned char **p, + const unsigned char *start, + size_t len, + unsigned char tag) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len(p, start, len)); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag(p, start, tag)); + + return (int) len; +} -int mbedtls_asn1_write_raw_buffer(unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, +int mbedtls_asn1_write_raw_buffer(unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *start, const unsigned char *buf, size_t size) { size_t len = 0; @@ -108,7 +96,7 @@ int mbedtls_asn1_write_raw_buffer(unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, } #if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) -int mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi(unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, const mbedtls_mpi *X) +int mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi(unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *start, const mbedtls_mpi *X) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t len = 0; @@ -142,30 +130,21 @@ int mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi(unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, const mbedtl len += 1; } - MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len(p, start, len)); - MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag(p, start, MBEDTLS_ASN1_INTEGER)); - - ret = (int) len; + ret = mbedtls_asn1_write_len_and_tag(p, start, len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_INTEGER); cleanup: return ret; } #endif /* MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C */ -int mbedtls_asn1_write_null(unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start) +int mbedtls_asn1_write_null(unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *start) { - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - size_t len = 0; - // Write NULL // - MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len(p, start, 0)); - MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag(p, start, MBEDTLS_ASN1_NULL)); - - return (int) len; + return mbedtls_asn1_write_len_and_tag(p, start, 0, MBEDTLS_ASN1_NULL); } -int mbedtls_asn1_write_oid(unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, +int mbedtls_asn1_write_oid(unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *start, const char *oid, size_t oid_len) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; @@ -173,20 +152,17 @@ int mbedtls_asn1_write_oid(unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_raw_buffer(p, start, (const unsigned char *) oid, oid_len)); - MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len(p, start, len)); - MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag(p, start, MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID)); - - return (int) len; + return mbedtls_asn1_write_len_and_tag(p, start, len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID); } -int mbedtls_asn1_write_algorithm_identifier(unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, +int mbedtls_asn1_write_algorithm_identifier(unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *start, const char *oid, size_t oid_len, size_t par_len) { return mbedtls_asn1_write_algorithm_identifier_ext(p, start, oid, oid_len, par_len, 1); } -int mbedtls_asn1_write_algorithm_identifier_ext(unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, +int mbedtls_asn1_write_algorithm_identifier_ext(unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *start, const char *oid, size_t oid_len, size_t par_len, int has_par) { @@ -203,17 +179,12 @@ int mbedtls_asn1_write_algorithm_identifier_ext(unsigned char **p, unsigned char MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_oid(p, start, oid, oid_len)); - MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len(p, start, len)); - MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag(p, start, - MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | - MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)); - - return (int) len; + return mbedtls_asn1_write_len_and_tag(p, start, len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE); } -int mbedtls_asn1_write_bool(unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, int boolean) +int mbedtls_asn1_write_bool(unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *start, int boolean) { - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t len = 0; if (*p - start < 1) { @@ -223,15 +194,11 @@ int mbedtls_asn1_write_bool(unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, int boolean *--(*p) = (boolean) ? 255 : 0; len++; - MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len(p, start, len)); - MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag(p, start, MBEDTLS_ASN1_BOOLEAN)); - - return (int) len; + return mbedtls_asn1_write_len_and_tag(p, start, len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_BOOLEAN); } -static int asn1_write_tagged_int(unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, int val, int tag) +static int asn1_write_tagged_int(unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *start, int val, int tag) { - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t len = 0; do { @@ -251,23 +218,20 @@ static int asn1_write_tagged_int(unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, int va len += 1; } - MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len(p, start, len)); - MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag(p, start, tag)); - - return (int) len; + return mbedtls_asn1_write_len_and_tag(p, start, len, tag); } -int mbedtls_asn1_write_int(unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, int val) +int mbedtls_asn1_write_int(unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *start, int val) { return asn1_write_tagged_int(p, start, val, MBEDTLS_ASN1_INTEGER); } -int mbedtls_asn1_write_enum(unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, int val) +int mbedtls_asn1_write_enum(unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *start, int val) { return asn1_write_tagged_int(p, start, val, MBEDTLS_ASN1_ENUMERATED); } -int mbedtls_asn1_write_tagged_string(unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, int tag, +int mbedtls_asn1_write_tagged_string(unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *start, int tag, const char *text, size_t text_len) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; @@ -277,33 +241,30 @@ int mbedtls_asn1_write_tagged_string(unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, in (const unsigned char *) text, text_len)); - MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len(p, start, len)); - MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag(p, start, tag)); - - return (int) len; + return mbedtls_asn1_write_len_and_tag(p, start, len, tag); } -int mbedtls_asn1_write_utf8_string(unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, +int mbedtls_asn1_write_utf8_string(unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *start, const char *text, size_t text_len) { return mbedtls_asn1_write_tagged_string(p, start, MBEDTLS_ASN1_UTF8_STRING, text, text_len); } -int mbedtls_asn1_write_printable_string(unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, +int mbedtls_asn1_write_printable_string(unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *start, const char *text, size_t text_len) { return mbedtls_asn1_write_tagged_string(p, start, MBEDTLS_ASN1_PRINTABLE_STRING, text, text_len); } -int mbedtls_asn1_write_ia5_string(unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, +int mbedtls_asn1_write_ia5_string(unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *start, const char *text, size_t text_len) { return mbedtls_asn1_write_tagged_string(p, start, MBEDTLS_ASN1_IA5_STRING, text, text_len); } int mbedtls_asn1_write_named_bitstring(unsigned char **p, - unsigned char *start, + const unsigned char *start, const unsigned char *buf, size_t bits) { @@ -346,10 +307,9 @@ int mbedtls_asn1_write_named_bitstring(unsigned char **p, return mbedtls_asn1_write_bitstring(p, start, buf, bits); } -int mbedtls_asn1_write_bitstring(unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, +int mbedtls_asn1_write_bitstring(unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *start, const unsigned char *buf, size_t bits) { - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t len = 0; size_t unused_bits, byte_len; @@ -373,13 +333,10 @@ int mbedtls_asn1_write_bitstring(unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, /* Write unused bits */ *--(*p) = (unsigned char) unused_bits; - MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len(p, start, len)); - MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag(p, start, MBEDTLS_ASN1_BIT_STRING)); - - return (int) len; + return mbedtls_asn1_write_len_and_tag(p, start, len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_BIT_STRING); } -int mbedtls_asn1_write_octet_string(unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, +int mbedtls_asn1_write_octet_string(unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *start, const unsigned char *buf, size_t size) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; @@ -387,13 +344,11 @@ int mbedtls_asn1_write_octet_string(unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_raw_buffer(p, start, buf, size)); - MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len(p, start, len)); - MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag(p, start, MBEDTLS_ASN1_OCTET_STRING)); - - return (int) len; + return mbedtls_asn1_write_len_and_tag(p, start, len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_OCTET_STRING); } +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C) /* This is a copy of the ASN.1 parsing function mbedtls_asn1_find_named_data(), * which is replicated to avoid a dependency ASN1_WRITE_C on ASN1_PARSE_C. */ static mbedtls_asn1_named_data *asn1_find_named_data( @@ -411,6 +366,10 @@ static mbedtls_asn1_named_data *asn1_find_named_data( return list; } +#else +#define asn1_find_named_data(list, oid, len) \ + ((mbedtls_asn1_named_data *) mbedtls_asn1_find_named_data(list, oid, len)) +#endif mbedtls_asn1_named_data *mbedtls_asn1_store_named_data( mbedtls_asn1_named_data **head, diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/base64.c b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/base64.c index 1f1a90a93744..9677dee5b295 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/base64.c +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/base64.c @@ -5,11 +5,14 @@ * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later */ +#include + #include "common.h" #if defined(MBEDTLS_BASE64_C) #include "mbedtls/base64.h" +#include "base64_internal.h" #include "constant_time_internal.h" #include @@ -19,7 +22,38 @@ #include "mbedtls/platform.h" #endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ -#define BASE64_SIZE_T_MAX ((size_t) -1) /* SIZE_T_MAX is not standard */ +MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE +unsigned char mbedtls_ct_base64_enc_char(unsigned char value) +{ + unsigned char digit = 0; + /* For each range of values, if value is in that range, mask digit with + * the corresponding value. Since value can only be in a single range, + * only at most one masking will change digit. */ + digit |= mbedtls_ct_uchar_in_range_if(0, 25, value, 'A' + value); + digit |= mbedtls_ct_uchar_in_range_if(26, 51, value, 'a' + value - 26); + digit |= mbedtls_ct_uchar_in_range_if(52, 61, value, '0' + value - 52); + digit |= mbedtls_ct_uchar_in_range_if(62, 62, value, '+'); + digit |= mbedtls_ct_uchar_in_range_if(63, 63, value, '/'); + return digit; +} + +MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE +signed char mbedtls_ct_base64_dec_value(unsigned char c) +{ + unsigned char val = 0; + /* For each range of digits, if c is in that range, mask val with + * the corresponding value. Since c can only be in a single range, + * only at most one masking will change val. Set val to one plus + * the desired value so that it stays 0 if c is in none of the ranges. */ + val |= mbedtls_ct_uchar_in_range_if('A', 'Z', c, c - 'A' + 0 + 1); + val |= mbedtls_ct_uchar_in_range_if('a', 'z', c, c - 'a' + 26 + 1); + val |= mbedtls_ct_uchar_in_range_if('0', '9', c, c - '0' + 52 + 1); + val |= mbedtls_ct_uchar_in_range_if('+', '+', c, c - '+' + 62 + 1); + val |= mbedtls_ct_uchar_in_range_if('/', '/', c, c - '/' + 63 + 1); + /* At this point, val is 0 if c is an invalid digit and v+1 if c is + * a digit with the value v. */ + return val - 1; +} /* * Encode a buffer into base64 format @@ -38,8 +72,8 @@ int mbedtls_base64_encode(unsigned char *dst, size_t dlen, size_t *olen, n = slen / 3 + (slen % 3 != 0); - if (n > (BASE64_SIZE_T_MAX - 1) / 4) { - *olen = BASE64_SIZE_T_MAX; + if (n > (SIZE_MAX - 1) / 4) { + *olen = SIZE_MAX; return MBEDTLS_ERR_BASE64_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; } @@ -82,7 +116,7 @@ int mbedtls_base64_encode(unsigned char *dst, size_t dlen, size_t *olen, *p++ = '='; } - *olen = p - dst; + *olen = (size_t) (p - dst); *p = 0; return 0; @@ -191,7 +225,7 @@ int mbedtls_base64_decode(unsigned char *dst, size_t dlen, size_t *olen, } } - *olen = p - dst; + *olen = (size_t) (p - dst); return 0; } diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/base64_internal.h b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/base64_internal.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..a09bd2377714 --- /dev/null +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/base64_internal.h @@ -0,0 +1,45 @@ +/** + * \file base64_internal.h + * + * \brief RFC 1521 base64 encoding/decoding: interfaces for invasive testing + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +#ifndef MBEDTLS_BASE64_INTERNAL +#define MBEDTLS_BASE64_INTERNAL + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS) + +/** Given a value in the range 0..63, return the corresponding Base64 digit. + * + * The implementation assumes that letters are consecutive (e.g. ASCII + * but not EBCDIC). + * + * \param value A value in the range 0..63. + * + * \return A base64 digit converted from \p value. + */ +unsigned char mbedtls_ct_base64_enc_char(unsigned char value); + +/** Given a Base64 digit, return its value. + * + * If c is not a Base64 digit ('A'..'Z', 'a'..'z', '0'..'9', '+' or '/'), + * return -1. + * + * The implementation assumes that letters are consecutive (e.g. ASCII + * but not EBCDIC). + * + * \param c A base64 digit. + * + * \return The value of the base64 digit \p c. + */ +signed char mbedtls_ct_base64_dec_value(unsigned char c); + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_BASE64_INTERNAL */ diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/bignum.c b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/bignum.c index fadd9e9cc2a2..c45fd5bf2487 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/bignum.c +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/bignum.c @@ -26,48 +26,159 @@ #if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) #include "mbedtls/bignum.h" -#include "mbedtls/bn_mul.h" +#include "bignum_core.h" +#include "bn_mul.h" #include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" #include "mbedtls/error.h" #include "constant_time_internal.h" -#include "bignum_internal.h" #include #include #include "mbedtls/platform.h" -#define MPI_VALIDATE_RET(cond) \ - MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE_RET(cond, MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA) -#define MPI_VALIDATE(cond) \ - MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE(cond) -#define ciL (sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint)) /* chars in limb */ -#define biL (ciL << 3) /* bits in limb */ -#define biH (ciL << 2) /* half limb size */ -#define MPI_SIZE_T_MAX ((size_t) -1) /* SIZE_T_MAX is not standard */ +/* + * Conditionally select an MPI sign in constant time. + * (MPI sign is the field s in mbedtls_mpi. It is unsigned short and only 1 and -1 are valid + * values.) + */ +static inline signed short mbedtls_ct_mpi_sign_if(mbedtls_ct_condition_t cond, + signed short sign1, signed short sign2) +{ + return (signed short) mbedtls_ct_uint_if(cond, sign1 + 1, sign2 + 1) - 1; +} /* - * Convert between bits/chars and number of limbs - * Divide first in order to avoid potential overflows + * Compare signed values in constant time */ -#define BITS_TO_LIMBS(i) ((i) / biL + ((i) % biL != 0)) -#define CHARS_TO_LIMBS(i) ((i) / ciL + ((i) % ciL != 0)) +int mbedtls_mpi_lt_mpi_ct(const mbedtls_mpi *X, + const mbedtls_mpi *Y, + unsigned *ret) +{ + mbedtls_ct_condition_t different_sign, X_is_negative, Y_is_negative, result; -/* Implementation that should never be optimized out by the compiler */ -static void mbedtls_mpi_zeroize(mbedtls_mpi_uint *v, size_t n) + if (X->n != Y->n) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + /* + * Set N_is_negative to MBEDTLS_CT_FALSE if N >= 0, MBEDTLS_CT_TRUE if N < 0. + * We know that N->s == 1 if N >= 0 and N->s == -1 if N < 0. + */ + X_is_negative = mbedtls_ct_bool((X->s & 2) >> 1); + Y_is_negative = mbedtls_ct_bool((Y->s & 2) >> 1); + + /* + * If the signs are different, then the positive operand is the bigger. + * That is if X is negative (X_is_negative == 1), then X < Y is true and it + * is false if X is positive (X_is_negative == 0). + */ + different_sign = mbedtls_ct_bool_ne(X_is_negative, Y_is_negative); // true if different sign + result = mbedtls_ct_bool_and(different_sign, X_is_negative); + + /* + * Assuming signs are the same, compare X and Y. We switch the comparison + * order if they are negative so that we get the right result, regardles of + * sign. + */ + + /* This array is used to conditionally swap the pointers in const time */ + void * const p[2] = { X->p, Y->p }; + size_t i = mbedtls_ct_size_if_else_0(X_is_negative, 1); + mbedtls_ct_condition_t lt = mbedtls_mpi_core_lt_ct(p[i], p[i ^ 1], X->n); + + /* + * Store in result iff the signs are the same (i.e., iff different_sign == false). If + * the signs differ, result has already been set, so we don't change it. + */ + result = mbedtls_ct_bool_or(result, + mbedtls_ct_bool_and(mbedtls_ct_bool_not(different_sign), lt)); + + *ret = mbedtls_ct_uint_if_else_0(result, 1); + + return 0; +} + +/* + * Conditionally assign X = Y, without leaking information + * about whether the assignment was made or not. + * (Leaking information about the respective sizes of X and Y is ok however.) + */ +#if defined(_MSC_VER) && defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_IS_WINDOWS_ON_ARM64) && \ + (_MSC_FULL_VER < 193131103) +/* + * MSVC miscompiles this function if it's inlined prior to Visual Studio 2022 version 17.1. See: + * https://developercommunity.visualstudio.com/t/c-compiler-miscompiles-part-of-mbedtls-library-on/1646989 + */ +__declspec(noinline) +#endif +int mbedtls_mpi_safe_cond_assign(mbedtls_mpi *X, + const mbedtls_mpi *Y, + unsigned char assign) { - mbedtls_platform_zeroize(v, ciL * n); + int ret = 0; + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_grow(X, Y->n)); + + { + mbedtls_ct_condition_t do_assign = mbedtls_ct_bool(assign); + + X->s = mbedtls_ct_mpi_sign_if(do_assign, Y->s, X->s); + + mbedtls_mpi_core_cond_assign(X->p, Y->p, Y->n, do_assign); + + mbedtls_ct_condition_t do_not_assign = mbedtls_ct_bool_not(do_assign); + for (size_t i = Y->n; i < X->n; i++) { + X->p[i] = mbedtls_ct_mpi_uint_if_else_0(do_not_assign, X->p[i]); + } + } + +cleanup: + return ret; } +/* + * Conditionally swap X and Y, without leaking information + * about whether the swap was made or not. + * Here it is not ok to simply swap the pointers, which would lead to + * different memory access patterns when X and Y are used afterwards. + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_safe_cond_swap(mbedtls_mpi *X, + mbedtls_mpi *Y, + unsigned char swap) +{ + int ret = 0; + int s; + + if (X == Y) { + return 0; + } + + mbedtls_ct_condition_t do_swap = mbedtls_ct_bool(swap); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_grow(X, Y->n)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_grow(Y, X->n)); + + s = X->s; + X->s = mbedtls_ct_mpi_sign_if(do_swap, Y->s, X->s); + Y->s = mbedtls_ct_mpi_sign_if(do_swap, s, Y->s); + + mbedtls_mpi_core_cond_swap(X->p, Y->p, X->n, do_swap); + +cleanup: + return ret; +} + +/* Implementation that should never be optimized out by the compiler */ +#define mbedtls_mpi_zeroize_and_free(v, n) mbedtls_zeroize_and_free(v, ciL * (n)) + /* * Initialize one MPI */ void mbedtls_mpi_init(mbedtls_mpi *X) { - MPI_VALIDATE(X != NULL); - X->s = 1; X->n = 0; X->p = NULL; @@ -83,8 +194,7 @@ void mbedtls_mpi_free(mbedtls_mpi *X) } if (X->p != NULL) { - mbedtls_mpi_zeroize(X->p, X->n); - mbedtls_free(X->p); + mbedtls_mpi_zeroize_and_free(X->p, X->n); } X->s = 1; @@ -98,7 +208,6 @@ void mbedtls_mpi_free(mbedtls_mpi *X) int mbedtls_mpi_grow(mbedtls_mpi *X, size_t nblimbs) { mbedtls_mpi_uint *p; - MPI_VALIDATE_RET(X != NULL); if (nblimbs > MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_LIMBS) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED; @@ -111,11 +220,12 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_grow(mbedtls_mpi *X, size_t nblimbs) if (X->p != NULL) { memcpy(p, X->p, X->n * ciL); - mbedtls_mpi_zeroize(X->p, X->n); - mbedtls_free(X->p); + mbedtls_mpi_zeroize_and_free(X->p, X->n); } - X->n = nblimbs; + /* nblimbs fits in n because we ensure that MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_LIMBS + * fits, and we've checked that nblimbs <= MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_LIMBS. */ + X->n = (unsigned short) nblimbs; X->p = p; } @@ -130,7 +240,6 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_shrink(mbedtls_mpi *X, size_t nblimbs) { mbedtls_mpi_uint *p; size_t i; - MPI_VALIDATE_RET(X != NULL); if (nblimbs > MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_LIMBS) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED; @@ -159,11 +268,12 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_shrink(mbedtls_mpi *X, size_t nblimbs) if (X->p != NULL) { memcpy(p, X->p, i * ciL); - mbedtls_mpi_zeroize(X->p, X->n); - mbedtls_free(X->p); + mbedtls_mpi_zeroize_and_free(X->p, X->n); } - X->n = i; + /* i fits in n because we ensure that MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_LIMBS + * fits, and we've checked that i <= nblimbs <= MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_LIMBS. */ + X->n = (unsigned short) i; X->p = p; return 0; @@ -191,15 +301,12 @@ static int mbedtls_mpi_resize_clear(mbedtls_mpi *X, size_t limbs) * This function is not constant-time. Leading zeros in Y may be removed. * * Ensure that X does not shrink. This is not guaranteed by the public API, - * but some code in the bignum module relies on this property, for example - * in mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod(). + * but some code in the bignum module might still rely on this property. */ int mbedtls_mpi_copy(mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *Y) { int ret = 0; size_t i; - MPI_VALIDATE_RET(X != NULL); - MPI_VALIDATE_RET(Y != NULL); if (X == Y) { return 0; @@ -241,8 +348,6 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_copy(mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *Y) void mbedtls_mpi_swap(mbedtls_mpi *X, mbedtls_mpi *Y) { mbedtls_mpi T; - MPI_VALIDATE(X != NULL); - MPI_VALIDATE(Y != NULL); memcpy(&T, X, sizeof(mbedtls_mpi)); memcpy(X, Y, sizeof(mbedtls_mpi)); @@ -261,19 +366,22 @@ static inline mbedtls_mpi_uint mpi_sint_abs(mbedtls_mpi_sint z) return (mbedtls_mpi_uint) 0 - (mbedtls_mpi_uint) z; } +/* Convert x to a sign, i.e. to 1, if x is positive, or -1, if x is negative. + * This looks awkward but generates smaller code than (x < 0 ? -1 : 1) */ +#define TO_SIGN(x) ((mbedtls_mpi_sint) (((mbedtls_mpi_uint) x) >> (biL - 1)) * -2 + 1) + /* * Set value from integer */ int mbedtls_mpi_lset(mbedtls_mpi *X, mbedtls_mpi_sint z) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - MPI_VALIDATE_RET(X != NULL); MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_grow(X, 1)); memset(X->p, 0, X->n * ciL); X->p[0] = mpi_sint_abs(z); - X->s = (z < 0) ? -1 : 1; + X->s = TO_SIGN(z); cleanup: @@ -285,8 +393,6 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_lset(mbedtls_mpi *X, mbedtls_mpi_sint z) */ int mbedtls_mpi_get_bit(const mbedtls_mpi *X, size_t pos) { - MPI_VALIDATE_RET(X != NULL); - if (X->n * biL <= pos) { return 0; } @@ -294,10 +400,6 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_get_bit(const mbedtls_mpi *X, size_t pos) return (X->p[pos / biL] >> (pos % biL)) & 0x01; } -/* Get a specific byte, without range checks. */ -#define GET_BYTE(X, i) \ - (((X)->p[(i) / ciL] >> (((i) % ciL) * 8)) & 0xff) - /* * Set a bit to a specific value of 0 or 1 */ @@ -306,7 +408,6 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_set_bit(mbedtls_mpi *X, size_t pos, unsigned char val) int ret = 0; size_t off = pos / biL; size_t idx = pos % biL; - MPI_VALIDATE_RET(X != NULL); if (val != 0 && val != 1) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA; @@ -333,59 +434,44 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_set_bit(mbedtls_mpi *X, size_t pos, unsigned char val) */ size_t mbedtls_mpi_lsb(const mbedtls_mpi *X) { - size_t i, j, count = 0; - MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE_RET(X != NULL, 0); + size_t i; +#if defined(__has_builtin) +#if (MBEDTLS_MPI_UINT_MAX == UINT_MAX) && __has_builtin(__builtin_ctz) + #define mbedtls_mpi_uint_ctz __builtin_ctz +#elif (MBEDTLS_MPI_UINT_MAX == ULONG_MAX) && __has_builtin(__builtin_ctzl) + #define mbedtls_mpi_uint_ctz __builtin_ctzl +#elif (MBEDTLS_MPI_UINT_MAX == ULLONG_MAX) && __has_builtin(__builtin_ctzll) + #define mbedtls_mpi_uint_ctz __builtin_ctzll +#endif +#endif + +#if defined(mbedtls_mpi_uint_ctz) for (i = 0; i < X->n; i++) { - for (j = 0; j < biL; j++, count++) { + if (X->p[i] != 0) { + return i * biL + mbedtls_mpi_uint_ctz(X->p[i]); + } + } +#else + size_t count = 0; + for (i = 0; i < X->n; i++) { + for (size_t j = 0; j < biL; j++, count++) { if (((X->p[i] >> j) & 1) != 0) { return count; } } } +#endif return 0; } -/* - * Count leading zero bits in a given integer - */ -static size_t mbedtls_clz(const mbedtls_mpi_uint x) -{ - size_t j; - mbedtls_mpi_uint mask = (mbedtls_mpi_uint) 1 << (biL - 1); - - for (j = 0; j < biL; j++) { - if (x & mask) { - break; - } - - mask >>= 1; - } - - return j; -} - /* * Return the number of bits */ size_t mbedtls_mpi_bitlen(const mbedtls_mpi *X) { - size_t i, j; - - if (X->n == 0) { - return 0; - } - - for (i = X->n - 1; i > 0; i--) { - if (X->p[i] != 0) { - break; - } - } - - j = biL - mbedtls_clz(X->p[i]); - - return (i * biL) + j; + return mbedtls_mpi_core_bitlen(X->p, X->n); } /* @@ -430,8 +516,6 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_read_string(mbedtls_mpi *X, int radix, const char *s) int sign = 1; mbedtls_mpi_uint d; mbedtls_mpi T; - MPI_VALIDATE_RET(X != NULL); - MPI_VALIDATE_RET(s != NULL); if (radix < 2 || radix > 16) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA; @@ -452,7 +536,7 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_read_string(mbedtls_mpi *X, int radix, const char *s) slen = strlen(s); if (radix == 16) { - if (slen > MPI_SIZE_T_MAX >> 2) { + if (slen > SIZE_MAX >> 2) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } @@ -534,9 +618,6 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_write_string(const mbedtls_mpi *X, int radix, size_t n; char *p; mbedtls_mpi T; - MPI_VALIDATE_RET(X != NULL); - MPI_VALIDATE_RET(olen != NULL); - MPI_VALIDATE_RET(buflen == 0 || buf != NULL); if (radix < 2 || radix > 16) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA; @@ -602,7 +683,7 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_write_string(const mbedtls_mpi *X, int radix, } *p++ = '\0'; - *olen = p - buf; + *olen = (size_t) (p - buf); cleanup: @@ -626,9 +707,6 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_read_file(mbedtls_mpi *X, int radix, FILE *fin) */ char s[MBEDTLS_MPI_RW_BUFFER_SIZE]; - MPI_VALIDATE_RET(X != NULL); - MPI_VALIDATE_RET(fin != NULL); - if (radix < 2 || radix > 16) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } @@ -672,7 +750,6 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_write_file(const char *p, const mbedtls_mpi *X, int radix, FILE * newline characters and '\0' */ char s[MBEDTLS_MPI_RW_BUFFER_SIZE]; - MPI_VALIDATE_RET(X != NULL); if (radix < 2 || radix > 16) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA; @@ -706,111 +783,22 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_write_file(const char *p, const mbedtls_mpi *X, int radix, FILE } #endif /* MBEDTLS_FS_IO */ - -/* Convert a big-endian byte array aligned to the size of mbedtls_mpi_uint - * into the storage form used by mbedtls_mpi. */ - -static mbedtls_mpi_uint mpi_uint_bigendian_to_host_c(mbedtls_mpi_uint x) -{ - uint8_t i; - unsigned char *x_ptr; - mbedtls_mpi_uint tmp = 0; - - for (i = 0, x_ptr = (unsigned char *) &x; i < ciL; i++, x_ptr++) { - tmp <<= CHAR_BIT; - tmp |= (mbedtls_mpi_uint) *x_ptr; - } - - return tmp; -} - -static mbedtls_mpi_uint mpi_uint_bigendian_to_host(mbedtls_mpi_uint x) -{ -#if defined(__BYTE_ORDER__) - -/* Nothing to do on bigendian systems. */ -#if (__BYTE_ORDER__ == __ORDER_BIG_ENDIAN__) - return x; -#endif /* __BYTE_ORDER__ == __ORDER_BIG_ENDIAN__ */ - -#if (__BYTE_ORDER__ == __ORDER_LITTLE_ENDIAN__) - -/* For GCC and Clang, have builtins for byte swapping. */ -#if defined(__GNUC__) && defined(__GNUC_PREREQ) -#if __GNUC_PREREQ(4, 3) -#define have_bswap -#endif -#endif - -#if defined(__clang__) && defined(__has_builtin) -#if __has_builtin(__builtin_bswap32) && \ - __has_builtin(__builtin_bswap64) -#define have_bswap -#endif -#endif - -#if defined(have_bswap) - /* The compiler is hopefully able to statically evaluate this! */ - switch (sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint)) { - case 4: - return __builtin_bswap32(x); - case 8: - return __builtin_bswap64(x); - } -#endif -#endif /* __BYTE_ORDER__ == __ORDER_LITTLE_ENDIAN__ */ -#endif /* __BYTE_ORDER__ */ - - /* Fall back to C-based reordering if we don't know the byte order - * or we couldn't use a compiler-specific builtin. */ - return mpi_uint_bigendian_to_host_c(x); -} - -static void mpi_bigendian_to_host(mbedtls_mpi_uint * const p, size_t limbs) -{ - mbedtls_mpi_uint *cur_limb_left; - mbedtls_mpi_uint *cur_limb_right; - if (limbs == 0) { - return; - } - - /* - * Traverse limbs and - * - adapt byte-order in each limb - * - swap the limbs themselves. - * For that, simultaneously traverse the limbs from left to right - * and from right to left, as long as the left index is not bigger - * than the right index (it's not a problem if limbs is odd and the - * indices coincide in the last iteration). - */ - for (cur_limb_left = p, cur_limb_right = p + (limbs - 1); - cur_limb_left <= cur_limb_right; - cur_limb_left++, cur_limb_right--) { - mbedtls_mpi_uint tmp; - /* Note that if cur_limb_left == cur_limb_right, - * this code effectively swaps the bytes only once. */ - tmp = mpi_uint_bigendian_to_host(*cur_limb_left); - *cur_limb_left = mpi_uint_bigendian_to_host(*cur_limb_right); - *cur_limb_right = tmp; - } -} - /* * Import X from unsigned binary data, little endian + * + * This function is guaranteed to return an MPI with exactly the necessary + * number of limbs (in particular, it does not skip 0s in the input). */ int mbedtls_mpi_read_binary_le(mbedtls_mpi *X, const unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - size_t i; - size_t const limbs = CHARS_TO_LIMBS(buflen); + const size_t limbs = CHARS_TO_LIMBS(buflen); /* Ensure that target MPI has exactly the necessary number of limbs */ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_resize_clear(X, limbs)); - for (i = 0; i < buflen; i++) { - X->p[i / ciL] |= ((mbedtls_mpi_uint) buf[i]) << ((i % ciL) << 3); - } + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_core_read_le(X->p, X->n, buf, buflen)); cleanup: @@ -824,28 +812,19 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_read_binary_le(mbedtls_mpi *X, /* * Import X from unsigned binary data, big endian + * + * This function is guaranteed to return an MPI with exactly the necessary + * number of limbs (in particular, it does not skip 0s in the input). */ int mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(mbedtls_mpi *X, const unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - size_t const limbs = CHARS_TO_LIMBS(buflen); - size_t const overhead = (limbs * ciL) - buflen; - unsigned char *Xp; - - MPI_VALIDATE_RET(X != NULL); - MPI_VALIDATE_RET(buflen == 0 || buf != NULL); + const size_t limbs = CHARS_TO_LIMBS(buflen); /* Ensure that target MPI has exactly the necessary number of limbs */ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_resize_clear(X, limbs)); - /* Avoid calling `memcpy` with NULL source or destination argument, - * even if buflen is 0. */ - if (buflen != 0) { - Xp = (unsigned char *) X->p; - memcpy(Xp + overhead, buf, buflen); - - mpi_bigendian_to_host(X->p, limbs); - } + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_core_read_be(X->p, X->n, buf, buflen)); cleanup: @@ -863,34 +842,7 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(mbedtls_mpi *X, const unsigned char *buf, size_t buf int mbedtls_mpi_write_binary_le(const mbedtls_mpi *X, unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen) { - size_t stored_bytes = X->n * ciL; - size_t bytes_to_copy; - size_t i; - - if (stored_bytes < buflen) { - bytes_to_copy = stored_bytes; - } else { - bytes_to_copy = buflen; - - /* The output buffer is smaller than the allocated size of X. - * However X may fit if its leading bytes are zero. */ - for (i = bytes_to_copy; i < stored_bytes; i++) { - if (GET_BYTE(X, i) != 0) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; - } - } - } - - for (i = 0; i < bytes_to_copy; i++) { - buf[i] = GET_BYTE(X, i); - } - - if (stored_bytes < buflen) { - /* Write trailing 0 bytes */ - memset(buf + stored_bytes, 0, buflen - stored_bytes); - } - - return 0; + return mbedtls_mpi_core_write_le(X->p, X->n, buf, buflen); } /* @@ -899,42 +851,7 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_write_binary_le(const mbedtls_mpi *X, int mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(const mbedtls_mpi *X, unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen) { - size_t stored_bytes; - size_t bytes_to_copy; - unsigned char *p; - size_t i; - - MPI_VALIDATE_RET(X != NULL); - MPI_VALIDATE_RET(buflen == 0 || buf != NULL); - - stored_bytes = X->n * ciL; - - if (stored_bytes < buflen) { - /* There is enough space in the output buffer. Write initial - * null bytes and record the position at which to start - * writing the significant bytes. In this case, the execution - * trace of this function does not depend on the value of the - * number. */ - bytes_to_copy = stored_bytes; - p = buf + buflen - stored_bytes; - memset(buf, 0, buflen - stored_bytes); - } else { - /* The output buffer is smaller than the allocated size of X. - * However X may fit if its leading bytes are zero. */ - bytes_to_copy = buflen; - p = buf; - for (i = bytes_to_copy; i < stored_bytes; i++) { - if (GET_BYTE(X, i) != 0) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; - } - } - } - - for (i = 0; i < bytes_to_copy; i++) { - p[bytes_to_copy - i - 1] = GET_BYTE(X, i); - } - - return 0; + return mbedtls_mpi_core_write_be(X->p, X->n, buf, buflen); } /* @@ -943,12 +860,7 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(const mbedtls_mpi *X, int mbedtls_mpi_shift_l(mbedtls_mpi *X, size_t count) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - size_t i, v0, t1; - mbedtls_mpi_uint r0 = 0, r1; - MPI_VALIDATE_RET(X != NULL); - - v0 = count / (biL); - t1 = count & (biL - 1); + size_t i; i = mbedtls_mpi_bitlen(X) + count; @@ -958,31 +870,7 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_shift_l(mbedtls_mpi *X, size_t count) ret = 0; - /* - * shift by count / limb_size - */ - if (v0 > 0) { - for (i = X->n; i > v0; i--) { - X->p[i - 1] = X->p[i - v0 - 1]; - } - - for (; i > 0; i--) { - X->p[i - 1] = 0; - } - } - - /* - * shift by count % limb_size - */ - if (t1 > 0) { - for (i = v0; i < X->n; i++) { - r1 = X->p[i] >> (biL - t1); - X->p[i] <<= t1; - X->p[i] |= r0; - r0 = r1; - } - } - + mbedtls_mpi_core_shift_l(X->p, X->n, count); cleanup: return ret; @@ -993,42 +881,9 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_shift_l(mbedtls_mpi *X, size_t count) */ int mbedtls_mpi_shift_r(mbedtls_mpi *X, size_t count) { - size_t i, v0, v1; - mbedtls_mpi_uint r0 = 0, r1; - MPI_VALIDATE_RET(X != NULL); - - v0 = count / biL; - v1 = count & (biL - 1); - - if (v0 > X->n || (v0 == X->n && v1 > 0)) { - return mbedtls_mpi_lset(X, 0); + if (X->n != 0) { + mbedtls_mpi_core_shift_r(X->p, X->n, count); } - - /* - * shift by count / limb_size - */ - if (v0 > 0) { - for (i = 0; i < X->n - v0; i++) { - X->p[i] = X->p[i + v0]; - } - - for (; i < X->n; i++) { - X->p[i] = 0; - } - } - - /* - * shift by count % limb_size - */ - if (v1 > 0) { - for (i = X->n; i > 0; i--) { - r1 = X->p[i - 1] << (biL - v1); - X->p[i - 1] >>= v1; - X->p[i - 1] |= r0; - r0 = r1; - } - } - return 0; } @@ -1038,8 +893,6 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_shift_r(mbedtls_mpi *X, size_t count) int mbedtls_mpi_cmp_abs(const mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *Y) { size_t i, j; - MPI_VALIDATE_RET(X != NULL); - MPI_VALIDATE_RET(Y != NULL); for (i = X->n; i > 0; i--) { if (X->p[i - 1] != 0) { @@ -1053,9 +906,8 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_cmp_abs(const mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *Y) } } - if (i == 0 && j == 0) { - return 0; - } + /* If i == j == 0, i.e. abs(X) == abs(Y), + * we end up returning 0 at the end of the function. */ if (i > j) { return 1; @@ -1082,8 +934,6 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_cmp_abs(const mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *Y) int mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi(const mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *Y) { size_t i, j; - MPI_VALIDATE_RET(X != NULL); - MPI_VALIDATE_RET(Y != NULL); for (i = X->n; i > 0; i--) { if (X->p[i - 1] != 0) { @@ -1134,10 +984,9 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(const mbedtls_mpi *X, mbedtls_mpi_sint z) { mbedtls_mpi Y; mbedtls_mpi_uint p[1]; - MPI_VALIDATE_RET(X != NULL); *p = mpi_sint_abs(z); - Y.s = (z < 0) ? -1 : 1; + Y.s = TO_SIGN(z); Y.n = 1; Y.p = p; @@ -1150,11 +999,9 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(const mbedtls_mpi *X, mbedtls_mpi_sint z) int mbedtls_mpi_add_abs(mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *A, const mbedtls_mpi *B) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - size_t i, j; - mbedtls_mpi_uint *o, *p, c, tmp; - MPI_VALIDATE_RET(X != NULL); - MPI_VALIDATE_RET(A != NULL); - MPI_VALIDATE_RET(B != NULL); + size_t j; + mbedtls_mpi_uint *p; + mbedtls_mpi_uint c; if (X == B) { const mbedtls_mpi *T = A; A = X; B = T; @@ -1165,7 +1012,7 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_add_abs(mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *A, const mbedtls_mpi } /* - * X should always be positive as a result of unsigned additions. + * X must always be positive as a result of unsigned additions. */ X->s = 1; @@ -1183,24 +1030,23 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_add_abs(mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *A, const mbedtls_mpi MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_grow(X, j)); - o = B->p; p = X->p; c = 0; + /* j is the number of non-zero limbs of B. Add those to X. */ - /* - * tmp is used because it might happen that p == o - */ - for (i = 0; i < j; i++, o++, p++) { - tmp = *o; - *p += c; c = (*p < c); - *p += tmp; c += (*p < tmp); - } + p = X->p; + + c = mbedtls_mpi_core_add(p, p, B->p, j); + + p += j; + + /* Now propagate any carry */ while (c != 0) { - if (i >= X->n) { - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_grow(X, i + 1)); - p = X->p + i; + if (j >= X->n) { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_grow(X, j + 1)); + p = X->p + j; } - *p += c; c = (*p < c); i++; p++; + *p += c; c = (*p < c); j++; p++; } cleanup: @@ -1208,39 +1054,6 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_add_abs(mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *A, const mbedtls_mpi return ret; } -/** - * Helper for mbedtls_mpi subtraction. - * - * Calculate l - r where l and r have the same size. - * This function operates modulo (2^ciL)^n and returns the carry - * (1 if there was a wraparound, i.e. if `l < r`, and 0 otherwise). - * - * d may be aliased to l or r. - * - * \param n Number of limbs of \p d, \p l and \p r. - * \param[out] d The result of the subtraction. - * \param[in] l The left operand. - * \param[in] r The right operand. - * - * \return 1 if `l < r`. - * 0 if `l >= r`. - */ -static mbedtls_mpi_uint mpi_sub_hlp(size_t n, - mbedtls_mpi_uint *d, - const mbedtls_mpi_uint *l, - const mbedtls_mpi_uint *r) -{ - size_t i; - mbedtls_mpi_uint c = 0, t, z; - - for (i = 0; i < n; i++) { - z = (l[i] < c); t = l[i] - c; - c = (t < r[i]) + z; d[i] = t - r[i]; - } - - return c; -} - /* * Unsigned subtraction: X = |A| - |B| (HAC 14.9, 14.10) */ @@ -1249,9 +1062,6 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_sub_abs(mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *A, const mbedtls_mpi int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t n; mbedtls_mpi_uint carry; - MPI_VALIDATE_RET(X != NULL); - MPI_VALIDATE_RET(A != NULL); - MPI_VALIDATE_RET(B != NULL); for (n = B->n; n > 0; n--) { if (B->p[n - 1] != 0) { @@ -1276,19 +1086,16 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_sub_abs(mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *A, const mbedtls_mpi memset(X->p + A->n, 0, (X->n - A->n) * ciL); } - carry = mpi_sub_hlp(n, X->p, A->p, B->p); + carry = mbedtls_mpi_core_sub(X->p, A->p, B->p, n); if (carry != 0) { - /* Propagate the carry to the first nonzero limb of X. */ - for (; n < X->n && X->p[n] == 0; n++) { - --X->p[n]; - } - /* If we ran out of space for the carry, it means that the result - * is negative. */ - if (n == X->n) { + /* Propagate the carry through the rest of X. */ + carry = mbedtls_mpi_core_sub_int(X->p + n, X->p + n, carry, X->n - n); + + /* If we have further carry/borrow, the result is negative. */ + if (carry != 0) { ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NEGATIVE_VALUE; goto cleanup; } - --X->p[n]; } /* X should always be positive as a result of unsigned subtractions. */ @@ -1306,9 +1113,6 @@ static int add_sub_mpi(mbedtls_mpi *X, int flip_B) { int ret, s; - MPI_VALIDATE_RET(X != NULL); - MPI_VALIDATE_RET(A != NULL); - MPI_VALIDATE_RET(B != NULL); s = A->s; if (A->s * B->s * flip_B < 0) { @@ -1357,11 +1161,9 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_add_int(mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *A, mbedtls_mpi_sint b { mbedtls_mpi B; mbedtls_mpi_uint p[1]; - MPI_VALIDATE_RET(X != NULL); - MPI_VALIDATE_RET(A != NULL); p[0] = mpi_sint_abs(b); - B.s = (b < 0) ? -1 : 1; + B.s = TO_SIGN(b); B.n = 1; B.p = p; @@ -1375,98 +1177,15 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_sub_int(mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *A, mbedtls_mpi_sint b { mbedtls_mpi B; mbedtls_mpi_uint p[1]; - MPI_VALIDATE_RET(X != NULL); - MPI_VALIDATE_RET(A != NULL); p[0] = mpi_sint_abs(b); - B.s = (b < 0) ? -1 : 1; + B.s = TO_SIGN(b); B.n = 1; B.p = p; return mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi(X, A, &B); } -/** Helper for mbedtls_mpi multiplication. - * - * Add \p b * \p s to \p d. - * - * \param i The number of limbs of \p s. - * \param[in] s A bignum to multiply, of size \p i. - * It may overlap with \p d, but only if - * \p d <= \p s. - * Its leading limb must not be \c 0. - * \param[in,out] d The bignum to add to. - * It must be sufficiently large to store the - * result of the multiplication. This means - * \p i + 1 limbs if \p d[\p i - 1] started as 0 and \p b - * is not known a priori. - * \param b A scalar to multiply. - */ -static -#if defined(__APPLE__) && defined(__arm__) -/* - * Apple LLVM version 4.2 (clang-425.0.24) (based on LLVM 3.2svn) - * appears to need this to prevent bad ARM code generation at -O3. - */ -__attribute__((noinline)) -#endif -void mpi_mul_hlp(size_t i, - const mbedtls_mpi_uint *s, - mbedtls_mpi_uint *d, - mbedtls_mpi_uint b) -{ - mbedtls_mpi_uint c = 0, t = 0; - (void) t; /* Unused in some architectures */ - -#if defined(MULADDC_HUIT) - for (; i >= 8; i -= 8) { - MULADDC_INIT - MULADDC_HUIT - MULADDC_STOP - } - - for (; i > 0; i--) { - MULADDC_INIT - MULADDC_CORE - MULADDC_STOP - } -#else /* MULADDC_HUIT */ - for (; i >= 16; i -= 16) { - MULADDC_INIT - MULADDC_CORE MULADDC_CORE - MULADDC_CORE MULADDC_CORE - MULADDC_CORE MULADDC_CORE - MULADDC_CORE MULADDC_CORE - - MULADDC_CORE MULADDC_CORE - MULADDC_CORE MULADDC_CORE - MULADDC_CORE MULADDC_CORE - MULADDC_CORE MULADDC_CORE - MULADDC_STOP - } - - for (; i >= 8; i -= 8) { - MULADDC_INIT - MULADDC_CORE MULADDC_CORE - MULADDC_CORE MULADDC_CORE - - MULADDC_CORE MULADDC_CORE - MULADDC_CORE MULADDC_CORE - MULADDC_STOP - } - - for (; i > 0; i--) { - MULADDC_INIT - MULADDC_CORE - MULADDC_STOP - } -#endif /* MULADDC_HUIT */ - - while (c != 0) { - *d += c; c = (*d < c); d++; - } -} - /* * Baseline multiplication: X = A * B (HAC 14.12) */ @@ -1476,11 +1195,9 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi(mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *A, const mbedtls_mpi size_t i, j; mbedtls_mpi TA, TB; int result_is_zero = 0; - MPI_VALIDATE_RET(X != NULL); - MPI_VALIDATE_RET(A != NULL); - MPI_VALIDATE_RET(B != NULL); - mbedtls_mpi_init(&TA); mbedtls_mpi_init(&TB); + mbedtls_mpi_init(&TA); + mbedtls_mpi_init(&TB); if (X == A) { MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_copy(&TA, A)); A = &TA; @@ -1510,9 +1227,7 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi(mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *A, const mbedtls_mpi MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_grow(X, i + j)); MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_lset(X, 0)); - for (; j > 0; j--) { - mpi_mul_hlp(i, A->p, X->p + j - 1, B->p[j - 1]); - } + mbedtls_mpi_core_mul(X->p, A->p, i, B->p, j); /* If the result is 0, we don't shortcut the operation, which reduces * but does not eliminate side channels leaking the zero-ness. We do @@ -1536,22 +1251,17 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi(mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *A, const mbedtls_mpi */ int mbedtls_mpi_mul_int(mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *A, mbedtls_mpi_uint b) { - MPI_VALIDATE_RET(X != NULL); - MPI_VALIDATE_RET(A != NULL); - - /* mpi_mul_hlp can't deal with a leading 0. */ size_t n = A->n; while (n > 0 && A->p[n - 1] == 0) { --n; } - /* The general method below doesn't work if n==0 or b==0. By chance - * calculating the result is trivial in those cases. */ + /* The general method below doesn't work if b==0. */ if (b == 0 || n == 0) { return mbedtls_mpi_lset(X, 0); } - /* Calculate A*b as A + A*(b-1) to take advantage of mpi_mul_hlp */ + /* Calculate A*b as A + A*(b-1) to take advantage of mbedtls_mpi_core_mla */ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; /* In general, A * b requires 1 limb more than b. If * A->p[n - 1] * b / b == A->p[n - 1], then A * b fits in the same @@ -1560,10 +1270,13 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_mul_int(mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *A, mbedtls_mpi_uint b * making the call to grow() unconditional causes slightly fewer * calls to calloc() in ECP code, presumably because it reuses the * same mpi for a while and this way the mpi is more likely to directly - * grow to its final size. */ + * grow to its final size. + * + * Note that calculating A*b as 0 + A*b doesn't work as-is because + * A,X can be the same. */ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_grow(X, n + 1)); MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_copy(X, A)); - mpi_mul_hlp(n, A->p, X->p, b - 1); + mbedtls_mpi_core_mla(X->p, X->n, A->p, n, b - 1); cleanup: return ret; @@ -1622,7 +1335,7 @@ static mbedtls_mpi_uint mbedtls_int_div_int(mbedtls_mpi_uint u1, /* * Normalize the divisor, d, and dividend, u0, u1 */ - s = mbedtls_clz(d); + s = mbedtls_mpi_core_clz(d); d = d << s; u1 = u1 << s; @@ -1683,8 +1396,6 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_div_mpi(mbedtls_mpi *Q, mbedtls_mpi *R, const mbedtls_mpi *A, size_t i, n, t, k; mbedtls_mpi X, Y, Z, T1, T2; mbedtls_mpi_uint TP2[3]; - MPI_VALIDATE_RET(A != NULL); - MPI_VALIDATE_RET(B != NULL); if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(B, 0) == 0) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_DIVISION_BY_ZERO; @@ -1807,10 +1518,9 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_div_int(mbedtls_mpi *Q, mbedtls_mpi *R, { mbedtls_mpi B; mbedtls_mpi_uint p[1]; - MPI_VALIDATE_RET(A != NULL); p[0] = mpi_sint_abs(b); - B.s = (b < 0) ? -1 : 1; + B.s = TO_SIGN(b); B.n = 1; B.p = p; @@ -1823,9 +1533,6 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_div_int(mbedtls_mpi *Q, mbedtls_mpi *R, int mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi(mbedtls_mpi *R, const mbedtls_mpi *A, const mbedtls_mpi *B) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - MPI_VALIDATE_RET(R != NULL); - MPI_VALIDATE_RET(A != NULL); - MPI_VALIDATE_RET(B != NULL); if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(B, 0) < 0) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NEGATIVE_VALUE; @@ -1853,8 +1560,6 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_mod_int(mbedtls_mpi_uint *r, const mbedtls_mpi *A, mbedtls_mpi_s { size_t i; mbedtls_mpi_uint x, y, z; - MPI_VALIDATE_RET(r != NULL); - MPI_VALIDATE_RET(A != NULL); if (b == 0) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_DIVISION_BY_ZERO; @@ -1905,152 +1610,11 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_mod_int(mbedtls_mpi_uint *r, const mbedtls_mpi *A, mbedtls_mpi_s return 0; } -/* - * Fast Montgomery initialization (thanks to Tom St Denis) - */ -mbedtls_mpi_uint mbedtls_mpi_montmul_init(const mbedtls_mpi_uint *N) -{ - mbedtls_mpi_uint x = N[0]; - - x += ((N[0] + 2) & 4) << 1; - - for (unsigned int i = biL; i >= 8; i /= 2) { - x *= (2 - (N[0] * x)); - } - - return ~x + 1; -} - -void mbedtls_mpi_montmul(mbedtls_mpi *A, - const mbedtls_mpi *B, - const mbedtls_mpi *N, - mbedtls_mpi_uint mm, - const mbedtls_mpi *T) -{ - size_t i, n, m; - mbedtls_mpi_uint u0, u1, *d; - - memset(T->p, 0, T->n * ciL); - - d = T->p; - n = N->n; - m = (B->n < n) ? B->n : n; - - for (i = 0; i < n; i++) { - /* - * T = (T + u0*B + u1*N) / 2^biL - */ - u0 = A->p[i]; - u1 = (d[0] + u0 * B->p[0]) * mm; - - mpi_mul_hlp(m, B->p, d, u0); - mpi_mul_hlp(n, N->p, d, u1); - - *d++ = u0; d[n + 1] = 0; - } - - /* At this point, d is either the desired result or the desired result - * plus N. We now potentially subtract N, avoiding leaking whether the - * subtraction is performed through side channels. */ - - /* Copy the n least significant limbs of d to A, so that - * A = d if d < N (recall that N has n limbs). */ - memcpy(A->p, d, n * ciL); - /* If d >= N then we want to set A to d - N. To prevent timing attacks, - * do the calculation without using conditional tests. */ - /* Set d to d0 + (2^biL)^n - N where d0 is the current value of d. */ - d[n] += 1; - d[n] -= mpi_sub_hlp(n, d, d, N->p); - /* If d0 < N then d < (2^biL)^n - * so d[n] == 0 and we want to keep A as it is. - * If d0 >= N then d >= (2^biL)^n, and d <= (2^biL)^n + N < 2 * (2^biL)^n - * so d[n] == 1 and we want to set A to the result of the subtraction - * which is d - (2^biL)^n, i.e. the n least significant limbs of d. - * This exactly corresponds to a conditional assignment. */ - mbedtls_ct_mpi_uint_cond_assign(n, A->p, d, (unsigned char) d[n]); -} - -/* - * Montgomery reduction: A = A * R^-1 mod N - * - * See mbedtls_mpi_montmul() regarding constraints and guarantees on the - * parameters. - */ -static void mpi_montred(mbedtls_mpi *A, const mbedtls_mpi *N, - mbedtls_mpi_uint mm, const mbedtls_mpi *T) -{ - mbedtls_mpi_uint z = 1; - mbedtls_mpi U; - - U.n = U.s = (int) z; - U.p = &z; - - mbedtls_mpi_montmul(A, &U, N, mm, T); -} - -/** - * Select an MPI from a table without leaking the index. - * - * This is functionally equivalent to mbedtls_mpi_copy(R, T[idx]) except it - * reads the entire table in order to avoid leaking the value of idx to an - * attacker able to observe memory access patterns. - * - * \param[out] R Where to write the selected MPI. - * \param[in] T The table to read from. - * \param[in] T_size The number of elements in the table. - * \param[in] idx The index of the element to select; - * this must satisfy 0 <= idx < T_size. - * - * \return \c 0 on success, or a negative error code. - */ -static int mpi_select(mbedtls_mpi *R, const mbedtls_mpi *T, size_t T_size, size_t idx) -{ - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - - for (size_t i = 0; i < T_size; i++) { - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_safe_cond_assign(R, &T[i], - (unsigned char) mbedtls_ct_size_bool_eq(i, - idx))); - } - -cleanup: - return ret; -} - -int mbedtls_mpi_get_mont_r2_unsafe(mbedtls_mpi *X, - const mbedtls_mpi *N) -{ - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_lset(X, 1)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_shift_l(X, N->n * 2 * biL)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi(X, X, N)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_shrink(X, N->n)); - -cleanup: - return ret; -} - -/* - * Sliding-window exponentiation: X = A^E mod N (HAC 14.85) - */ int mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod(mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *A, const mbedtls_mpi *E, const mbedtls_mpi *N, mbedtls_mpi *prec_RR) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - size_t window_bitsize; - size_t i, j, nblimbs; - size_t bufsize, nbits; - size_t exponent_bits_in_window = 0; - mbedtls_mpi_uint ei, mm, state; - mbedtls_mpi RR, T, W[(size_t) 1 << MBEDTLS_MPI_WINDOW_SIZE], WW, Apos; - int neg; - - MPI_VALIDATE_RET(X != NULL); - MPI_VALIDATE_RET(A != NULL); - MPI_VALIDATE_RET(E != NULL); - MPI_VALIDATE_RET(N != NULL); if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(N, 0) <= 0 || (N->p[0] & 1) == 0) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA; @@ -2066,259 +1630,88 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod(mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *A, } /* - * Init temps and window size + * Ensure that the exponent that we are passing to the core is not NULL. */ - mm = mbedtls_mpi_montmul_init(N->p); - mbedtls_mpi_init(&RR); mbedtls_mpi_init(&T); - mbedtls_mpi_init(&Apos); - mbedtls_mpi_init(&WW); - memset(W, 0, sizeof(W)); - - i = mbedtls_mpi_bitlen(E); - - window_bitsize = (i > 671) ? 6 : (i > 239) ? 5 : - (i > 79) ? 4 : (i > 23) ? 3 : 1; - -#if (MBEDTLS_MPI_WINDOW_SIZE < 6) - if (window_bitsize > MBEDTLS_MPI_WINDOW_SIZE) { - window_bitsize = MBEDTLS_MPI_WINDOW_SIZE; + if (E->n == 0) { + ret = mbedtls_mpi_lset(X, 1); + return ret; } -#endif - - const size_t w_table_used_size = (size_t) 1 << window_bitsize; - - /* - * This function is not constant-trace: its memory accesses depend on the - * exponent value. To defend against timing attacks, callers (such as RSA - * and DHM) should use exponent blinding. However this is not enough if the - * adversary can find the exponent in a single trace, so this function - * takes extra precautions against adversaries who can observe memory - * access patterns. - * - * This function performs a series of multiplications by table elements and - * squarings, and we want the prevent the adversary from finding out which - * table element was used, and from distinguishing between multiplications - * and squarings. Firstly, when multiplying by an element of the window - * W[i], we do a constant-trace table lookup to obfuscate i. This leaves - * squarings as having a different memory access patterns from other - * multiplications. So secondly, we put the accumulator in the table as - * well, and also do a constant-trace table lookup to multiply by the - * accumulator which is W[x_index]. - * - * This way, all multiplications take the form of a lookup-and-multiply. - * The number of lookup-and-multiply operations inside each iteration of - * the main loop still depends on the bits of the exponent, but since the - * other operations in the loop don't have an easily recognizable memory - * trace, an adversary is unlikely to be able to observe the exact - * patterns. - * - * An adversary may still be able to recover the exponent if they can - * observe both memory accesses and branches. However, branch prediction - * exploitation typically requires many traces of execution over the same - * data, which is defeated by randomized blinding. - */ - const size_t x_index = 0; - mbedtls_mpi_init(&W[x_index]); - - j = N->n + 1; - /* All W[i] including the accumulator must have at least N->n limbs for - * the mbedtls_mpi_montmul() and mpi_montred() calls later. Here we ensure - * that W[1] and the accumulator W[x_index] are large enough. later we'll - * grow other W[i] to the same length. They must not be shrunk midway - * through this function! - */ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_grow(&W[x_index], j)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_grow(&W[1], j)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_grow(&T, j * 2)); /* - * Compensate for negative A (and correct at the end) + * Allocate working memory for mbedtls_mpi_core_exp_mod() */ - neg = (A->s == -1); - if (neg) { - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_copy(&Apos, A)); - Apos.s = 1; - A = &Apos; + size_t T_limbs = mbedtls_mpi_core_exp_mod_working_limbs(N->n, E->n); + mbedtls_mpi_uint *T = (mbedtls_mpi_uint *) mbedtls_calloc(T_limbs, sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint)); + if (T == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED; } + mbedtls_mpi RR; + mbedtls_mpi_init(&RR); + /* * If 1st call, pre-compute R^2 mod N */ if (prec_RR == NULL || prec_RR->p == NULL) { - mbedtls_mpi_get_mont_r2_unsafe(&RR, N); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_core_get_mont_r2_unsafe(&RR, N)); if (prec_RR != NULL) { - memcpy(prec_RR, &RR, sizeof(mbedtls_mpi)); + *prec_RR = RR; } } else { - memcpy(&RR, prec_RR, sizeof(mbedtls_mpi)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_grow(prec_RR, N->n)); + RR = *prec_RR; } /* - * W[1] = A * R^2 * R^-1 mod N = A * R mod N + * To preserve constness we need to make a copy of A. Using X for this to + * save memory. */ - if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi(A, N) >= 0) { - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi(&W[1], A, N)); - /* This should be a no-op because W[1] is already that large before - * mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi(), but it's necessary to avoid an overflow - * in mbedtls_mpi_montmul() below, so let's make sure. */ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_grow(&W[1], N->n + 1)); - } else { - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_copy(&W[1], A)); - } - - /* Note that this is safe because W[1] always has at least N->n limbs - * (it grew above and was preserved by mbedtls_mpi_copy()). */ - mbedtls_mpi_montmul(&W[1], &RR, N, mm, &T); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_copy(X, A)); /* - * W[x_index] = R^2 * R^-1 mod N = R mod N + * Compensate for negative A (and correct at the end). */ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_copy(&W[x_index], &RR)); - mpi_montred(&W[x_index], N, mm, &T); - - - if (window_bitsize > 1) { - /* - * W[i] = W[1] ^ i - * - * The first bit of the sliding window is always 1 and therefore we - * only need to store the second half of the table. - * - * (There are two special elements in the table: W[0] for the - * accumulator/result and W[1] for A in Montgomery form. Both of these - * are already set at this point.) - */ - j = w_table_used_size / 2; - - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_grow(&W[j], N->n + 1)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_copy(&W[j], &W[1])); - - for (i = 0; i < window_bitsize - 1; i++) { - mbedtls_mpi_montmul(&W[j], &W[j], N, mm, &T); - } - - /* - * W[i] = W[i - 1] * W[1] - */ - for (i = j + 1; i < w_table_used_size; i++) { - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_grow(&W[i], N->n + 1)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_copy(&W[i], &W[i - 1])); - - mbedtls_mpi_montmul(&W[i], &W[1], N, mm, &T); - } - } - - nblimbs = E->n; - bufsize = 0; - nbits = 0; - state = 0; - - while (1) { - if (bufsize == 0) { - if (nblimbs == 0) { - break; - } - - nblimbs--; - - bufsize = sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint) << 3; - } - - bufsize--; - - ei = (E->p[nblimbs] >> bufsize) & 1; - - /* - * skip leading 0s - */ - if (ei == 0 && state == 0) { - continue; - } - - if (ei == 0 && state == 1) { - /* - * out of window, square W[x_index] - */ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mpi_select(&WW, W, w_table_used_size, x_index)); - mbedtls_mpi_montmul(&W[x_index], &WW, N, mm, &T); - continue; - } - - /* - * add ei to current window - */ - state = 2; - - nbits++; - exponent_bits_in_window |= (ei << (window_bitsize - nbits)); - - if (nbits == window_bitsize) { - /* - * W[x_index] = W[x_index]^window_bitsize R^-1 mod N - */ - for (i = 0; i < window_bitsize; i++) { - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mpi_select(&WW, W, w_table_used_size, - x_index)); - mbedtls_mpi_montmul(&W[x_index], &WW, N, mm, &T); - } - - /* - * W[x_index] = W[x_index] * W[exponent_bits_in_window] R^-1 mod N - */ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mpi_select(&WW, W, w_table_used_size, - exponent_bits_in_window)); - mbedtls_mpi_montmul(&W[x_index], &WW, N, mm, &T); - - state--; - nbits = 0; - exponent_bits_in_window = 0; - } - } + X->s = 1; /* - * process the remaining bits + * Make sure that X is in a form that is safe for consumption by + * the core functions. + * + * - The core functions will not touch the limbs of X above N->n. The + * result will be correct if those limbs are 0, which the mod call + * ensures. + * - Also, X must have at least as many limbs as N for the calls to the + * core functions. */ - for (i = 0; i < nbits; i++) { - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mpi_select(&WW, W, w_table_used_size, x_index)); - mbedtls_mpi_montmul(&W[x_index], &WW, N, mm, &T); - - exponent_bits_in_window <<= 1; - - if ((exponent_bits_in_window & ((size_t) 1 << window_bitsize)) != 0) { - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mpi_select(&WW, W, w_table_used_size, 1)); - mbedtls_mpi_montmul(&W[x_index], &WW, N, mm, &T); - } + if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi(X, N) >= 0) { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi(X, X, N)); } + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_grow(X, N->n)); /* - * W[x_index] = A^E * R * R^-1 mod N = A^E mod N + * Convert to and from Montgomery around mbedtls_mpi_core_exp_mod(). */ - mpi_montred(&W[x_index], N, mm, &T); - - if (neg && E->n != 0 && (E->p[0] & 1) != 0) { - W[x_index].s = -1; - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi(&W[x_index], N, &W[x_index])); + { + mbedtls_mpi_uint mm = mbedtls_mpi_core_montmul_init(N->p); + mbedtls_mpi_core_to_mont_rep(X->p, X->p, N->p, N->n, mm, RR.p, T); + mbedtls_mpi_core_exp_mod(X->p, X->p, N->p, N->n, E->p, E->n, RR.p, T); + mbedtls_mpi_core_from_mont_rep(X->p, X->p, N->p, N->n, mm, T); } /* - * Load the result in the output variable. + * Correct for negative A. */ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_copy(X, &W[x_index])); - -cleanup: + if (A->s == -1 && (E->p[0] & 1) != 0) { + mbedtls_ct_condition_t is_x_non_zero = mbedtls_mpi_core_check_zero_ct(X->p, X->n); + X->s = mbedtls_ct_mpi_sign_if(is_x_non_zero, -1, 1); - /* The first bit of the sliding window is always 1 and therefore the first - * half of the table was unused. */ - for (i = w_table_used_size/2; i < w_table_used_size; i++) { - mbedtls_mpi_free(&W[i]); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi(X, N, X)); } - mbedtls_mpi_free(&W[x_index]); - mbedtls_mpi_free(&W[1]); - mbedtls_mpi_free(&T); - mbedtls_mpi_free(&Apos); - mbedtls_mpi_free(&WW); +cleanup: + + mbedtls_mpi_zeroize_and_free(T, T_limbs); if (prec_RR == NULL || prec_RR->p == NULL) { mbedtls_mpi_free(&RR); @@ -2336,10 +1729,6 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_gcd(mbedtls_mpi *G, const mbedtls_mpi *A, const mbedtls_mpi *B) size_t lz, lzt; mbedtls_mpi TA, TB; - MPI_VALIDATE_RET(G != NULL); - MPI_VALIDATE_RET(A != NULL); - MPI_VALIDATE_RET(B != NULL); - mbedtls_mpi_init(&TA); mbedtls_mpi_init(&TB); MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_copy(&TA, A)); @@ -2437,50 +1826,18 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_gcd(mbedtls_mpi *G, const mbedtls_mpi *A, const mbedtls_mpi *B) return ret; } -/* Fill X with n_bytes random bytes. - * X must already have room for those bytes. - * The ordering of the bytes returned from the RNG is suitable for - * deterministic ECDSA (see RFC 6979 §3.3 and mbedtls_mpi_random()). - * The size and sign of X are unchanged. - * n_bytes must not be 0. - */ -static int mpi_fill_random_internal( - mbedtls_mpi *X, size_t n_bytes, - int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng) -{ - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - const size_t limbs = CHARS_TO_LIMBS(n_bytes); - const size_t overhead = (limbs * ciL) - n_bytes; - - if (X->n < limbs) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA; - } - - memset(X->p, 0, overhead); - memset((unsigned char *) X->p + limbs * ciL, 0, (X->n - limbs) * ciL); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(f_rng(p_rng, (unsigned char *) X->p + overhead, n_bytes)); - mpi_bigendian_to_host(X->p, limbs); - -cleanup: - return ret; -} - /* * Fill X with size bytes of random. - * - * Use a temporary bytes representation to make sure the result is the same - * regardless of the platform endianness (useful when f_rng is actually - * deterministic, eg for tests). + * The bytes returned from the RNG are used in a specific order which + * is suitable for deterministic ECDSA (see the specification of + * mbedtls_mpi_random() and the implementation in mbedtls_mpi_fill_random()). */ int mbedtls_mpi_fill_random(mbedtls_mpi *X, size_t size, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - size_t const limbs = CHARS_TO_LIMBS(size); - - MPI_VALIDATE_RET(X != NULL); - MPI_VALIDATE_RET(f_rng != NULL); + const size_t limbs = CHARS_TO_LIMBS(size); /* Ensure that target MPI has exactly the necessary number of limbs */ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_resize_clear(X, limbs)); @@ -2488,7 +1845,7 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_fill_random(mbedtls_mpi *X, size_t size, return 0; } - ret = mpi_fill_random_internal(X, size, f_rng, p_rng); + ret = mbedtls_mpi_core_fill_random(X->p, X->n, size, f_rng, p_rng); cleanup: return ret; @@ -2500,13 +1857,6 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_random(mbedtls_mpi *X, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng) { - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA; - int count; - unsigned lt_lower = 1, lt_upper = 0; - size_t n_bits = mbedtls_mpi_bitlen(N); - size_t n_bytes = (n_bits + 7) / 8; - mbedtls_mpi lower_bound; - if (min < 0) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } @@ -2514,58 +1864,15 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_random(mbedtls_mpi *X, return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } - /* - * When min == 0, each try has at worst a probability 1/2 of failing - * (the msb has a probability 1/2 of being 0, and then the result will - * be < N), so after 30 tries failure probability is a most 2**(-30). - * - * When N is just below a power of 2, as is the case when generating - * a random scalar on most elliptic curves, 1 try is enough with - * overwhelming probability. When N is just above a power of 2, - * as when generating a random scalar on secp224k1, each try has - * a probability of failing that is almost 1/2. - * - * The probabilities are almost the same if min is nonzero but negligible - * compared to N. This is always the case when N is crypto-sized, but - * it's convenient to support small N for testing purposes. When N - * is small, use a higher repeat count, otherwise the probability of - * failure is macroscopic. - */ - count = (n_bytes > 4 ? 30 : 250); - - mbedtls_mpi_init(&lower_bound); - /* Ensure that target MPI has exactly the same number of limbs * as the upper bound, even if the upper bound has leading zeros. - * This is necessary for the mbedtls_mpi_lt_mpi_ct() check. */ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_resize_clear(X, N->n)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_grow(&lower_bound, N->n)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_lset(&lower_bound, min)); - - /* - * Match the procedure given in RFC 6979 §3.3 (deterministic ECDSA) - * when f_rng is a suitably parametrized instance of HMAC_DRBG: - * - use the same byte ordering; - * - keep the leftmost n_bits bits of the generated octet string; - * - try until result is in the desired range. - * This also avoids any bias, which is especially important for ECDSA. - */ - do { - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mpi_fill_random_internal(X, n_bytes, f_rng, p_rng)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_shift_r(X, 8 * n_bytes - n_bits)); - - if (--count == 0) { - ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NOT_ACCEPTABLE; - goto cleanup; - } - - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_lt_mpi_ct(X, &lower_bound, <_lower)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_lt_mpi_ct(X, N, <_upper)); - } while (lt_lower != 0 || lt_upper == 0); + * This is necessary for mbedtls_mpi_core_random. */ + int ret = mbedtls_mpi_resize_clear(X, N->n); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } -cleanup: - mbedtls_mpi_free(&lower_bound); - return ret; + return mbedtls_mpi_core_random(X->p, min, N->p, X->n, f_rng, p_rng); } /* @@ -2575,9 +1882,6 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_inv_mod(mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *A, const mbedtls_mpi { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; mbedtls_mpi G, TA, TU, U1, U2, TB, TV, V1, V2; - MPI_VALIDATE_RET(X != NULL); - MPI_VALIDATE_RET(A != NULL); - MPI_VALIDATE_RET(N != NULL); if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(N, 1) <= 0) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA; @@ -2661,29 +1965,30 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_inv_mod(mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *A, const mbedtls_mpi #if defined(MBEDTLS_GENPRIME) -static const int small_prime[] = -{ - 3, 5, 7, 11, 13, 17, 19, 23, - 29, 31, 37, 41, 43, 47, 53, 59, - 61, 67, 71, 73, 79, 83, 89, 97, - 101, 103, 107, 109, 113, 127, 131, 137, - 139, 149, 151, 157, 163, 167, 173, 179, - 181, 191, 193, 197, 199, 211, 223, 227, - 229, 233, 239, 241, 251, 257, 263, 269, - 271, 277, 281, 283, 293, 307, 311, 313, - 317, 331, 337, 347, 349, 353, 359, 367, - 373, 379, 383, 389, 397, 401, 409, 419, - 421, 431, 433, 439, 443, 449, 457, 461, - 463, 467, 479, 487, 491, 499, 503, 509, - 521, 523, 541, 547, 557, 563, 569, 571, - 577, 587, 593, 599, 601, 607, 613, 617, - 619, 631, 641, 643, 647, 653, 659, 661, - 673, 677, 683, 691, 701, 709, 719, 727, - 733, 739, 743, 751, 757, 761, 769, 773, - 787, 797, 809, 811, 821, 823, 827, 829, - 839, 853, 857, 859, 863, 877, 881, 883, - 887, 907, 911, 919, 929, 937, 941, 947, - 953, 967, 971, 977, 983, 991, 997, -103 +/* Gaps between primes, starting at 3. https://oeis.org/A001223 */ +static const unsigned char small_prime_gaps[] = { + 2, 2, 4, 2, 4, 2, 4, 6, + 2, 6, 4, 2, 4, 6, 6, 2, + 6, 4, 2, 6, 4, 6, 8, 4, + 2, 4, 2, 4, 14, 4, 6, 2, + 10, 2, 6, 6, 4, 6, 6, 2, + 10, 2, 4, 2, 12, 12, 4, 2, + 4, 6, 2, 10, 6, 6, 6, 2, + 6, 4, 2, 10, 14, 4, 2, 4, + 14, 6, 10, 2, 4, 6, 8, 6, + 6, 4, 6, 8, 4, 8, 10, 2, + 10, 2, 6, 4, 6, 8, 4, 2, + 4, 12, 8, 4, 8, 4, 6, 12, + 2, 18, 6, 10, 6, 6, 2, 6, + 10, 6, 6, 2, 6, 6, 4, 2, + 12, 10, 2, 4, 6, 6, 2, 12, + 4, 6, 8, 10, 8, 10, 8, 6, + 6, 4, 8, 6, 4, 8, 4, 14, + 10, 12, 2, 10, 2, 4, 2, 10, + 14, 4, 2, 4, 14, 4, 2, 4, + 20, 4, 8, 10, 8, 4, 6, 6, + 14, 4, 6, 6, 8, 6, /*reaches 997*/ + 0 /* the last entry is effectively unused */ }; /* @@ -2700,20 +2005,20 @@ static int mpi_check_small_factors(const mbedtls_mpi *X) int ret = 0; size_t i; mbedtls_mpi_uint r; + unsigned p = 3; /* The first odd prime */ if ((X->p[0] & 1) == 0) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NOT_ACCEPTABLE; } - for (i = 0; small_prime[i] > 0; i++) { - if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(X, small_prime[i]) <= 0) { - return 1; - } - - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mod_int(&r, X, small_prime[i])); - + for (i = 0; i < sizeof(small_prime_gaps); p += small_prime_gaps[i], i++) { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mod_int(&r, X, p)); if (r == 0) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NOT_ACCEPTABLE; + if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(X, p) == 0) { + return 1; + } else { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NOT_ACCEPTABLE; + } } } @@ -2732,9 +2037,6 @@ static int mpi_miller_rabin(const mbedtls_mpi *X, size_t rounds, size_t i, j, k, s; mbedtls_mpi W, R, T, A, RR; - MPI_VALIDATE_RET(X != NULL); - MPI_VALIDATE_RET(f_rng != NULL); - mbedtls_mpi_init(&W); mbedtls_mpi_init(&R); mbedtls_mpi_init(&T); mbedtls_mpi_init(&A); mbedtls_mpi_init(&RR); @@ -2822,8 +2124,6 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_is_prime_ext(const mbedtls_mpi *X, int rounds, { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; mbedtls_mpi XX; - MPI_VALIDATE_RET(X != NULL); - MPI_VALIDATE_RET(f_rng != NULL); XX.s = 1; XX.n = X->n; @@ -2849,26 +2149,6 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_is_prime_ext(const mbedtls_mpi *X, int rounds, return mpi_miller_rabin(&XX, rounds, f_rng, p_rng); } -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) -/* - * Pseudo-primality test, error probability 2^-80 - */ -int mbedtls_mpi_is_prime(const mbedtls_mpi *X, - int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), - void *p_rng) -{ - MPI_VALIDATE_RET(X != NULL); - MPI_VALIDATE_RET(f_rng != NULL); - - /* - * In the past our key generation aimed for an error rate of at most - * 2^-80. Since this function is deprecated, aim for the same certainty - * here as well. - */ - return mbedtls_mpi_is_prime_ext(X, 40, f_rng, p_rng); -} -#endif - /* * Prime number generation * @@ -2893,9 +2173,6 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_gen_prime(mbedtls_mpi *X, size_t nbits, int flags, mbedtls_mpi_uint r; mbedtls_mpi Y; - MPI_VALIDATE_RET(X != NULL); - MPI_VALIDATE_RET(f_rng != NULL); - if (nbits < 3 || nbits > MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_BITS) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/bignum_core.c b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/bignum_core.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..1a3e0b9b6f5a --- /dev/null +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/bignum_core.c @@ -0,0 +1,895 @@ +/* + * Core bignum functions + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) + +#include + +#include "mbedtls/error.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" +#include "constant_time_internal.h" + +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" + +#include "bignum_core.h" +#include "bn_mul.h" +#include "constant_time_internal.h" + +size_t mbedtls_mpi_core_clz(mbedtls_mpi_uint a) +{ +#if defined(__has_builtin) +#if (MBEDTLS_MPI_UINT_MAX == UINT_MAX) && __has_builtin(__builtin_clz) + #define core_clz __builtin_clz +#elif (MBEDTLS_MPI_UINT_MAX == ULONG_MAX) && __has_builtin(__builtin_clzl) + #define core_clz __builtin_clzl +#elif (MBEDTLS_MPI_UINT_MAX == ULLONG_MAX) && __has_builtin(__builtin_clzll) + #define core_clz __builtin_clzll +#endif +#endif +#if defined(core_clz) + return (size_t) core_clz(a); +#else + size_t j; + mbedtls_mpi_uint mask = (mbedtls_mpi_uint) 1 << (biL - 1); + + for (j = 0; j < biL; j++) { + if (a & mask) { + break; + } + + mask >>= 1; + } + + return j; +#endif +} + +size_t mbedtls_mpi_core_bitlen(const mbedtls_mpi_uint *A, size_t A_limbs) +{ + int i; + size_t j; + + for (i = ((int) A_limbs) - 1; i >= 0; i--) { + if (A[i] != 0) { + j = biL - mbedtls_mpi_core_clz(A[i]); + return (i * biL) + j; + } + } + + return 0; +} + +static mbedtls_mpi_uint mpi_bigendian_to_host(mbedtls_mpi_uint a) +{ + if (MBEDTLS_IS_BIG_ENDIAN) { + /* Nothing to do on bigendian systems. */ + return a; + } else { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT32) + return (mbedtls_mpi_uint) MBEDTLS_BSWAP32(a); +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT64) + return (mbedtls_mpi_uint) MBEDTLS_BSWAP64(a); +#endif + } +} + +void mbedtls_mpi_core_bigendian_to_host(mbedtls_mpi_uint *A, + size_t A_limbs) +{ + mbedtls_mpi_uint *cur_limb_left; + mbedtls_mpi_uint *cur_limb_right; + if (A_limbs == 0) { + return; + } + + /* + * Traverse limbs and + * - adapt byte-order in each limb + * - swap the limbs themselves. + * For that, simultaneously traverse the limbs from left to right + * and from right to left, as long as the left index is not bigger + * than the right index (it's not a problem if limbs is odd and the + * indices coincide in the last iteration). + */ + for (cur_limb_left = A, cur_limb_right = A + (A_limbs - 1); + cur_limb_left <= cur_limb_right; + cur_limb_left++, cur_limb_right--) { + mbedtls_mpi_uint tmp; + /* Note that if cur_limb_left == cur_limb_right, + * this code effectively swaps the bytes only once. */ + tmp = mpi_bigendian_to_host(*cur_limb_left); + *cur_limb_left = mpi_bigendian_to_host(*cur_limb_right); + *cur_limb_right = tmp; + } +} + +/* Whether min <= A, in constant time. + * A_limbs must be at least 1. */ +mbedtls_ct_condition_t mbedtls_mpi_core_uint_le_mpi(mbedtls_mpi_uint min, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *A, + size_t A_limbs) +{ + /* min <= least significant limb? */ + mbedtls_ct_condition_t min_le_lsl = mbedtls_ct_uint_ge(A[0], min); + + /* limbs other than the least significant one are all zero? */ + mbedtls_ct_condition_t msll_mask = MBEDTLS_CT_FALSE; + for (size_t i = 1; i < A_limbs; i++) { + msll_mask = mbedtls_ct_bool_or(msll_mask, mbedtls_ct_bool(A[i])); + } + + /* min <= A iff the lowest limb of A is >= min or the other limbs + * are not all zero. */ + return mbedtls_ct_bool_or(msll_mask, min_le_lsl); +} + +mbedtls_ct_condition_t mbedtls_mpi_core_lt_ct(const mbedtls_mpi_uint *A, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *B, + size_t limbs) +{ + mbedtls_ct_condition_t ret = MBEDTLS_CT_FALSE, cond = MBEDTLS_CT_FALSE, done = MBEDTLS_CT_FALSE; + + for (size_t i = limbs; i > 0; i--) { + /* + * If B[i - 1] < A[i - 1] then A < B is false and the result must + * remain 0. + * + * Again even if we can make a decision, we just mark the result and + * the fact that we are done and continue looping. + */ + cond = mbedtls_ct_uint_lt(B[i - 1], A[i - 1]); + done = mbedtls_ct_bool_or(done, cond); + + /* + * If A[i - 1] < B[i - 1] then A < B is true. + * + * Again even if we can make a decision, we just mark the result and + * the fact that we are done and continue looping. + */ + cond = mbedtls_ct_uint_lt(A[i - 1], B[i - 1]); + ret = mbedtls_ct_bool_or(ret, mbedtls_ct_bool_and(cond, mbedtls_ct_bool_not(done))); + done = mbedtls_ct_bool_or(done, cond); + } + + /* + * If all the limbs were equal, then the numbers are equal, A < B is false + * and leaving the result 0 is correct. + */ + + return ret; +} + +void mbedtls_mpi_core_cond_assign(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *A, + size_t limbs, + mbedtls_ct_condition_t assign) +{ + if (X == A) { + return; + } + + /* This function is very performance-sensitive for RSA. For this reason + * we have the loop below, instead of calling mbedtls_ct_memcpy_if + * (this is more optimal since here we don't have to handle the case where + * we copy awkwardly sized data). + */ + for (size_t i = 0; i < limbs; i++) { + X[i] = mbedtls_ct_mpi_uint_if(assign, A[i], X[i]); + } +} + +void mbedtls_mpi_core_cond_swap(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, + mbedtls_mpi_uint *Y, + size_t limbs, + mbedtls_ct_condition_t swap) +{ + if (X == Y) { + return; + } + + for (size_t i = 0; i < limbs; i++) { + mbedtls_mpi_uint tmp = X[i]; + X[i] = mbedtls_ct_mpi_uint_if(swap, Y[i], X[i]); + Y[i] = mbedtls_ct_mpi_uint_if(swap, tmp, Y[i]); + } +} + +int mbedtls_mpi_core_read_le(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, + size_t X_limbs, + const unsigned char *input, + size_t input_length) +{ + const size_t limbs = CHARS_TO_LIMBS(input_length); + + if (X_limbs < limbs) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + } + + if (X != NULL) { + memset(X, 0, X_limbs * ciL); + + for (size_t i = 0; i < input_length; i++) { + size_t offset = ((i % ciL) << 3); + X[i / ciL] |= ((mbedtls_mpi_uint) input[i]) << offset; + } + } + + return 0; +} + +int mbedtls_mpi_core_read_be(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, + size_t X_limbs, + const unsigned char *input, + size_t input_length) +{ + const size_t limbs = CHARS_TO_LIMBS(input_length); + + if (X_limbs < limbs) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + } + + /* If X_limbs is 0, input_length must also be 0 (from previous test). + * Nothing to do. */ + if (X_limbs == 0) { + return 0; + } + + memset(X, 0, X_limbs * ciL); + + /* memcpy() with (NULL, 0) is undefined behaviour */ + if (input_length != 0) { + size_t overhead = (X_limbs * ciL) - input_length; + unsigned char *Xp = (unsigned char *) X; + memcpy(Xp + overhead, input, input_length); + } + + mbedtls_mpi_core_bigendian_to_host(X, X_limbs); + + return 0; +} + +int mbedtls_mpi_core_write_le(const mbedtls_mpi_uint *A, + size_t A_limbs, + unsigned char *output, + size_t output_length) +{ + size_t stored_bytes = A_limbs * ciL; + size_t bytes_to_copy; + + if (stored_bytes < output_length) { + bytes_to_copy = stored_bytes; + } else { + bytes_to_copy = output_length; + + /* The output buffer is smaller than the allocated size of A. + * However A may fit if its leading bytes are zero. */ + for (size_t i = bytes_to_copy; i < stored_bytes; i++) { + if (GET_BYTE(A, i) != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + } + } + } + + for (size_t i = 0; i < bytes_to_copy; i++) { + output[i] = GET_BYTE(A, i); + } + + if (stored_bytes < output_length) { + /* Write trailing 0 bytes */ + memset(output + stored_bytes, 0, output_length - stored_bytes); + } + + return 0; +} + +int mbedtls_mpi_core_write_be(const mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, + size_t X_limbs, + unsigned char *output, + size_t output_length) +{ + size_t stored_bytes; + size_t bytes_to_copy; + unsigned char *p; + + stored_bytes = X_limbs * ciL; + + if (stored_bytes < output_length) { + /* There is enough space in the output buffer. Write initial + * null bytes and record the position at which to start + * writing the significant bytes. In this case, the execution + * trace of this function does not depend on the value of the + * number. */ + bytes_to_copy = stored_bytes; + p = output + output_length - stored_bytes; + memset(output, 0, output_length - stored_bytes); + } else { + /* The output buffer is smaller than the allocated size of X. + * However X may fit if its leading bytes are zero. */ + bytes_to_copy = output_length; + p = output; + for (size_t i = bytes_to_copy; i < stored_bytes; i++) { + if (GET_BYTE(X, i) != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + } + } + } + + for (size_t i = 0; i < bytes_to_copy; i++) { + p[bytes_to_copy - i - 1] = GET_BYTE(X, i); + } + + return 0; +} + +void mbedtls_mpi_core_shift_r(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, size_t limbs, + size_t count) +{ + size_t i, v0, v1; + mbedtls_mpi_uint r0 = 0, r1; + + v0 = count / biL; + v1 = count & (biL - 1); + + if (v0 > limbs || (v0 == limbs && v1 > 0)) { + memset(X, 0, limbs * ciL); + return; + } + + /* + * shift by count / limb_size + */ + if (v0 > 0) { + for (i = 0; i < limbs - v0; i++) { + X[i] = X[i + v0]; + } + + for (; i < limbs; i++) { + X[i] = 0; + } + } + + /* + * shift by count % limb_size + */ + if (v1 > 0) { + for (i = limbs; i > 0; i--) { + r1 = X[i - 1] << (biL - v1); + X[i - 1] >>= v1; + X[i - 1] |= r0; + r0 = r1; + } + } +} + +void mbedtls_mpi_core_shift_l(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, size_t limbs, + size_t count) +{ + size_t i, v0, v1; + mbedtls_mpi_uint r0 = 0, r1; + + v0 = count / (biL); + v1 = count & (biL - 1); + + /* + * shift by count / limb_size + */ + if (v0 > 0) { + for (i = limbs; i > v0; i--) { + X[i - 1] = X[i - v0 - 1]; + } + + for (; i > 0; i--) { + X[i - 1] = 0; + } + } + + /* + * shift by count % limb_size + */ + if (v1 > 0) { + for (i = v0; i < limbs; i++) { + r1 = X[i] >> (biL - v1); + X[i] <<= v1; + X[i] |= r0; + r0 = r1; + } + } +} + +mbedtls_mpi_uint mbedtls_mpi_core_add(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *A, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *B, + size_t limbs) +{ + mbedtls_mpi_uint c = 0; + + for (size_t i = 0; i < limbs; i++) { + mbedtls_mpi_uint t = c + A[i]; + c = (t < A[i]); + t += B[i]; + c += (t < B[i]); + X[i] = t; + } + + return c; +} + +mbedtls_mpi_uint mbedtls_mpi_core_add_if(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *A, + size_t limbs, + unsigned cond) +{ + mbedtls_mpi_uint c = 0; + + mbedtls_ct_condition_t do_add = mbedtls_ct_bool(cond); + + for (size_t i = 0; i < limbs; i++) { + mbedtls_mpi_uint add = mbedtls_ct_mpi_uint_if_else_0(do_add, A[i]); + mbedtls_mpi_uint t = c + X[i]; + c = (t < X[i]); + t += add; + c += (t < add); + X[i] = t; + } + + return c; +} + +mbedtls_mpi_uint mbedtls_mpi_core_sub(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *A, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *B, + size_t limbs) +{ + mbedtls_mpi_uint c = 0; + + for (size_t i = 0; i < limbs; i++) { + mbedtls_mpi_uint z = (A[i] < c); + mbedtls_mpi_uint t = A[i] - c; + c = (t < B[i]) + z; + X[i] = t - B[i]; + } + + return c; +} + +mbedtls_mpi_uint mbedtls_mpi_core_mla(mbedtls_mpi_uint *d, size_t d_len, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *s, size_t s_len, + mbedtls_mpi_uint b) +{ + mbedtls_mpi_uint c = 0; /* carry */ + /* + * It is a documented precondition of this function that d_len >= s_len. + * If that's not the case, we swap these round: this turns what would be + * a buffer overflow into an incorrect result. + */ + if (d_len < s_len) { + s_len = d_len; + } + size_t excess_len = d_len - s_len; + size_t steps_x8 = s_len / 8; + size_t steps_x1 = s_len & 7; + + while (steps_x8--) { + MULADDC_X8_INIT + MULADDC_X8_CORE + MULADDC_X8_STOP + } + + while (steps_x1--) { + MULADDC_X1_INIT + MULADDC_X1_CORE + MULADDC_X1_STOP + } + + while (excess_len--) { + *d += c; + c = (*d < c); + d++; + } + + return c; +} + +void mbedtls_mpi_core_mul(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *A, size_t A_limbs, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *B, size_t B_limbs) +{ + memset(X, 0, (A_limbs + B_limbs) * ciL); + + for (size_t i = 0; i < B_limbs; i++) { + (void) mbedtls_mpi_core_mla(X + i, A_limbs + 1, A, A_limbs, B[i]); + } +} + +/* + * Fast Montgomery initialization (thanks to Tom St Denis). + */ +mbedtls_mpi_uint mbedtls_mpi_core_montmul_init(const mbedtls_mpi_uint *N) +{ + mbedtls_mpi_uint x = N[0]; + + x += ((N[0] + 2) & 4) << 1; + + for (unsigned int i = biL; i >= 8; i /= 2) { + x *= (2 - (N[0] * x)); + } + + return ~x + 1; +} + +void mbedtls_mpi_core_montmul(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *A, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *B, + size_t B_limbs, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *N, + size_t AN_limbs, + mbedtls_mpi_uint mm, + mbedtls_mpi_uint *T) +{ + memset(T, 0, (2 * AN_limbs + 1) * ciL); + + for (size_t i = 0; i < AN_limbs; i++) { + /* T = (T + u0*B + u1*N) / 2^biL */ + mbedtls_mpi_uint u0 = A[i]; + mbedtls_mpi_uint u1 = (T[0] + u0 * B[0]) * mm; + + (void) mbedtls_mpi_core_mla(T, AN_limbs + 2, B, B_limbs, u0); + (void) mbedtls_mpi_core_mla(T, AN_limbs + 2, N, AN_limbs, u1); + + T++; + } + + /* + * The result we want is (T >= N) ? T - N : T. + * + * For better constant-time properties in this function, we always do the + * subtraction, with the result in X. + * + * We also look to see if there was any carry in the final additions in the + * loop above. + */ + + mbedtls_mpi_uint carry = T[AN_limbs]; + mbedtls_mpi_uint borrow = mbedtls_mpi_core_sub(X, T, N, AN_limbs); + + /* + * Using R as the Montgomery radix (auxiliary modulus) i.e. 2^(biL*AN_limbs): + * + * T can be in one of 3 ranges: + * + * 1) T < N : (carry, borrow) = (0, 1): we want T + * 2) N <= T < R : (carry, borrow) = (0, 0): we want X + * 3) T >= R : (carry, borrow) = (1, 1): we want X + * + * and (carry, borrow) = (1, 0) can't happen. + * + * So the correct return value is already in X if (carry ^ borrow) = 0, + * but is in (the lower AN_limbs limbs of) T if (carry ^ borrow) = 1. + */ + mbedtls_ct_memcpy_if(mbedtls_ct_bool(carry ^ borrow), + (unsigned char *) X, + (unsigned char *) T, + NULL, + AN_limbs * sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint)); +} + +int mbedtls_mpi_core_get_mont_r2_unsafe(mbedtls_mpi *X, + const mbedtls_mpi *N) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_lset(X, 1)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_shift_l(X, N->n * 2 * biL)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi(X, X, N)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_shrink(X, N->n)); + +cleanup: + return ret; +} + +MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE +void mbedtls_mpi_core_ct_uint_table_lookup(mbedtls_mpi_uint *dest, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *table, + size_t limbs, + size_t count, + size_t index) +{ + for (size_t i = 0; i < count; i++, table += limbs) { + mbedtls_ct_condition_t assign = mbedtls_ct_uint_eq(i, index); + mbedtls_mpi_core_cond_assign(dest, table, limbs, assign); + } +} + +/* Fill X with n_bytes random bytes. + * X must already have room for those bytes. + * The ordering of the bytes returned from the RNG is suitable for + * deterministic ECDSA (see RFC 6979 §3.3 and the specification of + * mbedtls_mpi_core_random()). + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_core_fill_random( + mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, size_t X_limbs, + size_t n_bytes, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + const size_t limbs = CHARS_TO_LIMBS(n_bytes); + const size_t overhead = (limbs * ciL) - n_bytes; + + if (X_limbs < limbs) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + memset(X, 0, overhead); + memset((unsigned char *) X + limbs * ciL, 0, (X_limbs - limbs) * ciL); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(f_rng(p_rng, (unsigned char *) X + overhead, n_bytes)); + mbedtls_mpi_core_bigendian_to_host(X, limbs); + +cleanup: + return ret; +} + +int mbedtls_mpi_core_random(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, + mbedtls_mpi_uint min, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *N, + size_t limbs, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng) +{ + mbedtls_ct_condition_t ge_lower = MBEDTLS_CT_TRUE, lt_upper = MBEDTLS_CT_FALSE; + size_t n_bits = mbedtls_mpi_core_bitlen(N, limbs); + size_t n_bytes = (n_bits + 7) / 8; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + /* + * When min == 0, each try has at worst a probability 1/2 of failing + * (the msb has a probability 1/2 of being 0, and then the result will + * be < N), so after 30 tries failure probability is a most 2**(-30). + * + * When N is just below a power of 2, as is the case when generating + * a random scalar on most elliptic curves, 1 try is enough with + * overwhelming probability. When N is just above a power of 2, + * as when generating a random scalar on secp224k1, each try has + * a probability of failing that is almost 1/2. + * + * The probabilities are almost the same if min is nonzero but negligible + * compared to N. This is always the case when N is crypto-sized, but + * it's convenient to support small N for testing purposes. When N + * is small, use a higher repeat count, otherwise the probability of + * failure is macroscopic. + */ + int count = (n_bytes > 4 ? 30 : 250); + + /* + * Match the procedure given in RFC 6979 §3.3 (deterministic ECDSA) + * when f_rng is a suitably parametrized instance of HMAC_DRBG: + * - use the same byte ordering; + * - keep the leftmost n_bits bits of the generated octet string; + * - try until result is in the desired range. + * This also avoids any bias, which is especially important for ECDSA. + */ + do { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_core_fill_random(X, limbs, + n_bytes, + f_rng, p_rng)); + mbedtls_mpi_core_shift_r(X, limbs, 8 * n_bytes - n_bits); + + if (--count == 0) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NOT_ACCEPTABLE; + goto cleanup; + } + + ge_lower = mbedtls_mpi_core_uint_le_mpi(min, X, limbs); + lt_upper = mbedtls_mpi_core_lt_ct(X, N, limbs); + } while (mbedtls_ct_bool_and(ge_lower, lt_upper) == MBEDTLS_CT_FALSE); + +cleanup: + return ret; +} + +static size_t exp_mod_get_window_size(size_t Ebits) +{ +#if MBEDTLS_MPI_WINDOW_SIZE >= 6 + return (Ebits > 671) ? 6 : (Ebits > 239) ? 5 : (Ebits > 79) ? 4 : 1; +#elif MBEDTLS_MPI_WINDOW_SIZE == 5 + return (Ebits > 239) ? 5 : (Ebits > 79) ? 4 : 1; +#elif MBEDTLS_MPI_WINDOW_SIZE > 1 + return (Ebits > 79) ? MBEDTLS_MPI_WINDOW_SIZE : 1; +#else + (void) Ebits; + return 1; +#endif +} + +size_t mbedtls_mpi_core_exp_mod_working_limbs(size_t AN_limbs, size_t E_limbs) +{ + const size_t wsize = exp_mod_get_window_size(E_limbs * biL); + const size_t welem = ((size_t) 1) << wsize; + + /* How big does each part of the working memory pool need to be? */ + const size_t table_limbs = welem * AN_limbs; + const size_t select_limbs = AN_limbs; + const size_t temp_limbs = 2 * AN_limbs + 1; + + return table_limbs + select_limbs + temp_limbs; +} + +static void exp_mod_precompute_window(const mbedtls_mpi_uint *A, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *N, + size_t AN_limbs, + mbedtls_mpi_uint mm, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *RR, + size_t welem, + mbedtls_mpi_uint *Wtable, + mbedtls_mpi_uint *temp) +{ + /* W[0] = 1 (in Montgomery presentation) */ + memset(Wtable, 0, AN_limbs * ciL); + Wtable[0] = 1; + mbedtls_mpi_core_montmul(Wtable, Wtable, RR, AN_limbs, N, AN_limbs, mm, temp); + + /* W[1] = A (already in Montgomery presentation) */ + mbedtls_mpi_uint *W1 = Wtable + AN_limbs; + memcpy(W1, A, AN_limbs * ciL); + + /* W[i+1] = W[i] * W[1], i >= 2 */ + mbedtls_mpi_uint *Wprev = W1; + for (size_t i = 2; i < welem; i++) { + mbedtls_mpi_uint *Wcur = Wprev + AN_limbs; + mbedtls_mpi_core_montmul(Wcur, Wprev, W1, AN_limbs, N, AN_limbs, mm, temp); + Wprev = Wcur; + } +} + +/* Exponentiation: X := A^E mod N. + * + * A must already be in Montgomery form. + * + * As in other bignum functions, assume that AN_limbs and E_limbs are nonzero. + * + * RR must contain 2^{2*biL} mod N. + * + * The algorithm is a variant of Left-to-right k-ary exponentiation: HAC 14.82 + * (The difference is that the body in our loop processes a single bit instead + * of a full window.) + */ +void mbedtls_mpi_core_exp_mod(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *A, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *N, + size_t AN_limbs, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *E, + size_t E_limbs, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *RR, + mbedtls_mpi_uint *T) +{ + const size_t wsize = exp_mod_get_window_size(E_limbs * biL); + const size_t welem = ((size_t) 1) << wsize; + + /* This is how we will use the temporary storage T, which must have space + * for table_limbs, select_limbs and (2 * AN_limbs + 1) for montmul. */ + const size_t table_limbs = welem * AN_limbs; + const size_t select_limbs = AN_limbs; + + /* Pointers to specific parts of the temporary working memory pool */ + mbedtls_mpi_uint *const Wtable = T; + mbedtls_mpi_uint *const Wselect = Wtable + table_limbs; + mbedtls_mpi_uint *const temp = Wselect + select_limbs; + + /* + * Window precomputation + */ + + const mbedtls_mpi_uint mm = mbedtls_mpi_core_montmul_init(N); + + /* Set Wtable[i] = A^(2^i) (in Montgomery representation) */ + exp_mod_precompute_window(A, N, AN_limbs, + mm, RR, + welem, Wtable, temp); + + /* + * Fixed window exponentiation + */ + + /* X = 1 (in Montgomery presentation) initially */ + memcpy(X, Wtable, AN_limbs * ciL); + + /* We'll process the bits of E from most significant + * (limb_index=E_limbs-1, E_bit_index=biL-1) to least significant + * (limb_index=0, E_bit_index=0). */ + size_t E_limb_index = E_limbs; + size_t E_bit_index = 0; + /* At any given time, window contains window_bits bits from E. + * window_bits can go up to wsize. */ + size_t window_bits = 0; + mbedtls_mpi_uint window = 0; + + do { + /* Square */ + mbedtls_mpi_core_montmul(X, X, X, AN_limbs, N, AN_limbs, mm, temp); + + /* Move to the next bit of the exponent */ + if (E_bit_index == 0) { + --E_limb_index; + E_bit_index = biL - 1; + } else { + --E_bit_index; + } + /* Insert next exponent bit into window */ + ++window_bits; + window <<= 1; + window |= (E[E_limb_index] >> E_bit_index) & 1; + + /* Clear window if it's full. Also clear the window at the end, + * when we've finished processing the exponent. */ + if (window_bits == wsize || + (E_bit_index == 0 && E_limb_index == 0)) { + /* Select Wtable[window] without leaking window through + * memory access patterns. */ + mbedtls_mpi_core_ct_uint_table_lookup(Wselect, Wtable, + AN_limbs, welem, window); + /* Multiply X by the selected element. */ + mbedtls_mpi_core_montmul(X, X, Wselect, AN_limbs, N, AN_limbs, mm, + temp); + window = 0; + window_bits = 0; + } + } while (!(E_bit_index == 0 && E_limb_index == 0)); +} + +mbedtls_mpi_uint mbedtls_mpi_core_sub_int(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *A, + mbedtls_mpi_uint c, /* doubles as carry */ + size_t limbs) +{ + for (size_t i = 0; i < limbs; i++) { + mbedtls_mpi_uint s = A[i]; + mbedtls_mpi_uint t = s - c; + c = (t > s); + X[i] = t; + } + + return c; +} + +mbedtls_ct_condition_t mbedtls_mpi_core_check_zero_ct(const mbedtls_mpi_uint *A, + size_t limbs) +{ + volatile const mbedtls_mpi_uint *force_read_A = A; + mbedtls_mpi_uint bits = 0; + + for (size_t i = 0; i < limbs; i++) { + bits |= force_read_A[i]; + } + + return mbedtls_ct_bool(bits); +} + +void mbedtls_mpi_core_to_mont_rep(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *A, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *N, + size_t AN_limbs, + mbedtls_mpi_uint mm, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *rr, + mbedtls_mpi_uint *T) +{ + mbedtls_mpi_core_montmul(X, A, rr, AN_limbs, N, AN_limbs, mm, T); +} + +void mbedtls_mpi_core_from_mont_rep(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *A, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *N, + size_t AN_limbs, + mbedtls_mpi_uint mm, + mbedtls_mpi_uint *T) +{ + const mbedtls_mpi_uint Rinv = 1; /* 1/R in Mont. rep => 1 */ + + mbedtls_mpi_core_montmul(X, A, &Rinv, 1, N, AN_limbs, mm, T); +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C */ diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/bignum_core.h b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/bignum_core.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..92c8d47db56b --- /dev/null +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/bignum_core.h @@ -0,0 +1,763 @@ +/** + * Core bignum functions + * + * This interface should only be used by the legacy bignum module (bignum.h) + * and the modular bignum modules (bignum_mod.c, bignum_mod_raw.c). All other + * modules should use the high-level modular bignum interface (bignum_mod.h) + * or the legacy bignum interface (bignum.h). + * + * This module is about processing non-negative integers with a fixed upper + * bound that's of the form 2^n-1 where n is a multiple of #biL. + * These can be thought of integers written in base 2^#biL with a fixed + * number of digits. Digits in this base are called *limbs*. + * Many operations treat these numbers as the principal representation of + * a number modulo 2^n or a smaller bound. + * + * The functions in this module obey the following conventions unless + * explicitly indicated otherwise: + * + * - **Overflow**: some functions indicate overflow from the range + * [0, 2^n-1] by returning carry parameters, while others operate + * modulo and so cannot overflow. This should be clear from the function + * documentation. + * - **Bignum parameters**: Bignums are passed as pointers to an array of + * limbs. A limb has the type #mbedtls_mpi_uint. Unless otherwise specified: + * - Bignum parameters called \p A, \p B, ... are inputs, and are + * not modified by the function. + * - For operations modulo some number, the modulus is called \p N + * and is input-only. + * - Bignum parameters called \p X, \p Y are outputs or input-output. + * The initial content of output-only parameters is ignored. + * - Some functions use different names that reflect traditional + * naming of operands of certain operations (e.g. + * divisor/dividend/quotient/remainder). + * - \p T is a temporary storage area. The initial content of such + * parameter is ignored and the final content is unspecified. + * - **Bignum sizes**: bignum sizes are always expressed in limbs. + * Most functions work on bignums of a given size and take a single + * \p limbs parameter that applies to all parameters that are limb arrays. + * All bignum sizes must be at least 1 and must be significantly less than + * #SIZE_MAX. The behavior if a size is 0 is undefined. The behavior if the + * total size of all parameters overflows #SIZE_MAX is undefined. + * - **Parameter ordering**: for bignum parameters, outputs come before inputs. + * Temporaries come last. + * - **Aliasing**: in general, output bignums may be aliased to one or more + * inputs. As an exception, parameters that are documented as a modulus value + * may not be aliased to an output. Outputs may not be aliased to one another. + * Temporaries may not be aliased to any other parameter. + * - **Overlap**: apart from aliasing of limb array pointers (where two + * arguments are equal pointers), overlap is not supported and may result + * in undefined behavior. + * - **Error handling**: This is a low-level module. Functions generally do not + * try to protect against invalid arguments such as nonsensical sizes or + * null pointers. Note that some functions that operate on bignums of + * different sizes have constraints about their size, and violating those + * constraints may lead to buffer overflows. + * - **Modular representatives**: functions that operate modulo \p N expect + * all modular inputs to be in the range [0, \p N - 1] and guarantee outputs + * in the range [0, \p N - 1]. If an input is out of range, outputs are + * fully unspecified, though bignum values out of range should not cause + * buffer overflows (beware that this is not extensively tested). + */ + +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +#ifndef MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_CORE_H +#define MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_CORE_H + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) +#include "mbedtls/bignum.h" +#endif + +#include "constant_time_internal.h" + +#define ciL (sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint)) /** chars in limb */ +#define biL (ciL << 3) /** bits in limb */ +#define biH (ciL << 2) /** half limb size */ + +/* + * Convert between bits/chars and number of limbs + * Divide first in order to avoid potential overflows + */ +#define BITS_TO_LIMBS(i) ((i) / biL + ((i) % biL != 0)) +#define CHARS_TO_LIMBS(i) ((i) / ciL + ((i) % ciL != 0)) +/* Get a specific byte, without range checks. */ +#define GET_BYTE(X, i) \ + (((X)[(i) / ciL] >> (((i) % ciL) * 8)) & 0xff) + +/** Count leading zero bits in a given integer. + * + * \warning The result is undefined if \p a == 0 + * + * \param a Integer to count leading zero bits. + * + * \return The number of leading zero bits in \p a, if \p a != 0. + * If \p a == 0, the result is undefined. + */ +size_t mbedtls_mpi_core_clz(mbedtls_mpi_uint a); + +/** Return the minimum number of bits required to represent the value held + * in the MPI. + * + * \note This function returns 0 if all the limbs of \p A are 0. + * + * \param[in] A The address of the MPI. + * \param A_limbs The number of limbs of \p A. + * + * \return The number of bits in \p A. + */ +size_t mbedtls_mpi_core_bitlen(const mbedtls_mpi_uint *A, size_t A_limbs); + +/** Convert a big-endian byte array aligned to the size of mbedtls_mpi_uint + * into the storage form used by mbedtls_mpi. + * + * \param[in,out] A The address of the MPI. + * \param A_limbs The number of limbs of \p A. + */ +void mbedtls_mpi_core_bigendian_to_host(mbedtls_mpi_uint *A, + size_t A_limbs); + +/** \brief Compare a machine integer with an MPI. + * + * This function operates in constant time with respect + * to the values of \p min and \p A. + * + * \param min A machine integer. + * \param[in] A An MPI. + * \param A_limbs The number of limbs of \p A. + * This must be at least 1. + * + * \return MBEDTLS_CT_TRUE if \p min is less than or equal to \p A, otherwise MBEDTLS_CT_FALSE. + */ +mbedtls_ct_condition_t mbedtls_mpi_core_uint_le_mpi(mbedtls_mpi_uint min, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *A, + size_t A_limbs); + +/** + * \brief Check if one unsigned MPI is less than another in constant + * time. + * + * \param A The left-hand MPI. This must point to an array of limbs + * with the same allocated length as \p B. + * \param B The right-hand MPI. This must point to an array of limbs + * with the same allocated length as \p A. + * \param limbs The number of limbs in \p A and \p B. + * This must not be 0. + * + * \return MBEDTLS_CT_TRUE if \p A is less than \p B. + * MBEDTLS_CT_FALSE if \p A is greater than or equal to \p B. + */ +mbedtls_ct_condition_t mbedtls_mpi_core_lt_ct(const mbedtls_mpi_uint *A, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *B, + size_t limbs); + +/** + * \brief Perform a safe conditional copy of an MPI which doesn't reveal + * whether assignment was done or not. + * + * \param[out] X The address of the destination MPI. + * This must be initialized. Must have enough limbs to + * store the full value of \p A. + * \param[in] A The address of the source MPI. This must be initialized. + * \param limbs The number of limbs of \p A. + * \param assign The condition deciding whether to perform the + * assignment or not. Callers will need to use + * the constant time interface (e.g. `mbedtls_ct_bool()`) + * to construct this argument. + * + * \note This function avoids leaking any information about whether + * the assignment was done or not. + */ +void mbedtls_mpi_core_cond_assign(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *A, + size_t limbs, + mbedtls_ct_condition_t assign); + +/** + * \brief Perform a safe conditional swap of two MPIs which doesn't reveal + * whether the swap was done or not. + * + * \param[in,out] X The address of the first MPI. + * This must be initialized. + * \param[in,out] Y The address of the second MPI. + * This must be initialized. + * \param limbs The number of limbs of \p X and \p Y. + * \param swap The condition deciding whether to perform + * the swap or not. + * + * \note This function avoids leaking any information about whether + * the swap was done or not. + */ +void mbedtls_mpi_core_cond_swap(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, + mbedtls_mpi_uint *Y, + size_t limbs, + mbedtls_ct_condition_t swap); + +/** Import X from unsigned binary data, little-endian. + * + * The MPI needs to have enough limbs to store the full value (including any + * most significant zero bytes in the input). + * + * \param[out] X The address of the MPI. + * \param X_limbs The number of limbs of \p X. + * \param[in] input The input buffer to import from. + * \param input_length The length bytes of \p input. + * + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL if \p X isn't + * large enough to hold the value in \p input. + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_core_read_le(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, + size_t X_limbs, + const unsigned char *input, + size_t input_length); + +/** Import X from unsigned binary data, big-endian. + * + * The MPI needs to have enough limbs to store the full value (including any + * most significant zero bytes in the input). + * + * \param[out] X The address of the MPI. + * May only be #NULL if \p X_limbs is 0 and \p input_length + * is 0. + * \param X_limbs The number of limbs of \p X. + * \param[in] input The input buffer to import from. + * May only be #NULL if \p input_length is 0. + * \param input_length The length in bytes of \p input. + * + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL if \p X isn't + * large enough to hold the value in \p input. + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_core_read_be(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, + size_t X_limbs, + const unsigned char *input, + size_t input_length); + +/** Export A into unsigned binary data, little-endian. + * + * \note If \p output is shorter than \p A the export is still successful if the + * value held in \p A fits in the buffer (that is, if enough of the most + * significant bytes of \p A are 0). + * + * \param[in] A The address of the MPI. + * \param A_limbs The number of limbs of \p A. + * \param[out] output The output buffer to export to. + * \param output_length The length in bytes of \p output. + * + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL if \p output isn't + * large enough to hold the value of \p A. + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_core_write_le(const mbedtls_mpi_uint *A, + size_t A_limbs, + unsigned char *output, + size_t output_length); + +/** Export A into unsigned binary data, big-endian. + * + * \note If \p output is shorter than \p A the export is still successful if the + * value held in \p A fits in the buffer (that is, if enough of the most + * significant bytes of \p A are 0). + * + * \param[in] A The address of the MPI. + * \param A_limbs The number of limbs of \p A. + * \param[out] output The output buffer to export to. + * \param output_length The length in bytes of \p output. + * + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL if \p output isn't + * large enough to hold the value of \p A. + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_core_write_be(const mbedtls_mpi_uint *A, + size_t A_limbs, + unsigned char *output, + size_t output_length); + +/** \brief Shift an MPI in-place right by a number of bits. + * + * Shifting by more bits than there are bit positions + * in \p X is valid and results in setting \p X to 0. + * + * This function's execution time depends on the value + * of \p count (and of course \p limbs). + * + * \param[in,out] X The number to shift. + * \param limbs The number of limbs of \p X. This must be at least 1. + * \param count The number of bits to shift by. + */ +void mbedtls_mpi_core_shift_r(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, size_t limbs, + size_t count); + +/** + * \brief Shift an MPI in-place left by a number of bits. + * + * Shifting by more bits than there are bit positions + * in \p X will produce an unspecified result. + * + * This function's execution time depends on the value + * of \p count (and of course \p limbs). + * \param[in,out] X The number to shift. + * \param limbs The number of limbs of \p X. This must be at least 1. + * \param count The number of bits to shift by. + */ +void mbedtls_mpi_core_shift_l(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, size_t limbs, + size_t count); + +/** + * \brief Add two fixed-size large unsigned integers, returning the carry. + * + * Calculates `A + B` where `A` and `B` have the same size. + * + * This function operates modulo `2^(biL*limbs)` and returns the carry + * (1 if there was a wraparound, and 0 otherwise). + * + * \p X may be aliased to \p A or \p B. + * + * \param[out] X The result of the addition. + * \param[in] A Little-endian presentation of the left operand. + * \param[in] B Little-endian presentation of the right operand. + * \param limbs Number of limbs of \p X, \p A and \p B. + * + * \return 1 if `A + B >= 2^(biL*limbs)`, 0 otherwise. + */ +mbedtls_mpi_uint mbedtls_mpi_core_add(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *A, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *B, + size_t limbs); + +/** + * \brief Conditional addition of two fixed-size large unsigned integers, + * returning the carry. + * + * Functionally equivalent to + * + * ``` + * if( cond ) + * X += A; + * return carry; + * ``` + * + * This function operates modulo `2^(biL*limbs)`. + * + * \param[in,out] X The pointer to the (little-endian) array + * representing the bignum to accumulate onto. + * \param[in] A The pointer to the (little-endian) array + * representing the bignum to conditionally add + * to \p X. This may be aliased to \p X but may not + * overlap otherwise. + * \param limbs Number of limbs of \p X and \p A. + * \param cond Condition bit dictating whether addition should + * happen or not. This must be \c 0 or \c 1. + * + * \warning If \p cond is neither 0 nor 1, the result of this function + * is unspecified, and the resulting value in \p X might be + * neither its original value nor \p X + \p A. + * + * \return 1 if `X + cond * A >= 2^(biL*limbs)`, 0 otherwise. + */ +mbedtls_mpi_uint mbedtls_mpi_core_add_if(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *A, + size_t limbs, + unsigned cond); + +/** + * \brief Subtract two fixed-size large unsigned integers, returning the borrow. + * + * Calculate `A - B` where \p A and \p B have the same size. + * This function operates modulo `2^(biL*limbs)` and returns the carry + * (1 if there was a wraparound, i.e. if `A < B`, and 0 otherwise). + * + * \p X may be aliased to \p A or \p B, or even both, but may not overlap + * either otherwise. + * + * \param[out] X The result of the subtraction. + * \param[in] A Little-endian presentation of left operand. + * \param[in] B Little-endian presentation of right operand. + * \param limbs Number of limbs of \p X, \p A and \p B. + * + * \return 1 if `A < B`. + * 0 if `A >= B`. + */ +mbedtls_mpi_uint mbedtls_mpi_core_sub(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *A, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *B, + size_t limbs); + +/** + * \brief Perform a fixed-size multiply accumulate operation: X += b * A + * + * \p X may be aliased to \p A (when \p X_limbs == \p A_limbs), but may not + * otherwise overlap. + * + * This function operates modulo `2^(biL*X_limbs)`. + * + * \param[in,out] X The pointer to the (little-endian) array + * representing the bignum to accumulate onto. + * \param X_limbs The number of limbs of \p X. This must be + * at least \p A_limbs. + * \param[in] A The pointer to the (little-endian) array + * representing the bignum to multiply with. + * This may be aliased to \p X but may not overlap + * otherwise. + * \param A_limbs The number of limbs of \p A. + * \param b X scalar to multiply with. + * + * \return The carry at the end of the operation. + */ +mbedtls_mpi_uint mbedtls_mpi_core_mla(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, size_t X_limbs, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *A, size_t A_limbs, + mbedtls_mpi_uint b); + +/** + * \brief Perform a known-size multiplication + * + * \p X may not be aliased to any of the inputs for this function. + * \p A may be aliased to \p B. + * + * \param[out] X The pointer to the (little-endian) array to receive + * the product of \p A_limbs and \p B_limbs. + * This must be of length \p A_limbs + \p B_limbs. + * \param[in] A The pointer to the (little-endian) array + * representing the first factor. + * \param A_limbs The number of limbs in \p A. + * \param[in] B The pointer to the (little-endian) array + * representing the second factor. + * \param B_limbs The number of limbs in \p B. + */ +void mbedtls_mpi_core_mul(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *A, size_t A_limbs, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *B, size_t B_limbs); + +/** + * \brief Calculate initialisation value for fast Montgomery modular + * multiplication + * + * \param[in] N Little-endian presentation of the modulus. This must have + * at least one limb. + * + * \return The initialisation value for fast Montgomery modular multiplication + */ +mbedtls_mpi_uint mbedtls_mpi_core_montmul_init(const mbedtls_mpi_uint *N); + +/** + * \brief Montgomery multiplication: X = A * B * R^-1 mod N (HAC 14.36) + * + * \p A and \p B must be in canonical form. That is, < \p N. + * + * \p X may be aliased to \p A or \p N, or even \p B (if \p AN_limbs == + * \p B_limbs) but may not overlap any parameters otherwise. + * + * \p A and \p B may alias each other, if \p AN_limbs == \p B_limbs. They may + * not alias \p N (since they must be in canonical form, they cannot == \p N). + * + * \param[out] X The destination MPI, as a little-endian array of + * length \p AN_limbs. + * On successful completion, X contains the result of + * the multiplication `A * B * R^-1` mod N where + * `R = 2^(biL*AN_limbs)`. + * \param[in] A Little-endian presentation of first operand. + * Must have the same number of limbs as \p N. + * \param[in] B Little-endian presentation of second operand. + * \param[in] B_limbs The number of limbs in \p B. + * Must be <= \p AN_limbs. + * \param[in] N Little-endian presentation of the modulus. + * This must be odd, and have exactly the same number + * of limbs as \p A. + * It may alias \p X, but must not alias or otherwise + * overlap any of the other parameters. + * \param[in] AN_limbs The number of limbs in \p X, \p A and \p N. + * \param mm The Montgomery constant for \p N: -N^-1 mod 2^biL. + * This can be calculated by `mbedtls_mpi_core_montmul_init()`. + * \param[in,out] T Temporary storage of size at least 2*AN_limbs+1 limbs. + * Its initial content is unused and + * its final content is indeterminate. + * It must not alias or otherwise overlap any of the + * other parameters. + */ +void mbedtls_mpi_core_montmul(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *A, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *B, size_t B_limbs, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *N, size_t AN_limbs, + mbedtls_mpi_uint mm, mbedtls_mpi_uint *T); + +/** + * \brief Calculate the square of the Montgomery constant. (Needed + * for conversion and operations in Montgomery form.) + * + * \param[out] X A pointer to the result of the calculation of + * the square of the Montgomery constant: + * 2^{2*n*biL} mod N. + * \param[in] N Little-endian presentation of the modulus, which must be odd. + * + * \return 0 if successful. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED if there is not enough space + * to store the value of Montgomery constant squared. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_DIVISION_BY_ZERO if \p N modulus is zero. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NEGATIVE_VALUE if \p N modulus is negative. + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_core_get_mont_r2_unsafe(mbedtls_mpi *X, + const mbedtls_mpi *N); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS) +/** + * Copy an MPI from a table without leaking the index. + * + * \param dest The destination buffer. This must point to a writable + * buffer of at least \p limbs limbs. + * \param table The address of the table. This must point to a readable + * array of \p count elements of \p limbs limbs each. + * \param limbs The number of limbs in each table entry. + * \param count The number of entries in \p table. + * \param index The (secret) table index to look up. This must be in the + * range `0 .. count-1`. + */ +void mbedtls_mpi_core_ct_uint_table_lookup(mbedtls_mpi_uint *dest, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *table, + size_t limbs, + size_t count, + size_t index); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS */ + +/** + * \brief Fill an integer with a number of random bytes. + * + * \param X The destination MPI. + * \param X_limbs The number of limbs of \p X. + * \param bytes The number of random bytes to generate. + * \param f_rng The RNG function to use. This must not be \c NULL. + * \param p_rng The RNG parameter to be passed to \p f_rng. This may be + * \c NULL if \p f_rng doesn't need a context argument. + * + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA if \p X does not have + * enough room for \p bytes bytes. + * \return A negative error code on RNG failure. + * + * \note The bytes obtained from the RNG are interpreted + * as a big-endian representation of an MPI; this can + * be relevant in applications like deterministic ECDSA. + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_core_fill_random(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, size_t X_limbs, + size_t bytes, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng); + +/** Generate a random number uniformly in a range. + * + * This function generates a random number between \p min inclusive and + * \p N exclusive. + * + * The procedure complies with RFC 6979 §3.3 (deterministic ECDSA) + * when the RNG is a suitably parametrized instance of HMAC_DRBG + * and \p min is \c 1. + * + * \note There are `N - min` possible outputs. The lower bound + * \p min can be reached, but the upper bound \p N cannot. + * + * \param X The destination MPI, with \p limbs limbs. + * It must not be aliased with \p N or otherwise overlap it. + * \param min The minimum value to return. + * \param N The upper bound of the range, exclusive, with \p limbs limbs. + * In other words, this is one plus the maximum value to return. + * \p N must be strictly larger than \p min. + * \param limbs The number of limbs of \p N and \p X. + * This must not be 0. + * \param f_rng The RNG function to use. This must not be \c NULL. + * \param p_rng The RNG parameter to be passed to \p f_rng. + * + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NOT_ACCEPTABLE if the implementation was + * unable to find a suitable value within a limited number + * of attempts. This has a negligible probability if \p N + * is significantly larger than \p min, which is the case + * for all usual cryptographic applications. + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_core_random(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, + mbedtls_mpi_uint min, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *N, + size_t limbs, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng); + +/** + * \brief Returns the number of limbs of working memory required for + * a call to `mbedtls_mpi_core_exp_mod()`. + * + * \note This will always be at least + * `mbedtls_mpi_core_montmul_working_limbs(AN_limbs)`, + * i.e. sufficient for a call to `mbedtls_mpi_core_montmul()`. + * + * \param AN_limbs The number of limbs in the input `A` and the modulus `N` + * (they must be the same size) that will be given to + * `mbedtls_mpi_core_exp_mod()`. + * \param E_limbs The number of limbs in the exponent `E` that will be given + * to `mbedtls_mpi_core_exp_mod()`. + * + * \return The number of limbs of working memory required by + * `mbedtls_mpi_core_exp_mod()`. + */ +size_t mbedtls_mpi_core_exp_mod_working_limbs(size_t AN_limbs, size_t E_limbs); + +/** + * \brief Perform a modular exponentiation with secret exponent: + * X = A^E mod N, where \p A is already in Montgomery form. + * + * \p X may be aliased to \p A, but not to \p RR or \p E, even if \p E_limbs == + * \p AN_limbs. + * + * \param[out] X The destination MPI, as a little endian array of length + * \p AN_limbs. + * \param[in] A The base MPI, as a little endian array of length \p AN_limbs. + * Must be in Montgomery form. + * \param[in] N The modulus, as a little endian array of length \p AN_limbs. + * \param AN_limbs The number of limbs in \p X, \p A, \p N, \p RR. + * \param[in] E The exponent, as a little endian array of length \p E_limbs. + * \param E_limbs The number of limbs in \p E. + * \param[in] RR The precomputed residue of 2^{2*biL} modulo N, as a little + * endian array of length \p AN_limbs. + * \param[in,out] T Temporary storage of at least the number of limbs returned + * by `mbedtls_mpi_core_exp_mod_working_limbs()`. + * Its initial content is unused and its final content is + * indeterminate. + * It must not alias or otherwise overlap any of the other + * parameters. + * It is up to the caller to zeroize \p T when it is no + * longer needed, and before freeing it if it was dynamically + * allocated. + */ +void mbedtls_mpi_core_exp_mod(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *A, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *N, size_t AN_limbs, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *E, size_t E_limbs, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *RR, + mbedtls_mpi_uint *T); + +/** + * \brief Subtract unsigned integer from known-size large unsigned integers. + * Return the borrow. + * + * \param[out] X The result of the subtraction. + * \param[in] A The left operand. + * \param b The unsigned scalar to subtract. + * \param limbs Number of limbs of \p X and \p A. + * + * \return 1 if `A < b`. + * 0 if `A >= b`. + */ +mbedtls_mpi_uint mbedtls_mpi_core_sub_int(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *A, + mbedtls_mpi_uint b, + size_t limbs); + +/** + * \brief Determine if a given MPI has the value \c 0 in constant time with + * respect to the value (but not with respect to the number of limbs). + * + * \param[in] A The MPI to test. + * \param limbs Number of limbs in \p A. + * + * \return MBEDTLS_CT_FALSE if `A == 0` + * MBEDTLS_CT_TRUE if `A != 0`. + */ +mbedtls_ct_condition_t mbedtls_mpi_core_check_zero_ct(const mbedtls_mpi_uint *A, + size_t limbs); + +/** + * \brief Returns the number of limbs of working memory required for + * a call to `mbedtls_mpi_core_montmul()`. + * + * \param AN_limbs The number of limbs in the input `A` and the modulus `N` + * (they must be the same size) that will be given to + * `mbedtls_mpi_core_montmul()` or one of the other functions + * that specifies this as the amount of working memory needed. + * + * \return The number of limbs of working memory required by + * `mbedtls_mpi_core_montmul()` (or other similar function). + */ +static inline size_t mbedtls_mpi_core_montmul_working_limbs(size_t AN_limbs) +{ + return 2 * AN_limbs + 1; +} + +/** Convert an MPI into Montgomery form. + * + * \p X may be aliased to \p A, but may not otherwise overlap it. + * + * \p X may not alias \p N (it is in canonical form, so must be strictly less + * than \p N). Nor may it alias or overlap \p rr (this is unlikely to be + * required in practice.) + * + * This function is a thin wrapper around `mbedtls_mpi_core_montmul()` that is + * an alternative to calling `mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_to_mont_rep()` when we + * don't want to allocate memory. + * + * \param[out] X The result of the conversion. + * Must have the same number of limbs as \p A. + * \param[in] A The MPI to convert into Montgomery form. + * Must have the same number of limbs as the modulus. + * \param[in] N The address of the modulus, which gives the size of + * the base `R` = 2^(biL*N->limbs). + * \param[in] AN_limbs The number of limbs in \p X, \p A, \p N and \p rr. + * \param mm The Montgomery constant for \p N: -N^-1 mod 2^biL. + * This can be determined by calling + * `mbedtls_mpi_core_montmul_init()`. + * \param[in] rr The residue for `2^{2*n*biL} mod N`. + * \param[in,out] T Temporary storage of size at least + * `mbedtls_mpi_core_montmul_working_limbs(AN_limbs)` + * limbs. + * Its initial content is unused and + * its final content is indeterminate. + * It must not alias or otherwise overlap any of the + * other parameters. + */ +void mbedtls_mpi_core_to_mont_rep(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *A, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *N, + size_t AN_limbs, + mbedtls_mpi_uint mm, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *rr, + mbedtls_mpi_uint *T); + +/** Convert an MPI from Montgomery form. + * + * \p X may be aliased to \p A, but may not otherwise overlap it. + * + * \p X may not alias \p N (it is in canonical form, so must be strictly less + * than \p N). + * + * This function is a thin wrapper around `mbedtls_mpi_core_montmul()` that is + * an alternative to calling `mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_from_mont_rep()` when we + * don't want to allocate memory. + * + * \param[out] X The result of the conversion. + * Must have the same number of limbs as \p A. + * \param[in] A The MPI to convert from Montgomery form. + * Must have the same number of limbs as the modulus. + * \param[in] N The address of the modulus, which gives the size of + * the base `R` = 2^(biL*N->limbs). + * \param[in] AN_limbs The number of limbs in \p X, \p A and \p N. + * \param mm The Montgomery constant for \p N: -N^-1 mod 2^biL. + * This can be determined by calling + * `mbedtls_mpi_core_montmul_init()`. + * \param[in,out] T Temporary storage of size at least + * `mbedtls_mpi_core_montmul_working_limbs(AN_limbs)` + * limbs. + * Its initial content is unused and + * its final content is indeterminate. + * It must not alias or otherwise overlap any of the + * other parameters. + */ +void mbedtls_mpi_core_from_mont_rep(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *A, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *N, + size_t AN_limbs, + mbedtls_mpi_uint mm, + mbedtls_mpi_uint *T); + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_CORE_H */ diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/bignum_internal.h b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/bignum_internal.h deleted file mode 100644 index 5435ebb46490..000000000000 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/bignum_internal.h +++ /dev/null @@ -1,71 +0,0 @@ -/** - * Low level bignum functions - * - * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later - */ - -#ifndef MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_INTERNAL_H -#define MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_INTERNAL_H - -#include "mbedtls/bignum.h" - -/** - * \brief Calculate the square of the Montgomery constant. (Needed - * for conversion and operations in Montgomery form.) - * - * \param[out] X A pointer to the result of the calculation of - * the square of the Montgomery constant: - * 2^{2*n*biL} mod N. - * \param[in] N Little-endian presentation of the modulus, which must be odd. - * - * \return 0 if successful. - * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED if there is not enough space - * to store the value of Montgomery constant squared. - * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_DIVISION_BY_ZERO if \p N modulus is zero. - * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NEGATIVE_VALUE if \p N modulus is negative. - */ -int mbedtls_mpi_get_mont_r2_unsafe(mbedtls_mpi *X, - const mbedtls_mpi *N); - -/** - * \brief Calculate initialisation value for fast Montgomery modular - * multiplication - * - * \param[in] N Little-endian presentation of the modulus. This must have - * at least one limb. - * - * \return The initialisation value for fast Montgomery modular multiplication - */ -mbedtls_mpi_uint mbedtls_mpi_montmul_init(const mbedtls_mpi_uint *N); - -/** Montgomery multiplication: A = A * B * R^-1 mod N (HAC 14.36) - * - * \param[in,out] A One of the numbers to multiply. - * It must have at least as many limbs as N - * (A->n >= N->n), and any limbs beyond n are ignored. - * On successful completion, A contains the result of - * the multiplication A * B * R^-1 mod N where - * R = (2^ciL)^n. - * \param[in] B One of the numbers to multiply. - * It must be nonzero and must not have more limbs than N - * (B->n <= N->n). - * \param[in] N The modulo. N must be odd. - * \param mm The value calculated by - * `mbedtls_mpi_montg_init(&mm, N)`. - * This is -N^-1 mod 2^ciL. - * \param[in,out] T A bignum for temporary storage. - * It must be at least twice the limb size of N plus 2 - * (T->n >= 2 * (N->n + 1)). - * Its initial content is unused and - * its final content is indeterminate. - * Note that unlike the usual convention in the library - * for `const mbedtls_mpi*`, the content of T can change. - */ -void mbedtls_mpi_montmul(mbedtls_mpi *A, - const mbedtls_mpi *B, - const mbedtls_mpi *N, - mbedtls_mpi_uint mm, - const mbedtls_mpi *T); - -#endif /* MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_INTERNAL_H */ diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/bignum_mod.c b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/bignum_mod.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..dfd332a70341 --- /dev/null +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/bignum_mod.c @@ -0,0 +1,394 @@ +/** + * Modular bignum functions + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_WITH_MPI_UINT) + +#include + +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" +#include "mbedtls/bignum.h" + +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" + +#include "bignum_core.h" +#include "bignum_mod.h" +#include "bignum_mod_raw.h" +#include "constant_time_internal.h" + +int mbedtls_mpi_mod_residue_setup(mbedtls_mpi_mod_residue *r, + const mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *N, + mbedtls_mpi_uint *p, + size_t p_limbs) +{ + if (p_limbs != N->limbs || !mbedtls_mpi_core_lt_ct(p, N->p, N->limbs)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + r->limbs = N->limbs; + r->p = p; + + return 0; +} + +void mbedtls_mpi_mod_residue_release(mbedtls_mpi_mod_residue *r) +{ + if (r == NULL) { + return; + } + + r->limbs = 0; + r->p = NULL; +} + +void mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus_init(mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *N) +{ + if (N == NULL) { + return; + } + + N->p = NULL; + N->limbs = 0; + N->bits = 0; + N->int_rep = MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_REP_INVALID; +} + +void mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus_free(mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *N) +{ + if (N == NULL) { + return; + } + + switch (N->int_rep) { + case MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_REP_MONTGOMERY: + if (N->rep.mont.rr != NULL) { + mbedtls_zeroize_and_free((mbedtls_mpi_uint *) N->rep.mont.rr, + N->limbs * sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint)); + N->rep.mont.rr = NULL; + } + N->rep.mont.mm = 0; + break; + case MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_REP_OPT_RED: + N->rep.ored.modp = NULL; + break; + case MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_REP_INVALID: + break; + } + + N->p = NULL; + N->limbs = 0; + N->bits = 0; + N->int_rep = MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_REP_INVALID; +} + +static int set_mont_const_square(const mbedtls_mpi_uint **X, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *A, + size_t limbs) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_mpi N; + mbedtls_mpi RR; + *X = NULL; + + mbedtls_mpi_init(&N); + mbedtls_mpi_init(&RR); + + if (A == NULL || limbs == 0 || limbs >= (MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_LIMBS / 2) - 2) { + goto cleanup; + } + + if (mbedtls_mpi_grow(&N, limbs)) { + goto cleanup; + } + + memcpy(N.p, A, sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint) * limbs); + + ret = mbedtls_mpi_core_get_mont_r2_unsafe(&RR, &N); + + if (ret == 0) { + *X = RR.p; + RR.p = NULL; + } + +cleanup: + mbedtls_mpi_free(&N); + mbedtls_mpi_free(&RR); + ret = (ret != 0) ? MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED : 0; + return ret; +} + +static inline void standard_modulus_setup(mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *N, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *p, + size_t p_limbs, + mbedtls_mpi_mod_rep_selector int_rep) +{ + N->p = p; + N->limbs = p_limbs; + N->bits = mbedtls_mpi_core_bitlen(p, p_limbs); + N->int_rep = int_rep; +} + +int mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus_setup(mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *N, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *p, + size_t p_limbs) +{ + int ret = 0; + standard_modulus_setup(N, p, p_limbs, MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_REP_MONTGOMERY); + N->rep.mont.mm = mbedtls_mpi_core_montmul_init(N->p); + ret = set_mont_const_square(&N->rep.mont.rr, N->p, N->limbs); + + if (ret != 0) { + mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus_free(N); + } + + return ret; +} + +int mbedtls_mpi_mod_optred_modulus_setup(mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *N, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *p, + size_t p_limbs, + mbedtls_mpi_modp_fn modp) +{ + standard_modulus_setup(N, p, p_limbs, MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_REP_OPT_RED); + N->rep.ored.modp = modp; + return 0; +} + +int mbedtls_mpi_mod_mul(mbedtls_mpi_mod_residue *X, + const mbedtls_mpi_mod_residue *A, + const mbedtls_mpi_mod_residue *B, + const mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *N) +{ + if (N->limbs == 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + if (X->limbs != N->limbs || A->limbs != N->limbs || B->limbs != N->limbs) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + mbedtls_mpi_uint *T = mbedtls_calloc(N->limbs * 2 + 1, ciL); + if (T == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED; + } + + mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_mul(X->p, A->p, B->p, N, T); + + mbedtls_free(T); + + return 0; +} + +int mbedtls_mpi_mod_sub(mbedtls_mpi_mod_residue *X, + const mbedtls_mpi_mod_residue *A, + const mbedtls_mpi_mod_residue *B, + const mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *N) +{ + if (X->limbs != N->limbs || A->limbs != N->limbs || B->limbs != N->limbs) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_sub(X->p, A->p, B->p, N); + + return 0; +} + +static int mbedtls_mpi_mod_inv_mont(mbedtls_mpi_mod_residue *X, + const mbedtls_mpi_mod_residue *A, + const mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *N, + mbedtls_mpi_uint *working_memory) +{ + /* Input already in Montgomery form, so there's little to do */ + mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_inv_prime(X->p, A->p, + N->p, N->limbs, + N->rep.mont.rr, + working_memory); + return 0; +} + +static int mbedtls_mpi_mod_inv_non_mont(mbedtls_mpi_mod_residue *X, + const mbedtls_mpi_mod_residue *A, + const mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *N, + mbedtls_mpi_uint *working_memory) +{ + /* Need to convert input into Montgomery form */ + + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus Nmont; + mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus_init(&Nmont); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus_setup(&Nmont, N->p, N->limbs)); + + /* We'll use X->p to hold the Montgomery form of the input A->p */ + mbedtls_mpi_core_to_mont_rep(X->p, A->p, Nmont.p, Nmont.limbs, + Nmont.rep.mont.mm, Nmont.rep.mont.rr, + working_memory); + + mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_inv_prime(X->p, X->p, + Nmont.p, Nmont.limbs, + Nmont.rep.mont.rr, + working_memory); + + /* And convert back from Montgomery form */ + + mbedtls_mpi_core_from_mont_rep(X->p, X->p, Nmont.p, Nmont.limbs, + Nmont.rep.mont.mm, working_memory); + +cleanup: + mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus_free(&Nmont); + return ret; +} + +int mbedtls_mpi_mod_inv(mbedtls_mpi_mod_residue *X, + const mbedtls_mpi_mod_residue *A, + const mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *N) +{ + if (X->limbs != N->limbs || A->limbs != N->limbs) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + /* Zero has the same value regardless of Montgomery form or not */ + if (mbedtls_mpi_core_check_zero_ct(A->p, A->limbs) == 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + size_t working_limbs = + mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_inv_prime_working_limbs(N->limbs); + + mbedtls_mpi_uint *working_memory = mbedtls_calloc(working_limbs, + sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint)); + if (working_memory == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED; + } + + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + switch (N->int_rep) { + case MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_REP_MONTGOMERY: + ret = mbedtls_mpi_mod_inv_mont(X, A, N, working_memory); + break; + case MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_REP_OPT_RED: + ret = mbedtls_mpi_mod_inv_non_mont(X, A, N, working_memory); + break; + default: + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + break; + } + + mbedtls_zeroize_and_free(working_memory, + working_limbs * sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint)); + + return ret; +} + +int mbedtls_mpi_mod_add(mbedtls_mpi_mod_residue *X, + const mbedtls_mpi_mod_residue *A, + const mbedtls_mpi_mod_residue *B, + const mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *N) +{ + if (X->limbs != N->limbs || A->limbs != N->limbs || B->limbs != N->limbs) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_add(X->p, A->p, B->p, N); + + return 0; +} + +int mbedtls_mpi_mod_random(mbedtls_mpi_mod_residue *X, + mbedtls_mpi_uint min, + const mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *N, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng) +{ + if (X->limbs != N->limbs) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + return mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_random(X->p, min, N, f_rng, p_rng); +} + +int mbedtls_mpi_mod_read(mbedtls_mpi_mod_residue *r, + const mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *N, + const unsigned char *buf, + size_t buflen, + mbedtls_mpi_mod_ext_rep ext_rep) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + + /* Do our best to check if r and m have been set up */ + if (r->limbs == 0 || N->limbs == 0) { + goto cleanup; + } + if (r->limbs != N->limbs) { + goto cleanup; + } + + ret = mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_read(r->p, N, buf, buflen, ext_rep); + if (ret != 0) { + goto cleanup; + } + + r->limbs = N->limbs; + + ret = mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_canonical_to_modulus_rep(r->p, N); + +cleanup: + return ret; +} + +int mbedtls_mpi_mod_write(const mbedtls_mpi_mod_residue *r, + const mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *N, + unsigned char *buf, + size_t buflen, + mbedtls_mpi_mod_ext_rep ext_rep) +{ + /* Do our best to check if r and m have been set up */ + if (r->limbs == 0 || N->limbs == 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + if (r->limbs != N->limbs) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_mpi_uint *working_memory = r->p; + size_t working_memory_len = sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint) * r->limbs; + + if (N->int_rep == MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_REP_MONTGOMERY) { + + working_memory = mbedtls_calloc(r->limbs, sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint)); + + if (working_memory == NULL) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED; + goto cleanup; + } + + memcpy(working_memory, r->p, working_memory_len); + + ret = mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_from_mont_rep(working_memory, N); + if (ret != 0) { + goto cleanup; + } + } + + ret = mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_write(working_memory, N, buf, buflen, ext_rep); + +cleanup: + + if (N->int_rep == MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_REP_MONTGOMERY && + working_memory != NULL) { + + mbedtls_zeroize_and_free(working_memory, working_memory_len); + } + + return ret; +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C && MBEDTLS_ECP_WITH_MPI_UINT */ diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/bignum_mod.h b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/bignum_mod.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..963d8881ace5 --- /dev/null +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/bignum_mod.h @@ -0,0 +1,452 @@ +/** + * Modular bignum functions + * + * This module implements operations on integers modulo some fixed modulus. + * + * The functions in this module obey the following conventions unless + * explicitly indicated otherwise: + * + * - **Modulus parameters**: the modulus is passed as a pointer to a structure + * of type #mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus. The structure must be set up with an + * array of limbs storing the bignum value of the modulus. The modulus must + * be odd and is assumed to have no leading zeroes. The modulus is usually + * named \c N and is usually input-only. Functions which take a parameter + * of type \c const #mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus* must not modify its value. + * - **Bignum parameters**: Bignums are passed as pointers to an array of + * limbs or to a #mbedtls_mpi_mod_residue structure. A limb has the type + * #mbedtls_mpi_uint. Residues must be initialized before use, and must be + * associated with the modulus \c N. Unless otherwise specified: + * - Bignum parameters called \c A, \c B, ... are inputs and are not + * modified by the function. Functions which take a parameter of + * type \c const #mbedtls_mpi_mod_residue* must not modify its value. + * - Bignum parameters called \c X, \c Y, ... are outputs or input-output. + * The initial bignum value of output-only parameters is ignored, but + * they must be set up and associated with the modulus \c N. Some + * functions (typically constant-flow) require that the limbs in an + * output residue are initialized. + * - Bignum parameters called \c p are inputs used to set up a modulus or + * residue. These must be pointers to an array of limbs. + * - \c T is a temporary storage area. The initial content of such a + * parameter is ignored and the final content is unspecified. + * - Some functions use different names, such as \c r for the residue. + * - **Bignum sizes**: bignum sizes are always expressed in limbs. Both + * #mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus and #mbedtls_mpi_mod_residue have a \c limbs + * member storing its size. All bignum parameters must have the same + * number of limbs as the modulus. All bignum sizes must be at least 1 and + * must be significantly less than #SIZE_MAX. The behavior if a size is 0 is + * undefined. + * - **Bignum representation**: the representation of inputs and outputs is + * specified by the \c int_rep field of the modulus. + * - **Parameter ordering**: for bignum parameters, outputs come before inputs. + * The modulus is passed after residues. Temporaries come last. + * - **Aliasing**: in general, output bignums may be aliased to one or more + * inputs. Modulus values may not be aliased to any other parameter. Outputs + * may not be aliased to one another. Temporaries may not be aliased to any + * other parameter. + * - **Overlap**: apart from aliasing of residue pointers (where two residue + * arguments are equal pointers), overlap is not supported and may result + * in undefined behavior. + * - **Error handling**: functions generally check compatibility of input + * sizes. Most functions will not check that input values are in canonical + * form (i.e. that \c A < \c N), this is only checked during setup of a + * residue structure. + * - **Modular representatives**: all functions expect inputs to be in the + * range [0, \c N - 1] and guarantee outputs in the range [0, \c N - 1]. + * Residues are set up with an associated modulus, and operations are only + * guaranteed to work if the modulus is associated with all residue + * parameters. If a residue is passed with a modulus other than the one it + * is associated with, then it may be out of range. If an input is out of + * range, outputs are fully unspecified, though bignum values out of range + * should not cause buffer overflows (beware that this is not extensively + * tested). + */ + +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +#ifndef MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_MOD_H +#define MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_MOD_H + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) +#include "mbedtls/bignum.h" +#endif + +/** How residues associated with a modulus are represented. + * + * This also determines which fields of the modulus structure are valid and + * what their contents are (see #mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus). + */ +typedef enum { + /** Representation not chosen (makes the modulus structure invalid). */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_REP_INVALID = 0, + /* Skip 1 as it is slightly easier to accidentally pass to functions. */ + /** Montgomery representation. */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_REP_MONTGOMERY = 2, + /* Optimised reduction available. This indicates a coordinate modulus (P) + * and one or more of the following have been configured: + * - A nist curve (MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECPXXXR1_ENABLED) & MBEDTLS_ECP_NIST_OPTIM. + * - A Kobliz Curve. + * - A Fast Reduction Curve CURVE25519 or CURVE448. */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_REP_OPT_RED, +} mbedtls_mpi_mod_rep_selector; + +/* Make mbedtls_mpi_mod_rep_selector and mbedtls_mpi_mod_ext_rep disjoint to + * make it easier to catch when they are accidentally swapped. */ +typedef enum { + MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_EXT_REP_INVALID = 0, + MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_EXT_REP_LE = 8, + MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_EXT_REP_BE +} mbedtls_mpi_mod_ext_rep; + +typedef struct { + mbedtls_mpi_uint *p; + size_t limbs; +} mbedtls_mpi_mod_residue; + +typedef struct { + mbedtls_mpi_uint const *rr; /* The residue for 2^{2*n*biL} mod N */ + mbedtls_mpi_uint mm; /* Montgomery const for -N^{-1} mod 2^{ciL} */ +} mbedtls_mpi_mont_struct; + +typedef int (*mbedtls_mpi_modp_fn)(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, size_t X_limbs); + +typedef struct { + mbedtls_mpi_modp_fn modp; /* The optimised reduction function pointer */ +} mbedtls_mpi_opt_red_struct; + +typedef struct { + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *p; + size_t limbs; // number of limbs + size_t bits; // bitlen of p + mbedtls_mpi_mod_rep_selector int_rep; // selector to signal the active member of the union + union rep { + /* if int_rep == #MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_REP_MONTGOMERY */ + mbedtls_mpi_mont_struct mont; + /* if int_rep == #MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_REP_OPT_RED */ + mbedtls_mpi_opt_red_struct ored; + } rep; +} mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus; + +/** Setup a residue structure. + * + * The residue will be set up with the buffer \p p and modulus \p N. + * + * The memory pointed to by \p p will be used by the resulting residue structure. + * The value at the pointed-to memory will be the initial value of \p r and must + * hold a value that is less than the modulus. This value will be used as-is + * and interpreted according to the value of the `N->int_rep` field. + * + * The modulus \p N will be the modulus associated with \p r. The residue \p r + * should only be used in operations where the modulus is \p N. + * + * \param[out] r The address of the residue to setup. + * \param[in] N The address of the modulus related to \p r. + * \param[in] p The address of the limb array containing the value of \p r. + * The memory pointed to by \p p will be used by \p r and must + * not be modified in any way until after + * mbedtls_mpi_mod_residue_release() is called. The data + * pointed to by \p p must be less than the modulus (the value + * pointed to by `N->p`) and already in the representation + * indicated by `N->int_rep`. + * \param p_limbs The number of limbs of \p p. Must be the same as the number + * of limbs in the modulus \p N. + * + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA if \p p_limbs is less than the + * limbs in \p N or if \p p is not less than \p N. + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_mod_residue_setup(mbedtls_mpi_mod_residue *r, + const mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *N, + mbedtls_mpi_uint *p, + size_t p_limbs); + +/** Unbind elements of a residue structure. + * + * This function removes the reference to the limb array that was passed to + * mbedtls_mpi_mod_residue_setup() to make it safe to free or use again. + * + * This function invalidates \p r and it must not be used until after + * mbedtls_mpi_mod_residue_setup() is called on it again. + * + * \param[out] r The address of residue to release. + */ +void mbedtls_mpi_mod_residue_release(mbedtls_mpi_mod_residue *r); + +/** Initialize a modulus structure. + * + * \param[out] N The address of the modulus structure to initialize. + */ +void mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus_init(mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *N); + +/** Setup a modulus structure. + * + * \param[out] N The address of the modulus structure to populate. + * \param[in] p The address of the limb array storing the value of \p N. + * The memory pointed to by \p p will be used by \p N and must + * not be modified in any way until after + * mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus_free() is called. + * \param p_limbs The number of limbs of \p p. + * + * \return \c 0 if successful. + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus_setup(mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *N, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *p, + size_t p_limbs); + +/** Setup an optimised-reduction compatible modulus structure. + * + * \param[out] N The address of the modulus structure to populate. + * \param[in] p The address of the limb array storing the value of \p N. + * The memory pointed to by \p p will be used by \p N and must + * not be modified in any way until after + * mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus_free() is called. + * \param p_limbs The number of limbs of \p p. + * \param modp A pointer to the optimised reduction function to use. \p p. + * + * \return \c 0 if successful. + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_mod_optred_modulus_setup(mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *N, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *p, + size_t p_limbs, + mbedtls_mpi_modp_fn modp); + +/** Free elements of a modulus structure. + * + * This function frees any memory allocated by mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus_setup(). + * + * \warning This function does not free the limb array passed to + * mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus_setup() only removes the reference to it, + * making it safe to free or to use it again. + * + * \param[in,out] N The address of the modulus structure to free. + */ +void mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus_free(mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *N); + +/** \brief Multiply two residues, returning the residue modulo the specified + * modulus. + * + * \note Currently handles the case when `N->int_rep` is + * MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_REP_MONTGOMERY. + * + * The size of the operation is determined by \p N. \p A, \p B and \p X must + * all be associated with the modulus \p N and must all have the same number + * of limbs as \p N. + * + * \p X may be aliased to \p A or \p B, or even both, but may not overlap + * either otherwise. They may not alias \p N (since they must be in canonical + * form, they cannot == \p N). + * + * \param[out] X The address of the result MPI. Must have the same + * number of limbs as \p N. + * On successful completion, \p X contains the result of + * the multiplication `A * B * R^-1` mod N where + * `R = 2^(biL * N->limbs)`. + * \param[in] A The address of the first MPI. + * \param[in] B The address of the second MPI. + * \param[in] N The address of the modulus. Used to perform a modulo + * operation on the result of the multiplication. + * + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA if all the parameters do not + * have the same number of limbs or \p N is invalid. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED on memory-allocation failure. + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_mod_mul(mbedtls_mpi_mod_residue *X, + const mbedtls_mpi_mod_residue *A, + const mbedtls_mpi_mod_residue *B, + const mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *N); + +/** + * \brief Perform a fixed-size modular subtraction. + * + * Calculate `A - B modulo N`. + * + * \p A, \p B and \p X must all have the same number of limbs as \p N. + * + * \p X may be aliased to \p A or \p B, or even both, but may not overlap + * either otherwise. + * + * \note This function does not check that \p A or \p B are in canonical + * form (that is, are < \p N) - that will have been done by + * mbedtls_mpi_mod_residue_setup(). + * + * \param[out] X The address of the result MPI. Must be initialized. + * Must have the same number of limbs as the modulus \p N. + * \param[in] A The address of the first MPI. + * \param[in] B The address of the second MPI. + * \param[in] N The address of the modulus. Used to perform a modulo + * operation on the result of the subtraction. + * + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA if the given MPIs do not + * have the correct number of limbs. + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_mod_sub(mbedtls_mpi_mod_residue *X, + const mbedtls_mpi_mod_residue *A, + const mbedtls_mpi_mod_residue *B, + const mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *N); + +/** + * \brief Perform modular inversion of an MPI with respect to a modulus \p N. + * + * \p A and \p X must be associated with the modulus \p N and will therefore + * have the same number of limbs as \p N. + * + * \p X may be aliased to \p A. + * + * \warning Currently only supports prime moduli, but does not check for them. + * + * \param[out] X The modular inverse of \p A with respect to \p N. + * \param[in] A The number to calculate the modular inverse of. + * Must not be 0. + * \param[in] N The modulus to use. + * + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA if \p A and \p N do not + * have the same number of limbs. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA if \p A is zero. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED if couldn't allocate enough + * memory (needed for conversion to and from Mongtomery form + * when not in Montgomery form already, and for temporary use + * by the inversion calculation itself). + */ + +int mbedtls_mpi_mod_inv(mbedtls_mpi_mod_residue *X, + const mbedtls_mpi_mod_residue *A, + const mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *N); +/** + * \brief Perform a fixed-size modular addition. + * + * Calculate `A + B modulo N`. + * + * \p A, \p B and \p X must all be associated with the modulus \p N and must + * all have the same number of limbs as \p N. + * + * \p X may be aliased to \p A or \p B, or even both, but may not overlap + * either otherwise. + * + * \note This function does not check that \p A or \p B are in canonical + * form (that is, are < \p N) - that will have been done by + * mbedtls_mpi_mod_residue_setup(). + * + * \param[out] X The address of the result residue. Must be initialized. + * Must have the same number of limbs as the modulus \p N. + * \param[in] A The address of the first input residue. + * \param[in] B The address of the second input residue. + * \param[in] N The address of the modulus. Used to perform a modulo + * operation on the result of the addition. + * + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA if the given MPIs do not + * have the correct number of limbs. + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_mod_add(mbedtls_mpi_mod_residue *X, + const mbedtls_mpi_mod_residue *A, + const mbedtls_mpi_mod_residue *B, + const mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *N); + +/** Generate a random number uniformly in a range. + * + * This function generates a random number between \p min inclusive and + * \p N exclusive. + * + * The procedure complies with RFC 6979 §3.3 (deterministic ECDSA) + * when the RNG is a suitably parametrized instance of HMAC_DRBG + * and \p min is \c 1. + * + * \note There are `N - min` possible outputs. The lower bound + * \p min can be reached, but the upper bound \p N cannot. + * + * \param X The destination residue. + * \param min The minimum value to return. It must be strictly smaller + * than \b N. + * \param N The modulus. + * This is the upper bound of the output range, exclusive. + * \param f_rng The RNG function to use. This must not be \c NULL. + * \param p_rng The RNG parameter to be passed to \p f_rng. + * + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NOT_ACCEPTABLE if the implementation was + * unable to find a suitable value within a limited number + * of attempts. This has a negligible probability if \p N + * is significantly larger than \p min, which is the case + * for all usual cryptographic applications. + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_mod_random(mbedtls_mpi_mod_residue *X, + mbedtls_mpi_uint min, + const mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *N, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng); + +/** Read a residue from a byte buffer. + * + * The residue will be automatically converted to the internal representation + * based on the value of the `N->int_rep` field. + * + * The modulus \p N will be the modulus associated with \p r. The residue \p r + * should only be used in operations where the modulus is \p N or a modulus + * equivalent to \p N (in the sense that all their fields or memory pointed by + * their fields hold the same value). + * + * \param[out] r The address of the residue. It must have exactly the same + * number of limbs as the modulus \p N. + * \param[in] N The address of the modulus. + * \param[in] buf The input buffer to import from. + * \param buflen The length in bytes of \p buf. + * \param ext_rep The endianness of the number in the input buffer. + * + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL if \p r isn't + * large enough to hold the value in \p buf. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA if \p ext_rep + * is invalid or the value in the buffer is not less than \p N. + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_mod_read(mbedtls_mpi_mod_residue *r, + const mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *N, + const unsigned char *buf, + size_t buflen, + mbedtls_mpi_mod_ext_rep ext_rep); + +/** Write a residue into a byte buffer. + * + * The modulus \p N must be the modulus associated with \p r (see + * mbedtls_mpi_mod_residue_setup() and mbedtls_mpi_mod_read()). + * + * The residue will be automatically converted from the internal representation + * based on the value of `N->int_rep` field. + * + * \warning If the buffer is smaller than `N->bits`, the number of + * leading zeroes is leaked through timing. If \p r is + * secret, the caller must ensure that \p buflen is at least + * (`N->bits`+7)/8. + * + * \param[in] r The address of the residue. It must have the same number of + * limbs as the modulus \p N. (\p r is an input parameter, but + * its value will be modified during execution and restored + * before the function returns.) + * \param[in] N The address of the modulus associated with \p r. + * \param[out] buf The output buffer to export to. + * \param buflen The length in bytes of \p buf. + * \param ext_rep The endianness in which the number should be written into + * the output buffer. + * + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL if \p buf isn't + * large enough to hold the value of \p r (without leading + * zeroes). + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA if \p ext_rep is invalid. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED if couldn't allocate enough + * memory for conversion. Can occur only for moduli with + * MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_REP_MONTGOMERY. + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_mod_write(const mbedtls_mpi_mod_residue *r, + const mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *N, + unsigned char *buf, + size_t buflen, + mbedtls_mpi_mod_ext_rep ext_rep); + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_MOD_H */ diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/bignum_mod_raw.c b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/bignum_mod_raw.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..5343bc650d16 --- /dev/null +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/bignum_mod_raw.c @@ -0,0 +1,276 @@ +/* + * Low-level modular bignum functions + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_WITH_MPI_UINT) + +#include + +#include "mbedtls/error.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" + +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" + +#include "bignum_core.h" +#include "bignum_mod_raw.h" +#include "bignum_mod.h" +#include "constant_time_internal.h" + +#include "bignum_mod_raw_invasive.h" + +void mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_cond_assign(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *A, + const mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *N, + unsigned char assign) +{ + mbedtls_mpi_core_cond_assign(X, A, N->limbs, mbedtls_ct_bool(assign)); +} + +void mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_cond_swap(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, + mbedtls_mpi_uint *Y, + const mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *N, + unsigned char swap) +{ + mbedtls_mpi_core_cond_swap(X, Y, N->limbs, mbedtls_ct_bool(swap)); +} + +int mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_read(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, + const mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *N, + const unsigned char *input, + size_t input_length, + mbedtls_mpi_mod_ext_rep ext_rep) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + switch (ext_rep) { + case MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_EXT_REP_LE: + ret = mbedtls_mpi_core_read_le(X, N->limbs, + input, input_length); + break; + case MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_EXT_REP_BE: + ret = mbedtls_mpi_core_read_be(X, N->limbs, + input, input_length); + break; + default: + return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + if (ret != 0) { + goto cleanup; + } + + if (!mbedtls_mpi_core_lt_ct(X, N->p, N->limbs)) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + goto cleanup; + } + +cleanup: + + return ret; +} + +int mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_write(const mbedtls_mpi_uint *A, + const mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *N, + unsigned char *output, + size_t output_length, + mbedtls_mpi_mod_ext_rep ext_rep) +{ + switch (ext_rep) { + case MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_EXT_REP_LE: + return mbedtls_mpi_core_write_le(A, N->limbs, + output, output_length); + case MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_EXT_REP_BE: + return mbedtls_mpi_core_write_be(A, N->limbs, + output, output_length); + default: + return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } +} + +void mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_sub(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *A, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *B, + const mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *N) +{ + mbedtls_mpi_uint c = mbedtls_mpi_core_sub(X, A, B, N->limbs); + + (void) mbedtls_mpi_core_add_if(X, N->p, N->limbs, (unsigned) c); +} + +MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE +void mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_fix_quasi_reduction(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, + const mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *N) +{ + mbedtls_mpi_uint c = mbedtls_mpi_core_sub(X, X, N->p, N->limbs); + + (void) mbedtls_mpi_core_add_if(X, N->p, N->limbs, (unsigned) c); +} + + +void mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_mul(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *A, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *B, + const mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *N, + mbedtls_mpi_uint *T) +{ + /* Standard (A * B) multiplication stored into pre-allocated T + * buffer of fixed limb size of (2N + 1). + * + * The space may not not fully filled by when + * MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_REP_OPT_RED is used. */ + const size_t T_limbs = BITS_TO_LIMBS(N->bits) * 2; + switch (N->int_rep) { + case MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_REP_MONTGOMERY: + mbedtls_mpi_core_montmul(X, A, B, N->limbs, N->p, N->limbs, + N->rep.mont.mm, T); + break; + case MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_REP_OPT_RED: + mbedtls_mpi_core_mul(T, A, N->limbs, B, N->limbs); + + /* Optimised Reduction */ + (*N->rep.ored.modp)(T, T_limbs); + + /* Convert back to canonical representation */ + mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_fix_quasi_reduction(T, N); + memcpy(X, T, N->limbs * sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint)); + break; + default: + break; + } + +} + +size_t mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_inv_prime_working_limbs(size_t AN_limbs) +{ + /* mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_inv_prime() needs a temporary for the exponent, + * which will be the same size as the modulus and input (AN_limbs), + * and additional space to pass to mbedtls_mpi_core_exp_mod(). */ + return AN_limbs + + mbedtls_mpi_core_exp_mod_working_limbs(AN_limbs, AN_limbs); +} + +void mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_inv_prime(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *A, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *N, + size_t AN_limbs, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *RR, + mbedtls_mpi_uint *T) +{ + /* Inversion by power: g^|G| = 1 => g^(-1) = g^(|G|-1), and + * |G| = N - 1, so we want + * g^(|G|-1) = g^(N - 2) + */ + + /* Use the first AN_limbs of T to hold N - 2 */ + mbedtls_mpi_uint *Nminus2 = T; + (void) mbedtls_mpi_core_sub_int(Nminus2, N, 2, AN_limbs); + + /* Rest of T is given to exp_mod for its working space */ + mbedtls_mpi_core_exp_mod(X, + A, N, AN_limbs, Nminus2, AN_limbs, + RR, T + AN_limbs); +} + +void mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_add(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *A, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *B, + const mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *N) +{ + mbedtls_mpi_uint carry, borrow; + carry = mbedtls_mpi_core_add(X, A, B, N->limbs); + borrow = mbedtls_mpi_core_sub(X, X, N->p, N->limbs); + (void) mbedtls_mpi_core_add_if(X, N->p, N->limbs, (unsigned) (carry ^ borrow)); +} + +int mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_canonical_to_modulus_rep( + mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, + const mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *N) +{ + switch (N->int_rep) { + case MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_REP_MONTGOMERY: + return mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_to_mont_rep(X, N); + case MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_REP_OPT_RED: + return 0; + default: + return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } +} + +int mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_modulus_to_canonical_rep( + mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, + const mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *N) +{ + switch (N->int_rep) { + case MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_REP_MONTGOMERY: + return mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_from_mont_rep(X, N); + case MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_REP_OPT_RED: + return 0; + default: + return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } +} + +int mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_random(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, + mbedtls_mpi_uint min, + const mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *N, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng) +{ + int ret = mbedtls_mpi_core_random(X, min, N->p, N->limbs, f_rng, p_rng); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + return mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_canonical_to_modulus_rep(X, N); +} + +int mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_to_mont_rep(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, + const mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *N) +{ + mbedtls_mpi_uint *T; + const size_t t_limbs = mbedtls_mpi_core_montmul_working_limbs(N->limbs); + + if ((T = (mbedtls_mpi_uint *) mbedtls_calloc(t_limbs, ciL)) == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED; + } + + mbedtls_mpi_core_to_mont_rep(X, X, N->p, N->limbs, + N->rep.mont.mm, N->rep.mont.rr, T); + + mbedtls_zeroize_and_free(T, t_limbs * ciL); + return 0; +} + +int mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_from_mont_rep(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, + const mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *N) +{ + const size_t t_limbs = mbedtls_mpi_core_montmul_working_limbs(N->limbs); + mbedtls_mpi_uint *T; + + if ((T = (mbedtls_mpi_uint *) mbedtls_calloc(t_limbs, ciL)) == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED; + } + + mbedtls_mpi_core_from_mont_rep(X, X, N->p, N->limbs, N->rep.mont.mm, T); + + mbedtls_zeroize_and_free(T, t_limbs * ciL); + return 0; +} + +void mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_neg(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *A, + const mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *N) +{ + mbedtls_mpi_core_sub(X, N->p, A, N->limbs); + + /* If A=0 initially, then X=N now. Detect this by + * subtracting N and catching the carry. */ + mbedtls_mpi_uint borrow = mbedtls_mpi_core_sub(X, X, N->p, N->limbs); + (void) mbedtls_mpi_core_add_if(X, N->p, N->limbs, (unsigned) borrow); +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C && MBEDTLS_ECP_WITH_MPI_UINT */ diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/bignum_mod_raw.h b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/bignum_mod_raw.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..7bb4ca3cf528 --- /dev/null +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/bignum_mod_raw.h @@ -0,0 +1,416 @@ +/** + * Low-level modular bignum functions + * + * This interface should only be used by the higher-level modular bignum + * module (bignum_mod.c) and the ECP module (ecp.c, ecp_curves.c). All other + * modules should use the high-level modular bignum interface (bignum_mod.h) + * or the legacy bignum interface (bignum.h). + * + * This is a low-level interface to operations on integers modulo which + * has no protection against passing invalid arguments such as arrays of + * the wrong size. The functions in bignum_mod.h provide a higher-level + * interface that includes protections against accidental misuse, at the + * expense of code size and sometimes more cumbersome memory management. + * + * The functions in this module obey the following conventions unless + * explicitly indicated otherwise: + * - **Modulus parameters**: the modulus is passed as a pointer to a structure + * of type #mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus. The structure must be set up with an + * array of limbs storing the bignum value of the modulus. The modulus must + * be odd and is assumed to have no leading zeroes. The modulus is usually + * named \c N and is usually input-only. + * - **Bignum parameters**: Bignums are passed as pointers to an array of + * limbs. A limb has the type #mbedtls_mpi_uint. Unless otherwise specified: + * - Bignum parameters called \c A, \c B, ... are inputs, and are not + * modified by the function. + * - Bignum parameters called \c X, \c Y are outputs or input-output. + * The initial content of output-only parameters is ignored. + * - \c T is a temporary storage area. The initial content of such a + * parameter is ignored and the final content is unspecified. + * - **Bignum sizes**: bignum sizes are usually expressed by the \c limbs + * member of the modulus argument. All bignum parameters must have the same + * number of limbs as the modulus. All bignum sizes must be at least 1 and + * must be significantly less than #SIZE_MAX. The behavior if a size is 0 is + * undefined. + * - **Bignum representation**: the representation of inputs and outputs is + * specified by the \c int_rep field of the modulus for arithmetic + * functions. Utility functions may allow for different representation. + * - **Parameter ordering**: for bignum parameters, outputs come before inputs. + * The modulus is passed after other bignum input parameters. Temporaries + * come last. + * - **Aliasing**: in general, output bignums may be aliased to one or more + * inputs. Modulus values may not be aliased to any other parameter. Outputs + * may not be aliased to one another. Temporaries may not be aliased to any + * other parameter. + * - **Overlap**: apart from aliasing of limb array pointers (where two + * arguments are equal pointers), overlap is not supported and may result + * in undefined behavior. + * - **Error handling**: This is a low-level module. Functions generally do not + * try to protect against invalid arguments such as nonsensical sizes or + * null pointers. Note that passing bignums with a different size than the + * modulus may lead to buffer overflows. Some functions which allocate + * memory or handle reading/writing of bignums will return an error if + * memory allocation fails or if buffer sizes are invalid. + * - **Modular representatives**: all functions expect inputs to be in the + * range [0, \c N - 1] and guarantee outputs in the range [0, \c N - 1]. If + * an input is out of range, outputs are fully unspecified, though bignum + * values out of range should not cause buffer overflows (beware that this is + * not extensively tested). + */ + +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +#ifndef MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_MOD_RAW_H +#define MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_MOD_RAW_H + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) +#include "mbedtls/bignum.h" +#endif + +#include "bignum_mod.h" + +/** + * \brief Perform a safe conditional copy of an MPI which doesn't reveal + * whether the assignment was done or not. + * + * The size to copy is determined by \p N. + * + * \param[out] X The address of the destination MPI. + * This must be initialized. Must have enough limbs to + * store the full value of \p A. + * \param[in] A The address of the source MPI. This must be initialized. + * \param[in] N The address of the modulus related to \p X and \p A. + * \param assign The condition deciding whether to perform the + * assignment or not. Must be either 0 or 1: + * * \c 1: Perform the assignment `X = A`. + * * \c 0: Keep the original value of \p X. + * + * \note This function avoids leaking any information about whether + * the assignment was done or not. + * + * \warning If \p assign is neither 0 nor 1, the result of this function + * is indeterminate, and the resulting value in \p X might be + * neither its original value nor the value in \p A. + */ +void mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_cond_assign(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *A, + const mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *N, + unsigned char assign); + +/** + * \brief Perform a safe conditional swap of two MPIs which doesn't reveal + * whether the swap was done or not. + * + * The size to swap is determined by \p N. + * + * \param[in,out] X The address of the first MPI. This must be initialized. + * \param[in,out] Y The address of the second MPI. This must be initialized. + * \param[in] N The address of the modulus related to \p X and \p Y. + * \param swap The condition deciding whether to perform + * the swap or not. Must be either 0 or 1: + * * \c 1: Swap the values of \p X and \p Y. + * * \c 0: Keep the original values of \p X and \p Y. + * + * \note This function avoids leaking any information about whether + * the swap was done or not. + * + * \warning If \p swap is neither 0 nor 1, the result of this function + * is indeterminate, and both \p X and \p Y might end up with + * values different to either of the original ones. + */ +void mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_cond_swap(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, + mbedtls_mpi_uint *Y, + const mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *N, + unsigned char swap); + +/** Import X from unsigned binary data. + * + * The MPI needs to have enough limbs to store the full value (including any + * most significant zero bytes in the input). + * + * \param[out] X The address of the MPI. The size is determined by \p N. + * (In particular, it must have at least as many limbs as + * the modulus \p N.) + * \param[in] N The address of the modulus related to \p X. + * \param[in] input The input buffer to import from. + * \param input_length The length in bytes of \p input. + * \param ext_rep The endianness of the number in the input buffer. + * + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL if \p X isn't + * large enough to hold the value in \p input. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA if the external representation + * of \p N is invalid or \p X is not less than \p N. + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_read(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, + const mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *N, + const unsigned char *input, + size_t input_length, + mbedtls_mpi_mod_ext_rep ext_rep); + +/** Export A into unsigned binary data. + * + * \param[in] A The address of the MPI. The size is determined by \p N. + * (In particular, it must have at least as many limbs as + * the modulus \p N.) + * \param[in] N The address of the modulus related to \p A. + * \param[out] output The output buffer to export to. + * \param output_length The length in bytes of \p output. + * \param ext_rep The endianness in which the number should be written into the output buffer. + * + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL if \p output isn't + * large enough to hold the value of \p A. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA if the external representation + * of \p N is invalid. + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_write(const mbedtls_mpi_uint *A, + const mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *N, + unsigned char *output, + size_t output_length, + mbedtls_mpi_mod_ext_rep ext_rep); + +/** \brief Subtract two MPIs, returning the residue modulo the specified + * modulus. + * + * The size of the operation is determined by \p N. \p A and \p B must have + * the same number of limbs as \p N. + * + * \p X may be aliased to \p A or \p B, or even both, but may not overlap + * either otherwise. + * + * \param[out] X The address of the result MPI. + * This must be initialized. Must have enough limbs to + * store the full value of the result. + * \param[in] A The address of the first MPI. This must be initialized. + * \param[in] B The address of the second MPI. This must be initialized. + * \param[in] N The address of the modulus. Used to perform a modulo + * operation on the result of the subtraction. + */ +void mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_sub(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *A, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *B, + const mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *N); + +/** \brief Multiply two MPIs, returning the residue modulo the specified + * modulus. + * + * \note Currently handles the case when `N->int_rep` is + * MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_REP_MONTGOMERY. + * + * The size of the operation is determined by \p N. \p A, \p B and \p X must + * all be associated with the modulus \p N and must all have the same number + * of limbs as \p N. + * + * \p X may be aliased to \p A or \p B, or even both, but may not overlap + * either otherwise. They may not alias \p N (since they must be in canonical + * form, they cannot == \p N). + * + * \param[out] X The address of the result MPI. Must have the same + * number of limbs as \p N. + * On successful completion, \p X contains the result of + * the multiplication `A * B * R^-1` mod N where + * `R = 2^(biL * N->limbs)`. + * \param[in] A The address of the first MPI. + * \param[in] B The address of the second MPI. + * \param[in] N The address of the modulus. Used to perform a modulo + * operation on the result of the multiplication. + * \param[in,out] T Temporary storage of size at least 2 * N->limbs + 1 + * limbs. Its initial content is unused and + * its final content is indeterminate. + * It must not alias or otherwise overlap any of the + * other parameters. + */ +void mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_mul(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *A, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *B, + const mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *N, + mbedtls_mpi_uint *T); + +/** + * \brief Returns the number of limbs of working memory required for + * a call to `mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_inv_prime()`. + * + * \note This will always be at least + * `mbedtls_mpi_core_montmul_working_limbs(AN_limbs)`, + * i.e. sufficient for a call to `mbedtls_mpi_core_montmul()`. + * + * \param AN_limbs The number of limbs in the input `A` and the modulus `N` + * (they must be the same size) that will be given to + * `mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_inv_prime()`. + * + * \return The number of limbs of working memory required by + * `mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_inv_prime()`. + */ +size_t mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_inv_prime_working_limbs(size_t AN_limbs); + +/** + * \brief Perform fixed-width modular inversion of a Montgomery-form MPI with + * respect to a modulus \p N that must be prime. + * + * \p X may be aliased to \p A, but not to \p N or \p RR. + * + * \param[out] X The modular inverse of \p A with respect to \p N. + * Will be in Montgomery form. + * \param[in] A The number to calculate the modular inverse of. + * Must be in Montgomery form. Must not be 0. + * \param[in] N The modulus, as a little-endian array of length \p AN_limbs. + * Must be prime. + * \param AN_limbs The number of limbs in \p A, \p N and \p RR. + * \param[in] RR The precomputed residue of 2^{2*biL} modulo N, as a little- + * endian array of length \p AN_limbs. + * \param[in,out] T Temporary storage of at least the number of limbs returned + * by `mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_inv_prime_working_limbs()`. + * Its initial content is unused and its final content is + * indeterminate. + * It must not alias or otherwise overlap any of the other + * parameters. + * It is up to the caller to zeroize \p T when it is no + * longer needed, and before freeing it if it was dynamically + * allocated. + */ +void mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_inv_prime(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *A, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *N, + size_t AN_limbs, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *RR, + mbedtls_mpi_uint *T); + +/** + * \brief Perform a known-size modular addition. + * + * Calculate `A + B modulo N`. + * + * The number of limbs in each operand, and the result, is given by the + * modulus \p N. + * + * \p X may be aliased to \p A or \p B, or even both, but may not overlap + * either otherwise. + * + * \param[out] X The result of the modular addition. + * \param[in] A Little-endian presentation of the left operand. This + * must be smaller than \p N. + * \param[in] B Little-endian presentation of the right operand. This + * must be smaller than \p N. + * \param[in] N The address of the modulus. + */ +void mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_add(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *A, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *B, + const mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *N); + +/** Convert an MPI from canonical representation (little-endian limb array) + * to the representation associated with the modulus. + * + * \param[in,out] X The limb array to convert. + * It must have as many limbs as \p N. + * It is converted in place. + * If this function returns an error, the content of \p X + * is unspecified. + * \param[in] N The modulus structure. + * + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * Otherwise an \c MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_xxx error code. + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_canonical_to_modulus_rep( + mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, + const mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *N); + +/** Convert an MPI from the representation associated with the modulus + * to canonical representation (little-endian limb array). + * + * \param[in,out] X The limb array to convert. + * It must have as many limbs as \p N. + * It is converted in place. + * If this function returns an error, the content of \p X + * is unspecified. + * \param[in] N The modulus structure. + * + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * Otherwise an \c MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_xxx error code. + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_modulus_to_canonical_rep( + mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, + const mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *N); + +/** Generate a random number uniformly in a range. + * + * This function generates a random number between \p min inclusive and + * \p N exclusive. + * + * The procedure complies with RFC 6979 §3.3 (deterministic ECDSA) + * when the RNG is a suitably parametrized instance of HMAC_DRBG + * and \p min is \c 1. + * + * \note There are `N - min` possible outputs. The lower bound + * \p min can be reached, but the upper bound \p N cannot. + * + * \param X The destination MPI, in canonical representation modulo \p N. + * It must not be aliased with \p N or otherwise overlap it. + * \param min The minimum value to return. It must be strictly smaller + * than \b N. + * \param N The modulus. + * This is the upper bound of the output range, exclusive. + * \param f_rng The RNG function to use. This must not be \c NULL. + * \param p_rng The RNG parameter to be passed to \p f_rng. + * + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NOT_ACCEPTABLE if the implementation was + * unable to find a suitable value within a limited number + * of attempts. This has a negligible probability if \p N + * is significantly larger than \p min, which is the case + * for all usual cryptographic applications. + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_random(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, + mbedtls_mpi_uint min, + const mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *N, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng); + +/** Convert an MPI into Montgomery form. + * + * \param X The address of the MPI. + * Must have the same number of limbs as \p N. + * \param N The address of the modulus, which gives the size of + * the base `R` = 2^(biL*N->limbs). + * + * \return \c 0 if successful. + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_to_mont_rep(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, + const mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *N); + +/** Convert an MPI back from Montgomery representation. + * + * \param X The address of the MPI. + * Must have the same number of limbs as \p N. + * \param N The address of the modulus, which gives the size of + * the base `R`= 2^(biL*N->limbs). + * + * \return \c 0 if successful. + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_from_mont_rep(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, + const mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *N); + +/** \brief Perform fixed width modular negation. + * + * The size of the operation is determined by \p N. \p A must have + * the same number of limbs as \p N. + * + * \p X may be aliased to \p A. + * + * \param[out] X The result of the modular negation. + * This must be initialized. + * \param[in] A Little-endian presentation of the input operand. This + * must be less than or equal to \p N. + * \param[in] N The modulus to use. + */ +void mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_neg(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *A, + const mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *N); + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_MOD_RAW_H */ diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/bignum_mod_raw_invasive.h b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/bignum_mod_raw_invasive.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..94a0d06cf0f8 --- /dev/null +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/bignum_mod_raw_invasive.h @@ -0,0 +1,34 @@ +/** + * \file bignum_mod_raw_invasive.h + * + * \brief Function declarations for invasive functions of Low-level + * modular bignum. + */ +/** + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +#ifndef MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_MOD_RAW_INVASIVE_H +#define MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_MOD_RAW_INVASIVE_H + +#include "common.h" +#include "mbedtls/bignum.h" +#include "bignum_mod.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS) + +/** Convert the result of a quasi-reduction to its canonical representative. + * + * \param[in,out] X The address of the MPI to be converted. Must have the + * same number of limbs as \p N. The input value must + * be in range 0 <= X < 2N. + * \param[in] N The address of the modulus. + */ +MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE +void mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_fix_quasi_reduction(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, + const mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *N); + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_MOD_RAW_INVASIVE_H */ diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/block_cipher.c b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/block_cipher.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..04cd7fb444a1 --- /dev/null +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/block_cipher.c @@ -0,0 +1,203 @@ +/** + * \file block_cipher.c + * + * \brief Lightweight abstraction layer for block ciphers with 128 bit blocks, + * for use by the GCM and CCM modules. + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_SOME_PSA) +#include "psa/crypto.h" +#include "psa_crypto_core.h" +#include "psa_util_internal.h" +#endif + +#include "block_cipher_internal.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_C) + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_SOME_PSA) +static psa_key_type_t psa_key_type_from_block_cipher_id(mbedtls_block_cipher_id_t cipher_id) +{ + switch (cipher_id) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_AES_VIA_PSA) + case MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_ID_AES: + return PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_ARIA_VIA_PSA) + case MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_ID_ARIA: + return PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_VIA_PSA) + case MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_ID_CAMELLIA: + return PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA; +#endif + default: + return PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE; + } +} + +static int mbedtls_cipher_error_from_psa(psa_status_t status) +{ + return PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR_LIST(status, psa_to_cipher_errors, + psa_generic_status_to_mbedtls); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_SOME_PSA */ + +void mbedtls_block_cipher_free(mbedtls_block_cipher_context_t *ctx) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_SOME_PSA) + if (ctx->engine == MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_ENGINE_PSA) { + psa_destroy_key(ctx->psa_key_id); + return; + } +#endif + switch (ctx->id) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) + case MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_ID_AES: + mbedtls_aes_free(&ctx->ctx.aes); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARIA_C) + case MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_ID_ARIA: + mbedtls_aria_free(&ctx->ctx.aria); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C) + case MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_ID_CAMELLIA: + mbedtls_camellia_free(&ctx->ctx.camellia); + break; +#endif + default: + break; + } + ctx->id = MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_ID_NONE; +} + +int mbedtls_block_cipher_setup(mbedtls_block_cipher_context_t *ctx, + mbedtls_cipher_id_t cipher_id) +{ + ctx->id = (cipher_id == MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES) ? MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_ID_AES : + (cipher_id == MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_ARIA) ? MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_ID_ARIA : + (cipher_id == MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_CAMELLIA) ? MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_ID_CAMELLIA : + MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_ID_NONE; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_SOME_PSA) + psa_key_type_t psa_key_type = psa_key_type_from_block_cipher_id(ctx->id); + if (psa_key_type != PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE && + psa_can_do_cipher(psa_key_type, PSA_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING)) { + ctx->engine = MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_ENGINE_PSA; + return 0; + } + ctx->engine = MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_ENGINE_LEGACY; +#endif + + switch (ctx->id) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) + case MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_ID_AES: + mbedtls_aes_init(&ctx->ctx.aes); + return 0; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARIA_C) + case MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_ID_ARIA: + mbedtls_aria_init(&ctx->ctx.aria); + return 0; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C) + case MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_ID_CAMELLIA: + mbedtls_camellia_init(&ctx->ctx.camellia); + return 0; +#endif + default: + ctx->id = MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_ID_NONE; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } +} + +int mbedtls_block_cipher_setkey(mbedtls_block_cipher_context_t *ctx, + const unsigned char *key, + unsigned key_bitlen) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_SOME_PSA) + if (ctx->engine == MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_ENGINE_PSA) { + psa_key_attributes_t key_attr = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + psa_status_t status; + + psa_set_key_type(&key_attr, psa_key_type_from_block_cipher_id(ctx->id)); + psa_set_key_bits(&key_attr, key_bitlen); + psa_set_key_algorithm(&key_attr, PSA_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING); + psa_set_key_usage_flags(&key_attr, PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT); + + status = psa_import_key(&key_attr, key, PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(key_bitlen), &ctx->psa_key_id); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return mbedtls_cipher_error_from_psa(status); + } + psa_reset_key_attributes(&key_attr); + + return 0; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_SOME_PSA */ + + switch (ctx->id) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) + case MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_ID_AES: + return mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc(&ctx->ctx.aes, key, key_bitlen); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARIA_C) + case MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_ID_ARIA: + return mbedtls_aria_setkey_enc(&ctx->ctx.aria, key, key_bitlen); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C) + case MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_ID_CAMELLIA: + return mbedtls_camellia_setkey_enc(&ctx->ctx.camellia, key, key_bitlen); +#endif + default: + return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_INVALID_CONTEXT; + } +} + +int mbedtls_block_cipher_encrypt(mbedtls_block_cipher_context_t *ctx, + const unsigned char input[16], + unsigned char output[16]) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_SOME_PSA) + if (ctx->engine == MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_ENGINE_PSA) { + psa_status_t status; + size_t olen; + + status = psa_cipher_encrypt(ctx->psa_key_id, PSA_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING, + input, 16, output, 16, &olen); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return mbedtls_cipher_error_from_psa(status); + } + return 0; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_SOME_PSA */ + + switch (ctx->id) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) + case MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_ID_AES: + return mbedtls_aes_crypt_ecb(&ctx->ctx.aes, MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT, + input, output); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARIA_C) + case MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_ID_ARIA: + return mbedtls_aria_crypt_ecb(&ctx->ctx.aria, input, output); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C) + case MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_ID_CAMELLIA: + return mbedtls_camellia_crypt_ecb(&ctx->ctx.camellia, + MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_ENCRYPT, + input, output); +#endif + default: + return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_INVALID_CONTEXT; + } +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_C */ diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/block_cipher_internal.h b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/block_cipher_internal.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..c57338b751e0 --- /dev/null +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/block_cipher_internal.h @@ -0,0 +1,99 @@ +/** + * \file block_cipher_internal.h + * + * \brief Lightweight abstraction layer for block ciphers with 128 bit blocks, + * for use by the GCM and CCM modules. + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ +#ifndef MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_INTERNAL_H +#define MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_INTERNAL_H + +#include "mbedtls/build_info.h" + +#include "mbedtls/cipher.h" + +#include "mbedtls/block_cipher.h" + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +/** + * \brief Initialize the context. + * This must be the first API call before using the context. + * + * \param ctx The context to initialize. + */ +static inline void mbedtls_block_cipher_init(mbedtls_block_cipher_context_t *ctx) +{ + memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(*ctx)); +} + +/** + * \brief Set the block cipher to use with this context. + * This must be called after mbedtls_block_cipher_init(). + * + * \param ctx The context to set up. + * \param cipher_id The identifier of the cipher to use. + * This must be either AES, ARIA or Camellia. + * Warning: this is a ::mbedtls_cipher_id_t, + * not a ::mbedtls_block_cipher_id_t! + * + * \retval \c 0 on success. + * \retval #MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA if \p cipher_id was + * invalid. + */ +int mbedtls_block_cipher_setup(mbedtls_block_cipher_context_t *ctx, + mbedtls_cipher_id_t cipher_id); + +/** + * \brief Set the key into the context. + * + * \param ctx The context to configure. + * \param key The buffer holding the key material. + * \param key_bitlen The size of the key in bits. + * + * \retval \c 0 on success. + * \retval #MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_INVALID_CONTEXT if the context was not + * properly set up before calling this function. + * \retval One of #MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH, + * #MBEDTLS_ERR_ARIA_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + * #MBEDTLS_ERR_CAMELLIA_BAD_INPUT_DATA if \p key_bitlen is + * invalid. + */ +int mbedtls_block_cipher_setkey(mbedtls_block_cipher_context_t *ctx, + const unsigned char *key, + unsigned key_bitlen); + +/** + * \brief Encrypt one block (16 bytes) with the configured key. + * + * \param ctx The context holding the key. + * \param input The buffer holding the input block. Must be 16 bytes. + * \param output The buffer to which the output block will be written. + * Must be writable and 16 bytes long. + * This must either not overlap with \p input, or be equal. + * + * \retval \c 0 on success. + * \retval #MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_INVALID_CONTEXT if the context was not + * properly set up before calling this function. + * \retval Another negative value if encryption failed. + */ +int mbedtls_block_cipher_encrypt(mbedtls_block_cipher_context_t *ctx, + const unsigned char input[16], + unsigned char output[16]); +/** + * \brief Clear the context. + * + * \param ctx The context to clear. + */ +void mbedtls_block_cipher_free(mbedtls_block_cipher_context_t *ctx); + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_INTERNAL_H */ diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/blowfish.c b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/blowfish.c deleted file mode 100644 index d90456b961a0..000000000000 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/blowfish.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,644 +0,0 @@ -/* - * Blowfish implementation - * - * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later - */ -/* - * The Blowfish block cipher was designed by Bruce Schneier in 1993. - * http://www.schneier.com/blowfish.html - * http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Blowfish_%28cipher%29 - * - */ - -#include "common.h" - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C) - -#include "mbedtls/blowfish.h" -#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" - -#include - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_ALT) - -/* Parameter validation macros */ -#define BLOWFISH_VALIDATE_RET(cond) \ - MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE_RET(cond, MBEDTLS_ERR_BLOWFISH_BAD_INPUT_DATA) -#define BLOWFISH_VALIDATE(cond) \ - MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE(cond) - -static const uint32_t P[MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_ROUNDS + 2] = { - 0x243F6A88L, 0x85A308D3L, 0x13198A2EL, 0x03707344L, - 0xA4093822L, 0x299F31D0L, 0x082EFA98L, 0xEC4E6C89L, - 0x452821E6L, 0x38D01377L, 0xBE5466CFL, 0x34E90C6CL, - 0xC0AC29B7L, 0xC97C50DDL, 0x3F84D5B5L, 0xB5470917L, - 0x9216D5D9L, 0x8979FB1BL -}; - -/* declarations of data at the end of this file */ -static const uint32_t S[4][256]; - -static uint32_t F(mbedtls_blowfish_context *ctx, uint32_t x) -{ - unsigned short a, b, c, d; - uint32_t y; - - d = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(x); - x >>= 8; - c = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(x); - x >>= 8; - b = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(x); - x >>= 8; - a = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(x); - y = ctx->S[0][a] + ctx->S[1][b]; - y = y ^ ctx->S[2][c]; - y = y + ctx->S[3][d]; - - return y; -} - -static void blowfish_enc(mbedtls_blowfish_context *ctx, uint32_t *xl, uint32_t *xr) -{ - uint32_t Xl, Xr, temp; - short i; - - Xl = *xl; - Xr = *xr; - - for (i = 0; i < MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_ROUNDS; ++i) { - Xl = Xl ^ ctx->P[i]; - Xr = F(ctx, Xl) ^ Xr; - - temp = Xl; - Xl = Xr; - Xr = temp; - } - - temp = Xl; - Xl = Xr; - Xr = temp; - - Xr = Xr ^ ctx->P[MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_ROUNDS]; - Xl = Xl ^ ctx->P[MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_ROUNDS + 1]; - - *xl = Xl; - *xr = Xr; -} - -static void blowfish_dec(mbedtls_blowfish_context *ctx, uint32_t *xl, uint32_t *xr) -{ - uint32_t Xl, Xr, temp; - short i; - - Xl = *xl; - Xr = *xr; - - for (i = MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_ROUNDS + 1; i > 1; --i) { - Xl = Xl ^ ctx->P[i]; - Xr = F(ctx, Xl) ^ Xr; - - temp = Xl; - Xl = Xr; - Xr = temp; - } - - temp = Xl; - Xl = Xr; - Xr = temp; - - Xr = Xr ^ ctx->P[1]; - Xl = Xl ^ ctx->P[0]; - - *xl = Xl; - *xr = Xr; -} - -void mbedtls_blowfish_init(mbedtls_blowfish_context *ctx) -{ - BLOWFISH_VALIDATE(ctx != NULL); - memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_blowfish_context)); -} - -void mbedtls_blowfish_free(mbedtls_blowfish_context *ctx) -{ - if (ctx == NULL) { - return; - } - - mbedtls_platform_zeroize(ctx, sizeof(mbedtls_blowfish_context)); -} - -/* - * Blowfish key schedule - */ -int mbedtls_blowfish_setkey(mbedtls_blowfish_context *ctx, - const unsigned char *key, - unsigned int keybits) -{ - unsigned int i, j, k; - uint32_t data, datal, datar; - BLOWFISH_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - BLOWFISH_VALIDATE_RET(key != NULL); - - if (keybits < MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_MIN_KEY_BITS || - keybits > MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_MAX_KEY_BITS || - keybits % 8 != 0) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_BLOWFISH_BAD_INPUT_DATA; - } - - keybits >>= 3; - - for (i = 0; i < 4; i++) { - for (j = 0; j < 256; j++) { - ctx->S[i][j] = S[i][j]; - } - } - - j = 0; - for (i = 0; i < MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_ROUNDS + 2; ++i) { - data = 0x00000000; - for (k = 0; k < 4; ++k) { - data = (data << 8) | key[j++]; - if (j >= keybits) { - j = 0; - } - } - ctx->P[i] = P[i] ^ data; - } - - datal = 0x00000000; - datar = 0x00000000; - - for (i = 0; i < MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_ROUNDS + 2; i += 2) { - blowfish_enc(ctx, &datal, &datar); - ctx->P[i] = datal; - ctx->P[i + 1] = datar; - } - - for (i = 0; i < 4; i++) { - for (j = 0; j < 256; j += 2) { - blowfish_enc(ctx, &datal, &datar); - ctx->S[i][j] = datal; - ctx->S[i][j + 1] = datar; - } - } - return 0; -} - -/* - * Blowfish-ECB block encryption/decryption - */ -int mbedtls_blowfish_crypt_ecb(mbedtls_blowfish_context *ctx, - int mode, - const unsigned char input[MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_BLOCKSIZE], - unsigned char output[MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_BLOCKSIZE]) -{ - uint32_t X0, X1; - BLOWFISH_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - BLOWFISH_VALIDATE_RET(mode == MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_ENCRYPT || - mode == MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_DECRYPT); - BLOWFISH_VALIDATE_RET(input != NULL); - BLOWFISH_VALIDATE_RET(output != NULL); - - X0 = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE(input, 0); - X1 = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE(input, 4); - - if (mode == MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_DECRYPT) { - blowfish_dec(ctx, &X0, &X1); - } else { /* MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_ENCRYPT */ - blowfish_enc(ctx, &X0, &X1); - } - - MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE(X0, output, 0); - MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE(X1, output, 4); - - return 0; -} - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) -/* - * Blowfish-CBC buffer encryption/decryption - */ -int mbedtls_blowfish_crypt_cbc(mbedtls_blowfish_context *ctx, - int mode, - size_t length, - unsigned char iv[MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_BLOCKSIZE], - const unsigned char *input, - unsigned char *output) -{ - int i; - unsigned char temp[MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_BLOCKSIZE]; - BLOWFISH_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - BLOWFISH_VALIDATE_RET(mode == MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_ENCRYPT || - mode == MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_DECRYPT); - BLOWFISH_VALIDATE_RET(iv != NULL); - BLOWFISH_VALIDATE_RET(length == 0 || input != NULL); - BLOWFISH_VALIDATE_RET(length == 0 || output != NULL); - - if (length % MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_BLOCKSIZE) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_BLOWFISH_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH; - } - - if (mode == MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_DECRYPT) { - while (length > 0) { - memcpy(temp, input, MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_BLOCKSIZE); - mbedtls_blowfish_crypt_ecb(ctx, mode, input, output); - - for (i = 0; i < MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_BLOCKSIZE; i++) { - output[i] = (unsigned char) (output[i] ^ iv[i]); - } - - memcpy(iv, temp, MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_BLOCKSIZE); - - input += MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_BLOCKSIZE; - output += MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_BLOCKSIZE; - length -= MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_BLOCKSIZE; - } - } else { - while (length > 0) { - for (i = 0; i < MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_BLOCKSIZE; i++) { - output[i] = (unsigned char) (input[i] ^ iv[i]); - } - - mbedtls_blowfish_crypt_ecb(ctx, mode, output, output); - memcpy(iv, output, MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_BLOCKSIZE); - - input += MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_BLOCKSIZE; - output += MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_BLOCKSIZE; - length -= MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_BLOCKSIZE; - } - } - - return 0; -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB) -/* - * Blowfish CFB buffer encryption/decryption - */ -int mbedtls_blowfish_crypt_cfb64(mbedtls_blowfish_context *ctx, - int mode, - size_t length, - size_t *iv_off, - unsigned char iv[MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_BLOCKSIZE], - const unsigned char *input, - unsigned char *output) -{ - int c; - size_t n; - - BLOWFISH_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - BLOWFISH_VALIDATE_RET(mode == MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_ENCRYPT || - mode == MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_DECRYPT); - BLOWFISH_VALIDATE_RET(iv != NULL); - BLOWFISH_VALIDATE_RET(iv_off != NULL); - BLOWFISH_VALIDATE_RET(length == 0 || input != NULL); - BLOWFISH_VALIDATE_RET(length == 0 || output != NULL); - - n = *iv_off; - if (n >= 8) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_BLOWFISH_BAD_INPUT_DATA; - } - - if (mode == MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_DECRYPT) { - while (length--) { - if (n == 0) { - mbedtls_blowfish_crypt_ecb(ctx, MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_ENCRYPT, iv, iv); - } - - c = *input++; - *output++ = (unsigned char) (c ^ iv[n]); - iv[n] = (unsigned char) c; - - n = (n + 1) % MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_BLOCKSIZE; - } - } else { - while (length--) { - if (n == 0) { - mbedtls_blowfish_crypt_ecb(ctx, MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_ENCRYPT, iv, iv); - } - - iv[n] = *output++ = (unsigned char) (iv[n] ^ *input++); - - n = (n + 1) % MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_BLOCKSIZE; - } - } - - *iv_off = n; - - return 0; -} -#endif /*MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR) -/* - * Blowfish CTR buffer encryption/decryption - */ -int mbedtls_blowfish_crypt_ctr(mbedtls_blowfish_context *ctx, - size_t length, - size_t *nc_off, - unsigned char nonce_counter[MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_BLOCKSIZE], - unsigned char stream_block[MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_BLOCKSIZE], - const unsigned char *input, - unsigned char *output) -{ - int c, i; - size_t n; - BLOWFISH_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - BLOWFISH_VALIDATE_RET(nonce_counter != NULL); - BLOWFISH_VALIDATE_RET(stream_block != NULL); - BLOWFISH_VALIDATE_RET(nc_off != NULL); - BLOWFISH_VALIDATE_RET(length == 0 || input != NULL); - BLOWFISH_VALIDATE_RET(length == 0 || output != NULL); - - n = *nc_off; - if (n >= 8) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_BLOWFISH_BAD_INPUT_DATA; - } - - while (length--) { - if (n == 0) { - mbedtls_blowfish_crypt_ecb(ctx, MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_ENCRYPT, nonce_counter, - stream_block); - - for (i = MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_BLOCKSIZE; i > 0; i--) { - if (++nonce_counter[i - 1] != 0) { - break; - } - } - } - c = *input++; - *output++ = (unsigned char) (c ^ stream_block[n]); - - n = (n + 1) % MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_BLOCKSIZE; - } - - *nc_off = n; - - return 0; -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR */ - -static const uint32_t S[4][256] = { - { 0xD1310BA6L, 0x98DFB5ACL, 0x2FFD72DBL, 0xD01ADFB7L, - 0xB8E1AFEDL, 0x6A267E96L, 0xBA7C9045L, 0xF12C7F99L, - 0x24A19947L, 0xB3916CF7L, 0x0801F2E2L, 0x858EFC16L, - 0x636920D8L, 0x71574E69L, 0xA458FEA3L, 0xF4933D7EL, - 0x0D95748FL, 0x728EB658L, 0x718BCD58L, 0x82154AEEL, - 0x7B54A41DL, 0xC25A59B5L, 0x9C30D539L, 0x2AF26013L, - 0xC5D1B023L, 0x286085F0L, 0xCA417918L, 0xB8DB38EFL, - 0x8E79DCB0L, 0x603A180EL, 0x6C9E0E8BL, 0xB01E8A3EL, - 0xD71577C1L, 0xBD314B27L, 0x78AF2FDAL, 0x55605C60L, - 0xE65525F3L, 0xAA55AB94L, 0x57489862L, 0x63E81440L, - 0x55CA396AL, 0x2AAB10B6L, 0xB4CC5C34L, 0x1141E8CEL, - 0xA15486AFL, 0x7C72E993L, 0xB3EE1411L, 0x636FBC2AL, - 0x2BA9C55DL, 0x741831F6L, 0xCE5C3E16L, 0x9B87931EL, - 0xAFD6BA33L, 0x6C24CF5CL, 0x7A325381L, 0x28958677L, - 0x3B8F4898L, 0x6B4BB9AFL, 0xC4BFE81BL, 0x66282193L, - 0x61D809CCL, 0xFB21A991L, 0x487CAC60L, 0x5DEC8032L, - 0xEF845D5DL, 0xE98575B1L, 0xDC262302L, 0xEB651B88L, - 0x23893E81L, 0xD396ACC5L, 0x0F6D6FF3L, 0x83F44239L, - 0x2E0B4482L, 0xA4842004L, 0x69C8F04AL, 0x9E1F9B5EL, - 0x21C66842L, 0xF6E96C9AL, 0x670C9C61L, 0xABD388F0L, - 0x6A51A0D2L, 0xD8542F68L, 0x960FA728L, 0xAB5133A3L, - 0x6EEF0B6CL, 0x137A3BE4L, 0xBA3BF050L, 0x7EFB2A98L, - 0xA1F1651DL, 0x39AF0176L, 0x66CA593EL, 0x82430E88L, - 0x8CEE8619L, 0x456F9FB4L, 0x7D84A5C3L, 0x3B8B5EBEL, - 0xE06F75D8L, 0x85C12073L, 0x401A449FL, 0x56C16AA6L, - 0x4ED3AA62L, 0x363F7706L, 0x1BFEDF72L, 0x429B023DL, - 0x37D0D724L, 0xD00A1248L, 0xDB0FEAD3L, 0x49F1C09BL, - 0x075372C9L, 0x80991B7BL, 0x25D479D8L, 0xF6E8DEF7L, - 0xE3FE501AL, 0xB6794C3BL, 0x976CE0BDL, 0x04C006BAL, - 0xC1A94FB6L, 0x409F60C4L, 0x5E5C9EC2L, 0x196A2463L, - 0x68FB6FAFL, 0x3E6C53B5L, 0x1339B2EBL, 0x3B52EC6FL, - 0x6DFC511FL, 0x9B30952CL, 0xCC814544L, 0xAF5EBD09L, - 0xBEE3D004L, 0xDE334AFDL, 0x660F2807L, 0x192E4BB3L, - 0xC0CBA857L, 0x45C8740FL, 0xD20B5F39L, 0xB9D3FBDBL, - 0x5579C0BDL, 0x1A60320AL, 0xD6A100C6L, 0x402C7279L, - 0x679F25FEL, 0xFB1FA3CCL, 0x8EA5E9F8L, 0xDB3222F8L, - 0x3C7516DFL, 0xFD616B15L, 0x2F501EC8L, 0xAD0552ABL, - 0x323DB5FAL, 0xFD238760L, 0x53317B48L, 0x3E00DF82L, - 0x9E5C57BBL, 0xCA6F8CA0L, 0x1A87562EL, 0xDF1769DBL, - 0xD542A8F6L, 0x287EFFC3L, 0xAC6732C6L, 0x8C4F5573L, - 0x695B27B0L, 0xBBCA58C8L, 0xE1FFA35DL, 0xB8F011A0L, - 0x10FA3D98L, 0xFD2183B8L, 0x4AFCB56CL, 0x2DD1D35BL, - 0x9A53E479L, 0xB6F84565L, 0xD28E49BCL, 0x4BFB9790L, - 0xE1DDF2DAL, 0xA4CB7E33L, 0x62FB1341L, 0xCEE4C6E8L, - 0xEF20CADAL, 0x36774C01L, 0xD07E9EFEL, 0x2BF11FB4L, - 0x95DBDA4DL, 0xAE909198L, 0xEAAD8E71L, 0x6B93D5A0L, - 0xD08ED1D0L, 0xAFC725E0L, 0x8E3C5B2FL, 0x8E7594B7L, - 0x8FF6E2FBL, 0xF2122B64L, 0x8888B812L, 0x900DF01CL, - 0x4FAD5EA0L, 0x688FC31CL, 0xD1CFF191L, 0xB3A8C1ADL, - 0x2F2F2218L, 0xBE0E1777L, 0xEA752DFEL, 0x8B021FA1L, - 0xE5A0CC0FL, 0xB56F74E8L, 0x18ACF3D6L, 0xCE89E299L, - 0xB4A84FE0L, 0xFD13E0B7L, 0x7CC43B81L, 0xD2ADA8D9L, - 0x165FA266L, 0x80957705L, 0x93CC7314L, 0x211A1477L, - 0xE6AD2065L, 0x77B5FA86L, 0xC75442F5L, 0xFB9D35CFL, - 0xEBCDAF0CL, 0x7B3E89A0L, 0xD6411BD3L, 0xAE1E7E49L, - 0x00250E2DL, 0x2071B35EL, 0x226800BBL, 0x57B8E0AFL, - 0x2464369BL, 0xF009B91EL, 0x5563911DL, 0x59DFA6AAL, - 0x78C14389L, 0xD95A537FL, 0x207D5BA2L, 0x02E5B9C5L, - 0x83260376L, 0x6295CFA9L, 0x11C81968L, 0x4E734A41L, - 0xB3472DCAL, 0x7B14A94AL, 0x1B510052L, 0x9A532915L, - 0xD60F573FL, 0xBC9BC6E4L, 0x2B60A476L, 0x81E67400L, - 0x08BA6FB5L, 0x571BE91FL, 0xF296EC6BL, 0x2A0DD915L, - 0xB6636521L, 0xE7B9F9B6L, 0xFF34052EL, 0xC5855664L, - 0x53B02D5DL, 0xA99F8FA1L, 0x08BA4799L, 0x6E85076AL }, - { 0x4B7A70E9L, 0xB5B32944L, 0xDB75092EL, 0xC4192623L, - 0xAD6EA6B0L, 0x49A7DF7DL, 0x9CEE60B8L, 0x8FEDB266L, - 0xECAA8C71L, 0x699A17FFL, 0x5664526CL, 0xC2B19EE1L, - 0x193602A5L, 0x75094C29L, 0xA0591340L, 0xE4183A3EL, - 0x3F54989AL, 0x5B429D65L, 0x6B8FE4D6L, 0x99F73FD6L, - 0xA1D29C07L, 0xEFE830F5L, 0x4D2D38E6L, 0xF0255DC1L, - 0x4CDD2086L, 0x8470EB26L, 0x6382E9C6L, 0x021ECC5EL, - 0x09686B3FL, 0x3EBAEFC9L, 0x3C971814L, 0x6B6A70A1L, - 0x687F3584L, 0x52A0E286L, 0xB79C5305L, 0xAA500737L, - 0x3E07841CL, 0x7FDEAE5CL, 0x8E7D44ECL, 0x5716F2B8L, - 0xB03ADA37L, 0xF0500C0DL, 0xF01C1F04L, 0x0200B3FFL, - 0xAE0CF51AL, 0x3CB574B2L, 0x25837A58L, 0xDC0921BDL, - 0xD19113F9L, 0x7CA92FF6L, 0x94324773L, 0x22F54701L, - 0x3AE5E581L, 0x37C2DADCL, 0xC8B57634L, 0x9AF3DDA7L, - 0xA9446146L, 0x0FD0030EL, 0xECC8C73EL, 0xA4751E41L, - 0xE238CD99L, 0x3BEA0E2FL, 0x3280BBA1L, 0x183EB331L, - 0x4E548B38L, 0x4F6DB908L, 0x6F420D03L, 0xF60A04BFL, - 0x2CB81290L, 0x24977C79L, 0x5679B072L, 0xBCAF89AFL, - 0xDE9A771FL, 0xD9930810L, 0xB38BAE12L, 0xDCCF3F2EL, - 0x5512721FL, 0x2E6B7124L, 0x501ADDE6L, 0x9F84CD87L, - 0x7A584718L, 0x7408DA17L, 0xBC9F9ABCL, 0xE94B7D8CL, - 0xEC7AEC3AL, 0xDB851DFAL, 0x63094366L, 0xC464C3D2L, - 0xEF1C1847L, 0x3215D908L, 0xDD433B37L, 0x24C2BA16L, - 0x12A14D43L, 0x2A65C451L, 0x50940002L, 0x133AE4DDL, - 0x71DFF89EL, 0x10314E55L, 0x81AC77D6L, 0x5F11199BL, - 0x043556F1L, 0xD7A3C76BL, 0x3C11183BL, 0x5924A509L, - 0xF28FE6EDL, 0x97F1FBFAL, 0x9EBABF2CL, 0x1E153C6EL, - 0x86E34570L, 0xEAE96FB1L, 0x860E5E0AL, 0x5A3E2AB3L, - 0x771FE71CL, 0x4E3D06FAL, 0x2965DCB9L, 0x99E71D0FL, - 0x803E89D6L, 0x5266C825L, 0x2E4CC978L, 0x9C10B36AL, - 0xC6150EBAL, 0x94E2EA78L, 0xA5FC3C53L, 0x1E0A2DF4L, - 0xF2F74EA7L, 0x361D2B3DL, 0x1939260FL, 0x19C27960L, - 0x5223A708L, 0xF71312B6L, 0xEBADFE6EL, 0xEAC31F66L, - 0xE3BC4595L, 0xA67BC883L, 0xB17F37D1L, 0x018CFF28L, - 0xC332DDEFL, 0xBE6C5AA5L, 0x65582185L, 0x68AB9802L, - 0xEECEA50FL, 0xDB2F953BL, 0x2AEF7DADL, 0x5B6E2F84L, - 0x1521B628L, 0x29076170L, 0xECDD4775L, 0x619F1510L, - 0x13CCA830L, 0xEB61BD96L, 0x0334FE1EL, 0xAA0363CFL, - 0xB5735C90L, 0x4C70A239L, 0xD59E9E0BL, 0xCBAADE14L, - 0xEECC86BCL, 0x60622CA7L, 0x9CAB5CABL, 0xB2F3846EL, - 0x648B1EAFL, 0x19BDF0CAL, 0xA02369B9L, 0x655ABB50L, - 0x40685A32L, 0x3C2AB4B3L, 0x319EE9D5L, 0xC021B8F7L, - 0x9B540B19L, 0x875FA099L, 0x95F7997EL, 0x623D7DA8L, - 0xF837889AL, 0x97E32D77L, 0x11ED935FL, 0x16681281L, - 0x0E358829L, 0xC7E61FD6L, 0x96DEDFA1L, 0x7858BA99L, - 0x57F584A5L, 0x1B227263L, 0x9B83C3FFL, 0x1AC24696L, - 0xCDB30AEBL, 0x532E3054L, 0x8FD948E4L, 0x6DBC3128L, - 0x58EBF2EFL, 0x34C6FFEAL, 0xFE28ED61L, 0xEE7C3C73L, - 0x5D4A14D9L, 0xE864B7E3L, 0x42105D14L, 0x203E13E0L, - 0x45EEE2B6L, 0xA3AAABEAL, 0xDB6C4F15L, 0xFACB4FD0L, - 0xC742F442L, 0xEF6ABBB5L, 0x654F3B1DL, 0x41CD2105L, - 0xD81E799EL, 0x86854DC7L, 0xE44B476AL, 0x3D816250L, - 0xCF62A1F2L, 0x5B8D2646L, 0xFC8883A0L, 0xC1C7B6A3L, - 0x7F1524C3L, 0x69CB7492L, 0x47848A0BL, 0x5692B285L, - 0x095BBF00L, 0xAD19489DL, 0x1462B174L, 0x23820E00L, - 0x58428D2AL, 0x0C55F5EAL, 0x1DADF43EL, 0x233F7061L, - 0x3372F092L, 0x8D937E41L, 0xD65FECF1L, 0x6C223BDBL, - 0x7CDE3759L, 0xCBEE7460L, 0x4085F2A7L, 0xCE77326EL, - 0xA6078084L, 0x19F8509EL, 0xE8EFD855L, 0x61D99735L, - 0xA969A7AAL, 0xC50C06C2L, 0x5A04ABFCL, 0x800BCADCL, - 0x9E447A2EL, 0xC3453484L, 0xFDD56705L, 0x0E1E9EC9L, - 0xDB73DBD3L, 0x105588CDL, 0x675FDA79L, 0xE3674340L, - 0xC5C43465L, 0x713E38D8L, 0x3D28F89EL, 0xF16DFF20L, - 0x153E21E7L, 0x8FB03D4AL, 0xE6E39F2BL, 0xDB83ADF7L }, - { 0xE93D5A68L, 0x948140F7L, 0xF64C261CL, 0x94692934L, - 0x411520F7L, 0x7602D4F7L, 0xBCF46B2EL, 0xD4A20068L, - 0xD4082471L, 0x3320F46AL, 0x43B7D4B7L, 0x500061AFL, - 0x1E39F62EL, 0x97244546L, 0x14214F74L, 0xBF8B8840L, - 0x4D95FC1DL, 0x96B591AFL, 0x70F4DDD3L, 0x66A02F45L, - 0xBFBC09ECL, 0x03BD9785L, 0x7FAC6DD0L, 0x31CB8504L, - 0x96EB27B3L, 0x55FD3941L, 0xDA2547E6L, 0xABCA0A9AL, - 0x28507825L, 0x530429F4L, 0x0A2C86DAL, 0xE9B66DFBL, - 0x68DC1462L, 0xD7486900L, 0x680EC0A4L, 0x27A18DEEL, - 0x4F3FFEA2L, 0xE887AD8CL, 0xB58CE006L, 0x7AF4D6B6L, - 0xAACE1E7CL, 0xD3375FECL, 0xCE78A399L, 0x406B2A42L, - 0x20FE9E35L, 0xD9F385B9L, 0xEE39D7ABL, 0x3B124E8BL, - 0x1DC9FAF7L, 0x4B6D1856L, 0x26A36631L, 0xEAE397B2L, - 0x3A6EFA74L, 0xDD5B4332L, 0x6841E7F7L, 0xCA7820FBL, - 0xFB0AF54EL, 0xD8FEB397L, 0x454056ACL, 0xBA489527L, - 0x55533A3AL, 0x20838D87L, 0xFE6BA9B7L, 0xD096954BL, - 0x55A867BCL, 0xA1159A58L, 0xCCA92963L, 0x99E1DB33L, - 0xA62A4A56L, 0x3F3125F9L, 0x5EF47E1CL, 0x9029317CL, - 0xFDF8E802L, 0x04272F70L, 0x80BB155CL, 0x05282CE3L, - 0x95C11548L, 0xE4C66D22L, 0x48C1133FL, 0xC70F86DCL, - 0x07F9C9EEL, 0x41041F0FL, 0x404779A4L, 0x5D886E17L, - 0x325F51EBL, 0xD59BC0D1L, 0xF2BCC18FL, 0x41113564L, - 0x257B7834L, 0x602A9C60L, 0xDFF8E8A3L, 0x1F636C1BL, - 0x0E12B4C2L, 0x02E1329EL, 0xAF664FD1L, 0xCAD18115L, - 0x6B2395E0L, 0x333E92E1L, 0x3B240B62L, 0xEEBEB922L, - 0x85B2A20EL, 0xE6BA0D99L, 0xDE720C8CL, 0x2DA2F728L, - 0xD0127845L, 0x95B794FDL, 0x647D0862L, 0xE7CCF5F0L, - 0x5449A36FL, 0x877D48FAL, 0xC39DFD27L, 0xF33E8D1EL, - 0x0A476341L, 0x992EFF74L, 0x3A6F6EABL, 0xF4F8FD37L, - 0xA812DC60L, 0xA1EBDDF8L, 0x991BE14CL, 0xDB6E6B0DL, - 0xC67B5510L, 0x6D672C37L, 0x2765D43BL, 0xDCD0E804L, - 0xF1290DC7L, 0xCC00FFA3L, 0xB5390F92L, 0x690FED0BL, - 0x667B9FFBL, 0xCEDB7D9CL, 0xA091CF0BL, 0xD9155EA3L, - 0xBB132F88L, 0x515BAD24L, 0x7B9479BFL, 0x763BD6EBL, - 0x37392EB3L, 0xCC115979L, 0x8026E297L, 0xF42E312DL, - 0x6842ADA7L, 0xC66A2B3BL, 0x12754CCCL, 0x782EF11CL, - 0x6A124237L, 0xB79251E7L, 0x06A1BBE6L, 0x4BFB6350L, - 0x1A6B1018L, 0x11CAEDFAL, 0x3D25BDD8L, 0xE2E1C3C9L, - 0x44421659L, 0x0A121386L, 0xD90CEC6EL, 0xD5ABEA2AL, - 0x64AF674EL, 0xDA86A85FL, 0xBEBFE988L, 0x64E4C3FEL, - 0x9DBC8057L, 0xF0F7C086L, 0x60787BF8L, 0x6003604DL, - 0xD1FD8346L, 0xF6381FB0L, 0x7745AE04L, 0xD736FCCCL, - 0x83426B33L, 0xF01EAB71L, 0xB0804187L, 0x3C005E5FL, - 0x77A057BEL, 0xBDE8AE24L, 0x55464299L, 0xBF582E61L, - 0x4E58F48FL, 0xF2DDFDA2L, 0xF474EF38L, 0x8789BDC2L, - 0x5366F9C3L, 0xC8B38E74L, 0xB475F255L, 0x46FCD9B9L, - 0x7AEB2661L, 0x8B1DDF84L, 0x846A0E79L, 0x915F95E2L, - 0x466E598EL, 0x20B45770L, 0x8CD55591L, 0xC902DE4CL, - 0xB90BACE1L, 0xBB8205D0L, 0x11A86248L, 0x7574A99EL, - 0xB77F19B6L, 0xE0A9DC09L, 0x662D09A1L, 0xC4324633L, - 0xE85A1F02L, 0x09F0BE8CL, 0x4A99A025L, 0x1D6EFE10L, - 0x1AB93D1DL, 0x0BA5A4DFL, 0xA186F20FL, 0x2868F169L, - 0xDCB7DA83L, 0x573906FEL, 0xA1E2CE9BL, 0x4FCD7F52L, - 0x50115E01L, 0xA70683FAL, 0xA002B5C4L, 0x0DE6D027L, - 0x9AF88C27L, 0x773F8641L, 0xC3604C06L, 0x61A806B5L, - 0xF0177A28L, 0xC0F586E0L, 0x006058AAL, 0x30DC7D62L, - 0x11E69ED7L, 0x2338EA63L, 0x53C2DD94L, 0xC2C21634L, - 0xBBCBEE56L, 0x90BCB6DEL, 0xEBFC7DA1L, 0xCE591D76L, - 0x6F05E409L, 0x4B7C0188L, 0x39720A3DL, 0x7C927C24L, - 0x86E3725FL, 0x724D9DB9L, 0x1AC15BB4L, 0xD39EB8FCL, - 0xED545578L, 0x08FCA5B5L, 0xD83D7CD3L, 0x4DAD0FC4L, - 0x1E50EF5EL, 0xB161E6F8L, 0xA28514D9L, 0x6C51133CL, - 0x6FD5C7E7L, 0x56E14EC4L, 0x362ABFCEL, 0xDDC6C837L, - 0xD79A3234L, 0x92638212L, 0x670EFA8EL, 0x406000E0L }, - { 0x3A39CE37L, 0xD3FAF5CFL, 0xABC27737L, 0x5AC52D1BL, - 0x5CB0679EL, 0x4FA33742L, 0xD3822740L, 0x99BC9BBEL, - 0xD5118E9DL, 0xBF0F7315L, 0xD62D1C7EL, 0xC700C47BL, - 0xB78C1B6BL, 0x21A19045L, 0xB26EB1BEL, 0x6A366EB4L, - 0x5748AB2FL, 0xBC946E79L, 0xC6A376D2L, 0x6549C2C8L, - 0x530FF8EEL, 0x468DDE7DL, 0xD5730A1DL, 0x4CD04DC6L, - 0x2939BBDBL, 0xA9BA4650L, 0xAC9526E8L, 0xBE5EE304L, - 0xA1FAD5F0L, 0x6A2D519AL, 0x63EF8CE2L, 0x9A86EE22L, - 0xC089C2B8L, 0x43242EF6L, 0xA51E03AAL, 0x9CF2D0A4L, - 0x83C061BAL, 0x9BE96A4DL, 0x8FE51550L, 0xBA645BD6L, - 0x2826A2F9L, 0xA73A3AE1L, 0x4BA99586L, 0xEF5562E9L, - 0xC72FEFD3L, 0xF752F7DAL, 0x3F046F69L, 0x77FA0A59L, - 0x80E4A915L, 0x87B08601L, 0x9B09E6ADL, 0x3B3EE593L, - 0xE990FD5AL, 0x9E34D797L, 0x2CF0B7D9L, 0x022B8B51L, - 0x96D5AC3AL, 0x017DA67DL, 0xD1CF3ED6L, 0x7C7D2D28L, - 0x1F9F25CFL, 0xADF2B89BL, 0x5AD6B472L, 0x5A88F54CL, - 0xE029AC71L, 0xE019A5E6L, 0x47B0ACFDL, 0xED93FA9BL, - 0xE8D3C48DL, 0x283B57CCL, 0xF8D56629L, 0x79132E28L, - 0x785F0191L, 0xED756055L, 0xF7960E44L, 0xE3D35E8CL, - 0x15056DD4L, 0x88F46DBAL, 0x03A16125L, 0x0564F0BDL, - 0xC3EB9E15L, 0x3C9057A2L, 0x97271AECL, 0xA93A072AL, - 0x1B3F6D9BL, 0x1E6321F5L, 0xF59C66FBL, 0x26DCF319L, - 0x7533D928L, 0xB155FDF5L, 0x03563482L, 0x8ABA3CBBL, - 0x28517711L, 0xC20AD9F8L, 0xABCC5167L, 0xCCAD925FL, - 0x4DE81751L, 0x3830DC8EL, 0x379D5862L, 0x9320F991L, - 0xEA7A90C2L, 0xFB3E7BCEL, 0x5121CE64L, 0x774FBE32L, - 0xA8B6E37EL, 0xC3293D46L, 0x48DE5369L, 0x6413E680L, - 0xA2AE0810L, 0xDD6DB224L, 0x69852DFDL, 0x09072166L, - 0xB39A460AL, 0x6445C0DDL, 0x586CDECFL, 0x1C20C8AEL, - 0x5BBEF7DDL, 0x1B588D40L, 0xCCD2017FL, 0x6BB4E3BBL, - 0xDDA26A7EL, 0x3A59FF45L, 0x3E350A44L, 0xBCB4CDD5L, - 0x72EACEA8L, 0xFA6484BBL, 0x8D6612AEL, 0xBF3C6F47L, - 0xD29BE463L, 0x542F5D9EL, 0xAEC2771BL, 0xF64E6370L, - 0x740E0D8DL, 0xE75B1357L, 0xF8721671L, 0xAF537D5DL, - 0x4040CB08L, 0x4EB4E2CCL, 0x34D2466AL, 0x0115AF84L, - 0xE1B00428L, 0x95983A1DL, 0x06B89FB4L, 0xCE6EA048L, - 0x6F3F3B82L, 0x3520AB82L, 0x011A1D4BL, 0x277227F8L, - 0x611560B1L, 0xE7933FDCL, 0xBB3A792BL, 0x344525BDL, - 0xA08839E1L, 0x51CE794BL, 0x2F32C9B7L, 0xA01FBAC9L, - 0xE01CC87EL, 0xBCC7D1F6L, 0xCF0111C3L, 0xA1E8AAC7L, - 0x1A908749L, 0xD44FBD9AL, 0xD0DADECBL, 0xD50ADA38L, - 0x0339C32AL, 0xC6913667L, 0x8DF9317CL, 0xE0B12B4FL, - 0xF79E59B7L, 0x43F5BB3AL, 0xF2D519FFL, 0x27D9459CL, - 0xBF97222CL, 0x15E6FC2AL, 0x0F91FC71L, 0x9B941525L, - 0xFAE59361L, 0xCEB69CEBL, 0xC2A86459L, 0x12BAA8D1L, - 0xB6C1075EL, 0xE3056A0CL, 0x10D25065L, 0xCB03A442L, - 0xE0EC6E0EL, 0x1698DB3BL, 0x4C98A0BEL, 0x3278E964L, - 0x9F1F9532L, 0xE0D392DFL, 0xD3A0342BL, 0x8971F21EL, - 0x1B0A7441L, 0x4BA3348CL, 0xC5BE7120L, 0xC37632D8L, - 0xDF359F8DL, 0x9B992F2EL, 0xE60B6F47L, 0x0FE3F11DL, - 0xE54CDA54L, 0x1EDAD891L, 0xCE6279CFL, 0xCD3E7E6FL, - 0x1618B166L, 0xFD2C1D05L, 0x848FD2C5L, 0xF6FB2299L, - 0xF523F357L, 0xA6327623L, 0x93A83531L, 0x56CCCD02L, - 0xACF08162L, 0x5A75EBB5L, 0x6E163697L, 0x88D273CCL, - 0xDE966292L, 0x81B949D0L, 0x4C50901BL, 0x71C65614L, - 0xE6C6C7BDL, 0x327A140AL, 0x45E1D006L, 0xC3F27B9AL, - 0xC9AA53FDL, 0x62A80F00L, 0xBB25BFE2L, 0x35BDD2F6L, - 0x71126905L, 0xB2040222L, 0xB6CBCF7CL, 0xCD769C2BL, - 0x53113EC0L, 0x1640E3D3L, 0x38ABBD60L, 0x2547ADF0L, - 0xBA38209CL, 0xF746CE76L, 0x77AFA1C5L, 0x20756060L, - 0x85CBFE4EL, 0x8AE88DD8L, 0x7AAAF9B0L, 0x4CF9AA7EL, - 0x1948C25CL, 0x02FB8A8CL, 0x01C36AE4L, 0xD6EBE1F9L, - 0x90D4F869L, 0xA65CDEA0L, 0x3F09252DL, 0xC208E69FL, - 0xB74E6132L, 0xCE77E25BL, 0x578FDFE3L, 0x3AC372E6L } -}; - -#endif /* !MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_ALT */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C */ diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/bn_mul.h b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/bn_mul.h similarity index 75% rename from thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/bn_mul.h rename to thirdparty/mbedtls/library/bn_mul.h index fc0c3cf31896..0738469db4f0 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/bn_mul.h +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/bn_mul.h @@ -24,11 +24,7 @@ #ifndef MBEDTLS_BN_MUL_H #define MBEDTLS_BN_MUL_H -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "mbedtls/build_info.h" #include "mbedtls/bignum.h" @@ -75,10 +71,6 @@ /* *INDENT-OFF* */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM) -#ifndef asm -#define asm __asm -#endif - /* armcc5 --gnu defines __GNUC__ but doesn't support GNU's extended asm */ #if defined(__GNUC__) && \ ( !defined(__ARMCC_VERSION) || __ARMCC_VERSION >= 6000000 ) @@ -107,7 +99,8 @@ */ #if defined(__i386__) && defined(__OPTIMIZE__) && !defined(MULADDC_CANNOT_USE_EBX) -#define MULADDC_INIT \ +#define MULADDC_X1_INIT \ + { mbedtls_mpi_uint t; \ asm( \ "movl %%ebx, %0 \n\t" \ "movl %5, %%esi \n\t" \ @@ -115,7 +108,7 @@ "movl %7, %%ecx \n\t" \ "movl %8, %%ebx \n\t" -#define MULADDC_CORE \ +#define MULADDC_X1_CORE \ "lodsl \n\t" \ "mull %%ebx \n\t" \ "addl %%ecx, %%eax \n\t" \ @@ -125,9 +118,21 @@ "movl %%edx, %%ecx \n\t" \ "stosl \n\t" +#define MULADDC_X1_STOP \ + "movl %4, %%ebx \n\t" \ + "movl %%ecx, %1 \n\t" \ + "movl %%edi, %2 \n\t" \ + "movl %%esi, %3 \n\t" \ + : "=m" (t), "=m" (c), "=m" (d), "=m" (s) \ + : "m" (t), "m" (s), "m" (d), "m" (c), "m" (b) \ + : "eax", "ebx", "ecx", "edx", "esi", "edi" \ + ); } + #if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_SSE2) -#define MULADDC_HUIT \ +#define MULADDC_X8_INIT MULADDC_X1_INIT + +#define MULADDC_X8_CORE \ "movd %%ecx, %%mm1 \n\t" \ "movd %%ebx, %%mm0 \n\t" \ "movd (%%edi), %%mm3 \n\t" \ @@ -190,7 +195,7 @@ "psrlq $32, %%mm1 \n\t" \ "movd %%mm1, %%ecx \n\t" -#define MULADDC_STOP \ +#define MULADDC_X8_STOP \ "emms \n\t" \ "movl %4, %%ebx \n\t" \ "movl %%ecx, %1 \n\t" \ @@ -199,29 +204,19 @@ : "=m" (t), "=m" (c), "=m" (d), "=m" (s) \ : "m" (t), "m" (s), "m" (d), "m" (c), "m" (b) \ : "eax", "ebx", "ecx", "edx", "esi", "edi" \ - ); - -#else + ); } \ -#define MULADDC_STOP \ - "movl %4, %%ebx \n\t" \ - "movl %%ecx, %1 \n\t" \ - "movl %%edi, %2 \n\t" \ - "movl %%esi, %3 \n\t" \ - : "=m" (t), "=m" (c), "=m" (d), "=m" (s) \ - : "m" (t), "m" (s), "m" (d), "m" (c), "m" (b) \ - : "eax", "ebx", "ecx", "edx", "esi", "edi" \ - ); #endif /* SSE2 */ + #endif /* i386 */ #if defined(__amd64__) || defined (__x86_64__) -#define MULADDC_INIT \ +#define MULADDC_X1_INIT \ asm( \ "xorq %%r8, %%r8\n" -#define MULADDC_CORE \ +#define MULADDC_X1_CORE \ "movq (%%rsi), %%rax\n" \ "mulq %%rbx\n" \ "addq $8, %%rsi\n" \ @@ -233,7 +228,7 @@ "adcq %%rdx, %%rcx\n" \ "addq $8, %%rdi\n" -#define MULADDC_STOP \ +#define MULADDC_X1_STOP \ : "+c" (c), "+D" (d), "+S" (s), "+m" (*(uint64_t (*)[16]) d) \ : "b" (b), "m" (*(const uint64_t (*)[16]) s) \ : "rax", "rdx", "r8" \ @@ -241,33 +236,45 @@ #endif /* AMD64 */ -#if defined(__aarch64__) +// The following assembly code assumes that a pointer will fit in a 64-bit register +// (including ILP32 __aarch64__ ABIs such as on watchOS, hence the 2^32 - 1) +#if defined(__aarch64__) && (UINTPTR_MAX == 0xfffffffful || UINTPTR_MAX == 0xfffffffffffffffful) -#define MULADDC_INIT \ - asm( +/* + * There are some issues around different compilers requiring different constraint + * syntax for updating pointers from assembly code (see notes for + * MBEDTLS_ASM_AARCH64_PTR_CONSTRAINT in common.h), especially on aarch64_32 (aka ILP32). + * + * For this reason we cast the pointers to/from uintptr_t here. + */ +#define MULADDC_X1_INIT \ + do { uintptr_t muladdc_d = (uintptr_t) d, muladdc_s = (uintptr_t) s; asm( -#define MULADDC_CORE \ - "ldr x4, [%2], #8 \n\t" \ - "ldr x5, [%1] \n\t" \ +#define MULADDC_X1_CORE \ + "ldr x4, [%x2], #8 \n\t" \ + "ldr x5, [%x1] \n\t" \ "mul x6, x4, %4 \n\t" \ "umulh x7, x4, %4 \n\t" \ "adds x5, x5, x6 \n\t" \ "adc x7, x7, xzr \n\t" \ "adds x5, x5, %0 \n\t" \ "adc %0, x7, xzr \n\t" \ - "str x5, [%1], #8 \n\t" + "str x5, [%x1], #8 \n\t" -#define MULADDC_STOP \ - : "+r" (c), "+r" (d), "+r" (s), "+m" (*(uint64_t (*)[16]) d) \ +#define MULADDC_X1_STOP \ + : "+r" (c), \ + "+r" (muladdc_d), \ + "+r" (muladdc_s), \ + "+m" (*(uint64_t (*)[16]) d) \ : "r" (b), "m" (*(const uint64_t (*)[16]) s) \ : "x4", "x5", "x6", "x7", "cc" \ - ); + ); d = (mbedtls_mpi_uint *)muladdc_d; s = (mbedtls_mpi_uint *)muladdc_s; } while (0); #endif /* Aarch64 */ #if defined(__mc68020__) || defined(__mcpu32__) -#define MULADDC_INIT \ +#define MULADDC_X1_INIT \ asm( \ "movl %3, %%a2 \n\t" \ "movl %4, %%a3 \n\t" \ @@ -275,7 +282,7 @@ "movl %6, %%d2 \n\t" \ "moveq #0, %%d0 \n\t" -#define MULADDC_CORE \ +#define MULADDC_X1_CORE \ "movel %%a2@+, %%d1 \n\t" \ "mulul %%d2, %%d4:%%d1 \n\t" \ "addl %%d3, %%d1 \n\t" \ @@ -284,7 +291,7 @@ "addl %%d1, %%a3@+ \n\t" \ "addxl %%d4, %%d3 \n\t" -#define MULADDC_STOP \ +#define MULADDC_X1_STOP \ "movl %%d3, %0 \n\t" \ "movl %%a3, %1 \n\t" \ "movl %%a2, %2 \n\t" \ @@ -293,7 +300,9 @@ : "d0", "d1", "d2", "d3", "d4", "a2", "a3" \ ); -#define MULADDC_HUIT \ +#define MULADDC_X8_INIT MULADDC_X1_INIT + +#define MULADDC_X8_CORE \ "movel %%a2@+, %%d1 \n\t" \ "mulul %%d2, %%d4:%%d1 \n\t" \ "addxl %%d3, %%d1 \n\t" \ @@ -336,13 +345,15 @@ "addl %%d1, %%a3@+ \n\t" \ "addxl %%d0, %%d3 \n\t" +#define MULADDC_X8_STOP MULADDC_X1_STOP + #endif /* MC68000 */ #if defined(__powerpc64__) || defined(__ppc64__) #if defined(__MACH__) && defined(__APPLE__) -#define MULADDC_INIT \ +#define MULADDC_X1_INIT \ asm( \ "ld r3, %3 \n\t" \ "ld r4, %4 \n\t" \ @@ -352,7 +363,7 @@ "addi r4, r4, -8 \n\t" \ "addic r5, r5, 0 \n\t" -#define MULADDC_CORE \ +#define MULADDC_X1_CORE \ "ldu r7, 8(r3) \n\t" \ "mulld r8, r7, r6 \n\t" \ "mulhdu r9, r7, r6 \n\t" \ @@ -362,7 +373,7 @@ "addc r8, r8, r7 \n\t" \ "stdu r8, 8(r4) \n\t" -#define MULADDC_STOP \ +#define MULADDC_X1_STOP \ "addze r5, r5 \n\t" \ "addi r4, r4, 8 \n\t" \ "addi r3, r3, 8 \n\t" \ @@ -377,7 +388,7 @@ #else /* __MACH__ && __APPLE__ */ -#define MULADDC_INIT \ +#define MULADDC_X1_INIT \ asm( \ "ld %%r3, %3 \n\t" \ "ld %%r4, %4 \n\t" \ @@ -387,7 +398,7 @@ "addi %%r4, %%r4, -8 \n\t" \ "addic %%r5, %%r5, 0 \n\t" -#define MULADDC_CORE \ +#define MULADDC_X1_CORE \ "ldu %%r7, 8(%%r3) \n\t" \ "mulld %%r8, %%r7, %%r6 \n\t" \ "mulhdu %%r9, %%r7, %%r6 \n\t" \ @@ -397,7 +408,7 @@ "addc %%r8, %%r8, %%r7 \n\t" \ "stdu %%r8, 8(%%r4) \n\t" -#define MULADDC_STOP \ +#define MULADDC_X1_STOP \ "addze %%r5, %%r5 \n\t" \ "addi %%r4, %%r4, 8 \n\t" \ "addi %%r3, %%r3, 8 \n\t" \ @@ -415,7 +426,7 @@ #if defined(__MACH__) && defined(__APPLE__) -#define MULADDC_INIT \ +#define MULADDC_X1_INIT \ asm( \ "lwz r3, %3 \n\t" \ "lwz r4, %4 \n\t" \ @@ -425,7 +436,7 @@ "addi r4, r4, -4 \n\t" \ "addic r5, r5, 0 \n\t" -#define MULADDC_CORE \ +#define MULADDC_X1_CORE \ "lwzu r7, 4(r3) \n\t" \ "mullw r8, r7, r6 \n\t" \ "mulhwu r9, r7, r6 \n\t" \ @@ -435,7 +446,7 @@ "addc r8, r8, r7 \n\t" \ "stwu r8, 4(r4) \n\t" -#define MULADDC_STOP \ +#define MULADDC_X1_STOP \ "addze r5, r5 \n\t" \ "addi r4, r4, 4 \n\t" \ "addi r3, r3, 4 \n\t" \ @@ -449,7 +460,7 @@ #else /* __MACH__ && __APPLE__ */ -#define MULADDC_INIT \ +#define MULADDC_X1_INIT \ asm( \ "lwz %%r3, %3 \n\t" \ "lwz %%r4, %4 \n\t" \ @@ -459,7 +470,7 @@ "addi %%r4, %%r4, -4 \n\t" \ "addic %%r5, %%r5, 0 \n\t" -#define MULADDC_CORE \ +#define MULADDC_X1_CORE \ "lwzu %%r7, 4(%%r3) \n\t" \ "mullw %%r8, %%r7, %%r6 \n\t" \ "mulhwu %%r9, %%r7, %%r6 \n\t" \ @@ -469,7 +480,7 @@ "addc %%r8, %%r8, %%r7 \n\t" \ "stwu %%r8, 4(%%r4) \n\t" -#define MULADDC_STOP \ +#define MULADDC_X1_STOP \ "addze %%r5, %%r5 \n\t" \ "addi %%r4, %%r4, 4 \n\t" \ "addi %%r3, %%r3, 4 \n\t" \ @@ -492,14 +503,14 @@ #if 0 && defined(__sparc__) #if defined(__sparc64__) -#define MULADDC_INIT \ +#define MULADDC_X1_INIT \ asm( \ "ldx %3, %%o0 \n\t" \ "ldx %4, %%o1 \n\t" \ "ld %5, %%o2 \n\t" \ "ld %6, %%o3 \n\t" -#define MULADDC_CORE \ +#define MULADDC_X1_CORE \ "ld [%%o0], %%o4 \n\t" \ "inc 4, %%o0 \n\t" \ "ld [%%o1], %%o5 \n\t" \ @@ -512,7 +523,7 @@ "addx %%g1, 0, %%o2 \n\t" \ "inc 4, %%o1 \n\t" - #define MULADDC_STOP \ +#define MULADDC_X1_STOP \ "st %%o2, %0 \n\t" \ "stx %%o1, %1 \n\t" \ "stx %%o0, %2 \n\t" \ @@ -524,14 +535,14 @@ #else /* __sparc64__ */ -#define MULADDC_INIT \ +#define MULADDC_X1_INIT \ asm( \ "ld %3, %%o0 \n\t" \ "ld %4, %%o1 \n\t" \ "ld %5, %%o2 \n\t" \ "ld %6, %%o3 \n\t" -#define MULADDC_CORE \ +#define MULADDC_X1_CORE \ "ld [%%o0], %%o4 \n\t" \ "inc 4, %%o0 \n\t" \ "ld [%%o1], %%o5 \n\t" \ @@ -544,7 +555,7 @@ "addx %%g1, 0, %%o2 \n\t" \ "inc 4, %%o1 \n\t" -#define MULADDC_STOP \ +#define MULADDC_X1_STOP \ "st %%o2, %0 \n\t" \ "st %%o1, %1 \n\t" \ "st %%o0, %2 \n\t" \ @@ -559,7 +570,7 @@ #if defined(__microblaze__) || defined(microblaze) -#define MULADDC_INIT \ +#define MULADDC_X1_INIT \ asm( \ "lwi r3, %3 \n\t" \ "lwi r4, %4 \n\t" \ @@ -580,7 +591,7 @@ "lhui r9, r3, 0 \n\t" #endif -#define MULADDC_CORE \ +#define MULADDC_X1_CORE \ MULADDC_LHUI \ "addi r3, r3, 2 \n\t" \ "mul r10, r9, r6 \n\t" \ @@ -605,7 +616,7 @@ "swi r12, r4, 0 \n\t" \ "addi r4, r4, 4 \n\t" -#define MULADDC_STOP \ +#define MULADDC_X1_STOP \ "swi r5, %0 \n\t" \ "swi r4, %1 \n\t" \ "swi r3, %2 \n\t" \ @@ -619,7 +630,7 @@ #if defined(__tricore__) -#define MULADDC_INIT \ +#define MULADDC_X1_INIT \ asm( \ "ld.a %%a2, %3 \n\t" \ "ld.a %%a3, %4 \n\t" \ @@ -627,7 +638,7 @@ "ld.w %%d1, %6 \n\t" \ "xor %%d5, %%d5 \n\t" -#define MULADDC_CORE \ +#define MULADDC_X1_CORE \ "ld.w %%d0, [%%a2+] \n\t" \ "madd.u %%e2, %%e4, %%d0, %%d1 \n\t" \ "ld.w %%d0, [%%a3] \n\t" \ @@ -636,7 +647,7 @@ "mov %%d4, %%d3 \n\t" \ "st.w [%%a3+], %%d2 \n\t" -#define MULADDC_STOP \ +#define MULADDC_X1_STOP \ "st.w %0, %%d4 \n\t" \ "st.a %1, %%a3 \n\t" \ "st.a %2, %%a2 \n\t" \ @@ -647,6 +658,16 @@ #endif /* TriCore */ +#if defined(__arm__) + +#if defined(__thumb__) && !defined(__thumb2__) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_COMPILER_IS_GCC) +/* + * Thumb 1 ISA. This code path has only been tested successfully on gcc; + * it does not compile on clang or armclang. + */ + +#if !defined(__OPTIMIZE__) && defined(__GNUC__) /* * Note, gcc -O0 by default uses r7 for the frame pointer, so it complains about * our use of r7 below, unless -fomit-frame-pointer is passed. @@ -655,41 +676,39 @@ * x !=0, which we can detect using __OPTIMIZE__ (which is also defined by * clang and armcc5 under the same conditions). * - * So, only use the optimized assembly below for optimized build, which avoids - * the build error and is pretty reasonable anyway. + * If gcc needs to use r7, we use r1 as a scratch register and have a few extra + * instructions to preserve/restore it; otherwise, we can use r7 and avoid + * the preserve/restore overhead. */ -#if defined(__GNUC__) && !defined(__OPTIMIZE__) -#define MULADDC_CANNOT_USE_R7 -#endif - -#if defined(__arm__) && !defined(MULADDC_CANNOT_USE_R7) - -#if defined(__thumb__) && !defined(__thumb2__) -#if !defined(__ARMCC_VERSION) && !defined(__clang__) \ - && !defined(__llvm__) && !defined(__INTEL_COMPILER) -/* - * Thumb 1 ISA. This code path has only been tested successfully on gcc; - * it does not compile on clang or armclang. - * - * Other compilers which define __GNUC__ may not work. The above macro - * attempts to exclude these untested compilers. - */ - -#define MULADDC_INIT \ +#define MULADDC_SCRATCH "RS .req r1 \n\t" +#define MULADDC_PRESERVE_SCRATCH "mov r10, r1 \n\t" +#define MULADDC_RESTORE_SCRATCH "mov r1, r10 \n\t" +#define MULADDC_SCRATCH_CLOBBER "r10" +#else /* !defined(__OPTIMIZE__) && defined(__GNUC__) */ +#define MULADDC_SCRATCH "RS .req r7 \n\t" +#define MULADDC_PRESERVE_SCRATCH "" +#define MULADDC_RESTORE_SCRATCH "" +#define MULADDC_SCRATCH_CLOBBER "r7" +#endif /* !defined(__OPTIMIZE__) && defined(__GNUC__) */ + +#define MULADDC_X1_INIT \ asm( \ + MULADDC_SCRATCH \ "ldr r0, %3 \n\t" \ "ldr r1, %4 \n\t" \ "ldr r2, %5 \n\t" \ "ldr r3, %6 \n\t" \ - "lsr r7, r3, #16 \n\t" \ - "mov r9, r7 \n\t" \ - "lsl r7, r3, #16 \n\t" \ - "lsr r7, r7, #16 \n\t" \ - "mov r8, r7 \n\t" + "lsr r4, r3, #16 \n\t" \ + "mov r9, r4 \n\t" \ + "lsl r4, r3, #16 \n\t" \ + "lsr r4, r4, #16 \n\t" \ + "mov r8, r4 \n\t" \ + -#define MULADDC_CORE \ +#define MULADDC_X1_CORE \ + MULADDC_PRESERVE_SCRATCH \ "ldmia r0!, {r6} \n\t" \ - "lsr r7, r6, #16 \n\t" \ + "lsr RS, r6, #16 \n\t" \ "lsl r6, r6, #16 \n\t" \ "lsr r6, r6, #16 \n\t" \ "mov r4, r8 \n\t" \ @@ -697,12 +716,12 @@ "mov r3, r9 \n\t" \ "mul r6, r3 \n\t" \ "mov r5, r9 \n\t" \ - "mul r5, r7 \n\t" \ + "mul r5, RS \n\t" \ "mov r3, r8 \n\t" \ - "mul r7, r3 \n\t" \ + "mul RS, r3 \n\t" \ "lsr r3, r6, #16 \n\t" \ "add r5, r5, r3 \n\t" \ - "lsr r3, r7, #16 \n\t" \ + "lsr r3, RS, #16 \n\t" \ "add r5, r5, r3 \n\t" \ "add r4, r4, r2 \n\t" \ "mov r2, #0 \n\t" \ @@ -710,86 +729,137 @@ "lsl r3, r6, #16 \n\t" \ "add r4, r4, r3 \n\t" \ "adc r5, r2 \n\t" \ - "lsl r3, r7, #16 \n\t" \ + "lsl r3, RS, #16 \n\t" \ "add r4, r4, r3 \n\t" \ "adc r5, r2 \n\t" \ + MULADDC_RESTORE_SCRATCH \ "ldr r3, [r1] \n\t" \ "add r4, r4, r3 \n\t" \ "adc r2, r5 \n\t" \ "stmia r1!, {r4} \n\t" -#define MULADDC_STOP \ +#define MULADDC_X1_STOP \ "str r2, %0 \n\t" \ "str r1, %1 \n\t" \ "str r0, %2 \n\t" \ : "=m" (c), "=m" (d), "=m" (s) \ : "m" (s), "m" (d), "m" (c), "m" (b) \ : "r0", "r1", "r2", "r3", "r4", "r5", \ - "r6", "r7", "r8", "r9", "cc" \ + "r6", MULADDC_SCRATCH_CLOBBER, "r8", "r9", "cc" \ ); - -#endif /* Compiler is gcc */ +#endif /* !defined(__ARMCC_VERSION) && !defined(__clang__) */ #elif (__ARM_ARCH >= 6) && \ defined (__ARM_FEATURE_DSP) && (__ARM_FEATURE_DSP == 1) +/* Armv6-M (or later) with DSP Instruction Set Extensions. + * Requires support for either Thumb 2 or Arm ISA. + */ -#define MULADDC_INIT \ - asm( - -#define MULADDC_CORE \ - "ldr r0, [%0], #4 \n\t" \ - "ldr r1, [%1] \n\t" \ - "umaal r1, %2, %3, r0 \n\t" \ - "str r1, [%1], #4 \n\t" - -#define MULADDC_STOP \ - : "=r" (s), "=r" (d), "=r" (c) \ - : "r" (b), "0" (s), "1" (d), "2" (c) \ - : "r0", "r1", "memory" \ - ); - -#else - -#define MULADDC_INIT \ +#define MULADDC_X1_INIT \ + { \ + mbedtls_mpi_uint tmp_a, tmp_b; \ + asm volatile ( + +#define MULADDC_X1_CORE \ + ".p2align 2 \n\t" \ + "ldr %[a], [%[in]], #4 \n\t" \ + "ldr %[b], [%[acc]] \n\t" \ + "umaal %[b], %[carry], %[scalar], %[a] \n\t" \ + "str %[b], [%[acc]], #4 \n\t" + +#define MULADDC_X1_STOP \ + : [a] "=&r" (tmp_a), \ + [b] "=&r" (tmp_b), \ + [in] "+r" (s), \ + [acc] "+r" (d), \ + [carry] "+l" (c) \ + : [scalar] "r" (b) \ + : "memory" \ + ); \ + } + +#define MULADDC_X2_INIT \ + { \ + mbedtls_mpi_uint tmp_a0, tmp_b0; \ + mbedtls_mpi_uint tmp_a1, tmp_b1; \ + asm volatile ( + + /* - Make sure loop is 4-byte aligned to avoid stalls + * upon repeated non-word aligned instructions in + * some microarchitectures. + * - Don't use ldm with post-increment or back-to-back + * loads with post-increment and same address register + * to avoid stalls on some microarchitectures. + * - Bunch loads and stores to reduce latency on some + * microarchitectures. E.g., on Cortex-M4, the first + * in a series of load/store operations has latency + * 2 cycles, while subsequent loads/stores are single-cycle. */ +#define MULADDC_X2_CORE \ + ".p2align 2 \n\t" \ + "ldr %[a0], [%[in]], #+8 \n\t" \ + "ldr %[b0], [%[acc]], #+8 \n\t" \ + "ldr %[a1], [%[in], #-4] \n\t" \ + "ldr %[b1], [%[acc], #-4] \n\t" \ + "umaal %[b0], %[carry], %[scalar], %[a0] \n\t" \ + "umaal %[b1], %[carry], %[scalar], %[a1] \n\t" \ + "str %[b0], [%[acc], #-8] \n\t" \ + "str %[b1], [%[acc], #-4] \n\t" + +#define MULADDC_X2_STOP \ + : [a0] "=&r" (tmp_a0), \ + [b0] "=&r" (tmp_b0), \ + [a1] "=&r" (tmp_a1), \ + [b1] "=&r" (tmp_b1), \ + [in] "+r" (s), \ + [acc] "+r" (d), \ + [carry] "+l" (c) \ + : [scalar] "r" (b) \ + : "memory" \ + ); \ + } + +#else /* Thumb 2 or Arm ISA, without DSP extensions */ + +#define MULADDC_X1_INIT \ asm( \ "ldr r0, %3 \n\t" \ "ldr r1, %4 \n\t" \ "ldr r2, %5 \n\t" \ "ldr r3, %6 \n\t" -#define MULADDC_CORE \ +#define MULADDC_X1_CORE \ "ldr r4, [r0], #4 \n\t" \ "mov r5, #0 \n\t" \ "ldr r6, [r1] \n\t" \ "umlal r2, r5, r3, r4 \n\t" \ - "adds r7, r6, r2 \n\t" \ + "adds r4, r6, r2 \n\t" \ "adc r2, r5, #0 \n\t" \ - "str r7, [r1], #4 \n\t" + "str r4, [r1], #4 \n\t" -#define MULADDC_STOP \ +#define MULADDC_X1_STOP \ "str r2, %0 \n\t" \ "str r1, %1 \n\t" \ "str r0, %2 \n\t" \ : "=m" (c), "=m" (d), "=m" (s) \ : "m" (s), "m" (d), "m" (c), "m" (b) \ : "r0", "r1", "r2", "r3", "r4", "r5", \ - "r6", "r7", "cc" \ + "r6", "cc" \ ); -#endif /* Thumb */ +#endif /* ISA codepath selection */ -#endif /* ARMv3 */ +#endif /* defined(__arm__) */ #if defined(__alpha__) -#define MULADDC_INIT \ +#define MULADDC_X1_INIT \ asm( \ "ldq $1, %3 \n\t" \ "ldq $2, %4 \n\t" \ "ldq $3, %5 \n\t" \ "ldq $4, %6 \n\t" -#define MULADDC_CORE \ +#define MULADDC_X1_CORE \ "ldq $6, 0($1) \n\t" \ "addq $1, 8, $1 \n\t" \ "mulq $6, $4, $7 \n\t" \ @@ -804,7 +874,7 @@ "addq $6, $3, $3 \n\t" \ "addq $5, $3, $3 \n\t" -#define MULADDC_STOP \ +#define MULADDC_X1_STOP \ "stq $3, %0 \n\t" \ "stq $2, %1 \n\t" \ "stq $1, %2 \n\t" \ @@ -816,14 +886,14 @@ #if defined(__mips__) && !defined(__mips64) -#define MULADDC_INIT \ +#define MULADDC_X1_INIT \ asm( \ "lw $10, %3 \n\t" \ "lw $11, %4 \n\t" \ "lw $12, %5 \n\t" \ "lw $13, %6 \n\t" -#define MULADDC_CORE \ +#define MULADDC_X1_CORE \ "lw $14, 0($10) \n\t" \ "multu $13, $14 \n\t" \ "addi $10, $10, 4 \n\t" \ @@ -839,7 +909,7 @@ "addu $12, $12, $14 \n\t" \ "addi $11, $11, 4 \n\t" -#define MULADDC_STOP \ +#define MULADDC_X1_STOP \ "sw $12, %0 \n\t" \ "sw $11, %1 \n\t" \ "sw $10, %2 \n\t" \ @@ -853,13 +923,13 @@ #if (defined(_MSC_VER) && defined(_M_IX86)) || defined(__WATCOMC__) -#define MULADDC_INIT \ +#define MULADDC_X1_INIT \ __asm mov esi, s \ __asm mov edi, d \ __asm mov ecx, c \ __asm mov ebx, b -#define MULADDC_CORE \ +#define MULADDC_X1_CORE \ __asm lodsd \ __asm mul ebx \ __asm add eax, ecx \ @@ -869,11 +939,18 @@ __asm mov ecx, edx \ __asm stosd +#define MULADDC_X1_STOP \ + __asm mov c, ecx \ + __asm mov d, edi \ + __asm mov s, esi + #if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_SSE2) #define EMIT __asm _emit -#define MULADDC_HUIT \ +#define MULADDC_X8_INIT MULADDC_X1_INIT + +#define MULADDC_X8_CORE \ EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0x6E EMIT 0xC9 \ EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0x6E EMIT 0xC3 \ EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0x6E EMIT 0x1F \ @@ -936,33 +1013,26 @@ EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0x73 EMIT 0xD1 EMIT 0x20 \ EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0x7E EMIT 0xC9 -#define MULADDC_STOP \ +#define MULADDC_X8_STOP \ EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0x77 \ __asm mov c, ecx \ __asm mov d, edi \ - __asm mov s, esi \ - -#else - -#define MULADDC_STOP \ - __asm mov c, ecx \ - __asm mov d, edi \ - __asm mov s, esi \ + __asm mov s, esi #endif /* SSE2 */ #endif /* MSVC */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM */ -#if !defined(MULADDC_CORE) +#if !defined(MULADDC_X1_CORE) #if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_UDBL) -#define MULADDC_INIT \ +#define MULADDC_X1_INIT \ { \ mbedtls_t_udbl r; \ mbedtls_mpi_uint r0, r1; -#define MULADDC_CORE \ +#define MULADDC_X1_CORE \ r = *(s++) * (mbedtls_t_udbl) b; \ r0 = (mbedtls_mpi_uint) r; \ r1 = (mbedtls_mpi_uint)( r >> biL ); \ @@ -970,18 +1040,19 @@ r0 += *d; r1 += (r0 < *d); \ c = r1; *(d++) = r0; -#define MULADDC_STOP \ +#define MULADDC_X1_STOP \ } -#else -#define MULADDC_INIT \ +#else /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_UDBL */ + +#define MULADDC_X1_INIT \ { \ mbedtls_mpi_uint s0, s1, b0, b1; \ mbedtls_mpi_uint r0, r1, rx, ry; \ b0 = ( b << biH ) >> biH; \ b1 = ( b >> biH ); -#define MULADDC_CORE \ +#define MULADDC_X1_CORE \ s0 = ( *s << biH ) >> biH; \ s1 = ( *s >> biH ); s++; \ rx = s0 * b1; r0 = s0 * b0; \ @@ -995,11 +1066,29 @@ r0 += *d; r1 += (r0 < *d); \ c = r1; *(d++) = r0; -#define MULADDC_STOP \ +#define MULADDC_X1_STOP \ } -#endif /* C (generic) */ #endif /* C (longlong) */ +#endif /* C (generic) */ + +#if !defined(MULADDC_X2_CORE) +#define MULADDC_X2_INIT MULADDC_X1_INIT +#define MULADDC_X2_STOP MULADDC_X1_STOP +#define MULADDC_X2_CORE MULADDC_X1_CORE MULADDC_X1_CORE +#endif /* MULADDC_X2_CORE */ + +#if !defined(MULADDC_X4_CORE) +#define MULADDC_X4_INIT MULADDC_X2_INIT +#define MULADDC_X4_STOP MULADDC_X2_STOP +#define MULADDC_X4_CORE MULADDC_X2_CORE MULADDC_X2_CORE +#endif /* MULADDC_X4_CORE */ + +#if !defined(MULADDC_X8_CORE) +#define MULADDC_X8_INIT MULADDC_X4_INIT +#define MULADDC_X8_STOP MULADDC_X4_STOP +#define MULADDC_X8_CORE MULADDC_X4_CORE MULADDC_X4_CORE +#endif /* MULADDC_X8_CORE */ /* *INDENT-ON* */ #endif /* bn_mul.h */ diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/camellia.c b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/camellia.c index bd76ea874f7f..b1c0a08ca23a 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/camellia.c +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/camellia.c @@ -24,12 +24,6 @@ #if !defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_ALT) -/* Parameter validation macros */ -#define CAMELLIA_VALIDATE_RET(cond) \ - MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE_RET(cond, MBEDTLS_ERR_CAMELLIA_BAD_INPUT_DATA) -#define CAMELLIA_VALIDATE(cond) \ - MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE(cond) - static const unsigned char SIGMA_CHARS[6][8] = { { 0xa0, 0x9e, 0x66, 0x7f, 0x3b, 0xcc, 0x90, 0x8b }, @@ -279,7 +273,6 @@ static void camellia_feistel(const uint32_t x[2], const uint32_t k[2], void mbedtls_camellia_init(mbedtls_camellia_context *ctx) { - CAMELLIA_VALIDATE(ctx != NULL); memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_camellia_context)); } @@ -307,9 +300,6 @@ int mbedtls_camellia_setkey_enc(mbedtls_camellia_context *ctx, uint32_t KC[16]; uint32_t TK[20]; - CAMELLIA_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - CAMELLIA_VALIDATE_RET(key != NULL); - RK = ctx->rk; memset(t, 0, 64); @@ -409,6 +399,7 @@ int mbedtls_camellia_setkey_enc(mbedtls_camellia_context *ctx, /* * Camellia key schedule (decryption) */ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT) int mbedtls_camellia_setkey_dec(mbedtls_camellia_context *ctx, const unsigned char *key, unsigned int keybits) @@ -418,8 +409,6 @@ int mbedtls_camellia_setkey_dec(mbedtls_camellia_context *ctx, mbedtls_camellia_context cty; uint32_t *RK; uint32_t *SK; - CAMELLIA_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - CAMELLIA_VALIDATE_RET(key != NULL); mbedtls_camellia_init(&cty); @@ -456,6 +445,7 @@ int mbedtls_camellia_setkey_dec(mbedtls_camellia_context *ctx, return ret; } +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT */ /* * Camellia-ECB block encryption/decryption @@ -467,11 +457,9 @@ int mbedtls_camellia_crypt_ecb(mbedtls_camellia_context *ctx, { int NR; uint32_t *RK, X[4]; - CAMELLIA_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - CAMELLIA_VALIDATE_RET(mode == MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_ENCRYPT || - mode == MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_DECRYPT); - CAMELLIA_VALIDATE_RET(input != NULL); - CAMELLIA_VALIDATE_RET(output != NULL); + if (mode != MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_ENCRYPT && mode != MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_DECRYPT) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_CAMELLIA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } ((void) mode); @@ -535,14 +523,10 @@ int mbedtls_camellia_crypt_cbc(mbedtls_camellia_context *ctx, const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output) { - int i; unsigned char temp[16]; - CAMELLIA_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - CAMELLIA_VALIDATE_RET(mode == MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_ENCRYPT || - mode == MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_DECRYPT); - CAMELLIA_VALIDATE_RET(iv != NULL); - CAMELLIA_VALIDATE_RET(length == 0 || input != NULL); - CAMELLIA_VALIDATE_RET(length == 0 || output != NULL); + if (mode != MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_ENCRYPT && mode != MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_DECRYPT) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_CAMELLIA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } if (length % 16) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_CAMELLIA_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH; @@ -553,9 +537,7 @@ int mbedtls_camellia_crypt_cbc(mbedtls_camellia_context *ctx, memcpy(temp, input, 16); mbedtls_camellia_crypt_ecb(ctx, mode, input, output); - for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) { - output[i] = (unsigned char) (output[i] ^ iv[i]); - } + mbedtls_xor(output, output, iv, 16); memcpy(iv, temp, 16); @@ -565,9 +547,7 @@ int mbedtls_camellia_crypt_cbc(mbedtls_camellia_context *ctx, } } else { while (length > 0) { - for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) { - output[i] = (unsigned char) (input[i] ^ iv[i]); - } + mbedtls_xor(output, input, iv, 16); mbedtls_camellia_crypt_ecb(ctx, mode, output, output); memcpy(iv, output, 16); @@ -596,13 +576,9 @@ int mbedtls_camellia_crypt_cfb128(mbedtls_camellia_context *ctx, { int c; size_t n; - CAMELLIA_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - CAMELLIA_VALIDATE_RET(mode == MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_ENCRYPT || - mode == MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_DECRYPT); - CAMELLIA_VALIDATE_RET(iv != NULL); - CAMELLIA_VALIDATE_RET(iv_off != NULL); - CAMELLIA_VALIDATE_RET(length == 0 || input != NULL); - CAMELLIA_VALIDATE_RET(length == 0 || output != NULL); + if (mode != MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_ENCRYPT && mode != MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_DECRYPT) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_CAMELLIA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } n = *iv_off; if (n >= 16) { @@ -653,12 +629,6 @@ int mbedtls_camellia_crypt_ctr(mbedtls_camellia_context *ctx, { int c, i; size_t n; - CAMELLIA_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - CAMELLIA_VALIDATE_RET(nonce_counter != NULL); - CAMELLIA_VALIDATE_RET(stream_block != NULL); - CAMELLIA_VALIDATE_RET(nc_off != NULL); - CAMELLIA_VALIDATE_RET(length == 0 || input != NULL); - CAMELLIA_VALIDATE_RET(length == 0 || output != NULL); n = *nc_off; if (n >= 16) { @@ -920,14 +890,26 @@ int mbedtls_camellia_self_test(int verbose) (v == MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_DECRYPT) ? "dec" : "enc"); } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT) + if (v == MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_DECRYPT) { + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf("skipped\n"); + } + continue; + } +#endif + for (i = 0; i < CAMELLIA_TESTS_ECB; i++) { memcpy(key, camellia_test_ecb_key[u][i], 16 + 8 * u); +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT) if (v == MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_DECRYPT) { mbedtls_camellia_setkey_dec(&ctx, key, 128 + u * 64); memcpy(src, camellia_test_ecb_cipher[u][i], 16); memcpy(dst, camellia_test_ecb_plain[i], 16); - } else { /* MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_ENCRYPT */ + } else +#endif + { /* MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_ENCRYPT */ mbedtls_camellia_setkey_enc(&ctx, key, 128 + u * 64); memcpy(src, camellia_test_ecb_plain[i], 16); memcpy(dst, camellia_test_ecb_cipher[u][i], 16); diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ccm.c b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ccm.c index 2ba21c7e71d8..45ed697dd321 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ccm.c +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ccm.c @@ -23,26 +23,29 @@ #include "mbedtls/error.h" #include "mbedtls/constant_time.h" +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_C) +#include "block_cipher_internal.h" +#endif + #include +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) #include "mbedtls/platform.h" +#else +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) && defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) +#include +#define mbedtls_printf printf +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST && MBEDTLS_AES_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C */ #if !defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_ALT) -#define CCM_VALIDATE_RET(cond) \ - MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE_RET(cond, MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT) -#define CCM_VALIDATE(cond) \ - MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE(cond) - -#define CCM_ENCRYPT 0 -#define CCM_DECRYPT 1 /* * Initialize context */ void mbedtls_ccm_init(mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx) { - CCM_VALIDATE(ctx != NULL); memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_ccm_context)); } @@ -52,10 +55,19 @@ int mbedtls_ccm_setkey(mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx, unsigned int keybits) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *cipher_info; - CCM_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - CCM_VALIDATE_RET(key != NULL); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_C) + mbedtls_block_cipher_free(&ctx->block_cipher_ctx); + + if ((ret = mbedtls_block_cipher_setup(&ctx->block_cipher_ctx, cipher)) != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT; + } + + if ((ret = mbedtls_block_cipher_setkey(&ctx->block_cipher_ctx, key, keybits)) != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT; + } +#else + const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *cipher_info; cipher_info = mbedtls_cipher_info_from_values(cipher, keybits, MBEDTLS_MODE_ECB); @@ -63,7 +75,7 @@ int mbedtls_ccm_setkey(mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx, return MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT; } - if (cipher_info->block_size != 16) { + if (mbedtls_cipher_info_get_block_size(cipher_info) != 16) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT; } @@ -77,8 +89,9 @@ int mbedtls_ccm_setkey(mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx, MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT)) != 0) { return ret; } +#endif - return 0; + return ret; } /* @@ -89,89 +102,88 @@ void mbedtls_ccm_free(mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx) if (ctx == NULL) { return; } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_C) + mbedtls_block_cipher_free(&ctx->block_cipher_ctx); +#else mbedtls_cipher_free(&ctx->cipher_ctx); +#endif mbedtls_platform_zeroize(ctx, sizeof(mbedtls_ccm_context)); } -/* - * Macros for common operations. - * Results in smaller compiled code than static inline functions. - */ +#define CCM_STATE__CLEAR 0 +#define CCM_STATE__STARTED (1 << 0) +#define CCM_STATE__LENGTHS_SET (1 << 1) +#define CCM_STATE__AUTH_DATA_STARTED (1 << 2) +#define CCM_STATE__AUTH_DATA_FINISHED (1 << 3) +#define CCM_STATE__ERROR (1 << 4) /* - * Update the CBC-MAC state in y using a block in b - * (Always using b as the source helps the compiler optimise a bit better.) + * Encrypt or decrypt a partial block with CTR */ -#define UPDATE_CBC_MAC \ - for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) \ - y[i] ^= b[i]; \ - \ - if ((ret = mbedtls_cipher_update(&ctx->cipher_ctx, y, 16, y, &olen)) != 0) \ +static int mbedtls_ccm_crypt(mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx, + size_t offset, size_t use_len, + const unsigned char *input, + unsigned char *output) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char tmp_buf[16] = { 0 }; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_C) + ret = mbedtls_block_cipher_encrypt(&ctx->block_cipher_ctx, ctx->ctr, tmp_buf); +#else + size_t olen = 0; + ret = mbedtls_cipher_update(&ctx->cipher_ctx, ctx->ctr, 16, tmp_buf, &olen); +#endif + if (ret != 0) { + ctx->state |= CCM_STATE__ERROR; + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(tmp_buf, sizeof(tmp_buf)); + return ret; + } + + mbedtls_xor(output, input, tmp_buf + offset, use_len); + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(tmp_buf, sizeof(tmp_buf)); return ret; +} -/* - * Encrypt or decrypt a partial block with CTR - * Warning: using b for temporary storage! src and dst must not be b! - * This avoids allocating one more 16 bytes buffer while allowing src == dst. - */ -#define CTR_CRYPT(dst, src, len) \ - do \ - { \ - if ((ret = mbedtls_cipher_update(&ctx->cipher_ctx, ctr, \ - 16, b, &olen)) != 0) \ - { \ - return ret; \ - } \ - \ - for (i = 0; i < (len); i++) \ - (dst)[i] = (src)[i] ^ b[i]; \ - } while (0) +static void mbedtls_ccm_clear_state(mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx) +{ + ctx->state = CCM_STATE__CLEAR; + memset(ctx->y, 0, 16); + memset(ctx->ctr, 0, 16); +} -/* - * Authenticated encryption or decryption - */ -static int ccm_auth_crypt(mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx, int mode, size_t length, - const unsigned char *iv, size_t iv_len, - const unsigned char *add, size_t add_len, - const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output, - unsigned char *tag, size_t tag_len) +static int ccm_calculate_first_block_if_ready(mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; unsigned char i; - unsigned char q; - size_t len_left, olen; - unsigned char b[16]; - unsigned char y[16]; - unsigned char ctr[16]; - const unsigned char *src; - unsigned char *dst; + size_t len_left; +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_C) + size_t olen; +#endif - /* - * Check length requirements: SP800-38C A.1 - * Additional requirement: a < 2^16 - 2^8 to simplify the code. - * 'length' checked later (when writing it to the first block) - * - * Also, loosen the requirements to enable support for CCM* (IEEE 802.15.4). + /* length calculation can be done only after both + * mbedtls_ccm_starts() and mbedtls_ccm_set_lengths() have been executed */ - if (tag_len == 2 || tag_len > 16 || tag_len % 2 != 0) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT; + if (!(ctx->state & CCM_STATE__STARTED) || !(ctx->state & CCM_STATE__LENGTHS_SET)) { + return 0; } - /* Also implies q is within bounds */ - if (iv_len < 7 || iv_len > 13) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT; - } - - if (add_len >= 0xFF00) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT; + /* CCM expects non-empty tag. + * CCM* allows empty tag. For CCM* without tag, ignore plaintext length. + */ + if (ctx->tag_len == 0) { + if (ctx->mode == MBEDTLS_CCM_STAR_ENCRYPT || ctx->mode == MBEDTLS_CCM_STAR_DECRYPT) { + ctx->plaintext_len = 0; + } else { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT; + } } - q = 16 - 1 - (unsigned char) iv_len; - /* - * First block B_0: + * First block: * 0 .. 0 flags - * 1 .. iv_len nonce (aka iv) + * 1 .. iv_len nonce (aka iv) - set by: mbedtls_ccm_starts() * iv_len+1 .. 15 length * * With flags as (bits): @@ -180,57 +192,46 @@ static int ccm_auth_crypt(mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx, int mode, size_t length, * 5 .. 3 (t - 2) / 2 * 2 .. 0 q - 1 */ - b[0] = 0; - b[0] |= (add_len > 0) << 6; - b[0] |= ((tag_len - 2) / 2) << 3; - b[0] |= q - 1; + ctx->y[0] |= (ctx->add_len > 0) << 6; + ctx->y[0] |= ((ctx->tag_len - 2) / 2) << 3; + ctx->y[0] |= ctx->q - 1; - memcpy(b + 1, iv, iv_len); - - for (i = 0, len_left = length; i < q; i++, len_left >>= 8) { - b[15-i] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(len_left); + for (i = 0, len_left = ctx->plaintext_len; i < ctx->q; i++, len_left >>= 8) { + ctx->y[15-i] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(len_left); } if (len_left > 0) { + ctx->state |= CCM_STATE__ERROR; return MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT; } + /* Start CBC-MAC with first block*/ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_C) + ret = mbedtls_block_cipher_encrypt(&ctx->block_cipher_ctx, ctx->y, ctx->y); +#else + ret = mbedtls_cipher_update(&ctx->cipher_ctx, ctx->y, 16, ctx->y, &olen); +#endif + if (ret != 0) { + ctx->state |= CCM_STATE__ERROR; + return ret; + } - /* Start CBC-MAC with first block */ - memset(y, 0, 16); - UPDATE_CBC_MAC; - - /* - * If there is additional data, update CBC-MAC with - * add_len, add, 0 (padding to a block boundary) - */ - if (add_len > 0) { - size_t use_len; - len_left = add_len; - src = add; - - memset(b, 0, 16); - MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(add_len, b, 0); - - use_len = len_left < 16 - 2 ? len_left : 16 - 2; - memcpy(b + 2, src, use_len); - len_left -= use_len; - src += use_len; - - UPDATE_CBC_MAC; - - while (len_left > 0) { - use_len = len_left > 16 ? 16 : len_left; - - memset(b, 0, 16); - memcpy(b, src, use_len); - UPDATE_CBC_MAC; + return 0; +} - len_left -= use_len; - src += use_len; - } +int mbedtls_ccm_starts(mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx, + int mode, + const unsigned char *iv, + size_t iv_len) +{ + /* Also implies q is within bounds */ + if (iv_len < 7 || iv_len > 13) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT; } + ctx->mode = mode; + ctx->q = 16 - 1 - (unsigned char) iv_len; + /* * Prepare counter block for encryption: * 0 .. 0 flags @@ -241,62 +242,302 @@ static int ccm_auth_crypt(mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx, int mode, size_t length, * 7 .. 3 0 * 2 .. 0 q - 1 */ - ctr[0] = q - 1; - memcpy(ctr + 1, iv, iv_len); - memset(ctr + 1 + iv_len, 0, q); - ctr[15] = 1; + memset(ctx->ctr, 0, 16); + ctx->ctr[0] = ctx->q - 1; + memcpy(ctx->ctr + 1, iv, iv_len); + memset(ctx->ctr + 1 + iv_len, 0, ctx->q); + ctx->ctr[15] = 1; + + /* + * See ccm_calculate_first_block_if_ready() for block layout description + */ + memcpy(ctx->y + 1, iv, iv_len); + + ctx->state |= CCM_STATE__STARTED; + return ccm_calculate_first_block_if_ready(ctx); +} +int mbedtls_ccm_set_lengths(mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx, + size_t total_ad_len, + size_t plaintext_len, + size_t tag_len) +{ /* - * Authenticate and {en,de}crypt the message. + * Check length requirements: SP800-38C A.1 + * Additional requirement: a < 2^16 - 2^8 to simplify the code. + * 'length' checked later (when writing it to the first block) * - * The only difference between encryption and decryption is - * the respective order of authentication and {en,de}cryption. + * Also, loosen the requirements to enable support for CCM* (IEEE 802.15.4). + */ + if (tag_len == 2 || tag_len > 16 || tag_len % 2 != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT; + } + + if (total_ad_len >= 0xFF00) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT; + } + + ctx->plaintext_len = plaintext_len; + ctx->add_len = total_ad_len; + ctx->tag_len = tag_len; + ctx->processed = 0; + + ctx->state |= CCM_STATE__LENGTHS_SET; + return ccm_calculate_first_block_if_ready(ctx); +} + +int mbedtls_ccm_update_ad(mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *add, + size_t add_len) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t use_len, offset; +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_C) + size_t olen; +#endif + + if (ctx->state & CCM_STATE__ERROR) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT; + } + + if (add_len > 0) { + if (ctx->state & CCM_STATE__AUTH_DATA_FINISHED) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT; + } + + if (!(ctx->state & CCM_STATE__AUTH_DATA_STARTED)) { + if (add_len > ctx->add_len) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT; + } + + ctx->y[0] ^= (unsigned char) ((ctx->add_len >> 8) & 0xFF); + ctx->y[1] ^= (unsigned char) ((ctx->add_len) & 0xFF); + + ctx->state |= CCM_STATE__AUTH_DATA_STARTED; + } else if (ctx->processed + add_len > ctx->add_len) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT; + } + + while (add_len > 0) { + offset = (ctx->processed + 2) % 16; /* account for y[0] and y[1] + * holding total auth data length */ + use_len = 16 - offset; + + if (use_len > add_len) { + use_len = add_len; + } + + mbedtls_xor(ctx->y + offset, ctx->y + offset, add, use_len); + + ctx->processed += use_len; + add_len -= use_len; + add += use_len; + + if (use_len + offset == 16 || ctx->processed == ctx->add_len) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_C) + ret = mbedtls_block_cipher_encrypt(&ctx->block_cipher_ctx, ctx->y, ctx->y); +#else + ret = mbedtls_cipher_update(&ctx->cipher_ctx, ctx->y, 16, ctx->y, &olen); +#endif + if (ret != 0) { + ctx->state |= CCM_STATE__ERROR; + return ret; + } + } + } + + if (ctx->processed == ctx->add_len) { + ctx->state |= CCM_STATE__AUTH_DATA_FINISHED; + ctx->processed = 0; // prepare for mbedtls_ccm_update() + } + } + + return 0; +} + +int mbedtls_ccm_update(mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *input, size_t input_len, + unsigned char *output, size_t output_size, + size_t *output_len) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char i; + size_t use_len, offset; +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_C) + size_t olen; +#endif + + unsigned char local_output[16]; + + if (ctx->state & CCM_STATE__ERROR) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT; + } + + /* Check against plaintext length only if performing operation with + * authentication */ - len_left = length; - src = input; - dst = output; + if (ctx->tag_len != 0 && ctx->processed + input_len > ctx->plaintext_len) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT; + } + + if (output_size < input_len) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT; + } + *output_len = input_len; + + ret = 0; + + while (input_len > 0) { + offset = ctx->processed % 16; + + use_len = 16 - offset; - while (len_left > 0) { - size_t use_len = len_left > 16 ? 16 : len_left; + if (use_len > input_len) { + use_len = input_len; + } + + ctx->processed += use_len; + + if (ctx->mode == MBEDTLS_CCM_ENCRYPT || \ + ctx->mode == MBEDTLS_CCM_STAR_ENCRYPT) { + mbedtls_xor(ctx->y + offset, ctx->y + offset, input, use_len); + + if (use_len + offset == 16 || ctx->processed == ctx->plaintext_len) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_C) + ret = mbedtls_block_cipher_encrypt(&ctx->block_cipher_ctx, ctx->y, ctx->y); +#else + ret = mbedtls_cipher_update(&ctx->cipher_ctx, ctx->y, 16, ctx->y, &olen); +#endif + if (ret != 0) { + ctx->state |= CCM_STATE__ERROR; + goto exit; + } + } - if (mode == CCM_ENCRYPT) { - memset(b, 0, 16); - memcpy(b, src, use_len); - UPDATE_CBC_MAC; + ret = mbedtls_ccm_crypt(ctx, offset, use_len, input, output); + if (ret != 0) { + goto exit; + } } - CTR_CRYPT(dst, src, use_len); + if (ctx->mode == MBEDTLS_CCM_DECRYPT || \ + ctx->mode == MBEDTLS_CCM_STAR_DECRYPT) { + /* Since output may be in shared memory, we cannot be sure that + * it will contain what we wrote to it. Therefore, we should avoid using + * it as input to any operations. + * Write decrypted data to local_output to avoid using output variable as + * input in the XOR operation for Y. + */ + ret = mbedtls_ccm_crypt(ctx, offset, use_len, input, local_output); + if (ret != 0) { + goto exit; + } + + mbedtls_xor(ctx->y + offset, ctx->y + offset, local_output, use_len); + + memcpy(output, local_output, use_len); - if (mode == CCM_DECRYPT) { - memset(b, 0, 16); - memcpy(b, dst, use_len); - UPDATE_CBC_MAC; + if (use_len + offset == 16 || ctx->processed == ctx->plaintext_len) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_C) + ret = mbedtls_block_cipher_encrypt(&ctx->block_cipher_ctx, ctx->y, ctx->y); +#else + ret = mbedtls_cipher_update(&ctx->cipher_ctx, ctx->y, 16, ctx->y, &olen); +#endif + if (ret != 0) { + ctx->state |= CCM_STATE__ERROR; + goto exit; + } + } } - dst += use_len; - src += use_len; - len_left -= use_len; - - /* - * Increment counter. - * No need to check for overflow thanks to the length check above. - */ - for (i = 0; i < q; i++) { - if (++ctr[15-i] != 0) { - break; + if (use_len + offset == 16 || ctx->processed == ctx->plaintext_len) { + for (i = 0; i < ctx->q; i++) { + if (++(ctx->ctr)[15-i] != 0) { + break; + } } } + + input_len -= use_len; + input += use_len; + output += use_len; + } + +exit: + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(local_output, 16); + + return ret; +} + +int mbedtls_ccm_finish(mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx, + unsigned char *tag, size_t tag_len) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char i; + + if (ctx->state & CCM_STATE__ERROR) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + } + + if (ctx->add_len > 0 && !(ctx->state & CCM_STATE__AUTH_DATA_FINISHED)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT; + } + + if (ctx->plaintext_len > 0 && ctx->processed != ctx->plaintext_len) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT; } /* * Authentication: reset counter and crypt/mask internal tag */ - for (i = 0; i < q; i++) { - ctr[15-i] = 0; + for (i = 0; i < ctx->q; i++) { + ctx->ctr[15-i] = 0; + } + + ret = mbedtls_ccm_crypt(ctx, 0, 16, ctx->y, ctx->y); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + if (tag != NULL) { + memcpy(tag, ctx->y, tag_len); + } + mbedtls_ccm_clear_state(ctx); + + return 0; +} + +/* + * Authenticated encryption or decryption + */ +static int ccm_auth_crypt(mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx, int mode, size_t length, + const unsigned char *iv, size_t iv_len, + const unsigned char *add, size_t add_len, + const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output, + unsigned char *tag, size_t tag_len) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t olen; + + if ((ret = mbedtls_ccm_starts(ctx, mode, iv, iv_len)) != 0) { + return ret; } - CTR_CRYPT(y, y, 16); - memcpy(tag, y, tag_len); + if ((ret = mbedtls_ccm_set_lengths(ctx, add_len, length, tag_len)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + + if ((ret = mbedtls_ccm_update_ad(ctx, add, add_len)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + + if ((ret = mbedtls_ccm_update(ctx, input, length, + output, length, &olen)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + + if ((ret = mbedtls_ccm_finish(ctx, tag, tag_len)) != 0) { + return ret; + } return 0; } @@ -310,13 +551,7 @@ int mbedtls_ccm_star_encrypt_and_tag(mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx, size_t length, const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output, unsigned char *tag, size_t tag_len) { - CCM_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - CCM_VALIDATE_RET(iv != NULL); - CCM_VALIDATE_RET(add_len == 0 || add != NULL); - CCM_VALIDATE_RET(length == 0 || input != NULL); - CCM_VALIDATE_RET(length == 0 || output != NULL); - CCM_VALIDATE_RET(tag_len == 0 || tag != NULL); - return ccm_auth_crypt(ctx, CCM_ENCRYPT, length, iv, iv_len, + return ccm_auth_crypt(ctx, MBEDTLS_CCM_STAR_ENCRYPT, length, iv, iv_len, add, add_len, input, output, tag, tag_len); } @@ -326,80 +561,74 @@ int mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag(mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx, size_t length, const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output, unsigned char *tag, size_t tag_len) { - CCM_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - CCM_VALIDATE_RET(iv != NULL); - CCM_VALIDATE_RET(add_len == 0 || add != NULL); - CCM_VALIDATE_RET(length == 0 || input != NULL); - CCM_VALIDATE_RET(length == 0 || output != NULL); - CCM_VALIDATE_RET(tag_len == 0 || tag != NULL); - if (tag_len == 0) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT; - } - - return mbedtls_ccm_star_encrypt_and_tag(ctx, length, iv, iv_len, add, - add_len, input, output, tag, tag_len); + return ccm_auth_crypt(ctx, MBEDTLS_CCM_ENCRYPT, length, iv, iv_len, + add, add_len, input, output, tag, tag_len); } /* * Authenticated decryption */ -int mbedtls_ccm_star_auth_decrypt(mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx, size_t length, - const unsigned char *iv, size_t iv_len, - const unsigned char *add, size_t add_len, - const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output, - const unsigned char *tag, size_t tag_len) +static int mbedtls_ccm_compare_tags(const unsigned char *tag1, + const unsigned char *tag2, + size_t tag_len) +{ + /* Check tag in "constant-time" */ + int diff = mbedtls_ct_memcmp(tag1, tag2, tag_len); + + if (diff != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_AUTH_FAILED; + } + + return 0; +} + +static int ccm_auth_decrypt(mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx, int mode, size_t length, + const unsigned char *iv, size_t iv_len, + const unsigned char *add, size_t add_len, + const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output, + const unsigned char *tag, size_t tag_len) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; unsigned char check_tag[16]; - int diff; - - CCM_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - CCM_VALIDATE_RET(iv != NULL); - CCM_VALIDATE_RET(add_len == 0 || add != NULL); - CCM_VALIDATE_RET(length == 0 || input != NULL); - CCM_VALIDATE_RET(length == 0 || output != NULL); - CCM_VALIDATE_RET(tag_len == 0 || tag != NULL); - if ((ret = ccm_auth_crypt(ctx, CCM_DECRYPT, length, + if ((ret = ccm_auth_crypt(ctx, mode, length, iv, iv_len, add, add_len, input, output, check_tag, tag_len)) != 0) { return ret; } - /* Check tag in "constant-time" */ - diff = mbedtls_ct_memcmp(tag, check_tag, tag_len); - - if (diff != 0) { + if ((ret = mbedtls_ccm_compare_tags(tag, check_tag, tag_len)) != 0) { mbedtls_platform_zeroize(output, length); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_AUTH_FAILED; + return ret; } return 0; } +int mbedtls_ccm_star_auth_decrypt(mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx, size_t length, + const unsigned char *iv, size_t iv_len, + const unsigned char *add, size_t add_len, + const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output, + const unsigned char *tag, size_t tag_len) +{ + return ccm_auth_decrypt(ctx, MBEDTLS_CCM_STAR_DECRYPT, length, + iv, iv_len, add, add_len, + input, output, tag, tag_len); +} + int mbedtls_ccm_auth_decrypt(mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx, size_t length, const unsigned char *iv, size_t iv_len, const unsigned char *add, size_t add_len, const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output, const unsigned char *tag, size_t tag_len) { - CCM_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - CCM_VALIDATE_RET(iv != NULL); - CCM_VALIDATE_RET(add_len == 0 || add != NULL); - CCM_VALIDATE_RET(length == 0 || input != NULL); - CCM_VALIDATE_RET(length == 0 || output != NULL); - CCM_VALIDATE_RET(tag_len == 0 || tag != NULL); - - if (tag_len == 0) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT; - } - - return mbedtls_ccm_star_auth_decrypt(ctx, length, iv, iv_len, add, - add_len, input, output, tag, tag_len); + return ccm_auth_decrypt(ctx, MBEDTLS_CCM_DECRYPT, length, + iv, iv_len, add, add_len, + input, output, tag, tag_len); } #endif /* !MBEDTLS_CCM_ALT */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) && defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) && defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_GCM_CAN_AES) /* * Examples 1 to 3 from SP800-38C Appendix C */ diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/certs.c b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/certs.c deleted file mode 100644 index 79856cd6cf90..000000000000 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/certs.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,1734 +0,0 @@ -/* - * X.509 test certificates - * - * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later - */ - -#include "common.h" - -#include "mbedtls/certs.h" - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CERTS_C) - -/* - * Test CA Certificates - * - * We define test CA certificates for each choice of the following parameters: - * - PEM or DER encoding - * - SHA-1 or SHA-256 hash - * - RSA or EC key - * - * Things to add: - * - multiple EC curve types - * - */ - -/* This is taken from tests/data_files/test-ca2.crt */ -/* BEGIN FILE string macro TEST_CA_CRT_EC_PEM tests/data_files/test-ca2.crt */ -#define TEST_CA_CRT_EC_PEM \ - "-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\r\n" \ - "MIICBDCCAYigAwIBAgIJAMFD4n5iQ8zoMAwGCCqGSM49BAMCBQAwPjELMAkGA1UE\r\n" \ - "BhMCTkwxETAPBgNVBAoMCFBvbGFyU1NMMRwwGgYDVQQDDBNQb2xhcnNzbCBUZXN0\r\n" \ - "IEVDIENBMB4XDTE5MDIxMDE0NDQwMFoXDTI5MDIxMDE0NDQwMFowPjELMAkGA1UE\r\n" \ - "BhMCTkwxETAPBgNVBAoMCFBvbGFyU1NMMRwwGgYDVQQDDBNQb2xhcnNzbCBUZXN0\r\n" \ - "IEVDIENBMHYwEAYHKoZIzj0CAQYFK4EEACIDYgAEw9orNEE3WC+HVv78ibopQ0tO\r\n" \ - "4G7DDldTMzlY1FK0kZU5CyPfXxckYkj8GpUpziwth8KIUoCv1mqrId240xxuWLjK\r\n" \ - "6LJpjvNBrSnDtF91p0dv1RkpVWmaUzsgtGYWYDMeo1AwTjAMBgNVHRMEBTADAQH/\r\n" \ - "MB0GA1UdDgQWBBSdbSAkSQE/K8t4tRm8fiTJ2/s2fDAfBgNVHSMEGDAWgBSdbSAk\r\n" \ - "SQE/K8t4tRm8fiTJ2/s2fDAMBggqhkjOPQQDAgUAA2gAMGUCMFHKrjAPpHB0BN1a\r\n" \ - "LH8TwcJ3vh0AxeKZj30mRdOKBmg/jLS3rU3g8VQBHpn8sOTTBwIxANxPO5AerimZ\r\n" \ - "hCjMe0d4CTHf1gFZMF70+IqEP+o5VHsIp2Cqvflb0VGWFC5l9a4cQg==\r\n" \ - "-----END CERTIFICATE-----\r\n" -/* END FILE */ - -/* This is generated from tests/data_files/test-ca2.crt.der using `xxd -i`. */ -/* BEGIN FILE binary macro TEST_CA_CRT_EC_DER tests/data_files/test-ca2.crt.der */ -#define TEST_CA_CRT_EC_DER { \ - 0x30, 0x82, 0x02, 0x04, 0x30, 0x82, 0x01, 0x88, 0xa0, 0x03, 0x02, 0x01, \ - 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x00, 0xc1, 0x43, 0xe2, 0x7e, 0x62, 0x43, 0xcc, 0xe8, \ - 0x30, 0x0c, 0x06, 0x08, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0xce, 0x3d, 0x04, 0x03, 0x02, \ - 0x05, 0x00, 0x30, 0x3e, 0x31, 0x0b, 0x30, 0x09, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, \ - 0x06, 0x13, 0x02, 0x4e, 0x4c, 0x31, 0x11, 0x30, 0x0f, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, \ - 0x04, 0x0a, 0x0c, 0x08, 0x50, 0x6f, 0x6c, 0x61, 0x72, 0x53, 0x53, 0x4c, \ - 0x31, 0x1c, 0x30, 0x1a, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x03, 0x0c, 0x13, 0x50, \ - 0x6f, 0x6c, 0x61, 0x72, 0x73, 0x73, 0x6c, 0x20, 0x54, 0x65, 0x73, 0x74, \ - 0x20, 0x45, 0x43, 0x20, 0x43, 0x41, 0x30, 0x1e, 0x17, 0x0d, 0x31, 0x39, \ - 0x30, 0x32, 0x31, 0x30, 0x31, 0x34, 0x34, 0x34, 0x30, 0x30, 0x5a, 0x17, \ - 0x0d, 0x32, 0x39, 0x30, 0x32, 0x31, 0x30, 0x31, 0x34, 0x34, 0x34, 0x30, \ - 0x30, 0x5a, 0x30, 0x3e, 0x31, 0x0b, 0x30, 0x09, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, \ - 0x06, 0x13, 0x02, 0x4e, 0x4c, 0x31, 0x11, 0x30, 0x0f, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, \ - 0x04, 0x0a, 0x0c, 0x08, 0x50, 0x6f, 0x6c, 0x61, 0x72, 0x53, 0x53, 0x4c, \ - 0x31, 0x1c, 0x30, 0x1a, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x03, 0x0c, 0x13, 0x50, \ - 0x6f, 0x6c, 0x61, 0x72, 0x73, 0x73, 0x6c, 0x20, 0x54, 0x65, 0x73, 0x74, \ - 0x20, 0x45, 0x43, 0x20, 0x43, 0x41, 0x30, 0x76, 0x30, 0x10, 0x06, 0x07, \ - 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0xce, 0x3d, 0x02, 0x01, 0x06, 0x05, 0x2b, 0x81, 0x04, \ - 0x00, 0x22, 0x03, 0x62, 0x00, 0x04, 0xc3, 0xda, 0x2b, 0x34, 0x41, 0x37, \ - 0x58, 0x2f, 0x87, 0x56, 0xfe, 0xfc, 0x89, 0xba, 0x29, 0x43, 0x4b, 0x4e, \ - 0xe0, 0x6e, 0xc3, 0x0e, 0x57, 0x53, 0x33, 0x39, 0x58, 0xd4, 0x52, 0xb4, \ - 0x91, 0x95, 0x39, 0x0b, 0x23, 0xdf, 0x5f, 0x17, 0x24, 0x62, 0x48, 0xfc, \ - 0x1a, 0x95, 0x29, 0xce, 0x2c, 0x2d, 0x87, 0xc2, 0x88, 0x52, 0x80, 0xaf, \ - 0xd6, 0x6a, 0xab, 0x21, 0xdd, 0xb8, 0xd3, 0x1c, 0x6e, 0x58, 0xb8, 0xca, \ - 0xe8, 0xb2, 0x69, 0x8e, 0xf3, 0x41, 0xad, 0x29, 0xc3, 0xb4, 0x5f, 0x75, \ - 0xa7, 0x47, 0x6f, 0xd5, 0x19, 0x29, 0x55, 0x69, 0x9a, 0x53, 0x3b, 0x20, \ - 0xb4, 0x66, 0x16, 0x60, 0x33, 0x1e, 0xa3, 0x50, 0x30, 0x4e, 0x30, 0x0c, \ - 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x1d, 0x13, 0x04, 0x05, 0x30, 0x03, 0x01, 0x01, 0xff, \ - 0x30, 0x1d, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x1d, 0x0e, 0x04, 0x16, 0x04, 0x14, 0x9d, \ - 0x6d, 0x20, 0x24, 0x49, 0x01, 0x3f, 0x2b, 0xcb, 0x78, 0xb5, 0x19, 0xbc, \ - 0x7e, 0x24, 0xc9, 0xdb, 0xfb, 0x36, 0x7c, 0x30, 0x1f, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, \ - 0x1d, 0x23, 0x04, 0x18, 0x30, 0x16, 0x80, 0x14, 0x9d, 0x6d, 0x20, 0x24, \ - 0x49, 0x01, 0x3f, 0x2b, 0xcb, 0x78, 0xb5, 0x19, 0xbc, 0x7e, 0x24, 0xc9, \ - 0xdb, 0xfb, 0x36, 0x7c, 0x30, 0x0c, 0x06, 0x08, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0xce, \ - 0x3d, 0x04, 0x03, 0x02, 0x05, 0x00, 0x03, 0x68, 0x00, 0x30, 0x65, 0x02, \ - 0x30, 0x51, 0xca, 0xae, 0x30, 0x0f, 0xa4, 0x70, 0x74, 0x04, 0xdd, 0x5a, \ - 0x2c, 0x7f, 0x13, 0xc1, 0xc2, 0x77, 0xbe, 0x1d, 0x00, 0xc5, 0xe2, 0x99, \ - 0x8f, 0x7d, 0x26, 0x45, 0xd3, 0x8a, 0x06, 0x68, 0x3f, 0x8c, 0xb4, 0xb7, \ - 0xad, 0x4d, 0xe0, 0xf1, 0x54, 0x01, 0x1e, 0x99, 0xfc, 0xb0, 0xe4, 0xd3, \ - 0x07, 0x02, 0x31, 0x00, 0xdc, 0x4f, 0x3b, 0x90, 0x1e, 0xae, 0x29, 0x99, \ - 0x84, 0x28, 0xcc, 0x7b, 0x47, 0x78, 0x09, 0x31, 0xdf, 0xd6, 0x01, 0x59, \ - 0x30, 0x5e, 0xf4, 0xf8, 0x8a, 0x84, 0x3f, 0xea, 0x39, 0x54, 0x7b, 0x08, \ - 0xa7, 0x60, 0xaa, 0xbd, 0xf9, 0x5b, 0xd1, 0x51, 0x96, 0x14, 0x2e, 0x65, \ - 0xf5, 0xae, 0x1c, 0x42 \ -} -/* END FILE */ - -/* This is taken from tests/data_files/test-ca2.key.enc */ -/* BEGIN FILE string macro TEST_CA_KEY_EC_PEM tests/data_files/test-ca2.key.enc */ -#define TEST_CA_KEY_EC_PEM \ - "-----BEGIN EC PRIVATE KEY-----\r\n" \ - "Proc-Type: 4,ENCRYPTED\r\n" \ - "DEK-Info: DES-EDE3-CBC,307EAB469933D64E\r\n" \ - "\r\n" \ - "IxbrRmKcAzctJqPdTQLA4SWyBYYGYJVkYEna+F7Pa5t5Yg/gKADrFKcm6B72e7DG\r\n" \ - "ihExtZI648s0zdYw6qSJ74vrPSuWDe5qm93BqsfVH9svtCzWHW0pm1p0KTBCFfUq\r\n" \ - "UsuWTITwJImcnlAs1gaRZ3sAWm7cOUidL0fo2G0fYUFNcYoCSLffCFTEHBuPnagb\r\n" \ - "a77x/sY1Bvii8S9/XhDTb6pTMx06wzrm\r\n" \ - "-----END EC PRIVATE KEY-----\r\n" -/* END FILE */ - -#define TEST_CA_PWD_EC_PEM "PolarSSLTest" - -/* This is generated from tests/data_files/test-ca2.key.der using `xxd -i`. */ -/* BEGIN FILE binary macro TEST_CA_KEY_EC_DER tests/data_files/test-ca2.key.der */ -#define TEST_CA_KEY_EC_DER { \ - 0x30, 0x81, 0xa4, 0x02, 0x01, 0x01, 0x04, 0x30, 0x83, 0xd9, 0x15, 0x0e, \ - 0xa0, 0x71, 0xf0, 0x57, 0x10, 0x33, 0xa3, 0x38, 0xb8, 0x86, 0xc1, 0xa6, \ - 0x11, 0x5d, 0x6d, 0xb4, 0x03, 0xe1, 0x29, 0x76, 0x45, 0xd7, 0x87, 0x6f, \ - 0x23, 0xab, 0x44, 0x20, 0xea, 0x64, 0x7b, 0x85, 0xb1, 0x76, 0xe7, 0x85, \ - 0x95, 0xaa, 0x74, 0xd6, 0xd1, 0xa4, 0x5e, 0xea, 0xa0, 0x07, 0x06, 0x05, \ - 0x2b, 0x81, 0x04, 0x00, 0x22, 0xa1, 0x64, 0x03, 0x62, 0x00, 0x04, 0xc3, \ - 0xda, 0x2b, 0x34, 0x41, 0x37, 0x58, 0x2f, 0x87, 0x56, 0xfe, 0xfc, 0x89, \ - 0xba, 0x29, 0x43, 0x4b, 0x4e, 0xe0, 0x6e, 0xc3, 0x0e, 0x57, 0x53, 0x33, \ - 0x39, 0x58, 0xd4, 0x52, 0xb4, 0x91, 0x95, 0x39, 0x0b, 0x23, 0xdf, 0x5f, \ - 0x17, 0x24, 0x62, 0x48, 0xfc, 0x1a, 0x95, 0x29, 0xce, 0x2c, 0x2d, 0x87, \ - 0xc2, 0x88, 0x52, 0x80, 0xaf, 0xd6, 0x6a, 0xab, 0x21, 0xdd, 0xb8, 0xd3, \ - 0x1c, 0x6e, 0x58, 0xb8, 0xca, 0xe8, 0xb2, 0x69, 0x8e, 0xf3, 0x41, 0xad, \ - 0x29, 0xc3, 0xb4, 0x5f, 0x75, 0xa7, 0x47, 0x6f, 0xd5, 0x19, 0x29, 0x55, \ - 0x69, 0x9a, 0x53, 0x3b, 0x20, 0xb4, 0x66, 0x16, 0x60, 0x33, 0x1e \ -} -/* END FILE */ - -/* This is taken from tests/data_files/test-ca-sha256.crt. */ -/* BEGIN FILE string macro TEST_CA_CRT_RSA_SHA256_PEM tests/data_files/test-ca-sha256.crt */ -#define TEST_CA_CRT_RSA_SHA256_PEM \ - "-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\r\n" \ - "MIIDQTCCAimgAwIBAgIBAzANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADA7MQswCQYDVQQGEwJOTDER\r\n" \ - "MA8GA1UECgwIUG9sYXJTU0wxGTAXBgNVBAMMEFBvbGFyU1NMIFRlc3QgQ0EwHhcN\r\n" \ - "MTkwMjEwMTQ0NDAwWhcNMjkwMjEwMTQ0NDAwWjA7MQswCQYDVQQGEwJOTDERMA8G\r\n" \ - "A1UECgwIUG9sYXJTU0wxGTAXBgNVBAMMEFBvbGFyU1NMIFRlc3QgQ0EwggEiMA0G\r\n" \ - "CSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4IBDwAwggEKAoIBAQDA3zf8F7vglp0/ht6WMn1EpRagzSHx\r\n" \ - "mdTs6st8GFgIlKXsm8WL3xoemTiZhx57wI053zhdcHgH057Zk+i5clHFzqMwUqny\r\n" \ - "50BwFMtEonILwuVA+T7lpg6z+exKY8C4KQB0nFc7qKUEkHHxvYPZP9al4jwqj+8n\r\n" \ - "YMPGn8u67GB9t+aEMr5P+1gmIgNb1LTV+/Xjli5wwOQuvfwu7uJBVcA0Ln0kcmnL\r\n" \ - "R7EUQIN9Z/SG9jGr8XmksrUuEvmEF/Bibyc+E1ixVA0hmnM3oTDPb5Lc9un8rNsu\r\n" \ - "KNF+AksjoBXyOGVkCeoMbo4bF6BxyLObyavpw/LPh5aPgAIynplYb6LVAgMBAAGj\r\n" \ - "UDBOMAwGA1UdEwQFMAMBAf8wHQYDVR0OBBYEFLRa5KWz3tJS9rnVppUP6z68x/3/\r\n" \ - "MB8GA1UdIwQYMBaAFLRa5KWz3tJS9rnVppUP6z68x/3/MA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBCwUA\r\n" \ - "A4IBAQA4qFSCth2q22uJIdE4KGHJsJjVEfw2/xn+MkTvCMfxVrvmRvqCtjE4tKDl\r\n" \ - "oK4MxFOek07oDZwvtAT9ijn1hHftTNS7RH9zd/fxNpfcHnMZXVC4w4DNA1fSANtW\r\n" \ - "5sY1JB5Je9jScrsLSS+mAjyv0Ow3Hb2Bix8wu7xNNrV5fIf7Ubm+wt6SqEBxu3Kb\r\n" \ - "+EfObAT4huf3czznhH3C17ed6NSbXwoXfby7stWUDeRJv08RaFOykf/Aae7bY5PL\r\n" \ - "yTVrkAnikMntJ9YI+hNNYt3inqq11A5cN0+rVTst8UKCxzQ4GpvroSwPKTFkbMw4\r\n" \ - "/anT1dVxr/BtwJfiESoK3/4CeXR1\r\n" \ - "-----END CERTIFICATE-----\r\n" -/* END FILE */ - -/* This is generated from tests/data_files/test-ca-sha256.crt.der - * using `xxd -i`. */ -/* BEGIN FILE binary macro TEST_CA_CRT_RSA_SHA256_DER tests/data_files/test-ca-sha256.crt.der */ -#define TEST_CA_CRT_RSA_SHA256_DER { \ - 0x30, 0x82, 0x03, 0x41, 0x30, 0x82, 0x02, 0x29, 0xa0, 0x03, 0x02, 0x01, \ - 0x02, 0x02, 0x01, 0x03, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, \ - 0xf7, 0x0d, 0x01, 0x01, 0x0b, 0x05, 0x00, 0x30, 0x3b, 0x31, 0x0b, 0x30, \ - 0x09, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x06, 0x13, 0x02, 0x4e, 0x4c, 0x31, 0x11, \ - 0x30, 0x0f, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x0a, 0x0c, 0x08, 0x50, 0x6f, 0x6c, \ - 0x61, 0x72, 0x53, 0x53, 0x4c, 0x31, 0x19, 0x30, 0x17, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, \ - 0x04, 0x03, 0x0c, 0x10, 0x50, 0x6f, 0x6c, 0x61, 0x72, 0x53, 0x53, 0x4c, \ - 0x20, 0x54, 0x65, 0x73, 0x74, 0x20, 0x43, 0x41, 0x30, 0x1e, 0x17, 0x0d, \ - 0x31, 0x39, 0x30, 0x32, 0x31, 0x30, 0x31, 0x34, 0x34, 0x34, 0x30, 0x30, \ - 0x5a, 0x17, 0x0d, 0x32, 0x39, 0x30, 0x32, 0x31, 0x30, 0x31, 0x34, 0x34, \ - 0x34, 0x30, 0x30, 0x5a, 0x30, 0x3b, 0x31, 0x0b, 0x30, 0x09, 0x06, 0x03, \ - 0x55, 0x04, 0x06, 0x13, 0x02, 0x4e, 0x4c, 0x31, 0x11, 0x30, 0x0f, 0x06, \ - 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x0a, 0x0c, 0x08, 0x50, 0x6f, 0x6c, 0x61, 0x72, 0x53, \ - 0x53, 0x4c, 0x31, 0x19, 0x30, 0x17, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x03, 0x0c, \ - 0x10, 0x50, 0x6f, 0x6c, 0x61, 0x72, 0x53, 0x53, 0x4c, 0x20, 0x54, 0x65, \ - 0x73, 0x74, 0x20, 0x43, 0x41, 0x30, 0x82, 0x01, 0x22, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, \ - 0x09, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x0d, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x05, 0x00, \ - 0x03, 0x82, 0x01, 0x0f, 0x00, 0x30, 0x82, 0x01, 0x0a, 0x02, 0x82, 0x01, \ - 0x01, 0x00, 0xc0, 0xdf, 0x37, 0xfc, 0x17, 0xbb, 0xe0, 0x96, 0x9d, 0x3f, \ - 0x86, 0xde, 0x96, 0x32, 0x7d, 0x44, 0xa5, 0x16, 0xa0, 0xcd, 0x21, 0xf1, \ - 0x99, 0xd4, 0xec, 0xea, 0xcb, 0x7c, 0x18, 0x58, 0x08, 0x94, 0xa5, 0xec, \ - 0x9b, 0xc5, 0x8b, 0xdf, 0x1a, 0x1e, 0x99, 0x38, 0x99, 0x87, 0x1e, 0x7b, \ - 0xc0, 0x8d, 0x39, 0xdf, 0x38, 0x5d, 0x70, 0x78, 0x07, 0xd3, 0x9e, 0xd9, \ - 0x93, 0xe8, 0xb9, 0x72, 0x51, 0xc5, 0xce, 0xa3, 0x30, 0x52, 0xa9, 0xf2, \ - 0xe7, 0x40, 0x70, 0x14, 0xcb, 0x44, 0xa2, 0x72, 0x0b, 0xc2, 0xe5, 0x40, \ - 0xf9, 0x3e, 0xe5, 0xa6, 0x0e, 0xb3, 0xf9, 0xec, 0x4a, 0x63, 0xc0, 0xb8, \ - 0x29, 0x00, 0x74, 0x9c, 0x57, 0x3b, 0xa8, 0xa5, 0x04, 0x90, 0x71, 0xf1, \ - 0xbd, 0x83, 0xd9, 0x3f, 0xd6, 0xa5, 0xe2, 0x3c, 0x2a, 0x8f, 0xef, 0x27, \ - 0x60, 0xc3, 0xc6, 0x9f, 0xcb, 0xba, 0xec, 0x60, 0x7d, 0xb7, 0xe6, 0x84, \ - 0x32, 0xbe, 0x4f, 0xfb, 0x58, 0x26, 0x22, 0x03, 0x5b, 0xd4, 0xb4, 0xd5, \ - 0xfb, 0xf5, 0xe3, 0x96, 0x2e, 0x70, 0xc0, 0xe4, 0x2e, 0xbd, 0xfc, 0x2e, \ - 0xee, 0xe2, 0x41, 0x55, 0xc0, 0x34, 0x2e, 0x7d, 0x24, 0x72, 0x69, 0xcb, \ - 0x47, 0xb1, 0x14, 0x40, 0x83, 0x7d, 0x67, 0xf4, 0x86, 0xf6, 0x31, 0xab, \ - 0xf1, 0x79, 0xa4, 0xb2, 0xb5, 0x2e, 0x12, 0xf9, 0x84, 0x17, 0xf0, 0x62, \ - 0x6f, 0x27, 0x3e, 0x13, 0x58, 0xb1, 0x54, 0x0d, 0x21, 0x9a, 0x73, 0x37, \ - 0xa1, 0x30, 0xcf, 0x6f, 0x92, 0xdc, 0xf6, 0xe9, 0xfc, 0xac, 0xdb, 0x2e, \ - 0x28, 0xd1, 0x7e, 0x02, 0x4b, 0x23, 0xa0, 0x15, 0xf2, 0x38, 0x65, 0x64, \ - 0x09, 0xea, 0x0c, 0x6e, 0x8e, 0x1b, 0x17, 0xa0, 0x71, 0xc8, 0xb3, 0x9b, \ - 0xc9, 0xab, 0xe9, 0xc3, 0xf2, 0xcf, 0x87, 0x96, 0x8f, 0x80, 0x02, 0x32, \ - 0x9e, 0x99, 0x58, 0x6f, 0xa2, 0xd5, 0x02, 0x03, 0x01, 0x00, 0x01, 0xa3, \ - 0x50, 0x30, 0x4e, 0x30, 0x0c, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x1d, 0x13, 0x04, 0x05, \ - 0x30, 0x03, 0x01, 0x01, 0xff, 0x30, 0x1d, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x1d, 0x0e, \ - 0x04, 0x16, 0x04, 0x14, 0xb4, 0x5a, 0xe4, 0xa5, 0xb3, 0xde, 0xd2, 0x52, \ - 0xf6, 0xb9, 0xd5, 0xa6, 0x95, 0x0f, 0xeb, 0x3e, 0xbc, 0xc7, 0xfd, 0xff, \ - 0x30, 0x1f, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x1d, 0x23, 0x04, 0x18, 0x30, 0x16, 0x80, \ - 0x14, 0xb4, 0x5a, 0xe4, 0xa5, 0xb3, 0xde, 0xd2, 0x52, 0xf6, 0xb9, 0xd5, \ - 0xa6, 0x95, 0x0f, 0xeb, 0x3e, 0xbc, 0xc7, 0xfd, 0xff, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, \ - 0x09, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x0d, 0x01, 0x01, 0x0b, 0x05, 0x00, \ - 0x03, 0x82, 0x01, 0x01, 0x00, 0x38, 0xa8, 0x54, 0x82, 0xb6, 0x1d, 0xaa, \ - 0xdb, 0x6b, 0x89, 0x21, 0xd1, 0x38, 0x28, 0x61, 0xc9, 0xb0, 0x98, 0xd5, \ - 0x11, 0xfc, 0x36, 0xff, 0x19, 0xfe, 0x32, 0x44, 0xef, 0x08, 0xc7, 0xf1, \ - 0x56, 0xbb, 0xe6, 0x46, 0xfa, 0x82, 0xb6, 0x31, 0x38, 0xb4, 0xa0, 0xe5, \ - 0xa0, 0xae, 0x0c, 0xc4, 0x53, 0x9e, 0x93, 0x4e, 0xe8, 0x0d, 0x9c, 0x2f, \ - 0xb4, 0x04, 0xfd, 0x8a, 0x39, 0xf5, 0x84, 0x77, 0xed, 0x4c, 0xd4, 0xbb, \ - 0x44, 0x7f, 0x73, 0x77, 0xf7, 0xf1, 0x36, 0x97, 0xdc, 0x1e, 0x73, 0x19, \ - 0x5d, 0x50, 0xb8, 0xc3, 0x80, 0xcd, 0x03, 0x57, 0xd2, 0x00, 0xdb, 0x56, \ - 0xe6, 0xc6, 0x35, 0x24, 0x1e, 0x49, 0x7b, 0xd8, 0xd2, 0x72, 0xbb, 0x0b, \ - 0x49, 0x2f, 0xa6, 0x02, 0x3c, 0xaf, 0xd0, 0xec, 0x37, 0x1d, 0xbd, 0x81, \ - 0x8b, 0x1f, 0x30, 0xbb, 0xbc, 0x4d, 0x36, 0xb5, 0x79, 0x7c, 0x87, 0xfb, \ - 0x51, 0xb9, 0xbe, 0xc2, 0xde, 0x92, 0xa8, 0x40, 0x71, 0xbb, 0x72, 0x9b, \ - 0xf8, 0x47, 0xce, 0x6c, 0x04, 0xf8, 0x86, 0xe7, 0xf7, 0x73, 0x3c, 0xe7, \ - 0x84, 0x7d, 0xc2, 0xd7, 0xb7, 0x9d, 0xe8, 0xd4, 0x9b, 0x5f, 0x0a, 0x17, \ - 0x7d, 0xbc, 0xbb, 0xb2, 0xd5, 0x94, 0x0d, 0xe4, 0x49, 0xbf, 0x4f, 0x11, \ - 0x68, 0x53, 0xb2, 0x91, 0xff, 0xc0, 0x69, 0xee, 0xdb, 0x63, 0x93, 0xcb, \ - 0xc9, 0x35, 0x6b, 0x90, 0x09, 0xe2, 0x90, 0xc9, 0xed, 0x27, 0xd6, 0x08, \ - 0xfa, 0x13, 0x4d, 0x62, 0xdd, 0xe2, 0x9e, 0xaa, 0xb5, 0xd4, 0x0e, 0x5c, \ - 0x37, 0x4f, 0xab, 0x55, 0x3b, 0x2d, 0xf1, 0x42, 0x82, 0xc7, 0x34, 0x38, \ - 0x1a, 0x9b, 0xeb, 0xa1, 0x2c, 0x0f, 0x29, 0x31, 0x64, 0x6c, 0xcc, 0x38, \ - 0xfd, 0xa9, 0xd3, 0xd5, 0xd5, 0x71, 0xaf, 0xf0, 0x6d, 0xc0, 0x97, 0xe2, \ - 0x11, 0x2a, 0x0a, 0xdf, 0xfe, 0x02, 0x79, 0x74, 0x75 \ -} -/* END FILE */ - -/* This is taken from tests/data_files/test-ca-sha1.crt. */ -/* BEGIN FILE string macro TEST_CA_CRT_RSA_SHA1_PEM tests/data_files/test-ca-sha1.crt */ -#define TEST_CA_CRT_RSA_SHA1_PEM \ - "-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\r\n" \ - "MIIDQTCCAimgAwIBAgIBAzANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQUFADA7MQswCQYDVQQGEwJOTDER\r\n" \ - "MA8GA1UECgwIUG9sYXJTU0wxGTAXBgNVBAMMEFBvbGFyU1NMIFRlc3QgQ0EwHhcN\r\n" \ - "MTEwMjEyMTQ0NDAwWhcNMjEwMjEyMTQ0NDAwWjA7MQswCQYDVQQGEwJOTDERMA8G\r\n" \ - "A1UECgwIUG9sYXJTU0wxGTAXBgNVBAMMEFBvbGFyU1NMIFRlc3QgQ0EwggEiMA0G\r\n" \ - "CSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4IBDwAwggEKAoIBAQDA3zf8F7vglp0/ht6WMn1EpRagzSHx\r\n" \ - "mdTs6st8GFgIlKXsm8WL3xoemTiZhx57wI053zhdcHgH057Zk+i5clHFzqMwUqny\r\n" \ - "50BwFMtEonILwuVA+T7lpg6z+exKY8C4KQB0nFc7qKUEkHHxvYPZP9al4jwqj+8n\r\n" \ - "YMPGn8u67GB9t+aEMr5P+1gmIgNb1LTV+/Xjli5wwOQuvfwu7uJBVcA0Ln0kcmnL\r\n" \ - "R7EUQIN9Z/SG9jGr8XmksrUuEvmEF/Bibyc+E1ixVA0hmnM3oTDPb5Lc9un8rNsu\r\n" \ - "KNF+AksjoBXyOGVkCeoMbo4bF6BxyLObyavpw/LPh5aPgAIynplYb6LVAgMBAAGj\r\n" \ - "UDBOMAwGA1UdEwQFMAMBAf8wHQYDVR0OBBYEFLRa5KWz3tJS9rnVppUP6z68x/3/\r\n" \ - "MB8GA1UdIwQYMBaAFLRa5KWz3tJS9rnVppUP6z68x/3/MA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBBQUA\r\n" \ - "A4IBAQABE3OEPfEd/bcJW5ZdU3/VgPNS4tMzh8gnJP/V2FcvFtGylMpQq6YnEBYI\r\n" \ - "yBHAL4DRvlMY5rnXGBp3ODR8MpqHC6AquRTCLzjS57iYff//4QFQqW9n92zctspv\r\n" \ - "czkaPKgjqo1No3Uq0Xaz10rcxyTUPrf5wNVRZ2V0KvllvAAVSzbI4mpdUXztjhST\r\n" \ - "S5A2BeWQAAOr0zq1F7TSRVJpJs7jmB2ai/igkh1IAjcuwV6VwlP+sbw0gjQ0NpGM\r\n" \ - "iHpnlzRAi/tIbtOvMIGOBU2TIfax/5jq1agUx5aPmT5TWAiJPOOP6l5xXnDwxeYS\r\n" \ - "NWqiX9GyusBZjezaCaHabjDLU0qQ\r\n" \ - "-----END CERTIFICATE-----\r\n" -/* END FILE */ - -/* This is taken from tests/data_files/test-ca-sha1.crt.der. */ -/* BEGIN FILE binary macro TEST_CA_CRT_RSA_SHA1_DER tests/data_files/test-ca-sha1.crt.der */ -#define TEST_CA_CRT_RSA_SHA1_DER { \ - 0x30, 0x82, 0x03, 0x41, 0x30, 0x82, 0x02, 0x29, 0xa0, 0x03, 0x02, 0x01, \ - 0x02, 0x02, 0x01, 0x03, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, \ - 0xf7, 0x0d, 0x01, 0x01, 0x05, 0x05, 0x00, 0x30, 0x3b, 0x31, 0x0b, 0x30, \ - 0x09, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x06, 0x13, 0x02, 0x4e, 0x4c, 0x31, 0x11, \ - 0x30, 0x0f, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x0a, 0x0c, 0x08, 0x50, 0x6f, 0x6c, \ - 0x61, 0x72, 0x53, 0x53, 0x4c, 0x31, 0x19, 0x30, 0x17, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, \ - 0x04, 0x03, 0x0c, 0x10, 0x50, 0x6f, 0x6c, 0x61, 0x72, 0x53, 0x53, 0x4c, \ - 0x20, 0x54, 0x65, 0x73, 0x74, 0x20, 0x43, 0x41, 0x30, 0x1e, 0x17, 0x0d, \ - 0x31, 0x31, 0x30, 0x32, 0x31, 0x32, 0x31, 0x34, 0x34, 0x34, 0x30, 0x30, \ - 0x5a, 0x17, 0x0d, 0x32, 0x31, 0x30, 0x32, 0x31, 0x32, 0x31, 0x34, 0x34, \ - 0x34, 0x30, 0x30, 0x5a, 0x30, 0x3b, 0x31, 0x0b, 0x30, 0x09, 0x06, 0x03, \ - 0x55, 0x04, 0x06, 0x13, 0x02, 0x4e, 0x4c, 0x31, 0x11, 0x30, 0x0f, 0x06, \ - 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x0a, 0x0c, 0x08, 0x50, 0x6f, 0x6c, 0x61, 0x72, 0x53, \ - 0x53, 0x4c, 0x31, 0x19, 0x30, 0x17, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x03, 0x0c, \ - 0x10, 0x50, 0x6f, 0x6c, 0x61, 0x72, 0x53, 0x53, 0x4c, 0x20, 0x54, 0x65, \ - 0x73, 0x74, 0x20, 0x43, 0x41, 0x30, 0x82, 0x01, 0x22, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, \ - 0x09, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x0d, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x05, 0x00, \ - 0x03, 0x82, 0x01, 0x0f, 0x00, 0x30, 0x82, 0x01, 0x0a, 0x02, 0x82, 0x01, \ - 0x01, 0x00, 0xc0, 0xdf, 0x37, 0xfc, 0x17, 0xbb, 0xe0, 0x96, 0x9d, 0x3f, \ - 0x86, 0xde, 0x96, 0x32, 0x7d, 0x44, 0xa5, 0x16, 0xa0, 0xcd, 0x21, 0xf1, \ - 0x99, 0xd4, 0xec, 0xea, 0xcb, 0x7c, 0x18, 0x58, 0x08, 0x94, 0xa5, 0xec, \ - 0x9b, 0xc5, 0x8b, 0xdf, 0x1a, 0x1e, 0x99, 0x38, 0x99, 0x87, 0x1e, 0x7b, \ - 0xc0, 0x8d, 0x39, 0xdf, 0x38, 0x5d, 0x70, 0x78, 0x07, 0xd3, 0x9e, 0xd9, \ - 0x93, 0xe8, 0xb9, 0x72, 0x51, 0xc5, 0xce, 0xa3, 0x30, 0x52, 0xa9, 0xf2, \ - 0xe7, 0x40, 0x70, 0x14, 0xcb, 0x44, 0xa2, 0x72, 0x0b, 0xc2, 0xe5, 0x40, \ - 0xf9, 0x3e, 0xe5, 0xa6, 0x0e, 0xb3, 0xf9, 0xec, 0x4a, 0x63, 0xc0, 0xb8, \ - 0x29, 0x00, 0x74, 0x9c, 0x57, 0x3b, 0xa8, 0xa5, 0x04, 0x90, 0x71, 0xf1, \ - 0xbd, 0x83, 0xd9, 0x3f, 0xd6, 0xa5, 0xe2, 0x3c, 0x2a, 0x8f, 0xef, 0x27, \ - 0x60, 0xc3, 0xc6, 0x9f, 0xcb, 0xba, 0xec, 0x60, 0x7d, 0xb7, 0xe6, 0x84, \ - 0x32, 0xbe, 0x4f, 0xfb, 0x58, 0x26, 0x22, 0x03, 0x5b, 0xd4, 0xb4, 0xd5, \ - 0xfb, 0xf5, 0xe3, 0x96, 0x2e, 0x70, 0xc0, 0xe4, 0x2e, 0xbd, 0xfc, 0x2e, \ - 0xee, 0xe2, 0x41, 0x55, 0xc0, 0x34, 0x2e, 0x7d, 0x24, 0x72, 0x69, 0xcb, \ - 0x47, 0xb1, 0x14, 0x40, 0x83, 0x7d, 0x67, 0xf4, 0x86, 0xf6, 0x31, 0xab, \ - 0xf1, 0x79, 0xa4, 0xb2, 0xb5, 0x2e, 0x12, 0xf9, 0x84, 0x17, 0xf0, 0x62, \ - 0x6f, 0x27, 0x3e, 0x13, 0x58, 0xb1, 0x54, 0x0d, 0x21, 0x9a, 0x73, 0x37, \ - 0xa1, 0x30, 0xcf, 0x6f, 0x92, 0xdc, 0xf6, 0xe9, 0xfc, 0xac, 0xdb, 0x2e, \ - 0x28, 0xd1, 0x7e, 0x02, 0x4b, 0x23, 0xa0, 0x15, 0xf2, 0x38, 0x65, 0x64, \ - 0x09, 0xea, 0x0c, 0x6e, 0x8e, 0x1b, 0x17, 0xa0, 0x71, 0xc8, 0xb3, 0x9b, \ - 0xc9, 0xab, 0xe9, 0xc3, 0xf2, 0xcf, 0x87, 0x96, 0x8f, 0x80, 0x02, 0x32, \ - 0x9e, 0x99, 0x58, 0x6f, 0xa2, 0xd5, 0x02, 0x03, 0x01, 0x00, 0x01, 0xa3, \ - 0x50, 0x30, 0x4e, 0x30, 0x0c, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x1d, 0x13, 0x04, 0x05, \ - 0x30, 0x03, 0x01, 0x01, 0xff, 0x30, 0x1d, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x1d, 0x0e, \ - 0x04, 0x16, 0x04, 0x14, 0xb4, 0x5a, 0xe4, 0xa5, 0xb3, 0xde, 0xd2, 0x52, \ - 0xf6, 0xb9, 0xd5, 0xa6, 0x95, 0x0f, 0xeb, 0x3e, 0xbc, 0xc7, 0xfd, 0xff, \ - 0x30, 0x1f, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x1d, 0x23, 0x04, 0x18, 0x30, 0x16, 0x80, \ - 0x14, 0xb4, 0x5a, 0xe4, 0xa5, 0xb3, 0xde, 0xd2, 0x52, 0xf6, 0xb9, 0xd5, \ - 0xa6, 0x95, 0x0f, 0xeb, 0x3e, 0xbc, 0xc7, 0xfd, 0xff, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, \ - 0x09, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x0d, 0x01, 0x01, 0x05, 0x05, 0x00, \ - 0x03, 0x82, 0x01, 0x01, 0x00, 0x01, 0x13, 0x73, 0x84, 0x3d, 0xf1, 0x1d, \ - 0xfd, 0xb7, 0x09, 0x5b, 0x96, 0x5d, 0x53, 0x7f, 0xd5, 0x80, 0xf3, 0x52, \ - 0xe2, 0xd3, 0x33, 0x87, 0xc8, 0x27, 0x24, 0xff, 0xd5, 0xd8, 0x57, 0x2f, \ - 0x16, 0xd1, 0xb2, 0x94, 0xca, 0x50, 0xab, 0xa6, 0x27, 0x10, 0x16, 0x08, \ - 0xc8, 0x11, 0xc0, 0x2f, 0x80, 0xd1, 0xbe, 0x53, 0x18, 0xe6, 0xb9, 0xd7, \ - 0x18, 0x1a, 0x77, 0x38, 0x34, 0x7c, 0x32, 0x9a, 0x87, 0x0b, 0xa0, 0x2a, \ - 0xb9, 0x14, 0xc2, 0x2f, 0x38, 0xd2, 0xe7, 0xb8, 0x98, 0x7d, 0xff, 0xff, \ - 0xe1, 0x01, 0x50, 0xa9, 0x6f, 0x67, 0xf7, 0x6c, 0xdc, 0xb6, 0xca, 0x6f, \ - 0x73, 0x39, 0x1a, 0x3c, 0xa8, 0x23, 0xaa, 0x8d, 0x4d, 0xa3, 0x75, 0x2a, \ - 0xd1, 0x76, 0xb3, 0xd7, 0x4a, 0xdc, 0xc7, 0x24, 0xd4, 0x3e, 0xb7, 0xf9, \ - 0xc0, 0xd5, 0x51, 0x67, 0x65, 0x74, 0x2a, 0xf9, 0x65, 0xbc, 0x00, 0x15, \ - 0x4b, 0x36, 0xc8, 0xe2, 0x6a, 0x5d, 0x51, 0x7c, 0xed, 0x8e, 0x14, 0x93, \ - 0x4b, 0x90, 0x36, 0x05, 0xe5, 0x90, 0x00, 0x03, 0xab, 0xd3, 0x3a, 0xb5, \ - 0x17, 0xb4, 0xd2, 0x45, 0x52, 0x69, 0x26, 0xce, 0xe3, 0x98, 0x1d, 0x9a, \ - 0x8b, 0xf8, 0xa0, 0x92, 0x1d, 0x48, 0x02, 0x37, 0x2e, 0xc1, 0x5e, 0x95, \ - 0xc2, 0x53, 0xfe, 0xb1, 0xbc, 0x34, 0x82, 0x34, 0x34, 0x36, 0x91, 0x8c, \ - 0x88, 0x7a, 0x67, 0x97, 0x34, 0x40, 0x8b, 0xfb, 0x48, 0x6e, 0xd3, 0xaf, \ - 0x30, 0x81, 0x8e, 0x05, 0x4d, 0x93, 0x21, 0xf6, 0xb1, 0xff, 0x98, 0xea, \ - 0xd5, 0xa8, 0x14, 0xc7, 0x96, 0x8f, 0x99, 0x3e, 0x53, 0x58, 0x08, 0x89, \ - 0x3c, 0xe3, 0x8f, 0xea, 0x5e, 0x71, 0x5e, 0x70, 0xf0, 0xc5, 0xe6, 0x12, \ - 0x35, 0x6a, 0xa2, 0x5f, 0xd1, 0xb2, 0xba, 0xc0, 0x59, 0x8d, 0xec, 0xda, \ - 0x09, 0xa1, 0xda, 0x6e, 0x30, 0xcb, 0x53, 0x4a, 0x90 \ -} -/* END FILE */ - -/* This is taken from tests/data_files/test-ca.key */ -/* BEGIN FILE string macro TEST_CA_KEY_RSA_PEM tests/data_files/test-ca.key */ -#define TEST_CA_KEY_RSA_PEM \ - "-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----\r\n" \ - "Proc-Type: 4,ENCRYPTED\r\n" \ - "AES-128-CBC,781840E6B804AE83D2AF71127C4CE314\r\n" \ - "\r\n" \ - "etQ3xgGLbuYF9vR1km03TH5fwfly1hOlix0PtfQ+t9HG065vTtSEHYc/OyHwdy79\r\n" \ - "NCLX5RUrPh06E/XlKzMNVHAXqkwFnIwNzRLsOozeP1L7iZEZb9QMeiN5Org+btCO\r\n" \ - "bylXPB4YirfuE7GSJalWY/pq3FQtD33zTIKmNhXfVj3sbwGI/8D9XjaKUb8PODOB\r\n" \ - "skOalmx6RvYRvg0lmRxB3+T3wejIsrrDPweYqte9B6dVHIVG1ZmvoA6/wnKZZZeV\r\n" \ - "sjj8OpL3OwUBrjuGSknE9Rs6kCuSCbHOYVK8VzcZmCYpie0TFnb3Sk8M6vjfW+45\r\n" \ - "U7WUMlSAPxKH6lJDzWdwHqLvsVJwuNnaAaBXg9/8U/rzQEWuq8Ar3s8fw2Jg3F1G\r\n" \ - "L6N5ZAEfCz3Sa0N9WKafR/RSQj+rq8Z3w4POAafhbzk249uo5K8B1Z3cQwLxeXIl\r\n" \ - "UbRQz1TZy4oNTfQzCahYruPNyvwgTkfwAFFvbLAdaiJd2ZtLBoqYE64TYakYnvcC\r\n" \ - "itim1bmySIKoxlMfBGFmMuF03epT0pSx701jlGzGi0l0m16NEjoVxDwo5j93SmiM\r\n" \ - "sQdjC1lOGk2iCLkphIQqHFjFJYWjvh1UUIqWZf+ZWOOxlf4x9a1pUVj6FvtECxNB\r\n" \ - "/mA/m4Iq4LAuVXHE1MpHeq067lJ6wWlrsb2WVmiNGfQ2AC7fMtpcPuunBVT9NV1m\r\n" \ - "1rbDzIgLIWAzqz/cy3N8Q8vfxnrFtmNUyM191Zyq+YF14hIKWX9J1qR4LXwWAzVV\r\n" \ - "UrC8IL4pA2mtRkW4qFsB0EmHAxO/cedDTPjVFty5WSzhNuvYZxX45HAkGIfK6d21\r\n" \ - "7WHPhHG+zaaUTWMUVixB0IcKp6RecjYPFzBHS0YeX88Ue2cyT/90jMiQ9ssOgRrG\r\n" \ - "ZJRJvZAc3TSCnY9sNPYoGrJPiZuCnlUj3ENNurYVy12ai0WFxwnNUZjRUhDS6hjm\r\n" \ - "cDHD5TlI9MZ6M+Mb/Bw4Ig8HuTHOtQBYD9vhtXsG+B7H/j6cS+1umaKjrnG/kK4W\r\n" \ - "R6YXwM2faAi+DwgjjoMXSzRqSTF8PdTIWbAXo3bc2qsXPTMBA8PEp4nb5scHZ4Ts\r\n" \ - "EcBNp2jv0j4gBkRmGIab17cWMrlagjFy89DhqZUFwKdeZs+yJ92A5xstWxOUfpEP\r\n" \ - "90T/bsp1G5d7WW5fl2TRJvYJNDM+djkKIh0zCkduiZ36oVM6nDdbjmXqjQXopeSD\r\n" \ - "gtOourBRF8g99W0fW8QT+yPhP0Pkyz6EG8eQO6Zwh439xdoVwu9jUzQAPmZ0uNeR\r\n" \ - "xTXXihYyv72z27rInjLiIPXL25K9eDVLlcSR3RyG7YYgjdQAL2VJDLcBz5jox1uQ\r\n" \ - "0guoD5wmfu2FWLqYE7HeTYntdY53lCflwq0GHRMjrrsVpx+5VDQ6Yi47Ny9SWLcp\r\n" \ - "fPI3iBkXuGRWupzs6N4pQdSO0dU28KfpMM5QvFoLIn67brCHEQij4dgFrCTYEyBX\r\n" \ - "9+jiNImUFYUhAFuxvUbfZt4O/ABLIElvHLfJs1oYCmI/nWpvLFqXB5rnzPNfEi0H\r\n" \ - "PGGe1Hj/t+CJIp/6ios3yNy2QtXO754TZH2UVu51Ykyig5PFjZVoUkbRvHQYcWfU\r\n" \ - "-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----\r\n" -/* END FILE */ - -#define TEST_CA_PWD_RSA_PEM "PolarSSLTest" - -/* This was generated from test-ca.key.der using `xxd -i`. */ -/* BEGIN FILE binary macro TEST_CA_KEY_RSA_DER tests/data_files/test-ca.key.der */ -#define TEST_CA_KEY_RSA_DER { \ - 0x30, 0x82, 0x04, 0xa4, 0x02, 0x01, 0x00, 0x02, 0x82, 0x01, 0x01, 0x00, \ - 0xc0, 0xdf, 0x37, 0xfc, 0x17, 0xbb, 0xe0, 0x96, 0x9d, 0x3f, 0x86, 0xde, \ - 0x96, 0x32, 0x7d, 0x44, 0xa5, 0x16, 0xa0, 0xcd, 0x21, 0xf1, 0x99, 0xd4, \ - 0xec, 0xea, 0xcb, 0x7c, 0x18, 0x58, 0x08, 0x94, 0xa5, 0xec, 0x9b, 0xc5, \ - 0x8b, 0xdf, 0x1a, 0x1e, 0x99, 0x38, 0x99, 0x87, 0x1e, 0x7b, 0xc0, 0x8d, \ - 0x39, 0xdf, 0x38, 0x5d, 0x70, 0x78, 0x07, 0xd3, 0x9e, 0xd9, 0x93, 0xe8, \ - 0xb9, 0x72, 0x51, 0xc5, 0xce, 0xa3, 0x30, 0x52, 0xa9, 0xf2, 0xe7, 0x40, \ - 0x70, 0x14, 0xcb, 0x44, 0xa2, 0x72, 0x0b, 0xc2, 0xe5, 0x40, 0xf9, 0x3e, \ - 0xe5, 0xa6, 0x0e, 0xb3, 0xf9, 0xec, 0x4a, 0x63, 0xc0, 0xb8, 0x29, 0x00, \ - 0x74, 0x9c, 0x57, 0x3b, 0xa8, 0xa5, 0x04, 0x90, 0x71, 0xf1, 0xbd, 0x83, \ - 0xd9, 0x3f, 0xd6, 0xa5, 0xe2, 0x3c, 0x2a, 0x8f, 0xef, 0x27, 0x60, 0xc3, \ - 0xc6, 0x9f, 0xcb, 0xba, 0xec, 0x60, 0x7d, 0xb7, 0xe6, 0x84, 0x32, 0xbe, \ - 0x4f, 0xfb, 0x58, 0x26, 0x22, 0x03, 0x5b, 0xd4, 0xb4, 0xd5, 0xfb, 0xf5, \ - 0xe3, 0x96, 0x2e, 0x70, 0xc0, 0xe4, 0x2e, 0xbd, 0xfc, 0x2e, 0xee, 0xe2, \ - 0x41, 0x55, 0xc0, 0x34, 0x2e, 0x7d, 0x24, 0x72, 0x69, 0xcb, 0x47, 0xb1, \ - 0x14, 0x40, 0x83, 0x7d, 0x67, 0xf4, 0x86, 0xf6, 0x31, 0xab, 0xf1, 0x79, \ - 0xa4, 0xb2, 0xb5, 0x2e, 0x12, 0xf9, 0x84, 0x17, 0xf0, 0x62, 0x6f, 0x27, \ - 0x3e, 0x13, 0x58, 0xb1, 0x54, 0x0d, 0x21, 0x9a, 0x73, 0x37, 0xa1, 0x30, \ - 0xcf, 0x6f, 0x92, 0xdc, 0xf6, 0xe9, 0xfc, 0xac, 0xdb, 0x2e, 0x28, 0xd1, \ - 0x7e, 0x02, 0x4b, 0x23, 0xa0, 0x15, 0xf2, 0x38, 0x65, 0x64, 0x09, 0xea, \ - 0x0c, 0x6e, 0x8e, 0x1b, 0x17, 0xa0, 0x71, 0xc8, 0xb3, 0x9b, 0xc9, 0xab, \ - 0xe9, 0xc3, 0xf2, 0xcf, 0x87, 0x96, 0x8f, 0x80, 0x02, 0x32, 0x9e, 0x99, \ - 0x58, 0x6f, 0xa2, 0xd5, 0x02, 0x03, 0x01, 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x82, 0x01, \ - 0x00, 0x3f, 0xf7, 0x07, 0xd3, 0x34, 0x6f, 0xdb, 0xc9, 0x37, 0xb7, 0x84, \ - 0xdc, 0x37, 0x45, 0xe1, 0x63, 0xad, 0xb8, 0xb6, 0x75, 0xb1, 0xc7, 0x35, \ - 0xb4, 0x77, 0x2a, 0x5b, 0x77, 0xf9, 0x7e, 0xe0, 0xc1, 0xa3, 0xd1, 0xb7, \ - 0xcb, 0xa9, 0x5a, 0xc1, 0x87, 0xda, 0x5a, 0xfa, 0x17, 0xe4, 0xd5, 0x38, \ - 0x03, 0xde, 0x68, 0x98, 0x81, 0xec, 0xb5, 0xf2, 0x2a, 0x8d, 0xe9, 0x2c, \ - 0xf3, 0xa6, 0xe5, 0x32, 0x17, 0x7f, 0x33, 0x81, 0xe8, 0x38, 0x72, 0xd5, \ - 0x9c, 0xfa, 0x4e, 0xfb, 0x26, 0xf5, 0x15, 0x0b, 0xaf, 0x84, 0x66, 0xab, \ - 0x02, 0xe0, 0x18, 0xd5, 0x91, 0x7c, 0xd6, 0x8f, 0xc9, 0x4b, 0x76, 0x08, \ - 0x2b, 0x1d, 0x81, 0x68, 0x30, 0xe1, 0xfa, 0x70, 0x6c, 0x13, 0x4e, 0x10, \ - 0x03, 0x35, 0x3e, 0xc5, 0xca, 0x58, 0x20, 0x8a, 0x21, 0x18, 0x38, 0xa0, \ - 0x0f, 0xed, 0xc4, 0xbb, 0x45, 0x6f, 0xf5, 0x84, 0x5b, 0xb0, 0xcf, 0x4e, \ - 0x9d, 0x58, 0x13, 0x6b, 0x35, 0x35, 0x69, 0xa1, 0xd2, 0xc4, 0xf2, 0xc1, \ - 0x48, 0x04, 0x20, 0x51, 0xb9, 0x6b, 0xa4, 0x5d, 0xa5, 0x4b, 0x84, 0x88, \ - 0x43, 0x48, 0x99, 0x2c, 0xbb, 0xa4, 0x97, 0xd6, 0xd6, 0x18, 0xf6, 0xec, \ - 0x5c, 0xd1, 0x31, 0x49, 0xc9, 0xf2, 0x8f, 0x0b, 0x4d, 0xef, 0x09, 0x02, \ - 0xfe, 0x7d, 0xfd, 0xbb, 0xaf, 0x2b, 0x83, 0x94, 0x22, 0xc4, 0xa7, 0x3e, \ - 0x66, 0xf5, 0xe0, 0x57, 0xdc, 0xf2, 0xed, 0x2c, 0x3e, 0x81, 0x74, 0x76, \ - 0x1e, 0x96, 0x6f, 0x74, 0x1e, 0x32, 0x0e, 0x14, 0x31, 0xd0, 0x74, 0xf0, \ - 0xf4, 0x07, 0xbd, 0xc3, 0xd1, 0x22, 0xc2, 0xa8, 0x95, 0x92, 0x06, 0x7f, \ - 0x43, 0x02, 0x91, 0xbc, 0xdd, 0x23, 0x01, 0x89, 0x94, 0x20, 0x44, 0x64, \ - 0xf5, 0x1d, 0x67, 0xd2, 0x8f, 0xe8, 0x69, 0xa5, 0x29, 0x25, 0xe6, 0x50, \ - 0x9c, 0xe3, 0xe9, 0xcb, 0x75, 0x02, 0x81, 0x81, 0x00, 0xe2, 0x29, 0x3e, \ - 0xaa, 0x6b, 0xd5, 0x59, 0x1e, 0x9c, 0xe6, 0x47, 0xd5, 0xb6, 0xd7, 0xe3, \ - 0xf1, 0x8e, 0x9e, 0xe9, 0x83, 0x5f, 0x10, 0x9f, 0x63, 0xec, 0x04, 0x44, \ - 0xcc, 0x3f, 0xf8, 0xd9, 0x3a, 0x17, 0xe0, 0x4f, 0xfe, 0xd8, 0x4d, 0xcd, \ - 0x46, 0x54, 0x74, 0xbf, 0x0a, 0xc4, 0x67, 0x9c, 0xa7, 0xd8, 0x89, 0x65, \ - 0x4c, 0xfd, 0x58, 0x2a, 0x47, 0x0f, 0xf4, 0x37, 0xb6, 0x55, 0xb0, 0x1d, \ - 0xed, 0xa7, 0x39, 0xfc, 0x4f, 0xa3, 0xc4, 0x75, 0x3a, 0xa3, 0x98, 0xa7, \ - 0x45, 0xf5, 0x66, 0xcb, 0x7c, 0x65, 0xfb, 0x80, 0x23, 0xe6, 0xff, 0xfd, \ - 0x99, 0x1f, 0x8e, 0x6b, 0xff, 0x5e, 0x93, 0x66, 0xdf, 0x6c, 0x6f, 0xc3, \ - 0xf6, 0x38, 0x2e, 0xff, 0x69, 0xb5, 0xac, 0xae, 0xbb, 0xc6, 0x71, 0x16, \ - 0x6b, 0xd0, 0xf8, 0x22, 0xd9, 0xf8, 0xa2, 0x72, 0x20, 0xd2, 0xe2, 0x3a, \ - 0x70, 0x4b, 0xde, 0xab, 0x2f, 0x02, 0x81, 0x81, 0x00, 0xda, 0x51, 0x9b, \ - 0xb8, 0xb2, 0x2a, 0x14, 0x75, 0x58, 0x40, 0x8d, 0x27, 0x70, 0xfa, 0x31, \ - 0x48, 0xb0, 0x20, 0x21, 0x34, 0xfa, 0x4c, 0x57, 0xa8, 0x11, 0x88, 0xf3, \ - 0xa7, 0xae, 0x21, 0xe9, 0xb6, 0x2b, 0xd1, 0xcd, 0xa7, 0xf8, 0xd8, 0x0c, \ - 0x8a, 0x76, 0x22, 0x35, 0x44, 0xce, 0x3f, 0x25, 0x29, 0x83, 0x7d, 0x79, \ - 0xa7, 0x31, 0xd6, 0xec, 0xb2, 0xbf, 0xda, 0x34, 0xb6, 0xf6, 0xb2, 0x3b, \ - 0xf3, 0x78, 0x5a, 0x04, 0x83, 0x33, 0x3e, 0xa2, 0xe2, 0x81, 0x82, 0x13, \ - 0xd4, 0x35, 0x17, 0x63, 0x9b, 0x9e, 0xc4, 0x8d, 0x91, 0x4c, 0x03, 0x77, \ - 0xc7, 0x71, 0x5b, 0xee, 0x83, 0x6d, 0xd5, 0x78, 0x88, 0xf6, 0x2c, 0x79, \ - 0xc2, 0x4a, 0xb4, 0x79, 0x90, 0x70, 0xbf, 0xdf, 0x34, 0x56, 0x96, 0x71, \ - 0xe3, 0x0e, 0x68, 0x91, 0xbc, 0xea, 0xcb, 0x33, 0xc0, 0xbe, 0x45, 0xd7, \ - 0xfc, 0x30, 0xfd, 0x01, 0x3b, 0x02, 0x81, 0x81, 0x00, 0xd2, 0x9f, 0x2a, \ - 0xb7, 0x38, 0x19, 0xc7, 0x17, 0x95, 0x73, 0x78, 0xae, 0xf5, 0xcb, 0x75, \ - 0x83, 0x7f, 0x19, 0x4b, 0xcb, 0x86, 0xfb, 0x4a, 0x15, 0x9a, 0xb6, 0x17, \ - 0x04, 0x49, 0x07, 0x8d, 0xf6, 0x66, 0x4a, 0x06, 0xf6, 0x05, 0xa7, 0xdf, \ - 0x66, 0x82, 0x3c, 0xff, 0xb6, 0x1d, 0x57, 0x89, 0x33, 0x5f, 0x9c, 0x05, \ - 0x75, 0x7f, 0xf3, 0x5d, 0xdc, 0x34, 0x65, 0x72, 0x85, 0x22, 0xa4, 0x14, \ - 0x1b, 0x41, 0xc3, 0xe4, 0xd0, 0x9e, 0x69, 0xd5, 0xeb, 0x38, 0x74, 0x70, \ - 0x43, 0xdc, 0xd9, 0x50, 0xe4, 0x97, 0x6d, 0x73, 0xd6, 0xfb, 0xc8, 0xa7, \ - 0xfa, 0xb4, 0xc2, 0xc4, 0x9d, 0x5d, 0x0c, 0xd5, 0x9f, 0x79, 0xb3, 0x54, \ - 0xc2, 0xb7, 0x6c, 0x3d, 0x7d, 0xcb, 0x2d, 0xf8, 0xc4, 0xf3, 0x78, 0x5a, \ - 0x33, 0x2a, 0xb8, 0x0c, 0x6d, 0x06, 0xfa, 0xf2, 0x62, 0xd3, 0x42, 0xd0, \ - 0xbd, 0xc8, 0x4a, 0xa5, 0x0d, 0x02, 0x81, 0x81, 0x00, 0xd4, 0xa9, 0x90, \ - 0x15, 0xde, 0xbf, 0x2c, 0xc4, 0x8d, 0x9d, 0xfb, 0xa1, 0xc2, 0xe4, 0x83, \ - 0xe3, 0x79, 0x65, 0x22, 0xd3, 0xb7, 0x49, 0x6c, 0x4d, 0x94, 0x1f, 0x22, \ - 0xb1, 0x60, 0xe7, 0x3a, 0x00, 0xb1, 0x38, 0xa2, 0xab, 0x0f, 0xb4, 0x6c, \ - 0xaa, 0xe7, 0x9e, 0x34, 0xe3, 0x7c, 0x40, 0x78, 0x53, 0xb2, 0xf9, 0x23, \ - 0xea, 0xa0, 0x9a, 0xea, 0x60, 0xc8, 0x8f, 0xa6, 0xaf, 0xdf, 0x29, 0x09, \ - 0x4b, 0x06, 0x1e, 0x31, 0xad, 0x17, 0xda, 0xd8, 0xd1, 0xe9, 0x33, 0xab, \ - 0x5b, 0x18, 0x08, 0x5b, 0x87, 0xf8, 0xa5, 0x1f, 0xfd, 0xbb, 0xdc, 0xd8, \ - 0xed, 0x97, 0x57, 0xe4, 0xc3, 0x73, 0xd6, 0xf0, 0x9e, 0x01, 0xa6, 0x9b, \ - 0x48, 0x8e, 0x7a, 0xb4, 0xbb, 0xe5, 0x88, 0x91, 0xc5, 0x2a, 0xdf, 0x4b, \ - 0xba, 0xd0, 0x8b, 0x3e, 0x03, 0x97, 0x77, 0x2f, 0x47, 0x7e, 0x51, 0x0c, \ - 0xae, 0x65, 0x8d, 0xde, 0x87, 0x02, 0x81, 0x80, 0x20, 0x24, 0x0f, 0xd2, \ - 0xaf, 0xc2, 0x28, 0x3b, 0x97, 0x20, 0xb2, 0x92, 0x49, 0xeb, 0x09, 0x68, \ - 0x40, 0xb2, 0xbe, 0xd1, 0xc3, 0x83, 0x94, 0x34, 0x38, 0xd6, 0xc9, 0xec, \ - 0x34, 0x09, 0xf9, 0x41, 0x6d, 0x5c, 0x42, 0x94, 0xf7, 0x04, 0xfc, 0x32, \ - 0x39, 0x69, 0xbc, 0x1c, 0xfb, 0x3e, 0x61, 0x98, 0xc0, 0x80, 0xd8, 0x36, \ - 0x47, 0xc3, 0x6d, 0xc2, 0x2e, 0xe7, 0x81, 0x2a, 0x17, 0x34, 0x64, 0x30, \ - 0x4e, 0x96, 0xbb, 0x26, 0x16, 0xb9, 0x41, 0x36, 0xfe, 0x8a, 0xd6, 0x53, \ - 0x7c, 0xaa, 0xec, 0x39, 0x42, 0x50, 0xef, 0xe3, 0xb3, 0x01, 0x28, 0x32, \ - 0xca, 0x6d, 0xf5, 0x9a, 0x1e, 0x9f, 0x37, 0xbe, 0xfe, 0x38, 0x20, 0x22, \ - 0x91, 0x8c, 0xcd, 0x95, 0x02, 0xf2, 0x4d, 0x6f, 0x1a, 0xb4, 0x43, 0xf0, \ - 0x19, 0xdf, 0x65, 0xc0, 0x92, 0xe7, 0x9d, 0x2f, 0x09, 0xe7, 0xec, 0x69, \ - 0xa8, 0xc2, 0x8f, 0x0d \ -} -/* END FILE */ - -/* - * Test server Certificates - * - * Test server certificates are defined for each choice - * of the following parameters: - * - PEM or DER encoding - * - SHA-1 or SHA-256 hash - * - RSA or EC key - * - * Things to add: - * - multiple EC curve types - */ - -/* This is taken from tests/data_files/server5.crt. */ -/* BEGIN FILE string macro TEST_SRV_CRT_EC_PEM tests/data_files/server5.crt */ -#define TEST_SRV_CRT_EC_PEM \ - "-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\r\n" \ - "MIICHzCCAaWgAwIBAgIBCTAKBggqhkjOPQQDAjA+MQswCQYDVQQGEwJOTDERMA8G\r\n" \ - "A1UECgwIUG9sYXJTU0wxHDAaBgNVBAMME1BvbGFyc3NsIFRlc3QgRUMgQ0EwHhcN\r\n" \ - "MjMwNjE1MDMzNDE4WhcNMzMwNjEyMDMzNDE4WjA0MQswCQYDVQQGEwJOTDERMA8G\r\n" \ - "A1UECgwIUG9sYXJTU0wxEjAQBgNVBAMMCWxvY2FsaG9zdDBZMBMGByqGSM49AgEG\r\n" \ - "CCqGSM49AwEHA0IABDfMVtl2CR5acj7HWS3/IG7ufPkGkXTQrRS192giWWKSTuUA\r\n" \ - "2CMR/+ov0jRdXRa9iojCa3cNVc2KKg76Aci07f+jgZ0wgZowCQYDVR0TBAIwADAd\r\n" \ - "BgNVHQ4EFgQUUGGlj9QH2deCAQzlZX+MY0anE74wbgYDVR0jBGcwZYAUnW0gJEkB\r\n" \ - "PyvLeLUZvH4kydv7NnyhQqRAMD4xCzAJBgNVBAYTAk5MMREwDwYDVQQKDAhQb2xh\r\n" \ - "clNTTDEcMBoGA1UEAwwTUG9sYXJzc2wgVGVzdCBFQyBDQYIJAMFD4n5iQ8zoMAoG\r\n" \ - "CCqGSM49BAMCA2gAMGUCMAHFbGEzx8dZaUlIltT5s1QO9FvKmvFer4uRY3ntEy9S\r\n" \ - "k7DCCozM86WWLjfzbJ78bwIxAJYRPF1CzNEiXPHb9O46ZPHKo2S5x//g/54RowAK\r\n" \ - "uZz+hKPuMi6YY6cIm81jfeaSZQ==\r\n" \ - "-----END CERTIFICATE-----\r\n" -/* END FILE */ - -/* This is generated from tests/data_files/server5.crt.der using `xxd -i`. */ -/* BEGIN FILE binary macro TEST_SRV_CRT_EC_DER tests/data_files/server5.crt.der */ -#define TEST_SRV_CRT_EC_DER { \ - 0x30, 0x82, 0x02, 0x1f, 0x30, 0x82, 0x01, 0xa5, 0xa0, 0x03, 0x02, 0x01, \ - 0x02, 0x02, 0x01, 0x09, 0x30, 0x0a, 0x06, 0x08, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0xce, \ - 0x3d, 0x04, 0x03, 0x02, 0x30, 0x3e, 0x31, 0x0b, 0x30, 0x09, 0x06, 0x03, \ - 0x55, 0x04, 0x06, 0x13, 0x02, 0x4e, 0x4c, 0x31, 0x11, 0x30, 0x0f, 0x06, \ - 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x0a, 0x0c, 0x08, 0x50, 0x6f, 0x6c, 0x61, 0x72, 0x53, \ - 0x53, 0x4c, 0x31, 0x1c, 0x30, 0x1a, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x03, 0x0c, \ - 0x13, 0x50, 0x6f, 0x6c, 0x61, 0x72, 0x73, 0x73, 0x6c, 0x20, 0x54, 0x65, \ - 0x73, 0x74, 0x20, 0x45, 0x43, 0x20, 0x43, 0x41, 0x30, 0x1e, 0x17, 0x0d, \ - 0x32, 0x33, 0x30, 0x36, 0x31, 0x35, 0x30, 0x33, 0x33, 0x34, 0x31, 0x38, \ - 0x5a, 0x17, 0x0d, 0x33, 0x33, 0x30, 0x36, 0x31, 0x32, 0x30, 0x33, 0x33, \ - 0x34, 0x31, 0x38, 0x5a, 0x30, 0x34, 0x31, 0x0b, 0x30, 0x09, 0x06, 0x03, \ - 0x55, 0x04, 0x06, 0x13, 0x02, 0x4e, 0x4c, 0x31, 0x11, 0x30, 0x0f, 0x06, \ - 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x0a, 0x0c, 0x08, 0x50, 0x6f, 0x6c, 0x61, 0x72, 0x53, \ - 0x53, 0x4c, 0x31, 0x12, 0x30, 0x10, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x03, 0x0c, \ - 0x09, 0x6c, 0x6f, 0x63, 0x61, 0x6c, 0x68, 0x6f, 0x73, 0x74, 0x30, 0x59, \ - 0x30, 0x13, 0x06, 0x07, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0xce, 0x3d, 0x02, 0x01, 0x06, \ - 0x08, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0xce, 0x3d, 0x03, 0x01, 0x07, 0x03, 0x42, 0x00, \ - 0x04, 0x37, 0xcc, 0x56, 0xd9, 0x76, 0x09, 0x1e, 0x5a, 0x72, 0x3e, 0xc7, \ - 0x59, 0x2d, 0xff, 0x20, 0x6e, 0xee, 0x7c, 0xf9, 0x06, 0x91, 0x74, 0xd0, \ - 0xad, 0x14, 0xb5, 0xf7, 0x68, 0x22, 0x59, 0x62, 0x92, 0x4e, 0xe5, 0x00, \ - 0xd8, 0x23, 0x11, 0xff, 0xea, 0x2f, 0xd2, 0x34, 0x5d, 0x5d, 0x16, 0xbd, \ - 0x8a, 0x88, 0xc2, 0x6b, 0x77, 0x0d, 0x55, 0xcd, 0x8a, 0x2a, 0x0e, 0xfa, \ - 0x01, 0xc8, 0xb4, 0xed, 0xff, 0xa3, 0x81, 0x9d, 0x30, 0x81, 0x9a, 0x30, \ - 0x09, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x1d, 0x13, 0x04, 0x02, 0x30, 0x00, 0x30, 0x1d, \ - 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x1d, 0x0e, 0x04, 0x16, 0x04, 0x14, 0x50, 0x61, 0xa5, \ - 0x8f, 0xd4, 0x07, 0xd9, 0xd7, 0x82, 0x01, 0x0c, 0xe5, 0x65, 0x7f, 0x8c, \ - 0x63, 0x46, 0xa7, 0x13, 0xbe, 0x30, 0x6e, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x1d, 0x23, \ - 0x04, 0x67, 0x30, 0x65, 0x80, 0x14, 0x9d, 0x6d, 0x20, 0x24, 0x49, 0x01, \ - 0x3f, 0x2b, 0xcb, 0x78, 0xb5, 0x19, 0xbc, 0x7e, 0x24, 0xc9, 0xdb, 0xfb, \ - 0x36, 0x7c, 0xa1, 0x42, 0xa4, 0x40, 0x30, 0x3e, 0x31, 0x0b, 0x30, 0x09, \ - 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x06, 0x13, 0x02, 0x4e, 0x4c, 0x31, 0x11, 0x30, \ - 0x0f, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x0a, 0x0c, 0x08, 0x50, 0x6f, 0x6c, 0x61, \ - 0x72, 0x53, 0x53, 0x4c, 0x31, 0x1c, 0x30, 0x1a, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, \ - 0x03, 0x0c, 0x13, 0x50, 0x6f, 0x6c, 0x61, 0x72, 0x73, 0x73, 0x6c, 0x20, \ - 0x54, 0x65, 0x73, 0x74, 0x20, 0x45, 0x43, 0x20, 0x43, 0x41, 0x82, 0x09, \ - 0x00, 0xc1, 0x43, 0xe2, 0x7e, 0x62, 0x43, 0xcc, 0xe8, 0x30, 0x0a, 0x06, \ - 0x08, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0xce, 0x3d, 0x04, 0x03, 0x02, 0x03, 0x68, 0x00, \ - 0x30, 0x65, 0x02, 0x30, 0x01, 0xc5, 0x6c, 0x61, 0x33, 0xc7, 0xc7, 0x59, \ - 0x69, 0x49, 0x48, 0x96, 0xd4, 0xf9, 0xb3, 0x54, 0x0e, 0xf4, 0x5b, 0xca, \ - 0x9a, 0xf1, 0x5e, 0xaf, 0x8b, 0x91, 0x63, 0x79, 0xed, 0x13, 0x2f, 0x52, \ - 0x93, 0xb0, 0xc2, 0x0a, 0x8c, 0xcc, 0xf3, 0xa5, 0x96, 0x2e, 0x37, 0xf3, \ - 0x6c, 0x9e, 0xfc, 0x6f, 0x02, 0x31, 0x00, 0x96, 0x11, 0x3c, 0x5d, 0x42, \ - 0xcc, 0xd1, 0x22, 0x5c, 0xf1, 0xdb, 0xf4, 0xee, 0x3a, 0x64, 0xf1, 0xca, \ - 0xa3, 0x64, 0xb9, 0xc7, 0xff, 0xe0, 0xff, 0x9e, 0x11, 0xa3, 0x00, 0x0a, \ - 0xb9, 0x9c, 0xfe, 0x84, 0xa3, 0xee, 0x32, 0x2e, 0x98, 0x63, 0xa7, 0x08, \ - 0x9b, 0xcd, 0x63, 0x7d, 0xe6, 0x92, 0x65 \ -} -/* END FILE */ - -/* This is taken from tests/data_files/server5.key. */ -/* BEGIN FILE string macro TEST_SRV_KEY_EC_PEM tests/data_files/server5.key */ -#define TEST_SRV_KEY_EC_PEM \ - "-----BEGIN EC PRIVATE KEY-----\r\n" \ - "MHcCAQEEIPEqEyB2AnCoPL/9U/YDHvdqXYbIogTywwyp6/UfDw6noAoGCCqGSM49\r\n" \ - "AwEHoUQDQgAEN8xW2XYJHlpyPsdZLf8gbu58+QaRdNCtFLX3aCJZYpJO5QDYIxH/\r\n" \ - "6i/SNF1dFr2KiMJrdw1VzYoqDvoByLTt/w==\r\n" \ - "-----END EC PRIVATE KEY-----\r\n" -/* END FILE */ - -/* This is generated from tests/data_files/server5.key.der using `xxd -i`. */ -/* BEGIN FILE binary macro TEST_SRV_KEY_EC_DER tests/data_files/server5.key.der */ -#define TEST_SRV_KEY_EC_DER { \ - 0x30, 0x77, 0x02, 0x01, 0x01, 0x04, 0x20, 0xf1, 0x2a, 0x13, 0x20, 0x76, \ - 0x02, 0x70, 0xa8, 0x3c, 0xbf, 0xfd, 0x53, 0xf6, 0x03, 0x1e, 0xf7, 0x6a, \ - 0x5d, 0x86, 0xc8, 0xa2, 0x04, 0xf2, 0xc3, 0x0c, 0xa9, 0xeb, 0xf5, 0x1f, \ - 0x0f, 0x0e, 0xa7, 0xa0, 0x0a, 0x06, 0x08, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0xce, 0x3d, \ - 0x03, 0x01, 0x07, 0xa1, 0x44, 0x03, 0x42, 0x00, 0x04, 0x37, 0xcc, 0x56, \ - 0xd9, 0x76, 0x09, 0x1e, 0x5a, 0x72, 0x3e, 0xc7, 0x59, 0x2d, 0xff, 0x20, \ - 0x6e, 0xee, 0x7c, 0xf9, 0x06, 0x91, 0x74, 0xd0, 0xad, 0x14, 0xb5, 0xf7, \ - 0x68, 0x22, 0x59, 0x62, 0x92, 0x4e, 0xe5, 0x00, 0xd8, 0x23, 0x11, 0xff, \ - 0xea, 0x2f, 0xd2, 0x34, 0x5d, 0x5d, 0x16, 0xbd, 0x8a, 0x88, 0xc2, 0x6b, \ - 0x77, 0x0d, 0x55, 0xcd, 0x8a, 0x2a, 0x0e, 0xfa, 0x01, 0xc8, 0xb4, 0xed, \ - 0xff \ -} -/* END FILE */ - -/* This is taken from tests/data_files/server2-sha256.crt. */ -/* BEGIN FILE string macro TEST_SRV_CRT_RSA_SHA256_PEM tests/data_files/server2-sha256.crt */ -#define TEST_SRV_CRT_RSA_SHA256_PEM \ - "-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\r\n" \ - "MIIDNzCCAh+gAwIBAgIBAjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADA7MQswCQYDVQQGEwJOTDER\r\n" \ - "MA8GA1UECgwIUG9sYXJTU0wxGTAXBgNVBAMMEFBvbGFyU1NMIFRlc3QgQ0EwHhcN\r\n" \ - "MTkwMjEwMTQ0NDA2WhcNMjkwMjEwMTQ0NDA2WjA0MQswCQYDVQQGEwJOTDERMA8G\r\n" \ - "A1UECgwIUG9sYXJTU0wxEjAQBgNVBAMMCWxvY2FsaG9zdDCCASIwDQYJKoZIhvcN\r\n" \ - "AQEBBQADggEPADCCAQoCggEBAMFNo93nzR3RBNdJcriZrA545Do8Ss86ExbQWuTN\r\n" \ - "owCIp+4ea5anUrSQ7y1yej4kmvy2NKwk9XfgJmSMnLAofaHa6ozmyRyWvP7BBFKz\r\n" \ - "NtSj+uGxdtiQwWG0ZlI2oiZTqqt0Xgd9GYLbKtgfoNkNHC1JZvdbJXNG6AuKT2kM\r\n" \ - "tQCQ4dqCEGZ9rlQri2V5kaHiYcPNQEkI7mgM8YuG0ka/0LiqEQMef1aoGh5EGA8P\r\n" \ - "hYvai0Re4hjGYi/HZo36Xdh98yeJKQHFkA4/J/EwyEoO79bex8cna8cFPXrEAjya\r\n" \ - "HT4P6DSYW8tzS1KW2BGiLICIaTla0w+w3lkvEcf36hIBMJcCAwEAAaNNMEswCQYD\r\n" \ - "VR0TBAIwADAdBgNVHQ4EFgQUpQXoZLjc32APUBJNYKhkr02LQ5MwHwYDVR0jBBgw\r\n" \ - "FoAUtFrkpbPe0lL2udWmlQ/rPrzH/f8wDQYJKoZIhvcNAQELBQADggEBAC465FJh\r\n" \ - "Pqel7zJngHIHJrqj/wVAxGAFOTF396XKATGAp+HRCqJ81Ry60CNK1jDzk8dv6M6U\r\n" \ - "HoS7RIFiM/9rXQCbJfiPD5xMTejZp5n5UYHAmxsxDaazfA5FuBhkfokKK6jD4Eq9\r\n" \ - "1C94xGKb6X4/VkaPF7cqoBBw/bHxawXc0UEPjqayiBpCYU/rJoVZgLqFVP7Px3sv\r\n" \ - "a1nOrNx8rPPI1hJ+ZOg8maiPTxHZnBVLakSSLQy/sWeWyazO1RnrbxjrbgQtYKz0\r\n" \ - "e3nwGpu1w13vfckFmUSBhHXH7AAS/HpKC4IH7G2GAk3+n8iSSN71sZzpxonQwVbo\r\n" \ - "pMZqLmbBm/7WPLc=\r\n" \ - "-----END CERTIFICATE-----\r\n" -/* END FILE */ - -/* This is taken from tests/data_files/server2-sha256.crt.der. */ -/* BEGIN FILE binary macro TEST_SRV_CRT_RSA_SHA256_DER tests/data_files/server2-sha256.crt.der */ -#define TEST_SRV_CRT_RSA_SHA256_DER { \ - 0x30, 0x82, 0x03, 0x37, 0x30, 0x82, 0x02, 0x1f, 0xa0, 0x03, 0x02, 0x01, \ - 0x02, 0x02, 0x01, 0x02, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, \ - 0xf7, 0x0d, 0x01, 0x01, 0x0b, 0x05, 0x00, 0x30, 0x3b, 0x31, 0x0b, 0x30, \ - 0x09, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x06, 0x13, 0x02, 0x4e, 0x4c, 0x31, 0x11, \ - 0x30, 0x0f, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x0a, 0x0c, 0x08, 0x50, 0x6f, 0x6c, \ - 0x61, 0x72, 0x53, 0x53, 0x4c, 0x31, 0x19, 0x30, 0x17, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, \ - 0x04, 0x03, 0x0c, 0x10, 0x50, 0x6f, 0x6c, 0x61, 0x72, 0x53, 0x53, 0x4c, \ - 0x20, 0x54, 0x65, 0x73, 0x74, 0x20, 0x43, 0x41, 0x30, 0x1e, 0x17, 0x0d, \ - 0x31, 0x39, 0x30, 0x32, 0x31, 0x30, 0x31, 0x34, 0x34, 0x34, 0x30, 0x36, \ - 0x5a, 0x17, 0x0d, 0x32, 0x39, 0x30, 0x32, 0x31, 0x30, 0x31, 0x34, 0x34, \ - 0x34, 0x30, 0x36, 0x5a, 0x30, 0x34, 0x31, 0x0b, 0x30, 0x09, 0x06, 0x03, \ - 0x55, 0x04, 0x06, 0x13, 0x02, 0x4e, 0x4c, 0x31, 0x11, 0x30, 0x0f, 0x06, \ - 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x0a, 0x0c, 0x08, 0x50, 0x6f, 0x6c, 0x61, 0x72, 0x53, \ - 0x53, 0x4c, 0x31, 0x12, 0x30, 0x10, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x03, 0x0c, \ - 0x09, 0x6c, 0x6f, 0x63, 0x61, 0x6c, 0x68, 0x6f, 0x73, 0x74, 0x30, 0x82, \ - 0x01, 0x22, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x0d, \ - 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x05, 0x00, 0x03, 0x82, 0x01, 0x0f, 0x00, 0x30, 0x82, \ - 0x01, 0x0a, 0x02, 0x82, 0x01, 0x01, 0x00, 0xc1, 0x4d, 0xa3, 0xdd, 0xe7, \ - 0xcd, 0x1d, 0xd1, 0x04, 0xd7, 0x49, 0x72, 0xb8, 0x99, 0xac, 0x0e, 0x78, \ - 0xe4, 0x3a, 0x3c, 0x4a, 0xcf, 0x3a, 0x13, 0x16, 0xd0, 0x5a, 0xe4, 0xcd, \ - 0xa3, 0x00, 0x88, 0xa7, 0xee, 0x1e, 0x6b, 0x96, 0xa7, 0x52, 0xb4, 0x90, \ - 0xef, 0x2d, 0x72, 0x7a, 0x3e, 0x24, 0x9a, 0xfc, 0xb6, 0x34, 0xac, 0x24, \ - 0xf5, 0x77, 0xe0, 0x26, 0x64, 0x8c, 0x9c, 0xb0, 0x28, 0x7d, 0xa1, 0xda, \ - 0xea, 0x8c, 0xe6, 0xc9, 0x1c, 0x96, 0xbc, 0xfe, 0xc1, 0x04, 0x52, 0xb3, \ - 0x36, 0xd4, 0xa3, 0xfa, 0xe1, 0xb1, 0x76, 0xd8, 0x90, 0xc1, 0x61, 0xb4, \ - 0x66, 0x52, 0x36, 0xa2, 0x26, 0x53, 0xaa, 0xab, 0x74, 0x5e, 0x07, 0x7d, \ - 0x19, 0x82, 0xdb, 0x2a, 0xd8, 0x1f, 0xa0, 0xd9, 0x0d, 0x1c, 0x2d, 0x49, \ - 0x66, 0xf7, 0x5b, 0x25, 0x73, 0x46, 0xe8, 0x0b, 0x8a, 0x4f, 0x69, 0x0c, \ - 0xb5, 0x00, 0x90, 0xe1, 0xda, 0x82, 0x10, 0x66, 0x7d, 0xae, 0x54, 0x2b, \ - 0x8b, 0x65, 0x79, 0x91, 0xa1, 0xe2, 0x61, 0xc3, 0xcd, 0x40, 0x49, 0x08, \ - 0xee, 0x68, 0x0c, 0xf1, 0x8b, 0x86, 0xd2, 0x46, 0xbf, 0xd0, 0xb8, 0xaa, \ - 0x11, 0x03, 0x1e, 0x7f, 0x56, 0xa8, 0x1a, 0x1e, 0x44, 0x18, 0x0f, 0x0f, \ - 0x85, 0x8b, 0xda, 0x8b, 0x44, 0x5e, 0xe2, 0x18, 0xc6, 0x62, 0x2f, 0xc7, \ - 0x66, 0x8d, 0xfa, 0x5d, 0xd8, 0x7d, 0xf3, 0x27, 0x89, 0x29, 0x01, 0xc5, \ - 0x90, 0x0e, 0x3f, 0x27, 0xf1, 0x30, 0xc8, 0x4a, 0x0e, 0xef, 0xd6, 0xde, \ - 0xc7, 0xc7, 0x27, 0x6b, 0xc7, 0x05, 0x3d, 0x7a, 0xc4, 0x02, 0x3c, 0x9a, \ - 0x1d, 0x3e, 0x0f, 0xe8, 0x34, 0x98, 0x5b, 0xcb, 0x73, 0x4b, 0x52, 0x96, \ - 0xd8, 0x11, 0xa2, 0x2c, 0x80, 0x88, 0x69, 0x39, 0x5a, 0xd3, 0x0f, 0xb0, \ - 0xde, 0x59, 0x2f, 0x11, 0xc7, 0xf7, 0xea, 0x12, 0x01, 0x30, 0x97, 0x02, \ - 0x03, 0x01, 0x00, 0x01, 0xa3, 0x4d, 0x30, 0x4b, 0x30, 0x09, 0x06, 0x03, \ - 0x55, 0x1d, 0x13, 0x04, 0x02, 0x30, 0x00, 0x30, 0x1d, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, \ - 0x1d, 0x0e, 0x04, 0x16, 0x04, 0x14, 0xa5, 0x05, 0xe8, 0x64, 0xb8, 0xdc, \ - 0xdf, 0x60, 0x0f, 0x50, 0x12, 0x4d, 0x60, 0xa8, 0x64, 0xaf, 0x4d, 0x8b, \ - 0x43, 0x93, 0x30, 0x1f, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x1d, 0x23, 0x04, 0x18, 0x30, \ - 0x16, 0x80, 0x14, 0xb4, 0x5a, 0xe4, 0xa5, 0xb3, 0xde, 0xd2, 0x52, 0xf6, \ - 0xb9, 0xd5, 0xa6, 0x95, 0x0f, 0xeb, 0x3e, 0xbc, 0xc7, 0xfd, 0xff, 0x30, \ - 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x0d, 0x01, 0x01, 0x0b, \ - 0x05, 0x00, 0x03, 0x82, 0x01, 0x01, 0x00, 0x2e, 0x3a, 0xe4, 0x52, 0x61, \ - 0x3e, 0xa7, 0xa5, 0xef, 0x32, 0x67, 0x80, 0x72, 0x07, 0x26, 0xba, 0xa3, \ - 0xff, 0x05, 0x40, 0xc4, 0x60, 0x05, 0x39, 0x31, 0x77, 0xf7, 0xa5, 0xca, \ - 0x01, 0x31, 0x80, 0xa7, 0xe1, 0xd1, 0x0a, 0xa2, 0x7c, 0xd5, 0x1c, 0xba, \ - 0xd0, 0x23, 0x4a, 0xd6, 0x30, 0xf3, 0x93, 0xc7, 0x6f, 0xe8, 0xce, 0x94, \ - 0x1e, 0x84, 0xbb, 0x44, 0x81, 0x62, 0x33, 0xff, 0x6b, 0x5d, 0x00, 0x9b, \ - 0x25, 0xf8, 0x8f, 0x0f, 0x9c, 0x4c, 0x4d, 0xe8, 0xd9, 0xa7, 0x99, 0xf9, \ - 0x51, 0x81, 0xc0, 0x9b, 0x1b, 0x31, 0x0d, 0xa6, 0xb3, 0x7c, 0x0e, 0x45, \ - 0xb8, 0x18, 0x64, 0x7e, 0x89, 0x0a, 0x2b, 0xa8, 0xc3, 0xe0, 0x4a, 0xbd, \ - 0xd4, 0x2f, 0x78, 0xc4, 0x62, 0x9b, 0xe9, 0x7e, 0x3f, 0x56, 0x46, 0x8f, \ - 0x17, 0xb7, 0x2a, 0xa0, 0x10, 0x70, 0xfd, 0xb1, 0xf1, 0x6b, 0x05, 0xdc, \ - 0xd1, 0x41, 0x0f, 0x8e, 0xa6, 0xb2, 0x88, 0x1a, 0x42, 0x61, 0x4f, 0xeb, \ - 0x26, 0x85, 0x59, 0x80, 0xba, 0x85, 0x54, 0xfe, 0xcf, 0xc7, 0x7b, 0x2f, \ - 0x6b, 0x59, 0xce, 0xac, 0xdc, 0x7c, 0xac, 0xf3, 0xc8, 0xd6, 0x12, 0x7e, \ - 0x64, 0xe8, 0x3c, 0x99, 0xa8, 0x8f, 0x4f, 0x11, 0xd9, 0x9c, 0x15, 0x4b, \ - 0x6a, 0x44, 0x92, 0x2d, 0x0c, 0xbf, 0xb1, 0x67, 0x96, 0xc9, 0xac, 0xce, \ - 0xd5, 0x19, 0xeb, 0x6f, 0x18, 0xeb, 0x6e, 0x04, 0x2d, 0x60, 0xac, 0xf4, \ - 0x7b, 0x79, 0xf0, 0x1a, 0x9b, 0xb5, 0xc3, 0x5d, 0xef, 0x7d, 0xc9, 0x05, \ - 0x99, 0x44, 0x81, 0x84, 0x75, 0xc7, 0xec, 0x00, 0x12, 0xfc, 0x7a, 0x4a, \ - 0x0b, 0x82, 0x07, 0xec, 0x6d, 0x86, 0x02, 0x4d, 0xfe, 0x9f, 0xc8, 0x92, \ - 0x48, 0xde, 0xf5, 0xb1, 0x9c, 0xe9, 0xc6, 0x89, 0xd0, 0xc1, 0x56, 0xe8, \ - 0xa4, 0xc6, 0x6a, 0x2e, 0x66, 0xc1, 0x9b, 0xfe, 0xd6, 0x3c, 0xb7 \ -} -/* END FILE */ - -/* This is taken from tests/data_files/server2.crt. */ -/* BEGIN FILE string macro TEST_SRV_CRT_RSA_SHA1_PEM tests/data_files/server2.crt */ -#define TEST_SRV_CRT_RSA_SHA1_PEM \ - "-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\r\n" \ - "MIIDNzCCAh+gAwIBAgIBAjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQUFADA7MQswCQYDVQQGEwJOTDER\r\n" \ - "MA8GA1UECgwIUG9sYXJTU0wxGTAXBgNVBAMMEFBvbGFyU1NMIFRlc3QgQ0EwHhcN\r\n" \ - "MTkwMjEwMTQ0NDA2WhcNMjkwMjEwMTQ0NDA2WjA0MQswCQYDVQQGEwJOTDERMA8G\r\n" \ - "A1UECgwIUG9sYXJTU0wxEjAQBgNVBAMMCWxvY2FsaG9zdDCCASIwDQYJKoZIhvcN\r\n" \ - "AQEBBQADggEPADCCAQoCggEBAMFNo93nzR3RBNdJcriZrA545Do8Ss86ExbQWuTN\r\n" \ - "owCIp+4ea5anUrSQ7y1yej4kmvy2NKwk9XfgJmSMnLAofaHa6ozmyRyWvP7BBFKz\r\n" \ - "NtSj+uGxdtiQwWG0ZlI2oiZTqqt0Xgd9GYLbKtgfoNkNHC1JZvdbJXNG6AuKT2kM\r\n" \ - "tQCQ4dqCEGZ9rlQri2V5kaHiYcPNQEkI7mgM8YuG0ka/0LiqEQMef1aoGh5EGA8P\r\n" \ - "hYvai0Re4hjGYi/HZo36Xdh98yeJKQHFkA4/J/EwyEoO79bex8cna8cFPXrEAjya\r\n" \ - "HT4P6DSYW8tzS1KW2BGiLICIaTla0w+w3lkvEcf36hIBMJcCAwEAAaNNMEswCQYD\r\n" \ - "VR0TBAIwADAdBgNVHQ4EFgQUpQXoZLjc32APUBJNYKhkr02LQ5MwHwYDVR0jBBgw\r\n" \ - "FoAUtFrkpbPe0lL2udWmlQ/rPrzH/f8wDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEFBQADggEBAJklg3Q4\r\n" \ - "cB7v7BzsxM/vLyKccO6op0/gZzM4ghuLq2Y32kl0sM6kSNUUmduuq3u/+GmUZN2A\r\n" \ - "O/7c+Hw7hDFEIvZk98aBGjCLqn3DmgHIv8ToQ67nellQxx2Uj309PdgjNi/r9HOc\r\n" \ - "KNAYPbBcg6MJGWWj2TI6vNaceios/DhOYx5V0j5nfqSJ/pnU0g9Ign2LAhgYpGJE\r\n" \ - "iEM9wW7hEMkwmk0h/sqZsrJsGH5YsF/VThSq/JVO1e2mZH2vruyZKJVBq+8tDNYp\r\n" \ - "HkK6tSyVYQhzIt3StMJWKMl/o5k2AYz6tSC164+1oG+ML3LWg8XrGKa91H4UOKap\r\n" \ - "Awgk0+4m0T25cNs=\r\n" \ - "-----END CERTIFICATE-----\r\n" -/* END FILE */ - -/* This is taken from tests/data_files/server2.crt.der. */ -/* BEGIN FILE binary macro TEST_SRV_CRT_RSA_SHA1_DER tests/data_files/server2.crt.der */ -#define TEST_SRV_CRT_RSA_SHA1_DER { \ - 0x30, 0x82, 0x03, 0x37, 0x30, 0x82, 0x02, 0x1f, 0xa0, 0x03, 0x02, 0x01, \ - 0x02, 0x02, 0x01, 0x02, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, \ - 0xf7, 0x0d, 0x01, 0x01, 0x05, 0x05, 0x00, 0x30, 0x3b, 0x31, 0x0b, 0x30, \ - 0x09, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x06, 0x13, 0x02, 0x4e, 0x4c, 0x31, 0x11, \ - 0x30, 0x0f, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x0a, 0x0c, 0x08, 0x50, 0x6f, 0x6c, \ - 0x61, 0x72, 0x53, 0x53, 0x4c, 0x31, 0x19, 0x30, 0x17, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, \ - 0x04, 0x03, 0x0c, 0x10, 0x50, 0x6f, 0x6c, 0x61, 0x72, 0x53, 0x53, 0x4c, \ - 0x20, 0x54, 0x65, 0x73, 0x74, 0x20, 0x43, 0x41, 0x30, 0x1e, 0x17, 0x0d, \ - 0x31, 0x31, 0x30, 0x32, 0x31, 0x32, 0x31, 0x34, 0x34, 0x34, 0x30, 0x36, \ - 0x5a, 0x17, 0x0d, 0x32, 0x31, 0x30, 0x32, 0x31, 0x32, 0x31, 0x34, 0x34, \ - 0x34, 0x30, 0x36, 0x5a, 0x30, 0x34, 0x31, 0x0b, 0x30, 0x09, 0x06, 0x03, \ - 0x55, 0x04, 0x06, 0x13, 0x02, 0x4e, 0x4c, 0x31, 0x11, 0x30, 0x0f, 0x06, \ - 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x0a, 0x0c, 0x08, 0x50, 0x6f, 0x6c, 0x61, 0x72, 0x53, \ - 0x53, 0x4c, 0x31, 0x12, 0x30, 0x10, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x03, 0x0c, \ - 0x09, 0x6c, 0x6f, 0x63, 0x61, 0x6c, 0x68, 0x6f, 0x73, 0x74, 0x30, 0x82, \ - 0x01, 0x22, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x0d, \ - 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x05, 0x00, 0x03, 0x82, 0x01, 0x0f, 0x00, 0x30, 0x82, \ - 0x01, 0x0a, 0x02, 0x82, 0x01, 0x01, 0x00, 0xc1, 0x4d, 0xa3, 0xdd, 0xe7, \ - 0xcd, 0x1d, 0xd1, 0x04, 0xd7, 0x49, 0x72, 0xb8, 0x99, 0xac, 0x0e, 0x78, \ - 0xe4, 0x3a, 0x3c, 0x4a, 0xcf, 0x3a, 0x13, 0x16, 0xd0, 0x5a, 0xe4, 0xcd, \ - 0xa3, 0x00, 0x88, 0xa7, 0xee, 0x1e, 0x6b, 0x96, 0xa7, 0x52, 0xb4, 0x90, \ - 0xef, 0x2d, 0x72, 0x7a, 0x3e, 0x24, 0x9a, 0xfc, 0xb6, 0x34, 0xac, 0x24, \ - 0xf5, 0x77, 0xe0, 0x26, 0x64, 0x8c, 0x9c, 0xb0, 0x28, 0x7d, 0xa1, 0xda, \ - 0xea, 0x8c, 0xe6, 0xc9, 0x1c, 0x96, 0xbc, 0xfe, 0xc1, 0x04, 0x52, 0xb3, \ - 0x36, 0xd4, 0xa3, 0xfa, 0xe1, 0xb1, 0x76, 0xd8, 0x90, 0xc1, 0x61, 0xb4, \ - 0x66, 0x52, 0x36, 0xa2, 0x26, 0x53, 0xaa, 0xab, 0x74, 0x5e, 0x07, 0x7d, \ - 0x19, 0x82, 0xdb, 0x2a, 0xd8, 0x1f, 0xa0, 0xd9, 0x0d, 0x1c, 0x2d, 0x49, \ - 0x66, 0xf7, 0x5b, 0x25, 0x73, 0x46, 0xe8, 0x0b, 0x8a, 0x4f, 0x69, 0x0c, \ - 0xb5, 0x00, 0x90, 0xe1, 0xda, 0x82, 0x10, 0x66, 0x7d, 0xae, 0x54, 0x2b, \ - 0x8b, 0x65, 0x79, 0x91, 0xa1, 0xe2, 0x61, 0xc3, 0xcd, 0x40, 0x49, 0x08, \ - 0xee, 0x68, 0x0c, 0xf1, 0x8b, 0x86, 0xd2, 0x46, 0xbf, 0xd0, 0xb8, 0xaa, \ - 0x11, 0x03, 0x1e, 0x7f, 0x56, 0xa8, 0x1a, 0x1e, 0x44, 0x18, 0x0f, 0x0f, \ - 0x85, 0x8b, 0xda, 0x8b, 0x44, 0x5e, 0xe2, 0x18, 0xc6, 0x62, 0x2f, 0xc7, \ - 0x66, 0x8d, 0xfa, 0x5d, 0xd8, 0x7d, 0xf3, 0x27, 0x89, 0x29, 0x01, 0xc5, \ - 0x90, 0x0e, 0x3f, 0x27, 0xf1, 0x30, 0xc8, 0x4a, 0x0e, 0xef, 0xd6, 0xde, \ - 0xc7, 0xc7, 0x27, 0x6b, 0xc7, 0x05, 0x3d, 0x7a, 0xc4, 0x02, 0x3c, 0x9a, \ - 0x1d, 0x3e, 0x0f, 0xe8, 0x34, 0x98, 0x5b, 0xcb, 0x73, 0x4b, 0x52, 0x96, \ - 0xd8, 0x11, 0xa2, 0x2c, 0x80, 0x88, 0x69, 0x39, 0x5a, 0xd3, 0x0f, 0xb0, \ - 0xde, 0x59, 0x2f, 0x11, 0xc7, 0xf7, 0xea, 0x12, 0x01, 0x30, 0x97, 0x02, \ - 0x03, 0x01, 0x00, 0x01, 0xa3, 0x4d, 0x30, 0x4b, 0x30, 0x09, 0x06, 0x03, \ - 0x55, 0x1d, 0x13, 0x04, 0x02, 0x30, 0x00, 0x30, 0x1d, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, \ - 0x1d, 0x0e, 0x04, 0x16, 0x04, 0x14, 0xa5, 0x05, 0xe8, 0x64, 0xb8, 0xdc, \ - 0xdf, 0x60, 0x0f, 0x50, 0x12, 0x4d, 0x60, 0xa8, 0x64, 0xaf, 0x4d, 0x8b, \ - 0x43, 0x93, 0x30, 0x1f, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x1d, 0x23, 0x04, 0x18, 0x30, \ - 0x16, 0x80, 0x14, 0xb4, 0x5a, 0xe4, 0xa5, 0xb3, 0xde, 0xd2, 0x52, 0xf6, \ - 0xb9, 0xd5, 0xa6, 0x95, 0x0f, 0xeb, 0x3e, 0xbc, 0xc7, 0xfd, 0xff, 0x30, \ - 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x0d, 0x01, 0x01, 0x05, \ - 0x05, 0x00, 0x03, 0x82, 0x01, 0x01, 0x00, 0x01, 0x73, 0x0b, 0x4a, 0xc5, \ - 0xcb, 0xa0, 0xde, 0xf1, 0x63, 0x1c, 0x76, 0x04, 0x2b, 0x13, 0x0d, 0xc0, \ - 0x84, 0x11, 0xc5, 0x8f, 0x3a, 0xa7, 0xc5, 0x9c, 0x35, 0x7a, 0x77, 0xb8, \ - 0x20, 0x14, 0x82, 0xee, 0x54, 0xf0, 0xf2, 0xb0, 0x52, 0xcb, 0x78, 0xce, \ - 0x59, 0x07, 0x4f, 0x51, 0x69, 0xfe, 0xd3, 0x2f, 0xe9, 0x09, 0xe7, 0x85, \ - 0x92, 0xd8, 0xba, 0xb1, 0xeb, 0xc5, 0x76, 0x5d, 0x61, 0x2d, 0xe9, 0x86, \ - 0xb5, 0xde, 0x2a, 0xf9, 0x3f, 0x53, 0x28, 0x42, 0x86, 0x83, 0x73, 0x43, \ - 0xe0, 0x04, 0x5f, 0x07, 0x90, 0x14, 0x65, 0x9f, 0x6e, 0x10, 0x7a, 0xbc, \ - 0x58, 0x19, 0x22, 0xc2, 0xeb, 0x39, 0x72, 0x51, 0x92, 0xd7, 0xb4, 0x1d, \ - 0x75, 0x2f, 0xd3, 0x3a, 0x2b, 0x01, 0xe7, 0xdb, 0x50, 0xae, 0xe2, 0xf1, \ - 0xd4, 0x4d, 0x5b, 0x3c, 0xbb, 0x41, 0x2b, 0x2a, 0xa4, 0xe2, 0x4a, 0x02, \ - 0xe5, 0x60, 0x14, 0x2c, 0x9c, 0x1f, 0xa6, 0xcc, 0x06, 0x4b, 0x25, 0x89, \ - 0x4e, 0x96, 0x30, 0x22, 0x9c, 0x5c, 0x58, 0x4d, 0xc3, 0xda, 0xd0, 0x6e, \ - 0x50, 0x1e, 0x8c, 0x65, 0xf5, 0xd9, 0x17, 0x35, 0xa6, 0x58, 0x43, 0xb2, \ - 0x29, 0xb7, 0xa8, 0x5e, 0x35, 0xde, 0xf0, 0x60, 0x42, 0x1a, 0x01, 0xcb, \ - 0xcb, 0x0b, 0xd8, 0x0e, 0xc1, 0x90, 0xdf, 0xa1, 0xd2, 0x1a, 0xd1, 0x2c, \ - 0x02, 0xf4, 0x76, 0x41, 0xa4, 0xcb, 0x4b, 0x15, 0x98, 0x71, 0xf9, 0x35, \ - 0x7d, 0xb0, 0xe7, 0xe2, 0x34, 0x96, 0x91, 0xbe, 0x32, 0x67, 0x2d, 0x6b, \ - 0xd3, 0x55, 0x04, 0x8a, 0x01, 0x50, 0xb4, 0xe3, 0x62, 0x78, 0x6c, 0x11, \ - 0x15, 0xa5, 0x2a, 0x11, 0xc1, 0x49, 0x1c, 0x9b, 0xc4, 0x10, 0x65, 0x60, \ - 0x87, 0xd9, 0x1e, 0x69, 0x59, 0x4e, 0x8f, 0x6b, 0xeb, 0xc1, 0xfe, 0x6b, \ - 0xe2, 0x63, 0x78, 0x95, 0x6e, 0xe0, 0x2d, 0xd7, 0xa7, 0x37, 0xa8 \ -} -/* END FILE */ - -/* This is taken from tests/data_files/server2.key. */ -/* BEGIN FILE string macro TEST_SRV_KEY_RSA_PEM tests/data_files/server2.key */ -#define TEST_SRV_KEY_RSA_PEM \ - "-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----\r\n" \ - "MIIEpAIBAAKCAQEAwU2j3efNHdEE10lyuJmsDnjkOjxKzzoTFtBa5M2jAIin7h5r\r\n" \ - "lqdStJDvLXJ6PiSa/LY0rCT1d+AmZIycsCh9odrqjObJHJa8/sEEUrM21KP64bF2\r\n" \ - "2JDBYbRmUjaiJlOqq3ReB30Zgtsq2B+g2Q0cLUlm91slc0boC4pPaQy1AJDh2oIQ\r\n" \ - "Zn2uVCuLZXmRoeJhw81ASQjuaAzxi4bSRr/QuKoRAx5/VqgaHkQYDw+Fi9qLRF7i\r\n" \ - "GMZiL8dmjfpd2H3zJ4kpAcWQDj8n8TDISg7v1t7HxydrxwU9esQCPJodPg/oNJhb\r\n" \ - "y3NLUpbYEaIsgIhpOVrTD7DeWS8Rx/fqEgEwlwIDAQABAoIBAQCXR0S8EIHFGORZ\r\n" \ - "++AtOg6eENxD+xVs0f1IeGz57Tjo3QnXX7VBZNdj+p1ECvhCE/G7XnkgU5hLZX+G\r\n" \ - "Z0jkz/tqJOI0vRSdLBbipHnWouyBQ4e/A1yIJdlBtqXxJ1KE/ituHRbNc4j4kL8Z\r\n" \ - "/r6pvwnTI0PSx2Eqs048YdS92LT6qAv4flbNDxMn2uY7s4ycS4Q8w1JXnCeaAnYm\r\n" \ - "WYI5wxO+bvRELR2Mcz5DmVnL8jRyml6l6582bSv5oufReFIbyPZbQWlXgYnpu6He\r\n" \ - "GTc7E1zKYQGG/9+DQUl/1vQuCPqQwny0tQoX2w5tdYpdMdVm+zkLtbajzdTviJJa\r\n" \ - "TWzL6lt5AoGBAN86+SVeJDcmQJcv4Eq6UhtRr4QGMiQMz0Sod6ettYxYzMgxtw28\r\n" \ - "CIrgpozCc+UaZJLo7UxvC6an85r1b2nKPCLQFaggJ0H4Q0J/sZOhBIXaoBzWxveK\r\n" \ - "nupceKdVxGsFi8CDy86DBfiyFivfBj+47BbaQzPBj7C4rK7UlLjab2rDAoGBAN2u\r\n" \ - "AM2gchoFiu4v1HFL8D7lweEpi6ZnMJjnEu/dEgGQJFjwdpLnPbsj4c75odQ4Gz8g\r\n" \ - "sw9lao9VVzbusoRE/JGI4aTdO0pATXyG7eG1Qu+5Yc1YGXcCrliA2xM9xx+d7f+s\r\n" \ - "mPzN+WIEg5GJDYZDjAzHG5BNvi/FfM1C9dOtjv2dAoGAF0t5KmwbjWHBhcVqO4Ic\r\n" \ - "BVvN3BIlc1ue2YRXEDlxY5b0r8N4XceMgKmW18OHApZxfl8uPDauWZLXOgl4uepv\r\n" \ - "whZC3EuWrSyyICNhLY21Ah7hbIEBPF3L3ZsOwC+UErL+dXWLdB56Jgy3gZaBeW7b\r\n" \ - "vDrEnocJbqCm7IukhXHOBK8CgYEAwqdHB0hqyNSzIOGY7v9abzB6pUdA3BZiQvEs\r\n" \ - "3LjHVd4HPJ2x0N8CgrBIWOE0q8+0hSMmeE96WW/7jD3fPWwCR5zlXknxBQsfv0gP\r\n" \ - "3BC5PR0Qdypz+d+9zfMf625kyit4T/hzwhDveZUzHnk1Cf+IG7Q+TOEnLnWAWBED\r\n" \ - "ISOWmrUCgYAFEmRxgwAc/u+D6t0syCwAYh6POtscq9Y0i9GyWk89NzgC4NdwwbBH\r\n" \ - "4AgahOxIxXx2gxJnq3yfkJfIjwf0s2DyP0kY2y6Ua1OeomPeY9mrIS4tCuDQ6LrE\r\n" \ - "TB6l9VGoxJL4fyHnZb8L5gGvnB1bbD8cL6YPaDiOhcRseC9vBiEuVg==\r\n" \ - "-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----\r\n" -/* END FILE */ - -/* This was generated from tests/data_files/server2.key.der using `xxd -i`. */ -/* BEGIN FILE binary macro TEST_SRV_KEY_RSA_DER tests/data_files/server2.key.der */ -#define TEST_SRV_KEY_RSA_DER { \ - 0x30, 0x82, 0x04, 0xa4, 0x02, 0x01, 0x00, 0x02, 0x82, 0x01, 0x01, 0x00, \ - 0xc1, 0x4d, 0xa3, 0xdd, 0xe7, 0xcd, 0x1d, 0xd1, 0x04, 0xd7, 0x49, 0x72, \ - 0xb8, 0x99, 0xac, 0x0e, 0x78, 0xe4, 0x3a, 0x3c, 0x4a, 0xcf, 0x3a, 0x13, \ - 0x16, 0xd0, 0x5a, 0xe4, 0xcd, 0xa3, 0x00, 0x88, 0xa7, 0xee, 0x1e, 0x6b, \ - 0x96, 0xa7, 0x52, 0xb4, 0x90, 0xef, 0x2d, 0x72, 0x7a, 0x3e, 0x24, 0x9a, \ - 0xfc, 0xb6, 0x34, 0xac, 0x24, 0xf5, 0x77, 0xe0, 0x26, 0x64, 0x8c, 0x9c, \ - 0xb0, 0x28, 0x7d, 0xa1, 0xda, 0xea, 0x8c, 0xe6, 0xc9, 0x1c, 0x96, 0xbc, \ - 0xfe, 0xc1, 0x04, 0x52, 0xb3, 0x36, 0xd4, 0xa3, 0xfa, 0xe1, 0xb1, 0x76, \ - 0xd8, 0x90, 0xc1, 0x61, 0xb4, 0x66, 0x52, 0x36, 0xa2, 0x26, 0x53, 0xaa, \ - 0xab, 0x74, 0x5e, 0x07, 0x7d, 0x19, 0x82, 0xdb, 0x2a, 0xd8, 0x1f, 0xa0, \ - 0xd9, 0x0d, 0x1c, 0x2d, 0x49, 0x66, 0xf7, 0x5b, 0x25, 0x73, 0x46, 0xe8, \ - 0x0b, 0x8a, 0x4f, 0x69, 0x0c, 0xb5, 0x00, 0x90, 0xe1, 0xda, 0x82, 0x10, \ - 0x66, 0x7d, 0xae, 0x54, 0x2b, 0x8b, 0x65, 0x79, 0x91, 0xa1, 0xe2, 0x61, \ - 0xc3, 0xcd, 0x40, 0x49, 0x08, 0xee, 0x68, 0x0c, 0xf1, 0x8b, 0x86, 0xd2, \ - 0x46, 0xbf, 0xd0, 0xb8, 0xaa, 0x11, 0x03, 0x1e, 0x7f, 0x56, 0xa8, 0x1a, \ - 0x1e, 0x44, 0x18, 0x0f, 0x0f, 0x85, 0x8b, 0xda, 0x8b, 0x44, 0x5e, 0xe2, \ - 0x18, 0xc6, 0x62, 0x2f, 0xc7, 0x66, 0x8d, 0xfa, 0x5d, 0xd8, 0x7d, 0xf3, \ - 0x27, 0x89, 0x29, 0x01, 0xc5, 0x90, 0x0e, 0x3f, 0x27, 0xf1, 0x30, 0xc8, \ - 0x4a, 0x0e, 0xef, 0xd6, 0xde, 0xc7, 0xc7, 0x27, 0x6b, 0xc7, 0x05, 0x3d, \ - 0x7a, 0xc4, 0x02, 0x3c, 0x9a, 0x1d, 0x3e, 0x0f, 0xe8, 0x34, 0x98, 0x5b, \ - 0xcb, 0x73, 0x4b, 0x52, 0x96, 0xd8, 0x11, 0xa2, 0x2c, 0x80, 0x88, 0x69, \ - 0x39, 0x5a, 0xd3, 0x0f, 0xb0, 0xde, 0x59, 0x2f, 0x11, 0xc7, 0xf7, 0xea, \ - 0x12, 0x01, 0x30, 0x97, 0x02, 0x03, 0x01, 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x82, 0x01, \ - 0x01, 0x00, 0x97, 0x47, 0x44, 0xbc, 0x10, 0x81, 0xc5, 0x18, 0xe4, 0x59, \ - 0xfb, 0xe0, 0x2d, 0x3a, 0x0e, 0x9e, 0x10, 0xdc, 0x43, 0xfb, 0x15, 0x6c, \ - 0xd1, 0xfd, 0x48, 0x78, 0x6c, 0xf9, 0xed, 0x38, 0xe8, 0xdd, 0x09, 0xd7, \ - 0x5f, 0xb5, 0x41, 0x64, 0xd7, 0x63, 0xfa, 0x9d, 0x44, 0x0a, 0xf8, 0x42, \ - 0x13, 0xf1, 0xbb, 0x5e, 0x79, 0x20, 0x53, 0x98, 0x4b, 0x65, 0x7f, 0x86, \ - 0x67, 0x48, 0xe4, 0xcf, 0xfb, 0x6a, 0x24, 0xe2, 0x34, 0xbd, 0x14, 0x9d, \ - 0x2c, 0x16, 0xe2, 0xa4, 0x79, 0xd6, 0xa2, 0xec, 0x81, 0x43, 0x87, 0xbf, \ - 0x03, 0x5c, 0x88, 0x25, 0xd9, 0x41, 0xb6, 0xa5, 0xf1, 0x27, 0x52, 0x84, \ - 0xfe, 0x2b, 0x6e, 0x1d, 0x16, 0xcd, 0x73, 0x88, 0xf8, 0x90, 0xbf, 0x19, \ - 0xfe, 0xbe, 0xa9, 0xbf, 0x09, 0xd3, 0x23, 0x43, 0xd2, 0xc7, 0x61, 0x2a, \ - 0xb3, 0x4e, 0x3c, 0x61, 0xd4, 0xbd, 0xd8, 0xb4, 0xfa, 0xa8, 0x0b, 0xf8, \ - 0x7e, 0x56, 0xcd, 0x0f, 0x13, 0x27, 0xda, 0xe6, 0x3b, 0xb3, 0x8c, 0x9c, \ - 0x4b, 0x84, 0x3c, 0xc3, 0x52, 0x57, 0x9c, 0x27, 0x9a, 0x02, 0x76, 0x26, \ - 0x59, 0x82, 0x39, 0xc3, 0x13, 0xbe, 0x6e, 0xf4, 0x44, 0x2d, 0x1d, 0x8c, \ - 0x73, 0x3e, 0x43, 0x99, 0x59, 0xcb, 0xf2, 0x34, 0x72, 0x9a, 0x5e, 0xa5, \ - 0xeb, 0x9f, 0x36, 0x6d, 0x2b, 0xf9, 0xa2, 0xe7, 0xd1, 0x78, 0x52, 0x1b, \ - 0xc8, 0xf6, 0x5b, 0x41, 0x69, 0x57, 0x81, 0x89, 0xe9, 0xbb, 0xa1, 0xde, \ - 0x19, 0x37, 0x3b, 0x13, 0x5c, 0xca, 0x61, 0x01, 0x86, 0xff, 0xdf, 0x83, \ - 0x41, 0x49, 0x7f, 0xd6, 0xf4, 0x2e, 0x08, 0xfa, 0x90, 0xc2, 0x7c, 0xb4, \ - 0xb5, 0x0a, 0x17, 0xdb, 0x0e, 0x6d, 0x75, 0x8a, 0x5d, 0x31, 0xd5, 0x66, \ - 0xfb, 0x39, 0x0b, 0xb5, 0xb6, 0xa3, 0xcd, 0xd4, 0xef, 0x88, 0x92, 0x5a, \ - 0x4d, 0x6c, 0xcb, 0xea, 0x5b, 0x79, 0x02, 0x81, 0x81, 0x00, 0xdf, 0x3a, \ - 0xf9, 0x25, 0x5e, 0x24, 0x37, 0x26, 0x40, 0x97, 0x2f, 0xe0, 0x4a, 0xba, \ - 0x52, 0x1b, 0x51, 0xaf, 0x84, 0x06, 0x32, 0x24, 0x0c, 0xcf, 0x44, 0xa8, \ - 0x77, 0xa7, 0xad, 0xb5, 0x8c, 0x58, 0xcc, 0xc8, 0x31, 0xb7, 0x0d, 0xbc, \ - 0x08, 0x8a, 0xe0, 0xa6, 0x8c, 0xc2, 0x73, 0xe5, 0x1a, 0x64, 0x92, 0xe8, \ - 0xed, 0x4c, 0x6f, 0x0b, 0xa6, 0xa7, 0xf3, 0x9a, 0xf5, 0x6f, 0x69, 0xca, \ - 0x3c, 0x22, 0xd0, 0x15, 0xa8, 0x20, 0x27, 0x41, 0xf8, 0x43, 0x42, 0x7f, \ - 0xb1, 0x93, 0xa1, 0x04, 0x85, 0xda, 0xa0, 0x1c, 0xd6, 0xc6, 0xf7, 0x8a, \ - 0x9e, 0xea, 0x5c, 0x78, 0xa7, 0x55, 0xc4, 0x6b, 0x05, 0x8b, 0xc0, 0x83, \ - 0xcb, 0xce, 0x83, 0x05, 0xf8, 0xb2, 0x16, 0x2b, 0xdf, 0x06, 0x3f, 0xb8, \ - 0xec, 0x16, 0xda, 0x43, 0x33, 0xc1, 0x8f, 0xb0, 0xb8, 0xac, 0xae, 0xd4, \ - 0x94, 0xb8, 0xda, 0x6f, 0x6a, 0xc3, 0x02, 0x81, 0x81, 0x00, 0xdd, 0xae, \ - 0x00, 0xcd, 0xa0, 0x72, 0x1a, 0x05, 0x8a, 0xee, 0x2f, 0xd4, 0x71, 0x4b, \ - 0xf0, 0x3e, 0xe5, 0xc1, 0xe1, 0x29, 0x8b, 0xa6, 0x67, 0x30, 0x98, 0xe7, \ - 0x12, 0xef, 0xdd, 0x12, 0x01, 0x90, 0x24, 0x58, 0xf0, 0x76, 0x92, 0xe7, \ - 0x3d, 0xbb, 0x23, 0xe1, 0xce, 0xf9, 0xa1, 0xd4, 0x38, 0x1b, 0x3f, 0x20, \ - 0xb3, 0x0f, 0x65, 0x6a, 0x8f, 0x55, 0x57, 0x36, 0xee, 0xb2, 0x84, 0x44, \ - 0xfc, 0x91, 0x88, 0xe1, 0xa4, 0xdd, 0x3b, 0x4a, 0x40, 0x4d, 0x7c, 0x86, \ - 0xed, 0xe1, 0xb5, 0x42, 0xef, 0xb9, 0x61, 0xcd, 0x58, 0x19, 0x77, 0x02, \ - 0xae, 0x58, 0x80, 0xdb, 0x13, 0x3d, 0xc7, 0x1f, 0x9d, 0xed, 0xff, 0xac, \ - 0x98, 0xfc, 0xcd, 0xf9, 0x62, 0x04, 0x83, 0x91, 0x89, 0x0d, 0x86, 0x43, \ - 0x8c, 0x0c, 0xc7, 0x1b, 0x90, 0x4d, 0xbe, 0x2f, 0xc5, 0x7c, 0xcd, 0x42, \ - 0xf5, 0xd3, 0xad, 0x8e, 0xfd, 0x9d, 0x02, 0x81, 0x80, 0x17, 0x4b, 0x79, \ - 0x2a, 0x6c, 0x1b, 0x8d, 0x61, 0xc1, 0x85, 0xc5, 0x6a, 0x3b, 0x82, 0x1c, \ - 0x05, 0x5b, 0xcd, 0xdc, 0x12, 0x25, 0x73, 0x5b, 0x9e, 0xd9, 0x84, 0x57, \ - 0x10, 0x39, 0x71, 0x63, 0x96, 0xf4, 0xaf, 0xc3, 0x78, 0x5d, 0xc7, 0x8c, \ - 0x80, 0xa9, 0x96, 0xd7, 0xc3, 0x87, 0x02, 0x96, 0x71, 0x7e, 0x5f, 0x2e, \ - 0x3c, 0x36, 0xae, 0x59, 0x92, 0xd7, 0x3a, 0x09, 0x78, 0xb9, 0xea, 0x6f, \ - 0xc2, 0x16, 0x42, 0xdc, 0x4b, 0x96, 0xad, 0x2c, 0xb2, 0x20, 0x23, 0x61, \ - 0x2d, 0x8d, 0xb5, 0x02, 0x1e, 0xe1, 0x6c, 0x81, 0x01, 0x3c, 0x5d, 0xcb, \ - 0xdd, 0x9b, 0x0e, 0xc0, 0x2f, 0x94, 0x12, 0xb2, 0xfe, 0x75, 0x75, 0x8b, \ - 0x74, 0x1e, 0x7a, 0x26, 0x0c, 0xb7, 0x81, 0x96, 0x81, 0x79, 0x6e, 0xdb, \ - 0xbc, 0x3a, 0xc4, 0x9e, 0x87, 0x09, 0x6e, 0xa0, 0xa6, 0xec, 0x8b, 0xa4, \ - 0x85, 0x71, 0xce, 0x04, 0xaf, 0x02, 0x81, 0x81, 0x00, 0xc2, 0xa7, 0x47, \ - 0x07, 0x48, 0x6a, 0xc8, 0xd4, 0xb3, 0x20, 0xe1, 0x98, 0xee, 0xff, 0x5a, \ - 0x6f, 0x30, 0x7a, 0xa5, 0x47, 0x40, 0xdc, 0x16, 0x62, 0x42, 0xf1, 0x2c, \ - 0xdc, 0xb8, 0xc7, 0x55, 0xde, 0x07, 0x3c, 0x9d, 0xb1, 0xd0, 0xdf, 0x02, \ - 0x82, 0xb0, 0x48, 0x58, 0xe1, 0x34, 0xab, 0xcf, 0xb4, 0x85, 0x23, 0x26, \ - 0x78, 0x4f, 0x7a, 0x59, 0x6f, 0xfb, 0x8c, 0x3d, 0xdf, 0x3d, 0x6c, 0x02, \ - 0x47, 0x9c, 0xe5, 0x5e, 0x49, 0xf1, 0x05, 0x0b, 0x1f, 0xbf, 0x48, 0x0f, \ - 0xdc, 0x10, 0xb9, 0x3d, 0x1d, 0x10, 0x77, 0x2a, 0x73, 0xf9, 0xdf, 0xbd, \ - 0xcd, 0xf3, 0x1f, 0xeb, 0x6e, 0x64, 0xca, 0x2b, 0x78, 0x4f, 0xf8, 0x73, \ - 0xc2, 0x10, 0xef, 0x79, 0x95, 0x33, 0x1e, 0x79, 0x35, 0x09, 0xff, 0x88, \ - 0x1b, 0xb4, 0x3e, 0x4c, 0xe1, 0x27, 0x2e, 0x75, 0x80, 0x58, 0x11, 0x03, \ - 0x21, 0x23, 0x96, 0x9a, 0xb5, 0x02, 0x81, 0x80, 0x05, 0x12, 0x64, 0x71, \ - 0x83, 0x00, 0x1c, 0xfe, 0xef, 0x83, 0xea, 0xdd, 0x2c, 0xc8, 0x2c, 0x00, \ - 0x62, 0x1e, 0x8f, 0x3a, 0xdb, 0x1c, 0xab, 0xd6, 0x34, 0x8b, 0xd1, 0xb2, \ - 0x5a, 0x4f, 0x3d, 0x37, 0x38, 0x02, 0xe0, 0xd7, 0x70, 0xc1, 0xb0, 0x47, \ - 0xe0, 0x08, 0x1a, 0x84, 0xec, 0x48, 0xc5, 0x7c, 0x76, 0x83, 0x12, 0x67, \ - 0xab, 0x7c, 0x9f, 0x90, 0x97, 0xc8, 0x8f, 0x07, 0xf4, 0xb3, 0x60, 0xf2, \ - 0x3f, 0x49, 0x18, 0xdb, 0x2e, 0x94, 0x6b, 0x53, 0x9e, 0xa2, 0x63, 0xde, \ - 0x63, 0xd9, 0xab, 0x21, 0x2e, 0x2d, 0x0a, 0xe0, 0xd0, 0xe8, 0xba, 0xc4, \ - 0x4c, 0x1e, 0xa5, 0xf5, 0x51, 0xa8, 0xc4, 0x92, 0xf8, 0x7f, 0x21, 0xe7, \ - 0x65, 0xbf, 0x0b, 0xe6, 0x01, 0xaf, 0x9c, 0x1d, 0x5b, 0x6c, 0x3f, 0x1c, \ - 0x2f, 0xa6, 0x0f, 0x68, 0x38, 0x8e, 0x85, 0xc4, 0x6c, 0x78, 0x2f, 0x6f, \ - 0x06, 0x21, 0x2e, 0x56 \ -} -/* END FILE */ - -/* - * Test client Certificates - * - * Test client certificates are defined for each choice - * of the following parameters: - * - PEM or DER encoding - * - RSA or EC key - * - * Things to add: - * - hash type - * - multiple EC curve types - */ - -/* This is taken from tests/data_files/cli2.crt. */ -/* BEGIN FILE string macro TEST_CLI_CRT_EC_PEM tests/data_files/cli2.crt */ -#define TEST_CLI_CRT_EC_PEM \ - "-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\r\n" \ - "MIIB3zCCAWOgAwIBAgIBDTAMBggqhkjOPQQDAgUAMD4xCzAJBgNVBAYTAk5MMREw\r\n" \ - "DwYDVQQKDAhQb2xhclNTTDEcMBoGA1UEAwwTUG9sYXJTU0wgVGVzdCBFQyBDQTAe\r\n" \ - "Fw0xOTAyMTAxNDQ0MDBaFw0yOTAyMTAxNDQ0MDBaMEExCzAJBgNVBAYTAk5MMREw\r\n" \ - "DwYDVQQKDAhQb2xhclNTTDEfMB0GA1UEAwwWUG9sYXJTU0wgVGVzdCBDbGllbnQg\r\n" \ - "MjBZMBMGByqGSM49AgEGCCqGSM49AwEHA0IABFflrrFz39Osu5O4gf8Sru7mU6zO\r\n" \ - "VVP2NA7MLuNjJQvfmOLzXGA2lsDVGBRw5X+f1UtFGOWwbNVc+JaPh3Cj5MejTTBL\r\n" \ - "MAkGA1UdEwQCMAAwHQYDVR0OBBYEFHoAX4Zk/OBd5REQO7LmO8QmP8/iMB8GA1Ud\r\n" \ - "IwQYMBaAFJ1tICRJAT8ry3i1Gbx+JMnb+zZ8MAwGCCqGSM49BAMCBQADaAAwZQIx\r\n" \ - "AMqme4DKMldUlplDET9Q6Eptre7uUWKhsLOF+zPkKDlfzpIkJYEFgcloDHGYw80u\r\n" \ - "IgIwNftyPXsabTqMM7iEHgVpX/GRozKklY9yQI/5eoA6gGW7Y+imuGR/oao5ySOb\r\n" \ - "a9Vk\r\n" \ - "-----END CERTIFICATE-----\r\n" -/* END FILE */ - -/* This is generated from tests/data_files/cli2.crt.der using `xxd -i`. */ -/* BEGIN FILE binary macro TEST_CLI_CRT_EC_DER tests/data_files/cli2.crt.der */ -#define TEST_CLI_CRT_EC_DER { \ - 0x30, 0x82, 0x01, 0xdf, 0x30, 0x82, 0x01, 0x63, 0xa0, 0x03, 0x02, 0x01, \ - 0x02, 0x02, 0x01, 0x0d, 0x30, 0x0c, 0x06, 0x08, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0xce, \ - 0x3d, 0x04, 0x03, 0x02, 0x05, 0x00, 0x30, 0x3e, 0x31, 0x0b, 0x30, 0x09, \ - 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x06, 0x13, 0x02, 0x4e, 0x4c, 0x31, 0x11, 0x30, \ - 0x0f, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x0a, 0x0c, 0x08, 0x50, 0x6f, 0x6c, 0x61, \ - 0x72, 0x53, 0x53, 0x4c, 0x31, 0x1c, 0x30, 0x1a, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, \ - 0x03, 0x0c, 0x13, 0x50, 0x6f, 0x6c, 0x61, 0x72, 0x53, 0x53, 0x4c, 0x20, \ - 0x54, 0x65, 0x73, 0x74, 0x20, 0x45, 0x43, 0x20, 0x43, 0x41, 0x30, 0x1e, \ - 0x17, 0x0d, 0x31, 0x39, 0x30, 0x32, 0x31, 0x30, 0x31, 0x34, 0x34, 0x34, \ - 0x30, 0x30, 0x5a, 0x17, 0x0d, 0x32, 0x39, 0x30, 0x32, 0x31, 0x30, 0x31, \ - 0x34, 0x34, 0x34, 0x30, 0x30, 0x5a, 0x30, 0x41, 0x31, 0x0b, 0x30, 0x09, \ - 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x06, 0x13, 0x02, 0x4e, 0x4c, 0x31, 0x11, 0x30, \ - 0x0f, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x0a, 0x0c, 0x08, 0x50, 0x6f, 0x6c, 0x61, \ - 0x72, 0x53, 0x53, 0x4c, 0x31, 0x1f, 0x30, 0x1d, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, \ - 0x03, 0x0c, 0x16, 0x50, 0x6f, 0x6c, 0x61, 0x72, 0x53, 0x53, 0x4c, 0x20, \ - 0x54, 0x65, 0x73, 0x74, 0x20, 0x43, 0x6c, 0x69, 0x65, 0x6e, 0x74, 0x20, \ - 0x32, 0x30, 0x59, 0x30, 0x13, 0x06, 0x07, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0xce, 0x3d, \ - 0x02, 0x01, 0x06, 0x08, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0xce, 0x3d, 0x03, 0x01, 0x07, \ - 0x03, 0x42, 0x00, 0x04, 0x57, 0xe5, 0xae, 0xb1, 0x73, 0xdf, 0xd3, 0xac, \ - 0xbb, 0x93, 0xb8, 0x81, 0xff, 0x12, 0xae, 0xee, 0xe6, 0x53, 0xac, 0xce, \ - 0x55, 0x53, 0xf6, 0x34, 0x0e, 0xcc, 0x2e, 0xe3, 0x63, 0x25, 0x0b, 0xdf, \ - 0x98, 0xe2, 0xf3, 0x5c, 0x60, 0x36, 0x96, 0xc0, 0xd5, 0x18, 0x14, 0x70, \ - 0xe5, 0x7f, 0x9f, 0xd5, 0x4b, 0x45, 0x18, 0xe5, 0xb0, 0x6c, 0xd5, 0x5c, \ - 0xf8, 0x96, 0x8f, 0x87, 0x70, 0xa3, 0xe4, 0xc7, 0xa3, 0x4d, 0x30, 0x4b, \ - 0x30, 0x09, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x1d, 0x13, 0x04, 0x02, 0x30, 0x00, 0x30, \ - 0x1d, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x1d, 0x0e, 0x04, 0x16, 0x04, 0x14, 0x7a, 0x00, \ - 0x5f, 0x86, 0x64, 0xfc, 0xe0, 0x5d, 0xe5, 0x11, 0x10, 0x3b, 0xb2, 0xe6, \ - 0x3b, 0xc4, 0x26, 0x3f, 0xcf, 0xe2, 0x30, 0x1f, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x1d, \ - 0x23, 0x04, 0x18, 0x30, 0x16, 0x80, 0x14, 0x9d, 0x6d, 0x20, 0x24, 0x49, \ - 0x01, 0x3f, 0x2b, 0xcb, 0x78, 0xb5, 0x19, 0xbc, 0x7e, 0x24, 0xc9, 0xdb, \ - 0xfb, 0x36, 0x7c, 0x30, 0x0c, 0x06, 0x08, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0xce, 0x3d, \ - 0x04, 0x03, 0x02, 0x05, 0x00, 0x03, 0x68, 0x00, 0x30, 0x65, 0x02, 0x31, \ - 0x00, 0xca, 0xa6, 0x7b, 0x80, 0xca, 0x32, 0x57, 0x54, 0x96, 0x99, 0x43, \ - 0x11, 0x3f, 0x50, 0xe8, 0x4a, 0x6d, 0xad, 0xee, 0xee, 0x51, 0x62, 0xa1, \ - 0xb0, 0xb3, 0x85, 0xfb, 0x33, 0xe4, 0x28, 0x39, 0x5f, 0xce, 0x92, 0x24, \ - 0x25, 0x81, 0x05, 0x81, 0xc9, 0x68, 0x0c, 0x71, 0x98, 0xc3, 0xcd, 0x2e, \ - 0x22, 0x02, 0x30, 0x35, 0xfb, 0x72, 0x3d, 0x7b, 0x1a, 0x6d, 0x3a, 0x8c, \ - 0x33, 0xb8, 0x84, 0x1e, 0x05, 0x69, 0x5f, 0xf1, 0x91, 0xa3, 0x32, 0xa4, \ - 0x95, 0x8f, 0x72, 0x40, 0x8f, 0xf9, 0x7a, 0x80, 0x3a, 0x80, 0x65, 0xbb, \ - 0x63, 0xe8, 0xa6, 0xb8, 0x64, 0x7f, 0xa1, 0xaa, 0x39, 0xc9, 0x23, 0x9b, \ - 0x6b, 0xd5, 0x64 \ -} -/* END FILE */ - -/* This is taken from tests/data_files/cli2.key. */ -/* BEGIN FILE string macro TEST_CLI_KEY_EC_PEM tests/data_files/cli2.key */ -#define TEST_CLI_KEY_EC_PEM \ - "-----BEGIN EC PRIVATE KEY-----\r\n" \ - "MHcCAQEEIPb3hmTxZ3/mZI3vyk7p3U3wBf+WIop6hDhkFzJhmLcqoAoGCCqGSM49\r\n" \ - "AwEHoUQDQgAEV+WusXPf06y7k7iB/xKu7uZTrM5VU/Y0Dswu42MlC9+Y4vNcYDaW\r\n" \ - "wNUYFHDlf5/VS0UY5bBs1Vz4lo+HcKPkxw==\r\n" \ - "-----END EC PRIVATE KEY-----\r\n" -/* END FILE */ - -/* This is generated from tests/data_files/cli2.key.der using `xxd -i`. */ -/* BEGIN FILE binary macro TEST_CLI_KEY_EC_DER tests/data_files/cli2.key.der */ -#define TEST_CLI_KEY_EC_DER { \ - 0x30, 0x77, 0x02, 0x01, 0x01, 0x04, 0x20, 0xf6, 0xf7, 0x86, 0x64, 0xf1, \ - 0x67, 0x7f, 0xe6, 0x64, 0x8d, 0xef, 0xca, 0x4e, 0xe9, 0xdd, 0x4d, 0xf0, \ - 0x05, 0xff, 0x96, 0x22, 0x8a, 0x7a, 0x84, 0x38, 0x64, 0x17, 0x32, 0x61, \ - 0x98, 0xb7, 0x2a, 0xa0, 0x0a, 0x06, 0x08, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0xce, 0x3d, \ - 0x03, 0x01, 0x07, 0xa1, 0x44, 0x03, 0x42, 0x00, 0x04, 0x57, 0xe5, 0xae, \ - 0xb1, 0x73, 0xdf, 0xd3, 0xac, 0xbb, 0x93, 0xb8, 0x81, 0xff, 0x12, 0xae, \ - 0xee, 0xe6, 0x53, 0xac, 0xce, 0x55, 0x53, 0xf6, 0x34, 0x0e, 0xcc, 0x2e, \ - 0xe3, 0x63, 0x25, 0x0b, 0xdf, 0x98, 0xe2, 0xf3, 0x5c, 0x60, 0x36, 0x96, \ - 0xc0, 0xd5, 0x18, 0x14, 0x70, 0xe5, 0x7f, 0x9f, 0xd5, 0x4b, 0x45, 0x18, \ - 0xe5, 0xb0, 0x6c, 0xd5, 0x5c, 0xf8, 0x96, 0x8f, 0x87, 0x70, 0xa3, 0xe4, \ - 0xc7 \ -} -/* END FILE */ - -/* This is taken from tests/data_files/cli-rsa-sha256.crt. */ -/* BEGIN FILE string macro TEST_CLI_CRT_RSA_PEM tests/data_files/cli-rsa-sha256.crt */ -#define TEST_CLI_CRT_RSA_PEM \ - "-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\r\n" \ - "MIIDPzCCAiegAwIBAgIBBDANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADA7MQswCQYDVQQGEwJOTDER\r\n" \ - "MA8GA1UECgwIUG9sYXJTU0wxGTAXBgNVBAMMEFBvbGFyU1NMIFRlc3QgQ0EwHhcN\r\n" \ - "MTkwMjEwMTQ0NDA2WhcNMjkwMjEwMTQ0NDA2WjA8MQswCQYDVQQGEwJOTDERMA8G\r\n" \ - "A1UECgwIUG9sYXJTU0wxGjAYBgNVBAMMEVBvbGFyU1NMIENsaWVudCAyMIIBIjAN\r\n" \ - "BgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEAyHTEzLn5tXnpRdkUYLB9u5Pyax6f\r\n" \ - "M60Nj4o8VmXl3ETZzGaFB9X4J7BKNdBjngpuG7fa8H6r7gwQk4ZJGDTzqCrSV/Uu\r\n" \ - "1C93KYRhTYJQj6eVSHD1bk2y1RPD0hrt5kPqQhTrdOrA7R/UV06p86jt0uDBMHEw\r\n" \ - "MjDV0/YI0FZPRo7yX/k9Z5GIMC5Cst99++UMd//sMcB4j7/Cf8qtbCHWjdmLao5v\r\n" \ - "4Jv4EFbMs44TFeY0BGbH7vk2DmqV9gmaBmf0ZXH4yqSxJeD+PIs1BGe64E92hfx/\r\n" \ - "/DZrtenNLQNiTrM9AM+vdqBpVoNq0qjU51Bx5rU2BXcFbXvI5MT9TNUhXwIDAQAB\r\n" \ - "o00wSzAJBgNVHRMEAjAAMB0GA1UdDgQWBBRxoQBzckAvVHZeM/xSj7zx3WtGITAf\r\n" \ - "BgNVHSMEGDAWgBS0WuSls97SUva51aaVD+s+vMf9/zANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFAAOC\r\n" \ - "AQEAXidv1d4pLlBiKWED95rMycBdgDcgyNqJxakFkRfRyA2y1mlyTn7uBXRkNLY5\r\n" \ - "ZFzK82GCjk2Q2OD4RZSCPAJJqLpHHU34t71ciffvy2KK81YvrxczRhMAE64i+qna\r\n" \ - "yP3Td2XuWJR05PVPoSemsNELs9gWttdnYy3ce+EY2Y0n7Rsi7982EeLIAA7H6ca4\r\n" \ - "2Es/NUH//JZJT32OP0doMxeDRA+vplkKqTLLWf7dX26LIriBkBaRCgR5Yv9LBPFc\r\n" \ - "NOtpzu/LbrY7QFXKJMI+JXDudCsOn8KCmiA4d6Emisqfh3V3485l7HEQNcvLTxlD\r\n" \ - "6zDQyi0/ykYUYZkwQTK1N2Nvlw==\r\n" \ - "-----END CERTIFICATE-----\r\n" -/* END FILE */ - -/* This was generated from tests/data_files/cli-rsa-sha256.crt.der - using `xxd -i.` */ -/* BEGIN FILE binary macro TEST_CLI_CRT_RSA_DER tests/data_files/cli-rsa-sha256.crt.der */ -#define TEST_CLI_CRT_RSA_DER { \ - 0x30, 0x82, 0x03, 0x3f, 0x30, 0x82, 0x02, 0x27, 0xa0, 0x03, 0x02, 0x01, \ - 0x02, 0x02, 0x01, 0x04, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, \ - 0xf7, 0x0d, 0x01, 0x01, 0x0b, 0x05, 0x00, 0x30, 0x3b, 0x31, 0x0b, 0x30, \ - 0x09, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x06, 0x13, 0x02, 0x4e, 0x4c, 0x31, 0x11, \ - 0x30, 0x0f, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x0a, 0x0c, 0x08, 0x50, 0x6f, 0x6c, \ - 0x61, 0x72, 0x53, 0x53, 0x4c, 0x31, 0x19, 0x30, 0x17, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, \ - 0x04, 0x03, 0x0c, 0x10, 0x50, 0x6f, 0x6c, 0x61, 0x72, 0x53, 0x53, 0x4c, \ - 0x20, 0x54, 0x65, 0x73, 0x74, 0x20, 0x43, 0x41, 0x30, 0x1e, 0x17, 0x0d, \ - 0x31, 0x39, 0x30, 0x32, 0x31, 0x30, 0x31, 0x34, 0x34, 0x34, 0x30, 0x36, \ - 0x5a, 0x17, 0x0d, 0x32, 0x39, 0x30, 0x32, 0x31, 0x30, 0x31, 0x34, 0x34, \ - 0x34, 0x30, 0x36, 0x5a, 0x30, 0x3c, 0x31, 0x0b, 0x30, 0x09, 0x06, 0x03, \ - 0x55, 0x04, 0x06, 0x13, 0x02, 0x4e, 0x4c, 0x31, 0x11, 0x30, 0x0f, 0x06, \ - 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x0a, 0x0c, 0x08, 0x50, 0x6f, 0x6c, 0x61, 0x72, 0x53, \ - 0x53, 0x4c, 0x31, 0x1a, 0x30, 0x18, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x03, 0x0c, \ - 0x11, 0x50, 0x6f, 0x6c, 0x61, 0x72, 0x53, 0x53, 0x4c, 0x20, 0x43, 0x6c, \ - 0x69, 0x65, 0x6e, 0x74, 0x20, 0x32, 0x30, 0x82, 0x01, 0x22, 0x30, 0x0d, \ - 0x06, 0x09, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x0d, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x05, \ - 0x00, 0x03, 0x82, 0x01, 0x0f, 0x00, 0x30, 0x82, 0x01, 0x0a, 0x02, 0x82, \ - 0x01, 0x01, 0x00, 0xc8, 0x74, 0xc4, 0xcc, 0xb9, 0xf9, 0xb5, 0x79, 0xe9, \ - 0x45, 0xd9, 0x14, 0x60, 0xb0, 0x7d, 0xbb, 0x93, 0xf2, 0x6b, 0x1e, 0x9f, \ - 0x33, 0xad, 0x0d, 0x8f, 0x8a, 0x3c, 0x56, 0x65, 0xe5, 0xdc, 0x44, 0xd9, \ - 0xcc, 0x66, 0x85, 0x07, 0xd5, 0xf8, 0x27, 0xb0, 0x4a, 0x35, 0xd0, 0x63, \ - 0x9e, 0x0a, 0x6e, 0x1b, 0xb7, 0xda, 0xf0, 0x7e, 0xab, 0xee, 0x0c, 0x10, \ - 0x93, 0x86, 0x49, 0x18, 0x34, 0xf3, 0xa8, 0x2a, 0xd2, 0x57, 0xf5, 0x2e, \ - 0xd4, 0x2f, 0x77, 0x29, 0x84, 0x61, 0x4d, 0x82, 0x50, 0x8f, 0xa7, 0x95, \ - 0x48, 0x70, 0xf5, 0x6e, 0x4d, 0xb2, 0xd5, 0x13, 0xc3, 0xd2, 0x1a, 0xed, \ - 0xe6, 0x43, 0xea, 0x42, 0x14, 0xeb, 0x74, 0xea, 0xc0, 0xed, 0x1f, 0xd4, \ - 0x57, 0x4e, 0xa9, 0xf3, 0xa8, 0xed, 0xd2, 0xe0, 0xc1, 0x30, 0x71, 0x30, \ - 0x32, 0x30, 0xd5, 0xd3, 0xf6, 0x08, 0xd0, 0x56, 0x4f, 0x46, 0x8e, 0xf2, \ - 0x5f, 0xf9, 0x3d, 0x67, 0x91, 0x88, 0x30, 0x2e, 0x42, 0xb2, 0xdf, 0x7d, \ - 0xfb, 0xe5, 0x0c, 0x77, 0xff, 0xec, 0x31, 0xc0, 0x78, 0x8f, 0xbf, 0xc2, \ - 0x7f, 0xca, 0xad, 0x6c, 0x21, 0xd6, 0x8d, 0xd9, 0x8b, 0x6a, 0x8e, 0x6f, \ - 0xe0, 0x9b, 0xf8, 0x10, 0x56, 0xcc, 0xb3, 0x8e, 0x13, 0x15, 0xe6, 0x34, \ - 0x04, 0x66, 0xc7, 0xee, 0xf9, 0x36, 0x0e, 0x6a, 0x95, 0xf6, 0x09, 0x9a, \ - 0x06, 0x67, 0xf4, 0x65, 0x71, 0xf8, 0xca, 0xa4, 0xb1, 0x25, 0xe0, 0xfe, \ - 0x3c, 0x8b, 0x35, 0x04, 0x67, 0xba, 0xe0, 0x4f, 0x76, 0x85, 0xfc, 0x7f, \ - 0xfc, 0x36, 0x6b, 0xb5, 0xe9, 0xcd, 0x2d, 0x03, 0x62, 0x4e, 0xb3, 0x3d, \ - 0x00, 0xcf, 0xaf, 0x76, 0xa0, 0x69, 0x56, 0x83, 0x6a, 0xd2, 0xa8, 0xd4, \ - 0xe7, 0x50, 0x71, 0xe6, 0xb5, 0x36, 0x05, 0x77, 0x05, 0x6d, 0x7b, 0xc8, \ - 0xe4, 0xc4, 0xfd, 0x4c, 0xd5, 0x21, 0x5f, 0x02, 0x03, 0x01, 0x00, 0x01, \ - 0xa3, 0x4d, 0x30, 0x4b, 0x30, 0x09, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x1d, 0x13, 0x04, \ - 0x02, 0x30, 0x00, 0x30, 0x1d, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x1d, 0x0e, 0x04, 0x16, \ - 0x04, 0x14, 0x71, 0xa1, 0x00, 0x73, 0x72, 0x40, 0x2f, 0x54, 0x76, 0x5e, \ - 0x33, 0xfc, 0x52, 0x8f, 0xbc, 0xf1, 0xdd, 0x6b, 0x46, 0x21, 0x30, 0x1f, \ - 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x1d, 0x23, 0x04, 0x18, 0x30, 0x16, 0x80, 0x14, 0xb4, \ - 0x5a, 0xe4, 0xa5, 0xb3, 0xde, 0xd2, 0x52, 0xf6, 0xb9, 0xd5, 0xa6, 0x95, \ - 0x0f, 0xeb, 0x3e, 0xbc, 0xc7, 0xfd, 0xff, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09, 0x2a, \ - 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x0d, 0x01, 0x01, 0x0b, 0x05, 0x00, 0x03, 0x82, \ - 0x01, 0x01, 0x00, 0x5e, 0x27, 0x6f, 0xd5, 0xde, 0x29, 0x2e, 0x50, 0x62, \ - 0x29, 0x61, 0x03, 0xf7, 0x9a, 0xcc, 0xc9, 0xc0, 0x5d, 0x80, 0x37, 0x20, \ - 0xc8, 0xda, 0x89, 0xc5, 0xa9, 0x05, 0x91, 0x17, 0xd1, 0xc8, 0x0d, 0xb2, \ - 0xd6, 0x69, 0x72, 0x4e, 0x7e, 0xee, 0x05, 0x74, 0x64, 0x34, 0xb6, 0x39, \ - 0x64, 0x5c, 0xca, 0xf3, 0x61, 0x82, 0x8e, 0x4d, 0x90, 0xd8, 0xe0, 0xf8, \ - 0x45, 0x94, 0x82, 0x3c, 0x02, 0x49, 0xa8, 0xba, 0x47, 0x1d, 0x4d, 0xf8, \ - 0xb7, 0xbd, 0x5c, 0x89, 0xf7, 0xef, 0xcb, 0x62, 0x8a, 0xf3, 0x56, 0x2f, \ - 0xaf, 0x17, 0x33, 0x46, 0x13, 0x00, 0x13, 0xae, 0x22, 0xfa, 0xa9, 0xda, \ - 0xc8, 0xfd, 0xd3, 0x77, 0x65, 0xee, 0x58, 0x94, 0x74, 0xe4, 0xf5, 0x4f, \ - 0xa1, 0x27, 0xa6, 0xb0, 0xd1, 0x0b, 0xb3, 0xd8, 0x16, 0xb6, 0xd7, 0x67, \ - 0x63, 0x2d, 0xdc, 0x7b, 0xe1, 0x18, 0xd9, 0x8d, 0x27, 0xed, 0x1b, 0x22, \ - 0xef, 0xdf, 0x36, 0x11, 0xe2, 0xc8, 0x00, 0x0e, 0xc7, 0xe9, 0xc6, 0xb8, \ - 0xd8, 0x4b, 0x3f, 0x35, 0x41, 0xff, 0xfc, 0x96, 0x49, 0x4f, 0x7d, 0x8e, \ - 0x3f, 0x47, 0x68, 0x33, 0x17, 0x83, 0x44, 0x0f, 0xaf, 0xa6, 0x59, 0x0a, \ - 0xa9, 0x32, 0xcb, 0x59, 0xfe, 0xdd, 0x5f, 0x6e, 0x8b, 0x22, 0xb8, 0x81, \ - 0x90, 0x16, 0x91, 0x0a, 0x04, 0x79, 0x62, 0xff, 0x4b, 0x04, 0xf1, 0x5c, \ - 0x34, 0xeb, 0x69, 0xce, 0xef, 0xcb, 0x6e, 0xb6, 0x3b, 0x40, 0x55, 0xca, \ - 0x24, 0xc2, 0x3e, 0x25, 0x70, 0xee, 0x74, 0x2b, 0x0e, 0x9f, 0xc2, 0x82, \ - 0x9a, 0x20, 0x38, 0x77, 0xa1, 0x26, 0x8a, 0xca, 0x9f, 0x87, 0x75, 0x77, \ - 0xe3, 0xce, 0x65, 0xec, 0x71, 0x10, 0x35, 0xcb, 0xcb, 0x4f, 0x19, 0x43, \ - 0xeb, 0x30, 0xd0, 0xca, 0x2d, 0x3f, 0xca, 0x46, 0x14, 0x61, 0x99, 0x30, \ - 0x41, 0x32, 0xb5, 0x37, 0x63, 0x6f, 0x97 \ -} -/* END FILE */ - -/* This is taken from tests/data_files/cli-rsa.key. */ -/* BEGIN FILE string macro TEST_CLI_KEY_RSA_PEM tests/data_files/cli-rsa.key */ -#define TEST_CLI_KEY_RSA_PEM \ - "-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----\r\n" \ - "MIIEpAIBAAKCAQEAyHTEzLn5tXnpRdkUYLB9u5Pyax6fM60Nj4o8VmXl3ETZzGaF\r\n" \ - "B9X4J7BKNdBjngpuG7fa8H6r7gwQk4ZJGDTzqCrSV/Uu1C93KYRhTYJQj6eVSHD1\r\n" \ - "bk2y1RPD0hrt5kPqQhTrdOrA7R/UV06p86jt0uDBMHEwMjDV0/YI0FZPRo7yX/k9\r\n" \ - "Z5GIMC5Cst99++UMd//sMcB4j7/Cf8qtbCHWjdmLao5v4Jv4EFbMs44TFeY0BGbH\r\n" \ - "7vk2DmqV9gmaBmf0ZXH4yqSxJeD+PIs1BGe64E92hfx//DZrtenNLQNiTrM9AM+v\r\n" \ - "dqBpVoNq0qjU51Bx5rU2BXcFbXvI5MT9TNUhXwIDAQABAoIBAGdNtfYDiap6bzst\r\n" \ - "yhCiI8m9TtrhZw4MisaEaN/ll3XSjaOG2dvV6xMZCMV+5TeXDHOAZnY18Yi18vzz\r\n" \ - "4Ut2TnNFzizCECYNaA2fST3WgInnxUkV3YXAyP6CNxJaCmv2aA0yFr2kFVSeaKGt\r\n" \ - "ymvljNp2NVkvm7Th8fBQBO7I7AXhz43k0mR7XmPgewe8ApZOG3hstkOaMvbWAvWA\r\n" \ - "zCZupdDjZYjOJqlA4eEA4H8/w7F83r5CugeBE8LgEREjLPiyejrU5H1fubEY+h0d\r\n" \ - "l5HZBJ68ybTXfQ5U9o/QKA3dd0toBEhhdRUDGzWtjvwkEQfqF1reGWj/tod/gCpf\r\n" \ - "DFi6X0ECgYEA4wOv/pjSC3ty6TuOvKX2rOUiBrLXXv2JSxZnMoMiWI5ipLQt+RYT\r\n" \ - "VPafL/m7Dn6MbwjayOkcZhBwk5CNz5A6Q4lJ64Mq/lqHznRCQQ2Mc1G8eyDF/fYL\r\n" \ - "Ze2pLvwP9VD5jTc2miDfw+MnvJhywRRLcemDFP8k4hQVtm8PMp3ZmNECgYEA4gz7\r\n" \ - "wzObR4gn8ibe617uQPZjWzUj9dUHYd+in1gwBCIrtNnaRn9I9U/Q6tegRYpii4ys\r\n" \ - "c176NmU+umy6XmuSKV5qD9bSpZWG2nLFnslrN15Lm3fhZxoeMNhBaEDTnLT26yoi\r\n" \ - "33gp0mSSWy94ZEqipms+ULF6sY1ZtFW6tpGFoy8CgYAQHhnnvJflIs2ky4q10B60\r\n" \ - "ZcxFp3rtDpkp0JxhFLhiizFrujMtZSjYNm5U7KkgPVHhLELEUvCmOnKTt4ap/vZ0\r\n" \ - "BxJNe1GZH3pW6SAvGDQpl9sG7uu/vTFP+lCxukmzxB0DrrDcvorEkKMom7ZCCRvW\r\n" \ - "KZsZ6YeH2Z81BauRj218kQKBgQCUV/DgKP2985xDTT79N08jUo3hTP5MVYCCuj/+\r\n" \ - "UeEw1TvZcx3LJby7P6Xad6a1/BqveaGyFKIfEFIaBUBItk801sDDpDaYc4gL00Xc\r\n" \ - "7lFuBHOZkxJYlss5QrGpuOEl9ZwUt5IrFLBdYaKqNHzNVC1pCPfb/JyH6Dr2HUxq\r\n" \ - "gxUwAQKBgQCcU6G2L8AG9d9c0UpOyL1tMvFe5Ttw0KjlQVdsh1MP6yigYo9DYuwu\r\n" \ - "bHFVW2r0dBTqegP2/KTOxKzaHfC1qf0RGDsUoJCNJrd1cwoCLG8P2EF4w3OBrKqv\r\n" \ - "8u4ytY0F+Vlanj5lm3TaoHSVF1+NWPyOTiwevIECGKwSxvlki4fDAA==\r\n" \ - "-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----\r\n"/* END FILE */ - -/* This was generated from tests/data_files/cli-rsa.key.der using `xxd -i`. */ -/* BEGIN FILE binary macro TEST_CLI_KEY_RSA_DER tests/data_files/cli-rsa.key.der */ -#define TEST_CLI_KEY_RSA_DER { \ - 0x30, 0x82, 0x04, 0xa4, 0x02, 0x01, 0x00, 0x02, 0x82, 0x01, 0x01, 0x00, \ - 0xc8, 0x74, 0xc4, 0xcc, 0xb9, 0xf9, 0xb5, 0x79, 0xe9, 0x45, 0xd9, 0x14, \ - 0x60, 0xb0, 0x7d, 0xbb, 0x93, 0xf2, 0x6b, 0x1e, 0x9f, 0x33, 0xad, 0x0d, \ - 0x8f, 0x8a, 0x3c, 0x56, 0x65, 0xe5, 0xdc, 0x44, 0xd9, 0xcc, 0x66, 0x85, \ - 0x07, 0xd5, 0xf8, 0x27, 0xb0, 0x4a, 0x35, 0xd0, 0x63, 0x9e, 0x0a, 0x6e, \ - 0x1b, 0xb7, 0xda, 0xf0, 0x7e, 0xab, 0xee, 0x0c, 0x10, 0x93, 0x86, 0x49, \ - 0x18, 0x34, 0xf3, 0xa8, 0x2a, 0xd2, 0x57, 0xf5, 0x2e, 0xd4, 0x2f, 0x77, \ - 0x29, 0x84, 0x61, 0x4d, 0x82, 0x50, 0x8f, 0xa7, 0x95, 0x48, 0x70, 0xf5, \ - 0x6e, 0x4d, 0xb2, 0xd5, 0x13, 0xc3, 0xd2, 0x1a, 0xed, 0xe6, 0x43, 0xea, \ - 0x42, 0x14, 0xeb, 0x74, 0xea, 0xc0, 0xed, 0x1f, 0xd4, 0x57, 0x4e, 0xa9, \ - 0xf3, 0xa8, 0xed, 0xd2, 0xe0, 0xc1, 0x30, 0x71, 0x30, 0x32, 0x30, 0xd5, \ - 0xd3, 0xf6, 0x08, 0xd0, 0x56, 0x4f, 0x46, 0x8e, 0xf2, 0x5f, 0xf9, 0x3d, \ - 0x67, 0x91, 0x88, 0x30, 0x2e, 0x42, 0xb2, 0xdf, 0x7d, 0xfb, 0xe5, 0x0c, \ - 0x77, 0xff, 0xec, 0x31, 0xc0, 0x78, 0x8f, 0xbf, 0xc2, 0x7f, 0xca, 0xad, \ - 0x6c, 0x21, 0xd6, 0x8d, 0xd9, 0x8b, 0x6a, 0x8e, 0x6f, 0xe0, 0x9b, 0xf8, \ - 0x10, 0x56, 0xcc, 0xb3, 0x8e, 0x13, 0x15, 0xe6, 0x34, 0x04, 0x66, 0xc7, \ - 0xee, 0xf9, 0x36, 0x0e, 0x6a, 0x95, 0xf6, 0x09, 0x9a, 0x06, 0x67, 0xf4, \ - 0x65, 0x71, 0xf8, 0xca, 0xa4, 0xb1, 0x25, 0xe0, 0xfe, 0x3c, 0x8b, 0x35, \ - 0x04, 0x67, 0xba, 0xe0, 0x4f, 0x76, 0x85, 0xfc, 0x7f, 0xfc, 0x36, 0x6b, \ - 0xb5, 0xe9, 0xcd, 0x2d, 0x03, 0x62, 0x4e, 0xb3, 0x3d, 0x00, 0xcf, 0xaf, \ - 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0x32, 0xf1, 0x5e, 0xe5, 0x3b, 0x70, 0xd0, 0xa8, 0xe5, 0x41, 0x57, 0x6c, \ - 0x87, 0x53, 0x0f, 0xeb, 0x28, 0xa0, 0x62, 0x8f, 0x43, 0x62, 0xec, 0x2e, \ - 0x6c, 0x71, 0x55, 0x5b, 0x6a, 0xf4, 0x74, 0x14, 0xea, 0x7a, 0x03, 0xf6, \ - 0xfc, 0xa4, 0xce, 0xc4, 0xac, 0xda, 0x1d, 0xf0, 0xb5, 0xa9, 0xfd, 0x11, \ - 0x18, 0x3b, 0x14, 0xa0, 0x90, 0x8d, 0x26, 0xb7, 0x75, 0x73, 0x0a, 0x02, \ - 0x2c, 0x6f, 0x0f, 0xd8, 0x41, 0x78, 0xc3, 0x73, 0x81, 0xac, 0xaa, 0xaf, \ - 0xf2, 0xee, 0x32, 0xb5, 0x8d, 0x05, 0xf9, 0x59, 0x5a, 0x9e, 0x3e, 0x65, \ - 0x9b, 0x74, 0xda, 0xa0, 0x74, 0x95, 0x17, 0x5f, 0x8d, 0x58, 0xfc, 0x8e, \ - 0x4e, 0x2c, 0x1e, 0xbc, 0x81, 0x02, 0x18, 0xac, 0x12, 0xc6, 0xf9, 0x64, \ - 0x8b, 0x87, 0xc3, 0x00 \ -} -/* END FILE */ - -/* - * - * Test certificates and keys as C variables - * - */ - -/* - * CA - */ - -const char mbedtls_test_ca_crt_ec_pem[] = TEST_CA_CRT_EC_PEM; -const char mbedtls_test_ca_key_ec_pem[] = TEST_CA_KEY_EC_PEM; -const char mbedtls_test_ca_pwd_ec_pem[] = TEST_CA_PWD_EC_PEM; -const char mbedtls_test_ca_key_rsa_pem[] = TEST_CA_KEY_RSA_PEM; -const char mbedtls_test_ca_pwd_rsa_pem[] = TEST_CA_PWD_RSA_PEM; -const char mbedtls_test_ca_crt_rsa_sha1_pem[] = TEST_CA_CRT_RSA_SHA1_PEM; -const char mbedtls_test_ca_crt_rsa_sha256_pem[] = TEST_CA_CRT_RSA_SHA256_PEM; - -const unsigned char mbedtls_test_ca_crt_ec_der[] = TEST_CA_CRT_EC_DER; -const unsigned char mbedtls_test_ca_key_ec_der[] = TEST_CA_KEY_EC_DER; -const unsigned char mbedtls_test_ca_key_rsa_der[] = TEST_CA_KEY_RSA_DER; -const unsigned char mbedtls_test_ca_crt_rsa_sha1_der[] = - TEST_CA_CRT_RSA_SHA1_DER; -const unsigned char mbedtls_test_ca_crt_rsa_sha256_der[] = - TEST_CA_CRT_RSA_SHA256_DER; - -const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_crt_ec_pem_len = - sizeof(mbedtls_test_ca_crt_ec_pem); -const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_key_ec_pem_len = - sizeof(mbedtls_test_ca_key_ec_pem); -const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_pwd_ec_pem_len = - sizeof(mbedtls_test_ca_pwd_ec_pem) - 1; -const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_key_rsa_pem_len = - sizeof(mbedtls_test_ca_key_rsa_pem); -const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_pwd_rsa_pem_len = - sizeof(mbedtls_test_ca_pwd_rsa_pem) - 1; -const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_crt_rsa_sha1_pem_len = - sizeof(mbedtls_test_ca_crt_rsa_sha1_pem); -const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_crt_rsa_sha256_pem_len = - sizeof(mbedtls_test_ca_crt_rsa_sha256_pem); - -const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_crt_ec_der_len = - sizeof(mbedtls_test_ca_crt_ec_der); -const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_key_ec_der_len = - sizeof(mbedtls_test_ca_key_ec_der); -const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_pwd_ec_der_len = 0; -const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_key_rsa_der_len = - sizeof(mbedtls_test_ca_key_rsa_der); -const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_pwd_rsa_der_len = 0; -const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_crt_rsa_sha1_der_len = - sizeof(mbedtls_test_ca_crt_rsa_sha1_der); -const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_crt_rsa_sha256_der_len = - sizeof(mbedtls_test_ca_crt_rsa_sha256_der); - -/* - * Server - */ - -const char mbedtls_test_srv_crt_ec_pem[] = TEST_SRV_CRT_EC_PEM; -const char mbedtls_test_srv_key_ec_pem[] = TEST_SRV_KEY_EC_PEM; -const char mbedtls_test_srv_pwd_ec_pem[] = ""; -const char mbedtls_test_srv_key_rsa_pem[] = TEST_SRV_KEY_RSA_PEM; -const char mbedtls_test_srv_pwd_rsa_pem[] = ""; -const char mbedtls_test_srv_crt_rsa_sha1_pem[] = TEST_SRV_CRT_RSA_SHA1_PEM; -const char mbedtls_test_srv_crt_rsa_sha256_pem[] = TEST_SRV_CRT_RSA_SHA256_PEM; - -const unsigned char mbedtls_test_srv_crt_ec_der[] = TEST_SRV_CRT_EC_DER; -const unsigned char mbedtls_test_srv_key_ec_der[] = TEST_SRV_KEY_EC_DER; -const unsigned char mbedtls_test_srv_key_rsa_der[] = TEST_SRV_KEY_RSA_DER; -const unsigned char mbedtls_test_srv_crt_rsa_sha1_der[] = - TEST_SRV_CRT_RSA_SHA1_DER; -const unsigned char mbedtls_test_srv_crt_rsa_sha256_der[] = - TEST_SRV_CRT_RSA_SHA256_DER; - -const size_t mbedtls_test_srv_crt_ec_pem_len = - sizeof(mbedtls_test_srv_crt_ec_pem); -const size_t mbedtls_test_srv_key_ec_pem_len = - sizeof(mbedtls_test_srv_key_ec_pem); -const size_t mbedtls_test_srv_pwd_ec_pem_len = - sizeof(mbedtls_test_srv_pwd_ec_pem) - 1; -const size_t mbedtls_test_srv_key_rsa_pem_len = - sizeof(mbedtls_test_srv_key_rsa_pem); -const size_t mbedtls_test_srv_pwd_rsa_pem_len = - sizeof(mbedtls_test_srv_pwd_rsa_pem) - 1; -const size_t mbedtls_test_srv_crt_rsa_sha1_pem_len = - sizeof(mbedtls_test_srv_crt_rsa_sha1_pem); -const size_t mbedtls_test_srv_crt_rsa_sha256_pem_len = - sizeof(mbedtls_test_srv_crt_rsa_sha256_pem); - -const size_t mbedtls_test_srv_crt_ec_der_len = - sizeof(mbedtls_test_srv_crt_ec_der); -const size_t mbedtls_test_srv_key_ec_der_len = - sizeof(mbedtls_test_srv_key_ec_der); -const size_t mbedtls_test_srv_pwd_ec_der_len = 0; -const size_t mbedtls_test_srv_key_rsa_der_len = - sizeof(mbedtls_test_srv_key_rsa_der); -const size_t mbedtls_test_srv_pwd_rsa_der_len = 0; -const size_t mbedtls_test_srv_crt_rsa_sha1_der_len = - sizeof(mbedtls_test_srv_crt_rsa_sha1_der); -const size_t mbedtls_test_srv_crt_rsa_sha256_der_len = - sizeof(mbedtls_test_srv_crt_rsa_sha256_der); - -/* - * Client - */ - -const char mbedtls_test_cli_crt_ec_pem[] = TEST_CLI_CRT_EC_PEM; -const char mbedtls_test_cli_key_ec_pem[] = TEST_CLI_KEY_EC_PEM; -const char mbedtls_test_cli_pwd_ec_pem[] = ""; -const char mbedtls_test_cli_key_rsa_pem[] = TEST_CLI_KEY_RSA_PEM; -const char mbedtls_test_cli_pwd_rsa_pem[] = ""; -const char mbedtls_test_cli_crt_rsa_pem[] = TEST_CLI_CRT_RSA_PEM; - -const unsigned char mbedtls_test_cli_crt_ec_der[] = TEST_CLI_CRT_EC_DER; -const unsigned char mbedtls_test_cli_key_ec_der[] = TEST_CLI_KEY_EC_DER; -const unsigned char mbedtls_test_cli_key_rsa_der[] = TEST_CLI_KEY_RSA_DER; -const unsigned char mbedtls_test_cli_crt_rsa_der[] = TEST_CLI_CRT_RSA_DER; - -const size_t mbedtls_test_cli_crt_ec_pem_len = - sizeof(mbedtls_test_cli_crt_ec_pem); -const size_t mbedtls_test_cli_key_ec_pem_len = - sizeof(mbedtls_test_cli_key_ec_pem); -const size_t mbedtls_test_cli_pwd_ec_pem_len = - sizeof(mbedtls_test_cli_pwd_ec_pem) - 1; -const size_t mbedtls_test_cli_key_rsa_pem_len = - sizeof(mbedtls_test_cli_key_rsa_pem); -const size_t mbedtls_test_cli_pwd_rsa_pem_len = - sizeof(mbedtls_test_cli_pwd_rsa_pem) - 1; -const size_t mbedtls_test_cli_crt_rsa_pem_len = - sizeof(mbedtls_test_cli_crt_rsa_pem); - -const size_t mbedtls_test_cli_crt_ec_der_len = - sizeof(mbedtls_test_cli_crt_ec_der); -const size_t mbedtls_test_cli_key_ec_der_len = - sizeof(mbedtls_test_cli_key_ec_der); -const size_t mbedtls_test_cli_key_rsa_der_len = - sizeof(mbedtls_test_cli_key_rsa_der); -const size_t mbedtls_test_cli_crt_rsa_der_len = - sizeof(mbedtls_test_cli_crt_rsa_der); - -/* - * - * Definitions of test CRTs without specification of all parameters, choosing - * them automatically according to the config. For example, mbedtls_test_ca_crt - * is one of mbedtls_test_ca_crt_{rsa|ec}_{sha1|sha256}_{pem|der}. - * - */ - -/* - * Dispatch between PEM and DER according to config - */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C) - -/* PEM encoded test CA certificates and keys */ - -#define TEST_CA_KEY_RSA TEST_CA_KEY_RSA_PEM -#define TEST_CA_PWD_RSA TEST_CA_PWD_RSA_PEM -#define TEST_CA_CRT_RSA_SHA256 TEST_CA_CRT_RSA_SHA256_PEM -#define TEST_CA_CRT_RSA_SHA1 TEST_CA_CRT_RSA_SHA1_PEM -#define TEST_CA_KEY_EC TEST_CA_KEY_EC_PEM -#define TEST_CA_PWD_EC TEST_CA_PWD_EC_PEM -#define TEST_CA_CRT_EC TEST_CA_CRT_EC_PEM - -/* PEM encoded test server certificates and keys */ - -#define TEST_SRV_KEY_RSA TEST_SRV_KEY_RSA_PEM -#define TEST_SRV_PWD_RSA "" -#define TEST_SRV_CRT_RSA_SHA256 TEST_SRV_CRT_RSA_SHA256_PEM -#define TEST_SRV_CRT_RSA_SHA1 TEST_SRV_CRT_RSA_SHA1_PEM -#define TEST_SRV_KEY_EC TEST_SRV_KEY_EC_PEM -#define TEST_SRV_PWD_EC "" -#define TEST_SRV_CRT_EC TEST_SRV_CRT_EC_PEM - -/* PEM encoded test client certificates and keys */ - -#define TEST_CLI_KEY_RSA TEST_CLI_KEY_RSA_PEM -#define TEST_CLI_PWD_RSA "" -#define TEST_CLI_CRT_RSA TEST_CLI_CRT_RSA_PEM -#define TEST_CLI_KEY_EC TEST_CLI_KEY_EC_PEM -#define TEST_CLI_PWD_EC "" -#define TEST_CLI_CRT_EC TEST_CLI_CRT_EC_PEM - -#else /* MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C */ - -/* DER encoded test CA certificates and keys */ - -#define TEST_CA_KEY_RSA TEST_CA_KEY_RSA_DER -#define TEST_CA_PWD_RSA "" -#define TEST_CA_CRT_RSA_SHA256 TEST_CA_CRT_RSA_SHA256_DER -#define TEST_CA_CRT_RSA_SHA1 TEST_CA_CRT_RSA_SHA1_DER -#define TEST_CA_KEY_EC TEST_CA_KEY_EC_DER -#define TEST_CA_PWD_EC "" -#define TEST_CA_CRT_EC TEST_CA_CRT_EC_DER - -/* DER encoded test server certificates and keys */ - -#define TEST_SRV_KEY_RSA TEST_SRV_KEY_RSA_DER -#define TEST_SRV_PWD_RSA "" -#define TEST_SRV_CRT_RSA_SHA256 TEST_SRV_CRT_RSA_SHA256_DER -#define TEST_SRV_CRT_RSA_SHA1 TEST_SRV_CRT_RSA_SHA1_DER -#define TEST_SRV_KEY_EC TEST_SRV_KEY_EC_DER -#define TEST_SRV_PWD_EC "" -#define TEST_SRV_CRT_EC TEST_SRV_CRT_EC_DER - -/* DER encoded test client certificates and keys */ - -#define TEST_CLI_KEY_RSA TEST_CLI_KEY_RSA_DER -#define TEST_CLI_PWD_RSA "" -#define TEST_CLI_CRT_RSA TEST_CLI_CRT_RSA_DER -#define TEST_CLI_KEY_EC TEST_CLI_KEY_EC_DER -#define TEST_CLI_PWD_EC "" -#define TEST_CLI_CRT_EC TEST_CLI_CRT_EC_DER - -#endif /* MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C */ - -const char mbedtls_test_ca_key_rsa[] = TEST_CA_KEY_RSA; -const char mbedtls_test_ca_pwd_rsa[] = TEST_CA_PWD_RSA; -const char mbedtls_test_ca_crt_rsa_sha256[] = TEST_CA_CRT_RSA_SHA256; -const char mbedtls_test_ca_crt_rsa_sha1[] = TEST_CA_CRT_RSA_SHA1; -const char mbedtls_test_ca_key_ec[] = TEST_CA_KEY_EC; -const char mbedtls_test_ca_pwd_ec[] = TEST_CA_PWD_EC; -const char mbedtls_test_ca_crt_ec[] = TEST_CA_CRT_EC; - -const char mbedtls_test_srv_key_rsa[] = TEST_SRV_KEY_RSA; -const char mbedtls_test_srv_pwd_rsa[] = TEST_SRV_PWD_RSA; -const char mbedtls_test_srv_crt_rsa_sha256[] = TEST_SRV_CRT_RSA_SHA256; -const char mbedtls_test_srv_crt_rsa_sha1[] = TEST_SRV_CRT_RSA_SHA1; -const char mbedtls_test_srv_key_ec[] = TEST_SRV_KEY_EC; -const char mbedtls_test_srv_pwd_ec[] = TEST_SRV_PWD_EC; -const char mbedtls_test_srv_crt_ec[] = TEST_SRV_CRT_EC; - -const char mbedtls_test_cli_key_rsa[] = TEST_CLI_KEY_RSA; -const char mbedtls_test_cli_pwd_rsa[] = TEST_CLI_PWD_RSA; -const char mbedtls_test_cli_crt_rsa[] = TEST_CLI_CRT_RSA; -const char mbedtls_test_cli_key_ec[] = TEST_CLI_KEY_EC; -const char mbedtls_test_cli_pwd_ec[] = TEST_CLI_PWD_EC; -const char mbedtls_test_cli_crt_ec[] = TEST_CLI_CRT_EC; - -const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_key_rsa_len = - sizeof(mbedtls_test_ca_key_rsa); -const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_pwd_rsa_len = - sizeof(mbedtls_test_ca_pwd_rsa) - 1; -const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_crt_rsa_sha256_len = - sizeof(mbedtls_test_ca_crt_rsa_sha256); -const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_crt_rsa_sha1_len = - sizeof(mbedtls_test_ca_crt_rsa_sha1); -const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_key_ec_len = - sizeof(mbedtls_test_ca_key_ec); -const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_pwd_ec_len = - sizeof(mbedtls_test_ca_pwd_ec) - 1; -const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_crt_ec_len = - sizeof(mbedtls_test_ca_crt_ec); - -const size_t mbedtls_test_srv_key_rsa_len = - sizeof(mbedtls_test_srv_key_rsa); -const size_t mbedtls_test_srv_pwd_rsa_len = - sizeof(mbedtls_test_srv_pwd_rsa) -1; -const size_t mbedtls_test_srv_crt_rsa_sha256_len = - sizeof(mbedtls_test_srv_crt_rsa_sha256); -const size_t mbedtls_test_srv_crt_rsa_sha1_len = - sizeof(mbedtls_test_srv_crt_rsa_sha1); -const size_t mbedtls_test_srv_key_ec_len = - sizeof(mbedtls_test_srv_key_ec); -const size_t mbedtls_test_srv_pwd_ec_len = - sizeof(mbedtls_test_srv_pwd_ec) - 1; -const size_t mbedtls_test_srv_crt_ec_len = - sizeof(mbedtls_test_srv_crt_ec); - -const size_t mbedtls_test_cli_key_rsa_len = - sizeof(mbedtls_test_cli_key_rsa); -const size_t mbedtls_test_cli_pwd_rsa_len = - sizeof(mbedtls_test_cli_pwd_rsa) - 1; -const size_t mbedtls_test_cli_crt_rsa_len = - sizeof(mbedtls_test_cli_crt_rsa); -const size_t mbedtls_test_cli_key_ec_len = - sizeof(mbedtls_test_cli_key_ec); -const size_t mbedtls_test_cli_pwd_ec_len = - sizeof(mbedtls_test_cli_pwd_ec) - 1; -const size_t mbedtls_test_cli_crt_ec_len = - sizeof(mbedtls_test_cli_crt_ec); - -/* - * Dispatch between SHA-1 and SHA-256 - */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) -#define TEST_CA_CRT_RSA TEST_CA_CRT_RSA_SHA256 -#define TEST_SRV_CRT_RSA TEST_SRV_CRT_RSA_SHA256 -#else -#define TEST_CA_CRT_RSA TEST_CA_CRT_RSA_SHA1 -#define TEST_SRV_CRT_RSA TEST_SRV_CRT_RSA_SHA1 -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ - -const char mbedtls_test_ca_crt_rsa[] = TEST_CA_CRT_RSA; -const char mbedtls_test_srv_crt_rsa[] = TEST_SRV_CRT_RSA; - -const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_crt_rsa_len = - sizeof(mbedtls_test_ca_crt_rsa); -const size_t mbedtls_test_srv_crt_rsa_len = - sizeof(mbedtls_test_srv_crt_rsa); - -/* - * Dispatch between RSA and EC - */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) - -#define TEST_CA_KEY TEST_CA_KEY_RSA -#define TEST_CA_PWD TEST_CA_PWD_RSA -#define TEST_CA_CRT TEST_CA_CRT_RSA - -#define TEST_SRV_KEY TEST_SRV_KEY_RSA -#define TEST_SRV_PWD TEST_SRV_PWD_RSA -#define TEST_SRV_CRT TEST_SRV_CRT_RSA - -#define TEST_CLI_KEY TEST_CLI_KEY_RSA -#define TEST_CLI_PWD TEST_CLI_PWD_RSA -#define TEST_CLI_CRT TEST_CLI_CRT_RSA - -#else /* no RSA, so assume ECDSA */ - -#define TEST_CA_KEY TEST_CA_KEY_EC -#define TEST_CA_PWD TEST_CA_PWD_EC -#define TEST_CA_CRT TEST_CA_CRT_EC - -#define TEST_SRV_KEY TEST_SRV_KEY_EC -#define TEST_SRV_PWD TEST_SRV_PWD_EC -#define TEST_SRV_CRT TEST_SRV_CRT_EC - -#define TEST_CLI_KEY TEST_CLI_KEY_EC -#define TEST_CLI_PWD TEST_CLI_PWD_EC -#define TEST_CLI_CRT TEST_CLI_CRT_EC -#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */ - -/* API stability forces us to declare - * mbedtls_test_{ca|srv|cli}_{key|pwd|crt} - * as pointers. */ -static const char test_ca_key[] = TEST_CA_KEY; -static const char test_ca_pwd[] = TEST_CA_PWD; -static const char test_ca_crt[] = TEST_CA_CRT; - -static const char test_srv_key[] = TEST_SRV_KEY; -static const char test_srv_pwd[] = TEST_SRV_PWD; -static const char test_srv_crt[] = TEST_SRV_CRT; - -static const char test_cli_key[] = TEST_CLI_KEY; -static const char test_cli_pwd[] = TEST_CLI_PWD; -static const char test_cli_crt[] = TEST_CLI_CRT; - -const char *mbedtls_test_ca_key = test_ca_key; -const char *mbedtls_test_ca_pwd = test_ca_pwd; -const char *mbedtls_test_ca_crt = test_ca_crt; - -const char *mbedtls_test_srv_key = test_srv_key; -const char *mbedtls_test_srv_pwd = test_srv_pwd; -const char *mbedtls_test_srv_crt = test_srv_crt; - -const char *mbedtls_test_cli_key = test_cli_key; -const char *mbedtls_test_cli_pwd = test_cli_pwd; -const char *mbedtls_test_cli_crt = test_cli_crt; - -const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_key_len = - sizeof(test_ca_key); -const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_pwd_len = - sizeof(test_ca_pwd) - 1; -const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_crt_len = - sizeof(test_ca_crt); - -const size_t mbedtls_test_srv_key_len = - sizeof(test_srv_key); -const size_t mbedtls_test_srv_pwd_len = - sizeof(test_srv_pwd) - 1; -const size_t mbedtls_test_srv_crt_len = - sizeof(test_srv_crt); - -const size_t mbedtls_test_cli_key_len = - sizeof(test_cli_key); -const size_t mbedtls_test_cli_pwd_len = - sizeof(test_cli_pwd) - 1; -const size_t mbedtls_test_cli_crt_len = - sizeof(test_cli_crt); - -/* - * - * Lists of certificates - * - */ - -/* List of CAs in PEM or DER, depending on config */ -const char *mbedtls_test_cas[] = { -#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) - mbedtls_test_ca_crt_rsa_sha1, -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) - mbedtls_test_ca_crt_rsa_sha256, -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) - mbedtls_test_ca_crt_ec, -#endif - NULL -}; -const size_t mbedtls_test_cas_len[] = { -#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) - sizeof(mbedtls_test_ca_crt_rsa_sha1), -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) - sizeof(mbedtls_test_ca_crt_rsa_sha256), -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) - sizeof(mbedtls_test_ca_crt_ec), -#endif - 0 -}; - -/* List of all available CA certificates in DER format */ -const unsigned char *mbedtls_test_cas_der[] = { -#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) - mbedtls_test_ca_crt_rsa_sha256_der, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) - mbedtls_test_ca_crt_rsa_sha1_der, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) - mbedtls_test_ca_crt_ec_der, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C */ - NULL -}; - -const size_t mbedtls_test_cas_der_len[] = { -#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) - sizeof(mbedtls_test_ca_crt_rsa_sha256_der), -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) - sizeof(mbedtls_test_ca_crt_rsa_sha1_der), -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) - sizeof(mbedtls_test_ca_crt_ec_der), -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C */ - 0 -}; - -/* Concatenation of all available CA certificates in PEM format */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C) -const char mbedtls_test_cas_pem[] = -#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) - TEST_CA_CRT_RSA_SHA256_PEM -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) - TEST_CA_CRT_RSA_SHA1_PEM -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) - TEST_CA_CRT_EC_PEM -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C */ - ""; -const size_t mbedtls_test_cas_pem_len = sizeof(mbedtls_test_cas_pem); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C */ - -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CERTS_C */ diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/chacha20.c b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/chacha20.c index 82b7b1d89f46..acaae5b2e98d 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/chacha20.c +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/chacha20.c @@ -24,12 +24,6 @@ #if !defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_ALT) -/* Parameter validation macros */ -#define CHACHA20_VALIDATE_RET(cond) \ - MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE_RET(cond, MBEDTLS_ERR_CHACHA20_BAD_INPUT_DATA) -#define CHACHA20_VALIDATE(cond) \ - MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE(cond) - #define ROTL32(value, amount) \ ((uint32_t) ((value) << (amount)) | ((value) >> (32 - (amount)))) @@ -148,8 +142,6 @@ static void chacha20_block(const uint32_t initial_state[16], void mbedtls_chacha20_init(mbedtls_chacha20_context *ctx) { - CHACHA20_VALIDATE(ctx != NULL); - mbedtls_platform_zeroize(ctx->state, sizeof(ctx->state)); mbedtls_platform_zeroize(ctx->keystream8, sizeof(ctx->keystream8)); @@ -167,9 +159,6 @@ void mbedtls_chacha20_free(mbedtls_chacha20_context *ctx) int mbedtls_chacha20_setkey(mbedtls_chacha20_context *ctx, const unsigned char key[32]) { - CHACHA20_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - CHACHA20_VALIDATE_RET(key != NULL); - /* ChaCha20 constants - the string "expand 32-byte k" */ ctx->state[0] = 0x61707865; ctx->state[1] = 0x3320646e; @@ -193,9 +182,6 @@ int mbedtls_chacha20_starts(mbedtls_chacha20_context *ctx, const unsigned char nonce[12], uint32_t counter) { - CHACHA20_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - CHACHA20_VALIDATE_RET(nonce != NULL); - /* Counter */ ctx->state[12] = counter; @@ -218,11 +204,6 @@ int mbedtls_chacha20_update(mbedtls_chacha20_context *ctx, unsigned char *output) { size_t offset = 0U; - size_t i; - - CHACHA20_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - CHACHA20_VALIDATE_RET(size == 0 || input != NULL); - CHACHA20_VALIDATE_RET(size == 0 || output != NULL); /* Use leftover keystream bytes, if available */ while (size > 0U && ctx->keystream_bytes_used < CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE_BYTES) { @@ -240,16 +221,7 @@ int mbedtls_chacha20_update(mbedtls_chacha20_context *ctx, chacha20_block(ctx->state, ctx->keystream8); ctx->state[CHACHA20_CTR_INDEX]++; - for (i = 0U; i < 64U; i += 8U) { - output[offset + i] = input[offset + i] ^ ctx->keystream8[i]; - output[offset + i+1] = input[offset + i+1] ^ ctx->keystream8[i+1]; - output[offset + i+2] = input[offset + i+2] ^ ctx->keystream8[i+2]; - output[offset + i+3] = input[offset + i+3] ^ ctx->keystream8[i+3]; - output[offset + i+4] = input[offset + i+4] ^ ctx->keystream8[i+4]; - output[offset + i+5] = input[offset + i+5] ^ ctx->keystream8[i+5]; - output[offset + i+6] = input[offset + i+6] ^ ctx->keystream8[i+6]; - output[offset + i+7] = input[offset + i+7] ^ ctx->keystream8[i+7]; - } + mbedtls_xor(output + offset, input + offset, ctx->keystream8, 64U); offset += CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE_BYTES; size -= CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE_BYTES; @@ -261,9 +233,7 @@ int mbedtls_chacha20_update(mbedtls_chacha20_context *ctx, chacha20_block(ctx->state, ctx->keystream8); ctx->state[CHACHA20_CTR_INDEX]++; - for (i = 0U; i < size; i++) { - output[offset + i] = input[offset + i] ^ ctx->keystream8[i]; - } + mbedtls_xor(output + offset, input + offset, ctx->keystream8, size); ctx->keystream_bytes_used = size; @@ -282,11 +252,6 @@ int mbedtls_chacha20_crypt(const unsigned char key[32], mbedtls_chacha20_context ctx; int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - CHACHA20_VALIDATE_RET(key != NULL); - CHACHA20_VALIDATE_RET(nonce != NULL); - CHACHA20_VALIDATE_RET(data_len == 0 || input != NULL); - CHACHA20_VALIDATE_RET(data_len == 0 || output != NULL); - mbedtls_chacha20_init(&ctx); ret = mbedtls_chacha20_setkey(&ctx, key); diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/chachapoly.c b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/chachapoly.c index dd678f4c331d..a1314eab6dfb 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/chachapoly.c +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/chachapoly.c @@ -21,12 +21,6 @@ #if !defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_ALT) -/* Parameter validation macros */ -#define CHACHAPOLY_VALIDATE_RET(cond) \ - MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE_RET(cond, MBEDTLS_ERR_POLY1305_BAD_INPUT_DATA) -#define CHACHAPOLY_VALIDATE(cond) \ - MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE(cond) - #define CHACHAPOLY_STATE_INIT (0) #define CHACHAPOLY_STATE_AAD (1) #define CHACHAPOLY_STATE_CIPHERTEXT (2) /* Encrypting or decrypting */ @@ -75,8 +69,6 @@ static int chachapoly_pad_ciphertext(mbedtls_chachapoly_context *ctx) void mbedtls_chachapoly_init(mbedtls_chachapoly_context *ctx) { - CHACHAPOLY_VALIDATE(ctx != NULL); - mbedtls_chacha20_init(&ctx->chacha20_ctx); mbedtls_poly1305_init(&ctx->poly1305_ctx); ctx->aad_len = 0U; @@ -103,8 +95,6 @@ int mbedtls_chachapoly_setkey(mbedtls_chachapoly_context *ctx, const unsigned char key[32]) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - CHACHAPOLY_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - CHACHAPOLY_VALIDATE_RET(key != NULL); ret = mbedtls_chacha20_setkey(&ctx->chacha20_ctx, key); @@ -117,8 +107,6 @@ int mbedtls_chachapoly_starts(mbedtls_chachapoly_context *ctx, { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; unsigned char poly1305_key[64]; - CHACHAPOLY_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - CHACHAPOLY_VALIDATE_RET(nonce != NULL); /* Set counter = 0, will be update to 1 when generating Poly1305 key */ ret = mbedtls_chacha20_starts(&ctx->chacha20_ctx, nonce, 0U); @@ -156,9 +144,6 @@ int mbedtls_chachapoly_update_aad(mbedtls_chachapoly_context *ctx, const unsigned char *aad, size_t aad_len) { - CHACHAPOLY_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - CHACHAPOLY_VALIDATE_RET(aad_len == 0 || aad != NULL); - if (ctx->state != CHACHAPOLY_STATE_AAD) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_CHACHAPOLY_BAD_STATE; } @@ -174,9 +159,6 @@ int mbedtls_chachapoly_update(mbedtls_chachapoly_context *ctx, unsigned char *output) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - CHACHAPOLY_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - CHACHAPOLY_VALIDATE_RET(len == 0 || input != NULL); - CHACHAPOLY_VALIDATE_RET(len == 0 || output != NULL); if ((ctx->state != CHACHAPOLY_STATE_AAD) && (ctx->state != CHACHAPOLY_STATE_CIPHERTEXT)) { @@ -224,8 +206,6 @@ int mbedtls_chachapoly_finish(mbedtls_chachapoly_context *ctx, { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; unsigned char len_block[16]; - CHACHAPOLY_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - CHACHAPOLY_VALIDATE_RET(mac != NULL); if (ctx->state == CHACHAPOLY_STATE_INIT) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_CHACHAPOLY_BAD_STATE; @@ -303,13 +283,6 @@ int mbedtls_chachapoly_encrypt_and_tag(mbedtls_chachapoly_context *ctx, unsigned char *output, unsigned char tag[16]) { - CHACHAPOLY_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - CHACHAPOLY_VALIDATE_RET(nonce != NULL); - CHACHAPOLY_VALIDATE_RET(tag != NULL); - CHACHAPOLY_VALIDATE_RET(aad_len == 0 || aad != NULL); - CHACHAPOLY_VALIDATE_RET(length == 0 || input != NULL); - CHACHAPOLY_VALIDATE_RET(length == 0 || output != NULL); - return chachapoly_crypt_and_tag(ctx, MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_ENCRYPT, length, nonce, aad, aad_len, input, output, tag); @@ -327,12 +300,6 @@ int mbedtls_chachapoly_auth_decrypt(mbedtls_chachapoly_context *ctx, int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; unsigned char check_tag[16]; int diff; - CHACHAPOLY_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - CHACHAPOLY_VALIDATE_RET(nonce != NULL); - CHACHAPOLY_VALIDATE_RET(tag != NULL); - CHACHAPOLY_VALIDATE_RET(aad_len == 0 || aad != NULL); - CHACHAPOLY_VALIDATE_RET(length == 0 || input != NULL); - CHACHAPOLY_VALIDATE_RET(length == 0 || output != NULL); if ((ret = chachapoly_crypt_and_tag(ctx, MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_DECRYPT, length, nonce, diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/check_crypto_config.h b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/check_crypto_config.h index 0ba32bfe0dd2..6469e9f43939 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/check_crypto_config.h +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/check_crypto_config.h @@ -30,13 +30,13 @@ #endif #if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA) && \ - !(defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR) || \ + !(defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_BASIC) || \ defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY)) #error "PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif #if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA) && \ - !(defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR) || \ + !(defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_BASIC) || \ defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY)) #error "PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif @@ -48,32 +48,94 @@ #endif #if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT) && \ - !(defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR) || \ + !(defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_BASIC) || \ defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY)) #error "PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif #if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN) && \ - !(defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR) || \ + !(defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_BASIC) || \ defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY)) #error "PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif #if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP) && \ - !(defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR) || \ + !(defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_BASIC) || \ defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY)) #error "PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif #if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS) && \ - !(defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR) || \ + !(defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_BASIC) || \ defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY)) #error "PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif -#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR) && \ +#if (defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_BASIC) || \ + defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT) || \ + defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT) || \ + defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE) || \ + defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_DERIVE)) && \ !defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY) -#error "PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR defined, but not all prerequisites" +#error "PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_xxx defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if (defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_BASIC) || \ + defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT) || \ + defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT) || \ + defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE)) && \ + !defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY) +#error "PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_xxx defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if (defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_BASIC) || \ + defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT) || \ + defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT) || \ + defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE)) && \ + !defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_PUBLIC_KEY) +#error "PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_xxx defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) +#error "PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR is deprecated and will be removed in a \ + future version of Mbed TLS. Please switch to new PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_xxx \ + symbols, where xxx can be: USE, IMPORT, EXPORT, GENERATE, DERIVE" +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING) +#warning "PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR is deprecated and will be removed in a \ + future version of Mbed TLS. Please switch to new PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_xxx \ + symbols, where xxx can be: USE, IMPORT, EXPORT, GENERATE, DERIVE" +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING */ +#endif /* PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) +#error "PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR is deprecated and will be removed in a \ + future version of Mbed TLS. Please switch to new PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_xxx \ + symbols, where xxx can be: USE, IMPORT, EXPORT, GENERATE, DERIVE" +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING) +#warning "PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR is deprecated and will be removed in a \ + future version of Mbed TLS. Please switch to new PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_xxx \ + symbols, where xxx can be: USE, IMPORT, EXPORT, GENERATE, DERIVE" +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING */ +#endif /* PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_DERIVE) +#error "PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_DERIVE defined, but feature is not supported" +#endif + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_DERIVE) +#error "PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_DERIVE defined, but feature is not supported" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && \ + !(defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1) || defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256) || defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512)) +#error "MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_ECJPAKE_TO_PMS) && \ + !defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256) +#error "PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_ECJPAKE_TO_PMS defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif #endif /* MBEDTLS_CHECK_CRYPTO_CONFIG_H */ diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/cipher.c b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/cipher.c index 37a2effc8f5c..0683677edaa4 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/cipher.c +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/cipher.c @@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ #if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C) #include "mbedtls/cipher.h" -#include "mbedtls/cipher_internal.h" +#include "cipher_wrap.h" #include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" #include "mbedtls/error.h" #include "mbedtls/constant_time.h" @@ -43,10 +43,9 @@ #include "mbedtls/cmac.h" #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) #include "psa/crypto.h" -#include "mbedtls/psa_util.h" -#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO && !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C) #include "mbedtls/nist_kw.h" @@ -54,13 +53,14 @@ #include "mbedtls/platform.h" -#define CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET(cond) \ - MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE_RET(cond, MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA) -#define CIPHER_VALIDATE(cond) \ - MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE(cond) - static int supported_init = 0; +static inline const mbedtls_cipher_base_t *mbedtls_cipher_get_base( + const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *info) +{ + return mbedtls_cipher_base_lookup_table[info->base_idx]; +} + const int *mbedtls_cipher_list(void) { const mbedtls_cipher_definition_t *def; @@ -122,8 +122,8 @@ const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *mbedtls_cipher_info_from_values( const mbedtls_cipher_definition_t *def; for (def = mbedtls_cipher_definitions; def->info != NULL; def++) { - if (def->info->base->cipher == cipher_id && - def->info->key_bitlen == (unsigned) key_bitlen && + if (mbedtls_cipher_get_base(def->info)->cipher == cipher_id && + mbedtls_cipher_info_get_key_bitlen(def->info) == (unsigned) key_bitlen && def->info->mode == mode) { return def->info; } @@ -132,9 +132,74 @@ const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *mbedtls_cipher_info_from_values( return NULL; } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) +static inline psa_key_type_t mbedtls_psa_translate_cipher_type( + mbedtls_cipher_type_t cipher) +{ + switch (cipher) { + case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM: + case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM: + case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM: + case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG: + case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG: + case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG: + case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_GCM: + case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_GCM: + case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_GCM: + case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC: + case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC: + case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC: + case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_ECB: + case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_ECB: + case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_ECB: + return PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES; + + /* ARIA not yet supported in PSA. */ + /* case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CCM: + case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CCM: + case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CCM: + case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG: + case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG: + case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG: + case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_GCM: + case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_GCM: + case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_GCM: + case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC: + case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CBC: + case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC: + return( PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA ); */ + + default: + return 0; + } +} + +static inline psa_algorithm_t mbedtls_psa_translate_cipher_mode( + mbedtls_cipher_mode_t mode, size_t taglen) +{ + switch (mode) { + case MBEDTLS_MODE_ECB: + return PSA_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING; + case MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM: + return PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_GCM, taglen); + case MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM: + return PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, taglen); + case MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG: + return PSA_ALG_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG; + case MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC: + if (taglen == 0) { + return PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING; + } else { + return 0; + } + default: + return 0; + } +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO && !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ + void mbedtls_cipher_init(mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx) { - CIPHER_VALIDATE(ctx != NULL); memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_cipher_context_t)); } @@ -144,7 +209,7 @@ void mbedtls_cipher_free(mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx) return; } -#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) if (ctx->psa_enabled == 1) { if (ctx->cipher_ctx != NULL) { mbedtls_cipher_context_psa * const cipher_psa = @@ -155,25 +220,23 @@ void mbedtls_cipher_free(mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx) (void) psa_destroy_key(cipher_psa->slot); } - mbedtls_platform_zeroize(cipher_psa, sizeof(*cipher_psa)); - mbedtls_free(cipher_psa); + mbedtls_zeroize_and_free(cipher_psa, sizeof(*cipher_psa)); } mbedtls_platform_zeroize(ctx, sizeof(mbedtls_cipher_context_t)); return; } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO && !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_CMAC_C) if (ctx->cmac_ctx) { - mbedtls_platform_zeroize(ctx->cmac_ctx, + mbedtls_zeroize_and_free(ctx->cmac_ctx, sizeof(mbedtls_cmac_context_t)); - mbedtls_free(ctx->cmac_ctx); } #endif if (ctx->cipher_ctx) { - ctx->cipher_info->base->ctx_free_func(ctx->cipher_ctx); + mbedtls_cipher_get_base(ctx->cipher_info)->ctx_free_func(ctx->cipher_ctx); } mbedtls_platform_zeroize(ctx, sizeof(mbedtls_cipher_context_t)); @@ -182,34 +245,25 @@ void mbedtls_cipher_free(mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx) int mbedtls_cipher_setup(mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *cipher_info) { - CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); if (cipher_info == NULL) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_cipher_context_t)); - if (NULL == (ctx->cipher_ctx = cipher_info->base->ctx_alloc_func())) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_ALLOC_FAILED; + if (mbedtls_cipher_get_base(cipher_info)->ctx_alloc_func != NULL) { + ctx->cipher_ctx = mbedtls_cipher_get_base(cipher_info)->ctx_alloc_func(); + if (ctx->cipher_ctx == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_ALLOC_FAILED; + } } ctx->cipher_info = cipher_info; -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_WITH_PADDING) - /* - * Ignore possible errors caused by a cipher mode that doesn't use padding - */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7) - (void) mbedtls_cipher_set_padding_mode(ctx, MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7); -#else - (void) mbedtls_cipher_set_padding_mode(ctx, MBEDTLS_PADDING_NONE); -#endif -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_WITH_PADDING */ - return 0; } -#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) int mbedtls_cipher_setup_psa(mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *cipher_info, size_t taglen) @@ -223,11 +277,11 @@ int mbedtls_cipher_setup_psa(mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, /* Check that the underlying cipher mode and cipher type are * supported by the underlying PSA Crypto implementation. */ - alg = mbedtls_psa_translate_cipher_mode(cipher_info->mode, taglen); + alg = mbedtls_psa_translate_cipher_mode(((mbedtls_cipher_mode_t) cipher_info->mode), taglen); if (alg == 0) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; } - if (mbedtls_psa_translate_cipher_type(cipher_info->type) == 0) { + if (mbedtls_psa_translate_cipher_type(((mbedtls_cipher_type_t) cipher_info->type)) == 0) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; } @@ -243,22 +297,27 @@ int mbedtls_cipher_setup_psa(mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, ctx->psa_enabled = 1; return 0; } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO && !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ int mbedtls_cipher_setkey(mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, const unsigned char *key, int key_bitlen, const mbedtls_operation_t operation) { - CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET(key != NULL); - CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET(operation == MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT || - operation == MBEDTLS_DECRYPT); + if (operation != MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT && operation != MBEDTLS_DECRYPT) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } if (ctx->cipher_info == NULL) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT) + if (MBEDTLS_MODE_ECB == ((mbedtls_cipher_mode_t) ctx->cipher_info->mode) && + MBEDTLS_DECRYPT == operation) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + } +#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) if (ctx->psa_enabled == 1) { mbedtls_cipher_context_psa * const cipher_psa = (mbedtls_cipher_context_psa *) ctx->cipher_ctx; @@ -280,7 +339,7 @@ int mbedtls_cipher_setkey(mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, } key_type = mbedtls_psa_translate_cipher_type( - ctx->cipher_info->type); + ((mbedtls_cipher_type_t) ctx->cipher_info->type)); if (key_type == 0) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; } @@ -291,7 +350,6 @@ int mbedtls_cipher_setkey(mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, * and use it for AEAD decryption. Until tests relying on this * are changed, allow any usage in PSA. */ psa_set_key_usage_flags(&attributes, - /* mbedtls_psa_translate_cipher_operation( operation ); */ PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT); psa_set_key_algorithm(&attributes, cipher_psa->alg); @@ -305,7 +363,7 @@ int mbedtls_cipher_setkey(mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, case PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED: return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; default: - return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_HW_ACCEL_FAILED; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_HW_ACCEL_FAILED; } /* Indicate that we own the key slot and need to * destroy it in mbedtls_cipher_free(). */ @@ -315,31 +373,38 @@ int mbedtls_cipher_setkey(mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, ctx->operation = operation; return 0; } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO && !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ if ((ctx->cipher_info->flags & MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_KEY_LEN) == 0 && - (int) ctx->cipher_info->key_bitlen != key_bitlen) { + (int) mbedtls_cipher_info_get_key_bitlen(ctx->cipher_info) != key_bitlen) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } ctx->key_bitlen = key_bitlen; ctx->operation = operation; +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT) /* * For OFB, CFB and CTR mode always use the encryption key schedule */ if (MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT == operation || - MBEDTLS_MODE_CFB == ctx->cipher_info->mode || - MBEDTLS_MODE_OFB == ctx->cipher_info->mode || - MBEDTLS_MODE_CTR == ctx->cipher_info->mode) { - return ctx->cipher_info->base->setkey_enc_func(ctx->cipher_ctx, key, - ctx->key_bitlen); + MBEDTLS_MODE_CFB == ((mbedtls_cipher_mode_t) ctx->cipher_info->mode) || + MBEDTLS_MODE_OFB == ((mbedtls_cipher_mode_t) ctx->cipher_info->mode) || + MBEDTLS_MODE_CTR == ((mbedtls_cipher_mode_t) ctx->cipher_info->mode)) { + return mbedtls_cipher_get_base(ctx->cipher_info)->setkey_enc_func(ctx->cipher_ctx, key, + ctx->key_bitlen); } if (MBEDTLS_DECRYPT == operation) { - return ctx->cipher_info->base->setkey_dec_func(ctx->cipher_ctx, key, - ctx->key_bitlen); + return mbedtls_cipher_get_base(ctx->cipher_info)->setkey_dec_func(ctx->cipher_ctx, key, + ctx->key_bitlen); + } +#else + if (operation == MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT || operation == MBEDTLS_DECRYPT) { + return mbedtls_cipher_get_base(ctx->cipher_info)->setkey_enc_func(ctx->cipher_ctx, key, + ctx->key_bitlen); } +#endif return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } @@ -350,19 +415,17 @@ int mbedtls_cipher_set_iv(mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, { size_t actual_iv_size; - CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET(iv_len == 0 || iv != NULL); if (ctx->cipher_info == NULL) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } -#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) if (ctx->psa_enabled == 1) { /* While PSA Crypto has an API for multipart * operations, we currently don't make it * accessible through the cipher layer. */ return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO && !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ /* avoid buffer overflow in ctx->iv */ if (iv_len > MBEDTLS_MAX_IV_LENGTH) { @@ -372,7 +435,7 @@ int mbedtls_cipher_set_iv(mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, if ((ctx->cipher_info->flags & MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_IV_LEN) != 0) { actual_iv_size = iv_len; } else { - actual_iv_size = ctx->cipher_info->iv_size; + actual_iv_size = mbedtls_cipher_info_get_iv_size(ctx->cipher_info); /* avoid reading past the end of input buffer */ if (actual_iv_size > iv_len) { @@ -381,7 +444,7 @@ int mbedtls_cipher_set_iv(mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, } #if defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_C) - if (ctx->cipher_info->type == MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20) { + if (((mbedtls_cipher_type_t) ctx->cipher_info->type) == MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20) { /* Even though the actual_iv_size is overwritten with a correct value * of 12 from the cipher info, return an error to indicate that * the input iv_len is wrong. */ @@ -396,13 +459,47 @@ int mbedtls_cipher_set_iv(mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, } } #if defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C) - if (ctx->cipher_info->type == MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20_POLY1305 && + if (((mbedtls_cipher_type_t) ctx->cipher_info->type) == MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20_POLY1305 && iv_len != 12) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } #endif #endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) + if (MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM == ((mbedtls_cipher_mode_t) ctx->cipher_info->mode)) { + return mbedtls_gcm_starts((mbedtls_gcm_context *) ctx->cipher_ctx, + ctx->operation, + iv, iv_len); + } +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C) + if (MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG == ((mbedtls_cipher_mode_t) ctx->cipher_info->mode)) { + int set_lengths_result; + int ccm_star_mode; + + set_lengths_result = mbedtls_ccm_set_lengths( + (mbedtls_ccm_context *) ctx->cipher_ctx, + 0, 0, 0); + if (set_lengths_result != 0) { + return set_lengths_result; + } + + if (ctx->operation == MBEDTLS_DECRYPT) { + ccm_star_mode = MBEDTLS_CCM_STAR_DECRYPT; + } else if (ctx->operation == MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT) { + ccm_star_mode = MBEDTLS_CCM_STAR_ENCRYPT; + } else { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + return mbedtls_ccm_starts((mbedtls_ccm_context *) ctx->cipher_ctx, + ccm_star_mode, + iv, iv_len); + } +#endif + if (actual_iv_size != 0) { memcpy(ctx->iv, iv, actual_iv_size); ctx->iv_size = actual_iv_size; @@ -413,18 +510,17 @@ int mbedtls_cipher_set_iv(mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, int mbedtls_cipher_reset(mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx) { - CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); if (ctx->cipher_info == NULL) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } -#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) if (ctx->psa_enabled == 1) { /* We don't support resetting PSA-based * cipher contexts, yet. */ return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO && !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ ctx->unprocessed_len = 0; @@ -435,30 +531,28 @@ int mbedtls_cipher_reset(mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx) int mbedtls_cipher_update_ad(mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, const unsigned char *ad, size_t ad_len) { - CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET(ad_len == 0 || ad != NULL); if (ctx->cipher_info == NULL) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } -#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) if (ctx->psa_enabled == 1) { /* While PSA Crypto has an API for multipart * operations, we currently don't make it * accessible through the cipher layer. */ return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO && !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) - if (MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM == ctx->cipher_info->mode) { - return mbedtls_gcm_starts((mbedtls_gcm_context *) ctx->cipher_ctx, ctx->operation, - ctx->iv, ctx->iv_size, ad, ad_len); + if (MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM == ((mbedtls_cipher_mode_t) ctx->cipher_info->mode)) { + return mbedtls_gcm_update_ad((mbedtls_gcm_context *) ctx->cipher_ctx, + ad, ad_len); } #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C) - if (MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20_POLY1305 == ctx->cipher_info->type) { + if (MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20_POLY1305 == ((mbedtls_cipher_type_t) ctx->cipher_info->type)) { int result; mbedtls_chachapoly_mode_t mode; @@ -478,7 +572,7 @@ int mbedtls_cipher_update_ad(mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, } #endif - return 0; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; } #endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C || MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C */ @@ -488,22 +582,18 @@ int mbedtls_cipher_update(mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, const unsigned char *in int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t block_size; - CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET(ilen == 0 || input != NULL); - CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET(output != NULL); - CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET(olen != NULL); if (ctx->cipher_info == NULL) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } -#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) if (ctx->psa_enabled == 1) { /* While PSA Crypto has an API for multipart * operations, we currently don't make it * accessible through the cipher layer. */ return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO && !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ *olen = 0; block_size = mbedtls_cipher_get_block_size(ctx); @@ -511,15 +601,16 @@ int mbedtls_cipher_update(mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, const unsigned char *in return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_INVALID_CONTEXT; } - if (ctx->cipher_info->mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_ECB) { + if (((mbedtls_cipher_mode_t) ctx->cipher_info->mode) == MBEDTLS_MODE_ECB) { if (ilen != block_size) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FULL_BLOCK_EXPECTED; } *olen = ilen; - if (0 != (ret = ctx->cipher_info->base->ecb_func(ctx->cipher_ctx, - ctx->operation, input, output))) { + if (0 != (ret = mbedtls_cipher_get_base(ctx->cipher_info)->ecb_func(ctx->cipher_ctx, + ctx->operation, input, + output))) { return ret; } @@ -527,15 +618,23 @@ int mbedtls_cipher_update(mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, const unsigned char *in } #if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) - if (ctx->cipher_info->mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM) { - *olen = ilen; - return mbedtls_gcm_update((mbedtls_gcm_context *) ctx->cipher_ctx, ilen, input, - output); + if (((mbedtls_cipher_mode_t) ctx->cipher_info->mode) == MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM) { + return mbedtls_gcm_update((mbedtls_gcm_context *) ctx->cipher_ctx, + input, ilen, + output, ilen, olen); + } +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C) + if (((mbedtls_cipher_mode_t) ctx->cipher_info->mode) == MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG) { + return mbedtls_ccm_update((mbedtls_ccm_context *) ctx->cipher_ctx, + input, ilen, + output, ilen, olen); } #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C) - if (ctx->cipher_info->type == MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20_POLY1305) { + if (((mbedtls_cipher_type_t) ctx->cipher_info->type) == MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20_POLY1305) { *olen = ilen; return mbedtls_chachapoly_update((mbedtls_chachapoly_context *) ctx->cipher_ctx, ilen, input, output); @@ -548,7 +647,7 @@ int mbedtls_cipher_update(mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, const unsigned char *in } #if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) - if (ctx->cipher_info->mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC) { + if (((mbedtls_cipher_mode_t) ctx->cipher_info->mode) == MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC) { size_t copy_len = 0; /* @@ -576,9 +675,12 @@ int mbedtls_cipher_update(mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, const unsigned char *in memcpy(&(ctx->unprocessed_data[ctx->unprocessed_len]), input, copy_len); - if (0 != (ret = ctx->cipher_info->base->cbc_func(ctx->cipher_ctx, - ctx->operation, block_size, ctx->iv, - ctx->unprocessed_data, output))) { + if (0 != (ret = mbedtls_cipher_get_base(ctx->cipher_info)->cbc_func(ctx->cipher_ctx, + ctx->operation, + block_size, ctx->iv, + ctx-> + unprocessed_data, + output))) { return ret; } @@ -616,9 +718,11 @@ int mbedtls_cipher_update(mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, const unsigned char *in * Process remaining full blocks */ if (ilen) { - if (0 != (ret = ctx->cipher_info->base->cbc_func(ctx->cipher_ctx, - ctx->operation, ilen, ctx->iv, input, - output))) { + if (0 != (ret = mbedtls_cipher_get_base(ctx->cipher_info)->cbc_func(ctx->cipher_ctx, + ctx->operation, + ilen, ctx->iv, + input, + output))) { return ret; } @@ -630,11 +734,12 @@ int mbedtls_cipher_update(mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, const unsigned char *in #endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB) - if (ctx->cipher_info->mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_CFB) { - if (0 != (ret = ctx->cipher_info->base->cfb_func(ctx->cipher_ctx, - ctx->operation, ilen, - &ctx->unprocessed_len, ctx->iv, - input, output))) { + if (((mbedtls_cipher_mode_t) ctx->cipher_info->mode) == MBEDTLS_MODE_CFB) { + if (0 != (ret = mbedtls_cipher_get_base(ctx->cipher_info)->cfb_func(ctx->cipher_ctx, + ctx->operation, ilen, + &ctx->unprocessed_len, + ctx->iv, + input, output))) { return ret; } @@ -645,10 +750,12 @@ int mbedtls_cipher_update(mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, const unsigned char *in #endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB) - if (ctx->cipher_info->mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_OFB) { - if (0 != (ret = ctx->cipher_info->base->ofb_func(ctx->cipher_ctx, - ilen, &ctx->unprocessed_len, ctx->iv, - input, output))) { + if (((mbedtls_cipher_mode_t) ctx->cipher_info->mode) == MBEDTLS_MODE_OFB) { + if (0 != (ret = mbedtls_cipher_get_base(ctx->cipher_info)->ofb_func(ctx->cipher_ctx, + ilen, + &ctx->unprocessed_len, + ctx->iv, + input, output))) { return ret; } @@ -659,10 +766,13 @@ int mbedtls_cipher_update(mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, const unsigned char *in #endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR) - if (ctx->cipher_info->mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_CTR) { - if (0 != (ret = ctx->cipher_info->base->ctr_func(ctx->cipher_ctx, - ilen, &ctx->unprocessed_len, ctx->iv, - ctx->unprocessed_data, input, output))) { + if (((mbedtls_cipher_mode_t) ctx->cipher_info->mode) == MBEDTLS_MODE_CTR) { + if (0 != (ret = mbedtls_cipher_get_base(ctx->cipher_info)->ctr_func(ctx->cipher_ctx, + ilen, + &ctx->unprocessed_len, + ctx->iv, + ctx->unprocessed_data, + input, output))) { return ret; } @@ -673,14 +783,18 @@ int mbedtls_cipher_update(mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, const unsigned char *in #endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS) - if (ctx->cipher_info->mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_XTS) { + if (((mbedtls_cipher_mode_t) ctx->cipher_info->mode) == MBEDTLS_MODE_XTS) { if (ctx->unprocessed_len > 0) { /* We can only process an entire data unit at a time. */ return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; } - ret = ctx->cipher_info->base->xts_func(ctx->cipher_ctx, - ctx->operation, ilen, ctx->iv, input, output); + ret = mbedtls_cipher_get_base(ctx->cipher_info)->xts_func(ctx->cipher_ctx, + ctx->operation, + ilen, + ctx->iv, + input, + output); if (ret != 0) { return ret; } @@ -692,9 +806,10 @@ int mbedtls_cipher_update(mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, const unsigned char *in #endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_STREAM) - if (ctx->cipher_info->mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_STREAM) { - if (0 != (ret = ctx->cipher_info->base->stream_func(ctx->cipher_ctx, - ilen, input, output))) { + if (((mbedtls_cipher_mode_t) ctx->cipher_info->mode) == MBEDTLS_MODE_STREAM) { + if (0 != (ret = mbedtls_cipher_get_base(ctx->cipher_info)->stream_func(ctx->cipher_ctx, + ilen, input, + output))) { return ret; } @@ -727,7 +842,7 @@ static int get_pkcs_padding(unsigned char *input, size_t input_len, size_t *data_len) { size_t i, pad_idx; - unsigned char padding_len, bad = 0; + unsigned char padding_len; if (NULL == input || NULL == data_len) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA; @@ -736,18 +851,19 @@ static int get_pkcs_padding(unsigned char *input, size_t input_len, padding_len = input[input_len - 1]; *data_len = input_len - padding_len; - /* Avoid logical || since it results in a branch */ - bad |= ~mbedtls_ct_size_mask_ge(input_len, padding_len); - bad |= mbedtls_ct_size_bool_eq(padding_len, 0); + mbedtls_ct_condition_t bad = mbedtls_ct_uint_gt(padding_len, input_len); + bad = mbedtls_ct_bool_or(bad, mbedtls_ct_uint_eq(padding_len, 0)); /* The number of bytes checked must be independent of padding_len, * so pick input_len, which is usually 8 or 16 (one block) */ pad_idx = input_len - padding_len; for (i = 0; i < input_len; i++) { - size_t mask = mbedtls_ct_size_mask_ge(i, pad_idx); - bad |= (input[i] ^ padding_len) & mask; + mbedtls_ct_condition_t in_padding = mbedtls_ct_uint_ge(i, pad_idx); + mbedtls_ct_condition_t different = mbedtls_ct_uint_ne(input[i], padding_len); + bad = mbedtls_ct_bool_or(bad, mbedtls_ct_bool_and(in_padding, different)); } - return -(int) mbedtls_ct_uint_if(bad, -MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_INVALID_PADDING, 0); + + return mbedtls_ct_error_if_else_0(bad, MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_INVALID_PADDING); } #endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 */ @@ -770,29 +886,28 @@ static void add_one_and_zeros_padding(unsigned char *output, static int get_one_and_zeros_padding(unsigned char *input, size_t input_len, size_t *data_len) { - unsigned int bad = 1; - if (NULL == input || NULL == data_len) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } + mbedtls_ct_condition_t in_padding = MBEDTLS_CT_TRUE; + mbedtls_ct_condition_t bad = MBEDTLS_CT_TRUE; + *data_len = 0; - size_t in_padding = ~0; for (ptrdiff_t i = (ptrdiff_t) (input_len) - 1; i >= 0; i--) { - size_t is_nonzero = mbedtls_ct_uint_mask(input[i]); + mbedtls_ct_condition_t is_nonzero = mbedtls_ct_bool(input[i]); - size_t hit_first_nonzero = is_nonzero & in_padding; + mbedtls_ct_condition_t hit_first_nonzero = mbedtls_ct_bool_and(is_nonzero, in_padding); - *data_len = (*data_len & ~hit_first_nonzero) | ((size_t) i & hit_first_nonzero); + *data_len = mbedtls_ct_size_if(hit_first_nonzero, i, *data_len); - bad = mbedtls_ct_uint_if((unsigned int) hit_first_nonzero, - !mbedtls_ct_size_bool_eq(input[i], 0x80), bad); + bad = mbedtls_ct_bool_if(hit_first_nonzero, mbedtls_ct_uint_ne(input[i], 0x80), bad); - in_padding = in_padding & ~is_nonzero; + in_padding = mbedtls_ct_bool_and(in_padding, mbedtls_ct_bool_not(is_nonzero)); } - return -(int) mbedtls_ct_uint_if(bad, -MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_INVALID_PADDING, 0); + return mbedtls_ct_error_if_else_0(bad, MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_INVALID_PADDING); } #endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ONE_AND_ZEROS */ @@ -816,7 +931,8 @@ static int get_zeros_and_len_padding(unsigned char *input, size_t input_len, size_t *data_len) { size_t i, pad_idx; - unsigned char padding_len, bad = 0; + unsigned char padding_len; + mbedtls_ct_condition_t bad; if (NULL == input || NULL == data_len) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA; @@ -826,17 +942,19 @@ static int get_zeros_and_len_padding(unsigned char *input, size_t input_len, *data_len = input_len - padding_len; /* Avoid logical || since it results in a branch */ - bad |= mbedtls_ct_size_mask_ge(padding_len, input_len + 1); - bad |= mbedtls_ct_size_bool_eq(padding_len, 0); + bad = mbedtls_ct_uint_gt(padding_len, input_len); + bad = mbedtls_ct_bool_or(bad, mbedtls_ct_uint_eq(padding_len, 0)); /* The number of bytes checked must be independent of padding_len */ pad_idx = input_len - padding_len; for (i = 0; i < input_len - 1; i++) { - size_t mask = mbedtls_ct_size_mask_ge(i, pad_idx); - bad |= input[i] & mask; + mbedtls_ct_condition_t is_padding = mbedtls_ct_uint_ge(i, pad_idx); + mbedtls_ct_condition_t nonzero_pad_byte; + nonzero_pad_byte = mbedtls_ct_bool_if_else_0(is_padding, mbedtls_ct_bool(input[i])); + bad = mbedtls_ct_bool_or(bad, nonzero_pad_byte); } - return -(int) mbedtls_ct_uint_if(bad, -MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_INVALID_PADDING, 0); + return mbedtls_ct_error_if_else_0(bad, MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_INVALID_PADDING); } #endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ZEROS_AND_LEN */ @@ -847,18 +965,14 @@ static int get_zeros_and_len_padding(unsigned char *input, size_t input_len, static void add_zeros_padding(unsigned char *output, size_t output_len, size_t data_len) { - size_t i; - - for (i = data_len; i < output_len; i++) { - output[i] = 0x00; - } + memset(output + data_len, 0, output_len - data_len); } static int get_zeros_padding(unsigned char *input, size_t input_len, size_t *data_len) { size_t i; - unsigned char done = 0, prev_done; + mbedtls_ct_condition_t done = MBEDTLS_CT_FALSE, prev_done; if (NULL == input || NULL == data_len) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA; @@ -867,9 +981,8 @@ static int get_zeros_padding(unsigned char *input, size_t input_len, *data_len = 0; for (i = input_len; i > 0; i--) { prev_done = done; - done |= !mbedtls_ct_size_bool_eq(input[i-1], 0); - size_t mask = mbedtls_ct_size_mask(done ^ prev_done); - *data_len |= i & mask; + done = mbedtls_ct_bool_or(done, mbedtls_ct_uint_ne(input[i-1], 0)); + *data_len = mbedtls_ct_size_if(mbedtls_ct_bool_ne(done, prev_done), i, *data_len); } return 0; @@ -898,39 +1011,47 @@ static int get_no_padding(unsigned char *input, size_t input_len, int mbedtls_cipher_finish(mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, unsigned char *output, size_t *olen) { - CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET(output != NULL); - CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET(olen != NULL); if (ctx->cipher_info == NULL) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } -#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) if (ctx->psa_enabled == 1) { /* While PSA Crypto has an API for multipart * operations, we currently don't make it * accessible through the cipher layer. */ return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO && !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ *olen = 0; - if (MBEDTLS_MODE_CFB == ctx->cipher_info->mode || - MBEDTLS_MODE_OFB == ctx->cipher_info->mode || - MBEDTLS_MODE_CTR == ctx->cipher_info->mode || - MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM == ctx->cipher_info->mode || - MBEDTLS_MODE_XTS == ctx->cipher_info->mode || - MBEDTLS_MODE_STREAM == ctx->cipher_info->mode) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_WITH_PADDING) + /* CBC mode requires padding so we make sure a call to + * mbedtls_cipher_set_padding_mode has been done successfully. */ + if (MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC == ((mbedtls_cipher_mode_t) ctx->cipher_info->mode)) { + if (ctx->get_padding == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + } +#endif + + if (MBEDTLS_MODE_CFB == ((mbedtls_cipher_mode_t) ctx->cipher_info->mode) || + MBEDTLS_MODE_OFB == ((mbedtls_cipher_mode_t) ctx->cipher_info->mode) || + MBEDTLS_MODE_CTR == ((mbedtls_cipher_mode_t) ctx->cipher_info->mode) || + MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM == ((mbedtls_cipher_mode_t) ctx->cipher_info->mode) || + MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG == ((mbedtls_cipher_mode_t) ctx->cipher_info->mode) || + MBEDTLS_MODE_XTS == ((mbedtls_cipher_mode_t) ctx->cipher_info->mode) || + MBEDTLS_MODE_STREAM == ((mbedtls_cipher_mode_t) ctx->cipher_info->mode)) { return 0; } - if ((MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20 == ctx->cipher_info->type) || - (MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20_POLY1305 == ctx->cipher_info->type)) { + if ((MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20 == ((mbedtls_cipher_type_t) ctx->cipher_info->type)) || + (MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20_POLY1305 == ((mbedtls_cipher_type_t) ctx->cipher_info->type))) { return 0; } - if (MBEDTLS_MODE_ECB == ctx->cipher_info->mode) { + if (MBEDTLS_MODE_ECB == ((mbedtls_cipher_mode_t) ctx->cipher_info->mode)) { if (ctx->unprocessed_len != 0) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FULL_BLOCK_EXPECTED; } @@ -939,7 +1060,7 @@ int mbedtls_cipher_finish(mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, } #if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) - if (MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC == ctx->cipher_info->mode) { + if (MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC == ((mbedtls_cipher_mode_t) ctx->cipher_info->mode)) { int ret = 0; if (MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT == ctx->operation) { @@ -967,11 +1088,13 @@ int mbedtls_cipher_finish(mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, } /* cipher block */ - if (0 != (ret = ctx->cipher_info->base->cbc_func(ctx->cipher_ctx, - ctx->operation, - mbedtls_cipher_get_block_size(ctx), - ctx->iv, - ctx->unprocessed_data, output))) { + if (0 != (ret = mbedtls_cipher_get_base(ctx->cipher_info)->cbc_func(ctx->cipher_ctx, + ctx->operation, + mbedtls_cipher_get_block_size( + ctx), + ctx->iv, + ctx->unprocessed_data, + output))) { return ret; } @@ -996,13 +1119,12 @@ int mbedtls_cipher_finish(mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, int mbedtls_cipher_set_padding_mode(mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, mbedtls_cipher_padding_t mode) { - CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - - if (NULL == ctx->cipher_info || MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC != ctx->cipher_info->mode) { + if (NULL == ctx->cipher_info || + MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC != ((mbedtls_cipher_mode_t) ctx->cipher_info->mode)) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } -#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) if (ctx->psa_enabled == 1) { /* While PSA Crypto knows about CBC padding * schemes, we currently don't make them @@ -1013,7 +1135,7 @@ int mbedtls_cipher_set_padding_mode(mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, return 0; } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO && !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ switch (mode) { #if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7) @@ -1057,8 +1179,6 @@ int mbedtls_cipher_set_padding_mode(mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, int mbedtls_cipher_write_tag(mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, unsigned char *tag, size_t tag_len) { - CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET(tag_len == 0 || tag != NULL); if (ctx->cipher_info == NULL) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } @@ -1067,24 +1187,28 @@ int mbedtls_cipher_write_tag(mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } -#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) if (ctx->psa_enabled == 1) { /* While PSA Crypto has an API for multipart * operations, we currently don't make it * accessible through the cipher layer. */ return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO && !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) - if (MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM == ctx->cipher_info->mode) { + if (MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM == ((mbedtls_cipher_mode_t) ctx->cipher_info->mode)) { + size_t output_length; + /* The code here doesn't yet support alternative implementations + * that can delay up to a block of output. */ return mbedtls_gcm_finish((mbedtls_gcm_context *) ctx->cipher_ctx, + NULL, 0, &output_length, tag, tag_len); } #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C) - if (MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20_POLY1305 == ctx->cipher_info->type) { + if (MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20_POLY1305 == ((mbedtls_cipher_type_t) ctx->cipher_info->type)) { /* Don't allow truncated MAC for Poly1305 */ if (tag_len != 16U) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA; @@ -1095,7 +1219,7 @@ int mbedtls_cipher_write_tag(mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, } #endif - return 0; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; } int mbedtls_cipher_check_tag(mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, @@ -1104,8 +1228,6 @@ int mbedtls_cipher_check_tag(mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, unsigned char check_tag[16]; int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET(tag_len == 0 || tag != NULL); if (ctx->cipher_info == NULL) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } @@ -1114,29 +1236,31 @@ int mbedtls_cipher_check_tag(mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } -#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) if (ctx->psa_enabled == 1) { /* While PSA Crypto has an API for multipart * operations, we currently don't make it * accessible through the cipher layer. */ return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO && !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ - /* Status to return on a non-authenticated algorithm. It would make sense - * to return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_INVALID_CONTEXT or perhaps - * MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA, but at the time I write this our - * unit tests assume 0. */ - ret = 0; + /* Status to return on a non-authenticated algorithm. */ + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; #if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) - if (MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM == ctx->cipher_info->mode) { + if (MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM == ((mbedtls_cipher_mode_t) ctx->cipher_info->mode)) { + size_t output_length; + /* The code here doesn't yet support alternative implementations + * that can delay up to a block of output. */ + if (tag_len > sizeof(check_tag)) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } if (0 != (ret = mbedtls_gcm_finish( (mbedtls_gcm_context *) ctx->cipher_ctx, + NULL, 0, &output_length, check_tag, tag_len))) { return ret; } @@ -1150,7 +1274,7 @@ int mbedtls_cipher_check_tag(mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, #endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C) - if (MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20_POLY1305 == ctx->cipher_info->type) { + if (MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20_POLY1305 == ((mbedtls_cipher_type_t) ctx->cipher_info->type)) { /* Don't allow truncated MAC for Poly1305 */ if (tag_len != sizeof(check_tag)) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA; @@ -1187,13 +1311,7 @@ int mbedtls_cipher_crypt(mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t finish_olen; - CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET(iv_len == 0 || iv != NULL); - CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET(ilen == 0 || input != NULL); - CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET(output != NULL); - CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET(olen != NULL); - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) if (ctx->psa_enabled == 1) { /* As in the non-PSA case, we don't check that * a key has been set. If not, the key slot will @@ -1224,13 +1342,13 @@ int mbedtls_cipher_crypt(mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, * are terminated by unsuccessful calls to psa_cipher_update(), * and by any call to psa_cipher_finish(). */ if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_HW_ACCEL_FAILED; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_HW_ACCEL_FAILED; } - if (ctx->cipher_info->mode != MBEDTLS_MODE_ECB) { + if (((mbedtls_cipher_mode_t) ctx->cipher_info->mode) != MBEDTLS_MODE_ECB) { status = psa_cipher_set_iv(&cipher_op, iv, iv_len); if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_HW_ACCEL_FAILED; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_HW_ACCEL_FAILED; } } @@ -1238,20 +1356,20 @@ int mbedtls_cipher_crypt(mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, input, ilen, output, ilen, olen); if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_HW_ACCEL_FAILED; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_HW_ACCEL_FAILED; } status = psa_cipher_finish(&cipher_op, output + *olen, ilen - *olen, &part_len); if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_HW_ACCEL_FAILED; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_HW_ACCEL_FAILED; } *olen += part_len; return 0; } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO && !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ if ((ret = mbedtls_cipher_set_iv(ctx, iv, iv_len)) != 0) { return ret; @@ -1278,8 +1396,8 @@ int mbedtls_cipher_crypt(mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, #if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_AEAD) /* - * Packet-oriented encryption for AEAD modes: internal function shared by - * mbedtls_cipher_auth_encrypt() and mbedtls_cipher_auth_encrypt_ext(). + * Packet-oriented encryption for AEAD modes: internal function used by + * mbedtls_cipher_auth_encrypt_ext(). */ static int mbedtls_cipher_aead_encrypt(mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, const unsigned char *iv, size_t iv_len, @@ -1288,7 +1406,7 @@ static int mbedtls_cipher_aead_encrypt(mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, unsigned char *output, size_t *olen, unsigned char *tag, size_t tag_len) { -#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) if (ctx->psa_enabled == 1) { /* As in the non-PSA case, we don't check that * a key has been set. If not, the key slot will @@ -1313,16 +1431,16 @@ static int mbedtls_cipher_aead_encrypt(mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, input, ilen, output, ilen + tag_len, olen); if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_HW_ACCEL_FAILED; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_HW_ACCEL_FAILED; } *olen -= tag_len; return 0; } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO && !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) - if (MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM == ctx->cipher_info->mode) { + if (MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM == ((mbedtls_cipher_mode_t) ctx->cipher_info->mode)) { *olen = ilen; return mbedtls_gcm_crypt_and_tag(ctx->cipher_ctx, MBEDTLS_GCM_ENCRYPT, ilen, iv, iv_len, ad, ad_len, @@ -1330,7 +1448,7 @@ static int mbedtls_cipher_aead_encrypt(mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, } #endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C) - if (MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM == ctx->cipher_info->mode) { + if (MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM == ((mbedtls_cipher_mode_t) ctx->cipher_info->mode)) { *olen = ilen; return mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag(ctx->cipher_ctx, ilen, iv, iv_len, ad, ad_len, input, output, @@ -1338,9 +1456,9 @@ static int mbedtls_cipher_aead_encrypt(mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, } #endif /* MBEDTLS_CCM_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C) - if (MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20_POLY1305 == ctx->cipher_info->type) { + if (MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20_POLY1305 == ((mbedtls_cipher_type_t) ctx->cipher_info->type)) { /* ChachaPoly has fixed length nonce and MAC (tag) */ - if ((iv_len != ctx->cipher_info->iv_size) || + if ((iv_len != mbedtls_cipher_info_get_iv_size(ctx->cipher_info)) || (tag_len != 16U)) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } @@ -1355,8 +1473,8 @@ static int mbedtls_cipher_aead_encrypt(mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, } /* - * Packet-oriented encryption for AEAD modes: internal function shared by - * mbedtls_cipher_auth_encrypt() and mbedtls_cipher_auth_encrypt_ext(). + * Packet-oriented encryption for AEAD modes: internal function used by + * mbedtls_cipher_auth_encrypt_ext(). */ static int mbedtls_cipher_aead_decrypt(mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, const unsigned char *iv, size_t iv_len, @@ -1365,7 +1483,7 @@ static int mbedtls_cipher_aead_decrypt(mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, unsigned char *output, size_t *olen, const unsigned char *tag, size_t tag_len) { -#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) if (ctx->psa_enabled == 1) { /* As in the non-PSA case, we don't check that * a key has been set. If not, the key slot will @@ -1392,15 +1510,15 @@ static int mbedtls_cipher_aead_decrypt(mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, if (status == PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_AUTH_FAILED; } else if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_HW_ACCEL_FAILED; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_HW_ACCEL_FAILED; } return 0; } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO && !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) - if (MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM == ctx->cipher_info->mode) { + if (MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM == ((mbedtls_cipher_mode_t) ctx->cipher_info->mode)) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; *olen = ilen; @@ -1416,7 +1534,7 @@ static int mbedtls_cipher_aead_decrypt(mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, } #endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C) - if (MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM == ctx->cipher_info->mode) { + if (MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM == ((mbedtls_cipher_mode_t) ctx->cipher_info->mode)) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; *olen = ilen; @@ -1432,11 +1550,11 @@ static int mbedtls_cipher_aead_decrypt(mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, } #endif /* MBEDTLS_CCM_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C) - if (MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20_POLY1305 == ctx->cipher_info->type) { + if (MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20_POLY1305 == ((mbedtls_cipher_type_t) ctx->cipher_info->type)) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; /* ChachaPoly has fixed length nonce and MAC (tag) */ - if ((iv_len != ctx->cipher_info->iv_size) || + if ((iv_len != mbedtls_cipher_info_get_iv_size(ctx->cipher_info)) || (tag_len != 16U)) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } @@ -1455,54 +1573,6 @@ static int mbedtls_cipher_aead_decrypt(mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; } - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) -/* - * Packet-oriented encryption for AEAD modes: public legacy function. - */ -int mbedtls_cipher_auth_encrypt(mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, - const unsigned char *iv, size_t iv_len, - const unsigned char *ad, size_t ad_len, - const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen, - unsigned char *output, size_t *olen, - unsigned char *tag, size_t tag_len) -{ - CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET(iv_len == 0 || iv != NULL); - CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET(ad_len == 0 || ad != NULL); - CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET(ilen == 0 || input != NULL); - CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET(ilen == 0 || output != NULL); - CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET(olen != NULL); - CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET(tag_len == 0 || tag != NULL); - - return mbedtls_cipher_aead_encrypt(ctx, iv, iv_len, ad, ad_len, - input, ilen, output, olen, - tag, tag_len); -} - -/* - * Packet-oriented decryption for AEAD modes: public legacy function. - */ -int mbedtls_cipher_auth_decrypt(mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, - const unsigned char *iv, size_t iv_len, - const unsigned char *ad, size_t ad_len, - const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen, - unsigned char *output, size_t *olen, - const unsigned char *tag, size_t tag_len) -{ - CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET(iv_len == 0 || iv != NULL); - CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET(ad_len == 0 || ad != NULL); - CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET(ilen == 0 || input != NULL); - CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET(ilen == 0 || output != NULL); - CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET(olen != NULL); - CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET(tag_len == 0 || tag != NULL); - - return mbedtls_cipher_aead_decrypt(ctx, iv, iv_len, ad, ad_len, - input, ilen, output, olen, - tag, tag_len); -} -#endif /* !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_AEAD */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_AEAD) || defined(MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C) @@ -1516,22 +1586,16 @@ int mbedtls_cipher_auth_encrypt_ext(mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, unsigned char *output, size_t output_len, size_t *olen, size_t tag_len) { - CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET(iv_len == 0 || iv != NULL); - CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET(ad_len == 0 || ad != NULL); - CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET(ilen == 0 || input != NULL); - CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET(output != NULL); - CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET(olen != NULL); - #if defined(MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C) if ( -#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) ctx->psa_enabled == 0 && #endif - (MBEDTLS_MODE_KW == ctx->cipher_info->mode || - MBEDTLS_MODE_KWP == ctx->cipher_info->mode)) { - mbedtls_nist_kw_mode_t mode = (MBEDTLS_MODE_KW == ctx->cipher_info->mode) ? - MBEDTLS_KW_MODE_KW : MBEDTLS_KW_MODE_KWP; + (MBEDTLS_MODE_KW == ((mbedtls_cipher_mode_t) ctx->cipher_info->mode) || + MBEDTLS_MODE_KWP == ((mbedtls_cipher_mode_t) ctx->cipher_info->mode))) { + mbedtls_nist_kw_mode_t mode = + (MBEDTLS_MODE_KW == ((mbedtls_cipher_mode_t) ctx->cipher_info->mode)) ? + MBEDTLS_KW_MODE_KW : MBEDTLS_KW_MODE_KWP; /* There is no iv, tag or ad associated with KW and KWP, * so these length should be 0 as documented. */ @@ -1573,22 +1637,16 @@ int mbedtls_cipher_auth_decrypt_ext(mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, unsigned char *output, size_t output_len, size_t *olen, size_t tag_len) { - CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET(iv_len == 0 || iv != NULL); - CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET(ad_len == 0 || ad != NULL); - CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET(ilen == 0 || input != NULL); - CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET(output_len == 0 || output != NULL); - CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET(olen != NULL); - #if defined(MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C) if ( -#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) ctx->psa_enabled == 0 && #endif - (MBEDTLS_MODE_KW == ctx->cipher_info->mode || - MBEDTLS_MODE_KWP == ctx->cipher_info->mode)) { - mbedtls_nist_kw_mode_t mode = (MBEDTLS_MODE_KW == ctx->cipher_info->mode) ? - MBEDTLS_KW_MODE_KW : MBEDTLS_KW_MODE_KWP; + (MBEDTLS_MODE_KW == ((mbedtls_cipher_mode_t) ctx->cipher_info->mode) || + MBEDTLS_MODE_KWP == ((mbedtls_cipher_mode_t) ctx->cipher_info->mode))) { + mbedtls_nist_kw_mode_t mode = + (MBEDTLS_MODE_KW == ((mbedtls_cipher_mode_t) ctx->cipher_info->mode)) ? + MBEDTLS_KW_MODE_KW : MBEDTLS_KW_MODE_KWP; /* There is no iv, tag or ad associated with KW and KWP, * so these length should be 0 as documented. */ diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/cipher_wrap.c b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/cipher_wrap.c index 5f8dde3f4a3b..d2fee22e2bc5 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/cipher_wrap.c +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/cipher_wrap.c @@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ #if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C) -#include "mbedtls/cipher_internal.h" +#include "cipher_wrap.h" #include "mbedtls/error.h" #if defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C) @@ -24,10 +24,6 @@ #include "mbedtls/aes.h" #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARC4_C) -#include "mbedtls/arc4.h" -#endif - #if defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C) #include "mbedtls/camellia.h" #endif @@ -40,10 +36,6 @@ #include "mbedtls/des.h" #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C) -#include "mbedtls/blowfish.h" -#endif - #if defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_C) #include "mbedtls/chacha20.h" #endif @@ -66,7 +58,65 @@ #include "mbedtls/platform.h" -#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) +enum mbedtls_cipher_base_index { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_AES, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARIA_C) + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_ARIA, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C) + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_CAMELLIA, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_HAVE_CCM_AES_VIA_LEGACY_OR_USE_PSA) + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_CCM_AES, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ARIA_C) + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_CCM_ARIA, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C) + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_CCM_CAMELLIA, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_C) + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_CHACHA20_BASE, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C) + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_CHACHAPOLY_BASE, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DES_C) + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_DES_EDE3, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DES_C) + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_DES_EDE, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DES_C) + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_DES, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_HAVE_GCM_AES_VIA_LEGACY_OR_USE_PSA) + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_GCM_AES, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ARIA_C) + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_GCM_ARIA, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C) + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_GCM_CAMELLIA, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C) + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_KW_AES, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER) + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_NULL_BASE, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS) && defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_XTS_AES, +#endif + /* Prevent compile failure due to empty enum */ + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_PREVENT_EMPTY_ENUM +}; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) && \ + (defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_HAVE_GCM_AES_VIA_LEGACY_OR_USE_PSA) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ARIA_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C)) /* shared by all GCM ciphers */ static void *gcm_ctx_alloc(void) { @@ -86,7 +136,9 @@ static void gcm_ctx_free(void *ctx) } #endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C) && \ + (defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_HAVE_CCM_AES_VIA_LEGACY_OR_USE_PSA) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ARIA_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C)) /* shared by all CCM ciphers */ static void *ccm_ctx_alloc(void) { @@ -178,11 +230,13 @@ static int aes_crypt_xts_wrap(void *ctx, mbedtls_operation_t operation, } #endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS */ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT) static int aes_setkey_dec_wrap(void *ctx, const unsigned char *key, unsigned int key_bitlen) { return mbedtls_aes_setkey_dec((mbedtls_aes_context *) ctx, key, key_bitlen); } +#endif static int aes_setkey_enc_wrap(void *ctx, const unsigned char *key, unsigned int key_bitlen) @@ -231,182 +285,194 @@ static const mbedtls_cipher_base_t aes_info = { NULL, #endif aes_setkey_enc_wrap, +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT) aes_setkey_dec_wrap, +#endif aes_ctx_alloc, aes_ctx_free }; static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aes_128_ecb_info = { - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_ECB, - MBEDTLS_MODE_ECB, - 128, "AES-128-ECB", - 0, - 0, 16, - &aes_info + 0 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT, + 128 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_MODE_ECB, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_ECB, + 0, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_AES }; +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH) static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aes_192_ecb_info = { - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_ECB, - MBEDTLS_MODE_ECB, - 192, "AES-192-ECB", - 0, - 0, 16, - &aes_info + 0 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT, + 192 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_MODE_ECB, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_ECB, + 0, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_AES }; static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aes_256_ecb_info = { - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_ECB, - MBEDTLS_MODE_ECB, - 256, "AES-256-ECB", - 0, - 0, 16, - &aes_info + 0 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT, + 256 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_MODE_ECB, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_ECB, + 0, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_AES }; +#endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aes_128_cbc_info = { - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC, - MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC, - 128, "AES-128-CBC", 16, + 16 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT, + 128 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC, 0, - 16, - &aes_info + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_AES }; +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH) static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aes_192_cbc_info = { - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC, - MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC, - 192, "AES-192-CBC", 16, + 16 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT, + 192 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC, 0, - 16, - &aes_info + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_AES }; static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aes_256_cbc_info = { - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC, - MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC, - 256, "AES-256-CBC", 16, + 16 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT, + 256 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC, 0, - 16, - &aes_info + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_AES }; +#endif #endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB) static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aes_128_cfb128_info = { - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CFB128, - MBEDTLS_MODE_CFB, - 128, "AES-128-CFB128", 16, + 16 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT, + 128 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_MODE_CFB, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CFB128, 0, - 16, - &aes_info + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_AES }; +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH) static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aes_192_cfb128_info = { - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CFB128, - MBEDTLS_MODE_CFB, - 192, "AES-192-CFB128", 16, + 16 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT, + 192 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_MODE_CFB, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CFB128, 0, - 16, - &aes_info + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_AES }; static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aes_256_cfb128_info = { - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CFB128, - MBEDTLS_MODE_CFB, - 256, "AES-256-CFB128", 16, + 16 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT, + 256 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_MODE_CFB, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CFB128, 0, - 16, - &aes_info + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_AES }; +#endif #endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB) static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aes_128_ofb_info = { - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_OFB, - MBEDTLS_MODE_OFB, - 128, "AES-128-OFB", 16, + 16 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT, + 128 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_MODE_OFB, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_OFB, 0, - 16, - &aes_info + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_AES }; +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH) static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aes_192_ofb_info = { - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_OFB, - MBEDTLS_MODE_OFB, - 192, "AES-192-OFB", 16, + 16 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT, + 192 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_MODE_OFB, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_OFB, 0, - 16, - &aes_info + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_AES }; static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aes_256_ofb_info = { - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_OFB, - MBEDTLS_MODE_OFB, - 256, "AES-256-OFB", 16, + 16 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT, + 256 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_MODE_OFB, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_OFB, 0, - 16, - &aes_info + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_AES }; +#endif #endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR) static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aes_128_ctr_info = { - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CTR, - MBEDTLS_MODE_CTR, - 128, "AES-128-CTR", 16, + 16 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT, + 128 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_MODE_CTR, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CTR, 0, - 16, - &aes_info + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_AES }; +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH) static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aes_192_ctr_info = { - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CTR, - MBEDTLS_MODE_CTR, - 192, "AES-192-CTR", 16, + 16 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT, + 192 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_MODE_CTR, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CTR, 0, - 16, - &aes_info + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_AES }; static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aes_256_ctr_info = { - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CTR, - MBEDTLS_MODE_CTR, - 256, "AES-256-CTR", 16, + 16 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT, + 256 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_MODE_CTR, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CTR, 0, - 16, - &aes_info + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_AES }; +#endif #endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS) @@ -475,36 +541,41 @@ static const mbedtls_cipher_base_t xts_aes_info = { }; static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aes_128_xts_info = { - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_XTS, - MBEDTLS_MODE_XTS, - 256, "AES-128-XTS", 16, + 16 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT, + 256 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_MODE_XTS, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_XTS, 0, - 16, - &xts_aes_info + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_XTS_AES }; +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH) static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aes_256_xts_info = { - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_XTS, - MBEDTLS_MODE_XTS, - 512, "AES-256-XTS", 16, + 16 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT, + 512 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_MODE_XTS, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_XTS, 0, - 16, - &xts_aes_info + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_XTS_AES }; +#endif #endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_AES_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_GCM_CAN_AES) static int gcm_aes_setkey_wrap(void *ctx, const unsigned char *key, unsigned int key_bitlen) { return mbedtls_gcm_setkey((mbedtls_gcm_context *) ctx, MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES, key, key_bitlen); } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C && MBEDTLS_CCM_GCM_CAN_AES */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_HAVE_GCM_AES_VIA_LEGACY_OR_USE_PSA) static const mbedtls_cipher_base_t gcm_aes_info = { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES, NULL, @@ -526,54 +597,69 @@ static const mbedtls_cipher_base_t gcm_aes_info = { #if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_STREAM) NULL, #endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) gcm_aes_setkey_wrap, +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT) gcm_aes_setkey_wrap, +#endif gcm_ctx_alloc, gcm_ctx_free, +#else + NULL, + NULL, + NULL, + NULL, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C */ }; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_HAVE_GCM_AES_VIA_LEGACY_OR_USE_PSA */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_HAVE_GCM_AES_VIA_LEGACY_OR_USE_PSA) static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aes_128_gcm_info = { - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_GCM, - MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM, - 128, "AES-128-GCM", - 12, - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_IV_LEN, 16, - &gcm_aes_info + 12 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT, + 128 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_GCM, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_IV_LEN, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_GCM_AES }; +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH) static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aes_192_gcm_info = { - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_GCM, - MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM, - 192, "AES-192-GCM", - 12, - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_IV_LEN, 16, - &gcm_aes_info + 12 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT, + 192 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_GCM, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_IV_LEN, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_GCM_AES }; static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aes_256_gcm_info = { - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_GCM, - MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM, - 256, "AES-256-GCM", - 12, - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_IV_LEN, 16, - &gcm_aes_info + 12 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT, + 256 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_GCM, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_IV_LEN, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_GCM_AES }; -#endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C */ +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_HAVE_GCM_AES_VIA_LEGACY_OR_USE_PSA */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_GCM_CAN_AES) static int ccm_aes_setkey_wrap(void *ctx, const unsigned char *key, unsigned int key_bitlen) { return mbedtls_ccm_setkey((mbedtls_ccm_context *) ctx, MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES, key, key_bitlen); } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CCM_C && MBEDTLS_CCM_GCM_CAN_AES */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_HAVE_CCM_AES_VIA_LEGACY_OR_USE_PSA) static const mbedtls_cipher_base_t ccm_aes_info = { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES, NULL, @@ -595,47 +681,96 @@ static const mbedtls_cipher_base_t ccm_aes_info = { #if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_STREAM) NULL, #endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C) ccm_aes_setkey_wrap, +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT) ccm_aes_setkey_wrap, +#endif ccm_ctx_alloc, ccm_ctx_free, +#else + NULL, + NULL, + NULL, + NULL, +#endif }; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_HAVE_CCM_AES_VIA_LEGACY_OR_USE_PSA */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_HAVE_CCM_AES_VIA_LEGACY_OR_USE_PSA) static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aes_128_ccm_info = { - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM, - MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM, - 128, "AES-128-CCM", - 12, - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_IV_LEN, 16, - &ccm_aes_info + 12 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT, + 128 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_IV_LEN, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_CCM_AES }; +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH) static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aes_192_ccm_info = { - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM, - MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM, - 192, "AES-192-CCM", - 12, - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_IV_LEN, 16, - &ccm_aes_info + 12 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT, + 192 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_IV_LEN, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_CCM_AES }; static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aes_256_ccm_info = { - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM, - MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM, - 256, "AES-256-CCM", - 12, + 16, + 12 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT, + 256 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_IV_LEN, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_CCM_AES +}; +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_HAVE_CCM_AES_VIA_LEGACY_OR_USE_PSA */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_HAVE_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG_AES_VIA_LEGACY_OR_USE_PSA) +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aes_128_ccm_star_no_tag_info = { + "AES-128-CCM*-NO-TAG", + 16, + 12 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT, + 128 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG, MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_IV_LEN, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_CCM_AES +}; + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH) +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aes_192_ccm_star_no_tag_info = { + "AES-192-CCM*-NO-TAG", 16, - &ccm_aes_info + 12 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT, + 192 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_IV_LEN, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_CCM_AES }; -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CCM_C */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_AES_C */ +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aes_256_ccm_star_no_tag_info = { + "AES-256-CCM*-NO-TAG", + 16, + 12 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT, + 256 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_IV_LEN, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_CCM_AES +}; +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_HAVE_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG_AES_VIA_LEGACY_OR_USE_PSA */ + #if defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C) @@ -676,11 +811,13 @@ static int camellia_crypt_ctr_wrap(void *ctx, size_t length, size_t *nc_off, } #endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR */ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT) static int camellia_setkey_dec_wrap(void *ctx, const unsigned char *key, unsigned int key_bitlen) { return mbedtls_camellia_setkey_dec((mbedtls_camellia_context *) ctx, key, key_bitlen); } +#endif static int camellia_setkey_enc_wrap(void *ctx, const unsigned char *key, unsigned int key_bitlen) @@ -730,146 +867,148 @@ static const mbedtls_cipher_base_t camellia_info = { NULL, #endif camellia_setkey_enc_wrap, +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT) camellia_setkey_dec_wrap, +#endif camellia_ctx_alloc, camellia_ctx_free }; static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t camellia_128_ecb_info = { - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_ECB, - MBEDTLS_MODE_ECB, - 128, "CAMELLIA-128-ECB", - 0, - 0, 16, - &camellia_info + 0 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT, + 128 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_MODE_ECB, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_ECB, + 0, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_CAMELLIA }; static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t camellia_192_ecb_info = { - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_ECB, - MBEDTLS_MODE_ECB, - 192, "CAMELLIA-192-ECB", - 0, - 0, 16, - &camellia_info + 0 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT, + 192 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_MODE_ECB, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_ECB, + 0, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_CAMELLIA }; static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t camellia_256_ecb_info = { - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_ECB, - MBEDTLS_MODE_ECB, - 256, "CAMELLIA-256-ECB", - 0, - 0, 16, - &camellia_info + 0 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT, + 256 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_MODE_ECB, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_ECB, + 0, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_CAMELLIA }; #if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t camellia_128_cbc_info = { - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC, - MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC, - 128, "CAMELLIA-128-CBC", 16, + 16 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT, + 128 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC, 0, - 16, - &camellia_info + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_CAMELLIA }; static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t camellia_192_cbc_info = { - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC, - MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC, - 192, "CAMELLIA-192-CBC", 16, + 16 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT, + 192 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC, 0, - 16, - &camellia_info + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_CAMELLIA }; static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t camellia_256_cbc_info = { - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC, - MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC, - 256, "CAMELLIA-256-CBC", 16, + 16 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT, + 256 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC, 0, - 16, - &camellia_info + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_CAMELLIA }; #endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB) static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t camellia_128_cfb128_info = { - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CFB128, - MBEDTLS_MODE_CFB, - 128, "CAMELLIA-128-CFB128", 16, + 16 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT, + 128 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_MODE_CFB, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CFB128, 0, - 16, - &camellia_info + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_CAMELLIA }; static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t camellia_192_cfb128_info = { - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CFB128, - MBEDTLS_MODE_CFB, - 192, "CAMELLIA-192-CFB128", 16, + 16 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT, + 192 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_MODE_CFB, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CFB128, 0, - 16, - &camellia_info + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_CAMELLIA }; static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t camellia_256_cfb128_info = { - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CFB128, - MBEDTLS_MODE_CFB, - 256, "CAMELLIA-256-CFB128", 16, + 16 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT, + 256 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_MODE_CFB, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CFB128, 0, - 16, - &camellia_info + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_CAMELLIA }; #endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR) static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t camellia_128_ctr_info = { - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CTR, - MBEDTLS_MODE_CTR, - 128, "CAMELLIA-128-CTR", 16, + 16 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT, + 128 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_MODE_CTR, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CTR, 0, - 16, - &camellia_info + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_CAMELLIA }; static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t camellia_192_ctr_info = { - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CTR, - MBEDTLS_MODE_CTR, - 192, "CAMELLIA-192-CTR", 16, + 16 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT, + 192 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_MODE_CTR, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CTR, 0, - 16, - &camellia_info + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_CAMELLIA }; static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t camellia_256_ctr_info = { - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CTR, - MBEDTLS_MODE_CTR, - 256, "CAMELLIA-256-CTR", 16, + 16 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT, + 256 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_MODE_CTR, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CTR, 0, - 16, - &camellia_info + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_CAMELLIA }; #endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR */ @@ -903,42 +1042,44 @@ static const mbedtls_cipher_base_t gcm_camellia_info = { NULL, #endif gcm_camellia_setkey_wrap, +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT) gcm_camellia_setkey_wrap, +#endif gcm_ctx_alloc, gcm_ctx_free, }; static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t camellia_128_gcm_info = { - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_GCM, - MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM, - 128, "CAMELLIA-128-GCM", - 12, - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_IV_LEN, 16, - &gcm_camellia_info + 12 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT, + 128 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_GCM, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_IV_LEN, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_GCM_CAMELLIA }; static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t camellia_192_gcm_info = { - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_GCM, - MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM, - 192, "CAMELLIA-192-GCM", - 12, - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_IV_LEN, 16, - &gcm_camellia_info + 12 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT, + 192 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_GCM, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_IV_LEN, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_GCM_CAMELLIA }; static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t camellia_256_gcm_info = { - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_GCM, - MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM, - 256, "CAMELLIA-256-GCM", - 12, - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_IV_LEN, 16, - &gcm_camellia_info + 12 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT, + 256 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_GCM, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_IV_LEN, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_GCM_CAMELLIA }; #endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C */ @@ -972,42 +1113,77 @@ static const mbedtls_cipher_base_t ccm_camellia_info = { NULL, #endif ccm_camellia_setkey_wrap, +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT) ccm_camellia_setkey_wrap, +#endif ccm_ctx_alloc, ccm_ctx_free, }; static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t camellia_128_ccm_info = { - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CCM, - MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM, - 128, "CAMELLIA-128-CCM", - 12, - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_IV_LEN, 16, - &ccm_camellia_info + 12 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT, + 128 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CCM, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_IV_LEN, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_CCM_CAMELLIA }; static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t camellia_192_ccm_info = { - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CCM, - MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM, - 192, "CAMELLIA-192-CCM", - 12, - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_IV_LEN, 16, - &ccm_camellia_info + 12 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT, + 192 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CCM, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_IV_LEN, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_CCM_CAMELLIA }; static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t camellia_256_ccm_info = { - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CCM, - MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM, - 256, "CAMELLIA-256-CCM", - 12, + 16, + 12 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT, + 256 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CCM, MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_IV_LEN, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_CCM_CAMELLIA +}; + +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t camellia_128_ccm_star_no_tag_info = { + "CAMELLIA-128-CCM*-NO-TAG", 16, - &ccm_camellia_info + 12 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT, + 128 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_IV_LEN, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_CCM_CAMELLIA +}; + +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t camellia_192_ccm_star_no_tag_info = { + "CAMELLIA-192-CCM*-NO-TAG", + 16, + 12 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT, + 192 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_IV_LEN, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_CCM_CAMELLIA +}; + +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t camellia_256_ccm_star_no_tag_info = { + "CAMELLIA-256-CCM*-NO-TAG", + 16, + 12 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT, + 256 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_IV_LEN, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_CCM_CAMELLIA }; #endif /* MBEDTLS_CCM_C */ @@ -1053,11 +1229,13 @@ static int aria_crypt_ctr_wrap(void *ctx, size_t length, size_t *nc_off, } #endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR */ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT) static int aria_setkey_dec_wrap(void *ctx, const unsigned char *key, unsigned int key_bitlen) { return mbedtls_aria_setkey_dec((mbedtls_aria_context *) ctx, key, key_bitlen); } +#endif static int aria_setkey_enc_wrap(void *ctx, const unsigned char *key, unsigned int key_bitlen) @@ -1107,146 +1285,148 @@ static const mbedtls_cipher_base_t aria_info = { NULL, #endif aria_setkey_enc_wrap, +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT) aria_setkey_dec_wrap, +#endif aria_ctx_alloc, aria_ctx_free }; static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aria_128_ecb_info = { - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_ECB, - MBEDTLS_MODE_ECB, - 128, "ARIA-128-ECB", - 0, - 0, 16, - &aria_info + 0 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT, + 128 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_MODE_ECB, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_ECB, + 0, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_ARIA }; static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aria_192_ecb_info = { - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_ECB, - MBEDTLS_MODE_ECB, - 192, "ARIA-192-ECB", - 0, - 0, 16, - &aria_info + 0 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT, + 192 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_MODE_ECB, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_ECB, + 0, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_ARIA }; static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aria_256_ecb_info = { - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_ECB, - MBEDTLS_MODE_ECB, - 256, "ARIA-256-ECB", - 0, - 0, 16, - &aria_info + 0 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT, + 256 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_MODE_ECB, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_ECB, + 0, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_ARIA }; #if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aria_128_cbc_info = { - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC, - MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC, - 128, "ARIA-128-CBC", 16, + 16 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT, + 128 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC, 0, - 16, - &aria_info + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_ARIA }; static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aria_192_cbc_info = { - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CBC, - MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC, - 192, "ARIA-192-CBC", 16, + 16 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT, + 192 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CBC, 0, - 16, - &aria_info + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_ARIA }; static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aria_256_cbc_info = { - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC, - MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC, - 256, "ARIA-256-CBC", 16, + 16 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT, + 256 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC, 0, - 16, - &aria_info + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_ARIA }; #endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB) static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aria_128_cfb128_info = { - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CFB128, - MBEDTLS_MODE_CFB, - 128, "ARIA-128-CFB128", 16, + 16 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT, + 128 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_MODE_CFB, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CFB128, 0, - 16, - &aria_info + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_ARIA }; static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aria_192_cfb128_info = { - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CFB128, - MBEDTLS_MODE_CFB, - 192, "ARIA-192-CFB128", 16, + 16 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT, + 192 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_MODE_CFB, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CFB128, 0, - 16, - &aria_info + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_ARIA }; static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aria_256_cfb128_info = { - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CFB128, - MBEDTLS_MODE_CFB, - 256, "ARIA-256-CFB128", 16, + 16 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT, + 256 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_MODE_CFB, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CFB128, 0, - 16, - &aria_info + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_ARIA }; #endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR) static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aria_128_ctr_info = { - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CTR, - MBEDTLS_MODE_CTR, - 128, "ARIA-128-CTR", 16, + 16 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT, + 128 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_MODE_CTR, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CTR, 0, - 16, - &aria_info + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_ARIA }; static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aria_192_ctr_info = { - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CTR, - MBEDTLS_MODE_CTR, - 192, "ARIA-192-CTR", 16, + 16 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT, + 192 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_MODE_CTR, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CTR, 0, - 16, - &aria_info + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_ARIA }; static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aria_256_ctr_info = { - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CTR, - MBEDTLS_MODE_CTR, - 256, "ARIA-256-CTR", 16, + 16 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT, + 256 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_MODE_CTR, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CTR, 0, - 16, - &aria_info + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_ARIA }; #endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR */ @@ -1280,42 +1460,44 @@ static const mbedtls_cipher_base_t gcm_aria_info = { NULL, #endif gcm_aria_setkey_wrap, +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT) gcm_aria_setkey_wrap, +#endif gcm_ctx_alloc, gcm_ctx_free, }; static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aria_128_gcm_info = { - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_GCM, - MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM, - 128, "ARIA-128-GCM", - 12, - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_IV_LEN, 16, - &gcm_aria_info + 12 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT, + 128 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_GCM, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_IV_LEN, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_GCM_ARIA }; static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aria_192_gcm_info = { - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_GCM, - MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM, - 192, "ARIA-192-GCM", - 12, - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_IV_LEN, 16, - &gcm_aria_info + 12 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT, + 192 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_GCM, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_IV_LEN, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_GCM_ARIA }; static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aria_256_gcm_info = { - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_GCM, - MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM, - 256, "ARIA-256-GCM", - 12, - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_IV_LEN, 16, - &gcm_aria_info + 12 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT, + 256 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_GCM, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_IV_LEN, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_GCM_ARIA }; #endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C */ @@ -1349,42 +1531,77 @@ static const mbedtls_cipher_base_t ccm_aria_info = { NULL, #endif ccm_aria_setkey_wrap, +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT) ccm_aria_setkey_wrap, +#endif ccm_ctx_alloc, ccm_ctx_free, }; static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aria_128_ccm_info = { - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CCM, - MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM, - 128, "ARIA-128-CCM", - 12, - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_IV_LEN, 16, - &ccm_aria_info + 12 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT, + 128 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CCM, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_IV_LEN, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_CCM_ARIA }; static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aria_192_ccm_info = { - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CCM, - MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM, - 192, "ARIA-192-CCM", - 12, - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_IV_LEN, 16, - &ccm_aria_info + 12 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT, + 192 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CCM, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_IV_LEN, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_CCM_ARIA }; static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aria_256_ccm_info = { - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CCM, - MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM, - 256, "ARIA-256-CCM", - 12, + 16, + 12 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT, + 256 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CCM, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_IV_LEN, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_CCM_ARIA +}; + +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aria_128_ccm_star_no_tag_info = { + "ARIA-128-CCM*-NO-TAG", + 16, + 12 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT, + 128 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_IV_LEN, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_CCM_ARIA +}; + +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aria_192_ccm_star_no_tag_info = { + "ARIA-192-CCM*-NO-TAG", + 16, + 12 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT, + 192 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG, MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_IV_LEN, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_CCM_ARIA +}; + +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aria_256_ccm_star_no_tag_info = { + "ARIA-256-CCM*-NO-TAG", 16, - &ccm_aria_info + 12 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT, + 256 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_IV_LEN, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_CCM_ARIA }; #endif /* MBEDTLS_CCM_C */ @@ -1539,26 +1756,26 @@ static const mbedtls_cipher_base_t des_info = { }; static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t des_ecb_info = { - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_ECB, - MBEDTLS_MODE_ECB, - MBEDTLS_KEY_LENGTH_DES, "DES-ECB", - 0, - 0, 8, - &des_info + 0 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_KEY_LENGTH_DES >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_MODE_ECB, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_ECB, + 0, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_DES }; #if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t des_cbc_info = { - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_CBC, - MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC, - MBEDTLS_KEY_LENGTH_DES, "DES-CBC", 8, + 8 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_KEY_LENGTH_DES >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_CBC, 0, - 8, - &des_info + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_DES }; #endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ @@ -1590,26 +1807,26 @@ static const mbedtls_cipher_base_t des_ede_info = { }; static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t des_ede_ecb_info = { - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE_ECB, - MBEDTLS_MODE_ECB, - MBEDTLS_KEY_LENGTH_DES_EDE, "DES-EDE-ECB", - 0, - 0, 8, - &des_ede_info + 0 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_KEY_LENGTH_DES_EDE >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_MODE_ECB, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE_ECB, + 0, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_DES_EDE }; #if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t des_ede_cbc_info = { - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE_CBC, - MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC, - MBEDTLS_KEY_LENGTH_DES_EDE, "DES-EDE-CBC", 8, + 8 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_KEY_LENGTH_DES_EDE >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE_CBC, 0, - 8, - &des_ede_info + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_DES_EDE }; #endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ @@ -1641,251 +1858,29 @@ static const mbedtls_cipher_base_t des_ede3_info = { }; static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t des_ede3_ecb_info = { - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_ECB, - MBEDTLS_MODE_ECB, - MBEDTLS_KEY_LENGTH_DES_EDE3, "DES-EDE3-ECB", - 0, - 0, 8, - &des_ede3_info + 0 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_KEY_LENGTH_DES_EDE3 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_MODE_ECB, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_ECB, + 0, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_DES_EDE3 }; #if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t des_ede3_cbc_info = { - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC, - MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC, - MBEDTLS_KEY_LENGTH_DES_EDE3, "DES-EDE3-CBC", 8, + 8 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_KEY_LENGTH_DES_EDE3 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC, 0, - 8, - &des_ede3_info + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_DES_EDE3 }; #endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_DES_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C) - -static int blowfish_crypt_ecb_wrap(void *ctx, mbedtls_operation_t operation, - const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output) -{ - return mbedtls_blowfish_crypt_ecb((mbedtls_blowfish_context *) ctx, operation, input, - output); -} - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) -static int blowfish_crypt_cbc_wrap(void *ctx, mbedtls_operation_t operation, - size_t length, unsigned char *iv, const unsigned char *input, - unsigned char *output) -{ - return mbedtls_blowfish_crypt_cbc((mbedtls_blowfish_context *) ctx, operation, length, iv, - input, output); -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB) -static int blowfish_crypt_cfb64_wrap(void *ctx, mbedtls_operation_t operation, - size_t length, size_t *iv_off, unsigned char *iv, - const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output) -{ - return mbedtls_blowfish_crypt_cfb64((mbedtls_blowfish_context *) ctx, operation, length, - iv_off, iv, input, output); -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR) -static int blowfish_crypt_ctr_wrap(void *ctx, size_t length, size_t *nc_off, - unsigned char *nonce_counter, unsigned char *stream_block, - const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output) -{ - return mbedtls_blowfish_crypt_ctr((mbedtls_blowfish_context *) ctx, length, nc_off, - nonce_counter, stream_block, input, output); -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR */ - -static int blowfish_setkey_wrap(void *ctx, const unsigned char *key, - unsigned int key_bitlen) -{ - return mbedtls_blowfish_setkey((mbedtls_blowfish_context *) ctx, key, key_bitlen); -} - -static void *blowfish_ctx_alloc(void) -{ - mbedtls_blowfish_context *ctx; - ctx = mbedtls_calloc(1, sizeof(mbedtls_blowfish_context)); - - if (ctx == NULL) { - return NULL; - } - - mbedtls_blowfish_init(ctx); - - return ctx; -} - -static void blowfish_ctx_free(void *ctx) -{ - mbedtls_blowfish_free((mbedtls_blowfish_context *) ctx); - mbedtls_free(ctx); -} - -static const mbedtls_cipher_base_t blowfish_info = { - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_BLOWFISH, - blowfish_crypt_ecb_wrap, -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) - blowfish_crypt_cbc_wrap, -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB) - blowfish_crypt_cfb64_wrap, -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB) - NULL, -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR) - blowfish_crypt_ctr_wrap, -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS) - NULL, -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_STREAM) - NULL, -#endif - blowfish_setkey_wrap, - blowfish_setkey_wrap, - blowfish_ctx_alloc, - blowfish_ctx_free -}; - -static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t blowfish_ecb_info = { - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_ECB, - MBEDTLS_MODE_ECB, - 128, - "BLOWFISH-ECB", - 0, - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_KEY_LEN, - 8, - &blowfish_info -}; - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) -static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t blowfish_cbc_info = { - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC, - MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC, - 128, - "BLOWFISH-CBC", - 8, - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_KEY_LEN, - 8, - &blowfish_info -}; -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB) -static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t blowfish_cfb64_info = { - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CFB64, - MBEDTLS_MODE_CFB, - 128, - "BLOWFISH-CFB64", - 8, - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_KEY_LEN, - 8, - &blowfish_info -}; -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR) -static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t blowfish_ctr_info = { - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CTR, - MBEDTLS_MODE_CTR, - 128, - "BLOWFISH-CTR", - 8, - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_KEY_LEN, - 8, - &blowfish_info -}; -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARC4_C) -static int arc4_crypt_stream_wrap(void *ctx, size_t length, - const unsigned char *input, - unsigned char *output) -{ - return mbedtls_arc4_crypt((mbedtls_arc4_context *) ctx, length, input, output); -} - -static int arc4_setkey_wrap(void *ctx, const unsigned char *key, - unsigned int key_bitlen) -{ - /* we get key_bitlen in bits, arc4 expects it in bytes */ - if (key_bitlen % 8 != 0) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA; - } - - mbedtls_arc4_setup((mbedtls_arc4_context *) ctx, key, key_bitlen / 8); - return 0; -} - -static void *arc4_ctx_alloc(void) -{ - mbedtls_arc4_context *ctx; - ctx = mbedtls_calloc(1, sizeof(mbedtls_arc4_context)); - - if (ctx == NULL) { - return NULL; - } - - mbedtls_arc4_init(ctx); - - return ctx; -} - -static void arc4_ctx_free(void *ctx) -{ - mbedtls_arc4_free((mbedtls_arc4_context *) ctx); - mbedtls_free(ctx); -} - -static const mbedtls_cipher_base_t arc4_base_info = { - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_ARC4, - NULL, -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) - NULL, -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB) - NULL, -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB) - NULL, -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR) - NULL, -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS) - NULL, -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_STREAM) - arc4_crypt_stream_wrap, -#endif - arc4_setkey_wrap, - arc4_setkey_wrap, - arc4_ctx_alloc, - arc4_ctx_free -}; - -static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t arc4_128_info = { - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128, - MBEDTLS_MODE_STREAM, - 128, - "ARC4-128", - 0, - 0, - 1, - &arc4_base_info -}; -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ARC4_C */ - #if defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_C) static int chacha20_setkey_wrap(void *ctx, const unsigned char *key, @@ -1958,19 +1953,21 @@ static const mbedtls_cipher_base_t chacha20_base_info = { chacha20_stream_wrap, #endif chacha20_setkey_wrap, +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT) chacha20_setkey_wrap, +#endif chacha20_ctx_alloc, chacha20_ctx_free }; static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t chacha20_info = { - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20, - MBEDTLS_MODE_STREAM, - 256, "CHACHA20", - 12, - 0, 1, - &chacha20_base_info + 12 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT, + 256 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_MODE_STREAM, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20, + 0, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_CHACHA20_BASE }; #endif /* MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_C */ @@ -2033,19 +2030,21 @@ static const mbedtls_cipher_base_t chachapoly_base_info = { NULL, #endif chachapoly_setkey_wrap, +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT) chachapoly_setkey_wrap, +#endif chachapoly_ctx_alloc, chachapoly_ctx_free }; static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t chachapoly_info = { - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20_POLY1305, - MBEDTLS_MODE_CHACHAPOLY, - 256, "CHACHA20-POLY1305", - 12, - 0, 1, - &chachapoly_base_info + 12 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT, + 256 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_MODE_CHACHAPOLY, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20_POLY1305, + 0, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_CHACHAPOLY_BASE }; #endif /* MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C */ @@ -2101,20 +2100,22 @@ static const mbedtls_cipher_base_t null_base_info = { null_crypt_stream, #endif null_setkey, +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT) null_setkey, +#endif null_ctx_alloc, null_ctx_free }; static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t null_cipher_info = { - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL, - MBEDTLS_MODE_STREAM, - 0, "NULL", - 0, - 0, 1, - &null_base_info + 0 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT, + 0 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_MODE_STREAM, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL, + 0, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_NULL_BASE }; #endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER) */ @@ -2178,130 +2179,140 @@ static const mbedtls_cipher_base_t kw_aes_info = { }; static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aes_128_nist_kw_info = { - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_KW, - MBEDTLS_MODE_KW, - 128, "AES-128-KW", - 0, - 0, 16, - &kw_aes_info + 0 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT, + 128 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_MODE_KW, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_KW, + 0, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_KW_AES }; +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH) static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aes_192_nist_kw_info = { - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_KW, - MBEDTLS_MODE_KW, - 192, "AES-192-KW", - 0, - 0, 16, - &kw_aes_info + 0 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT, + 192 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_MODE_KW, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_KW, + 0, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_KW_AES }; static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aes_256_nist_kw_info = { - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_KW, - MBEDTLS_MODE_KW, - 256, "AES-256-KW", - 0, - 0, 16, - &kw_aes_info + 0 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT, + 256 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_MODE_KW, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_KW, + 0, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_KW_AES }; +#endif static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aes_128_nist_kwp_info = { - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_KWP, - MBEDTLS_MODE_KWP, - 128, "AES-128-KWP", - 0, - 0, 16, - &kw_aes_info + 0 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT, + 128 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_MODE_KWP, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_KWP, + 0, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_KW_AES }; +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH) static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aes_192_nist_kwp_info = { - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_KWP, - MBEDTLS_MODE_KWP, - 192, "AES-192-KWP", - 0, - 0, 16, - &kw_aes_info + 0 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT, + 192 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_MODE_KWP, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_KWP, + 0, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_KW_AES }; static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aes_256_nist_kwp_info = { - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_KWP, - MBEDTLS_MODE_KWP, - 256, "AES-256-KWP", - 0, - 0, 16, - &kw_aes_info + 0 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT, + 256 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_MODE_KWP, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_KWP, + 0, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_KW_AES }; +#endif #endif /* MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C */ const mbedtls_cipher_definition_t mbedtls_cipher_definitions[] = { #if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_ECB, &aes_128_ecb_info }, +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH) { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_ECB, &aes_192_ecb_info }, { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_ECB, &aes_256_ecb_info }, +#endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC, &aes_128_cbc_info }, +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH) { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC, &aes_192_cbc_info }, { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC, &aes_256_cbc_info }, #endif +#endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB) { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CFB128, &aes_128_cfb128_info }, +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH) { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CFB128, &aes_192_cfb128_info }, { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CFB128, &aes_256_cfb128_info }, #endif +#endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB) { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_OFB, &aes_128_ofb_info }, +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH) { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_OFB, &aes_192_ofb_info }, { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_OFB, &aes_256_ofb_info }, #endif +#endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR) { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CTR, &aes_128_ctr_info }, +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH) { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CTR, &aes_192_ctr_info }, { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CTR, &aes_256_ctr_info }, #endif +#endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS) { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_XTS, &aes_128_xts_info }, +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH) { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_XTS, &aes_256_xts_info }, #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_AES_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_HAVE_GCM_AES_VIA_LEGACY_OR_USE_PSA) { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_GCM, &aes_128_gcm_info }, +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH) { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_GCM, &aes_192_gcm_info }, { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_GCM, &aes_256_gcm_info }, #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C) +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_HAVE_CCM_AES_VIA_LEGACY_OR_USE_PSA) { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM, &aes_128_ccm_info }, +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH) { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM, &aes_192_ccm_info }, { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM, &aes_256_ccm_info }, #endif -#endif /* MBEDTLS_AES_C */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARC4_C) - { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128, &arc4_128_info }, -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C) - { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_ECB, &blowfish_ecb_info }, -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) - { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC, &blowfish_cbc_info }, #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB) - { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CFB64, &blowfish_cfb64_info }, +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_HAVE_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG_AES_VIA_LEGACY_OR_USE_PSA) + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG, &aes_128_ccm_star_no_tag_info }, +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH) + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG, &aes_192_ccm_star_no_tag_info }, + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG, &aes_256_ccm_star_no_tag_info }, #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR) - { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CTR, &blowfish_ctr_info }, #endif -#endif /* MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C) { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_ECB, &camellia_128_ecb_info }, @@ -2331,6 +2342,9 @@ const mbedtls_cipher_definition_t mbedtls_cipher_definitions[] = { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CCM, &camellia_128_ccm_info }, { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CCM, &camellia_192_ccm_info }, { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CCM, &camellia_256_ccm_info }, + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG, &camellia_128_ccm_star_no_tag_info }, + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG, &camellia_192_ccm_star_no_tag_info }, + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG, &camellia_256_ccm_star_no_tag_info }, #endif #endif /* MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C */ @@ -2362,6 +2376,9 @@ const mbedtls_cipher_definition_t mbedtls_cipher_definitions[] = { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CCM, &aria_128_ccm_info }, { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CCM, &aria_192_ccm_info }, { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CCM, &aria_256_ccm_info }, + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG, &aria_128_ccm_star_no_tag_info }, + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG, &aria_192_ccm_star_no_tag_info }, + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG, &aria_256_ccm_star_no_tag_info }, #endif #endif /* MBEDTLS_ARIA_C */ @@ -2386,12 +2403,16 @@ const mbedtls_cipher_definition_t mbedtls_cipher_definitions[] = #if defined(MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C) { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_KW, &aes_128_nist_kw_info }, +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH) { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_KW, &aes_192_nist_kw_info }, { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_KW, &aes_256_nist_kw_info }, +#endif { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_KWP, &aes_128_nist_kwp_info }, +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH) { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_KWP, &aes_192_nist_kwp_info }, { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_KWP, &aes_256_nist_kwp_info }, #endif +#endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER) { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL, &null_cipher_info }, @@ -2404,4 +2425,58 @@ const mbedtls_cipher_definition_t mbedtls_cipher_definitions[] = sizeof(mbedtls_cipher_definitions[0])) int mbedtls_cipher_supported[NUM_CIPHERS]; +const mbedtls_cipher_base_t *mbedtls_cipher_base_lookup_table[] = { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) + [MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_AES] = &aes_info, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARIA_C) + [MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_ARIA] = &aria_info, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C) + [MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_CAMELLIA] = &camellia_info, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_HAVE_CCM_AES_VIA_LEGACY_OR_USE_PSA) + [MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_CCM_AES] = &ccm_aes_info, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ARIA_C) + [MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_CCM_ARIA] = &ccm_aria_info, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C) + [MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_CCM_CAMELLIA] = &ccm_camellia_info, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_C) + [MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_CHACHA20_BASE] = &chacha20_base_info, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C) + [MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_CHACHAPOLY_BASE] = &chachapoly_base_info, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DES_C) + [MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_DES_EDE3] = &des_ede3_info, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DES_C) + [MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_DES_EDE] = &des_ede_info, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DES_C) + [MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_DES] = &des_info, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_HAVE_GCM_AES_VIA_LEGACY_OR_USE_PSA) + [MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_GCM_AES] = &gcm_aes_info, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ARIA_C) + [MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_GCM_ARIA] = &gcm_aria_info, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C) + [MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_GCM_CAMELLIA] = &gcm_camellia_info, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C) + [MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_KW_AES] = &kw_aes_info, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER) + [MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_NULL_BASE] = &null_base_info, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS) && defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) + [MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_XTS_AES] = &xts_aes_info +#endif +}; + #endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C */ diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/cipher_internal.h b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/cipher_wrap.h similarity index 67% rename from thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/cipher_internal.h rename to thirdparty/mbedtls/library/cipher_wrap.h index c98abab6872e..f22915120dda 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/cipher_internal.h +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/cipher_wrap.h @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ /** - * \file cipher_internal.h + * \file cipher_wrap.h * * \brief Cipher wrappers. * @@ -12,11 +12,7 @@ #ifndef MBEDTLS_CIPHER_WRAP_H #define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_WRAP_H -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "mbedtls/build_info.h" #include "mbedtls/cipher.h" @@ -28,6 +24,50 @@ extern "C" { #endif +/* Support for GCM either through Mbed TLS SW implementation or PSA */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) || \ + (defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM)) +#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_HAVE_GCM_VIA_LEGACY_OR_USE_PSA +#endif + +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C)) || \ + (defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM) && defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES)) +#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_HAVE_GCM_AES_VIA_LEGACY_OR_USE_PSA +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C) || \ + (defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM)) +#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_HAVE_CCM_VIA_LEGACY_OR_USE_PSA +#endif + +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C)) || \ + (defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM) && defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES)) +#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_HAVE_CCM_AES_VIA_LEGACY_OR_USE_PSA +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C) || \ + (defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG)) +#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_HAVE_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG_VIA_LEGACY_OR_USE_PSA +#endif + +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C)) || \ + (defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG) && \ + defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES)) +#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_HAVE_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG_AES_VIA_LEGACY_OR_USE_PSA +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C) || \ + (defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305)) +#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_HAVE_CHACHAPOLY_VIA_LEGACY_OR_USE_PSA +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_HAVE_GCM_VIA_LEGACY_OR_USE_PSA) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_HAVE_CCM_VIA_LEGACY_OR_USE_PSA) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_HAVE_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG_VIA_LEGACY_OR_USE_PSA) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_HAVE_CHACHAPOLY_VIA_LEGACY_OR_USE_PSA) +#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_HAVE_SOME_AEAD_VIA_LEGACY_OR_USE_PSA +#endif + /** * Base cipher information. The non-mode specific functions and values. */ @@ -85,9 +125,11 @@ struct mbedtls_cipher_base_t { int (*setkey_enc_func)(void *ctx, const unsigned char *key, unsigned int key_bitlen); +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT) /** Set key for decryption purposes */ int (*setkey_dec_func)(void *ctx, const unsigned char *key, unsigned int key_bitlen); +#endif /** Allocate a new context */ void * (*ctx_alloc_func)(void); @@ -118,7 +160,7 @@ typedef enum { typedef struct { psa_algorithm_t alg; - psa_key_id_t slot; + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t slot; mbedtls_cipher_psa_key_ownership slot_state; } mbedtls_cipher_context_psa; #endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ @@ -127,6 +169,8 @@ extern const mbedtls_cipher_definition_t mbedtls_cipher_definitions[]; extern int mbedtls_cipher_supported[]; +extern const mbedtls_cipher_base_t *mbedtls_cipher_base_lookup_table[]; + #ifdef __cplusplus } #endif diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/cmac.c b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/cmac.c index 32a9a0e56682..eda10d0b3dd1 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/cmac.c +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/cmac.c @@ -34,6 +34,7 @@ #include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" #include "mbedtls/error.h" #include "mbedtls/platform.h" +#include "constant_time_internal.h" #include @@ -56,39 +57,33 @@ static int cmac_multiply_by_u(unsigned char *output, size_t blocksize) { const unsigned char R_128 = 0x87; - const unsigned char R_64 = 0x1B; - unsigned char R_n, mask; - unsigned char overflow = 0x00; + unsigned char R_n; + uint32_t overflow = 0x00; int i; if (blocksize == MBEDTLS_AES_BLOCK_SIZE) { R_n = R_128; - } else if (blocksize == MBEDTLS_DES3_BLOCK_SIZE) { + } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DES_C) + else if (blocksize == MBEDTLS_DES3_BLOCK_SIZE) { + const unsigned char R_64 = 0x1B; R_n = R_64; - } else { + } +#endif + else { return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } - for (i = (int) blocksize - 1; i >= 0; i--) { - output[i] = input[i] << 1 | overflow; - overflow = input[i] >> 7; + for (i = (int) blocksize - 4; i >= 0; i -= 4) { + uint32_t i32 = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE(&input[i], 0); + uint32_t new_overflow = i32 >> 31; + i32 = (i32 << 1) | overflow; + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE(i32, &output[i], 0); + overflow = new_overflow; } - /* mask = ( input[0] >> 7 ) ? 0xff : 0x00 - * using bit operations to avoid branches */ - - /* MSVC has a warning about unary minus on unsigned, but this is - * well-defined and precisely what we want to do here */ -#if defined(_MSC_VER) -#pragma warning( push ) -#pragma warning( disable : 4146 ) -#endif - mask = -(input[0] >> 7); -#if defined(_MSC_VER) -#pragma warning( pop ) -#endif - - output[blocksize - 1] ^= R_n & mask; + R_n = (unsigned char) mbedtls_ct_uint_if_else_0(mbedtls_ct_bool(input[0] >> 7), R_n); + output[blocksize - 1] ^= R_n; return 0; } @@ -102,12 +97,12 @@ static int cmac_generate_subkeys(mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, unsigned char *K1, unsigned char *K2) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - unsigned char L[MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLKSIZE_MAX]; + unsigned char L[MBEDTLS_CMAC_MAX_BLOCK_SIZE]; size_t olen, block_size; mbedtls_platform_zeroize(L, sizeof(L)); - block_size = ctx->cipher_info->block_size; + block_size = mbedtls_cipher_info_get_block_size(ctx->cipher_info); /* Calculate Ek(0) */ if ((ret = mbedtls_cipher_update(ctx, L, block_size, L, &olen)) != 0) { @@ -133,16 +128,6 @@ static int cmac_generate_subkeys(mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, #endif /* !defined(MBEDTLS_CMAC_ALT) || defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) */ #if !defined(MBEDTLS_CMAC_ALT) -static void cmac_xor_block(unsigned char *output, const unsigned char *input1, - const unsigned char *input2, - const size_t block_size) -{ - size_t idx; - - for (idx = 0; idx < block_size; idx++) { - output[idx] = input1[idx] ^ input2[idx]; - } -} /* * Create padded last block from (partial) last block. @@ -150,7 +135,7 @@ static void cmac_xor_block(unsigned char *output, const unsigned char *input1, * We can't use the padding option from the cipher layer, as it only works for * CBC and we use ECB mode, and anyway we need to XOR K1 or K2 in addition. */ -static void cmac_pad(unsigned char padded_block[MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLKSIZE_MAX], +static void cmac_pad(unsigned char padded_block[MBEDTLS_CMAC_MAX_BLOCK_SIZE], size_t padded_block_len, const unsigned char *last_block, size_t last_block_len) @@ -184,7 +169,7 @@ int mbedtls_cipher_cmac_starts(mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, return retval; } - type = ctx->cipher_info->type; + type = mbedtls_cipher_info_get_type(ctx->cipher_info); switch (type) { case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_ECB: @@ -224,9 +209,13 @@ int mbedtls_cipher_cmac_update(mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, } cmac_ctx = ctx->cmac_ctx; - block_size = ctx->cipher_info->block_size; + block_size = mbedtls_cipher_info_get_block_size(ctx->cipher_info); state = ctx->cmac_ctx->state; + /* Without the MBEDTLS_ASSUME below, gcc -O3 will generate a warning of the form + * error: writing 16 bytes into a region of size 0 [-Werror=stringop-overflow=] */ + MBEDTLS_ASSUME(block_size <= MBEDTLS_CMAC_MAX_BLOCK_SIZE); + /* Is there data still to process from the last call, that's greater in * size than a block? */ if (cmac_ctx->unprocessed_len > 0 && @@ -235,7 +224,7 @@ int mbedtls_cipher_cmac_update(mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, input, block_size - cmac_ctx->unprocessed_len); - cmac_xor_block(state, cmac_ctx->unprocessed_block, state, block_size); + mbedtls_xor_no_simd(state, cmac_ctx->unprocessed_block, state, block_size); if ((ret = mbedtls_cipher_update(ctx, state, block_size, state, &olen)) != 0) { @@ -253,7 +242,7 @@ int mbedtls_cipher_cmac_update(mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, /* Iterate across the input data in block sized chunks, excluding any * final partial or complete block */ for (j = 1; j < n; j++) { - cmac_xor_block(state, input, state, block_size); + mbedtls_xor_no_simd(state, input, state, block_size); if ((ret = mbedtls_cipher_update(ctx, state, block_size, state, &olen)) != 0) { @@ -281,9 +270,9 @@ int mbedtls_cipher_cmac_finish(mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, { mbedtls_cmac_context_t *cmac_ctx; unsigned char *state, *last_block; - unsigned char K1[MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLKSIZE_MAX]; - unsigned char K2[MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLKSIZE_MAX]; - unsigned char M_last[MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLKSIZE_MAX]; + unsigned char K1[MBEDTLS_CMAC_MAX_BLOCK_SIZE]; + unsigned char K2[MBEDTLS_CMAC_MAX_BLOCK_SIZE]; + unsigned char M_last[MBEDTLS_CMAC_MAX_BLOCK_SIZE]; int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t olen, block_size; @@ -293,7 +282,8 @@ int mbedtls_cipher_cmac_finish(mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, } cmac_ctx = ctx->cmac_ctx; - block_size = ctx->cipher_info->block_size; + block_size = mbedtls_cipher_info_get_block_size(ctx->cipher_info); + MBEDTLS_ASSUME(block_size <= MBEDTLS_CMAC_MAX_BLOCK_SIZE); // silence GCC warning state = cmac_ctx->state; mbedtls_platform_zeroize(K1, sizeof(K1)); @@ -305,14 +295,14 @@ int mbedtls_cipher_cmac_finish(mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, /* Calculate last block */ if (cmac_ctx->unprocessed_len < block_size) { cmac_pad(M_last, block_size, last_block, cmac_ctx->unprocessed_len); - cmac_xor_block(M_last, M_last, K2, block_size); + mbedtls_xor(M_last, M_last, K2, block_size); } else { /* Last block is complete block */ - cmac_xor_block(M_last, last_block, K1, block_size); + mbedtls_xor(M_last, last_block, K1, block_size); } - cmac_xor_block(state, M_last, state, block_size); + mbedtls_xor(state, M_last, state, block_size); if ((ret = mbedtls_cipher_update(ctx, state, block_size, state, &olen)) != 0) { goto exit; @@ -330,7 +320,7 @@ int mbedtls_cipher_cmac_finish(mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, mbedtls_platform_zeroize(cmac_ctx->unprocessed_block, sizeof(cmac_ctx->unprocessed_block)); - mbedtls_platform_zeroize(state, MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLKSIZE_MAX); + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(state, MBEDTLS_CMAC_MAX_BLOCK_SIZE); return ret; } @@ -519,6 +509,7 @@ static const unsigned char aes_128_expected_result[NB_CMAC_TESTS_PER_KEY][MBEDTL }; /* CMAC-AES192 Test Data */ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH) static const unsigned char aes_192_key[24] = { 0x8e, 0x73, 0xb0, 0xf7, 0xda, 0x0e, 0x64, 0x52, 0xc8, 0x10, 0xf3, 0x2b, 0x80, 0x90, 0x79, 0xe5, @@ -559,8 +550,10 @@ static const unsigned char aes_192_expected_result[NB_CMAC_TESTS_PER_KEY][MBEDTL 0x4d, 0x77, 0x58, 0x96, 0x59, 0xf3, 0x9a, 0x11 } }; +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH */ /* CMAC-AES256 Test Data */ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH) static const unsigned char aes_256_key[32] = { 0x60, 0x3d, 0xeb, 0x10, 0x15, 0xca, 0x71, 0xbe, 0x2b, 0x73, 0xae, 0xf0, 0x85, 0x7d, 0x77, 0x81, @@ -602,6 +595,7 @@ static const unsigned char aes_256_expected_result[NB_CMAC_TESTS_PER_KEY][MBEDTL 0x69, 0x6a, 0x2c, 0x05, 0x6c, 0x31, 0x54, 0x10 } }; +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_AES_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_DES_C) @@ -744,8 +738,8 @@ static int cmac_test_subkeys(int verbose, int i, ret = 0; mbedtls_cipher_context_t ctx; const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *cipher_info; - unsigned char K1[MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLKSIZE_MAX]; - unsigned char K2[MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLKSIZE_MAX]; + unsigned char K1[MBEDTLS_CMAC_MAX_BLOCK_SIZE]; + unsigned char K2[MBEDTLS_CMAC_MAX_BLOCK_SIZE]; cipher_info = mbedtls_cipher_info_from_type(cipher_type); if (cipher_info == NULL) { @@ -839,7 +833,7 @@ static int cmac_test_wth_cipher(int verbose, { const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *cipher_info; int i, ret = 0; - unsigned char output[MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLKSIZE_MAX]; + unsigned char output[MBEDTLS_CMAC_MAX_BLOCK_SIZE]; cipher_info = mbedtls_cipher_info_from_type(cipher_type); if (cipher_info == NULL) { @@ -949,6 +943,7 @@ int mbedtls_cmac_self_test(int verbose) } /* AES-192 */ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH) if ((ret = cmac_test_subkeys(verbose, "AES 192", aes_192_key, @@ -972,8 +967,10 @@ int mbedtls_cmac_self_test(int verbose) NB_CMAC_TESTS_PER_KEY)) != 0) { return ret; } +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH */ /* AES-256 */ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH) if ((ret = cmac_test_subkeys(verbose, "AES 256", aes_256_key, @@ -997,6 +994,7 @@ int mbedtls_cmac_self_test(int verbose) NB_CMAC_TESTS_PER_KEY)) != 0) { return ret; } +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_AES_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_DES_C) diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/common.h b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/common.h index 49e2c97ea049..3936ffdfe1e3 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/common.h +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/common.h @@ -11,20 +11,20 @@ #ifndef MBEDTLS_LIBRARY_COMMON_H #define MBEDTLS_LIBRARY_COMMON_H -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#else -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#endif +#include "mbedtls/build_info.h" +#include "alignment.h" #include #include #include +#include -/* Define `inline` on some non-C99-compliant compilers. */ -#if (defined(__ARMCC_VERSION) || defined(_MSC_VER)) && \ - !defined(inline) && !defined(__cplusplus) -#define inline __inline +#if defined(__ARM_NEON) +#include +#define MBEDTLS_HAVE_NEON_INTRINSICS +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_IS_WINDOWS_ON_ARM64) +#include +#define MBEDTLS_HAVE_NEON_INTRINSICS #endif /** Helper to define a function as static except when building invasive tests. @@ -48,6 +48,78 @@ #define MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE static #endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS) +extern void (*mbedtls_test_hook_test_fail)(const char *test, int line, const char *file); +#define MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOK_TEST_ASSERT(TEST) \ + do { \ + if ((!(TEST)) && ((*mbedtls_test_hook_test_fail) != NULL)) \ + { \ + (*mbedtls_test_hook_test_fail)( #TEST, __LINE__, __FILE__); \ + } \ + } while (0) +#else +#define MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOK_TEST_ASSERT(TEST) +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS) */ + +/** \def ARRAY_LENGTH + * Return the number of elements of a static or stack array. + * + * \param array A value of array (not pointer) type. + * + * \return The number of elements of the array. + */ +/* A correct implementation of ARRAY_LENGTH, but which silently gives + * a nonsensical result if called with a pointer rather than an array. */ +#define ARRAY_LENGTH_UNSAFE(array) \ + (sizeof(array) / sizeof(*(array))) + +#if defined(__GNUC__) +/* Test if arg and &(arg)[0] have the same type. This is true if arg is + * an array but not if it's a pointer. */ +#define IS_ARRAY_NOT_POINTER(arg) \ + (!__builtin_types_compatible_p(__typeof__(arg), \ + __typeof__(&(arg)[0]))) +/* A compile-time constant with the value 0. If `const_expr` is not a + * compile-time constant with a nonzero value, cause a compile-time error. */ +#define STATIC_ASSERT_EXPR(const_expr) \ + (0 && sizeof(struct { unsigned int STATIC_ASSERT : 1 - 2 * !(const_expr); })) + +/* Return the scalar value `value` (possibly promoted). This is a compile-time + * constant if `value` is. `condition` must be a compile-time constant. + * If `condition` is false, arrange to cause a compile-time error. */ +#define STATIC_ASSERT_THEN_RETURN(condition, value) \ + (STATIC_ASSERT_EXPR(condition) ? 0 : (value)) + +#define ARRAY_LENGTH(array) \ + (STATIC_ASSERT_THEN_RETURN(IS_ARRAY_NOT_POINTER(array), \ + ARRAY_LENGTH_UNSAFE(array))) + +#else +/* If we aren't sure the compiler supports our non-standard tricks, + * fall back to the unsafe implementation. */ +#define ARRAY_LENGTH(array) ARRAY_LENGTH_UNSAFE(array) +#endif +/** Allow library to access its structs' private members. + * + * Although structs defined in header files are publicly available, + * their members are private and should not be accessed by the user. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_ALLOW_PRIVATE_ACCESS + +/** + * \brief Securely zeroize a buffer then free it. + * + * Similar to making consecutive calls to + * \c mbedtls_platform_zeroize() and \c mbedtls_free(), but has + * code size savings, and potential for optimisation in the future. + * + * Guaranteed to be a no-op if \p buf is \c NULL and \p len is 0. + * + * \param buf Buffer to be zeroized then freed. + * \param len Length of the buffer in bytes + */ +void mbedtls_zeroize_and_free(void *buf, size_t len); + /** Return an offset into a buffer. * * This is just the addition of an offset to a pointer, except that this @@ -86,254 +158,197 @@ static inline const unsigned char *mbedtls_buffer_offset_const( return p == NULL ? NULL : p + n; } -/** Byte Reading Macros - * - * Given a multi-byte integer \p x, MBEDTLS_BYTE_n retrieves the n-th - * byte from x, where byte 0 is the least significant byte. - */ -#define MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(x) ((uint8_t) ((x) & 0xff)) -#define MBEDTLS_BYTE_1(x) ((uint8_t) (((x) >> 8) & 0xff)) -#define MBEDTLS_BYTE_2(x) ((uint8_t) (((x) >> 16) & 0xff)) -#define MBEDTLS_BYTE_3(x) ((uint8_t) (((x) >> 24) & 0xff)) -#define MBEDTLS_BYTE_4(x) ((uint8_t) (((x) >> 32) & 0xff)) -#define MBEDTLS_BYTE_5(x) ((uint8_t) (((x) >> 40) & 0xff)) -#define MBEDTLS_BYTE_6(x) ((uint8_t) (((x) >> 48) & 0xff)) -#define MBEDTLS_BYTE_7(x) ((uint8_t) (((x) >> 56) & 0xff)) - -/** - * Get the unsigned 32 bits integer corresponding to four bytes in - * big-endian order (MSB first). - * - * \param data Base address of the memory to get the four bytes from. - * \param offset Offset from \p base of the first and most significant - * byte of the four bytes to build the 32 bits unsigned - * integer from. - */ -#ifndef MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE -#define MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE(data, offset) \ - ( \ - ((uint32_t) (data)[(offset)] << 24) \ - | ((uint32_t) (data)[(offset) + 1] << 16) \ - | ((uint32_t) (data)[(offset) + 2] << 8) \ - | ((uint32_t) (data)[(offset) + 3]) \ - ) +/* Always inline mbedtls_xor() for similar reasons as mbedtls_xor_no_simd(). */ +#if defined(__IAR_SYSTEMS_ICC__) +#pragma inline = forced +#elif defined(__GNUC__) +__attribute__((always_inline)) #endif - /** - * Put in memory a 32 bits unsigned integer in big-endian order. + * Perform a fast block XOR operation, such that + * r[i] = a[i] ^ b[i] where 0 <= i < n * - * \param n 32 bits unsigned integer to put in memory. - * \param data Base address of the memory where to put the 32 - * bits unsigned integer in. - * \param offset Offset from \p base where to put the most significant - * byte of the 32 bits unsigned integer \p n. + * \param r Pointer to result (buffer of at least \p n bytes). \p r + * may be equal to either \p a or \p b, but behaviour when + * it overlaps in other ways is undefined. + * \param a Pointer to input (buffer of at least \p n bytes) + * \param b Pointer to input (buffer of at least \p n bytes) + * \param n Number of bytes to process. + * + * \note Depending on the situation, it may be faster to use either mbedtls_xor() or + * mbedtls_xor_no_simd() (these are functionally equivalent). + * If the result is used immediately after the xor operation in non-SIMD code (e.g, in + * AES-CBC), there may be additional latency to transfer the data from SIMD to scalar + * registers, and in this case, mbedtls_xor_no_simd() may be faster. In other cases where + * the result is not used immediately (e.g., in AES-CTR), mbedtls_xor() may be faster. + * For targets without SIMD support, they will behave the same. */ -#ifndef MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE -#define MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE(n, data, offset) \ - { \ - (data)[(offset)] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_3(n); \ - (data)[(offset) + 1] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_2(n); \ - (data)[(offset) + 2] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_1(n); \ - (data)[(offset) + 3] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(n); \ +static inline void mbedtls_xor(unsigned char *r, + const unsigned char *a, + const unsigned char *b, + size_t n) +{ + size_t i = 0; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_NEON_INTRINSICS) && \ + (!(defined(MBEDTLS_COMPILER_IS_GCC) && MBEDTLS_GCC_VERSION < 70300)) + /* Old GCC versions generate a warning here, so disable the NEON path for these compilers */ + for (; (i + 16) <= n; i += 16) { + uint8x16_t v1 = vld1q_u8(a + i); + uint8x16_t v2 = vld1q_u8(b + i); + uint8x16_t x = veorq_u8(v1, v2); + vst1q_u8(r + i, x); + } +#if defined(__IAR_SYSTEMS_ICC__) + /* This if statement helps some compilers (e.g., IAR) optimise out the byte-by-byte tail case + * where n is a constant multiple of 16. + * For other compilers (e.g. recent gcc and clang) it makes no difference if n is a compile-time + * constant, and is a very small perf regression if n is not a compile-time constant. */ + if (n % 16 == 0) { + return; } #endif - -/** - * Get the unsigned 32 bits integer corresponding to four bytes in - * little-endian order (LSB first). - * - * \param data Base address of the memory to get the four bytes from. - * \param offset Offset from \p base of the first and least significant - * byte of the four bytes to build the 32 bits unsigned - * integer from. - */ -#ifndef MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE -#define MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE(data, offset) \ - ( \ - ((uint32_t) (data)[(offset)]) \ - | ((uint32_t) (data)[(offset) + 1] << 8) \ - | ((uint32_t) (data)[(offset) + 2] << 16) \ - | ((uint32_t) (data)[(offset) + 3] << 24) \ - ) +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_ARCH_IS_X64) || defined(MBEDTLS_ARCH_IS_ARM64) + /* This codepath probably only makes sense on architectures with 64-bit registers */ + for (; (i + 8) <= n; i += 8) { + uint64_t x = mbedtls_get_unaligned_uint64(a + i) ^ mbedtls_get_unaligned_uint64(b + i); + mbedtls_put_unaligned_uint64(r + i, x); + } +#if defined(__IAR_SYSTEMS_ICC__) + if (n % 8 == 0) { + return; + } #endif - -/** - * Put in memory a 32 bits unsigned integer in little-endian order. - * - * \param n 32 bits unsigned integer to put in memory. - * \param data Base address of the memory where to put the 32 - * bits unsigned integer in. - * \param offset Offset from \p base where to put the least significant - * byte of the 32 bits unsigned integer \p n. - */ -#ifndef MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_LE -#define MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_LE(n, data, offset) \ - { \ - (data)[(offset)] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(n); \ - (data)[(offset) + 1] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_1(n); \ - (data)[(offset) + 2] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_2(n); \ - (data)[(offset) + 3] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_3(n); \ +#else + for (; (i + 4) <= n; i += 4) { + uint32_t x = mbedtls_get_unaligned_uint32(a + i) ^ mbedtls_get_unaligned_uint32(b + i); + mbedtls_put_unaligned_uint32(r + i, x); + } +#if defined(__IAR_SYSTEMS_ICC__) + if (n % 4 == 0) { + return; } #endif - -/** - * Get the unsigned 16 bits integer corresponding to two bytes in - * little-endian order (LSB first). - * - * \param data Base address of the memory to get the two bytes from. - * \param offset Offset from \p base of the first and least significant - * byte of the two bytes to build the 16 bits unsigned - * integer from. - */ -#ifndef MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_LE -#define MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_LE(data, offset) \ - ( \ - ((uint16_t) (data)[(offset)]) \ - | ((uint16_t) (data)[(offset) + 1] << 8) \ - ) #endif - -/** - * Put in memory a 16 bits unsigned integer in little-endian order. - * - * \param n 16 bits unsigned integer to put in memory. - * \param data Base address of the memory where to put the 16 - * bits unsigned integer in. - * \param offset Offset from \p base where to put the least significant - * byte of the 16 bits unsigned integer \p n. - */ -#ifndef MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_LE -#define MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_LE(n, data, offset) \ - { \ - (data)[(offset)] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(n); \ - (data)[(offset) + 1] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_1(n); \ - } #endif + for (; i < n; i++) { + r[i] = a[i] ^ b[i]; + } +} -/** - * Get the unsigned 16 bits integer corresponding to two bytes in - * big-endian order (MSB first). - * - * \param data Base address of the memory to get the two bytes from. - * \param offset Offset from \p base of the first and most significant - * byte of the two bytes to build the 16 bits unsigned - * integer from. - */ -#ifndef MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE -#define MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(data, offset) \ - ( \ - ((uint16_t) (data)[(offset)] << 8) \ - | ((uint16_t) (data)[(offset) + 1]) \ - ) +/* Always inline mbedtls_xor_no_simd() as we see significant perf regressions when it does not get + * inlined (e.g., observed about 3x perf difference in gcm_mult_largetable with gcc 7 - 12) */ +#if defined(__IAR_SYSTEMS_ICC__) +#pragma inline = forced +#elif defined(__GNUC__) +__attribute__((always_inline)) #endif - /** - * Put in memory a 16 bits unsigned integer in big-endian order. + * Perform a fast block XOR operation, such that + * r[i] = a[i] ^ b[i] where 0 <= i < n + * + * In some situations, this can perform better than mbedtls_xor() (e.g., it's about 5% + * better in AES-CBC). * - * \param n 16 bits unsigned integer to put in memory. - * \param data Base address of the memory where to put the 16 - * bits unsigned integer in. - * \param offset Offset from \p base where to put the most significant - * byte of the 16 bits unsigned integer \p n. + * \param r Pointer to result (buffer of at least \p n bytes). \p r + * may be equal to either \p a or \p b, but behaviour when + * it overlaps in other ways is undefined. + * \param a Pointer to input (buffer of at least \p n bytes) + * \param b Pointer to input (buffer of at least \p n bytes) + * \param n Number of bytes to process. + * + * \note Depending on the situation, it may be faster to use either mbedtls_xor() or + * mbedtls_xor_no_simd() (these are functionally equivalent). + * If the result is used immediately after the xor operation in non-SIMD code (e.g, in + * AES-CBC), there may be additional latency to transfer the data from SIMD to scalar + * registers, and in this case, mbedtls_xor_no_simd() may be faster. In other cases where + * the result is not used immediately (e.g., in AES-CTR), mbedtls_xor() may be faster. + * For targets without SIMD support, they will behave the same. */ -#ifndef MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE -#define MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(n, data, offset) \ - { \ - (data)[(offset)] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_1(n); \ - (data)[(offset) + 1] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(n); \ +static inline void mbedtls_xor_no_simd(unsigned char *r, + const unsigned char *a, + const unsigned char *b, + size_t n) +{ + size_t i = 0; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARCH_IS_X64) || defined(MBEDTLS_ARCH_IS_ARM64) + /* This codepath probably only makes sense on architectures with 64-bit registers */ + for (; (i + 8) <= n; i += 8) { + uint64_t x = mbedtls_get_unaligned_uint64(a + i) ^ mbedtls_get_unaligned_uint64(b + i); + mbedtls_put_unaligned_uint64(r + i, x); + } +#if defined(__IAR_SYSTEMS_ICC__) + /* This if statement helps some compilers (e.g., IAR) optimise out the byte-by-byte tail case + * where n is a constant multiple of 8. + * For other compilers (e.g. recent gcc and clang) it makes no difference if n is a compile-time + * constant, and is a very small perf regression if n is not a compile-time constant. */ + if (n % 8 == 0) { + return; } #endif - -/** - * Get the unsigned 64 bits integer corresponding to eight bytes in - * big-endian order (MSB first). - * - * \param data Base address of the memory to get the eight bytes from. - * \param offset Offset from \p base of the first and most significant - * byte of the eight bytes to build the 64 bits unsigned - * integer from. - */ -#ifndef MBEDTLS_GET_UINT64_BE -#define MBEDTLS_GET_UINT64_BE(data, offset) \ - ( \ - ((uint64_t) (data)[(offset)] << 56) \ - | ((uint64_t) (data)[(offset) + 1] << 48) \ - | ((uint64_t) (data)[(offset) + 2] << 40) \ - | ((uint64_t) (data)[(offset) + 3] << 32) \ - | ((uint64_t) (data)[(offset) + 4] << 24) \ - | ((uint64_t) (data)[(offset) + 5] << 16) \ - | ((uint64_t) (data)[(offset) + 6] << 8) \ - | ((uint64_t) (data)[(offset) + 7]) \ - ) +#else + for (; (i + 4) <= n; i += 4) { + uint32_t x = mbedtls_get_unaligned_uint32(a + i) ^ mbedtls_get_unaligned_uint32(b + i); + mbedtls_put_unaligned_uint32(r + i, x); + } +#if defined(__IAR_SYSTEMS_ICC__) + if (n % 4 == 0) { + return; + } +#endif +#endif #endif + for (; i < n; i++) { + r[i] = a[i] ^ b[i]; + } +} -/** - * Put in memory a 64 bits unsigned integer in big-endian order. - * - * \param n 64 bits unsigned integer to put in memory. - * \param data Base address of the memory where to put the 64 - * bits unsigned integer in. - * \param offset Offset from \p base where to put the most significant - * byte of the 64 bits unsigned integer \p n. +/* Fix MSVC C99 compatible issue + * MSVC support __func__ from visual studio 2015( 1900 ) + * Use MSVC predefine macro to avoid name check fail. */ -#ifndef MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT64_BE -#define MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT64_BE(n, data, offset) \ - { \ - (data)[(offset)] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_7(n); \ - (data)[(offset) + 1] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_6(n); \ - (data)[(offset) + 2] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_5(n); \ - (data)[(offset) + 3] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_4(n); \ - (data)[(offset) + 4] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_3(n); \ - (data)[(offset) + 5] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_2(n); \ - (data)[(offset) + 6] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_1(n); \ - (data)[(offset) + 7] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(n); \ - } +#if (defined(_MSC_VER) && (_MSC_VER <= 1900)) +#define /*no-check-names*/ __func__ __FUNCTION__ #endif -/** - * Get the unsigned 64 bits integer corresponding to eight bytes in - * little-endian order (LSB first). - * - * \param data Base address of the memory to get the eight bytes from. - * \param offset Offset from \p base of the first and least significant - * byte of the eight bytes to build the 64 bits unsigned - * integer from. - */ -#ifndef MBEDTLS_GET_UINT64_LE -#define MBEDTLS_GET_UINT64_LE(data, offset) \ - ( \ - ((uint64_t) (data)[(offset) + 7] << 56) \ - | ((uint64_t) (data)[(offset) + 6] << 48) \ - | ((uint64_t) (data)[(offset) + 5] << 40) \ - | ((uint64_t) (data)[(offset) + 4] << 32) \ - | ((uint64_t) (data)[(offset) + 3] << 24) \ - | ((uint64_t) (data)[(offset) + 2] << 16) \ - | ((uint64_t) (data)[(offset) + 1] << 8) \ - | ((uint64_t) (data)[(offset)]) \ - ) +/* Define `asm` for compilers which don't define it. */ +/* *INDENT-OFF* */ +#ifndef asm +#if defined(__IAR_SYSTEMS_ICC__) +#define asm __asm +#else +#define asm __asm__ +#endif #endif +/* *INDENT-ON* */ -/** - * Put in memory a 64 bits unsigned integer in little-endian order. +/* + * Define the constraint used for read-only pointer operands to aarch64 asm. + * + * This is normally the usual "r", but for aarch64_32 (aka ILP32, + * as found in watchos), "p" is required to avoid warnings from clang. * - * \param n 64 bits unsigned integer to put in memory. - * \param data Base address of the memory where to put the 64 - * bits unsigned integer in. - * \param offset Offset from \p base where to put the least significant - * byte of the 64 bits unsigned integer \p n. + * Note that clang does not recognise '+p' or '=p', and armclang + * does not recognise 'p' at all. Therefore, to update a pointer from + * aarch64 assembly, it is necessary to use something like: + * + * uintptr_t uptr = (uintptr_t) ptr; + * asm( "ldr x4, [%x0], #8" ... : "+r" (uptr) : : ) + * ptr = (void*) uptr; + * + * Note that the "x" in "%x0" is neccessary; writing "%0" will cause warnings. */ -#ifndef MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT64_LE -#define MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT64_LE(n, data, offset) \ - { \ - (data)[(offset)] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(n); \ - (data)[(offset) + 1] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_1(n); \ - (data)[(offset) + 2] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_2(n); \ - (data)[(offset) + 3] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_3(n); \ - (data)[(offset) + 4] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_4(n); \ - (data)[(offset) + 5] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_5(n); \ - (data)[(offset) + 6] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_6(n); \ - (data)[(offset) + 7] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_7(n); \ - } +#if defined(__aarch64__) && defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM) +#if UINTPTR_MAX == 0xfffffffful +/* ILP32: Specify the pointer operand slightly differently, as per #7787. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ASM_AARCH64_PTR_CONSTRAINT "p" +#elif UINTPTR_MAX == 0xfffffffffffffffful +/* Normal case (64-bit pointers): use "r" as the constraint for pointer operands to asm */ +#define MBEDTLS_ASM_AARCH64_PTR_CONSTRAINT "r" +#else +#error "Unrecognised pointer size for aarch64" +#endif #endif /* Always provide a static assert macro, so it can be used unconditionally. @@ -350,6 +365,46 @@ static inline const unsigned char *mbedtls_buffer_offset_const( #define MBEDTLS_STATIC_ASSERT(expr, msg) #endif +#if defined(__has_builtin) +#define MBEDTLS_HAS_BUILTIN(x) __has_builtin(x) +#else +#define MBEDTLS_HAS_BUILTIN(x) 0 +#endif + +/* Define compiler branch hints */ +#if MBEDTLS_HAS_BUILTIN(__builtin_expect) +#define MBEDTLS_LIKELY(x) __builtin_expect(!!(x), 1) +#define MBEDTLS_UNLIKELY(x) __builtin_expect(!!(x), 0) +#else +#define MBEDTLS_LIKELY(x) x +#define MBEDTLS_UNLIKELY(x) x +#endif + +/* MBEDTLS_ASSUME may be used to provide additional information to the compiler + * which can result in smaller code-size. */ +#if MBEDTLS_HAS_BUILTIN(__builtin_assume) +/* clang provides __builtin_assume */ +#define MBEDTLS_ASSUME(x) __builtin_assume(x) +#elif MBEDTLS_HAS_BUILTIN(__builtin_unreachable) +/* gcc and IAR can use __builtin_unreachable */ +#define MBEDTLS_ASSUME(x) do { if (!(x)) __builtin_unreachable(); } while (0) +#elif defined(_MSC_VER) +/* Supported by MSVC since VS 2005 */ +#define MBEDTLS_ASSUME(x) __assume(x) +#else +#define MBEDTLS_ASSUME(x) do { } while (0) +#endif + +/* For gcc -Os, override with -O2 for a given function. + * + * This will not affect behaviour for other optimisation settings, e.g. -O0. + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_COMPILER_IS_GCC) && defined(__OPTIMIZE_SIZE__) +#define MBEDTLS_OPTIMIZE_FOR_PERFORMANCE __attribute__((optimize("-O2"))) +#else +#define MBEDTLS_OPTIMIZE_FOR_PERFORMANCE +#endif + /* Suppress compiler warnings for unused functions and variables. */ #if !defined(MBEDTLS_MAYBE_UNUSED) && defined(__has_attribute) # if __has_attribute(unused) diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/constant_time.c b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/constant_time.c index 002ca491c6f5..d212ddfd8104 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/constant_time.c +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/constant_time.c @@ -10,40 +10,85 @@ * might be translated to branches by some compilers on some platforms. */ +#include +#include + #include "common.h" #include "constant_time_internal.h" #include "mbedtls/constant_time.h" #include "mbedtls/error.h" #include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" -#if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) -#include "mbedtls/bignum.h" -#endif +#include -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C) -#include "mbedtls/ssl_internal.h" +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CT_ASM) +/* + * Define an object with the value zero, such that the compiler cannot prove that it + * has the value zero (because it is volatile, it "may be modified in ways unknown to + * the implementation"). + */ +volatile mbedtls_ct_uint_t mbedtls_ct_zero = 0; #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) -#include "mbedtls/rsa.h" -#endif +/* + * Define MBEDTLS_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_VOLATILE_ACCESS where assembly is present to + * perform fast unaligned access to volatile data. + * + * This is needed because mbedtls_get_unaligned_uintXX etc don't support volatile + * memory accesses. + * + * Some of these definitions could be moved into alignment.h but for now they are + * only used here. + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS) && \ + ((defined(MBEDTLS_CT_ARM_ASM) && (UINTPTR_MAX == 0xfffffffful)) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_CT_AARCH64_ASM)) +/* We check pointer sizes to avoid issues with them not matching register size requirements */ +#define MBEDTLS_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_VOLATILE_ACCESS -#if defined(MBEDTLS_BASE64_C) -#include "constant_time_invasive.h" +static inline uint32_t mbedtls_get_unaligned_volatile_uint32(volatile const unsigned char *p) +{ + /* This is UB, even where it's safe: + * return *((volatile uint32_t*)p); + * so instead the same thing is expressed in assembly below. + */ + uint32_t r; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CT_ARM_ASM) + asm volatile ("ldr %0, [%1]" : "=r" (r) : "r" (p) :); +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_CT_AARCH64_ASM) + asm volatile ("ldr %w0, [%1]" : "=r" (r) : MBEDTLS_ASM_AARCH64_PTR_CONSTRAINT(p) :); +#else +#error "No assembly defined for mbedtls_get_unaligned_volatile_uint32" #endif - -#include + return r; +} +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS) && + (defined(MBEDTLS_CT_ARM_ASM) || defined(MBEDTLS_CT_AARCH64_ASM)) */ int mbedtls_ct_memcmp(const void *a, const void *b, size_t n) { - size_t i; + size_t i = 0; + /* + * `A` and `B` are cast to volatile to ensure that the compiler + * generates code that always fully reads both buffers. + * Otherwise it could generate a test to exit early if `diff` has all + * bits set early in the loop. + */ volatile const unsigned char *A = (volatile const unsigned char *) a; volatile const unsigned char *B = (volatile const unsigned char *) b; - volatile unsigned char diff = 0; + uint32_t diff = 0; - for (i = 0; i < n; i++) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_VOLATILE_ACCESS) + for (; (i + 4) <= n; i += 4) { + uint32_t x = mbedtls_get_unaligned_volatile_uint32(A + i); + uint32_t y = mbedtls_get_unaligned_volatile_uint32(B + i); + diff |= x ^ y; + } +#endif + + for (; i < n; i++) { /* Read volatile data in order before computing diff. * This avoids IAR compiler warning: * 'the order of volatile accesses is undefined ..' */ @@ -51,330 +96,119 @@ int mbedtls_ct_memcmp(const void *a, diff |= x ^ y; } - return (int) diff; -} - -unsigned mbedtls_ct_uint_mask(unsigned value) -{ - /* MSVC has a warning about unary minus on unsigned, but this is - * well-defined and precisely what we want to do here */ -#if defined(_MSC_VER) -#pragma warning( push ) -#pragma warning( disable : 4146 ) -#endif - return -((value | -value) >> (sizeof(value) * 8 - 1)); -#if defined(_MSC_VER) -#pragma warning( pop ) -#endif -} - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_MODES_USE_MAC) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_TLS_CBC) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) - -size_t mbedtls_ct_size_mask(size_t value) -{ - /* MSVC has a warning about unary minus on unsigned integer types, - * but this is well-defined and precisely what we want to do here. */ -#if defined(_MSC_VER) -#pragma warning( push ) -#pragma warning( disable : 4146 ) -#endif - return -((value | -value) >> (sizeof(value) * 8 - 1)); -#if defined(_MSC_VER) -#pragma warning( pop ) -#endif -} - -#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_MODES_USE_MAC) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_TLS_CBC) || - defined(MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) - -mbedtls_mpi_uint mbedtls_ct_mpi_uint_mask(mbedtls_mpi_uint value) -{ - /* MSVC has a warning about unary minus on unsigned, but this is - * well-defined and precisely what we want to do here */ -#if defined(_MSC_VER) -#pragma warning( push ) -#pragma warning( disable : 4146 ) -#endif - return -((value | -value) >> (sizeof(value) * 8 - 1)); -#if defined(_MSC_VER) -#pragma warning( pop ) -#endif -} - -#endif /* MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_TLS_CBC) || defined(MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) - -/** Constant-flow mask generation for "less than" comparison: - * - if \p x < \p y, return all-bits 1, that is (size_t) -1 - * - otherwise, return all bits 0, that is 0 - * - * This function can be used to write constant-time code by replacing branches - * with bit operations using masks. - * - * \param x The first value to analyze. - * \param y The second value to analyze. - * - * \return All-bits-one if \p x is less than \p y, otherwise zero. - */ -static size_t mbedtls_ct_size_mask_lt(size_t x, - size_t y) -{ - /* This has the most significant bit set if and only if x < y */ - const size_t sub = x - y; - - /* sub1 = (x < y) ? 1 : 0 */ - const size_t sub1 = sub >> (sizeof(sub) * 8 - 1); - - /* mask = (x < y) ? 0xff... : 0x00... */ - const size_t mask = mbedtls_ct_size_mask(sub1); - - return mask; -} - -size_t mbedtls_ct_size_mask_ge(size_t x, - size_t y) -{ - return ~mbedtls_ct_size_mask_lt(x, y); -} - -#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_TLS_CBC) || defined(MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C) || - defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_BASE64_C) - -/* Return 0xff if low <= c <= high, 0 otherwise. - * - * Constant flow with respect to c. - */ -MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE -unsigned char mbedtls_ct_uchar_mask_of_range(unsigned char low, - unsigned char high, - unsigned char c) -{ - /* low_mask is: 0 if low <= c, 0x...ff if low > c */ - unsigned low_mask = ((unsigned) c - low) >> 8; - /* high_mask is: 0 if c <= high, 0x...ff if c > high */ - unsigned high_mask = ((unsigned) high - c) >> 8; - return ~(low_mask | high_mask) & 0xff; -} - -#endif /* MBEDTLS_BASE64_C */ - -unsigned mbedtls_ct_size_bool_eq(size_t x, - size_t y) -{ - /* diff = 0 if x == y, non-zero otherwise */ - const size_t diff = x ^ y; - - /* MSVC has a warning about unary minus on unsigned integer types, - * but this is well-defined and precisely what we want to do here. */ -#if defined(_MSC_VER) -#pragma warning( push ) -#pragma warning( disable : 4146 ) -#endif - - /* diff_msb's most significant bit is equal to x != y */ - const size_t diff_msb = (diff | (size_t) -diff); - -#if defined(_MSC_VER) -#pragma warning( pop ) -#endif - - /* diff1 = (x != y) ? 1 : 0 */ - const unsigned diff1 = diff_msb >> (sizeof(diff_msb) * 8 - 1); - - return 1 ^ diff1; -} - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15) && defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_ALT) - -/** Constant-flow "greater than" comparison: - * return x > y - * - * This is equivalent to \p x > \p y, but is likely to be compiled - * to code using bitwise operation rather than a branch. - * - * \param x The first value to analyze. - * \param y The second value to analyze. - * - * \return 1 if \p x greater than \p y, otherwise 0. - */ -static unsigned mbedtls_ct_size_gt(size_t x, - size_t y) -{ - /* Return the sign bit (1 for negative) of (y - x). */ - return (y - x) >> (sizeof(size_t) * 8 - 1); -} - -#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 && MBEDTLS_RSA_C && ! MBEDTLS_RSA_ALT */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) - -unsigned mbedtls_ct_mpi_uint_lt(const mbedtls_mpi_uint x, - const mbedtls_mpi_uint y) -{ - mbedtls_mpi_uint ret; - mbedtls_mpi_uint cond; - - /* - * Check if the most significant bits (MSB) of the operands are different. - */ - cond = (x ^ y); - /* - * If the MSB are the same then the difference x-y will be negative (and - * have its MSB set to 1 during conversion to unsigned) if and only if x> (sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint) * 8 - 1); - - return (unsigned) ret; -} - -#endif /* MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C */ - -unsigned mbedtls_ct_uint_if(unsigned condition, - unsigned if1, - unsigned if0) -{ - unsigned mask = mbedtls_ct_uint_mask(condition); - return (mask & if1) | (~mask & if0); + return (int) ((diff & 0xffff) | (diff >> 16)); +#endif } -#if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C) -void mbedtls_ct_mpi_uint_cond_assign(size_t n, - mbedtls_mpi_uint *dest, - const mbedtls_mpi_uint *src, - unsigned char condition) +int mbedtls_ct_memcmp_partial(const void *a, + const void *b, + size_t n, + size_t skip_head, + size_t skip_tail) { - size_t i; - - /* MSVC has a warning about unary minus on unsigned integer types, - * but this is well-defined and precisely what we want to do here. */ -#if defined(_MSC_VER) -#pragma warning( push ) -#pragma warning( disable : 4146 ) -#endif + unsigned int diff = 0; - /* all-bits 1 if condition is 1, all-bits 0 if condition is 0 */ - const mbedtls_mpi_uint mask = -condition; + volatile const unsigned char *A = (volatile const unsigned char *) a; + volatile const unsigned char *B = (volatile const unsigned char *) b; -#if defined(_MSC_VER) -#pragma warning( pop ) -#endif + size_t valid_end = n - skip_tail; - for (i = 0; i < n; i++) { - dest[i] = (src[i] & mask) | (dest[i] & ~mask); + for (size_t i = 0; i < n; i++) { + unsigned char x = A[i], y = B[i]; + unsigned int d = x ^ y; + mbedtls_ct_condition_t valid = mbedtls_ct_bool_and(mbedtls_ct_uint_ge(i, skip_head), + mbedtls_ct_uint_lt(i, valid_end)); + diff |= mbedtls_ct_uint_if_else_0(valid, d); } -} - -#endif /* MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_BASE64_C) - -unsigned char mbedtls_ct_base64_enc_char(unsigned char value) -{ - unsigned char digit = 0; - /* For each range of values, if value is in that range, mask digit with - * the corresponding value. Since value can only be in a single range, - * only at most one masking will change digit. */ - digit |= mbedtls_ct_uchar_mask_of_range(0, 25, value) & ('A' + value); - digit |= mbedtls_ct_uchar_mask_of_range(26, 51, value) & ('a' + value - 26); - digit |= mbedtls_ct_uchar_mask_of_range(52, 61, value) & ('0' + value - 52); - digit |= mbedtls_ct_uchar_mask_of_range(62, 62, value) & '+'; - digit |= mbedtls_ct_uchar_mask_of_range(63, 63, value) & '/'; - return digit; -} -signed char mbedtls_ct_base64_dec_value(unsigned char c) -{ - unsigned char val = 0; - /* For each range of digits, if c is in that range, mask val with - * the corresponding value. Since c can only be in a single range, - * only at most one masking will change val. Set val to one plus - * the desired value so that it stays 0 if c is in none of the ranges. */ - val |= mbedtls_ct_uchar_mask_of_range('A', 'Z', c) & (c - 'A' + 0 + 1); - val |= mbedtls_ct_uchar_mask_of_range('a', 'z', c) & (c - 'a' + 26 + 1); - val |= mbedtls_ct_uchar_mask_of_range('0', '9', c) & (c - '0' + 52 + 1); - val |= mbedtls_ct_uchar_mask_of_range('+', '+', c) & (c - '+' + 62 + 1); - val |= mbedtls_ct_uchar_mask_of_range('/', '/', c) & (c - '/' + 63 + 1); - /* At this point, val is 0 if c is an invalid digit and v+1 if c is - * a digit with the value v. */ - return val - 1; + /* Since we go byte-by-byte, the only bits set will be in the bottom 8 bits, so the + * cast from uint to int is safe. */ + return (int) diff; } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_BASE64_C */ +#endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15) && defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_ALT) -/** Shift some data towards the left inside a buffer. - * - * `mbedtls_ct_mem_move_to_left(start, total, offset)` is functionally - * equivalent to - * ``` - * memmove(start, start + offset, total - offset); - * memset(start + offset, 0, total - offset); - * ``` - * but it strives to use a memory access pattern (and thus total timing) - * that does not depend on \p offset. This timing independence comes at - * the expense of performance. - * - * \param start Pointer to the start of the buffer. - * \param total Total size of the buffer. - * \param offset Offset from which to copy \p total - \p offset bytes. - */ -static void mbedtls_ct_mem_move_to_left(void *start, - size_t total, - size_t offset) +void mbedtls_ct_memmove_left(void *start, size_t total, size_t offset) { volatile unsigned char *buf = start; - size_t i, n; - if (total == 0) { - return; - } - for (i = 0; i < total; i++) { - unsigned no_op = mbedtls_ct_size_gt(total - offset, i); + for (size_t i = 0; i < total; i++) { + mbedtls_ct_condition_t no_op = mbedtls_ct_uint_gt(total - offset, i); /* The first `total - offset` passes are a no-op. The last * `offset` passes shift the data one byte to the left and * zero out the last byte. */ - for (n = 0; n < total - 1; n++) { + for (size_t n = 0; n < total - 1; n++) { unsigned char current = buf[n]; - unsigned char next = buf[n+1]; + unsigned char next = buf[n+1]; buf[n] = mbedtls_ct_uint_if(no_op, current, next); } - buf[total-1] = mbedtls_ct_uint_if(no_op, buf[total-1], 0); + buf[total-1] = mbedtls_ct_uint_if_else_0(no_op, buf[total-1]); } } #endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 && MBEDTLS_RSA_C && ! MBEDTLS_RSA_ALT */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_MODES_USE_MAC) -void mbedtls_ct_memcpy_if_eq(unsigned char *dest, - const unsigned char *src, - size_t len, - size_t c1, - size_t c2) -{ - /* mask = c1 == c2 ? 0xff : 0x00 */ - const size_t equal = mbedtls_ct_size_bool_eq(c1, c2); - const unsigned char mask = (unsigned char) mbedtls_ct_size_mask(equal); +void mbedtls_ct_memcpy_if(mbedtls_ct_condition_t condition, + unsigned char *dest, + const unsigned char *src1, + const unsigned char *src2, + size_t len) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CT_SIZE_64) + const uint64_t mask = (uint64_t) condition; + const uint64_t not_mask = (uint64_t) ~mbedtls_ct_compiler_opaque(condition); +#else + const uint32_t mask = (uint32_t) condition; + const uint32_t not_mask = (uint32_t) ~mbedtls_ct_compiler_opaque(condition); +#endif + + /* If src2 is NULL, setup src2 so that we read from the destination address. + * + * This means that if src2 == NULL && condition is false, the result will be a + * no-op because we read from dest and write the same data back into dest. + */ + if (src2 == NULL) { + src2 = dest; + } /* dest[i] = c1 == c2 ? src[i] : dest[i] */ - for (size_t i = 0; i < len; i++) { - dest[i] = (src[i] & mask) | (dest[i] & ~mask); + size_t i = 0; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CT_SIZE_64) + for (; (i + 8) <= len; i += 8) { + uint64_t a = mbedtls_get_unaligned_uint64(src1 + i) & mask; + uint64_t b = mbedtls_get_unaligned_uint64(src2 + i) & not_mask; + mbedtls_put_unaligned_uint64(dest + i, a | b); + } +#else + for (; (i + 4) <= len; i += 4) { + uint32_t a = mbedtls_get_unaligned_uint32(src1 + i) & mask; + uint32_t b = mbedtls_get_unaligned_uint32(src2 + i) & not_mask; + mbedtls_put_unaligned_uint32(dest + i, a | b); + } +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_CT_SIZE_64) */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS */ + for (; i < len; i++) { + dest[i] = (src1[i] & mask) | (src2[i] & not_mask); } } @@ -388,399 +222,27 @@ void mbedtls_ct_memcpy_offset(unsigned char *dest, size_t offsetval; for (offsetval = offset_min; offsetval <= offset_max; offsetval++) { - mbedtls_ct_memcpy_if_eq(dest, src + offsetval, len, - offsetval, offset); - } -} - -int mbedtls_ct_hmac(mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx, - const unsigned char *add_data, - size_t add_data_len, - const unsigned char *data, - size_t data_len_secret, - size_t min_data_len, - size_t max_data_len, - unsigned char *output) -{ - /* - * This function breaks the HMAC abstraction and uses the md_clone() - * extension to the MD API in order to get constant-flow behaviour. - * - * HMAC(msg) is defined as HASH(okey + HASH(ikey + msg)) where + means - * concatenation, and okey/ikey are the XOR of the key with some fixed bit - * patterns (see RFC 2104, sec. 2), which are stored in ctx->hmac_ctx. - * - * We'll first compute inner_hash = HASH(ikey + msg) by hashing up to - * minlen, then cloning the context, and for each byte up to maxlen - * finishing up the hash computation, keeping only the correct result. - * - * Then we only need to compute HASH(okey + inner_hash) and we're done. - */ - const mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg = mbedtls_md_get_type(ctx->md_info); - /* TLS 1.0-1.2 only support SHA-384, SHA-256, SHA-1, MD-5, - * all of which have the same block size except SHA-384. */ - const size_t block_size = md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384 ? 128 : 64; - const unsigned char * const ikey = ctx->hmac_ctx; - const unsigned char * const okey = ikey + block_size; - const size_t hash_size = mbedtls_md_get_size(ctx->md_info); - - unsigned char aux_out[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE]; - mbedtls_md_context_t aux; - size_t offset; - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - - mbedtls_md_init(&aux); - -#define MD_CHK(func_call) \ - do { \ - ret = (func_call); \ - if (ret != 0) \ - goto cleanup; \ - } while (0) - - MD_CHK(mbedtls_md_setup(&aux, ctx->md_info, 0)); - - /* After hmac_start() of hmac_reset(), ikey has already been hashed, - * so we can start directly with the message */ - MD_CHK(mbedtls_md_update(ctx, add_data, add_data_len)); - MD_CHK(mbedtls_md_update(ctx, data, min_data_len)); - - /* Fill the hash buffer in advance with something that is - * not a valid hash (barring an attack on the hash and - * deliberately-crafted input), in case the caller doesn't - * check the return status properly. */ - memset(output, '!', hash_size); - - /* For each possible length, compute the hash up to that point */ - for (offset = min_data_len; offset <= max_data_len; offset++) { - MD_CHK(mbedtls_md_clone(&aux, ctx)); - MD_CHK(mbedtls_md_finish(&aux, aux_out)); - /* Keep only the correct inner_hash in the output buffer */ - mbedtls_ct_memcpy_if_eq(output, aux_out, hash_size, - offset, data_len_secret); - - if (offset < max_data_len) { - MD_CHK(mbedtls_md_update(ctx, data + offset, 1)); - } - } - - /* The context needs to finish() before it starts() again */ - MD_CHK(mbedtls_md_finish(ctx, aux_out)); - - /* Now compute HASH(okey + inner_hash) */ - MD_CHK(mbedtls_md_starts(ctx)); - MD_CHK(mbedtls_md_update(ctx, okey, block_size)); - MD_CHK(mbedtls_md_update(ctx, output, hash_size)); - MD_CHK(mbedtls_md_finish(ctx, output)); - - /* Done, get ready for next time */ - MD_CHK(mbedtls_md_hmac_reset(ctx)); - -#undef MD_CHK - -cleanup: - mbedtls_md_free(&aux); - return ret; -} - -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_MODES_USE_MAC */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) - -#define MPI_VALIDATE_RET(cond) \ - MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE_RET(cond, MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA) - -/* - * Conditionally assign X = Y, without leaking information - * about whether the assignment was made or not. - * (Leaking information about the respective sizes of X and Y is ok however.) - */ -#if defined(_MSC_VER) && defined(_M_ARM64) && (_MSC_FULL_VER < 193131103) -/* - * MSVC miscompiles this function if it's inlined prior to Visual Studio 2022 version 17.1. See: - * https://developercommunity.visualstudio.com/t/c-compiler-miscompiles-part-of-mbedtls-library-on/1646989 - */ -__declspec(noinline) -#endif -int mbedtls_mpi_safe_cond_assign(mbedtls_mpi *X, - const mbedtls_mpi *Y, - unsigned char assign) -{ - int ret = 0; - size_t i; - mbedtls_mpi_uint limb_mask; - MPI_VALIDATE_RET(X != NULL); - MPI_VALIDATE_RET(Y != NULL); - - /* all-bits 1 if assign is 1, all-bits 0 if assign is 0 */ - limb_mask = mbedtls_ct_mpi_uint_mask(assign);; - - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_grow(X, Y->n)); - - X->s = (int) mbedtls_ct_uint_if(assign, Y->s, X->s); - - mbedtls_ct_mpi_uint_cond_assign(Y->n, X->p, Y->p, assign); - - for (i = Y->n; i < X->n; i++) { - X->p[i] &= ~limb_mask; - } - -cleanup: - return ret; -} - -/* - * Conditionally swap X and Y, without leaking information - * about whether the swap was made or not. - * Here it is not ok to simply swap the pointers, which would lead to - * different memory access patterns when X and Y are used afterwards. - */ -int mbedtls_mpi_safe_cond_swap(mbedtls_mpi *X, - mbedtls_mpi *Y, - unsigned char swap) -{ - int ret, s; - size_t i; - mbedtls_mpi_uint limb_mask; - mbedtls_mpi_uint tmp; - MPI_VALIDATE_RET(X != NULL); - MPI_VALIDATE_RET(Y != NULL); - - if (X == Y) { - return 0; + mbedtls_ct_memcpy_if(mbedtls_ct_uint_eq(offsetval, offset), dest, src + offsetval, NULL, + len); } - - /* all-bits 1 if swap is 1, all-bits 0 if swap is 0 */ - limb_mask = mbedtls_ct_mpi_uint_mask(swap); - - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_grow(X, Y->n)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_grow(Y, X->n)); - - s = X->s; - X->s = (int) mbedtls_ct_uint_if(swap, Y->s, X->s); - Y->s = (int) mbedtls_ct_uint_if(swap, s, Y->s); - - - for (i = 0; i < X->n; i++) { - tmp = X->p[i]; - X->p[i] = (X->p[i] & ~limb_mask) | (Y->p[i] & limb_mask); - Y->p[i] = (Y->p[i] & ~limb_mask) | (tmp & limb_mask); - } - -cleanup: - return ret; } -/* - * Compare signed values in constant time - */ -int mbedtls_mpi_lt_mpi_ct(const mbedtls_mpi *X, - const mbedtls_mpi *Y, - unsigned *ret) -{ - size_t i; - /* The value of any of these variables is either 0 or 1 at all times. */ - unsigned cond, done, X_is_negative, Y_is_negative; - - MPI_VALIDATE_RET(X != NULL); - MPI_VALIDATE_RET(Y != NULL); - MPI_VALIDATE_RET(ret != NULL); - - if (X->n != Y->n) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA; - } - - /* - * Set sign_N to 1 if N >= 0, 0 if N < 0. - * We know that N->s == 1 if N >= 0 and N->s == -1 if N < 0. - */ - X_is_negative = (X->s & 2) >> 1; - Y_is_negative = (Y->s & 2) >> 1; - - /* - * If the signs are different, then the positive operand is the bigger. - * That is if X is negative (X_is_negative == 1), then X < Y is true and it - * is false if X is positive (X_is_negative == 0). - */ - cond = (X_is_negative ^ Y_is_negative); - *ret = cond & X_is_negative; - - /* - * This is a constant-time function. We might have the result, but we still - * need to go through the loop. Record if we have the result already. - */ - done = cond; - - for (i = X->n; i > 0; i--) { - /* - * If Y->p[i - 1] < X->p[i - 1] then X < Y is true if and only if both - * X and Y are negative. - * - * Again even if we can make a decision, we just mark the result and - * the fact that we are done and continue looping. - */ - cond = mbedtls_ct_mpi_uint_lt(Y->p[i - 1], X->p[i - 1]); - *ret |= cond & (1 - done) & X_is_negative; - done |= cond; - - /* - * If X->p[i - 1] < Y->p[i - 1] then X < Y is true if and only if both - * X and Y are positive. - * - * Again even if we can make a decision, we just mark the result and - * the fact that we are done and continue looping. - */ - cond = mbedtls_ct_mpi_uint_lt(X->p[i - 1], Y->p[i - 1]); - *ret |= cond & (1 - done) & (1 - X_is_negative); - done |= cond; - } - - return 0; -} - -#endif /* MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C */ - #if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15) && defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_ALT) -int mbedtls_ct_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_unpadding(int mode, - unsigned char *input, - size_t ilen, - unsigned char *output, - size_t output_max_len, - size_t *olen) +void mbedtls_ct_zeroize_if(mbedtls_ct_condition_t condition, void *buf, size_t len) { - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - size_t i, plaintext_max_size; - - /* The following variables take sensitive values: their value must - * not leak into the observable behavior of the function other than - * the designated outputs (output, olen, return value). Otherwise - * this would open the execution of the function to - * side-channel-based variants of the Bleichenbacher padding oracle - * attack. Potential side channels include overall timing, memory - * access patterns (especially visible to an adversary who has access - * to a shared memory cache), and branches (especially visible to - * an adversary who has access to a shared code cache or to a shared - * branch predictor). */ - size_t pad_count = 0; - unsigned bad = 0; - unsigned char pad_done = 0; - size_t plaintext_size = 0; - unsigned output_too_large; - - plaintext_max_size = (output_max_len > ilen - 11) ? ilen - 11 - : output_max_len; - - /* Check and get padding length in constant time and constant - * memory trace. The first byte must be 0. */ - bad |= input[0]; - - if (mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE) { - /* Decode EME-PKCS1-v1_5 padding: 0x00 || 0x02 || PS || 0x00 - * where PS must be at least 8 nonzero bytes. */ - bad |= input[1] ^ MBEDTLS_RSA_CRYPT; - - /* Read the whole buffer. Set pad_done to nonzero if we find - * the 0x00 byte and remember the padding length in pad_count. */ - for (i = 2; i < ilen; i++) { - pad_done |= ((input[i] | (unsigned char) -input[i]) >> 7) ^ 1; - pad_count += ((pad_done | (unsigned char) -pad_done) >> 7) ^ 1; - } - } else { - /* Decode EMSA-PKCS1-v1_5 padding: 0x00 || 0x01 || PS || 0x00 - * where PS must be at least 8 bytes with the value 0xFF. */ - bad |= input[1] ^ MBEDTLS_RSA_SIGN; - - /* Read the whole buffer. Set pad_done to nonzero if we find - * the 0x00 byte and remember the padding length in pad_count. - * If there's a non-0xff byte in the padding, the padding is bad. */ - for (i = 2; i < ilen; i++) { - pad_done |= mbedtls_ct_uint_if(input[i], 0, 1); - pad_count += mbedtls_ct_uint_if(pad_done, 0, 1); - bad |= mbedtls_ct_uint_if(pad_done, 0, input[i] ^ 0xFF); - } + uint32_t mask = (uint32_t) ~condition; + uint8_t *p = (uint8_t *) buf; + size_t i = 0; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS) + for (; (i + 4) <= len; i += 4) { + mbedtls_put_unaligned_uint32((void *) (p + i), + mbedtls_get_unaligned_uint32((void *) (p + i)) & mask); } - - /* If pad_done is still zero, there's no data, only unfinished padding. */ - bad |= mbedtls_ct_uint_if(pad_done, 0, 1); - - /* There must be at least 8 bytes of padding. */ - bad |= mbedtls_ct_size_gt(8, pad_count); - - /* If the padding is valid, set plaintext_size to the number of - * remaining bytes after stripping the padding. If the padding - * is invalid, avoid leaking this fact through the size of the - * output: use the maximum message size that fits in the output - * buffer. Do it without branches to avoid leaking the padding - * validity through timing. RSA keys are small enough that all the - * size_t values involved fit in unsigned int. */ - plaintext_size = mbedtls_ct_uint_if( - bad, (unsigned) plaintext_max_size, - (unsigned) (ilen - pad_count - 3)); - - /* Set output_too_large to 0 if the plaintext fits in the output - * buffer and to 1 otherwise. */ - output_too_large = mbedtls_ct_size_gt(plaintext_size, - plaintext_max_size); - - /* Set ret without branches to avoid timing attacks. Return: - * - INVALID_PADDING if the padding is bad (bad != 0). - * - OUTPUT_TOO_LARGE if the padding is good but the decrypted - * plaintext does not fit in the output buffer. - * - 0 if the padding is correct. */ - ret = -(int) mbedtls_ct_uint_if( - bad, -MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING, - mbedtls_ct_uint_if(output_too_large, - -MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_OUTPUT_TOO_LARGE, - 0)); - - /* If the padding is bad or the plaintext is too large, zero the - * data that we're about to copy to the output buffer. - * We need to copy the same amount of data - * from the same buffer whether the padding is good or not to - * avoid leaking the padding validity through overall timing or - * through memory or cache access patterns. */ - bad = mbedtls_ct_uint_mask(bad | output_too_large); - for (i = 11; i < ilen; i++) { - input[i] &= ~bad; - } - - /* If the plaintext is too large, truncate it to the buffer size. - * Copy anyway to avoid revealing the length through timing, because - * revealing the length is as bad as revealing the padding validity - * for a Bleichenbacher attack. */ - plaintext_size = mbedtls_ct_uint_if(output_too_large, - (unsigned) plaintext_max_size, - (unsigned) plaintext_size); - - /* Move the plaintext to the leftmost position where it can start in - * the working buffer, i.e. make it start plaintext_max_size from - * the end of the buffer. Do this with a memory access trace that - * does not depend on the plaintext size. After this move, the - * starting location of the plaintext is no longer sensitive - * information. */ - mbedtls_ct_mem_move_to_left(input + ilen - plaintext_max_size, - plaintext_max_size, - plaintext_max_size - plaintext_size); - - /* Finally copy the decrypted plaintext plus trailing zeros into the output - * buffer. If output_max_len is 0, then output may be an invalid pointer - * and the result of memcpy() would be undefined; prevent undefined - * behavior making sure to depend only on output_max_len (the size of the - * user-provided output buffer), which is independent from plaintext - * length, validity of padding, success of the decryption, and other - * secrets. */ - if (output_max_len != 0) { - memcpy(output, input + ilen - plaintext_max_size, plaintext_max_size); +#endif + for (; i < len; i++) { + p[i] = p[i] & mask; } - - /* Report the amount of data we copied to the output buffer. In case - * of errors (bad padding or output too large), the value of *olen - * when this function returns is not specified. Making it equivalent - * to the good case limits the risks of leaking the padding validity. */ - *olen = plaintext_size; - - return ret; } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 && MBEDTLS_RSA_C && ! MBEDTLS_RSA_ALT */ +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15) && defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_ALT) */ diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/constant_time_impl.h b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/constant_time_impl.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..2a4574ba68f4 --- /dev/null +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/constant_time_impl.h @@ -0,0 +1,556 @@ +/** + * Constant-time functions + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +#ifndef MBEDTLS_CONSTANT_TIME_IMPL_H +#define MBEDTLS_CONSTANT_TIME_IMPL_H + +#include + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) +#include "mbedtls/bignum.h" +#endif + +/* + * To improve readability of constant_time_internal.h, the static inline + * definitions are here, and constant_time_internal.h has only the declarations. + * + * This results in duplicate declarations of the form: + * static inline void f(); // from constant_time_internal.h + * static inline void f() { ... } // from constant_time_impl.h + * when constant_time_internal.h is included. + * + * This appears to behave as if the declaration-without-definition was not present + * (except for warnings if gcc -Wredundant-decls or similar is used). + * + * Disable -Wredundant-decls so that gcc does not warn about this. This is re-enabled + * at the bottom of this file. + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_COMPILER_IS_GCC) && (__GNUC__ > 4) + #pragma GCC diagnostic push + #pragma GCC diagnostic ignored "-Wredundant-decls" +#endif + +/* Disable asm under Memsan because it confuses Memsan and generates false errors. + * + * We also disable under Valgrind by default, because it's more useful + * for Valgrind to test the plain C implementation. MBEDTLS_TEST_CONSTANT_FLOW_ASM //no-check-names + * may be set to permit building asm under Valgrind. + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_CONSTANT_FLOW_MEMSAN) || \ + (defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_CONSTANT_FLOW_VALGRIND) && !defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_CONSTANT_FLOW_ASM)) //no-check-names +#define MBEDTLS_CT_NO_ASM +#elif defined(__has_feature) +#if __has_feature(memory_sanitizer) +#define MBEDTLS_CT_NO_ASM +#endif +#endif + +/* armcc5 --gnu defines __GNUC__ but doesn't support GNU's extended asm */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM) && defined(__GNUC__) && (!defined(__ARMCC_VERSION) || \ + __ARMCC_VERSION >= 6000000) && !defined(MBEDTLS_CT_NO_ASM) +#define MBEDTLS_CT_ASM +#if (defined(__arm__) || defined(__thumb__) || defined(__thumb2__)) +#define MBEDTLS_CT_ARM_ASM +#elif defined(__aarch64__) +#define MBEDTLS_CT_AARCH64_ASM +#elif defined(__amd64__) || defined(__x86_64__) +#define MBEDTLS_CT_X86_64_ASM +#elif defined(__i386__) +#define MBEDTLS_CT_X86_ASM +#endif +#endif + +#define MBEDTLS_CT_SIZE (sizeof(mbedtls_ct_uint_t) * 8) + + +/* ============================================================================ + * Core const-time primitives + */ + +/* Ensure that the compiler cannot know the value of x (i.e., cannot optimise + * based on its value) after this function is called. + * + * If we are not using assembly, this will be fairly inefficient, so its use + * should be minimised. + */ + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CT_ASM) +extern volatile mbedtls_ct_uint_t mbedtls_ct_zero; +#endif + +/** + * \brief Ensure that a value cannot be known at compile time. + * + * \param x The value to hide from the compiler. + * \return The same value that was passed in, such that the compiler + * cannot prove its value (even for calls of the form + * x = mbedtls_ct_compiler_opaque(1), x will be unknown). + * + * \note This is mainly used in constructing mbedtls_ct_condition_t + * values and performing operations over them, to ensure that + * there is no way for the compiler to ever know anything about + * the value of an mbedtls_ct_condition_t. + */ +static inline mbedtls_ct_uint_t mbedtls_ct_compiler_opaque(mbedtls_ct_uint_t x) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CT_ASM) + asm volatile ("" : [x] "+r" (x) :); + return x; +#else + return x ^ mbedtls_ct_zero; +#endif +} + +/* + * Selecting unified syntax is needed for gcc, and harmless on clang. + * + * This is needed because on Thumb 1, condition flags are always set, so + * e.g. "negs" is supported but "neg" is not (on Thumb 2, both exist). + * + * Under Thumb 1 unified syntax, only the "negs" form is accepted, and + * under divided syntax, only the "neg" form is accepted. clang only + * supports unified syntax. + * + * On Thumb 2 and Arm, both compilers are happy with the "s" suffix, + * although we don't actually care about setting the flags. + * + * For old versions of gcc (see #8516 for details), restore divided + * syntax afterwards - otherwise old versions of gcc seem to apply + * unified syntax globally, which breaks other asm code. + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_COMPILER_IS_GCC) && defined(__thumb__) && !defined(__thumb2__) && \ + (__GNUC__ < 11) && !defined(__ARM_ARCH_2__) +#define RESTORE_ASM_SYNTAX ".syntax divided \n\t" +#else +#define RESTORE_ASM_SYNTAX +#endif + +/* Convert a number into a condition in constant time. */ +static inline mbedtls_ct_condition_t mbedtls_ct_bool(mbedtls_ct_uint_t x) +{ + /* + * Define mask-generation code that, as far as possible, will not use branches or conditional instructions. + * + * For some platforms / type sizes, we define assembly to assure this. + * + * Otherwise, we define a plain C fallback which (in May 2023) does not get optimised into + * conditional instructions or branches by trunk clang, gcc, or MSVC v19. + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CT_AARCH64_ASM) && (defined(MBEDTLS_CT_SIZE_32) || defined(MBEDTLS_CT_SIZE_64)) + mbedtls_ct_uint_t s; + asm volatile ("neg %x[s], %x[x] \n\t" + "orr %x[x], %x[s], %x[x] \n\t" + "asr %x[x], %x[x], 63 \n\t" + : + [s] "=&r" (s), + [x] "+&r" (x) + : + : + ); + return (mbedtls_ct_condition_t) x; +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_CT_ARM_ASM) && defined(MBEDTLS_CT_SIZE_32) + uint32_t s; + asm volatile (".syntax unified \n\t" + "negs %[s], %[x] \n\t" + "orrs %[x], %[x], %[s] \n\t" + "asrs %[x], %[x], #31 \n\t" + RESTORE_ASM_SYNTAX + : + [s] "=&l" (s), + [x] "+&l" (x) + : + : + "cc" /* clobbers flag bits */ + ); + return (mbedtls_ct_condition_t) x; +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_CT_X86_64_ASM) && (defined(MBEDTLS_CT_SIZE_32) || defined(MBEDTLS_CT_SIZE_64)) + uint64_t s; + asm volatile ("mov %[x], %[s] \n\t" + "neg %[s] \n\t" + "or %[x], %[s] \n\t" + "sar $63, %[s] \n\t" + : + [s] "=&a" (s) + : + [x] "D" (x) + : + ); + return (mbedtls_ct_condition_t) s; +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_CT_X86_ASM) && defined(MBEDTLS_CT_SIZE_32) + uint32_t s; + asm volatile ("mov %[x], %[s] \n\t" + "neg %[s] \n\t" + "or %[s], %[x] \n\t" + "sar $31, %[x] \n\t" + : + [s] "=&c" (s), + [x] "+&a" (x) + : + : + ); + return (mbedtls_ct_condition_t) x; +#else + const mbedtls_ct_uint_t xo = mbedtls_ct_compiler_opaque(x); +#if defined(_MSC_VER) + /* MSVC has a warning about unary minus on unsigned, but this is + * well-defined and precisely what we want to do here */ +#pragma warning( push ) +#pragma warning( disable : 4146 ) +#endif + // y is negative (i.e., top bit set) iff x is non-zero + mbedtls_ct_int_t y = (-xo) | -(xo >> 1); + + // extract only the sign bit of y so that y == 1 (if x is non-zero) or 0 (if x is zero) + y = (((mbedtls_ct_uint_t) y) >> (MBEDTLS_CT_SIZE - 1)); + + // -y has all bits set (if x is non-zero), or all bits clear (if x is zero) + return (mbedtls_ct_condition_t) (-y); +#if defined(_MSC_VER) +#pragma warning( pop ) +#endif +#endif +} + +static inline mbedtls_ct_uint_t mbedtls_ct_if(mbedtls_ct_condition_t condition, + mbedtls_ct_uint_t if1, + mbedtls_ct_uint_t if0) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CT_AARCH64_ASM) && (defined(MBEDTLS_CT_SIZE_32) || defined(MBEDTLS_CT_SIZE_64)) + asm volatile ("and %x[if1], %x[if1], %x[condition] \n\t" + "mvn %x[condition], %x[condition] \n\t" + "and %x[condition], %x[condition], %x[if0] \n\t" + "orr %x[condition], %x[if1], %x[condition]" + : + [condition] "+&r" (condition), + [if1] "+&r" (if1) + : + [if0] "r" (if0) + : + ); + return (mbedtls_ct_uint_t) condition; +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_CT_ARM_ASM) && defined(MBEDTLS_CT_SIZE_32) + asm volatile (".syntax unified \n\t" + "ands %[if1], %[if1], %[condition] \n\t" + "mvns %[condition], %[condition] \n\t" + "ands %[condition], %[condition], %[if0] \n\t" + "orrs %[condition], %[if1], %[condition] \n\t" + RESTORE_ASM_SYNTAX + : + [condition] "+&l" (condition), + [if1] "+&l" (if1) + : + [if0] "l" (if0) + : + "cc" + ); + return (mbedtls_ct_uint_t) condition; +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_CT_X86_64_ASM) && (defined(MBEDTLS_CT_SIZE_32) || defined(MBEDTLS_CT_SIZE_64)) + asm volatile ("and %[condition], %[if1] \n\t" + "not %[condition] \n\t" + "and %[condition], %[if0] \n\t" + "or %[if1], %[if0] \n\t" + : + [condition] "+&D" (condition), + [if1] "+&S" (if1), + [if0] "+&a" (if0) + : + : + ); + return if0; +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_CT_X86_ASM) && defined(MBEDTLS_CT_SIZE_32) + asm volatile ("and %[condition], %[if1] \n\t" + "not %[condition] \n\t" + "and %[if0], %[condition] \n\t" + "or %[condition], %[if1] \n\t" + : + [condition] "+&c" (condition), + [if1] "+&a" (if1) + : + [if0] "b" (if0) + : + ); + return if1; +#else + mbedtls_ct_condition_t not_cond = + (mbedtls_ct_condition_t) (~mbedtls_ct_compiler_opaque(condition)); + return (mbedtls_ct_uint_t) ((condition & if1) | (not_cond & if0)); +#endif +} + +static inline mbedtls_ct_condition_t mbedtls_ct_uint_lt(mbedtls_ct_uint_t x, mbedtls_ct_uint_t y) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CT_AARCH64_ASM) && (defined(MBEDTLS_CT_SIZE_32) || defined(MBEDTLS_CT_SIZE_64)) + uint64_t s1; + asm volatile ("eor %x[s1], %x[y], %x[x] \n\t" + "sub %x[x], %x[x], %x[y] \n\t" + "bic %x[x], %x[x], %x[s1] \n\t" + "and %x[s1], %x[s1], %x[y] \n\t" + "orr %x[s1], %x[x], %x[s1] \n\t" + "asr %x[x], %x[s1], 63" + : + [s1] "=&r" (s1), + [x] "+&r" (x) + : + [y] "r" (y) + : + ); + return (mbedtls_ct_condition_t) x; +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_CT_ARM_ASM) && defined(MBEDTLS_CT_SIZE_32) + uint32_t s1; + asm volatile ( + ".syntax unified \n\t" +#if defined(__thumb__) && !defined(__thumb2__) + "movs %[s1], %[x] \n\t" + "eors %[s1], %[s1], %[y] \n\t" +#else + "eors %[s1], %[x], %[y] \n\t" +#endif + "subs %[x], %[x], %[y] \n\t" + "bics %[x], %[x], %[s1] \n\t" + "ands %[y], %[s1], %[y] \n\t" + "orrs %[x], %[x], %[y] \n\t" + "asrs %[x], %[x], #31 \n\t" + RESTORE_ASM_SYNTAX + : + [s1] "=&l" (s1), + [x] "+&l" (x), + [y] "+&l" (y) + : + : + "cc" + ); + return (mbedtls_ct_condition_t) x; +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_CT_X86_64_ASM) && (defined(MBEDTLS_CT_SIZE_32) || defined(MBEDTLS_CT_SIZE_64)) + uint64_t s; + asm volatile ("mov %[x], %[s] \n\t" + "xor %[y], %[s] \n\t" + "sub %[y], %[x] \n\t" + "and %[s], %[y] \n\t" + "not %[s] \n\t" + "and %[s], %[x] \n\t" + "or %[y], %[x] \n\t" + "sar $63, %[x] \n\t" + : + [s] "=&a" (s), + [x] "+&D" (x), + [y] "+&S" (y) + : + : + ); + return (mbedtls_ct_condition_t) x; +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_CT_X86_ASM) && defined(MBEDTLS_CT_SIZE_32) + uint32_t s; + asm volatile ("mov %[x], %[s] \n\t" + "xor %[y], %[s] \n\t" + "sub %[y], %[x] \n\t" + "and %[s], %[y] \n\t" + "not %[s] \n\t" + "and %[s], %[x] \n\t" + "or %[y], %[x] \n\t" + "sar $31, %[x] \n\t" + : + [s] "=&b" (s), + [x] "+&a" (x), + [y] "+&c" (y) + : + : + ); + return (mbedtls_ct_condition_t) x; +#else + /* Ensure that the compiler cannot optimise the following operations over x and y, + * even if it knows the value of x and y. + */ + const mbedtls_ct_uint_t xo = mbedtls_ct_compiler_opaque(x); + const mbedtls_ct_uint_t yo = mbedtls_ct_compiler_opaque(y); + /* + * Check if the most significant bits (MSB) of the operands are different. + * cond is true iff the MSBs differ. + */ + mbedtls_ct_condition_t cond = mbedtls_ct_bool((xo ^ yo) >> (MBEDTLS_CT_SIZE - 1)); + + /* + * If the MSB are the same then the difference x-y will be negative (and + * have its MSB set to 1 during conversion to unsigned) if and only if x> (MBEDTLS_CT_SIZE - 1); + + // Convert to a condition (i.e., all bits set iff non-zero) + return mbedtls_ct_bool(ret); +#endif +} + +static inline mbedtls_ct_condition_t mbedtls_ct_uint_ne(mbedtls_ct_uint_t x, mbedtls_ct_uint_t y) +{ + /* diff = 0 if x == y, non-zero otherwise */ + const mbedtls_ct_uint_t diff = mbedtls_ct_compiler_opaque(x) ^ mbedtls_ct_compiler_opaque(y); + + /* all ones if x != y, 0 otherwise */ + return mbedtls_ct_bool(diff); +} + +static inline unsigned char mbedtls_ct_uchar_in_range_if(unsigned char low, + unsigned char high, + unsigned char c, + unsigned char t) +{ + const unsigned char co = (unsigned char) mbedtls_ct_compiler_opaque(c); + const unsigned char to = (unsigned char) mbedtls_ct_compiler_opaque(t); + + /* low_mask is: 0 if low <= c, 0x...ff if low > c */ + unsigned low_mask = ((unsigned) co - low) >> 8; + /* high_mask is: 0 if c <= high, 0x...ff if c > high */ + unsigned high_mask = ((unsigned) high - co) >> 8; + + return (unsigned char) (~(low_mask | high_mask)) & to; +} + +/* ============================================================================ + * Everything below here is trivial wrapper functions + */ + +static inline size_t mbedtls_ct_size_if(mbedtls_ct_condition_t condition, + size_t if1, + size_t if0) +{ + return (size_t) mbedtls_ct_if(condition, (mbedtls_ct_uint_t) if1, (mbedtls_ct_uint_t) if0); +} + +static inline unsigned mbedtls_ct_uint_if(mbedtls_ct_condition_t condition, + unsigned if1, + unsigned if0) +{ + return (unsigned) mbedtls_ct_if(condition, (mbedtls_ct_uint_t) if1, (mbedtls_ct_uint_t) if0); +} + +static inline mbedtls_ct_condition_t mbedtls_ct_bool_if(mbedtls_ct_condition_t condition, + mbedtls_ct_condition_t if1, + mbedtls_ct_condition_t if0) +{ + return (mbedtls_ct_condition_t) mbedtls_ct_if(condition, (mbedtls_ct_uint_t) if1, + (mbedtls_ct_uint_t) if0); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) + +static inline mbedtls_mpi_uint mbedtls_ct_mpi_uint_if(mbedtls_ct_condition_t condition, + mbedtls_mpi_uint if1, + mbedtls_mpi_uint if0) +{ + return (mbedtls_mpi_uint) mbedtls_ct_if(condition, + (mbedtls_ct_uint_t) if1, + (mbedtls_ct_uint_t) if0); +} + +#endif + +static inline size_t mbedtls_ct_size_if_else_0(mbedtls_ct_condition_t condition, size_t if1) +{ + return (size_t) (condition & if1); +} + +static inline unsigned mbedtls_ct_uint_if_else_0(mbedtls_ct_condition_t condition, unsigned if1) +{ + return (unsigned) (condition & if1); +} + +static inline mbedtls_ct_condition_t mbedtls_ct_bool_if_else_0(mbedtls_ct_condition_t condition, + mbedtls_ct_condition_t if1) +{ + return (mbedtls_ct_condition_t) (condition & if1); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) + +static inline mbedtls_mpi_uint mbedtls_ct_mpi_uint_if_else_0(mbedtls_ct_condition_t condition, + mbedtls_mpi_uint if1) +{ + return (mbedtls_mpi_uint) (condition & if1); +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C */ + +static inline int mbedtls_ct_error_if(mbedtls_ct_condition_t condition, int if1, int if0) +{ + /* Coverting int -> uint -> int here is safe, because we require if1 and if0 to be + * in the range -32767..0, and we require 32-bit int and uint types. + * + * This means that (0 <= -if0 < INT_MAX), so negating if0 is safe, and similarly for + * converting back to int. + */ + return -((int) mbedtls_ct_if(condition, (mbedtls_ct_uint_t) (-if1), + (mbedtls_ct_uint_t) (-if0))); +} + +static inline int mbedtls_ct_error_if_else_0(mbedtls_ct_condition_t condition, int if1) +{ + return -((int) (condition & (-if1))); +} + +static inline mbedtls_ct_condition_t mbedtls_ct_uint_eq(mbedtls_ct_uint_t x, + mbedtls_ct_uint_t y) +{ + return ~mbedtls_ct_uint_ne(x, y); +} + +static inline mbedtls_ct_condition_t mbedtls_ct_uint_gt(mbedtls_ct_uint_t x, + mbedtls_ct_uint_t y) +{ + return mbedtls_ct_uint_lt(y, x); +} + +static inline mbedtls_ct_condition_t mbedtls_ct_uint_ge(mbedtls_ct_uint_t x, + mbedtls_ct_uint_t y) +{ + return ~mbedtls_ct_uint_lt(x, y); +} + +static inline mbedtls_ct_condition_t mbedtls_ct_uint_le(mbedtls_ct_uint_t x, + mbedtls_ct_uint_t y) +{ + return ~mbedtls_ct_uint_gt(x, y); +} + +static inline mbedtls_ct_condition_t mbedtls_ct_bool_ne(mbedtls_ct_condition_t x, + mbedtls_ct_condition_t y) +{ + return (mbedtls_ct_condition_t) (x ^ y); +} + +static inline mbedtls_ct_condition_t mbedtls_ct_bool_and(mbedtls_ct_condition_t x, + mbedtls_ct_condition_t y) +{ + return (mbedtls_ct_condition_t) (x & y); +} + +static inline mbedtls_ct_condition_t mbedtls_ct_bool_or(mbedtls_ct_condition_t x, + mbedtls_ct_condition_t y) +{ + return (mbedtls_ct_condition_t) (x | y); +} + +static inline mbedtls_ct_condition_t mbedtls_ct_bool_not(mbedtls_ct_condition_t x) +{ + return (mbedtls_ct_condition_t) (~x); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_COMPILER_IS_GCC) && (__GNUC__ > 4) +/* Restore warnings for -Wredundant-decls on gcc */ + #pragma GCC diagnostic pop +#endif + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CONSTANT_TIME_IMPL_H */ diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/constant_time_internal.h b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/constant_time_internal.h index 82e65cc02826..61a5c6d4e952 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/constant_time_internal.h +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/constant_time_internal.h @@ -8,209 +8,506 @@ #ifndef MBEDTLS_CONSTANT_TIME_INTERNAL_H #define MBEDTLS_CONSTANT_TIME_INTERNAL_H +#include +#include + #include "common.h" #if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) #include "mbedtls/bignum.h" #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C) -#include "mbedtls/ssl_internal.h" +/* The constant-time interface provides various operations that are likely + * to result in constant-time code that does not branch or use conditional + * instructions for secret data (for secret pointers, this also applies to + * the data pointed to). + * + * It has three main parts: + * + * - boolean operations + * These are all named mbedtls_ct__. + * They operate over and return mbedtls_ct_condition_t. + * All arguments are considered secret. + * example: bool x = y | z => x = mbedtls_ct_bool_or(y, z) + * example: bool x = y == z => x = mbedtls_ct_uint_eq(y, z) + * + * - conditional data selection + * These are all named mbedtls_ct__if and mbedtls_ct__if_else_0 + * All arguments are considered secret. + * example: size_t a = x ? b : c => a = mbedtls_ct_size_if(x, b, c) + * example: unsigned a = x ? b : 0 => a = mbedtls_ct_uint_if_else_0(x, b) + * + * - block memory operations + * Only some arguments are considered secret, as documented for each + * function. + * example: if (x) memcpy(...) => mbedtls_ct_memcpy_if(x, ...) + * + * mbedtls_ct_condition_t must be treated as opaque and only created and + * manipulated via the functions in this header. The compiler should never + * be able to prove anything about its value at compile-time. + * + * mbedtls_ct_uint_t is an unsigned integer type over which constant time + * operations may be performed via the functions in this header. It is as big + * as the larger of size_t and mbedtls_mpi_uint, i.e. it is safe to cast + * to/from "unsigned int", "size_t", and "mbedtls_mpi_uint" (and any other + * not-larger integer types). + * + * For Arm (32-bit, 64-bit and Thumb), x86 and x86-64, assembly implementations + * are used to ensure that the generated code is constant time. For other + * architectures, it uses a plain C fallback designed to yield constant-time code + * (this has been observed to be constant-time on latest gcc, clang and MSVC + * as of May 2023). + * + * For readability, the static inline definitions are separated out into + * constant_time_impl.h. + */ + +#if (SIZE_MAX > 0xffffffffffffffffULL) +/* Pointer size > 64-bit */ +typedef size_t mbedtls_ct_condition_t; +typedef size_t mbedtls_ct_uint_t; +typedef ptrdiff_t mbedtls_ct_int_t; +#define MBEDTLS_CT_TRUE ((mbedtls_ct_condition_t) mbedtls_ct_compiler_opaque(SIZE_MAX)) +#elif (SIZE_MAX > 0xffffffff) || defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT64) +/* 32-bit < pointer size <= 64-bit, or 64-bit MPI */ +typedef uint64_t mbedtls_ct_condition_t; +typedef uint64_t mbedtls_ct_uint_t; +typedef int64_t mbedtls_ct_int_t; +#define MBEDTLS_CT_SIZE_64 +#define MBEDTLS_CT_TRUE ((mbedtls_ct_condition_t) mbedtls_ct_compiler_opaque(UINT64_MAX)) +#else +/* Pointer size <= 32-bit, and no 64-bit MPIs */ +typedef uint32_t mbedtls_ct_condition_t; +typedef uint32_t mbedtls_ct_uint_t; +typedef int32_t mbedtls_ct_int_t; +#define MBEDTLS_CT_SIZE_32 +#define MBEDTLS_CT_TRUE ((mbedtls_ct_condition_t) mbedtls_ct_compiler_opaque(UINT32_MAX)) #endif +#define MBEDTLS_CT_FALSE ((mbedtls_ct_condition_t) mbedtls_ct_compiler_opaque(0)) -#include +/* ============================================================================ + * Boolean operations + */ -/** Turn a value into a mask: - * - if \p value == 0, return the all-bits 0 mask, aka 0 - * - otherwise, return the all-bits 1 mask, aka (unsigned) -1 +/** Convert a number into a mbedtls_ct_condition_t. * - * This function can be used to write constant-time code by replacing branches - * with bit operations using masks. + * \param x Number to convert. * - * \param value The value to analyze. + * \return MBEDTLS_CT_TRUE if \p x != 0, or MBEDTLS_CT_FALSE if \p x == 0 * - * \return Zero if \p value is zero, otherwise all-bits-one. */ -unsigned mbedtls_ct_uint_mask(unsigned value); - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_MODES_USE_MAC) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_TLS_CBC) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) +static inline mbedtls_ct_condition_t mbedtls_ct_bool(mbedtls_ct_uint_t x); -/** Turn a value into a mask: - * - if \p value == 0, return the all-bits 0 mask, aka 0 - * - otherwise, return the all-bits 1 mask, aka (size_t) -1 +/** Boolean "not equal" operation. * - * This function can be used to write constant-time code by replacing branches - * with bit operations using masks. + * Functionally equivalent to: * - * \param value The value to analyze. + * \p x != \p y + * + * \param x The first value to analyze. + * \param y The second value to analyze. * - * \return Zero if \p value is zero, otherwise all-bits-one. + * \return MBEDTLS_CT_TRUE if \p x != \p y, otherwise MBEDTLS_CT_FALSE. */ -size_t mbedtls_ct_size_mask(size_t value); +static inline mbedtls_ct_condition_t mbedtls_ct_uint_ne(mbedtls_ct_uint_t x, mbedtls_ct_uint_t y); -#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_MODES_USE_MAC) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_TLS_CBC) || - defined(MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) */ +/** Boolean "equals" operation. + * + * Functionally equivalent to: + * + * \p x == \p y + * + * \param x The first value to analyze. + * \param y The second value to analyze. + * + * \return MBEDTLS_CT_TRUE if \p x == \p y, otherwise MBEDTLS_CT_FALSE. + */ +static inline mbedtls_ct_condition_t mbedtls_ct_uint_eq(mbedtls_ct_uint_t x, + mbedtls_ct_uint_t y); -#if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) +/** Boolean "less than" operation. + * + * Functionally equivalent to: + * + * \p x < \p y + * + * \param x The first value to analyze. + * \param y The second value to analyze. + * + * \return MBEDTLS_CT_TRUE if \p x < \p y, otherwise MBEDTLS_CT_FALSE. + */ +static inline mbedtls_ct_condition_t mbedtls_ct_uint_lt(mbedtls_ct_uint_t x, mbedtls_ct_uint_t y); -/** Turn a value into a mask: - * - if \p value == 0, return the all-bits 0 mask, aka 0 - * - otherwise, return the all-bits 1 mask, aka (mbedtls_mpi_uint) -1 +/** Boolean "greater than" operation. * - * This function can be used to write constant-time code by replacing branches - * with bit operations using masks. + * Functionally equivalent to: * - * \param value The value to analyze. + * \p x > \p y + * + * \param x The first value to analyze. + * \param y The second value to analyze. * - * \return Zero if \p value is zero, otherwise all-bits-one. + * \return MBEDTLS_CT_TRUE if \p x > \p y, otherwise MBEDTLS_CT_FALSE. */ -mbedtls_mpi_uint mbedtls_ct_mpi_uint_mask(mbedtls_mpi_uint value); +static inline mbedtls_ct_condition_t mbedtls_ct_uint_gt(mbedtls_ct_uint_t x, + mbedtls_ct_uint_t y); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C */ +/** Boolean "greater or equal" operation. + * + * Functionally equivalent to: + * + * \p x >= \p y + * + * \param x The first value to analyze. + * \param y The second value to analyze. + * + * \return MBEDTLS_CT_TRUE if \p x >= \p y, + * otherwise MBEDTLS_CT_FALSE. + */ +static inline mbedtls_ct_condition_t mbedtls_ct_uint_ge(mbedtls_ct_uint_t x, + mbedtls_ct_uint_t y); -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_TLS_CBC) || defined(MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) +/** Boolean "less than or equal" operation. + * + * Functionally equivalent to: + * + * \p x <= \p y + * + * \param x The first value to analyze. + * \param y The second value to analyze. + * + * \return MBEDTLS_CT_TRUE if \p x <= \p y, + * otherwise MBEDTLS_CT_FALSE. + */ +static inline mbedtls_ct_condition_t mbedtls_ct_uint_le(mbedtls_ct_uint_t x, + mbedtls_ct_uint_t y); -/** Constant-flow mask generation for "greater or equal" comparison: - * - if \p x >= \p y, return all-bits 1, that is (size_t) -1 - * - otherwise, return all bits 0, that is 0 +/** Boolean not-equals operation. + * + * Functionally equivalent to: * - * This function can be used to write constant-time code by replacing branches - * with bit operations using masks. + * \p x != \p y * * \param x The first value to analyze. * \param y The second value to analyze. * - * \return All-bits-one if \p x is greater or equal than \p y, - * otherwise zero. + * \note This is more efficient than mbedtls_ct_uint_ne if both arguments are + * mbedtls_ct_condition_t. + * + * \return MBEDTLS_CT_TRUE if \p x != \p y, + * otherwise MBEDTLS_CT_FALSE. */ -size_t mbedtls_ct_size_mask_ge(size_t x, - size_t y); +static inline mbedtls_ct_condition_t mbedtls_ct_bool_ne(mbedtls_ct_condition_t x, + mbedtls_ct_condition_t y); -#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_TLS_CBC) || defined(MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C) || - defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) */ +/** Boolean "and" operation. + * + * Functionally equivalent to: + * + * \p x && \p y + * + * \param x The first value to analyze. + * \param y The second value to analyze. + * + * \return MBEDTLS_CT_TRUE if \p x && \p y, + * otherwise MBEDTLS_CT_FALSE. + */ +static inline mbedtls_ct_condition_t mbedtls_ct_bool_and(mbedtls_ct_condition_t x, + mbedtls_ct_condition_t y); -/** Constant-flow boolean "equal" comparison: - * return x == y +/** Boolean "or" operation. + * + * Functionally equivalent to: * - * This is equivalent to \p x == \p y, but is likely to be compiled - * to code using bitwise operation rather than a branch. + * \p x || \p y * * \param x The first value to analyze. * \param y The second value to analyze. * - * \return 1 if \p x equals to \p y, otherwise 0. + * \return MBEDTLS_CT_TRUE if \p x || \p y, + * otherwise MBEDTLS_CT_FALSE. + */ +static inline mbedtls_ct_condition_t mbedtls_ct_bool_or(mbedtls_ct_condition_t x, + mbedtls_ct_condition_t y); + +/** Boolean "not" operation. + * + * Functionally equivalent to: + * + * ! \p x + * + * \param x The value to invert + * + * \return MBEDTLS_CT_FALSE if \p x, otherwise MBEDTLS_CT_TRUE. + */ +static inline mbedtls_ct_condition_t mbedtls_ct_bool_not(mbedtls_ct_condition_t x); + + +/* ============================================================================ + * Data selection operations + */ + +/** Choose between two size_t values. + * + * Functionally equivalent to: + * + * condition ? if1 : if0. + * + * \param condition Condition to test. + * \param if1 Value to use if \p condition == MBEDTLS_CT_TRUE. + * \param if0 Value to use if \p condition == MBEDTLS_CT_FALSE. + * + * \return \c if1 if \p condition == MBEDTLS_CT_TRUE, otherwise \c if0. + */ +static inline size_t mbedtls_ct_size_if(mbedtls_ct_condition_t condition, + size_t if1, + size_t if0); + +/** Choose between two unsigned values. + * + * Functionally equivalent to: + * + * condition ? if1 : if0. + * + * \param condition Condition to test. + * \param if1 Value to use if \p condition == MBEDTLS_CT_TRUE. + * \param if0 Value to use if \p condition == MBEDTLS_CT_FALSE. + * + * \return \c if1 if \p condition == MBEDTLS_CT_TRUE, otherwise \c if0. + */ +static inline unsigned mbedtls_ct_uint_if(mbedtls_ct_condition_t condition, + unsigned if1, + unsigned if0); + +/** Choose between two mbedtls_ct_condition_t values. + * + * Functionally equivalent to: + * + * condition ? if1 : if0. + * + * \param condition Condition to test. + * \param if1 Value to use if \p condition == MBEDTLS_CT_TRUE. + * \param if0 Value to use if \p condition == MBEDTLS_CT_FALSE. + * + * \return \c if1 if \p condition == MBEDTLS_CT_TRUE, otherwise \c if0. */ -unsigned mbedtls_ct_size_bool_eq(size_t x, - size_t y); +static inline mbedtls_ct_condition_t mbedtls_ct_bool_if(mbedtls_ct_condition_t condition, + mbedtls_ct_condition_t if1, + mbedtls_ct_condition_t if0); #if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) -/** Decide if an integer is less than the other, without branches. +/** Choose between two mbedtls_mpi_uint values. * - * This is equivalent to \p x < \p y, but is likely to be compiled - * to code using bitwise operation rather than a branch. + * Functionally equivalent to: * - * \param x The first value to analyze. - * \param y The second value to analyze. + * condition ? if1 : if0. + * + * \param condition Condition to test. + * \param if1 Value to use if \p condition == MBEDTLS_CT_TRUE. + * \param if0 Value to use if \p condition == MBEDTLS_CT_FALSE. + * + * \return \c if1 if \p condition == MBEDTLS_CT_TRUE, otherwise \c if0. + */ +static inline mbedtls_mpi_uint mbedtls_ct_mpi_uint_if(mbedtls_ct_condition_t condition, \ + mbedtls_mpi_uint if1, \ + mbedtls_mpi_uint if0); + +#endif + +/** Choose between an unsigned value and 0. + * + * Functionally equivalent to: + * + * condition ? if1 : 0. + * + * Functionally equivalent to mbedtls_ct_uint_if(condition, if1, 0) but + * results in smaller code size. * - * \return 1 if \p x is less than \p y, otherwise 0. + * \param condition Condition to test. + * \param if1 Value to use if \p condition == MBEDTLS_CT_TRUE. + * + * \return \c if1 if \p condition == MBEDTLS_CT_TRUE, otherwise 0. */ -unsigned mbedtls_ct_mpi_uint_lt(const mbedtls_mpi_uint x, - const mbedtls_mpi_uint y); +static inline unsigned mbedtls_ct_uint_if_else_0(mbedtls_ct_condition_t condition, unsigned if1); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C */ +/** Choose between an mbedtls_ct_condition_t and 0. + * + * Functionally equivalent to: + * + * condition ? if1 : 0. + * + * Functionally equivalent to mbedtls_ct_bool_if(condition, if1, 0) but + * results in smaller code size. + * + * \param condition Condition to test. + * \param if1 Value to use if \p condition == MBEDTLS_CT_TRUE. + * + * \return \c if1 if \p condition == MBEDTLS_CT_TRUE, otherwise 0. + */ +static inline mbedtls_ct_condition_t mbedtls_ct_bool_if_else_0(mbedtls_ct_condition_t condition, + mbedtls_ct_condition_t if1); -/** Choose between two integer values without branches. +/** Choose between a size_t value and 0. * - * This is equivalent to `condition ? if1 : if0`, but is likely to be compiled - * to code using bitwise operation rather than a branch. + * Functionally equivalent to: + * + * condition ? if1 : 0. + * + * Functionally equivalent to mbedtls_ct_size_if(condition, if1, 0) but + * results in smaller code size. * * \param condition Condition to test. - * \param if1 Value to use if \p condition is nonzero. - * \param if0 Value to use if \p condition is zero. + * \param if1 Value to use if \p condition == MBEDTLS_CT_TRUE. * - * \return \c if1 if \p condition is nonzero, otherwise \c if0. + * \return \c if1 if \p condition == MBEDTLS_CT_TRUE, otherwise 0. */ -unsigned mbedtls_ct_uint_if(unsigned condition, - unsigned if1, - unsigned if0); +static inline size_t mbedtls_ct_size_if_else_0(mbedtls_ct_condition_t condition, size_t if1); #if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) -/** Conditionally assign a value without branches. +/** Choose between an mbedtls_mpi_uint value and 0. + * + * Functionally equivalent to: + * + * condition ? if1 : 0. * - * This is equivalent to `if ( condition ) dest = src`, but is likely - * to be compiled to code using bitwise operation rather than a branch. + * Functionally equivalent to mbedtls_ct_mpi_uint_if(condition, if1, 0) but + * results in smaller code size. * - * \param n \p dest and \p src must be arrays of limbs of size n. - * \param dest The MPI to conditionally assign to. This must point - * to an initialized MPI. - * \param src The MPI to be assigned from. This must point to an - * initialized MPI. - * \param condition Condition to test, must be 0 or 1. + * \param condition Condition to test. + * \param if1 Value to use if \p condition == MBEDTLS_CT_TRUE. + * + * \return \c if1 if \p condition == MBEDTLS_CT_TRUE, otherwise 0. */ -void mbedtls_ct_mpi_uint_cond_assign(size_t n, - mbedtls_mpi_uint *dest, - const mbedtls_mpi_uint *src, - unsigned char condition); +static inline mbedtls_mpi_uint mbedtls_ct_mpi_uint_if_else_0(mbedtls_ct_condition_t condition, + mbedtls_mpi_uint if1); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C */ +#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_BASE64_C) +/** Constant-flow char selection + * + * \param low Secret. Bottom of range + * \param high Secret. Top of range + * \param c Secret. Value to compare to range + * \param t Secret. Value to return, if in range + * + * \return \p t if \p low <= \p c <= \p high, 0 otherwise. + */ +static inline unsigned char mbedtls_ct_uchar_in_range_if(unsigned char low, + unsigned char high, + unsigned char c, + unsigned char t); -/** Given a value in the range 0..63, return the corresponding Base64 digit. +/** Choose between two error values. The values must be in the range [-32767..0]. + * + * Functionally equivalent to: * - * The implementation assumes that letters are consecutive (e.g. ASCII - * but not EBCDIC). + * condition ? if1 : if0. * - * \param value A value in the range 0..63. + * \param condition Condition to test. + * \param if1 Value to use if \p condition == MBEDTLS_CT_TRUE. + * \param if0 Value to use if \p condition == MBEDTLS_CT_FALSE. * - * \return A base64 digit converted from \p value. + * \return \c if1 if \p condition == MBEDTLS_CT_TRUE, otherwise \c if0. */ -unsigned char mbedtls_ct_base64_enc_char(unsigned char value); +static inline int mbedtls_ct_error_if(mbedtls_ct_condition_t condition, int if1, int if0); -/** Given a Base64 digit, return its value. +/** Choose between an error value and 0. The error value must be in the range [-32767..0]. + * + * Functionally equivalent to: * - * If c is not a Base64 digit ('A'..'Z', 'a'..'z', '0'..'9', '+' or '/'), - * return -1. + * condition ? if1 : 0. * - * The implementation assumes that letters are consecutive (e.g. ASCII - * but not EBCDIC). + * Functionally equivalent to mbedtls_ct_error_if(condition, if1, 0) but + * results in smaller code size. * - * \param c A base64 digit. + * \param condition Condition to test. + * \param if1 Value to use if \p condition == MBEDTLS_CT_TRUE. * - * \return The value of the base64 digit \p c. + * \return \c if1 if \p condition == MBEDTLS_CT_TRUE, otherwise 0. */ -signed char mbedtls_ct_base64_dec_value(unsigned char c); +static inline int mbedtls_ct_error_if_else_0(mbedtls_ct_condition_t condition, int if1); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_BASE64_C */ +/* ============================================================================ + * Block memory operations + */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_MODES_USE_MAC) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15) && defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_ALT) -/** Conditional memcpy without branches. +/** Conditionally set a block of memory to zero. * - * This is equivalent to `if ( c1 == c2 ) memcpy(dest, src, len)`, but is likely - * to be compiled to code using bitwise operation rather than a branch. + * Regardless of the condition, every byte will be read once and written to + * once. * - * \param dest The pointer to conditionally copy to. - * \param src The pointer to copy from. Shouldn't overlap with \p dest. - * \param len The number of bytes to copy. - * \param c1 The first value to analyze in the condition. - * \param c2 The second value to analyze in the condition. + * \param condition Secret. Condition to test. + * \param buf Secret. Pointer to the start of the buffer. + * \param len Number of bytes to set to zero. + * + * \warning Unlike mbedtls_platform_zeroize, this does not have the same guarantees + * about not being optimised away if the memory is never read again. */ -void mbedtls_ct_memcpy_if_eq(unsigned char *dest, - const unsigned char *src, - size_t len, - size_t c1, size_t c2); +void mbedtls_ct_zeroize_if(mbedtls_ct_condition_t condition, void *buf, size_t len); -/** Copy data from a secret position with constant flow. +/** Shift some data towards the left inside a buffer. + * + * Functionally equivalent to: * - * This function copies \p len bytes from \p src_base + \p offset_secret to \p - * dst, with a code flow and memory access pattern that does not depend on \p - * offset_secret, but only on \p offset_min, \p offset_max and \p len. - * Functionally equivalent to `memcpy(dst, src + offset_secret, len)`. + * memmove(start, start + offset, total - offset); + * memset(start + (total - offset), 0, offset); + * + * Timing independence comes at the expense of performance. + * + * \param start Secret. Pointer to the start of the buffer. + * \param total Total size of the buffer. + * \param offset Secret. Offset from which to copy \p total - \p offset bytes. + */ +void mbedtls_ct_memmove_left(void *start, + size_t total, + size_t offset); + +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15) && defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_ALT) */ + +/** Conditional memcpy. + * + * Functionally equivalent to: + * + * if (condition) { + * memcpy(dest, src1, len); + * } else { + * if (src2 != NULL) + * memcpy(dest, src2, len); + * } + * + * It will always read len bytes from src1. + * If src2 != NULL, it will always read len bytes from src2. + * If src2 == NULL, it will instead read len bytes from dest (as if src2 == dest). + * + * \param condition The condition + * \param dest Secret. Destination pointer. + * \param src1 Secret. Pointer to copy from (if \p condition == MBEDTLS_CT_TRUE). + * This may be equal to \p dest, but may not overlap in other ways. + * \param src2 Secret (contents only - may branch to determine if this parameter is NULL). + * Pointer to copy from (if \p condition == MBEDTLS_CT_FALSE and \p src2 is not NULL). May be NULL. + * This may be equal to \p dest, but may not overlap it in other ways. It may overlap with \p src1. + * \param len Number of bytes to copy. + */ +void mbedtls_ct_memcpy_if(mbedtls_ct_condition_t condition, + unsigned char *dest, + const unsigned char *src1, + const unsigned char *src2, + size_t len + ); + +/** Copy data from a secret position. + * + * Functionally equivalent to: + * + * memcpy(dst, src + offset, len) + * + * This function copies \p len bytes from \p src + \p offset to + * \p dst, with a code flow and memory access pattern that does not depend on + * \p offset, but only on \p offset_min, \p offset_max and \p len. * * \note This function reads from \p dest, but the value that * is read does not influence the result and this @@ -219,12 +516,12 @@ void mbedtls_ct_memcpy_if_eq(unsigned char *dest, * positives from static or dynamic analyzers, especially * if \p dest is not initialized. * - * \param dest The destination buffer. This must point to a writable + * \param dest Secret. The destination buffer. This must point to a writable * buffer of at least \p len bytes. - * \param src The base of the source buffer. This must point to a + * \param src Secret. The base of the source buffer. This must point to a * readable buffer of at least \p offset_max + \p len - * bytes. Shouldn't overlap with \p dest. - * \param offset The offset in the source buffer from which to copy. + * bytes. Shouldn't overlap with \p dest + * \param offset Secret. The offset in the source buffer from which to copy. * This must be no less than \p offset_min and no greater * than \p offset_max. * \param offset_min The minimal value of \p offset. @@ -238,90 +535,45 @@ void mbedtls_ct_memcpy_offset(unsigned char *dest, size_t offset_max, size_t len); -/** Compute the HMAC of variable-length data with constant flow. - * - * This function computes the HMAC of the concatenation of \p add_data and \p - * data, and does with a code flow and memory access pattern that does not - * depend on \p data_len_secret, but only on \p min_data_len and \p - * max_data_len. In particular, this function always reads exactly \p - * max_data_len bytes from \p data. - * - * \param ctx The HMAC context. It must have keys configured - * with mbedtls_md_hmac_starts() and use one of the - * following hashes: SHA-384, SHA-256, SHA-1 or MD-5. - * It is reset using mbedtls_md_hmac_reset() after - * the computation is complete to prepare for the - * next computation. - * \param add_data The first part of the message whose HMAC is being - * calculated. This must point to a readable buffer - * of \p add_data_len bytes. - * \param add_data_len The length of \p add_data in bytes. - * \param data The buffer containing the second part of the - * message. This must point to a readable buffer - * of \p max_data_len bytes. - * \param data_len_secret The length of the data to process in \p data. - * This must be no less than \p min_data_len and no - * greater than \p max_data_len. - * \param min_data_len The minimal length of the second part of the - * message, read from \p data. - * \param max_data_len The maximal length of the second part of the - * message, read from \p data. - * \param output The HMAC will be written here. This must point to - * a writable buffer of sufficient size to hold the - * HMAC value. - * - * \retval 0 on success. - * \retval #MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_HW_ACCEL_FAILED - * The hardware accelerator failed. - */ -int mbedtls_ct_hmac(mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx, - const unsigned char *add_data, - size_t add_data_len, - const unsigned char *data, - size_t data_len_secret, - size_t min_data_len, - size_t max_data_len, - unsigned char *output); - -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_MODES_USE_MAC */ +/* Documented in include/mbedtls/constant_time.h. a and b are secret. -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15) && defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_ALT) + int mbedtls_ct_memcmp(const void *a, + const void *b, + size_t n); + */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C) + +/** Constant-time buffer comparison without branches. + * + * Similar to mbedtls_ct_memcmp, except that the result only depends on part of + * the input data - differences in the head or tail are ignored. Functionally equivalent to: + * + * memcmp(a + skip_head, b + skip_head, size - skip_head - skip_tail) + * + * Time taken depends on \p n, but not on \p skip_head or \p skip_tail . + * + * Behaviour is undefined if ( \p skip_head + \p skip_tail) > \p n. + * + * \param a Secret. Pointer to the first buffer, containing at least \p n bytes. May not be NULL. + * \param b Secret. Pointer to the second buffer, containing at least \p n bytes. May not be NULL. + * \param n The number of bytes to examine (total size of the buffers). + * \param skip_head Secret. The number of bytes to treat as non-significant at the start of the buffer. + * These bytes will still be read. + * \param skip_tail Secret. The number of bytes to treat as non-significant at the end of the buffer. + * These bytes will still be read. + * + * \return Zero if the contents of the two buffers are the same, otherwise non-zero. + */ +int mbedtls_ct_memcmp_partial(const void *a, + const void *b, + size_t n, + size_t skip_head, + size_t skip_tail); + +#endif -/** This function performs the unpadding part of a PKCS#1 v1.5 decryption - * operation (EME-PKCS1-v1_5 decoding). - * - * \note The return value from this function is a sensitive value - * (this is unusual). #MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_OUTPUT_TOO_LARGE shouldn't happen - * in a well-written application, but 0 vs #MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING - * is often a situation that an attacker can provoke and leaking which - * one is the result is precisely the information the attacker wants. - * - * \param mode The mode of operation. This must be either - * #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE or #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC (deprecated). - * \param input The input buffer which is the payload inside PKCS#1v1.5 - * encryption padding, called the "encoded message EM" - * by the terminology. - * \param ilen The length of the payload in the \p input buffer. - * \param output The buffer for the payload, called "message M" by the - * PKCS#1 terminology. This must be a writable buffer of - * length \p output_max_len bytes. - * \param olen The address at which to store the length of - * the payload. This must not be \c NULL. - * \param output_max_len The length in bytes of the output buffer \p output. - * - * \return \c 0 on success. - * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_OUTPUT_TOO_LARGE - * The output buffer is too small for the unpadded payload. - * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING - * The input doesn't contain properly formatted padding. - */ -int mbedtls_ct_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_unpadding(int mode, - unsigned char *input, - size_t ilen, - unsigned char *output, - size_t output_max_len, - size_t *olen); - -#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 && MBEDTLS_RSA_C && ! MBEDTLS_RSA_ALT */ +/* Include the implementation of static inline functions above. */ +#include "constant_time_impl.h" #endif /* MBEDTLS_CONSTANT_TIME_INTERNAL_H */ diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/constant_time_invasive.h b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/constant_time_invasive.h deleted file mode 100644 index 14e0bec5ea7a..000000000000 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/constant_time_invasive.h +++ /dev/null @@ -1,39 +0,0 @@ -/** - * \file constant_time_invasive.h - * - * \brief Constant-time module: interfaces for invasive testing only. - * - * The interfaces in this file are intended for testing purposes only. - * They SHOULD NOT be made available in library integrations except when - * building the library for testing. - */ -/* - * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later - */ - -#ifndef MBEDTLS_CONSTANT_TIME_INVASIVE_H -#define MBEDTLS_CONSTANT_TIME_INVASIVE_H - -#include "common.h" - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS) - -/** Turn a value into a mask: - * - if \p low <= \p c <= \p high, - * return the all-bits 1 mask, aka (unsigned) -1 - * - otherwise, return the all-bits 0 mask, aka 0 - * - * \param low The value to analyze. - * \param high The value to analyze. - * \param c The value to analyze. - * - * \return All-bits-one if \p low <= \p c <= \p high, otherwise zero. - */ -unsigned char mbedtls_ct_uchar_mask_of_range(unsigned char low, - unsigned char high, - unsigned char c); - -#endif /* MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS */ - -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CONSTANT_TIME_INVASIVE_H */ diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ctr.h b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ctr.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..aa48fb9e707a --- /dev/null +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ctr.h @@ -0,0 +1,35 @@ +/** + * \file ctr.h + * + * \brief This file contains common functionality for counter algorithms. + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +#ifndef MBEDTLS_CTR_H +#define MBEDTLS_CTR_H + +#include "common.h" + +/** + * \brief Increment a big-endian 16-byte value. + * This is quite performance-sensitive for AES-CTR and CTR-DRBG. + * + * \param n A 16-byte value to be incremented. + */ +static inline void mbedtls_ctr_increment_counter(uint8_t n[16]) +{ + // The 32-bit version seems to perform about the same as a 64-bit version + // on 64-bit architectures, so no need to define a 64-bit version. + for (int i = 3;; i--) { + uint32_t x = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE(n, i << 2); + x += 1; + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE(x, n, i << 2); + if (x != 0 || i == 0) { + break; + } + } +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CTR_H */ diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ctr_drbg.c b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ctr_drbg.c index 53987a22fff1..66d9d28c589a 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ctr_drbg.c +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ctr_drbg.c @@ -14,25 +14,71 @@ #if defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C) +#include "ctr.h" #include "mbedtls/ctr_drbg.h" #include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" #include "mbedtls/error.h" -#include #include #if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) #include #endif +/* Using error translation functions from PSA to MbedTLS */ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) +#include "psa_util_internal.h" +#endif + #include "mbedtls/platform.h" +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) +static psa_status_t ctr_drbg_setup_psa_context(mbedtls_ctr_drbg_psa_context *psa_ctx, + unsigned char *key, size_t key_len) +{ + psa_key_attributes_t key_attr = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + psa_status_t status; + + psa_set_key_usage_flags(&key_attr, PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT); + psa_set_key_algorithm(&key_attr, PSA_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING); + psa_set_key_type(&key_attr, PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES); + status = psa_import_key(&key_attr, key, key_len, &psa_ctx->key_id); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_cipher_encrypt_setup(&psa_ctx->operation, psa_ctx->key_id, PSA_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + +exit: + psa_reset_key_attributes(&key_attr); + return status; +} + +static void ctr_drbg_destroy_psa_contex(mbedtls_ctr_drbg_psa_context *psa_ctx) +{ + psa_cipher_abort(&psa_ctx->operation); + psa_destroy_key(psa_ctx->key_id); + + psa_ctx->operation = psa_cipher_operation_init(); + psa_ctx->key_id = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; +} +#endif + /* * CTR_DRBG context initialization */ void mbedtls_ctr_drbg_init(mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx) { memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context)); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) + mbedtls_aes_init(&ctx->aes_ctx); +#else + ctx->psa_ctx.key_id = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + ctx->psa_ctx.operation = psa_cipher_operation_init(); +#endif /* Indicate that the entropy nonce length is not set explicitly. * See mbedtls_ctr_drbg_set_nonce_len(). */ ctx->reseed_counter = -1; @@ -56,7 +102,11 @@ void mbedtls_ctr_drbg_free(mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx) mbedtls_mutex_free(&ctx->mutex); } #endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) mbedtls_aes_free(&ctx->aes_ctx); +#else + ctr_drbg_destroy_psa_contex(&ctx->psa_ctx); +#endif mbedtls_platform_zeroize(ctx, sizeof(mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context)); ctx->reseed_interval = MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_RESEED_INTERVAL; ctx->reseed_counter = -1; @@ -86,14 +136,13 @@ int mbedtls_ctr_drbg_set_nonce_len(mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx, if (len > MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_INPUT_TOO_BIG; } -#if SIZE_MAX > INT_MAX + /* This shouldn't be an issue because * MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT < INT_MAX in any sensible * configuration, but make sure anyway. */ if (len > INT_MAX) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_INPUT_TOO_BIG; } -#endif /* For backward compatibility with Mbed TLS <= 2.19, store the * entropy nonce length in a field that already exists, but isn't @@ -118,8 +167,17 @@ static int block_cipher_df(unsigned char *output, unsigned char key[MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYSIZE]; unsigned char chain[MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE]; unsigned char *p, *iv; - mbedtls_aes_context aes_ctx; int ret = 0; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) + mbedtls_aes_context aes_ctx; +#else + psa_status_t status; + size_t tmp_len; + mbedtls_ctr_drbg_psa_context psa_ctx; + + psa_ctx.key_id = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + psa_ctx.operation = psa_cipher_operation_init(); +#endif int i, j; size_t buf_len, use_len; @@ -130,7 +188,6 @@ static int block_cipher_df(unsigned char *output, memset(buf, 0, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT + MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE + 16); - mbedtls_aes_init(&aes_ctx); /* * Construct IV (16 bytes) and S in buffer @@ -152,10 +209,20 @@ static int block_cipher_df(unsigned char *output, key[i] = i; } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) + mbedtls_aes_init(&aes_ctx); + if ((ret = mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc(&aes_ctx, key, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYBITS)) != 0) { goto exit; } +#else + status = ctr_drbg_setup_psa_context(&psa_ctx, key, sizeof(key)); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + ret = psa_generic_status_to_mbedtls(status); + goto exit; + } +#endif /* * Reduce data to MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_SEEDLEN bytes of data @@ -166,17 +233,24 @@ static int block_cipher_df(unsigned char *output, use_len = buf_len; while (use_len > 0) { - for (i = 0; i < MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE; i++) { - chain[i] ^= p[i]; - } + mbedtls_xor(chain, chain, p, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE); p += MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE; use_len -= (use_len >= MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE) ? MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE : use_len; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) if ((ret = mbedtls_aes_crypt_ecb(&aes_ctx, MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT, chain, chain)) != 0) { goto exit; } +#else + status = psa_cipher_update(&psa_ctx.operation, chain, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE, + chain, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE, &tmp_len); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + ret = psa_generic_status_to_mbedtls(status); + goto exit; + } +#endif } memcpy(tmp + j, chain, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE); @@ -190,23 +264,46 @@ static int block_cipher_df(unsigned char *output, /* * Do final encryption with reduced data */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) if ((ret = mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc(&aes_ctx, tmp, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYBITS)) != 0) { goto exit; } +#else + ctr_drbg_destroy_psa_contex(&psa_ctx); + + status = ctr_drbg_setup_psa_context(&psa_ctx, tmp, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYSIZE); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + ret = psa_generic_status_to_mbedtls(status); + goto exit; + } +#endif iv = tmp + MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYSIZE; p = output; for (j = 0; j < MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_SEEDLEN; j += MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) if ((ret = mbedtls_aes_crypt_ecb(&aes_ctx, MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT, iv, iv)) != 0) { goto exit; } +#else + status = psa_cipher_update(&psa_ctx.operation, iv, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE, + iv, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE, &tmp_len); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + ret = psa_generic_status_to_mbedtls(status); + goto exit; + } +#endif memcpy(p, iv, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE); p += MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE; } exit: +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) mbedtls_aes_free(&aes_ctx); +#else + ctr_drbg_destroy_psa_contex(&psa_ctx); +#endif /* * tidy up the stack */ @@ -237,8 +334,12 @@ static int ctr_drbg_update_internal(mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx, { unsigned char tmp[MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_SEEDLEN]; unsigned char *p = tmp; - int i, j; + int j; int ret = 0; +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) + psa_status_t status; + size_t tmp_len; +#endif memset(tmp, 0, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_SEEDLEN); @@ -246,34 +347,47 @@ static int ctr_drbg_update_internal(mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx, /* * Increase counter */ - for (i = MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE; i > 0; i--) { - if (++ctx->counter[i - 1] != 0) { - break; - } - } + mbedtls_ctr_increment_counter(ctx->counter); /* * Crypt counter block */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) if ((ret = mbedtls_aes_crypt_ecb(&ctx->aes_ctx, MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT, ctx->counter, p)) != 0) { goto exit; } +#else + status = psa_cipher_update(&ctx->psa_ctx.operation, ctx->counter, sizeof(ctx->counter), + p, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE, &tmp_len); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + ret = psa_generic_status_to_mbedtls(status); + goto exit; + } +#endif p += MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE; } - for (i = 0; i < MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_SEEDLEN; i++) { - tmp[i] ^= data[i]; - } + mbedtls_xor(tmp, tmp, data, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_SEEDLEN); /* * Update key and counter */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) if ((ret = mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc(&ctx->aes_ctx, tmp, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYBITS)) != 0) { goto exit; } +#else + ctr_drbg_destroy_psa_contex(&ctx->psa_ctx); + + status = ctr_drbg_setup_psa_context(&ctx->psa_ctx, tmp, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYSIZE); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + ret = psa_generic_status_to_mbedtls(status); + goto exit; + } +#endif memcpy(ctx->counter, tmp + MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYSIZE, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE); @@ -294,9 +408,9 @@ static int ctr_drbg_update_internal(mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx, * and with outputs * ctx = initial_working_state */ -int mbedtls_ctr_drbg_update_ret(mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx, - const unsigned char *additional, - size_t add_len) +int mbedtls_ctr_drbg_update(mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *additional, + size_t add_len) { unsigned char add_input[MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_SEEDLEN]; int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; @@ -317,20 +431,6 @@ int mbedtls_ctr_drbg_update_ret(mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx, return ret; } -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) -void mbedtls_ctr_drbg_update(mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx, - const unsigned char *additional, - size_t add_len) -{ - /* MAX_INPUT would be more logical here, but we have to match - * block_cipher_df()'s limits since we can't propagate errors */ - if (add_len > MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT) { - add_len = MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT; - } - (void) mbedtls_ctr_drbg_update_ret(ctx, additional, add_len); -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ - /* CTR_DRBG_Reseed with derivation function (SP 800-90A §10.2.1.4.2) * mbedtls_ctr_drbg_reseed(ctx, additional, len, nonce_len) * implements @@ -449,8 +549,6 @@ int mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed(mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx, mbedtls_mutex_init(&ctx->mutex); #endif - mbedtls_aes_init(&ctx->aes_ctx); - ctx->f_entropy = f_entropy; ctx->p_entropy = p_entropy; @@ -466,10 +564,20 @@ int mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed(mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx, good_nonce_len(ctx->entropy_len)); /* Initialize with an empty key. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) if ((ret = mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc(&ctx->aes_ctx, key, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYBITS)) != 0) { return ret; } +#else + psa_status_t status; + + status = ctr_drbg_setup_psa_context(&ctx->psa_ctx, key, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYSIZE); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + ret = psa_generic_status_to_mbedtls(status); + return status; + } +#endif /* Do the initial seeding. */ if ((ret = mbedtls_ctr_drbg_reseed_internal(ctx, custom, len, @@ -504,10 +612,11 @@ int mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random_with_add(void *p_rng, { int ret = 0; mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx = (mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *) p_rng; - unsigned char add_input[MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_SEEDLEN]; unsigned char *p = output; - unsigned char tmp[MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE]; - int i; + struct { + unsigned char add_input[MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_SEEDLEN]; + unsigned char tmp[MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE]; + } locals; size_t use_len; if (output_len > MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_REQUEST) { @@ -518,7 +627,7 @@ int mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random_with_add(void *p_rng, return MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_INPUT_TOO_BIG; } - memset(add_input, 0, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_SEEDLEN); + memset(locals.add_input, 0, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_SEEDLEN); if (ctx->reseed_counter > ctx->reseed_interval || ctx->prediction_resistance) { @@ -529,51 +638,58 @@ int mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random_with_add(void *p_rng, } if (add_len > 0) { - if ((ret = block_cipher_df(add_input, additional, add_len)) != 0) { + if ((ret = block_cipher_df(locals.add_input, additional, add_len)) != 0) { goto exit; } - if ((ret = ctr_drbg_update_internal(ctx, add_input)) != 0) { + if ((ret = ctr_drbg_update_internal(ctx, locals.add_input)) != 0) { goto exit; } } while (output_len > 0) { /* - * Increase counter + * Increase counter (treat it as a 128-bit big-endian integer). */ - for (i = MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE; i > 0; i--) { - if (++ctx->counter[i - 1] != 0) { - break; - } - } + mbedtls_ctr_increment_counter(ctx->counter); /* * Crypt counter block */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) if ((ret = mbedtls_aes_crypt_ecb(&ctx->aes_ctx, MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT, - ctx->counter, tmp)) != 0) { + ctx->counter, locals.tmp)) != 0) { + goto exit; + } +#else + psa_status_t status; + size_t tmp_len; + + status = psa_cipher_update(&ctx->psa_ctx.operation, ctx->counter, sizeof(ctx->counter), + locals.tmp, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE, &tmp_len); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + ret = psa_generic_status_to_mbedtls(status); goto exit; } +#endif use_len = (output_len > MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE) ? MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE : output_len; /* * Copy random block to destination */ - memcpy(p, tmp, use_len); + memcpy(p, locals.tmp, use_len); p += use_len; output_len -= use_len; } - if ((ret = ctr_drbg_update_internal(ctx, add_input)) != 0) { + if ((ret = ctr_drbg_update_internal(ctx, locals.add_input)) != 0) { goto exit; } ctx->reseed_counter++; exit: - mbedtls_platform_zeroize(add_input, sizeof(add_input)); - mbedtls_platform_zeroize(tmp, sizeof(tmp)); + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(&locals, sizeof(locals)); return ret; } @@ -612,6 +728,9 @@ int mbedtls_ctr_drbg_write_seed_file(mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx, return MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_FILE_IO_ERROR; } + /* Ensure no stdio buffering of secrets, as such buffers cannot be wiped. */ + mbedtls_setbuf(f, NULL); + if ((ret = mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random(ctx, buf, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_INPUT)) != 0) { goto exit; @@ -644,6 +763,9 @@ int mbedtls_ctr_drbg_update_seed_file(mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx, return MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_FILE_IO_ERROR; } + /* Ensure no stdio buffering of secrets, as such buffers cannot be wiped. */ + mbedtls_setbuf(f, NULL); + n = fread(buf, 1, sizeof(buf), f); if (fread(&c, 1, 1, f) != 0) { ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_INPUT_TOO_BIG; @@ -656,7 +778,7 @@ int mbedtls_ctr_drbg_update_seed_file(mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx, fclose(f); f = NULL; - ret = mbedtls_ctr_drbg_update_ret(ctx, buf, n); + ret = mbedtls_ctr_drbg_update(ctx, buf, n); exit: mbedtls_platform_zeroize(buf, sizeof(buf)); diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/debug.c b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/debug.c index f2d8dced5f4b..c36ed3c5c21c 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/debug.c +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/debug.c @@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ #include "mbedtls/platform.h" -#include "mbedtls/debug.h" +#include "debug_internal.h" #include "mbedtls/error.h" #include @@ -100,7 +100,7 @@ void mbedtls_debug_print_ret(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int level, /* * With non-blocking I/O and examples that just retry immediately, * the logs would be quickly flooded with WANT_READ, so ignore that. - * Don't ignore WANT_WRITE however, since is is usually rare. + * Don't ignore WANT_WRITE however, since it is usually rare. */ if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ) { return; @@ -132,7 +132,6 @@ void mbedtls_debug_print_buf(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int level, debug_send_line(ssl, level, file, line, str); - idx = 0; memset(txt, 0, sizeof(txt)); for (i = 0; i < len; i++) { if (i >= 4096) { @@ -168,7 +167,7 @@ void mbedtls_debug_print_buf(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int level, } } -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_LIGHT) void mbedtls_debug_print_ecp(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int level, const char *file, int line, const char *text, const mbedtls_ecp_point *X) @@ -188,7 +187,79 @@ void mbedtls_debug_print_ecp(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int level, mbedtls_snprintf(str, sizeof(str), "%s(Y)", text); mbedtls_debug_print_mpi(ssl, level, file, line, str, &X->Y); } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_LIGHT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA) +static void mbedtls_debug_print_ec_coord(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int level, + const char *file, int line, const char *text, + const unsigned char *buf, size_t len) +{ + char str[DEBUG_BUF_SIZE]; + size_t i, idx = 0; + + mbedtls_snprintf(str + idx, sizeof(str) - idx, "value of '%s' (%u bits) is:\n", + text, (unsigned int) len * 8); + + debug_send_line(ssl, level, file, line, str); + + for (i = 0; i < len; i++) { + if (i >= 4096) { + break; + } + + if (i % 16 == 0) { + if (i > 0) { + mbedtls_snprintf(str + idx, sizeof(str) - idx, "\n"); + debug_send_line(ssl, level, file, line, str); + + idx = 0; + } + } + + idx += mbedtls_snprintf(str + idx, sizeof(str) - idx, " %02x", + (unsigned int) buf[i]); + } + + if (len > 0) { + for (/* i = i */; i % 16 != 0; i++) { + idx += mbedtls_snprintf(str + idx, sizeof(str) - idx, " "); + } + + mbedtls_snprintf(str + idx, sizeof(str) - idx, "\n"); + debug_send_line(ssl, level, file, line, str); + } +} + +void mbedtls_debug_print_psa_ec(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int level, + const char *file, int line, + const char *text, const mbedtls_pk_context *pk) +{ + char str[DEBUG_BUF_SIZE]; + const uint8_t *coord_start; + size_t coord_len; + + if (NULL == ssl || + NULL == ssl->conf || + NULL == ssl->conf->f_dbg || + level > debug_threshold) { + return; + } + + /* For the description of pk->pk_raw content please refer to the description + * psa_export_public_key() function. */ + coord_len = (pk->pub_raw_len - 1)/2; + + /* X coordinate */ + coord_start = pk->pub_raw + 1; + mbedtls_snprintf(str, sizeof(str), "%s(X)", text); + mbedtls_debug_print_ec_coord(ssl, level, file, line, str, coord_start, coord_len); + + /* Y coordinate */ + coord_start = coord_start + coord_len; + mbedtls_snprintf(str, sizeof(str), "%s(Y)", text); + mbedtls_debug_print_ec_coord(ssl, level, file, line, str, coord_start, coord_len); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) void mbedtls_debug_print_mpi(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int level, @@ -241,7 +312,7 @@ void mbedtls_debug_print_mpi(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int level, } #endif /* MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_REMOVE_INFO) static void debug_print_pk(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int level, const char *file, int line, const char *text, const mbedtls_pk_context *pk) @@ -266,14 +337,21 @@ static void debug_print_pk(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int level, mbedtls_snprintf(name, sizeof(name), "%s%s", text, items[i].name); name[sizeof(name) - 1] = '\0'; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) if (items[i].type == MBEDTLS_PK_DEBUG_MPI) { mbedtls_debug_print_mpi(ssl, level, file, line, name, items[i].value); } else -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) +#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_LIGHT) if (items[i].type == MBEDTLS_PK_DEBUG_ECP) { mbedtls_debug_print_ecp(ssl, level, file, line, name, items[i].value); } else -#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_LIGHT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA) + if (items[i].type == MBEDTLS_PK_DEBUG_PSA_EC) { + mbedtls_debug_print_psa_ec(ssl, level, file, line, name, items[i].value); + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA */ { debug_send_line(ssl, level, file, line, "should not happen\n"); } } @@ -288,7 +366,7 @@ static void debug_print_line_by_line(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int level, start = text; for (cur = text; *cur != '\0'; cur++) { if (*cur == '\n') { - size_t len = cur - start + 1; + size_t len = (size_t) (cur - start) + 1; if (len > DEBUG_BUF_SIZE - 1) { len = DEBUG_BUF_SIZE - 1; } @@ -332,9 +410,10 @@ void mbedtls_debug_print_crt(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int level, crt = crt->next; } } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C && MBEDTLS_X509_REMOVE_INFO */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDH_OR_ECDHE_ANY_ENABLED) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) static void mbedtls_debug_printf_ecdh_internal(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int level, const char *file, int line, @@ -380,6 +459,7 @@ void mbedtls_debug_printf_ecdh(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int level, } #endif } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDH_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDH_OR_ECDHE_ANY_ENABLED && + MBEDTLS_ECDH_C */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C */ diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/debug_internal.h b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/debug_internal.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..4523b4633a2e --- /dev/null +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/debug_internal.h @@ -0,0 +1,172 @@ +/** + * \file debug_internal.h + * + * \brief Internal part of the public "debug.h". + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ +#ifndef MBEDTLS_DEBUG_INTERNAL_H +#define MBEDTLS_DEBUG_INTERNAL_H + +#include "mbedtls/debug.h" + +/** + * \brief Print a message to the debug output. This function is always used + * through the MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG() macro, which supplies the ssl + * context, file and line number parameters. + * + * \param ssl SSL context + * \param level error level of the debug message + * \param file file the message has occurred in + * \param line line number the message has occurred at + * \param format format specifier, in printf format + * \param ... variables used by the format specifier + * + * \attention This function is intended for INTERNAL usage within the + * library only. + */ +void mbedtls_debug_print_msg(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int level, + const char *file, int line, + const char *format, ...) MBEDTLS_PRINTF_ATTRIBUTE(5, 6); + +/** + * \brief Print the return value of a function to the debug output. This + * function is always used through the MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET() macro, + * which supplies the ssl context, file and line number parameters. + * + * \param ssl SSL context + * \param level error level of the debug message + * \param file file the error has occurred in + * \param line line number the error has occurred in + * \param text the name of the function that returned the error + * \param ret the return code value + * + * \attention This function is intended for INTERNAL usage within the + * library only. + */ +void mbedtls_debug_print_ret(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int level, + const char *file, int line, + const char *text, int ret); + +/** + * \brief Output a buffer of size len bytes to the debug output. This function + * is always used through the MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF() macro, + * which supplies the ssl context, file and line number parameters. + * + * \param ssl SSL context + * \param level error level of the debug message + * \param file file the error has occurred in + * \param line line number the error has occurred in + * \param text a name or label for the buffer being dumped. Normally the + * variable or buffer name + * \param buf the buffer to be outputted + * \param len length of the buffer + * + * \attention This function is intended for INTERNAL usage within the + * library only. + */ +void mbedtls_debug_print_buf(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int level, + const char *file, int line, const char *text, + const unsigned char *buf, size_t len); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) +/** + * \brief Print a MPI variable to the debug output. This function is always + * used through the MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MPI() macro, which supplies the + * ssl context, file and line number parameters. + * + * \param ssl SSL context + * \param level error level of the debug message + * \param file file the error has occurred in + * \param line line number the error has occurred in + * \param text a name or label for the MPI being output. Normally the + * variable name + * \param X the MPI variable + * + * \attention This function is intended for INTERNAL usage within the + * library only. + */ +void mbedtls_debug_print_mpi(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int level, + const char *file, int line, + const char *text, const mbedtls_mpi *X); +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_LIGHT) +/** + * \brief Print an ECP point to the debug output. This function is always + * used through the MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ECP() macro, which supplies the + * ssl context, file and line number parameters. + * + * \param ssl SSL context + * \param level error level of the debug message + * \param file file the error has occurred in + * \param line line number the error has occurred in + * \param text a name or label for the ECP point being output. Normally the + * variable name + * \param X the ECP point + * + * \attention This function is intended for INTERNAL usage within the + * library only. + */ +void mbedtls_debug_print_ecp(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int level, + const char *file, int line, + const char *text, const mbedtls_ecp_point *X); +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_REMOVE_INFO) +/** + * \brief Print a X.509 certificate structure to the debug output. This + * function is always used through the MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_CRT() macro, + * which supplies the ssl context, file and line number parameters. + * + * \param ssl SSL context + * \param level error level of the debug message + * \param file file the error has occurred in + * \param line line number the error has occurred in + * \param text a name or label for the certificate being output + * \param crt X.509 certificate structure + * + * \attention This function is intended for INTERNAL usage within the + * library only. + */ +void mbedtls_debug_print_crt(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int level, + const char *file, int line, + const char *text, const mbedtls_x509_crt *crt); +#endif + +/* Note: the MBEDTLS_ECDH_C guard here is mandatory because this debug function + only works for the built-in implementation. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDH_OR_ECDHE_ANY_ENABLED) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) +typedef enum { + MBEDTLS_DEBUG_ECDH_Q, + MBEDTLS_DEBUG_ECDH_QP, + MBEDTLS_DEBUG_ECDH_Z, +} mbedtls_debug_ecdh_attr; + +/** + * \brief Print a field of the ECDH structure in the SSL context to the debug + * output. This function is always used through the + * MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ECDH() macro, which supplies the ssl context, file + * and line number parameters. + * + * \param ssl SSL context + * \param level error level of the debug message + * \param file file the error has occurred in + * \param line line number the error has occurred in + * \param ecdh the ECDH context + * \param attr the identifier of the attribute being output + * + * \attention This function is intended for INTERNAL usage within the + * library only. + */ +void mbedtls_debug_printf_ecdh(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int level, + const char *file, int line, + const mbedtls_ecdh_context *ecdh, + mbedtls_debug_ecdh_attr attr); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDH_OR_ECDHE_ANY_ENABLED && + MBEDTLS_ECDH_C */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEBUG_INTERNAL_H */ diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/des.c b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/des.c index afe72cec00e2..f0032b3b5699 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/des.c +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/des.c @@ -630,7 +630,6 @@ int mbedtls_des_crypt_cbc(mbedtls_des_context *ctx, const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output) { - int i; int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; unsigned char temp[8]; @@ -640,9 +639,7 @@ int mbedtls_des_crypt_cbc(mbedtls_des_context *ctx, if (mode == MBEDTLS_DES_ENCRYPT) { while (length > 0) { - for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) { - output[i] = (unsigned char) (input[i] ^ iv[i]); - } + mbedtls_xor(output, input, iv, 8); ret = mbedtls_des_crypt_ecb(ctx, output, output); if (ret != 0) { @@ -662,9 +659,7 @@ int mbedtls_des_crypt_cbc(mbedtls_des_context *ctx, goto exit; } - for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) { - output[i] = (unsigned char) (output[i] ^ iv[i]); - } + mbedtls_xor(output, output, iv, 8); memcpy(iv, temp, 8); @@ -733,7 +728,6 @@ int mbedtls_des3_crypt_cbc(mbedtls_des3_context *ctx, const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output) { - int i; int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; unsigned char temp[8]; @@ -743,9 +737,7 @@ int mbedtls_des3_crypt_cbc(mbedtls_des3_context *ctx, if (mode == MBEDTLS_DES_ENCRYPT) { while (length > 0) { - for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) { - output[i] = (unsigned char) (input[i] ^ iv[i]); - } + mbedtls_xor(output, input, iv, 8); ret = mbedtls_des3_crypt_ecb(ctx, output, output); if (ret != 0) { @@ -765,9 +757,7 @@ int mbedtls_des3_crypt_cbc(mbedtls_des3_context *ctx, goto exit; } - for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) { - output[i] = (unsigned char) (output[i] ^ iv[i]); - } + mbedtls_xor(output, output, iv, 8); memcpy(iv, temp, 8); diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/dhm.c b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/dhm.c index 1a41b91a90b6..bcc07f544194 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/dhm.c +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/dhm.c @@ -35,11 +35,6 @@ #if !defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_ALT) -#define DHM_VALIDATE_RET(cond) \ - MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE_RET(cond, MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_BAD_INPUT_DATA) -#define DHM_VALIDATE(cond) \ - MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE(cond) - /* * helper to validate the mbedtls_mpi size and import it */ @@ -53,10 +48,10 @@ static int dhm_read_bignum(mbedtls_mpi *X, return MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } - n = ((*p)[0] << 8) | (*p)[1]; + n = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(*p, 0); (*p) += 2; - if ((int) (end - *p) < n) { + if ((size_t) (end - *p) < (size_t) n) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } @@ -102,10 +97,49 @@ static int dhm_check_range(const mbedtls_mpi *param, const mbedtls_mpi *P) void mbedtls_dhm_init(mbedtls_dhm_context *ctx) { - DHM_VALIDATE(ctx != NULL); memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_dhm_context)); } +size_t mbedtls_dhm_get_bitlen(const mbedtls_dhm_context *ctx) +{ + return mbedtls_mpi_bitlen(&ctx->P); +} + +size_t mbedtls_dhm_get_len(const mbedtls_dhm_context *ctx) +{ + return mbedtls_mpi_size(&ctx->P); +} + +int mbedtls_dhm_get_value(const mbedtls_dhm_context *ctx, + mbedtls_dhm_parameter param, + mbedtls_mpi *dest) +{ + const mbedtls_mpi *src = NULL; + switch (param) { + case MBEDTLS_DHM_PARAM_P: + src = &ctx->P; + break; + case MBEDTLS_DHM_PARAM_G: + src = &ctx->G; + break; + case MBEDTLS_DHM_PARAM_X: + src = &ctx->X; + break; + case MBEDTLS_DHM_PARAM_GX: + src = &ctx->GX; + break; + case MBEDTLS_DHM_PARAM_GY: + src = &ctx->GY; + break; + case MBEDTLS_DHM_PARAM_K: + src = &ctx->K; + break; + default: + return MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + return mbedtls_mpi_copy(dest, src); +} + /* * Parse the ServerKeyExchange parameters */ @@ -114,9 +148,6 @@ int mbedtls_dhm_read_params(mbedtls_dhm_context *ctx, const unsigned char *end) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - DHM_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - DHM_VALIDATE_RET(p != NULL && *p != NULL); - DHM_VALIDATE_RET(end != NULL); if ((ret = dhm_read_bignum(&ctx->P, p, end)) != 0 || (ret = dhm_read_bignum(&ctx->G, p, end)) != 0 || @@ -128,8 +159,6 @@ int mbedtls_dhm_read_params(mbedtls_dhm_context *ctx, return ret; } - ctx->len = mbedtls_mpi_size(&ctx->P); - return 0; } @@ -199,10 +228,6 @@ int mbedtls_dhm_make_params(mbedtls_dhm_context *ctx, int x_size, int ret; size_t n1, n2, n3; unsigned char *p; - DHM_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - DHM_VALIDATE_RET(output != NULL); - DHM_VALIDATE_RET(olen != NULL); - DHM_VALIDATE_RET(f_rng != NULL); ret = dhm_make_common(ctx, x_size, f_rng, p_rng); if (ret != 0) { @@ -232,9 +257,7 @@ int mbedtls_dhm_make_params(mbedtls_dhm_context *ctx, int x_size, DHM_MPI_EXPORT(&ctx->G, n2); DHM_MPI_EXPORT(&ctx->GX, n3); - *olen = p - output; - - ctx->len = n1; + *olen = (size_t) (p - output); cleanup: if (ret != 0 && ret > -128) { @@ -251,16 +274,12 @@ int mbedtls_dhm_set_group(mbedtls_dhm_context *ctx, const mbedtls_mpi *G) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - DHM_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - DHM_VALIDATE_RET(P != NULL); - DHM_VALIDATE_RET(G != NULL); if ((ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy(&ctx->P, P)) != 0 || (ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy(&ctx->G, G)) != 0) { return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_SET_GROUP_FAILED, ret); } - ctx->len = mbedtls_mpi_size(&ctx->P); return 0; } @@ -271,10 +290,8 @@ int mbedtls_dhm_read_public(mbedtls_dhm_context *ctx, const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - DHM_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - DHM_VALIDATE_RET(input != NULL); - if (ilen < 1 || ilen > ctx->len) { + if (ilen < 1 || ilen > mbedtls_dhm_get_len(ctx)) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } @@ -294,11 +311,8 @@ int mbedtls_dhm_make_public(mbedtls_dhm_context *ctx, int x_size, void *p_rng) { int ret; - DHM_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - DHM_VALIDATE_RET(output != NULL); - DHM_VALIDATE_RET(f_rng != NULL); - if (olen < 1 || olen > ctx->len) { + if (olen < 1 || olen > mbedtls_dhm_get_len(ctx)) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } @@ -395,11 +409,12 @@ int mbedtls_dhm_calc_secret(mbedtls_dhm_context *ctx, { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; mbedtls_mpi GYb; - DHM_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - DHM_VALIDATE_RET(output != NULL); - DHM_VALIDATE_RET(olen != NULL); - if (output_size < ctx->len) { + if (f_rng == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + if (output_size < mbedtls_dhm_get_len(ctx)) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } @@ -410,23 +425,17 @@ int mbedtls_dhm_calc_secret(mbedtls_dhm_context *ctx, mbedtls_mpi_init(&GYb); /* Blind peer's value */ - if (f_rng != NULL) { - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(dhm_update_blinding(ctx, f_rng, p_rng)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi(&GYb, &ctx->GY, &ctx->Vi)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi(&GYb, &GYb, &ctx->P)); - } else { - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_copy(&GYb, &ctx->GY)); - } + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(dhm_update_blinding(ctx, f_rng, p_rng)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi(&GYb, &ctx->GY, &ctx->Vi)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi(&GYb, &GYb, &ctx->P)); /* Do modular exponentiation */ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod(&ctx->K, &GYb, &ctx->X, &ctx->P, &ctx->RP)); /* Unblind secret value */ - if (f_rng != NULL) { - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi(&ctx->K, &ctx->K, &ctx->Vf)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi(&ctx->K, &ctx->K, &ctx->P)); - } + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi(&ctx->K, &ctx->K, &ctx->Vf)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi(&ctx->K, &ctx->K, &ctx->P)); /* Output the secret without any leading zero byte. This is mandatory * for TLS per RFC 5246 §8.1.2. */ @@ -480,9 +489,6 @@ int mbedtls_dhm_parse_dhm(mbedtls_dhm_context *dhm, const unsigned char *dhmin, mbedtls_pem_context pem; #endif /* MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C */ - DHM_VALIDATE_RET(dhm != NULL); - DHM_VALIDATE_RET(dhmin != NULL); - #if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C) mbedtls_pem_init(&pem); @@ -552,8 +558,6 @@ int mbedtls_dhm_parse_dhm(mbedtls_dhm_context *dhm, const unsigned char *dhmin, ret = 0; - dhm->len = mbedtls_mpi_size(&dhm->P); - exit: #if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C) mbedtls_pem_free(&pem); @@ -581,6 +585,7 @@ static int load_file(const char *path, unsigned char **buf, size_t *n) if ((f = fopen(path, "rb")) == NULL) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_FILE_IO_ERROR; } + /* The data loaded here is public, so don't bother disabling buffering. */ fseek(f, 0, SEEK_END); if ((size = ftell(f)) == -1) { @@ -600,8 +605,7 @@ static int load_file(const char *path, unsigned char **buf, size_t *n) if (fread(*buf, 1, *n, f) != *n) { fclose(f); - mbedtls_platform_zeroize(*buf, *n + 1); - mbedtls_free(*buf); + mbedtls_zeroize_and_free(*buf, *n + 1); return MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_FILE_IO_ERROR; } @@ -625,8 +629,6 @@ int mbedtls_dhm_parse_dhmfile(mbedtls_dhm_context *dhm, const char *path) int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t n; unsigned char *buf; - DHM_VALIDATE_RET(dhm != NULL); - DHM_VALIDATE_RET(path != NULL); if ((ret = load_file(path, &buf, &n)) != 0) { return ret; @@ -634,8 +636,7 @@ int mbedtls_dhm_parse_dhmfile(mbedtls_dhm_context *dhm, const char *path) ret = mbedtls_dhm_parse_dhm(dhm, buf, n); - mbedtls_platform_zeroize(buf, n); - mbedtls_free(buf); + mbedtls_zeroize_and_free(buf, n); return ret; } diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ecdh.c b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ecdh.c index 29a732a08fdd..b276c6adadf4 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ecdh.c +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ecdh.c @@ -22,12 +22,6 @@ #include -/* Parameter validation macros based on platform_util.h */ -#define ECDH_VALIDATE_RET(cond) \ - MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE_RET(cond, MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA) -#define ECDH_VALIDATE(cond) \ - MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE(cond) - #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_LEGACY_CONTEXT) typedef mbedtls_ecdh_context mbedtls_ecdh_context_mbed; #endif @@ -88,10 +82,6 @@ int mbedtls_ecdh_gen_public(mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_mpi *d, mbedtls_ecp_ int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng) { - ECDH_VALIDATE_RET(grp != NULL); - ECDH_VALIDATE_RET(d != NULL); - ECDH_VALIDATE_RET(Q != NULL); - ECDH_VALIDATE_RET(f_rng != NULL); return ecdh_gen_public_restartable(grp, d, Q, f_rng, p_rng, NULL); } #endif /* !MBEDTLS_ECDH_GEN_PUBLIC_ALT */ @@ -136,10 +126,6 @@ int mbedtls_ecdh_compute_shared(mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_mpi *z, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng) { - ECDH_VALIDATE_RET(grp != NULL); - ECDH_VALIDATE_RET(Q != NULL); - ECDH_VALIDATE_RET(d != NULL); - ECDH_VALIDATE_RET(z != NULL); return ecdh_compute_shared_restartable(grp, z, Q, d, f_rng, p_rng, NULL); } @@ -158,13 +144,20 @@ static void ecdh_init_internal(mbedtls_ecdh_context_mbed *ctx) #endif } +mbedtls_ecp_group_id mbedtls_ecdh_get_grp_id(mbedtls_ecdh_context *ctx) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_LEGACY_CONTEXT) + return ctx->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(grp).id; +#else + return ctx->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(grp_id); +#endif +} + /* * Initialize context */ void mbedtls_ecdh_init(mbedtls_ecdh_context *ctx) { - ECDH_VALIDATE(ctx != NULL); - #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_LEGACY_CONTEXT) ecdh_init_internal(ctx); mbedtls_ecp_point_init(&ctx->Vi); @@ -199,8 +192,6 @@ static int ecdh_setup_internal(mbedtls_ecdh_context_mbed *ctx, */ int mbedtls_ecdh_setup(mbedtls_ecdh_context *ctx, mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id) { - ECDH_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_LEGACY_CONTEXT) return ecdh_setup_internal(ctx, grp_id); #else @@ -241,8 +232,6 @@ static void ecdh_free_internal(mbedtls_ecdh_context_mbed *ctx) */ void mbedtls_ecdh_enable_restart(mbedtls_ecdh_context *ctx) { - ECDH_VALIDATE(ctx != NULL); - ctx->restart_enabled = 1; } #endif @@ -351,11 +340,6 @@ int mbedtls_ecdh_make_params(mbedtls_ecdh_context *ctx, size_t *olen, void *p_rng) { int restart_enabled = 0; - ECDH_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - ECDH_VALIDATE_RET(olen != NULL); - ECDH_VALIDATE_RET(buf != NULL); - ECDH_VALIDATE_RET(f_rng != NULL); - #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) restart_enabled = ctx->restart_enabled; #else @@ -388,7 +372,7 @@ static int ecdh_read_params_internal(mbedtls_ecdh_context_mbed *ctx, const unsigned char *end) { return mbedtls_ecp_tls_read_point(&ctx->grp, &ctx->Qp, buf, - end - *buf); + (size_t) (end - *buf)); } /* @@ -404,12 +388,7 @@ int mbedtls_ecdh_read_params(mbedtls_ecdh_context *ctx, { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id; - ECDH_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - ECDH_VALIDATE_RET(buf != NULL); - ECDH_VALIDATE_RET(*buf != NULL); - ECDH_VALIDATE_RET(end != NULL); - - if ((ret = mbedtls_ecp_tls_read_group_id(&grp_id, buf, end - *buf)) + if ((ret = mbedtls_ecp_tls_read_group_id(&grp_id, buf, (size_t) (end - *buf))) != 0) { return ret; } @@ -468,10 +447,9 @@ int mbedtls_ecdh_get_params(mbedtls_ecdh_context *ctx, mbedtls_ecdh_side side) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - ECDH_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - ECDH_VALIDATE_RET(key != NULL); - ECDH_VALIDATE_RET(side == MBEDTLS_ECDH_OURS || - side == MBEDTLS_ECDH_THEIRS); + if (side != MBEDTLS_ECDH_OURS && side != MBEDTLS_ECDH_THEIRS) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } if (mbedtls_ecdh_grp_id(ctx) == MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE) { /* This is the first call to get_params(). Set up the context @@ -562,11 +540,6 @@ int mbedtls_ecdh_make_public(mbedtls_ecdh_context *ctx, size_t *olen, void *p_rng) { int restart_enabled = 0; - ECDH_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - ECDH_VALIDATE_RET(olen != NULL); - ECDH_VALIDATE_RET(buf != NULL); - ECDH_VALIDATE_RET(f_rng != NULL); - #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) restart_enabled = ctx->restart_enabled; #endif @@ -616,9 +589,6 @@ static int ecdh_read_public_internal(mbedtls_ecdh_context_mbed *ctx, int mbedtls_ecdh_read_public(mbedtls_ecdh_context *ctx, const unsigned char *buf, size_t blen) { - ECDH_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - ECDH_VALIDATE_RET(buf != NULL); - #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_LEGACY_CONTEXT) return ecdh_read_public_internal(ctx, buf, blen); #else @@ -698,10 +668,6 @@ int mbedtls_ecdh_calc_secret(mbedtls_ecdh_context *ctx, size_t *olen, void *p_rng) { int restart_enabled = 0; - ECDH_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - ECDH_VALIDATE_RET(olen != NULL); - ECDH_VALIDATE_RET(buf != NULL); - #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) restart_enabled = ctx->restart_enabled; #endif @@ -725,5 +691,4 @@ int mbedtls_ecdh_calc_secret(mbedtls_ecdh_context *ctx, size_t *olen, } #endif } - #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDH_C */ diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ecdsa.c b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ecdsa.c index 51aba0ed9a99..2f7a996a7e73 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ecdsa.c +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ecdsa.c @@ -29,12 +29,6 @@ #include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" #include "mbedtls/error.h" -/* Parameter validation macros based on platform_util.h */ -#define ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET(cond) \ - MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE_RET(cond, MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA) -#define ECDSA_VALIDATE(cond) \ - MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE(cond) - #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) /* @@ -246,13 +240,13 @@ int mbedtls_ecdsa_can_do(mbedtls_ecp_group_id gid) * Compute ECDSA signature of a hashed message (SEC1 4.1.3) * Obviously, compared to SEC1 4.1.3, we skip step 4 (hash message) */ -static int ecdsa_sign_restartable(mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, - mbedtls_mpi *r, mbedtls_mpi *s, - const mbedtls_mpi *d, const unsigned char *buf, size_t blen, - int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng, - int (*f_rng_blind)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), - void *p_rng_blind, - mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_ctx *rs_ctx) +int mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_restartable(mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + mbedtls_mpi *r, mbedtls_mpi *s, + const mbedtls_mpi *d, const unsigned char *buf, size_t blen, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng, + int (*f_rng_blind)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng_blind, + mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_ctx *rs_ctx) { int ret, key_tries, sign_tries; int *p_sign_tries = &sign_tries, *p_key_tries = &key_tries; @@ -387,30 +381,26 @@ int mbedtls_ecdsa_sign(mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_mpi *r, mbedtls_mpi *s, const mbedtls_mpi *d, const unsigned char *buf, size_t blen, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng) { - ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET(grp != NULL); - ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET(r != NULL); - ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET(s != NULL); - ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET(d != NULL); - ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET(f_rng != NULL); - ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET(buf != NULL || blen == 0); - /* Use the same RNG for both blinding and ephemeral key generation */ - return ecdsa_sign_restartable(grp, r, s, d, buf, blen, - f_rng, p_rng, f_rng, p_rng, NULL); + return mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_restartable(grp, r, s, d, buf, blen, + f_rng, p_rng, f_rng, p_rng, NULL); } #endif /* !MBEDTLS_ECDSA_SIGN_ALT */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC) /* * Deterministic signature wrapper + * + * note: The f_rng_blind parameter must not be NULL. + * */ -static int ecdsa_sign_det_restartable(mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, - mbedtls_mpi *r, mbedtls_mpi *s, - const mbedtls_mpi *d, const unsigned char *buf, size_t blen, - mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, - int (*f_rng_blind)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), - void *p_rng_blind, - mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_ctx *rs_ctx) +int mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det_restartable(mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + mbedtls_mpi *r, mbedtls_mpi *s, + const mbedtls_mpi *d, const unsigned char *buf, size_t blen, + mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + int (*f_rng_blind)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng_blind, + mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_ctx *rs_ctx) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context rng_ctx; @@ -460,67 +450,9 @@ static int ecdsa_sign_det_restartable(mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, ret = mbedtls_ecdsa_sign(grp, r, s, d, buf, blen, mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random, p_rng); #else - if (f_rng_blind != NULL) { - ret = ecdsa_sign_restartable(grp, r, s, d, buf, blen, - mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random, p_rng, - f_rng_blind, p_rng_blind, rs_ctx); - } else { - mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *p_rng_blind_det; - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) - /* - * To avoid reusing rng_ctx and risking incorrect behavior we seed a - * second HMAC-DRBG with the same seed. We also apply a label to avoid - * reusing the bits of the ephemeral key for blinding and eliminate the - * risk that they leak this way. - */ - const char *blind_label = "BLINDING CONTEXT"; - mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context rng_ctx_blind; - - mbedtls_hmac_drbg_init(&rng_ctx_blind); - p_rng_blind_det = &rng_ctx_blind; - mbedtls_hmac_drbg_seed_buf(p_rng_blind_det, md_info, - data, 2 * grp_len); - ret = mbedtls_hmac_drbg_update_ret(p_rng_blind_det, - (const unsigned char *) blind_label, - strlen(blind_label)); - if (ret != 0) { - mbedtls_hmac_drbg_free(&rng_ctx_blind); - goto cleanup; - } -#else - /* - * In the case of restartable computations we would either need to store - * the second RNG in the restart context too or set it up at every - * restart. The first option would penalize the correct application of - * the function and the second would defeat the purpose of the - * restartable feature. - * - * Therefore in this case we reuse the original RNG. This comes with the - * price that the resulting signature might not be a valid deterministic - * ECDSA signature with a very low probability (same magnitude as - * successfully guessing the private key). However even then it is still - * a valid ECDSA signature. - */ - p_rng_blind_det = p_rng; -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */ - - /* - * Since the output of the RNGs is always the same for the same key and - * message, this limits the efficiency of blinding and leaks information - * through side channels. After mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det() is removed NULL - * won't be a valid value for f_rng_blind anymore. Therefore it should - * be checked by the caller and this branch and check can be removed. - */ - ret = ecdsa_sign_restartable(grp, r, s, d, buf, blen, - mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random, p_rng, - mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random, p_rng_blind_det, - rs_ctx); - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) - mbedtls_hmac_drbg_free(&rng_ctx_blind); -#endif - } + ret = mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_restartable(grp, r, s, d, buf, blen, + mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random, p_rng, + f_rng_blind, p_rng_blind, rs_ctx); #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_SIGN_ALT */ cleanup: @@ -533,26 +465,8 @@ static int ecdsa_sign_det_restartable(mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, } /* - * Deterministic signature wrappers + * Deterministic signature wrapper */ - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) -int mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det(mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_mpi *r, - mbedtls_mpi *s, const mbedtls_mpi *d, - const unsigned char *buf, size_t blen, - mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg) -{ - ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET(grp != NULL); - ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET(r != NULL); - ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET(s != NULL); - ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET(d != NULL); - ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET(buf != NULL || blen == 0); - - return ecdsa_sign_det_restartable(grp, r, s, d, buf, blen, md_alg, - NULL, NULL, NULL); -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ - int mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det_ext(mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_mpi *r, mbedtls_mpi *s, const mbedtls_mpi *d, const unsigned char *buf, size_t blen, @@ -561,15 +475,8 @@ int mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det_ext(mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_mpi *r, size_t), void *p_rng_blind) { - ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET(grp != NULL); - ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET(r != NULL); - ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET(s != NULL); - ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET(d != NULL); - ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET(buf != NULL || blen == 0); - ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET(f_rng_blind != NULL); - - return ecdsa_sign_det_restartable(grp, r, s, d, buf, blen, md_alg, - f_rng_blind, p_rng_blind, NULL); + return mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det_restartable(grp, r, s, d, buf, blen, md_alg, + f_rng_blind, p_rng_blind, NULL); } #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC */ @@ -578,11 +485,12 @@ int mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det_ext(mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_mpi *r, * Verify ECDSA signature of hashed message (SEC1 4.1.4) * Obviously, compared to SEC1 4.1.3, we skip step 2 (hash message) */ -static int ecdsa_verify_restartable(mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, - const unsigned char *buf, size_t blen, - const mbedtls_ecp_point *Q, - const mbedtls_mpi *r, const mbedtls_mpi *s, - mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_ctx *rs_ctx) +int mbedtls_ecdsa_verify_restartable(mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + const unsigned char *buf, size_t blen, + const mbedtls_ecp_point *Q, + const mbedtls_mpi *r, + const mbedtls_mpi *s, + mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_ctx *rs_ctx) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; mbedtls_mpi e, s_inv, u1, u2; @@ -691,13 +599,7 @@ int mbedtls_ecdsa_verify(mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, const mbedtls_mpi *r, const mbedtls_mpi *s) { - ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET(grp != NULL); - ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET(Q != NULL); - ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET(r != NULL); - ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET(s != NULL); - ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET(buf != NULL || blen == 0); - - return ecdsa_verify_restartable(grp, buf, blen, Q, r, s, NULL); + return mbedtls_ecdsa_verify_restartable(grp, buf, blen, Q, r, s, NULL); } #endif /* !MBEDTLS_ECDSA_VERIFY_ALT */ @@ -705,7 +607,8 @@ int mbedtls_ecdsa_verify(mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, * Convert a signature (given by context) to ASN.1 */ static int ecdsa_signature_to_asn1(const mbedtls_mpi *r, const mbedtls_mpi *s, - unsigned char *sig, size_t *slen) + unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_size, + size_t *slen) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; unsigned char buf[MBEDTLS_ECDSA_MAX_LEN] = { 0 }; @@ -720,6 +623,10 @@ static int ecdsa_signature_to_asn1(const mbedtls_mpi *r, const mbedtls_mpi *s, MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)); + if (len > sig_size) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + } + memcpy(sig, p, len); *slen = len; @@ -732,25 +639,24 @@ static int ecdsa_signature_to_asn1(const mbedtls_mpi *r, const mbedtls_mpi *s, int mbedtls_ecdsa_write_signature_restartable(mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, const unsigned char *hash, size_t hlen, - unsigned char *sig, size_t *slen, + unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_size, size_t *slen, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng, mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_ctx *rs_ctx) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; mbedtls_mpi r, s; - ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET(hash != NULL); - ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET(sig != NULL); - ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET(slen != NULL); + if (f_rng == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } mbedtls_mpi_init(&r); mbedtls_mpi_init(&s); #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC) - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(ecdsa_sign_det_restartable(&ctx->grp, &r, &s, &ctx->d, - hash, hlen, md_alg, f_rng, - p_rng, rs_ctx)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det_restartable(&ctx->grp, &r, &s, &ctx->d, + hash, hlen, md_alg, f_rng, + p_rng, rs_ctx)); #else (void) md_alg; @@ -761,13 +667,13 @@ int mbedtls_ecdsa_write_signature_restartable(mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ctx, hash, hlen, f_rng, p_rng)); #else /* Use the same RNG for both blinding and ephemeral key generation */ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(ecdsa_sign_restartable(&ctx->grp, &r, &s, &ctx->d, - hash, hlen, f_rng, p_rng, f_rng, - p_rng, rs_ctx)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_restartable(&ctx->grp, &r, &s, &ctx->d, + hash, hlen, f_rng, p_rng, f_rng, + p_rng, rs_ctx)); #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_SIGN_ALT */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC */ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(ecdsa_signature_to_asn1(&r, &s, sig, slen)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(ecdsa_signature_to_asn1(&r, &s, sig, sig_size, slen)); cleanup: mbedtls_mpi_free(&r); @@ -782,34 +688,15 @@ int mbedtls_ecdsa_write_signature_restartable(mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ctx, int mbedtls_ecdsa_write_signature(mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, const unsigned char *hash, size_t hlen, - unsigned char *sig, size_t *slen, + unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_size, size_t *slen, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng) { - ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET(hash != NULL); - ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET(sig != NULL); - ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET(slen != NULL); return mbedtls_ecdsa_write_signature_restartable( - ctx, md_alg, hash, hlen, sig, slen, f_rng, p_rng, NULL); + ctx, md_alg, hash, hlen, sig, sig_size, slen, + f_rng, p_rng, NULL); } -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) && \ - defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC) -int mbedtls_ecdsa_write_signature_det(mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ctx, - const unsigned char *hash, size_t hlen, - unsigned char *sig, size_t *slen, - mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg) -{ - ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET(hash != NULL); - ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET(sig != NULL); - ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET(slen != NULL); - return mbedtls_ecdsa_write_signature(ctx, md_alg, hash, hlen, sig, slen, - NULL, NULL); -} -#endif - /* * Read and check signature */ @@ -817,9 +704,6 @@ int mbedtls_ecdsa_read_signature(mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ctx, const unsigned char *hash, size_t hlen, const unsigned char *sig, size_t slen) { - ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET(hash != NULL); - ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET(sig != NULL); return mbedtls_ecdsa_read_signature_restartable( ctx, hash, hlen, sig, slen, NULL); } @@ -837,10 +721,6 @@ int mbedtls_ecdsa_read_signature_restartable(mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ctx, const unsigned char *end = sig + slen; size_t len; mbedtls_mpi r, s; - ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET(hash != NULL); - ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET(sig != NULL); - mbedtls_mpi_init(&r); mbedtls_mpi_init(&s); @@ -869,8 +749,8 @@ int mbedtls_ecdsa_read_signature_restartable(mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ctx, goto cleanup; } #else - if ((ret = ecdsa_verify_restartable(&ctx->grp, hash, hlen, - &ctx->Q, &r, &s, rs_ctx)) != 0) { + if ((ret = mbedtls_ecdsa_verify_restartable(&ctx->grp, hash, hlen, + &ctx->Q, &r, &s, rs_ctx)) != 0) { goto cleanup; } #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_VERIFY_ALT */ @@ -897,9 +777,6 @@ int mbedtls_ecdsa_genkey(mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ctx, mbedtls_ecp_group_id gid, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng) { int ret = 0; - ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET(f_rng != NULL); - ret = mbedtls_ecp_group_load(&ctx->grp, gid); if (ret != 0) { return ret; @@ -916,9 +793,6 @@ int mbedtls_ecdsa_genkey(mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ctx, mbedtls_ecp_group_id gid, int mbedtls_ecdsa_from_keypair(mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ctx, const mbedtls_ecp_keypair *key) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET(key != NULL); - if ((ret = mbedtls_ecp_group_copy(&ctx->grp, &key->grp)) != 0 || (ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy(&ctx->d, &key->d)) != 0 || (ret = mbedtls_ecp_copy(&ctx->Q, &key->Q)) != 0) { @@ -933,8 +807,6 @@ int mbedtls_ecdsa_from_keypair(mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ctx, const mbedtls_ecp_key */ void mbedtls_ecdsa_init(mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ctx) { - ECDSA_VALIDATE(ctx != NULL); - mbedtls_ecp_keypair_init(ctx); } @@ -956,8 +828,6 @@ void mbedtls_ecdsa_free(mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ctx) */ void mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_init(mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_ctx *ctx) { - ECDSA_VALIDATE(ctx != NULL); - mbedtls_ecp_restart_init(&ctx->ecp); ctx->ver = NULL; diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ecjpake.c b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ecjpake.c index 102c24ab2a9e..cdf5d7ea46e5 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ecjpake.c +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ecjpake.c @@ -22,12 +22,6 @@ #if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_ALT) -/* Parameter validation macros based on platform_util.h */ -#define ECJPAKE_VALIDATE_RET(cond) \ - MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE_RET(cond, MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA) -#define ECJPAKE_VALIDATE(cond) \ - MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE(cond) - /* * Convert a mbedtls_ecjpake_role to identifier string */ @@ -39,14 +33,23 @@ static const char * const ecjpake_id[] = { #define ID_MINE (ecjpake_id[ctx->role]) #define ID_PEER (ecjpake_id[1 - ctx->role]) +/** + * Helper to Compute a hash from md_type + */ +static int mbedtls_ecjpake_compute_hash(mbedtls_md_type_t md_type, + const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen, + unsigned char *output) +{ + return mbedtls_md(mbedtls_md_info_from_type(md_type), + input, ilen, output); +} + /* * Initialize context */ void mbedtls_ecjpake_init(mbedtls_ecjpake_context *ctx) { - ECJPAKE_VALIDATE(ctx != NULL); - - ctx->md_info = NULL; + ctx->md_type = MBEDTLS_MD_NONE; mbedtls_ecp_group_init(&ctx->grp); ctx->point_format = MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_UNCOMPRESSED; @@ -70,7 +73,7 @@ void mbedtls_ecjpake_free(mbedtls_ecjpake_context *ctx) return; } - ctx->md_info = NULL; + ctx->md_type = MBEDTLS_MD_NONE; mbedtls_ecp_group_free(&ctx->grp); mbedtls_ecp_point_free(&ctx->Xm1); @@ -96,17 +99,18 @@ int mbedtls_ecjpake_setup(mbedtls_ecjpake_context *ctx, { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - ECJPAKE_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - ECJPAKE_VALIDATE_RET(role == MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_CLIENT || - role == MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_SERVER); - ECJPAKE_VALIDATE_RET(secret != NULL || len == 0); + if (role != MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_CLIENT && role != MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_SERVER) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } ctx->role = role; - if ((ctx->md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type(hash)) == NULL) { + if ((mbedtls_md_info_from_type(hash)) == NULL) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; } + ctx->md_type = hash; + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_ecp_group_load(&ctx->grp, curve)); MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(&ctx->s, secret, len)); @@ -119,14 +123,25 @@ int mbedtls_ecjpake_setup(mbedtls_ecjpake_context *ctx, return ret; } +int mbedtls_ecjpake_set_point_format(mbedtls_ecjpake_context *ctx, + int point_format) +{ + switch (point_format) { + case MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_UNCOMPRESSED: + case MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_COMPRESSED: + ctx->point_format = point_format; + return 0; + default: + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } +} + /* * Check if context is ready for use */ int mbedtls_ecjpake_check(const mbedtls_ecjpake_context *ctx) { - ECJPAKE_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - - if (ctx->md_info == NULL || + if (ctx->md_type == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE || ctx->grp.id == MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE || ctx->s.p == NULL) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA; @@ -153,7 +168,7 @@ static int ecjpake_write_len_point(unsigned char **p, } ret = mbedtls_ecp_point_write_binary(grp, P, pf, - &len, *p + 4, end - (*p + 4)); + &len, *p + 4, (size_t) (end - (*p + 4))); if (ret != 0) { return ret; } @@ -174,7 +189,7 @@ static int ecjpake_write_len_point(unsigned char **p, /* * Compute hash for ZKP (7.4.2.2.2.1) */ -static int ecjpake_hash(const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info, +static int ecjpake_hash(const mbedtls_md_type_t md_type, const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, const int pf, const mbedtls_ecp_point *G, @@ -210,11 +225,12 @@ static int ecjpake_hash(const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info, p += id_len; /* Compute hash */ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_md(md_info, buf, p - buf, hash)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_ecjpake_compute_hash(md_type, + buf, (size_t) (p - buf), hash)); /* Turn it into an integer mod n */ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(h, hash, - mbedtls_md_get_size(md_info))); + mbedtls_md_get_size_from_type(md_type))); MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi(h, h, &grp->N)); cleanup: @@ -224,7 +240,7 @@ static int ecjpake_hash(const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info, /* * Parse a ECShnorrZKP (7.4.2.2.2) and verify it (7.4.2.3.3) */ -static int ecjpake_zkp_read(const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info, +static int ecjpake_zkp_read(const mbedtls_md_type_t md_type, const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, const int pf, const mbedtls_ecp_point *G, @@ -253,7 +269,7 @@ static int ecjpake_zkp_read(const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info, return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_ecp_tls_read_point(grp, &V, p, end - *p)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_ecp_tls_read_point(grp, &V, p, (size_t) (end - *p))); if (end < *p || (size_t) (end - *p) < 1) { ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA; @@ -273,7 +289,7 @@ static int ecjpake_zkp_read(const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info, /* * Verification */ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(ecjpake_hash(md_info, grp, pf, G, &V, X, id, &h)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(ecjpake_hash(md_type, grp, pf, G, &V, X, id, &h)); MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_ecp_muladd((mbedtls_ecp_group *) grp, &VV, &h, X, &r, G)); @@ -294,7 +310,7 @@ static int ecjpake_zkp_read(const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info, /* * Generate ZKP (7.4.2.3.2) and write it as ECSchnorrZKP (7.4.2.2.2) */ -static int ecjpake_zkp_write(const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info, +static int ecjpake_zkp_write(const mbedtls_md_type_t md_type, const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, const int pf, const mbedtls_ecp_point *G, @@ -323,14 +339,14 @@ static int ecjpake_zkp_write(const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info, /* Compute signature */ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_ecp_gen_keypair_base((mbedtls_ecp_group *) grp, G, &v, &V, f_rng, p_rng)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(ecjpake_hash(md_info, grp, pf, G, &V, X, id, &h)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(ecjpake_hash(md_type, grp, pf, G, &V, X, id, &h)); MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi(&h, &h, x)); /* x*h */ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi(&h, &v, &h)); /* v - x*h */ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi(&h, &h, &grp->N)); /* r */ /* Write it out */ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_ecp_tls_write_point(grp, &V, - pf, &len, *p, end - *p)); + pf, &len, *p, (size_t) (end - *p))); *p += len; len = mbedtls_mpi_size(&h); /* actually r */ @@ -355,7 +371,7 @@ static int ecjpake_zkp_write(const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info, * Parse a ECJPAKEKeyKP (7.4.2.2.1) and check proof * Output: verified public key X */ -static int ecjpake_kkp_read(const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info, +static int ecjpake_kkp_read(const mbedtls_md_type_t md_type, const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, const int pf, const mbedtls_ecp_point *G, @@ -376,13 +392,13 @@ static int ecjpake_kkp_read(const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info, * ECSchnorrZKP zkp; * } ECJPAKEKeyKP; */ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_ecp_tls_read_point(grp, X, p, end - *p)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_ecp_tls_read_point(grp, X, p, (size_t) (end - *p))); if (mbedtls_ecp_is_zero(X)) { ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY; goto cleanup; } - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(ecjpake_zkp_read(md_info, grp, pf, G, X, id, p, end)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(ecjpake_zkp_read(md_type, grp, pf, G, X, id, p, end)); cleanup: return ret; @@ -392,7 +408,7 @@ static int ecjpake_kkp_read(const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info, * Generate an ECJPAKEKeyKP * Output: the serialized structure, plus private/public key pair */ -static int ecjpake_kkp_write(const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info, +static int ecjpake_kkp_write(const mbedtls_md_type_t md_type, const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, const int pf, const mbedtls_ecp_point *G, @@ -415,11 +431,11 @@ static int ecjpake_kkp_write(const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info, MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_ecp_gen_keypair_base((mbedtls_ecp_group *) grp, G, x, X, f_rng, p_rng)); MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_ecp_tls_write_point(grp, X, - pf, &len, *p, end - *p)); + pf, &len, *p, (size_t) (end - *p))); *p += len; /* Generate and write proof */ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(ecjpake_zkp_write(md_info, grp, pf, G, x, X, id, + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(ecjpake_zkp_write(md_type, grp, pf, G, x, X, id, p, end, f_rng, p_rng)); cleanup: @@ -430,7 +446,7 @@ static int ecjpake_kkp_write(const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info, * Read a ECJPAKEKeyKPPairList (7.4.2.3) and check proofs * Outputs: verified peer public keys Xa, Xb */ -static int ecjpake_kkpp_read(const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info, +static int ecjpake_kkpp_read(const mbedtls_md_type_t md_type, const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, const int pf, const mbedtls_ecp_point *G, @@ -449,8 +465,8 @@ static int ecjpake_kkpp_read(const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info, * ECJPAKEKeyKP ecjpake_key_kp_pair_list[2]; * } ECJPAKEKeyKPPairList; */ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(ecjpake_kkp_read(md_info, grp, pf, G, Xa, id, &p, end)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(ecjpake_kkp_read(md_info, grp, pf, G, Xb, id, &p, end)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(ecjpake_kkp_read(md_type, grp, pf, G, Xa, id, &p, end)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(ecjpake_kkp_read(md_type, grp, pf, G, Xb, id, &p, end)); if (p != end) { ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA; @@ -464,7 +480,7 @@ static int ecjpake_kkpp_read(const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info, * Generate a ECJPAKEKeyKPPairList * Outputs: the serialized structure, plus two private/public key pairs */ -static int ecjpake_kkpp_write(const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info, +static int ecjpake_kkpp_write(const mbedtls_md_type_t md_type, const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, const int pf, const mbedtls_ecp_point *G, @@ -483,12 +499,12 @@ static int ecjpake_kkpp_write(const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info, unsigned char *p = buf; const unsigned char *end = buf + len; - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(ecjpake_kkp_write(md_info, grp, pf, G, xm1, Xa, id, + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(ecjpake_kkp_write(md_type, grp, pf, G, xm1, Xa, id, &p, end, f_rng, p_rng)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(ecjpake_kkp_write(md_info, grp, pf, G, xm2, Xb, id, + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(ecjpake_kkp_write(md_type, grp, pf, G, xm2, Xb, id, &p, end, f_rng, p_rng)); - *olen = p - buf; + *olen = (size_t) (p - buf); cleanup: return ret; @@ -501,10 +517,7 @@ int mbedtls_ecjpake_read_round_one(mbedtls_ecjpake_context *ctx, const unsigned char *buf, size_t len) { - ECJPAKE_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - ECJPAKE_VALIDATE_RET(buf != NULL); - - return ecjpake_kkpp_read(ctx->md_info, &ctx->grp, ctx->point_format, + return ecjpake_kkpp_read(ctx->md_type, &ctx->grp, ctx->point_format, &ctx->grp.G, &ctx->Xp1, &ctx->Xp2, ID_PEER, buf, len); @@ -518,12 +531,7 @@ int mbedtls_ecjpake_write_round_one(mbedtls_ecjpake_context *ctx, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng) { - ECJPAKE_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - ECJPAKE_VALIDATE_RET(buf != NULL); - ECJPAKE_VALIDATE_RET(olen != NULL); - ECJPAKE_VALIDATE_RET(f_rng != NULL); - - return ecjpake_kkpp_write(ctx->md_info, &ctx->grp, ctx->point_format, + return ecjpake_kkpp_write(ctx->md_type, &ctx->grp, ctx->point_format, &ctx->grp.G, &ctx->xm1, &ctx->Xm1, &ctx->xm2, &ctx->Xm2, ID_MINE, buf, len, olen, f_rng, p_rng); @@ -565,9 +573,6 @@ int mbedtls_ecjpake_read_round_two(mbedtls_ecjpake_context *ctx, mbedtls_ecp_group grp; mbedtls_ecp_point G; /* C: GB, S: GA */ - ECJPAKE_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - ECJPAKE_VALIDATE_RET(buf != NULL); - mbedtls_ecp_group_init(&grp); mbedtls_ecp_point_init(&G); @@ -594,7 +599,7 @@ int mbedtls_ecjpake_read_round_two(mbedtls_ecjpake_context *ctx, } } - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(ecjpake_kkp_read(ctx->md_info, &ctx->grp, + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(ecjpake_kkp_read(ctx->md_type, &ctx->grp, ctx->point_format, &G, &ctx->Xp, ID_PEER, &p, end)); @@ -657,11 +662,6 @@ int mbedtls_ecjpake_write_round_two(mbedtls_ecjpake_context *ctx, const unsigned char *end = buf + len; size_t ec_len; - ECJPAKE_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - ECJPAKE_VALIDATE_RET(buf != NULL); - ECJPAKE_VALIDATE_RET(olen != NULL); - ECJPAKE_VALIDATE_RET(f_rng != NULL); - mbedtls_ecp_point_init(&G); mbedtls_ecp_point_init(&Xm); mbedtls_mpi_init(&xm); @@ -693,7 +693,7 @@ int mbedtls_ecjpake_write_round_two(mbedtls_ecjpake_context *ctx, goto cleanup; } MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_ecp_tls_write_group(&ctx->grp, &ec_len, - p, end - p)); + p, (size_t) (end - p))); p += ec_len; } @@ -702,15 +702,15 @@ int mbedtls_ecjpake_write_round_two(mbedtls_ecjpake_context *ctx, goto cleanup; } MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_ecp_tls_write_point(&ctx->grp, &Xm, - ctx->point_format, &ec_len, p, end - p)); + ctx->point_format, &ec_len, p, (size_t) (end - p))); p += ec_len; - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(ecjpake_zkp_write(ctx->md_info, &ctx->grp, + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(ecjpake_zkp_write(ctx->md_type, &ctx->grp, ctx->point_format, &G, &xm, &Xm, ID_MINE, &p, end, f_rng, p_rng)); - *olen = p - buf; + *olen = (size_t) (p - buf); cleanup: mbedtls_ecp_point_free(&G); @@ -723,28 +723,14 @@ int mbedtls_ecjpake_write_round_two(mbedtls_ecjpake_context *ctx, /* * Derive PMS (7.4.2.7 / 7.4.2.8) */ -int mbedtls_ecjpake_derive_secret(mbedtls_ecjpake_context *ctx, - unsigned char *buf, size_t len, size_t *olen, - int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), - void *p_rng) +static int mbedtls_ecjpake_derive_k(mbedtls_ecjpake_context *ctx, + mbedtls_ecp_point *K, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - mbedtls_ecp_point K; mbedtls_mpi m_xm2_s, one; - unsigned char kx[MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BYTES]; - size_t x_bytes; - - ECJPAKE_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - ECJPAKE_VALIDATE_RET(buf != NULL); - ECJPAKE_VALIDATE_RET(olen != NULL); - ECJPAKE_VALIDATE_RET(f_rng != NULL); - - *olen = mbedtls_md_get_size(ctx->md_info); - if (len < *olen) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; - } - mbedtls_ecp_point_init(&K); mbedtls_mpi_init(&m_xm2_s); mbedtls_mpi_init(&one); @@ -757,21 +743,76 @@ int mbedtls_ecjpake_derive_secret(mbedtls_ecjpake_context *ctx, */ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(ecjpake_mul_secret(&m_xm2_s, -1, &ctx->xm2, &ctx->s, &ctx->grp.N, f_rng, p_rng)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_ecp_muladd(&ctx->grp, &K, + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_ecp_muladd(&ctx->grp, K, &one, &ctx->Xp, &m_xm2_s, &ctx->Xp2)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_ecp_mul(&ctx->grp, &K, &ctx->xm2, &K, + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_ecp_mul(&ctx->grp, K, &ctx->xm2, K, f_rng, p_rng)); +cleanup: + mbedtls_mpi_free(&m_xm2_s); + mbedtls_mpi_free(&one); + + return ret; +} + +int mbedtls_ecjpake_derive_secret(mbedtls_ecjpake_context *ctx, + unsigned char *buf, size_t len, size_t *olen, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_ecp_point K; + unsigned char kx[MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BYTES]; + size_t x_bytes; + + *olen = mbedtls_md_get_size_from_type(ctx->md_type); + if (len < *olen) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + } + + mbedtls_ecp_point_init(&K); + + ret = mbedtls_ecjpake_derive_k(ctx, &K, f_rng, p_rng); + if (ret) { + goto cleanup; + } + /* PMS = SHA-256( K.X ) */ x_bytes = (ctx->grp.pbits + 7) / 8; MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(&K.X, kx, x_bytes)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_md(ctx->md_info, kx, x_bytes, buf)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_ecjpake_compute_hash(ctx->md_type, + kx, x_bytes, buf)); + +cleanup: + mbedtls_ecp_point_free(&K); + + return ret; +} + +int mbedtls_ecjpake_write_shared_key(mbedtls_ecjpake_context *ctx, + unsigned char *buf, size_t len, size_t *olen, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_ecp_point K; + + mbedtls_ecp_point_init(&K); + + ret = mbedtls_ecjpake_derive_k(ctx, &K, f_rng, p_rng); + if (ret) { + goto cleanup; + } + + ret = mbedtls_ecp_point_write_binary(&ctx->grp, &K, ctx->point_format, + olen, buf, len); + if (ret != 0) { + goto cleanup; + } cleanup: mbedtls_ecp_point_free(&K); - mbedtls_mpi_free(&m_xm2_s); - mbedtls_mpi_free(&one); return ret; } @@ -786,7 +827,7 @@ int mbedtls_ecjpake_derive_secret(mbedtls_ecjpake_context *ctx, #include "mbedtls/platform.h" #if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED) || \ - !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) + !defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) int mbedtls_ecjpake_self_test(int verbose) { (void) verbose; @@ -921,12 +962,42 @@ static const unsigned char ecjpake_test_cli_two[] = { 0xcc, 0x38, 0xdb, 0xdc, 0xae, 0x60, 0xd9, 0xc5, 0x4c }; +static const unsigned char ecjpake_test_shared_key[] = { + 0x04, 0x01, 0xab, 0xe9, 0xf2, 0xc7, 0x3a, 0x99, 0x14, 0xcb, 0x1f, 0x80, + 0xfb, 0x9d, 0xdb, 0x7e, 0x00, 0x12, 0xa8, 0x9c, 0x2f, 0x39, 0x27, 0x79, + 0xf9, 0x64, 0x40, 0x14, 0x75, 0xea, 0xc1, 0x31, 0x28, 0x43, 0x8f, 0xe1, + 0x12, 0x41, 0xd6, 0xc1, 0xe5, 0x5f, 0x7b, 0x80, 0x88, 0x94, 0xc9, 0xc0, + 0x27, 0xa3, 0x34, 0x41, 0xf5, 0xcb, 0xa1, 0xfe, 0x6c, 0xc7, 0xe6, 0x12, + 0x17, 0xc3, 0xde, 0x27, 0xb4, +}; + static const unsigned char ecjpake_test_pms[] = { 0xf3, 0xd4, 0x7f, 0x59, 0x98, 0x44, 0xdb, 0x92, 0xa5, 0x69, 0xbb, 0xe7, 0x98, 0x1e, 0x39, 0xd9, 0x31, 0xfd, 0x74, 0x3b, 0xf2, 0x2e, 0x98, 0xf9, 0xb4, 0x38, 0xf7, 0x19, 0xd3, 0xc4, 0xf3, 0x51 }; +/* + * PRNG for test - !!!INSECURE NEVER USE IN PRODUCTION!!! + * + * This is the linear congruential generator from numerical recipes, + * except we only use the low byte as the output. See + * https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Linear_congruential_generator#Parameters_in_common_use + */ +static int self_test_rng(void *ctx, unsigned char *out, size_t len) +{ + static uint32_t state = 42; + + (void) ctx; + + for (size_t i = 0; i < len; i++) { + state = state * 1664525u + 1013904223u; + out[i] = (unsigned char) state; + } + + return 0; +} + /* Load my private keys and generate the corresponding public keys */ static int ecjpake_test_load(mbedtls_ecjpake_context *ctx, const unsigned char *xm1, size_t len1, @@ -937,9 +1008,9 @@ static int ecjpake_test_load(mbedtls_ecjpake_context *ctx, MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(&ctx->xm1, xm1, len1)); MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(&ctx->xm2, xm2, len2)); MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_ecp_mul(&ctx->grp, &ctx->Xm1, &ctx->xm1, - &ctx->grp.G, NULL, NULL)); + &ctx->grp.G, self_test_rng, NULL)); MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_ecp_mul(&ctx->grp, &ctx->Xm2, &ctx->xm2, - &ctx->grp.G, NULL, NULL)); + &ctx->grp.G, self_test_rng, NULL)); cleanup: return ret; @@ -1089,6 +1160,13 @@ int mbedtls_ecjpake_self_test(int verbose) TEST_ASSERT(len == sizeof(ecjpake_test_pms)); TEST_ASSERT(memcmp(buf, ecjpake_test_pms, len) == 0); + /* Server derives K as unsigned binary data */ + TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_ecjpake_write_shared_key(&srv, + buf, sizeof(buf), &len, ecjpake_lgc, NULL) == 0); + + TEST_ASSERT(len == sizeof(ecjpake_test_shared_key)); + TEST_ASSERT(memcmp(buf, ecjpake_test_shared_key, len) == 0); + memset(buf, 0, len); /* Avoid interferences with next step */ /* Client derives PMS */ @@ -1098,6 +1176,13 @@ int mbedtls_ecjpake_self_test(int verbose) TEST_ASSERT(len == sizeof(ecjpake_test_pms)); TEST_ASSERT(memcmp(buf, ecjpake_test_pms, len) == 0); + /* Client derives K as unsigned binary data */ + TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_ecjpake_write_shared_key(&cli, + buf, sizeof(buf), &len, ecjpake_lgc, NULL) == 0); + + TEST_ASSERT(len == sizeof(ecjpake_test_shared_key)); + TEST_ASSERT(memcmp(buf, ecjpake_test_shared_key, len) == 0); + if (verbose != 0) { mbedtls_printf("passed\n"); } @@ -1124,7 +1209,7 @@ int mbedtls_ecjpake_self_test(int verbose) #undef TEST_ASSERT -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED && MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED && MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256 */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ecp.c b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ecp.c index cfe02b0d2c20..427059bb5322 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ecp.c +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ecp.c @@ -60,187 +60,35 @@ #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT) #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_LIGHT) #include "mbedtls/ecp.h" #include "mbedtls/threading.h" #include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" #include "mbedtls/error.h" -#include "mbedtls/bn_mul.h" +#include "bn_mul.h" #include "ecp_invasive.h" #include #if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_ALT) -/* Parameter validation macros based on platform_util.h */ -#define ECP_VALIDATE_RET(cond) \ - MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE_RET(cond, MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA) -#define ECP_VALIDATE(cond) \ - MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE(cond) - #include "mbedtls/platform.h" -#include "mbedtls/ecp_internal.h" - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C) -#include "mbedtls/hmac_drbg.h" -#elif defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C) -#include "mbedtls/ctr_drbg.h" -#else -#error \ - "Invalid configuration detected. Include check_config.h to ensure that the configuration is valid." -#endif -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG */ +#include "ecp_internal_alt.h" #if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) /* * Counts of point addition and doubling, and field multiplications. * Used to test resistance of point multiplication to simple timing attacks. */ -static unsigned long add_count, dbl_count, mul_count; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) +static unsigned long add_count, dbl_count; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */ +static unsigned long mul_count; #endif -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG) -/* - * Currently ecp_mul() takes a RNG function as an argument, used for - * side-channel protection, but it can be NULL. The initial reasoning was - * that people will pass non-NULL RNG when they care about side-channels, but - * unfortunately we have some APIs that call ecp_mul() with a NULL RNG, with - * no opportunity for the user to do anything about it. - * - * The obvious strategies for addressing that include: - * - change those APIs so that they take RNG arguments; - * - require a global RNG to be available to all crypto modules. - * - * Unfortunately those would break compatibility. So what we do instead is - * have our own internal DRBG instance, seeded from the secret scalar. - * - * The following is a light-weight abstraction layer for doing that with - * HMAC_DRBG (first choice) or CTR_DRBG. - */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C) - -/* DRBG context type */ -typedef mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context ecp_drbg_context; - -/* DRBG context init */ -static inline void ecp_drbg_init(ecp_drbg_context *ctx) -{ - mbedtls_hmac_drbg_init(ctx); -} - -/* DRBG context free */ -static inline void ecp_drbg_free(ecp_drbg_context *ctx) -{ - mbedtls_hmac_drbg_free(ctx); -} - -/* DRBG function */ -static inline int ecp_drbg_random(void *p_rng, - unsigned char *output, size_t output_len) -{ - return mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random(p_rng, output, output_len); -} - -/* DRBG context seeding */ -static int ecp_drbg_seed(ecp_drbg_context *ctx, - const mbedtls_mpi *secret, size_t secret_len) -{ - int ret; - unsigned char secret_bytes[MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BYTES]; - /* The list starts with strong hashes */ - const mbedtls_md_type_t md_type = - (mbedtls_md_type_t) (mbedtls_md_list()[0]); - const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type(md_type); - - if (secret_len > MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BYTES) { - ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_RANDOM_FAILED; - goto cleanup; - } - - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(secret, - secret_bytes, secret_len)); - - ret = mbedtls_hmac_drbg_seed_buf(ctx, md_info, secret_bytes, secret_len); - -cleanup: - mbedtls_platform_zeroize(secret_bytes, secret_len); - - return ret; -} - -#elif defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C) - -/* DRBG context type */ -typedef mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context ecp_drbg_context; - -/* DRBG context init */ -static inline void ecp_drbg_init(ecp_drbg_context *ctx) -{ - mbedtls_ctr_drbg_init(ctx); -} - -/* DRBG context free */ -static inline void ecp_drbg_free(ecp_drbg_context *ctx) -{ - mbedtls_ctr_drbg_free(ctx); -} - -/* DRBG function */ -static inline int ecp_drbg_random(void *p_rng, - unsigned char *output, size_t output_len) -{ - return mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random(p_rng, output, output_len); -} - -/* - * Since CTR_DRBG doesn't have a seed_buf() function the way HMAC_DRBG does, - * we need to pass an entropy function when seeding. So we use a dummy - * function for that, and pass the actual entropy as customisation string. - * (During seeding of CTR_DRBG the entropy input and customisation string are - * concatenated before being used to update the secret state.) - */ -static int ecp_ctr_drbg_null_entropy(void *ctx, unsigned char *out, size_t len) -{ - (void) ctx; - memset(out, 0, len); - return 0; -} - -/* DRBG context seeding */ -static int ecp_drbg_seed(ecp_drbg_context *ctx, - const mbedtls_mpi *secret, size_t secret_len) -{ - int ret; - unsigned char secret_bytes[MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BYTES]; - - if (secret_len > MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BYTES) { - ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_RANDOM_FAILED; - goto cleanup; - } - - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(secret, - secret_bytes, secret_len)); - - ret = mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed(ctx, ecp_ctr_drbg_null_entropy, NULL, - secret_bytes, secret_len); - -cleanup: - mbedtls_platform_zeroize(secret_bytes, secret_len); - - return ret; -} - -#else -#error \ - "Invalid configuration detected. Include check_config.h to ensure that the configuration is valid." -#endif /* DRBG modules */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG */ - #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) /* * Maximum number of "basic operations" to be done in a row. @@ -287,10 +135,6 @@ struct mbedtls_ecp_restart_mul { ecp_rsm_comb_core, /* ecp_mul_comb_core() */ ecp_rsm_final_norm, /* do the final normalization */ } state; -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG) - ecp_drbg_context drbg_ctx; - unsigned char drbg_seeded; -#endif }; /* @@ -303,10 +147,6 @@ static void ecp_restart_rsm_init(mbedtls_ecp_restart_mul_ctx *ctx) ctx->T = NULL; ctx->T_size = 0; ctx->state = ecp_rsm_init; -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG) - ecp_drbg_init(&ctx->drbg_ctx); - ctx->drbg_seeded = 0; -#endif } /* @@ -329,10 +169,6 @@ static void ecp_restart_rsm_free(mbedtls_ecp_restart_mul_ctx *ctx) mbedtls_free(ctx->T); } -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG) - ecp_drbg_free(&ctx->drbg_ctx); -#endif - ecp_restart_rsm_init(ctx); } @@ -380,7 +216,6 @@ static void ecp_restart_ma_free(mbedtls_ecp_restart_muladd_ctx *ctx) */ void mbedtls_ecp_restart_init(mbedtls_ecp_restart_ctx *ctx) { - ECP_VALIDATE(ctx != NULL); ctx->ops_done = 0; ctx->depth = 0; ctx->rsm = NULL; @@ -412,8 +247,6 @@ int mbedtls_ecp_check_budget(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_restart_ctx *rs_ctx, unsigned ops) { - ECP_VALIDATE_RET(grp != NULL); - if (rs_ctx != NULL && ecp_max_ops != 0) { /* scale depending on curve size: the chosen reference is 256-bit, * and multiplication is quadratic. Round to the closest integer. */ @@ -480,6 +313,22 @@ int mbedtls_ecp_check_budget(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) +static void mpi_init_many(mbedtls_mpi *arr, size_t size) +{ + while (size--) { + mbedtls_mpi_init(arr++); + } +} + +static void mpi_free_many(mbedtls_mpi *arr, size_t size) +{ + while (size--) { + mbedtls_mpi_free(arr++); + } +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */ + /* * List of supported curves: * - internal ID @@ -488,9 +337,9 @@ int mbedtls_ecp_check_budget(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, * - readable name * * Curves are listed in order: largest curves first, and for a given size, - * fastest curves first. This provides the default order for the SSL module. + * fastest curves first. * - * Reminder: update profiles in x509_crt.c when adding a new curves! + * Reminder: update profiles in x509_crt.c and ssl_tls.c when adding a new curve! */ static const mbedtls_ecp_curve_info ecp_supported_curves[] = { @@ -652,8 +501,6 @@ mbedtls_ecp_curve_type mbedtls_ecp_get_type(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp) */ void mbedtls_ecp_point_init(mbedtls_ecp_point *pt) { - ECP_VALIDATE(pt != NULL); - mbedtls_mpi_init(&pt->X); mbedtls_mpi_init(&pt->Y); mbedtls_mpi_init(&pt->Z); @@ -664,8 +511,6 @@ void mbedtls_ecp_point_init(mbedtls_ecp_point *pt) */ void mbedtls_ecp_group_init(mbedtls_ecp_group *grp) { - ECP_VALIDATE(grp != NULL); - grp->id = MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE; mbedtls_mpi_init(&grp->P); mbedtls_mpi_init(&grp->A); @@ -688,8 +533,6 @@ void mbedtls_ecp_group_init(mbedtls_ecp_group *grp) */ void mbedtls_ecp_keypair_init(mbedtls_ecp_keypair *key) { - ECP_VALIDATE(key != NULL); - mbedtls_ecp_group_init(&key->grp); mbedtls_mpi_init(&key->d); mbedtls_ecp_point_init(&key->Q); @@ -709,6 +552,19 @@ void mbedtls_ecp_point_free(mbedtls_ecp_point *pt) mbedtls_mpi_free(&(pt->Z)); } +/* + * Check that the comb table (grp->T) is static initialized. + */ +static int ecp_group_is_static_comb_table(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp) +{ +#if MBEDTLS_ECP_FIXED_POINT_OPTIM == 1 + return grp->T != NULL && grp->T_size == 0; +#else + (void) grp; + return 0; +#endif +} + /* * Unallocate (the components of) a group */ @@ -721,14 +577,17 @@ void mbedtls_ecp_group_free(mbedtls_ecp_group *grp) } if (grp->h != 1) { - mbedtls_mpi_free(&grp->P); mbedtls_mpi_free(&grp->A); mbedtls_mpi_free(&grp->B); mbedtls_ecp_point_free(&grp->G); + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_WITH_MPI_UINT) mbedtls_mpi_free(&grp->N); + mbedtls_mpi_free(&grp->P); +#endif } - if (grp->T != NULL) { + if (!ecp_group_is_static_comb_table(grp) && grp->T != NULL) { for (i = 0; i < grp->T_size; i++) { mbedtls_ecp_point_free(&grp->T[i]); } @@ -758,9 +617,6 @@ void mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free(mbedtls_ecp_keypair *key) int mbedtls_ecp_copy(mbedtls_ecp_point *P, const mbedtls_ecp_point *Q) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - ECP_VALIDATE_RET(P != NULL); - ECP_VALIDATE_RET(Q != NULL); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_copy(&P->X, &Q->X)); MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_copy(&P->Y, &Q->Y)); MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_copy(&P->Z, &Q->Z)); @@ -774,9 +630,6 @@ int mbedtls_ecp_copy(mbedtls_ecp_point *P, const mbedtls_ecp_point *Q) */ int mbedtls_ecp_group_copy(mbedtls_ecp_group *dst, const mbedtls_ecp_group *src) { - ECP_VALIDATE_RET(dst != NULL); - ECP_VALIDATE_RET(src != NULL); - return mbedtls_ecp_group_load(dst, src->id); } @@ -786,8 +639,6 @@ int mbedtls_ecp_group_copy(mbedtls_ecp_group *dst, const mbedtls_ecp_group *src) int mbedtls_ecp_set_zero(mbedtls_ecp_point *pt) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - ECP_VALIDATE_RET(pt != NULL); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_lset(&pt->X, 1)); MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_lset(&pt->Y, 1)); MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_lset(&pt->Z, 0)); @@ -801,8 +652,6 @@ int mbedtls_ecp_set_zero(mbedtls_ecp_point *pt) */ int mbedtls_ecp_is_zero(mbedtls_ecp_point *pt) { - ECP_VALIDATE_RET(pt != NULL); - return mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&pt->Z, 0) == 0; } @@ -812,9 +661,6 @@ int mbedtls_ecp_is_zero(mbedtls_ecp_point *pt) int mbedtls_ecp_point_cmp(const mbedtls_ecp_point *P, const mbedtls_ecp_point *Q) { - ECP_VALIDATE_RET(P != NULL); - ECP_VALIDATE_RET(Q != NULL); - if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi(&P->X, &Q->X) == 0 && mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi(&P->Y, &Q->Y) == 0 && mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi(&P->Z, &Q->Z) == 0) { @@ -831,10 +677,6 @@ int mbedtls_ecp_point_read_string(mbedtls_ecp_point *P, int radix, const char *x, const char *y) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - ECP_VALIDATE_RET(P != NULL); - ECP_VALIDATE_RET(x != NULL); - ECP_VALIDATE_RET(y != NULL); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_read_string(&P->X, radix, x)); MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_read_string(&P->Y, radix, y)); MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_lset(&P->Z, 1)); @@ -853,12 +695,10 @@ int mbedtls_ecp_point_write_binary(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; size_t plen; - ECP_VALIDATE_RET(grp != NULL); - ECP_VALIDATE_RET(P != NULL); - ECP_VALIDATE_RET(olen != NULL); - ECP_VALIDATE_RET(buf != NULL); - ECP_VALIDATE_RET(format == MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_UNCOMPRESSED || - format == MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_COMPRESSED); + if (format != MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_UNCOMPRESSED && + format != MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_COMPRESSED) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } plen = mbedtls_mpi_size(&grp->P); @@ -916,6 +756,13 @@ int mbedtls_ecp_point_write_binary(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, return ret; } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED) +static int mbedtls_ecp_sw_derive_y(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + const mbedtls_mpi *X, + mbedtls_mpi *Y, + int parity_bit); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED */ + /* * Import a point from unsigned binary data (SEC1 2.3.4 and RFC7748) */ @@ -925,10 +772,6 @@ int mbedtls_ecp_point_read_binary(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; size_t plen; - ECP_VALIDATE_RET(grp != NULL); - ECP_VALIDATE_RET(pt != NULL); - ECP_VALIDATE_RET(ilen == 0 || buf != NULL); - if (ilen < 1) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } @@ -962,18 +805,29 @@ int mbedtls_ecp_point_read_binary(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, } } - if (buf[0] != 0x04) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; - } - - if (ilen != 2 * plen + 1) { + if (ilen < 1 + plen) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(&pt->X, buf + 1, plen)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(&pt->Y, - buf + 1 + plen, plen)); MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_lset(&pt->Z, 1)); + + if (buf[0] == 0x04) { + /* format == MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_UNCOMPRESSED */ + if (ilen != 1 + plen * 2) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + return mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(&pt->Y, buf + 1 + plen, plen); + } else if (buf[0] == 0x02 || buf[0] == 0x03) { + /* format == MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_COMPRESSED */ + if (ilen != 1 + plen) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + return mbedtls_ecp_sw_derive_y(grp, &pt->X, &pt->Y, + (buf[0] & 1)); + } else { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } } #endif @@ -993,11 +847,6 @@ int mbedtls_ecp_tls_read_point(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, { unsigned char data_len; const unsigned char *buf_start; - ECP_VALIDATE_RET(grp != NULL); - ECP_VALIDATE_RET(pt != NULL); - ECP_VALIDATE_RET(buf != NULL); - ECP_VALIDATE_RET(buf_len == 0 || *buf != NULL); - /* * We must have at least two bytes (1 for length, at least one for data) */ @@ -1030,12 +879,10 @@ int mbedtls_ecp_tls_write_point(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, const mbedtls_ecp_ unsigned char *buf, size_t blen) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - ECP_VALIDATE_RET(grp != NULL); - ECP_VALIDATE_RET(pt != NULL); - ECP_VALIDATE_RET(olen != NULL); - ECP_VALIDATE_RET(buf != NULL); - ECP_VALIDATE_RET(format == MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_UNCOMPRESSED || - format == MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_COMPRESSED); + if (format != MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_UNCOMPRESSED && + format != MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_COMPRESSED) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } /* * buffer length must be at least one, for our length byte @@ -1066,10 +913,6 @@ int mbedtls_ecp_tls_read_group(mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id; - ECP_VALIDATE_RET(grp != NULL); - ECP_VALIDATE_RET(buf != NULL); - ECP_VALIDATE_RET(len == 0 || *buf != NULL); - if ((ret = mbedtls_ecp_tls_read_group_id(&grp_id, buf, len)) != 0) { return ret; } @@ -1086,10 +929,6 @@ int mbedtls_ecp_tls_read_group_id(mbedtls_ecp_group_id *grp, { uint16_t tls_id; const mbedtls_ecp_curve_info *curve_info; - ECP_VALIDATE_RET(grp != NULL); - ECP_VALIDATE_RET(buf != NULL); - ECP_VALIDATE_RET(len == 0 || *buf != NULL); - /* * We expect at least three bytes (see below) */ @@ -1107,9 +946,8 @@ int mbedtls_ecp_tls_read_group_id(mbedtls_ecp_group_id *grp, /* * Next two bytes are the namedcurve value */ - tls_id = *(*buf)++; - tls_id <<= 8; - tls_id |= *(*buf)++; + tls_id = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(*buf, 0); + *buf += 2; if ((curve_info = mbedtls_ecp_curve_info_from_tls_id(tls_id)) == NULL) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; @@ -1127,10 +965,6 @@ int mbedtls_ecp_tls_write_group(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, size_t *olen, unsigned char *buf, size_t blen) { const mbedtls_ecp_curve_info *curve_info; - ECP_VALIDATE_RET(grp != NULL); - ECP_VALIDATE_RET(buf != NULL); - ECP_VALIDATE_RET(olen != NULL); - if ((curve_info = mbedtls_ecp_curve_info_from_grp_id(grp->id)) == NULL) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } @@ -1234,17 +1068,13 @@ static inline int mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, * Reduce a mbedtls_mpi mod p in-place, to use after mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi * N->s < 0 is a very fast test, which fails only if N is 0 */ -#define MOD_SUB(N) \ - while ((N).s < 0 && mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&(N), 0) != 0) \ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi(&(N), &(N), &grp->P)) - -#if (defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED) && \ - !(defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_FALLBACK) && \ - defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DOUBLE_JAC_ALT) && \ - defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_ADD_MIXED_ALT))) || \ - (defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_MONTGOMERY_ENABLED) && \ - !(defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_FALLBACK) && \ - defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DOUBLE_ADD_MXZ_ALT))) +#define MOD_SUB(N) \ + do { \ + while ((N)->s < 0 && mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int((N), 0) != 0) \ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi((N), (N), &grp->P)); \ + } while (0) + +MBEDTLS_MAYBE_UNUSED static inline int mbedtls_mpi_sub_mod(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *A, @@ -1252,20 +1082,19 @@ static inline int mbedtls_mpi_sub_mod(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi(X, A, B)); - MOD_SUB(*X); + MOD_SUB(X); cleanup: return ret; } -#endif /* All functions referencing mbedtls_mpi_sub_mod() are alt-implemented without fallback */ /* * Reduce a mbedtls_mpi mod p in-place, to use after mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi and mbedtls_mpi_mul_int. * We known P, N and the result are positive, so sub_abs is correct, and * a bit faster. */ -#define MOD_ADD(N) \ - while (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi(&(N), &grp->P) >= 0) \ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_abs(&(N), &(N), &grp->P)) +#define MOD_ADD(N) \ + while (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi((N), &grp->P) >= 0) \ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_abs((N), (N), &grp->P)) static inline int mbedtls_mpi_add_mod(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_mpi *X, @@ -1274,28 +1103,201 @@ static inline int mbedtls_mpi_add_mod(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi(X, A, B)); - MOD_ADD(*X); + MOD_ADD(X); cleanup: return ret; } -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED) && \ - !(defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_FALLBACK) && \ - defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DOUBLE_JAC_ALT) && \ - defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_ADD_MIXED_ALT)) +MBEDTLS_MAYBE_UNUSED +static inline int mbedtls_mpi_mul_int_mod(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + mbedtls_mpi *X, + const mbedtls_mpi *A, + mbedtls_mpi_uint c) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_int(X, A, c)); + MOD_ADD(X); +cleanup: + return ret; +} + +MBEDTLS_MAYBE_UNUSED +static inline int mbedtls_mpi_sub_int_mod(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + mbedtls_mpi *X, + const mbedtls_mpi *A, + mbedtls_mpi_uint c) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_int(X, A, c)); + MOD_SUB(X); +cleanup: + return ret; +} + +#define MPI_ECP_SUB_INT(X, A, c) \ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_int_mod(grp, X, A, c)) + +MBEDTLS_MAYBE_UNUSED static inline int mbedtls_mpi_shift_l_mod(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_mpi *X, size_t count) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_shift_l(X, count)); - MOD_ADD(*X); + MOD_ADD(X); +cleanup: + return ret; +} + +/* + * Macro wrappers around ECP modular arithmetic + * + * Currently, these wrappers are defined via the bignum module. + */ + +#define MPI_ECP_ADD(X, A, B) \ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_add_mod(grp, X, A, B)) + +#define MPI_ECP_SUB(X, A, B) \ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_mod(grp, X, A, B)) + +#define MPI_ECP_MUL(X, A, B) \ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod(grp, X, A, B)) + +#define MPI_ECP_SQR(X, A) \ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod(grp, X, A, A)) + +#define MPI_ECP_MUL_INT(X, A, c) \ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_int_mod(grp, X, A, c)) + +#define MPI_ECP_INV(dst, src) \ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_inv_mod((dst), (src), &grp->P)) + +#define MPI_ECP_MOV(X, A) \ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_copy(X, A)) + +#define MPI_ECP_SHIFT_L(X, count) \ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_shift_l_mod(grp, X, count)) + +#define MPI_ECP_LSET(X, c) \ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_lset(X, c)) + +#define MPI_ECP_CMP_INT(X, c) \ + mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(X, c) + +#define MPI_ECP_CMP(X, Y) \ + mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi(X, Y) + +/* Needs f_rng, p_rng to be defined. */ +#define MPI_ECP_RAND(X) \ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_random((X), 2, &grp->P, f_rng, p_rng)) + +/* Conditional negation + * Needs grp and a temporary MPI tmp to be defined. */ +#define MPI_ECP_COND_NEG(X, cond) \ + do \ + { \ + unsigned char nonzero = mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int((X), 0) != 0; \ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi(&tmp, &grp->P, (X))); \ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_safe_cond_assign((X), &tmp, \ + nonzero & cond)); \ + } while (0) + +#define MPI_ECP_NEG(X) MPI_ECP_COND_NEG((X), 1) + +#define MPI_ECP_VALID(X) \ + ((X)->p != NULL) + +#define MPI_ECP_COND_ASSIGN(X, Y, cond) \ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_safe_cond_assign((X), (Y), (cond))) + +#define MPI_ECP_COND_SWAP(X, Y, cond) \ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_safe_cond_swap((X), (Y), (cond))) + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED) + +/* + * Computes the right-hand side of the Short Weierstrass equation + * RHS = X^3 + A X + B + */ +static int ecp_sw_rhs(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + mbedtls_mpi *rhs, + const mbedtls_mpi *X) +{ + int ret; + + /* Compute X^3 + A X + B as X (X^2 + A) + B */ + MPI_ECP_SQR(rhs, X); + + /* Special case for A = -3 */ + if (mbedtls_ecp_group_a_is_minus_3(grp)) { + MPI_ECP_SUB_INT(rhs, rhs, 3); + } else { + MPI_ECP_ADD(rhs, rhs, &grp->A); + } + + MPI_ECP_MUL(rhs, rhs, X); + MPI_ECP_ADD(rhs, rhs, &grp->B); + cleanup: return ret; } -#endif \ - /* All functions referencing mbedtls_mpi_shift_l_mod() are alt-implemented without fallback */ +/* + * Derive Y from X and a parity bit + */ +static int mbedtls_ecp_sw_derive_y(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + const mbedtls_mpi *X, + mbedtls_mpi *Y, + int parity_bit) +{ + /* w = y^2 = x^3 + ax + b + * y = sqrt(w) = w^((p+1)/4) mod p (for prime p where p = 3 mod 4) + * + * Note: this method for extracting square root does not validate that w + * was indeed a square so this function will return garbage in Y if X + * does not correspond to a point on the curve. + */ + + /* Check prerequisite p = 3 mod 4 */ + if (mbedtls_mpi_get_bit(&grp->P, 0) != 1 || + mbedtls_mpi_get_bit(&grp->P, 1) != 1) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + } + + int ret; + mbedtls_mpi exp; + mbedtls_mpi_init(&exp); + + /* use Y to store intermediate result, actually w above */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(ecp_sw_rhs(grp, Y, X)); + + /* w = y^2 */ /* Y contains y^2 intermediate result */ + /* exp = ((p+1)/4) */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_add_int(&exp, &grp->P, 1)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_shift_r(&exp, 2)); + /* sqrt(w) = w^((p+1)/4) mod p (for prime p where p = 3 mod 4) */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod(Y, Y /*y^2*/, &exp, &grp->P, NULL)); + + /* check parity bit match or else invert Y */ + /* This quick inversion implementation is valid because Y != 0 for all + * Short Weierstrass curves supported by mbedtls, as each supported curve + * has an order that is a large prime, so each supported curve does not + * have any point of order 2, and a point with Y == 0 would be of order 2 */ + if (mbedtls_mpi_get_bit(Y, 0) != parity_bit) { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi(Y, &grp->P, Y)); + } + +cleanup: + + mbedtls_mpi_free(&exp); + return ret; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED) /* * For curves in short Weierstrass form, we do all the internal operations in @@ -1311,7 +1313,7 @@ static inline int mbedtls_mpi_shift_l_mod(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, */ static int ecp_normalize_jac(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *pt) { - if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&pt->Z, 0) == 0) { + if (MPI_ECP_CMP_INT(&pt->Z, 0) == 0) { return 0; } @@ -1325,30 +1327,20 @@ static int ecp_normalize_jac(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *pt return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; #else int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - mbedtls_mpi Zi, ZZi; - mbedtls_mpi_init(&Zi); mbedtls_mpi_init(&ZZi); + mbedtls_mpi T; + mbedtls_mpi_init(&T); - /* - * X = X / Z^2 mod p - */ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_inv_mod(&Zi, &pt->Z, &grp->P)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod(grp, &ZZi, &Zi, &Zi)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod(grp, &pt->X, &pt->X, &ZZi)); + MPI_ECP_INV(&T, &pt->Z); /* T <- 1 / Z */ + MPI_ECP_MUL(&pt->Y, &pt->Y, &T); /* Y' <- Y*T = Y / Z */ + MPI_ECP_SQR(&T, &T); /* T <- T^2 = 1 / Z^2 */ + MPI_ECP_MUL(&pt->X, &pt->X, &T); /* X <- X * T = X / Z^2 */ + MPI_ECP_MUL(&pt->Y, &pt->Y, &T); /* Y'' <- Y' * T = Y / Z^3 */ - /* - * Y = Y / Z^3 mod p - */ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod(grp, &pt->Y, &pt->Y, &ZZi)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod(grp, &pt->Y, &pt->Y, &Zi)); - - /* - * Z = 1 - */ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_lset(&pt->Z, 1)); + MPI_ECP_LSET(&pt->Z, 1); cleanup: - mbedtls_mpi_free(&Zi); mbedtls_mpi_free(&ZZi); + mbedtls_mpi_free(&T); return ret; #endif /* !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_FALLBACK) || !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NORMALIZE_JAC_ALT) */ @@ -1383,50 +1375,54 @@ static int ecp_normalize_jac_many(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, #else int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t i; - mbedtls_mpi *c, u, Zi, ZZi; + mbedtls_mpi *c, t; if ((c = mbedtls_calloc(T_size, sizeof(mbedtls_mpi))) == NULL) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_ALLOC_FAILED; } - for (i = 0; i < T_size; i++) { - mbedtls_mpi_init(&c[i]); - } - - mbedtls_mpi_init(&u); mbedtls_mpi_init(&Zi); mbedtls_mpi_init(&ZZi); + mbedtls_mpi_init(&t); + mpi_init_many(c, T_size); /* - * c[i] = Z_0 * ... * Z_i + * c[i] = Z_0 * ... * Z_i, i = 0,..,n := T_size-1 */ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_copy(&c[0], &T[0]->Z)); + MPI_ECP_MOV(&c[0], &T[0]->Z); for (i = 1; i < T_size; i++) { - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod(grp, &c[i], &c[i-1], &T[i]->Z)); + MPI_ECP_MUL(&c[i], &c[i-1], &T[i]->Z); } /* - * u = 1 / (Z_0 * ... * Z_n) mod P + * c[n] = 1 / (Z_0 * ... * Z_n) mod P */ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_inv_mod(&u, &c[T_size-1], &grp->P)); + MPI_ECP_INV(&c[T_size-1], &c[T_size-1]); for (i = T_size - 1;; i--) { - /* - * Zi = 1 / Z_i mod p - * u = 1 / (Z_0 * ... * Z_i) mod P + /* At the start of iteration i (note that i decrements), we have + * - c[j] = Z_0 * .... * Z_j for j < i, + * - c[j] = 1 / (Z_0 * .... * Z_j) for j == i, + * + * This is maintained via + * - c[i-1] <- c[i] * Z_i + * + * We also derive 1/Z_i = c[i] * c[i-1] for i>0 and use that + * to do the actual normalization. For i==0, we already have + * c[0] = 1 / Z_0. */ - if (i == 0) { - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_copy(&Zi, &u)); + + if (i > 0) { + /* Compute 1/Z_i and establish invariant for the next iteration. */ + MPI_ECP_MUL(&t, &c[i], &c[i-1]); + MPI_ECP_MUL(&c[i-1], &c[i], &T[i]->Z); } else { - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod(grp, &Zi, &u, &c[i-1])); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod(grp, &u, &u, &T[i]->Z)); + MPI_ECP_MOV(&t, &c[0]); } - /* - * proceed as in normalize() - */ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod(grp, &ZZi, &Zi, &Zi)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod(grp, &T[i]->X, &T[i]->X, &ZZi)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod(grp, &T[i]->Y, &T[i]->Y, &ZZi)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod(grp, &T[i]->Y, &T[i]->Y, &Zi)); + /* Now t holds 1 / Z_i; normalize as in ecp_normalize_jac() */ + MPI_ECP_MUL(&T[i]->Y, &T[i]->Y, &t); + MPI_ECP_SQR(&t, &t); + MPI_ECP_MUL(&T[i]->X, &T[i]->X, &t); + MPI_ECP_MUL(&T[i]->Y, &T[i]->Y, &t); /* * Post-precessing: reclaim some memory by shrinking coordinates @@ -1436,7 +1432,8 @@ static int ecp_normalize_jac_many(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, */ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_shrink(&T[i]->X, grp->P.n)); MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_shrink(&T[i]->Y, grp->P.n)); - mbedtls_mpi_free(&T[i]->Z); + + MPI_ECP_LSET(&T[i]->Z, 1); if (i == 0) { break; @@ -1445,10 +1442,8 @@ static int ecp_normalize_jac_many(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, cleanup: - mbedtls_mpi_free(&u); mbedtls_mpi_free(&Zi); mbedtls_mpi_free(&ZZi); - for (i = 0; i < T_size; i++) { - mbedtls_mpi_free(&c[i]); - } + mbedtls_mpi_free(&t); + mpi_free_many(c, T_size); mbedtls_free(c); return ret; @@ -1464,19 +1459,13 @@ static int ecp_safe_invert_jac(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, unsigned char inv) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - unsigned char nonzero; - mbedtls_mpi mQY; + mbedtls_mpi tmp; + mbedtls_mpi_init(&tmp); - mbedtls_mpi_init(&mQY); - - /* Use the fact that -Q.Y mod P = P - Q.Y unless Q.Y == 0 */ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi(&mQY, &grp->P, &Q->Y)); - nonzero = mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&Q->Y, 0) != 0; - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_safe_cond_assign(&Q->Y, &mQY, inv & nonzero)); + MPI_ECP_COND_NEG(&Q->Y, inv); cleanup: - mbedtls_mpi_free(&mQY); - + mbedtls_mpi_free(&tmp); return ret; } @@ -1495,7 +1484,8 @@ static int ecp_safe_invert_jac(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, * 3M + 6S + 1a otherwise */ static int ecp_double_jac(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *R, - const mbedtls_ecp_point *P) + const mbedtls_ecp_point *P, + mbedtls_mpi tmp[4]) { #if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) dbl_count++; @@ -1511,63 +1501,60 @@ static int ecp_double_jac(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *R, return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; #else int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - mbedtls_mpi M, S, T, U; - - mbedtls_mpi_init(&M); mbedtls_mpi_init(&S); mbedtls_mpi_init(&T); mbedtls_mpi_init(&U); /* Special case for A = -3 */ - if (grp->A.p == NULL) { - /* M = 3(X + Z^2)(X - Z^2) */ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod(grp, &S, &P->Z, &P->Z)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_add_mod(grp, &T, &P->X, &S)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_mod(grp, &U, &P->X, &S)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod(grp, &S, &T, &U)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_int(&M, &S, 3)); MOD_ADD(M); + if (mbedtls_ecp_group_a_is_minus_3(grp)) { + /* tmp[0] <- M = 3(X + Z^2)(X - Z^2) */ + MPI_ECP_SQR(&tmp[1], &P->Z); + MPI_ECP_ADD(&tmp[2], &P->X, &tmp[1]); + MPI_ECP_SUB(&tmp[3], &P->X, &tmp[1]); + MPI_ECP_MUL(&tmp[1], &tmp[2], &tmp[3]); + MPI_ECP_MUL_INT(&tmp[0], &tmp[1], 3); } else { - /* M = 3.X^2 */ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod(grp, &S, &P->X, &P->X)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_int(&M, &S, 3)); MOD_ADD(M); + /* tmp[0] <- M = 3.X^2 + A.Z^4 */ + MPI_ECP_SQR(&tmp[1], &P->X); + MPI_ECP_MUL_INT(&tmp[0], &tmp[1], 3); /* Optimize away for "koblitz" curves with A = 0 */ - if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&grp->A, 0) != 0) { + if (MPI_ECP_CMP_INT(&grp->A, 0) != 0) { /* M += A.Z^4 */ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod(grp, &S, &P->Z, &P->Z)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod(grp, &T, &S, &S)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod(grp, &S, &T, &grp->A)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_add_mod(grp, &M, &M, &S)); + MPI_ECP_SQR(&tmp[1], &P->Z); + MPI_ECP_SQR(&tmp[2], &tmp[1]); + MPI_ECP_MUL(&tmp[1], &tmp[2], &grp->A); + MPI_ECP_ADD(&tmp[0], &tmp[0], &tmp[1]); } } - /* S = 4.X.Y^2 */ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod(grp, &T, &P->Y, &P->Y)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_shift_l_mod(grp, &T, 1)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod(grp, &S, &P->X, &T)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_shift_l_mod(grp, &S, 1)); + /* tmp[1] <- S = 4.X.Y^2 */ + MPI_ECP_SQR(&tmp[2], &P->Y); + MPI_ECP_SHIFT_L(&tmp[2], 1); + MPI_ECP_MUL(&tmp[1], &P->X, &tmp[2]); + MPI_ECP_SHIFT_L(&tmp[1], 1); - /* U = 8.Y^4 */ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod(grp, &U, &T, &T)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_shift_l_mod(grp, &U, 1)); + /* tmp[3] <- U = 8.Y^4 */ + MPI_ECP_SQR(&tmp[3], &tmp[2]); + MPI_ECP_SHIFT_L(&tmp[3], 1); - /* T = M^2 - 2.S */ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod(grp, &T, &M, &M)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_mod(grp, &T, &T, &S)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_mod(grp, &T, &T, &S)); + /* tmp[2] <- T = M^2 - 2.S */ + MPI_ECP_SQR(&tmp[2], &tmp[0]); + MPI_ECP_SUB(&tmp[2], &tmp[2], &tmp[1]); + MPI_ECP_SUB(&tmp[2], &tmp[2], &tmp[1]); - /* S = M(S - T) - U */ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_mod(grp, &S, &S, &T)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod(grp, &S, &S, &M)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_mod(grp, &S, &S, &U)); + /* tmp[1] <- S = M(S - T) - U */ + MPI_ECP_SUB(&tmp[1], &tmp[1], &tmp[2]); + MPI_ECP_MUL(&tmp[1], &tmp[1], &tmp[0]); + MPI_ECP_SUB(&tmp[1], &tmp[1], &tmp[3]); - /* U = 2.Y.Z */ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod(grp, &U, &P->Y, &P->Z)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_shift_l_mod(grp, &U, 1)); + /* tmp[3] <- U = 2.Y.Z */ + MPI_ECP_MUL(&tmp[3], &P->Y, &P->Z); + MPI_ECP_SHIFT_L(&tmp[3], 1); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_copy(&R->X, &T)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_copy(&R->Y, &S)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_copy(&R->Z, &U)); + /* Store results */ + MPI_ECP_MOV(&R->X, &tmp[2]); + MPI_ECP_MOV(&R->Y, &tmp[1]); + MPI_ECP_MOV(&R->Z, &tmp[3]); cleanup: - mbedtls_mpi_free(&M); mbedtls_mpi_free(&S); mbedtls_mpi_free(&T); mbedtls_mpi_free(&U); return ret; #endif /* !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_FALLBACK) || !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DOUBLE_JAC_ALT) */ @@ -1579,6 +1566,10 @@ static int ecp_double_jac(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *R, * The coordinates of Q must be normalized (= affine), * but those of P don't need to. R is not normalized. * + * P,Q,R may alias, but only at the level of EC points: they must be either + * equal as pointers, or disjoint (including the coordinate data buffers). + * Fine-grained aliasing at the level of coordinates is not supported. + * * Special cases: (1) P or Q is zero, (2) R is zero, (3) P == Q. * None of these cases can happen as intermediate step in ecp_mul_comb(): * - at each step, P, Q and R are multiples of the base point, the factor @@ -1587,12 +1578,11 @@ static int ecp_double_jac(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *R, * due to the choice of precomputed points in the modified comb method. * So branches for these cases do not leak secret information. * - * We accept Q->Z being unset (saving memory in tables) as meaning 1. - * * Cost: 1A := 8M + 3S */ static int ecp_add_mixed(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *R, - const mbedtls_ecp_point *P, const mbedtls_ecp_point *Q) + const mbedtls_ecp_point *P, const mbedtls_ecp_point *Q, + mbedtls_mpi tmp[4]) { #if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) add_count++; @@ -1608,40 +1598,47 @@ static int ecp_add_mixed(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *R, return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; #else int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - mbedtls_mpi T1, T2, T3, T4, X, Y, Z; + + /* NOTE: Aliasing between input and output is allowed, so one has to make + * sure that at the point X,Y,Z are written, {P,Q}->{X,Y,Z} are no + * longer read from. */ + mbedtls_mpi * const X = &R->X; + mbedtls_mpi * const Y = &R->Y; + mbedtls_mpi * const Z = &R->Z; + + if (!MPI_ECP_VALID(&Q->Z)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } /* * Trivial cases: P == 0 or Q == 0 (case 1) */ - if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&P->Z, 0) == 0) { + if (MPI_ECP_CMP_INT(&P->Z, 0) == 0) { return mbedtls_ecp_copy(R, Q); } - if (Q->Z.p != NULL && mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&Q->Z, 0) == 0) { + if (MPI_ECP_CMP_INT(&Q->Z, 0) == 0) { return mbedtls_ecp_copy(R, P); } /* * Make sure Q coordinates are normalized */ - if (Q->Z.p != NULL && mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&Q->Z, 1) != 0) { + if (MPI_ECP_CMP_INT(&Q->Z, 1) != 0) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } - mbedtls_mpi_init(&T1); mbedtls_mpi_init(&T2); mbedtls_mpi_init(&T3); mbedtls_mpi_init(&T4); - mbedtls_mpi_init(&X); mbedtls_mpi_init(&Y); mbedtls_mpi_init(&Z); - - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod(grp, &T1, &P->Z, &P->Z)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod(grp, &T2, &T1, &P->Z)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod(grp, &T1, &T1, &Q->X)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod(grp, &T2, &T2, &Q->Y)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_mod(grp, &T1, &T1, &P->X)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_mod(grp, &T2, &T2, &P->Y)); + MPI_ECP_SQR(&tmp[0], &P->Z); + MPI_ECP_MUL(&tmp[1], &tmp[0], &P->Z); + MPI_ECP_MUL(&tmp[0], &tmp[0], &Q->X); + MPI_ECP_MUL(&tmp[1], &tmp[1], &Q->Y); + MPI_ECP_SUB(&tmp[0], &tmp[0], &P->X); + MPI_ECP_SUB(&tmp[1], &tmp[1], &P->Y); /* Special cases (2) and (3) */ - if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&T1, 0) == 0) { - if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&T2, 0) == 0) { - ret = ecp_double_jac(grp, R, P); + if (MPI_ECP_CMP_INT(&tmp[0], 0) == 0) { + if (MPI_ECP_CMP_INT(&tmp[1], 0) == 0) { + ret = ecp_double_jac(grp, R, P, tmp); goto cleanup; } else { ret = mbedtls_ecp_set_zero(R); @@ -1649,28 +1646,26 @@ static int ecp_add_mixed(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *R, } } - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod(grp, &Z, &P->Z, &T1)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod(grp, &T3, &T1, &T1)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod(grp, &T4, &T3, &T1)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod(grp, &T3, &T3, &P->X)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_copy(&T1, &T3)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_shift_l_mod(grp, &T1, 1)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod(grp, &X, &T2, &T2)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_mod(grp, &X, &X, &T1)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_mod(grp, &X, &X, &T4)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_mod(grp, &T3, &T3, &X)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod(grp, &T3, &T3, &T2)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod(grp, &T4, &T4, &P->Y)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_mod(grp, &Y, &T3, &T4)); - - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_copy(&R->X, &X)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_copy(&R->Y, &Y)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_copy(&R->Z, &Z)); + /* {P,Q}->Z no longer used, so OK to write to Z even if there's aliasing. */ + MPI_ECP_MUL(Z, &P->Z, &tmp[0]); + MPI_ECP_SQR(&tmp[2], &tmp[0]); + MPI_ECP_MUL(&tmp[3], &tmp[2], &tmp[0]); + MPI_ECP_MUL(&tmp[2], &tmp[2], &P->X); -cleanup: + MPI_ECP_MOV(&tmp[0], &tmp[2]); + MPI_ECP_SHIFT_L(&tmp[0], 1); + + /* {P,Q}->X no longer used, so OK to write to X even if there's aliasing. */ + MPI_ECP_SQR(X, &tmp[1]); + MPI_ECP_SUB(X, X, &tmp[0]); + MPI_ECP_SUB(X, X, &tmp[3]); + MPI_ECP_SUB(&tmp[2], &tmp[2], X); + MPI_ECP_MUL(&tmp[2], &tmp[2], &tmp[1]); + MPI_ECP_MUL(&tmp[3], &tmp[3], &P->Y); + /* {P,Q}->Y no longer used, so OK to write to Y even if there's aliasing. */ + MPI_ECP_SUB(Y, &tmp[2], &tmp[3]); - mbedtls_mpi_free(&T1); mbedtls_mpi_free(&T2); mbedtls_mpi_free(&T3); mbedtls_mpi_free(&T4); - mbedtls_mpi_free(&X); mbedtls_mpi_free(&Y); mbedtls_mpi_free(&Z); +cleanup: return ret; #endif /* !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_FALLBACK) || !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_ADD_MIXED_ALT) */ @@ -1696,26 +1691,28 @@ static int ecp_randomize_jac(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *pt return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; #else int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - mbedtls_mpi l, ll; + mbedtls_mpi l; - mbedtls_mpi_init(&l); mbedtls_mpi_init(&ll); + mbedtls_mpi_init(&l); /* Generate l such that 1 < l < p */ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_random(&l, 2, &grp->P, f_rng, p_rng)); + MPI_ECP_RAND(&l); + + /* Z' = l * Z */ + MPI_ECP_MUL(&pt->Z, &pt->Z, &l); - /* Z = l * Z */ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod(grp, &pt->Z, &pt->Z, &l)); + /* Y' = l * Y */ + MPI_ECP_MUL(&pt->Y, &pt->Y, &l); - /* X = l^2 * X */ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod(grp, &ll, &l, &l)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod(grp, &pt->X, &pt->X, &ll)); + /* X' = l^2 * X */ + MPI_ECP_SQR(&l, &l); + MPI_ECP_MUL(&pt->X, &pt->X, &l); - /* Y = l^3 * Y */ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod(grp, &ll, &ll, &l)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod(grp, &pt->Y, &pt->Y, &ll)); + /* Y'' = l^2 * Y' = l^3 * Y */ + MPI_ECP_MUL(&pt->Y, &pt->Y, &l); cleanup: - mbedtls_mpi_free(&l); mbedtls_mpi_free(&ll); + mbedtls_mpi_free(&l); if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NOT_ACCEPTABLE) { ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_RANDOM_FAILED; @@ -1858,7 +1855,11 @@ static int ecp_precompute_comb(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, unsigned char i; size_t j = 0; const unsigned char T_size = 1U << (w - 1); - mbedtls_ecp_point *cur, *TT[COMB_MAX_PRE - 1]; + mbedtls_ecp_point *cur, *TT[COMB_MAX_PRE - 1] = { NULL }; + + mbedtls_mpi tmp[4]; + + mpi_init_many(tmp, sizeof(tmp) / sizeof(mbedtls_mpi)); #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) if (rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->rsm != NULL) { @@ -1912,7 +1913,7 @@ static int ecp_precompute_comb(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_ecp_copy(cur, T + (i >> 1))); } - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(ecp_double_jac(grp, cur, cur)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(ecp_double_jac(grp, cur, cur, tmp)); } #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) @@ -1923,8 +1924,11 @@ static int ecp_precompute_comb(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, norm_dbl: #endif /* - * Normalize current elements in T. As T has holes, - * use an auxiliary array of pointers to elements in T. + * Normalize current elements in T to allow them to be used in + * ecp_add_mixed() below, which requires one normalized input. + * + * As T has holes, use an auxiliary array of pointers to elements in T. + * */ j = 0; for (i = 1; i < T_size; i <<= 1) { @@ -1951,7 +1955,7 @@ static int ecp_precompute_comb(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, for (i = 1; i < T_size; i <<= 1) { j = i; while (j--) { - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(ecp_add_mixed(grp, &T[i + j], &T[j], &T[i])); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(ecp_add_mixed(grp, &T[i + j], &T[j], &T[i], tmp)); } } @@ -1975,7 +1979,19 @@ static int ecp_precompute_comb(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(ecp_normalize_jac_many(grp, TT, j)); + /* Free Z coordinate (=1 after normalization) to save RAM. + * This makes T[i] invalid as mbedtls_ecp_points, but this is OK + * since from this point onwards, they are only accessed indirectly + * via the getter function ecp_select_comb() which does set the + * target's Z coordinate to 1. */ + for (i = 0; i < T_size; i++) { + mbedtls_mpi_free(&T[i].Z); + } + cleanup: + + mpi_free_many(tmp, sizeof(tmp) / sizeof(mbedtls_mpi)); + #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) if (rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->rsm != NULL && ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS) { @@ -2005,13 +2021,15 @@ static int ecp_select_comb(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *R, /* Read the whole table to thwart cache-based timing attacks */ for (j = 0; j < T_size; j++) { - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_safe_cond_assign(&R->X, &T[j].X, j == ii)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_safe_cond_assign(&R->Y, &T[j].Y, j == ii)); + MPI_ECP_COND_ASSIGN(&R->X, &T[j].X, j == ii); + MPI_ECP_COND_ASSIGN(&R->Y, &T[j].Y, j == ii); } /* Safely invert result if i is "negative" */ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(ecp_safe_invert_jac(grp, R, i >> 7)); + MPI_ECP_LSET(&R->Z, 1); + cleanup: return ret; } @@ -2031,9 +2049,11 @@ static int ecp_mul_comb_core(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *R, { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; mbedtls_ecp_point Txi; + mbedtls_mpi tmp[4]; size_t i; mbedtls_ecp_point_init(&Txi); + mpi_init_many(tmp, sizeof(tmp) / sizeof(mbedtls_mpi)); #if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) (void) rs_ctx; @@ -2053,19 +2073,10 @@ static int ecp_mul_comb_core(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *R, } else #endif { - int have_rng = 1; - /* Start with a non-zero point and randomize its coordinates */ i = d; MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(ecp_select_comb(grp, R, T, T_size, x[i])); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_lset(&R->Z, 1)); - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG) - if (f_rng == NULL) { - have_rng = 0; - } -#endif - if (have_rng) { + if (f_rng != 0) { MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(ecp_randomize_jac(grp, R, f_rng, p_rng)); } } @@ -2074,14 +2085,15 @@ static int ecp_mul_comb_core(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *R, MBEDTLS_ECP_BUDGET(MBEDTLS_ECP_OPS_DBL + MBEDTLS_ECP_OPS_ADD); --i; - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(ecp_double_jac(grp, R, R)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(ecp_double_jac(grp, R, R, tmp)); MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(ecp_select_comb(grp, &Txi, T, T_size, x[i])); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(ecp_add_mixed(grp, R, R, &Txi)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(ecp_add_mixed(grp, R, R, &Txi, tmp)); } cleanup: mbedtls_ecp_point_free(&Txi); + mpi_free_many(tmp, sizeof(tmp) / sizeof(mbedtls_mpi)); #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) if (rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->rsm != NULL && @@ -2164,7 +2176,6 @@ static int ecp_mul_comb_after_precomp(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, unsigned char parity_trick; unsigned char k[COMB_MAX_D + 1]; mbedtls_ecp_point *RR = R; - int have_rng = 1; #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) if (rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->rsm != NULL) { @@ -2201,12 +2212,7 @@ static int ecp_mul_comb_after_precomp(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, * * Avoid the leak by randomizing coordinates before we normalize them. */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG) - if (f_rng == NULL) { - have_rng = 0; - } -#endif - if (have_rng) { + if (f_rng != 0) { MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(ecp_randomize_jac(grp, RR, f_rng, p_rng)); } @@ -2247,11 +2253,16 @@ static unsigned char ecp_pick_window_size(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, } /* - * Make sure w is within bounds. + * If static comb table may not be used (!p_eq_g) or static comb table does + * not exists, make sure w is within bounds. * (The last test is useful only for very small curves in the test suite.) + * + * The user reduces MBEDTLS_ECP_WINDOW_SIZE does not changes the size of + * static comb table, because the size of static comb table is fixed when + * it is generated. */ #if (MBEDTLS_ECP_WINDOW_SIZE < 6) - if (w > MBEDTLS_ECP_WINDOW_SIZE) { + if ((!p_eq_g || !ecp_group_is_static_comb_table(grp)) && w > MBEDTLS_ECP_WINDOW_SIZE) { w = MBEDTLS_ECP_WINDOW_SIZE; } #endif @@ -2286,46 +2297,13 @@ static int ecp_mul_comb(mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *R, size_t d; unsigned char T_size = 0, T_ok = 0; mbedtls_ecp_point *T = NULL; -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG) - ecp_drbg_context drbg_ctx; - - ecp_drbg_init(&drbg_ctx); -#endif ECP_RS_ENTER(rsm); -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG) - if (f_rng == NULL) { - /* Adjust pointers */ - f_rng = &ecp_drbg_random; -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) - if (rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->rsm != NULL) { - p_rng = &rs_ctx->rsm->drbg_ctx; - } else -#endif - p_rng = &drbg_ctx; - - /* Initialize internal DRBG if necessary */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) - if (rs_ctx == NULL || rs_ctx->rsm == NULL || - rs_ctx->rsm->drbg_seeded == 0) -#endif - { - const size_t m_len = (grp->nbits + 7) / 8; - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(ecp_drbg_seed(p_rng, m, m_len)); - } -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) - if (rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->rsm != NULL) { - rs_ctx->rsm->drbg_seeded = 1; - } -#endif - } -#endif /* !MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG */ - /* Is P the base point ? */ #if MBEDTLS_ECP_FIXED_POINT_OPTIM == 1 - p_eq_g = (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi(&P->Y, &grp->G.Y) == 0 && - mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi(&P->X, &grp->G.X) == 0); + p_eq_g = (MPI_ECP_CMP(&P->Y, &grp->G.Y) == 0 && + MPI_ECP_CMP(&P->X, &grp->G.X) == 0); #else p_eq_g = 0; #endif @@ -2387,10 +2365,6 @@ static int ecp_mul_comb(mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *R, cleanup: -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG) - ecp_drbg_free(&drbg_ctx); -#endif - /* does T belong to the group? */ if (T == grp->T) { T = NULL; @@ -2458,9 +2432,9 @@ static int ecp_normalize_mxz(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *P) return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; #else int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_inv_mod(&P->Z, &P->Z, &grp->P)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod(grp, &P->X, &P->X, &P->Z)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_lset(&P->Z, 1)); + MPI_ECP_INV(&P->Z, &P->Z); + MPI_ECP_MUL(&P->X, &P->X, &P->Z); + MPI_ECP_LSET(&P->Z, 1); cleanup: return ret; @@ -2492,10 +2466,10 @@ static int ecp_randomize_mxz(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *P, mbedtls_mpi_init(&l); /* Generate l such that 1 < l < p */ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_random(&l, 2, &grp->P, f_rng, p_rng)); + MPI_ECP_RAND(&l); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod(grp, &P->X, &P->X, &l)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod(grp, &P->Z, &P->Z, &l)); + MPI_ECP_MUL(&P->X, &P->X, &l); + MPI_ECP_MUL(&P->Z, &P->Z, &l); cleanup: mbedtls_mpi_free(&l); @@ -2525,7 +2499,8 @@ static int ecp_randomize_mxz(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *P, static int ecp_double_add_mxz(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *R, mbedtls_ecp_point *S, const mbedtls_ecp_point *P, const mbedtls_ecp_point *Q, - const mbedtls_mpi *d) + const mbedtls_mpi *d, + mbedtls_mpi T[4]) { #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DOUBLE_ADD_MXZ_ALT) if (mbedtls_internal_ecp_grp_capable(grp)) { @@ -2537,35 +2512,27 @@ static int ecp_double_add_mxz(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; #else int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - mbedtls_mpi A, AA, B, BB, E, C, D, DA, CB; - - mbedtls_mpi_init(&A); mbedtls_mpi_init(&AA); mbedtls_mpi_init(&B); - mbedtls_mpi_init(&BB); mbedtls_mpi_init(&E); mbedtls_mpi_init(&C); - mbedtls_mpi_init(&D); mbedtls_mpi_init(&DA); mbedtls_mpi_init(&CB); - - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_add_mod(grp, &A, &P->X, &P->Z)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod(grp, &AA, &A, &A)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_mod(grp, &B, &P->X, &P->Z)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod(grp, &BB, &B, &B)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_mod(grp, &E, &AA, &BB)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_add_mod(grp, &C, &Q->X, &Q->Z)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_mod(grp, &D, &Q->X, &Q->Z)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod(grp, &DA, &D, &A)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod(grp, &CB, &C, &B)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_add_mod(grp, &S->X, &DA, &CB)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod(grp, &S->X, &S->X, &S->X)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_mod(grp, &S->Z, &DA, &CB)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod(grp, &S->Z, &S->Z, &S->Z)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod(grp, &S->Z, d, &S->Z)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod(grp, &R->X, &AA, &BB)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod(grp, &R->Z, &grp->A, &E)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_add_mod(grp, &R->Z, &BB, &R->Z)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod(grp, &R->Z, &E, &R->Z)); + + MPI_ECP_ADD(&T[0], &P->X, &P->Z); /* Pp := PX + PZ */ + MPI_ECP_SUB(&T[1], &P->X, &P->Z); /* Pm := PX - PZ */ + MPI_ECP_ADD(&T[2], &Q->X, &Q->Z); /* Qp := QX + XZ */ + MPI_ECP_SUB(&T[3], &Q->X, &Q->Z); /* Qm := QX - QZ */ + MPI_ECP_MUL(&T[3], &T[3], &T[0]); /* Qm * Pp */ + MPI_ECP_MUL(&T[2], &T[2], &T[1]); /* Qp * Pm */ + MPI_ECP_SQR(&T[0], &T[0]); /* Pp^2 */ + MPI_ECP_SQR(&T[1], &T[1]); /* Pm^2 */ + MPI_ECP_MUL(&R->X, &T[0], &T[1]); /* Pp^2 * Pm^2 */ + MPI_ECP_SUB(&T[0], &T[0], &T[1]); /* Pp^2 - Pm^2 */ + MPI_ECP_MUL(&R->Z, &grp->A, &T[0]); /* A * (Pp^2 - Pm^2) */ + MPI_ECP_ADD(&R->Z, &T[1], &R->Z); /* [ A * (Pp^2-Pm^2) ] + Pm^2 */ + MPI_ECP_ADD(&S->X, &T[3], &T[2]); /* Qm*Pp + Qp*Pm */ + MPI_ECP_SQR(&S->X, &S->X); /* (Qm*Pp + Qp*Pm)^2 */ + MPI_ECP_SUB(&S->Z, &T[3], &T[2]); /* Qm*Pp - Qp*Pm */ + MPI_ECP_SQR(&S->Z, &S->Z); /* (Qm*Pp - Qp*Pm)^2 */ + MPI_ECP_MUL(&S->Z, d, &S->Z); /* d * ( Qm*Pp - Qp*Pm )^2 */ + MPI_ECP_MUL(&R->Z, &T[0], &R->Z); /* [A*(Pp^2-Pm^2)+Pm^2]*(Pp^2-Pm^2) */ cleanup: - mbedtls_mpi_free(&A); mbedtls_mpi_free(&AA); mbedtls_mpi_free(&B); - mbedtls_mpi_free(&BB); mbedtls_mpi_free(&E); mbedtls_mpi_free(&C); - mbedtls_mpi_free(&D); mbedtls_mpi_free(&DA); mbedtls_mpi_free(&CB); return ret; #endif /* !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_FALLBACK) || !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DOUBLE_ADD_MXZ_ALT) */ @@ -2581,48 +2548,33 @@ static int ecp_mul_mxz(mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *R, void *p_rng) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - int have_rng = 1; size_t i; unsigned char b; mbedtls_ecp_point RP; mbedtls_mpi PX; -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG) - ecp_drbg_context drbg_ctx; - - ecp_drbg_init(&drbg_ctx); -#endif + mbedtls_mpi tmp[4]; mbedtls_ecp_point_init(&RP); mbedtls_mpi_init(&PX); -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG) + mpi_init_many(tmp, sizeof(tmp) / sizeof(mbedtls_mpi)); + if (f_rng == NULL) { - const size_t m_len = (grp->nbits + 7) / 8; - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(ecp_drbg_seed(&drbg_ctx, m, m_len)); - f_rng = &ecp_drbg_random; - p_rng = &drbg_ctx; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } -#endif /* !MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG */ /* Save PX and read from P before writing to R, in case P == R */ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_copy(&PX, &P->X)); + MPI_ECP_MOV(&PX, &P->X); MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_ecp_copy(&RP, P)); /* Set R to zero in modified x/z coordinates */ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_lset(&R->X, 1)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_lset(&R->Z, 0)); + MPI_ECP_LSET(&R->X, 1); + MPI_ECP_LSET(&R->Z, 0); mbedtls_mpi_free(&R->Y); /* RP.X might be slightly larger than P, so reduce it */ - MOD_ADD(RP.X); + MOD_ADD(&RP.X); /* Randomize coordinates of the starting point */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG) - if (f_rng == NULL) { - have_rng = 0; - } -#endif - if (have_rng) { - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(ecp_randomize_mxz(grp, &RP, f_rng, p_rng)); - } + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(ecp_randomize_mxz(grp, &RP, f_rng, p_rng)); /* Loop invariant: R = result so far, RP = R + P */ i = grp->nbits + 1; /* one past the (zero-based) required msb for private keys */ @@ -2635,11 +2587,11 @@ static int ecp_mul_mxz(mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *R, * else double_add( R, RP, R, RP ) * but using safe conditional swaps to avoid leaks */ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_safe_cond_swap(&R->X, &RP.X, b)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_safe_cond_swap(&R->Z, &RP.Z, b)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(ecp_double_add_mxz(grp, R, &RP, R, &RP, &PX)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_safe_cond_swap(&R->X, &RP.X, b)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_safe_cond_swap(&R->Z, &RP.Z, b)); + MPI_ECP_COND_SWAP(&R->X, &RP.X, b); + MPI_ECP_COND_SWAP(&R->Z, &RP.Z, b); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(ecp_double_add_mxz(grp, R, &RP, R, &RP, &PX, tmp)); + MPI_ECP_COND_SWAP(&R->X, &RP.X, b); + MPI_ECP_COND_SWAP(&R->Z, &RP.Z, b); } /* @@ -2653,25 +2605,13 @@ static int ecp_mul_mxz(mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *R, * * Avoid the leak by randomizing coordinates before we normalize them. */ - have_rng = 1; -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG) - if (f_rng == NULL) { - have_rng = 0; - } -#endif - if (have_rng) { - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(ecp_randomize_mxz(grp, R, f_rng, p_rng)); - } - + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(ecp_randomize_mxz(grp, R, f_rng, p_rng)); MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(ecp_normalize_mxz(grp, R)); cleanup: -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG) - ecp_drbg_free(&drbg_ctx); -#endif - mbedtls_ecp_point_free(&RP); mbedtls_mpi_free(&PX); + mpi_free_many(tmp, sizeof(tmp) / sizeof(mbedtls_mpi)); return ret; } @@ -2679,20 +2619,19 @@ static int ecp_mul_mxz(mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *R, /* * Restartable multiplication R = m * P + * + * This internal function can be called without an RNG in case where we know + * the inputs are not sensitive. */ -int mbedtls_ecp_mul_restartable(mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *R, - const mbedtls_mpi *m, const mbedtls_ecp_point *P, - int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng, - mbedtls_ecp_restart_ctx *rs_ctx) +static int ecp_mul_restartable_internal(mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *R, + const mbedtls_mpi *m, const mbedtls_ecp_point *P, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng, + mbedtls_ecp_restart_ctx *rs_ctx) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA; #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT) char is_grp_capable = 0; #endif - ECP_VALIDATE_RET(grp != NULL); - ECP_VALIDATE_RET(R != NULL); - ECP_VALIDATE_RET(m != NULL); - ECP_VALIDATE_RET(P != NULL); #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) /* reset ops count for this call if top-level */ @@ -2752,6 +2691,21 @@ int mbedtls_ecp_mul_restartable(mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *R, return ret; } +/* + * Restartable multiplication R = m * P + */ +int mbedtls_ecp_mul_restartable(mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *R, + const mbedtls_mpi *m, const mbedtls_ecp_point *P, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng, + mbedtls_ecp_restart_ctx *rs_ctx) +{ + if (f_rng == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + return ecp_mul_restartable_internal(grp, R, m, P, f_rng, p_rng, rs_ctx); +} + /* * Multiplication R = m * P */ @@ -2759,12 +2713,9 @@ int mbedtls_ecp_mul(mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *R, const mbedtls_mpi *m, const mbedtls_ecp_point *P, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng) { - ECP_VALIDATE_RET(grp != NULL); - ECP_VALIDATE_RET(R != NULL); - ECP_VALIDATE_RET(m != NULL); - ECP_VALIDATE_RET(P != NULL); return mbedtls_ecp_mul_restartable(grp, R, m, P, f_rng, p_rng, NULL); } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED) /* @@ -2788,22 +2739,12 @@ static int ecp_check_pubkey_sw(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, const mbedtls_ecp_p /* * YY = Y^2 - * RHS = X (X^2 + A) + B = X^3 + A X + B + * RHS = X^3 + A X + B */ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod(grp, &YY, &pt->Y, &pt->Y)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod(grp, &RHS, &pt->X, &pt->X)); + MPI_ECP_SQR(&YY, &pt->Y); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(ecp_sw_rhs(grp, &RHS, &pt->X)); - /* Special case for A = -3 */ - if (grp->A.p == NULL) { - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_int(&RHS, &RHS, 3)); MOD_SUB(RHS); - } else { - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_add_mod(grp, &RHS, &RHS, &grp->A)); - } - - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod(grp, &RHS, &RHS, &pt->X)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_add_mod(grp, &RHS, &RHS, &grp->B)); - - if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi(&YY, &RHS) != 0) { + if (MPI_ECP_CMP(&YY, &RHS) != 0) { ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY; } @@ -2815,6 +2756,7 @@ static int ecp_check_pubkey_sw(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, const mbedtls_ecp_p } #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED) /* * R = m * P with shortcuts for m == 0, m == 1 and m == -1 @@ -2827,6 +2769,8 @@ static int mbedtls_ecp_mul_shortcuts(mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_restart_ctx *rs_ctx) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_mpi tmp; + mbedtls_mpi_init(&tmp); if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(m, 0) == 0) { MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_ecp_check_pubkey(grp, P)); @@ -2837,15 +2781,15 @@ static int mbedtls_ecp_mul_shortcuts(mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, } else if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(m, -1) == 0) { MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_ecp_check_pubkey(grp, P)); MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_ecp_copy(R, P)); - if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&R->Y, 0) != 0) { - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi(&R->Y, &grp->P, &R->Y)); - } + MPI_ECP_NEG(&R->Y); } else { - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_ecp_mul_restartable(grp, R, m, P, - NULL, NULL, rs_ctx)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(ecp_mul_restartable_internal(grp, R, m, P, + NULL, NULL, rs_ctx)); } cleanup: + mbedtls_mpi_free(&tmp); + return ret; } @@ -2863,21 +2807,16 @@ int mbedtls_ecp_muladd_restartable( mbedtls_ecp_point mP; mbedtls_ecp_point *pmP = &mP; mbedtls_ecp_point *pR = R; + mbedtls_mpi tmp[4]; #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT) char is_grp_capable = 0; #endif - ECP_VALIDATE_RET(grp != NULL); - ECP_VALIDATE_RET(R != NULL); - ECP_VALIDATE_RET(m != NULL); - ECP_VALIDATE_RET(P != NULL); - ECP_VALIDATE_RET(n != NULL); - ECP_VALIDATE_RET(Q != NULL); - if (mbedtls_ecp_get_type(grp) != MBEDTLS_ECP_TYPE_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; } mbedtls_ecp_point_init(&mP); + mpi_init_many(tmp, sizeof(tmp) / sizeof(mbedtls_mpi)); ECP_RS_ENTER(ma); @@ -2924,7 +2863,7 @@ int mbedtls_ecp_muladd_restartable( add: #endif MBEDTLS_ECP_BUDGET(MBEDTLS_ECP_OPS_ADD); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(ecp_add_mixed(grp, pR, pmP, pR)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(ecp_add_mixed(grp, pR, pmP, pR, tmp)); #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) if (rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->ma != NULL) { rs_ctx->ma->state = ecp_rsma_norm; @@ -2942,6 +2881,9 @@ int mbedtls_ecp_muladd_restartable( #endif cleanup: + + mpi_free_many(tmp, sizeof(tmp) / sizeof(mbedtls_mpi)); + #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT) if (is_grp_capable) { mbedtls_internal_ecp_free(grp); @@ -2963,21 +2905,16 @@ int mbedtls_ecp_muladd(mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *R, const mbedtls_mpi *m, const mbedtls_ecp_point *P, const mbedtls_mpi *n, const mbedtls_ecp_point *Q) { - ECP_VALIDATE_RET(grp != NULL); - ECP_VALIDATE_RET(R != NULL); - ECP_VALIDATE_RET(m != NULL); - ECP_VALIDATE_RET(P != NULL); - ECP_VALIDATE_RET(n != NULL); - ECP_VALIDATE_RET(Q != NULL); return mbedtls_ecp_muladd_restartable(grp, R, m, P, n, Q, NULL); } #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_MONTGOMERY_ENABLED) #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED) -#define ECP_MPI_INIT(s, n, p) { s, (n), (mbedtls_mpi_uint *) (p) } +#define ECP_MPI_INIT(_p, _n) { .p = (mbedtls_mpi_uint *) (_p), .s = 1, .n = (_n) } #define ECP_MPI_INIT_ARRAY(x) \ - ECP_MPI_INIT(1, sizeof(x) / sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint), x) + ECP_MPI_INIT(x, sizeof(x) / sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint)) /* * Constants for the two points other than 0, 1, -1 (mod p) in * https://cr.yp.to/ecdh.html#validate @@ -3090,9 +3027,6 @@ static int ecp_check_pubkey_mx(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, const mbedtls_ecp_p int mbedtls_ecp_check_pubkey(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, const mbedtls_ecp_point *pt) { - ECP_VALIDATE_RET(grp != NULL); - ECP_VALIDATE_RET(pt != NULL); - /* Must use affine coordinates */ if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&pt->Z, 1) != 0) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY; @@ -3117,9 +3051,6 @@ int mbedtls_ecp_check_pubkey(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, int mbedtls_ecp_check_privkey(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, const mbedtls_mpi *d) { - ECP_VALIDATE_RET(grp != NULL); - ECP_VALIDATE_RET(d != NULL); - #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_MONTGOMERY_ENABLED) if (mbedtls_ecp_get_type(grp) == MBEDTLS_ECP_TYPE_MONTGOMERY) { /* see RFC 7748 sec. 5 para. 5 */ @@ -3208,10 +3139,6 @@ int mbedtls_ecp_gen_privkey(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng) { - ECP_VALIDATE_RET(grp != NULL); - ECP_VALIDATE_RET(d != NULL); - ECP_VALIDATE_RET(f_rng != NULL); - #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_MONTGOMERY_ENABLED) if (mbedtls_ecp_get_type(grp) == MBEDTLS_ECP_TYPE_MONTGOMERY) { return mbedtls_ecp_gen_privkey_mx(grp->nbits, d, f_rng, p_rng); @@ -3227,6 +3154,7 @@ int mbedtls_ecp_gen_privkey(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) /* * Generate a keypair with configurable base point */ @@ -3237,12 +3165,6 @@ int mbedtls_ecp_gen_keypair_base(mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, void *p_rng) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - ECP_VALIDATE_RET(grp != NULL); - ECP_VALIDATE_RET(d != NULL); - ECP_VALIDATE_RET(G != NULL); - ECP_VALIDATE_RET(Q != NULL); - ECP_VALIDATE_RET(f_rng != NULL); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_ecp_gen_privkey(grp, d, f_rng, p_rng)); MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_ecp_mul(grp, Q, d, G, f_rng, p_rng)); @@ -3258,11 +3180,6 @@ int mbedtls_ecp_gen_keypair(mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng) { - ECP_VALIDATE_RET(grp != NULL); - ECP_VALIDATE_RET(d != NULL); - ECP_VALIDATE_RET(Q != NULL); - ECP_VALIDATE_RET(f_rng != NULL); - return mbedtls_ecp_gen_keypair_base(grp, &grp->G, d, Q, f_rng, p_rng); } @@ -3273,17 +3190,35 @@ int mbedtls_ecp_gen_key(mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id, mbedtls_ecp_keypair *key, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - ECP_VALIDATE_RET(key != NULL); - ECP_VALIDATE_RET(f_rng != NULL); - if ((ret = mbedtls_ecp_group_load(&key->grp, grp_id)) != 0) { return ret; } return mbedtls_ecp_gen_keypair(&key->grp, &key->d, &key->Q, f_rng, p_rng); } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */ + +int mbedtls_ecp_set_public_key(mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id, + mbedtls_ecp_keypair *key, + const mbedtls_ecp_point *Q) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + if (key->grp.id == MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE) { + /* Group not set yet */ + if ((ret = mbedtls_ecp_group_load(&key->grp, grp_id)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + } else if (key->grp.id != grp_id) { + /* Group mismatch */ + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + return mbedtls_ecp_copy(&key->Q, Q); +} + #define ECP_CURVE25519_KEY_SIZE 32 +#define ECP_CURVE448_KEY_SIZE 56 /* * Read a private key. */ @@ -3292,9 +3227,6 @@ int mbedtls_ecp_read_key(mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id, mbedtls_ecp_keypair *key, { int ret = 0; - ECP_VALIDATE_RET(key != NULL); - ECP_VALIDATE_RET(buf != NULL); - if ((ret = mbedtls_ecp_group_load(&key->grp, grp_id)) != 0) { return ret; } @@ -3304,7 +3236,7 @@ int mbedtls_ecp_read_key(mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id, mbedtls_ecp_keypair *key, #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_MONTGOMERY_ENABLED) if (mbedtls_ecp_get_type(&key->grp) == MBEDTLS_ECP_TYPE_MONTGOMERY) { /* - * If it is Curve25519 curve then mask the key as mandated by RFC7748 + * Mask the key as mandated by RFC7748 for Curve25519 and Curve448. */ if (grp_id == MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519) { if (buflen != ECP_CURVE25519_KEY_SIZE) { @@ -3329,20 +3261,35 @@ int mbedtls_ecp_read_key(mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id, mbedtls_ecp_keypair *key, mbedtls_mpi_set_bit(&key->d, ECP_CURVE25519_KEY_SIZE * 8 - 2, 1) ); - } else { - ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + } else if (grp_id == MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448) { + if (buflen != ECP_CURVE448_KEY_SIZE) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY; + } + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_read_binary_le(&key->d, buf, buflen)); + + /* Set the two least significant bits to 0 */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_set_bit(&key->d, 0, 0)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_set_bit(&key->d, 1, 0)); + + /* Set the most significant bit to 1 */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( + mbedtls_mpi_set_bit(&key->d, + ECP_CURVE448_KEY_SIZE * 8 - 1, 1) + ); } } - #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED) if (mbedtls_ecp_get_type(&key->grp) == MBEDTLS_ECP_TYPE_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS) { MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(&key->d, buf, buflen)); + } +#endif + if (ret == 0) { MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_ecp_check_privkey(&key->grp, &key->d)); } -#endif cleanup: if (ret != 0) { @@ -3355,14 +3302,12 @@ int mbedtls_ecp_read_key(mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id, mbedtls_ecp_keypair *key, /* * Write a private key. */ +#if !defined MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED int mbedtls_ecp_write_key(mbedtls_ecp_keypair *key, unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - ECP_VALIDATE_RET(key != NULL); - ECP_VALIDATE_RET(buflen == 0 || buf != NULL); - #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_MONTGOMERY_ENABLED) if (mbedtls_ecp_get_type(&key->grp) == MBEDTLS_ECP_TYPE_MONTGOMERY) { if (key->grp.id == MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519) { @@ -3370,12 +3315,13 @@ int mbedtls_ecp_write_key(mbedtls_ecp_keypair *key, return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; } - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_write_binary_le(&key->d, buf, buflen)); - } else { - ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + } else if (key->grp.id == MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448) { + if (buflen < ECP_CURVE448_KEY_SIZE) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + } } + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_write_binary_le(&key->d, buf, buflen)); } - #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED) if (mbedtls_ecp_get_type(&key->grp) == MBEDTLS_ECP_TYPE_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS) { @@ -3387,19 +3333,63 @@ int mbedtls_ecp_write_key(mbedtls_ecp_keypair *key, return ret; } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ +int mbedtls_ecp_write_key_ext(const mbedtls_ecp_keypair *key, + size_t *olen, unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen) +{ + size_t len = (key->grp.nbits + 7) / 8; + if (len > buflen) { + /* For robustness, ensure *olen <= buflen even on error. */ + *olen = 0; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + } + *olen = len; + + /* Private key not set */ + if (key->d.n == 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_MONTGOMERY_ENABLED) + if (mbedtls_ecp_get_type(&key->grp) == MBEDTLS_ECP_TYPE_MONTGOMERY) { + return mbedtls_mpi_write_binary_le(&key->d, buf, len); + } +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED) + if (mbedtls_ecp_get_type(&key->grp) == MBEDTLS_ECP_TYPE_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS) { + return mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(&key->d, buf, len); + } +#endif + + /* Private key set but no recognized curve type? This shouldn't happen. */ + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; +} + +/* + * Write a public key. + */ +int mbedtls_ecp_write_public_key(const mbedtls_ecp_keypair *key, + int format, size_t *olen, + unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen) +{ + return mbedtls_ecp_point_write_binary(&key->grp, &key->Q, + format, olen, buf, buflen); +} + + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) /* * Check a public-private key pair */ -int mbedtls_ecp_check_pub_priv(const mbedtls_ecp_keypair *pub, const mbedtls_ecp_keypair *prv) +int mbedtls_ecp_check_pub_priv( + const mbedtls_ecp_keypair *pub, const mbedtls_ecp_keypair *prv, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; mbedtls_ecp_point Q; mbedtls_ecp_group grp; - ECP_VALIDATE_RET(pub != NULL); - ECP_VALIDATE_RET(prv != NULL); - if (pub->grp.id == MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE || pub->grp.id != prv->grp.id || mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi(&pub->Q.X, &prv->Q.X) || @@ -3415,7 +3405,7 @@ int mbedtls_ecp_check_pub_priv(const mbedtls_ecp_keypair *pub, const mbedtls_ecp mbedtls_ecp_group_copy(&grp, &prv->grp); /* Also checks d is valid */ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_ecp_mul(&grp, &Q, &prv->d, &prv->grp.G, NULL, NULL)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_ecp_mul(&grp, &Q, &prv->d, &prv->grp.G, f_rng, p_rng)); if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi(&Q.X, &prv->Q.X) || mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi(&Q.Y, &prv->Q.Y) || @@ -3431,8 +3421,68 @@ int mbedtls_ecp_check_pub_priv(const mbedtls_ecp_keypair *pub, const mbedtls_ecp return ret; } +int mbedtls_ecp_keypair_calc_public(mbedtls_ecp_keypair *key, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng) +{ + return mbedtls_ecp_mul(&key->grp, &key->Q, &key->d, &key->grp.G, + f_rng, p_rng); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */ + +mbedtls_ecp_group_id mbedtls_ecp_keypair_get_group_id( + const mbedtls_ecp_keypair *key) +{ + return key->grp.id; +} + +/* + * Export generic key-pair parameters. + */ +int mbedtls_ecp_export(const mbedtls_ecp_keypair *key, mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + mbedtls_mpi *d, mbedtls_ecp_point *Q) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + if (grp != NULL && (ret = mbedtls_ecp_group_copy(grp, &key->grp)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + + if (d != NULL && (ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy(d, &key->d)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + + if (Q != NULL && (ret = mbedtls_ecp_copy(Q, &key->Q)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + + return 0; +} + #if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) +/* + * PRNG for test - !!!INSECURE NEVER USE IN PRODUCTION!!! + * + * This is the linear congruential generator from numerical recipes, + * except we only use the low byte as the output. See + * https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Linear_congruential_generator#Parameters_in_common_use + */ +static int self_test_rng(void *ctx, unsigned char *out, size_t len) +{ + static uint32_t state = 42; + + (void) ctx; + + for (size_t i = 0; i < len; i++) { + state = state * 1664525u + 1013904223u; + out[i] = (unsigned char) state; + } + + return 0; +} + /* Adjust the exponent to be a valid private point for the specified curve. * This is sometimes necessary because we use a single set of exponents * for all curves but the validity of values depends on the curve. */ @@ -3487,7 +3537,7 @@ static int self_test_point(int verbose, MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_read_string(m, 16, exponents[0])); MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(self_test_adjust_exponent(grp, m)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_ecp_mul(grp, R, m, P, NULL, NULL)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_ecp_mul(grp, R, m, P, self_test_rng, NULL)); for (i = 1; i < n_exponents; i++) { add_c_prev = add_count; @@ -3499,7 +3549,7 @@ static int self_test_point(int verbose, MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_read_string(m, 16, exponents[i])); MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(self_test_adjust_exponent(grp, m)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_ecp_mul(grp, R, m, P, NULL, NULL)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_ecp_mul(grp, R, m, P, self_test_rng, NULL)); if (add_count != add_c_prev || dbl_count != dbl_c_prev || @@ -3519,12 +3569,14 @@ static int self_test_point(int verbose, } return ret; } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */ /* * Checkup routine */ int mbedtls_ecp_self_test(int verbose) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; mbedtls_ecp_group grp; mbedtls_ecp_point R, P; @@ -3577,7 +3629,7 @@ int mbedtls_ecp_self_test(int verbose) } /* Do a dummy multiplication first to trigger precomputation */ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_lset(&m, 2)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_ecp_mul(&grp, &P, &m, &grp.G, NULL, NULL)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_ecp_mul(&grp, &P, &m, &grp.G, self_test_rng, NULL)); ret = self_test_point(verbose, &grp, &R, &m, &grp.G, sw_exponents, @@ -3638,10 +3690,14 @@ int mbedtls_ecp_self_test(int verbose) } return ret; +#else /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */ + (void) verbose; + return 0; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */ } #endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ #endif /* !MBEDTLS_ECP_ALT */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_LIGHT */ diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ecp_curves.c b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ecp_curves.c index 61a1046f3a27..c3cd33f47a86 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ecp_curves.c +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ecp_curves.c @@ -7,29 +7,47 @@ #include "common.h" -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_WITH_MPI_UINT) + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_LIGHT) #include "mbedtls/ecp.h" #include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" #include "mbedtls/error.h" -#include "mbedtls/bn_mul.h" +#include "bn_mul.h" +#include "bignum_core.h" #include "ecp_invasive.h" #include #if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_ALT) -/* Parameter validation macros based on platform_util.h */ -#define ECP_VALIDATE_RET(cond) \ - MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE_RET(cond, MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA) -#define ECP_VALIDATE(cond) \ - MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE(cond) - -#define ECP_MPI_INIT(s, n, p) { s, (n), (mbedtls_mpi_uint *) (p) } +#define ECP_MPI_INIT(_p, _n) { .p = (mbedtls_mpi_uint *) (_p), .s = 1, .n = (_n) } #define ECP_MPI_INIT_ARRAY(x) \ - ECP_MPI_INIT(1, sizeof(x) / sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint), x) + ECP_MPI_INIT(x, sizeof(x) / sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint)) + +#define ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(x, y) { \ + ECP_MPI_INIT_ARRAY(x), ECP_MPI_INIT_ARRAY(y), ECP_MPI_INIT(NULL, 0) } +#define ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z1(x, y) { \ + ECP_MPI_INIT_ARRAY(x), ECP_MPI_INIT_ARRAY(y), ECP_MPI_INIT(mpi_one, 1) } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED) +/* For these curves, we build the group parameters dynamically. */ +#define ECP_LOAD_GROUP +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint mpi_one[] = { 1 }; +#endif /* * Note: the constants are in little-endian order @@ -65,6 +83,188 @@ static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_n[] = { MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x36, 0xF8, 0xDE, 0x99, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF), MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF), }; +#if MBEDTLS_ECP_FIXED_POINT_OPTIM == 1 +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_0_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x12, 0x10, 0xFF, 0x82, 0xFD, 0x0A, 0xFF, 0xF4), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x00, 0x88, 0xA1, 0x43, 0xEB, 0x20, 0xBF, 0x7C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF6, 0x90, 0x30, 0xB0, 0x0E, 0xA8, 0x8D, 0x18), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_0_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x11, 0x48, 0x79, 0x1E, 0xA1, 0x77, 0xF9, 0x73), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD5, 0xCD, 0x24, 0x6B, 0xED, 0x11, 0x10, 0x63), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x78, 0xDA, 0xC8, 0xFF, 0x95, 0x2B, 0x19, 0x07), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_1_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x97, 0x9E, 0xE3, 0x60, 0x59, 0xD1, 0xC4, 0xC2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x91, 0xBD, 0x22, 0xD7, 0x2D, 0x07, 0xBD, 0xB6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x74, 0x2A, 0xCF, 0x33, 0xF0, 0xBE, 0xD1, 0xED), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_1_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x88, 0x71, 0x4B, 0xA8, 0xED, 0x7E, 0xC9, 0x1A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8E, 0x2A, 0xF6, 0xDF, 0x0E, 0xE8, 0x4C, 0x0F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC5, 0x35, 0xF7, 0x8A, 0xC3, 0xEC, 0xDE, 0x1E), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_2_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x00, 0x67, 0xC2, 0x1D, 0x32, 0x8F, 0x10, 0xFB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBB, 0x2D, 0x17, 0xF3, 0xE4, 0xFE, 0xD8, 0x13), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x55, 0x45, 0x10, 0x70, 0x2C, 0x3E, 0x52, 0x3E), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_2_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x61, 0xF1, 0x04, 0x5D, 0xEE, 0xD4, 0x56, 0xE6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x78, 0xB7, 0x38, 0x27, 0x61, 0xAA, 0x81, 0x87), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x71, 0x37, 0xD7, 0x0E, 0x29, 0x0E, 0x11, 0x14), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_3_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1E, 0x35, 0x52, 0xC6, 0x31, 0xB7, 0x27, 0xF5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3D, 0xD4, 0x15, 0x98, 0x0F, 0xE7, 0xF3, 0x6A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD3, 0x31, 0x70, 0x35, 0x09, 0xA0, 0x2B, 0xC2), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_3_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x21, 0x75, 0xA7, 0x4C, 0x88, 0xCF, 0x5B, 0xE4), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x17, 0x17, 0x48, 0x8D, 0xF2, 0xF0, 0x86, 0xED), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x49, 0xCF, 0xFE, 0x6B, 0xB0, 0xA5, 0x06, 0xAB), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_4_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x18, 0x6A, 0xDC, 0x9A, 0x6D, 0x7B, 0x47, 0x2E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x12, 0xFC, 0x51, 0x12, 0x62, 0x66, 0x0B, 0x59), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCD, 0x40, 0x93, 0xA0, 0xB5, 0x5A, 0x58, 0xD7), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_4_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEF, 0xCB, 0xAF, 0xDC, 0x0B, 0xA1, 0x26, 0xFB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDA, 0x36, 0x9D, 0xA3, 0xD7, 0x3B, 0xAD, 0x39), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB4, 0x3B, 0x05, 0x9A, 0xA8, 0xAA, 0x69, 0xB2), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_5_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6D, 0xD9, 0xD1, 0x4D, 0x4A, 0x6E, 0x96, 0x1E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x17, 0x66, 0x32, 0x39, 0xC6, 0x57, 0x7D, 0xE6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x92, 0xA0, 0x36, 0xC2, 0x45, 0xF9, 0x00, 0x62), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_5_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB4, 0xEF, 0x59, 0x46, 0xDC, 0x60, 0xD9, 0x8F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x24, 0xB0, 0xE9, 0x41, 0xA4, 0x87, 0x76, 0x89), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x13, 0xD4, 0x0E, 0xB2, 0xFA, 0x16, 0x56, 0xDC), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_6_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0A, 0x62, 0xD2, 0xB1, 0x34, 0xB2, 0xF1, 0x06), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB2, 0xED, 0x55, 0xC5, 0x47, 0xB5, 0x07, 0x15), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x17, 0xF6, 0x2F, 0x94, 0xC3, 0xDD, 0x54, 0x2F), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_6_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFD, 0xA6, 0xD4, 0x8C, 0xA9, 0xCE, 0x4D, 0x2E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB9, 0x4B, 0x46, 0xCC, 0xB2, 0x55, 0xC8, 0xB2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3A, 0xAE, 0x31, 0xED, 0x89, 0x65, 0x59, 0x55), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_7_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCC, 0x0A, 0xD1, 0x1A, 0xC5, 0xF6, 0xEA, 0x43), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0C, 0xFC, 0x0C, 0x1A, 0xFB, 0xA0, 0xC8, 0x70), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEA, 0xFD, 0x53, 0x6F, 0x6D, 0xBF, 0xBA, 0xAF), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_7_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2D, 0xB0, 0x7D, 0x83, 0x96, 0xE3, 0xCB, 0x9D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6F, 0x6E, 0x55, 0x2C, 0x20, 0x53, 0x2F, 0x46), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA6, 0x66, 0x00, 0x17, 0x08, 0xFE, 0xAC, 0x31), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_8_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x09, 0x12, 0x97, 0x3A, 0xC7, 0x57, 0x45, 0xCD), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x38, 0x25, 0x99, 0x00, 0xF6, 0x97, 0xB4, 0x64), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9B, 0x74, 0xE6, 0xE6, 0xA3, 0xDF, 0x9C, 0xCC), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_8_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x32, 0xF4, 0x76, 0xD5, 0x5F, 0x2A, 0xFD, 0x85), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x62, 0x80, 0x7E, 0x3E, 0xE5, 0xE8, 0xD6, 0x63), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE2, 0xAD, 0x1E, 0x70, 0x79, 0x3E, 0x3D, 0x83), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_9_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8E, 0x15, 0xBB, 0xB3, 0x42, 0x6A, 0xA1, 0x7C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9B, 0x58, 0xCB, 0x43, 0x25, 0x00, 0x14, 0x68), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x06, 0x4E, 0x93, 0x11, 0xE0, 0x32, 0x54, 0x98), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_9_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA7, 0x52, 0xA2, 0xB4, 0x57, 0x32, 0xB9, 0x11), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7D, 0x43, 0xA1, 0xB1, 0xFB, 0x01, 0xE1, 0xE7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA6, 0xFB, 0x5A, 0x11, 0xB8, 0xC2, 0x03, 0xE5), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_10_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1C, 0x2B, 0x71, 0x26, 0x4E, 0x7C, 0xC5, 0x32), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1F, 0xF5, 0xD3, 0xA8, 0xE4, 0x95, 0x48, 0x65), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x55, 0xAE, 0xD9, 0x5D, 0x9F, 0x6A, 0x22, 0xAD), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_10_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD9, 0xCC, 0xA3, 0x4D, 0xA0, 0x1C, 0x34, 0xEF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA3, 0x3C, 0x62, 0xF8, 0x5E, 0xA6, 0x58, 0x7D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6D, 0x6E, 0x66, 0x8A, 0x3D, 0x17, 0xFF, 0x0F), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_11_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF7, 0xCD, 0xA8, 0xDD, 0xD1, 0x20, 0x5C, 0xEA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBF, 0xFE, 0x17, 0xE2, 0xCF, 0xEA, 0x63, 0xDE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x74, 0x51, 0xC9, 0x16, 0xDE, 0xB4, 0xB2, 0xDD), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_11_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x59, 0xBE, 0x12, 0xD7, 0xA3, 0x0A, 0x50, 0x33), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x53, 0x87, 0xC5, 0x8A, 0x76, 0x57, 0x07, 0x60), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE5, 0x1F, 0xC6, 0x1B, 0x66, 0xC4, 0x3D, 0x8A), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_12_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x28, 0xA4, 0x85, 0x13, 0x8F, 0xA7, 0x35, 0x19), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x58, 0x0D, 0xFD, 0xFF, 0x1B, 0xD1, 0xD6, 0xEF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBA, 0x7A, 0xD0, 0xC3, 0xB4, 0xEF, 0x39, 0x66), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_12_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3A, 0xFE, 0xA5, 0x9C, 0x34, 0x30, 0x49, 0x40), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDE, 0xC5, 0x39, 0x26, 0x06, 0xE3, 0x01, 0x17), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE2, 0x2B, 0x66, 0xFC, 0x95, 0x5F, 0x35, 0xF7), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_13_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x58, 0xCF, 0x54, 0x63, 0x99, 0x57, 0x05, 0x45), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x71, 0x6F, 0x00, 0x5F, 0x65, 0x08, 0x47, 0x98), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x62, 0x2A, 0x90, 0x6D, 0x67, 0xC6, 0xBC, 0x45), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_13_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8A, 0x4D, 0x88, 0x0A, 0x35, 0x9E, 0x33, 0x9C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7C, 0x17, 0x0C, 0xF8, 0xE1, 0x7A, 0x49, 0x02), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA4, 0x44, 0x06, 0x8F, 0x0B, 0x70, 0x2F, 0x71), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_14_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x85, 0x4B, 0xCB, 0xF9, 0x8E, 0x6A, 0xDA, 0x1B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x29, 0x43, 0xA1, 0x3F, 0xCE, 0x17, 0xD2, 0x32), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5D, 0x0D, 0xD2, 0x6C, 0x82, 0x37, 0xE5, 0xFC), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_14_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4A, 0x3C, 0xF4, 0x92, 0xB4, 0x8A, 0x95, 0x85), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x85, 0x96, 0xF1, 0x0A, 0x34, 0x2F, 0x74, 0x7E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7B, 0xA1, 0xAA, 0xBA, 0x86, 0x77, 0x4F, 0xA2), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_15_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE5, 0x7F, 0xEF, 0x60, 0x50, 0x80, 0xD7, 0xD4), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x31, 0xAC, 0xC9, 0xFE, 0xEC, 0x0A, 0x1A, 0x9F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6B, 0x2F, 0xBE, 0x91, 0xD7, 0xB7, 0x38, 0x48), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_15_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB1, 0xAE, 0x85, 0x98, 0xFE, 0x05, 0x7F, 0x9F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x91, 0xBE, 0xFD, 0x11, 0x31, 0x3D, 0x14, 0x13), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x59, 0x75, 0xE8, 0x30, 0x01, 0xCB, 0x9B, 0x1C), +}; +static const mbedtls_ecp_point secp192r1_T[16] = { + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z1(secp192r1_T_0_X, secp192r1_T_0_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192r1_T_1_X, secp192r1_T_1_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192r1_T_2_X, secp192r1_T_2_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192r1_T_3_X, secp192r1_T_3_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192r1_T_4_X, secp192r1_T_4_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192r1_T_5_X, secp192r1_T_5_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192r1_T_6_X, secp192r1_T_6_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192r1_T_7_X, secp192r1_T_7_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192r1_T_8_X, secp192r1_T_8_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192r1_T_9_X, secp192r1_T_9_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192r1_T_10_X, secp192r1_T_10_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192r1_T_11_X, secp192r1_T_11_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192r1_T_12_X, secp192r1_T_12_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192r1_T_13_X, secp192r1_T_13_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192r1_T_14_X, secp192r1_T_14_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192r1_T_15_X, secp192r1_T_15_Y), +}; +#else +#define secp192r1_T NULL +#endif #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED */ /* @@ -101,6 +301,220 @@ static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_n[] = { MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF), MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_4(0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF), }; +#if MBEDTLS_ECP_FIXED_POINT_OPTIM == 1 +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_0_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x21, 0x1D, 0x5C, 0x11, 0xD6, 0x80, 0x32, 0x34), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x22, 0x11, 0xC2, 0x56, 0xD3, 0xC1, 0x03, 0x4A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB9, 0x90, 0x13, 0x32, 0x7F, 0xBF, 0xB4, 0x6B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBD, 0x0C, 0x0E, 0xB7, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_0_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x34, 0x7E, 0x00, 0x85, 0x99, 0x81, 0xD5, 0x44), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x64, 0x47, 0x07, 0x5A, 0xA0, 0x75, 0x43, 0xCD), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE6, 0xDF, 0x22, 0x4C, 0xFB, 0x23, 0xF7, 0xB5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x88, 0x63, 0x37, 0xBD, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_1_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE0, 0xF9, 0xB8, 0xD0, 0x3D, 0xD2, 0xD3, 0xFA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1E, 0xFD, 0x99, 0x26, 0x19, 0xFE, 0x13, 0x6E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1C, 0x0E, 0x4C, 0x48, 0x7C, 0xA2, 0x17, 0x01), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3D, 0xA3, 0x13, 0x57, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_1_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9F, 0x16, 0x5C, 0x8F, 0xAA, 0xED, 0x0F, 0x58), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBF, 0xC5, 0x43, 0x34, 0x93, 0x05, 0x2A, 0x4C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE4, 0xE3, 0x6C, 0xCA, 0xC6, 0x14, 0xC2, 0x25), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD3, 0x43, 0x6C, 0xD7, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_2_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC3, 0x5A, 0x98, 0x1E, 0xC8, 0xA5, 0x42, 0xA3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x98, 0x49, 0x56, 0x78, 0xF8, 0xEF, 0xED, 0x65), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1B, 0xBB, 0x64, 0xB6, 0x4C, 0x54, 0x5F, 0xD1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2F, 0x0C, 0x33, 0xCC, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_2_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFA, 0x79, 0xCB, 0x2E, 0x08, 0xFF, 0xD8, 0xE6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2E, 0x1F, 0xD4, 0xD7, 0x57, 0xE9, 0x39, 0x45), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD8, 0xD6, 0x3B, 0x0A, 0x1C, 0x87, 0xB7, 0x6A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEB, 0x30, 0xD8, 0x05, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_3_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAD, 0x79, 0x74, 0x9A, 0xE6, 0xBB, 0xC2, 0xC2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB4, 0x5B, 0xA6, 0x67, 0xC1, 0x91, 0xE7, 0x64), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF0, 0xDF, 0x38, 0x82, 0x19, 0x2C, 0x4C, 0xCA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD1, 0x2E, 0x39, 0xC5, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_3_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x99, 0x36, 0x78, 0x4E, 0xAE, 0x5B, 0x02, 0x76), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x14, 0xF6, 0x8B, 0xF8, 0xF4, 0x92, 0x6B, 0x42), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBA, 0x4D, 0x71, 0x35, 0xE7, 0x0C, 0x2C, 0x98), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9B, 0xA5, 0x1F, 0xAE, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_4_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAF, 0x1C, 0x4B, 0xDF, 0x5B, 0xF2, 0x51, 0xB7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x05, 0x74, 0xB1, 0x5A, 0xC6, 0x0F, 0x0E, 0x61), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE8, 0x24, 0x09, 0x62, 0xAF, 0xFC, 0xDB, 0x45), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x43, 0xE1, 0x80, 0x55, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_4_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3C, 0x82, 0xFE, 0xAD, 0xC3, 0xE5, 0xCF, 0xD8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x24, 0xA2, 0x62, 0x17, 0x76, 0xF0, 0x5A, 0xFA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3E, 0xB8, 0xE5, 0xAC, 0xB7, 0x66, 0x38, 0xAA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x97, 0xFD, 0x86, 0x05, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_5_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x59, 0xD3, 0x0C, 0x3C, 0xD1, 0x66, 0xB0, 0xF1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBC, 0x59, 0xB4, 0x8D, 0x90, 0x10, 0xB7, 0xA2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x96, 0x47, 0x9B, 0xE6, 0x55, 0x8A, 0xE4, 0xEE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB1, 0x49, 0xDB, 0x78, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_5_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x41, 0x97, 0xED, 0xDE, 0xFF, 0xB3, 0xDF, 0x48), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x10, 0xB9, 0x83, 0xB7, 0xEB, 0xBE, 0x40, 0x8D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAF, 0xD3, 0xD3, 0xCD, 0x0E, 0x82, 0x79, 0x3D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9B, 0x83, 0x1B, 0xF0, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_6_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3F, 0x22, 0xBB, 0x54, 0xD3, 0x31, 0x56, 0xFC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x80, 0x36, 0xE5, 0xE0, 0x89, 0x96, 0x8E, 0x71), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE1, 0xEF, 0x0A, 0xED, 0xD0, 0x11, 0x4A, 0xFF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x15, 0x00, 0x57, 0x27, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_6_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x13, 0xCA, 0x3D, 0xF7, 0x64, 0x9B, 0x6E, 0x85), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x90, 0xE3, 0x70, 0x6B, 0x41, 0xD7, 0xED, 0x8F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x02, 0x44, 0x44, 0x80, 0xCE, 0x13, 0x37, 0x92), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x94, 0x73, 0x80, 0x79, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_7_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB7, 0x4D, 0x70, 0x7D, 0x31, 0x0F, 0x1C, 0x58), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6D, 0x35, 0x88, 0x47, 0xC4, 0x24, 0x78, 0x3F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBA, 0xF0, 0xCD, 0x91, 0x81, 0xB3, 0xDE, 0xB6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x04, 0xCE, 0xC6, 0xF7, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_7_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE9, 0x9C, 0x2D, 0xE8, 0xD2, 0x00, 0x8F, 0x10), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD5, 0x5E, 0x7C, 0x0E, 0x0C, 0x6E, 0x58, 0x02), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAE, 0x81, 0x21, 0xCE, 0x43, 0xF4, 0x24, 0x3D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9E, 0xBC, 0xF0, 0xF4, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_8_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD6, 0x10, 0xC2, 0x74, 0x4A, 0x8F, 0x8A, 0xCF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x89, 0x67, 0xF4, 0x2B, 0x38, 0x2B, 0x35, 0x17), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF5, 0xE7, 0x0C, 0xA9, 0xFA, 0x77, 0x5C, 0xBD), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE0, 0x33, 0x19, 0x2B, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_8_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE7, 0x3E, 0x96, 0x22, 0x53, 0xE1, 0xE9, 0xBE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE0, 0x13, 0xBC, 0xA1, 0x16, 0xEC, 0x01, 0x1A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9A, 0x00, 0xC9, 0x7A, 0xC3, 0x73, 0xA5, 0x45), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE1, 0xF4, 0x5E, 0xC1, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_9_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA8, 0x95, 0xD6, 0xD9, 0x32, 0x30, 0x2B, 0xD0), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x77, 0x42, 0x09, 0x05, 0x61, 0x2A, 0x7E, 0x82), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x73, 0x84, 0xA2, 0x05, 0x88, 0x64, 0x65, 0xF9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x03, 0x2D, 0x90, 0xB3, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_9_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0A, 0xE7, 0x2E, 0x85, 0x55, 0x80, 0x7C, 0x79), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0F, 0xC1, 0xAC, 0x78, 0xB4, 0xAF, 0xFB, 0x6E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD3, 0xC3, 0x28, 0x8E, 0x79, 0x18, 0x1F, 0x58), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x34, 0x46, 0xCF, 0x49, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_10_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x63, 0x5F, 0xA8, 0x6C, 0x46, 0x83, 0x43, 0xFA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFA, 0xA9, 0x93, 0x11, 0xB6, 0x07, 0x57, 0x74), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x77, 0x2A, 0x9D, 0x03, 0x89, 0x7E, 0xD7, 0x3C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7B, 0x8C, 0x62, 0xCF, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_10_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x44, 0x2C, 0x13, 0x59, 0xCC, 0xFA, 0x84, 0x9E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x51, 0xB9, 0x48, 0xBC, 0x57, 0xC7, 0xB3, 0x7C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFC, 0x0A, 0x38, 0x24, 0x2E, 0x3A, 0x28, 0x25), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBC, 0x0A, 0x43, 0xB8, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_11_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x59, 0x25, 0xAB, 0xC1, 0xEE, 0x70, 0x3C, 0xE1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF3, 0xDB, 0x45, 0x1D, 0x4A, 0x80, 0x75, 0x35), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE8, 0x1F, 0x4D, 0x2D, 0x9A, 0x05, 0xF4, 0xCB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6B, 0x10, 0xF0, 0x5A, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_11_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x35, 0x95, 0xE1, 0xDC, 0x15, 0x86, 0xC3, 0x7B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEC, 0xDC, 0x27, 0xD1, 0x56, 0xA1, 0x14, 0x0D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x59, 0x0B, 0xD6, 0x77, 0x4E, 0x44, 0xA2, 0xF8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x94, 0x42, 0x71, 0x1F, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_12_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x30, 0x86, 0xB2, 0xB0, 0xC8, 0x2F, 0x7B, 0xFE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x96, 0xEF, 0xCB, 0xDB, 0xBC, 0x9E, 0x3B, 0xC5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1B, 0x03, 0x86, 0xDD, 0x5B, 0xF5, 0x8D, 0x46), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x58, 0x95, 0x79, 0xD6, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_12_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x84, 0x32, 0x14, 0xDA, 0x9B, 0x4F, 0x07, 0x39), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB5, 0x3E, 0xFB, 0x06, 0xEE, 0xA7, 0x40, 0x40), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x76, 0x1F, 0xDF, 0x71, 0x61, 0xFD, 0x8B, 0xBE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x80, 0x8B, 0xAB, 0x8B, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_13_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC9, 0x34, 0xB3, 0xB4, 0xBC, 0x9F, 0xB0, 0x5E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE6, 0x58, 0x48, 0xA8, 0x77, 0xBB, 0x13, 0x2F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x41, 0xC6, 0xF7, 0x34, 0xCC, 0x89, 0x21, 0x0A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCA, 0x33, 0xDD, 0x1F, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_13_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCC, 0x81, 0xEF, 0xA4, 0xF2, 0x10, 0x0B, 0xCD), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x83, 0xF7, 0x6E, 0x72, 0x4A, 0xDF, 0xDD, 0xE8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x67, 0x23, 0x0A, 0x53, 0x03, 0x16, 0x62, 0xD2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0B, 0x76, 0xFD, 0x3C, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_14_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCB, 0x14, 0xA1, 0xFA, 0xA0, 0x18, 0xBE, 0x07), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x03, 0x2A, 0xE1, 0xD7, 0xB0, 0x6C, 0xA0, 0xDE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD1, 0xC0, 0xB0, 0xC6, 0x63, 0x24, 0xCD, 0x4E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x33, 0x38, 0x2C, 0xB1, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_14_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEE, 0xCD, 0x7D, 0x20, 0x0C, 0xFE, 0xAC, 0xC3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x09, 0x97, 0x9F, 0xA2, 0xB6, 0x45, 0xF7, 0x7B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCA, 0x99, 0xF3, 0xD2, 0x20, 0x02, 0xEB, 0x04), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x43, 0x18, 0x5B, 0x7B, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_15_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2B, 0xDD, 0x77, 0x91, 0x60, 0xEA, 0xFD, 0xD3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7D, 0xD3, 0xB5, 0xD6, 0x90, 0x17, 0x0E, 0x1A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x00, 0xF4, 0x28, 0xC1, 0xF2, 0x53, 0xF6, 0x63), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x49, 0x58, 0xDC, 0x61, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_15_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA8, 0x20, 0x01, 0xFB, 0xF1, 0xBD, 0x5F, 0x45), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD0, 0x7F, 0x06, 0xDA, 0x11, 0xCB, 0xBA, 0xA6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA7, 0x41, 0x00, 0xA4, 0x1B, 0x30, 0x33, 0x79), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF4, 0xFF, 0x27, 0xCA, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_ecp_point secp224r1_T[16] = { + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z1(secp224r1_T_0_X, secp224r1_T_0_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224r1_T_1_X, secp224r1_T_1_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224r1_T_2_X, secp224r1_T_2_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224r1_T_3_X, secp224r1_T_3_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224r1_T_4_X, secp224r1_T_4_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224r1_T_5_X, secp224r1_T_5_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224r1_T_6_X, secp224r1_T_6_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224r1_T_7_X, secp224r1_T_7_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224r1_T_8_X, secp224r1_T_8_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224r1_T_9_X, secp224r1_T_9_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224r1_T_10_X, secp224r1_T_10_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224r1_T_11_X, secp224r1_T_11_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224r1_T_12_X, secp224r1_T_12_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224r1_T_13_X, secp224r1_T_13_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224r1_T_14_X, secp224r1_T_14_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224r1_T_15_X, secp224r1_T_15_Y), +}; +#else +#define secp224r1_T NULL +#endif #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED */ /* @@ -137,6 +551,221 @@ static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_n[] = { MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF), MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF), }; +#if MBEDTLS_ECP_FIXED_POINT_OPTIM == 1 +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_0_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x96, 0xC2, 0x98, 0xD8, 0x45, 0x39, 0xA1, 0xF4), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA0, 0x33, 0xEB, 0x2D, 0x81, 0x7D, 0x03, 0x77), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF2, 0x40, 0xA4, 0x63, 0xE5, 0xE6, 0xBC, 0xF8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x47, 0x42, 0x2C, 0xE1, 0xF2, 0xD1, 0x17, 0x6B), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_0_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF5, 0x51, 0xBF, 0x37, 0x68, 0x40, 0xB6, 0xCB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCE, 0x5E, 0x31, 0x6B, 0x57, 0x33, 0xCE, 0x2B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x16, 0x9E, 0x0F, 0x7C, 0x4A, 0xEB, 0xE7, 0x8E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9B, 0x7F, 0x1A, 0xFE, 0xE2, 0x42, 0xE3, 0x4F), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_1_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x70, 0xC8, 0xBA, 0x04, 0xB7, 0x4B, 0xD2, 0xF7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAB, 0xC6, 0x23, 0x3A, 0xA0, 0x09, 0x3A, 0x59), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1D, 0x9D, 0x4C, 0xF9, 0x58, 0x23, 0xCC, 0xDF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x02, 0xED, 0x7B, 0x29, 0x87, 0x0F, 0xFA, 0x3C), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_1_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x40, 0x69, 0xF2, 0x40, 0x0B, 0xA3, 0x98, 0xCE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAF, 0xA8, 0x48, 0x02, 0x0D, 0x1C, 0x12, 0x62), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9B, 0xAF, 0x09, 0x83, 0x80, 0xAA, 0x58, 0xA7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC6, 0x12, 0xBE, 0x70, 0x94, 0x76, 0xE3, 0xE4), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_2_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7D, 0x7D, 0xEF, 0x86, 0xFF, 0xE3, 0x37, 0xDD), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDB, 0x86, 0x8B, 0x08, 0x27, 0x7C, 0xD7, 0xF6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x91, 0x54, 0x4C, 0x25, 0x4F, 0x9A, 0xFE, 0x28), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5E, 0xFD, 0xF0, 0x6D, 0x37, 0x03, 0x69, 0xD6), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_2_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x96, 0xD5, 0xDA, 0xAD, 0x92, 0x49, 0xF0, 0x9F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF9, 0x73, 0x43, 0x9E, 0xAF, 0xA7, 0xD1, 0xF3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x67, 0x41, 0x07, 0xDF, 0x78, 0x95, 0x3E, 0xA1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x22, 0x3D, 0xD1, 0xE6, 0x3C, 0xA5, 0xE2, 0x20), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_3_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBF, 0x6A, 0x5D, 0x52, 0x35, 0xD7, 0xBF, 0xAE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5A, 0xA2, 0xBE, 0x96, 0xF4, 0xF8, 0x02, 0xC3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA4, 0x20, 0x49, 0x54, 0xEA, 0xB3, 0x82, 0xDB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2E, 0xDB, 0xEA, 0x02, 0xD1, 0x75, 0x1C, 0x62), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_3_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF0, 0x85, 0xF4, 0x9E, 0x4C, 0xDC, 0x39, 0x89), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x63, 0x6D, 0xC4, 0x57, 0xD8, 0x03, 0x5D, 0x22), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x70, 0x7F, 0x2D, 0x52, 0x6F, 0xC9, 0xDA, 0x4F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9D, 0x64, 0xFA, 0xB4, 0xFE, 0xA4, 0xC4, 0xD7), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_4_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2A, 0x37, 0xB9, 0xC0, 0xAA, 0x59, 0xC6, 0x8B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3F, 0x58, 0xD9, 0xED, 0x58, 0x99, 0x65, 0xF7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x88, 0x7D, 0x26, 0x8C, 0x4A, 0xF9, 0x05, 0x9F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9D, 0x73, 0x9A, 0xC9, 0xE7, 0x46, 0xDC, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_4_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF2, 0xD0, 0x55, 0xDF, 0x00, 0x0A, 0xF5, 0x4A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6A, 0xBF, 0x56, 0x81, 0x2D, 0x20, 0xEB, 0xB5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x11, 0xC1, 0x28, 0x52, 0xAB, 0xE3, 0xD1, 0x40), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x24, 0x34, 0x79, 0x45, 0x57, 0xA5, 0x12, 0x03), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_5_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEE, 0xCF, 0xB8, 0x7E, 0xF7, 0x92, 0x96, 0x8D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3D, 0x01, 0x8C, 0x0D, 0x23, 0xF2, 0xE3, 0x05), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x59, 0x2E, 0xE3, 0x84, 0x52, 0x7A, 0x34, 0x76), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE5, 0xA1, 0xB0, 0x15, 0x90, 0xE2, 0x53, 0x3C), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_5_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD4, 0x98, 0xE7, 0xFA, 0xA5, 0x7D, 0x8B, 0x53), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x91, 0x35, 0xD2, 0x00, 0xD1, 0x1B, 0x9F, 0x1B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3F, 0x69, 0x08, 0x9A, 0x72, 0xF0, 0xA9, 0x11), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB3, 0xFE, 0x0E, 0x14, 0xDA, 0x7C, 0x0E, 0xD3), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_6_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x83, 0xF6, 0xE8, 0xF8, 0x87, 0xF7, 0xFC, 0x6D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x90, 0xBE, 0x7F, 0x3F, 0x7A, 0x2B, 0xD7, 0x13), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCF, 0x32, 0xF2, 0x2D, 0x94, 0x6D, 0x42, 0xFD), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAD, 0x9A, 0xE3, 0x5F, 0x42, 0xBB, 0x84, 0xED), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_6_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFC, 0x95, 0x29, 0x73, 0xA1, 0x67, 0x3E, 0x02), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE3, 0x30, 0x54, 0x35, 0x8E, 0x0A, 0xDD, 0x67), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x03, 0xD7, 0xA1, 0x97, 0x61, 0x3B, 0xF8, 0x0C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF2, 0x33, 0x3C, 0x58, 0x55, 0x34, 0x23, 0xA3), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_7_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x99, 0x5D, 0x16, 0x5F, 0x7B, 0xBC, 0xBB, 0xCE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x61, 0xEE, 0x4E, 0x8A, 0xC1, 0x51, 0xCC, 0x50), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1F, 0x0D, 0x4D, 0x1B, 0x53, 0x23, 0x1D, 0xB3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDA, 0x2A, 0x38, 0x66, 0x52, 0x84, 0xE1, 0x95), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_7_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5B, 0x9B, 0x83, 0x0A, 0x81, 0x4F, 0xAD, 0xAC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0F, 0xFF, 0x42, 0x41, 0x6E, 0xA9, 0xA2, 0xA0), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2F, 0xA1, 0x4F, 0x1F, 0x89, 0x82, 0xAA, 0x3E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF3, 0xB8, 0x0F, 0x6B, 0x8F, 0x8C, 0xD6, 0x68), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_8_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF1, 0xB3, 0xBB, 0x51, 0x69, 0xA2, 0x11, 0x93), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x65, 0x4F, 0x0F, 0x8D, 0xBD, 0x26, 0x0F, 0xE8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB9, 0xCB, 0xEC, 0x6B, 0x34, 0xC3, 0x3D, 0x9D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE4, 0x5D, 0x1E, 0x10, 0xD5, 0x44, 0xE2, 0x54), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_8_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x28, 0x9E, 0xB1, 0xF1, 0x6E, 0x4C, 0xAD, 0xB3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB7, 0xE3, 0xC2, 0x58, 0xC0, 0xFB, 0x34, 0x43), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x25, 0x9C, 0xDF, 0x35, 0x07, 0x41, 0xBD, 0x19), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB6, 0x6E, 0x10, 0xEC, 0x0E, 0xEC, 0xBB, 0xD6), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_9_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC8, 0xCF, 0xEF, 0x3F, 0x83, 0x1A, 0x88, 0xE8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0B, 0x29, 0xB5, 0xB9, 0xE0, 0xC9, 0xA3, 0xAE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x88, 0x46, 0x1E, 0x77, 0xCD, 0x7E, 0xB3, 0x10), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB6, 0x21, 0xD0, 0xD4, 0xA3, 0x16, 0x08, 0xEE), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_9_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA1, 0xCA, 0xA8, 0xB3, 0xBF, 0x29, 0x99, 0x8E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD1, 0xF2, 0x05, 0xC1, 0xCF, 0x5D, 0x91, 0x48), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9F, 0x01, 0x49, 0xDB, 0x82, 0xDF, 0x5F, 0x3A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE1, 0x06, 0x90, 0xAD, 0xE3, 0x38, 0xA4, 0xC4), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_10_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC9, 0xD2, 0x3A, 0xE8, 0x03, 0xC5, 0x6D, 0x5D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBE, 0x35, 0xD0, 0xAE, 0x1D, 0x7A, 0x9F, 0xCA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x33, 0x1E, 0xD2, 0xCB, 0xAC, 0x88, 0x27, 0x55), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF0, 0xB9, 0x9C, 0xE0, 0x31, 0xDD, 0x99, 0x86), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_10_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x61, 0xF9, 0x9B, 0x32, 0x96, 0x41, 0x58, 0x38), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF9, 0x5A, 0x2A, 0xB8, 0x96, 0x0E, 0xB2, 0x4C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC1, 0x78, 0x2C, 0xC7, 0x08, 0x99, 0x19, 0x24), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB7, 0x59, 0x28, 0xE9, 0x84, 0x54, 0xE6, 0x16), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_11_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDD, 0x38, 0x30, 0xDB, 0x70, 0x2C, 0x0A, 0xA2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7C, 0x5C, 0x9D, 0xE9, 0xD5, 0x46, 0x0B, 0x5F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x83, 0x0B, 0x60, 0x4B, 0x37, 0x7D, 0xB9, 0xC9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5E, 0x24, 0xF3, 0x3D, 0x79, 0x7F, 0x6C, 0x18), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_11_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7F, 0xE5, 0x1C, 0x4F, 0x60, 0x24, 0xF7, 0x2A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xED, 0xD8, 0xE2, 0x91, 0x7F, 0x89, 0x49, 0x92), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x97, 0xA7, 0x2E, 0x8D, 0x6A, 0xB3, 0x39, 0x81), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x13, 0x89, 0xB5, 0x9A, 0xB8, 0x8D, 0x42, 0x9C), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_12_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8D, 0x45, 0xE6, 0x4B, 0x3F, 0x4F, 0x1E, 0x1F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x47, 0x65, 0x5E, 0x59, 0x22, 0xCC, 0x72, 0x5F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF1, 0x93, 0x1A, 0x27, 0x1E, 0x34, 0xC5, 0x5B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x63, 0xF2, 0xA5, 0x58, 0x5C, 0x15, 0x2E, 0xC6), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_12_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF4, 0x7F, 0xBA, 0x58, 0x5A, 0x84, 0x6F, 0x5F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAD, 0xA6, 0x36, 0x7E, 0xDC, 0xF7, 0xE1, 0x67), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x04, 0x4D, 0xAA, 0xEE, 0x57, 0x76, 0x3A, 0xD3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4E, 0x7E, 0x26, 0x18, 0x22, 0x23, 0x9F, 0xFF), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_13_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1D, 0x4C, 0x64, 0xC7, 0x55, 0x02, 0x3F, 0xE3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD8, 0x02, 0x90, 0xBB, 0xC3, 0xEC, 0x30, 0x40), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9F, 0x6F, 0x64, 0xF4, 0x16, 0x69, 0x48, 0xA4), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFA, 0x44, 0x9C, 0x95, 0x0C, 0x7D, 0x67, 0x5E), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_13_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x44, 0x91, 0x8B, 0xD8, 0xD0, 0xD7, 0xE7, 0xE2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1F, 0xF9, 0x48, 0x62, 0x6F, 0xA8, 0x93, 0x5D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEA, 0x3A, 0x99, 0x02, 0xD5, 0x0B, 0x3D, 0xE3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1E, 0xD3, 0x00, 0x31, 0xE6, 0x0C, 0x9F, 0x44), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_14_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x56, 0xB2, 0xAA, 0xFD, 0x88, 0x15, 0xDF, 0x52), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4C, 0x35, 0x27, 0x31, 0x44, 0xCD, 0xC0, 0x68), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x53, 0xF8, 0x91, 0xA5, 0x71, 0x94, 0x84, 0x2A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x92, 0xCB, 0xD0, 0x93, 0xE9, 0x88, 0xDA, 0xE4), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_14_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x24, 0xC6, 0x39, 0x16, 0x5D, 0xA3, 0x1E, 0x6D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBA, 0x07, 0x37, 0x26, 0x36, 0x2A, 0xFE, 0x60), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x51, 0xBC, 0xF3, 0xD0, 0xDE, 0x50, 0xFC, 0x97), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x80, 0x2E, 0x06, 0x10, 0x15, 0x4D, 0xFA, 0xF7), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_15_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x27, 0x65, 0x69, 0x5B, 0x66, 0xA2, 0x75, 0x2E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9C, 0x16, 0x00, 0x5A, 0xB0, 0x30, 0x25, 0x1A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x42, 0xFB, 0x86, 0x42, 0x80, 0xC1, 0xC4, 0x76), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5B, 0x1D, 0x83, 0x8E, 0x94, 0x01, 0x5F, 0x82), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_15_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x39, 0x37, 0x70, 0xEF, 0x1F, 0xA1, 0xF0, 0xDB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6A, 0x10, 0x5B, 0xCE, 0xC4, 0x9B, 0x6F, 0x10), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x50, 0x11, 0x11, 0x24, 0x4F, 0x4C, 0x79, 0x61), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x17, 0x3A, 0x72, 0xBC, 0xFE, 0x72, 0x58, 0x43), +}; +static const mbedtls_ecp_point secp256r1_T[16] = { + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z1(secp256r1_T_0_X, secp256r1_T_0_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256r1_T_1_X, secp256r1_T_1_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256r1_T_2_X, secp256r1_T_2_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256r1_T_3_X, secp256r1_T_3_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256r1_T_4_X, secp256r1_T_4_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256r1_T_5_X, secp256r1_T_5_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256r1_T_6_X, secp256r1_T_6_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256r1_T_7_X, secp256r1_T_7_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256r1_T_8_X, secp256r1_T_8_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256r1_T_9_X, secp256r1_T_9_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256r1_T_10_X, secp256r1_T_10_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256r1_T_11_X, secp256r1_T_11_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256r1_T_12_X, secp256r1_T_12_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256r1_T_13_X, secp256r1_T_13_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256r1_T_14_X, secp256r1_T_14_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256r1_T_15_X, secp256r1_T_15_Y), +}; +#else +#define secp256r1_T NULL +#endif + #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED */ /* @@ -183,6 +812,557 @@ static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_n[] = { MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF), MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF), }; +#if MBEDTLS_ECP_FIXED_POINT_OPTIM == 1 +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_0_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB7, 0x0A, 0x76, 0x72, 0x38, 0x5E, 0x54, 0x3A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6C, 0x29, 0x55, 0xBF, 0x5D, 0xF2, 0x02, 0x55), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x38, 0x2A, 0x54, 0x82, 0xE0, 0x41, 0xF7, 0x59), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x98, 0x9B, 0xA7, 0x8B, 0x62, 0x3B, 0x1D, 0x6E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x74, 0xAD, 0x20, 0xF3, 0x1E, 0xC7, 0xB1, 0x8E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x37, 0x05, 0x8B, 0xBE, 0x22, 0xCA, 0x87, 0xAA), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_0_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5F, 0x0E, 0xEA, 0x90, 0x7C, 0x1D, 0x43, 0x7A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9D, 0x81, 0x7E, 0x1D, 0xCE, 0xB1, 0x60, 0x0A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC0, 0xB8, 0xF0, 0xB5, 0x13, 0x31, 0xDA, 0xE9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7C, 0x14, 0x9A, 0x28, 0xBD, 0x1D, 0xF4, 0xF8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x29, 0xDC, 0x92, 0x92, 0xBF, 0x98, 0x9E, 0x5D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6F, 0x2C, 0x26, 0x96, 0x4A, 0xDE, 0x17, 0x36), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_1_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x46, 0x92, 0x00, 0x2C, 0x78, 0xDB, 0x1F, 0x37), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x17, 0xF3, 0xEB, 0xB7, 0x06, 0xF7, 0xB6, 0xBC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3D, 0xBC, 0x2C, 0xCF, 0xD8, 0xED, 0x53, 0xE7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x52, 0x75, 0x7B, 0xA3, 0xAB, 0xC3, 0x2C, 0x85), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE5, 0x9D, 0x78, 0x41, 0xF6, 0x76, 0x84, 0xAC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x54, 0x56, 0xE8, 0x52, 0xB3, 0xCB, 0xA8, 0xBD), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_1_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6D, 0xF2, 0xAE, 0xA4, 0xB6, 0x89, 0x1B, 0xDA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x01, 0x0F, 0xCE, 0x1C, 0x7C, 0xF6, 0x50, 0x4C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4C, 0xEB, 0x90, 0xE6, 0x4D, 0xC7, 0xD4, 0x7A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD1, 0x49, 0x2D, 0x8A, 0x01, 0x99, 0x60, 0x94), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5F, 0x80, 0x9B, 0x9B, 0x6A, 0xB0, 0x07, 0xD9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC2, 0xA2, 0xEE, 0x59, 0xBE, 0x95, 0xBC, 0x23), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_2_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE6, 0x9D, 0x56, 0xAE, 0x59, 0xFB, 0x1F, 0x98), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCF, 0xAC, 0x91, 0x80, 0x87, 0xA8, 0x6E, 0x58), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x30, 0x08, 0xA7, 0x08, 0x94, 0x32, 0xFC, 0x67), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9F, 0x29, 0x9E, 0x84, 0xF4, 0xE5, 0x6E, 0x7E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x55, 0x21, 0xB9, 0x50, 0x24, 0xF8, 0x9C, 0xC7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x34, 0x04, 0x01, 0xC2, 0xFB, 0x77, 0x3E, 0xDE), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_2_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x00, 0x38, 0xEE, 0xE3, 0xC7, 0x9D, 0xEC, 0xA6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB6, 0x88, 0xCF, 0x43, 0xFA, 0x92, 0x5E, 0x8E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE9, 0xCA, 0x43, 0xF8, 0x3B, 0x49, 0x7E, 0x75), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1C, 0xE7, 0xEB, 0x17, 0x45, 0x86, 0xC2, 0xE1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x92, 0x69, 0x57, 0x32, 0xE0, 0x9C, 0xD1, 0x00), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD9, 0x10, 0xB8, 0x4D, 0xB8, 0xF4, 0x0D, 0xE3), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_3_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x60, 0xDC, 0x9A, 0xB2, 0x79, 0x39, 0x27, 0x16), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4F, 0x71, 0xE4, 0x3B, 0x4D, 0x60, 0x0C, 0xA3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x55, 0xBD, 0x19, 0x40, 0xFA, 0x19, 0x2A, 0x5A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4D, 0xF8, 0x1E, 0x43, 0xA1, 0x50, 0x8D, 0xEF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA3, 0x18, 0x7C, 0x41, 0xFA, 0x7C, 0x1B, 0x58), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x00, 0x59, 0x24, 0xC4, 0xE9, 0xB7, 0xD3, 0xAD), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_3_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBB, 0x01, 0x3D, 0x63, 0x54, 0x45, 0x6F, 0xB7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7B, 0xB2, 0x19, 0xA3, 0x86, 0x1D, 0x42, 0x34), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x84, 0x02, 0x87, 0x18, 0x92, 0x52, 0x1A, 0x71), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6C, 0x18, 0xB1, 0x5D, 0x18, 0x1B, 0x37, 0xFE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF4, 0x74, 0x61, 0xBA, 0x18, 0xAF, 0x40, 0x30), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDA, 0x7D, 0x3C, 0x52, 0x0F, 0x07, 0xB0, 0x6F), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_4_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x09, 0x39, 0x13, 0xAA, 0x60, 0x15, 0x99, 0x30), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x17, 0x00, 0xCB, 0xC6, 0xB1, 0xDB, 0x97, 0x90), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE6, 0xFA, 0x60, 0xB8, 0x24, 0xE4, 0x7D, 0xD3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDD, 0x75, 0xB3, 0x70, 0xB2, 0x83, 0xB1, 0x9B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA3, 0xE3, 0x6C, 0xCD, 0x33, 0x62, 0x7A, 0x56), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x88, 0x30, 0xDC, 0x0F, 0x9F, 0xBB, 0xB8, 0xAA), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_4_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA6, 0xD5, 0x0A, 0x60, 0x81, 0xB9, 0xC5, 0x16), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x44, 0xAA, 0x2F, 0xD6, 0xF2, 0x73, 0xDF, 0xEB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF3, 0x7B, 0x74, 0xC9, 0xB3, 0x5B, 0x95, 0x6D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAC, 0x04, 0xEB, 0x15, 0xC8, 0x5F, 0x00, 0xF6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB5, 0x50, 0x20, 0x28, 0xD1, 0x01, 0xAF, 0xF0), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x28, 0x6D, 0x4F, 0x31, 0x81, 0x2F, 0x94, 0x48), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_5_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x46, 0x2F, 0xD8, 0xB6, 0x63, 0x7C, 0xE9, 0x50), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD9, 0x8C, 0xB9, 0x14, 0xD9, 0x37, 0x63, 0xDE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x10, 0x02, 0xB8, 0x46, 0xAD, 0xCE, 0x7B, 0x38), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x82, 0x47, 0x2D, 0x66, 0xA7, 0xE9, 0x33, 0x23), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x92, 0xF9, 0x93, 0x94, 0xA8, 0x48, 0xB3, 0x4F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE9, 0x4A, 0xAC, 0x51, 0x08, 0x72, 0x2F, 0x1A), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_5_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDA, 0xAD, 0xA0, 0xF9, 0x81, 0xE1, 0x78, 0x97), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3A, 0x9A, 0x63, 0xD8, 0xBA, 0x79, 0x1A, 0x17), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x34, 0x31, 0x7B, 0x7A, 0x5A, 0x5D, 0x7D, 0x2D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x83, 0x96, 0x12, 0x4B, 0x19, 0x09, 0xE0, 0xB7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x55, 0x8A, 0x57, 0xEE, 0x4E, 0x6E, 0x7E, 0xEC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x11, 0x9D, 0x69, 0xDC, 0xB3, 0xDA, 0xD8, 0x08), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_6_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x68, 0x49, 0x03, 0x03, 0x33, 0x6F, 0x28, 0x4A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5D, 0xDB, 0xA7, 0x05, 0x8C, 0xF3, 0x4D, 0xFB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8E, 0x92, 0xB1, 0xA8, 0xEC, 0x0D, 0x64, 0x3B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4E, 0xFC, 0xFD, 0xD0, 0x4B, 0x88, 0x1B, 0x5D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x83, 0x9C, 0x51, 0x69, 0xCE, 0x71, 0x73, 0xF5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB8, 0x5A, 0x14, 0x23, 0x1A, 0x46, 0x63, 0x5F), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_6_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBC, 0x4C, 0x70, 0x44, 0x18, 0xCD, 0xEF, 0xED), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC2, 0x49, 0xDD, 0x64, 0x7E, 0x7E, 0x4D, 0x92), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA2, 0x32, 0x7C, 0x09, 0xD0, 0x3F, 0xD6, 0x2C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6D, 0xE0, 0x4F, 0x65, 0x0C, 0x7A, 0x54, 0x3E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x16, 0xFA, 0xFB, 0x4A, 0xB4, 0x79, 0x5A, 0x8C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x04, 0x5D, 0x1B, 0x2B, 0xDA, 0xBC, 0x9A, 0x74), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_7_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x51, 0xAC, 0x56, 0xF7, 0x5F, 0x51, 0x68, 0x0B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC6, 0xE0, 0x1D, 0xBC, 0x13, 0x4E, 0xAC, 0x03), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB7, 0xF5, 0xC5, 0xE6, 0xD2, 0x88, 0xBA, 0xCB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFA, 0x0E, 0x28, 0x23, 0x58, 0x67, 0xFA, 0xEE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9E, 0x80, 0x4B, 0xD8, 0xC4, 0xDF, 0x15, 0xE4), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF1, 0x0E, 0x58, 0xE6, 0x2C, 0x59, 0xC2, 0x03), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_7_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9B, 0x26, 0x27, 0x99, 0x16, 0x2B, 0x22, 0x0B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBA, 0xF3, 0x8F, 0xC3, 0x2A, 0x9B, 0xFC, 0x38), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFC, 0x2E, 0x83, 0x3D, 0xFE, 0x9E, 0x3C, 0x1B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x08, 0x57, 0xCD, 0x2D, 0xC1, 0x49, 0x38, 0xB5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x95, 0x42, 0x8B, 0x33, 0x89, 0x1F, 0xEA, 0x01), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAA, 0x1D, 0x13, 0xD7, 0x50, 0xBB, 0x3E, 0xEB), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_8_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD2, 0x9A, 0x52, 0xD2, 0x54, 0x7C, 0x97, 0xF2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE0, 0x33, 0x6E, 0xED, 0xD9, 0x87, 0x50, 0xC5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5A, 0x35, 0x7E, 0x16, 0x40, 0x15, 0x83, 0xB8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x33, 0x2B, 0xA4, 0xAB, 0x03, 0x91, 0xEA, 0xFE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC1, 0x47, 0x39, 0xEF, 0x05, 0x59, 0xD0, 0x90), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBF, 0x24, 0x0D, 0x76, 0x11, 0x53, 0x08, 0xAF), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_8_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1F, 0x2F, 0xDD, 0xBD, 0x50, 0x48, 0xB1, 0xE5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x80, 0x1C, 0x84, 0x55, 0x78, 0x14, 0xEB, 0xF6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD9, 0x5E, 0x3E, 0xA6, 0xAF, 0xF6, 0xC7, 0x04), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE7, 0x11, 0xE2, 0x65, 0xCA, 0x41, 0x95, 0x3B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAE, 0x83, 0xD8, 0xE6, 0x4D, 0x22, 0x06, 0x2D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFA, 0x7F, 0x25, 0x2A, 0xAA, 0x28, 0x46, 0x97), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_9_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x79, 0xDB, 0x15, 0x56, 0x84, 0xCB, 0xC0, 0x56), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x56, 0xDB, 0x0E, 0x08, 0xC9, 0xF5, 0xD4, 0x9E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE6, 0x62, 0xD0, 0x1A, 0x7C, 0x13, 0xD5, 0x07), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7D, 0xAD, 0x53, 0xE0, 0x32, 0x21, 0xA0, 0xC0), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC5, 0x38, 0x81, 0x21, 0x23, 0x0E, 0xD2, 0xBB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1C, 0x51, 0x05, 0xD0, 0x1E, 0x82, 0xA9, 0x71), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_9_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA7, 0xC3, 0x27, 0xBF, 0xC6, 0xAA, 0xB7, 0xB9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCB, 0x65, 0x45, 0xDF, 0xB9, 0x46, 0x17, 0x46), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF5, 0x38, 0x3F, 0xB2, 0xB1, 0x5D, 0xCA, 0x1C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x88, 0x29, 0x6C, 0x63, 0xE9, 0xD7, 0x48, 0xB8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBC, 0xF1, 0xD7, 0x99, 0x8C, 0xC2, 0x05, 0x99), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6D, 0xE6, 0x5E, 0x82, 0x6D, 0xE5, 0x7E, 0xD5), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_10_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7B, 0x61, 0xFA, 0x7D, 0x01, 0xDB, 0xB6, 0x63), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x11, 0xC6, 0x58, 0x39, 0xF4, 0xC6, 0x82, 0x23), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x47, 0x5A, 0x7A, 0x80, 0x08, 0xCD, 0xAA, 0xD8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDA, 0x8C, 0xC6, 0x3F, 0x3C, 0xA5, 0x68, 0xF4), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBB, 0xF5, 0xD5, 0x17, 0xAE, 0x36, 0xD8, 0x8A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC7, 0xAD, 0x92, 0xC5, 0x57, 0x6C, 0xDA, 0x91), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_10_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE8, 0x67, 0x17, 0xC0, 0x40, 0x78, 0x8C, 0x84), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7E, 0x9F, 0xF4, 0xAA, 0xDA, 0x5C, 0x7E, 0xB2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x96, 0xDB, 0x42, 0x3E, 0x72, 0x64, 0xA0, 0x67), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x27, 0xF9, 0x41, 0x17, 0x43, 0xE3, 0xE8, 0xA8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x66, 0xDD, 0xCC, 0x43, 0x7E, 0x16, 0x05, 0x03), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x36, 0x4B, 0xCF, 0x48, 0x8F, 0x41, 0x90, 0xE5), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_11_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x98, 0x0C, 0x6B, 0x9D, 0x22, 0x04, 0xBC, 0x5C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x86, 0x63, 0x79, 0x2F, 0x6A, 0x0E, 0x8A, 0xDE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x29, 0x67, 0x3F, 0x02, 0xB8, 0x91, 0x7F, 0x74), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFC, 0x14, 0x64, 0xA0, 0x33, 0xF4, 0x6B, 0x50), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1C, 0x44, 0x71, 0x87, 0xB8, 0x88, 0x3F, 0x45), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1B, 0x2B, 0x85, 0x05, 0xC5, 0x44, 0x53, 0x15), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_11_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3E, 0x2B, 0xFE, 0xD1, 0x1C, 0x73, 0xE3, 0x2E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x66, 0x33, 0xA1, 0xD3, 0x69, 0x1C, 0x9D, 0xD2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE0, 0x5A, 0xBA, 0xB6, 0xAE, 0x1B, 0x94, 0x04), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAF, 0x74, 0x90, 0x5C, 0x57, 0xB0, 0x3A, 0x45), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDD, 0x2F, 0x93, 0x20, 0x24, 0x54, 0x1D, 0x8D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFA, 0x78, 0x9D, 0x71, 0x67, 0x5D, 0x49, 0x98), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_12_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x12, 0xC8, 0x0E, 0x11, 0x8D, 0xE0, 0x8F, 0x69), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x59, 0x7F, 0x79, 0x6C, 0x5F, 0xB7, 0xBC, 0xB1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x88, 0xE1, 0x83, 0x3C, 0x12, 0xBB, 0xEE, 0x96), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2A, 0xC2, 0xC4, 0x1B, 0x41, 0x71, 0xB9, 0x17), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB0, 0xEE, 0xBB, 0x1D, 0x89, 0x50, 0x88, 0xF2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFC, 0x1C, 0x55, 0x74, 0xEB, 0xDE, 0x92, 0x3F), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_12_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9C, 0x38, 0x92, 0x06, 0x19, 0xD0, 0xB3, 0xB2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2A, 0x99, 0x26, 0xA3, 0x5F, 0xE2, 0xC1, 0x81), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x75, 0xFC, 0xFD, 0xC3, 0xB6, 0x26, 0x24, 0x8F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAF, 0xAD, 0xE7, 0x49, 0xB7, 0x64, 0x4B, 0x96), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6C, 0x4E, 0x95, 0xAD, 0x07, 0xFE, 0xB6, 0x30), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4F, 0x15, 0xE7, 0x2D, 0x19, 0xA9, 0x08, 0x10), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_13_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBE, 0xBD, 0xAC, 0x0A, 0x3F, 0x6B, 0xFF, 0xFA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE0, 0xE4, 0x74, 0x14, 0xD9, 0x70, 0x1D, 0x71), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF2, 0xB0, 0x71, 0xBB, 0xD8, 0x18, 0x96, 0x2B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDA, 0xB8, 0x19, 0x90, 0x80, 0xB5, 0xEE, 0x01), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x91, 0x21, 0x20, 0xA6, 0x17, 0x48, 0x03, 0x6F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE3, 0x1D, 0xBB, 0x6D, 0x94, 0x20, 0x34, 0xF1), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_13_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x59, 0x82, 0x67, 0x4B, 0x8E, 0x4E, 0xBE, 0xE2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBE, 0xDA, 0x77, 0xF8, 0x23, 0x55, 0x2B, 0x2D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5C, 0x02, 0xDE, 0x25, 0x35, 0x2D, 0x74, 0x51), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD0, 0x0C, 0xB8, 0x0B, 0x39, 0xBA, 0xAD, 0x04), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA6, 0x0E, 0x28, 0x4D, 0xE1, 0x3D, 0xE4, 0x1B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5D, 0xEC, 0x0A, 0xD4, 0xB8, 0xC4, 0x8D, 0xB0), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_14_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3E, 0x68, 0xCE, 0xC2, 0x55, 0x4D, 0x0C, 0x6D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9B, 0x20, 0x93, 0x32, 0x90, 0xD6, 0xAE, 0x47), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDD, 0x78, 0xAB, 0x43, 0x9E, 0xEB, 0x73, 0xAE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xED, 0x97, 0xC3, 0x83, 0xA6, 0x3C, 0xF1, 0xBF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0F, 0x25, 0x25, 0x66, 0x08, 0x26, 0xFA, 0x4B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x41, 0xFB, 0x44, 0x5D, 0x82, 0xEC, 0x3B, 0xAC), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_14_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x58, 0x90, 0xEA, 0xB5, 0x04, 0x99, 0xD0, 0x69), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4A, 0xF2, 0x22, 0xA0, 0xEB, 0xFD, 0x45, 0x87), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5D, 0xA4, 0x81, 0x32, 0xFC, 0xFA, 0xEE, 0x5B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x27, 0xBB, 0xA4, 0x6A, 0x77, 0x41, 0x5C, 0x1D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA1, 0x1E, 0xAA, 0x4F, 0xF0, 0x10, 0xB3, 0x50), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x09, 0x74, 0x13, 0x14, 0x9E, 0x90, 0xD7, 0xE6), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_15_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDB, 0xBD, 0x70, 0x4F, 0xA8, 0xD1, 0x06, 0x2C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x19, 0x4E, 0x2E, 0x68, 0xFC, 0x35, 0xFA, 0x50), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x60, 0x53, 0x75, 0xED, 0xF2, 0x5F, 0xC2, 0xEB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x39, 0x87, 0x6B, 0x9F, 0x05, 0xE2, 0x22, 0x93), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4F, 0x1A, 0xA8, 0xB7, 0x03, 0x9E, 0x6D, 0x7C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCB, 0xD0, 0x69, 0x88, 0xA8, 0x39, 0x9E, 0x3A), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_15_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF8, 0xEF, 0x68, 0xFE, 0xEC, 0x24, 0x08, 0x15), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA1, 0x06, 0x4B, 0x92, 0x0D, 0xB7, 0x34, 0x74), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3E, 0xF4, 0xDD, 0x1A, 0xA0, 0x4A, 0xE4, 0x45), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC3, 0x63, 0x4F, 0x4F, 0xCE, 0xBB, 0xD6, 0xD3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCD, 0xEE, 0x8D, 0xDF, 0x3F, 0x73, 0xB7, 0xAC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDF, 0x06, 0xB6, 0x80, 0x4D, 0x81, 0xD9, 0x53), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_16_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x15, 0xF5, 0x13, 0xDF, 0x13, 0x19, 0x97, 0x94), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x08, 0xF9, 0xB3, 0x33, 0x66, 0x82, 0x21, 0xFE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF5, 0xFC, 0x39, 0x16, 0x23, 0x43, 0x76, 0x0E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x09, 0x48, 0x25, 0xA1, 0x64, 0x95, 0x1C, 0x2F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x43, 0xAC, 0x15, 0x57, 0xD9, 0xDE, 0xA0, 0x28), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x16, 0x5F, 0xB8, 0x3D, 0x48, 0x91, 0x24, 0xCC), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_16_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2D, 0xF2, 0xC8, 0x54, 0xD1, 0x32, 0xBD, 0xC4), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8A, 0x3B, 0xF0, 0xAA, 0x9D, 0xD8, 0xF4, 0x20), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4F, 0xC3, 0xBB, 0x6C, 0x66, 0xAC, 0x25, 0x2D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6F, 0x25, 0x10, 0xB2, 0xE1, 0x41, 0xDE, 0x1D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3C, 0xE8, 0x30, 0xB8, 0x37, 0xBC, 0x2A, 0x98), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBA, 0x57, 0x01, 0x4A, 0x1E, 0x78, 0x9F, 0x85), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_17_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBD, 0x19, 0xCD, 0x12, 0x0B, 0x51, 0x4F, 0x56), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x30, 0x4B, 0x3D, 0x24, 0xA4, 0x16, 0x59, 0x05), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAC, 0xEB, 0xD3, 0x59, 0x2E, 0x75, 0x7C, 0x01), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8C, 0xB9, 0xB4, 0xA5, 0xD9, 0x2E, 0x29, 0x4C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x86, 0x16, 0x05, 0x75, 0x02, 0xB3, 0x06, 0xEE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAB, 0x7C, 0x9F, 0x79, 0x91, 0xF1, 0x4F, 0x23), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_17_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x65, 0x98, 0x7C, 0x84, 0xE1, 0xFF, 0x30, 0x77), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x71, 0xE2, 0xC2, 0x5F, 0x55, 0x40, 0xBD, 0xCD), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x69, 0x65, 0x87, 0x3F, 0xC4, 0xC2, 0x24, 0x57), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0E, 0x30, 0x0A, 0x60, 0x15, 0xD1, 0x24, 0x48), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x57, 0x99, 0xD9, 0xB6, 0xAE, 0xB1, 0xAF, 0x1D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9B, 0x80, 0xEE, 0xA2, 0x0F, 0x74, 0xB9, 0xF3), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_18_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x03, 0xE6, 0x0F, 0x37, 0xC1, 0x10, 0x99, 0x1E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x61, 0xAD, 0x9D, 0x5D, 0x80, 0x01, 0xA6, 0xFE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB0, 0x0F, 0x10, 0x2A, 0x9D, 0x20, 0x38, 0xEB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6C, 0x60, 0xCB, 0xCE, 0x5A, 0xA0, 0xA7, 0x32), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBA, 0xCF, 0x14, 0xDF, 0xBF, 0xE5, 0x74, 0x2D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB5, 0x12, 0x1A, 0xDD, 0x59, 0x02, 0x5D, 0xC6), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_18_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC8, 0xC9, 0xF8, 0xF5, 0xB6, 0x13, 0x4D, 0x7B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xED, 0x45, 0xB1, 0x93, 0xB3, 0xA2, 0x79, 0xDC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x74, 0xF6, 0xCF, 0xF7, 0xE6, 0x29, 0x9C, 0xCC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x87, 0x50, 0x65, 0x80, 0xBC, 0x59, 0x0A, 0x59), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0E, 0xF0, 0x24, 0x35, 0xA2, 0x46, 0xF0, 0x0C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBD, 0x26, 0xC0, 0x9D, 0x61, 0x56, 0x62, 0x67), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_19_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x10, 0xBB, 0xC2, 0x24, 0x43, 0x2E, 0x37, 0x54), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8A, 0xF7, 0xCE, 0x35, 0xFC, 0x77, 0xF3, 0x3F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x75, 0x34, 0x96, 0xD5, 0x4A, 0x76, 0x9D, 0x6B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB8, 0x3B, 0x0F, 0xEA, 0xA8, 0x12, 0x0B, 0x22), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x66, 0x3F, 0x5D, 0x2D, 0x1C, 0xD4, 0x9E, 0xFB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7D, 0x2E, 0xDD, 0xC7, 0x6E, 0xAB, 0xAF, 0xDC), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_19_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8C, 0xB2, 0x7B, 0x0C, 0x9A, 0x83, 0x8E, 0x59), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x30, 0x51, 0x90, 0x92, 0x79, 0x32, 0x19, 0xC3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEE, 0x89, 0xF9, 0xD0, 0xCF, 0x2C, 0xA5, 0x8F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7B, 0x50, 0x21, 0xDE, 0x50, 0x41, 0x9D, 0x81), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE0, 0x7D, 0x2B, 0x9E, 0x9D, 0x95, 0xA8, 0xE3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD8, 0xA5, 0x20, 0x87, 0x88, 0x97, 0x5F, 0xAA), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_20_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x64, 0x59, 0xB4, 0x66, 0x7E, 0xE8, 0x5A, 0x60), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA5, 0x5C, 0x7E, 0xB2, 0xAD, 0xD9, 0xC9, 0xDA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x82, 0x97, 0x49, 0xA3, 0x13, 0x83, 0x07, 0x2E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5A, 0x26, 0xC7, 0x13, 0x35, 0x0D, 0xB0, 0x6B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1E, 0x60, 0xAB, 0xFA, 0x4B, 0x93, 0x18, 0x2C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x54, 0x2D, 0x1C, 0x31, 0x4C, 0xE4, 0x61, 0xAE), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_20_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDE, 0x4D, 0x1E, 0x51, 0x59, 0x6E, 0x91, 0xC5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x38, 0x54, 0x4D, 0x51, 0xED, 0x36, 0xCC, 0x60), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x18, 0xA8, 0x56, 0xC7, 0x78, 0x27, 0x33, 0xC5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x42, 0xB7, 0x95, 0xC9, 0x8B, 0xC8, 0x6A, 0xBC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5E, 0xE9, 0x13, 0x96, 0xB3, 0xE1, 0xF9, 0xEE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF5, 0x46, 0xB0, 0x5E, 0xC3, 0x94, 0x03, 0x05), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_21_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6D, 0x5B, 0x29, 0x30, 0x41, 0x1A, 0x9E, 0xB6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x76, 0xCA, 0x83, 0x31, 0x5B, 0xA7, 0xCB, 0x42), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x21, 0x41, 0x50, 0x44, 0x4D, 0x64, 0x31, 0x89), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCF, 0x84, 0xC2, 0x5D, 0x97, 0xA5, 0x3C, 0x18), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF0, 0x0F, 0xA5, 0xFD, 0x8E, 0x5A, 0x47, 0x2C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7C, 0x58, 0x02, 0x2D, 0x40, 0xB1, 0x0B, 0xBA), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_21_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDA, 0x33, 0x8C, 0x67, 0xCE, 0x23, 0x43, 0x99), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x84, 0x53, 0x47, 0x72, 0x44, 0x1F, 0x5B, 0x2A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAE, 0xC1, 0xD9, 0xA4, 0x50, 0x88, 0x63, 0x18), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7C, 0xF2, 0x75, 0x69, 0x73, 0x00, 0xC4, 0x31), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4B, 0x90, 0x1D, 0xDF, 0x1A, 0x00, 0xD8, 0x69), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x05, 0xB1, 0x89, 0x48, 0xA8, 0x70, 0x62, 0xEF), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_22_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7E, 0x8A, 0x55, 0x50, 0x7B, 0xEF, 0x8A, 0x3C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFE, 0x1B, 0x23, 0x48, 0x23, 0x63, 0x91, 0xB6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0D, 0x04, 0x54, 0x3C, 0x24, 0x9B, 0xC7, 0x9A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x25, 0x38, 0xC3, 0x84, 0xFB, 0xFF, 0x9F, 0x49), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x66, 0x2A, 0xE0, 0x6D, 0x68, 0x8A, 0x5C, 0xCB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC4, 0x93, 0x53, 0x85, 0xA1, 0x0D, 0xAF, 0x63), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_22_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1B, 0x88, 0x95, 0x4C, 0x0B, 0xD0, 0x06, 0x51), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x92, 0xAF, 0x8D, 0x49, 0xA2, 0xC8, 0xB4, 0xE0), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x75, 0x76, 0x53, 0x09, 0x88, 0x43, 0x87, 0xCA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x90, 0xA4, 0x77, 0x3F, 0x5E, 0x21, 0xB4, 0x0A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x35, 0x9E, 0x86, 0x64, 0xCC, 0x91, 0xC1, 0x77), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC1, 0x17, 0x56, 0xCB, 0xC3, 0x7D, 0x5B, 0xB1), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_23_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x64, 0x74, 0x9F, 0xB5, 0x91, 0x21, 0xB1, 0x1C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1E, 0xED, 0xE1, 0x11, 0xEF, 0x45, 0xAF, 0xC1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE0, 0x31, 0xBE, 0xB2, 0xBC, 0x72, 0x65, 0x1F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB1, 0x4B, 0x8C, 0x77, 0xCE, 0x1E, 0x42, 0xB5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xC9, 0xAA, 0xB9, 0xD9, 0x86, 0x99, 0x55), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x65, 0x23, 0x80, 0xC6, 0x4E, 0x35, 0x0B, 0x6D), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_23_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x47, 0xD8, 0xA2, 0x0A, 0x39, 0x32, 0x1D, 0x23), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x61, 0xC8, 0x86, 0xF1, 0x12, 0x9A, 0x4A, 0x05), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8D, 0xF1, 0x7C, 0xAA, 0x70, 0x8E, 0xBC, 0x01), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x62, 0x01, 0x47, 0x8F, 0xDD, 0x8B, 0xA5, 0xC8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDB, 0x08, 0x21, 0xF4, 0xAB, 0xC7, 0xF5, 0x96), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0A, 0x76, 0xA5, 0x95, 0xC4, 0x0F, 0x88, 0x1D), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_24_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3F, 0x42, 0x2A, 0x52, 0xCD, 0x75, 0x51, 0x49), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x90, 0x36, 0xE5, 0x04, 0x2B, 0x44, 0xC6, 0xEF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5C, 0xEE, 0x16, 0x13, 0x07, 0x83, 0xB5, 0x30), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x76, 0x59, 0xC6, 0xA2, 0x19, 0x05, 0xD3, 0xC6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB6, 0x8B, 0xA8, 0x16, 0x09, 0xB7, 0xEA, 0xD6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x70, 0xEE, 0x14, 0xAF, 0xB5, 0xFD, 0xD0, 0xEF), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_24_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x18, 0x7C, 0xCA, 0x71, 0x3E, 0x6E, 0x66, 0x75), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBE, 0x31, 0x0E, 0x3F, 0xE5, 0x91, 0xC4, 0x7F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8E, 0x3D, 0xC2, 0x3E, 0x95, 0x37, 0x58, 0x2B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x01, 0x1F, 0x02, 0x03, 0xF3, 0xEF, 0xEE, 0x66), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x28, 0x5B, 0x1A, 0xFC, 0x38, 0xCD, 0xE8, 0x24), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x12, 0x57, 0x42, 0x85, 0xC6, 0x21, 0x68, 0x71), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_25_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8D, 0xA2, 0x4A, 0x66, 0xB1, 0x0A, 0xE6, 0xC0), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x86, 0x0C, 0x94, 0x9D, 0x5E, 0x99, 0xB2, 0xCE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAD, 0x03, 0x40, 0xCA, 0xB2, 0xB3, 0x30, 0x55), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x74, 0x78, 0x48, 0x27, 0x34, 0x1E, 0xE2, 0x42), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAE, 0x72, 0x5B, 0xAC, 0xC1, 0x6D, 0xE3, 0x82), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x57, 0xAB, 0x46, 0xCB, 0xEA, 0x5E, 0x4B, 0x0B), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_25_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFC, 0x08, 0xAD, 0x4E, 0x51, 0x9F, 0x2A, 0x52), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x68, 0x5C, 0x7D, 0x4C, 0xD6, 0xCF, 0xDD, 0x02), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD8, 0x76, 0x26, 0xE0, 0x8B, 0x10, 0xD9, 0x7C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x30, 0xA7, 0x23, 0x4E, 0x5F, 0xD2, 0x42, 0x17), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD1, 0xE5, 0xA4, 0xEC, 0x77, 0x21, 0x34, 0x28), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5C, 0x14, 0x65, 0xEA, 0x4A, 0x85, 0xC3, 0x2F), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_26_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x19, 0xD8, 0x40, 0x27, 0x73, 0x15, 0x7E, 0x65), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF6, 0xBB, 0x53, 0x7E, 0x0F, 0x40, 0xC8, 0xD4), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEA, 0x37, 0x19, 0x73, 0xEF, 0x5A, 0x5E, 0x04), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9C, 0x73, 0x2B, 0x49, 0x7E, 0xAC, 0x97, 0x5C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x15, 0xB2, 0xC3, 0x1E, 0x0E, 0xE7, 0xD2, 0x21), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8A, 0x08, 0xD6, 0xDD, 0xAC, 0x21, 0xD6, 0x3E), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_26_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA9, 0x26, 0xBE, 0x6D, 0x6D, 0xF2, 0x38, 0x3F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x08, 0x6C, 0x31, 0xA7, 0x49, 0x50, 0x3A, 0x89), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC3, 0x99, 0xC6, 0xF5, 0xD2, 0xC2, 0x30, 0x5A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2A, 0xE4, 0xF6, 0x8B, 0x8B, 0x97, 0xE9, 0xB2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDD, 0x21, 0xB7, 0x0D, 0xFC, 0x15, 0x54, 0x0B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x65, 0x83, 0x1C, 0xA4, 0xCD, 0x6B, 0x9D, 0xF2), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_27_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD6, 0xE8, 0x4C, 0x48, 0xE4, 0xAA, 0x69, 0x93), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x27, 0x7A, 0x27, 0xFC, 0x37, 0x96, 0x1A, 0x7B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6F, 0xE7, 0x30, 0xA5, 0xCF, 0x13, 0x46, 0x5C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8C, 0xD8, 0xAF, 0x74, 0x23, 0x4D, 0x56, 0x84), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x32, 0x3D, 0x44, 0x14, 0x1B, 0x97, 0x83, 0xF0), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFA, 0x47, 0xD7, 0x5F, 0xFD, 0x98, 0x38, 0xF7), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_27_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA3, 0x73, 0x64, 0x36, 0xFD, 0x7B, 0xC1, 0x15), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEA, 0x5D, 0x32, 0xD2, 0x47, 0x94, 0x89, 0x2D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x51, 0xE9, 0x30, 0xAC, 0x06, 0xC8, 0x65, 0x04), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFA, 0x6C, 0xB9, 0x1B, 0xF7, 0x61, 0x49, 0x53), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD7, 0xFF, 0x32, 0x43, 0x80, 0xDA, 0xA6, 0xB1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAC, 0xF8, 0x04, 0x01, 0x95, 0x35, 0xCE, 0x21), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_28_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6D, 0x06, 0x46, 0x0D, 0x51, 0xE2, 0xD8, 0xAC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x14, 0x57, 0x1D, 0x6F, 0x79, 0xA0, 0xCD, 0xA6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDF, 0xFB, 0x36, 0xCA, 0xAD, 0xF5, 0x9E, 0x41), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6F, 0x7A, 0x1D, 0x9E, 0x1D, 0x95, 0x48, 0xDC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x81, 0x26, 0xA5, 0xB7, 0x15, 0x2C, 0xC2, 0xC6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x86, 0x42, 0x72, 0xAA, 0x11, 0xDC, 0xC9, 0xB6), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_28_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3F, 0x6C, 0x64, 0xA7, 0x62, 0x3C, 0xAB, 0xD4), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x48, 0x6A, 0x44, 0xD8, 0x60, 0xC0, 0xA8, 0x80), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x82, 0x76, 0x58, 0x12, 0x57, 0x3C, 0x89, 0x46), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x82, 0x4F, 0x83, 0xCE, 0xCB, 0xB8, 0xD0, 0x2C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9A, 0x84, 0x04, 0xB0, 0xAD, 0xEB, 0xFA, 0xDF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x34, 0xA4, 0xC3, 0x41, 0x44, 0x4E, 0x65, 0x3E), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_29_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB6, 0x16, 0xA9, 0x1C, 0xE7, 0x65, 0x20, 0xC1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x58, 0x53, 0x32, 0xF8, 0xC0, 0xA6, 0xBD, 0x2C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB7, 0xF0, 0xE6, 0x57, 0x31, 0xCC, 0x26, 0x6F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x27, 0xE3, 0x54, 0x1C, 0x34, 0xD3, 0x17, 0xBC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF5, 0xAE, 0xED, 0xFB, 0xCD, 0xE7, 0x1E, 0x9F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5A, 0x16, 0x1C, 0x34, 0x40, 0x00, 0x1F, 0xB6), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_29_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6A, 0x32, 0x00, 0xC2, 0xD4, 0x3B, 0x1A, 0x09), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x34, 0xE0, 0x99, 0x8F, 0x0C, 0x4A, 0x16, 0x44), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x83, 0x73, 0x18, 0x1B, 0xD4, 0x94, 0x29, 0x62), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x29, 0xA4, 0x2D, 0xB1, 0x9D, 0x74, 0x32, 0x67), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBF, 0xF4, 0xB1, 0x0C, 0x37, 0x62, 0x8B, 0x66), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC9, 0xFF, 0xDA, 0xE2, 0x35, 0xA3, 0xB6, 0x42), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_30_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x91, 0x49, 0x99, 0x65, 0xC5, 0xED, 0x16, 0xEF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x79, 0x42, 0x9A, 0xF3, 0xA7, 0x4E, 0x6F, 0x2B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7B, 0x0A, 0x7E, 0xC0, 0xD7, 0x4E, 0x07, 0x55), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD6, 0x7A, 0x31, 0x69, 0xA6, 0xB9, 0x15, 0x34), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA8, 0xE0, 0x72, 0xA4, 0x3F, 0xB9, 0xF8, 0x0C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2B, 0x75, 0x32, 0x85, 0xA2, 0xDE, 0x37, 0x12), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_30_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBC, 0xC0, 0x0D, 0xCF, 0x25, 0x41, 0xA4, 0xF4), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9B, 0xFC, 0xB2, 0x48, 0xC3, 0x85, 0x83, 0x4B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2B, 0xBE, 0x0B, 0x58, 0x2D, 0x7A, 0x9A, 0x62), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC5, 0xF3, 0x81, 0x18, 0x1B, 0x74, 0x4F, 0x2C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE2, 0x43, 0xA3, 0x0A, 0x16, 0x8B, 0xA3, 0x1E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4A, 0x18, 0x81, 0x7B, 0x8D, 0xA2, 0x35, 0x77), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_31_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x86, 0xC4, 0x3F, 0x2C, 0xE7, 0x5F, 0x99, 0x03), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF0, 0x2B, 0xB7, 0xB6, 0xAD, 0x5A, 0x56, 0xFF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x04, 0x00, 0xA4, 0x48, 0xC8, 0xE8, 0xBA, 0xBF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE8, 0xA1, 0xB5, 0x13, 0x5A, 0xCD, 0x99, 0x9C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB0, 0x95, 0xAD, 0xFC, 0xE2, 0x7E, 0xE7, 0xFE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x96, 0x6B, 0xD1, 0x34, 0x99, 0x53, 0x63, 0x0B), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_31_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x19, 0x8A, 0x77, 0x5D, 0x2B, 0xAB, 0x01, 0x28), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4E, 0x85, 0xD0, 0xD5, 0x49, 0x83, 0x4D, 0x60), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x81, 0xC6, 0x91, 0x30, 0x3B, 0x00, 0xAF, 0x7A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3A, 0xAE, 0x61, 0x07, 0xE1, 0xB6, 0xE2, 0xC9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x95, 0x43, 0x41, 0xFE, 0x9B, 0xB6, 0xF0, 0xA5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB4, 0x97, 0xAE, 0xAD, 0x89, 0x88, 0x9E, 0x41), +}; +static const mbedtls_ecp_point secp384r1_T[32] = { + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z1(secp384r1_T_0_X, secp384r1_T_0_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_1_X, secp384r1_T_1_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_2_X, secp384r1_T_2_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_3_X, secp384r1_T_3_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_4_X, secp384r1_T_4_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_5_X, secp384r1_T_5_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_6_X, secp384r1_T_6_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_7_X, secp384r1_T_7_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_8_X, secp384r1_T_8_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_9_X, secp384r1_T_9_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_10_X, secp384r1_T_10_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_11_X, secp384r1_T_11_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_12_X, secp384r1_T_12_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_13_X, secp384r1_T_13_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_14_X, secp384r1_T_14_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_15_X, secp384r1_T_15_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_16_X, secp384r1_T_16_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_17_X, secp384r1_T_17_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_18_X, secp384r1_T_18_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_19_X, secp384r1_T_19_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_20_X, secp384r1_T_20_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_21_X, secp384r1_T_21_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_22_X, secp384r1_T_22_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_23_X, secp384r1_T_23_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_24_X, secp384r1_T_24_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_25_X, secp384r1_T_25_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_26_X, secp384r1_T_26_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_27_X, secp384r1_T_27_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_28_X, secp384r1_T_28_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_29_X, secp384r1_T_29_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_30_X, secp384r1_T_30_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_31_X, secp384r1_T_31_Y), +}; +#else +#define secp384r1_T NULL +#endif + #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED */ /* @@ -244,6 +1424,748 @@ static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_n[] = { MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF), MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_2(0xFF, 0x01), }; +#if MBEDTLS_ECP_FIXED_POINT_OPTIM == 1 +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_0_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x66, 0xBD, 0xE5, 0xC2, 0x31, 0x7E, 0x7E, 0xF9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9B, 0x42, 0x6A, 0x85, 0xC1, 0xB3, 0x48, 0x33), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDE, 0xA8, 0xFF, 0xA2, 0x27, 0xC1, 0x1D, 0xFE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x28, 0x59, 0xE7, 0xEF, 0x77, 0x5E, 0x4B, 0xA1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBA, 0x3D, 0x4D, 0x6B, 0x60, 0xAF, 0x28, 0xF8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x21, 0xB5, 0x3F, 0x05, 0x39, 0x81, 0x64, 0x9C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x42, 0xB4, 0x95, 0x23, 0x66, 0xCB, 0x3E, 0x9E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCD, 0xE9, 0x04, 0x04, 0xB7, 0x06, 0x8E, 0x85), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC6, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_0_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x50, 0x66, 0xD1, 0x9F, 0x76, 0x94, 0xBE, 0x88), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x40, 0xC2, 0x72, 0xA2, 0x86, 0x70, 0x3C, 0x35), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x61, 0x07, 0xAD, 0x3F, 0x01, 0xB9, 0x50, 0xC5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x40, 0x26, 0xF4, 0x5E, 0x99, 0x72, 0xEE, 0x97), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2C, 0x66, 0x3E, 0x27, 0x17, 0xBD, 0xAF, 0x17), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x68, 0x44, 0x9B, 0x57, 0x49, 0x44, 0xF5, 0x98), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD9, 0x1B, 0x7D, 0x2C, 0xB4, 0x5F, 0x8A, 0x5C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x04, 0xC0, 0x3B, 0x9A, 0x78, 0x6A, 0x29, 0x39), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x18, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_1_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2F, 0xB1, 0x2D, 0xEB, 0x27, 0x2F, 0xE8, 0xDA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x98, 0x4B, 0x44, 0x25, 0xDB, 0x5C, 0x5F, 0x67), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x13, 0x85, 0x28, 0x78, 0x2E, 0x75, 0x34, 0x32), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x69, 0x57, 0x0F, 0x73, 0x78, 0x7A, 0xE3, 0x53), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8D, 0xD8, 0xEC, 0xDC, 0xDA, 0x04, 0xAD, 0xAB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x34, 0x8A, 0x09, 0xF3, 0x58, 0x79, 0xD8, 0x29), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x63, 0x03, 0xCB, 0x50, 0x1A, 0x7F, 0x56, 0x00), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF6, 0xA6, 0x78, 0x38, 0x85, 0x67, 0x0B, 0x40), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x83, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_1_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8A, 0xD5, 0xD2, 0x22, 0xC4, 0x00, 0x3B, 0xBA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD5, 0x93, 0x0E, 0x7B, 0x85, 0x51, 0xC3, 0x06), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3D, 0xA6, 0x5F, 0x54, 0x49, 0x02, 0x81, 0x78), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x22, 0xE9, 0x6B, 0x3A, 0x92, 0xE7, 0x72, 0x1D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6F, 0x5F, 0x28, 0x9E, 0x91, 0x27, 0x88, 0xE3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEF, 0x28, 0x31, 0xB3, 0x84, 0xCA, 0x12, 0x32), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3D, 0xF9, 0xAC, 0x22, 0x10, 0x0A, 0x64, 0x41), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE9, 0xC6, 0x33, 0x1F, 0x69, 0x19, 0x18, 0xBF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBE, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_2_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA0, 0x48, 0xB8, 0xC7, 0x37, 0x5A, 0x00, 0x36), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x07, 0xCC, 0x32, 0xE0, 0xEE, 0x03, 0xC2, 0xBA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC4, 0x29, 0xC2, 0xE4, 0x6E, 0x24, 0x20, 0x8D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x06, 0x6B, 0x7F, 0x7B, 0xF9, 0xB0, 0xB8, 0x13), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1D, 0x7B, 0x3C, 0xE1, 0x19, 0xA1, 0x23, 0x02), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2A, 0xE3, 0xC2, 0x53, 0xC0, 0x07, 0x13, 0xA9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x07, 0xFE, 0x36, 0x35, 0x9F, 0x5E, 0x59, 0xCE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1D, 0x55, 0x89, 0x84, 0xBC, 0xEF, 0xA2, 0xC2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x19, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_2_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFD, 0x1A, 0x08, 0x67, 0xB4, 0xE7, 0x22, 0xED), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x76, 0x26, 0xDF, 0x81, 0x3C, 0x5F, 0x1C, 0xDA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE0, 0x4D, 0xD0, 0x0A, 0x48, 0x06, 0xF4, 0x48), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x73, 0x18, 0x39, 0xF7, 0xD1, 0x20, 0x77, 0x8D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x78, 0x8F, 0x44, 0x13, 0xCB, 0x78, 0x11, 0x11), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x33, 0xE2, 0x49, 0xEA, 0x43, 0x79, 0x08, 0x39), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x01, 0xD1, 0xD8, 0x73, 0x2C, 0x71, 0x2F, 0x69), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x21, 0xE5, 0xE7, 0xF4, 0x46, 0xAB, 0x20, 0xCA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5A, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_3_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8C, 0x0B, 0xB9, 0x71, 0x1A, 0x27, 0xB7, 0xA7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2A, 0xA2, 0x2C, 0xD1, 0xDA, 0xBC, 0xC1, 0xBD), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x10, 0xA3, 0x10, 0x1F, 0x90, 0xF2, 0xA5, 0x52), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x28, 0xFB, 0x20, 0xF4, 0xC0, 0x70, 0xC0, 0xF5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8F, 0xA7, 0x99, 0xF0, 0xA5, 0xD3, 0x09, 0xDD), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x26, 0xE8, 0x14, 0x39, 0xBE, 0xCB, 0x60, 0xAF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9F, 0xD6, 0x14, 0xA9, 0xC9, 0x20, 0xC3, 0xEA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5D, 0xA8, 0x5B, 0xFD, 0x2D, 0x96, 0xBC, 0x78), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC0, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_3_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9D, 0x04, 0x45, 0xBE, 0xCE, 0x75, 0x95, 0xF6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCC, 0xDA, 0x58, 0x49, 0x35, 0x09, 0x8D, 0x41), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x76, 0xF0, 0xC0, 0x36, 0xF2, 0xA6, 0x2D, 0x14), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE7, 0xFC, 0x3D, 0xA8, 0xFB, 0x3C, 0xD2, 0x51), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x01, 0x4D, 0x71, 0x09, 0x18, 0x42, 0xF0, 0x2D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8D, 0xC1, 0xCE, 0x9E, 0x6A, 0x49, 0x60, 0x12), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAD, 0xB1, 0x00, 0xF7, 0xA1, 0x7A, 0x31, 0xB4), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x41, 0xC3, 0x86, 0xCD, 0x20, 0x4A, 0x17, 0x86), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6C, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_4_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x98, 0xAB, 0x8B, 0x47, 0x8D, 0xAA, 0xA6, 0x5B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC4, 0x97, 0xF0, 0xBC, 0x2D, 0xDC, 0x9D, 0x84), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x01, 0x86, 0xB0, 0x74, 0xB2, 0xF4, 0xF6, 0x67), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAC, 0xBD, 0xAC, 0xE3, 0x8F, 0x43, 0x5C, 0xB1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x37, 0xC3, 0xE2, 0x6E, 0x25, 0x49, 0xCD, 0x0B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x64, 0x5E, 0x08, 0xB3, 0xB9, 0xAC, 0x5F, 0xD1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x08, 0xB7, 0xD1, 0xF4, 0xDC, 0x19, 0xE9, 0xC8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x49, 0xE4, 0xFA, 0xE1, 0x36, 0x3E, 0xED, 0x6E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0A, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_4_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x00, 0x67, 0x92, 0x84, 0x6E, 0x48, 0x03, 0x51), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9E, 0x95, 0xEF, 0x8F, 0xB2, 0x82, 0x6B, 0x1C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8D, 0xFA, 0xB9, 0x55, 0x23, 0xFE, 0x09, 0xB3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEF, 0x79, 0x85, 0x4B, 0x0E, 0xD4, 0x35, 0xDB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9A, 0x27, 0x45, 0x81, 0xE0, 0x88, 0x52, 0xAD), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x17, 0x63, 0xA2, 0x4B, 0xBC, 0x5D, 0xB1, 0x92), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x28, 0x8C, 0x83, 0xD9, 0x3E, 0xD3, 0x42, 0xDA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x99, 0x03, 0x3A, 0x31, 0xBA, 0xE9, 0x3A, 0xD1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x47, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_5_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x35, 0x10, 0xCD, 0x2D, 0x00, 0xFE, 0x32, 0xA7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE4, 0x6E, 0x1F, 0xDA, 0xF8, 0x6F, 0x4D, 0x03), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x09, 0x79, 0x7D, 0x09, 0xE5, 0xD3, 0x03, 0x21), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x58, 0xC3, 0xBE, 0xDF, 0x07, 0x65, 0x49, 0xCC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x08, 0x57, 0x33, 0xEF, 0xAE, 0x4F, 0x04, 0x27), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9A, 0xE9, 0x9B, 0xFE, 0xBF, 0xE6, 0x85, 0xF6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBD, 0xBA, 0xAA, 0x06, 0xC4, 0xC6, 0xB8, 0x57), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0C, 0x83, 0x01, 0xA9, 0xF6, 0x51, 0xE7, 0xB8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1B, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_5_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB9, 0xA6, 0x15, 0x8E, 0xAB, 0x1F, 0x10, 0x87), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x74, 0x08, 0x27, 0x1A, 0xA1, 0x21, 0xAD, 0xF5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x02, 0x09, 0x90, 0x6E, 0x50, 0x90, 0x9A, 0x5D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x86, 0x9A, 0xFE, 0xD7, 0xA1, 0xF5, 0xA2, 0x15), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE8, 0x7D, 0xE3, 0xDC, 0x21, 0xFB, 0xA4, 0x7B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB9, 0xBF, 0x07, 0xFF, 0x45, 0xDF, 0x51, 0x77), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0B, 0x5C, 0x34, 0x02, 0x62, 0x9B, 0x08, 0x12), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x86, 0xCE, 0x9A, 0x6A, 0xEC, 0x75, 0xF6, 0x46), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6D, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_6_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE6, 0x59, 0xF4, 0x78, 0x3C, 0x60, 0xB1, 0x4A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3E, 0x37, 0x84, 0x6A, 0xDC, 0xF2, 0x9A, 0x7D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x40, 0x9A, 0x9A, 0x15, 0x36, 0xE0, 0x2B, 0x2D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEC, 0x38, 0x9C, 0x50, 0x3D, 0x1E, 0x37, 0x82), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB7, 0x79, 0xF0, 0x92, 0xF2, 0x8B, 0x18, 0x82), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x17, 0xE0, 0x82, 0x1E, 0x80, 0x82, 0x4B, 0xD7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFA, 0xBB, 0x59, 0x6B, 0x8A, 0x77, 0x41, 0x40), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA7, 0xF9, 0xD4, 0xB8, 0x4A, 0x82, 0xCF, 0x40), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5D, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_6_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1E, 0x8C, 0xC8, 0x9B, 0x72, 0x9E, 0xF7, 0xF9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB8, 0xCE, 0xE9, 0x77, 0x0A, 0x19, 0x59, 0x84), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9D, 0xA1, 0x41, 0x6A, 0x72, 0x4B, 0xB4, 0xDC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0B, 0x35, 0x43, 0xE2, 0x8C, 0xBE, 0x0D, 0xE3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC1, 0xEB, 0xAD, 0xF3, 0xA9, 0xA6, 0x68, 0xA1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x81, 0x2F, 0xE2, 0x48, 0x0C, 0xDB, 0x1F, 0x42), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD1, 0x1E, 0x60, 0x9B, 0x2A, 0xD2, 0xC1, 0x3C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC0, 0x64, 0xB5, 0xD2, 0xF6, 0xF6, 0x6E, 0x22), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x70, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_7_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC6, 0x3D, 0x30, 0x78, 0x10, 0x18, 0x41, 0x51), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x96, 0x1D, 0x1C, 0xE0, 0x6D, 0x83, 0xD1, 0x93), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7B, 0x03, 0x0B, 0xF5, 0x2F, 0x6C, 0x04, 0x98), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6C, 0x3E, 0xD5, 0xFC, 0x31, 0x5B, 0x3A, 0xEB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x50, 0x82, 0x2F, 0xFB, 0xFE, 0xF8, 0x76, 0x39), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x85, 0x26, 0xDA, 0x9C, 0x36, 0xF5, 0x93, 0xD1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4C, 0xE7, 0x6E, 0xD2, 0x7D, 0x81, 0x09, 0xC6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD3, 0x03, 0xF9, 0x58, 0x48, 0x24, 0xA2, 0xEE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE9, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_7_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1B, 0x79, 0x0C, 0x8E, 0x6B, 0x95, 0xF3, 0xC4), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF4, 0x10, 0x5C, 0x87, 0x03, 0x39, 0xCF, 0x68), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAD, 0xF0, 0xF7, 0xC1, 0x07, 0xA4, 0xF4, 0x3F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x32, 0xE8, 0x02, 0x89, 0x65, 0xC4, 0x72, 0x36), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB4, 0x88, 0xEA, 0x96, 0x67, 0x0B, 0x5D, 0xDF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA8, 0x75, 0x60, 0xA8, 0xBD, 0x74, 0xDF, 0x68), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6E, 0xE5, 0x71, 0x50, 0x67, 0xD0, 0xD2, 0xE6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD5, 0xFC, 0xE5, 0xC7, 0x77, 0xB0, 0x7F, 0x8C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF1, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_8_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x97, 0x86, 0x69, 0xCD, 0x0D, 0x9A, 0xBD, 0x66), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x58, 0x17, 0xBC, 0xBB, 0x59, 0x85, 0x7D, 0x0E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8D, 0xA8, 0x76, 0xAC, 0x80, 0xA9, 0x72, 0xE0), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x74, 0x78, 0xC1, 0xE2, 0x4D, 0xAF, 0xF9, 0x3C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAD, 0x97, 0x8E, 0x74, 0xC4, 0x4B, 0xB2, 0x85), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEA, 0xD8, 0xF6, 0xF3, 0xAF, 0x2F, 0x52, 0xE5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x95, 0x57, 0xF4, 0xCE, 0xEE, 0x43, 0xED, 0x60), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7D, 0x46, 0x38, 0xDE, 0x20, 0xFD, 0x59, 0x18), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD7, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_8_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1C, 0x18, 0xE8, 0x58, 0xB9, 0x76, 0x2C, 0xE6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xED, 0x54, 0xE4, 0xFE, 0xC7, 0xBC, 0x31, 0x37), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF5, 0xF8, 0x89, 0xEE, 0x70, 0xB5, 0xB0, 0x2C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x83, 0x22, 0x26, 0x9A, 0x53, 0xB9, 0x38, 0x0A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x74, 0xA7, 0x19, 0x8C, 0x74, 0x7E, 0x88, 0x46), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB4, 0xDA, 0x0A, 0xE8, 0xDA, 0xA5, 0xBE, 0x1D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x90, 0x5C, 0xF7, 0xB1, 0x0C, 0x72, 0xFB, 0x09), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x78, 0xE2, 0x23, 0xE7, 0x46, 0xB7, 0xE0, 0x91), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC5, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_9_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3A, 0x36, 0xBC, 0xBD, 0x48, 0x11, 0x8E, 0x72), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAB, 0xBB, 0xA1, 0xF7, 0x0B, 0x9E, 0xBF, 0xDF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x68, 0x28, 0xE1, 0xA2, 0x8F, 0xFC, 0xFC, 0xD6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x81, 0xFE, 0x19, 0x0A, 0xE5, 0xE7, 0x69, 0x39), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5E, 0xCD, 0x12, 0xF5, 0xBE, 0xD3, 0x04, 0xF1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF5, 0xA8, 0x0D, 0x81, 0x59, 0xC4, 0x79, 0x98), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA3, 0xF3, 0x4B, 0x92, 0x65, 0xC3, 0x31, 0xAD), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x75, 0xB5, 0x4F, 0x4D, 0x91, 0xD4, 0xE2, 0xB2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x51, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_9_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x72, 0x09, 0x41, 0x79, 0x1D, 0x4D, 0x0D, 0x33), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBB, 0x31, 0x18, 0xBA, 0xA0, 0xF2, 0x6E, 0x7E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x93, 0x5B, 0x4D, 0x4F, 0xAF, 0xC9, 0x8C, 0xA1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x48, 0x99, 0x9C, 0x06, 0x68, 0xDE, 0xD8, 0x29), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA0, 0x04, 0xE1, 0xB5, 0x9D, 0x00, 0xBC, 0xB8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x61, 0x95, 0x92, 0x8D, 0x72, 0xD3, 0x37, 0x42), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAB, 0x4B, 0x27, 0xA2, 0xE8, 0xA4, 0x26, 0xA1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4F, 0x45, 0x9C, 0xA9, 0xCB, 0x9F, 0xBA, 0x85), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCB, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_10_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x08, 0x7E, 0x1B, 0x64, 0xF4, 0xE8, 0xA5, 0x55), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF7, 0x20, 0xA9, 0xCA, 0xF3, 0x89, 0xE5, 0xE1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x83, 0xED, 0xFC, 0xAB, 0xD9, 0x0A, 0xB9, 0x07), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x08, 0x6F, 0x46, 0x7C, 0xCD, 0x78, 0xFF, 0x05), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x69, 0xAB, 0x71, 0x5A, 0x94, 0xAB, 0x20, 0x20), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC2, 0x2E, 0xEE, 0x87, 0x57, 0x1F, 0xAD, 0xD3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x91, 0x4C, 0x3D, 0xFB, 0x7E, 0xA1, 0x8B, 0x07), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x69, 0xCF, 0x07, 0x86, 0xBA, 0x53, 0x37, 0xCF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x38, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_10_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x00, 0x26, 0xB2, 0xB9, 0xE2, 0x91, 0xE3, 0xB5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x79, 0xC9, 0x54, 0x84, 0x08, 0x3D, 0x0B, 0xD2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5D, 0xA8, 0x77, 0x2F, 0x64, 0x45, 0x99, 0x4C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x87, 0x96, 0x16, 0x1F, 0xDB, 0x96, 0x28, 0x97), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x83, 0x2B, 0x8D, 0xFF, 0xA2, 0x4F, 0x55, 0xD3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x71, 0xE6, 0x48, 0xBD, 0x99, 0x3D, 0x12, 0x57), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3F, 0x84, 0x59, 0xDA, 0xB9, 0xB6, 0x66, 0x12), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6D, 0x78, 0x41, 0x92, 0xDF, 0xF4, 0x3F, 0x63), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1F, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_11_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7E, 0x86, 0x6F, 0x4F, 0xBF, 0x67, 0xDF, 0x2F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF2, 0x2B, 0x1E, 0x5F, 0x00, 0xEA, 0xF6, 0x56), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x90, 0xB9, 0x6A, 0x89, 0xD8, 0xC0, 0xD7, 0xA7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCB, 0x9A, 0x32, 0x23, 0xA0, 0x02, 0x91, 0x58), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x42, 0x7F, 0x6A, 0x15, 0x64, 0x6A, 0x8B, 0xBB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8A, 0x57, 0x82, 0x58, 0xA9, 0x56, 0xB5, 0xFB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDD, 0x50, 0x92, 0x60, 0xCC, 0x81, 0x24, 0xA8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x36, 0x3D, 0xAD, 0xDA, 0xD9, 0x51, 0x3E, 0x57), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5D, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_11_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEC, 0xFE, 0x8F, 0xB0, 0x0B, 0xDE, 0x2E, 0x7E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x79, 0xD2, 0xBE, 0xEF, 0xAC, 0x76, 0x71, 0xA3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x55, 0xE8, 0x72, 0x0B, 0xAC, 0xFE, 0xCA, 0x5A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAD, 0x5B, 0xC7, 0xFC, 0xE3, 0x3C, 0x7C, 0x4C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA1, 0x04, 0xA7, 0xB9, 0x9B, 0x93, 0xC0, 0x2F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x41, 0x48, 0x4B, 0x8E, 0x32, 0xC5, 0xF0, 0x6B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB0, 0x42, 0x07, 0xC1, 0xF2, 0xF1, 0x72, 0x5B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1E, 0x37, 0x54, 0x9C, 0x88, 0xD2, 0x62, 0xAA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC1, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_12_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC2, 0x19, 0x8A, 0x89, 0x58, 0xA2, 0x0F, 0xDB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x01, 0xCC, 0x4C, 0x97, 0x30, 0x66, 0x34, 0x26), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x83, 0x6A, 0x1E, 0x1F, 0xDB, 0xC9, 0x5E, 0x13), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1B, 0x4D, 0x49, 0xFF, 0x9B, 0x9C, 0xAC, 0x9B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD7, 0xE4, 0x4B, 0xF2, 0xD4, 0x1A, 0xD2, 0x78), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCD, 0xDA, 0xE8, 0x61, 0x9F, 0xC8, 0x49, 0x32), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x51, 0xCB, 0xF2, 0x2D, 0x85, 0xF6, 0x8D, 0x52), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB7, 0xC5, 0xCD, 0x2C, 0x79, 0xC6, 0x0E, 0x4F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDB, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_12_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x73, 0x1D, 0x55, 0x0F, 0xF8, 0x22, 0x9F, 0x78), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x76, 0x56, 0xBA, 0xE7, 0x57, 0x32, 0xEC, 0x42), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x65, 0x9A, 0xC6, 0x4C, 0x09, 0xC4, 0x52, 0x3F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB6, 0x1E, 0x6F, 0xF4, 0x7D, 0x27, 0xDD, 0xAF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x94, 0x11, 0x16, 0xEC, 0x79, 0x83, 0xAD, 0xAE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x46, 0x4E, 0x92, 0x1F, 0x19, 0x7D, 0x65, 0xDC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x09, 0xFF, 0x78, 0x15, 0x45, 0x63, 0x32, 0xE4), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBF, 0x91, 0xD0, 0x78, 0x58, 0xDA, 0x50, 0x47), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x73, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_13_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x23, 0xDE, 0x40, 0xF6, 0x41, 0xB4, 0x3B, 0x95), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC6, 0x8D, 0xE0, 0xE1, 0xA9, 0xF0, 0x35, 0x5D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE6, 0xD4, 0xBA, 0x7B, 0xCC, 0x1B, 0x3A, 0x32), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD0, 0x5A, 0x2E, 0x74, 0x47, 0x14, 0xC3, 0x4D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7D, 0xF0, 0x8B, 0x06, 0x15, 0x8E, 0x0E, 0xCA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB5, 0xD2, 0xEB, 0x97, 0x50, 0x7D, 0x31, 0xFC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x42, 0x93, 0x4C, 0xDB, 0x97, 0x79, 0x44, 0xF5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9C, 0xA2, 0xA0, 0x0B, 0xC8, 0x3A, 0x8A, 0xF9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x61, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_13_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x79, 0x50, 0x92, 0x9E, 0x24, 0x1F, 0xCB, 0x4C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD3, 0x16, 0xC9, 0xC5, 0x3D, 0x5A, 0xAF, 0x97), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x18, 0xE3, 0x97, 0xE4, 0xA8, 0x50, 0xF6, 0x7E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x45, 0x57, 0x97, 0x42, 0x78, 0x92, 0x49, 0x0D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA5, 0xEB, 0x62, 0x24, 0xFB, 0x8F, 0x32, 0xCF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF3, 0x0C, 0x36, 0x6E, 0x8F, 0xE8, 0xE8, 0x8E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC2, 0xD3, 0x7C, 0xC7, 0x8D, 0x3F, 0x5C, 0xE1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6A, 0x64, 0x6A, 0x73, 0x10, 0x79, 0xB8, 0x5A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCB, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_14_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x51, 0xF9, 0xEF, 0xA5, 0x20, 0x4A, 0x5C, 0xA1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2F, 0xF3, 0xF4, 0x49, 0x5B, 0x73, 0xAA, 0x1B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC6, 0xF2, 0xEA, 0x0F, 0x00, 0xAD, 0x53, 0xAB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x03, 0xB8, 0x66, 0xED, 0xC4, 0x2B, 0x4C, 0x35), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3A, 0x2F, 0xC1, 0x9A, 0x37, 0xD2, 0x7F, 0x58), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x29, 0xA7, 0x81, 0x38, 0x64, 0xC9, 0x37, 0x38), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBE, 0x3B, 0x6C, 0x9F, 0x5B, 0xD9, 0x8B, 0x1D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB6, 0x14, 0xD9, 0x08, 0xD8, 0xD2, 0x7E, 0x23), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1C, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_14_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x15, 0x71, 0xE6, 0x3D, 0xD1, 0xB0, 0xE7, 0xCD), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5B, 0x81, 0x23, 0xEC, 0x2D, 0x42, 0x45, 0xE6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x51, 0x5B, 0x44, 0x6B, 0x89, 0x03, 0x67, 0x28), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x84, 0x27, 0xAE, 0x80, 0x5A, 0x33, 0xBE, 0x11), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE3, 0xB6, 0x64, 0x1A, 0xDF, 0xD3, 0x85, 0x91), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x67, 0x8C, 0x22, 0xBA, 0xD0, 0xBD, 0xCC, 0xA0), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF7, 0x3C, 0x01, 0x3A, 0xFF, 0x9D, 0xC7, 0x6B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0C, 0xC7, 0x64, 0xB4, 0x59, 0x4E, 0x9F, 0x22), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x85, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_15_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA1, 0x34, 0x0A, 0x41, 0x94, 0xA8, 0xF2, 0xB7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF6, 0xD4, 0xE4, 0xF0, 0x97, 0x45, 0x6D, 0xCA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8F, 0x1F, 0x4D, 0x6D, 0xFE, 0xA0, 0xC4, 0x84), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1D, 0x28, 0x5C, 0x40, 0xBB, 0x65, 0xD4, 0x42), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x98, 0xA8, 0x87, 0x35, 0x20, 0x3A, 0x89, 0x44), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD6, 0xFD, 0x4F, 0xAB, 0x2D, 0xD1, 0xD0, 0xC0), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x86, 0xE8, 0x00, 0xFC, 0x69, 0x52, 0xF8, 0xD5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE1, 0x9A, 0x99, 0xE1, 0xDC, 0x9C, 0x3F, 0xD9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x99, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_15_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x12, 0x08, 0x98, 0xD9, 0xCA, 0x73, 0xD5, 0xA9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB9, 0x2C, 0xE0, 0xA7, 0x3E, 0x91, 0xD7, 0x87), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x68, 0x04, 0xB0, 0x54, 0x09, 0xF4, 0x72, 0xB7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC8, 0xEE, 0x28, 0xCC, 0xE8, 0x50, 0x78, 0x20), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0D, 0x91, 0x03, 0x76, 0xDB, 0x68, 0x24, 0x77), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7A, 0xE0, 0x56, 0xB2, 0x5D, 0x12, 0xD3, 0xB5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0D, 0x42, 0x59, 0x8B, 0xDF, 0x67, 0xB5, 0xBE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD1, 0xCC, 0xE5, 0x31, 0x53, 0x7A, 0x46, 0xB3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDA, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_16_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCC, 0x8D, 0x59, 0xB5, 0x1B, 0x0F, 0xF4, 0xAF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD9, 0x2F, 0xD1, 0x2C, 0xE0, 0xD8, 0x04, 0xEF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAC, 0xF4, 0xD7, 0xBA, 0xB0, 0xA3, 0x7E, 0xC9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCD, 0x08, 0x51, 0x56, 0xA6, 0x76, 0x67, 0x33), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8C, 0x17, 0x63, 0xFE, 0x56, 0xD0, 0xD9, 0x71), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAA, 0xF6, 0xC3, 0x14, 0x47, 0xC5, 0xA7, 0x31), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x72, 0x4C, 0x80, 0xF6, 0xA2, 0x57, 0xA7, 0x5D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x11, 0xB3, 0x7B, 0xF8, 0x2F, 0xE1, 0x3E, 0x7B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFA, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_16_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x26, 0xF4, 0xF9, 0x6B, 0x7B, 0x90, 0xDF, 0x30), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1F, 0x82, 0xEF, 0x62, 0xA1, 0x4C, 0x53, 0xCA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE6, 0x99, 0x76, 0x01, 0xBA, 0x8D, 0x0F, 0x54), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAF, 0xF4, 0x58, 0x73, 0x56, 0xFE, 0xDD, 0x7C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF6, 0xCE, 0xF9, 0xE8, 0xA1, 0x34, 0xC3, 0x5B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x09, 0x5F, 0xDC, 0x6A, 0x3D, 0xD8, 0x7F, 0x42), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC2, 0xF4, 0x51, 0xB8, 0xB8, 0xC1, 0xD7, 0x2F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAE, 0x7D, 0x58, 0xD1, 0xD4, 0x1B, 0x4D, 0x23), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD3, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_17_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB9, 0x95, 0xDF, 0x00, 0xD8, 0x21, 0xDE, 0x94), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF7, 0x47, 0x3C, 0xC3, 0xB2, 0x01, 0x53, 0x5D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1E, 0x17, 0x43, 0x23, 0xBD, 0xCA, 0x71, 0xF2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x70, 0xBA, 0x0F, 0x4F, 0xDC, 0x41, 0x54, 0xBE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD6, 0x39, 0x26, 0x70, 0x53, 0x32, 0x18, 0x11), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x32, 0x46, 0x07, 0x97, 0x3A, 0x57, 0xE0, 0x01), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD6, 0x92, 0x4F, 0xCE, 0xDF, 0x25, 0x80, 0x26), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5B, 0x6F, 0x9A, 0x03, 0x05, 0x4B, 0xD1, 0x47), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5D, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_17_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x25, 0x01, 0x72, 0x30, 0x90, 0x17, 0x51, 0x20), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x74, 0xFB, 0x41, 0x65, 0x5C, 0xB4, 0x2D, 0xEE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x66, 0xCD, 0xCD, 0xAA, 0x41, 0xCC, 0xBB, 0x07), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD4, 0xCE, 0x08, 0x0A, 0x63, 0xE9, 0xA2, 0xFF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3D, 0xA8, 0x21, 0x7F, 0x7A, 0x5B, 0x9B, 0x81), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x10, 0x6B, 0x89, 0x44, 0x0A, 0x7F, 0x85, 0x5F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7D, 0xDE, 0x7C, 0x19, 0x5C, 0x65, 0x26, 0x61), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD7, 0xAC, 0x62, 0x29, 0x4A, 0xF1, 0xD0, 0x81), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x38, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_18_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x32, 0x00, 0x40, 0x87, 0xEB, 0xA9, 0x58, 0x56), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAF, 0x51, 0x0B, 0xFF, 0x56, 0x35, 0x51, 0xB3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7B, 0xAC, 0x08, 0x94, 0x71, 0xDA, 0xEC, 0x99), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5F, 0x4D, 0xC5, 0x7B, 0x31, 0x8B, 0x8D, 0x5E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x15, 0x05, 0xF1, 0x3E, 0x9E, 0x8F, 0x17, 0x8F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF0, 0x9C, 0x4B, 0x62, 0x94, 0xAD, 0x49, 0xFC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0F, 0xC9, 0xC6, 0x8F, 0xFD, 0x33, 0x44, 0x34), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5F, 0x96, 0x17, 0x7F, 0x42, 0xBE, 0xF7, 0x0D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD4, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_18_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFB, 0x29, 0x39, 0x13, 0x08, 0x8D, 0x91, 0x47), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF6, 0x79, 0xF9, 0x2F, 0xA9, 0x0A, 0xCF, 0xD6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAB, 0x87, 0x7A, 0xA3, 0x19, 0xAB, 0x55, 0xAD), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE8, 0x0B, 0x01, 0xC5, 0x56, 0x19, 0x9D, 0x9E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x19, 0xDE, 0x82, 0x3B, 0xEA, 0xD3, 0x0B, 0x8C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x65, 0x6B, 0xC7, 0xF3, 0x0F, 0x82, 0x87, 0x6C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD8, 0x2E, 0x23, 0xF2, 0x39, 0x9D, 0x49, 0x70), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x31, 0xDE, 0xAF, 0x7A, 0xEE, 0xB0, 0xDA, 0x70), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x63, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_19_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x76, 0x4E, 0x2A, 0x50, 0xFD, 0x8E, 0xC0, 0xEB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x52, 0x0F, 0x7C, 0x76, 0x63, 0xD8, 0x89, 0x45), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEC, 0x2D, 0xB9, 0x4E, 0xF4, 0xEE, 0x85, 0xCF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC1, 0x95, 0x5C, 0x96, 0x5D, 0xAA, 0x59, 0x0B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCA, 0xDB, 0xD2, 0x68, 0x8E, 0x5A, 0x94, 0x60), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD9, 0x02, 0xBF, 0x77, 0x9F, 0xB9, 0x4C, 0xC9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2D, 0xDC, 0xC0, 0xCF, 0x81, 0x1E, 0xC4, 0x6C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2B, 0xCC, 0x37, 0x86, 0xDC, 0xE2, 0x64, 0x72), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD5, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_19_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2C, 0x30, 0xB1, 0x59, 0x20, 0x9D, 0x98, 0x28), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x77, 0x0C, 0x9D, 0xF8, 0x20, 0xDC, 0x90, 0xBA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB1, 0xA0, 0xF4, 0xE7, 0x3E, 0x9C, 0x9E, 0xA2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB5, 0x25, 0xA2, 0xB0, 0x54, 0xCD, 0x2E, 0x33), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEA, 0xD9, 0x42, 0xB0, 0x80, 0xB0, 0xA3, 0x38), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9F, 0xFE, 0x9D, 0x8D, 0x40, 0xFF, 0x27, 0x6D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3A, 0x9D, 0xA6, 0x88, 0x3A, 0x8B, 0x6F, 0x14), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB6, 0x39, 0xEE, 0x1F, 0x3F, 0xB1, 0x4F, 0x63), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x31, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_20_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6D, 0xD7, 0x9E, 0xFF, 0xD2, 0x35, 0x67, 0x03), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCA, 0x4F, 0x15, 0x5D, 0xE3, 0xE8, 0x53, 0x86), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x92, 0xF7, 0x24, 0x98, 0xA2, 0xCB, 0x11, 0x68), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x06, 0x2E, 0x25, 0xE1, 0x94, 0xC5, 0xA3, 0x96), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE0, 0x82, 0x6E, 0xBA, 0xE7, 0x43, 0x25, 0xB0), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x18, 0x65, 0xB4, 0x49, 0x73, 0x18, 0x35, 0x54), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x59, 0x5B, 0xBC, 0x62, 0x86, 0x4C, 0xC1, 0xB7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9B, 0xF2, 0x95, 0xA2, 0xBB, 0xA2, 0x35, 0x65), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBF, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_20_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x72, 0x59, 0x62, 0xB0, 0x4B, 0x1E, 0xB4, 0xD8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0D, 0x55, 0xCE, 0xB0, 0x69, 0xBA, 0x63, 0x10), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6E, 0x69, 0x86, 0xDB, 0x34, 0x7D, 0x68, 0x64), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDA, 0x06, 0xCA, 0x55, 0x44, 0x36, 0x2B, 0xBA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6C, 0xD4, 0xC4, 0x3D, 0xCD, 0x9E, 0x69, 0xA4), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3F, 0x44, 0xE4, 0xBF, 0x31, 0xE6, 0x40, 0x9F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7E, 0x4F, 0xFA, 0x75, 0xE3, 0xFB, 0x97, 0x0E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x08, 0xC0, 0xBD, 0x1C, 0x48, 0xB0, 0x26, 0xD0), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD2, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_21_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1C, 0x7B, 0x32, 0xFA, 0xF2, 0x6D, 0x84, 0x8E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA0, 0x21, 0x03, 0x1D, 0x0D, 0x22, 0x55, 0x67), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x18, 0xF9, 0x42, 0x03, 0x9C, 0xC2, 0xCB, 0xBA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF8, 0xA1, 0x96, 0xD9, 0x9D, 0x11, 0x6F, 0xBE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0x40, 0x57, 0xEB, 0x40, 0x2D, 0xC0, 0x11), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2F, 0x96, 0xBB, 0x4F, 0x2F, 0x23, 0xA8, 0x28), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3A, 0x29, 0x85, 0x21, 0xA5, 0x50, 0x62, 0x06), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC9, 0x7D, 0x92, 0xCF, 0x87, 0x0C, 0x22, 0xF9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC9, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_21_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5A, 0x0E, 0xA5, 0x32, 0x5B, 0xDF, 0x9C, 0xD5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x27, 0x96, 0x37, 0x2C, 0x88, 0x35, 0x30, 0xA1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x40, 0xB4, 0x69, 0xFF, 0xEB, 0xC6, 0x94, 0x08), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC9, 0x55, 0x60, 0xAD, 0xAA, 0x58, 0x14, 0x88), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3C, 0xFF, 0xF2, 0xB2, 0xD5, 0xA7, 0xD9, 0x27), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2D, 0xAE, 0x54, 0xD2, 0x60, 0x31, 0xF3, 0x15), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBB, 0x92, 0x83, 0xE3, 0xF1, 0x42, 0x83, 0x6E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x49, 0xD2, 0xC8, 0xB7, 0x76, 0x45, 0x7F, 0x7D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x04, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_22_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4A, 0x11, 0xA4, 0xFB, 0x7A, 0x01, 0xBC, 0xC8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCD, 0x27, 0x73, 0x8D, 0x02, 0x91, 0x27, 0x8E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA4, 0x62, 0xF6, 0xDD, 0x6B, 0xFA, 0x5B, 0xB9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEF, 0xCA, 0xA2, 0x44, 0x2C, 0xF0, 0x28, 0xD8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3C, 0xF1, 0x7A, 0xA2, 0x42, 0x4C, 0x50, 0xC6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2D, 0x83, 0x3E, 0x50, 0xAB, 0x9C, 0xF7, 0x67), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1D, 0xED, 0x78, 0xCB, 0x76, 0x69, 0xDA, 0x42), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDB, 0x01, 0x1E, 0x43, 0x27, 0x47, 0x6E, 0xDA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x94, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_22_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD3, 0x4F, 0x54, 0xB9, 0x3E, 0xBD, 0xD5, 0x44), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC9, 0x35, 0x40, 0x69, 0x7F, 0x74, 0x9D, 0x32), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5A, 0x06, 0x6F, 0x67, 0x68, 0x2B, 0x4D, 0x10), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC6, 0x65, 0x41, 0xFC, 0x7C, 0x1E, 0xE8, 0xC8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF2, 0x79, 0x37, 0xAF, 0xFD, 0xD2, 0xDA, 0x4C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x33, 0xA8, 0x69, 0x56, 0x62, 0xA4, 0xE4, 0xA3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x42, 0x71, 0x73, 0x21, 0x8A, 0x17, 0x81, 0xA2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x14, 0x55, 0x8F, 0x7B, 0xB8, 0xAF, 0xF7, 0x86), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAA, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_23_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4B, 0xD1, 0xBD, 0xBE, 0x8C, 0xBC, 0x60, 0x6E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x62, 0xA6, 0x57, 0x8C, 0xAE, 0x5C, 0x19, 0xFE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7A, 0x43, 0xE4, 0xD9, 0xD8, 0x7B, 0xE7, 0x41), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xED, 0xB9, 0xE4, 0x85, 0x7C, 0x2E, 0xFC, 0x20), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x02, 0x2E, 0x01, 0x2A, 0x6D, 0x56, 0xBE, 0x97), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6A, 0x0C, 0x25, 0x9B, 0xAE, 0x86, 0x37, 0x43), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4A, 0x22, 0xB3, 0xCB, 0x99, 0x66, 0xB7, 0x9E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x56, 0xF7, 0x90, 0xF0, 0x1B, 0x09, 0x27, 0xF7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC8, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_23_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1C, 0x16, 0x08, 0xEF, 0x39, 0x64, 0x49, 0x31), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x08, 0xA0, 0xE3, 0x97, 0xA9, 0x07, 0x54, 0x26), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCD, 0xFF, 0xE2, 0x00, 0x07, 0x21, 0x88, 0x20), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x16, 0xFD, 0x59, 0x53, 0x05, 0x6C, 0x42, 0x27), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8F, 0xF7, 0x39, 0x5C, 0x82, 0x36, 0xE8, 0x03), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2E, 0x83, 0xA8, 0xE2, 0xA8, 0x43, 0x07, 0x38), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE6, 0xAF, 0x2B, 0x79, 0xED, 0xD8, 0x39, 0x87), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x15, 0x20, 0x91, 0x7A, 0xC4, 0x07, 0xEF, 0x6C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x28, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_24_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6A, 0x10, 0x2F, 0xAA, 0x0C, 0x94, 0x0E, 0x5A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB7, 0x81, 0x87, 0x41, 0x23, 0xEB, 0x55, 0x7C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB8, 0x53, 0xCC, 0x79, 0xB6, 0xEB, 0x6C, 0xCC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF4, 0x77, 0x73, 0x9D, 0xFC, 0x64, 0x6F, 0x7F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3C, 0x40, 0xE3, 0x6D, 0x1C, 0x16, 0x71, 0x15), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5A, 0xF4, 0x1B, 0xFF, 0x1C, 0x2F, 0xA5, 0xD7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x06, 0x0E, 0x0B, 0x11, 0xF4, 0x8D, 0x93, 0xAF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x58, 0xC5, 0x64, 0x6F, 0x24, 0x19, 0xF2, 0x9B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1C, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_24_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x52, 0xB3, 0xAF, 0xA5, 0x0E, 0x4F, 0x5E, 0xE1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0F, 0x77, 0xCA, 0xF2, 0x6D, 0xC5, 0xF6, 0x9F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x90, 0x18, 0x8E, 0x33, 0x68, 0x6C, 0xE8, 0xE0), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFC, 0x8B, 0x80, 0x90, 0x19, 0x7F, 0x90, 0x96), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5B, 0x80, 0x6B, 0x68, 0xE2, 0x7D, 0xD4, 0xD0), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2A, 0xC1, 0x67, 0xB3, 0x72, 0xCB, 0xBF, 0x2F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4F, 0xD5, 0xD3, 0x1D, 0x14, 0x58, 0x0A, 0x80), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x79, 0x7A, 0x65, 0x98, 0xB3, 0x07, 0x4B, 0x2F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF3, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_25_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2A, 0x87, 0x0F, 0x5F, 0xCF, 0xA2, 0x01, 0x08), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0C, 0xC9, 0xC8, 0x6E, 0x35, 0x87, 0xA5, 0x67), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x94, 0x3E, 0x91, 0xA0, 0xAB, 0x24, 0x1E, 0xF2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB9, 0xBC, 0x02, 0x35, 0x70, 0xC1, 0x5F, 0x98), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x26, 0x59, 0xA0, 0x50, 0x04, 0x80, 0x52, 0x85), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF8, 0x56, 0x6E, 0x42, 0x8F, 0x8C, 0x91, 0x65), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAC, 0xA2, 0xCB, 0xA5, 0xDE, 0x14, 0x24, 0x38), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x00, 0xCB, 0x74, 0x28, 0xE6, 0xA7, 0xE7, 0xC3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5F, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_25_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x35, 0x73, 0xA8, 0x8F, 0x9E, 0x0E, 0x63, 0x96), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC8, 0x1B, 0x77, 0xC7, 0xC1, 0x38, 0xF9, 0xDC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD8, 0x3C, 0xCF, 0xA8, 0x7A, 0xD7, 0xF3, 0xC4), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDD, 0x5F, 0x9A, 0xC9, 0xAD, 0xE9, 0x1A, 0x93), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFC, 0xCF, 0x2B, 0x5E, 0xD5, 0x81, 0x95, 0xA8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x19, 0x88, 0x75, 0x29, 0x1F, 0xC7, 0xC7, 0xD0), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD8, 0xA9, 0x5A, 0x4D, 0x63, 0x95, 0xF9, 0x4E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEB, 0xCD, 0x04, 0x8F, 0xCD, 0x91, 0xDE, 0xC6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x71, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_26_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x88, 0xD4, 0xFD, 0x25, 0x11, 0x99, 0x6E, 0xEA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB0, 0x83, 0x01, 0x3D, 0xFB, 0x56, 0xA5, 0x4E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC2, 0x3A, 0xDC, 0x74, 0xC2, 0xD7, 0xCF, 0xE8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8F, 0xBD, 0xF1, 0xDD, 0xA3, 0x07, 0x03, 0xE2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7B, 0xBE, 0xE9, 0x2E, 0x58, 0x84, 0x66, 0xFC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x71, 0x20, 0x78, 0x37, 0x79, 0x0B, 0xA6, 0x64), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE3, 0xF2, 0xAC, 0x65, 0xC8, 0xC9, 0x2F, 0x61), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x26, 0x93, 0xE5, 0x0D, 0x0C, 0xC6, 0xB8, 0xCB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9C, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_26_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x69, 0xAD, 0x5C, 0x19, 0x12, 0x61, 0x0E, 0x25), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x39, 0x4F, 0x0B, 0x1F, 0x49, 0x7E, 0xCD, 0x81), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x46, 0x2E, 0x30, 0x61, 0xDB, 0x08, 0x68, 0x9B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x41, 0x78, 0xAF, 0xB3, 0x08, 0xC1, 0x69, 0xE5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC4, 0x5F, 0x5D, 0xC1, 0x57, 0x6F, 0xD8, 0x34), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x38, 0xD3, 0x6A, 0xF7, 0xFD, 0x86, 0xE5, 0xB3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA8, 0x63, 0xBD, 0x70, 0x7B, 0x47, 0xE8, 0x6D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x18, 0x62, 0xC8, 0x7E, 0x9D, 0x11, 0x2B, 0xA5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB6, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_27_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE2, 0x84, 0xFD, 0xD5, 0x9A, 0x56, 0x7F, 0x5C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7C, 0xBB, 0xA4, 0x6F, 0x12, 0x6E, 0x4D, 0xF8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1D, 0x08, 0xA1, 0x82, 0x9C, 0x62, 0x74, 0x7B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9E, 0x58, 0x22, 0x05, 0x1D, 0x15, 0x35, 0x79), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9A, 0x88, 0xCF, 0x5C, 0x05, 0x78, 0xFB, 0x94), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAC, 0x6B, 0x2F, 0x79, 0x09, 0x73, 0x67, 0xEC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD8, 0xA0, 0x80, 0xD8, 0xE8, 0xEC, 0xFB, 0x42), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF5, 0xE7, 0x0B, 0xB7, 0x81, 0x48, 0x7B, 0xD9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE3, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_27_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE8, 0x53, 0xA9, 0xED, 0x61, 0x92, 0xD7, 0x85), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x26, 0x49, 0xD9, 0x5D, 0x9B, 0x4E, 0x89, 0x35), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB8, 0x12, 0xEB, 0x9A, 0xC9, 0xCB, 0xC1, 0x95), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x35, 0xDC, 0x95, 0x16, 0xFE, 0x29, 0x70, 0x01), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x64, 0x33, 0xB1, 0xD6, 0x78, 0xB9, 0xE2, 0x36), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x34, 0xCE, 0x88, 0xC3, 0xFD, 0x7A, 0x6B, 0xB8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x40, 0x1E, 0x50, 0x1E, 0xAF, 0xB1, 0x25, 0x2D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC1, 0xE7, 0xD7, 0xD5, 0xBD, 0x7A, 0x12, 0xF9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x31, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_28_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x22, 0xAA, 0xA2, 0x80, 0x5D, 0x8F, 0xCD, 0xC8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x48, 0x39, 0x79, 0x64, 0xA1, 0x67, 0x3C, 0xB7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3D, 0xC7, 0x49, 0xFF, 0x7F, 0xAC, 0xAB, 0x55), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x81, 0x54, 0x3E, 0x83, 0xF0, 0x3D, 0xBC, 0xB5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x87, 0x92, 0x4A, 0x38, 0x42, 0x8A, 0xAB, 0xF6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE7, 0x0B, 0x4F, 0xEE, 0x9E, 0x92, 0xA5, 0xBE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBA, 0xDD, 0x19, 0x96, 0xF2, 0xF0, 0x6B, 0x2E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBE, 0xFC, 0xDD, 0xB2, 0x8A, 0xE5, 0x4C, 0x22), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD4, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_28_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB7, 0x06, 0x49, 0xAC, 0x99, 0x7E, 0xF8, 0x12), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x76, 0xC8, 0x01, 0x51, 0xEA, 0xF6, 0x52, 0xE7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x43, 0x89, 0x66, 0x2B, 0x1F, 0x9B, 0x2A, 0xA3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDF, 0x0F, 0x95, 0x07, 0x2B, 0x6C, 0x6E, 0x9E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x24, 0xC3, 0xB4, 0xBB, 0x91, 0x1F, 0xA3, 0x72), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5F, 0x6E, 0x54, 0x28, 0x7B, 0x9C, 0x79, 0x2E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x03, 0x45, 0xFF, 0xA6, 0xDA, 0xA2, 0x83, 0x71), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEB, 0xDE, 0x8F, 0x17, 0x37, 0x82, 0xCB, 0xE2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x30, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_29_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD8, 0x94, 0x3F, 0x26, 0xC9, 0x1D, 0xD9, 0xAE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x09, 0x97, 0x28, 0x20, 0xCD, 0xC1, 0xF3, 0x40), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x95, 0xC9, 0xB5, 0x60, 0x9B, 0x1E, 0xDC, 0x74), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5B, 0xB9, 0x5B, 0x7D, 0xA0, 0xB2, 0x8C, 0xF0), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x33, 0xD1, 0x42, 0xE6, 0x39, 0x33, 0x6D, 0xBB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5D, 0xC0, 0xFC, 0xD2, 0x14, 0x5D, 0x3E, 0x3C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x78, 0x4A, 0x3E, 0x40, 0x16, 0x93, 0x15, 0xCF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFA, 0x24, 0xC1, 0x27, 0x27, 0xE5, 0x4B, 0xD8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD4, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_29_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1D, 0x50, 0xD8, 0xBC, 0xC1, 0x46, 0x22, 0xBB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAD, 0x0E, 0x60, 0xA1, 0xB3, 0x50, 0xD4, 0x86), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x80, 0xB1, 0x26, 0xB6, 0x6D, 0x47, 0x5A, 0x6F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x45, 0xAC, 0x11, 0x35, 0x3E, 0xB9, 0xF4, 0x01), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x58, 0x97, 0xFA, 0xBB, 0x6B, 0x39, 0x13, 0xD8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x15, 0x7B, 0x34, 0x12, 0x75, 0x8E, 0x9B, 0xC6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2C, 0x9E, 0xCD, 0x29, 0xB6, 0xEF, 0x8D, 0x10), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x47, 0xAC, 0xE9, 0x25, 0x27, 0xBB, 0x78, 0x47), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2F, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_30_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x30, 0x7A, 0xA8, 0xD3, 0xE3, 0x66, 0xE5, 0x66), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2F, 0x4C, 0xC4, 0x2C, 0x76, 0x81, 0x50, 0x32), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEE, 0x71, 0x08, 0xB8, 0x52, 0x7C, 0xAF, 0xDC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x45, 0x59, 0x24, 0xDD, 0xFB, 0x2F, 0xD0, 0xDA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB7, 0xCD, 0x56, 0xE9, 0xAC, 0x91, 0xE6, 0xB9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE5, 0x64, 0x20, 0xC6, 0x9F, 0xE4, 0xEF, 0xDF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6D, 0x2C, 0x8F, 0x8C, 0x97, 0xF6, 0x22, 0xC3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAC, 0xF4, 0x88, 0xAA, 0xA8, 0xD7, 0xA5, 0x68), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDE, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_30_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x21, 0x6C, 0xAE, 0x83, 0xB1, 0x55, 0x55, 0xEE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB0, 0x67, 0x84, 0x47, 0x7C, 0x83, 0x5C, 0x89), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5B, 0x10, 0x4D, 0xDD, 0x30, 0x60, 0xB0, 0xE6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x59, 0xA7, 0x36, 0x76, 0x24, 0x32, 0x9F, 0x9D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDD, 0x42, 0x81, 0xFB, 0xA4, 0x2E, 0x13, 0x68), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x87, 0x94, 0x91, 0xFF, 0x99, 0xA0, 0x09, 0x61), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5D, 0x83, 0xA1, 0x76, 0xAF, 0x37, 0x5C, 0x77), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1E, 0xA8, 0x04, 0x86, 0xC4, 0xA9, 0x79, 0x42), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x93, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_31_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB6, 0x8C, 0xC2, 0x34, 0xFB, 0x83, 0x28, 0x27), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA4, 0x03, 0x7D, 0x5E, 0x9E, 0x0E, 0xB0, 0x22), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA2, 0x02, 0x46, 0x7F, 0xB9, 0xAC, 0xBB, 0x23), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x06, 0xED, 0x48, 0xC2, 0x96, 0x4D, 0x56, 0x27), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x44, 0xB5, 0xC5, 0xD1, 0xE6, 0x1C, 0x7E, 0x9B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x92, 0x2E, 0x18, 0x71, 0x2D, 0x7B, 0xD7, 0xB3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAB, 0x46, 0x9D, 0xDE, 0xAA, 0x78, 0x8E, 0xB1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4D, 0xD7, 0x69, 0x2E, 0xE1, 0xD9, 0x48, 0xDE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFB, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_31_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAF, 0xFF, 0x9E, 0x09, 0x22, 0x22, 0xE6, 0x8D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6C, 0x14, 0x28, 0x13, 0x1B, 0x62, 0x12, 0x22), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCC, 0x7F, 0x67, 0x03, 0xB0, 0xC0, 0xF3, 0x05), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC0, 0xC3, 0x0F, 0xFB, 0x25, 0x48, 0x3E, 0xF4), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0B, 0x6E, 0x53, 0x98, 0x36, 0xB3, 0xD3, 0x94), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEB, 0x81, 0x54, 0x22, 0xA4, 0xCC, 0xC1, 0x22), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF5, 0xBA, 0xFC, 0xA9, 0xDF, 0x68, 0x86, 0x2B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x71, 0x92, 0x0E, 0xC3, 0xF2, 0x58, 0xE8, 0x51), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE9, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_ecp_point secp521r1_T[32] = { + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z1(secp521r1_T_0_X, secp521r1_T_0_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_1_X, secp521r1_T_1_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_2_X, secp521r1_T_2_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_3_X, secp521r1_T_3_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_4_X, secp521r1_T_4_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_5_X, secp521r1_T_5_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_6_X, secp521r1_T_6_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_7_X, secp521r1_T_7_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_8_X, secp521r1_T_8_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_9_X, secp521r1_T_9_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_10_X, secp521r1_T_10_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_11_X, secp521r1_T_11_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_12_X, secp521r1_T_12_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_13_X, secp521r1_T_13_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_14_X, secp521r1_T_14_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_15_X, secp521r1_T_15_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_16_X, secp521r1_T_16_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_17_X, secp521r1_T_17_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_18_X, secp521r1_T_18_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_19_X, secp521r1_T_19_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_20_X, secp521r1_T_20_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_21_X, secp521r1_T_21_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_22_X, secp521r1_T_22_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_23_X, secp521r1_T_23_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_24_X, secp521r1_T_24_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_25_X, secp521r1_T_25_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_26_X, secp521r1_T_26_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_27_X, secp521r1_T_27_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_28_X, secp521r1_T_28_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_29_X, secp521r1_T_29_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_30_X, secp521r1_T_30_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_31_X, secp521r1_T_31_Y), +}; +#else +#define secp521r1_T NULL +#endif #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED) @@ -273,6 +2195,190 @@ static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_n[] = { MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x17, 0xFC, 0xF2, 0x26, 0xFE, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF), MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF), }; + +#if MBEDTLS_ECP_FIXED_POINT_OPTIM == 1 +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_0_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7D, 0x6C, 0xE0, 0xEA, 0xB1, 0xD1, 0xA5, 0x1D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x34, 0xF4, 0xB7, 0x80, 0x02, 0x7D, 0xB0, 0x26), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAE, 0xE9, 0x57, 0xC0, 0x0E, 0xF1, 0x4F, 0xDB), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_0_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9D, 0x2F, 0x5E, 0xD9, 0x88, 0xAA, 0x82, 0x40), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x34, 0x86, 0xBE, 0x15, 0xD0, 0x63, 0x41, 0x84), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA7, 0x28, 0x56, 0x9C, 0x6D, 0x2F, 0x2F, 0x9B), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_1_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6F, 0x77, 0x3D, 0x0D, 0x85, 0x48, 0xA8, 0xA9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x62, 0x07, 0xDF, 0x1D, 0xB3, 0xB3, 0x01, 0x54), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x05, 0x86, 0xF6, 0xAF, 0x19, 0x2A, 0x88, 0x2E), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_1_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x33, 0x90, 0xB6, 0x2F, 0x48, 0x36, 0x4C, 0x5B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDB, 0x11, 0x14, 0xA6, 0xCB, 0xBA, 0x15, 0xD9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7E, 0xB0, 0xF2, 0xD4, 0xC9, 0xDA, 0xBA, 0xD7), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_2_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE4, 0xC1, 0x9C, 0xE6, 0xBB, 0xFB, 0xCF, 0x23), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x93, 0x19, 0xAC, 0x5A, 0xC9, 0x8A, 0x1C, 0x75), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC1, 0xF6, 0x76, 0x86, 0x89, 0x27, 0x8D, 0x28), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_2_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4B, 0xE0, 0x6F, 0x34, 0xBA, 0x5E, 0xD3, 0x96), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6A, 0xDC, 0xA6, 0x87, 0xC9, 0x9D, 0xC0, 0x82), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x09, 0x11, 0x7E, 0xD6, 0xF7, 0x33, 0xFC, 0xE4), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_3_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC2, 0x37, 0x3E, 0xC0, 0x7F, 0x62, 0xE7, 0x54), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA5, 0x3B, 0x69, 0x9D, 0x44, 0xBC, 0x82, 0x99), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD4, 0x84, 0xB3, 0x5F, 0x2B, 0xA5, 0x9E, 0x2C), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_3_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1D, 0x95, 0xEB, 0x4C, 0x04, 0xB4, 0xF4, 0x75), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x55, 0xAD, 0x4B, 0xD5, 0x9A, 0xEB, 0xC4, 0x4E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC9, 0xB1, 0xC5, 0x59, 0xE3, 0xD5, 0x16, 0x2A), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_4_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x48, 0x2A, 0xCC, 0xAC, 0xD0, 0xEE, 0x50, 0xEC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x99, 0x83, 0xE0, 0x5B, 0x14, 0x44, 0x52, 0x20), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD6, 0x15, 0x2D, 0x78, 0xF6, 0x51, 0x32, 0xCF), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_4_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x86, 0x36, 0x9B, 0xDD, 0xF8, 0xDD, 0xEF, 0xB2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0B, 0xB1, 0x6A, 0x2B, 0xAF, 0xEB, 0x2B, 0xB1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC9, 0x87, 0x7A, 0x66, 0x5D, 0x5B, 0xDF, 0x8F), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_5_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x62, 0x45, 0xE5, 0x81, 0x9B, 0xEB, 0x37, 0x23), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB3, 0x29, 0xE2, 0x20, 0x64, 0x23, 0x6B, 0x6E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFE, 0x1D, 0x41, 0xE1, 0x9B, 0x61, 0x7B, 0xD9), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_5_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x75, 0x57, 0xA3, 0x0A, 0x13, 0xE4, 0x59, 0x15), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x79, 0x6E, 0x4A, 0x48, 0x84, 0x90, 0xAC, 0xC7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9C, 0xB8, 0xF5, 0xF3, 0xDE, 0xA0, 0xA1, 0x1D), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_6_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA3, 0x32, 0x81, 0xA9, 0x91, 0x5A, 0x4E, 0x33), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCB, 0xA8, 0x90, 0xBE, 0x0F, 0xEC, 0xC0, 0x85), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x80, 0x30, 0xD7, 0x08, 0xAE, 0xC4, 0x3A, 0xA5), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_6_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBC, 0x55, 0xE3, 0x76, 0xB3, 0x64, 0x74, 0x9F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3F, 0x75, 0xD4, 0xDB, 0x98, 0xD7, 0x39, 0xAE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD4, 0xEB, 0x8A, 0xAB, 0x16, 0xD9, 0xD4, 0x0B), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_7_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x41, 0xBE, 0xF9, 0xC7, 0xC7, 0xBA, 0xF3, 0xA1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC2, 0x85, 0x59, 0xF3, 0x60, 0x41, 0x02, 0xD2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x46, 0x1C, 0x4A, 0xA4, 0xC7, 0xED, 0x66, 0xBC), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_7_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC3, 0x9C, 0x2E, 0x46, 0x52, 0x18, 0x87, 0x14), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0x35, 0x5A, 0x75, 0xAC, 0x4D, 0x75, 0x91), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCE, 0x2F, 0xAC, 0xFC, 0xBC, 0xE6, 0x93, 0x5E), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_8_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x87, 0x4D, 0xC9, 0x18, 0xE9, 0x00, 0xEB, 0x33), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1A, 0x69, 0x72, 0x07, 0x5A, 0x59, 0xA8, 0x26), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB6, 0x65, 0x83, 0x20, 0x10, 0xF9, 0x69, 0x82), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_8_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8B, 0x56, 0x7F, 0x9F, 0xBF, 0x46, 0x0C, 0x7E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFC, 0xCF, 0xF0, 0xDC, 0xDF, 0x2D, 0xE6, 0xE5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x09, 0xF0, 0x72, 0x3A, 0x7A, 0x03, 0xE5, 0x22), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_9_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3E, 0xAA, 0x57, 0x13, 0x37, 0xA7, 0x2C, 0xD4), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA3, 0xAC, 0xA2, 0x23, 0xF9, 0x84, 0x60, 0xD3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x32, 0xEB, 0x51, 0x70, 0x64, 0x78, 0xCA, 0x05), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_9_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x91, 0xCC, 0x30, 0x62, 0x93, 0x46, 0x13, 0xE9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x21, 0x26, 0xCC, 0x6C, 0x3D, 0x5C, 0xDA, 0x2C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD5, 0xAA, 0xB8, 0x03, 0xA4, 0x1A, 0x00, 0x96), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_10_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF9, 0x9D, 0xE6, 0xCC, 0x4E, 0x2E, 0xC2, 0xD5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB4, 0xC3, 0x8A, 0xAE, 0x6F, 0x40, 0x05, 0xEB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9D, 0x8F, 0x4A, 0x4D, 0x35, 0xD3, 0x50, 0x9D), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_10_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1F, 0xFD, 0x98, 0xAB, 0xC7, 0x03, 0xB4, 0x55), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x40, 0x40, 0xD2, 0x9F, 0xCA, 0xD0, 0x53, 0x00), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1A, 0x84, 0x00, 0x6F, 0xC8, 0xAD, 0xED, 0x8D), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_11_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCE, 0xD3, 0x57, 0xD7, 0xC3, 0x07, 0xBD, 0xD7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x67, 0xBA, 0x47, 0x1D, 0x3D, 0xEF, 0x98, 0x6C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6D, 0xC0, 0x6C, 0x7F, 0x12, 0xEE, 0x9F, 0x67), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_11_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCA, 0x02, 0xDA, 0x79, 0xAA, 0xC9, 0x27, 0xC4), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x21, 0x79, 0xC7, 0x71, 0x84, 0xCB, 0xE5, 0x5A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x15, 0x37, 0x06, 0xBA, 0xB5, 0xD5, 0x18, 0x4C), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_12_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA1, 0x65, 0x72, 0x6C, 0xF2, 0x63, 0x27, 0x6A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x69, 0xBC, 0x71, 0xDF, 0x75, 0xF8, 0x98, 0x4D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x70, 0x70, 0x9B, 0xDC, 0xE7, 0x18, 0x71, 0xFF), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_12_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x15, 0x5B, 0x9F, 0x00, 0x5A, 0xB6, 0x80, 0x7A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB7, 0xE0, 0xBB, 0xFC, 0x5E, 0x78, 0x9C, 0x89), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x60, 0x03, 0x68, 0x83, 0x3D, 0x2E, 0x4C, 0xDD), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_13_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3B, 0x49, 0x23, 0xA8, 0xCB, 0x3B, 0x1A, 0xF6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8B, 0x3D, 0xA7, 0x46, 0xCF, 0x75, 0xB6, 0x2C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x92, 0xFD, 0x30, 0x01, 0xB6, 0xEF, 0xF9, 0xE8), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_13_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDC, 0xFA, 0xDA, 0xB8, 0x29, 0x42, 0xC9, 0xC7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x06, 0xD7, 0xA0, 0xE6, 0x6B, 0x86, 0x61, 0x39), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDB, 0xE9, 0xD3, 0x37, 0xD8, 0xE7, 0x35, 0xA9), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_14_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFD, 0xC8, 0x8E, 0xB1, 0xCB, 0xB1, 0xB5, 0x4D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x16, 0xD7, 0x46, 0x7D, 0xAF, 0xE2, 0xDC, 0xBB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD0, 0x46, 0xE7, 0xD8, 0x76, 0x31, 0x90, 0x76), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_14_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEB, 0xD3, 0xF4, 0x74, 0xE1, 0x67, 0xD8, 0x66), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE7, 0x70, 0x3C, 0xC8, 0xAF, 0x5F, 0xF4, 0x58), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x24, 0x4E, 0xED, 0x5C, 0x43, 0xB3, 0x16, 0x35), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_15_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x57, 0xAE, 0xD1, 0xDD, 0x31, 0x14, 0xD3, 0xF0), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE8, 0x14, 0x06, 0x13, 0x12, 0x1C, 0x81, 0xF5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA6, 0xF9, 0x0C, 0x91, 0xF7, 0x67, 0x59, 0x63), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_15_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAB, 0x91, 0xE2, 0xF4, 0x9D, 0xEB, 0x88, 0x87), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDB, 0x82, 0x30, 0x9C, 0xAE, 0x18, 0x4D, 0xB7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3C, 0x79, 0xCF, 0x17, 0xA5, 0x1E, 0xE8, 0xC8), +}; +static const mbedtls_ecp_point secp192k1_T[16] = { + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z1(secp192k1_T_0_X, secp192k1_T_0_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192k1_T_1_X, secp192k1_T_1_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192k1_T_2_X, secp192k1_T_2_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192k1_T_3_X, secp192k1_T_3_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192k1_T_4_X, secp192k1_T_4_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192k1_T_5_X, secp192k1_T_5_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192k1_T_6_X, secp192k1_T_6_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192k1_T_7_X, secp192k1_T_7_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192k1_T_8_X, secp192k1_T_8_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192k1_T_9_X, secp192k1_T_9_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192k1_T_10_X, secp192k1_T_10_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192k1_T_11_X, secp192k1_T_11_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192k1_T_12_X, secp192k1_T_12_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192k1_T_13_X, secp192k1_T_13_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192k1_T_14_X, secp192k1_T_14_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192k1_T_15_X, secp192k1_T_15_Y), +}; +#else +#define secp192k1_T NULL +#endif + #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED) @@ -306,6 +2412,221 @@ static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_n[] = { MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), }; + +#if MBEDTLS_ECP_FIXED_POINT_OPTIM == 1 +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_0_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5C, 0xA4, 0xB7, 0xB6, 0x0E, 0x65, 0x7E, 0x0F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA9, 0x75, 0x70, 0xE4, 0xE9, 0x67, 0xA4, 0x69), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA1, 0x28, 0xFC, 0x30, 0xDF, 0x99, 0xF0, 0x4D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x33, 0x5B, 0x45, 0xA1, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_0_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA5, 0x61, 0x6D, 0x55, 0xDB, 0x4B, 0xCA, 0xE2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x59, 0xBD, 0xB0, 0xC0, 0xF7, 0x19, 0xE3, 0xF7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD6, 0xFB, 0xCA, 0x82, 0x42, 0x34, 0xBA, 0x7F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xED, 0x9F, 0x08, 0x7E, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_1_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x99, 0x6C, 0x22, 0x22, 0x40, 0x89, 0xAE, 0x7A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2F, 0x92, 0xE1, 0x87, 0x56, 0x35, 0xAF, 0x9B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x88, 0xAF, 0x08, 0x35, 0x27, 0xEA, 0x04, 0xED), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF0, 0x53, 0xFD, 0xCF, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_1_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC1, 0xD0, 0x9F, 0x8D, 0xF3, 0x63, 0x54, 0x30), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x39, 0xDB, 0x0F, 0x61, 0x54, 0x26, 0xD1, 0x98), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF5, 0x21, 0xF7, 0x1B, 0xB5, 0x1D, 0xF6, 0x7E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0x05, 0xDA, 0x8F, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_2_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x10, 0x26, 0x73, 0xBC, 0xE4, 0x29, 0x62, 0x56), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x37, 0x95, 0x17, 0x8B, 0xC3, 0x9B, 0xAC, 0xCC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB1, 0xDB, 0x77, 0xDF, 0xDD, 0x13, 0x04, 0x98), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x02, 0xFC, 0x22, 0x93, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_2_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAC, 0x65, 0xF1, 0x5A, 0x37, 0xEF, 0x79, 0xAD), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x99, 0x01, 0x37, 0xAC, 0x9A, 0x5B, 0x51, 0x65), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFA, 0x75, 0x13, 0xA9, 0x4A, 0xAD, 0xFE, 0x9B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x32, 0x82, 0x6F, 0x66, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_3_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4D, 0x5E, 0xF0, 0x40, 0xC3, 0xA6, 0xE2, 0x1E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x34, 0x9A, 0x6F, 0xCF, 0x11, 0x26, 0x66, 0x85), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x79, 0x73, 0xA8, 0xCF, 0x2B, 0x12, 0x36, 0x37), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB9, 0xB3, 0x0A, 0x58, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_3_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD3, 0x79, 0x00, 0x55, 0x04, 0x34, 0x90, 0x1A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0A, 0x54, 0x1C, 0xC2, 0x45, 0x0C, 0x1B, 0x23), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x86, 0x19, 0xAB, 0xA8, 0xFC, 0x73, 0xDC, 0xEE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x72, 0xFB, 0x93, 0xCE, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_4_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF8, 0x75, 0xD0, 0x66, 0x95, 0x86, 0xCA, 0x66), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x17, 0xEA, 0x29, 0x16, 0x6A, 0x38, 0xDF, 0x41), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD8, 0xA2, 0x36, 0x2F, 0xDC, 0xBB, 0x5E, 0xF7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD4, 0x89, 0x59, 0x49, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_4_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCA, 0xA3, 0x99, 0x9D, 0xB8, 0x77, 0x9D, 0x1D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0A, 0x93, 0x43, 0x47, 0xC6, 0x5C, 0xF9, 0xFD), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAA, 0x00, 0x79, 0x42, 0x64, 0xB8, 0x25, 0x3E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x29, 0x54, 0xB4, 0x33, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_5_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD9, 0x0C, 0x42, 0x90, 0x83, 0x0B, 0x31, 0x5F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x54, 0x2E, 0xAE, 0xC8, 0xC7, 0x5F, 0xD2, 0x70), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA9, 0xBC, 0xAD, 0x41, 0xE7, 0x32, 0x3A, 0x81), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8A, 0x97, 0x52, 0x83, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_5_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1A, 0x13, 0x7A, 0xBD, 0xAE, 0x94, 0x60, 0xFD), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x92, 0x9B, 0x95, 0xB4, 0x6E, 0x68, 0xB2, 0x1F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x15, 0x49, 0xBE, 0x51, 0xFE, 0x66, 0x15, 0x74), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE6, 0x37, 0xE4, 0xFE, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_6_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF6, 0x9B, 0xEE, 0x64, 0xC9, 0x1B, 0xBD, 0x77), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDA, 0x5F, 0x34, 0xA9, 0x0B, 0xB7, 0x25, 0x52), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x90, 0x13, 0xB1, 0x38, 0xFB, 0x9D, 0x78, 0xED), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x39, 0xE7, 0x1B, 0xFA, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_6_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFB, 0xB3, 0xB7, 0x44, 0x92, 0x6B, 0x00, 0x82), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x97, 0x82, 0x44, 0x3E, 0x18, 0x1A, 0x58, 0x6A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x15, 0xF8, 0xC0, 0xE4, 0xEE, 0xC1, 0xBF, 0x44), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7E, 0x32, 0x27, 0xB2, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_7_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF4, 0x9A, 0x42, 0x62, 0x8B, 0x26, 0x54, 0x21), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x24, 0x85, 0x74, 0xA0, 0x79, 0xA8, 0xEE, 0xBE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x80, 0x36, 0x60, 0xB3, 0x28, 0x4D, 0x55, 0xBE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x32, 0x27, 0x82, 0x29, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_7_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0D, 0xFC, 0x73, 0x77, 0xAF, 0x5C, 0xAC, 0x78), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCC, 0xED, 0xE5, 0xF6, 0x1D, 0xA8, 0x67, 0x43), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF8, 0xDE, 0x33, 0x1C, 0xF1, 0x80, 0x73, 0xF8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2A, 0xE2, 0xDE, 0x3C, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_8_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x57, 0x3E, 0x6B, 0xFE, 0xF0, 0x04, 0x28, 0x01), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBB, 0xB2, 0x14, 0x9D, 0x18, 0x11, 0x7D, 0x9D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x96, 0xC4, 0xD6, 0x2E, 0x6E, 0x57, 0x4D, 0xE1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEA, 0x55, 0x1B, 0xDE, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_8_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x07, 0xF7, 0x17, 0xBC, 0x45, 0xAB, 0x16, 0xAB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCD, 0xB0, 0xEF, 0x61, 0xE3, 0x20, 0x7C, 0xF8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6C, 0x85, 0x41, 0x4D, 0xF1, 0x7E, 0x4D, 0x41), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x99, 0xC2, 0x9B, 0x5E, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_9_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x70, 0x2E, 0x49, 0x3D, 0x3E, 0x4B, 0xD3, 0x32), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC8, 0x2B, 0x9D, 0xD5, 0x27, 0xFA, 0xCA, 0xE0), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB3, 0xB3, 0x6A, 0xE0, 0x79, 0x14, 0x28, 0x0F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6C, 0x1E, 0xDC, 0xF5, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_9_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCA, 0x44, 0x56, 0xCD, 0xFC, 0x9F, 0x09, 0xFF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5C, 0x8C, 0x59, 0xA4, 0x64, 0x2A, 0x3A, 0xED), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x40, 0xA0, 0xB5, 0x86, 0x4E, 0x69, 0xDA, 0x06), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x08, 0x8B, 0x11, 0x38, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_10_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA0, 0x17, 0x16, 0x12, 0x17, 0xDC, 0x00, 0x7E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE7, 0x76, 0x24, 0x6C, 0x97, 0x2C, 0xB5, 0xF9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x82, 0x71, 0xE3, 0xB0, 0xBB, 0x4E, 0x50, 0x52), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6E, 0x48, 0x26, 0xD5, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_10_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x06, 0x5F, 0x28, 0xF6, 0x01, 0x5A, 0x60, 0x41), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAE, 0x95, 0xFE, 0xD0, 0xAD, 0x15, 0xD4, 0xD9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAD, 0x5B, 0x7A, 0xFD, 0x80, 0xF7, 0x9F, 0x64), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x32, 0xBC, 0x1B, 0xDF, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_11_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBB, 0xE6, 0xDF, 0x14, 0x29, 0xF4, 0xD4, 0x14), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE5, 0x12, 0xDD, 0xEC, 0x5B, 0x8A, 0x59, 0xE5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x26, 0x92, 0x3E, 0x35, 0x08, 0xE9, 0xCF, 0x0E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE0, 0x35, 0x29, 0x97, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_11_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x11, 0xDB, 0xD6, 0x6A, 0xC5, 0x43, 0xA4, 0xA1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x61, 0x33, 0x50, 0x61, 0x70, 0xA1, 0xE9, 0xCE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x15, 0x15, 0x6E, 0x5F, 0x01, 0x0C, 0x8C, 0xFA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x85, 0xA1, 0x9A, 0x9D, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_12_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6E, 0xC6, 0xF7, 0xE2, 0x4A, 0xCD, 0x9B, 0x61), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x34, 0x4D, 0x5A, 0xB8, 0xE2, 0x6D, 0xA6, 0x50), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x32, 0x3F, 0xB6, 0x17, 0xE3, 0x2C, 0x6F, 0x65), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1E, 0xA4, 0x59, 0x51, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_12_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x77, 0x4F, 0x7C, 0x49, 0xCD, 0x6E, 0xEB, 0x3C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x05, 0xC9, 0x1F, 0xB7, 0x4D, 0x98, 0xC7, 0x67), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4C, 0xFD, 0x98, 0x20, 0x95, 0xBB, 0x20, 0x3A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE0, 0xF2, 0x73, 0x92, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_13_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE2, 0xEF, 0xFB, 0x30, 0xFA, 0x12, 0x1A, 0xB0), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7A, 0x4C, 0x24, 0xB4, 0x5B, 0xC9, 0x4C, 0x0F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7A, 0xDD, 0x5E, 0x84, 0x95, 0x4D, 0x26, 0xED), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE3, 0xFA, 0xF9, 0x3A, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_13_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6A, 0xA3, 0x2E, 0x7A, 0xDC, 0xA7, 0x53, 0xA9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7C, 0x9F, 0x81, 0x84, 0xB2, 0x0D, 0xFE, 0x31), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x61, 0x89, 0x1B, 0x77, 0x0C, 0x89, 0x71, 0xEC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFA, 0xFF, 0x7F, 0xB2, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_14_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x28, 0xE9, 0x2C, 0x79, 0xA6, 0x3C, 0xAD, 0x93), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD6, 0xE0, 0x23, 0x02, 0x86, 0x0F, 0x77, 0x2A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x13, 0x93, 0x6D, 0xE9, 0xF9, 0x3C, 0xBE, 0xB9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x04, 0xE7, 0x24, 0x92, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_14_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBB, 0x3C, 0x5B, 0x4B, 0x1B, 0x25, 0x37, 0xD6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC9, 0xE8, 0x38, 0x1B, 0xA1, 0x5A, 0x2E, 0x68), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x03, 0x19, 0xFD, 0xF4, 0x78, 0x01, 0x6B, 0x44), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0F, 0x69, 0x37, 0x4F, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_15_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1A, 0xE2, 0xBF, 0xD3, 0xEC, 0x95, 0x9C, 0x03), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC2, 0x7B, 0xFC, 0xD5, 0xD3, 0x25, 0x5E, 0x0F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x39, 0x55, 0x09, 0xA2, 0x58, 0x6A, 0xC9, 0xFF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x80, 0xCC, 0x3B, 0xD9, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_15_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8F, 0x08, 0x65, 0x5E, 0xCB, 0xAB, 0x48, 0xC8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEE, 0x79, 0x8B, 0xC0, 0x11, 0xC0, 0x69, 0x38), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE6, 0xE8, 0x8C, 0x4C, 0xC5, 0x28, 0xE4, 0xAE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA5, 0x1F, 0x34, 0x5C, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_ecp_point secp224k1_T[16] = { + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z1(secp224k1_T_0_X, secp224k1_T_0_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224k1_T_1_X, secp224k1_T_1_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224k1_T_2_X, secp224k1_T_2_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224k1_T_3_X, secp224k1_T_3_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224k1_T_4_X, secp224k1_T_4_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224k1_T_5_X, secp224k1_T_5_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224k1_T_6_X, secp224k1_T_6_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224k1_T_7_X, secp224k1_T_7_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224k1_T_8_X, secp224k1_T_8_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224k1_T_9_X, secp224k1_T_9_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224k1_T_10_X, secp224k1_T_10_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224k1_T_11_X, secp224k1_T_11_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224k1_T_12_X, secp224k1_T_12_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224k1_T_13_X, secp224k1_T_13_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224k1_T_14_X, secp224k1_T_14_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224k1_T_15_X, secp224k1_T_15_Y), +}; +#else +#define secp224k1_T NULL +#endif #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED) @@ -333,12 +2654,227 @@ static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_gy[] = { MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA8, 0x08, 0x11, 0x0E, 0xFC, 0xFB, 0xA4, 0x5D), MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x65, 0xC4, 0xA3, 0x26, 0x77, 0xDA, 0x3A, 0x48), }; -static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_n[] = { - MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x41, 0x41, 0x36, 0xD0, 0x8C, 0x5E, 0xD2, 0xBF), - MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3B, 0xA0, 0x48, 0xAF, 0xE6, 0xDC, 0xAE, 0xBA), - MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFE, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF), - MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF), +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_n[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x41, 0x41, 0x36, 0xD0, 0x8C, 0x5E, 0xD2, 0xBF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3B, 0xA0, 0x48, 0xAF, 0xE6, 0xDC, 0xAE, 0xBA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFE, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF), +}; + +#if MBEDTLS_ECP_FIXED_POINT_OPTIM == 1 +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_0_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x98, 0x17, 0xF8, 0x16, 0x5B, 0x81, 0xF2, 0x59), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD9, 0x28, 0xCE, 0x2D, 0xDB, 0xFC, 0x9B, 0x02), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x07, 0x0B, 0x87, 0xCE, 0x95, 0x62, 0xA0, 0x55), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAC, 0xBB, 0xDC, 0xF9, 0x7E, 0x66, 0xBE, 0x79), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_0_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB8, 0xD4, 0x10, 0xFB, 0x8F, 0xD0, 0x47, 0x9C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x19, 0x54, 0x85, 0xA6, 0x48, 0xB4, 0x17, 0xFD), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA8, 0x08, 0x11, 0x0E, 0xFC, 0xFB, 0xA4, 0x5D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x65, 0xC4, 0xA3, 0x26, 0x77, 0xDA, 0x3A, 0x48), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_1_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE7, 0xEE, 0xD7, 0x1E, 0x67, 0x86, 0x32, 0x74), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x23, 0x73, 0xB1, 0xA9, 0xD5, 0xCC, 0x27, 0x78), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1F, 0x0E, 0x11, 0x01, 0x71, 0xFE, 0x92, 0x73), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC6, 0x28, 0x63, 0x6D, 0x72, 0x09, 0xA6, 0xC0), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_1_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCE, 0xE1, 0x69, 0xDC, 0x3E, 0x2C, 0x75, 0xC3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE5, 0xB7, 0x3F, 0x30, 0x26, 0x3C, 0xDF, 0x8E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3D, 0xBE, 0xB9, 0x5D, 0x0E, 0xE8, 0x5E, 0x14), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x01, 0xC3, 0x05, 0xD6, 0xB7, 0xD5, 0x24, 0xFC), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_2_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x13, 0xCF, 0x7B, 0xDC, 0xCD, 0xC3, 0x39, 0x9D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x42, 0xDA, 0xB9, 0xE5, 0x64, 0xA7, 0x47, 0x91), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x76, 0x46, 0xA8, 0x61, 0xF6, 0x23, 0xEB, 0x58), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5C, 0xC1, 0xFF, 0xE4, 0x55, 0xD5, 0xC2, 0xBF), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_2_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC9, 0xBE, 0xB9, 0x59, 0x24, 0x13, 0x4A, 0x2A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x64, 0x45, 0x12, 0xDE, 0xBA, 0x4F, 0xEF, 0x56), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBE, 0x08, 0xBF, 0xC1, 0x66, 0xAA, 0x0A, 0xBC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x36, 0xFE, 0x30, 0x55, 0x31, 0x86, 0xA7, 0xB4), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_3_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1D, 0xBF, 0x18, 0x81, 0x67, 0x27, 0x42, 0xBD), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x08, 0x05, 0x83, 0xA4, 0xDD, 0x57, 0xD3, 0x50), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x20, 0x63, 0xAB, 0xE4, 0x90, 0x70, 0xD0, 0x7C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x71, 0x5D, 0xFD, 0xA0, 0xEF, 0xCF, 0x1C, 0x54), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_3_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x13, 0x80, 0xE4, 0xF6, 0x09, 0xBC, 0x57, 0x90), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x21, 0x9F, 0x6E, 0x88, 0x54, 0x6E, 0x51, 0xF2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF5, 0x5F, 0x85, 0xFB, 0x84, 0x3E, 0x4A, 0xAA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA8, 0x19, 0xF5, 0x55, 0xC9, 0x07, 0xD8, 0xCE), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_4_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1A, 0xB4, 0xC3, 0xD9, 0x5C, 0xA0, 0xD4, 0x90), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0D, 0x30, 0xAF, 0x59, 0x9B, 0xF8, 0x04, 0x85), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4D, 0xA6, 0xFD, 0x66, 0x7B, 0xC3, 0x39, 0x85), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE0, 0xBF, 0xF0, 0xC2, 0xE9, 0x71, 0xA4, 0x9E), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_4_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x14, 0x2D, 0xB9, 0x88, 0x28, 0xF1, 0xBE, 0x78), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x14, 0xF3, 0x1A, 0x0E, 0xB9, 0x01, 0x66, 0x34), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x77, 0xA7, 0xA4, 0xF4, 0x05, 0xD0, 0xAA, 0x53), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x00, 0x39, 0x1E, 0x47, 0xE5, 0x68, 0xC8, 0xC0), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_5_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDD, 0xB9, 0xFC, 0xE0, 0x33, 0x8A, 0x7D, 0x96), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4F, 0x93, 0xA5, 0x53, 0x55, 0x16, 0xB4, 0x6E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE9, 0x5F, 0xEA, 0x9B, 0x29, 0x52, 0x71, 0xDA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB2, 0xF0, 0x24, 0xB8, 0x7D, 0xB7, 0xA0, 0x9B), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_5_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC2, 0x00, 0x27, 0xB2, 0xDF, 0x73, 0xA2, 0xE0), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1D, 0x2E, 0x4D, 0x7C, 0xDE, 0x7A, 0x23, 0x32), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAC, 0x65, 0x60, 0xC7, 0x97, 0x1E, 0xA4, 0x22), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCD, 0x13, 0x5B, 0x77, 0x59, 0xCB, 0x36, 0xE1), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_6_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x99, 0xBC, 0x9F, 0x9E, 0x2D, 0x53, 0x2A, 0xA8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x87, 0x5F, 0x64, 0x9F, 0x1A, 0x19, 0xE6, 0x77), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9E, 0x7B, 0x39, 0xD2, 0xDB, 0x85, 0x84, 0xD5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x83, 0xC7, 0x0D, 0x58, 0x6E, 0x3F, 0x52, 0x15), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_6_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x21, 0x68, 0x19, 0x0B, 0x68, 0xC9, 0x1E, 0xFB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD2, 0x4E, 0x21, 0x49, 0x3D, 0x55, 0xCC, 0x25), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF5, 0xF9, 0x25, 0x45, 0x54, 0x45, 0xB1, 0x0F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA9, 0xB3, 0xF7, 0xCD, 0x80, 0xA4, 0x04, 0x05), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_7_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD4, 0x1E, 0x88, 0xC4, 0xAA, 0x18, 0x7E, 0x45), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4B, 0xAC, 0xD9, 0xB2, 0xA1, 0xC0, 0x71, 0x5D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA9, 0xA2, 0xF1, 0x15, 0xA6, 0x5F, 0x6C, 0x86), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4F, 0x5B, 0x05, 0xBC, 0xB7, 0xC6, 0x4E, 0x72), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_7_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1D, 0x80, 0xF8, 0x5C, 0x20, 0x2A, 0xE1, 0xE2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7C, 0x48, 0x2E, 0x68, 0x82, 0x7F, 0xEB, 0x5F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA2, 0x3B, 0x25, 0xDB, 0x32, 0x4D, 0x88, 0x42), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEE, 0x6E, 0xA6, 0xB6, 0x6D, 0x62, 0x78, 0x22), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_8_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1F, 0x4D, 0x3E, 0x86, 0x58, 0xC3, 0xEB, 0xBA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1A, 0x89, 0x33, 0x18, 0x21, 0x1D, 0x9B, 0xE7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0B, 0x9D, 0xFF, 0xC3, 0x79, 0xC1, 0x88, 0xF8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x28, 0xD4, 0x48, 0x53, 0xE8, 0xAD, 0x21, 0x16), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_8_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF5, 0x7B, 0xDE, 0xCB, 0xD8, 0x39, 0x17, 0x7C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD3, 0xF3, 0x03, 0xF2, 0x5C, 0xBC, 0xC8, 0x8A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x27, 0xAE, 0x4C, 0xB0, 0x16, 0xA4, 0x93, 0x86), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x71, 0x8B, 0x6B, 0xDC, 0xD7, 0x9A, 0x3E, 0x7E), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_9_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD6, 0x2D, 0x7A, 0xD2, 0x59, 0x05, 0xA2, 0x82), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x57, 0x56, 0x09, 0x32, 0xF1, 0xE8, 0xE3, 0x72), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x03, 0xCA, 0xE5, 0x2E, 0xF0, 0xFB, 0x18, 0x19), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBA, 0x85, 0xA9, 0x23, 0x15, 0x31, 0x1F, 0x0E), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_9_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x76, 0xE5, 0xB1, 0x86, 0xB9, 0x6E, 0x8D, 0xD3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6C, 0x77, 0xFC, 0xC9, 0xA3, 0x3F, 0x89, 0xD2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDB, 0x6A, 0xDC, 0x25, 0xB0, 0xC7, 0x41, 0x54), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x02, 0x11, 0x6B, 0xA6, 0x11, 0x62, 0xD4, 0x2D), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_10_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x19, 0x7D, 0x34, 0xB3, 0x20, 0x7F, 0x37, 0xAA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBD, 0xD4, 0x45, 0xE8, 0xC2, 0xE9, 0xC5, 0xEA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5A, 0x32, 0x3B, 0x25, 0x7E, 0x79, 0xAF, 0xE7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3F, 0xE4, 0x54, 0x71, 0xBE, 0x35, 0x4E, 0xD0), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_10_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB0, 0x94, 0xDD, 0x8F, 0xB5, 0xC2, 0xDD, 0x75), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x07, 0x49, 0xE9, 0x1C, 0x2F, 0x08, 0x49, 0xC6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x77, 0xB6, 0x03, 0x88, 0x6F, 0xB8, 0x15, 0x67), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA4, 0xD3, 0x1C, 0xF3, 0xA5, 0xEB, 0x79, 0x01), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_11_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x25, 0xF9, 0x43, 0x88, 0x89, 0x0D, 0x06, 0xEA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x02, 0x2D, 0xF5, 0x98, 0x32, 0xF6, 0xB1, 0x05), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x23, 0x73, 0x8F, 0x2B, 0x50, 0x27, 0x0A, 0xE7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA7, 0xE3, 0xBD, 0x16, 0x05, 0xC8, 0x93, 0x12), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_11_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0A, 0x6A, 0xF7, 0xE3, 0x3D, 0xDE, 0x5F, 0x2F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x47, 0xA3, 0x9C, 0x22, 0x3C, 0x33, 0x36, 0x5D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x20, 0x24, 0x4C, 0x69, 0x45, 0x78, 0x14, 0xAE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x59, 0xF8, 0xD4, 0xBF, 0xB8, 0xC0, 0xA1, 0x25), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_12_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7E, 0x88, 0xE1, 0x91, 0x03, 0xEB, 0xB3, 0x2B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5C, 0x11, 0xA1, 0xEF, 0x14, 0x0D, 0xC4, 0x7D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFE, 0xD4, 0x0D, 0x1D, 0x96, 0x33, 0x5C, 0x19), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x70, 0x45, 0x2A, 0x1A, 0xE6, 0x57, 0x04, 0x9B), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_12_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x70, 0xB5, 0xA7, 0x80, 0xE9, 0x93, 0x97, 0x8D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5D, 0xB9, 0x7C, 0xA0, 0xC9, 0x57, 0x26, 0x43), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9E, 0xEF, 0x56, 0xDA, 0x66, 0xF6, 0x1B, 0x9A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1F, 0x89, 0x6B, 0x91, 0xE0, 0xA9, 0x65, 0x2B), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_13_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x91, 0x98, 0x96, 0x9B, 0x06, 0x7D, 0x5E, 0x5A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0A, 0xFA, 0xC1, 0x5F, 0x19, 0x37, 0x94, 0x9D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCF, 0xBE, 0x6B, 0x1A, 0x05, 0xE4, 0xBF, 0x9F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x84, 0xCD, 0x5D, 0x35, 0xB4, 0x51, 0xF7, 0x64), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_13_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6C, 0xEF, 0x96, 0xDB, 0xF2, 0x61, 0x63, 0x59), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCB, 0x04, 0x88, 0xC9, 0x9F, 0x1B, 0x94, 0xB9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDB, 0x30, 0x79, 0x7E, 0x24, 0xE7, 0x5F, 0xB8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3F, 0xB8, 0x90, 0xB7, 0x94, 0x25, 0xBB, 0x0F), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_14_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x62, 0x79, 0xEA, 0xAD, 0xC0, 0x6D, 0x18, 0x57), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE9, 0xA4, 0x58, 0x2A, 0x8D, 0x95, 0xB3, 0xE6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC8, 0xC4, 0xC2, 0x12, 0x0D, 0x79, 0xE2, 0x2B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x02, 0x6F, 0xBE, 0x97, 0x4D, 0xA4, 0x20, 0x07), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_14_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCA, 0x31, 0x71, 0xC6, 0xA6, 0x91, 0xEB, 0x1F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB4, 0x9B, 0xA8, 0x4A, 0xE7, 0x77, 0xE1, 0xAA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA9, 0x06, 0xD3, 0x3D, 0x94, 0x30, 0xEF, 0x8C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE7, 0xDF, 0xCA, 0xFA, 0xF5, 0x28, 0xF8, 0xC9), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_15_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCC, 0xE1, 0x32, 0xFD, 0x3E, 0x81, 0xF8, 0x11), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCD, 0xF2, 0x4B, 0x1D, 0x19, 0xC9, 0x0F, 0xCC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x59, 0xB1, 0x8A, 0x22, 0x8B, 0x05, 0x6B, 0x56), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x35, 0x21, 0xEF, 0x30, 0xEC, 0x09, 0x2A, 0x89), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_15_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x15, 0x84, 0x4A, 0x46, 0x07, 0x6C, 0x3C, 0x4C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDD, 0x18, 0x3A, 0xF4, 0xCC, 0xF5, 0xB2, 0xF2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4F, 0x8F, 0xCD, 0x0A, 0x9C, 0xF4, 0xBD, 0x95), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x37, 0x89, 0x7F, 0x8A, 0xB1, 0x52, 0x3A, 0xAB), }; +static const mbedtls_ecp_point secp256k1_T[16] = { + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z1(secp256k1_T_0_X, secp256k1_T_0_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256k1_T_1_X, secp256k1_T_1_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256k1_T_2_X, secp256k1_T_2_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256k1_T_3_X, secp256k1_T_3_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256k1_T_4_X, secp256k1_T_4_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256k1_T_5_X, secp256k1_T_5_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256k1_T_6_X, secp256k1_T_6_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256k1_T_7_X, secp256k1_T_7_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256k1_T_8_X, secp256k1_T_8_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256k1_T_9_X, secp256k1_T_9_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256k1_T_10_X, secp256k1_T_10_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256k1_T_11_X, secp256k1_T_11_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256k1_T_12_X, secp256k1_T_12_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256k1_T_13_X, secp256k1_T_13_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256k1_T_14_X, secp256k1_T_14_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256k1_T_15_X, secp256k1_T_15_Y), +}; +#else +#define secp256k1_T NULL +#endif #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED */ /* @@ -381,6 +2917,222 @@ static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_n[] = { MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x71, 0x8D, 0x83, 0x9D, 0x90, 0x0A, 0x66, 0x3E), MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBC, 0xA9, 0xEE, 0xA1, 0xDB, 0x57, 0xFB, 0xA9), }; + +#if MBEDTLS_ECP_FIXED_POINT_OPTIM == 1 +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_0_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x62, 0x32, 0xCE, 0x9A, 0xBD, 0x53, 0x44, 0x3A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC2, 0x23, 0xBD, 0xE3, 0xE1, 0x27, 0xDE, 0xB9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAF, 0xB7, 0x81, 0xFC, 0x2F, 0x48, 0x4B, 0x2C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCB, 0x57, 0x7E, 0xCB, 0xB9, 0xAE, 0xD2, 0x8B), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_0_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x97, 0x69, 0x04, 0x2F, 0xC7, 0x54, 0x1D, 0x5C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x54, 0x8E, 0xED, 0x2D, 0x13, 0x45, 0x77, 0xC2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC9, 0x1D, 0x61, 0x14, 0x1A, 0x46, 0xF8, 0x97), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFD, 0xC4, 0xDA, 0xC3, 0x35, 0xF8, 0x7E, 0x54), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_1_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3C, 0xA2, 0xED, 0x52, 0xC9, 0x8C, 0xE3, 0xA5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x72, 0xC9, 0xC4, 0x87, 0x3F, 0x93, 0x7A, 0xD1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x96, 0x12, 0x53, 0x61, 0x3E, 0x76, 0x08, 0xCB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x09, 0x8C, 0x74, 0xF4, 0x08, 0xC3, 0x76, 0x80), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_1_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x05, 0xDD, 0x09, 0xA6, 0xED, 0xEE, 0xC4, 0x38), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x74, 0xD9, 0xBE, 0x4B, 0xA5, 0xB7, 0x2B, 0x6E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x42, 0x20, 0x12, 0xCA, 0x0A, 0x38, 0x24, 0xAB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x00, 0x72, 0x71, 0x90, 0x7A, 0x2E, 0xB7, 0x23), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_2_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2C, 0x66, 0xA1, 0x93, 0x10, 0x2A, 0x51, 0x17), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x88, 0x10, 0x11, 0x12, 0xBC, 0xB0, 0xB6, 0x93), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3C, 0x58, 0xD7, 0x0A, 0x84, 0x05, 0xA3, 0x9C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF7, 0x8E, 0x95, 0x61, 0xD3, 0x0B, 0xDF, 0x36), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_2_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF9, 0x92, 0x12, 0x0F, 0x5E, 0x87, 0x70, 0x1B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x38, 0xE9, 0x9B, 0xEB, 0x3A, 0xFB, 0xCF, 0xC4), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDC, 0x92, 0xB9, 0xF7, 0x45, 0xD3, 0x06, 0xB6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x82, 0x28, 0x65, 0xE1, 0xC5, 0x6C, 0x57, 0x18), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_3_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x28, 0x0E, 0x77, 0x01, 0x81, 0x9E, 0x38, 0x5C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x71, 0xF0, 0xD5, 0xA5, 0x91, 0x2B, 0xDF, 0xC0), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD8, 0xEE, 0xB6, 0x25, 0xD6, 0x98, 0xDE, 0x2D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7B, 0xA1, 0x55, 0x63, 0x39, 0xEB, 0xB5, 0x47), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_3_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB6, 0xD6, 0xB8, 0xE3, 0x13, 0xED, 0x7F, 0xA3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6C, 0xE8, 0xAE, 0x36, 0xB8, 0xCD, 0x19, 0x02), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF9, 0x82, 0x83, 0x7A, 0x7B, 0x46, 0x56, 0xE8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4E, 0x60, 0x46, 0x15, 0x5A, 0xAC, 0x99, 0x30), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_4_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBF, 0x61, 0x50, 0xC6, 0xFF, 0x10, 0x7D, 0x04), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x92, 0x51, 0xDF, 0xA9, 0x7D, 0x78, 0x26, 0x74), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x56, 0x15, 0x9A, 0xF7, 0x01, 0xC1, 0xBB, 0x40), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x26, 0x0F, 0xE6, 0x2A, 0xBD, 0x4A, 0x9E, 0x87), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_4_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x57, 0xF8, 0xD1, 0x77, 0xD2, 0x49, 0xB3, 0xDD), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x36, 0x86, 0xFB, 0x9E, 0x1F, 0x5A, 0x60, 0x47), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x98, 0xC4, 0x8D, 0xCD, 0x86, 0x61, 0x2F, 0xF9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x41, 0xF6, 0xB9, 0xAC, 0x37, 0x9D, 0xE9, 0x28), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_5_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFA, 0x77, 0xAA, 0x97, 0x9C, 0x0B, 0x04, 0x20), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x80, 0xA6, 0x60, 0x81, 0xCE, 0x25, 0x13, 0x3E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x24, 0x00, 0xF3, 0xBB, 0x82, 0x99, 0x95, 0xB7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x47, 0x5A, 0xCE, 0x90, 0x71, 0x38, 0x2F, 0x10), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_5_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA7, 0x1A, 0xC0, 0x84, 0x27, 0xD6, 0x9D, 0xB7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x34, 0x37, 0x52, 0x16, 0x13, 0x0E, 0xCE, 0x92), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1E, 0xBF, 0x5A, 0xDB, 0xDB, 0x6E, 0x1E, 0x69), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3E, 0xB7, 0x5E, 0xF9, 0x86, 0xDD, 0x8A, 0x5C), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_6_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3D, 0xAB, 0x5C, 0x8D, 0x1D, 0xF2, 0x2D, 0x1E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x65, 0xC5, 0xF8, 0xF7, 0x1D, 0x96, 0x0B, 0x4D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAC, 0x4C, 0xA7, 0x45, 0x20, 0x6A, 0x1E, 0x5B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x21, 0x5D, 0xEF, 0xDE, 0xEE, 0x39, 0x44, 0x19), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_6_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4B, 0x2F, 0x6D, 0x52, 0xC9, 0x58, 0x60, 0xE8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC3, 0xC9, 0x62, 0xCB, 0x38, 0x3C, 0x55, 0xCA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xA5, 0x09, 0x10, 0x88, 0xDB, 0xE3, 0xBD), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x52, 0xE0, 0x3C, 0xCE, 0x06, 0x0B, 0x4B, 0x5D), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_7_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB1, 0x1D, 0xB4, 0x10, 0x76, 0x8F, 0xBA, 0x09), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x57, 0x70, 0x5A, 0x07, 0xF5, 0x1A, 0x74, 0xC7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0B, 0xE9, 0x94, 0xA8, 0xC0, 0xD5, 0x4A, 0x4A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3E, 0x6D, 0xD4, 0xE8, 0x9B, 0xE9, 0x6D, 0x0E), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_7_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x65, 0x00, 0x32, 0x41, 0x57, 0x84, 0x89, 0x52), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEE, 0xC7, 0x14, 0xEC, 0xE9, 0x27, 0xFF, 0xF3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9A, 0x67, 0x9E, 0xFB, 0xB6, 0xB8, 0x96, 0xF3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE5, 0x4A, 0xE3, 0x97, 0x4B, 0x58, 0xDE, 0x30), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_8_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA6, 0x1E, 0x5C, 0xF5, 0x7F, 0xD5, 0xD4, 0xAA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5D, 0x08, 0x7A, 0xF1, 0xBD, 0x89, 0xC7, 0x1E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3A, 0xF9, 0x11, 0x1B, 0xF5, 0x3C, 0x6D, 0x8C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x19, 0x50, 0xE5, 0x69, 0x1D, 0x59, 0xFC, 0x0C), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_8_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF1, 0x2F, 0xF8, 0x3F, 0xEC, 0x55, 0x99, 0x57), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x41, 0xA7, 0x29, 0x90, 0x43, 0x81, 0x31, 0x4C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC3, 0x18, 0x44, 0x50, 0x5D, 0x76, 0xCB, 0xDD), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF0, 0xC5, 0x5B, 0x9A, 0x03, 0xE6, 0x17, 0x39), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_9_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x21, 0x89, 0xFC, 0x55, 0x94, 0x91, 0x6A, 0xA2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x74, 0x46, 0x35, 0xF2, 0x3A, 0x42, 0x08, 0x2F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD3, 0xD2, 0x76, 0x49, 0x42, 0x87, 0xD3, 0x7F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x90, 0xEA, 0xA0, 0x52, 0xF1, 0x6A, 0x30, 0x57), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_9_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x00, 0xB2, 0x57, 0xA3, 0x8A, 0x4D, 0x1B, 0x3C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFC, 0xA3, 0x99, 0x94, 0xB5, 0x3D, 0x64, 0x09), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x35, 0xC3, 0xD7, 0x53, 0xF6, 0x49, 0x1C, 0x60), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x27, 0x23, 0x41, 0x4D, 0xFB, 0x7A, 0x5C, 0x53), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_10_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCA, 0xB8, 0x15, 0x65, 0x5C, 0x85, 0x94, 0xD7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAC, 0x37, 0xC7, 0xF8, 0x7E, 0xAE, 0x6C, 0x10), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x53, 0xD8, 0x11, 0x54, 0x98, 0x44, 0xE3, 0xF1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE4, 0x4D, 0xA6, 0x4B, 0x28, 0xF2, 0x57, 0x9E), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_10_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF6, 0xD0, 0xEB, 0x1E, 0xAA, 0x30, 0xD3, 0x6A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x58, 0x9B, 0x4D, 0xA7, 0x73, 0x6E, 0xB6, 0x45), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5D, 0x47, 0xF6, 0xED, 0x37, 0xEF, 0x71, 0x4D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA8, 0xB5, 0x49, 0x61, 0x5E, 0x45, 0xF6, 0x4A), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_11_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEF, 0x0E, 0xB3, 0x84, 0x3A, 0x63, 0x72, 0x84), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6D, 0x53, 0x5C, 0xA7, 0xC6, 0x2E, 0xAB, 0x9E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEB, 0x0F, 0x8F, 0x87, 0x50, 0x28, 0xB4, 0xAE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5C, 0x98, 0x4A, 0x98, 0x31, 0x86, 0xCA, 0x51), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_11_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBE, 0xC9, 0xE2, 0xFD, 0x5D, 0x1F, 0xE8, 0xC2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD5, 0x90, 0x91, 0xC4, 0x84, 0xF0, 0xBA, 0xC5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6C, 0x5A, 0xB3, 0x4E, 0xFB, 0xE0, 0x57, 0xE8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6B, 0x0B, 0x90, 0xA6, 0xFD, 0x9D, 0x8E, 0x02), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_12_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF8, 0x41, 0x8F, 0x31, 0xFA, 0x5A, 0xF6, 0x33), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAC, 0xE9, 0xE3, 0xF6, 0xE0, 0x4A, 0xE7, 0xD2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x84, 0x4E, 0xCD, 0xA2, 0x22, 0x14, 0xD4, 0x12), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7C, 0xED, 0x21, 0xB7, 0x0F, 0x53, 0x10, 0x17), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_12_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x05, 0x06, 0x24, 0x2C, 0x4E, 0xD1, 0x1E, 0x9F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD7, 0x3F, 0xC1, 0x9F, 0xAB, 0xF0, 0x37, 0x95), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x03, 0x5E, 0x12, 0xCE, 0x83, 0x1B, 0x2A, 0x18), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x61, 0x65, 0xCF, 0xE8, 0x5C, 0xA5, 0xA2, 0x70), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_13_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB8, 0x86, 0x76, 0x3A, 0x94, 0xF6, 0x1D, 0xC1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1D, 0xDA, 0xC9, 0xA6, 0x29, 0x93, 0x15, 0x10), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6D, 0x61, 0x6A, 0x7D, 0xC7, 0xA9, 0xF3, 0x76), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4A, 0x03, 0x71, 0xA2, 0x15, 0xCE, 0x50, 0x72), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_13_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB6, 0xD0, 0xA8, 0x1E, 0x91, 0xC4, 0x4F, 0x24), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2D, 0x4B, 0x7E, 0xD7, 0x71, 0x58, 0x7E, 0x1E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x93, 0x45, 0xAF, 0x2A, 0x18, 0x93, 0x95, 0x3B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1B, 0x8F, 0xC7, 0xFA, 0x4C, 0x7A, 0x86, 0x54), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_14_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x97, 0xAF, 0x68, 0x3A, 0x23, 0xC1, 0x2E, 0xBF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x89, 0x50, 0x11, 0x67, 0x39, 0xB9, 0xAF, 0x48), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x19, 0x86, 0xAA, 0x1E, 0x88, 0x21, 0x29, 0x8B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCD, 0x28, 0xA4, 0x9D, 0x89, 0xA9, 0x9A, 0x10), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_14_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x91, 0xBA, 0x04, 0x67, 0xB7, 0x01, 0x40, 0x38), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x08, 0xE9, 0x09, 0xA3, 0xCA, 0xA6, 0x37, 0xF6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6C, 0x97, 0xA8, 0xB6, 0x3C, 0xEE, 0x90, 0x3D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDC, 0xED, 0xC4, 0xF7, 0xC3, 0x95, 0xEC, 0x85), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_15_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF5, 0x84, 0xBD, 0xEB, 0xD5, 0x64, 0xBB, 0x9D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDB, 0x9B, 0xE2, 0x28, 0x50, 0xC2, 0x72, 0x40), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x39, 0xF2, 0x74, 0xD1, 0x26, 0xBF, 0x32, 0x68), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x36, 0xCB, 0xAF, 0x72, 0xDB, 0x6D, 0x30, 0x98), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_15_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB3, 0x50, 0x85, 0xF4, 0x2B, 0x48, 0xC1, 0xAD), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC0, 0x28, 0xBB, 0x11, 0xBA, 0x5B, 0x22, 0x6C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAD, 0xA1, 0xE5, 0x5C, 0xC9, 0x1D, 0x44, 0x45), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD4, 0xE8, 0xE6, 0x6F, 0xBB, 0xC1, 0x81, 0x7F), +}; +static const mbedtls_ecp_point brainpoolP256r1_T[16] = { + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z1(brainpoolP256r1_T_0_X, brainpoolP256r1_T_0_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP256r1_T_1_X, brainpoolP256r1_T_1_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP256r1_T_2_X, brainpoolP256r1_T_2_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP256r1_T_3_X, brainpoolP256r1_T_3_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP256r1_T_4_X, brainpoolP256r1_T_4_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP256r1_T_5_X, brainpoolP256r1_T_5_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP256r1_T_6_X, brainpoolP256r1_T_6_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP256r1_T_7_X, brainpoolP256r1_T_7_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP256r1_T_8_X, brainpoolP256r1_T_8_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP256r1_T_9_X, brainpoolP256r1_T_9_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP256r1_T_10_X, brainpoolP256r1_T_10_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP256r1_T_11_X, brainpoolP256r1_T_11_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP256r1_T_12_X, brainpoolP256r1_T_12_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP256r1_T_13_X, brainpoolP256r1_T_13_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP256r1_T_14_X, brainpoolP256r1_T_14_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP256r1_T_15_X, brainpoolP256r1_T_15_Y), +}; +#else +#define brainpoolP256r1_T NULL +#endif + #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED */ /* @@ -435,6 +3187,558 @@ static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_n[] = { MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDF, 0x41, 0xE6, 0x50, 0x7E, 0x6F, 0x5D, 0x0F), MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x28, 0x6D, 0x38, 0xA3, 0x82, 0x1E, 0xB9, 0x8C), }; + +#if MBEDTLS_ECP_FIXED_POINT_OPTIM == 1 +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_0_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1E, 0xAF, 0xD4, 0x47, 0xE2, 0xB2, 0x87, 0xEF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAA, 0x46, 0xD6, 0x36, 0x34, 0xE0, 0x26, 0xE8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE8, 0x10, 0xBD, 0x0C, 0xFE, 0xCA, 0x7F, 0xDB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE3, 0x4F, 0xF1, 0x7E, 0xE7, 0xA3, 0x47, 0x88), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6B, 0x3F, 0xC1, 0xB7, 0x81, 0x3A, 0xA6, 0xA2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0x45, 0xCF, 0x68, 0xF0, 0x64, 0x1C, 0x1D), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_0_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x15, 0x53, 0x3C, 0x26, 0x41, 0x03, 0x82, 0x42), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x11, 0x81, 0x91, 0x77, 0x21, 0x46, 0x46, 0x0E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x28, 0x29, 0x91, 0xF9, 0x4F, 0x05, 0x9C, 0xE1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x64, 0x58, 0xEC, 0xFE, 0x29, 0x0B, 0xB7, 0x62), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x52, 0xD5, 0xCF, 0x95, 0x8E, 0xEB, 0xB1, 0x5C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA4, 0xC2, 0xF9, 0x20, 0x75, 0x1D, 0xBE, 0x8A), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_1_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x93, 0xD8, 0x8A, 0x54, 0x41, 0xD6, 0x6B, 0x1D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE2, 0x3B, 0xF1, 0x22, 0xFD, 0x2D, 0x4B, 0x03), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x01, 0x55, 0xE3, 0x33, 0xF0, 0x73, 0x52, 0x5A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC1, 0x3F, 0x30, 0x26, 0xCA, 0x7F, 0x52, 0xA3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD3, 0x6E, 0x17, 0x9B, 0xD5, 0x2A, 0x4A, 0x31), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x86, 0xDA, 0x6B, 0xE5, 0x03, 0x07, 0x1D, 0x2E), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_1_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x51, 0x7A, 0xAF, 0x98, 0xE3, 0xA4, 0xF6, 0x19), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEC, 0x7D, 0xFE, 0x51, 0x40, 0x3B, 0x47, 0xD2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFC, 0x88, 0xEC, 0xC4, 0xE2, 0x8F, 0xCB, 0xA4), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x30, 0xE2, 0x88, 0x2D, 0x4E, 0x50, 0xEB, 0x9A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x13, 0x54, 0x94, 0x5E, 0xF4, 0x7F, 0x3A, 0x04), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCD, 0x07, 0x1C, 0xE1, 0xBD, 0x0F, 0xF8, 0x63), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_2_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x94, 0x92, 0x28, 0x2E, 0x32, 0x04, 0xB1, 0x4D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x25, 0x82, 0x44, 0x43, 0x76, 0x0D, 0x55, 0xBF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5B, 0xE3, 0xFF, 0x89, 0x46, 0xDE, 0x4E, 0xFE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5B, 0x22, 0xBB, 0x67, 0x1A, 0x81, 0xEE, 0x27), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC8, 0x54, 0xE2, 0x7A, 0xAE, 0xDA, 0x2C, 0xD0), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x74, 0x9A, 0x90, 0xAA, 0x6E, 0x8B, 0xCC, 0x5F), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_2_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x16, 0x40, 0xAC, 0xED, 0x7D, 0x37, 0x87, 0xAC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x98, 0xF8, 0xB1, 0x80, 0x4C, 0x8C, 0x04, 0x42), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC2, 0x98, 0x2C, 0xAD, 0x30, 0x69, 0x35, 0xC0), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x32, 0x2E, 0x00, 0x2F, 0x44, 0x8C, 0xF0, 0xC0), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x16, 0x58, 0x07, 0xD7, 0xCD, 0x60, 0xA1, 0x5B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAF, 0xFB, 0x7B, 0x03, 0x05, 0x5E, 0x79, 0x73), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_3_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC8, 0x17, 0xCE, 0x38, 0x4B, 0x5E, 0x5B, 0xC8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x60, 0x0E, 0x0A, 0x61, 0x9D, 0x7C, 0x62, 0x08), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x25, 0xF0, 0x98, 0x71, 0x7F, 0x17, 0x26, 0xD7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x83, 0xD3, 0xFA, 0x3C, 0xF0, 0x70, 0x07, 0x82), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x29, 0x47, 0x5C, 0x09, 0x43, 0xB7, 0x65, 0x15), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0E, 0xA9, 0xA7, 0x3E, 0xFA, 0xF3, 0xEC, 0x22), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_3_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDA, 0x78, 0x22, 0x2B, 0x58, 0x71, 0xFA, 0xAA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x00, 0x30, 0xCE, 0x6A, 0xB3, 0xB0, 0x4F, 0x83), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCF, 0x95, 0x20, 0xA9, 0x23, 0xC2, 0x65, 0xE7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x55, 0xCF, 0x03, 0x5B, 0x8A, 0x80, 0x44, 0xBB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5C, 0xF8, 0x91, 0xF7, 0xD5, 0xED, 0xEA, 0x81), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x40, 0x5B, 0x16, 0x10, 0x25, 0xAC, 0x2A, 0x17), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_4_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF2, 0xEC, 0xDC, 0xC4, 0x7B, 0x8C, 0x6B, 0xE9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2B, 0xBB, 0x1C, 0xD3, 0x5A, 0xEE, 0xD9, 0x97), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x64, 0x5D, 0x30, 0x5E, 0xF7, 0xB2, 0x41, 0x9D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xED, 0xCE, 0x0F, 0x1A, 0xC6, 0x41, 0x64, 0x62), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF2, 0x18, 0xE1, 0xE3, 0x82, 0x15, 0x66, 0x4B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9B, 0xE2, 0x24, 0x04, 0x72, 0x39, 0xA0, 0x7C), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_4_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2B, 0x51, 0xA2, 0x58, 0x88, 0x62, 0xE1, 0x02), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x58, 0xD2, 0x65, 0x14, 0xE9, 0x4C, 0x82, 0x30), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDC, 0xE1, 0xAC, 0x87, 0xAE, 0x31, 0x1A, 0x7A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x85, 0x4F, 0x96, 0x1E, 0x85, 0x7A, 0xC3, 0x2B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF0, 0x86, 0xBB, 0xF0, 0xC0, 0x9D, 0x08, 0x7B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBD, 0x53, 0x03, 0x09, 0x80, 0x91, 0xEF, 0x68), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_5_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2D, 0xD7, 0xAF, 0x6F, 0x69, 0x7B, 0x88, 0xA1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAF, 0x13, 0xE4, 0x30, 0xA2, 0x47, 0xB5, 0xC1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0F, 0xD2, 0xC0, 0xDD, 0x8A, 0x1C, 0x3C, 0xF2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF9, 0x8C, 0xB3, 0x4C, 0xBA, 0x8B, 0x6D, 0xCF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6B, 0xC7, 0xA1, 0xA8, 0x6E, 0x3C, 0x4F, 0xF1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x94, 0x4A, 0x97, 0xC8, 0x03, 0x6F, 0x01, 0x82), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_5_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x74, 0x18, 0x12, 0xA9, 0x39, 0xD5, 0x22, 0x26), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x47, 0xA7, 0xC0, 0xBD, 0x9D, 0x8D, 0x78, 0x38), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA9, 0xB3, 0xD0, 0x7F, 0xDF, 0xD0, 0x30, 0xDE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x37, 0x25, 0x73, 0x96, 0xEC, 0xA8, 0x1D, 0x7C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x91, 0xD1, 0x65, 0x66, 0xDC, 0xD9, 0xCF, 0xDF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x95, 0xED, 0x7B, 0x37, 0xAD, 0xE2, 0xBE, 0x2D), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_6_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x50, 0x79, 0x42, 0x6A, 0x07, 0x66, 0xB1, 0xBD), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x45, 0x53, 0x62, 0x65, 0x92, 0x09, 0x4C, 0xA1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x06, 0xAF, 0xC3, 0x03, 0xF6, 0xF4, 0x2D, 0x9B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE8, 0xCA, 0x41, 0xD9, 0xA2, 0x69, 0x9B, 0xC9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4B, 0xB2, 0xA6, 0x8D, 0xE1, 0xAA, 0x61, 0x76), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x11, 0xBA, 0x4D, 0x12, 0xB6, 0xBE, 0xF3, 0x7E), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_6_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCA, 0xD9, 0x92, 0x22, 0x07, 0xCE, 0xC9, 0x26), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x62, 0xA1, 0x7C, 0x91, 0xDB, 0x32, 0xF7, 0xE5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6D, 0x49, 0x4B, 0x6D, 0xFB, 0xD9, 0x70, 0x3B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1C, 0xFB, 0x4E, 0x4C, 0x5E, 0x66, 0x81, 0x1D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA5, 0xB3, 0xE1, 0x00, 0xB7, 0xD9, 0xCC, 0x58), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF3, 0x36, 0x8B, 0xC4, 0x39, 0x20, 0xFD, 0x30), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_7_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x94, 0x1F, 0x60, 0x03, 0xBB, 0xD7, 0x60, 0x57), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x72, 0x3C, 0x62, 0xDD, 0x71, 0x95, 0xE9, 0x61), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB0, 0x5B, 0x7A, 0x5F, 0x68, 0x81, 0xC5, 0x90), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1E, 0xAF, 0xB5, 0xB9, 0x98, 0x42, 0x28, 0xA5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0C, 0x29, 0x8E, 0x11, 0x49, 0xB4, 0xD7, 0x20), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9B, 0x3E, 0xD2, 0x30, 0xA1, 0xBA, 0xCA, 0x03), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_7_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x29, 0x37, 0x64, 0x44, 0x2F, 0x03, 0xE5, 0x41), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4A, 0x42, 0xBC, 0xFF, 0xA2, 0x1A, 0x5F, 0x06), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1D, 0x04, 0xAB, 0x04, 0xE0, 0x24, 0xAD, 0x2A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3D, 0x45, 0x17, 0x67, 0x1F, 0x3E, 0x53, 0xF8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xED, 0x0F, 0xB3, 0x1B, 0x57, 0x54, 0xC2, 0x03), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x59, 0xD3, 0xF8, 0xC4, 0x1B, 0x9B, 0xFA, 0x30), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_8_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x37, 0x90, 0xFD, 0xFB, 0xCA, 0x49, 0x38, 0x4E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC3, 0xCF, 0xC6, 0xDD, 0xF0, 0xFF, 0x8C, 0x11), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD7, 0x69, 0x9D, 0xBD, 0x5F, 0x33, 0xE9, 0xB4), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x47, 0x19, 0x82, 0x3D, 0xAC, 0x1C, 0x40, 0x23), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x40, 0xC7, 0x02, 0x46, 0x14, 0x77, 0x00, 0xBE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC9, 0x05, 0xF2, 0x77, 0x3A, 0x66, 0x5C, 0x39), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_8_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1E, 0xE6, 0x17, 0xDE, 0xB2, 0xA1, 0xE5, 0xB8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC7, 0x71, 0xEC, 0x9D, 0xD8, 0xF5, 0xD4, 0x66), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAA, 0xC6, 0x42, 0x5E, 0xE7, 0x18, 0xBA, 0xD0), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC5, 0x21, 0x68, 0x5A, 0x26, 0xFB, 0xD7, 0x17), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x26, 0x00, 0x5C, 0xBA, 0x8A, 0x34, 0xEC, 0x75), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC3, 0x9C, 0x3C, 0xAF, 0x53, 0xE8, 0x65, 0x35), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_9_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBE, 0xEF, 0x28, 0xDC, 0x67, 0x05, 0xC8, 0xDF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0B, 0x78, 0xC3, 0x85, 0x49, 0xA0, 0xBC, 0x0F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x10, 0x3E, 0x2D, 0xA0, 0xCF, 0xD4, 0x7A, 0xF5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x36, 0x93, 0xFE, 0x60, 0xB3, 0x6E, 0x99, 0xE2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x62, 0xAD, 0x04, 0xE7, 0x49, 0xAF, 0x5E, 0xE3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x54, 0x7A, 0xED, 0xA6, 0x9E, 0x18, 0x09, 0x31), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_9_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE8, 0x05, 0x94, 0x44, 0xDC, 0xB8, 0x85, 0x94), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x14, 0xB7, 0x37, 0xC2, 0x50, 0x75, 0x15, 0xDA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD6, 0xC6, 0x0F, 0xB2, 0xA9, 0x91, 0x3E, 0xE8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB9, 0x81, 0xAD, 0x25, 0xA1, 0x26, 0x73, 0x15), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFD, 0xF1, 0xD1, 0x61, 0x7C, 0x76, 0x8F, 0x13), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x06, 0xDB, 0x4A, 0xFF, 0x14, 0xA7, 0x48, 0x0B), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_10_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2A, 0x73, 0xC6, 0xC2, 0xCC, 0xF1, 0x57, 0x04), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB6, 0xED, 0x73, 0x27, 0x70, 0x82, 0xB6, 0x5E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0B, 0xBA, 0xAC, 0x3A, 0xCF, 0xF4, 0xEA, 0xA6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x99, 0xD6, 0xB1, 0x8F, 0x0E, 0x08, 0x2C, 0x5E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x17, 0xE3, 0x8F, 0x2F, 0x0E, 0xA1, 0xF3, 0x07), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1A, 0xF5, 0x7C, 0x9B, 0x29, 0x0A, 0xF6, 0x28), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_10_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBD, 0xEE, 0x17, 0x47, 0x34, 0x15, 0xA3, 0xAF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFB, 0xBE, 0x88, 0x48, 0xE7, 0xA2, 0xBB, 0xDE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC5, 0xAD, 0xDC, 0x65, 0x61, 0x37, 0x0F, 0xC1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFA, 0x67, 0xAD, 0xA2, 0x3A, 0x1C, 0x91, 0x78), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x55, 0x07, 0x0C, 0x3A, 0x41, 0x6E, 0x13, 0x28), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x73, 0xBD, 0x7E, 0xED, 0xAA, 0x14, 0xDD, 0x61), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_11_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC3, 0xDC, 0x20, 0x01, 0x72, 0x11, 0x48, 0x55), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1E, 0xC4, 0x7B, 0xF8, 0x62, 0x3D, 0xF0, 0x9F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE8, 0xC2, 0x3D, 0x2E, 0x52, 0xA3, 0x4A, 0x89), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCE, 0xE2, 0x53, 0x46, 0x5E, 0x21, 0xF8, 0xCE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC2, 0xC7, 0x8F, 0xA9, 0x26, 0x42, 0x32, 0x3A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFB, 0xA6, 0xA0, 0x8D, 0x4B, 0x9A, 0x19, 0x03), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_11_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEA, 0xAB, 0x6D, 0x1E, 0xFB, 0xEE, 0x60, 0x0C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB6, 0x56, 0x3C, 0xC5, 0x5D, 0x10, 0x79, 0x1C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x25, 0xBC, 0x41, 0x9F, 0x71, 0xEF, 0x02, 0xF9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA2, 0x36, 0xC4, 0xD0, 0x88, 0x9B, 0x32, 0xFC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9C, 0xD4, 0x5D, 0x17, 0x39, 0xE6, 0x22, 0x2C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7B, 0x26, 0x01, 0xCE, 0xBE, 0x4A, 0x9C, 0x27), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_12_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEF, 0x6D, 0x11, 0xCA, 0x6C, 0x5A, 0x93, 0x0C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEB, 0x96, 0x26, 0xAF, 0x2F, 0xE4, 0x30, 0x98), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x35, 0xC1, 0x4C, 0xC6, 0x30, 0x1F, 0x5C, 0x04), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x59, 0xB3, 0xE8, 0xFC, 0x35, 0xEB, 0x63, 0x6C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9C, 0x1D, 0xCA, 0xFC, 0x50, 0x36, 0x4B, 0x96), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE4, 0x0E, 0x23, 0x5B, 0xAF, 0xEB, 0x2D, 0x31), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_12_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC6, 0x88, 0xB6, 0xD7, 0x74, 0x4A, 0x23, 0xB6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEF, 0x66, 0xE2, 0xBB, 0x29, 0xA6, 0x4F, 0x55), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE9, 0x6F, 0x7E, 0x68, 0x6E, 0xA0, 0x14, 0x94), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3B, 0x73, 0xD4, 0xE8, 0xAB, 0x5B, 0xF6, 0x0D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x46, 0xE0, 0x3C, 0x24, 0x00, 0x95, 0xE9, 0xAD), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x37, 0x0D, 0x4F, 0x81, 0xD0, 0xF2, 0x3F, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_13_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x99, 0x1D, 0xCD, 0x78, 0x39, 0xC4, 0x6B, 0xD9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x81, 0x45, 0xC7, 0xB8, 0x2F, 0xAA, 0x5D, 0xE3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x33, 0x8C, 0x6E, 0xA3, 0x24, 0xB2, 0xDB, 0x4B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x69, 0x2D, 0xD9, 0xF1, 0xC7, 0x9B, 0x8A, 0xAF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x67, 0xE1, 0x2C, 0xB9, 0x40, 0x37, 0x91, 0x75), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x81, 0x2C, 0xB5, 0x23, 0x03, 0x2B, 0xAF, 0x2F), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_13_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2F, 0x9D, 0x5A, 0x20, 0x10, 0xA9, 0x84, 0xDA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x61, 0x30, 0x89, 0x20, 0x13, 0xE9, 0xB2, 0xCA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB6, 0x6E, 0x52, 0xEB, 0x03, 0x18, 0x1F, 0xA6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6C, 0x9E, 0x1C, 0x35, 0x87, 0x92, 0x69, 0xC7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA1, 0xC9, 0x88, 0xAF, 0xC6, 0x6C, 0x83, 0x72), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCB, 0xD5, 0x7A, 0x54, 0x34, 0x99, 0xB6, 0x6F), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_14_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDF, 0xAD, 0x45, 0x9B, 0x4B, 0x41, 0x4D, 0x50), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1B, 0x5D, 0xAB, 0x7F, 0x35, 0x34, 0xE9, 0x29), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x73, 0xBE, 0x78, 0x34, 0x44, 0xF3, 0x4A, 0x87), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFB, 0xDE, 0xE3, 0xC4, 0xEE, 0x0B, 0xF9, 0xEB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5E, 0x86, 0x16, 0x48, 0x32, 0xB8, 0x74, 0x41), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF2, 0xEE, 0x7C, 0xBA, 0xBD, 0x81, 0xE3, 0x55), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_14_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF8, 0x6A, 0xFA, 0x84, 0xDA, 0xB8, 0xD5, 0x14), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB2, 0x9F, 0x8A, 0xD5, 0x1B, 0x2E, 0x1A, 0x0B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5F, 0x0C, 0x61, 0xE2, 0xFF, 0x5B, 0xE6, 0xD5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0E, 0x62, 0xC1, 0x87, 0x53, 0x1B, 0x92, 0xA3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x54, 0x90, 0x00, 0xD1, 0x6A, 0x0C, 0x0E, 0x28), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8B, 0x2E, 0xB5, 0x3B, 0x44, 0xB5, 0xA0, 0x78), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_15_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB8, 0x5D, 0x02, 0x58, 0xB5, 0xBE, 0x45, 0x14), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAD, 0xEF, 0x8E, 0x90, 0x4D, 0x2A, 0x32, 0xAC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x48, 0x99, 0x75, 0x5C, 0x0A, 0x33, 0x8F, 0x36), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC8, 0x6C, 0x95, 0xD4, 0x1F, 0xF3, 0xEB, 0xDA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC2, 0xE4, 0x4C, 0x91, 0x20, 0xF3, 0x25, 0xEB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF1, 0x95, 0xEB, 0x29, 0x6F, 0x20, 0x34, 0x81), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_15_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2D, 0x15, 0xE5, 0x13, 0x7E, 0x64, 0x8B, 0xAD), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA7, 0xBC, 0x0D, 0x18, 0x7E, 0x37, 0x9E, 0xFA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE8, 0x82, 0x20, 0xF7, 0x2D, 0x7A, 0x77, 0x52), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCB, 0x29, 0xA2, 0xDB, 0x7A, 0xE6, 0x6F, 0xA5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA0, 0xC6, 0x50, 0x5C, 0xBC, 0xE6, 0x4F, 0xBD), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1E, 0x9F, 0xD5, 0xE8, 0xC5, 0x3D, 0xB7, 0x30), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_16_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x45, 0x03, 0x55, 0x10, 0xDB, 0xA6, 0x8B, 0x22), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4E, 0x17, 0xAE, 0x78, 0xC9, 0x1D, 0x43, 0xCA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4E, 0x35, 0x49, 0xD4, 0x47, 0x84, 0x8D, 0x20), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF3, 0x95, 0x2F, 0xEA, 0xBC, 0xB4, 0x18, 0xB3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD4, 0x48, 0xAE, 0x89, 0xF5, 0x65, 0x3D, 0x89), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x86, 0xF2, 0x2B, 0x20, 0xD1, 0x75, 0x50, 0x63), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_16_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAD, 0xE6, 0x5C, 0x2C, 0xE0, 0x7D, 0xDF, 0x2D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3E, 0x07, 0x3E, 0xCE, 0x9F, 0x18, 0xB6, 0x05), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9A, 0xF8, 0xF0, 0xD5, 0xFA, 0x42, 0x1D, 0x6D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x41, 0x6C, 0x1D, 0x03, 0xC9, 0x0E, 0x2B, 0x2F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x43, 0x18, 0x52, 0xA5, 0xB4, 0x63, 0xE1, 0x06), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB7, 0x0A, 0xD9, 0xC4, 0xFD, 0x16, 0x60, 0x54), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_17_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x43, 0x7D, 0xDE, 0xDF, 0x4B, 0x4A, 0xB0, 0xCB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB0, 0x4E, 0x8C, 0x94, 0xC1, 0xE2, 0x85, 0xDF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4F, 0xF0, 0xEA, 0xB5, 0x9B, 0x70, 0xEF, 0x10), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x56, 0xC2, 0x39, 0x5D, 0xF3, 0x2C, 0xD9, 0x2C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0D, 0x1C, 0x2E, 0xCC, 0x2F, 0x54, 0x87, 0x80), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB0, 0x72, 0xC7, 0xB5, 0x50, 0xA3, 0x84, 0x77), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_17_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB7, 0xD1, 0xAF, 0xA9, 0xB4, 0x8B, 0x5D, 0xFA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC8, 0xF6, 0x52, 0x8A, 0xC3, 0x56, 0xA5, 0x5E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3B, 0x52, 0xFF, 0xEA, 0x05, 0x42, 0x77, 0x83), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x29, 0x08, 0x90, 0x72, 0x86, 0xC4, 0xC3, 0xB8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4D, 0x15, 0xF8, 0xF1, 0x16, 0x67, 0xC6, 0xD5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x75, 0x87, 0xAC, 0x8F, 0x71, 0xEC, 0x83, 0x81), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_18_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x91, 0xE1, 0xE6, 0x2D, 0x0E, 0x11, 0xA1, 0x62), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x74, 0xE2, 0xA8, 0x32, 0xE6, 0xE3, 0x83, 0xD1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x50, 0x56, 0xE5, 0xCD, 0xB7, 0x2B, 0x67, 0x6F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE5, 0xED, 0xC9, 0x65, 0x6D, 0x87, 0xE1, 0x8E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x50, 0x8E, 0xFD, 0x9A, 0x53, 0x0E, 0xFA, 0xA3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x49, 0x4C, 0x4A, 0xE2, 0x23, 0x84, 0xFA, 0x01), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_18_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB4, 0xFE, 0x49, 0x81, 0xD1, 0x3E, 0xF4, 0x7C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x45, 0x72, 0xE0, 0xEF, 0x0D, 0xB8, 0x3E, 0x6F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3C, 0x00, 0x0F, 0x5F, 0xCE, 0x60, 0x72, 0x2C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB7, 0xCC, 0xD8, 0x03, 0x07, 0x6E, 0x5A, 0xCD), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x27, 0x3A, 0x35, 0x50, 0x4E, 0x1F, 0xCA, 0x5F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x58, 0xEA, 0x88, 0x55, 0xBD, 0x6E, 0x05, 0x7F), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_19_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB1, 0x6D, 0xF1, 0x97, 0xA6, 0x69, 0x39, 0x24), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0B, 0x41, 0x99, 0xFF, 0x3B, 0xA1, 0x26, 0xEC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x95, 0x2F, 0x95, 0x80, 0x12, 0x4A, 0x1B, 0xCB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEA, 0xBF, 0x51, 0xAA, 0xAE, 0x2D, 0xDA, 0xCF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0C, 0x1C, 0xB3, 0x52, 0x36, 0x49, 0xD4, 0x86), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x99, 0xC1, 0x1F, 0x3A, 0xD3, 0x3E, 0x5C, 0x1A), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_19_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x73, 0x51, 0xF7, 0x2B, 0xC8, 0xA9, 0xA7, 0x15), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x12, 0x4E, 0x7F, 0x98, 0x41, 0x66, 0xB0, 0x03), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x91, 0x1D, 0xC0, 0x42, 0xCD, 0xF8, 0xC3, 0x2B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCC, 0x41, 0x91, 0x7D, 0xCC, 0x8B, 0xCC, 0x41), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2A, 0xAE, 0x76, 0xED, 0x56, 0x18, 0xC5, 0xAB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAB, 0x6A, 0x06, 0xA3, 0x7F, 0x65, 0x10, 0x1F), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_20_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0C, 0xEC, 0x3C, 0x05, 0x05, 0xCA, 0xF6, 0xED), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x48, 0xCD, 0x02, 0x51, 0x12, 0x16, 0x3C, 0x63), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA8, 0xEB, 0xB3, 0x43, 0x7B, 0xDD, 0xB2, 0x7C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x00, 0x59, 0x90, 0x41, 0xDB, 0xE4, 0xF5, 0x91), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD0, 0x0E, 0x18, 0x2A, 0x5A, 0x83, 0x7C, 0x2F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE1, 0x37, 0xA1, 0x0D, 0xF1, 0x2F, 0x63, 0x79), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_20_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x21, 0xC0, 0xFA, 0x6F, 0x1F, 0x67, 0xCF, 0xEC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x98, 0x34, 0x45, 0xBB, 0xF4, 0xF9, 0x9B, 0x89), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF5, 0x69, 0xFE, 0x67, 0x1D, 0x64, 0x8F, 0xB9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDB, 0x39, 0xBF, 0xD8, 0xB3, 0xC7, 0xAD, 0x8A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8C, 0x93, 0xFF, 0xF3, 0x28, 0xFA, 0x39, 0xF6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFA, 0xF9, 0xC3, 0x85, 0x26, 0x7A, 0x88, 0x89), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_21_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4D, 0xD5, 0x79, 0xD8, 0x11, 0xDE, 0xEB, 0x4E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1C, 0x46, 0xA4, 0x6A, 0xDA, 0x74, 0x34, 0xA8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1E, 0xBD, 0xD3, 0xF5, 0x14, 0xEE, 0xFE, 0xAE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x19, 0x4C, 0xA3, 0x71, 0x43, 0x65, 0xF8, 0x94), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x72, 0x6C, 0x35, 0xFA, 0x90, 0x25, 0xD8, 0xE2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBB, 0x34, 0x84, 0x96, 0xA1, 0x43, 0x03, 0x4D), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_21_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF1, 0x3B, 0x3B, 0x2F, 0xCA, 0x59, 0xF2, 0x42), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCD, 0x48, 0x24, 0x74, 0xD8, 0x72, 0x90, 0xA3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x83, 0x42, 0x74, 0x8C, 0x6F, 0x52, 0x19, 0x3D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x40, 0x9E, 0x41, 0x63, 0x68, 0x78, 0x4C, 0x2F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x53, 0x94, 0xB6, 0x6B, 0x38, 0x52, 0xA8, 0x9F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x81, 0x30, 0x25, 0x93, 0xA1, 0x6F, 0x6E, 0x68), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_22_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFC, 0x2F, 0x4B, 0x64, 0x79, 0x50, 0xFF, 0x01), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD4, 0x36, 0xED, 0x57, 0x39, 0x3B, 0xE7, 0xF3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF1, 0x85, 0xEA, 0x35, 0xD6, 0xC0, 0xA0, 0x52), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBA, 0x89, 0x3A, 0xCC, 0x22, 0x1C, 0x46, 0x02), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6C, 0x7A, 0xB0, 0xA1, 0x1B, 0x69, 0x62, 0x55), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x57, 0xB8, 0x8A, 0x6C, 0x18, 0x85, 0x0D, 0x88), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_22_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFD, 0xB6, 0x50, 0xE9, 0x4E, 0x7F, 0xE8, 0x07), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x92, 0x5B, 0x5C, 0xD1, 0x4B, 0x11, 0x9A, 0xD8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x96, 0x25, 0x56, 0x74, 0x51, 0x9C, 0xEC, 0x9C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x55, 0x7F, 0xB6, 0x8A, 0xCB, 0x3A, 0x10, 0x6A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x60, 0x33, 0x07, 0x01, 0xE9, 0x49, 0x59, 0xE6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC6, 0xA5, 0x2E, 0xF2, 0xBA, 0x32, 0x63, 0x44), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_23_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF8, 0x06, 0x0B, 0xA5, 0x44, 0x27, 0x7F, 0x22), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x30, 0x74, 0xAC, 0x0F, 0xCC, 0x4F, 0x13, 0x61), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFD, 0xB1, 0xBF, 0x97, 0x49, 0xA5, 0x1C, 0x1D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8A, 0x64, 0x68, 0x7B, 0x0F, 0xCC, 0x77, 0xF8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBB, 0x39, 0xF9, 0x4E, 0x84, 0x9C, 0xF6, 0x96), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBC, 0xCF, 0x6D, 0xE2, 0xA1, 0x2D, 0xF9, 0x2B), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_23_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x95, 0xC4, 0x90, 0x57, 0x31, 0x01, 0x05, 0x5E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCC, 0x1E, 0xBB, 0xBF, 0x98, 0xA4, 0x7C, 0xE3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x89, 0xE3, 0xA0, 0xB2, 0xCD, 0x39, 0x9A, 0x3F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x92, 0x34, 0x60, 0x7A, 0x89, 0x98, 0xB5, 0x52), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8D, 0x20, 0x3D, 0x3A, 0x04, 0x8F, 0x5A, 0xAC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA3, 0x26, 0xB6, 0x49, 0x09, 0x9C, 0x0F, 0x59), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_24_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x72, 0x66, 0xD2, 0x38, 0x2A, 0x62, 0x81, 0xCA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC5, 0xC8, 0x20, 0x5E, 0x28, 0xA3, 0x81, 0xA7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x20, 0x31, 0xA4, 0xF1, 0xEA, 0x7D, 0x87, 0x45), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8F, 0x2C, 0x99, 0x09, 0x6F, 0x63, 0xEB, 0x2F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x73, 0x76, 0xDA, 0x1A, 0x06, 0xBE, 0xDE, 0xA2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x29, 0x09, 0x2E, 0x75, 0x39, 0x30, 0x2D, 0x42), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_24_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x41, 0x9B, 0xC1, 0x5A, 0x17, 0xC3, 0x8C, 0x31), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x58, 0x8D, 0x94, 0x4D, 0x3D, 0xAB, 0x60, 0xD4), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xFD, 0x1E, 0x0F, 0x43, 0xAE, 0x9D, 0x62), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8E, 0xF2, 0xF3, 0x20, 0x1B, 0xAA, 0xB7, 0x41), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9D, 0x5B, 0xA4, 0xF4, 0x90, 0x3B, 0xE3, 0x71), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF7, 0x78, 0x72, 0xBD, 0x65, 0x09, 0x0B, 0x01), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_25_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCA, 0x37, 0x2A, 0x6C, 0x16, 0x4F, 0x64, 0x59), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5A, 0xCE, 0xA3, 0x90, 0xB4, 0x9A, 0xBC, 0xF7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x27, 0x38, 0x55, 0x63, 0x1D, 0x3A, 0x6E, 0x18), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x37, 0xB4, 0xAA, 0x99, 0x22, 0x45, 0x89, 0x2C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB7, 0x7C, 0x8C, 0xA6, 0x3D, 0xA7, 0x3E, 0xE8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x70, 0x06, 0x42, 0xDC, 0xA6, 0xE3, 0xC6, 0x12), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_25_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x55, 0x8C, 0x3D, 0x5D, 0x47, 0x31, 0x7C, 0xEB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x46, 0x85, 0xEE, 0x46, 0x7E, 0x13, 0x04, 0x41), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9E, 0x3C, 0x8B, 0x43, 0x2E, 0x74, 0xF5, 0xF6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBA, 0x88, 0x8E, 0x07, 0x29, 0x08, 0x03, 0x26), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEA, 0x9B, 0x89, 0xEB, 0x08, 0xE8, 0x43, 0xB5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x17, 0x07, 0x67, 0xFD, 0xD9, 0x73, 0x6F, 0x18), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_26_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x29, 0xEB, 0x21, 0x8D, 0x98, 0x43, 0x74, 0x98), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x88, 0xCC, 0x14, 0xD8, 0x08, 0xBB, 0xA6, 0xE3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC4, 0x98, 0xF2, 0x6A, 0x18, 0xC3, 0xDD, 0x9E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC7, 0x38, 0x91, 0xA0, 0x03, 0xF2, 0x04, 0x62), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7A, 0xAF, 0xE8, 0xFD, 0xFB, 0x13, 0x70, 0x74), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD0, 0x93, 0x87, 0x98, 0x4A, 0xE0, 0x00, 0x12), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_26_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x97, 0x2E, 0x69, 0x9C, 0xA2, 0x2D, 0x03, 0x3F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x79, 0xFE, 0xF3, 0xB9, 0xC1, 0x85, 0x2A, 0xEE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCE, 0xFD, 0x86, 0xB1, 0xCD, 0xBF, 0x41, 0xB7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA0, 0xD8, 0x9A, 0x21, 0xF3, 0xFE, 0xCB, 0xF1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x95, 0x78, 0x04, 0x60, 0xB7, 0xA9, 0xA2, 0x84), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE8, 0x1E, 0x66, 0x2A, 0x54, 0x51, 0xBD, 0x8B), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_27_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8E, 0x16, 0x36, 0xEF, 0x61, 0x2D, 0xEE, 0x3B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x45, 0x5F, 0x88, 0xA0, 0x13, 0x12, 0xF7, 0x23), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA9, 0xC6, 0xAD, 0x4A, 0x4A, 0x07, 0x01, 0x5B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB8, 0x74, 0xB1, 0x4F, 0xEB, 0xBD, 0xD5, 0x6B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x57, 0xF9, 0x71, 0xA2, 0x06, 0x4F, 0xD7, 0xBC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0x8B, 0x4D, 0x48, 0xE0, 0x98, 0xFB, 0x6A), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_27_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC4, 0xBA, 0x10, 0xA3, 0x0D, 0x52, 0xAC, 0x3A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x11, 0xD0, 0xE0, 0x36, 0xE6, 0x07, 0x3A, 0x30), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7E, 0x80, 0xF0, 0xAA, 0x49, 0x22, 0x4B, 0xDD), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xC7, 0xAB, 0x1C, 0x89, 0xCD, 0x24, 0x40), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x82, 0x2A, 0xFC, 0xB3, 0x6D, 0x45, 0x96, 0x49), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x63, 0xE4, 0xDB, 0x52, 0x3F, 0xC4, 0xB4, 0x19), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_28_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5B, 0xCC, 0xC8, 0x7F, 0xBB, 0x6B, 0x87, 0x47), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC0, 0x21, 0x3C, 0x69, 0x7D, 0x38, 0x57, 0x50), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x52, 0x4C, 0x18, 0x3C, 0x53, 0xA5, 0x48, 0x6D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x21, 0xC3, 0x64, 0x45, 0xDB, 0xC4, 0x6D, 0x15), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x49, 0xCC, 0xD1, 0xBB, 0x17, 0xB8, 0x34, 0x2D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6C, 0x69, 0x71, 0xFA, 0xA0, 0x28, 0x4A, 0x3D), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_28_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xED, 0xE8, 0x9E, 0x39, 0xEA, 0x8D, 0x38, 0xDB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCC, 0x9C, 0xBB, 0xCD, 0x80, 0x1A, 0xEE, 0xB7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBC, 0xA0, 0x45, 0xBF, 0xD9, 0x22, 0x11, 0x32), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDA, 0x7C, 0x5C, 0xD9, 0xC0, 0x9F, 0x69, 0xF5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBC, 0x8A, 0xA6, 0x79, 0x4E, 0x35, 0xB9, 0xD5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCC, 0x8B, 0x9A, 0x3E, 0xA1, 0xB8, 0x28, 0x10), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_29_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x55, 0x2F, 0xEF, 0xBB, 0xA9, 0x72, 0x7F, 0xEA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB5, 0x34, 0xB7, 0x12, 0xB9, 0xE7, 0xC3, 0x2A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF8, 0x1D, 0xD9, 0x42, 0x77, 0x0C, 0x71, 0x6E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEC, 0x01, 0x59, 0xA7, 0x56, 0x03, 0x91, 0x8D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6C, 0x91, 0x99, 0x33, 0x30, 0x3E, 0xEF, 0x13), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x87, 0xC9, 0x5A, 0x9A, 0x54, 0x66, 0xF1, 0x70), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_29_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x64, 0x2C, 0xB7, 0x6E, 0x71, 0x7D, 0x35, 0x30), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1A, 0x0D, 0xEF, 0xD1, 0x2D, 0x99, 0x63, 0x2F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE4, 0x31, 0xAF, 0x2D, 0xC9, 0xC6, 0xC2, 0xAE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x19, 0xC0, 0xDF, 0x80, 0x54, 0xC4, 0xAC, 0xF3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE3, 0x6B, 0xA0, 0x84, 0x96, 0xF7, 0x31, 0xC8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x93, 0xE2, 0x7C, 0x7A, 0x41, 0x45, 0x75, 0x6A), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_30_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAE, 0xEE, 0x58, 0x31, 0xE8, 0x68, 0xD6, 0x76), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD2, 0x2E, 0x48, 0xB7, 0x09, 0x9F, 0xD4, 0xCA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x34, 0xA9, 0x5C, 0xE7, 0x64, 0x43, 0x5D, 0xC9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9E, 0x58, 0x9F, 0x50, 0xAB, 0x68, 0xFF, 0x6D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x87, 0x88, 0x2D, 0xBA, 0x12, 0xBF, 0x8D, 0x7D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD4, 0xDF, 0x6F, 0xB3, 0x75, 0xA4, 0x55, 0x73), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_30_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6D, 0x17, 0x92, 0x39, 0xB7, 0x13, 0x37, 0x6F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5E, 0x43, 0x71, 0xA7, 0xCA, 0x17, 0x1B, 0x32), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE7, 0xB9, 0xB0, 0x78, 0xEF, 0xA0, 0xDA, 0x83), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9A, 0x84, 0xF2, 0x0F, 0x85, 0xA2, 0xB6, 0x1F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x72, 0x65, 0x2E, 0x6E, 0x45, 0xB9, 0x4C, 0x3C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFE, 0x6A, 0x8C, 0x2B, 0x77, 0x96, 0x36, 0x22), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_31_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x68, 0x7A, 0x13, 0x4A, 0x97, 0x63, 0x02, 0x10), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBC, 0x1E, 0x06, 0x03, 0x8F, 0xB9, 0xEE, 0x64), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x68, 0xEE, 0x8B, 0x89, 0xA9, 0x70, 0xDB, 0xCE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x15, 0x7B, 0x81, 0xC9, 0x70, 0x8D, 0x62, 0x32), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x75, 0xDA, 0x46, 0xF8, 0xF9, 0x3A, 0xBE, 0x55), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9F, 0x9C, 0x7A, 0x97, 0x62, 0xEB, 0xFA, 0x0F), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_31_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB2, 0x03, 0x3D, 0x3C, 0x46, 0x27, 0x9E, 0x65), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA4, 0x08, 0x1C, 0xD5, 0x25, 0xAF, 0xE9, 0x40), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFE, 0x69, 0xDC, 0x59, 0xF4, 0x8A, 0x7C, 0x1F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFC, 0x9A, 0x7A, 0x99, 0x21, 0x0C, 0x4E, 0xE3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF5, 0xCE, 0x85, 0x5F, 0xAC, 0xAA, 0x82, 0x10), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x83, 0x57, 0x69, 0x90, 0x76, 0xF3, 0x53, 0x3F), +}; +static const mbedtls_ecp_point brainpoolP384r1_T[32] = { + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z1(brainpoolP384r1_T_0_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_0_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_1_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_1_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_2_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_2_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_3_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_3_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_4_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_4_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_5_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_5_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_6_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_6_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_7_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_7_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_8_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_8_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_9_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_9_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_10_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_10_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_11_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_11_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_12_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_12_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_13_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_13_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_14_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_14_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_15_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_15_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_16_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_16_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_17_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_17_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_18_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_18_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_19_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_19_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_20_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_20_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_21_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_21_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_22_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_22_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_23_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_23_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_24_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_24_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_25_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_25_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_26_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_26_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_27_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_27_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_28_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_28_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_29_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_29_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_30_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_30_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_31_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_31_Y), +}; +#else +#define brainpoolP384r1_T NULL +#endif + #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLED */ /* @@ -501,22 +3805,686 @@ static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_n[] = { MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x07, 0xFC, 0xC9, 0x33, 0xAE, 0xE6, 0xD4, 0x3F), MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8B, 0xC4, 0xE9, 0xDB, 0xB8, 0x9D, 0xDD, 0xAA), }; -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLED) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED) -/* For these curves, we build the group parameters dynamically. */ -#define ECP_LOAD_GROUP +#if MBEDTLS_ECP_FIXED_POINT_OPTIM == 1 +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_0_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x22, 0xF8, 0xB9, 0xBC, 0x09, 0x22, 0x35, 0x8B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x68, 0x5E, 0x6A, 0x40, 0x47, 0x50, 0x6D, 0x7C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5F, 0x7D, 0xB9, 0x93, 0x7B, 0x68, 0xD1, 0x50), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8D, 0xD4, 0xD0, 0xE2, 0x78, 0x1F, 0x3B, 0xFF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8E, 0x09, 0xD0, 0xF4, 0xEE, 0x62, 0x3B, 0xB4), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC1, 0x16, 0xD9, 0xB5, 0x70, 0x9F, 0xED, 0x85), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x93, 0x6A, 0x4C, 0x9C, 0x2E, 0x32, 0x21, 0x5A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x64, 0xD9, 0x2E, 0xD8, 0xBD, 0xE4, 0xAE, 0x81), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_0_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x92, 0x08, 0xD8, 0x3A, 0x0F, 0x1E, 0xCD, 0x78), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x06, 0x54, 0xF0, 0xA8, 0x2F, 0x2B, 0xCA, 0xD1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAE, 0x63, 0x27, 0x8A, 0xD8, 0x4B, 0xCA, 0x5B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5E, 0x48, 0x5F, 0x4A, 0x49, 0xDE, 0xDC, 0xB2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x11, 0x81, 0x1F, 0x88, 0x5B, 0xC5, 0x00, 0xA0), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1A, 0x7B, 0xA5, 0x24, 0x00, 0xF7, 0x09, 0xF2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFD, 0x22, 0x78, 0xCF, 0xA9, 0xBF, 0xEA, 0xC0), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEC, 0x32, 0x63, 0x56, 0x5D, 0x38, 0xDE, 0x7D), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_1_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEA, 0xE9, 0x6B, 0x8C, 0x6F, 0x9D, 0x88, 0x43), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBB, 0x4F, 0x86, 0x96, 0xA7, 0x56, 0xD1, 0x37), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9D, 0xAB, 0xFA, 0xEE, 0xA7, 0xF5, 0x0E, 0xA6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE3, 0x40, 0xEF, 0x9E, 0x6D, 0xD6, 0x32, 0x33), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE3, 0xED, 0x56, 0x14, 0x57, 0x1A, 0x8D, 0x69), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA4, 0xED, 0x4D, 0x3A, 0xFA, 0x71, 0x75, 0x6B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x66, 0xC5, 0x76, 0x1C, 0x14, 0xBE, 0xB5, 0xCD), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE1, 0x5A, 0xCB, 0xE7, 0x36, 0x1D, 0x52, 0x1C), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_1_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6B, 0x8D, 0x7A, 0xEB, 0xA3, 0x8B, 0xD5, 0xB0), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1F, 0xA3, 0x41, 0xF8, 0xAC, 0x9E, 0xAB, 0x74), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x12, 0xE3, 0x65, 0x0D, 0x1C, 0xFE, 0x09, 0x2B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3F, 0xCA, 0x13, 0x3F, 0xC5, 0xF9, 0x7E, 0xEC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2C, 0x5D, 0x63, 0x28, 0xA6, 0x89, 0xD3, 0x91), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC9, 0x95, 0x3F, 0x7A, 0x82, 0xD4, 0x77, 0xE3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x34, 0xBB, 0x92, 0x32, 0x00, 0xF4, 0x66, 0x42), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBA, 0x58, 0x31, 0xD1, 0x17, 0x9F, 0x2A, 0x22), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_2_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x52, 0x36, 0xA9, 0xCD, 0x80, 0xA5, 0x2D, 0x78), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x91, 0x44, 0xAB, 0xCE, 0x71, 0xFF, 0x0C, 0x9B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x18, 0x24, 0x58, 0x35, 0x5A, 0x21, 0x32, 0x93), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1B, 0xA6, 0x28, 0xF8, 0x7A, 0x97, 0xAE, 0x8B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x84, 0xE7, 0x08, 0xFA, 0x47, 0xC9, 0x55, 0x09), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8D, 0xAC, 0x2E, 0x84, 0xA4, 0xF5, 0x52, 0xC4), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD9, 0x58, 0x05, 0x9D, 0xA7, 0xC8, 0x71, 0xBF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB3, 0x92, 0xB4, 0x92, 0xC1, 0x92, 0xEC, 0x6B), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_2_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4A, 0x48, 0x2D, 0x79, 0x5E, 0x58, 0xE5, 0x69), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB4, 0x85, 0x26, 0xEC, 0xE9, 0x6E, 0xD4, 0x06), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x98, 0x68, 0x26, 0x87, 0x38, 0xA2, 0xD2, 0x0B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF7, 0x17, 0x60, 0xCE, 0x75, 0xF8, 0xA5, 0x6F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x20, 0x51, 0xDB, 0xA9, 0xAE, 0x87, 0xF1, 0x15), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDD, 0x49, 0x92, 0x3B, 0x19, 0x96, 0xF5, 0xB0), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC4, 0xD5, 0x52, 0x52, 0x8C, 0xCE, 0xFD, 0xFA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x24, 0x18, 0x0A, 0xE6, 0xF6, 0xAE, 0x08, 0x41), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_3_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7E, 0x2B, 0xD8, 0x54, 0xCE, 0xB0, 0x57, 0xFE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8A, 0xB0, 0xF8, 0x9E, 0x03, 0x03, 0x3C, 0x5D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x93, 0x0E, 0x29, 0x29, 0x00, 0xF3, 0x70, 0xBF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x54, 0x33, 0x99, 0x0E, 0x00, 0x5D, 0xFE, 0x4B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x46, 0x2D, 0xF2, 0x59, 0x32, 0xCF, 0x03, 0xF4), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3B, 0xC9, 0x72, 0xAE, 0x0C, 0xEF, 0xD1, 0x5B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB6, 0x5A, 0x27, 0xBF, 0x2F, 0x45, 0xF9, 0x51), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD4, 0xBE, 0xE5, 0x2C, 0xFF, 0x5B, 0x1E, 0x88), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_3_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAA, 0xAC, 0xBB, 0xD8, 0x83, 0xC2, 0x46, 0xF6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCF, 0xDC, 0xCE, 0x15, 0xB4, 0xEF, 0xCF, 0x46), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x46, 0xDB, 0x5E, 0x94, 0x31, 0x0B, 0xB2, 0x7A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3C, 0xB9, 0xE3, 0xE3, 0x11, 0x71, 0x41, 0x1E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x36, 0xE3, 0x01, 0xB7, 0x7D, 0xBC, 0x65, 0xBE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFC, 0x07, 0x65, 0x87, 0xA7, 0xE8, 0x48, 0xE3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x66, 0x48, 0x8F, 0xD4, 0x30, 0x8E, 0xB4, 0x6C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x86, 0xE0, 0x73, 0xBE, 0x1E, 0xBF, 0x56, 0x36), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_4_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFE, 0x0E, 0x5E, 0x87, 0xC5, 0xAB, 0x0E, 0x3C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB9, 0xF9, 0x5F, 0x80, 0x24, 0x4C, 0x2A, 0xF1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDE, 0x15, 0x21, 0x54, 0x92, 0x84, 0x8D, 0x6A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA8, 0x8A, 0x47, 0x74, 0xDC, 0x42, 0xB1, 0xF8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x81, 0xF7, 0x30, 0xFD, 0xC1, 0x9B, 0x0C, 0x5B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4E, 0x6C, 0xCC, 0xDF, 0xC5, 0xE3, 0xA9, 0xD5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD6, 0x67, 0x59, 0x10, 0x5C, 0x51, 0x54, 0x40), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA0, 0x37, 0xFB, 0x6E, 0xB0, 0x78, 0x63, 0x8E), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_4_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA5, 0xEF, 0xC4, 0x39, 0x20, 0xF1, 0x46, 0x66), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE2, 0x62, 0xAE, 0xFF, 0x10, 0xE4, 0xE2, 0xE9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0x5C, 0xF5, 0x2E, 0x22, 0x89, 0xE5, 0x82), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x89, 0x0C, 0x29, 0xA8, 0x62, 0xAE, 0xDB, 0x65), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD7, 0x9E, 0x0F, 0xCA, 0x87, 0x2A, 0x6F, 0x7B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCE, 0xDC, 0x9B, 0x9F, 0x65, 0xD4, 0xAD, 0x27), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xED, 0xC3, 0x08, 0x0F, 0xCF, 0x67, 0xE9, 0xF4), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x92, 0x5C, 0xD7, 0xFF, 0x41, 0x9C, 0xCB, 0x26), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_5_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x37, 0x25, 0x05, 0x12, 0xAD, 0x73, 0x63, 0x90), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC7, 0x99, 0x07, 0x86, 0x57, 0xE7, 0x94, 0xB1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x00, 0x4B, 0xA5, 0xBF, 0x18, 0xA9, 0xEF, 0x6A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFA, 0x4C, 0xC4, 0x09, 0xF2, 0x2F, 0x0C, 0xAA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8C, 0x3A, 0x04, 0xEA, 0x89, 0x6C, 0x91, 0xB9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7D, 0x6C, 0x3A, 0xE7, 0xA3, 0xEC, 0x24, 0x7B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x16, 0xA1, 0x26, 0x21, 0x04, 0xE3, 0xB9, 0x40), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x53, 0x71, 0x4B, 0x7B, 0xC2, 0x89, 0xCD, 0xA2), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_5_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB7, 0xB9, 0xA8, 0x9D, 0xFD, 0x00, 0x3A, 0x1F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x63, 0x41, 0x6C, 0xBB, 0x5A, 0xCA, 0x1F, 0x74), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2A, 0xD7, 0xE2, 0x6C, 0x6B, 0xA7, 0x48, 0xC9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1E, 0x19, 0xAD, 0xA7, 0xC1, 0x7E, 0x4F, 0x6E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD1, 0xF7, 0x19, 0x3C, 0x06, 0x74, 0x2C, 0x3A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC5, 0x23, 0x4F, 0x0C, 0x09, 0xB0, 0x80, 0x4A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4E, 0x74, 0x34, 0x08, 0x44, 0x7E, 0xA3, 0xDD), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFB, 0xCC, 0x8D, 0x12, 0x6E, 0xE1, 0x3D, 0x0B), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_6_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x38, 0x18, 0xB1, 0x71, 0x02, 0x93, 0xC2, 0xA4), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC9, 0x89, 0x40, 0xE2, 0x1F, 0xE7, 0x5E, 0x68), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x50, 0x8E, 0xAE, 0x89, 0x01, 0xD4, 0x0C, 0xEB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAE, 0xDA, 0x58, 0x70, 0x24, 0xF2, 0xE4, 0x5F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6F, 0xC7, 0x1D, 0xD6, 0x4A, 0x6F, 0x66, 0x4F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x92, 0x1D, 0x7E, 0x4A, 0x2C, 0xCA, 0xEC, 0x3B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA1, 0x06, 0x7F, 0xA8, 0x99, 0xE4, 0xD3, 0x4E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2A, 0x1D, 0x5A, 0xDF, 0x5E, 0x58, 0x36, 0x49), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_6_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9C, 0xB9, 0x32, 0x69, 0x1F, 0x72, 0x2A, 0xB3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1C, 0x73, 0xE2, 0x03, 0x39, 0x35, 0xAA, 0xA8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEB, 0x5E, 0x5D, 0x48, 0xEF, 0xAE, 0x30, 0xF5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x77, 0x7F, 0x60, 0x19, 0xAF, 0xEC, 0x9D, 0xFC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCA, 0xD9, 0x19, 0xE4, 0x1B, 0x56, 0x15, 0x5F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBC, 0xD7, 0x33, 0x59, 0x1F, 0x43, 0x59, 0x2C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC6, 0xCE, 0xEE, 0xCA, 0xA4, 0x7F, 0x63, 0xD4), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBD, 0x40, 0xC0, 0xF6, 0x19, 0x89, 0x43, 0x20), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_7_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEB, 0x92, 0xEA, 0x07, 0x65, 0x79, 0x86, 0xD3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xB7, 0x13, 0x75, 0xD3, 0xC5, 0x0A, 0xC9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x26, 0x9E, 0xFA, 0xE1, 0x1F, 0x0C, 0xF9, 0x74), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB4, 0x8C, 0xED, 0x5C, 0x21, 0xE9, 0x09, 0xDD), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF4, 0x4D, 0xD8, 0x18, 0xC4, 0xF6, 0x36, 0x39), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC7, 0xC9, 0xAC, 0x5C, 0xFA, 0x69, 0xA4, 0xA0), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6B, 0x8C, 0x94, 0x1C, 0x7B, 0x71, 0x36, 0x58), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7C, 0xBD, 0x46, 0xCE, 0xB7, 0x1D, 0x9C, 0x5E), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_7_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEA, 0xD6, 0x96, 0x4B, 0xA6, 0x47, 0xEB, 0xE5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5F, 0xF1, 0x5F, 0x15, 0xDE, 0x99, 0x6F, 0x66), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x21, 0xBD, 0xE5, 0x04, 0xB8, 0xE6, 0xC0, 0x0B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x49, 0xD3, 0xF0, 0x04, 0x00, 0xE4, 0x05, 0xDB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x96, 0xF3, 0x06, 0xA3, 0x1A, 0xFF, 0xEA, 0x73), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x08, 0x32, 0xAA, 0x99, 0x33, 0x09, 0xB6, 0x34), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6E, 0xEF, 0xFC, 0x61, 0x10, 0x42, 0x31, 0x94), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x34, 0xF1, 0xF4, 0x33, 0xCF, 0x28, 0x90, 0x9C), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_8_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x10, 0xDE, 0xF9, 0x88, 0x87, 0x7B, 0xEB, 0xC9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x66, 0xB8, 0xDA, 0xFA, 0xDA, 0x3D, 0xA6, 0x17), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA0, 0xF0, 0x62, 0x82, 0x53, 0x32, 0x55, 0x03), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2F, 0xA5, 0x32, 0x4A, 0x19, 0x11, 0x9C, 0x10), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x16, 0xB3, 0x27, 0xE9, 0x75, 0x90, 0x05, 0x2D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x63, 0x1C, 0x90, 0x48, 0x77, 0x01, 0x85, 0x1B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC7, 0xD6, 0x9B, 0x84, 0xA8, 0xD7, 0xC5, 0x28), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE1, 0x7A, 0xCB, 0xB3, 0x11, 0x46, 0xD7, 0x99), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_8_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8B, 0x23, 0xBF, 0x75, 0x75, 0xA1, 0x95, 0x90), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4B, 0x66, 0x5D, 0x34, 0x13, 0xA9, 0x03, 0xBE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x29, 0x80, 0x9D, 0x5F, 0xD2, 0x44, 0xE1, 0x62), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x96, 0x5D, 0xBD, 0xA8, 0xBF, 0xB4, 0x25, 0x1F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6A, 0x99, 0x1F, 0x53, 0xF1, 0x57, 0xDB, 0xE7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x21, 0x7C, 0xE5, 0xC5, 0x51, 0x0B, 0x4C, 0x9B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6B, 0xB0, 0x1A, 0x9C, 0x16, 0xB0, 0x32, 0x1F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF4, 0xE3, 0xCF, 0xDD, 0x48, 0xB4, 0x7B, 0x33), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_9_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC0, 0xDD, 0x9E, 0x3C, 0x98, 0x0E, 0x77, 0x65), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6C, 0xAB, 0x01, 0xD3, 0x87, 0x74, 0x25, 0x4A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x87, 0xA3, 0xE3, 0x76, 0x43, 0x87, 0x12, 0xBD), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x54, 0xB1, 0x3B, 0x60, 0x66, 0xEB, 0x98, 0x54), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD2, 0x78, 0xC8, 0xD7, 0x4E, 0x75, 0xCA, 0x69), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x07, 0xDF, 0x71, 0x19, 0xE7, 0x07, 0x36, 0xB5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6D, 0xC9, 0xA8, 0x5F, 0x91, 0xBF, 0x47, 0xB2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x80, 0x96, 0x58, 0x96, 0x18, 0xB6, 0xFA, 0x01), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_9_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD0, 0x2D, 0xA9, 0x9B, 0x86, 0xDB, 0x0C, 0x4C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE4, 0x0B, 0x2D, 0x56, 0x4A, 0xD3, 0x93, 0x8A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB5, 0x15, 0xE2, 0x65, 0x12, 0x86, 0x0E, 0xB2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB4, 0x41, 0x4D, 0xC1, 0xCB, 0xE4, 0xC3, 0xD7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6A, 0x53, 0x10, 0xCA, 0xA3, 0xAC, 0x83, 0x26), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3E, 0x01, 0x22, 0x96, 0x10, 0xAD, 0x69, 0xDB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x42, 0x46, 0x4E, 0xD8, 0xEA, 0xD6, 0x9D, 0xF3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x43, 0x2F, 0x7F, 0x62, 0x62, 0x80, 0xD0, 0x14), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_10_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB2, 0xDA, 0x00, 0x63, 0x09, 0xBD, 0x6A, 0x83), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0F, 0xD4, 0x6E, 0x48, 0x05, 0xB7, 0xF7, 0x17), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x14, 0x4D, 0xD7, 0x00, 0x4A, 0x15, 0x27, 0x7A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3A, 0x15, 0xAA, 0x37, 0x27, 0x34, 0x18, 0x24), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3A, 0x20, 0x2C, 0x84, 0x1B, 0x88, 0xBA, 0x05), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAC, 0x09, 0xD6, 0x04, 0xA2, 0x60, 0x84, 0x72), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC8, 0x04, 0x94, 0x08, 0xD4, 0xED, 0x47, 0xDB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8B, 0xF3, 0xE4, 0x3E, 0xB9, 0x5B, 0x35, 0x42), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_10_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5F, 0xD8, 0xB6, 0x80, 0xD6, 0xF1, 0x30, 0xDD), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD6, 0x14, 0xA6, 0x85, 0xEE, 0xA7, 0xD8, 0x61), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE4, 0x49, 0x2A, 0x1E, 0x7C, 0xE9, 0x2D, 0xEC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3A, 0x87, 0x56, 0x91, 0x03, 0x77, 0x4D, 0x55), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0E, 0x52, 0xD4, 0xAA, 0xF7, 0xFA, 0xB0, 0xC5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x04, 0x5D, 0x11, 0x39, 0xB1, 0xE7, 0x76, 0xAD), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD6, 0x13, 0xBC, 0x37, 0x5D, 0x74, 0xCD, 0xC2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC9, 0x48, 0x14, 0x23, 0x30, 0xF8, 0x46, 0x37), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_11_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAC, 0x27, 0xB0, 0xD9, 0xB2, 0x74, 0xB4, 0xC0), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEA, 0xA6, 0xB9, 0x6F, 0x9F, 0x64, 0x36, 0x92), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2E, 0x2B, 0x78, 0x40, 0x05, 0x2B, 0x7B, 0xA9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB3, 0x68, 0x3A, 0xB6, 0x4A, 0xE2, 0xDB, 0xB8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1E, 0x33, 0xD7, 0x34, 0x8B, 0x25, 0x45, 0xEF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x89, 0xCE, 0xA8, 0xC9, 0x01, 0xFB, 0x0E, 0x7B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE2, 0xF9, 0x51, 0x4C, 0x12, 0x9F, 0x60, 0xE4), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x67, 0x85, 0xBD, 0x30, 0x37, 0x84, 0x39, 0x44), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_11_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x26, 0x33, 0xAF, 0x2E, 0xB8, 0x2E, 0xCC, 0x3C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA4, 0xB1, 0x73, 0x59, 0x4E, 0x0C, 0x09, 0x4A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8A, 0x24, 0x89, 0x81, 0x12, 0xFF, 0xBB, 0x6E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x71, 0x37, 0x1A, 0x66, 0xEE, 0xED, 0xB6, 0x9B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x16, 0xBD, 0x04, 0x20, 0x5D, 0xFB, 0xBF, 0x95), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA0, 0xF8, 0x34, 0xA3, 0xFF, 0x45, 0xDE, 0x92), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9B, 0x18, 0x73, 0xF1, 0x32, 0x25, 0x58, 0xEB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x63, 0xC1, 0x14, 0xE3, 0x9E, 0x40, 0x0F, 0x12), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_12_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x61, 0x07, 0x9D, 0x9C, 0x00, 0xF7, 0x56, 0x19), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFB, 0xBA, 0x87, 0xF9, 0x15, 0x0C, 0x66, 0x5D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7E, 0x1F, 0xC1, 0x28, 0xB0, 0x47, 0x0D, 0xF5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x96, 0xCA, 0x27, 0xEE, 0x4B, 0x23, 0x2B, 0x89), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7E, 0xB5, 0x68, 0xC8, 0x17, 0x5D, 0xC3, 0xAA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x17, 0x02, 0x08, 0xEE, 0x20, 0x9D, 0xEA, 0x64), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA7, 0x14, 0x50, 0xD4, 0x7D, 0x5F, 0xCF, 0xA0), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD5, 0xFA, 0xF8, 0xA7, 0xC6, 0xDC, 0x14, 0x8C), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_12_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x76, 0xBD, 0x0A, 0x1A, 0x18, 0x98, 0xDC, 0xB0), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x63, 0x63, 0x02, 0xB7, 0xD5, 0x5B, 0x5A, 0xC6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x51, 0xB1, 0xD7, 0x4B, 0x15, 0x39, 0x61, 0x5D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5C, 0x32, 0xE1, 0x9E, 0x70, 0x1B, 0xCE, 0x51), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x64, 0xD8, 0x18, 0x83, 0x52, 0x9B, 0x6D, 0xA2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA4, 0x55, 0x56, 0x19, 0x34, 0xA4, 0xEA, 0xFC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x30, 0xA9, 0x55, 0x80, 0xE3, 0x15, 0x36, 0x8B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBB, 0x06, 0xC8, 0x1D, 0x17, 0x0D, 0xAD, 0x16), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_13_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x20, 0xD6, 0xF0, 0xCC, 0xF3, 0x63, 0x53, 0xD2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x27, 0x5A, 0xDC, 0x46, 0xBD, 0x0D, 0xAD, 0x96), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x21, 0x2F, 0x11, 0x60, 0x15, 0x51, 0x4A, 0xEA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x33, 0xE3, 0x93, 0x38, 0xD5, 0x83, 0xAA, 0x0D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x90, 0xA6, 0xCC, 0xB1, 0xFD, 0xBB, 0x1A, 0x0F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3B, 0x54, 0xC8, 0x54, 0x6F, 0x79, 0x1A, 0x59), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3F, 0x4A, 0xDA, 0x28, 0x92, 0x97, 0x9D, 0x7F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD6, 0x4B, 0xDB, 0xC7, 0x52, 0xC5, 0x66, 0x34), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_13_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x05, 0x7E, 0x92, 0x53, 0x30, 0x93, 0xFD, 0xFF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA0, 0x16, 0x6A, 0xB1, 0x91, 0x0A, 0xB4, 0x52), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6D, 0x9D, 0x40, 0x3F, 0xE3, 0xF1, 0x01, 0x46), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x13, 0x0E, 0xD8, 0xED, 0x11, 0x8E, 0x4C, 0xED), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x86, 0x4A, 0x1B, 0x88, 0xDF, 0x8D, 0x29, 0xE7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x97, 0x23, 0x21, 0x11, 0xAB, 0x77, 0x81, 0x62), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0B, 0xAF, 0x11, 0xFA, 0xBA, 0x40, 0x63, 0xE7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2B, 0x6F, 0x8D, 0x80, 0xDF, 0x67, 0xF5, 0x44), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_14_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB2, 0x8B, 0xB7, 0x08, 0xF4, 0xD7, 0x2D, 0xA8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC7, 0x2B, 0x30, 0x02, 0x45, 0x71, 0x08, 0x49), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x97, 0x3A, 0xCA, 0x50, 0xF6, 0xC2, 0x19, 0x8C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x17, 0xB9, 0x9B, 0x3E, 0x73, 0x95, 0x1D, 0x49), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB6, 0x60, 0x59, 0x48, 0xCB, 0xD8, 0xD6, 0xAA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF0, 0xB9, 0x6C, 0x89, 0xAB, 0x99, 0xA8, 0xF8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEF, 0xA1, 0x8B, 0x4E, 0x06, 0x19, 0xEC, 0x99), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x70, 0x95, 0x04, 0xCF, 0xD5, 0x94, 0xB3, 0x02), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_14_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x29, 0x35, 0x93, 0x7C, 0xB3, 0xB8, 0x9E, 0x1B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC4, 0x45, 0x5C, 0x7E, 0xBF, 0x75, 0x81, 0x0F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDC, 0xE8, 0x24, 0xDF, 0xEC, 0x2F, 0x7D, 0xB9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF2, 0x8B, 0xD5, 0x6A, 0x9B, 0xA0, 0xE0, 0x4F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x32, 0xE3, 0x27, 0x82, 0xDE, 0xDD, 0xCA, 0x4B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA7, 0x57, 0x56, 0x46, 0x05, 0x06, 0x01, 0x2E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x74, 0x35, 0xA7, 0x47, 0xE2, 0x6B, 0x2C, 0x4F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x38, 0x9D, 0x4C, 0xEC, 0x1F, 0x11, 0x75, 0x2B), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_15_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAC, 0xAA, 0x41, 0xC1, 0xE9, 0x0E, 0xE9, 0xAA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0A, 0xCF, 0x9C, 0x4B, 0xE8, 0xED, 0x0A, 0x49), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3D, 0x73, 0xCA, 0x0C, 0x46, 0x0A, 0x9C, 0xE4), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x99, 0xE1, 0x9E, 0xBC, 0xFE, 0x44, 0x63, 0x6D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x31, 0x43, 0x71, 0xEE, 0xF8, 0xC1, 0x8C, 0x5C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6A, 0x4B, 0xF0, 0x69, 0x25, 0xBD, 0x71, 0x1A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFD, 0x9A, 0xFE, 0x82, 0xE7, 0xC1, 0xC1, 0xEE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFC, 0x5A, 0x6E, 0x5E, 0x97, 0x6A, 0x35, 0x8D), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_15_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA2, 0x18, 0x6C, 0x7E, 0xB8, 0x9E, 0x57, 0x32), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x35, 0xB9, 0xC1, 0xD0, 0xFE, 0x78, 0xFB, 0x32), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7C, 0x08, 0xAE, 0x46, 0x34, 0xEA, 0x7A, 0x7F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE8, 0x1C, 0x56, 0xA9, 0x18, 0x37, 0xD4, 0x9E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x28, 0x63, 0xE9, 0x0A, 0xB6, 0x38, 0x3C, 0xC1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3E, 0x4F, 0xA4, 0x6E, 0x85, 0x31, 0x23, 0x52), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0D, 0xAD, 0xC4, 0xC3, 0xB1, 0x4B, 0x1C, 0x82), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x30, 0x56, 0x4A, 0x38, 0xB3, 0x6B, 0x6F, 0x2C), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_16_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x67, 0xC7, 0x19, 0xDE, 0x21, 0xED, 0x89, 0xD0), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2F, 0xBE, 0xA6, 0xAE, 0xEB, 0x9D, 0xA7, 0x2A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x04, 0x0E, 0x13, 0x1E, 0x86, 0x57, 0xC3, 0x3B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1F, 0x4B, 0x30, 0x46, 0x52, 0xC1, 0xEC, 0x52), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6E, 0xD5, 0x44, 0x31, 0x96, 0x3B, 0x26, 0x27), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x77, 0x68, 0xA8, 0x67, 0x78, 0x39, 0xE8, 0x68), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8E, 0x78, 0xB7, 0xDD, 0xF2, 0x58, 0xB6, 0x3D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x81, 0x3C, 0xB3, 0x26, 0xC4, 0x2C, 0x8C, 0xA5), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_16_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB9, 0x24, 0xE5, 0x73, 0xEE, 0x9A, 0x02, 0xA9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD9, 0x6A, 0x65, 0x60, 0xF3, 0x62, 0xE3, 0xE9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFB, 0x07, 0x84, 0xE6, 0x3B, 0x46, 0x65, 0x9F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE1, 0x8F, 0x0C, 0xB0, 0xE1, 0x04, 0x82, 0x9D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEB, 0x13, 0xBF, 0x3D, 0xA0, 0x48, 0xA2, 0x74), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x08, 0x26, 0x76, 0x74, 0xAB, 0x0B, 0x29, 0xE8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x30, 0x6E, 0x5F, 0x03, 0x34, 0x7C, 0x38, 0xCE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4D, 0x72, 0xF9, 0x3B, 0x3C, 0xA4, 0xBC, 0x7C), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_17_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5C, 0xCE, 0x18, 0x80, 0xB8, 0x24, 0x45, 0x81), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF1, 0x09, 0x03, 0xB8, 0x06, 0x64, 0xF7, 0xEC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF1, 0x26, 0xB1, 0x10, 0x6D, 0x71, 0x12, 0x2E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAD, 0x12, 0xC6, 0x6E, 0x1E, 0x6A, 0xC3, 0x80), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE5, 0xD3, 0x0A, 0xDE, 0xD8, 0x6B, 0x04, 0x5C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x96, 0x87, 0x5B, 0xAE, 0xDB, 0x3C, 0xC0, 0xC5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8E, 0xF5, 0xF9, 0xC1, 0x9A, 0x89, 0xBB, 0x7E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xED, 0x69, 0x72, 0x8B, 0xAE, 0x32, 0x13, 0x11), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_17_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF9, 0x16, 0x07, 0x50, 0xFA, 0x4C, 0xCF, 0xE8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF8, 0x50, 0x21, 0xE9, 0xDE, 0xEC, 0x7E, 0xDF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7C, 0x2F, 0xE8, 0x83, 0x30, 0x0B, 0x65, 0x0E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA5, 0x0B, 0x99, 0xAC, 0xC9, 0xBA, 0x6C, 0x2A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA7, 0x59, 0x5A, 0x0D, 0x7B, 0x9E, 0x08, 0xAD), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x34, 0x91, 0xB2, 0xDC, 0x90, 0xCE, 0x67, 0xED), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE3, 0x93, 0x60, 0x0C, 0xD7, 0x1F, 0x2F, 0x17), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x19, 0x7F, 0x9D, 0x40, 0xF8, 0x78, 0x7A, 0x54), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_18_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x13, 0x22, 0x95, 0xE8, 0xEF, 0x31, 0x57, 0x35), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2D, 0x88, 0x53, 0xFE, 0xAF, 0x7C, 0x47, 0x14), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0E, 0xCE, 0xCC, 0x79, 0xE8, 0x9F, 0x8C, 0xC4), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDB, 0x16, 0xDD, 0x77, 0x6E, 0x8A, 0x73, 0x97), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC0, 0x07, 0x97, 0x21, 0x3B, 0xF8, 0x5F, 0xA8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC6, 0xB5, 0xD2, 0x81, 0x84, 0xF0, 0xE7, 0x9F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCB, 0x8F, 0x75, 0x09, 0x6A, 0x0E, 0x53, 0xAD), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE6, 0x4F, 0x70, 0x97, 0xC7, 0xAC, 0x7D, 0x3F), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_18_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF9, 0x3C, 0x6A, 0xB4, 0x10, 0xA9, 0xC8, 0x1D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEE, 0xC5, 0xD6, 0x69, 0x16, 0xB8, 0xAC, 0x25), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAC, 0x44, 0xDC, 0xEB, 0x48, 0x54, 0x5D, 0x5F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6F, 0x48, 0x9B, 0xD7, 0x72, 0x69, 0xA4, 0x8A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB4, 0x0D, 0x36, 0x9A, 0x66, 0x0B, 0xEC, 0x24), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBE, 0xC6, 0xD4, 0xB6, 0x60, 0xE5, 0xC3, 0x3A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBA, 0x29, 0x42, 0xE0, 0x9D, 0xFD, 0x7C, 0x3E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x43, 0x10, 0xBA, 0x55, 0xBC, 0x3B, 0x38, 0x5D), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_19_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x25, 0x66, 0xFA, 0x05, 0x73, 0x03, 0x1B, 0x69), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x11, 0xA4, 0x66, 0x12, 0x96, 0x7B, 0x02, 0x4C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x44, 0xB5, 0xDE, 0x6D, 0x98, 0xD1, 0xD5, 0xA8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE2, 0xF5, 0x44, 0xB8, 0x8E, 0xF6, 0x8C, 0x05), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x68, 0x15, 0x2B, 0x72, 0xBC, 0x49, 0xE5, 0xDF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6C, 0x44, 0xD7, 0xDF, 0x8F, 0xEB, 0x8D, 0x80), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x05, 0x64, 0x88, 0xAA, 0xB7, 0xE4, 0x70, 0x1D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9C, 0x14, 0xBB, 0xE9, 0x9B, 0xB9, 0x65, 0x5D), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_19_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x66, 0x8E, 0x88, 0xF5, 0xF1, 0xC1, 0x89, 0xA2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x16, 0x30, 0x53, 0xE6, 0xFB, 0x2D, 0x82, 0xB4), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA7, 0xE4, 0xFF, 0xBA, 0x31, 0x79, 0xAB, 0xC2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x45, 0x09, 0xF7, 0xB7, 0x09, 0x78, 0x4C, 0x90), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x10, 0xAE, 0xC2, 0x44, 0xDC, 0x17, 0x78, 0x47), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC7, 0xD4, 0x17, 0x43, 0x19, 0x74, 0x9E, 0x23), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x15, 0x64, 0x3B, 0x73, 0xA2, 0x99, 0x27, 0x76), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x05, 0x74, 0x36, 0x5F, 0xD3, 0x14, 0xB1, 0x31), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_20_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAC, 0x07, 0xAB, 0xFD, 0x9B, 0x03, 0xC5, 0xD5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC7, 0xBE, 0xB0, 0x1D, 0xF2, 0x0C, 0x73, 0x73), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x99, 0xE7, 0x7B, 0x87, 0xD3, 0x34, 0xFD, 0xE2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9A, 0x25, 0x3D, 0xC7, 0x36, 0x83, 0x53, 0xDC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x22, 0x7C, 0xCF, 0x63, 0x55, 0x12, 0x11, 0xB0), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC0, 0x34, 0x4D, 0x27, 0x92, 0xAC, 0x18, 0x16), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x98, 0x42, 0x61, 0x9D, 0x2E, 0xFF, 0x13, 0x16), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF4, 0xDE, 0x92, 0x65, 0x57, 0x0D, 0xBC, 0x0A), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_20_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEF, 0x7B, 0x6E, 0xC6, 0x2A, 0x21, 0x74, 0x0A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x37, 0xA7, 0x53, 0x4D, 0x29, 0x36, 0xEF, 0xE5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE1, 0xD6, 0x41, 0xC7, 0x99, 0xAD, 0x50, 0x53), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x99, 0xAC, 0x41, 0x9F, 0xFB, 0x4C, 0x86, 0xF1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8B, 0xBB, 0xE6, 0x25, 0x28, 0xAA, 0xEB, 0x1E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x92, 0x04, 0xA2, 0xC3, 0xAA, 0x08, 0x8A, 0xCC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5A, 0x2B, 0x5B, 0xE2, 0x8D, 0x76, 0xEA, 0x34), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB3, 0x33, 0xD2, 0x21, 0x4D, 0x62, 0xE3, 0x8E), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_21_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF6, 0x06, 0x8B, 0x2B, 0xC2, 0xC4, 0xB1, 0xD2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFA, 0xF5, 0xA1, 0xC0, 0x03, 0x6A, 0x29, 0x12), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF5, 0xA9, 0xEF, 0x55, 0xB6, 0x1A, 0x9F, 0x6B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9B, 0x54, 0x32, 0xBE, 0x06, 0x43, 0xB5, 0xFD), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF7, 0xD6, 0xD9, 0x20, 0x89, 0xBE, 0xD4, 0x1B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE8, 0x26, 0x95, 0x10, 0xCE, 0xB4, 0x88, 0x79), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE6, 0xA6, 0x27, 0xAC, 0x32, 0xBA, 0xBD, 0xC7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA3, 0xA6, 0xAE, 0x9C, 0x7B, 0xBE, 0xA1, 0x63), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_21_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8B, 0xCD, 0x4D, 0x3D, 0xDF, 0x96, 0xBB, 0x7D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x77, 0xA7, 0x11, 0x06, 0xCC, 0x0E, 0x31, 0x81), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x20, 0xE4, 0xF4, 0xAD, 0x7B, 0x5F, 0xF1, 0xEF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE4, 0x54, 0xBE, 0xF4, 0x8A, 0x03, 0x47, 0xDF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB4, 0x53, 0x00, 0x7F, 0xB0, 0x8A, 0x68, 0xA6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA0, 0x16, 0xB1, 0x73, 0x6F, 0x5B, 0x0E, 0xC3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2A, 0x32, 0xE3, 0x43, 0x64, 0x75, 0xFB, 0xFB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA0, 0x18, 0x55, 0x8A, 0x4E, 0x6E, 0x35, 0x54), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_22_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x80, 0x97, 0x15, 0x1E, 0xCB, 0xF2, 0x9C, 0xA5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2B, 0xD1, 0xBB, 0xF3, 0x70, 0xAD, 0x13, 0xAD), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD8, 0x96, 0xA4, 0xC5, 0x5E, 0xDA, 0xD5, 0x57), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x07, 0x81, 0xE9, 0x65, 0x66, 0x76, 0x47, 0x45), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC9, 0x35, 0x87, 0x06, 0x73, 0xCF, 0x34, 0xD2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5A, 0x81, 0x15, 0x42, 0xA2, 0x79, 0x5B, 0x42), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x08, 0xA2, 0x7D, 0x09, 0x14, 0x64, 0xC6, 0xAE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5E, 0x6D, 0xC4, 0xED, 0xF1, 0xD6, 0xE9, 0x24), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_22_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB4, 0xD5, 0xBB, 0x25, 0xA3, 0xDD, 0xA3, 0x88), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x46, 0xF2, 0x68, 0x67, 0x39, 0x8F, 0x73, 0x93), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF0, 0x76, 0x28, 0x89, 0xAD, 0x32, 0xE0, 0xDF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF8, 0x90, 0xCC, 0x57, 0x58, 0xAA, 0xC9, 0x75), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5E, 0xD7, 0x43, 0xD2, 0xCE, 0x5E, 0xA0, 0x08), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x33, 0xB0, 0xB8, 0xA4, 0x9E, 0x96, 0x26, 0x86), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x94, 0x61, 0x1D, 0xF3, 0x65, 0x5E, 0x60, 0xCA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC7, 0x1E, 0x65, 0xED, 0xCF, 0x07, 0x60, 0x20), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_23_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA4, 0x30, 0x17, 0x8A, 0x91, 0x88, 0x0A, 0xA4), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x05, 0x7D, 0x18, 0xA4, 0xAC, 0x59, 0xFC, 0x5F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA4, 0x31, 0x8B, 0x25, 0x65, 0x39, 0x9A, 0xDC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x15, 0x16, 0x4B, 0x68, 0xBA, 0x59, 0x13, 0x2F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8D, 0xFD, 0xD3, 0xC5, 0x56, 0xC9, 0x8C, 0x5E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBC, 0xC6, 0x9F, 0xF4, 0xE6, 0xF7, 0xB4, 0x01), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2D, 0x7C, 0x03, 0x00, 0x26, 0x9F, 0xD8, 0x7B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x24, 0x1D, 0x6E, 0x00, 0xB9, 0x00, 0x6E, 0x93), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_23_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x75, 0x63, 0xDA, 0x03, 0x2B, 0xD5, 0x0B, 0xFE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x46, 0xFC, 0xE2, 0xC8, 0x47, 0xF0, 0xAE, 0xF2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x51, 0x4C, 0xF7, 0x50, 0x0C, 0x48, 0x06, 0x2A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDF, 0x2B, 0x32, 0x98, 0x0E, 0x7E, 0x61, 0x41), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5D, 0x02, 0x27, 0xFE, 0x75, 0x86, 0xDF, 0x24), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2B, 0x30, 0xB1, 0x22, 0x32, 0x1B, 0xFE, 0x24), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC2, 0x27, 0xF7, 0x78, 0x6F, 0xD7, 0xFD, 0xE4), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA0, 0x78, 0xCC, 0xEA, 0xC0, 0x50, 0x24, 0x44), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_24_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x37, 0x2B, 0x4F, 0x7F, 0x58, 0xE6, 0xC2, 0x70), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x37, 0x43, 0xD5, 0xA7, 0x35, 0x3C, 0x80, 0xB8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1A, 0x6D, 0x4B, 0x12, 0x00, 0x7B, 0xE6, 0xA6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x37, 0x15, 0xBD, 0xD0, 0x9B, 0xCA, 0xAA, 0x81), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCF, 0xCE, 0x9C, 0xE3, 0x8B, 0x60, 0x7A, 0x53), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0C, 0xDA, 0x4B, 0x03, 0xA7, 0x8D, 0x43, 0x22), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x57, 0xAF, 0x00, 0x2B, 0x32, 0xF0, 0x22, 0x68), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDC, 0xD9, 0x99, 0x99, 0xBE, 0x43, 0x99, 0x3E), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_24_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1F, 0x71, 0x41, 0xF4, 0xB5, 0xFD, 0xDD, 0x36), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9D, 0xE2, 0x20, 0x4C, 0xD1, 0x2E, 0x1F, 0x06), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x96, 0x43, 0x48, 0x76, 0x8A, 0x49, 0xAC, 0x87), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0C, 0x1A, 0x55, 0xA8, 0xA3, 0xD4, 0x57, 0x75), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7C, 0xA6, 0x84, 0x39, 0xC9, 0x13, 0xBB, 0x60), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD9, 0xFA, 0xA9, 0x70, 0xDE, 0x83, 0xDD, 0xC9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEC, 0xC9, 0xD9, 0x3E, 0x44, 0x91, 0x68, 0x7B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB6, 0x9F, 0x85, 0x6D, 0xF7, 0x54, 0x36, 0x82), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_25_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x68, 0x6B, 0xA6, 0xA3, 0xE5, 0xD4, 0x46, 0xDB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x23, 0x3E, 0xDC, 0x84, 0x7C, 0x7B, 0x24, 0x34), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x14, 0xED, 0x7F, 0x86, 0x07, 0x6C, 0x57, 0xCA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x95, 0x06, 0xFE, 0x52, 0x12, 0x79, 0x69, 0x56), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x84, 0xD1, 0x44, 0x5F, 0x21, 0x3A, 0xC3, 0x84), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5E, 0xD9, 0x4A, 0xC0, 0x75, 0xAB, 0x17, 0xAC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0x81, 0x94, 0xB6, 0x80, 0x6B, 0x6F, 0xC3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x07, 0xBE, 0x8E, 0xA5, 0xAA, 0xBC, 0x1E, 0x3E), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_25_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x89, 0xC7, 0x85, 0xA6, 0x59, 0x9B, 0xB1, 0x52), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1C, 0xCE, 0x40, 0xD1, 0xFB, 0xDF, 0x94, 0xF7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x18, 0xB8, 0x5E, 0xBF, 0x45, 0xA8, 0x2D, 0x2D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x98, 0x9C, 0x06, 0x1B, 0xA9, 0x57, 0xB9, 0x79), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x53, 0xE9, 0xCE, 0xA2, 0xD3, 0x74, 0xA1, 0x3C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAA, 0x5F, 0x34, 0x78, 0xDB, 0xAE, 0x3A, 0x14), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7D, 0x32, 0x84, 0x3E, 0x68, 0x6A, 0x43, 0x0F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8C, 0xBC, 0x39, 0x36, 0xA4, 0xC5, 0xBB, 0x11), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_26_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8C, 0x07, 0xA2, 0xB5, 0xC9, 0x0F, 0x4D, 0x0F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE3, 0x1D, 0x67, 0xE6, 0xF1, 0x46, 0xEB, 0x71), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD7, 0x41, 0x23, 0x95, 0xE7, 0xE0, 0x10, 0xDD), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBE, 0x69, 0xFE, 0x68, 0x8C, 0xC6, 0x5F, 0xB6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE3, 0xB9, 0x2B, 0x3D, 0xD2, 0x4F, 0xD8, 0x1A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA3, 0x09, 0xF5, 0x5F, 0xCF, 0xF6, 0x91, 0x57), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x65, 0x15, 0x42, 0x6B, 0x6D, 0xB5, 0xF3, 0xB6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBF, 0x56, 0x9D, 0xC5, 0xFF, 0xCA, 0x13, 0x9B), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_26_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4D, 0x38, 0xE6, 0x23, 0x63, 0x48, 0x3C, 0xCA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD2, 0x68, 0x3C, 0xD1, 0x3B, 0xE9, 0x3B, 0x82), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB5, 0x08, 0x54, 0x49, 0xD1, 0x46, 0x45, 0x13), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x07, 0x70, 0x52, 0x6E, 0x79, 0xC4, 0x5E, 0x95), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x36, 0xDF, 0xE8, 0x5A, 0x32, 0x81, 0xDA, 0xD3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3C, 0x2D, 0x94, 0x5B, 0xB5, 0x35, 0x9F, 0x0A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2A, 0x12, 0x8D, 0xC3, 0x36, 0x36, 0xB2, 0x2A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x39, 0x2F, 0x22, 0x38, 0x5B, 0x18, 0x4C, 0x35), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_27_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x10, 0xC1, 0x22, 0x0E, 0xF0, 0x73, 0x11, 0x05), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB2, 0xAE, 0xA4, 0x56, 0x18, 0x61, 0x66, 0x12), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x79, 0xFB, 0x72, 0x08, 0x84, 0x38, 0x51, 0xB0), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDA, 0x86, 0xA8, 0xB9, 0x31, 0x99, 0x29, 0xC3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8A, 0xFB, 0xC3, 0x42, 0xB3, 0xC7, 0x6F, 0x3A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD8, 0xF8, 0xE1, 0x09, 0xBE, 0x75, 0xB0, 0x22), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5A, 0x7D, 0xFF, 0xF4, 0x99, 0xFC, 0x13, 0xAB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE6, 0x1B, 0x84, 0x81, 0x42, 0x22, 0xC6, 0x3D), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_27_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x21, 0xE0, 0x37, 0xA4, 0xA0, 0x2F, 0x38, 0x7F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD0, 0x3D, 0xB7, 0x40, 0x2F, 0x39, 0x3C, 0x7A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7A, 0x3B, 0x8A, 0x51, 0xAE, 0x40, 0x49, 0x7A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x36, 0x20, 0x9F, 0xDD, 0xA9, 0xD0, 0x77, 0xC7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x78, 0x1D, 0x64, 0xDA, 0xA0, 0x53, 0xC7, 0x7D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x37, 0x7B, 0x66, 0x55, 0x94, 0xD1, 0x51, 0x44), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0E, 0xA9, 0xB5, 0x5B, 0x38, 0x35, 0x40, 0xC0), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC8, 0xC9, 0x0F, 0xF0, 0x73, 0x79, 0x43, 0x61), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_28_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x10, 0x47, 0x45, 0x69, 0x80, 0x72, 0x72, 0x42), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x70, 0x11, 0x99, 0x59, 0xDB, 0x48, 0x80, 0x39), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x75, 0x6E, 0x3D, 0xFC, 0x37, 0x15, 0xF4, 0xBF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x17, 0xBB, 0x5B, 0xA6, 0x35, 0x8D, 0x28, 0x20), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAB, 0x1A, 0x3B, 0x2C, 0x8F, 0xD3, 0xAA, 0x2D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x55, 0x1C, 0x1A, 0xF8, 0x02, 0xD9, 0x7B, 0x41), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAF, 0x69, 0xAC, 0xF8, 0x54, 0x31, 0x14, 0xA1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x41, 0x8A, 0xE6, 0xDE, 0x58, 0xB9, 0xC4, 0x7A), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_28_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x57, 0x83, 0x52, 0xFE, 0xF9, 0x7B, 0xE9, 0x1F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x07, 0xA2, 0x55, 0x46, 0x15, 0x49, 0xC1, 0x3A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1D, 0xBC, 0x5C, 0x91, 0xBD, 0xB9, 0x9C, 0xF4), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBB, 0xFD, 0xB1, 0x4E, 0x5F, 0x74, 0xEE, 0x53), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB1, 0x8B, 0xD8, 0x8B, 0x17, 0x73, 0x1B, 0x96), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x22, 0x92, 0xD7, 0x67, 0x06, 0xAD, 0x25, 0xCD), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x01, 0x0F, 0x80, 0x24, 0xE2, 0x27, 0x5F, 0x8B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x61, 0x1C, 0xCE, 0xD0, 0x67, 0xCA, 0xD4, 0x0B), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_29_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x87, 0xF1, 0xDD, 0x33, 0x66, 0xF9, 0x05, 0xD6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1D, 0xE5, 0x6B, 0x79, 0xBD, 0x48, 0x42, 0xAA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD1, 0x14, 0x52, 0xE3, 0x53, 0xB4, 0x50, 0xD4), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x32, 0x84, 0x6C, 0xCF, 0xDA, 0xB2, 0x20, 0x0A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x70, 0xD6, 0x1A, 0xE5, 0xE2, 0x29, 0x70, 0xCE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD5, 0x61, 0xFE, 0xBB, 0x21, 0x82, 0xD1, 0xFE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2C, 0xF0, 0x9C, 0x8B, 0x1A, 0x42, 0x30, 0x06), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x43, 0xD6, 0x49, 0x81, 0x92, 0xF1, 0xD0, 0x90), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_29_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC9, 0x91, 0x93, 0x6A, 0xA6, 0x22, 0xE9, 0xD6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x09, 0xDC, 0xC3, 0x69, 0x11, 0x95, 0x7D, 0xEC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1C, 0xA3, 0x9D, 0x87, 0x5E, 0x64, 0x41, 0xA2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBE, 0x87, 0x5A, 0x15, 0xBD, 0x6E, 0x3C, 0x8D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD0, 0x8D, 0x50, 0xCC, 0xCF, 0xB7, 0x8F, 0x0B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x38, 0x65, 0xCD, 0x31, 0x30, 0xF1, 0x68, 0x13), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x10, 0x5C, 0x66, 0x67, 0x92, 0x30, 0x57, 0x95), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x23, 0x9B, 0x01, 0x3D, 0x20, 0x8B, 0xD1, 0x0D), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_30_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAB, 0xC0, 0xE6, 0x4F, 0xDE, 0x62, 0xAB, 0xB3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA4, 0x48, 0xB3, 0x1C, 0x0F, 0x16, 0x93, 0x45), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x77, 0x63, 0xBD, 0x1F, 0x16, 0x50, 0x56, 0x98), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5D, 0x06, 0xBC, 0xE9, 0x27, 0x1C, 0x9A, 0x7B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF8, 0xFE, 0x21, 0xC5, 0x39, 0x55, 0xE1, 0xFD), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF6, 0xA8, 0xD0, 0x96, 0x0E, 0xB5, 0xB2, 0x84), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3D, 0xE7, 0x4B, 0xF3, 0x11, 0x0C, 0xC9, 0x5B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x43, 0x3A, 0xC4, 0x87, 0x71, 0xEE, 0xFA, 0x18), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_30_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA7, 0x77, 0xEE, 0x81, 0x5E, 0x96, 0xEA, 0x4B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEE, 0xDF, 0xA9, 0xF4, 0x4F, 0x7C, 0xB2, 0x43), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9F, 0xD4, 0xDF, 0x35, 0x63, 0x47, 0x25, 0x8A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA5, 0x3D, 0xFF, 0xA4, 0x02, 0xC3, 0x95, 0x11), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD5, 0x10, 0x78, 0xD1, 0x2B, 0xB7, 0xBE, 0x0E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0A, 0xE9, 0x57, 0xF9, 0xE0, 0xD8, 0xFC, 0xBC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF3, 0xC4, 0x01, 0xD6, 0xB4, 0xE7, 0x78, 0xE2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x02, 0x6C, 0xB9, 0x13, 0xA4, 0xE8, 0x6D, 0x6F), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_31_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE8, 0xB0, 0xC9, 0xCD, 0xBF, 0xA2, 0x1E, 0x63), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDD, 0x4F, 0x86, 0x22, 0x9B, 0xEA, 0xE8, 0xBB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x50, 0x46, 0xDF, 0x43, 0xB9, 0x82, 0x2D, 0x0A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x07, 0x32, 0xF1, 0x4E, 0x95, 0x41, 0xAE, 0x8E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x52, 0x93, 0x26, 0xFC, 0xD3, 0x90, 0xDC, 0xEB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x04, 0x05, 0x45, 0xCA, 0xF9, 0x5A, 0x89, 0x93), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC5, 0x82, 0x63, 0x4E, 0x55, 0x1D, 0x3A, 0x08), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7C, 0x69, 0x52, 0x49, 0xE9, 0xED, 0x57, 0x34), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_31_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x70, 0x64, 0xE9, 0xAC, 0x4C, 0x4A, 0xEA, 0x25), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE9, 0xE9, 0x0B, 0x99, 0xE7, 0xF9, 0xA9, 0x2C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x24, 0x0C, 0xC1, 0xF4, 0x8D, 0x07, 0xB6, 0xB1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAD, 0x68, 0xFA, 0x35, 0xE4, 0x9E, 0xAE, 0xD9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF0, 0x2D, 0x1A, 0x13, 0x8E, 0x02, 0xE2, 0x63), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x27, 0x38, 0x28, 0x86, 0x46, 0x7B, 0x3A, 0xE1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3F, 0x4C, 0x64, 0x59, 0x0A, 0xF9, 0x02, 0xC4), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x41, 0x4F, 0x23, 0xA2, 0xC3, 0xD5, 0xEF, 0x42), +}; +static const mbedtls_ecp_point brainpoolP512r1_T[32] = { + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z1(brainpoolP512r1_T_0_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_0_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_1_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_1_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_2_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_2_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_3_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_3_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_4_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_4_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_5_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_5_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_6_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_6_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_7_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_7_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_8_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_8_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_9_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_9_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_10_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_10_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_11_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_11_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_12_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_12_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_13_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_13_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_14_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_14_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_15_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_15_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_16_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_16_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_17_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_17_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_18_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_18_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_19_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_19_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_20_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_20_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_21_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_21_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_22_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_22_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_23_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_23_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_24_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_24_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_25_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_25_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_26_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_26_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_27_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_27_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_28_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_28_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_29_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_29_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_30_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_30_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_31_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_31_Y), +}; +#else +#define brainpoolP512r1_T NULL #endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED */ #if defined(ECP_LOAD_GROUP) /* @@ -526,7 +4494,7 @@ static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_n[] = { static inline void ecp_mpi_load(mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi_uint *p, size_t len) { X->s = 1; - X->n = len / sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint); + X->n = (unsigned short) (len / sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint)); X->p = (mbedtls_mpi_uint *) p; } @@ -535,10 +4503,9 @@ static inline void ecp_mpi_load(mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi_uint *p, size_ */ static inline void ecp_mpi_set1(mbedtls_mpi *X) { - static const mbedtls_mpi_uint one[] = { 1 }; X->s = 1; X->n = 1; - X->p = (mbedtls_mpi_uint *) one; /* X->p will not be modified so the cast is safe */ + X->p = (mbedtls_mpi_uint *) mpi_one; /* X->p will not be modified so the cast is safe */ } /* @@ -550,7 +4517,8 @@ static int ecp_group_load(mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, const mbedtls_mpi_uint *b, size_t blen, const mbedtls_mpi_uint *gx, size_t gxlen, const mbedtls_mpi_uint *gy, size_t gylen, - const mbedtls_mpi_uint *n, size_t nlen) + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *n, size_t nlen, + const mbedtls_ecp_point *T) { ecp_mpi_load(&grp->P, p, plen); if (a != NULL) { @@ -568,6 +4536,12 @@ static int ecp_group_load(mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, grp->h = 1; + grp->T = (mbedtls_ecp_point *) T; + /* + * Set T_size to 0 to prevent T free by mbedtls_ecp_group_free. + */ + grp->T_size = 0; + return 0; } #endif /* ECP_LOAD_GROUP */ @@ -619,7 +4593,9 @@ static int ecp_mod_p256k1(mbedtls_mpi *); G ## _b, sizeof(G ## _b), \ G ## _gx, sizeof(G ## _gx), \ G ## _gy, sizeof(G ## _gy), \ - G ## _n, sizeof(G ## _n)) + G ## _n, sizeof(G ## _n), \ + G ## _T \ + ) #define LOAD_GROUP(G) ecp_group_load(grp, \ G ## _p, sizeof(G ## _p), \ @@ -627,7 +4603,9 @@ static int ecp_mod_p256k1(mbedtls_mpi *); G ## _b, sizeof(G ## _b), \ G ## _gx, sizeof(G ## _gx), \ G ## _gy, sizeof(G ## _gy), \ - G ## _n, sizeof(G ## _n)) + G ## _n, sizeof(G ## _n), \ + G ## _T \ + ) #endif /* ECP_LOAD_GROUP */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED) @@ -738,7 +4716,6 @@ static int ecp_use_curve448(mbedtls_ecp_group *grp) */ int mbedtls_ecp_group_load(mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_group_id id) { - ECP_VALIDATE_RET(grp != NULL); mbedtls_ecp_group_free(grp); mbedtls_ecp_group_init(grp); @@ -970,9 +4947,6 @@ static inline void sub32(uint32_t *dst, uint32_t src, signed char *carry) #define ADD(j) add32(&cur, A(j), &c); #define SUB(j) sub32(&cur, A(j), &c); -#define ciL (sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint)) /* chars in limb */ -#define biL (ciL << 3) /* bits in limb */ - /* * Helpers for the main 'loop' */ @@ -1004,8 +4978,7 @@ static inline void sub32(uint32_t *dst, uint32_t src, signed char *carry) * If the result is negative, we get it in the form * c * 2^bits + N, with c negative and N positive shorter than 'bits' */ -MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE -void mbedtls_ecp_fix_negative(mbedtls_mpi *N, signed char c, size_t bits) +static void mbedtls_ecp_fix_negative(mbedtls_mpi *N, signed char c, size_t bits) { size_t i; @@ -1220,43 +5193,32 @@ static int ecp_mod_p521(mbedtls_mpi *N) /* * Fast quasi-reduction modulo p255 = 2^255 - 19 - * Write N as A0 + 2^255 A1, return A0 + 19 * A1 + * Write N as A0 + 2^256 A1, return A0 + 38 * A1 */ static int ecp_mod_p255(mbedtls_mpi *N) { - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - size_t i; - mbedtls_mpi M; - mbedtls_mpi_uint Mp[P255_WIDTH + 2]; + mbedtls_mpi_uint Mp[P255_WIDTH]; - if (N->n < P255_WIDTH) { + /* Helper references for top part of N */ + mbedtls_mpi_uint * const NT_p = N->p + P255_WIDTH; + const size_t NT_n = N->n - P255_WIDTH; + if (N->n <= P255_WIDTH) { return 0; } - - /* M = A1 */ - M.s = 1; - M.n = N->n - (P255_WIDTH - 1); - if (M.n > P255_WIDTH + 1) { + if (NT_n > P255_WIDTH) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } - M.p = Mp; - memset(Mp, 0, sizeof(Mp)); - memcpy(Mp, N->p + P255_WIDTH - 1, M.n * sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_shift_r(&M, 255 % (8 * sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint)))); - M.n++; /* Make room for multiplication by 19 */ - /* N = A0 */ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_set_bit(N, 255, 0)); - for (i = P255_WIDTH; i < N->n; i++) { - N->p[i] = 0; - } + /* Split N as N + 2^256 M */ + memcpy(Mp, NT_p, sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint) * NT_n); + memset(NT_p, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint) * NT_n); - /* N = A0 + 19 * A1 */ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_int(&M, &M, 19)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_add_abs(N, N, &M)); + /* N = A0 + 38 * A1 */ + mbedtls_mpi_core_mla(N->p, P255_WIDTH + 1, + Mp, NT_n, + 38); -cleanup: - return ret; + return 0; } #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED */ @@ -1267,8 +5229,9 @@ static int ecp_mod_p255(mbedtls_mpi *N) /* Number of limbs fully occupied by 2^224 (max), and limbs used by it (min) */ #define DIV_ROUND_UP(X, Y) (((X) + (Y) -1) / (Y)) -#define P224_WIDTH_MIN (28 / sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint)) -#define P224_WIDTH_MAX DIV_ROUND_UP(28, sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint)) +#define P224_SIZE (224 / 8) +#define P224_WIDTH_MIN (P224_SIZE / sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint)) +#define P224_WIDTH_MAX DIV_ROUND_UP(P224_SIZE, sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint)) #define P224_UNUSED_BITS ((P224_WIDTH_MAX * sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint) * 8) - 224) /* @@ -1370,9 +5333,9 @@ static inline int ecp_mod_koblitz(mbedtls_mpi *N, const mbedtls_mpi_uint *Rp, si M.p = Mp; /* M = A1 */ - M.n = N->n - (p_limbs - adjust); + M.n = (unsigned short) (N->n - (p_limbs - adjust)); if (M.n > p_limbs + adjust) { - M.n = p_limbs + adjust; + M.n = (unsigned short) (p_limbs + adjust); } memset(Mp, 0, sizeof(Mp)); memcpy(Mp, N->p + p_limbs - adjust, M.n * sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint)); @@ -1396,9 +5359,9 @@ static inline int ecp_mod_koblitz(mbedtls_mpi *N, const mbedtls_mpi_uint *Rp, si /* Second pass */ /* M = A1 */ - M.n = N->n - (p_limbs - adjust); + M.n = (unsigned short) (N->n - (p_limbs - adjust)); if (M.n > p_limbs + adjust) { - M.n = p_limbs + adjust; + M.n = (unsigned short) (p_limbs + adjust); } memset(Mp, 0, sizeof(Mp)); memcpy(Mp, N->p + p_limbs - adjust, M.n * sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint)); @@ -1429,7 +5392,7 @@ static inline int ecp_mod_koblitz(mbedtls_mpi *N, const mbedtls_mpi_uint *Rp, si #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED) /* * Fast quasi-reduction modulo p192k1 = 2^192 - R, - * with R = 2^32 + 2^12 + 2^8 + 2^7 + 2^6 + 2^3 + 1 = 0x0100001119 + * with R = 2^32 + 2^12 + 2^8 + 2^7 + 2^6 + 2^3 + 1 = 0x01000011C9 */ static int ecp_mod_p192k1(mbedtls_mpi *N) { @@ -1481,6 +5444,17 @@ static int ecp_mod_p256k1(mbedtls_mpi *N) } #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS) + +MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE +mbedtls_ecp_variant mbedtls_ecp_get_variant(void) +{ + return MBEDTLS_ECP_VARIANT_WITH_MPI_STRUCT; +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS */ + #endif /* !MBEDTLS_ECP_ALT */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_LIGHT */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_WITH_MPI_UINT */ diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ecp_curves_new.c b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ecp_curves_new.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..035b23a1b41c --- /dev/null +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ecp_curves_new.c @@ -0,0 +1,6036 @@ +/* + * Elliptic curves over GF(p): curve-specific data and functions + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_WITH_MPI_UINT) + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_LIGHT) + +#include "mbedtls/ecp.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" + +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" + +#include "constant_time_internal.h" + +#include "bn_mul.h" +#include "bignum_core.h" +#include "ecp_invasive.h" + +#include + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_ALT) + +#define ECP_MPI_INIT(_p, _n) { .p = (mbedtls_mpi_uint *) (_p), .s = 1, .n = (_n) } + +#define ECP_MPI_INIT_ARRAY(x) \ + ECP_MPI_INIT(x, sizeof(x) / sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint)) + +#define ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(x, y) { \ + ECP_MPI_INIT_ARRAY(x), ECP_MPI_INIT_ARRAY(y), ECP_MPI_INIT(NULL, 0) } +#define ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z1(x, y) { \ + ECP_MPI_INIT_ARRAY(x), ECP_MPI_INIT_ARRAY(y), ECP_MPI_INIT(mpi_one, 1) } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED) +/* For these curves, we build the group parameters dynamically. */ +#define ECP_LOAD_GROUP +static mbedtls_mpi_uint mpi_one[] = { 1 }; +#endif + +/* + * Note: the constants are in little-endian order + * to be directly usable in MPIs + */ + +/* + * Domain parameters for secp192r1 + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED) +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_p[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFE, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_b[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB1, 0xB9, 0x46, 0xC1, 0xEC, 0xDE, 0xB8, 0xFE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x49, 0x30, 0x24, 0x72, 0xAB, 0xE9, 0xA7, 0x0F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE7, 0x80, 0x9C, 0xE5, 0x19, 0x05, 0x21, 0x64), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_gx[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x12, 0x10, 0xFF, 0x82, 0xFD, 0x0A, 0xFF, 0xF4), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x00, 0x88, 0xA1, 0x43, 0xEB, 0x20, 0xBF, 0x7C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF6, 0x90, 0x30, 0xB0, 0x0E, 0xA8, 0x8D, 0x18), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_gy[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x11, 0x48, 0x79, 0x1E, 0xA1, 0x77, 0xF9, 0x73), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD5, 0xCD, 0x24, 0x6B, 0xED, 0x11, 0x10, 0x63), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x78, 0xDA, 0xC8, 0xFF, 0x95, 0x2B, 0x19, 0x07), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_n[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x31, 0x28, 0xD2, 0xB4, 0xB1, 0xC9, 0x6B, 0x14), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x36, 0xF8, 0xDE, 0x99, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF), +}; +#if MBEDTLS_ECP_FIXED_POINT_OPTIM == 1 +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_0_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x12, 0x10, 0xFF, 0x82, 0xFD, 0x0A, 0xFF, 0xF4), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x00, 0x88, 0xA1, 0x43, 0xEB, 0x20, 0xBF, 0x7C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF6, 0x90, 0x30, 0xB0, 0x0E, 0xA8, 0x8D, 0x18), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_0_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x11, 0x48, 0x79, 0x1E, 0xA1, 0x77, 0xF9, 0x73), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD5, 0xCD, 0x24, 0x6B, 0xED, 0x11, 0x10, 0x63), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x78, 0xDA, 0xC8, 0xFF, 0x95, 0x2B, 0x19, 0x07), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_1_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x97, 0x9E, 0xE3, 0x60, 0x59, 0xD1, 0xC4, 0xC2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x91, 0xBD, 0x22, 0xD7, 0x2D, 0x07, 0xBD, 0xB6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x74, 0x2A, 0xCF, 0x33, 0xF0, 0xBE, 0xD1, 0xED), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_1_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x88, 0x71, 0x4B, 0xA8, 0xED, 0x7E, 0xC9, 0x1A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8E, 0x2A, 0xF6, 0xDF, 0x0E, 0xE8, 0x4C, 0x0F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC5, 0x35, 0xF7, 0x8A, 0xC3, 0xEC, 0xDE, 0x1E), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_2_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x00, 0x67, 0xC2, 0x1D, 0x32, 0x8F, 0x10, 0xFB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBB, 0x2D, 0x17, 0xF3, 0xE4, 0xFE, 0xD8, 0x13), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x55, 0x45, 0x10, 0x70, 0x2C, 0x3E, 0x52, 0x3E), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_2_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x61, 0xF1, 0x04, 0x5D, 0xEE, 0xD4, 0x56, 0xE6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x78, 0xB7, 0x38, 0x27, 0x61, 0xAA, 0x81, 0x87), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x71, 0x37, 0xD7, 0x0E, 0x29, 0x0E, 0x11, 0x14), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_3_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1E, 0x35, 0x52, 0xC6, 0x31, 0xB7, 0x27, 0xF5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3D, 0xD4, 0x15, 0x98, 0x0F, 0xE7, 0xF3, 0x6A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD3, 0x31, 0x70, 0x35, 0x09, 0xA0, 0x2B, 0xC2), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_3_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x21, 0x75, 0xA7, 0x4C, 0x88, 0xCF, 0x5B, 0xE4), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x17, 0x17, 0x48, 0x8D, 0xF2, 0xF0, 0x86, 0xED), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x49, 0xCF, 0xFE, 0x6B, 0xB0, 0xA5, 0x06, 0xAB), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_4_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x18, 0x6A, 0xDC, 0x9A, 0x6D, 0x7B, 0x47, 0x2E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x12, 0xFC, 0x51, 0x12, 0x62, 0x66, 0x0B, 0x59), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCD, 0x40, 0x93, 0xA0, 0xB5, 0x5A, 0x58, 0xD7), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_4_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEF, 0xCB, 0xAF, 0xDC, 0x0B, 0xA1, 0x26, 0xFB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDA, 0x36, 0x9D, 0xA3, 0xD7, 0x3B, 0xAD, 0x39), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB4, 0x3B, 0x05, 0x9A, 0xA8, 0xAA, 0x69, 0xB2), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_5_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6D, 0xD9, 0xD1, 0x4D, 0x4A, 0x6E, 0x96, 0x1E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x17, 0x66, 0x32, 0x39, 0xC6, 0x57, 0x7D, 0xE6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x92, 0xA0, 0x36, 0xC2, 0x45, 0xF9, 0x00, 0x62), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_5_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB4, 0xEF, 0x59, 0x46, 0xDC, 0x60, 0xD9, 0x8F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x24, 0xB0, 0xE9, 0x41, 0xA4, 0x87, 0x76, 0x89), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x13, 0xD4, 0x0E, 0xB2, 0xFA, 0x16, 0x56, 0xDC), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_6_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0A, 0x62, 0xD2, 0xB1, 0x34, 0xB2, 0xF1, 0x06), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB2, 0xED, 0x55, 0xC5, 0x47, 0xB5, 0x07, 0x15), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x17, 0xF6, 0x2F, 0x94, 0xC3, 0xDD, 0x54, 0x2F), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_6_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFD, 0xA6, 0xD4, 0x8C, 0xA9, 0xCE, 0x4D, 0x2E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB9, 0x4B, 0x46, 0xCC, 0xB2, 0x55, 0xC8, 0xB2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3A, 0xAE, 0x31, 0xED, 0x89, 0x65, 0x59, 0x55), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_7_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCC, 0x0A, 0xD1, 0x1A, 0xC5, 0xF6, 0xEA, 0x43), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0C, 0xFC, 0x0C, 0x1A, 0xFB, 0xA0, 0xC8, 0x70), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEA, 0xFD, 0x53, 0x6F, 0x6D, 0xBF, 0xBA, 0xAF), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_7_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2D, 0xB0, 0x7D, 0x83, 0x96, 0xE3, 0xCB, 0x9D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6F, 0x6E, 0x55, 0x2C, 0x20, 0x53, 0x2F, 0x46), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA6, 0x66, 0x00, 0x17, 0x08, 0xFE, 0xAC, 0x31), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_8_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x09, 0x12, 0x97, 0x3A, 0xC7, 0x57, 0x45, 0xCD), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x38, 0x25, 0x99, 0x00, 0xF6, 0x97, 0xB4, 0x64), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9B, 0x74, 0xE6, 0xE6, 0xA3, 0xDF, 0x9C, 0xCC), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_8_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x32, 0xF4, 0x76, 0xD5, 0x5F, 0x2A, 0xFD, 0x85), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x62, 0x80, 0x7E, 0x3E, 0xE5, 0xE8, 0xD6, 0x63), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE2, 0xAD, 0x1E, 0x70, 0x79, 0x3E, 0x3D, 0x83), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_9_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8E, 0x15, 0xBB, 0xB3, 0x42, 0x6A, 0xA1, 0x7C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9B, 0x58, 0xCB, 0x43, 0x25, 0x00, 0x14, 0x68), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x06, 0x4E, 0x93, 0x11, 0xE0, 0x32, 0x54, 0x98), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_9_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA7, 0x52, 0xA2, 0xB4, 0x57, 0x32, 0xB9, 0x11), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7D, 0x43, 0xA1, 0xB1, 0xFB, 0x01, 0xE1, 0xE7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA6, 0xFB, 0x5A, 0x11, 0xB8, 0xC2, 0x03, 0xE5), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_10_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1C, 0x2B, 0x71, 0x26, 0x4E, 0x7C, 0xC5, 0x32), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1F, 0xF5, 0xD3, 0xA8, 0xE4, 0x95, 0x48, 0x65), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x55, 0xAE, 0xD9, 0x5D, 0x9F, 0x6A, 0x22, 0xAD), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_10_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD9, 0xCC, 0xA3, 0x4D, 0xA0, 0x1C, 0x34, 0xEF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA3, 0x3C, 0x62, 0xF8, 0x5E, 0xA6, 0x58, 0x7D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6D, 0x6E, 0x66, 0x8A, 0x3D, 0x17, 0xFF, 0x0F), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_11_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF7, 0xCD, 0xA8, 0xDD, 0xD1, 0x20, 0x5C, 0xEA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBF, 0xFE, 0x17, 0xE2, 0xCF, 0xEA, 0x63, 0xDE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x74, 0x51, 0xC9, 0x16, 0xDE, 0xB4, 0xB2, 0xDD), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_11_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x59, 0xBE, 0x12, 0xD7, 0xA3, 0x0A, 0x50, 0x33), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x53, 0x87, 0xC5, 0x8A, 0x76, 0x57, 0x07, 0x60), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE5, 0x1F, 0xC6, 0x1B, 0x66, 0xC4, 0x3D, 0x8A), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_12_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x28, 0xA4, 0x85, 0x13, 0x8F, 0xA7, 0x35, 0x19), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x58, 0x0D, 0xFD, 0xFF, 0x1B, 0xD1, 0xD6, 0xEF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBA, 0x7A, 0xD0, 0xC3, 0xB4, 0xEF, 0x39, 0x66), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_12_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3A, 0xFE, 0xA5, 0x9C, 0x34, 0x30, 0x49, 0x40), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDE, 0xC5, 0x39, 0x26, 0x06, 0xE3, 0x01, 0x17), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE2, 0x2B, 0x66, 0xFC, 0x95, 0x5F, 0x35, 0xF7), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_13_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x58, 0xCF, 0x54, 0x63, 0x99, 0x57, 0x05, 0x45), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x71, 0x6F, 0x00, 0x5F, 0x65, 0x08, 0x47, 0x98), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x62, 0x2A, 0x90, 0x6D, 0x67, 0xC6, 0xBC, 0x45), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_13_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8A, 0x4D, 0x88, 0x0A, 0x35, 0x9E, 0x33, 0x9C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7C, 0x17, 0x0C, 0xF8, 0xE1, 0x7A, 0x49, 0x02), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA4, 0x44, 0x06, 0x8F, 0x0B, 0x70, 0x2F, 0x71), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_14_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x85, 0x4B, 0xCB, 0xF9, 0x8E, 0x6A, 0xDA, 0x1B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x29, 0x43, 0xA1, 0x3F, 0xCE, 0x17, 0xD2, 0x32), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5D, 0x0D, 0xD2, 0x6C, 0x82, 0x37, 0xE5, 0xFC), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_14_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4A, 0x3C, 0xF4, 0x92, 0xB4, 0x8A, 0x95, 0x85), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x85, 0x96, 0xF1, 0x0A, 0x34, 0x2F, 0x74, 0x7E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7B, 0xA1, 0xAA, 0xBA, 0x86, 0x77, 0x4F, 0xA2), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_15_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE5, 0x7F, 0xEF, 0x60, 0x50, 0x80, 0xD7, 0xD4), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x31, 0xAC, 0xC9, 0xFE, 0xEC, 0x0A, 0x1A, 0x9F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6B, 0x2F, 0xBE, 0x91, 0xD7, 0xB7, 0x38, 0x48), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_15_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB1, 0xAE, 0x85, 0x98, 0xFE, 0x05, 0x7F, 0x9F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x91, 0xBE, 0xFD, 0x11, 0x31, 0x3D, 0x14, 0x13), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x59, 0x75, 0xE8, 0x30, 0x01, 0xCB, 0x9B, 0x1C), +}; +static const mbedtls_ecp_point secp192r1_T[16] = { + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z1(secp192r1_T_0_X, secp192r1_T_0_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192r1_T_1_X, secp192r1_T_1_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192r1_T_2_X, secp192r1_T_2_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192r1_T_3_X, secp192r1_T_3_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192r1_T_4_X, secp192r1_T_4_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192r1_T_5_X, secp192r1_T_5_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192r1_T_6_X, secp192r1_T_6_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192r1_T_7_X, secp192r1_T_7_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192r1_T_8_X, secp192r1_T_8_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192r1_T_9_X, secp192r1_T_9_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192r1_T_10_X, secp192r1_T_10_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192r1_T_11_X, secp192r1_T_11_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192r1_T_12_X, secp192r1_T_12_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192r1_T_13_X, secp192r1_T_13_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192r1_T_14_X, secp192r1_T_14_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192r1_T_15_X, secp192r1_T_15_Y), +}; +#else +#define secp192r1_T NULL +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED */ + +/* + * Domain parameters for secp224r1 + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED) +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_p[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_b[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB4, 0xFF, 0x55, 0x23, 0x43, 0x39, 0x0B, 0x27), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBA, 0xD8, 0xBF, 0xD7, 0xB7, 0xB0, 0x44, 0x50), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x56, 0x32, 0x41, 0xF5, 0xAB, 0xB3, 0x04, 0x0C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_4(0x85, 0x0A, 0x05, 0xB4), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_gx[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x21, 0x1D, 0x5C, 0x11, 0xD6, 0x80, 0x32, 0x34), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x22, 0x11, 0xC2, 0x56, 0xD3, 0xC1, 0x03, 0x4A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB9, 0x90, 0x13, 0x32, 0x7F, 0xBF, 0xB4, 0x6B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_4(0xBD, 0x0C, 0x0E, 0xB7), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_gy[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x34, 0x7E, 0x00, 0x85, 0x99, 0x81, 0xD5, 0x44), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x64, 0x47, 0x07, 0x5A, 0xA0, 0x75, 0x43, 0xCD), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE6, 0xDF, 0x22, 0x4C, 0xFB, 0x23, 0xF7, 0xB5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_4(0x88, 0x63, 0x37, 0xBD), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_n[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3D, 0x2A, 0x5C, 0x5C, 0x45, 0x29, 0xDD, 0x13), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3E, 0xF0, 0xB8, 0xE0, 0xA2, 0x16, 0xFF, 0xFF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_4(0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF), +}; +#if MBEDTLS_ECP_FIXED_POINT_OPTIM == 1 +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_0_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x21, 0x1D, 0x5C, 0x11, 0xD6, 0x80, 0x32, 0x34), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x22, 0x11, 0xC2, 0x56, 0xD3, 0xC1, 0x03, 0x4A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB9, 0x90, 0x13, 0x32, 0x7F, 0xBF, 0xB4, 0x6B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBD, 0x0C, 0x0E, 0xB7, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_0_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x34, 0x7E, 0x00, 0x85, 0x99, 0x81, 0xD5, 0x44), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x64, 0x47, 0x07, 0x5A, 0xA0, 0x75, 0x43, 0xCD), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE6, 0xDF, 0x22, 0x4C, 0xFB, 0x23, 0xF7, 0xB5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x88, 0x63, 0x37, 0xBD, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_1_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE0, 0xF9, 0xB8, 0xD0, 0x3D, 0xD2, 0xD3, 0xFA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1E, 0xFD, 0x99, 0x26, 0x19, 0xFE, 0x13, 0x6E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1C, 0x0E, 0x4C, 0x48, 0x7C, 0xA2, 0x17, 0x01), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3D, 0xA3, 0x13, 0x57, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_1_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9F, 0x16, 0x5C, 0x8F, 0xAA, 0xED, 0x0F, 0x58), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBF, 0xC5, 0x43, 0x34, 0x93, 0x05, 0x2A, 0x4C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE4, 0xE3, 0x6C, 0xCA, 0xC6, 0x14, 0xC2, 0x25), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD3, 0x43, 0x6C, 0xD7, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_2_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC3, 0x5A, 0x98, 0x1E, 0xC8, 0xA5, 0x42, 0xA3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x98, 0x49, 0x56, 0x78, 0xF8, 0xEF, 0xED, 0x65), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1B, 0xBB, 0x64, 0xB6, 0x4C, 0x54, 0x5F, 0xD1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2F, 0x0C, 0x33, 0xCC, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_2_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFA, 0x79, 0xCB, 0x2E, 0x08, 0xFF, 0xD8, 0xE6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2E, 0x1F, 0xD4, 0xD7, 0x57, 0xE9, 0x39, 0x45), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD8, 0xD6, 0x3B, 0x0A, 0x1C, 0x87, 0xB7, 0x6A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEB, 0x30, 0xD8, 0x05, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_3_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAD, 0x79, 0x74, 0x9A, 0xE6, 0xBB, 0xC2, 0xC2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB4, 0x5B, 0xA6, 0x67, 0xC1, 0x91, 0xE7, 0x64), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF0, 0xDF, 0x38, 0x82, 0x19, 0x2C, 0x4C, 0xCA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD1, 0x2E, 0x39, 0xC5, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_3_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x99, 0x36, 0x78, 0x4E, 0xAE, 0x5B, 0x02, 0x76), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x14, 0xF6, 0x8B, 0xF8, 0xF4, 0x92, 0x6B, 0x42), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBA, 0x4D, 0x71, 0x35, 0xE7, 0x0C, 0x2C, 0x98), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9B, 0xA5, 0x1F, 0xAE, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_4_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAF, 0x1C, 0x4B, 0xDF, 0x5B, 0xF2, 0x51, 0xB7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x05, 0x74, 0xB1, 0x5A, 0xC6, 0x0F, 0x0E, 0x61), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE8, 0x24, 0x09, 0x62, 0xAF, 0xFC, 0xDB, 0x45), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x43, 0xE1, 0x80, 0x55, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_4_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3C, 0x82, 0xFE, 0xAD, 0xC3, 0xE5, 0xCF, 0xD8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x24, 0xA2, 0x62, 0x17, 0x76, 0xF0, 0x5A, 0xFA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3E, 0xB8, 0xE5, 0xAC, 0xB7, 0x66, 0x38, 0xAA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x97, 0xFD, 0x86, 0x05, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_5_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x59, 0xD3, 0x0C, 0x3C, 0xD1, 0x66, 0xB0, 0xF1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBC, 0x59, 0xB4, 0x8D, 0x90, 0x10, 0xB7, 0xA2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x96, 0x47, 0x9B, 0xE6, 0x55, 0x8A, 0xE4, 0xEE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB1, 0x49, 0xDB, 0x78, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_5_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x41, 0x97, 0xED, 0xDE, 0xFF, 0xB3, 0xDF, 0x48), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x10, 0xB9, 0x83, 0xB7, 0xEB, 0xBE, 0x40, 0x8D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAF, 0xD3, 0xD3, 0xCD, 0x0E, 0x82, 0x79, 0x3D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9B, 0x83, 0x1B, 0xF0, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_6_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3F, 0x22, 0xBB, 0x54, 0xD3, 0x31, 0x56, 0xFC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x80, 0x36, 0xE5, 0xE0, 0x89, 0x96, 0x8E, 0x71), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE1, 0xEF, 0x0A, 0xED, 0xD0, 0x11, 0x4A, 0xFF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x15, 0x00, 0x57, 0x27, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_6_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x13, 0xCA, 0x3D, 0xF7, 0x64, 0x9B, 0x6E, 0x85), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x90, 0xE3, 0x70, 0x6B, 0x41, 0xD7, 0xED, 0x8F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x02, 0x44, 0x44, 0x80, 0xCE, 0x13, 0x37, 0x92), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x94, 0x73, 0x80, 0x79, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_7_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB7, 0x4D, 0x70, 0x7D, 0x31, 0x0F, 0x1C, 0x58), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6D, 0x35, 0x88, 0x47, 0xC4, 0x24, 0x78, 0x3F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBA, 0xF0, 0xCD, 0x91, 0x81, 0xB3, 0xDE, 0xB6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x04, 0xCE, 0xC6, 0xF7, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_7_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE9, 0x9C, 0x2D, 0xE8, 0xD2, 0x00, 0x8F, 0x10), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD5, 0x5E, 0x7C, 0x0E, 0x0C, 0x6E, 0x58, 0x02), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAE, 0x81, 0x21, 0xCE, 0x43, 0xF4, 0x24, 0x3D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9E, 0xBC, 0xF0, 0xF4, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_8_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD6, 0x10, 0xC2, 0x74, 0x4A, 0x8F, 0x8A, 0xCF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x89, 0x67, 0xF4, 0x2B, 0x38, 0x2B, 0x35, 0x17), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF5, 0xE7, 0x0C, 0xA9, 0xFA, 0x77, 0x5C, 0xBD), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE0, 0x33, 0x19, 0x2B, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_8_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE7, 0x3E, 0x96, 0x22, 0x53, 0xE1, 0xE9, 0xBE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE0, 0x13, 0xBC, 0xA1, 0x16, 0xEC, 0x01, 0x1A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9A, 0x00, 0xC9, 0x7A, 0xC3, 0x73, 0xA5, 0x45), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE1, 0xF4, 0x5E, 0xC1, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_9_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA8, 0x95, 0xD6, 0xD9, 0x32, 0x30, 0x2B, 0xD0), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x77, 0x42, 0x09, 0x05, 0x61, 0x2A, 0x7E, 0x82), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x73, 0x84, 0xA2, 0x05, 0x88, 0x64, 0x65, 0xF9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x03, 0x2D, 0x90, 0xB3, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_9_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0A, 0xE7, 0x2E, 0x85, 0x55, 0x80, 0x7C, 0x79), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0F, 0xC1, 0xAC, 0x78, 0xB4, 0xAF, 0xFB, 0x6E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD3, 0xC3, 0x28, 0x8E, 0x79, 0x18, 0x1F, 0x58), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x34, 0x46, 0xCF, 0x49, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_10_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x63, 0x5F, 0xA8, 0x6C, 0x46, 0x83, 0x43, 0xFA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFA, 0xA9, 0x93, 0x11, 0xB6, 0x07, 0x57, 0x74), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x77, 0x2A, 0x9D, 0x03, 0x89, 0x7E, 0xD7, 0x3C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7B, 0x8C, 0x62, 0xCF, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_10_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x44, 0x2C, 0x13, 0x59, 0xCC, 0xFA, 0x84, 0x9E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x51, 0xB9, 0x48, 0xBC, 0x57, 0xC7, 0xB3, 0x7C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFC, 0x0A, 0x38, 0x24, 0x2E, 0x3A, 0x28, 0x25), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBC, 0x0A, 0x43, 0xB8, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_11_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x59, 0x25, 0xAB, 0xC1, 0xEE, 0x70, 0x3C, 0xE1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF3, 0xDB, 0x45, 0x1D, 0x4A, 0x80, 0x75, 0x35), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE8, 0x1F, 0x4D, 0x2D, 0x9A, 0x05, 0xF4, 0xCB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6B, 0x10, 0xF0, 0x5A, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_11_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x35, 0x95, 0xE1, 0xDC, 0x15, 0x86, 0xC3, 0x7B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEC, 0xDC, 0x27, 0xD1, 0x56, 0xA1, 0x14, 0x0D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x59, 0x0B, 0xD6, 0x77, 0x4E, 0x44, 0xA2, 0xF8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x94, 0x42, 0x71, 0x1F, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_12_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x30, 0x86, 0xB2, 0xB0, 0xC8, 0x2F, 0x7B, 0xFE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x96, 0xEF, 0xCB, 0xDB, 0xBC, 0x9E, 0x3B, 0xC5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1B, 0x03, 0x86, 0xDD, 0x5B, 0xF5, 0x8D, 0x46), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x58, 0x95, 0x79, 0xD6, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_12_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x84, 0x32, 0x14, 0xDA, 0x9B, 0x4F, 0x07, 0x39), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB5, 0x3E, 0xFB, 0x06, 0xEE, 0xA7, 0x40, 0x40), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x76, 0x1F, 0xDF, 0x71, 0x61, 0xFD, 0x8B, 0xBE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x80, 0x8B, 0xAB, 0x8B, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_13_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC9, 0x34, 0xB3, 0xB4, 0xBC, 0x9F, 0xB0, 0x5E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE6, 0x58, 0x48, 0xA8, 0x77, 0xBB, 0x13, 0x2F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x41, 0xC6, 0xF7, 0x34, 0xCC, 0x89, 0x21, 0x0A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCA, 0x33, 0xDD, 0x1F, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_13_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCC, 0x81, 0xEF, 0xA4, 0xF2, 0x10, 0x0B, 0xCD), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x83, 0xF7, 0x6E, 0x72, 0x4A, 0xDF, 0xDD, 0xE8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x67, 0x23, 0x0A, 0x53, 0x03, 0x16, 0x62, 0xD2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0B, 0x76, 0xFD, 0x3C, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_14_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCB, 0x14, 0xA1, 0xFA, 0xA0, 0x18, 0xBE, 0x07), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x03, 0x2A, 0xE1, 0xD7, 0xB0, 0x6C, 0xA0, 0xDE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD1, 0xC0, 0xB0, 0xC6, 0x63, 0x24, 0xCD, 0x4E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x33, 0x38, 0x2C, 0xB1, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_14_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEE, 0xCD, 0x7D, 0x20, 0x0C, 0xFE, 0xAC, 0xC3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x09, 0x97, 0x9F, 0xA2, 0xB6, 0x45, 0xF7, 0x7B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCA, 0x99, 0xF3, 0xD2, 0x20, 0x02, 0xEB, 0x04), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x43, 0x18, 0x5B, 0x7B, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_15_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2B, 0xDD, 0x77, 0x91, 0x60, 0xEA, 0xFD, 0xD3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7D, 0xD3, 0xB5, 0xD6, 0x90, 0x17, 0x0E, 0x1A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x00, 0xF4, 0x28, 0xC1, 0xF2, 0x53, 0xF6, 0x63), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x49, 0x58, 0xDC, 0x61, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_15_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA8, 0x20, 0x01, 0xFB, 0xF1, 0xBD, 0x5F, 0x45), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD0, 0x7F, 0x06, 0xDA, 0x11, 0xCB, 0xBA, 0xA6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA7, 0x41, 0x00, 0xA4, 0x1B, 0x30, 0x33, 0x79), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF4, 0xFF, 0x27, 0xCA, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_ecp_point secp224r1_T[16] = { + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z1(secp224r1_T_0_X, secp224r1_T_0_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224r1_T_1_X, secp224r1_T_1_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224r1_T_2_X, secp224r1_T_2_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224r1_T_3_X, secp224r1_T_3_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224r1_T_4_X, secp224r1_T_4_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224r1_T_5_X, secp224r1_T_5_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224r1_T_6_X, secp224r1_T_6_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224r1_T_7_X, secp224r1_T_7_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224r1_T_8_X, secp224r1_T_8_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224r1_T_9_X, secp224r1_T_9_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224r1_T_10_X, secp224r1_T_10_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224r1_T_11_X, secp224r1_T_11_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224r1_T_12_X, secp224r1_T_12_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224r1_T_13_X, secp224r1_T_13_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224r1_T_14_X, secp224r1_T_14_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224r1_T_15_X, secp224r1_T_15_Y), +}; +#else +#define secp224r1_T NULL +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED */ + +/* + * Domain parameters for secp256r1 + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED) +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_p[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_b[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4B, 0x60, 0xD2, 0x27, 0x3E, 0x3C, 0xCE, 0x3B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF6, 0xB0, 0x53, 0xCC, 0xB0, 0x06, 0x1D, 0x65), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBC, 0x86, 0x98, 0x76, 0x55, 0xBD, 0xEB, 0xB3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE7, 0x93, 0x3A, 0xAA, 0xD8, 0x35, 0xC6, 0x5A), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_gx[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x96, 0xC2, 0x98, 0xD8, 0x45, 0x39, 0xA1, 0xF4), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA0, 0x33, 0xEB, 0x2D, 0x81, 0x7D, 0x03, 0x77), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF2, 0x40, 0xA4, 0x63, 0xE5, 0xE6, 0xBC, 0xF8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x47, 0x42, 0x2C, 0xE1, 0xF2, 0xD1, 0x17, 0x6B), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_gy[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF5, 0x51, 0xBF, 0x37, 0x68, 0x40, 0xB6, 0xCB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCE, 0x5E, 0x31, 0x6B, 0x57, 0x33, 0xCE, 0x2B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x16, 0x9E, 0x0F, 0x7C, 0x4A, 0xEB, 0xE7, 0x8E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9B, 0x7F, 0x1A, 0xFE, 0xE2, 0x42, 0xE3, 0x4F), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_n[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x51, 0x25, 0x63, 0xFC, 0xC2, 0xCA, 0xB9, 0xF3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x84, 0x9E, 0x17, 0xA7, 0xAD, 0xFA, 0xE6, 0xBC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF), +}; +#if MBEDTLS_ECP_FIXED_POINT_OPTIM == 1 +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_0_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x96, 0xC2, 0x98, 0xD8, 0x45, 0x39, 0xA1, 0xF4), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA0, 0x33, 0xEB, 0x2D, 0x81, 0x7D, 0x03, 0x77), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF2, 0x40, 0xA4, 0x63, 0xE5, 0xE6, 0xBC, 0xF8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x47, 0x42, 0x2C, 0xE1, 0xF2, 0xD1, 0x17, 0x6B), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_0_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF5, 0x51, 0xBF, 0x37, 0x68, 0x40, 0xB6, 0xCB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCE, 0x5E, 0x31, 0x6B, 0x57, 0x33, 0xCE, 0x2B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x16, 0x9E, 0x0F, 0x7C, 0x4A, 0xEB, 0xE7, 0x8E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9B, 0x7F, 0x1A, 0xFE, 0xE2, 0x42, 0xE3, 0x4F), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_1_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x70, 0xC8, 0xBA, 0x04, 0xB7, 0x4B, 0xD2, 0xF7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAB, 0xC6, 0x23, 0x3A, 0xA0, 0x09, 0x3A, 0x59), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1D, 0x9D, 0x4C, 0xF9, 0x58, 0x23, 0xCC, 0xDF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x02, 0xED, 0x7B, 0x29, 0x87, 0x0F, 0xFA, 0x3C), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_1_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x40, 0x69, 0xF2, 0x40, 0x0B, 0xA3, 0x98, 0xCE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAF, 0xA8, 0x48, 0x02, 0x0D, 0x1C, 0x12, 0x62), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9B, 0xAF, 0x09, 0x83, 0x80, 0xAA, 0x58, 0xA7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC6, 0x12, 0xBE, 0x70, 0x94, 0x76, 0xE3, 0xE4), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_2_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7D, 0x7D, 0xEF, 0x86, 0xFF, 0xE3, 0x37, 0xDD), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDB, 0x86, 0x8B, 0x08, 0x27, 0x7C, 0xD7, 0xF6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x91, 0x54, 0x4C, 0x25, 0x4F, 0x9A, 0xFE, 0x28), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5E, 0xFD, 0xF0, 0x6D, 0x37, 0x03, 0x69, 0xD6), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_2_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x96, 0xD5, 0xDA, 0xAD, 0x92, 0x49, 0xF0, 0x9F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF9, 0x73, 0x43, 0x9E, 0xAF, 0xA7, 0xD1, 0xF3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x67, 0x41, 0x07, 0xDF, 0x78, 0x95, 0x3E, 0xA1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x22, 0x3D, 0xD1, 0xE6, 0x3C, 0xA5, 0xE2, 0x20), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_3_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBF, 0x6A, 0x5D, 0x52, 0x35, 0xD7, 0xBF, 0xAE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5A, 0xA2, 0xBE, 0x96, 0xF4, 0xF8, 0x02, 0xC3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA4, 0x20, 0x49, 0x54, 0xEA, 0xB3, 0x82, 0xDB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2E, 0xDB, 0xEA, 0x02, 0xD1, 0x75, 0x1C, 0x62), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_3_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF0, 0x85, 0xF4, 0x9E, 0x4C, 0xDC, 0x39, 0x89), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x63, 0x6D, 0xC4, 0x57, 0xD8, 0x03, 0x5D, 0x22), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x70, 0x7F, 0x2D, 0x52, 0x6F, 0xC9, 0xDA, 0x4F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9D, 0x64, 0xFA, 0xB4, 0xFE, 0xA4, 0xC4, 0xD7), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_4_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2A, 0x37, 0xB9, 0xC0, 0xAA, 0x59, 0xC6, 0x8B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3F, 0x58, 0xD9, 0xED, 0x58, 0x99, 0x65, 0xF7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x88, 0x7D, 0x26, 0x8C, 0x4A, 0xF9, 0x05, 0x9F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9D, 0x73, 0x9A, 0xC9, 0xE7, 0x46, 0xDC, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_4_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF2, 0xD0, 0x55, 0xDF, 0x00, 0x0A, 0xF5, 0x4A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6A, 0xBF, 0x56, 0x81, 0x2D, 0x20, 0xEB, 0xB5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x11, 0xC1, 0x28, 0x52, 0xAB, 0xE3, 0xD1, 0x40), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x24, 0x34, 0x79, 0x45, 0x57, 0xA5, 0x12, 0x03), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_5_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEE, 0xCF, 0xB8, 0x7E, 0xF7, 0x92, 0x96, 0x8D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3D, 0x01, 0x8C, 0x0D, 0x23, 0xF2, 0xE3, 0x05), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x59, 0x2E, 0xE3, 0x84, 0x52, 0x7A, 0x34, 0x76), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE5, 0xA1, 0xB0, 0x15, 0x90, 0xE2, 0x53, 0x3C), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_5_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD4, 0x98, 0xE7, 0xFA, 0xA5, 0x7D, 0x8B, 0x53), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x91, 0x35, 0xD2, 0x00, 0xD1, 0x1B, 0x9F, 0x1B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3F, 0x69, 0x08, 0x9A, 0x72, 0xF0, 0xA9, 0x11), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB3, 0xFE, 0x0E, 0x14, 0xDA, 0x7C, 0x0E, 0xD3), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_6_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x83, 0xF6, 0xE8, 0xF8, 0x87, 0xF7, 0xFC, 0x6D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x90, 0xBE, 0x7F, 0x3F, 0x7A, 0x2B, 0xD7, 0x13), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCF, 0x32, 0xF2, 0x2D, 0x94, 0x6D, 0x42, 0xFD), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAD, 0x9A, 0xE3, 0x5F, 0x42, 0xBB, 0x84, 0xED), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_6_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFC, 0x95, 0x29, 0x73, 0xA1, 0x67, 0x3E, 0x02), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE3, 0x30, 0x54, 0x35, 0x8E, 0x0A, 0xDD, 0x67), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x03, 0xD7, 0xA1, 0x97, 0x61, 0x3B, 0xF8, 0x0C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF2, 0x33, 0x3C, 0x58, 0x55, 0x34, 0x23, 0xA3), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_7_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x99, 0x5D, 0x16, 0x5F, 0x7B, 0xBC, 0xBB, 0xCE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x61, 0xEE, 0x4E, 0x8A, 0xC1, 0x51, 0xCC, 0x50), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1F, 0x0D, 0x4D, 0x1B, 0x53, 0x23, 0x1D, 0xB3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDA, 0x2A, 0x38, 0x66, 0x52, 0x84, 0xE1, 0x95), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_7_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5B, 0x9B, 0x83, 0x0A, 0x81, 0x4F, 0xAD, 0xAC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0F, 0xFF, 0x42, 0x41, 0x6E, 0xA9, 0xA2, 0xA0), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2F, 0xA1, 0x4F, 0x1F, 0x89, 0x82, 0xAA, 0x3E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF3, 0xB8, 0x0F, 0x6B, 0x8F, 0x8C, 0xD6, 0x68), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_8_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF1, 0xB3, 0xBB, 0x51, 0x69, 0xA2, 0x11, 0x93), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x65, 0x4F, 0x0F, 0x8D, 0xBD, 0x26, 0x0F, 0xE8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB9, 0xCB, 0xEC, 0x6B, 0x34, 0xC3, 0x3D, 0x9D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE4, 0x5D, 0x1E, 0x10, 0xD5, 0x44, 0xE2, 0x54), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_8_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x28, 0x9E, 0xB1, 0xF1, 0x6E, 0x4C, 0xAD, 0xB3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB7, 0xE3, 0xC2, 0x58, 0xC0, 0xFB, 0x34, 0x43), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x25, 0x9C, 0xDF, 0x35, 0x07, 0x41, 0xBD, 0x19), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB6, 0x6E, 0x10, 0xEC, 0x0E, 0xEC, 0xBB, 0xD6), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_9_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC8, 0xCF, 0xEF, 0x3F, 0x83, 0x1A, 0x88, 0xE8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0B, 0x29, 0xB5, 0xB9, 0xE0, 0xC9, 0xA3, 0xAE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x88, 0x46, 0x1E, 0x77, 0xCD, 0x7E, 0xB3, 0x10), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB6, 0x21, 0xD0, 0xD4, 0xA3, 0x16, 0x08, 0xEE), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_9_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA1, 0xCA, 0xA8, 0xB3, 0xBF, 0x29, 0x99, 0x8E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD1, 0xF2, 0x05, 0xC1, 0xCF, 0x5D, 0x91, 0x48), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9F, 0x01, 0x49, 0xDB, 0x82, 0xDF, 0x5F, 0x3A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE1, 0x06, 0x90, 0xAD, 0xE3, 0x38, 0xA4, 0xC4), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_10_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC9, 0xD2, 0x3A, 0xE8, 0x03, 0xC5, 0x6D, 0x5D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBE, 0x35, 0xD0, 0xAE, 0x1D, 0x7A, 0x9F, 0xCA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x33, 0x1E, 0xD2, 0xCB, 0xAC, 0x88, 0x27, 0x55), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF0, 0xB9, 0x9C, 0xE0, 0x31, 0xDD, 0x99, 0x86), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_10_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x61, 0xF9, 0x9B, 0x32, 0x96, 0x41, 0x58, 0x38), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF9, 0x5A, 0x2A, 0xB8, 0x96, 0x0E, 0xB2, 0x4C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC1, 0x78, 0x2C, 0xC7, 0x08, 0x99, 0x19, 0x24), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB7, 0x59, 0x28, 0xE9, 0x84, 0x54, 0xE6, 0x16), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_11_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDD, 0x38, 0x30, 0xDB, 0x70, 0x2C, 0x0A, 0xA2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7C, 0x5C, 0x9D, 0xE9, 0xD5, 0x46, 0x0B, 0x5F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x83, 0x0B, 0x60, 0x4B, 0x37, 0x7D, 0xB9, 0xC9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5E, 0x24, 0xF3, 0x3D, 0x79, 0x7F, 0x6C, 0x18), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_11_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7F, 0xE5, 0x1C, 0x4F, 0x60, 0x24, 0xF7, 0x2A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xED, 0xD8, 0xE2, 0x91, 0x7F, 0x89, 0x49, 0x92), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x97, 0xA7, 0x2E, 0x8D, 0x6A, 0xB3, 0x39, 0x81), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x13, 0x89, 0xB5, 0x9A, 0xB8, 0x8D, 0x42, 0x9C), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_12_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8D, 0x45, 0xE6, 0x4B, 0x3F, 0x4F, 0x1E, 0x1F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x47, 0x65, 0x5E, 0x59, 0x22, 0xCC, 0x72, 0x5F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF1, 0x93, 0x1A, 0x27, 0x1E, 0x34, 0xC5, 0x5B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x63, 0xF2, 0xA5, 0x58, 0x5C, 0x15, 0x2E, 0xC6), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_12_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF4, 0x7F, 0xBA, 0x58, 0x5A, 0x84, 0x6F, 0x5F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAD, 0xA6, 0x36, 0x7E, 0xDC, 0xF7, 0xE1, 0x67), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x04, 0x4D, 0xAA, 0xEE, 0x57, 0x76, 0x3A, 0xD3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4E, 0x7E, 0x26, 0x18, 0x22, 0x23, 0x9F, 0xFF), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_13_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1D, 0x4C, 0x64, 0xC7, 0x55, 0x02, 0x3F, 0xE3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD8, 0x02, 0x90, 0xBB, 0xC3, 0xEC, 0x30, 0x40), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9F, 0x6F, 0x64, 0xF4, 0x16, 0x69, 0x48, 0xA4), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFA, 0x44, 0x9C, 0x95, 0x0C, 0x7D, 0x67, 0x5E), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_13_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x44, 0x91, 0x8B, 0xD8, 0xD0, 0xD7, 0xE7, 0xE2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1F, 0xF9, 0x48, 0x62, 0x6F, 0xA8, 0x93, 0x5D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEA, 0x3A, 0x99, 0x02, 0xD5, 0x0B, 0x3D, 0xE3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1E, 0xD3, 0x00, 0x31, 0xE6, 0x0C, 0x9F, 0x44), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_14_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x56, 0xB2, 0xAA, 0xFD, 0x88, 0x15, 0xDF, 0x52), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4C, 0x35, 0x27, 0x31, 0x44, 0xCD, 0xC0, 0x68), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x53, 0xF8, 0x91, 0xA5, 0x71, 0x94, 0x84, 0x2A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x92, 0xCB, 0xD0, 0x93, 0xE9, 0x88, 0xDA, 0xE4), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_14_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x24, 0xC6, 0x39, 0x16, 0x5D, 0xA3, 0x1E, 0x6D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBA, 0x07, 0x37, 0x26, 0x36, 0x2A, 0xFE, 0x60), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x51, 0xBC, 0xF3, 0xD0, 0xDE, 0x50, 0xFC, 0x97), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x80, 0x2E, 0x06, 0x10, 0x15, 0x4D, 0xFA, 0xF7), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_15_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x27, 0x65, 0x69, 0x5B, 0x66, 0xA2, 0x75, 0x2E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9C, 0x16, 0x00, 0x5A, 0xB0, 0x30, 0x25, 0x1A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x42, 0xFB, 0x86, 0x42, 0x80, 0xC1, 0xC4, 0x76), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5B, 0x1D, 0x83, 0x8E, 0x94, 0x01, 0x5F, 0x82), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_15_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x39, 0x37, 0x70, 0xEF, 0x1F, 0xA1, 0xF0, 0xDB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6A, 0x10, 0x5B, 0xCE, 0xC4, 0x9B, 0x6F, 0x10), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x50, 0x11, 0x11, 0x24, 0x4F, 0x4C, 0x79, 0x61), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x17, 0x3A, 0x72, 0xBC, 0xFE, 0x72, 0x58, 0x43), +}; +static const mbedtls_ecp_point secp256r1_T[16] = { + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z1(secp256r1_T_0_X, secp256r1_T_0_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256r1_T_1_X, secp256r1_T_1_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256r1_T_2_X, secp256r1_T_2_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256r1_T_3_X, secp256r1_T_3_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256r1_T_4_X, secp256r1_T_4_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256r1_T_5_X, secp256r1_T_5_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256r1_T_6_X, secp256r1_T_6_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256r1_T_7_X, secp256r1_T_7_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256r1_T_8_X, secp256r1_T_8_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256r1_T_9_X, secp256r1_T_9_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256r1_T_10_X, secp256r1_T_10_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256r1_T_11_X, secp256r1_T_11_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256r1_T_12_X, secp256r1_T_12_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256r1_T_13_X, secp256r1_T_13_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256r1_T_14_X, secp256r1_T_14_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256r1_T_15_X, secp256r1_T_15_Y), +}; +#else +#define secp256r1_T NULL +#endif + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED */ + +/* + * Domain parameters for secp384r1 + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED) +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_p[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFE, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_b[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEF, 0x2A, 0xEC, 0xD3, 0xED, 0xC8, 0x85, 0x2A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9D, 0xD1, 0x2E, 0x8A, 0x8D, 0x39, 0x56, 0xC6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5A, 0x87, 0x13, 0x50, 0x8F, 0x08, 0x14, 0x03), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x12, 0x41, 0x81, 0xFE, 0x6E, 0x9C, 0x1D, 0x18), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x19, 0x2D, 0xF8, 0xE3, 0x6B, 0x05, 0x8E, 0x98), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE4, 0xE7, 0x3E, 0xE2, 0xA7, 0x2F, 0x31, 0xB3), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_gx[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB7, 0x0A, 0x76, 0x72, 0x38, 0x5E, 0x54, 0x3A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6C, 0x29, 0x55, 0xBF, 0x5D, 0xF2, 0x02, 0x55), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x38, 0x2A, 0x54, 0x82, 0xE0, 0x41, 0xF7, 0x59), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x98, 0x9B, 0xA7, 0x8B, 0x62, 0x3B, 0x1D, 0x6E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x74, 0xAD, 0x20, 0xF3, 0x1E, 0xC7, 0xB1, 0x8E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x37, 0x05, 0x8B, 0xBE, 0x22, 0xCA, 0x87, 0xAA), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_gy[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5F, 0x0E, 0xEA, 0x90, 0x7C, 0x1D, 0x43, 0x7A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9D, 0x81, 0x7E, 0x1D, 0xCE, 0xB1, 0x60, 0x0A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC0, 0xB8, 0xF0, 0xB5, 0x13, 0x31, 0xDA, 0xE9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7C, 0x14, 0x9A, 0x28, 0xBD, 0x1D, 0xF4, 0xF8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x29, 0xDC, 0x92, 0x92, 0xBF, 0x98, 0x9E, 0x5D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6F, 0x2C, 0x26, 0x96, 0x4A, 0xDE, 0x17, 0x36), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_n[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x73, 0x29, 0xC5, 0xCC, 0x6A, 0x19, 0xEC, 0xEC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7A, 0xA7, 0xB0, 0x48, 0xB2, 0x0D, 0x1A, 0x58), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDF, 0x2D, 0x37, 0xF4, 0x81, 0x4D, 0x63, 0xC7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF), +}; +#if MBEDTLS_ECP_FIXED_POINT_OPTIM == 1 +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_0_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB7, 0x0A, 0x76, 0x72, 0x38, 0x5E, 0x54, 0x3A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6C, 0x29, 0x55, 0xBF, 0x5D, 0xF2, 0x02, 0x55), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x38, 0x2A, 0x54, 0x82, 0xE0, 0x41, 0xF7, 0x59), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x98, 0x9B, 0xA7, 0x8B, 0x62, 0x3B, 0x1D, 0x6E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x74, 0xAD, 0x20, 0xF3, 0x1E, 0xC7, 0xB1, 0x8E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x37, 0x05, 0x8B, 0xBE, 0x22, 0xCA, 0x87, 0xAA), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_0_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5F, 0x0E, 0xEA, 0x90, 0x7C, 0x1D, 0x43, 0x7A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9D, 0x81, 0x7E, 0x1D, 0xCE, 0xB1, 0x60, 0x0A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC0, 0xB8, 0xF0, 0xB5, 0x13, 0x31, 0xDA, 0xE9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7C, 0x14, 0x9A, 0x28, 0xBD, 0x1D, 0xF4, 0xF8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x29, 0xDC, 0x92, 0x92, 0xBF, 0x98, 0x9E, 0x5D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6F, 0x2C, 0x26, 0x96, 0x4A, 0xDE, 0x17, 0x36), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_1_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x46, 0x92, 0x00, 0x2C, 0x78, 0xDB, 0x1F, 0x37), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x17, 0xF3, 0xEB, 0xB7, 0x06, 0xF7, 0xB6, 0xBC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3D, 0xBC, 0x2C, 0xCF, 0xD8, 0xED, 0x53, 0xE7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x52, 0x75, 0x7B, 0xA3, 0xAB, 0xC3, 0x2C, 0x85), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE5, 0x9D, 0x78, 0x41, 0xF6, 0x76, 0x84, 0xAC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x54, 0x56, 0xE8, 0x52, 0xB3, 0xCB, 0xA8, 0xBD), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_1_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6D, 0xF2, 0xAE, 0xA4, 0xB6, 0x89, 0x1B, 0xDA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x01, 0x0F, 0xCE, 0x1C, 0x7C, 0xF6, 0x50, 0x4C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4C, 0xEB, 0x90, 0xE6, 0x4D, 0xC7, 0xD4, 0x7A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD1, 0x49, 0x2D, 0x8A, 0x01, 0x99, 0x60, 0x94), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5F, 0x80, 0x9B, 0x9B, 0x6A, 0xB0, 0x07, 0xD9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC2, 0xA2, 0xEE, 0x59, 0xBE, 0x95, 0xBC, 0x23), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_2_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE6, 0x9D, 0x56, 0xAE, 0x59, 0xFB, 0x1F, 0x98), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCF, 0xAC, 0x91, 0x80, 0x87, 0xA8, 0x6E, 0x58), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x30, 0x08, 0xA7, 0x08, 0x94, 0x32, 0xFC, 0x67), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9F, 0x29, 0x9E, 0x84, 0xF4, 0xE5, 0x6E, 0x7E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x55, 0x21, 0xB9, 0x50, 0x24, 0xF8, 0x9C, 0xC7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x34, 0x04, 0x01, 0xC2, 0xFB, 0x77, 0x3E, 0xDE), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_2_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x00, 0x38, 0xEE, 0xE3, 0xC7, 0x9D, 0xEC, 0xA6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB6, 0x88, 0xCF, 0x43, 0xFA, 0x92, 0x5E, 0x8E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE9, 0xCA, 0x43, 0xF8, 0x3B, 0x49, 0x7E, 0x75), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1C, 0xE7, 0xEB, 0x17, 0x45, 0x86, 0xC2, 0xE1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x92, 0x69, 0x57, 0x32, 0xE0, 0x9C, 0xD1, 0x00), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD9, 0x10, 0xB8, 0x4D, 0xB8, 0xF4, 0x0D, 0xE3), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_3_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x60, 0xDC, 0x9A, 0xB2, 0x79, 0x39, 0x27, 0x16), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4F, 0x71, 0xE4, 0x3B, 0x4D, 0x60, 0x0C, 0xA3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x55, 0xBD, 0x19, 0x40, 0xFA, 0x19, 0x2A, 0x5A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4D, 0xF8, 0x1E, 0x43, 0xA1, 0x50, 0x8D, 0xEF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA3, 0x18, 0x7C, 0x41, 0xFA, 0x7C, 0x1B, 0x58), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x00, 0x59, 0x24, 0xC4, 0xE9, 0xB7, 0xD3, 0xAD), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_3_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBB, 0x01, 0x3D, 0x63, 0x54, 0x45, 0x6F, 0xB7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7B, 0xB2, 0x19, 0xA3, 0x86, 0x1D, 0x42, 0x34), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x84, 0x02, 0x87, 0x18, 0x92, 0x52, 0x1A, 0x71), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6C, 0x18, 0xB1, 0x5D, 0x18, 0x1B, 0x37, 0xFE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF4, 0x74, 0x61, 0xBA, 0x18, 0xAF, 0x40, 0x30), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDA, 0x7D, 0x3C, 0x52, 0x0F, 0x07, 0xB0, 0x6F), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_4_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x09, 0x39, 0x13, 0xAA, 0x60, 0x15, 0x99, 0x30), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x17, 0x00, 0xCB, 0xC6, 0xB1, 0xDB, 0x97, 0x90), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE6, 0xFA, 0x60, 0xB8, 0x24, 0xE4, 0x7D, 0xD3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDD, 0x75, 0xB3, 0x70, 0xB2, 0x83, 0xB1, 0x9B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA3, 0xE3, 0x6C, 0xCD, 0x33, 0x62, 0x7A, 0x56), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x88, 0x30, 0xDC, 0x0F, 0x9F, 0xBB, 0xB8, 0xAA), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_4_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA6, 0xD5, 0x0A, 0x60, 0x81, 0xB9, 0xC5, 0x16), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x44, 0xAA, 0x2F, 0xD6, 0xF2, 0x73, 0xDF, 0xEB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF3, 0x7B, 0x74, 0xC9, 0xB3, 0x5B, 0x95, 0x6D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAC, 0x04, 0xEB, 0x15, 0xC8, 0x5F, 0x00, 0xF6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB5, 0x50, 0x20, 0x28, 0xD1, 0x01, 0xAF, 0xF0), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x28, 0x6D, 0x4F, 0x31, 0x81, 0x2F, 0x94, 0x48), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_5_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x46, 0x2F, 0xD8, 0xB6, 0x63, 0x7C, 0xE9, 0x50), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD9, 0x8C, 0xB9, 0x14, 0xD9, 0x37, 0x63, 0xDE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x10, 0x02, 0xB8, 0x46, 0xAD, 0xCE, 0x7B, 0x38), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x82, 0x47, 0x2D, 0x66, 0xA7, 0xE9, 0x33, 0x23), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x92, 0xF9, 0x93, 0x94, 0xA8, 0x48, 0xB3, 0x4F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE9, 0x4A, 0xAC, 0x51, 0x08, 0x72, 0x2F, 0x1A), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_5_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDA, 0xAD, 0xA0, 0xF9, 0x81, 0xE1, 0x78, 0x97), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3A, 0x9A, 0x63, 0xD8, 0xBA, 0x79, 0x1A, 0x17), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x34, 0x31, 0x7B, 0x7A, 0x5A, 0x5D, 0x7D, 0x2D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x83, 0x96, 0x12, 0x4B, 0x19, 0x09, 0xE0, 0xB7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x55, 0x8A, 0x57, 0xEE, 0x4E, 0x6E, 0x7E, 0xEC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x11, 0x9D, 0x69, 0xDC, 0xB3, 0xDA, 0xD8, 0x08), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_6_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x68, 0x49, 0x03, 0x03, 0x33, 0x6F, 0x28, 0x4A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5D, 0xDB, 0xA7, 0x05, 0x8C, 0xF3, 0x4D, 0xFB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8E, 0x92, 0xB1, 0xA8, 0xEC, 0x0D, 0x64, 0x3B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4E, 0xFC, 0xFD, 0xD0, 0x4B, 0x88, 0x1B, 0x5D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x83, 0x9C, 0x51, 0x69, 0xCE, 0x71, 0x73, 0xF5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB8, 0x5A, 0x14, 0x23, 0x1A, 0x46, 0x63, 0x5F), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_6_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBC, 0x4C, 0x70, 0x44, 0x18, 0xCD, 0xEF, 0xED), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC2, 0x49, 0xDD, 0x64, 0x7E, 0x7E, 0x4D, 0x92), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA2, 0x32, 0x7C, 0x09, 0xD0, 0x3F, 0xD6, 0x2C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6D, 0xE0, 0x4F, 0x65, 0x0C, 0x7A, 0x54, 0x3E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x16, 0xFA, 0xFB, 0x4A, 0xB4, 0x79, 0x5A, 0x8C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x04, 0x5D, 0x1B, 0x2B, 0xDA, 0xBC, 0x9A, 0x74), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_7_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x51, 0xAC, 0x56, 0xF7, 0x5F, 0x51, 0x68, 0x0B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC6, 0xE0, 0x1D, 0xBC, 0x13, 0x4E, 0xAC, 0x03), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB7, 0xF5, 0xC5, 0xE6, 0xD2, 0x88, 0xBA, 0xCB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFA, 0x0E, 0x28, 0x23, 0x58, 0x67, 0xFA, 0xEE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9E, 0x80, 0x4B, 0xD8, 0xC4, 0xDF, 0x15, 0xE4), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF1, 0x0E, 0x58, 0xE6, 0x2C, 0x59, 0xC2, 0x03), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_7_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9B, 0x26, 0x27, 0x99, 0x16, 0x2B, 0x22, 0x0B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBA, 0xF3, 0x8F, 0xC3, 0x2A, 0x9B, 0xFC, 0x38), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFC, 0x2E, 0x83, 0x3D, 0xFE, 0x9E, 0x3C, 0x1B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x08, 0x57, 0xCD, 0x2D, 0xC1, 0x49, 0x38, 0xB5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x95, 0x42, 0x8B, 0x33, 0x89, 0x1F, 0xEA, 0x01), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAA, 0x1D, 0x13, 0xD7, 0x50, 0xBB, 0x3E, 0xEB), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_8_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD2, 0x9A, 0x52, 0xD2, 0x54, 0x7C, 0x97, 0xF2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE0, 0x33, 0x6E, 0xED, 0xD9, 0x87, 0x50, 0xC5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5A, 0x35, 0x7E, 0x16, 0x40, 0x15, 0x83, 0xB8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x33, 0x2B, 0xA4, 0xAB, 0x03, 0x91, 0xEA, 0xFE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC1, 0x47, 0x39, 0xEF, 0x05, 0x59, 0xD0, 0x90), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBF, 0x24, 0x0D, 0x76, 0x11, 0x53, 0x08, 0xAF), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_8_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1F, 0x2F, 0xDD, 0xBD, 0x50, 0x48, 0xB1, 0xE5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x80, 0x1C, 0x84, 0x55, 0x78, 0x14, 0xEB, 0xF6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD9, 0x5E, 0x3E, 0xA6, 0xAF, 0xF6, 0xC7, 0x04), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE7, 0x11, 0xE2, 0x65, 0xCA, 0x41, 0x95, 0x3B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAE, 0x83, 0xD8, 0xE6, 0x4D, 0x22, 0x06, 0x2D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFA, 0x7F, 0x25, 0x2A, 0xAA, 0x28, 0x46, 0x97), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_9_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x79, 0xDB, 0x15, 0x56, 0x84, 0xCB, 0xC0, 0x56), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x56, 0xDB, 0x0E, 0x08, 0xC9, 0xF5, 0xD4, 0x9E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE6, 0x62, 0xD0, 0x1A, 0x7C, 0x13, 0xD5, 0x07), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7D, 0xAD, 0x53, 0xE0, 0x32, 0x21, 0xA0, 0xC0), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC5, 0x38, 0x81, 0x21, 0x23, 0x0E, 0xD2, 0xBB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1C, 0x51, 0x05, 0xD0, 0x1E, 0x82, 0xA9, 0x71), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_9_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA7, 0xC3, 0x27, 0xBF, 0xC6, 0xAA, 0xB7, 0xB9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCB, 0x65, 0x45, 0xDF, 0xB9, 0x46, 0x17, 0x46), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF5, 0x38, 0x3F, 0xB2, 0xB1, 0x5D, 0xCA, 0x1C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x88, 0x29, 0x6C, 0x63, 0xE9, 0xD7, 0x48, 0xB8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBC, 0xF1, 0xD7, 0x99, 0x8C, 0xC2, 0x05, 0x99), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6D, 0xE6, 0x5E, 0x82, 0x6D, 0xE5, 0x7E, 0xD5), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_10_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7B, 0x61, 0xFA, 0x7D, 0x01, 0xDB, 0xB6, 0x63), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x11, 0xC6, 0x58, 0x39, 0xF4, 0xC6, 0x82, 0x23), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x47, 0x5A, 0x7A, 0x80, 0x08, 0xCD, 0xAA, 0xD8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDA, 0x8C, 0xC6, 0x3F, 0x3C, 0xA5, 0x68, 0xF4), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBB, 0xF5, 0xD5, 0x17, 0xAE, 0x36, 0xD8, 0x8A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC7, 0xAD, 0x92, 0xC5, 0x57, 0x6C, 0xDA, 0x91), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_10_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE8, 0x67, 0x17, 0xC0, 0x40, 0x78, 0x8C, 0x84), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7E, 0x9F, 0xF4, 0xAA, 0xDA, 0x5C, 0x7E, 0xB2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x96, 0xDB, 0x42, 0x3E, 0x72, 0x64, 0xA0, 0x67), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x27, 0xF9, 0x41, 0x17, 0x43, 0xE3, 0xE8, 0xA8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x66, 0xDD, 0xCC, 0x43, 0x7E, 0x16, 0x05, 0x03), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x36, 0x4B, 0xCF, 0x48, 0x8F, 0x41, 0x90, 0xE5), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_11_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x98, 0x0C, 0x6B, 0x9D, 0x22, 0x04, 0xBC, 0x5C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x86, 0x63, 0x79, 0x2F, 0x6A, 0x0E, 0x8A, 0xDE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x29, 0x67, 0x3F, 0x02, 0xB8, 0x91, 0x7F, 0x74), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFC, 0x14, 0x64, 0xA0, 0x33, 0xF4, 0x6B, 0x50), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1C, 0x44, 0x71, 0x87, 0xB8, 0x88, 0x3F, 0x45), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1B, 0x2B, 0x85, 0x05, 0xC5, 0x44, 0x53, 0x15), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_11_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3E, 0x2B, 0xFE, 0xD1, 0x1C, 0x73, 0xE3, 0x2E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x66, 0x33, 0xA1, 0xD3, 0x69, 0x1C, 0x9D, 0xD2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE0, 0x5A, 0xBA, 0xB6, 0xAE, 0x1B, 0x94, 0x04), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAF, 0x74, 0x90, 0x5C, 0x57, 0xB0, 0x3A, 0x45), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDD, 0x2F, 0x93, 0x20, 0x24, 0x54, 0x1D, 0x8D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFA, 0x78, 0x9D, 0x71, 0x67, 0x5D, 0x49, 0x98), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_12_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x12, 0xC8, 0x0E, 0x11, 0x8D, 0xE0, 0x8F, 0x69), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x59, 0x7F, 0x79, 0x6C, 0x5F, 0xB7, 0xBC, 0xB1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x88, 0xE1, 0x83, 0x3C, 0x12, 0xBB, 0xEE, 0x96), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2A, 0xC2, 0xC4, 0x1B, 0x41, 0x71, 0xB9, 0x17), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB0, 0xEE, 0xBB, 0x1D, 0x89, 0x50, 0x88, 0xF2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFC, 0x1C, 0x55, 0x74, 0xEB, 0xDE, 0x92, 0x3F), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_12_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9C, 0x38, 0x92, 0x06, 0x19, 0xD0, 0xB3, 0xB2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2A, 0x99, 0x26, 0xA3, 0x5F, 0xE2, 0xC1, 0x81), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x75, 0xFC, 0xFD, 0xC3, 0xB6, 0x26, 0x24, 0x8F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAF, 0xAD, 0xE7, 0x49, 0xB7, 0x64, 0x4B, 0x96), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6C, 0x4E, 0x95, 0xAD, 0x07, 0xFE, 0xB6, 0x30), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4F, 0x15, 0xE7, 0x2D, 0x19, 0xA9, 0x08, 0x10), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_13_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBE, 0xBD, 0xAC, 0x0A, 0x3F, 0x6B, 0xFF, 0xFA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE0, 0xE4, 0x74, 0x14, 0xD9, 0x70, 0x1D, 0x71), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF2, 0xB0, 0x71, 0xBB, 0xD8, 0x18, 0x96, 0x2B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDA, 0xB8, 0x19, 0x90, 0x80, 0xB5, 0xEE, 0x01), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x91, 0x21, 0x20, 0xA6, 0x17, 0x48, 0x03, 0x6F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE3, 0x1D, 0xBB, 0x6D, 0x94, 0x20, 0x34, 0xF1), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_13_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x59, 0x82, 0x67, 0x4B, 0x8E, 0x4E, 0xBE, 0xE2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBE, 0xDA, 0x77, 0xF8, 0x23, 0x55, 0x2B, 0x2D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5C, 0x02, 0xDE, 0x25, 0x35, 0x2D, 0x74, 0x51), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD0, 0x0C, 0xB8, 0x0B, 0x39, 0xBA, 0xAD, 0x04), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA6, 0x0E, 0x28, 0x4D, 0xE1, 0x3D, 0xE4, 0x1B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5D, 0xEC, 0x0A, 0xD4, 0xB8, 0xC4, 0x8D, 0xB0), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_14_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3E, 0x68, 0xCE, 0xC2, 0x55, 0x4D, 0x0C, 0x6D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9B, 0x20, 0x93, 0x32, 0x90, 0xD6, 0xAE, 0x47), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDD, 0x78, 0xAB, 0x43, 0x9E, 0xEB, 0x73, 0xAE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xED, 0x97, 0xC3, 0x83, 0xA6, 0x3C, 0xF1, 0xBF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0F, 0x25, 0x25, 0x66, 0x08, 0x26, 0xFA, 0x4B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x41, 0xFB, 0x44, 0x5D, 0x82, 0xEC, 0x3B, 0xAC), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_14_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x58, 0x90, 0xEA, 0xB5, 0x04, 0x99, 0xD0, 0x69), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4A, 0xF2, 0x22, 0xA0, 0xEB, 0xFD, 0x45, 0x87), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5D, 0xA4, 0x81, 0x32, 0xFC, 0xFA, 0xEE, 0x5B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x27, 0xBB, 0xA4, 0x6A, 0x77, 0x41, 0x5C, 0x1D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA1, 0x1E, 0xAA, 0x4F, 0xF0, 0x10, 0xB3, 0x50), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x09, 0x74, 0x13, 0x14, 0x9E, 0x90, 0xD7, 0xE6), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_15_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDB, 0xBD, 0x70, 0x4F, 0xA8, 0xD1, 0x06, 0x2C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x19, 0x4E, 0x2E, 0x68, 0xFC, 0x35, 0xFA, 0x50), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x60, 0x53, 0x75, 0xED, 0xF2, 0x5F, 0xC2, 0xEB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x39, 0x87, 0x6B, 0x9F, 0x05, 0xE2, 0x22, 0x93), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4F, 0x1A, 0xA8, 0xB7, 0x03, 0x9E, 0x6D, 0x7C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCB, 0xD0, 0x69, 0x88, 0xA8, 0x39, 0x9E, 0x3A), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_15_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF8, 0xEF, 0x68, 0xFE, 0xEC, 0x24, 0x08, 0x15), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA1, 0x06, 0x4B, 0x92, 0x0D, 0xB7, 0x34, 0x74), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3E, 0xF4, 0xDD, 0x1A, 0xA0, 0x4A, 0xE4, 0x45), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC3, 0x63, 0x4F, 0x4F, 0xCE, 0xBB, 0xD6, 0xD3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCD, 0xEE, 0x8D, 0xDF, 0x3F, 0x73, 0xB7, 0xAC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDF, 0x06, 0xB6, 0x80, 0x4D, 0x81, 0xD9, 0x53), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_16_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x15, 0xF5, 0x13, 0xDF, 0x13, 0x19, 0x97, 0x94), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x08, 0xF9, 0xB3, 0x33, 0x66, 0x82, 0x21, 0xFE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF5, 0xFC, 0x39, 0x16, 0x23, 0x43, 0x76, 0x0E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x09, 0x48, 0x25, 0xA1, 0x64, 0x95, 0x1C, 0x2F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x43, 0xAC, 0x15, 0x57, 0xD9, 0xDE, 0xA0, 0x28), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x16, 0x5F, 0xB8, 0x3D, 0x48, 0x91, 0x24, 0xCC), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_16_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2D, 0xF2, 0xC8, 0x54, 0xD1, 0x32, 0xBD, 0xC4), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8A, 0x3B, 0xF0, 0xAA, 0x9D, 0xD8, 0xF4, 0x20), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4F, 0xC3, 0xBB, 0x6C, 0x66, 0xAC, 0x25, 0x2D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6F, 0x25, 0x10, 0xB2, 0xE1, 0x41, 0xDE, 0x1D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3C, 0xE8, 0x30, 0xB8, 0x37, 0xBC, 0x2A, 0x98), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBA, 0x57, 0x01, 0x4A, 0x1E, 0x78, 0x9F, 0x85), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_17_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBD, 0x19, 0xCD, 0x12, 0x0B, 0x51, 0x4F, 0x56), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x30, 0x4B, 0x3D, 0x24, 0xA4, 0x16, 0x59, 0x05), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAC, 0xEB, 0xD3, 0x59, 0x2E, 0x75, 0x7C, 0x01), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8C, 0xB9, 0xB4, 0xA5, 0xD9, 0x2E, 0x29, 0x4C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x86, 0x16, 0x05, 0x75, 0x02, 0xB3, 0x06, 0xEE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAB, 0x7C, 0x9F, 0x79, 0x91, 0xF1, 0x4F, 0x23), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_17_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x65, 0x98, 0x7C, 0x84, 0xE1, 0xFF, 0x30, 0x77), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x71, 0xE2, 0xC2, 0x5F, 0x55, 0x40, 0xBD, 0xCD), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x69, 0x65, 0x87, 0x3F, 0xC4, 0xC2, 0x24, 0x57), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0E, 0x30, 0x0A, 0x60, 0x15, 0xD1, 0x24, 0x48), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x57, 0x99, 0xD9, 0xB6, 0xAE, 0xB1, 0xAF, 0x1D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9B, 0x80, 0xEE, 0xA2, 0x0F, 0x74, 0xB9, 0xF3), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_18_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x03, 0xE6, 0x0F, 0x37, 0xC1, 0x10, 0x99, 0x1E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x61, 0xAD, 0x9D, 0x5D, 0x80, 0x01, 0xA6, 0xFE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB0, 0x0F, 0x10, 0x2A, 0x9D, 0x20, 0x38, 0xEB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6C, 0x60, 0xCB, 0xCE, 0x5A, 0xA0, 0xA7, 0x32), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBA, 0xCF, 0x14, 0xDF, 0xBF, 0xE5, 0x74, 0x2D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB5, 0x12, 0x1A, 0xDD, 0x59, 0x02, 0x5D, 0xC6), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_18_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC8, 0xC9, 0xF8, 0xF5, 0xB6, 0x13, 0x4D, 0x7B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xED, 0x45, 0xB1, 0x93, 0xB3, 0xA2, 0x79, 0xDC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x74, 0xF6, 0xCF, 0xF7, 0xE6, 0x29, 0x9C, 0xCC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x87, 0x50, 0x65, 0x80, 0xBC, 0x59, 0x0A, 0x59), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0E, 0xF0, 0x24, 0x35, 0xA2, 0x46, 0xF0, 0x0C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBD, 0x26, 0xC0, 0x9D, 0x61, 0x56, 0x62, 0x67), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_19_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x10, 0xBB, 0xC2, 0x24, 0x43, 0x2E, 0x37, 0x54), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8A, 0xF7, 0xCE, 0x35, 0xFC, 0x77, 0xF3, 0x3F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x75, 0x34, 0x96, 0xD5, 0x4A, 0x76, 0x9D, 0x6B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB8, 0x3B, 0x0F, 0xEA, 0xA8, 0x12, 0x0B, 0x22), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x66, 0x3F, 0x5D, 0x2D, 0x1C, 0xD4, 0x9E, 0xFB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7D, 0x2E, 0xDD, 0xC7, 0x6E, 0xAB, 0xAF, 0xDC), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_19_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8C, 0xB2, 0x7B, 0x0C, 0x9A, 0x83, 0x8E, 0x59), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x30, 0x51, 0x90, 0x92, 0x79, 0x32, 0x19, 0xC3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEE, 0x89, 0xF9, 0xD0, 0xCF, 0x2C, 0xA5, 0x8F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7B, 0x50, 0x21, 0xDE, 0x50, 0x41, 0x9D, 0x81), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE0, 0x7D, 0x2B, 0x9E, 0x9D, 0x95, 0xA8, 0xE3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD8, 0xA5, 0x20, 0x87, 0x88, 0x97, 0x5F, 0xAA), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_20_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x64, 0x59, 0xB4, 0x66, 0x7E, 0xE8, 0x5A, 0x60), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA5, 0x5C, 0x7E, 0xB2, 0xAD, 0xD9, 0xC9, 0xDA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x82, 0x97, 0x49, 0xA3, 0x13, 0x83, 0x07, 0x2E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5A, 0x26, 0xC7, 0x13, 0x35, 0x0D, 0xB0, 0x6B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1E, 0x60, 0xAB, 0xFA, 0x4B, 0x93, 0x18, 0x2C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x54, 0x2D, 0x1C, 0x31, 0x4C, 0xE4, 0x61, 0xAE), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_20_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDE, 0x4D, 0x1E, 0x51, 0x59, 0x6E, 0x91, 0xC5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x38, 0x54, 0x4D, 0x51, 0xED, 0x36, 0xCC, 0x60), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x18, 0xA8, 0x56, 0xC7, 0x78, 0x27, 0x33, 0xC5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x42, 0xB7, 0x95, 0xC9, 0x8B, 0xC8, 0x6A, 0xBC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5E, 0xE9, 0x13, 0x96, 0xB3, 0xE1, 0xF9, 0xEE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF5, 0x46, 0xB0, 0x5E, 0xC3, 0x94, 0x03, 0x05), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_21_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6D, 0x5B, 0x29, 0x30, 0x41, 0x1A, 0x9E, 0xB6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x76, 0xCA, 0x83, 0x31, 0x5B, 0xA7, 0xCB, 0x42), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x21, 0x41, 0x50, 0x44, 0x4D, 0x64, 0x31, 0x89), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCF, 0x84, 0xC2, 0x5D, 0x97, 0xA5, 0x3C, 0x18), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF0, 0x0F, 0xA5, 0xFD, 0x8E, 0x5A, 0x47, 0x2C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7C, 0x58, 0x02, 0x2D, 0x40, 0xB1, 0x0B, 0xBA), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_21_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDA, 0x33, 0x8C, 0x67, 0xCE, 0x23, 0x43, 0x99), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x84, 0x53, 0x47, 0x72, 0x44, 0x1F, 0x5B, 0x2A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAE, 0xC1, 0xD9, 0xA4, 0x50, 0x88, 0x63, 0x18), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7C, 0xF2, 0x75, 0x69, 0x73, 0x00, 0xC4, 0x31), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4B, 0x90, 0x1D, 0xDF, 0x1A, 0x00, 0xD8, 0x69), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x05, 0xB1, 0x89, 0x48, 0xA8, 0x70, 0x62, 0xEF), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_22_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7E, 0x8A, 0x55, 0x50, 0x7B, 0xEF, 0x8A, 0x3C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFE, 0x1B, 0x23, 0x48, 0x23, 0x63, 0x91, 0xB6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0D, 0x04, 0x54, 0x3C, 0x24, 0x9B, 0xC7, 0x9A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x25, 0x38, 0xC3, 0x84, 0xFB, 0xFF, 0x9F, 0x49), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x66, 0x2A, 0xE0, 0x6D, 0x68, 0x8A, 0x5C, 0xCB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC4, 0x93, 0x53, 0x85, 0xA1, 0x0D, 0xAF, 0x63), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_22_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1B, 0x88, 0x95, 0x4C, 0x0B, 0xD0, 0x06, 0x51), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x92, 0xAF, 0x8D, 0x49, 0xA2, 0xC8, 0xB4, 0xE0), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x75, 0x76, 0x53, 0x09, 0x88, 0x43, 0x87, 0xCA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x90, 0xA4, 0x77, 0x3F, 0x5E, 0x21, 0xB4, 0x0A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x35, 0x9E, 0x86, 0x64, 0xCC, 0x91, 0xC1, 0x77), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC1, 0x17, 0x56, 0xCB, 0xC3, 0x7D, 0x5B, 0xB1), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_23_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x64, 0x74, 0x9F, 0xB5, 0x91, 0x21, 0xB1, 0x1C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1E, 0xED, 0xE1, 0x11, 0xEF, 0x45, 0xAF, 0xC1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE0, 0x31, 0xBE, 0xB2, 0xBC, 0x72, 0x65, 0x1F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB1, 0x4B, 0x8C, 0x77, 0xCE, 0x1E, 0x42, 0xB5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xC9, 0xAA, 0xB9, 0xD9, 0x86, 0x99, 0x55), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x65, 0x23, 0x80, 0xC6, 0x4E, 0x35, 0x0B, 0x6D), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_23_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x47, 0xD8, 0xA2, 0x0A, 0x39, 0x32, 0x1D, 0x23), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x61, 0xC8, 0x86, 0xF1, 0x12, 0x9A, 0x4A, 0x05), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8D, 0xF1, 0x7C, 0xAA, 0x70, 0x8E, 0xBC, 0x01), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x62, 0x01, 0x47, 0x8F, 0xDD, 0x8B, 0xA5, 0xC8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDB, 0x08, 0x21, 0xF4, 0xAB, 0xC7, 0xF5, 0x96), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0A, 0x76, 0xA5, 0x95, 0xC4, 0x0F, 0x88, 0x1D), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_24_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3F, 0x42, 0x2A, 0x52, 0xCD, 0x75, 0x51, 0x49), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x90, 0x36, 0xE5, 0x04, 0x2B, 0x44, 0xC6, 0xEF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5C, 0xEE, 0x16, 0x13, 0x07, 0x83, 0xB5, 0x30), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x76, 0x59, 0xC6, 0xA2, 0x19, 0x05, 0xD3, 0xC6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB6, 0x8B, 0xA8, 0x16, 0x09, 0xB7, 0xEA, 0xD6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x70, 0xEE, 0x14, 0xAF, 0xB5, 0xFD, 0xD0, 0xEF), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_24_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x18, 0x7C, 0xCA, 0x71, 0x3E, 0x6E, 0x66, 0x75), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBE, 0x31, 0x0E, 0x3F, 0xE5, 0x91, 0xC4, 0x7F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8E, 0x3D, 0xC2, 0x3E, 0x95, 0x37, 0x58, 0x2B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x01, 0x1F, 0x02, 0x03, 0xF3, 0xEF, 0xEE, 0x66), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x28, 0x5B, 0x1A, 0xFC, 0x38, 0xCD, 0xE8, 0x24), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x12, 0x57, 0x42, 0x85, 0xC6, 0x21, 0x68, 0x71), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_25_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8D, 0xA2, 0x4A, 0x66, 0xB1, 0x0A, 0xE6, 0xC0), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x86, 0x0C, 0x94, 0x9D, 0x5E, 0x99, 0xB2, 0xCE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAD, 0x03, 0x40, 0xCA, 0xB2, 0xB3, 0x30, 0x55), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x74, 0x78, 0x48, 0x27, 0x34, 0x1E, 0xE2, 0x42), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAE, 0x72, 0x5B, 0xAC, 0xC1, 0x6D, 0xE3, 0x82), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x57, 0xAB, 0x46, 0xCB, 0xEA, 0x5E, 0x4B, 0x0B), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_25_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFC, 0x08, 0xAD, 0x4E, 0x51, 0x9F, 0x2A, 0x52), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x68, 0x5C, 0x7D, 0x4C, 0xD6, 0xCF, 0xDD, 0x02), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD8, 0x76, 0x26, 0xE0, 0x8B, 0x10, 0xD9, 0x7C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x30, 0xA7, 0x23, 0x4E, 0x5F, 0xD2, 0x42, 0x17), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD1, 0xE5, 0xA4, 0xEC, 0x77, 0x21, 0x34, 0x28), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5C, 0x14, 0x65, 0xEA, 0x4A, 0x85, 0xC3, 0x2F), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_26_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x19, 0xD8, 0x40, 0x27, 0x73, 0x15, 0x7E, 0x65), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF6, 0xBB, 0x53, 0x7E, 0x0F, 0x40, 0xC8, 0xD4), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEA, 0x37, 0x19, 0x73, 0xEF, 0x5A, 0x5E, 0x04), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9C, 0x73, 0x2B, 0x49, 0x7E, 0xAC, 0x97, 0x5C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x15, 0xB2, 0xC3, 0x1E, 0x0E, 0xE7, 0xD2, 0x21), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8A, 0x08, 0xD6, 0xDD, 0xAC, 0x21, 0xD6, 0x3E), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_26_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA9, 0x26, 0xBE, 0x6D, 0x6D, 0xF2, 0x38, 0x3F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x08, 0x6C, 0x31, 0xA7, 0x49, 0x50, 0x3A, 0x89), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC3, 0x99, 0xC6, 0xF5, 0xD2, 0xC2, 0x30, 0x5A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2A, 0xE4, 0xF6, 0x8B, 0x8B, 0x97, 0xE9, 0xB2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDD, 0x21, 0xB7, 0x0D, 0xFC, 0x15, 0x54, 0x0B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x65, 0x83, 0x1C, 0xA4, 0xCD, 0x6B, 0x9D, 0xF2), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_27_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD6, 0xE8, 0x4C, 0x48, 0xE4, 0xAA, 0x69, 0x93), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x27, 0x7A, 0x27, 0xFC, 0x37, 0x96, 0x1A, 0x7B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6F, 0xE7, 0x30, 0xA5, 0xCF, 0x13, 0x46, 0x5C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8C, 0xD8, 0xAF, 0x74, 0x23, 0x4D, 0x56, 0x84), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x32, 0x3D, 0x44, 0x14, 0x1B, 0x97, 0x83, 0xF0), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFA, 0x47, 0xD7, 0x5F, 0xFD, 0x98, 0x38, 0xF7), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_27_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA3, 0x73, 0x64, 0x36, 0xFD, 0x7B, 0xC1, 0x15), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEA, 0x5D, 0x32, 0xD2, 0x47, 0x94, 0x89, 0x2D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x51, 0xE9, 0x30, 0xAC, 0x06, 0xC8, 0x65, 0x04), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFA, 0x6C, 0xB9, 0x1B, 0xF7, 0x61, 0x49, 0x53), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD7, 0xFF, 0x32, 0x43, 0x80, 0xDA, 0xA6, 0xB1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAC, 0xF8, 0x04, 0x01, 0x95, 0x35, 0xCE, 0x21), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_28_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6D, 0x06, 0x46, 0x0D, 0x51, 0xE2, 0xD8, 0xAC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x14, 0x57, 0x1D, 0x6F, 0x79, 0xA0, 0xCD, 0xA6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDF, 0xFB, 0x36, 0xCA, 0xAD, 0xF5, 0x9E, 0x41), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6F, 0x7A, 0x1D, 0x9E, 0x1D, 0x95, 0x48, 0xDC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x81, 0x26, 0xA5, 0xB7, 0x15, 0x2C, 0xC2, 0xC6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x86, 0x42, 0x72, 0xAA, 0x11, 0xDC, 0xC9, 0xB6), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_28_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3F, 0x6C, 0x64, 0xA7, 0x62, 0x3C, 0xAB, 0xD4), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x48, 0x6A, 0x44, 0xD8, 0x60, 0xC0, 0xA8, 0x80), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x82, 0x76, 0x58, 0x12, 0x57, 0x3C, 0x89, 0x46), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x82, 0x4F, 0x83, 0xCE, 0xCB, 0xB8, 0xD0, 0x2C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9A, 0x84, 0x04, 0xB0, 0xAD, 0xEB, 0xFA, 0xDF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x34, 0xA4, 0xC3, 0x41, 0x44, 0x4E, 0x65, 0x3E), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_29_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB6, 0x16, 0xA9, 0x1C, 0xE7, 0x65, 0x20, 0xC1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x58, 0x53, 0x32, 0xF8, 0xC0, 0xA6, 0xBD, 0x2C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB7, 0xF0, 0xE6, 0x57, 0x31, 0xCC, 0x26, 0x6F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x27, 0xE3, 0x54, 0x1C, 0x34, 0xD3, 0x17, 0xBC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF5, 0xAE, 0xED, 0xFB, 0xCD, 0xE7, 0x1E, 0x9F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5A, 0x16, 0x1C, 0x34, 0x40, 0x00, 0x1F, 0xB6), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_29_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6A, 0x32, 0x00, 0xC2, 0xD4, 0x3B, 0x1A, 0x09), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x34, 0xE0, 0x99, 0x8F, 0x0C, 0x4A, 0x16, 0x44), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x83, 0x73, 0x18, 0x1B, 0xD4, 0x94, 0x29, 0x62), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x29, 0xA4, 0x2D, 0xB1, 0x9D, 0x74, 0x32, 0x67), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBF, 0xF4, 0xB1, 0x0C, 0x37, 0x62, 0x8B, 0x66), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC9, 0xFF, 0xDA, 0xE2, 0x35, 0xA3, 0xB6, 0x42), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_30_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x91, 0x49, 0x99, 0x65, 0xC5, 0xED, 0x16, 0xEF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x79, 0x42, 0x9A, 0xF3, 0xA7, 0x4E, 0x6F, 0x2B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7B, 0x0A, 0x7E, 0xC0, 0xD7, 0x4E, 0x07, 0x55), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD6, 0x7A, 0x31, 0x69, 0xA6, 0xB9, 0x15, 0x34), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA8, 0xE0, 0x72, 0xA4, 0x3F, 0xB9, 0xF8, 0x0C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2B, 0x75, 0x32, 0x85, 0xA2, 0xDE, 0x37, 0x12), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_30_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBC, 0xC0, 0x0D, 0xCF, 0x25, 0x41, 0xA4, 0xF4), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9B, 0xFC, 0xB2, 0x48, 0xC3, 0x85, 0x83, 0x4B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2B, 0xBE, 0x0B, 0x58, 0x2D, 0x7A, 0x9A, 0x62), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC5, 0xF3, 0x81, 0x18, 0x1B, 0x74, 0x4F, 0x2C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE2, 0x43, 0xA3, 0x0A, 0x16, 0x8B, 0xA3, 0x1E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4A, 0x18, 0x81, 0x7B, 0x8D, 0xA2, 0x35, 0x77), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_31_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x86, 0xC4, 0x3F, 0x2C, 0xE7, 0x5F, 0x99, 0x03), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF0, 0x2B, 0xB7, 0xB6, 0xAD, 0x5A, 0x56, 0xFF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x04, 0x00, 0xA4, 0x48, 0xC8, 0xE8, 0xBA, 0xBF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE8, 0xA1, 0xB5, 0x13, 0x5A, 0xCD, 0x99, 0x9C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB0, 0x95, 0xAD, 0xFC, 0xE2, 0x7E, 0xE7, 0xFE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x96, 0x6B, 0xD1, 0x34, 0x99, 0x53, 0x63, 0x0B), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_31_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x19, 0x8A, 0x77, 0x5D, 0x2B, 0xAB, 0x01, 0x28), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4E, 0x85, 0xD0, 0xD5, 0x49, 0x83, 0x4D, 0x60), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x81, 0xC6, 0x91, 0x30, 0x3B, 0x00, 0xAF, 0x7A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3A, 0xAE, 0x61, 0x07, 0xE1, 0xB6, 0xE2, 0xC9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x95, 0x43, 0x41, 0xFE, 0x9B, 0xB6, 0xF0, 0xA5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB4, 0x97, 0xAE, 0xAD, 0x89, 0x88, 0x9E, 0x41), +}; +static const mbedtls_ecp_point secp384r1_T[32] = { + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z1(secp384r1_T_0_X, secp384r1_T_0_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_1_X, secp384r1_T_1_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_2_X, secp384r1_T_2_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_3_X, secp384r1_T_3_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_4_X, secp384r1_T_4_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_5_X, secp384r1_T_5_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_6_X, secp384r1_T_6_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_7_X, secp384r1_T_7_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_8_X, secp384r1_T_8_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_9_X, secp384r1_T_9_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_10_X, secp384r1_T_10_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_11_X, secp384r1_T_11_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_12_X, secp384r1_T_12_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_13_X, secp384r1_T_13_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_14_X, secp384r1_T_14_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_15_X, secp384r1_T_15_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_16_X, secp384r1_T_16_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_17_X, secp384r1_T_17_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_18_X, secp384r1_T_18_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_19_X, secp384r1_T_19_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_20_X, secp384r1_T_20_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_21_X, secp384r1_T_21_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_22_X, secp384r1_T_22_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_23_X, secp384r1_T_23_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_24_X, secp384r1_T_24_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_25_X, secp384r1_T_25_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_26_X, secp384r1_T_26_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_27_X, secp384r1_T_27_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_28_X, secp384r1_T_28_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_29_X, secp384r1_T_29_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_30_X, secp384r1_T_30_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_31_X, secp384r1_T_31_Y), +}; +#else +#define secp384r1_T NULL +#endif + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED */ + +/* + * Domain parameters for secp521r1 + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED) +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_p[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_2(0xFF, 0x01), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_b[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x00, 0x3F, 0x50, 0x6B, 0xD4, 0x1F, 0x45, 0xEF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF1, 0x34, 0x2C, 0x3D, 0x88, 0xDF, 0x73, 0x35), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x07, 0xBF, 0xB1, 0x3B, 0xBD, 0xC0, 0x52, 0x16), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7B, 0x93, 0x7E, 0xEC, 0x51, 0x39, 0x19, 0x56), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE1, 0x09, 0xF1, 0x8E, 0x91, 0x89, 0xB4, 0xB8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF3, 0x15, 0xB3, 0x99, 0x5B, 0x72, 0xDA, 0xA2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEE, 0x40, 0x85, 0xB6, 0xA0, 0x21, 0x9A, 0x92), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1F, 0x9A, 0x1C, 0x8E, 0x61, 0xB9, 0x3E, 0x95), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_2(0x51, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_gx[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x66, 0xBD, 0xE5, 0xC2, 0x31, 0x7E, 0x7E, 0xF9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9B, 0x42, 0x6A, 0x85, 0xC1, 0xB3, 0x48, 0x33), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDE, 0xA8, 0xFF, 0xA2, 0x27, 0xC1, 0x1D, 0xFE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x28, 0x59, 0xE7, 0xEF, 0x77, 0x5E, 0x4B, 0xA1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBA, 0x3D, 0x4D, 0x6B, 0x60, 0xAF, 0x28, 0xF8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x21, 0xB5, 0x3F, 0x05, 0x39, 0x81, 0x64, 0x9C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x42, 0xB4, 0x95, 0x23, 0x66, 0xCB, 0x3E, 0x9E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCD, 0xE9, 0x04, 0x04, 0xB7, 0x06, 0x8E, 0x85), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_2(0xC6, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_gy[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x50, 0x66, 0xD1, 0x9F, 0x76, 0x94, 0xBE, 0x88), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x40, 0xC2, 0x72, 0xA2, 0x86, 0x70, 0x3C, 0x35), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x61, 0x07, 0xAD, 0x3F, 0x01, 0xB9, 0x50, 0xC5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x40, 0x26, 0xF4, 0x5E, 0x99, 0x72, 0xEE, 0x97), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2C, 0x66, 0x3E, 0x27, 0x17, 0xBD, 0xAF, 0x17), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x68, 0x44, 0x9B, 0x57, 0x49, 0x44, 0xF5, 0x98), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD9, 0x1B, 0x7D, 0x2C, 0xB4, 0x5F, 0x8A, 0x5C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x04, 0xC0, 0x3B, 0x9A, 0x78, 0x6A, 0x29, 0x39), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_2(0x18, 0x01), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_n[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x09, 0x64, 0x38, 0x91, 0x1E, 0xB7, 0x6F, 0xBB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAE, 0x47, 0x9C, 0x89, 0xB8, 0xC9, 0xB5, 0x3B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD0, 0xA5, 0x09, 0xF7, 0x48, 0x01, 0xCC, 0x7F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6B, 0x96, 0x2F, 0xBF, 0x83, 0x87, 0x86, 0x51), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFA, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_2(0xFF, 0x01), +}; +#if MBEDTLS_ECP_FIXED_POINT_OPTIM == 1 +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_0_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x66, 0xBD, 0xE5, 0xC2, 0x31, 0x7E, 0x7E, 0xF9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9B, 0x42, 0x6A, 0x85, 0xC1, 0xB3, 0x48, 0x33), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDE, 0xA8, 0xFF, 0xA2, 0x27, 0xC1, 0x1D, 0xFE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x28, 0x59, 0xE7, 0xEF, 0x77, 0x5E, 0x4B, 0xA1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBA, 0x3D, 0x4D, 0x6B, 0x60, 0xAF, 0x28, 0xF8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x21, 0xB5, 0x3F, 0x05, 0x39, 0x81, 0x64, 0x9C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x42, 0xB4, 0x95, 0x23, 0x66, 0xCB, 0x3E, 0x9E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCD, 0xE9, 0x04, 0x04, 0xB7, 0x06, 0x8E, 0x85), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC6, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_0_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x50, 0x66, 0xD1, 0x9F, 0x76, 0x94, 0xBE, 0x88), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x40, 0xC2, 0x72, 0xA2, 0x86, 0x70, 0x3C, 0x35), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x61, 0x07, 0xAD, 0x3F, 0x01, 0xB9, 0x50, 0xC5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x40, 0x26, 0xF4, 0x5E, 0x99, 0x72, 0xEE, 0x97), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2C, 0x66, 0x3E, 0x27, 0x17, 0xBD, 0xAF, 0x17), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x68, 0x44, 0x9B, 0x57, 0x49, 0x44, 0xF5, 0x98), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD9, 0x1B, 0x7D, 0x2C, 0xB4, 0x5F, 0x8A, 0x5C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x04, 0xC0, 0x3B, 0x9A, 0x78, 0x6A, 0x29, 0x39), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x18, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_1_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2F, 0xB1, 0x2D, 0xEB, 0x27, 0x2F, 0xE8, 0xDA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x98, 0x4B, 0x44, 0x25, 0xDB, 0x5C, 0x5F, 0x67), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x13, 0x85, 0x28, 0x78, 0x2E, 0x75, 0x34, 0x32), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x69, 0x57, 0x0F, 0x73, 0x78, 0x7A, 0xE3, 0x53), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8D, 0xD8, 0xEC, 0xDC, 0xDA, 0x04, 0xAD, 0xAB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x34, 0x8A, 0x09, 0xF3, 0x58, 0x79, 0xD8, 0x29), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x63, 0x03, 0xCB, 0x50, 0x1A, 0x7F, 0x56, 0x00), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF6, 0xA6, 0x78, 0x38, 0x85, 0x67, 0x0B, 0x40), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x83, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_1_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8A, 0xD5, 0xD2, 0x22, 0xC4, 0x00, 0x3B, 0xBA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD5, 0x93, 0x0E, 0x7B, 0x85, 0x51, 0xC3, 0x06), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3D, 0xA6, 0x5F, 0x54, 0x49, 0x02, 0x81, 0x78), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x22, 0xE9, 0x6B, 0x3A, 0x92, 0xE7, 0x72, 0x1D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6F, 0x5F, 0x28, 0x9E, 0x91, 0x27, 0x88, 0xE3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEF, 0x28, 0x31, 0xB3, 0x84, 0xCA, 0x12, 0x32), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3D, 0xF9, 0xAC, 0x22, 0x10, 0x0A, 0x64, 0x41), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE9, 0xC6, 0x33, 0x1F, 0x69, 0x19, 0x18, 0xBF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBE, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_2_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA0, 0x48, 0xB8, 0xC7, 0x37, 0x5A, 0x00, 0x36), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x07, 0xCC, 0x32, 0xE0, 0xEE, 0x03, 0xC2, 0xBA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC4, 0x29, 0xC2, 0xE4, 0x6E, 0x24, 0x20, 0x8D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x06, 0x6B, 0x7F, 0x7B, 0xF9, 0xB0, 0xB8, 0x13), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1D, 0x7B, 0x3C, 0xE1, 0x19, 0xA1, 0x23, 0x02), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2A, 0xE3, 0xC2, 0x53, 0xC0, 0x07, 0x13, 0xA9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x07, 0xFE, 0x36, 0x35, 0x9F, 0x5E, 0x59, 0xCE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1D, 0x55, 0x89, 0x84, 0xBC, 0xEF, 0xA2, 0xC2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x19, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_2_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFD, 0x1A, 0x08, 0x67, 0xB4, 0xE7, 0x22, 0xED), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x76, 0x26, 0xDF, 0x81, 0x3C, 0x5F, 0x1C, 0xDA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE0, 0x4D, 0xD0, 0x0A, 0x48, 0x06, 0xF4, 0x48), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x73, 0x18, 0x39, 0xF7, 0xD1, 0x20, 0x77, 0x8D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x78, 0x8F, 0x44, 0x13, 0xCB, 0x78, 0x11, 0x11), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x33, 0xE2, 0x49, 0xEA, 0x43, 0x79, 0x08, 0x39), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x01, 0xD1, 0xD8, 0x73, 0x2C, 0x71, 0x2F, 0x69), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x21, 0xE5, 0xE7, 0xF4, 0x46, 0xAB, 0x20, 0xCA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5A, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_3_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8C, 0x0B, 0xB9, 0x71, 0x1A, 0x27, 0xB7, 0xA7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2A, 0xA2, 0x2C, 0xD1, 0xDA, 0xBC, 0xC1, 0xBD), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x10, 0xA3, 0x10, 0x1F, 0x90, 0xF2, 0xA5, 0x52), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x28, 0xFB, 0x20, 0xF4, 0xC0, 0x70, 0xC0, 0xF5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8F, 0xA7, 0x99, 0xF0, 0xA5, 0xD3, 0x09, 0xDD), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x26, 0xE8, 0x14, 0x39, 0xBE, 0xCB, 0x60, 0xAF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9F, 0xD6, 0x14, 0xA9, 0xC9, 0x20, 0xC3, 0xEA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5D, 0xA8, 0x5B, 0xFD, 0x2D, 0x96, 0xBC, 0x78), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC0, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_3_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9D, 0x04, 0x45, 0xBE, 0xCE, 0x75, 0x95, 0xF6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCC, 0xDA, 0x58, 0x49, 0x35, 0x09, 0x8D, 0x41), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x76, 0xF0, 0xC0, 0x36, 0xF2, 0xA6, 0x2D, 0x14), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE7, 0xFC, 0x3D, 0xA8, 0xFB, 0x3C, 0xD2, 0x51), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x01, 0x4D, 0x71, 0x09, 0x18, 0x42, 0xF0, 0x2D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8D, 0xC1, 0xCE, 0x9E, 0x6A, 0x49, 0x60, 0x12), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAD, 0xB1, 0x00, 0xF7, 0xA1, 0x7A, 0x31, 0xB4), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x41, 0xC3, 0x86, 0xCD, 0x20, 0x4A, 0x17, 0x86), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6C, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_4_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x98, 0xAB, 0x8B, 0x47, 0x8D, 0xAA, 0xA6, 0x5B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC4, 0x97, 0xF0, 0xBC, 0x2D, 0xDC, 0x9D, 0x84), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x01, 0x86, 0xB0, 0x74, 0xB2, 0xF4, 0xF6, 0x67), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAC, 0xBD, 0xAC, 0xE3, 0x8F, 0x43, 0x5C, 0xB1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x37, 0xC3, 0xE2, 0x6E, 0x25, 0x49, 0xCD, 0x0B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x64, 0x5E, 0x08, 0xB3, 0xB9, 0xAC, 0x5F, 0xD1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x08, 0xB7, 0xD1, 0xF4, 0xDC, 0x19, 0xE9, 0xC8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x49, 0xE4, 0xFA, 0xE1, 0x36, 0x3E, 0xED, 0x6E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0A, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_4_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x00, 0x67, 0x92, 0x84, 0x6E, 0x48, 0x03, 0x51), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9E, 0x95, 0xEF, 0x8F, 0xB2, 0x82, 0x6B, 0x1C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8D, 0xFA, 0xB9, 0x55, 0x23, 0xFE, 0x09, 0xB3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEF, 0x79, 0x85, 0x4B, 0x0E, 0xD4, 0x35, 0xDB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9A, 0x27, 0x45, 0x81, 0xE0, 0x88, 0x52, 0xAD), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x17, 0x63, 0xA2, 0x4B, 0xBC, 0x5D, 0xB1, 0x92), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x28, 0x8C, 0x83, 0xD9, 0x3E, 0xD3, 0x42, 0xDA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x99, 0x03, 0x3A, 0x31, 0xBA, 0xE9, 0x3A, 0xD1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x47, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_5_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x35, 0x10, 0xCD, 0x2D, 0x00, 0xFE, 0x32, 0xA7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE4, 0x6E, 0x1F, 0xDA, 0xF8, 0x6F, 0x4D, 0x03), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x09, 0x79, 0x7D, 0x09, 0xE5, 0xD3, 0x03, 0x21), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x58, 0xC3, 0xBE, 0xDF, 0x07, 0x65, 0x49, 0xCC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x08, 0x57, 0x33, 0xEF, 0xAE, 0x4F, 0x04, 0x27), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9A, 0xE9, 0x9B, 0xFE, 0xBF, 0xE6, 0x85, 0xF6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBD, 0xBA, 0xAA, 0x06, 0xC4, 0xC6, 0xB8, 0x57), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0C, 0x83, 0x01, 0xA9, 0xF6, 0x51, 0xE7, 0xB8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1B, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_5_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB9, 0xA6, 0x15, 0x8E, 0xAB, 0x1F, 0x10, 0x87), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x74, 0x08, 0x27, 0x1A, 0xA1, 0x21, 0xAD, 0xF5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x02, 0x09, 0x90, 0x6E, 0x50, 0x90, 0x9A, 0x5D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x86, 0x9A, 0xFE, 0xD7, 0xA1, 0xF5, 0xA2, 0x15), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE8, 0x7D, 0xE3, 0xDC, 0x21, 0xFB, 0xA4, 0x7B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB9, 0xBF, 0x07, 0xFF, 0x45, 0xDF, 0x51, 0x77), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0B, 0x5C, 0x34, 0x02, 0x62, 0x9B, 0x08, 0x12), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x86, 0xCE, 0x9A, 0x6A, 0xEC, 0x75, 0xF6, 0x46), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6D, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_6_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE6, 0x59, 0xF4, 0x78, 0x3C, 0x60, 0xB1, 0x4A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3E, 0x37, 0x84, 0x6A, 0xDC, 0xF2, 0x9A, 0x7D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x40, 0x9A, 0x9A, 0x15, 0x36, 0xE0, 0x2B, 0x2D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEC, 0x38, 0x9C, 0x50, 0x3D, 0x1E, 0x37, 0x82), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB7, 0x79, 0xF0, 0x92, 0xF2, 0x8B, 0x18, 0x82), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x17, 0xE0, 0x82, 0x1E, 0x80, 0x82, 0x4B, 0xD7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFA, 0xBB, 0x59, 0x6B, 0x8A, 0x77, 0x41, 0x40), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA7, 0xF9, 0xD4, 0xB8, 0x4A, 0x82, 0xCF, 0x40), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5D, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_6_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1E, 0x8C, 0xC8, 0x9B, 0x72, 0x9E, 0xF7, 0xF9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB8, 0xCE, 0xE9, 0x77, 0x0A, 0x19, 0x59, 0x84), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9D, 0xA1, 0x41, 0x6A, 0x72, 0x4B, 0xB4, 0xDC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0B, 0x35, 0x43, 0xE2, 0x8C, 0xBE, 0x0D, 0xE3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC1, 0xEB, 0xAD, 0xF3, 0xA9, 0xA6, 0x68, 0xA1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x81, 0x2F, 0xE2, 0x48, 0x0C, 0xDB, 0x1F, 0x42), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD1, 0x1E, 0x60, 0x9B, 0x2A, 0xD2, 0xC1, 0x3C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC0, 0x64, 0xB5, 0xD2, 0xF6, 0xF6, 0x6E, 0x22), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x70, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_7_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC6, 0x3D, 0x30, 0x78, 0x10, 0x18, 0x41, 0x51), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x96, 0x1D, 0x1C, 0xE0, 0x6D, 0x83, 0xD1, 0x93), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7B, 0x03, 0x0B, 0xF5, 0x2F, 0x6C, 0x04, 0x98), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6C, 0x3E, 0xD5, 0xFC, 0x31, 0x5B, 0x3A, 0xEB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x50, 0x82, 0x2F, 0xFB, 0xFE, 0xF8, 0x76, 0x39), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x85, 0x26, 0xDA, 0x9C, 0x36, 0xF5, 0x93, 0xD1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4C, 0xE7, 0x6E, 0xD2, 0x7D, 0x81, 0x09, 0xC6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD3, 0x03, 0xF9, 0x58, 0x48, 0x24, 0xA2, 0xEE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE9, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_7_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1B, 0x79, 0x0C, 0x8E, 0x6B, 0x95, 0xF3, 0xC4), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF4, 0x10, 0x5C, 0x87, 0x03, 0x39, 0xCF, 0x68), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAD, 0xF0, 0xF7, 0xC1, 0x07, 0xA4, 0xF4, 0x3F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x32, 0xE8, 0x02, 0x89, 0x65, 0xC4, 0x72, 0x36), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB4, 0x88, 0xEA, 0x96, 0x67, 0x0B, 0x5D, 0xDF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA8, 0x75, 0x60, 0xA8, 0xBD, 0x74, 0xDF, 0x68), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6E, 0xE5, 0x71, 0x50, 0x67, 0xD0, 0xD2, 0xE6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD5, 0xFC, 0xE5, 0xC7, 0x77, 0xB0, 0x7F, 0x8C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF1, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_8_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x97, 0x86, 0x69, 0xCD, 0x0D, 0x9A, 0xBD, 0x66), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x58, 0x17, 0xBC, 0xBB, 0x59, 0x85, 0x7D, 0x0E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8D, 0xA8, 0x76, 0xAC, 0x80, 0xA9, 0x72, 0xE0), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x74, 0x78, 0xC1, 0xE2, 0x4D, 0xAF, 0xF9, 0x3C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAD, 0x97, 0x8E, 0x74, 0xC4, 0x4B, 0xB2, 0x85), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEA, 0xD8, 0xF6, 0xF3, 0xAF, 0x2F, 0x52, 0xE5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x95, 0x57, 0xF4, 0xCE, 0xEE, 0x43, 0xED, 0x60), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7D, 0x46, 0x38, 0xDE, 0x20, 0xFD, 0x59, 0x18), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD7, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_8_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1C, 0x18, 0xE8, 0x58, 0xB9, 0x76, 0x2C, 0xE6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xED, 0x54, 0xE4, 0xFE, 0xC7, 0xBC, 0x31, 0x37), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF5, 0xF8, 0x89, 0xEE, 0x70, 0xB5, 0xB0, 0x2C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x83, 0x22, 0x26, 0x9A, 0x53, 0xB9, 0x38, 0x0A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x74, 0xA7, 0x19, 0x8C, 0x74, 0x7E, 0x88, 0x46), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB4, 0xDA, 0x0A, 0xE8, 0xDA, 0xA5, 0xBE, 0x1D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x90, 0x5C, 0xF7, 0xB1, 0x0C, 0x72, 0xFB, 0x09), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x78, 0xE2, 0x23, 0xE7, 0x46, 0xB7, 0xE0, 0x91), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC5, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_9_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3A, 0x36, 0xBC, 0xBD, 0x48, 0x11, 0x8E, 0x72), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAB, 0xBB, 0xA1, 0xF7, 0x0B, 0x9E, 0xBF, 0xDF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x68, 0x28, 0xE1, 0xA2, 0x8F, 0xFC, 0xFC, 0xD6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x81, 0xFE, 0x19, 0x0A, 0xE5, 0xE7, 0x69, 0x39), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5E, 0xCD, 0x12, 0xF5, 0xBE, 0xD3, 0x04, 0xF1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF5, 0xA8, 0x0D, 0x81, 0x59, 0xC4, 0x79, 0x98), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA3, 0xF3, 0x4B, 0x92, 0x65, 0xC3, 0x31, 0xAD), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x75, 0xB5, 0x4F, 0x4D, 0x91, 0xD4, 0xE2, 0xB2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x51, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_9_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x72, 0x09, 0x41, 0x79, 0x1D, 0x4D, 0x0D, 0x33), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBB, 0x31, 0x18, 0xBA, 0xA0, 0xF2, 0x6E, 0x7E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x93, 0x5B, 0x4D, 0x4F, 0xAF, 0xC9, 0x8C, 0xA1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x48, 0x99, 0x9C, 0x06, 0x68, 0xDE, 0xD8, 0x29), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA0, 0x04, 0xE1, 0xB5, 0x9D, 0x00, 0xBC, 0xB8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x61, 0x95, 0x92, 0x8D, 0x72, 0xD3, 0x37, 0x42), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAB, 0x4B, 0x27, 0xA2, 0xE8, 0xA4, 0x26, 0xA1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4F, 0x45, 0x9C, 0xA9, 0xCB, 0x9F, 0xBA, 0x85), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCB, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_10_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x08, 0x7E, 0x1B, 0x64, 0xF4, 0xE8, 0xA5, 0x55), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF7, 0x20, 0xA9, 0xCA, 0xF3, 0x89, 0xE5, 0xE1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x83, 0xED, 0xFC, 0xAB, 0xD9, 0x0A, 0xB9, 0x07), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x08, 0x6F, 0x46, 0x7C, 0xCD, 0x78, 0xFF, 0x05), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x69, 0xAB, 0x71, 0x5A, 0x94, 0xAB, 0x20, 0x20), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC2, 0x2E, 0xEE, 0x87, 0x57, 0x1F, 0xAD, 0xD3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x91, 0x4C, 0x3D, 0xFB, 0x7E, 0xA1, 0x8B, 0x07), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x69, 0xCF, 0x07, 0x86, 0xBA, 0x53, 0x37, 0xCF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x38, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_10_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x00, 0x26, 0xB2, 0xB9, 0xE2, 0x91, 0xE3, 0xB5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x79, 0xC9, 0x54, 0x84, 0x08, 0x3D, 0x0B, 0xD2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5D, 0xA8, 0x77, 0x2F, 0x64, 0x45, 0x99, 0x4C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x87, 0x96, 0x16, 0x1F, 0xDB, 0x96, 0x28, 0x97), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x83, 0x2B, 0x8D, 0xFF, 0xA2, 0x4F, 0x55, 0xD3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x71, 0xE6, 0x48, 0xBD, 0x99, 0x3D, 0x12, 0x57), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3F, 0x84, 0x59, 0xDA, 0xB9, 0xB6, 0x66, 0x12), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6D, 0x78, 0x41, 0x92, 0xDF, 0xF4, 0x3F, 0x63), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1F, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_11_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7E, 0x86, 0x6F, 0x4F, 0xBF, 0x67, 0xDF, 0x2F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF2, 0x2B, 0x1E, 0x5F, 0x00, 0xEA, 0xF6, 0x56), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x90, 0xB9, 0x6A, 0x89, 0xD8, 0xC0, 0xD7, 0xA7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCB, 0x9A, 0x32, 0x23, 0xA0, 0x02, 0x91, 0x58), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x42, 0x7F, 0x6A, 0x15, 0x64, 0x6A, 0x8B, 0xBB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8A, 0x57, 0x82, 0x58, 0xA9, 0x56, 0xB5, 0xFB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDD, 0x50, 0x92, 0x60, 0xCC, 0x81, 0x24, 0xA8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x36, 0x3D, 0xAD, 0xDA, 0xD9, 0x51, 0x3E, 0x57), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5D, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_11_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEC, 0xFE, 0x8F, 0xB0, 0x0B, 0xDE, 0x2E, 0x7E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x79, 0xD2, 0xBE, 0xEF, 0xAC, 0x76, 0x71, 0xA3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x55, 0xE8, 0x72, 0x0B, 0xAC, 0xFE, 0xCA, 0x5A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAD, 0x5B, 0xC7, 0xFC, 0xE3, 0x3C, 0x7C, 0x4C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA1, 0x04, 0xA7, 0xB9, 0x9B, 0x93, 0xC0, 0x2F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x41, 0x48, 0x4B, 0x8E, 0x32, 0xC5, 0xF0, 0x6B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB0, 0x42, 0x07, 0xC1, 0xF2, 0xF1, 0x72, 0x5B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1E, 0x37, 0x54, 0x9C, 0x88, 0xD2, 0x62, 0xAA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC1, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_12_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC2, 0x19, 0x8A, 0x89, 0x58, 0xA2, 0x0F, 0xDB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x01, 0xCC, 0x4C, 0x97, 0x30, 0x66, 0x34, 0x26), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x83, 0x6A, 0x1E, 0x1F, 0xDB, 0xC9, 0x5E, 0x13), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1B, 0x4D, 0x49, 0xFF, 0x9B, 0x9C, 0xAC, 0x9B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD7, 0xE4, 0x4B, 0xF2, 0xD4, 0x1A, 0xD2, 0x78), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCD, 0xDA, 0xE8, 0x61, 0x9F, 0xC8, 0x49, 0x32), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x51, 0xCB, 0xF2, 0x2D, 0x85, 0xF6, 0x8D, 0x52), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB7, 0xC5, 0xCD, 0x2C, 0x79, 0xC6, 0x0E, 0x4F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDB, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_12_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x73, 0x1D, 0x55, 0x0F, 0xF8, 0x22, 0x9F, 0x78), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x76, 0x56, 0xBA, 0xE7, 0x57, 0x32, 0xEC, 0x42), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x65, 0x9A, 0xC6, 0x4C, 0x09, 0xC4, 0x52, 0x3F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB6, 0x1E, 0x6F, 0xF4, 0x7D, 0x27, 0xDD, 0xAF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x94, 0x11, 0x16, 0xEC, 0x79, 0x83, 0xAD, 0xAE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x46, 0x4E, 0x92, 0x1F, 0x19, 0x7D, 0x65, 0xDC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x09, 0xFF, 0x78, 0x15, 0x45, 0x63, 0x32, 0xE4), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBF, 0x91, 0xD0, 0x78, 0x58, 0xDA, 0x50, 0x47), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x73, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_13_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x23, 0xDE, 0x40, 0xF6, 0x41, 0xB4, 0x3B, 0x95), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC6, 0x8D, 0xE0, 0xE1, 0xA9, 0xF0, 0x35, 0x5D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE6, 0xD4, 0xBA, 0x7B, 0xCC, 0x1B, 0x3A, 0x32), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD0, 0x5A, 0x2E, 0x74, 0x47, 0x14, 0xC3, 0x4D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7D, 0xF0, 0x8B, 0x06, 0x15, 0x8E, 0x0E, 0xCA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB5, 0xD2, 0xEB, 0x97, 0x50, 0x7D, 0x31, 0xFC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x42, 0x93, 0x4C, 0xDB, 0x97, 0x79, 0x44, 0xF5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9C, 0xA2, 0xA0, 0x0B, 0xC8, 0x3A, 0x8A, 0xF9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x61, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_13_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x79, 0x50, 0x92, 0x9E, 0x24, 0x1F, 0xCB, 0x4C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD3, 0x16, 0xC9, 0xC5, 0x3D, 0x5A, 0xAF, 0x97), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x18, 0xE3, 0x97, 0xE4, 0xA8, 0x50, 0xF6, 0x7E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x45, 0x57, 0x97, 0x42, 0x78, 0x92, 0x49, 0x0D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA5, 0xEB, 0x62, 0x24, 0xFB, 0x8F, 0x32, 0xCF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF3, 0x0C, 0x36, 0x6E, 0x8F, 0xE8, 0xE8, 0x8E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC2, 0xD3, 0x7C, 0xC7, 0x8D, 0x3F, 0x5C, 0xE1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6A, 0x64, 0x6A, 0x73, 0x10, 0x79, 0xB8, 0x5A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCB, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_14_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x51, 0xF9, 0xEF, 0xA5, 0x20, 0x4A, 0x5C, 0xA1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2F, 0xF3, 0xF4, 0x49, 0x5B, 0x73, 0xAA, 0x1B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC6, 0xF2, 0xEA, 0x0F, 0x00, 0xAD, 0x53, 0xAB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x03, 0xB8, 0x66, 0xED, 0xC4, 0x2B, 0x4C, 0x35), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3A, 0x2F, 0xC1, 0x9A, 0x37, 0xD2, 0x7F, 0x58), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x29, 0xA7, 0x81, 0x38, 0x64, 0xC9, 0x37, 0x38), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBE, 0x3B, 0x6C, 0x9F, 0x5B, 0xD9, 0x8B, 0x1D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB6, 0x14, 0xD9, 0x08, 0xD8, 0xD2, 0x7E, 0x23), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1C, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_14_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x15, 0x71, 0xE6, 0x3D, 0xD1, 0xB0, 0xE7, 0xCD), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5B, 0x81, 0x23, 0xEC, 0x2D, 0x42, 0x45, 0xE6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x51, 0x5B, 0x44, 0x6B, 0x89, 0x03, 0x67, 0x28), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x84, 0x27, 0xAE, 0x80, 0x5A, 0x33, 0xBE, 0x11), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE3, 0xB6, 0x64, 0x1A, 0xDF, 0xD3, 0x85, 0x91), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x67, 0x8C, 0x22, 0xBA, 0xD0, 0xBD, 0xCC, 0xA0), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF7, 0x3C, 0x01, 0x3A, 0xFF, 0x9D, 0xC7, 0x6B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0C, 0xC7, 0x64, 0xB4, 0x59, 0x4E, 0x9F, 0x22), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x85, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_15_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA1, 0x34, 0x0A, 0x41, 0x94, 0xA8, 0xF2, 0xB7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF6, 0xD4, 0xE4, 0xF0, 0x97, 0x45, 0x6D, 0xCA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8F, 0x1F, 0x4D, 0x6D, 0xFE, 0xA0, 0xC4, 0x84), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1D, 0x28, 0x5C, 0x40, 0xBB, 0x65, 0xD4, 0x42), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x98, 0xA8, 0x87, 0x35, 0x20, 0x3A, 0x89, 0x44), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD6, 0xFD, 0x4F, 0xAB, 0x2D, 0xD1, 0xD0, 0xC0), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x86, 0xE8, 0x00, 0xFC, 0x69, 0x52, 0xF8, 0xD5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE1, 0x9A, 0x99, 0xE1, 0xDC, 0x9C, 0x3F, 0xD9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x99, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_15_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x12, 0x08, 0x98, 0xD9, 0xCA, 0x73, 0xD5, 0xA9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB9, 0x2C, 0xE0, 0xA7, 0x3E, 0x91, 0xD7, 0x87), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x68, 0x04, 0xB0, 0x54, 0x09, 0xF4, 0x72, 0xB7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC8, 0xEE, 0x28, 0xCC, 0xE8, 0x50, 0x78, 0x20), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0D, 0x91, 0x03, 0x76, 0xDB, 0x68, 0x24, 0x77), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7A, 0xE0, 0x56, 0xB2, 0x5D, 0x12, 0xD3, 0xB5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0D, 0x42, 0x59, 0x8B, 0xDF, 0x67, 0xB5, 0xBE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD1, 0xCC, 0xE5, 0x31, 0x53, 0x7A, 0x46, 0xB3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDA, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_16_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCC, 0x8D, 0x59, 0xB5, 0x1B, 0x0F, 0xF4, 0xAF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD9, 0x2F, 0xD1, 0x2C, 0xE0, 0xD8, 0x04, 0xEF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAC, 0xF4, 0xD7, 0xBA, 0xB0, 0xA3, 0x7E, 0xC9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCD, 0x08, 0x51, 0x56, 0xA6, 0x76, 0x67, 0x33), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8C, 0x17, 0x63, 0xFE, 0x56, 0xD0, 0xD9, 0x71), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAA, 0xF6, 0xC3, 0x14, 0x47, 0xC5, 0xA7, 0x31), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x72, 0x4C, 0x80, 0xF6, 0xA2, 0x57, 0xA7, 0x5D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x11, 0xB3, 0x7B, 0xF8, 0x2F, 0xE1, 0x3E, 0x7B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFA, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_16_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x26, 0xF4, 0xF9, 0x6B, 0x7B, 0x90, 0xDF, 0x30), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1F, 0x82, 0xEF, 0x62, 0xA1, 0x4C, 0x53, 0xCA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE6, 0x99, 0x76, 0x01, 0xBA, 0x8D, 0x0F, 0x54), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAF, 0xF4, 0x58, 0x73, 0x56, 0xFE, 0xDD, 0x7C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF6, 0xCE, 0xF9, 0xE8, 0xA1, 0x34, 0xC3, 0x5B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x09, 0x5F, 0xDC, 0x6A, 0x3D, 0xD8, 0x7F, 0x42), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC2, 0xF4, 0x51, 0xB8, 0xB8, 0xC1, 0xD7, 0x2F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAE, 0x7D, 0x58, 0xD1, 0xD4, 0x1B, 0x4D, 0x23), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD3, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_17_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB9, 0x95, 0xDF, 0x00, 0xD8, 0x21, 0xDE, 0x94), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF7, 0x47, 0x3C, 0xC3, 0xB2, 0x01, 0x53, 0x5D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1E, 0x17, 0x43, 0x23, 0xBD, 0xCA, 0x71, 0xF2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x70, 0xBA, 0x0F, 0x4F, 0xDC, 0x41, 0x54, 0xBE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD6, 0x39, 0x26, 0x70, 0x53, 0x32, 0x18, 0x11), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x32, 0x46, 0x07, 0x97, 0x3A, 0x57, 0xE0, 0x01), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD6, 0x92, 0x4F, 0xCE, 0xDF, 0x25, 0x80, 0x26), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5B, 0x6F, 0x9A, 0x03, 0x05, 0x4B, 0xD1, 0x47), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5D, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_17_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x25, 0x01, 0x72, 0x30, 0x90, 0x17, 0x51, 0x20), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x74, 0xFB, 0x41, 0x65, 0x5C, 0xB4, 0x2D, 0xEE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x66, 0xCD, 0xCD, 0xAA, 0x41, 0xCC, 0xBB, 0x07), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD4, 0xCE, 0x08, 0x0A, 0x63, 0xE9, 0xA2, 0xFF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3D, 0xA8, 0x21, 0x7F, 0x7A, 0x5B, 0x9B, 0x81), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x10, 0x6B, 0x89, 0x44, 0x0A, 0x7F, 0x85, 0x5F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7D, 0xDE, 0x7C, 0x19, 0x5C, 0x65, 0x26, 0x61), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD7, 0xAC, 0x62, 0x29, 0x4A, 0xF1, 0xD0, 0x81), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x38, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_18_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x32, 0x00, 0x40, 0x87, 0xEB, 0xA9, 0x58, 0x56), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAF, 0x51, 0x0B, 0xFF, 0x56, 0x35, 0x51, 0xB3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7B, 0xAC, 0x08, 0x94, 0x71, 0xDA, 0xEC, 0x99), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5F, 0x4D, 0xC5, 0x7B, 0x31, 0x8B, 0x8D, 0x5E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x15, 0x05, 0xF1, 0x3E, 0x9E, 0x8F, 0x17, 0x8F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF0, 0x9C, 0x4B, 0x62, 0x94, 0xAD, 0x49, 0xFC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0F, 0xC9, 0xC6, 0x8F, 0xFD, 0x33, 0x44, 0x34), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5F, 0x96, 0x17, 0x7F, 0x42, 0xBE, 0xF7, 0x0D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD4, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_18_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFB, 0x29, 0x39, 0x13, 0x08, 0x8D, 0x91, 0x47), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF6, 0x79, 0xF9, 0x2F, 0xA9, 0x0A, 0xCF, 0xD6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAB, 0x87, 0x7A, 0xA3, 0x19, 0xAB, 0x55, 0xAD), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE8, 0x0B, 0x01, 0xC5, 0x56, 0x19, 0x9D, 0x9E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x19, 0xDE, 0x82, 0x3B, 0xEA, 0xD3, 0x0B, 0x8C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x65, 0x6B, 0xC7, 0xF3, 0x0F, 0x82, 0x87, 0x6C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD8, 0x2E, 0x23, 0xF2, 0x39, 0x9D, 0x49, 0x70), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x31, 0xDE, 0xAF, 0x7A, 0xEE, 0xB0, 0xDA, 0x70), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x63, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_19_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x76, 0x4E, 0x2A, 0x50, 0xFD, 0x8E, 0xC0, 0xEB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x52, 0x0F, 0x7C, 0x76, 0x63, 0xD8, 0x89, 0x45), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEC, 0x2D, 0xB9, 0x4E, 0xF4, 0xEE, 0x85, 0xCF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC1, 0x95, 0x5C, 0x96, 0x5D, 0xAA, 0x59, 0x0B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCA, 0xDB, 0xD2, 0x68, 0x8E, 0x5A, 0x94, 0x60), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD9, 0x02, 0xBF, 0x77, 0x9F, 0xB9, 0x4C, 0xC9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2D, 0xDC, 0xC0, 0xCF, 0x81, 0x1E, 0xC4, 0x6C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2B, 0xCC, 0x37, 0x86, 0xDC, 0xE2, 0x64, 0x72), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD5, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_19_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2C, 0x30, 0xB1, 0x59, 0x20, 0x9D, 0x98, 0x28), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x77, 0x0C, 0x9D, 0xF8, 0x20, 0xDC, 0x90, 0xBA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB1, 0xA0, 0xF4, 0xE7, 0x3E, 0x9C, 0x9E, 0xA2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB5, 0x25, 0xA2, 0xB0, 0x54, 0xCD, 0x2E, 0x33), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEA, 0xD9, 0x42, 0xB0, 0x80, 0xB0, 0xA3, 0x38), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9F, 0xFE, 0x9D, 0x8D, 0x40, 0xFF, 0x27, 0x6D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3A, 0x9D, 0xA6, 0x88, 0x3A, 0x8B, 0x6F, 0x14), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB6, 0x39, 0xEE, 0x1F, 0x3F, 0xB1, 0x4F, 0x63), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x31, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_20_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6D, 0xD7, 0x9E, 0xFF, 0xD2, 0x35, 0x67, 0x03), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCA, 0x4F, 0x15, 0x5D, 0xE3, 0xE8, 0x53, 0x86), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x92, 0xF7, 0x24, 0x98, 0xA2, 0xCB, 0x11, 0x68), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x06, 0x2E, 0x25, 0xE1, 0x94, 0xC5, 0xA3, 0x96), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE0, 0x82, 0x6E, 0xBA, 0xE7, 0x43, 0x25, 0xB0), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x18, 0x65, 0xB4, 0x49, 0x73, 0x18, 0x35, 0x54), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x59, 0x5B, 0xBC, 0x62, 0x86, 0x4C, 0xC1, 0xB7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9B, 0xF2, 0x95, 0xA2, 0xBB, 0xA2, 0x35, 0x65), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBF, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_20_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x72, 0x59, 0x62, 0xB0, 0x4B, 0x1E, 0xB4, 0xD8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0D, 0x55, 0xCE, 0xB0, 0x69, 0xBA, 0x63, 0x10), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6E, 0x69, 0x86, 0xDB, 0x34, 0x7D, 0x68, 0x64), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDA, 0x06, 0xCA, 0x55, 0x44, 0x36, 0x2B, 0xBA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6C, 0xD4, 0xC4, 0x3D, 0xCD, 0x9E, 0x69, 0xA4), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3F, 0x44, 0xE4, 0xBF, 0x31, 0xE6, 0x40, 0x9F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7E, 0x4F, 0xFA, 0x75, 0xE3, 0xFB, 0x97, 0x0E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x08, 0xC0, 0xBD, 0x1C, 0x48, 0xB0, 0x26, 0xD0), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD2, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_21_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1C, 0x7B, 0x32, 0xFA, 0xF2, 0x6D, 0x84, 0x8E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA0, 0x21, 0x03, 0x1D, 0x0D, 0x22, 0x55, 0x67), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x18, 0xF9, 0x42, 0x03, 0x9C, 0xC2, 0xCB, 0xBA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF8, 0xA1, 0x96, 0xD9, 0x9D, 0x11, 0x6F, 0xBE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0x40, 0x57, 0xEB, 0x40, 0x2D, 0xC0, 0x11), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2F, 0x96, 0xBB, 0x4F, 0x2F, 0x23, 0xA8, 0x28), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3A, 0x29, 0x85, 0x21, 0xA5, 0x50, 0x62, 0x06), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC9, 0x7D, 0x92, 0xCF, 0x87, 0x0C, 0x22, 0xF9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC9, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_21_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5A, 0x0E, 0xA5, 0x32, 0x5B, 0xDF, 0x9C, 0xD5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x27, 0x96, 0x37, 0x2C, 0x88, 0x35, 0x30, 0xA1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x40, 0xB4, 0x69, 0xFF, 0xEB, 0xC6, 0x94, 0x08), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC9, 0x55, 0x60, 0xAD, 0xAA, 0x58, 0x14, 0x88), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3C, 0xFF, 0xF2, 0xB2, 0xD5, 0xA7, 0xD9, 0x27), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2D, 0xAE, 0x54, 0xD2, 0x60, 0x31, 0xF3, 0x15), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBB, 0x92, 0x83, 0xE3, 0xF1, 0x42, 0x83, 0x6E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x49, 0xD2, 0xC8, 0xB7, 0x76, 0x45, 0x7F, 0x7D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x04, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_22_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4A, 0x11, 0xA4, 0xFB, 0x7A, 0x01, 0xBC, 0xC8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCD, 0x27, 0x73, 0x8D, 0x02, 0x91, 0x27, 0x8E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA4, 0x62, 0xF6, 0xDD, 0x6B, 0xFA, 0x5B, 0xB9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEF, 0xCA, 0xA2, 0x44, 0x2C, 0xF0, 0x28, 0xD8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3C, 0xF1, 0x7A, 0xA2, 0x42, 0x4C, 0x50, 0xC6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2D, 0x83, 0x3E, 0x50, 0xAB, 0x9C, 0xF7, 0x67), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1D, 0xED, 0x78, 0xCB, 0x76, 0x69, 0xDA, 0x42), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDB, 0x01, 0x1E, 0x43, 0x27, 0x47, 0x6E, 0xDA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x94, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_22_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD3, 0x4F, 0x54, 0xB9, 0x3E, 0xBD, 0xD5, 0x44), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC9, 0x35, 0x40, 0x69, 0x7F, 0x74, 0x9D, 0x32), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5A, 0x06, 0x6F, 0x67, 0x68, 0x2B, 0x4D, 0x10), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC6, 0x65, 0x41, 0xFC, 0x7C, 0x1E, 0xE8, 0xC8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF2, 0x79, 0x37, 0xAF, 0xFD, 0xD2, 0xDA, 0x4C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x33, 0xA8, 0x69, 0x56, 0x62, 0xA4, 0xE4, 0xA3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x42, 0x71, 0x73, 0x21, 0x8A, 0x17, 0x81, 0xA2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x14, 0x55, 0x8F, 0x7B, 0xB8, 0xAF, 0xF7, 0x86), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAA, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_23_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4B, 0xD1, 0xBD, 0xBE, 0x8C, 0xBC, 0x60, 0x6E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x62, 0xA6, 0x57, 0x8C, 0xAE, 0x5C, 0x19, 0xFE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7A, 0x43, 0xE4, 0xD9, 0xD8, 0x7B, 0xE7, 0x41), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xED, 0xB9, 0xE4, 0x85, 0x7C, 0x2E, 0xFC, 0x20), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x02, 0x2E, 0x01, 0x2A, 0x6D, 0x56, 0xBE, 0x97), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6A, 0x0C, 0x25, 0x9B, 0xAE, 0x86, 0x37, 0x43), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4A, 0x22, 0xB3, 0xCB, 0x99, 0x66, 0xB7, 0x9E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x56, 0xF7, 0x90, 0xF0, 0x1B, 0x09, 0x27, 0xF7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC8, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_23_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1C, 0x16, 0x08, 0xEF, 0x39, 0x64, 0x49, 0x31), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x08, 0xA0, 0xE3, 0x97, 0xA9, 0x07, 0x54, 0x26), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCD, 0xFF, 0xE2, 0x00, 0x07, 0x21, 0x88, 0x20), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x16, 0xFD, 0x59, 0x53, 0x05, 0x6C, 0x42, 0x27), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8F, 0xF7, 0x39, 0x5C, 0x82, 0x36, 0xE8, 0x03), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2E, 0x83, 0xA8, 0xE2, 0xA8, 0x43, 0x07, 0x38), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE6, 0xAF, 0x2B, 0x79, 0xED, 0xD8, 0x39, 0x87), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x15, 0x20, 0x91, 0x7A, 0xC4, 0x07, 0xEF, 0x6C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x28, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_24_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6A, 0x10, 0x2F, 0xAA, 0x0C, 0x94, 0x0E, 0x5A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB7, 0x81, 0x87, 0x41, 0x23, 0xEB, 0x55, 0x7C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB8, 0x53, 0xCC, 0x79, 0xB6, 0xEB, 0x6C, 0xCC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF4, 0x77, 0x73, 0x9D, 0xFC, 0x64, 0x6F, 0x7F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3C, 0x40, 0xE3, 0x6D, 0x1C, 0x16, 0x71, 0x15), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5A, 0xF4, 0x1B, 0xFF, 0x1C, 0x2F, 0xA5, 0xD7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x06, 0x0E, 0x0B, 0x11, 0xF4, 0x8D, 0x93, 0xAF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x58, 0xC5, 0x64, 0x6F, 0x24, 0x19, 0xF2, 0x9B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1C, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_24_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x52, 0xB3, 0xAF, 0xA5, 0x0E, 0x4F, 0x5E, 0xE1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0F, 0x77, 0xCA, 0xF2, 0x6D, 0xC5, 0xF6, 0x9F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x90, 0x18, 0x8E, 0x33, 0x68, 0x6C, 0xE8, 0xE0), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFC, 0x8B, 0x80, 0x90, 0x19, 0x7F, 0x90, 0x96), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5B, 0x80, 0x6B, 0x68, 0xE2, 0x7D, 0xD4, 0xD0), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2A, 0xC1, 0x67, 0xB3, 0x72, 0xCB, 0xBF, 0x2F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4F, 0xD5, 0xD3, 0x1D, 0x14, 0x58, 0x0A, 0x80), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x79, 0x7A, 0x65, 0x98, 0xB3, 0x07, 0x4B, 0x2F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF3, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_25_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2A, 0x87, 0x0F, 0x5F, 0xCF, 0xA2, 0x01, 0x08), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0C, 0xC9, 0xC8, 0x6E, 0x35, 0x87, 0xA5, 0x67), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x94, 0x3E, 0x91, 0xA0, 0xAB, 0x24, 0x1E, 0xF2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB9, 0xBC, 0x02, 0x35, 0x70, 0xC1, 0x5F, 0x98), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x26, 0x59, 0xA0, 0x50, 0x04, 0x80, 0x52, 0x85), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF8, 0x56, 0x6E, 0x42, 0x8F, 0x8C, 0x91, 0x65), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAC, 0xA2, 0xCB, 0xA5, 0xDE, 0x14, 0x24, 0x38), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x00, 0xCB, 0x74, 0x28, 0xE6, 0xA7, 0xE7, 0xC3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5F, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_25_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x35, 0x73, 0xA8, 0x8F, 0x9E, 0x0E, 0x63, 0x96), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC8, 0x1B, 0x77, 0xC7, 0xC1, 0x38, 0xF9, 0xDC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD8, 0x3C, 0xCF, 0xA8, 0x7A, 0xD7, 0xF3, 0xC4), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDD, 0x5F, 0x9A, 0xC9, 0xAD, 0xE9, 0x1A, 0x93), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFC, 0xCF, 0x2B, 0x5E, 0xD5, 0x81, 0x95, 0xA8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x19, 0x88, 0x75, 0x29, 0x1F, 0xC7, 0xC7, 0xD0), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD8, 0xA9, 0x5A, 0x4D, 0x63, 0x95, 0xF9, 0x4E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEB, 0xCD, 0x04, 0x8F, 0xCD, 0x91, 0xDE, 0xC6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x71, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_26_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x88, 0xD4, 0xFD, 0x25, 0x11, 0x99, 0x6E, 0xEA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB0, 0x83, 0x01, 0x3D, 0xFB, 0x56, 0xA5, 0x4E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC2, 0x3A, 0xDC, 0x74, 0xC2, 0xD7, 0xCF, 0xE8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8F, 0xBD, 0xF1, 0xDD, 0xA3, 0x07, 0x03, 0xE2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7B, 0xBE, 0xE9, 0x2E, 0x58, 0x84, 0x66, 0xFC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x71, 0x20, 0x78, 0x37, 0x79, 0x0B, 0xA6, 0x64), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE3, 0xF2, 0xAC, 0x65, 0xC8, 0xC9, 0x2F, 0x61), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x26, 0x93, 0xE5, 0x0D, 0x0C, 0xC6, 0xB8, 0xCB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9C, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_26_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x69, 0xAD, 0x5C, 0x19, 0x12, 0x61, 0x0E, 0x25), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x39, 0x4F, 0x0B, 0x1F, 0x49, 0x7E, 0xCD, 0x81), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x46, 0x2E, 0x30, 0x61, 0xDB, 0x08, 0x68, 0x9B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x41, 0x78, 0xAF, 0xB3, 0x08, 0xC1, 0x69, 0xE5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC4, 0x5F, 0x5D, 0xC1, 0x57, 0x6F, 0xD8, 0x34), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x38, 0xD3, 0x6A, 0xF7, 0xFD, 0x86, 0xE5, 0xB3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA8, 0x63, 0xBD, 0x70, 0x7B, 0x47, 0xE8, 0x6D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x18, 0x62, 0xC8, 0x7E, 0x9D, 0x11, 0x2B, 0xA5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB6, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_27_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE2, 0x84, 0xFD, 0xD5, 0x9A, 0x56, 0x7F, 0x5C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7C, 0xBB, 0xA4, 0x6F, 0x12, 0x6E, 0x4D, 0xF8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1D, 0x08, 0xA1, 0x82, 0x9C, 0x62, 0x74, 0x7B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9E, 0x58, 0x22, 0x05, 0x1D, 0x15, 0x35, 0x79), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9A, 0x88, 0xCF, 0x5C, 0x05, 0x78, 0xFB, 0x94), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAC, 0x6B, 0x2F, 0x79, 0x09, 0x73, 0x67, 0xEC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD8, 0xA0, 0x80, 0xD8, 0xE8, 0xEC, 0xFB, 0x42), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF5, 0xE7, 0x0B, 0xB7, 0x81, 0x48, 0x7B, 0xD9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE3, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_27_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE8, 0x53, 0xA9, 0xED, 0x61, 0x92, 0xD7, 0x85), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x26, 0x49, 0xD9, 0x5D, 0x9B, 0x4E, 0x89, 0x35), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB8, 0x12, 0xEB, 0x9A, 0xC9, 0xCB, 0xC1, 0x95), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x35, 0xDC, 0x95, 0x16, 0xFE, 0x29, 0x70, 0x01), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x64, 0x33, 0xB1, 0xD6, 0x78, 0xB9, 0xE2, 0x36), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x34, 0xCE, 0x88, 0xC3, 0xFD, 0x7A, 0x6B, 0xB8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x40, 0x1E, 0x50, 0x1E, 0xAF, 0xB1, 0x25, 0x2D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC1, 0xE7, 0xD7, 0xD5, 0xBD, 0x7A, 0x12, 0xF9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x31, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_28_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x22, 0xAA, 0xA2, 0x80, 0x5D, 0x8F, 0xCD, 0xC8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x48, 0x39, 0x79, 0x64, 0xA1, 0x67, 0x3C, 0xB7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3D, 0xC7, 0x49, 0xFF, 0x7F, 0xAC, 0xAB, 0x55), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x81, 0x54, 0x3E, 0x83, 0xF0, 0x3D, 0xBC, 0xB5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x87, 0x92, 0x4A, 0x38, 0x42, 0x8A, 0xAB, 0xF6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE7, 0x0B, 0x4F, 0xEE, 0x9E, 0x92, 0xA5, 0xBE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBA, 0xDD, 0x19, 0x96, 0xF2, 0xF0, 0x6B, 0x2E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBE, 0xFC, 0xDD, 0xB2, 0x8A, 0xE5, 0x4C, 0x22), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD4, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_28_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB7, 0x06, 0x49, 0xAC, 0x99, 0x7E, 0xF8, 0x12), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x76, 0xC8, 0x01, 0x51, 0xEA, 0xF6, 0x52, 0xE7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x43, 0x89, 0x66, 0x2B, 0x1F, 0x9B, 0x2A, 0xA3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDF, 0x0F, 0x95, 0x07, 0x2B, 0x6C, 0x6E, 0x9E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x24, 0xC3, 0xB4, 0xBB, 0x91, 0x1F, 0xA3, 0x72), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5F, 0x6E, 0x54, 0x28, 0x7B, 0x9C, 0x79, 0x2E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x03, 0x45, 0xFF, 0xA6, 0xDA, 0xA2, 0x83, 0x71), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEB, 0xDE, 0x8F, 0x17, 0x37, 0x82, 0xCB, 0xE2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x30, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_29_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD8, 0x94, 0x3F, 0x26, 0xC9, 0x1D, 0xD9, 0xAE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x09, 0x97, 0x28, 0x20, 0xCD, 0xC1, 0xF3, 0x40), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x95, 0xC9, 0xB5, 0x60, 0x9B, 0x1E, 0xDC, 0x74), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5B, 0xB9, 0x5B, 0x7D, 0xA0, 0xB2, 0x8C, 0xF0), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x33, 0xD1, 0x42, 0xE6, 0x39, 0x33, 0x6D, 0xBB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5D, 0xC0, 0xFC, 0xD2, 0x14, 0x5D, 0x3E, 0x3C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x78, 0x4A, 0x3E, 0x40, 0x16, 0x93, 0x15, 0xCF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFA, 0x24, 0xC1, 0x27, 0x27, 0xE5, 0x4B, 0xD8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD4, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_29_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1D, 0x50, 0xD8, 0xBC, 0xC1, 0x46, 0x22, 0xBB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAD, 0x0E, 0x60, 0xA1, 0xB3, 0x50, 0xD4, 0x86), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x80, 0xB1, 0x26, 0xB6, 0x6D, 0x47, 0x5A, 0x6F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x45, 0xAC, 0x11, 0x35, 0x3E, 0xB9, 0xF4, 0x01), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x58, 0x97, 0xFA, 0xBB, 0x6B, 0x39, 0x13, 0xD8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x15, 0x7B, 0x34, 0x12, 0x75, 0x8E, 0x9B, 0xC6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2C, 0x9E, 0xCD, 0x29, 0xB6, 0xEF, 0x8D, 0x10), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x47, 0xAC, 0xE9, 0x25, 0x27, 0xBB, 0x78, 0x47), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2F, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_30_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x30, 0x7A, 0xA8, 0xD3, 0xE3, 0x66, 0xE5, 0x66), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2F, 0x4C, 0xC4, 0x2C, 0x76, 0x81, 0x50, 0x32), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEE, 0x71, 0x08, 0xB8, 0x52, 0x7C, 0xAF, 0xDC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x45, 0x59, 0x24, 0xDD, 0xFB, 0x2F, 0xD0, 0xDA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB7, 0xCD, 0x56, 0xE9, 0xAC, 0x91, 0xE6, 0xB9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE5, 0x64, 0x20, 0xC6, 0x9F, 0xE4, 0xEF, 0xDF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6D, 0x2C, 0x8F, 0x8C, 0x97, 0xF6, 0x22, 0xC3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAC, 0xF4, 0x88, 0xAA, 0xA8, 0xD7, 0xA5, 0x68), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDE, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_30_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x21, 0x6C, 0xAE, 0x83, 0xB1, 0x55, 0x55, 0xEE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB0, 0x67, 0x84, 0x47, 0x7C, 0x83, 0x5C, 0x89), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5B, 0x10, 0x4D, 0xDD, 0x30, 0x60, 0xB0, 0xE6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x59, 0xA7, 0x36, 0x76, 0x24, 0x32, 0x9F, 0x9D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDD, 0x42, 0x81, 0xFB, 0xA4, 0x2E, 0x13, 0x68), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x87, 0x94, 0x91, 0xFF, 0x99, 0xA0, 0x09, 0x61), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5D, 0x83, 0xA1, 0x76, 0xAF, 0x37, 0x5C, 0x77), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1E, 0xA8, 0x04, 0x86, 0xC4, 0xA9, 0x79, 0x42), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x93, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_31_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB6, 0x8C, 0xC2, 0x34, 0xFB, 0x83, 0x28, 0x27), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA4, 0x03, 0x7D, 0x5E, 0x9E, 0x0E, 0xB0, 0x22), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA2, 0x02, 0x46, 0x7F, 0xB9, 0xAC, 0xBB, 0x23), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x06, 0xED, 0x48, 0xC2, 0x96, 0x4D, 0x56, 0x27), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x44, 0xB5, 0xC5, 0xD1, 0xE6, 0x1C, 0x7E, 0x9B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x92, 0x2E, 0x18, 0x71, 0x2D, 0x7B, 0xD7, 0xB3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAB, 0x46, 0x9D, 0xDE, 0xAA, 0x78, 0x8E, 0xB1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4D, 0xD7, 0x69, 0x2E, 0xE1, 0xD9, 0x48, 0xDE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFB, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_31_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAF, 0xFF, 0x9E, 0x09, 0x22, 0x22, 0xE6, 0x8D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6C, 0x14, 0x28, 0x13, 0x1B, 0x62, 0x12, 0x22), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCC, 0x7F, 0x67, 0x03, 0xB0, 0xC0, 0xF3, 0x05), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC0, 0xC3, 0x0F, 0xFB, 0x25, 0x48, 0x3E, 0xF4), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0B, 0x6E, 0x53, 0x98, 0x36, 0xB3, 0xD3, 0x94), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEB, 0x81, 0x54, 0x22, 0xA4, 0xCC, 0xC1, 0x22), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF5, 0xBA, 0xFC, 0xA9, 0xDF, 0x68, 0x86, 0x2B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x71, 0x92, 0x0E, 0xC3, 0xF2, 0x58, 0xE8, 0x51), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE9, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_ecp_point secp521r1_T[32] = { + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z1(secp521r1_T_0_X, secp521r1_T_0_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_1_X, secp521r1_T_1_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_2_X, secp521r1_T_2_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_3_X, secp521r1_T_3_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_4_X, secp521r1_T_4_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_5_X, secp521r1_T_5_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_6_X, secp521r1_T_6_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_7_X, secp521r1_T_7_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_8_X, secp521r1_T_8_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_9_X, secp521r1_T_9_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_10_X, secp521r1_T_10_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_11_X, secp521r1_T_11_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_12_X, secp521r1_T_12_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_13_X, secp521r1_T_13_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_14_X, secp521r1_T_14_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_15_X, secp521r1_T_15_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_16_X, secp521r1_T_16_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_17_X, secp521r1_T_17_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_18_X, secp521r1_T_18_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_19_X, secp521r1_T_19_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_20_X, secp521r1_T_20_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_21_X, secp521r1_T_21_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_22_X, secp521r1_T_22_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_23_X, secp521r1_T_23_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_24_X, secp521r1_T_24_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_25_X, secp521r1_T_25_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_26_X, secp521r1_T_26_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_27_X, secp521r1_T_27_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_28_X, secp521r1_T_28_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_29_X, secp521r1_T_29_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_30_X, secp521r1_T_30_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_31_X, secp521r1_T_31_Y), +}; +#else +#define secp521r1_T NULL +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED) +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_p[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x37, 0xEE, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFE, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_a[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_2(0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_b[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_2(0x03, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_gx[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7D, 0x6C, 0xE0, 0xEA, 0xB1, 0xD1, 0xA5, 0x1D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x34, 0xF4, 0xB7, 0x80, 0x02, 0x7D, 0xB0, 0x26), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAE, 0xE9, 0x57, 0xC0, 0x0E, 0xF1, 0x4F, 0xDB), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_gy[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9D, 0x2F, 0x5E, 0xD9, 0x88, 0xAA, 0x82, 0x40), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x34, 0x86, 0xBE, 0x15, 0xD0, 0x63, 0x41, 0x84), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA7, 0x28, 0x56, 0x9C, 0x6D, 0x2F, 0x2F, 0x9B), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_n[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8D, 0xFD, 0xDE, 0x74, 0x6A, 0x46, 0x69, 0x0F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x17, 0xFC, 0xF2, 0x26, 0xFE, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF), +}; + +#if MBEDTLS_ECP_FIXED_POINT_OPTIM == 1 +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_0_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7D, 0x6C, 0xE0, 0xEA, 0xB1, 0xD1, 0xA5, 0x1D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x34, 0xF4, 0xB7, 0x80, 0x02, 0x7D, 0xB0, 0x26), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAE, 0xE9, 0x57, 0xC0, 0x0E, 0xF1, 0x4F, 0xDB), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_0_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9D, 0x2F, 0x5E, 0xD9, 0x88, 0xAA, 0x82, 0x40), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x34, 0x86, 0xBE, 0x15, 0xD0, 0x63, 0x41, 0x84), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA7, 0x28, 0x56, 0x9C, 0x6D, 0x2F, 0x2F, 0x9B), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_1_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6F, 0x77, 0x3D, 0x0D, 0x85, 0x48, 0xA8, 0xA9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x62, 0x07, 0xDF, 0x1D, 0xB3, 0xB3, 0x01, 0x54), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x05, 0x86, 0xF6, 0xAF, 0x19, 0x2A, 0x88, 0x2E), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_1_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x33, 0x90, 0xB6, 0x2F, 0x48, 0x36, 0x4C, 0x5B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDB, 0x11, 0x14, 0xA6, 0xCB, 0xBA, 0x15, 0xD9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7E, 0xB0, 0xF2, 0xD4, 0xC9, 0xDA, 0xBA, 0xD7), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_2_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE4, 0xC1, 0x9C, 0xE6, 0xBB, 0xFB, 0xCF, 0x23), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x93, 0x19, 0xAC, 0x5A, 0xC9, 0x8A, 0x1C, 0x75), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC1, 0xF6, 0x76, 0x86, 0x89, 0x27, 0x8D, 0x28), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_2_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4B, 0xE0, 0x6F, 0x34, 0xBA, 0x5E, 0xD3, 0x96), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6A, 0xDC, 0xA6, 0x87, 0xC9, 0x9D, 0xC0, 0x82), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x09, 0x11, 0x7E, 0xD6, 0xF7, 0x33, 0xFC, 0xE4), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_3_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC2, 0x37, 0x3E, 0xC0, 0x7F, 0x62, 0xE7, 0x54), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA5, 0x3B, 0x69, 0x9D, 0x44, 0xBC, 0x82, 0x99), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD4, 0x84, 0xB3, 0x5F, 0x2B, 0xA5, 0x9E, 0x2C), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_3_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1D, 0x95, 0xEB, 0x4C, 0x04, 0xB4, 0xF4, 0x75), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x55, 0xAD, 0x4B, 0xD5, 0x9A, 0xEB, 0xC4, 0x4E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC9, 0xB1, 0xC5, 0x59, 0xE3, 0xD5, 0x16, 0x2A), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_4_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x48, 0x2A, 0xCC, 0xAC, 0xD0, 0xEE, 0x50, 0xEC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x99, 0x83, 0xE0, 0x5B, 0x14, 0x44, 0x52, 0x20), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD6, 0x15, 0x2D, 0x78, 0xF6, 0x51, 0x32, 0xCF), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_4_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x86, 0x36, 0x9B, 0xDD, 0xF8, 0xDD, 0xEF, 0xB2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0B, 0xB1, 0x6A, 0x2B, 0xAF, 0xEB, 0x2B, 0xB1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC9, 0x87, 0x7A, 0x66, 0x5D, 0x5B, 0xDF, 0x8F), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_5_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x62, 0x45, 0xE5, 0x81, 0x9B, 0xEB, 0x37, 0x23), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB3, 0x29, 0xE2, 0x20, 0x64, 0x23, 0x6B, 0x6E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFE, 0x1D, 0x41, 0xE1, 0x9B, 0x61, 0x7B, 0xD9), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_5_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x75, 0x57, 0xA3, 0x0A, 0x13, 0xE4, 0x59, 0x15), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x79, 0x6E, 0x4A, 0x48, 0x84, 0x90, 0xAC, 0xC7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9C, 0xB8, 0xF5, 0xF3, 0xDE, 0xA0, 0xA1, 0x1D), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_6_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA3, 0x32, 0x81, 0xA9, 0x91, 0x5A, 0x4E, 0x33), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCB, 0xA8, 0x90, 0xBE, 0x0F, 0xEC, 0xC0, 0x85), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x80, 0x30, 0xD7, 0x08, 0xAE, 0xC4, 0x3A, 0xA5), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_6_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBC, 0x55, 0xE3, 0x76, 0xB3, 0x64, 0x74, 0x9F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3F, 0x75, 0xD4, 0xDB, 0x98, 0xD7, 0x39, 0xAE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD4, 0xEB, 0x8A, 0xAB, 0x16, 0xD9, 0xD4, 0x0B), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_7_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x41, 0xBE, 0xF9, 0xC7, 0xC7, 0xBA, 0xF3, 0xA1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC2, 0x85, 0x59, 0xF3, 0x60, 0x41, 0x02, 0xD2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x46, 0x1C, 0x4A, 0xA4, 0xC7, 0xED, 0x66, 0xBC), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_7_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC3, 0x9C, 0x2E, 0x46, 0x52, 0x18, 0x87, 0x14), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0x35, 0x5A, 0x75, 0xAC, 0x4D, 0x75, 0x91), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCE, 0x2F, 0xAC, 0xFC, 0xBC, 0xE6, 0x93, 0x5E), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_8_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x87, 0x4D, 0xC9, 0x18, 0xE9, 0x00, 0xEB, 0x33), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1A, 0x69, 0x72, 0x07, 0x5A, 0x59, 0xA8, 0x26), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB6, 0x65, 0x83, 0x20, 0x10, 0xF9, 0x69, 0x82), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_8_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8B, 0x56, 0x7F, 0x9F, 0xBF, 0x46, 0x0C, 0x7E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFC, 0xCF, 0xF0, 0xDC, 0xDF, 0x2D, 0xE6, 0xE5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x09, 0xF0, 0x72, 0x3A, 0x7A, 0x03, 0xE5, 0x22), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_9_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3E, 0xAA, 0x57, 0x13, 0x37, 0xA7, 0x2C, 0xD4), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA3, 0xAC, 0xA2, 0x23, 0xF9, 0x84, 0x60, 0xD3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x32, 0xEB, 0x51, 0x70, 0x64, 0x78, 0xCA, 0x05), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_9_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x91, 0xCC, 0x30, 0x62, 0x93, 0x46, 0x13, 0xE9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x21, 0x26, 0xCC, 0x6C, 0x3D, 0x5C, 0xDA, 0x2C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD5, 0xAA, 0xB8, 0x03, 0xA4, 0x1A, 0x00, 0x96), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_10_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF9, 0x9D, 0xE6, 0xCC, 0x4E, 0x2E, 0xC2, 0xD5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB4, 0xC3, 0x8A, 0xAE, 0x6F, 0x40, 0x05, 0xEB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9D, 0x8F, 0x4A, 0x4D, 0x35, 0xD3, 0x50, 0x9D), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_10_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1F, 0xFD, 0x98, 0xAB, 0xC7, 0x03, 0xB4, 0x55), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x40, 0x40, 0xD2, 0x9F, 0xCA, 0xD0, 0x53, 0x00), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1A, 0x84, 0x00, 0x6F, 0xC8, 0xAD, 0xED, 0x8D), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_11_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCE, 0xD3, 0x57, 0xD7, 0xC3, 0x07, 0xBD, 0xD7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x67, 0xBA, 0x47, 0x1D, 0x3D, 0xEF, 0x98, 0x6C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6D, 0xC0, 0x6C, 0x7F, 0x12, 0xEE, 0x9F, 0x67), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_11_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCA, 0x02, 0xDA, 0x79, 0xAA, 0xC9, 0x27, 0xC4), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x21, 0x79, 0xC7, 0x71, 0x84, 0xCB, 0xE5, 0x5A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x15, 0x37, 0x06, 0xBA, 0xB5, 0xD5, 0x18, 0x4C), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_12_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA1, 0x65, 0x72, 0x6C, 0xF2, 0x63, 0x27, 0x6A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x69, 0xBC, 0x71, 0xDF, 0x75, 0xF8, 0x98, 0x4D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x70, 0x70, 0x9B, 0xDC, 0xE7, 0x18, 0x71, 0xFF), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_12_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x15, 0x5B, 0x9F, 0x00, 0x5A, 0xB6, 0x80, 0x7A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB7, 0xE0, 0xBB, 0xFC, 0x5E, 0x78, 0x9C, 0x89), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x60, 0x03, 0x68, 0x83, 0x3D, 0x2E, 0x4C, 0xDD), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_13_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3B, 0x49, 0x23, 0xA8, 0xCB, 0x3B, 0x1A, 0xF6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8B, 0x3D, 0xA7, 0x46, 0xCF, 0x75, 0xB6, 0x2C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x92, 0xFD, 0x30, 0x01, 0xB6, 0xEF, 0xF9, 0xE8), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_13_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDC, 0xFA, 0xDA, 0xB8, 0x29, 0x42, 0xC9, 0xC7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x06, 0xD7, 0xA0, 0xE6, 0x6B, 0x86, 0x61, 0x39), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDB, 0xE9, 0xD3, 0x37, 0xD8, 0xE7, 0x35, 0xA9), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_14_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFD, 0xC8, 0x8E, 0xB1, 0xCB, 0xB1, 0xB5, 0x4D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x16, 0xD7, 0x46, 0x7D, 0xAF, 0xE2, 0xDC, 0xBB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD0, 0x46, 0xE7, 0xD8, 0x76, 0x31, 0x90, 0x76), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_14_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEB, 0xD3, 0xF4, 0x74, 0xE1, 0x67, 0xD8, 0x66), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE7, 0x70, 0x3C, 0xC8, 0xAF, 0x5F, 0xF4, 0x58), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x24, 0x4E, 0xED, 0x5C, 0x43, 0xB3, 0x16, 0x35), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_15_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x57, 0xAE, 0xD1, 0xDD, 0x31, 0x14, 0xD3, 0xF0), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE8, 0x14, 0x06, 0x13, 0x12, 0x1C, 0x81, 0xF5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA6, 0xF9, 0x0C, 0x91, 0xF7, 0x67, 0x59, 0x63), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_15_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAB, 0x91, 0xE2, 0xF4, 0x9D, 0xEB, 0x88, 0x87), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDB, 0x82, 0x30, 0x9C, 0xAE, 0x18, 0x4D, 0xB7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3C, 0x79, 0xCF, 0x17, 0xA5, 0x1E, 0xE8, 0xC8), +}; +static const mbedtls_ecp_point secp192k1_T[16] = { + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z1(secp192k1_T_0_X, secp192k1_T_0_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192k1_T_1_X, secp192k1_T_1_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192k1_T_2_X, secp192k1_T_2_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192k1_T_3_X, secp192k1_T_3_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192k1_T_4_X, secp192k1_T_4_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192k1_T_5_X, secp192k1_T_5_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192k1_T_6_X, secp192k1_T_6_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192k1_T_7_X, secp192k1_T_7_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192k1_T_8_X, secp192k1_T_8_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192k1_T_9_X, secp192k1_T_9_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192k1_T_10_X, secp192k1_T_10_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192k1_T_11_X, secp192k1_T_11_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192k1_T_12_X, secp192k1_T_12_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192k1_T_13_X, secp192k1_T_13_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192k1_T_14_X, secp192k1_T_14_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192k1_T_15_X, secp192k1_T_15_Y), +}; +#else +#define secp192k1_T NULL +#endif + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED) +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_p[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6D, 0xE5, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFE, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_4(0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_a[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_2(0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_b[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_2(0x05, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_gx[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5C, 0xA4, 0xB7, 0xB6, 0x0E, 0x65, 0x7E, 0x0F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA9, 0x75, 0x70, 0xE4, 0xE9, 0x67, 0xA4, 0x69), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA1, 0x28, 0xFC, 0x30, 0xDF, 0x99, 0xF0, 0x4D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_4(0x33, 0x5B, 0x45, 0xA1), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_gy[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA5, 0x61, 0x6D, 0x55, 0xDB, 0x4B, 0xCA, 0xE2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x59, 0xBD, 0xB0, 0xC0, 0xF7, 0x19, 0xE3, 0xF7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD6, 0xFB, 0xCA, 0x82, 0x42, 0x34, 0xBA, 0x7F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_4(0xED, 0x9F, 0x08, 0x7E), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_n[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF7, 0xB1, 0x9F, 0x76, 0x71, 0xA9, 0xF0, 0xCA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x84, 0x61, 0xEC, 0xD2, 0xE8, 0xDC, 0x01, 0x00), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; + +#if MBEDTLS_ECP_FIXED_POINT_OPTIM == 1 +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_0_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5C, 0xA4, 0xB7, 0xB6, 0x0E, 0x65, 0x7E, 0x0F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA9, 0x75, 0x70, 0xE4, 0xE9, 0x67, 0xA4, 0x69), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA1, 0x28, 0xFC, 0x30, 0xDF, 0x99, 0xF0, 0x4D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x33, 0x5B, 0x45, 0xA1, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_0_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA5, 0x61, 0x6D, 0x55, 0xDB, 0x4B, 0xCA, 0xE2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x59, 0xBD, 0xB0, 0xC0, 0xF7, 0x19, 0xE3, 0xF7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD6, 0xFB, 0xCA, 0x82, 0x42, 0x34, 0xBA, 0x7F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xED, 0x9F, 0x08, 0x7E, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_1_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x99, 0x6C, 0x22, 0x22, 0x40, 0x89, 0xAE, 0x7A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2F, 0x92, 0xE1, 0x87, 0x56, 0x35, 0xAF, 0x9B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x88, 0xAF, 0x08, 0x35, 0x27, 0xEA, 0x04, 0xED), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF0, 0x53, 0xFD, 0xCF, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_1_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC1, 0xD0, 0x9F, 0x8D, 0xF3, 0x63, 0x54, 0x30), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x39, 0xDB, 0x0F, 0x61, 0x54, 0x26, 0xD1, 0x98), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF5, 0x21, 0xF7, 0x1B, 0xB5, 0x1D, 0xF6, 0x7E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0x05, 0xDA, 0x8F, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_2_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x10, 0x26, 0x73, 0xBC, 0xE4, 0x29, 0x62, 0x56), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x37, 0x95, 0x17, 0x8B, 0xC3, 0x9B, 0xAC, 0xCC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB1, 0xDB, 0x77, 0xDF, 0xDD, 0x13, 0x04, 0x98), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x02, 0xFC, 0x22, 0x93, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_2_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAC, 0x65, 0xF1, 0x5A, 0x37, 0xEF, 0x79, 0xAD), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x99, 0x01, 0x37, 0xAC, 0x9A, 0x5B, 0x51, 0x65), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFA, 0x75, 0x13, 0xA9, 0x4A, 0xAD, 0xFE, 0x9B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x32, 0x82, 0x6F, 0x66, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_3_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4D, 0x5E, 0xF0, 0x40, 0xC3, 0xA6, 0xE2, 0x1E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x34, 0x9A, 0x6F, 0xCF, 0x11, 0x26, 0x66, 0x85), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x79, 0x73, 0xA8, 0xCF, 0x2B, 0x12, 0x36, 0x37), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB9, 0xB3, 0x0A, 0x58, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_3_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD3, 0x79, 0x00, 0x55, 0x04, 0x34, 0x90, 0x1A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0A, 0x54, 0x1C, 0xC2, 0x45, 0x0C, 0x1B, 0x23), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x86, 0x19, 0xAB, 0xA8, 0xFC, 0x73, 0xDC, 0xEE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x72, 0xFB, 0x93, 0xCE, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_4_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF8, 0x75, 0xD0, 0x66, 0x95, 0x86, 0xCA, 0x66), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x17, 0xEA, 0x29, 0x16, 0x6A, 0x38, 0xDF, 0x41), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD8, 0xA2, 0x36, 0x2F, 0xDC, 0xBB, 0x5E, 0xF7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD4, 0x89, 0x59, 0x49, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_4_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCA, 0xA3, 0x99, 0x9D, 0xB8, 0x77, 0x9D, 0x1D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0A, 0x93, 0x43, 0x47, 0xC6, 0x5C, 0xF9, 0xFD), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAA, 0x00, 0x79, 0x42, 0x64, 0xB8, 0x25, 0x3E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x29, 0x54, 0xB4, 0x33, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_5_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD9, 0x0C, 0x42, 0x90, 0x83, 0x0B, 0x31, 0x5F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x54, 0x2E, 0xAE, 0xC8, 0xC7, 0x5F, 0xD2, 0x70), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA9, 0xBC, 0xAD, 0x41, 0xE7, 0x32, 0x3A, 0x81), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8A, 0x97, 0x52, 0x83, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_5_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1A, 0x13, 0x7A, 0xBD, 0xAE, 0x94, 0x60, 0xFD), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x92, 0x9B, 0x95, 0xB4, 0x6E, 0x68, 0xB2, 0x1F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x15, 0x49, 0xBE, 0x51, 0xFE, 0x66, 0x15, 0x74), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE6, 0x37, 0xE4, 0xFE, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_6_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF6, 0x9B, 0xEE, 0x64, 0xC9, 0x1B, 0xBD, 0x77), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDA, 0x5F, 0x34, 0xA9, 0x0B, 0xB7, 0x25, 0x52), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x90, 0x13, 0xB1, 0x38, 0xFB, 0x9D, 0x78, 0xED), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x39, 0xE7, 0x1B, 0xFA, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_6_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFB, 0xB3, 0xB7, 0x44, 0x92, 0x6B, 0x00, 0x82), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x97, 0x82, 0x44, 0x3E, 0x18, 0x1A, 0x58, 0x6A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x15, 0xF8, 0xC0, 0xE4, 0xEE, 0xC1, 0xBF, 0x44), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7E, 0x32, 0x27, 0xB2, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_7_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF4, 0x9A, 0x42, 0x62, 0x8B, 0x26, 0x54, 0x21), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x24, 0x85, 0x74, 0xA0, 0x79, 0xA8, 0xEE, 0xBE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x80, 0x36, 0x60, 0xB3, 0x28, 0x4D, 0x55, 0xBE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x32, 0x27, 0x82, 0x29, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_7_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0D, 0xFC, 0x73, 0x77, 0xAF, 0x5C, 0xAC, 0x78), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCC, 0xED, 0xE5, 0xF6, 0x1D, 0xA8, 0x67, 0x43), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF8, 0xDE, 0x33, 0x1C, 0xF1, 0x80, 0x73, 0xF8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2A, 0xE2, 0xDE, 0x3C, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_8_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x57, 0x3E, 0x6B, 0xFE, 0xF0, 0x04, 0x28, 0x01), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBB, 0xB2, 0x14, 0x9D, 0x18, 0x11, 0x7D, 0x9D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x96, 0xC4, 0xD6, 0x2E, 0x6E, 0x57, 0x4D, 0xE1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEA, 0x55, 0x1B, 0xDE, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_8_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x07, 0xF7, 0x17, 0xBC, 0x45, 0xAB, 0x16, 0xAB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCD, 0xB0, 0xEF, 0x61, 0xE3, 0x20, 0x7C, 0xF8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6C, 0x85, 0x41, 0x4D, 0xF1, 0x7E, 0x4D, 0x41), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x99, 0xC2, 0x9B, 0x5E, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_9_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x70, 0x2E, 0x49, 0x3D, 0x3E, 0x4B, 0xD3, 0x32), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC8, 0x2B, 0x9D, 0xD5, 0x27, 0xFA, 0xCA, 0xE0), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB3, 0xB3, 0x6A, 0xE0, 0x79, 0x14, 0x28, 0x0F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6C, 0x1E, 0xDC, 0xF5, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_9_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCA, 0x44, 0x56, 0xCD, 0xFC, 0x9F, 0x09, 0xFF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5C, 0x8C, 0x59, 0xA4, 0x64, 0x2A, 0x3A, 0xED), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x40, 0xA0, 0xB5, 0x86, 0x4E, 0x69, 0xDA, 0x06), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x08, 0x8B, 0x11, 0x38, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_10_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA0, 0x17, 0x16, 0x12, 0x17, 0xDC, 0x00, 0x7E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE7, 0x76, 0x24, 0x6C, 0x97, 0x2C, 0xB5, 0xF9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x82, 0x71, 0xE3, 0xB0, 0xBB, 0x4E, 0x50, 0x52), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6E, 0x48, 0x26, 0xD5, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_10_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x06, 0x5F, 0x28, 0xF6, 0x01, 0x5A, 0x60, 0x41), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAE, 0x95, 0xFE, 0xD0, 0xAD, 0x15, 0xD4, 0xD9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAD, 0x5B, 0x7A, 0xFD, 0x80, 0xF7, 0x9F, 0x64), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x32, 0xBC, 0x1B, 0xDF, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_11_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBB, 0xE6, 0xDF, 0x14, 0x29, 0xF4, 0xD4, 0x14), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE5, 0x12, 0xDD, 0xEC, 0x5B, 0x8A, 0x59, 0xE5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x26, 0x92, 0x3E, 0x35, 0x08, 0xE9, 0xCF, 0x0E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE0, 0x35, 0x29, 0x97, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_11_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x11, 0xDB, 0xD6, 0x6A, 0xC5, 0x43, 0xA4, 0xA1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x61, 0x33, 0x50, 0x61, 0x70, 0xA1, 0xE9, 0xCE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x15, 0x15, 0x6E, 0x5F, 0x01, 0x0C, 0x8C, 0xFA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x85, 0xA1, 0x9A, 0x9D, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_12_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6E, 0xC6, 0xF7, 0xE2, 0x4A, 0xCD, 0x9B, 0x61), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x34, 0x4D, 0x5A, 0xB8, 0xE2, 0x6D, 0xA6, 0x50), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x32, 0x3F, 0xB6, 0x17, 0xE3, 0x2C, 0x6F, 0x65), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1E, 0xA4, 0x59, 0x51, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_12_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x77, 0x4F, 0x7C, 0x49, 0xCD, 0x6E, 0xEB, 0x3C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x05, 0xC9, 0x1F, 0xB7, 0x4D, 0x98, 0xC7, 0x67), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4C, 0xFD, 0x98, 0x20, 0x95, 0xBB, 0x20, 0x3A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE0, 0xF2, 0x73, 0x92, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_13_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE2, 0xEF, 0xFB, 0x30, 0xFA, 0x12, 0x1A, 0xB0), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7A, 0x4C, 0x24, 0xB4, 0x5B, 0xC9, 0x4C, 0x0F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7A, 0xDD, 0x5E, 0x84, 0x95, 0x4D, 0x26, 0xED), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE3, 0xFA, 0xF9, 0x3A, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_13_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6A, 0xA3, 0x2E, 0x7A, 0xDC, 0xA7, 0x53, 0xA9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7C, 0x9F, 0x81, 0x84, 0xB2, 0x0D, 0xFE, 0x31), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x61, 0x89, 0x1B, 0x77, 0x0C, 0x89, 0x71, 0xEC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFA, 0xFF, 0x7F, 0xB2, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_14_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x28, 0xE9, 0x2C, 0x79, 0xA6, 0x3C, 0xAD, 0x93), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD6, 0xE0, 0x23, 0x02, 0x86, 0x0F, 0x77, 0x2A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x13, 0x93, 0x6D, 0xE9, 0xF9, 0x3C, 0xBE, 0xB9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x04, 0xE7, 0x24, 0x92, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_14_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBB, 0x3C, 0x5B, 0x4B, 0x1B, 0x25, 0x37, 0xD6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC9, 0xE8, 0x38, 0x1B, 0xA1, 0x5A, 0x2E, 0x68), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x03, 0x19, 0xFD, 0xF4, 0x78, 0x01, 0x6B, 0x44), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0F, 0x69, 0x37, 0x4F, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_15_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1A, 0xE2, 0xBF, 0xD3, 0xEC, 0x95, 0x9C, 0x03), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC2, 0x7B, 0xFC, 0xD5, 0xD3, 0x25, 0x5E, 0x0F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x39, 0x55, 0x09, 0xA2, 0x58, 0x6A, 0xC9, 0xFF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x80, 0xCC, 0x3B, 0xD9, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_15_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8F, 0x08, 0x65, 0x5E, 0xCB, 0xAB, 0x48, 0xC8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEE, 0x79, 0x8B, 0xC0, 0x11, 0xC0, 0x69, 0x38), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE6, 0xE8, 0x8C, 0x4C, 0xC5, 0x28, 0xE4, 0xAE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA5, 0x1F, 0x34, 0x5C, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_ecp_point secp224k1_T[16] = { + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z1(secp224k1_T_0_X, secp224k1_T_0_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224k1_T_1_X, secp224k1_T_1_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224k1_T_2_X, secp224k1_T_2_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224k1_T_3_X, secp224k1_T_3_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224k1_T_4_X, secp224k1_T_4_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224k1_T_5_X, secp224k1_T_5_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224k1_T_6_X, secp224k1_T_6_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224k1_T_7_X, secp224k1_T_7_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224k1_T_8_X, secp224k1_T_8_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224k1_T_9_X, secp224k1_T_9_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224k1_T_10_X, secp224k1_T_10_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224k1_T_11_X, secp224k1_T_11_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224k1_T_12_X, secp224k1_T_12_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224k1_T_13_X, secp224k1_T_13_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224k1_T_14_X, secp224k1_T_14_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224k1_T_15_X, secp224k1_T_15_Y), +}; +#else +#define secp224k1_T NULL +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED) +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_p[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2F, 0xFC, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFE, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_a[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_2(0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_b[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_2(0x07, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_gx[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x98, 0x17, 0xF8, 0x16, 0x5B, 0x81, 0xF2, 0x59), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD9, 0x28, 0xCE, 0x2D, 0xDB, 0xFC, 0x9B, 0x02), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x07, 0x0B, 0x87, 0xCE, 0x95, 0x62, 0xA0, 0x55), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAC, 0xBB, 0xDC, 0xF9, 0x7E, 0x66, 0xBE, 0x79), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_gy[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB8, 0xD4, 0x10, 0xFB, 0x8F, 0xD0, 0x47, 0x9C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x19, 0x54, 0x85, 0xA6, 0x48, 0xB4, 0x17, 0xFD), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA8, 0x08, 0x11, 0x0E, 0xFC, 0xFB, 0xA4, 0x5D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x65, 0xC4, 0xA3, 0x26, 0x77, 0xDA, 0x3A, 0x48), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_n[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x41, 0x41, 0x36, 0xD0, 0x8C, 0x5E, 0xD2, 0xBF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3B, 0xA0, 0x48, 0xAF, 0xE6, 0xDC, 0xAE, 0xBA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFE, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF), +}; + +#if MBEDTLS_ECP_FIXED_POINT_OPTIM == 1 +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_0_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x98, 0x17, 0xF8, 0x16, 0x5B, 0x81, 0xF2, 0x59), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD9, 0x28, 0xCE, 0x2D, 0xDB, 0xFC, 0x9B, 0x02), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x07, 0x0B, 0x87, 0xCE, 0x95, 0x62, 0xA0, 0x55), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAC, 0xBB, 0xDC, 0xF9, 0x7E, 0x66, 0xBE, 0x79), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_0_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB8, 0xD4, 0x10, 0xFB, 0x8F, 0xD0, 0x47, 0x9C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x19, 0x54, 0x85, 0xA6, 0x48, 0xB4, 0x17, 0xFD), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA8, 0x08, 0x11, 0x0E, 0xFC, 0xFB, 0xA4, 0x5D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x65, 0xC4, 0xA3, 0x26, 0x77, 0xDA, 0x3A, 0x48), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_1_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE7, 0xEE, 0xD7, 0x1E, 0x67, 0x86, 0x32, 0x74), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x23, 0x73, 0xB1, 0xA9, 0xD5, 0xCC, 0x27, 0x78), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1F, 0x0E, 0x11, 0x01, 0x71, 0xFE, 0x92, 0x73), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC6, 0x28, 0x63, 0x6D, 0x72, 0x09, 0xA6, 0xC0), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_1_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCE, 0xE1, 0x69, 0xDC, 0x3E, 0x2C, 0x75, 0xC3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE5, 0xB7, 0x3F, 0x30, 0x26, 0x3C, 0xDF, 0x8E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3D, 0xBE, 0xB9, 0x5D, 0x0E, 0xE8, 0x5E, 0x14), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x01, 0xC3, 0x05, 0xD6, 0xB7, 0xD5, 0x24, 0xFC), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_2_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x13, 0xCF, 0x7B, 0xDC, 0xCD, 0xC3, 0x39, 0x9D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x42, 0xDA, 0xB9, 0xE5, 0x64, 0xA7, 0x47, 0x91), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x76, 0x46, 0xA8, 0x61, 0xF6, 0x23, 0xEB, 0x58), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5C, 0xC1, 0xFF, 0xE4, 0x55, 0xD5, 0xC2, 0xBF), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_2_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC9, 0xBE, 0xB9, 0x59, 0x24, 0x13, 0x4A, 0x2A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x64, 0x45, 0x12, 0xDE, 0xBA, 0x4F, 0xEF, 0x56), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBE, 0x08, 0xBF, 0xC1, 0x66, 0xAA, 0x0A, 0xBC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x36, 0xFE, 0x30, 0x55, 0x31, 0x86, 0xA7, 0xB4), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_3_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1D, 0xBF, 0x18, 0x81, 0x67, 0x27, 0x42, 0xBD), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x08, 0x05, 0x83, 0xA4, 0xDD, 0x57, 0xD3, 0x50), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x20, 0x63, 0xAB, 0xE4, 0x90, 0x70, 0xD0, 0x7C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x71, 0x5D, 0xFD, 0xA0, 0xEF, 0xCF, 0x1C, 0x54), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_3_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x13, 0x80, 0xE4, 0xF6, 0x09, 0xBC, 0x57, 0x90), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x21, 0x9F, 0x6E, 0x88, 0x54, 0x6E, 0x51, 0xF2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF5, 0x5F, 0x85, 0xFB, 0x84, 0x3E, 0x4A, 0xAA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA8, 0x19, 0xF5, 0x55, 0xC9, 0x07, 0xD8, 0xCE), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_4_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1A, 0xB4, 0xC3, 0xD9, 0x5C, 0xA0, 0xD4, 0x90), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0D, 0x30, 0xAF, 0x59, 0x9B, 0xF8, 0x04, 0x85), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4D, 0xA6, 0xFD, 0x66, 0x7B, 0xC3, 0x39, 0x85), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE0, 0xBF, 0xF0, 0xC2, 0xE9, 0x71, 0xA4, 0x9E), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_4_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x14, 0x2D, 0xB9, 0x88, 0x28, 0xF1, 0xBE, 0x78), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x14, 0xF3, 0x1A, 0x0E, 0xB9, 0x01, 0x66, 0x34), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x77, 0xA7, 0xA4, 0xF4, 0x05, 0xD0, 0xAA, 0x53), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x00, 0x39, 0x1E, 0x47, 0xE5, 0x68, 0xC8, 0xC0), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_5_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDD, 0xB9, 0xFC, 0xE0, 0x33, 0x8A, 0x7D, 0x96), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4F, 0x93, 0xA5, 0x53, 0x55, 0x16, 0xB4, 0x6E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE9, 0x5F, 0xEA, 0x9B, 0x29, 0x52, 0x71, 0xDA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB2, 0xF0, 0x24, 0xB8, 0x7D, 0xB7, 0xA0, 0x9B), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_5_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC2, 0x00, 0x27, 0xB2, 0xDF, 0x73, 0xA2, 0xE0), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1D, 0x2E, 0x4D, 0x7C, 0xDE, 0x7A, 0x23, 0x32), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAC, 0x65, 0x60, 0xC7, 0x97, 0x1E, 0xA4, 0x22), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCD, 0x13, 0x5B, 0x77, 0x59, 0xCB, 0x36, 0xE1), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_6_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x99, 0xBC, 0x9F, 0x9E, 0x2D, 0x53, 0x2A, 0xA8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x87, 0x5F, 0x64, 0x9F, 0x1A, 0x19, 0xE6, 0x77), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9E, 0x7B, 0x39, 0xD2, 0xDB, 0x85, 0x84, 0xD5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x83, 0xC7, 0x0D, 0x58, 0x6E, 0x3F, 0x52, 0x15), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_6_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x21, 0x68, 0x19, 0x0B, 0x68, 0xC9, 0x1E, 0xFB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD2, 0x4E, 0x21, 0x49, 0x3D, 0x55, 0xCC, 0x25), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF5, 0xF9, 0x25, 0x45, 0x54, 0x45, 0xB1, 0x0F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA9, 0xB3, 0xF7, 0xCD, 0x80, 0xA4, 0x04, 0x05), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_7_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD4, 0x1E, 0x88, 0xC4, 0xAA, 0x18, 0x7E, 0x45), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4B, 0xAC, 0xD9, 0xB2, 0xA1, 0xC0, 0x71, 0x5D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA9, 0xA2, 0xF1, 0x15, 0xA6, 0x5F, 0x6C, 0x86), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4F, 0x5B, 0x05, 0xBC, 0xB7, 0xC6, 0x4E, 0x72), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_7_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1D, 0x80, 0xF8, 0x5C, 0x20, 0x2A, 0xE1, 0xE2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7C, 0x48, 0x2E, 0x68, 0x82, 0x7F, 0xEB, 0x5F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA2, 0x3B, 0x25, 0xDB, 0x32, 0x4D, 0x88, 0x42), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEE, 0x6E, 0xA6, 0xB6, 0x6D, 0x62, 0x78, 0x22), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_8_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1F, 0x4D, 0x3E, 0x86, 0x58, 0xC3, 0xEB, 0xBA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1A, 0x89, 0x33, 0x18, 0x21, 0x1D, 0x9B, 0xE7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0B, 0x9D, 0xFF, 0xC3, 0x79, 0xC1, 0x88, 0xF8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x28, 0xD4, 0x48, 0x53, 0xE8, 0xAD, 0x21, 0x16), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_8_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF5, 0x7B, 0xDE, 0xCB, 0xD8, 0x39, 0x17, 0x7C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD3, 0xF3, 0x03, 0xF2, 0x5C, 0xBC, 0xC8, 0x8A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x27, 0xAE, 0x4C, 0xB0, 0x16, 0xA4, 0x93, 0x86), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x71, 0x8B, 0x6B, 0xDC, 0xD7, 0x9A, 0x3E, 0x7E), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_9_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD6, 0x2D, 0x7A, 0xD2, 0x59, 0x05, 0xA2, 0x82), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x57, 0x56, 0x09, 0x32, 0xF1, 0xE8, 0xE3, 0x72), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x03, 0xCA, 0xE5, 0x2E, 0xF0, 0xFB, 0x18, 0x19), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBA, 0x85, 0xA9, 0x23, 0x15, 0x31, 0x1F, 0x0E), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_9_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x76, 0xE5, 0xB1, 0x86, 0xB9, 0x6E, 0x8D, 0xD3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6C, 0x77, 0xFC, 0xC9, 0xA3, 0x3F, 0x89, 0xD2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDB, 0x6A, 0xDC, 0x25, 0xB0, 0xC7, 0x41, 0x54), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x02, 0x11, 0x6B, 0xA6, 0x11, 0x62, 0xD4, 0x2D), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_10_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x19, 0x7D, 0x34, 0xB3, 0x20, 0x7F, 0x37, 0xAA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBD, 0xD4, 0x45, 0xE8, 0xC2, 0xE9, 0xC5, 0xEA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5A, 0x32, 0x3B, 0x25, 0x7E, 0x79, 0xAF, 0xE7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3F, 0xE4, 0x54, 0x71, 0xBE, 0x35, 0x4E, 0xD0), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_10_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB0, 0x94, 0xDD, 0x8F, 0xB5, 0xC2, 0xDD, 0x75), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x07, 0x49, 0xE9, 0x1C, 0x2F, 0x08, 0x49, 0xC6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x77, 0xB6, 0x03, 0x88, 0x6F, 0xB8, 0x15, 0x67), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA4, 0xD3, 0x1C, 0xF3, 0xA5, 0xEB, 0x79, 0x01), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_11_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x25, 0xF9, 0x43, 0x88, 0x89, 0x0D, 0x06, 0xEA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x02, 0x2D, 0xF5, 0x98, 0x32, 0xF6, 0xB1, 0x05), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x23, 0x73, 0x8F, 0x2B, 0x50, 0x27, 0x0A, 0xE7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA7, 0xE3, 0xBD, 0x16, 0x05, 0xC8, 0x93, 0x12), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_11_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0A, 0x6A, 0xF7, 0xE3, 0x3D, 0xDE, 0x5F, 0x2F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x47, 0xA3, 0x9C, 0x22, 0x3C, 0x33, 0x36, 0x5D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x20, 0x24, 0x4C, 0x69, 0x45, 0x78, 0x14, 0xAE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x59, 0xF8, 0xD4, 0xBF, 0xB8, 0xC0, 0xA1, 0x25), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_12_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7E, 0x88, 0xE1, 0x91, 0x03, 0xEB, 0xB3, 0x2B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5C, 0x11, 0xA1, 0xEF, 0x14, 0x0D, 0xC4, 0x7D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFE, 0xD4, 0x0D, 0x1D, 0x96, 0x33, 0x5C, 0x19), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x70, 0x45, 0x2A, 0x1A, 0xE6, 0x57, 0x04, 0x9B), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_12_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x70, 0xB5, 0xA7, 0x80, 0xE9, 0x93, 0x97, 0x8D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5D, 0xB9, 0x7C, 0xA0, 0xC9, 0x57, 0x26, 0x43), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9E, 0xEF, 0x56, 0xDA, 0x66, 0xF6, 0x1B, 0x9A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1F, 0x89, 0x6B, 0x91, 0xE0, 0xA9, 0x65, 0x2B), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_13_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x91, 0x98, 0x96, 0x9B, 0x06, 0x7D, 0x5E, 0x5A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0A, 0xFA, 0xC1, 0x5F, 0x19, 0x37, 0x94, 0x9D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCF, 0xBE, 0x6B, 0x1A, 0x05, 0xE4, 0xBF, 0x9F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x84, 0xCD, 0x5D, 0x35, 0xB4, 0x51, 0xF7, 0x64), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_13_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6C, 0xEF, 0x96, 0xDB, 0xF2, 0x61, 0x63, 0x59), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCB, 0x04, 0x88, 0xC9, 0x9F, 0x1B, 0x94, 0xB9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDB, 0x30, 0x79, 0x7E, 0x24, 0xE7, 0x5F, 0xB8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3F, 0xB8, 0x90, 0xB7, 0x94, 0x25, 0xBB, 0x0F), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_14_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x62, 0x79, 0xEA, 0xAD, 0xC0, 0x6D, 0x18, 0x57), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE9, 0xA4, 0x58, 0x2A, 0x8D, 0x95, 0xB3, 0xE6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC8, 0xC4, 0xC2, 0x12, 0x0D, 0x79, 0xE2, 0x2B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x02, 0x6F, 0xBE, 0x97, 0x4D, 0xA4, 0x20, 0x07), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_14_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCA, 0x31, 0x71, 0xC6, 0xA6, 0x91, 0xEB, 0x1F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB4, 0x9B, 0xA8, 0x4A, 0xE7, 0x77, 0xE1, 0xAA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA9, 0x06, 0xD3, 0x3D, 0x94, 0x30, 0xEF, 0x8C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE7, 0xDF, 0xCA, 0xFA, 0xF5, 0x28, 0xF8, 0xC9), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_15_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCC, 0xE1, 0x32, 0xFD, 0x3E, 0x81, 0xF8, 0x11), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCD, 0xF2, 0x4B, 0x1D, 0x19, 0xC9, 0x0F, 0xCC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x59, 0xB1, 0x8A, 0x22, 0x8B, 0x05, 0x6B, 0x56), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x35, 0x21, 0xEF, 0x30, 0xEC, 0x09, 0x2A, 0x89), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_15_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x15, 0x84, 0x4A, 0x46, 0x07, 0x6C, 0x3C, 0x4C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDD, 0x18, 0x3A, 0xF4, 0xCC, 0xF5, 0xB2, 0xF2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4F, 0x8F, 0xCD, 0x0A, 0x9C, 0xF4, 0xBD, 0x95), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x37, 0x89, 0x7F, 0x8A, 0xB1, 0x52, 0x3A, 0xAB), +}; +static const mbedtls_ecp_point secp256k1_T[16] = { + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z1(secp256k1_T_0_X, secp256k1_T_0_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256k1_T_1_X, secp256k1_T_1_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256k1_T_2_X, secp256k1_T_2_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256k1_T_3_X, secp256k1_T_3_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256k1_T_4_X, secp256k1_T_4_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256k1_T_5_X, secp256k1_T_5_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256k1_T_6_X, secp256k1_T_6_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256k1_T_7_X, secp256k1_T_7_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256k1_T_8_X, secp256k1_T_8_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256k1_T_9_X, secp256k1_T_9_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256k1_T_10_X, secp256k1_T_10_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256k1_T_11_X, secp256k1_T_11_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256k1_T_12_X, secp256k1_T_12_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256k1_T_13_X, secp256k1_T_13_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256k1_T_14_X, secp256k1_T_14_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256k1_T_15_X, secp256k1_T_15_Y), +}; +#else +#define secp256k1_T NULL +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED */ + +/* + * Domain parameters for brainpoolP256r1 (RFC 5639 3.4) + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED) +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_p[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x77, 0x53, 0x6E, 0x1F, 0x1D, 0x48, 0x13, 0x20), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x28, 0x20, 0x26, 0xD5, 0x23, 0xF6, 0x3B, 0x6E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x72, 0x8D, 0x83, 0x9D, 0x90, 0x0A, 0x66, 0x3E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBC, 0xA9, 0xEE, 0xA1, 0xDB, 0x57, 0xFB, 0xA9), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_a[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD9, 0xB5, 0x30, 0xF3, 0x44, 0x4B, 0x4A, 0xE9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6C, 0x5C, 0xDC, 0x26, 0xC1, 0x55, 0x80, 0xFB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE7, 0xFF, 0x7A, 0x41, 0x30, 0x75, 0xF6, 0xEE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x57, 0x30, 0x2C, 0xFC, 0x75, 0x09, 0x5A, 0x7D), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_b[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB6, 0x07, 0x8C, 0xFF, 0x18, 0xDC, 0xCC, 0x6B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCE, 0xE1, 0xF7, 0x5C, 0x29, 0x16, 0x84, 0x95), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBF, 0x7C, 0xD7, 0xBB, 0xD9, 0xB5, 0x30, 0xF3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x44, 0x4B, 0x4A, 0xE9, 0x6C, 0x5C, 0xDC, 0x26), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_gx[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x62, 0x32, 0xCE, 0x9A, 0xBD, 0x53, 0x44, 0x3A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC2, 0x23, 0xBD, 0xE3, 0xE1, 0x27, 0xDE, 0xB9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAF, 0xB7, 0x81, 0xFC, 0x2F, 0x48, 0x4B, 0x2C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCB, 0x57, 0x7E, 0xCB, 0xB9, 0xAE, 0xD2, 0x8B), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_gy[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x97, 0x69, 0x04, 0x2F, 0xC7, 0x54, 0x1D, 0x5C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x54, 0x8E, 0xED, 0x2D, 0x13, 0x45, 0x77, 0xC2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC9, 0x1D, 0x61, 0x14, 0x1A, 0x46, 0xF8, 0x97), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFD, 0xC4, 0xDA, 0xC3, 0x35, 0xF8, 0x7E, 0x54), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_n[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA7, 0x56, 0x48, 0x97, 0x82, 0x0E, 0x1E, 0x90), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF7, 0xA6, 0x61, 0xB5, 0xA3, 0x7A, 0x39, 0x8C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x71, 0x8D, 0x83, 0x9D, 0x90, 0x0A, 0x66, 0x3E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBC, 0xA9, 0xEE, 0xA1, 0xDB, 0x57, 0xFB, 0xA9), +}; + +#if MBEDTLS_ECP_FIXED_POINT_OPTIM == 1 +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_0_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x62, 0x32, 0xCE, 0x9A, 0xBD, 0x53, 0x44, 0x3A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC2, 0x23, 0xBD, 0xE3, 0xE1, 0x27, 0xDE, 0xB9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAF, 0xB7, 0x81, 0xFC, 0x2F, 0x48, 0x4B, 0x2C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCB, 0x57, 0x7E, 0xCB, 0xB9, 0xAE, 0xD2, 0x8B), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_0_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x97, 0x69, 0x04, 0x2F, 0xC7, 0x54, 0x1D, 0x5C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x54, 0x8E, 0xED, 0x2D, 0x13, 0x45, 0x77, 0xC2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC9, 0x1D, 0x61, 0x14, 0x1A, 0x46, 0xF8, 0x97), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFD, 0xC4, 0xDA, 0xC3, 0x35, 0xF8, 0x7E, 0x54), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_1_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3C, 0xA2, 0xED, 0x52, 0xC9, 0x8C, 0xE3, 0xA5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x72, 0xC9, 0xC4, 0x87, 0x3F, 0x93, 0x7A, 0xD1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x96, 0x12, 0x53, 0x61, 0x3E, 0x76, 0x08, 0xCB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x09, 0x8C, 0x74, 0xF4, 0x08, 0xC3, 0x76, 0x80), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_1_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x05, 0xDD, 0x09, 0xA6, 0xED, 0xEE, 0xC4, 0x38), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x74, 0xD9, 0xBE, 0x4B, 0xA5, 0xB7, 0x2B, 0x6E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x42, 0x20, 0x12, 0xCA, 0x0A, 0x38, 0x24, 0xAB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x00, 0x72, 0x71, 0x90, 0x7A, 0x2E, 0xB7, 0x23), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_2_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2C, 0x66, 0xA1, 0x93, 0x10, 0x2A, 0x51, 0x17), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x88, 0x10, 0x11, 0x12, 0xBC, 0xB0, 0xB6, 0x93), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3C, 0x58, 0xD7, 0x0A, 0x84, 0x05, 0xA3, 0x9C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF7, 0x8E, 0x95, 0x61, 0xD3, 0x0B, 0xDF, 0x36), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_2_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF9, 0x92, 0x12, 0x0F, 0x5E, 0x87, 0x70, 0x1B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x38, 0xE9, 0x9B, 0xEB, 0x3A, 0xFB, 0xCF, 0xC4), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDC, 0x92, 0xB9, 0xF7, 0x45, 0xD3, 0x06, 0xB6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x82, 0x28, 0x65, 0xE1, 0xC5, 0x6C, 0x57, 0x18), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_3_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x28, 0x0E, 0x77, 0x01, 0x81, 0x9E, 0x38, 0x5C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x71, 0xF0, 0xD5, 0xA5, 0x91, 0x2B, 0xDF, 0xC0), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD8, 0xEE, 0xB6, 0x25, 0xD6, 0x98, 0xDE, 0x2D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7B, 0xA1, 0x55, 0x63, 0x39, 0xEB, 0xB5, 0x47), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_3_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB6, 0xD6, 0xB8, 0xE3, 0x13, 0xED, 0x7F, 0xA3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6C, 0xE8, 0xAE, 0x36, 0xB8, 0xCD, 0x19, 0x02), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF9, 0x82, 0x83, 0x7A, 0x7B, 0x46, 0x56, 0xE8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4E, 0x60, 0x46, 0x15, 0x5A, 0xAC, 0x99, 0x30), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_4_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBF, 0x61, 0x50, 0xC6, 0xFF, 0x10, 0x7D, 0x04), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x92, 0x51, 0xDF, 0xA9, 0x7D, 0x78, 0x26, 0x74), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x56, 0x15, 0x9A, 0xF7, 0x01, 0xC1, 0xBB, 0x40), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x26, 0x0F, 0xE6, 0x2A, 0xBD, 0x4A, 0x9E, 0x87), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_4_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x57, 0xF8, 0xD1, 0x77, 0xD2, 0x49, 0xB3, 0xDD), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x36, 0x86, 0xFB, 0x9E, 0x1F, 0x5A, 0x60, 0x47), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x98, 0xC4, 0x8D, 0xCD, 0x86, 0x61, 0x2F, 0xF9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x41, 0xF6, 0xB9, 0xAC, 0x37, 0x9D, 0xE9, 0x28), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_5_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFA, 0x77, 0xAA, 0x97, 0x9C, 0x0B, 0x04, 0x20), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x80, 0xA6, 0x60, 0x81, 0xCE, 0x25, 0x13, 0x3E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x24, 0x00, 0xF3, 0xBB, 0x82, 0x99, 0x95, 0xB7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x47, 0x5A, 0xCE, 0x90, 0x71, 0x38, 0x2F, 0x10), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_5_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA7, 0x1A, 0xC0, 0x84, 0x27, 0xD6, 0x9D, 0xB7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x34, 0x37, 0x52, 0x16, 0x13, 0x0E, 0xCE, 0x92), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1E, 0xBF, 0x5A, 0xDB, 0xDB, 0x6E, 0x1E, 0x69), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3E, 0xB7, 0x5E, 0xF9, 0x86, 0xDD, 0x8A, 0x5C), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_6_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3D, 0xAB, 0x5C, 0x8D, 0x1D, 0xF2, 0x2D, 0x1E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x65, 0xC5, 0xF8, 0xF7, 0x1D, 0x96, 0x0B, 0x4D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAC, 0x4C, 0xA7, 0x45, 0x20, 0x6A, 0x1E, 0x5B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x21, 0x5D, 0xEF, 0xDE, 0xEE, 0x39, 0x44, 0x19), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_6_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4B, 0x2F, 0x6D, 0x52, 0xC9, 0x58, 0x60, 0xE8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC3, 0xC9, 0x62, 0xCB, 0x38, 0x3C, 0x55, 0xCA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xA5, 0x09, 0x10, 0x88, 0xDB, 0xE3, 0xBD), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x52, 0xE0, 0x3C, 0xCE, 0x06, 0x0B, 0x4B, 0x5D), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_7_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB1, 0x1D, 0xB4, 0x10, 0x76, 0x8F, 0xBA, 0x09), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x57, 0x70, 0x5A, 0x07, 0xF5, 0x1A, 0x74, 0xC7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0B, 0xE9, 0x94, 0xA8, 0xC0, 0xD5, 0x4A, 0x4A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3E, 0x6D, 0xD4, 0xE8, 0x9B, 0xE9, 0x6D, 0x0E), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_7_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x65, 0x00, 0x32, 0x41, 0x57, 0x84, 0x89, 0x52), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEE, 0xC7, 0x14, 0xEC, 0xE9, 0x27, 0xFF, 0xF3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9A, 0x67, 0x9E, 0xFB, 0xB6, 0xB8, 0x96, 0xF3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE5, 0x4A, 0xE3, 0x97, 0x4B, 0x58, 0xDE, 0x30), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_8_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA6, 0x1E, 0x5C, 0xF5, 0x7F, 0xD5, 0xD4, 0xAA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5D, 0x08, 0x7A, 0xF1, 0xBD, 0x89, 0xC7, 0x1E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3A, 0xF9, 0x11, 0x1B, 0xF5, 0x3C, 0x6D, 0x8C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x19, 0x50, 0xE5, 0x69, 0x1D, 0x59, 0xFC, 0x0C), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_8_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF1, 0x2F, 0xF8, 0x3F, 0xEC, 0x55, 0x99, 0x57), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x41, 0xA7, 0x29, 0x90, 0x43, 0x81, 0x31, 0x4C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC3, 0x18, 0x44, 0x50, 0x5D, 0x76, 0xCB, 0xDD), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF0, 0xC5, 0x5B, 0x9A, 0x03, 0xE6, 0x17, 0x39), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_9_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x21, 0x89, 0xFC, 0x55, 0x94, 0x91, 0x6A, 0xA2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x74, 0x46, 0x35, 0xF2, 0x3A, 0x42, 0x08, 0x2F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD3, 0xD2, 0x76, 0x49, 0x42, 0x87, 0xD3, 0x7F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x90, 0xEA, 0xA0, 0x52, 0xF1, 0x6A, 0x30, 0x57), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_9_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x00, 0xB2, 0x57, 0xA3, 0x8A, 0x4D, 0x1B, 0x3C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFC, 0xA3, 0x99, 0x94, 0xB5, 0x3D, 0x64, 0x09), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x35, 0xC3, 0xD7, 0x53, 0xF6, 0x49, 0x1C, 0x60), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x27, 0x23, 0x41, 0x4D, 0xFB, 0x7A, 0x5C, 0x53), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_10_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCA, 0xB8, 0x15, 0x65, 0x5C, 0x85, 0x94, 0xD7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAC, 0x37, 0xC7, 0xF8, 0x7E, 0xAE, 0x6C, 0x10), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x53, 0xD8, 0x11, 0x54, 0x98, 0x44, 0xE3, 0xF1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE4, 0x4D, 0xA6, 0x4B, 0x28, 0xF2, 0x57, 0x9E), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_10_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF6, 0xD0, 0xEB, 0x1E, 0xAA, 0x30, 0xD3, 0x6A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x58, 0x9B, 0x4D, 0xA7, 0x73, 0x6E, 0xB6, 0x45), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5D, 0x47, 0xF6, 0xED, 0x37, 0xEF, 0x71, 0x4D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA8, 0xB5, 0x49, 0x61, 0x5E, 0x45, 0xF6, 0x4A), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_11_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEF, 0x0E, 0xB3, 0x84, 0x3A, 0x63, 0x72, 0x84), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6D, 0x53, 0x5C, 0xA7, 0xC6, 0x2E, 0xAB, 0x9E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEB, 0x0F, 0x8F, 0x87, 0x50, 0x28, 0xB4, 0xAE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5C, 0x98, 0x4A, 0x98, 0x31, 0x86, 0xCA, 0x51), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_11_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBE, 0xC9, 0xE2, 0xFD, 0x5D, 0x1F, 0xE8, 0xC2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD5, 0x90, 0x91, 0xC4, 0x84, 0xF0, 0xBA, 0xC5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6C, 0x5A, 0xB3, 0x4E, 0xFB, 0xE0, 0x57, 0xE8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6B, 0x0B, 0x90, 0xA6, 0xFD, 0x9D, 0x8E, 0x02), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_12_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF8, 0x41, 0x8F, 0x31, 0xFA, 0x5A, 0xF6, 0x33), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAC, 0xE9, 0xE3, 0xF6, 0xE0, 0x4A, 0xE7, 0xD2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x84, 0x4E, 0xCD, 0xA2, 0x22, 0x14, 0xD4, 0x12), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7C, 0xED, 0x21, 0xB7, 0x0F, 0x53, 0x10, 0x17), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_12_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x05, 0x06, 0x24, 0x2C, 0x4E, 0xD1, 0x1E, 0x9F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD7, 0x3F, 0xC1, 0x9F, 0xAB, 0xF0, 0x37, 0x95), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x03, 0x5E, 0x12, 0xCE, 0x83, 0x1B, 0x2A, 0x18), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x61, 0x65, 0xCF, 0xE8, 0x5C, 0xA5, 0xA2, 0x70), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_13_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB8, 0x86, 0x76, 0x3A, 0x94, 0xF6, 0x1D, 0xC1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1D, 0xDA, 0xC9, 0xA6, 0x29, 0x93, 0x15, 0x10), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6D, 0x61, 0x6A, 0x7D, 0xC7, 0xA9, 0xF3, 0x76), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4A, 0x03, 0x71, 0xA2, 0x15, 0xCE, 0x50, 0x72), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_13_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB6, 0xD0, 0xA8, 0x1E, 0x91, 0xC4, 0x4F, 0x24), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2D, 0x4B, 0x7E, 0xD7, 0x71, 0x58, 0x7E, 0x1E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x93, 0x45, 0xAF, 0x2A, 0x18, 0x93, 0x95, 0x3B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1B, 0x8F, 0xC7, 0xFA, 0x4C, 0x7A, 0x86, 0x54), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_14_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x97, 0xAF, 0x68, 0x3A, 0x23, 0xC1, 0x2E, 0xBF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x89, 0x50, 0x11, 0x67, 0x39, 0xB9, 0xAF, 0x48), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x19, 0x86, 0xAA, 0x1E, 0x88, 0x21, 0x29, 0x8B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCD, 0x28, 0xA4, 0x9D, 0x89, 0xA9, 0x9A, 0x10), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_14_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x91, 0xBA, 0x04, 0x67, 0xB7, 0x01, 0x40, 0x38), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x08, 0xE9, 0x09, 0xA3, 0xCA, 0xA6, 0x37, 0xF6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6C, 0x97, 0xA8, 0xB6, 0x3C, 0xEE, 0x90, 0x3D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDC, 0xED, 0xC4, 0xF7, 0xC3, 0x95, 0xEC, 0x85), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_15_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF5, 0x84, 0xBD, 0xEB, 0xD5, 0x64, 0xBB, 0x9D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDB, 0x9B, 0xE2, 0x28, 0x50, 0xC2, 0x72, 0x40), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x39, 0xF2, 0x74, 0xD1, 0x26, 0xBF, 0x32, 0x68), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x36, 0xCB, 0xAF, 0x72, 0xDB, 0x6D, 0x30, 0x98), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_15_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB3, 0x50, 0x85, 0xF4, 0x2B, 0x48, 0xC1, 0xAD), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC0, 0x28, 0xBB, 0x11, 0xBA, 0x5B, 0x22, 0x6C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAD, 0xA1, 0xE5, 0x5C, 0xC9, 0x1D, 0x44, 0x45), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD4, 0xE8, 0xE6, 0x6F, 0xBB, 0xC1, 0x81, 0x7F), +}; +static const mbedtls_ecp_point brainpoolP256r1_T[16] = { + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z1(brainpoolP256r1_T_0_X, brainpoolP256r1_T_0_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP256r1_T_1_X, brainpoolP256r1_T_1_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP256r1_T_2_X, brainpoolP256r1_T_2_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP256r1_T_3_X, brainpoolP256r1_T_3_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP256r1_T_4_X, brainpoolP256r1_T_4_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP256r1_T_5_X, brainpoolP256r1_T_5_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP256r1_T_6_X, brainpoolP256r1_T_6_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP256r1_T_7_X, brainpoolP256r1_T_7_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP256r1_T_8_X, brainpoolP256r1_T_8_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP256r1_T_9_X, brainpoolP256r1_T_9_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP256r1_T_10_X, brainpoolP256r1_T_10_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP256r1_T_11_X, brainpoolP256r1_T_11_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP256r1_T_12_X, brainpoolP256r1_T_12_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP256r1_T_13_X, brainpoolP256r1_T_13_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP256r1_T_14_X, brainpoolP256r1_T_14_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP256r1_T_15_X, brainpoolP256r1_T_15_Y), +}; +#else +#define brainpoolP256r1_T NULL +#endif + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED */ + +/* + * Domain parameters for brainpoolP384r1 (RFC 5639 3.6) + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLED) +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_p[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x53, 0xEC, 0x07, 0x31, 0x13, 0x00, 0x47, 0x87), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x71, 0x1A, 0x1D, 0x90, 0x29, 0xA7, 0xD3, 0xAC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x23, 0x11, 0xB7, 0x7F, 0x19, 0xDA, 0xB1, 0x12), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB4, 0x56, 0x54, 0xED, 0x09, 0x71, 0x2F, 0x15), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDF, 0x41, 0xE6, 0x50, 0x7E, 0x6F, 0x5D, 0x0F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x28, 0x6D, 0x38, 0xA3, 0x82, 0x1E, 0xB9, 0x8C), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_a[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x26, 0x28, 0xCE, 0x22, 0xDD, 0xC7, 0xA8, 0x04), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEB, 0xD4, 0x3A, 0x50, 0x4A, 0x81, 0xA5, 0x8A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0F, 0xF9, 0x91, 0xBA, 0xEF, 0x65, 0x91, 0x13), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x87, 0x27, 0xB2, 0x4F, 0x8E, 0xA2, 0xBE, 0xC2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA0, 0xAF, 0x05, 0xCE, 0x0A, 0x08, 0x72, 0x3C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0C, 0x15, 0x8C, 0x3D, 0xC6, 0x82, 0xC3, 0x7B), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_b[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x11, 0x4C, 0x50, 0xFA, 0x96, 0x86, 0xB7, 0x3A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x94, 0xC9, 0xDB, 0x95, 0x02, 0x39, 0xB4, 0x7C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD5, 0x62, 0xEB, 0x3E, 0xA5, 0x0E, 0x88, 0x2E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA6, 0xD2, 0xDC, 0x07, 0xE1, 0x7D, 0xB7, 0x2F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7C, 0x44, 0xF0, 0x16, 0x54, 0xB5, 0x39, 0x8B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x26, 0x28, 0xCE, 0x22, 0xDD, 0xC7, 0xA8, 0x04), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_gx[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1E, 0xAF, 0xD4, 0x47, 0xE2, 0xB2, 0x87, 0xEF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAA, 0x46, 0xD6, 0x36, 0x34, 0xE0, 0x26, 0xE8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE8, 0x10, 0xBD, 0x0C, 0xFE, 0xCA, 0x7F, 0xDB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE3, 0x4F, 0xF1, 0x7E, 0xE7, 0xA3, 0x47, 0x88), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6B, 0x3F, 0xC1, 0xB7, 0x81, 0x3A, 0xA6, 0xA2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0x45, 0xCF, 0x68, 0xF0, 0x64, 0x1C, 0x1D), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_gy[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x15, 0x53, 0x3C, 0x26, 0x41, 0x03, 0x82, 0x42), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x11, 0x81, 0x91, 0x77, 0x21, 0x46, 0x46, 0x0E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x28, 0x29, 0x91, 0xF9, 0x4F, 0x05, 0x9C, 0xE1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x64, 0x58, 0xEC, 0xFE, 0x29, 0x0B, 0xB7, 0x62), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x52, 0xD5, 0xCF, 0x95, 0x8E, 0xEB, 0xB1, 0x5C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA4, 0xC2, 0xF9, 0x20, 0x75, 0x1D, 0xBE, 0x8A), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_n[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x65, 0x65, 0x04, 0xE9, 0x02, 0x32, 0x88, 0x3B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x10, 0xC3, 0x7F, 0x6B, 0xAF, 0xB6, 0x3A, 0xCF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA7, 0x25, 0x04, 0xAC, 0x6C, 0x6E, 0x16, 0x1F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB3, 0x56, 0x54, 0xED, 0x09, 0x71, 0x2F, 0x15), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDF, 0x41, 0xE6, 0x50, 0x7E, 0x6F, 0x5D, 0x0F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x28, 0x6D, 0x38, 0xA3, 0x82, 0x1E, 0xB9, 0x8C), +}; + +#if MBEDTLS_ECP_FIXED_POINT_OPTIM == 1 +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_0_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1E, 0xAF, 0xD4, 0x47, 0xE2, 0xB2, 0x87, 0xEF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAA, 0x46, 0xD6, 0x36, 0x34, 0xE0, 0x26, 0xE8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE8, 0x10, 0xBD, 0x0C, 0xFE, 0xCA, 0x7F, 0xDB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE3, 0x4F, 0xF1, 0x7E, 0xE7, 0xA3, 0x47, 0x88), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6B, 0x3F, 0xC1, 0xB7, 0x81, 0x3A, 0xA6, 0xA2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0x45, 0xCF, 0x68, 0xF0, 0x64, 0x1C, 0x1D), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_0_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x15, 0x53, 0x3C, 0x26, 0x41, 0x03, 0x82, 0x42), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x11, 0x81, 0x91, 0x77, 0x21, 0x46, 0x46, 0x0E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x28, 0x29, 0x91, 0xF9, 0x4F, 0x05, 0x9C, 0xE1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x64, 0x58, 0xEC, 0xFE, 0x29, 0x0B, 0xB7, 0x62), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x52, 0xD5, 0xCF, 0x95, 0x8E, 0xEB, 0xB1, 0x5C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA4, 0xC2, 0xF9, 0x20, 0x75, 0x1D, 0xBE, 0x8A), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_1_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x93, 0xD8, 0x8A, 0x54, 0x41, 0xD6, 0x6B, 0x1D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE2, 0x3B, 0xF1, 0x22, 0xFD, 0x2D, 0x4B, 0x03), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x01, 0x55, 0xE3, 0x33, 0xF0, 0x73, 0x52, 0x5A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC1, 0x3F, 0x30, 0x26, 0xCA, 0x7F, 0x52, 0xA3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD3, 0x6E, 0x17, 0x9B, 0xD5, 0x2A, 0x4A, 0x31), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x86, 0xDA, 0x6B, 0xE5, 0x03, 0x07, 0x1D, 0x2E), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_1_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x51, 0x7A, 0xAF, 0x98, 0xE3, 0xA4, 0xF6, 0x19), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEC, 0x7D, 0xFE, 0x51, 0x40, 0x3B, 0x47, 0xD2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFC, 0x88, 0xEC, 0xC4, 0xE2, 0x8F, 0xCB, 0xA4), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x30, 0xE2, 0x88, 0x2D, 0x4E, 0x50, 0xEB, 0x9A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x13, 0x54, 0x94, 0x5E, 0xF4, 0x7F, 0x3A, 0x04), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCD, 0x07, 0x1C, 0xE1, 0xBD, 0x0F, 0xF8, 0x63), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_2_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x94, 0x92, 0x28, 0x2E, 0x32, 0x04, 0xB1, 0x4D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x25, 0x82, 0x44, 0x43, 0x76, 0x0D, 0x55, 0xBF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5B, 0xE3, 0xFF, 0x89, 0x46, 0xDE, 0x4E, 0xFE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5B, 0x22, 0xBB, 0x67, 0x1A, 0x81, 0xEE, 0x27), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC8, 0x54, 0xE2, 0x7A, 0xAE, 0xDA, 0x2C, 0xD0), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x74, 0x9A, 0x90, 0xAA, 0x6E, 0x8B, 0xCC, 0x5F), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_2_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x16, 0x40, 0xAC, 0xED, 0x7D, 0x37, 0x87, 0xAC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x98, 0xF8, 0xB1, 0x80, 0x4C, 0x8C, 0x04, 0x42), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC2, 0x98, 0x2C, 0xAD, 0x30, 0x69, 0x35, 0xC0), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x32, 0x2E, 0x00, 0x2F, 0x44, 0x8C, 0xF0, 0xC0), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x16, 0x58, 0x07, 0xD7, 0xCD, 0x60, 0xA1, 0x5B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAF, 0xFB, 0x7B, 0x03, 0x05, 0x5E, 0x79, 0x73), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_3_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC8, 0x17, 0xCE, 0x38, 0x4B, 0x5E, 0x5B, 0xC8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x60, 0x0E, 0x0A, 0x61, 0x9D, 0x7C, 0x62, 0x08), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x25, 0xF0, 0x98, 0x71, 0x7F, 0x17, 0x26, 0xD7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x83, 0xD3, 0xFA, 0x3C, 0xF0, 0x70, 0x07, 0x82), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x29, 0x47, 0x5C, 0x09, 0x43, 0xB7, 0x65, 0x15), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0E, 0xA9, 0xA7, 0x3E, 0xFA, 0xF3, 0xEC, 0x22), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_3_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDA, 0x78, 0x22, 0x2B, 0x58, 0x71, 0xFA, 0xAA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x00, 0x30, 0xCE, 0x6A, 0xB3, 0xB0, 0x4F, 0x83), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCF, 0x95, 0x20, 0xA9, 0x23, 0xC2, 0x65, 0xE7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x55, 0xCF, 0x03, 0x5B, 0x8A, 0x80, 0x44, 0xBB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5C, 0xF8, 0x91, 0xF7, 0xD5, 0xED, 0xEA, 0x81), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x40, 0x5B, 0x16, 0x10, 0x25, 0xAC, 0x2A, 0x17), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_4_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF2, 0xEC, 0xDC, 0xC4, 0x7B, 0x8C, 0x6B, 0xE9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2B, 0xBB, 0x1C, 0xD3, 0x5A, 0xEE, 0xD9, 0x97), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x64, 0x5D, 0x30, 0x5E, 0xF7, 0xB2, 0x41, 0x9D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xED, 0xCE, 0x0F, 0x1A, 0xC6, 0x41, 0x64, 0x62), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF2, 0x18, 0xE1, 0xE3, 0x82, 0x15, 0x66, 0x4B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9B, 0xE2, 0x24, 0x04, 0x72, 0x39, 0xA0, 0x7C), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_4_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2B, 0x51, 0xA2, 0x58, 0x88, 0x62, 0xE1, 0x02), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x58, 0xD2, 0x65, 0x14, 0xE9, 0x4C, 0x82, 0x30), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDC, 0xE1, 0xAC, 0x87, 0xAE, 0x31, 0x1A, 0x7A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x85, 0x4F, 0x96, 0x1E, 0x85, 0x7A, 0xC3, 0x2B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF0, 0x86, 0xBB, 0xF0, 0xC0, 0x9D, 0x08, 0x7B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBD, 0x53, 0x03, 0x09, 0x80, 0x91, 0xEF, 0x68), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_5_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2D, 0xD7, 0xAF, 0x6F, 0x69, 0x7B, 0x88, 0xA1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAF, 0x13, 0xE4, 0x30, 0xA2, 0x47, 0xB5, 0xC1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0F, 0xD2, 0xC0, 0xDD, 0x8A, 0x1C, 0x3C, 0xF2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF9, 0x8C, 0xB3, 0x4C, 0xBA, 0x8B, 0x6D, 0xCF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6B, 0xC7, 0xA1, 0xA8, 0x6E, 0x3C, 0x4F, 0xF1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x94, 0x4A, 0x97, 0xC8, 0x03, 0x6F, 0x01, 0x82), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_5_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x74, 0x18, 0x12, 0xA9, 0x39, 0xD5, 0x22, 0x26), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x47, 0xA7, 0xC0, 0xBD, 0x9D, 0x8D, 0x78, 0x38), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA9, 0xB3, 0xD0, 0x7F, 0xDF, 0xD0, 0x30, 0xDE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x37, 0x25, 0x73, 0x96, 0xEC, 0xA8, 0x1D, 0x7C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x91, 0xD1, 0x65, 0x66, 0xDC, 0xD9, 0xCF, 0xDF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x95, 0xED, 0x7B, 0x37, 0xAD, 0xE2, 0xBE, 0x2D), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_6_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x50, 0x79, 0x42, 0x6A, 0x07, 0x66, 0xB1, 0xBD), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x45, 0x53, 0x62, 0x65, 0x92, 0x09, 0x4C, 0xA1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x06, 0xAF, 0xC3, 0x03, 0xF6, 0xF4, 0x2D, 0x9B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE8, 0xCA, 0x41, 0xD9, 0xA2, 0x69, 0x9B, 0xC9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4B, 0xB2, 0xA6, 0x8D, 0xE1, 0xAA, 0x61, 0x76), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x11, 0xBA, 0x4D, 0x12, 0xB6, 0xBE, 0xF3, 0x7E), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_6_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCA, 0xD9, 0x92, 0x22, 0x07, 0xCE, 0xC9, 0x26), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x62, 0xA1, 0x7C, 0x91, 0xDB, 0x32, 0xF7, 0xE5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6D, 0x49, 0x4B, 0x6D, 0xFB, 0xD9, 0x70, 0x3B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1C, 0xFB, 0x4E, 0x4C, 0x5E, 0x66, 0x81, 0x1D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA5, 0xB3, 0xE1, 0x00, 0xB7, 0xD9, 0xCC, 0x58), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF3, 0x36, 0x8B, 0xC4, 0x39, 0x20, 0xFD, 0x30), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_7_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x94, 0x1F, 0x60, 0x03, 0xBB, 0xD7, 0x60, 0x57), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x72, 0x3C, 0x62, 0xDD, 0x71, 0x95, 0xE9, 0x61), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB0, 0x5B, 0x7A, 0x5F, 0x68, 0x81, 0xC5, 0x90), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1E, 0xAF, 0xB5, 0xB9, 0x98, 0x42, 0x28, 0xA5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0C, 0x29, 0x8E, 0x11, 0x49, 0xB4, 0xD7, 0x20), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9B, 0x3E, 0xD2, 0x30, 0xA1, 0xBA, 0xCA, 0x03), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_7_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x29, 0x37, 0x64, 0x44, 0x2F, 0x03, 0xE5, 0x41), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4A, 0x42, 0xBC, 0xFF, 0xA2, 0x1A, 0x5F, 0x06), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1D, 0x04, 0xAB, 0x04, 0xE0, 0x24, 0xAD, 0x2A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3D, 0x45, 0x17, 0x67, 0x1F, 0x3E, 0x53, 0xF8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xED, 0x0F, 0xB3, 0x1B, 0x57, 0x54, 0xC2, 0x03), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x59, 0xD3, 0xF8, 0xC4, 0x1B, 0x9B, 0xFA, 0x30), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_8_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x37, 0x90, 0xFD, 0xFB, 0xCA, 0x49, 0x38, 0x4E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC3, 0xCF, 0xC6, 0xDD, 0xF0, 0xFF, 0x8C, 0x11), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD7, 0x69, 0x9D, 0xBD, 0x5F, 0x33, 0xE9, 0xB4), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x47, 0x19, 0x82, 0x3D, 0xAC, 0x1C, 0x40, 0x23), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x40, 0xC7, 0x02, 0x46, 0x14, 0x77, 0x00, 0xBE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC9, 0x05, 0xF2, 0x77, 0x3A, 0x66, 0x5C, 0x39), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_8_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1E, 0xE6, 0x17, 0xDE, 0xB2, 0xA1, 0xE5, 0xB8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC7, 0x71, 0xEC, 0x9D, 0xD8, 0xF5, 0xD4, 0x66), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAA, 0xC6, 0x42, 0x5E, 0xE7, 0x18, 0xBA, 0xD0), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC5, 0x21, 0x68, 0x5A, 0x26, 0xFB, 0xD7, 0x17), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x26, 0x00, 0x5C, 0xBA, 0x8A, 0x34, 0xEC, 0x75), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC3, 0x9C, 0x3C, 0xAF, 0x53, 0xE8, 0x65, 0x35), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_9_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBE, 0xEF, 0x28, 0xDC, 0x67, 0x05, 0xC8, 0xDF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0B, 0x78, 0xC3, 0x85, 0x49, 0xA0, 0xBC, 0x0F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x10, 0x3E, 0x2D, 0xA0, 0xCF, 0xD4, 0x7A, 0xF5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x36, 0x93, 0xFE, 0x60, 0xB3, 0x6E, 0x99, 0xE2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x62, 0xAD, 0x04, 0xE7, 0x49, 0xAF, 0x5E, 0xE3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x54, 0x7A, 0xED, 0xA6, 0x9E, 0x18, 0x09, 0x31), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_9_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE8, 0x05, 0x94, 0x44, 0xDC, 0xB8, 0x85, 0x94), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x14, 0xB7, 0x37, 0xC2, 0x50, 0x75, 0x15, 0xDA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD6, 0xC6, 0x0F, 0xB2, 0xA9, 0x91, 0x3E, 0xE8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB9, 0x81, 0xAD, 0x25, 0xA1, 0x26, 0x73, 0x15), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFD, 0xF1, 0xD1, 0x61, 0x7C, 0x76, 0x8F, 0x13), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x06, 0xDB, 0x4A, 0xFF, 0x14, 0xA7, 0x48, 0x0B), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_10_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2A, 0x73, 0xC6, 0xC2, 0xCC, 0xF1, 0x57, 0x04), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB6, 0xED, 0x73, 0x27, 0x70, 0x82, 0xB6, 0x5E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0B, 0xBA, 0xAC, 0x3A, 0xCF, 0xF4, 0xEA, 0xA6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x99, 0xD6, 0xB1, 0x8F, 0x0E, 0x08, 0x2C, 0x5E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x17, 0xE3, 0x8F, 0x2F, 0x0E, 0xA1, 0xF3, 0x07), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1A, 0xF5, 0x7C, 0x9B, 0x29, 0x0A, 0xF6, 0x28), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_10_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBD, 0xEE, 0x17, 0x47, 0x34, 0x15, 0xA3, 0xAF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFB, 0xBE, 0x88, 0x48, 0xE7, 0xA2, 0xBB, 0xDE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC5, 0xAD, 0xDC, 0x65, 0x61, 0x37, 0x0F, 0xC1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFA, 0x67, 0xAD, 0xA2, 0x3A, 0x1C, 0x91, 0x78), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x55, 0x07, 0x0C, 0x3A, 0x41, 0x6E, 0x13, 0x28), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x73, 0xBD, 0x7E, 0xED, 0xAA, 0x14, 0xDD, 0x61), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_11_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC3, 0xDC, 0x20, 0x01, 0x72, 0x11, 0x48, 0x55), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1E, 0xC4, 0x7B, 0xF8, 0x62, 0x3D, 0xF0, 0x9F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE8, 0xC2, 0x3D, 0x2E, 0x52, 0xA3, 0x4A, 0x89), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCE, 0xE2, 0x53, 0x46, 0x5E, 0x21, 0xF8, 0xCE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC2, 0xC7, 0x8F, 0xA9, 0x26, 0x42, 0x32, 0x3A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFB, 0xA6, 0xA0, 0x8D, 0x4B, 0x9A, 0x19, 0x03), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_11_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEA, 0xAB, 0x6D, 0x1E, 0xFB, 0xEE, 0x60, 0x0C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB6, 0x56, 0x3C, 0xC5, 0x5D, 0x10, 0x79, 0x1C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x25, 0xBC, 0x41, 0x9F, 0x71, 0xEF, 0x02, 0xF9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA2, 0x36, 0xC4, 0xD0, 0x88, 0x9B, 0x32, 0xFC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9C, 0xD4, 0x5D, 0x17, 0x39, 0xE6, 0x22, 0x2C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7B, 0x26, 0x01, 0xCE, 0xBE, 0x4A, 0x9C, 0x27), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_12_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEF, 0x6D, 0x11, 0xCA, 0x6C, 0x5A, 0x93, 0x0C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEB, 0x96, 0x26, 0xAF, 0x2F, 0xE4, 0x30, 0x98), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x35, 0xC1, 0x4C, 0xC6, 0x30, 0x1F, 0x5C, 0x04), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x59, 0xB3, 0xE8, 0xFC, 0x35, 0xEB, 0x63, 0x6C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9C, 0x1D, 0xCA, 0xFC, 0x50, 0x36, 0x4B, 0x96), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE4, 0x0E, 0x23, 0x5B, 0xAF, 0xEB, 0x2D, 0x31), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_12_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC6, 0x88, 0xB6, 0xD7, 0x74, 0x4A, 0x23, 0xB6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEF, 0x66, 0xE2, 0xBB, 0x29, 0xA6, 0x4F, 0x55), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE9, 0x6F, 0x7E, 0x68, 0x6E, 0xA0, 0x14, 0x94), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3B, 0x73, 0xD4, 0xE8, 0xAB, 0x5B, 0xF6, 0x0D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x46, 0xE0, 0x3C, 0x24, 0x00, 0x95, 0xE9, 0xAD), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x37, 0x0D, 0x4F, 0x81, 0xD0, 0xF2, 0x3F, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_13_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x99, 0x1D, 0xCD, 0x78, 0x39, 0xC4, 0x6B, 0xD9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x81, 0x45, 0xC7, 0xB8, 0x2F, 0xAA, 0x5D, 0xE3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x33, 0x8C, 0x6E, 0xA3, 0x24, 0xB2, 0xDB, 0x4B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x69, 0x2D, 0xD9, 0xF1, 0xC7, 0x9B, 0x8A, 0xAF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x67, 0xE1, 0x2C, 0xB9, 0x40, 0x37, 0x91, 0x75), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x81, 0x2C, 0xB5, 0x23, 0x03, 0x2B, 0xAF, 0x2F), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_13_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2F, 0x9D, 0x5A, 0x20, 0x10, 0xA9, 0x84, 0xDA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x61, 0x30, 0x89, 0x20, 0x13, 0xE9, 0xB2, 0xCA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB6, 0x6E, 0x52, 0xEB, 0x03, 0x18, 0x1F, 0xA6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6C, 0x9E, 0x1C, 0x35, 0x87, 0x92, 0x69, 0xC7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA1, 0xC9, 0x88, 0xAF, 0xC6, 0x6C, 0x83, 0x72), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCB, 0xD5, 0x7A, 0x54, 0x34, 0x99, 0xB6, 0x6F), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_14_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDF, 0xAD, 0x45, 0x9B, 0x4B, 0x41, 0x4D, 0x50), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1B, 0x5D, 0xAB, 0x7F, 0x35, 0x34, 0xE9, 0x29), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x73, 0xBE, 0x78, 0x34, 0x44, 0xF3, 0x4A, 0x87), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFB, 0xDE, 0xE3, 0xC4, 0xEE, 0x0B, 0xF9, 0xEB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5E, 0x86, 0x16, 0x48, 0x32, 0xB8, 0x74, 0x41), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF2, 0xEE, 0x7C, 0xBA, 0xBD, 0x81, 0xE3, 0x55), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_14_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF8, 0x6A, 0xFA, 0x84, 0xDA, 0xB8, 0xD5, 0x14), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB2, 0x9F, 0x8A, 0xD5, 0x1B, 0x2E, 0x1A, 0x0B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5F, 0x0C, 0x61, 0xE2, 0xFF, 0x5B, 0xE6, 0xD5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0E, 0x62, 0xC1, 0x87, 0x53, 0x1B, 0x92, 0xA3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x54, 0x90, 0x00, 0xD1, 0x6A, 0x0C, 0x0E, 0x28), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8B, 0x2E, 0xB5, 0x3B, 0x44, 0xB5, 0xA0, 0x78), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_15_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB8, 0x5D, 0x02, 0x58, 0xB5, 0xBE, 0x45, 0x14), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAD, 0xEF, 0x8E, 0x90, 0x4D, 0x2A, 0x32, 0xAC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x48, 0x99, 0x75, 0x5C, 0x0A, 0x33, 0x8F, 0x36), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC8, 0x6C, 0x95, 0xD4, 0x1F, 0xF3, 0xEB, 0xDA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC2, 0xE4, 0x4C, 0x91, 0x20, 0xF3, 0x25, 0xEB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF1, 0x95, 0xEB, 0x29, 0x6F, 0x20, 0x34, 0x81), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_15_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2D, 0x15, 0xE5, 0x13, 0x7E, 0x64, 0x8B, 0xAD), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA7, 0xBC, 0x0D, 0x18, 0x7E, 0x37, 0x9E, 0xFA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE8, 0x82, 0x20, 0xF7, 0x2D, 0x7A, 0x77, 0x52), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCB, 0x29, 0xA2, 0xDB, 0x7A, 0xE6, 0x6F, 0xA5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA0, 0xC6, 0x50, 0x5C, 0xBC, 0xE6, 0x4F, 0xBD), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1E, 0x9F, 0xD5, 0xE8, 0xC5, 0x3D, 0xB7, 0x30), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_16_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x45, 0x03, 0x55, 0x10, 0xDB, 0xA6, 0x8B, 0x22), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4E, 0x17, 0xAE, 0x78, 0xC9, 0x1D, 0x43, 0xCA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4E, 0x35, 0x49, 0xD4, 0x47, 0x84, 0x8D, 0x20), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF3, 0x95, 0x2F, 0xEA, 0xBC, 0xB4, 0x18, 0xB3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD4, 0x48, 0xAE, 0x89, 0xF5, 0x65, 0x3D, 0x89), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x86, 0xF2, 0x2B, 0x20, 0xD1, 0x75, 0x50, 0x63), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_16_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAD, 0xE6, 0x5C, 0x2C, 0xE0, 0x7D, 0xDF, 0x2D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3E, 0x07, 0x3E, 0xCE, 0x9F, 0x18, 0xB6, 0x05), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9A, 0xF8, 0xF0, 0xD5, 0xFA, 0x42, 0x1D, 0x6D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x41, 0x6C, 0x1D, 0x03, 0xC9, 0x0E, 0x2B, 0x2F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x43, 0x18, 0x52, 0xA5, 0xB4, 0x63, 0xE1, 0x06), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB7, 0x0A, 0xD9, 0xC4, 0xFD, 0x16, 0x60, 0x54), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_17_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x43, 0x7D, 0xDE, 0xDF, 0x4B, 0x4A, 0xB0, 0xCB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB0, 0x4E, 0x8C, 0x94, 0xC1, 0xE2, 0x85, 0xDF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4F, 0xF0, 0xEA, 0xB5, 0x9B, 0x70, 0xEF, 0x10), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x56, 0xC2, 0x39, 0x5D, 0xF3, 0x2C, 0xD9, 0x2C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0D, 0x1C, 0x2E, 0xCC, 0x2F, 0x54, 0x87, 0x80), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB0, 0x72, 0xC7, 0xB5, 0x50, 0xA3, 0x84, 0x77), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_17_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB7, 0xD1, 0xAF, 0xA9, 0xB4, 0x8B, 0x5D, 0xFA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC8, 0xF6, 0x52, 0x8A, 0xC3, 0x56, 0xA5, 0x5E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3B, 0x52, 0xFF, 0xEA, 0x05, 0x42, 0x77, 0x83), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x29, 0x08, 0x90, 0x72, 0x86, 0xC4, 0xC3, 0xB8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4D, 0x15, 0xF8, 0xF1, 0x16, 0x67, 0xC6, 0xD5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x75, 0x87, 0xAC, 0x8F, 0x71, 0xEC, 0x83, 0x81), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_18_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x91, 0xE1, 0xE6, 0x2D, 0x0E, 0x11, 0xA1, 0x62), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x74, 0xE2, 0xA8, 0x32, 0xE6, 0xE3, 0x83, 0xD1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x50, 0x56, 0xE5, 0xCD, 0xB7, 0x2B, 0x67, 0x6F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE5, 0xED, 0xC9, 0x65, 0x6D, 0x87, 0xE1, 0x8E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x50, 0x8E, 0xFD, 0x9A, 0x53, 0x0E, 0xFA, 0xA3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x49, 0x4C, 0x4A, 0xE2, 0x23, 0x84, 0xFA, 0x01), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_18_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB4, 0xFE, 0x49, 0x81, 0xD1, 0x3E, 0xF4, 0x7C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x45, 0x72, 0xE0, 0xEF, 0x0D, 0xB8, 0x3E, 0x6F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3C, 0x00, 0x0F, 0x5F, 0xCE, 0x60, 0x72, 0x2C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB7, 0xCC, 0xD8, 0x03, 0x07, 0x6E, 0x5A, 0xCD), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x27, 0x3A, 0x35, 0x50, 0x4E, 0x1F, 0xCA, 0x5F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x58, 0xEA, 0x88, 0x55, 0xBD, 0x6E, 0x05, 0x7F), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_19_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB1, 0x6D, 0xF1, 0x97, 0xA6, 0x69, 0x39, 0x24), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0B, 0x41, 0x99, 0xFF, 0x3B, 0xA1, 0x26, 0xEC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x95, 0x2F, 0x95, 0x80, 0x12, 0x4A, 0x1B, 0xCB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEA, 0xBF, 0x51, 0xAA, 0xAE, 0x2D, 0xDA, 0xCF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0C, 0x1C, 0xB3, 0x52, 0x36, 0x49, 0xD4, 0x86), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x99, 0xC1, 0x1F, 0x3A, 0xD3, 0x3E, 0x5C, 0x1A), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_19_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x73, 0x51, 0xF7, 0x2B, 0xC8, 0xA9, 0xA7, 0x15), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x12, 0x4E, 0x7F, 0x98, 0x41, 0x66, 0xB0, 0x03), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x91, 0x1D, 0xC0, 0x42, 0xCD, 0xF8, 0xC3, 0x2B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCC, 0x41, 0x91, 0x7D, 0xCC, 0x8B, 0xCC, 0x41), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2A, 0xAE, 0x76, 0xED, 0x56, 0x18, 0xC5, 0xAB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAB, 0x6A, 0x06, 0xA3, 0x7F, 0x65, 0x10, 0x1F), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_20_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0C, 0xEC, 0x3C, 0x05, 0x05, 0xCA, 0xF6, 0xED), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x48, 0xCD, 0x02, 0x51, 0x12, 0x16, 0x3C, 0x63), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA8, 0xEB, 0xB3, 0x43, 0x7B, 0xDD, 0xB2, 0x7C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x00, 0x59, 0x90, 0x41, 0xDB, 0xE4, 0xF5, 0x91), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD0, 0x0E, 0x18, 0x2A, 0x5A, 0x83, 0x7C, 0x2F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE1, 0x37, 0xA1, 0x0D, 0xF1, 0x2F, 0x63, 0x79), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_20_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x21, 0xC0, 0xFA, 0x6F, 0x1F, 0x67, 0xCF, 0xEC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x98, 0x34, 0x45, 0xBB, 0xF4, 0xF9, 0x9B, 0x89), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF5, 0x69, 0xFE, 0x67, 0x1D, 0x64, 0x8F, 0xB9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDB, 0x39, 0xBF, 0xD8, 0xB3, 0xC7, 0xAD, 0x8A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8C, 0x93, 0xFF, 0xF3, 0x28, 0xFA, 0x39, 0xF6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFA, 0xF9, 0xC3, 0x85, 0x26, 0x7A, 0x88, 0x89), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_21_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4D, 0xD5, 0x79, 0xD8, 0x11, 0xDE, 0xEB, 0x4E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1C, 0x46, 0xA4, 0x6A, 0xDA, 0x74, 0x34, 0xA8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1E, 0xBD, 0xD3, 0xF5, 0x14, 0xEE, 0xFE, 0xAE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x19, 0x4C, 0xA3, 0x71, 0x43, 0x65, 0xF8, 0x94), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x72, 0x6C, 0x35, 0xFA, 0x90, 0x25, 0xD8, 0xE2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBB, 0x34, 0x84, 0x96, 0xA1, 0x43, 0x03, 0x4D), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_21_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF1, 0x3B, 0x3B, 0x2F, 0xCA, 0x59, 0xF2, 0x42), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCD, 0x48, 0x24, 0x74, 0xD8, 0x72, 0x90, 0xA3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x83, 0x42, 0x74, 0x8C, 0x6F, 0x52, 0x19, 0x3D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x40, 0x9E, 0x41, 0x63, 0x68, 0x78, 0x4C, 0x2F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x53, 0x94, 0xB6, 0x6B, 0x38, 0x52, 0xA8, 0x9F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x81, 0x30, 0x25, 0x93, 0xA1, 0x6F, 0x6E, 0x68), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_22_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFC, 0x2F, 0x4B, 0x64, 0x79, 0x50, 0xFF, 0x01), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD4, 0x36, 0xED, 0x57, 0x39, 0x3B, 0xE7, 0xF3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF1, 0x85, 0xEA, 0x35, 0xD6, 0xC0, 0xA0, 0x52), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBA, 0x89, 0x3A, 0xCC, 0x22, 0x1C, 0x46, 0x02), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6C, 0x7A, 0xB0, 0xA1, 0x1B, 0x69, 0x62, 0x55), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x57, 0xB8, 0x8A, 0x6C, 0x18, 0x85, 0x0D, 0x88), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_22_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFD, 0xB6, 0x50, 0xE9, 0x4E, 0x7F, 0xE8, 0x07), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x92, 0x5B, 0x5C, 0xD1, 0x4B, 0x11, 0x9A, 0xD8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x96, 0x25, 0x56, 0x74, 0x51, 0x9C, 0xEC, 0x9C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x55, 0x7F, 0xB6, 0x8A, 0xCB, 0x3A, 0x10, 0x6A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x60, 0x33, 0x07, 0x01, 0xE9, 0x49, 0x59, 0xE6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC6, 0xA5, 0x2E, 0xF2, 0xBA, 0x32, 0x63, 0x44), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_23_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF8, 0x06, 0x0B, 0xA5, 0x44, 0x27, 0x7F, 0x22), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x30, 0x74, 0xAC, 0x0F, 0xCC, 0x4F, 0x13, 0x61), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFD, 0xB1, 0xBF, 0x97, 0x49, 0xA5, 0x1C, 0x1D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8A, 0x64, 0x68, 0x7B, 0x0F, 0xCC, 0x77, 0xF8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBB, 0x39, 0xF9, 0x4E, 0x84, 0x9C, 0xF6, 0x96), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBC, 0xCF, 0x6D, 0xE2, 0xA1, 0x2D, 0xF9, 0x2B), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_23_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x95, 0xC4, 0x90, 0x57, 0x31, 0x01, 0x05, 0x5E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCC, 0x1E, 0xBB, 0xBF, 0x98, 0xA4, 0x7C, 0xE3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x89, 0xE3, 0xA0, 0xB2, 0xCD, 0x39, 0x9A, 0x3F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x92, 0x34, 0x60, 0x7A, 0x89, 0x98, 0xB5, 0x52), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8D, 0x20, 0x3D, 0x3A, 0x04, 0x8F, 0x5A, 0xAC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA3, 0x26, 0xB6, 0x49, 0x09, 0x9C, 0x0F, 0x59), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_24_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x72, 0x66, 0xD2, 0x38, 0x2A, 0x62, 0x81, 0xCA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC5, 0xC8, 0x20, 0x5E, 0x28, 0xA3, 0x81, 0xA7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x20, 0x31, 0xA4, 0xF1, 0xEA, 0x7D, 0x87, 0x45), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8F, 0x2C, 0x99, 0x09, 0x6F, 0x63, 0xEB, 0x2F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x73, 0x76, 0xDA, 0x1A, 0x06, 0xBE, 0xDE, 0xA2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x29, 0x09, 0x2E, 0x75, 0x39, 0x30, 0x2D, 0x42), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_24_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x41, 0x9B, 0xC1, 0x5A, 0x17, 0xC3, 0x8C, 0x31), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x58, 0x8D, 0x94, 0x4D, 0x3D, 0xAB, 0x60, 0xD4), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xFD, 0x1E, 0x0F, 0x43, 0xAE, 0x9D, 0x62), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8E, 0xF2, 0xF3, 0x20, 0x1B, 0xAA, 0xB7, 0x41), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9D, 0x5B, 0xA4, 0xF4, 0x90, 0x3B, 0xE3, 0x71), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF7, 0x78, 0x72, 0xBD, 0x65, 0x09, 0x0B, 0x01), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_25_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCA, 0x37, 0x2A, 0x6C, 0x16, 0x4F, 0x64, 0x59), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5A, 0xCE, 0xA3, 0x90, 0xB4, 0x9A, 0xBC, 0xF7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x27, 0x38, 0x55, 0x63, 0x1D, 0x3A, 0x6E, 0x18), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x37, 0xB4, 0xAA, 0x99, 0x22, 0x45, 0x89, 0x2C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB7, 0x7C, 0x8C, 0xA6, 0x3D, 0xA7, 0x3E, 0xE8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x70, 0x06, 0x42, 0xDC, 0xA6, 0xE3, 0xC6, 0x12), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_25_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x55, 0x8C, 0x3D, 0x5D, 0x47, 0x31, 0x7C, 0xEB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x46, 0x85, 0xEE, 0x46, 0x7E, 0x13, 0x04, 0x41), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9E, 0x3C, 0x8B, 0x43, 0x2E, 0x74, 0xF5, 0xF6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBA, 0x88, 0x8E, 0x07, 0x29, 0x08, 0x03, 0x26), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEA, 0x9B, 0x89, 0xEB, 0x08, 0xE8, 0x43, 0xB5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x17, 0x07, 0x67, 0xFD, 0xD9, 0x73, 0x6F, 0x18), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_26_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x29, 0xEB, 0x21, 0x8D, 0x98, 0x43, 0x74, 0x98), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x88, 0xCC, 0x14, 0xD8, 0x08, 0xBB, 0xA6, 0xE3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC4, 0x98, 0xF2, 0x6A, 0x18, 0xC3, 0xDD, 0x9E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC7, 0x38, 0x91, 0xA0, 0x03, 0xF2, 0x04, 0x62), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7A, 0xAF, 0xE8, 0xFD, 0xFB, 0x13, 0x70, 0x74), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD0, 0x93, 0x87, 0x98, 0x4A, 0xE0, 0x00, 0x12), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_26_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x97, 0x2E, 0x69, 0x9C, 0xA2, 0x2D, 0x03, 0x3F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x79, 0xFE, 0xF3, 0xB9, 0xC1, 0x85, 0x2A, 0xEE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCE, 0xFD, 0x86, 0xB1, 0xCD, 0xBF, 0x41, 0xB7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA0, 0xD8, 0x9A, 0x21, 0xF3, 0xFE, 0xCB, 0xF1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x95, 0x78, 0x04, 0x60, 0xB7, 0xA9, 0xA2, 0x84), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE8, 0x1E, 0x66, 0x2A, 0x54, 0x51, 0xBD, 0x8B), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_27_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8E, 0x16, 0x36, 0xEF, 0x61, 0x2D, 0xEE, 0x3B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x45, 0x5F, 0x88, 0xA0, 0x13, 0x12, 0xF7, 0x23), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA9, 0xC6, 0xAD, 0x4A, 0x4A, 0x07, 0x01, 0x5B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB8, 0x74, 0xB1, 0x4F, 0xEB, 0xBD, 0xD5, 0x6B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x57, 0xF9, 0x71, 0xA2, 0x06, 0x4F, 0xD7, 0xBC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0x8B, 0x4D, 0x48, 0xE0, 0x98, 0xFB, 0x6A), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_27_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC4, 0xBA, 0x10, 0xA3, 0x0D, 0x52, 0xAC, 0x3A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x11, 0xD0, 0xE0, 0x36, 0xE6, 0x07, 0x3A, 0x30), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7E, 0x80, 0xF0, 0xAA, 0x49, 0x22, 0x4B, 0xDD), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xC7, 0xAB, 0x1C, 0x89, 0xCD, 0x24, 0x40), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x82, 0x2A, 0xFC, 0xB3, 0x6D, 0x45, 0x96, 0x49), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x63, 0xE4, 0xDB, 0x52, 0x3F, 0xC4, 0xB4, 0x19), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_28_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5B, 0xCC, 0xC8, 0x7F, 0xBB, 0x6B, 0x87, 0x47), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC0, 0x21, 0x3C, 0x69, 0x7D, 0x38, 0x57, 0x50), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x52, 0x4C, 0x18, 0x3C, 0x53, 0xA5, 0x48, 0x6D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x21, 0xC3, 0x64, 0x45, 0xDB, 0xC4, 0x6D, 0x15), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x49, 0xCC, 0xD1, 0xBB, 0x17, 0xB8, 0x34, 0x2D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6C, 0x69, 0x71, 0xFA, 0xA0, 0x28, 0x4A, 0x3D), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_28_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xED, 0xE8, 0x9E, 0x39, 0xEA, 0x8D, 0x38, 0xDB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCC, 0x9C, 0xBB, 0xCD, 0x80, 0x1A, 0xEE, 0xB7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBC, 0xA0, 0x45, 0xBF, 0xD9, 0x22, 0x11, 0x32), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDA, 0x7C, 0x5C, 0xD9, 0xC0, 0x9F, 0x69, 0xF5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBC, 0x8A, 0xA6, 0x79, 0x4E, 0x35, 0xB9, 0xD5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCC, 0x8B, 0x9A, 0x3E, 0xA1, 0xB8, 0x28, 0x10), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_29_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x55, 0x2F, 0xEF, 0xBB, 0xA9, 0x72, 0x7F, 0xEA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB5, 0x34, 0xB7, 0x12, 0xB9, 0xE7, 0xC3, 0x2A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF8, 0x1D, 0xD9, 0x42, 0x77, 0x0C, 0x71, 0x6E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEC, 0x01, 0x59, 0xA7, 0x56, 0x03, 0x91, 0x8D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6C, 0x91, 0x99, 0x33, 0x30, 0x3E, 0xEF, 0x13), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x87, 0xC9, 0x5A, 0x9A, 0x54, 0x66, 0xF1, 0x70), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_29_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x64, 0x2C, 0xB7, 0x6E, 0x71, 0x7D, 0x35, 0x30), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1A, 0x0D, 0xEF, 0xD1, 0x2D, 0x99, 0x63, 0x2F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE4, 0x31, 0xAF, 0x2D, 0xC9, 0xC6, 0xC2, 0xAE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x19, 0xC0, 0xDF, 0x80, 0x54, 0xC4, 0xAC, 0xF3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE3, 0x6B, 0xA0, 0x84, 0x96, 0xF7, 0x31, 0xC8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x93, 0xE2, 0x7C, 0x7A, 0x41, 0x45, 0x75, 0x6A), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_30_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAE, 0xEE, 0x58, 0x31, 0xE8, 0x68, 0xD6, 0x76), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD2, 0x2E, 0x48, 0xB7, 0x09, 0x9F, 0xD4, 0xCA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x34, 0xA9, 0x5C, 0xE7, 0x64, 0x43, 0x5D, 0xC9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9E, 0x58, 0x9F, 0x50, 0xAB, 0x68, 0xFF, 0x6D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x87, 0x88, 0x2D, 0xBA, 0x12, 0xBF, 0x8D, 0x7D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD4, 0xDF, 0x6F, 0xB3, 0x75, 0xA4, 0x55, 0x73), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_30_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6D, 0x17, 0x92, 0x39, 0xB7, 0x13, 0x37, 0x6F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5E, 0x43, 0x71, 0xA7, 0xCA, 0x17, 0x1B, 0x32), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE7, 0xB9, 0xB0, 0x78, 0xEF, 0xA0, 0xDA, 0x83), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9A, 0x84, 0xF2, 0x0F, 0x85, 0xA2, 0xB6, 0x1F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x72, 0x65, 0x2E, 0x6E, 0x45, 0xB9, 0x4C, 0x3C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFE, 0x6A, 0x8C, 0x2B, 0x77, 0x96, 0x36, 0x22), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_31_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x68, 0x7A, 0x13, 0x4A, 0x97, 0x63, 0x02, 0x10), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBC, 0x1E, 0x06, 0x03, 0x8F, 0xB9, 0xEE, 0x64), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x68, 0xEE, 0x8B, 0x89, 0xA9, 0x70, 0xDB, 0xCE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x15, 0x7B, 0x81, 0xC9, 0x70, 0x8D, 0x62, 0x32), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x75, 0xDA, 0x46, 0xF8, 0xF9, 0x3A, 0xBE, 0x55), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9F, 0x9C, 0x7A, 0x97, 0x62, 0xEB, 0xFA, 0x0F), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_31_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB2, 0x03, 0x3D, 0x3C, 0x46, 0x27, 0x9E, 0x65), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA4, 0x08, 0x1C, 0xD5, 0x25, 0xAF, 0xE9, 0x40), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFE, 0x69, 0xDC, 0x59, 0xF4, 0x8A, 0x7C, 0x1F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFC, 0x9A, 0x7A, 0x99, 0x21, 0x0C, 0x4E, 0xE3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF5, 0xCE, 0x85, 0x5F, 0xAC, 0xAA, 0x82, 0x10), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x83, 0x57, 0x69, 0x90, 0x76, 0xF3, 0x53, 0x3F), +}; +static const mbedtls_ecp_point brainpoolP384r1_T[32] = { + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z1(brainpoolP384r1_T_0_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_0_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_1_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_1_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_2_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_2_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_3_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_3_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_4_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_4_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_5_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_5_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_6_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_6_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_7_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_7_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_8_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_8_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_9_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_9_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_10_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_10_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_11_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_11_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_12_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_12_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_13_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_13_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_14_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_14_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_15_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_15_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_16_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_16_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_17_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_17_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_18_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_18_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_19_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_19_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_20_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_20_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_21_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_21_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_22_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_22_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_23_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_23_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_24_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_24_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_25_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_25_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_26_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_26_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_27_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_27_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_28_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_28_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_29_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_29_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_30_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_30_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_31_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_31_Y), +}; +#else +#define brainpoolP384r1_T NULL +#endif + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLED */ + +/* + * Domain parameters for brainpoolP512r1 (RFC 5639 3.7) + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED) +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_p[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF3, 0x48, 0x3A, 0x58, 0x56, 0x60, 0xAA, 0x28), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x85, 0xC6, 0x82, 0x2D, 0x2F, 0xFF, 0x81, 0x28), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE6, 0x80, 0xA3, 0xE6, 0x2A, 0xA1, 0xCD, 0xAE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x42, 0x68, 0xC6, 0x9B, 0x00, 0x9B, 0x4D, 0x7D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x71, 0x08, 0x33, 0x70, 0xCA, 0x9C, 0x63, 0xD6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0E, 0xD2, 0xC9, 0xB3, 0xB3, 0x8D, 0x30, 0xCB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x07, 0xFC, 0xC9, 0x33, 0xAE, 0xE6, 0xD4, 0x3F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8B, 0xC4, 0xE9, 0xDB, 0xB8, 0x9D, 0xDD, 0xAA), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_a[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCA, 0x94, 0xFC, 0x77, 0x4D, 0xAC, 0xC1, 0xE7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB9, 0xC7, 0xF2, 0x2B, 0xA7, 0x17, 0x11, 0x7F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB5, 0xC8, 0x9A, 0x8B, 0xC9, 0xF1, 0x2E, 0x0A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA1, 0x3A, 0x25, 0xA8, 0x5A, 0x5D, 0xED, 0x2D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBC, 0x63, 0x98, 0xEA, 0xCA, 0x41, 0x34, 0xA8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x10, 0x16, 0xF9, 0x3D, 0x8D, 0xDD, 0xCB, 0x94), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC5, 0x4C, 0x23, 0xAC, 0x45, 0x71, 0x32, 0xE2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x89, 0x3B, 0x60, 0x8B, 0x31, 0xA3, 0x30, 0x78), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_b[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x23, 0xF7, 0x16, 0x80, 0x63, 0xBD, 0x09, 0x28), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDD, 0xE5, 0xBA, 0x5E, 0xB7, 0x50, 0x40, 0x98), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x67, 0x3E, 0x08, 0xDC, 0xCA, 0x94, 0xFC, 0x77), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4D, 0xAC, 0xC1, 0xE7, 0xB9, 0xC7, 0xF2, 0x2B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA7, 0x17, 0x11, 0x7F, 0xB5, 0xC8, 0x9A, 0x8B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC9, 0xF1, 0x2E, 0x0A, 0xA1, 0x3A, 0x25, 0xA8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5A, 0x5D, 0xED, 0x2D, 0xBC, 0x63, 0x98, 0xEA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCA, 0x41, 0x34, 0xA8, 0x10, 0x16, 0xF9, 0x3D), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_gx[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x22, 0xF8, 0xB9, 0xBC, 0x09, 0x22, 0x35, 0x8B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x68, 0x5E, 0x6A, 0x40, 0x47, 0x50, 0x6D, 0x7C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5F, 0x7D, 0xB9, 0x93, 0x7B, 0x68, 0xD1, 0x50), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8D, 0xD4, 0xD0, 0xE2, 0x78, 0x1F, 0x3B, 0xFF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8E, 0x09, 0xD0, 0xF4, 0xEE, 0x62, 0x3B, 0xB4), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC1, 0x16, 0xD9, 0xB5, 0x70, 0x9F, 0xED, 0x85), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x93, 0x6A, 0x4C, 0x9C, 0x2E, 0x32, 0x21, 0x5A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x64, 0xD9, 0x2E, 0xD8, 0xBD, 0xE4, 0xAE, 0x81), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_gy[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x92, 0x08, 0xD8, 0x3A, 0x0F, 0x1E, 0xCD, 0x78), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x06, 0x54, 0xF0, 0xA8, 0x2F, 0x2B, 0xCA, 0xD1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAE, 0x63, 0x27, 0x8A, 0xD8, 0x4B, 0xCA, 0x5B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5E, 0x48, 0x5F, 0x4A, 0x49, 0xDE, 0xDC, 0xB2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x11, 0x81, 0x1F, 0x88, 0x5B, 0xC5, 0x00, 0xA0), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1A, 0x7B, 0xA5, 0x24, 0x00, 0xF7, 0x09, 0xF2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFD, 0x22, 0x78, 0xCF, 0xA9, 0xBF, 0xEA, 0xC0), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEC, 0x32, 0x63, 0x56, 0x5D, 0x38, 0xDE, 0x7D), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_n[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x69, 0x00, 0xA9, 0x9C, 0x82, 0x96, 0x87, 0xB5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDD, 0xDA, 0x5D, 0x08, 0x81, 0xD3, 0xB1, 0x1D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x47, 0x10, 0xAC, 0x7F, 0x19, 0x61, 0x86, 0x41), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x19, 0x26, 0xA9, 0x4C, 0x41, 0x5C, 0x3E, 0x55), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x70, 0x08, 0x33, 0x70, 0xCA, 0x9C, 0x63, 0xD6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0E, 0xD2, 0xC9, 0xB3, 0xB3, 0x8D, 0x30, 0xCB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x07, 0xFC, 0xC9, 0x33, 0xAE, 0xE6, 0xD4, 0x3F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8B, 0xC4, 0xE9, 0xDB, 0xB8, 0x9D, 0xDD, 0xAA), +}; + +#if MBEDTLS_ECP_FIXED_POINT_OPTIM == 1 +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_0_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x22, 0xF8, 0xB9, 0xBC, 0x09, 0x22, 0x35, 0x8B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x68, 0x5E, 0x6A, 0x40, 0x47, 0x50, 0x6D, 0x7C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5F, 0x7D, 0xB9, 0x93, 0x7B, 0x68, 0xD1, 0x50), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8D, 0xD4, 0xD0, 0xE2, 0x78, 0x1F, 0x3B, 0xFF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8E, 0x09, 0xD0, 0xF4, 0xEE, 0x62, 0x3B, 0xB4), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC1, 0x16, 0xD9, 0xB5, 0x70, 0x9F, 0xED, 0x85), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x93, 0x6A, 0x4C, 0x9C, 0x2E, 0x32, 0x21, 0x5A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x64, 0xD9, 0x2E, 0xD8, 0xBD, 0xE4, 0xAE, 0x81), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_0_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x92, 0x08, 0xD8, 0x3A, 0x0F, 0x1E, 0xCD, 0x78), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x06, 0x54, 0xF0, 0xA8, 0x2F, 0x2B, 0xCA, 0xD1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAE, 0x63, 0x27, 0x8A, 0xD8, 0x4B, 0xCA, 0x5B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5E, 0x48, 0x5F, 0x4A, 0x49, 0xDE, 0xDC, 0xB2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x11, 0x81, 0x1F, 0x88, 0x5B, 0xC5, 0x00, 0xA0), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1A, 0x7B, 0xA5, 0x24, 0x00, 0xF7, 0x09, 0xF2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFD, 0x22, 0x78, 0xCF, 0xA9, 0xBF, 0xEA, 0xC0), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEC, 0x32, 0x63, 0x56, 0x5D, 0x38, 0xDE, 0x7D), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_1_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEA, 0xE9, 0x6B, 0x8C, 0x6F, 0x9D, 0x88, 0x43), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBB, 0x4F, 0x86, 0x96, 0xA7, 0x56, 0xD1, 0x37), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9D, 0xAB, 0xFA, 0xEE, 0xA7, 0xF5, 0x0E, 0xA6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE3, 0x40, 0xEF, 0x9E, 0x6D, 0xD6, 0x32, 0x33), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE3, 0xED, 0x56, 0x14, 0x57, 0x1A, 0x8D, 0x69), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA4, 0xED, 0x4D, 0x3A, 0xFA, 0x71, 0x75, 0x6B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x66, 0xC5, 0x76, 0x1C, 0x14, 0xBE, 0xB5, 0xCD), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE1, 0x5A, 0xCB, 0xE7, 0x36, 0x1D, 0x52, 0x1C), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_1_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6B, 0x8D, 0x7A, 0xEB, 0xA3, 0x8B, 0xD5, 0xB0), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1F, 0xA3, 0x41, 0xF8, 0xAC, 0x9E, 0xAB, 0x74), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x12, 0xE3, 0x65, 0x0D, 0x1C, 0xFE, 0x09, 0x2B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3F, 0xCA, 0x13, 0x3F, 0xC5, 0xF9, 0x7E, 0xEC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2C, 0x5D, 0x63, 0x28, 0xA6, 0x89, 0xD3, 0x91), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC9, 0x95, 0x3F, 0x7A, 0x82, 0xD4, 0x77, 0xE3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x34, 0xBB, 0x92, 0x32, 0x00, 0xF4, 0x66, 0x42), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBA, 0x58, 0x31, 0xD1, 0x17, 0x9F, 0x2A, 0x22), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_2_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x52, 0x36, 0xA9, 0xCD, 0x80, 0xA5, 0x2D, 0x78), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x91, 0x44, 0xAB, 0xCE, 0x71, 0xFF, 0x0C, 0x9B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x18, 0x24, 0x58, 0x35, 0x5A, 0x21, 0x32, 0x93), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1B, 0xA6, 0x28, 0xF8, 0x7A, 0x97, 0xAE, 0x8B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x84, 0xE7, 0x08, 0xFA, 0x47, 0xC9, 0x55, 0x09), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8D, 0xAC, 0x2E, 0x84, 0xA4, 0xF5, 0x52, 0xC4), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD9, 0x58, 0x05, 0x9D, 0xA7, 0xC8, 0x71, 0xBF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB3, 0x92, 0xB4, 0x92, 0xC1, 0x92, 0xEC, 0x6B), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_2_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4A, 0x48, 0x2D, 0x79, 0x5E, 0x58, 0xE5, 0x69), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB4, 0x85, 0x26, 0xEC, 0xE9, 0x6E, 0xD4, 0x06), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x98, 0x68, 0x26, 0x87, 0x38, 0xA2, 0xD2, 0x0B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF7, 0x17, 0x60, 0xCE, 0x75, 0xF8, 0xA5, 0x6F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x20, 0x51, 0xDB, 0xA9, 0xAE, 0x87, 0xF1, 0x15), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDD, 0x49, 0x92, 0x3B, 0x19, 0x96, 0xF5, 0xB0), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC4, 0xD5, 0x52, 0x52, 0x8C, 0xCE, 0xFD, 0xFA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x24, 0x18, 0x0A, 0xE6, 0xF6, 0xAE, 0x08, 0x41), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_3_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7E, 0x2B, 0xD8, 0x54, 0xCE, 0xB0, 0x57, 0xFE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8A, 0xB0, 0xF8, 0x9E, 0x03, 0x03, 0x3C, 0x5D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x93, 0x0E, 0x29, 0x29, 0x00, 0xF3, 0x70, 0xBF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x54, 0x33, 0x99, 0x0E, 0x00, 0x5D, 0xFE, 0x4B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x46, 0x2D, 0xF2, 0x59, 0x32, 0xCF, 0x03, 0xF4), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3B, 0xC9, 0x72, 0xAE, 0x0C, 0xEF, 0xD1, 0x5B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB6, 0x5A, 0x27, 0xBF, 0x2F, 0x45, 0xF9, 0x51), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD4, 0xBE, 0xE5, 0x2C, 0xFF, 0x5B, 0x1E, 0x88), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_3_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAA, 0xAC, 0xBB, 0xD8, 0x83, 0xC2, 0x46, 0xF6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCF, 0xDC, 0xCE, 0x15, 0xB4, 0xEF, 0xCF, 0x46), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x46, 0xDB, 0x5E, 0x94, 0x31, 0x0B, 0xB2, 0x7A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3C, 0xB9, 0xE3, 0xE3, 0x11, 0x71, 0x41, 0x1E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x36, 0xE3, 0x01, 0xB7, 0x7D, 0xBC, 0x65, 0xBE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFC, 0x07, 0x65, 0x87, 0xA7, 0xE8, 0x48, 0xE3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x66, 0x48, 0x8F, 0xD4, 0x30, 0x8E, 0xB4, 0x6C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x86, 0xE0, 0x73, 0xBE, 0x1E, 0xBF, 0x56, 0x36), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_4_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFE, 0x0E, 0x5E, 0x87, 0xC5, 0xAB, 0x0E, 0x3C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB9, 0xF9, 0x5F, 0x80, 0x24, 0x4C, 0x2A, 0xF1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDE, 0x15, 0x21, 0x54, 0x92, 0x84, 0x8D, 0x6A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA8, 0x8A, 0x47, 0x74, 0xDC, 0x42, 0xB1, 0xF8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x81, 0xF7, 0x30, 0xFD, 0xC1, 0x9B, 0x0C, 0x5B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4E, 0x6C, 0xCC, 0xDF, 0xC5, 0xE3, 0xA9, 0xD5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD6, 0x67, 0x59, 0x10, 0x5C, 0x51, 0x54, 0x40), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA0, 0x37, 0xFB, 0x6E, 0xB0, 0x78, 0x63, 0x8E), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_4_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA5, 0xEF, 0xC4, 0x39, 0x20, 0xF1, 0x46, 0x66), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE2, 0x62, 0xAE, 0xFF, 0x10, 0xE4, 0xE2, 0xE9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0x5C, 0xF5, 0x2E, 0x22, 0x89, 0xE5, 0x82), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x89, 0x0C, 0x29, 0xA8, 0x62, 0xAE, 0xDB, 0x65), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD7, 0x9E, 0x0F, 0xCA, 0x87, 0x2A, 0x6F, 0x7B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCE, 0xDC, 0x9B, 0x9F, 0x65, 0xD4, 0xAD, 0x27), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xED, 0xC3, 0x08, 0x0F, 0xCF, 0x67, 0xE9, 0xF4), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x92, 0x5C, 0xD7, 0xFF, 0x41, 0x9C, 0xCB, 0x26), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_5_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x37, 0x25, 0x05, 0x12, 0xAD, 0x73, 0x63, 0x90), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC7, 0x99, 0x07, 0x86, 0x57, 0xE7, 0x94, 0xB1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x00, 0x4B, 0xA5, 0xBF, 0x18, 0xA9, 0xEF, 0x6A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFA, 0x4C, 0xC4, 0x09, 0xF2, 0x2F, 0x0C, 0xAA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8C, 0x3A, 0x04, 0xEA, 0x89, 0x6C, 0x91, 0xB9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7D, 0x6C, 0x3A, 0xE7, 0xA3, 0xEC, 0x24, 0x7B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x16, 0xA1, 0x26, 0x21, 0x04, 0xE3, 0xB9, 0x40), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x53, 0x71, 0x4B, 0x7B, 0xC2, 0x89, 0xCD, 0xA2), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_5_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB7, 0xB9, 0xA8, 0x9D, 0xFD, 0x00, 0x3A, 0x1F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x63, 0x41, 0x6C, 0xBB, 0x5A, 0xCA, 0x1F, 0x74), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2A, 0xD7, 0xE2, 0x6C, 0x6B, 0xA7, 0x48, 0xC9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1E, 0x19, 0xAD, 0xA7, 0xC1, 0x7E, 0x4F, 0x6E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD1, 0xF7, 0x19, 0x3C, 0x06, 0x74, 0x2C, 0x3A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC5, 0x23, 0x4F, 0x0C, 0x09, 0xB0, 0x80, 0x4A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4E, 0x74, 0x34, 0x08, 0x44, 0x7E, 0xA3, 0xDD), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFB, 0xCC, 0x8D, 0x12, 0x6E, 0xE1, 0x3D, 0x0B), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_6_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x38, 0x18, 0xB1, 0x71, 0x02, 0x93, 0xC2, 0xA4), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC9, 0x89, 0x40, 0xE2, 0x1F, 0xE7, 0x5E, 0x68), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x50, 0x8E, 0xAE, 0x89, 0x01, 0xD4, 0x0C, 0xEB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAE, 0xDA, 0x58, 0x70, 0x24, 0xF2, 0xE4, 0x5F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6F, 0xC7, 0x1D, 0xD6, 0x4A, 0x6F, 0x66, 0x4F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x92, 0x1D, 0x7E, 0x4A, 0x2C, 0xCA, 0xEC, 0x3B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA1, 0x06, 0x7F, 0xA8, 0x99, 0xE4, 0xD3, 0x4E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2A, 0x1D, 0x5A, 0xDF, 0x5E, 0x58, 0x36, 0x49), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_6_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9C, 0xB9, 0x32, 0x69, 0x1F, 0x72, 0x2A, 0xB3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1C, 0x73, 0xE2, 0x03, 0x39, 0x35, 0xAA, 0xA8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEB, 0x5E, 0x5D, 0x48, 0xEF, 0xAE, 0x30, 0xF5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x77, 0x7F, 0x60, 0x19, 0xAF, 0xEC, 0x9D, 0xFC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCA, 0xD9, 0x19, 0xE4, 0x1B, 0x56, 0x15, 0x5F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBC, 0xD7, 0x33, 0x59, 0x1F, 0x43, 0x59, 0x2C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC6, 0xCE, 0xEE, 0xCA, 0xA4, 0x7F, 0x63, 0xD4), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBD, 0x40, 0xC0, 0xF6, 0x19, 0x89, 0x43, 0x20), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_7_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEB, 0x92, 0xEA, 0x07, 0x65, 0x79, 0x86, 0xD3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xB7, 0x13, 0x75, 0xD3, 0xC5, 0x0A, 0xC9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x26, 0x9E, 0xFA, 0xE1, 0x1F, 0x0C, 0xF9, 0x74), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB4, 0x8C, 0xED, 0x5C, 0x21, 0xE9, 0x09, 0xDD), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF4, 0x4D, 0xD8, 0x18, 0xC4, 0xF6, 0x36, 0x39), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC7, 0xC9, 0xAC, 0x5C, 0xFA, 0x69, 0xA4, 0xA0), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6B, 0x8C, 0x94, 0x1C, 0x7B, 0x71, 0x36, 0x58), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7C, 0xBD, 0x46, 0xCE, 0xB7, 0x1D, 0x9C, 0x5E), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_7_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEA, 0xD6, 0x96, 0x4B, 0xA6, 0x47, 0xEB, 0xE5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5F, 0xF1, 0x5F, 0x15, 0xDE, 0x99, 0x6F, 0x66), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x21, 0xBD, 0xE5, 0x04, 0xB8, 0xE6, 0xC0, 0x0B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x49, 0xD3, 0xF0, 0x04, 0x00, 0xE4, 0x05, 0xDB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x96, 0xF3, 0x06, 0xA3, 0x1A, 0xFF, 0xEA, 0x73), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x08, 0x32, 0xAA, 0x99, 0x33, 0x09, 0xB6, 0x34), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6E, 0xEF, 0xFC, 0x61, 0x10, 0x42, 0x31, 0x94), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x34, 0xF1, 0xF4, 0x33, 0xCF, 0x28, 0x90, 0x9C), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_8_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x10, 0xDE, 0xF9, 0x88, 0x87, 0x7B, 0xEB, 0xC9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x66, 0xB8, 0xDA, 0xFA, 0xDA, 0x3D, 0xA6, 0x17), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA0, 0xF0, 0x62, 0x82, 0x53, 0x32, 0x55, 0x03), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2F, 0xA5, 0x32, 0x4A, 0x19, 0x11, 0x9C, 0x10), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x16, 0xB3, 0x27, 0xE9, 0x75, 0x90, 0x05, 0x2D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x63, 0x1C, 0x90, 0x48, 0x77, 0x01, 0x85, 0x1B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC7, 0xD6, 0x9B, 0x84, 0xA8, 0xD7, 0xC5, 0x28), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE1, 0x7A, 0xCB, 0xB3, 0x11, 0x46, 0xD7, 0x99), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_8_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8B, 0x23, 0xBF, 0x75, 0x75, 0xA1, 0x95, 0x90), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4B, 0x66, 0x5D, 0x34, 0x13, 0xA9, 0x03, 0xBE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x29, 0x80, 0x9D, 0x5F, 0xD2, 0x44, 0xE1, 0x62), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x96, 0x5D, 0xBD, 0xA8, 0xBF, 0xB4, 0x25, 0x1F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6A, 0x99, 0x1F, 0x53, 0xF1, 0x57, 0xDB, 0xE7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x21, 0x7C, 0xE5, 0xC5, 0x51, 0x0B, 0x4C, 0x9B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6B, 0xB0, 0x1A, 0x9C, 0x16, 0xB0, 0x32, 0x1F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF4, 0xE3, 0xCF, 0xDD, 0x48, 0xB4, 0x7B, 0x33), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_9_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC0, 0xDD, 0x9E, 0x3C, 0x98, 0x0E, 0x77, 0x65), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6C, 0xAB, 0x01, 0xD3, 0x87, 0x74, 0x25, 0x4A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x87, 0xA3, 0xE3, 0x76, 0x43, 0x87, 0x12, 0xBD), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x54, 0xB1, 0x3B, 0x60, 0x66, 0xEB, 0x98, 0x54), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD2, 0x78, 0xC8, 0xD7, 0x4E, 0x75, 0xCA, 0x69), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x07, 0xDF, 0x71, 0x19, 0xE7, 0x07, 0x36, 0xB5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6D, 0xC9, 0xA8, 0x5F, 0x91, 0xBF, 0x47, 0xB2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x80, 0x96, 0x58, 0x96, 0x18, 0xB6, 0xFA, 0x01), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_9_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD0, 0x2D, 0xA9, 0x9B, 0x86, 0xDB, 0x0C, 0x4C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE4, 0x0B, 0x2D, 0x56, 0x4A, 0xD3, 0x93, 0x8A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB5, 0x15, 0xE2, 0x65, 0x12, 0x86, 0x0E, 0xB2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB4, 0x41, 0x4D, 0xC1, 0xCB, 0xE4, 0xC3, 0xD7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6A, 0x53, 0x10, 0xCA, 0xA3, 0xAC, 0x83, 0x26), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3E, 0x01, 0x22, 0x96, 0x10, 0xAD, 0x69, 0xDB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x42, 0x46, 0x4E, 0xD8, 0xEA, 0xD6, 0x9D, 0xF3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x43, 0x2F, 0x7F, 0x62, 0x62, 0x80, 0xD0, 0x14), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_10_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB2, 0xDA, 0x00, 0x63, 0x09, 0xBD, 0x6A, 0x83), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0F, 0xD4, 0x6E, 0x48, 0x05, 0xB7, 0xF7, 0x17), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x14, 0x4D, 0xD7, 0x00, 0x4A, 0x15, 0x27, 0x7A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3A, 0x15, 0xAA, 0x37, 0x27, 0x34, 0x18, 0x24), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3A, 0x20, 0x2C, 0x84, 0x1B, 0x88, 0xBA, 0x05), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAC, 0x09, 0xD6, 0x04, 0xA2, 0x60, 0x84, 0x72), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC8, 0x04, 0x94, 0x08, 0xD4, 0xED, 0x47, 0xDB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8B, 0xF3, 0xE4, 0x3E, 0xB9, 0x5B, 0x35, 0x42), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_10_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5F, 0xD8, 0xB6, 0x80, 0xD6, 0xF1, 0x30, 0xDD), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD6, 0x14, 0xA6, 0x85, 0xEE, 0xA7, 0xD8, 0x61), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE4, 0x49, 0x2A, 0x1E, 0x7C, 0xE9, 0x2D, 0xEC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3A, 0x87, 0x56, 0x91, 0x03, 0x77, 0x4D, 0x55), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0E, 0x52, 0xD4, 0xAA, 0xF7, 0xFA, 0xB0, 0xC5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x04, 0x5D, 0x11, 0x39, 0xB1, 0xE7, 0x76, 0xAD), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD6, 0x13, 0xBC, 0x37, 0x5D, 0x74, 0xCD, 0xC2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC9, 0x48, 0x14, 0x23, 0x30, 0xF8, 0x46, 0x37), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_11_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAC, 0x27, 0xB0, 0xD9, 0xB2, 0x74, 0xB4, 0xC0), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEA, 0xA6, 0xB9, 0x6F, 0x9F, 0x64, 0x36, 0x92), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2E, 0x2B, 0x78, 0x40, 0x05, 0x2B, 0x7B, 0xA9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB3, 0x68, 0x3A, 0xB6, 0x4A, 0xE2, 0xDB, 0xB8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1E, 0x33, 0xD7, 0x34, 0x8B, 0x25, 0x45, 0xEF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x89, 0xCE, 0xA8, 0xC9, 0x01, 0xFB, 0x0E, 0x7B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE2, 0xF9, 0x51, 0x4C, 0x12, 0x9F, 0x60, 0xE4), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x67, 0x85, 0xBD, 0x30, 0x37, 0x84, 0x39, 0x44), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_11_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x26, 0x33, 0xAF, 0x2E, 0xB8, 0x2E, 0xCC, 0x3C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA4, 0xB1, 0x73, 0x59, 0x4E, 0x0C, 0x09, 0x4A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8A, 0x24, 0x89, 0x81, 0x12, 0xFF, 0xBB, 0x6E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x71, 0x37, 0x1A, 0x66, 0xEE, 0xED, 0xB6, 0x9B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x16, 0xBD, 0x04, 0x20, 0x5D, 0xFB, 0xBF, 0x95), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA0, 0xF8, 0x34, 0xA3, 0xFF, 0x45, 0xDE, 0x92), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9B, 0x18, 0x73, 0xF1, 0x32, 0x25, 0x58, 0xEB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x63, 0xC1, 0x14, 0xE3, 0x9E, 0x40, 0x0F, 0x12), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_12_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x61, 0x07, 0x9D, 0x9C, 0x00, 0xF7, 0x56, 0x19), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFB, 0xBA, 0x87, 0xF9, 0x15, 0x0C, 0x66, 0x5D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7E, 0x1F, 0xC1, 0x28, 0xB0, 0x47, 0x0D, 0xF5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x96, 0xCA, 0x27, 0xEE, 0x4B, 0x23, 0x2B, 0x89), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7E, 0xB5, 0x68, 0xC8, 0x17, 0x5D, 0xC3, 0xAA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x17, 0x02, 0x08, 0xEE, 0x20, 0x9D, 0xEA, 0x64), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA7, 0x14, 0x50, 0xD4, 0x7D, 0x5F, 0xCF, 0xA0), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD5, 0xFA, 0xF8, 0xA7, 0xC6, 0xDC, 0x14, 0x8C), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_12_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x76, 0xBD, 0x0A, 0x1A, 0x18, 0x98, 0xDC, 0xB0), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x63, 0x63, 0x02, 0xB7, 0xD5, 0x5B, 0x5A, 0xC6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x51, 0xB1, 0xD7, 0x4B, 0x15, 0x39, 0x61, 0x5D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5C, 0x32, 0xE1, 0x9E, 0x70, 0x1B, 0xCE, 0x51), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x64, 0xD8, 0x18, 0x83, 0x52, 0x9B, 0x6D, 0xA2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA4, 0x55, 0x56, 0x19, 0x34, 0xA4, 0xEA, 0xFC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x30, 0xA9, 0x55, 0x80, 0xE3, 0x15, 0x36, 0x8B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBB, 0x06, 0xC8, 0x1D, 0x17, 0x0D, 0xAD, 0x16), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_13_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x20, 0xD6, 0xF0, 0xCC, 0xF3, 0x63, 0x53, 0xD2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x27, 0x5A, 0xDC, 0x46, 0xBD, 0x0D, 0xAD, 0x96), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x21, 0x2F, 0x11, 0x60, 0x15, 0x51, 0x4A, 0xEA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x33, 0xE3, 0x93, 0x38, 0xD5, 0x83, 0xAA, 0x0D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x90, 0xA6, 0xCC, 0xB1, 0xFD, 0xBB, 0x1A, 0x0F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3B, 0x54, 0xC8, 0x54, 0x6F, 0x79, 0x1A, 0x59), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3F, 0x4A, 0xDA, 0x28, 0x92, 0x97, 0x9D, 0x7F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD6, 0x4B, 0xDB, 0xC7, 0x52, 0xC5, 0x66, 0x34), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_13_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x05, 0x7E, 0x92, 0x53, 0x30, 0x93, 0xFD, 0xFF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA0, 0x16, 0x6A, 0xB1, 0x91, 0x0A, 0xB4, 0x52), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6D, 0x9D, 0x40, 0x3F, 0xE3, 0xF1, 0x01, 0x46), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x13, 0x0E, 0xD8, 0xED, 0x11, 0x8E, 0x4C, 0xED), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x86, 0x4A, 0x1B, 0x88, 0xDF, 0x8D, 0x29, 0xE7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x97, 0x23, 0x21, 0x11, 0xAB, 0x77, 0x81, 0x62), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0B, 0xAF, 0x11, 0xFA, 0xBA, 0x40, 0x63, 0xE7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2B, 0x6F, 0x8D, 0x80, 0xDF, 0x67, 0xF5, 0x44), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_14_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB2, 0x8B, 0xB7, 0x08, 0xF4, 0xD7, 0x2D, 0xA8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC7, 0x2B, 0x30, 0x02, 0x45, 0x71, 0x08, 0x49), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x97, 0x3A, 0xCA, 0x50, 0xF6, 0xC2, 0x19, 0x8C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x17, 0xB9, 0x9B, 0x3E, 0x73, 0x95, 0x1D, 0x49), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB6, 0x60, 0x59, 0x48, 0xCB, 0xD8, 0xD6, 0xAA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF0, 0xB9, 0x6C, 0x89, 0xAB, 0x99, 0xA8, 0xF8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEF, 0xA1, 0x8B, 0x4E, 0x06, 0x19, 0xEC, 0x99), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x70, 0x95, 0x04, 0xCF, 0xD5, 0x94, 0xB3, 0x02), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_14_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x29, 0x35, 0x93, 0x7C, 0xB3, 0xB8, 0x9E, 0x1B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC4, 0x45, 0x5C, 0x7E, 0xBF, 0x75, 0x81, 0x0F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDC, 0xE8, 0x24, 0xDF, 0xEC, 0x2F, 0x7D, 0xB9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF2, 0x8B, 0xD5, 0x6A, 0x9B, 0xA0, 0xE0, 0x4F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x32, 0xE3, 0x27, 0x82, 0xDE, 0xDD, 0xCA, 0x4B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA7, 0x57, 0x56, 0x46, 0x05, 0x06, 0x01, 0x2E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x74, 0x35, 0xA7, 0x47, 0xE2, 0x6B, 0x2C, 0x4F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x38, 0x9D, 0x4C, 0xEC, 0x1F, 0x11, 0x75, 0x2B), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_15_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAC, 0xAA, 0x41, 0xC1, 0xE9, 0x0E, 0xE9, 0xAA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0A, 0xCF, 0x9C, 0x4B, 0xE8, 0xED, 0x0A, 0x49), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3D, 0x73, 0xCA, 0x0C, 0x46, 0x0A, 0x9C, 0xE4), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x99, 0xE1, 0x9E, 0xBC, 0xFE, 0x44, 0x63, 0x6D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x31, 0x43, 0x71, 0xEE, 0xF8, 0xC1, 0x8C, 0x5C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6A, 0x4B, 0xF0, 0x69, 0x25, 0xBD, 0x71, 0x1A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFD, 0x9A, 0xFE, 0x82, 0xE7, 0xC1, 0xC1, 0xEE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFC, 0x5A, 0x6E, 0x5E, 0x97, 0x6A, 0x35, 0x8D), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_15_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA2, 0x18, 0x6C, 0x7E, 0xB8, 0x9E, 0x57, 0x32), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x35, 0xB9, 0xC1, 0xD0, 0xFE, 0x78, 0xFB, 0x32), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7C, 0x08, 0xAE, 0x46, 0x34, 0xEA, 0x7A, 0x7F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE8, 0x1C, 0x56, 0xA9, 0x18, 0x37, 0xD4, 0x9E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x28, 0x63, 0xE9, 0x0A, 0xB6, 0x38, 0x3C, 0xC1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3E, 0x4F, 0xA4, 0x6E, 0x85, 0x31, 0x23, 0x52), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0D, 0xAD, 0xC4, 0xC3, 0xB1, 0x4B, 0x1C, 0x82), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x30, 0x56, 0x4A, 0x38, 0xB3, 0x6B, 0x6F, 0x2C), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_16_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x67, 0xC7, 0x19, 0xDE, 0x21, 0xED, 0x89, 0xD0), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2F, 0xBE, 0xA6, 0xAE, 0xEB, 0x9D, 0xA7, 0x2A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x04, 0x0E, 0x13, 0x1E, 0x86, 0x57, 0xC3, 0x3B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1F, 0x4B, 0x30, 0x46, 0x52, 0xC1, 0xEC, 0x52), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6E, 0xD5, 0x44, 0x31, 0x96, 0x3B, 0x26, 0x27), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x77, 0x68, 0xA8, 0x67, 0x78, 0x39, 0xE8, 0x68), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8E, 0x78, 0xB7, 0xDD, 0xF2, 0x58, 0xB6, 0x3D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x81, 0x3C, 0xB3, 0x26, 0xC4, 0x2C, 0x8C, 0xA5), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_16_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB9, 0x24, 0xE5, 0x73, 0xEE, 0x9A, 0x02, 0xA9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD9, 0x6A, 0x65, 0x60, 0xF3, 0x62, 0xE3, 0xE9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFB, 0x07, 0x84, 0xE6, 0x3B, 0x46, 0x65, 0x9F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE1, 0x8F, 0x0C, 0xB0, 0xE1, 0x04, 0x82, 0x9D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEB, 0x13, 0xBF, 0x3D, 0xA0, 0x48, 0xA2, 0x74), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x08, 0x26, 0x76, 0x74, 0xAB, 0x0B, 0x29, 0xE8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x30, 0x6E, 0x5F, 0x03, 0x34, 0x7C, 0x38, 0xCE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4D, 0x72, 0xF9, 0x3B, 0x3C, 0xA4, 0xBC, 0x7C), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_17_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5C, 0xCE, 0x18, 0x80, 0xB8, 0x24, 0x45, 0x81), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF1, 0x09, 0x03, 0xB8, 0x06, 0x64, 0xF7, 0xEC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF1, 0x26, 0xB1, 0x10, 0x6D, 0x71, 0x12, 0x2E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAD, 0x12, 0xC6, 0x6E, 0x1E, 0x6A, 0xC3, 0x80), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE5, 0xD3, 0x0A, 0xDE, 0xD8, 0x6B, 0x04, 0x5C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x96, 0x87, 0x5B, 0xAE, 0xDB, 0x3C, 0xC0, 0xC5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8E, 0xF5, 0xF9, 0xC1, 0x9A, 0x89, 0xBB, 0x7E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xED, 0x69, 0x72, 0x8B, 0xAE, 0x32, 0x13, 0x11), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_17_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF9, 0x16, 0x07, 0x50, 0xFA, 0x4C, 0xCF, 0xE8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF8, 0x50, 0x21, 0xE9, 0xDE, 0xEC, 0x7E, 0xDF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7C, 0x2F, 0xE8, 0x83, 0x30, 0x0B, 0x65, 0x0E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA5, 0x0B, 0x99, 0xAC, 0xC9, 0xBA, 0x6C, 0x2A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA7, 0x59, 0x5A, 0x0D, 0x7B, 0x9E, 0x08, 0xAD), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x34, 0x91, 0xB2, 0xDC, 0x90, 0xCE, 0x67, 0xED), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE3, 0x93, 0x60, 0x0C, 0xD7, 0x1F, 0x2F, 0x17), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x19, 0x7F, 0x9D, 0x40, 0xF8, 0x78, 0x7A, 0x54), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_18_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x13, 0x22, 0x95, 0xE8, 0xEF, 0x31, 0x57, 0x35), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2D, 0x88, 0x53, 0xFE, 0xAF, 0x7C, 0x47, 0x14), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0E, 0xCE, 0xCC, 0x79, 0xE8, 0x9F, 0x8C, 0xC4), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDB, 0x16, 0xDD, 0x77, 0x6E, 0x8A, 0x73, 0x97), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC0, 0x07, 0x97, 0x21, 0x3B, 0xF8, 0x5F, 0xA8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC6, 0xB5, 0xD2, 0x81, 0x84, 0xF0, 0xE7, 0x9F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCB, 0x8F, 0x75, 0x09, 0x6A, 0x0E, 0x53, 0xAD), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE6, 0x4F, 0x70, 0x97, 0xC7, 0xAC, 0x7D, 0x3F), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_18_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF9, 0x3C, 0x6A, 0xB4, 0x10, 0xA9, 0xC8, 0x1D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEE, 0xC5, 0xD6, 0x69, 0x16, 0xB8, 0xAC, 0x25), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAC, 0x44, 0xDC, 0xEB, 0x48, 0x54, 0x5D, 0x5F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6F, 0x48, 0x9B, 0xD7, 0x72, 0x69, 0xA4, 0x8A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB4, 0x0D, 0x36, 0x9A, 0x66, 0x0B, 0xEC, 0x24), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBE, 0xC6, 0xD4, 0xB6, 0x60, 0xE5, 0xC3, 0x3A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBA, 0x29, 0x42, 0xE0, 0x9D, 0xFD, 0x7C, 0x3E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x43, 0x10, 0xBA, 0x55, 0xBC, 0x3B, 0x38, 0x5D), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_19_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x25, 0x66, 0xFA, 0x05, 0x73, 0x03, 0x1B, 0x69), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x11, 0xA4, 0x66, 0x12, 0x96, 0x7B, 0x02, 0x4C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x44, 0xB5, 0xDE, 0x6D, 0x98, 0xD1, 0xD5, 0xA8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE2, 0xF5, 0x44, 0xB8, 0x8E, 0xF6, 0x8C, 0x05), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x68, 0x15, 0x2B, 0x72, 0xBC, 0x49, 0xE5, 0xDF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6C, 0x44, 0xD7, 0xDF, 0x8F, 0xEB, 0x8D, 0x80), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x05, 0x64, 0x88, 0xAA, 0xB7, 0xE4, 0x70, 0x1D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9C, 0x14, 0xBB, 0xE9, 0x9B, 0xB9, 0x65, 0x5D), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_19_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x66, 0x8E, 0x88, 0xF5, 0xF1, 0xC1, 0x89, 0xA2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x16, 0x30, 0x53, 0xE6, 0xFB, 0x2D, 0x82, 0xB4), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA7, 0xE4, 0xFF, 0xBA, 0x31, 0x79, 0xAB, 0xC2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x45, 0x09, 0xF7, 0xB7, 0x09, 0x78, 0x4C, 0x90), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x10, 0xAE, 0xC2, 0x44, 0xDC, 0x17, 0x78, 0x47), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC7, 0xD4, 0x17, 0x43, 0x19, 0x74, 0x9E, 0x23), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x15, 0x64, 0x3B, 0x73, 0xA2, 0x99, 0x27, 0x76), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x05, 0x74, 0x36, 0x5F, 0xD3, 0x14, 0xB1, 0x31), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_20_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAC, 0x07, 0xAB, 0xFD, 0x9B, 0x03, 0xC5, 0xD5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC7, 0xBE, 0xB0, 0x1D, 0xF2, 0x0C, 0x73, 0x73), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x99, 0xE7, 0x7B, 0x87, 0xD3, 0x34, 0xFD, 0xE2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9A, 0x25, 0x3D, 0xC7, 0x36, 0x83, 0x53, 0xDC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x22, 0x7C, 0xCF, 0x63, 0x55, 0x12, 0x11, 0xB0), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC0, 0x34, 0x4D, 0x27, 0x92, 0xAC, 0x18, 0x16), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x98, 0x42, 0x61, 0x9D, 0x2E, 0xFF, 0x13, 0x16), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF4, 0xDE, 0x92, 0x65, 0x57, 0x0D, 0xBC, 0x0A), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_20_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEF, 0x7B, 0x6E, 0xC6, 0x2A, 0x21, 0x74, 0x0A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x37, 0xA7, 0x53, 0x4D, 0x29, 0x36, 0xEF, 0xE5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE1, 0xD6, 0x41, 0xC7, 0x99, 0xAD, 0x50, 0x53), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x99, 0xAC, 0x41, 0x9F, 0xFB, 0x4C, 0x86, 0xF1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8B, 0xBB, 0xE6, 0x25, 0x28, 0xAA, 0xEB, 0x1E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x92, 0x04, 0xA2, 0xC3, 0xAA, 0x08, 0x8A, 0xCC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5A, 0x2B, 0x5B, 0xE2, 0x8D, 0x76, 0xEA, 0x34), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB3, 0x33, 0xD2, 0x21, 0x4D, 0x62, 0xE3, 0x8E), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_21_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF6, 0x06, 0x8B, 0x2B, 0xC2, 0xC4, 0xB1, 0xD2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFA, 0xF5, 0xA1, 0xC0, 0x03, 0x6A, 0x29, 0x12), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF5, 0xA9, 0xEF, 0x55, 0xB6, 0x1A, 0x9F, 0x6B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9B, 0x54, 0x32, 0xBE, 0x06, 0x43, 0xB5, 0xFD), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF7, 0xD6, 0xD9, 0x20, 0x89, 0xBE, 0xD4, 0x1B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE8, 0x26, 0x95, 0x10, 0xCE, 0xB4, 0x88, 0x79), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE6, 0xA6, 0x27, 0xAC, 0x32, 0xBA, 0xBD, 0xC7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA3, 0xA6, 0xAE, 0x9C, 0x7B, 0xBE, 0xA1, 0x63), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_21_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8B, 0xCD, 0x4D, 0x3D, 0xDF, 0x96, 0xBB, 0x7D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x77, 0xA7, 0x11, 0x06, 0xCC, 0x0E, 0x31, 0x81), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x20, 0xE4, 0xF4, 0xAD, 0x7B, 0x5F, 0xF1, 0xEF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE4, 0x54, 0xBE, 0xF4, 0x8A, 0x03, 0x47, 0xDF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB4, 0x53, 0x00, 0x7F, 0xB0, 0x8A, 0x68, 0xA6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA0, 0x16, 0xB1, 0x73, 0x6F, 0x5B, 0x0E, 0xC3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2A, 0x32, 0xE3, 0x43, 0x64, 0x75, 0xFB, 0xFB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA0, 0x18, 0x55, 0x8A, 0x4E, 0x6E, 0x35, 0x54), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_22_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x80, 0x97, 0x15, 0x1E, 0xCB, 0xF2, 0x9C, 0xA5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2B, 0xD1, 0xBB, 0xF3, 0x70, 0xAD, 0x13, 0xAD), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD8, 0x96, 0xA4, 0xC5, 0x5E, 0xDA, 0xD5, 0x57), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x07, 0x81, 0xE9, 0x65, 0x66, 0x76, 0x47, 0x45), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC9, 0x35, 0x87, 0x06, 0x73, 0xCF, 0x34, 0xD2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5A, 0x81, 0x15, 0x42, 0xA2, 0x79, 0x5B, 0x42), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x08, 0xA2, 0x7D, 0x09, 0x14, 0x64, 0xC6, 0xAE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5E, 0x6D, 0xC4, 0xED, 0xF1, 0xD6, 0xE9, 0x24), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_22_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB4, 0xD5, 0xBB, 0x25, 0xA3, 0xDD, 0xA3, 0x88), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x46, 0xF2, 0x68, 0x67, 0x39, 0x8F, 0x73, 0x93), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF0, 0x76, 0x28, 0x89, 0xAD, 0x32, 0xE0, 0xDF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF8, 0x90, 0xCC, 0x57, 0x58, 0xAA, 0xC9, 0x75), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5E, 0xD7, 0x43, 0xD2, 0xCE, 0x5E, 0xA0, 0x08), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x33, 0xB0, 0xB8, 0xA4, 0x9E, 0x96, 0x26, 0x86), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x94, 0x61, 0x1D, 0xF3, 0x65, 0x5E, 0x60, 0xCA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC7, 0x1E, 0x65, 0xED, 0xCF, 0x07, 0x60, 0x20), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_23_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA4, 0x30, 0x17, 0x8A, 0x91, 0x88, 0x0A, 0xA4), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x05, 0x7D, 0x18, 0xA4, 0xAC, 0x59, 0xFC, 0x5F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA4, 0x31, 0x8B, 0x25, 0x65, 0x39, 0x9A, 0xDC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x15, 0x16, 0x4B, 0x68, 0xBA, 0x59, 0x13, 0x2F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8D, 0xFD, 0xD3, 0xC5, 0x56, 0xC9, 0x8C, 0x5E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBC, 0xC6, 0x9F, 0xF4, 0xE6, 0xF7, 0xB4, 0x01), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2D, 0x7C, 0x03, 0x00, 0x26, 0x9F, 0xD8, 0x7B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x24, 0x1D, 0x6E, 0x00, 0xB9, 0x00, 0x6E, 0x93), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_23_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x75, 0x63, 0xDA, 0x03, 0x2B, 0xD5, 0x0B, 0xFE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x46, 0xFC, 0xE2, 0xC8, 0x47, 0xF0, 0xAE, 0xF2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x51, 0x4C, 0xF7, 0x50, 0x0C, 0x48, 0x06, 0x2A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDF, 0x2B, 0x32, 0x98, 0x0E, 0x7E, 0x61, 0x41), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5D, 0x02, 0x27, 0xFE, 0x75, 0x86, 0xDF, 0x24), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2B, 0x30, 0xB1, 0x22, 0x32, 0x1B, 0xFE, 0x24), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC2, 0x27, 0xF7, 0x78, 0x6F, 0xD7, 0xFD, 0xE4), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA0, 0x78, 0xCC, 0xEA, 0xC0, 0x50, 0x24, 0x44), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_24_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x37, 0x2B, 0x4F, 0x7F, 0x58, 0xE6, 0xC2, 0x70), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x37, 0x43, 0xD5, 0xA7, 0x35, 0x3C, 0x80, 0xB8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1A, 0x6D, 0x4B, 0x12, 0x00, 0x7B, 0xE6, 0xA6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x37, 0x15, 0xBD, 0xD0, 0x9B, 0xCA, 0xAA, 0x81), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCF, 0xCE, 0x9C, 0xE3, 0x8B, 0x60, 0x7A, 0x53), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0C, 0xDA, 0x4B, 0x03, 0xA7, 0x8D, 0x43, 0x22), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x57, 0xAF, 0x00, 0x2B, 0x32, 0xF0, 0x22, 0x68), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDC, 0xD9, 0x99, 0x99, 0xBE, 0x43, 0x99, 0x3E), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_24_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1F, 0x71, 0x41, 0xF4, 0xB5, 0xFD, 0xDD, 0x36), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9D, 0xE2, 0x20, 0x4C, 0xD1, 0x2E, 0x1F, 0x06), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x96, 0x43, 0x48, 0x76, 0x8A, 0x49, 0xAC, 0x87), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0C, 0x1A, 0x55, 0xA8, 0xA3, 0xD4, 0x57, 0x75), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7C, 0xA6, 0x84, 0x39, 0xC9, 0x13, 0xBB, 0x60), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD9, 0xFA, 0xA9, 0x70, 0xDE, 0x83, 0xDD, 0xC9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEC, 0xC9, 0xD9, 0x3E, 0x44, 0x91, 0x68, 0x7B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB6, 0x9F, 0x85, 0x6D, 0xF7, 0x54, 0x36, 0x82), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_25_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x68, 0x6B, 0xA6, 0xA3, 0xE5, 0xD4, 0x46, 0xDB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x23, 0x3E, 0xDC, 0x84, 0x7C, 0x7B, 0x24, 0x34), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x14, 0xED, 0x7F, 0x86, 0x07, 0x6C, 0x57, 0xCA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x95, 0x06, 0xFE, 0x52, 0x12, 0x79, 0x69, 0x56), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x84, 0xD1, 0x44, 0x5F, 0x21, 0x3A, 0xC3, 0x84), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5E, 0xD9, 0x4A, 0xC0, 0x75, 0xAB, 0x17, 0xAC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0x81, 0x94, 0xB6, 0x80, 0x6B, 0x6F, 0xC3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x07, 0xBE, 0x8E, 0xA5, 0xAA, 0xBC, 0x1E, 0x3E), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_25_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x89, 0xC7, 0x85, 0xA6, 0x59, 0x9B, 0xB1, 0x52), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1C, 0xCE, 0x40, 0xD1, 0xFB, 0xDF, 0x94, 0xF7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x18, 0xB8, 0x5E, 0xBF, 0x45, 0xA8, 0x2D, 0x2D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x98, 0x9C, 0x06, 0x1B, 0xA9, 0x57, 0xB9, 0x79), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x53, 0xE9, 0xCE, 0xA2, 0xD3, 0x74, 0xA1, 0x3C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAA, 0x5F, 0x34, 0x78, 0xDB, 0xAE, 0x3A, 0x14), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7D, 0x32, 0x84, 0x3E, 0x68, 0x6A, 0x43, 0x0F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8C, 0xBC, 0x39, 0x36, 0xA4, 0xC5, 0xBB, 0x11), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_26_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8C, 0x07, 0xA2, 0xB5, 0xC9, 0x0F, 0x4D, 0x0F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE3, 0x1D, 0x67, 0xE6, 0xF1, 0x46, 0xEB, 0x71), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD7, 0x41, 0x23, 0x95, 0xE7, 0xE0, 0x10, 0xDD), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBE, 0x69, 0xFE, 0x68, 0x8C, 0xC6, 0x5F, 0xB6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE3, 0xB9, 0x2B, 0x3D, 0xD2, 0x4F, 0xD8, 0x1A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA3, 0x09, 0xF5, 0x5F, 0xCF, 0xF6, 0x91, 0x57), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x65, 0x15, 0x42, 0x6B, 0x6D, 0xB5, 0xF3, 0xB6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBF, 0x56, 0x9D, 0xC5, 0xFF, 0xCA, 0x13, 0x9B), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_26_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4D, 0x38, 0xE6, 0x23, 0x63, 0x48, 0x3C, 0xCA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD2, 0x68, 0x3C, 0xD1, 0x3B, 0xE9, 0x3B, 0x82), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB5, 0x08, 0x54, 0x49, 0xD1, 0x46, 0x45, 0x13), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x07, 0x70, 0x52, 0x6E, 0x79, 0xC4, 0x5E, 0x95), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x36, 0xDF, 0xE8, 0x5A, 0x32, 0x81, 0xDA, 0xD3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3C, 0x2D, 0x94, 0x5B, 0xB5, 0x35, 0x9F, 0x0A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2A, 0x12, 0x8D, 0xC3, 0x36, 0x36, 0xB2, 0x2A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x39, 0x2F, 0x22, 0x38, 0x5B, 0x18, 0x4C, 0x35), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_27_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x10, 0xC1, 0x22, 0x0E, 0xF0, 0x73, 0x11, 0x05), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB2, 0xAE, 0xA4, 0x56, 0x18, 0x61, 0x66, 0x12), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x79, 0xFB, 0x72, 0x08, 0x84, 0x38, 0x51, 0xB0), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDA, 0x86, 0xA8, 0xB9, 0x31, 0x99, 0x29, 0xC3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8A, 0xFB, 0xC3, 0x42, 0xB3, 0xC7, 0x6F, 0x3A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD8, 0xF8, 0xE1, 0x09, 0xBE, 0x75, 0xB0, 0x22), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5A, 0x7D, 0xFF, 0xF4, 0x99, 0xFC, 0x13, 0xAB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE6, 0x1B, 0x84, 0x81, 0x42, 0x22, 0xC6, 0x3D), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_27_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x21, 0xE0, 0x37, 0xA4, 0xA0, 0x2F, 0x38, 0x7F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD0, 0x3D, 0xB7, 0x40, 0x2F, 0x39, 0x3C, 0x7A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7A, 0x3B, 0x8A, 0x51, 0xAE, 0x40, 0x49, 0x7A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x36, 0x20, 0x9F, 0xDD, 0xA9, 0xD0, 0x77, 0xC7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x78, 0x1D, 0x64, 0xDA, 0xA0, 0x53, 0xC7, 0x7D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x37, 0x7B, 0x66, 0x55, 0x94, 0xD1, 0x51, 0x44), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0E, 0xA9, 0xB5, 0x5B, 0x38, 0x35, 0x40, 0xC0), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC8, 0xC9, 0x0F, 0xF0, 0x73, 0x79, 0x43, 0x61), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_28_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x10, 0x47, 0x45, 0x69, 0x80, 0x72, 0x72, 0x42), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x70, 0x11, 0x99, 0x59, 0xDB, 0x48, 0x80, 0x39), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x75, 0x6E, 0x3D, 0xFC, 0x37, 0x15, 0xF4, 0xBF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x17, 0xBB, 0x5B, 0xA6, 0x35, 0x8D, 0x28, 0x20), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAB, 0x1A, 0x3B, 0x2C, 0x8F, 0xD3, 0xAA, 0x2D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x55, 0x1C, 0x1A, 0xF8, 0x02, 0xD9, 0x7B, 0x41), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAF, 0x69, 0xAC, 0xF8, 0x54, 0x31, 0x14, 0xA1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x41, 0x8A, 0xE6, 0xDE, 0x58, 0xB9, 0xC4, 0x7A), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_28_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x57, 0x83, 0x52, 0xFE, 0xF9, 0x7B, 0xE9, 0x1F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x07, 0xA2, 0x55, 0x46, 0x15, 0x49, 0xC1, 0x3A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1D, 0xBC, 0x5C, 0x91, 0xBD, 0xB9, 0x9C, 0xF4), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBB, 0xFD, 0xB1, 0x4E, 0x5F, 0x74, 0xEE, 0x53), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB1, 0x8B, 0xD8, 0x8B, 0x17, 0x73, 0x1B, 0x96), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x22, 0x92, 0xD7, 0x67, 0x06, 0xAD, 0x25, 0xCD), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x01, 0x0F, 0x80, 0x24, 0xE2, 0x27, 0x5F, 0x8B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x61, 0x1C, 0xCE, 0xD0, 0x67, 0xCA, 0xD4, 0x0B), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_29_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x87, 0xF1, 0xDD, 0x33, 0x66, 0xF9, 0x05, 0xD6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1D, 0xE5, 0x6B, 0x79, 0xBD, 0x48, 0x42, 0xAA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD1, 0x14, 0x52, 0xE3, 0x53, 0xB4, 0x50, 0xD4), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x32, 0x84, 0x6C, 0xCF, 0xDA, 0xB2, 0x20, 0x0A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x70, 0xD6, 0x1A, 0xE5, 0xE2, 0x29, 0x70, 0xCE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD5, 0x61, 0xFE, 0xBB, 0x21, 0x82, 0xD1, 0xFE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2C, 0xF0, 0x9C, 0x8B, 0x1A, 0x42, 0x30, 0x06), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x43, 0xD6, 0x49, 0x81, 0x92, 0xF1, 0xD0, 0x90), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_29_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC9, 0x91, 0x93, 0x6A, 0xA6, 0x22, 0xE9, 0xD6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x09, 0xDC, 0xC3, 0x69, 0x11, 0x95, 0x7D, 0xEC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1C, 0xA3, 0x9D, 0x87, 0x5E, 0x64, 0x41, 0xA2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBE, 0x87, 0x5A, 0x15, 0xBD, 0x6E, 0x3C, 0x8D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD0, 0x8D, 0x50, 0xCC, 0xCF, 0xB7, 0x8F, 0x0B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x38, 0x65, 0xCD, 0x31, 0x30, 0xF1, 0x68, 0x13), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x10, 0x5C, 0x66, 0x67, 0x92, 0x30, 0x57, 0x95), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x23, 0x9B, 0x01, 0x3D, 0x20, 0x8B, 0xD1, 0x0D), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_30_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAB, 0xC0, 0xE6, 0x4F, 0xDE, 0x62, 0xAB, 0xB3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA4, 0x48, 0xB3, 0x1C, 0x0F, 0x16, 0x93, 0x45), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x77, 0x63, 0xBD, 0x1F, 0x16, 0x50, 0x56, 0x98), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5D, 0x06, 0xBC, 0xE9, 0x27, 0x1C, 0x9A, 0x7B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF8, 0xFE, 0x21, 0xC5, 0x39, 0x55, 0xE1, 0xFD), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF6, 0xA8, 0xD0, 0x96, 0x0E, 0xB5, 0xB2, 0x84), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3D, 0xE7, 0x4B, 0xF3, 0x11, 0x0C, 0xC9, 0x5B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x43, 0x3A, 0xC4, 0x87, 0x71, 0xEE, 0xFA, 0x18), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_30_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA7, 0x77, 0xEE, 0x81, 0x5E, 0x96, 0xEA, 0x4B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEE, 0xDF, 0xA9, 0xF4, 0x4F, 0x7C, 0xB2, 0x43), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9F, 0xD4, 0xDF, 0x35, 0x63, 0x47, 0x25, 0x8A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA5, 0x3D, 0xFF, 0xA4, 0x02, 0xC3, 0x95, 0x11), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD5, 0x10, 0x78, 0xD1, 0x2B, 0xB7, 0xBE, 0x0E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0A, 0xE9, 0x57, 0xF9, 0xE0, 0xD8, 0xFC, 0xBC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF3, 0xC4, 0x01, 0xD6, 0xB4, 0xE7, 0x78, 0xE2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x02, 0x6C, 0xB9, 0x13, 0xA4, 0xE8, 0x6D, 0x6F), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_31_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE8, 0xB0, 0xC9, 0xCD, 0xBF, 0xA2, 0x1E, 0x63), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDD, 0x4F, 0x86, 0x22, 0x9B, 0xEA, 0xE8, 0xBB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x50, 0x46, 0xDF, 0x43, 0xB9, 0x82, 0x2D, 0x0A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x07, 0x32, 0xF1, 0x4E, 0x95, 0x41, 0xAE, 0x8E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x52, 0x93, 0x26, 0xFC, 0xD3, 0x90, 0xDC, 0xEB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x04, 0x05, 0x45, 0xCA, 0xF9, 0x5A, 0x89, 0x93), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC5, 0x82, 0x63, 0x4E, 0x55, 0x1D, 0x3A, 0x08), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7C, 0x69, 0x52, 0x49, 0xE9, 0xED, 0x57, 0x34), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_31_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x70, 0x64, 0xE9, 0xAC, 0x4C, 0x4A, 0xEA, 0x25), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE9, 0xE9, 0x0B, 0x99, 0xE7, 0xF9, 0xA9, 0x2C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x24, 0x0C, 0xC1, 0xF4, 0x8D, 0x07, 0xB6, 0xB1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAD, 0x68, 0xFA, 0x35, 0xE4, 0x9E, 0xAE, 0xD9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF0, 0x2D, 0x1A, 0x13, 0x8E, 0x02, 0xE2, 0x63), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x27, 0x38, 0x28, 0x86, 0x46, 0x7B, 0x3A, 0xE1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3F, 0x4C, 0x64, 0x59, 0x0A, 0xF9, 0x02, 0xC4), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x41, 0x4F, 0x23, 0xA2, 0xC3, 0xD5, 0xEF, 0x42), +}; +static const mbedtls_ecp_point brainpoolP512r1_T[32] = { + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z1(brainpoolP512r1_T_0_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_0_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_1_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_1_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_2_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_2_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_3_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_3_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_4_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_4_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_5_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_5_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_6_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_6_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_7_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_7_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_8_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_8_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_9_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_9_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_10_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_10_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_11_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_11_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_12_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_12_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_13_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_13_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_14_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_14_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_15_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_15_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_16_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_16_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_17_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_17_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_18_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_18_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_19_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_19_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_20_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_20_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_21_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_21_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_22_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_22_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_23_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_23_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_24_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_24_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_25_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_25_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_26_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_26_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_27_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_27_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_28_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_28_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_29_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_29_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_30_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_30_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_31_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_31_Y), +}; +#else +#define brainpoolP512r1_T NULL +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED */ + + +#if defined(ECP_LOAD_GROUP) || defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED) +/* + * Create an MPI from embedded constants + * (assumes len is an exact multiple of sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint) and + * len < 1048576) + */ +static inline void ecp_mpi_load(mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi_uint *p, size_t len) +{ + X->s = 1; + X->n = (unsigned short) (len / sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint)); + X->p = (mbedtls_mpi_uint *) p; +} +#endif + +#if defined(ECP_LOAD_GROUP) +/* + * Set an MPI to static value 1 + */ +static inline void ecp_mpi_set1(mbedtls_mpi *X) +{ + X->s = 1; + X->n = 1; + X->p = mpi_one; +} + +/* + * Make group available from embedded constants + */ +static int ecp_group_load(mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *p, size_t plen, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *a, size_t alen, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *b, size_t blen, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *gx, size_t gxlen, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *gy, size_t gylen, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *n, size_t nlen, + const mbedtls_ecp_point *T) +{ + ecp_mpi_load(&grp->P, p, plen); + if (a != NULL) { + ecp_mpi_load(&grp->A, a, alen); + } + ecp_mpi_load(&grp->B, b, blen); + ecp_mpi_load(&grp->N, n, nlen); + + ecp_mpi_load(&grp->G.X, gx, gxlen); + ecp_mpi_load(&grp->G.Y, gy, gylen); + ecp_mpi_set1(&grp->G.Z); + + grp->pbits = mbedtls_mpi_bitlen(&grp->P); + grp->nbits = mbedtls_mpi_bitlen(&grp->N); + + grp->h = 1; + + grp->T = (mbedtls_ecp_point *) T; + /* + * Set T_size to 0 to prevent T free by mbedtls_ecp_group_free. + */ + grp->T_size = 0; + + return 0; +} +#endif /* ECP_LOAD_GROUP */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NIST_OPTIM) +/* Forward declarations */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED) +static int ecp_mod_p192(mbedtls_mpi *); +MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE +int mbedtls_ecp_mod_p192_raw(mbedtls_mpi_uint *Np, size_t Nn); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED) +static int ecp_mod_p224(mbedtls_mpi *); +MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE +int mbedtls_ecp_mod_p224_raw(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, size_t X_limbs); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED) +static int ecp_mod_p256(mbedtls_mpi *); +MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE +int mbedtls_ecp_mod_p256_raw(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, size_t X_limbs); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED) +static int ecp_mod_p384(mbedtls_mpi *); +MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE +int mbedtls_ecp_mod_p384_raw(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, size_t X_limbs); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED) +static int ecp_mod_p521(mbedtls_mpi *); +MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE +int mbedtls_ecp_mod_p521_raw(mbedtls_mpi_uint *N_p, size_t N_n); +#endif + +#define NIST_MODP(P) grp->modp = ecp_mod_ ## P; +#else +#define NIST_MODP(P) +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_NIST_OPTIM */ + +/* Additional forward declarations */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED) +static int ecp_mod_p255(mbedtls_mpi *); +MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE +int mbedtls_ecp_mod_p255_raw(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, size_t X_limbs); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED) +static int ecp_mod_p448(mbedtls_mpi *); +MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE +int mbedtls_ecp_mod_p448_raw(mbedtls_mpi_uint *, size_t); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED) +static int ecp_mod_p192k1(mbedtls_mpi *); +MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE +int mbedtls_ecp_mod_p192k1_raw(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, size_t X_limbs); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED) +static int ecp_mod_p224k1(mbedtls_mpi *); +MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE +int mbedtls_ecp_mod_p224k1_raw(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, size_t X_limbs); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED) +static int ecp_mod_p256k1(mbedtls_mpi *); +MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE +int mbedtls_ecp_mod_p256k1_raw(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, size_t X_limbs); +#endif + +#if defined(ECP_LOAD_GROUP) +#define LOAD_GROUP_A(G) ecp_group_load(grp, \ + G ## _p, sizeof(G ## _p), \ + G ## _a, sizeof(G ## _a), \ + G ## _b, sizeof(G ## _b), \ + G ## _gx, sizeof(G ## _gx), \ + G ## _gy, sizeof(G ## _gy), \ + G ## _n, sizeof(G ## _n), \ + G ## _T \ + ) + +#define LOAD_GROUP(G) ecp_group_load(grp, \ + G ## _p, sizeof(G ## _p), \ + NULL, 0, \ + G ## _b, sizeof(G ## _b), \ + G ## _gx, sizeof(G ## _gx), \ + G ## _gy, sizeof(G ## _gy), \ + G ## _n, sizeof(G ## _n), \ + G ## _T \ + ) +#endif /* ECP_LOAD_GROUP */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED) +/* Constants used by ecp_use_curve25519() */ +static const mbedtls_mpi_sint curve25519_a24 = 0x01DB42; + +/* P = 2^255 - 19 */ +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint curve25519_p[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xED, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0X7F) +}; + +/* N = 2^252 + 27742317777372353535851937790883648493 */ +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint curve25519_n[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0XED, 0XD3, 0XF5, 0X5C, 0X1A, 0X63, 0X12, 0X58), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0XD6, 0X9C, 0XF7, 0XA2, 0XDE, 0XF9, 0XDE, 0X14), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0X00, 0X00, 0X00, 0X00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x10) +}; + +/* + * Specialized function for creating the Curve25519 group + */ +static int ecp_use_curve25519(mbedtls_ecp_group *grp) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + /* Actually ( A + 2 ) / 4 */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_lset(&grp->A, curve25519_a24)); + + ecp_mpi_load(&grp->P, curve25519_p, sizeof(curve25519_p)); + + grp->pbits = mbedtls_mpi_bitlen(&grp->P); + + ecp_mpi_load(&grp->N, curve25519_n, sizeof(curve25519_n)); + + /* Y intentionally not set, since we use x/z coordinates. + * This is used as a marker to identify Montgomery curves! */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_lset(&grp->G.X, 9)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_lset(&grp->G.Z, 1)); + mbedtls_mpi_free(&grp->G.Y); + + /* Actually, the required msb for private keys */ + grp->nbits = 254; + +cleanup: + if (ret != 0) { + mbedtls_ecp_group_free(grp); + } + + return ret; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED) +/* Constants used by ecp_use_curve448() */ +static const mbedtls_mpi_sint curve448_a24 = 0x98AA; + +/* P = 2^448 - 2^224 - 1 */ +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint curve448_p[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFE, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0X00, 0X00, 0X00, 0X00, 0X00, 0X00, 0X00, 0X00) +}; + +/* N = 2^446 - 13818066809895115352007386748515426880336692474882178609894547503885 */ +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint curve448_n[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0XF3, 0X44, 0X58, 0XAB, 0X92, 0XC2, 0X78, 0X23), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0X55, 0X8F, 0XC5, 0X8D, 0X72, 0XC2, 0X6C, 0X21), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0X90, 0X36, 0XD6, 0XAE, 0X49, 0XDB, 0X4E, 0XC4), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0XE9, 0X23, 0XCA, 0X7C, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0X3F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0X00, 0X00, 0X00, 0X00, 0X00, 0X00, 0X00, 0X00) +}; + +/* + * Specialized function for creating the Curve448 group + */ +static int ecp_use_curve448(mbedtls_ecp_group *grp) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + /* Actually ( A + 2 ) / 4 */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_lset(&grp->A, curve448_a24)); + + ecp_mpi_load(&grp->P, curve448_p, sizeof(curve448_p)); + grp->pbits = mbedtls_mpi_bitlen(&grp->P); + + /* Y intentionally not set, since we use x/z coordinates. + * This is used as a marker to identify Montgomery curves! */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_lset(&grp->G.X, 5)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_lset(&grp->G.Z, 1)); + mbedtls_mpi_free(&grp->G.Y); + + ecp_mpi_load(&grp->N, curve448_n, sizeof(curve448_n)); + + /* Actually, the required msb for private keys */ + grp->nbits = 447; + +cleanup: + if (ret != 0) { + mbedtls_ecp_group_free(grp); + } + + return ret; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED */ + +/* + * Set a group using well-known domain parameters + */ +int mbedtls_ecp_group_load(mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_group_id id) +{ + mbedtls_ecp_group_free(grp); + + mbedtls_ecp_group_init(grp); + + grp->id = id; + + switch (id) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED) + case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1: + NIST_MODP(p192); + return LOAD_GROUP(secp192r1); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED) + case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1: + NIST_MODP(p224); + return LOAD_GROUP(secp224r1); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED) + case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1: + NIST_MODP(p256); + return LOAD_GROUP(secp256r1); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED) + case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1: + NIST_MODP(p384); + return LOAD_GROUP(secp384r1); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED) + case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1: + NIST_MODP(p521); + return LOAD_GROUP(secp521r1); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED) + case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1: + grp->modp = ecp_mod_p192k1; + return LOAD_GROUP_A(secp192k1); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED) + case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1: + grp->modp = ecp_mod_p224k1; + return LOAD_GROUP_A(secp224k1); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED) + case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1: + grp->modp = ecp_mod_p256k1; + return LOAD_GROUP_A(secp256k1); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED) + case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1: + return LOAD_GROUP_A(brainpoolP256r1); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLED) + case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1: + return LOAD_GROUP_A(brainpoolP384r1); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED) + case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1: + return LOAD_GROUP_A(brainpoolP512r1); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED) + case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519: + grp->modp = ecp_mod_p255; + return ecp_use_curve25519(grp); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED) + case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448: + grp->modp = ecp_mod_p448; + return ecp_use_curve448(grp); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED */ + + default: + grp->id = MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + } +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NIST_OPTIM) +/* + * Fast reduction modulo the primes used by the NIST curves. + * + * These functions are critical for speed, but not needed for correct + * operations. So, we make the choice to heavily rely on the internals of our + * bignum library, which creates a tight coupling between these functions and + * our MPI implementation. However, the coupling between the ECP module and + * MPI remains loose, since these functions can be deactivated at will. + */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED) +/* + * Compared to the way things are presented in FIPS 186-3 D.2, + * we proceed in columns, from right (least significant chunk) to left, + * adding chunks to N in place, and keeping a carry for the next chunk. + * This avoids moving things around in memory, and uselessly adding zeros, + * compared to the more straightforward, line-oriented approach. + * + * For this prime we need to handle data in chunks of 64 bits. + * Since this is always a multiple of our basic mbedtls_mpi_uint, we can + * use a mbedtls_mpi_uint * to designate such a chunk, and small loops to handle it. + */ + +/* Add 64-bit chunks (dst += src) and update carry */ +static inline void add64(mbedtls_mpi_uint *dst, mbedtls_mpi_uint *src, mbedtls_mpi_uint *carry) +{ + unsigned char i; + mbedtls_mpi_uint c = 0; + for (i = 0; i < 8 / sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint); i++, dst++, src++) { + *dst += c; c = (*dst < c); + *dst += *src; c += (*dst < *src); + } + *carry += c; +} + +/* Add carry to a 64-bit chunk and update carry */ +static inline void carry64(mbedtls_mpi_uint *dst, mbedtls_mpi_uint *carry) +{ + unsigned char i; + for (i = 0; i < 8 / sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint); i++, dst++) { + *dst += *carry; + *carry = (*dst < *carry); + } +} + +#define WIDTH 8 / sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint) +#define A(i) Np + (i) * WIDTH +#define ADD(i) add64(p, A(i), &c) +#define NEXT p += WIDTH; carry64(p, &c) +#define LAST p += WIDTH; do *p = 0; while (++p < end) +#define RESET last_carry[0] = c; c = 0; p = Np +#define ADD_LAST add64(p, last_carry, &c) + +/* + * Fast quasi-reduction modulo p192 (FIPS 186-3 D.2.1) + */ +static int ecp_mod_p192(mbedtls_mpi *N) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t expected_width = BITS_TO_LIMBS(192) * 2; + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_grow(N, expected_width)); + ret = mbedtls_ecp_mod_p192_raw(N->p, expected_width); + +cleanup: + return ret; +} + +MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE +int mbedtls_ecp_mod_p192_raw(mbedtls_mpi_uint *Np, size_t Nn) +{ + mbedtls_mpi_uint c = 0, last_carry[WIDTH] = { 0 }; + mbedtls_mpi_uint *p, *end; + + if (Nn != BITS_TO_LIMBS(192) * 2) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + p = Np; + end = p + Nn; + + ADD(3); ADD(5); NEXT; // A0 += A3 + A5 + ADD(3); ADD(4); ADD(5); NEXT; // A1 += A3 + A4 + A5 + ADD(4); ADD(5); // A2 += A4 + A5 + + RESET; + + /* Use the reduction for the carry as well: + * 2^192 * last_carry = 2^64 * last_carry + last_carry mod P192 + * It can generate a carry. */ + ADD_LAST; NEXT; // A0 += last_carry + ADD_LAST; NEXT; // A1 += last_carry + // A2 += carry + + RESET; + + /* Use the reduction for the carry as well: + * 2^192 * last_carry = 2^64 * last_carry + last_carry mod P192 + */ + ADD_LAST; NEXT; // A0 += last_carry + ADD_LAST; NEXT; // A1 += last_carry + // A2 += carry + + LAST; + + return 0; +} + +#undef WIDTH +#undef A +#undef ADD +#undef NEXT +#undef LAST +#undef RESET +#undef ADD_LAST +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED) + +/* + * The reader is advised to first understand ecp_mod_p192() since the same + * general structure is used here, but with additional complications: + * (1) chunks of 32 bits, and (2) subtractions. + */ + +/* + * For these primes, we need to handle data in chunks of 32 bits. + * This makes it more complicated if we use 64 bits limbs in MPI, + * which prevents us from using a uniform access method as for p192. + * + * So, we define a mini abstraction layer to access 32 bit chunks, + * load them in 'cur' for work, and store them back from 'cur' when done. + * + * While at it, also define the size of N in terms of 32-bit chunks. + */ +#define LOAD32 cur = A(i); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT32) /* 32 bit */ + +#define MAX32 X_limbs +#define A(j) X[j] +#define STORE32 X[i] = (mbedtls_mpi_uint) cur; +#define STORE0 X[i] = 0; + +#else /* 64 bit */ + +#define MAX32 X_limbs * 2 +#define A(j) \ + (j) % 2 ? \ + (uint32_t) (X[(j) / 2] >> 32) : \ + (uint32_t) (X[(j) / 2]) +#define STORE32 \ + if (i % 2) { \ + X[i/2] &= 0x00000000FFFFFFFF; \ + X[i/2] |= (uint64_t) (cur) << 32; \ + } else { \ + X[i/2] &= 0xFFFFFFFF00000000; \ + X[i/2] |= (uint32_t) cur; \ + } + +#define STORE0 \ + if (i % 2) { \ + X[i/2] &= 0x00000000FFFFFFFF; \ + } else { \ + X[i/2] &= 0xFFFFFFFF00000000; \ + } + +#endif + +static inline int8_t extract_carry(int64_t cur) +{ + return (int8_t) (cur >> 32); +} + +#define ADD(j) cur += A(j) +#define SUB(j) cur -= A(j) + +#define ADD_CARRY(cc) cur += (cc) +#define SUB_CARRY(cc) cur -= (cc) + +#define ADD_LAST ADD_CARRY(last_c) +#define SUB_LAST SUB_CARRY(last_c) + +/* + * Helpers for the main 'loop' + */ +#define INIT(b) \ + int8_t c = 0, last_c; \ + int64_t cur; \ + size_t i = 0; \ + LOAD32; + +#define NEXT \ + c = extract_carry(cur); \ + STORE32; i++; LOAD32; \ + ADD_CARRY(c); + +#define RESET \ + c = extract_carry(cur); \ + last_c = c; \ + STORE32; i = 0; LOAD32; \ + c = 0; \ + +#define LAST \ + c = extract_carry(cur); \ + STORE32; i++; \ + if (c != 0) \ + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA; \ + while (i < MAX32) { STORE0; i++; } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED) + +/* + * Fast quasi-reduction modulo p224 (FIPS 186-3 D.2.2) + */ +static int ecp_mod_p224(mbedtls_mpi *N) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t expected_width = BITS_TO_LIMBS(224) * 2; + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_grow(N, expected_width)); + ret = mbedtls_ecp_mod_p224_raw(N->p, expected_width); +cleanup: + return ret; +} + +MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE +int mbedtls_ecp_mod_p224_raw(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, size_t X_limbs) +{ + if (X_limbs != BITS_TO_LIMBS(224) * 2) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + INIT(224); + + SUB(7); SUB(11); NEXT; // A0 += -A7 - A11 + SUB(8); SUB(12); NEXT; // A1 += -A8 - A12 + SUB(9); SUB(13); NEXT; // A2 += -A9 - A13 + SUB(10); ADD(7); ADD(11); NEXT; // A3 += -A10 + A7 + A11 + SUB(11); ADD(8); ADD(12); NEXT; // A4 += -A11 + A8 + A12 + SUB(12); ADD(9); ADD(13); NEXT; // A5 += -A12 + A9 + A13 + SUB(13); ADD(10); // A6 += -A13 + A10 + + RESET; + + /* Use 2^224 = P + 2^96 - 1 to modulo reduce the final carry */ + SUB_LAST; NEXT; // A0 -= last_c + ; NEXT; // A1 + ; NEXT; // A2 + ADD_LAST; NEXT; // A3 += last_c + ; NEXT; // A4 + ; NEXT; // A5 + // A6 + + /* The carry reduction cannot generate a carry + * (see commit 73e8553 for details)*/ + + LAST; + + return 0; +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED) + +/* + * Fast quasi-reduction modulo p256 (FIPS 186-3 D.2.3) + */ +static int ecp_mod_p256(mbedtls_mpi *N) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t expected_width = BITS_TO_LIMBS(256) * 2; + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_grow(N, expected_width)); + ret = mbedtls_ecp_mod_p256_raw(N->p, expected_width); +cleanup: + return ret; +} + +MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE +int mbedtls_ecp_mod_p256_raw(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, size_t X_limbs) +{ + if (X_limbs != BITS_TO_LIMBS(256) * 2) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + INIT(256); + + ADD(8); ADD(9); + SUB(11); SUB(12); SUB(13); SUB(14); NEXT; // A0 + + ADD(9); ADD(10); + SUB(12); SUB(13); SUB(14); SUB(15); NEXT; // A1 + + ADD(10); ADD(11); + SUB(13); SUB(14); SUB(15); NEXT; // A2 + + ADD(11); ADD(11); ADD(12); ADD(12); ADD(13); + SUB(15); SUB(8); SUB(9); NEXT; // A3 + + ADD(12); ADD(12); ADD(13); ADD(13); ADD(14); + SUB(9); SUB(10); NEXT; // A4 + + ADD(13); ADD(13); ADD(14); ADD(14); ADD(15); + SUB(10); SUB(11); NEXT; // A5 + + ADD(14); ADD(14); ADD(15); ADD(15); ADD(14); ADD(13); + SUB(8); SUB(9); NEXT; // A6 + + ADD(15); ADD(15); ADD(15); ADD(8); + SUB(10); SUB(11); SUB(12); SUB(13); // A7 + + RESET; + + /* Use 2^224 * (2^32 - 1) + 2^192 + 2^96 - 1 + * to modulo reduce the final carry. */ + ADD_LAST; NEXT; // A0 + ; NEXT; // A1 + ; NEXT; // A2 + SUB_LAST; NEXT; // A3 + ; NEXT; // A4 + ; NEXT; // A5 + SUB_LAST; NEXT; // A6 + ADD_LAST; // A7 + + RESET; + + /* Use 2^224 * (2^32 - 1) + 2^192 + 2^96 - 1 + * to modulo reduce the carry generated by the previous reduction. */ + ADD_LAST; NEXT; // A0 + ; NEXT; // A1 + ; NEXT; // A2 + SUB_LAST; NEXT; // A3 + ; NEXT; // A4 + ; NEXT; // A5 + SUB_LAST; NEXT; // A6 + ADD_LAST; // A7 + + LAST; + + return 0; +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED) +/* + * Fast quasi-reduction modulo p384 (FIPS 186-3 D.2.4) + */ +static int ecp_mod_p384(mbedtls_mpi *N) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t expected_width = BITS_TO_LIMBS(384) * 2; + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_grow(N, expected_width)); + ret = mbedtls_ecp_mod_p384_raw(N->p, expected_width); +cleanup: + return ret; +} + +MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE +int mbedtls_ecp_mod_p384_raw(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, size_t X_limbs) +{ + if (X_limbs != BITS_TO_LIMBS(384) * 2) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + INIT(384); + + ADD(12); ADD(21); ADD(20); + SUB(23); NEXT; // A0 + + ADD(13); ADD(22); ADD(23); + SUB(12); SUB(20); NEXT; // A1 + + ADD(14); ADD(23); + SUB(13); SUB(21); NEXT; // A2 + + ADD(15); ADD(12); ADD(20); ADD(21); + SUB(14); SUB(22); SUB(23); NEXT; // A3 + + ADD(21); ADD(21); ADD(16); ADD(13); ADD(12); ADD(20); ADD(22); + SUB(15); SUB(23); SUB(23); NEXT; // A4 + + ADD(22); ADD(22); ADD(17); ADD(14); ADD(13); ADD(21); ADD(23); + SUB(16); NEXT; // A5 + + ADD(23); ADD(23); ADD(18); ADD(15); ADD(14); ADD(22); + SUB(17); NEXT; // A6 + + ADD(19); ADD(16); ADD(15); ADD(23); + SUB(18); NEXT; // A7 + + ADD(20); ADD(17); ADD(16); + SUB(19); NEXT; // A8 + + ADD(21); ADD(18); ADD(17); + SUB(20); NEXT; // A9 + + ADD(22); ADD(19); ADD(18); + SUB(21); NEXT; // A10 + + ADD(23); ADD(20); ADD(19); + SUB(22); // A11 + + RESET; + + /* Use 2^384 = P + 2^128 + 2^96 - 2^32 + 1 to modulo reduce the final carry */ + ADD_LAST; NEXT; // A0 + SUB_LAST; NEXT; // A1 + ; NEXT; // A2 + ADD_LAST; NEXT; // A3 + ADD_LAST; NEXT; // A4 + ; NEXT; // A5 + ; NEXT; // A6 + ; NEXT; // A7 + ; NEXT; // A8 + ; NEXT; // A9 + ; NEXT; // A10 + // A11 + + RESET; + + ADD_LAST; NEXT; // A0 + SUB_LAST; NEXT; // A1 + ; NEXT; // A2 + ADD_LAST; NEXT; // A3 + ADD_LAST; NEXT; // A4 + ; NEXT; // A5 + ; NEXT; // A6 + ; NEXT; // A7 + ; NEXT; // A8 + ; NEXT; // A9 + ; NEXT; // A10 + // A11 + + LAST; + + return 0; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED */ + +#undef LOAD32 +#undef MAX32 +#undef A +#undef STORE32 +#undef STORE0 +#undef ADD +#undef SUB +#undef ADD_CARRY +#undef SUB_CARRY +#undef ADD_LAST +#undef SUB_LAST +#undef INIT +#undef NEXT +#undef RESET +#undef LAST + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED || + MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED || + MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED) +/* Size of p521 in terms of mbedtls_mpi_uint */ +#define P521_WIDTH (521 / 8 / sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint) + 1) + +/* Bits to keep in the most significant mbedtls_mpi_uint */ +#define P521_MASK 0x01FF + +/* + * Fast quasi-reduction modulo p521 = 2^521 - 1 (FIPS 186-3 D.2.5) + */ +static int ecp_mod_p521(mbedtls_mpi *N) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t expected_width = BITS_TO_LIMBS(521) * 2; + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_grow(N, expected_width)); + ret = mbedtls_ecp_mod_p521_raw(N->p, expected_width); +cleanup: + return ret; +} + +MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE +int mbedtls_ecp_mod_p521_raw(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, size_t X_limbs) +{ + mbedtls_mpi_uint carry = 0; + + if (X_limbs != BITS_TO_LIMBS(521) * 2) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + /* Step 1: Reduction to P521_WIDTH limbs */ + /* Helper references for bottom part of X */ + mbedtls_mpi_uint *X0 = X; + size_t X0_limbs = P521_WIDTH; + /* Helper references for top part of X */ + mbedtls_mpi_uint *X1 = X + X0_limbs; + size_t X1_limbs = X_limbs - X0_limbs; + /* Split X as X0 + 2^P521_WIDTH X1 and compute X0 + 2^(biL - 9) X1. + * (We are using that 2^P521_WIDTH = 2^(512 + biL) and that + * 2^(512 + biL) X1 = 2^(biL - 9) X1 mod P521.) + * The high order limb of the result will be held in carry and the rest + * in X0 (that is the result will be represented as + * 2^P521_WIDTH carry + X0). + * + * Also, note that the resulting carry is either 0 or 1: + * X0 < 2^P521_WIDTH = 2^(512 + biL) and X1 < 2^(P521_WIDTH-biL) = 2^512 + * therefore + * X0 + 2^(biL - 9) X1 < 2^(512 + biL) + 2^(512 + biL - 9) + * which in turn is less than 2 * 2^(512 + biL). + */ + mbedtls_mpi_uint shift = ((mbedtls_mpi_uint) 1u) << (biL - 9); + carry = mbedtls_mpi_core_mla(X0, X0_limbs, X1, X1_limbs, shift); + /* Set X to X0 (by clearing the top part). */ + memset(X1, 0, X1_limbs * sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint)); + + /* Step 2: Reduction modulo P521 + * + * At this point X is reduced to P521_WIDTH limbs. What remains is to add + * the carry (that is 2^P521_WIDTH carry) and to reduce mod P521. */ + + /* 2^P521_WIDTH carry = 2^(512 + biL) carry = 2^(biL - 9) carry mod P521. + * Also, recall that carry is either 0 or 1. */ + mbedtls_mpi_uint addend = carry << (biL - 9); + /* Keep the top 9 bits and reduce the rest, using 2^521 = 1 mod P521. */ + addend += (X[P521_WIDTH - 1] >> 9); + X[P521_WIDTH - 1] &= P521_MASK; + + /* Reuse the top part of X (already zeroed) as a helper array for + * carrying out the addition. */ + mbedtls_mpi_uint *addend_arr = X + P521_WIDTH; + addend_arr[0] = addend; + (void) mbedtls_mpi_core_add(X, X, addend_arr, P521_WIDTH); + /* Both addends were less than P521 therefore X < 2 * P521. (This also means + * that the result fit in P521_WIDTH limbs and there won't be any carry.) */ + + /* Clear the reused part of X. */ + addend_arr[0] = 0; + + return 0; +} + +#undef P521_WIDTH +#undef P521_MASK + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_NIST_OPTIM */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED) + +/* Size of p255 in terms of mbedtls_mpi_uint */ +#define P255_WIDTH (255 / 8 / sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint) + 1) + +/* + * Fast quasi-reduction modulo p255 = 2^255 - 19 + * Write N as A0 + 2^256 A1, return A0 + 38 * A1 + */ +static int ecp_mod_p255(mbedtls_mpi *N) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t expected_width = BITS_TO_LIMBS(255) * 2; + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_grow(N, expected_width)); + ret = mbedtls_ecp_mod_p255_raw(N->p, expected_width); +cleanup: + return ret; +} + +MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE +int mbedtls_ecp_mod_p255_raw(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, size_t X_Limbs) +{ + + if (X_Limbs != BITS_TO_LIMBS(255) * 2) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + mbedtls_mpi_uint *carry = mbedtls_calloc(P255_WIDTH, ciL); + if (carry == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_ALLOC_FAILED; + } + + /* Step 1: Reduction to P255_WIDTH limbs */ + if (X_Limbs > P255_WIDTH) { + /* Helper references for top part of X */ + mbedtls_mpi_uint * const A1 = X + P255_WIDTH; + const size_t A1_limbs = X_Limbs - P255_WIDTH; + + /* X = A0 + 38 * A1, capture carry out */ + *carry = mbedtls_mpi_core_mla(X, P255_WIDTH, A1, A1_limbs, 38); + /* Clear top part */ + memset(A1, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint) * A1_limbs); + } + + /* Step 2: Reduce to <2p + * Split as A0 + 2^255*c, with c a scalar, and compute A0 + 19*c */ + *carry <<= 1; + *carry += (X[P255_WIDTH - 1] >> (biL - 1)); + *carry *= 19; + + /* Clear top bit */ + X[P255_WIDTH - 1] <<= 1; X[P255_WIDTH - 1] >>= 1; + /* Since the top bit for X has been cleared 0 + 0 + Carry + * will not overflow. + * + * Furthermore for 2p = 2^256-38. When a carry propagation on the highest + * limb occurs, X > 2^255 and all the remaining bits on the limb are zero. + * - If X < 2^255 ==> X < 2p + * - If X > 2^255 ==> X < 2^256 - 2^255 < 2p */ + (void) mbedtls_mpi_core_add(X, X, carry, P255_WIDTH); + + mbedtls_free(carry); + return 0; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED) + +/* Size of p448 in terms of mbedtls_mpi_uint */ +#define P448_WIDTH (448 / 8 / sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint)) + +/* Number of limbs fully occupied by 2^224 (max), and limbs used by it (min) */ +#define DIV_ROUND_UP(X, Y) (((X) + (Y) -1) / (Y)) +#define P224_SIZE (224 / 8) +#define P224_WIDTH_MIN (P224_SIZE / sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint)) +#define P224_WIDTH_MAX DIV_ROUND_UP(P224_SIZE, sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint)) +#define P224_UNUSED_BITS ((P224_WIDTH_MAX * sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint) * 8) - 224) + +static int ecp_mod_p448(mbedtls_mpi *N) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t expected_width = BITS_TO_LIMBS(448) * 2; + + /* This is required as some tests and use cases do not pass in a Bignum of + * the correct size, and expect the growth to be done automatically, which + * will no longer happen. */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_grow(N, expected_width)); + + ret = mbedtls_ecp_mod_p448_raw(N->p, N->n); + +cleanup: + return ret; +} + +/* + * Fast quasi-reduction modulo p448 = 2^448 - 2^224 - 1 + * Write X as A0 + 2^448 A1 and A1 as B0 + 2^224 B1, and return A0 + A1 + B1 + + * (B0 + B1) * 2^224. This is different to the reference implementation of + * Curve448, which uses its own special 56-bit limbs rather than a generic + * bignum library. We could squeeze some extra speed out on 32-bit machines by + * splitting N up into 32-bit limbs and doing the arithmetic using the limbs + * directly as we do for the NIST primes above, but for 64-bit targets it should + * use half the number of operations if we do the reduction with 224-bit limbs, + * since mpi_core_add will then use 64-bit adds. + */ +MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE +int mbedtls_ecp_mod_p448_raw(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, size_t X_limbs) +{ + size_t round; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + if (X_limbs != BITS_TO_LIMBS(448) * 2) { + return 0; + } + + size_t M_limbs = X_limbs - (P448_WIDTH); + + if (M_limbs > P448_WIDTH) { + /* Shouldn't be called with X larger than 2^896! */ + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + /* Both M and Q require an extra limb to catch carries. */ + M_limbs++; + + const size_t Q_limbs = M_limbs; + mbedtls_mpi_uint *M = NULL; + mbedtls_mpi_uint *Q = NULL; + + M = mbedtls_calloc(M_limbs, ciL); + + if (M == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_ALLOC_FAILED; + } + + Q = mbedtls_calloc(Q_limbs, ciL); + + if (Q == NULL) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_ALLOC_FAILED; + goto cleanup; + } + + /* M = A1 */ + memset(M, 0, (M_limbs * ciL)); + /* Do not copy into the overflow limb, as this would read past the end of + * X. */ + memcpy(M, X + P448_WIDTH, ((M_limbs - 1) * ciL)); + + /* X = A0 */ + memset(X + P448_WIDTH, 0, ((M_limbs - 1) * ciL)); + + /* X = X + M = A0 + A1 */ + /* Carry here fits in oversize X. Oversize M means it will get + * added in, not returned as carry. */ + (void) mbedtls_mpi_core_add(X, X, M, M_limbs); + + /* Q = B1 = M >> 224 */ + memcpy(Q, (char *) M + P224_SIZE, P224_SIZE); + memset((char *) Q + P224_SIZE, 0, P224_SIZE); + + /* X = X + Q = (A0 + A1) + B1 + * Oversize Q catches potential carry here when X is already max 448 bits. + */ + (void) mbedtls_mpi_core_add(X, X, Q, Q_limbs); + + /* M = B0 */ +#ifdef MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT64 + M[P224_WIDTH_MIN] &= ((mbedtls_mpi_uint)-1) >> (P224_UNUSED_BITS); + #endif + memset(M + P224_WIDTH_MAX, 0, ((M_limbs - P224_WIDTH_MAX) * ciL)); + + /* M = M + Q = B0 + B1 */ + (void) mbedtls_mpi_core_add(M, M, Q, Q_limbs); + + /* M = (B0 + B1) * 2^224 */ + /* Shifted carry bit from the addition fits in oversize M. */ + memmove((char *) M + P224_SIZE, M, P224_SIZE + ciL); + memset(M, 0, P224_SIZE); + + /* X = X + M = (A0 + A1 + B1) + (B0 + B1) * 2^224 */ + (void) mbedtls_mpi_core_add(X, X, M, M_limbs); + + /* In the second and third rounds A1 and B0 have at most 1 non-zero limb and + * B1=0. + * Using this we need to calculate: + * A0 + A1 + B1 + (B0 + B1) * 2^224 = A0 + A1 + B0 * 2^224. */ + for (round = 0; round < 2; ++round) { + + /* M = A1 */ + memset(M, 0, (M_limbs * ciL)); + memcpy(M, X + P448_WIDTH, ((M_limbs - 1) * ciL)); + + /* X = A0 */ + memset(X + P448_WIDTH, 0, ((M_limbs - 1) * ciL)); + + /* M = A1 + B0 * 2^224 + * We know that only one limb of A1 will be non-zero and that it will be + * limb 0. We also know that B0 is the bottom 224 bits of A1 (which is + * then shifted up 224 bits), so, given M is currently A1 this turns + * into: + * M = M + (M << 224) + * As the single non-zero limb in B0 will be A1 limb 0 shifted up by 224 + * bits, we can just move that into the right place, shifted up + * accordingly.*/ + M[P224_WIDTH_MIN] = M[0] << (224 & (biL - 1)); + + /* X = A0 + (A1 + B0 * 2^224) */ + (void) mbedtls_mpi_core_add(X, X, M, M_limbs); + } + + ret = 0; + +cleanup: + mbedtls_free(M); + mbedtls_free(Q); + + return ret; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED) + +/* + * Fast quasi-reduction modulo P = 2^s - R, + * with R about 33 bits, used by the Koblitz curves. + * + * Write X as A0 + 2^224 A1, return A0 + R * A1. + */ +#define P_KOBLITZ_R (8 / sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint)) // Limbs in R + +static inline int ecp_mod_koblitz(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, + size_t X_limbs, + mbedtls_mpi_uint *R, + size_t bits) +{ + int ret = 0; + + /* Determine if A1 is aligned to limb bitsize. If not then the used limbs + * of P, A0 and A1 must be set accordingly and there is a middle limb + * which is shared by A0 and A1 and need to handle accordingly. + */ + size_t shift = bits % biL; + size_t adjust = (shift + biL - 1) / biL; + size_t P_limbs = bits / biL + adjust; + + mbedtls_mpi_uint *A1 = mbedtls_calloc(P_limbs, ciL); + if (A1 == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_ALLOC_FAILED; + } + + /* Create a buffer to store the value of `R * A1` */ + size_t R_limbs = P_KOBLITZ_R; + size_t M_limbs = P_limbs + R_limbs; + mbedtls_mpi_uint *M = mbedtls_calloc(M_limbs, ciL); + if (M == NULL) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_ALLOC_FAILED; + goto cleanup; + } + + mbedtls_mpi_uint mask = 0; + if (adjust != 0) { + mask = ((mbedtls_mpi_uint) 1 << shift) - 1; + } + + /* Two passes are needed to reduce the value of `A0 + R * A1` and then + * we need an additional one to reduce the possible overflow during + * the addition. + */ + for (size_t pass = 0; pass < 3; pass++) { + /* Copy A1 */ + memcpy(A1, X + P_limbs - adjust, P_limbs * ciL); + + /* Shift A1 to be aligned */ + if (shift != 0) { + mbedtls_mpi_core_shift_r(A1, P_limbs, shift); + } + + /* Zeroize the A1 part of the shared limb */ + if (mask != 0) { + X[P_limbs - 1] &= mask; + } + + /* X = A0 + * Zeroize the A1 part of X to keep only the A0 part. + */ + for (size_t i = P_limbs; i < X_limbs; i++) { + X[i] = 0; + } + + /* X = A0 + R * A1 */ + mbedtls_mpi_core_mul(M, A1, P_limbs, R, R_limbs); + (void) mbedtls_mpi_core_add(X, X, M, P_limbs + R_limbs); + + /* Carry can not be generated since R is a 33-bit value and stored in + * 64 bits. The result value of the multiplication is at most + * P length + 33 bits in length and the result value of the addition + * is at most P length + 34 bits in length. So the result of the + * addition always fits in P length + 64 bits. + */ + } + +cleanup: + mbedtls_free(M); + mbedtls_free(A1); + + return ret; +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED) || + MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED) || + MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED) */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED) + +/* + * Fast quasi-reduction modulo p192k1 = 2^192 - R, + * with R = 2^32 + 2^12 + 2^8 + 2^7 + 2^6 + 2^3 + 1 = 0x01000011C9 + */ +static int ecp_mod_p192k1(mbedtls_mpi *N) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t expected_width = BITS_TO_LIMBS(192) * 2; + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_grow(N, expected_width)); + ret = mbedtls_ecp_mod_p192k1_raw(N->p, expected_width); + +cleanup: + return ret; +} + +MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE +int mbedtls_ecp_mod_p192k1_raw(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, size_t X_limbs) +{ + static mbedtls_mpi_uint Rp[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC9, 0x11, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00) + }; + + if (X_limbs != BITS_TO_LIMBS(192) * 2) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + return ecp_mod_koblitz(X, X_limbs, Rp, 192); +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED) + +/* + * Fast quasi-reduction modulo p224k1 = 2^224 - R, + * with R = 2^32 + 2^12 + 2^11 + 2^9 + 2^7 + 2^4 + 2 + 1 = 0x0100001A93 + */ +static int ecp_mod_p224k1(mbedtls_mpi *N) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t expected_width = BITS_TO_LIMBS(224) * 2; + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_grow(N, expected_width)); + ret = mbedtls_ecp_mod_p224k1_raw(N->p, expected_width); + +cleanup: + return ret; +} + +MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE +int mbedtls_ecp_mod_p224k1_raw(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, size_t X_limbs) +{ + static mbedtls_mpi_uint Rp[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x93, 0x1A, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00) + }; + + if (X_limbs != BITS_TO_LIMBS(224) * 2) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + return ecp_mod_koblitz(X, X_limbs, Rp, 224); +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED) + +/* + * Fast quasi-reduction modulo p256k1 = 2^256 - R, + * with R = 2^32 + 2^9 + 2^8 + 2^7 + 2^6 + 2^4 + 1 = 0x01000003D1 + */ +static int ecp_mod_p256k1(mbedtls_mpi *N) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t expected_width = BITS_TO_LIMBS(256) * 2; + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_grow(N, expected_width)); + ret = mbedtls_ecp_mod_p256k1_raw(N->p, expected_width); + +cleanup: + return ret; +} + +MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE +int mbedtls_ecp_mod_p256k1_raw(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, size_t X_limbs) +{ + static mbedtls_mpi_uint Rp[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD1, 0x03, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00) + }; + + if (X_limbs != BITS_TO_LIMBS(256) * 2) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + return ecp_mod_koblitz(X, X_limbs, Rp, 256); +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS) +MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE +int mbedtls_ecp_modulus_setup(mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *N, + const mbedtls_ecp_group_id id, + const mbedtls_ecp_modulus_type ctype) +{ + mbedtls_mpi_modp_fn modp = NULL; + mbedtls_mpi_uint *p = NULL; + size_t p_limbs; + + if (!(ctype == (mbedtls_ecp_modulus_type) MBEDTLS_ECP_MOD_COORDINATE || \ + ctype == (mbedtls_ecp_modulus_type) MBEDTLS_ECP_MOD_SCALAR)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + switch (id) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED) + case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1: + if (ctype == (mbedtls_ecp_modulus_type) MBEDTLS_ECP_MOD_COORDINATE) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NIST_OPTIM) + modp = &mbedtls_ecp_mod_p192_raw; +#endif + p = (mbedtls_mpi_uint *) secp192r1_p; + p_limbs = CHARS_TO_LIMBS(sizeof(secp192r1_p)); + } else { + p = (mbedtls_mpi_uint *) secp192r1_n; + p_limbs = CHARS_TO_LIMBS(sizeof(secp192r1_n)); + } + break; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED) + case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1: + if (ctype == (mbedtls_ecp_modulus_type) MBEDTLS_ECP_MOD_COORDINATE) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NIST_OPTIM) + modp = &mbedtls_ecp_mod_p224_raw; +#endif + p = (mbedtls_mpi_uint *) secp224r1_p; + p_limbs = CHARS_TO_LIMBS(sizeof(secp224r1_p)); + } else { + p = (mbedtls_mpi_uint *) secp224r1_n; + p_limbs = CHARS_TO_LIMBS(sizeof(secp224r1_n)); + } + break; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED) + case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1: + if (ctype == (mbedtls_ecp_modulus_type) MBEDTLS_ECP_MOD_COORDINATE) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NIST_OPTIM) + modp = &mbedtls_ecp_mod_p256_raw; +#endif + p = (mbedtls_mpi_uint *) secp256r1_p; + p_limbs = CHARS_TO_LIMBS(sizeof(secp256r1_p)); + } else { + p = (mbedtls_mpi_uint *) secp256r1_n; + p_limbs = CHARS_TO_LIMBS(sizeof(secp256r1_n)); + } + break; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED) + case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1: + if (ctype == (mbedtls_ecp_modulus_type) MBEDTLS_ECP_MOD_COORDINATE) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NIST_OPTIM) + modp = &mbedtls_ecp_mod_p384_raw; +#endif + p = (mbedtls_mpi_uint *) secp384r1_p; + p_limbs = CHARS_TO_LIMBS(sizeof(secp384r1_p)); + } else { + p = (mbedtls_mpi_uint *) secp384r1_n; + p_limbs = CHARS_TO_LIMBS(sizeof(secp384r1_n)); + } + break; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED) + case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1: + if (ctype == (mbedtls_ecp_modulus_type) MBEDTLS_ECP_MOD_COORDINATE) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NIST_OPTIM) + modp = &mbedtls_ecp_mod_p521_raw; +#endif + p = (mbedtls_mpi_uint *) secp521r1_p; + p_limbs = CHARS_TO_LIMBS(sizeof(secp521r1_p)); + } else { + p = (mbedtls_mpi_uint *) secp521r1_n; + p_limbs = CHARS_TO_LIMBS(sizeof(secp521r1_n)); + } + break; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED) + case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1: + if (ctype == (mbedtls_ecp_modulus_type) MBEDTLS_ECP_MOD_COORDINATE) { + p = (mbedtls_mpi_uint *) brainpoolP256r1_p; + p_limbs = CHARS_TO_LIMBS(sizeof(brainpoolP256r1_p)); + } else { + p = (mbedtls_mpi_uint *) brainpoolP256r1_n; + p_limbs = CHARS_TO_LIMBS(sizeof(brainpoolP256r1_n)); + } + break; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLED) + case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1: + if (ctype == (mbedtls_ecp_modulus_type) MBEDTLS_ECP_MOD_COORDINATE) { + p = (mbedtls_mpi_uint *) brainpoolP384r1_p; + p_limbs = CHARS_TO_LIMBS(sizeof(brainpoolP384r1_p)); + } else { + p = (mbedtls_mpi_uint *) brainpoolP384r1_n; + p_limbs = CHARS_TO_LIMBS(sizeof(brainpoolP384r1_n)); + } + break; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED) + case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1: + if (ctype == (mbedtls_ecp_modulus_type) MBEDTLS_ECP_MOD_COORDINATE) { + p = (mbedtls_mpi_uint *) brainpoolP512r1_p; + p_limbs = CHARS_TO_LIMBS(sizeof(brainpoolP512r1_p)); + } else { + p = (mbedtls_mpi_uint *) brainpoolP512r1_n; + p_limbs = CHARS_TO_LIMBS(sizeof(brainpoolP512r1_n)); + } + break; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED) + case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519: + if (ctype == (mbedtls_ecp_modulus_type) MBEDTLS_ECP_MOD_COORDINATE) { + modp = &mbedtls_ecp_mod_p255_raw; + p = (mbedtls_mpi_uint *) curve25519_p; + p_limbs = CHARS_TO_LIMBS(sizeof(curve25519_p)); + } else { + p = (mbedtls_mpi_uint *) curve25519_n; + p_limbs = CHARS_TO_LIMBS(sizeof(curve25519_n)); + } + break; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED) + case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1: + if (ctype == (mbedtls_ecp_modulus_type) MBEDTLS_ECP_MOD_COORDINATE) { + modp = &mbedtls_ecp_mod_p192k1_raw; + p = (mbedtls_mpi_uint *) secp192k1_p; + p_limbs = CHARS_TO_LIMBS(sizeof(secp192k1_p)); + } else { + p = (mbedtls_mpi_uint *) secp192k1_n; + p_limbs = CHARS_TO_LIMBS(sizeof(secp192k1_n)); + } + break; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED) + case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1: + if (ctype == (mbedtls_ecp_modulus_type) MBEDTLS_ECP_MOD_COORDINATE) { + modp = &mbedtls_ecp_mod_p224k1_raw; + p = (mbedtls_mpi_uint *) secp224k1_p; + p_limbs = CHARS_TO_LIMBS(sizeof(secp224k1_p)); + } else { + p = (mbedtls_mpi_uint *) secp224k1_n; + p_limbs = CHARS_TO_LIMBS(sizeof(secp224k1_n)); + } + break; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED) + case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1: + if (ctype == (mbedtls_ecp_modulus_type) MBEDTLS_ECP_MOD_COORDINATE) { + modp = &mbedtls_ecp_mod_p256k1_raw; + p = (mbedtls_mpi_uint *) secp256k1_p; + p_limbs = CHARS_TO_LIMBS(sizeof(secp256k1_p)); + } else { + p = (mbedtls_mpi_uint *) secp256k1_n; + p_limbs = CHARS_TO_LIMBS(sizeof(secp256k1_n)); + } + break; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED) + case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448: + if (ctype == (mbedtls_ecp_modulus_type) MBEDTLS_ECP_MOD_COORDINATE) { + modp = &mbedtls_ecp_mod_p448_raw; + p = (mbedtls_mpi_uint *) curve448_p; + p_limbs = CHARS_TO_LIMBS(sizeof(curve448_p)); + } else { + p = (mbedtls_mpi_uint *) curve448_n; + p_limbs = CHARS_TO_LIMBS(sizeof(curve448_n)); + } + break; +#endif + + default: + case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE: + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + if (modp != NULL) { + if (mbedtls_mpi_mod_optred_modulus_setup(N, p, p_limbs, modp)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + } + } else { + if (mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus_setup(N, p, p_limbs)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + } + } + return 0; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS) + +MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE +mbedtls_ecp_variant mbedtls_ecp_get_variant(void) +{ + return MBEDTLS_ECP_VARIANT_WITH_MPI_UINT; +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS */ + +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_ECP_ALT */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_LIGHT */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_WITH_MPI_UINT */ diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/ecp_internal.h b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ecp_internal_alt.h similarity index 98% rename from thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/ecp_internal.h rename to thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ecp_internal_alt.h index f6af5cbca623..668edc74c976 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/ecp_internal.h +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ecp_internal_alt.h @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ /** - * \file ecp_internal.h + * \file ecp_internal_alt.h * * \brief Function declarations for alternative implementation of elliptic curve * point arithmetic. @@ -47,11 +47,7 @@ #ifndef MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_H #define MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_H -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "mbedtls/build_info.h" #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT) @@ -288,4 +284,4 @@ int mbedtls_internal_ecp_normalize_mxz(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT */ -#endif /* ecp_internal.h */ +#endif /* ecp_internal_alt.h */ diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ecp_invasive.h b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ecp_invasive.h index b5a1f7ce7dff..ff9f9ecf1d1c 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ecp_invasive.h +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ecp_invasive.h @@ -16,24 +16,32 @@ #include "common.h" #include "mbedtls/bignum.h" +#include "bignum_mod.h" #include "mbedtls/ecp.h" -#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) +/* + * Curve modulus types + */ +typedef enum { + MBEDTLS_ECP_MOD_NONE = 0, + MBEDTLS_ECP_MOD_COORDINATE, + MBEDTLS_ECP_MOD_SCALAR +} mbedtls_ecp_modulus_type; + +typedef enum { + MBEDTLS_ECP_VARIANT_NONE = 0, + MBEDTLS_ECP_VARIANT_WITH_MPI_STRUCT, + MBEDTLS_ECP_VARIANT_WITH_MPI_UINT +} mbedtls_ecp_variant; -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED) -/* Preconditions: - * - bits is a multiple of 64 or is 224 - * - c is -1 or -2 - * - 0 <= N < 2^bits - * - N has room for bits plus one limb +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_LIGHT) + +/** Queries the ecp variant. * - * Behavior: - * Set N to c * 2^bits + old_value_of_N. + * \return The id of the ecp variant. */ -void mbedtls_ecp_fix_negative(mbedtls_mpi *N, signed char c, size_t bits); -#endif +MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE +mbedtls_ecp_variant mbedtls_ecp_get_variant(void); #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_MONTGOMERY_ENABLED) /** Generate a private key on a Montgomery curve (Curve25519 or Curve448). @@ -64,6 +72,254 @@ int mbedtls_ecp_gen_privkey_mx(size_t high_bit, #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_MONTGOMERY_ENABLED */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED) + +/** Fast quasi-reduction modulo p192 (FIPS 186-3 D.2.1) + * + * This operation expects a 384 bit MPI and the result of the reduction + * is a 192 bit MPI. + * + * \param[in,out] Np The address of the MPI to be converted. + * Must have twice as many limbs as the modulus. + * Upon return this holds the reduced value. The bitlength + * of the reduced value is the same as that of the modulus + * (192 bits). + * \param[in] Nn The length of \p Np in limbs. + */ +MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE +int mbedtls_ecp_mod_p192_raw(mbedtls_mpi_uint *Np, size_t Nn); + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED) + +/** Fast quasi-reduction modulo p224 (FIPS 186-3 D.2.2) + * + * \param[in,out] X The address of the MPI to be converted. + * Must have exact limb size that stores a 448-bit MPI + * (double the bitlength of the modulus). + * Upon return holds the reduced value which is + * in range `0 <= X < 2 * N` (where N is the modulus). + * The bitlength of the reduced value is the same as + * that of the modulus (224 bits). + * \param[in] X_limbs The length of \p X in limbs. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA if \p X_limbs is not the + * limb size that sores a 448-bit MPI. + */ +MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE +int mbedtls_ecp_mod_p224_raw(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, size_t X_limbs); + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED) + +/** Fast quasi-reduction modulo p256 (FIPS 186-3 D.2.3) + * + * \param[in,out] X The address of the MPI to be converted. + * Must have exact limb size that stores a 512-bit MPI + * (double the bitlength of the modulus). + * Upon return holds the reduced value which is + * in range `0 <= X < 2 * N` (where N is the modulus). + * The bitlength of the reduced value is the same as + * that of the modulus (256 bits). + * \param[in] X_limbs The length of \p X in limbs. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA if \p X_limbs is not the + * limb size that sores a 512-bit MPI. + */ +MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE +int mbedtls_ecp_mod_p256_raw(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, size_t X_limbs); + +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED) + +/** Fast quasi-reduction modulo p521 = 2^521 - 1 (FIPS 186-3 D.2.5) + * + * \param[in,out] X The address of the MPI to be converted. + * Must have twice as many limbs as the modulus + * (the modulus is 521 bits long). Upon return this + * holds the reduced value. The reduced value is + * in range `0 <= X < 2 * N` (where N is the modulus). + * and its the bitlength is one plus the bitlength + * of the modulus. + * \param[in] X_limbs The length of \p X in limbs. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA if \p X_limbs does not have + * twice as many limbs as the modulus. + */ +MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE +int mbedtls_ecp_mod_p521_raw(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, size_t X_limbs); + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED) + +/** Fast quasi-reduction modulo p384 (FIPS 186-3 D.2.4) + * + * \param[in,out] X The address of the MPI to be converted. + * Must have exact limb size that stores a 768-bit MPI + * (double the bitlength of the modulus). + * Upon return holds the reduced value which is + * in range `0 <= X < 2 * N` (where N is the modulus). + * The bitlength of the reduced value is the same as + * that of the modulus (384 bits). + * \param[in] X_limbs The length of \p N in limbs. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA if \p N_n does not have + * twice as many limbs as the modulus. + */ +MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE +int mbedtls_ecp_mod_p384_raw(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, size_t X_limbs); + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED) + +/** Fast quasi-reduction modulo p192k1 = 2^192 - R, + * with R = 2^32 + 2^12 + 2^8 + 2^7 + 2^6 + 2^3 + 1 = 0x01000011C9 + * + * \param[in,out] X The address of the MPI to be converted. + * Must have exact limb size that stores a 384-bit MPI + * (double the bitlength of the modulus). + * Upon return holds the reduced value which is + * in range `0 <= X < 2 * N` (where N is the modulus). + * The bitlength of the reduced value is the same as + * that of the modulus (192 bits). + * \param[in] X_limbs The length of \p X in limbs. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA if \p X does not have + * twice as many limbs as the modulus. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_ALLOC_FAILED if memory allocation failed. + */ +MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE +int mbedtls_ecp_mod_p192k1_raw(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, size_t X_limbs); + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED) + +/** Fast quasi-reduction modulo p224k1 = 2^224 - R, + * with R = 2^32 + 2^12 + 2^11 + 2^9 + 2^7 + 2^4 + 2 + 1 = 0x0100001A93 + * + * \param[in,out] X The address of the MPI to be converted. + * Must have exact limb size that stores a 448-bit MPI + * (double the bitlength of the modulus). + * Upon return holds the reduced value which is + * in range `0 <= X < 2 * N` (where N is the modulus). + * The bitlength of the reduced value is the same as + * that of the modulus (224 bits). + * \param[in] X_limbs The length of \p X in limbs. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA if \p X does not have + * twice as many limbs as the modulus. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_ALLOC_FAILED if memory allocation failed. + */ +MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE +int mbedtls_ecp_mod_p224k1_raw(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, size_t X_limbs); + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED) + +/** Fast quasi-reduction modulo p256k1 = 2^256 - R, + * with R = 2^32 + 2^9 + 2^8 + 2^7 + 2^6 + 2^4 + 1 = 0x01000003D1 + * + * \param[in,out] X The address of the MPI to be converted. + * Must have exact limb size that stores a 512-bit MPI + * (double the bitlength of the modulus). + * Upon return holds the reduced value which is + * in range `0 <= X < 2 * N` (where N is the modulus). + * The bitlength of the reduced value is the same as + * that of the modulus (256 bits). + * \param[in] X_limbs The length of \p X in limbs. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA if \p X does not have + * twice as many limbs as the modulus. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_ALLOC_FAILED if memory allocation failed. + */ +MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE +int mbedtls_ecp_mod_p256k1_raw(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, size_t X_limbs); + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED) + +/** Fast quasi-reduction modulo p255 = 2^255 - 19 + * + * \param[in,out] X The address of the MPI to be converted. + * Must have exact limb size that stores a 510-bit MPI + * (double the bitlength of the modulus). + * Upon return holds the reduced value which is + * in range `0 <= X < 2 * N` (where N is the modulus). + * \param[in] X_limbs The length of \p X in limbs. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA if \p X does not have + * twice as many limbs as the modulus. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_ALLOC_FAILED if memory allocation failed. + */ +MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE +int mbedtls_ecp_mod_p255_raw(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, size_t X_limbs); + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED) + +/** Fast quasi-reduction modulo p448 = 2^448 - 2^224 - 1 + * Write X as A0 + 2^448 A1 and A1 as B0 + 2^224 B1, and return A0 + A1 + B1 + + * (B0 + B1) * 2^224. + * + * \param[in,out] X The address of the MPI to be converted. + * Must have exact limb size that stores a 896-bit MPI + * (double the bitlength of the modulus). Upon return + * holds the reduced value which is in range `0 <= X < + * N` (where N is the modulus). The bitlength of the + * reduced value is the same as that of the modulus + * (448 bits). + * \param[in] X_limbs The length of \p X in limbs. + * + * \return \c 0 on Success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA if \p X does not have + * twice as many limbs as the modulus. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_ALLOC_FAILED if memory allocation + * failed. + */ +MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE +int mbedtls_ecp_mod_p448_raw(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, size_t X_limbs); + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED */ + +/** Initialise a modulus with hard-coded const curve data. + * + * \note The caller is responsible for the \p N modulus' memory. + * mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus_free(&N) should be invoked at the + * end of its lifecycle. + * + * \param[in,out] N The address of the modulus structure to populate. + * Must be initialized. + * \param[in] id The mbedtls_ecp_group_id for which to initialise the modulus. + * \param[in] ctype The mbedtls_ecp_modulus_type identifier for a coordinate modulus (P) + * or a scalar modulus (N). + * + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA if the given MPIs do not + * have the correct number of limbs. + * + */ +MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE +int mbedtls_ecp_modulus_setup(mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *N, + const mbedtls_ecp_group_id id, + const mbedtls_ecp_modulus_type ctype); + #endif /* MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS && MBEDTLS_ECP_C */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_INVASIVE_H */ diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/entropy.c b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/entropy.c index 339dc0e038fc..e3bc8516e2f2 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/entropy.c +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/entropy.c @@ -9,18 +9,10 @@ #if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_NULL_ENTROPY) -#warning "**** WARNING! MBEDTLS_TEST_NULL_ENTROPY defined! " -#warning "**** THIS BUILD HAS NO DEFINED ENTROPY SOURCES " -#warning "**** THIS BUILD IS *NOT* SUITABLE FOR PRODUCTION USE " -#endif - #include "mbedtls/entropy.h" -#include "mbedtls/entropy_poll.h" +#include "entropy_poll.h" #include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" #include "mbedtls/error.h" -#include "mbedtls/sha256.h" -#include "mbedtls/sha512.h" #include @@ -30,12 +22,6 @@ #include "mbedtls/platform.h" -#include "mbedtls/platform.h" - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVEGE_C) -#include "mbedtls/havege.h" -#endif - #define ENTROPY_MAX_LOOP 256 /**< Maximum amount to loop before error */ void mbedtls_entropy_init(mbedtls_entropy_context *ctx) @@ -48,39 +34,17 @@ void mbedtls_entropy_init(mbedtls_entropy_context *ctx) #endif ctx->accumulator_started = 0; -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_SHA512_ACCUMULATOR) - mbedtls_sha512_init(&ctx->accumulator); -#else - mbedtls_sha256_init(&ctx->accumulator); -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVEGE_C) - mbedtls_havege_init(&ctx->havege_data); -#endif + mbedtls_md_init(&ctx->accumulator); /* Reminder: Update ENTROPY_HAVE_STRONG in the test files * when adding more strong entropy sources here. */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_NULL_ENTROPY) - mbedtls_entropy_add_source(ctx, mbedtls_null_entropy_poll, NULL, - 1, MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_SOURCE_STRONG); -#endif - #if !defined(MBEDTLS_NO_DEFAULT_ENTROPY_SOURCES) #if !defined(MBEDTLS_NO_PLATFORM_ENTROPY) mbedtls_entropy_add_source(ctx, mbedtls_platform_entropy_poll, NULL, MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MIN_PLATFORM, MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_SOURCE_STRONG); #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_TIMING_C) - mbedtls_entropy_add_source(ctx, mbedtls_hardclock_poll, NULL, - MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MIN_HARDCLOCK, - MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_SOURCE_WEAK); -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVEGE_C) - mbedtls_entropy_add_source(ctx, mbedtls_havege_poll, &ctx->havege_data, - MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MIN_HAVEGE, - MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_SOURCE_STRONG); -#endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_HARDWARE_ALT) mbedtls_entropy_add_source(ctx, mbedtls_hardware_poll, NULL, MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MIN_HARDWARE, @@ -103,17 +67,10 @@ void mbedtls_entropy_free(mbedtls_entropy_context *ctx) return; } -#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVEGE_C) - mbedtls_havege_free(&ctx->havege_data); -#endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) mbedtls_mutex_free(&ctx->mutex); #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_SHA512_ACCUMULATOR) - mbedtls_sha512_free(&ctx->accumulator); -#else - mbedtls_sha256_free(&ctx->accumulator); -#endif + mbedtls_md_free(&ctx->accumulator); #if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_NV_SEED) ctx->initial_entropy_run = 0; #endif @@ -170,15 +127,10 @@ static int entropy_update(mbedtls_entropy_context *ctx, unsigned char source_id, int ret = 0; if (use_len > MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE) { -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_SHA512_ACCUMULATOR) - if ((ret = mbedtls_sha512_ret(data, len, tmp, 0)) != 0) { - goto cleanup; - } -#else - if ((ret = mbedtls_sha256_ret(data, len, tmp, 0)) != 0) { + if ((ret = mbedtls_md(mbedtls_md_info_from_type(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MD), + data, len, tmp)) != 0) { goto cleanup; } -#endif p = tmp; use_len = MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE; } @@ -191,29 +143,22 @@ static int entropy_update(mbedtls_entropy_context *ctx, unsigned char source_id, * it is sufficient to start the accumulator here only because all calls to * gather entropy eventually execute this code. */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_SHA512_ACCUMULATOR) - if (ctx->accumulator_started == 0 && - (ret = mbedtls_sha512_starts_ret(&ctx->accumulator, 0)) != 0) { - goto cleanup; - } else { - ctx->accumulator_started = 1; - } - if ((ret = mbedtls_sha512_update_ret(&ctx->accumulator, header, 2)) != 0) { - goto cleanup; - } - ret = mbedtls_sha512_update_ret(&ctx->accumulator, p, use_len); -#else - if (ctx->accumulator_started == 0 && - (ret = mbedtls_sha256_starts_ret(&ctx->accumulator, 0)) != 0) { - goto cleanup; - } else { + if (ctx->accumulator_started == 0) { + ret = mbedtls_md_setup(&ctx->accumulator, + mbedtls_md_info_from_type(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MD), 0); + if (ret != 0) { + goto cleanup; + } + ret = mbedtls_md_starts(&ctx->accumulator); + if (ret != 0) { + goto cleanup; + } ctx->accumulator_started = 1; } - if ((ret = mbedtls_sha256_update_ret(&ctx->accumulator, header, 2)) != 0) { + if ((ret = mbedtls_md_update(&ctx->accumulator, header, 2)) != 0) { goto cleanup; } - ret = mbedtls_sha256_update_ret(&ctx->accumulator, p, use_len); -#endif + ret = mbedtls_md_update(&ctx->accumulator, p, use_len); cleanup: mbedtls_platform_zeroize(tmp, sizeof(tmp)); @@ -374,62 +319,41 @@ int mbedtls_entropy_func(void *data, unsigned char *output, size_t len) memset(buf, 0, MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE); -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_SHA512_ACCUMULATOR) /* * Note that at this stage it is assumed that the accumulator was started * in a previous call to entropy_update(). If this is not guaranteed, the * code below will fail. */ - if ((ret = mbedtls_sha512_finish_ret(&ctx->accumulator, buf)) != 0) { + if ((ret = mbedtls_md_finish(&ctx->accumulator, buf)) != 0) { goto exit; } /* * Reset accumulator and counters and recycle existing entropy */ - mbedtls_sha512_free(&ctx->accumulator); - mbedtls_sha512_init(&ctx->accumulator); - if ((ret = mbedtls_sha512_starts_ret(&ctx->accumulator, 0)) != 0) { - goto exit; - } - if ((ret = mbedtls_sha512_update_ret(&ctx->accumulator, buf, - MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE)) != 0) { - goto exit; - } - - /* - * Perform second SHA-512 on entropy - */ - if ((ret = mbedtls_sha512_ret(buf, MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE, - buf, 0)) != 0) { - goto exit; - } -#else /* MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_SHA512_ACCUMULATOR */ - if ((ret = mbedtls_sha256_finish_ret(&ctx->accumulator, buf)) != 0) { + mbedtls_md_free(&ctx->accumulator); + mbedtls_md_init(&ctx->accumulator); + ret = mbedtls_md_setup(&ctx->accumulator, + mbedtls_md_info_from_type(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MD), 0); + if (ret != 0) { goto exit; } - - /* - * Reset accumulator and counters and recycle existing entropy - */ - mbedtls_sha256_free(&ctx->accumulator); - mbedtls_sha256_init(&ctx->accumulator); - if ((ret = mbedtls_sha256_starts_ret(&ctx->accumulator, 0)) != 0) { + ret = mbedtls_md_starts(&ctx->accumulator); + if (ret != 0) { goto exit; } - if ((ret = mbedtls_sha256_update_ret(&ctx->accumulator, buf, - MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE)) != 0) { + if ((ret = mbedtls_md_update(&ctx->accumulator, buf, + MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE)) != 0) { goto exit; } /* - * Perform second SHA-256 on entropy + * Perform second hashing on entropy */ - if ((ret = mbedtls_sha256_ret(buf, MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE, - buf, 0)) != 0) { + if ((ret = mbedtls_md(mbedtls_md_info_from_type(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MD), + buf, MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE, buf)) != 0) { goto exit; } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_SHA512_ACCUMULATOR */ for (i = 0; i < ctx->source_count; i++) { ctx->source[i].size = 0; @@ -491,6 +415,9 @@ int mbedtls_entropy_write_seed_file(mbedtls_entropy_context *ctx, const char *pa goto exit; } + /* Ensure no stdio buffering of secrets, as such buffers cannot be wiped. */ + mbedtls_setbuf(f, NULL); + if (fwrite(buf, 1, MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE, f) != MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE) { ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_FILE_IO_ERROR; goto exit; @@ -519,6 +446,9 @@ int mbedtls_entropy_update_seed_file(mbedtls_entropy_context *ctx, const char *p return MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_FILE_IO_ERROR; } + /* Ensure no stdio buffering of secrets, as such buffers cannot be wiped. */ + mbedtls_setbuf(f, NULL); + fseek(f, 0, SEEK_END); n = (size_t) ftell(f); fseek(f, 0, SEEK_SET); @@ -546,7 +476,6 @@ int mbedtls_entropy_update_seed_file(mbedtls_entropy_context *ctx, const char *p #endif /* MBEDTLS_FS_IO */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_NULL_ENTROPY) /* * Dummy source function */ @@ -560,7 +489,6 @@ static int entropy_dummy_source(void *data, unsigned char *output, return 0; } -#endif /* !MBEDTLS_TEST_NULL_ENTROPY */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_HARDWARE_ALT) @@ -671,18 +599,15 @@ int mbedtls_entropy_source_self_test(int verbose) int mbedtls_entropy_self_test(int verbose) { int ret = 1; -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_NULL_ENTROPY) mbedtls_entropy_context ctx; unsigned char buf[MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE] = { 0 }; unsigned char acc[MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE] = { 0 }; size_t i, j; -#endif /* !MBEDTLS_TEST_NULL_ENTROPY */ if (verbose != 0) { mbedtls_printf(" ENTROPY test: "); } -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_NULL_ENTROPY) mbedtls_entropy_init(&ctx); /* First do a gather to make sure we have default sources */ @@ -733,7 +658,6 @@ int mbedtls_entropy_self_test(int verbose) cleanup: mbedtls_entropy_free(&ctx); -#endif /* !MBEDTLS_TEST_NULL_ENTROPY */ if (verbose != 0) { if (ret != 0) { diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/entropy_poll.c b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/entropy_poll.c index 727f848b934a..794ee03a831b 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/entropy_poll.c +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/entropy_poll.c @@ -17,24 +17,21 @@ #if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C) #include "mbedtls/entropy.h" -#include "mbedtls/entropy_poll.h" +#include "entropy_poll.h" #include "mbedtls/error.h" #if defined(MBEDTLS_TIMING_C) #include "mbedtls/timing.h" #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVEGE_C) -#include "mbedtls/havege.h" -#endif #include "mbedtls/platform.h" #if !defined(MBEDTLS_NO_PLATFORM_ENTROPY) #if !defined(unix) && !defined(__unix__) && !defined(__unix) && \ !defined(__APPLE__) && !defined(_WIN32) && !defined(__QNXNTO__) && \ - !defined(__HAIKU__) && !defined(__midipix__) + !defined(__HAIKU__) && !defined(__midipix__) && !defined(__MVS__) #error \ - "Platform entropy sources only work on Unix and Windows, see MBEDTLS_NO_PLATFORM_ENTROPY in config.h" + "Platform entropy sources only work on Unix and Windows, see MBEDTLS_NO_PLATFORM_ENTROPY in mbedtls_config.h" #endif #if defined(_WIN32) && !defined(EFIX64) && !defined(EFI32) @@ -91,7 +88,7 @@ static int getrandom_wrapper(void *buf, size_t buflen, unsigned int flags) memset(buf, 0, buflen); #endif #endif - return syscall(SYS_getrandom, buf, buflen, flags); + return (int) syscall(SYS_getrandom, buf, buflen, flags); } #endif /* SYS_getrandom */ #endif /* __linux__ || __midipix__ */ @@ -105,7 +102,7 @@ static int getrandom_wrapper(void *buf, size_t buflen, unsigned int flags) #define HAVE_GETRANDOM static int getrandom_wrapper(void *buf, size_t buflen, unsigned int flags) { - return getrandom(buf, buflen, flags); + return (int) getrandom(buf, buflen, flags); } #endif /* (__FreeBSD__ && __FreeBSD_version >= 1200000) || (__DragonFly__ && __DragonFly_version >= 500700) */ @@ -159,7 +156,7 @@ int mbedtls_platform_entropy_poll(void *data, #if defined(HAVE_GETRANDOM) ret = getrandom_wrapper(output, len, 0); if (ret >= 0) { - *olen = ret; + *olen = (size_t) ret; return 0; } else if (errno != ENOSYS) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED; @@ -186,6 +183,9 @@ int mbedtls_platform_entropy_poll(void *data, return MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED; } + /* Ensure no stdio buffering of secrets, as such buffers cannot be wiped. */ + mbedtls_setbuf(file, NULL); + read_len = fread(output, 1, len, file); if (read_len != len) { fclose(file); @@ -201,60 +201,6 @@ int mbedtls_platform_entropy_poll(void *data, #endif /* _WIN32 && !EFIX64 && !EFI32 */ #endif /* !MBEDTLS_NO_PLATFORM_ENTROPY */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_NULL_ENTROPY) -int mbedtls_null_entropy_poll(void *data, - unsigned char *output, size_t len, size_t *olen) -{ - ((void) data); - ((void) output); - - *olen = 0; - if (len < sizeof(unsigned char)) { - return 0; - } - - output[0] = 0; - *olen = sizeof(unsigned char); - return 0; -} -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_TIMING_C) -int mbedtls_hardclock_poll(void *data, - unsigned char *output, size_t len, size_t *olen) -{ - unsigned long timer = mbedtls_timing_hardclock(); - ((void) data); - *olen = 0; - - if (len < sizeof(unsigned long)) { - return 0; - } - - memcpy(output, &timer, sizeof(unsigned long)); - *olen = sizeof(unsigned long); - - return 0; -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_TIMING_C */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVEGE_C) -int mbedtls_havege_poll(void *data, - unsigned char *output, size_t len, size_t *olen) -{ - mbedtls_havege_state *hs = (mbedtls_havege_state *) data; - *olen = 0; - - if (mbedtls_havege_random(hs, output, len) != 0) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED; - } - - *olen = len; - - return 0; -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVEGE_C */ - #if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_NV_SEED) int mbedtls_nv_seed_poll(void *data, unsigned char *output, size_t len, size_t *olen) diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/entropy_poll.h b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/entropy_poll.h similarity index 58% rename from thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/entropy_poll.h rename to thirdparty/mbedtls/library/entropy_poll.h index d7147b976b05..6b4aec03e18b 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/entropy_poll.h +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/entropy_poll.h @@ -10,11 +10,7 @@ #ifndef MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_POLL_H #define MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_POLL_H -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "mbedtls/build_info.h" #include @@ -26,20 +22,10 @@ extern "C" { * Default thresholds for built-in sources, in bytes */ #define MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MIN_PLATFORM 32 /**< Minimum for platform source */ -#define MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MIN_HAVEGE 32 /**< Minimum for HAVEGE */ -#define MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MIN_HARDCLOCK 4 /**< Minimum for mbedtls_timing_hardclock() */ #if !defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MIN_HARDWARE) #define MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MIN_HARDWARE 32 /**< Minimum for the hardware source */ #endif -/** - * \brief Entropy poll callback that provides 0 entropy. - */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_NULL_ENTROPY) -int mbedtls_null_entropy_poll(void *data, - unsigned char *output, size_t len, size_t *olen); -#endif - #if !defined(MBEDTLS_NO_PLATFORM_ENTROPY) /** * \brief Platform-specific entropy poll callback @@ -48,30 +34,12 @@ int mbedtls_platform_entropy_poll(void *data, unsigned char *output, size_t len, size_t *olen); #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVEGE_C) -/** - * \brief HAVEGE based entropy poll callback - * - * Requires an HAVEGE state as its data pointer. - */ -int mbedtls_havege_poll(void *data, - unsigned char *output, size_t len, size_t *olen); -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_TIMING_C) -/** - * \brief mbedtls_timing_hardclock-based entropy poll callback - */ -int mbedtls_hardclock_poll(void *data, - unsigned char *output, size_t len, size_t *olen); -#endif - #if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_HARDWARE_ALT) /** * \brief Entropy poll callback for a hardware source * * \warning This is not provided by Mbed TLS! - * See \c MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_HARDWARE_ALT in config.h. + * See \c MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_HARDWARE_ALT in mbedtls_config.h. * * \note This must accept NULL as its first argument. */ diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/error.c b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/error.c index cb7ad57e4504..84b637aeb22c 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/error.c +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/error.c @@ -22,10 +22,6 @@ #include "mbedtls/aes.h" #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARC4_C) -#include "mbedtls/arc4.h" -#endif - #if defined(MBEDTLS_ARIA_C) #include "mbedtls/aria.h" #endif @@ -42,10 +38,6 @@ #include "mbedtls/bignum.h" #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C) -#include "mbedtls/blowfish.h" -#endif - #if defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C) #include "mbedtls/camellia.h" #endif @@ -66,10 +58,6 @@ #include "mbedtls/cipher.h" #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CMAC_C) -#include "mbedtls/cmac.h" -#endif - #if defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C) #include "mbedtls/ctr_drbg.h" #endif @@ -94,6 +82,10 @@ #include "mbedtls/error.h" #endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" +#endif + #if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) #include "mbedtls/gcm.h" #endif @@ -106,20 +98,12 @@ #include "mbedtls/hmac_drbg.h" #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_C) -#include "mbedtls/md.h" -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD2_C) -#include "mbedtls/md2.h" -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD4_C) -#include "mbedtls/md4.h" +#if defined(MBEDTLS_LMS_C) +#include "mbedtls/lms.h" #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C) -#include "mbedtls/md5.h" +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_C) +#include "mbedtls/md.h" #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_NET_C) @@ -130,10 +114,6 @@ #include "mbedtls/oid.h" #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_C) -#include "mbedtls/padlock.h" -#endif - #if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_WRITE_C) #include "mbedtls/pem.h" #endif @@ -150,18 +130,14 @@ #include "mbedtls/pkcs5.h" #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) -#include "mbedtls/platform.h" +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS7_C) +#include "mbedtls/pkcs7.h" #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_POLY1305_C) #include "mbedtls/poly1305.h" #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C) -#include "mbedtls/ripemd160.h" -#endif - #if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) #include "mbedtls/rsa.h" #endif @@ -174,6 +150,10 @@ #include "mbedtls/sha256.h" #endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA3_C) +#include "mbedtls/sha3.h" +#endif + #if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) #include "mbedtls/sha512.h" #endif @@ -190,10 +170,6 @@ #include "mbedtls/x509.h" #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_XTEA_C) -#include "mbedtls/xtea.h" -#endif - const char *mbedtls_high_level_strerr(int error_code) { @@ -223,8 +199,6 @@ const char *mbedtls_high_level_strerr(int error_code) return( "CIPHER - Authentication failed (for AEAD modes)" ); case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_INVALID_CONTEXT): return( "CIPHER - The context is invalid. For example, because it was freed" ); - case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_HW_ACCEL_FAILED): - return( "CIPHER - Cipher hardware accelerator failed" ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_C) @@ -246,8 +220,6 @@ const char *mbedtls_high_level_strerr(int error_code) return( "DHM - Allocation of memory failed" ); case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_FILE_IO_ERROR): return( "DHM - Read or write of file failed" ); - case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_HW_ACCEL_FAILED): - return( "DHM - DHM hardware accelerator failed" ); case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_SET_GROUP_FAILED): return( "DHM - Setting the modulus and generator failed" ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_DHM_C */ @@ -269,8 +241,6 @@ const char *mbedtls_high_level_strerr(int error_code) return( "ECP - Invalid private or public key" ); case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_SIG_LEN_MISMATCH): return( "ECP - The buffer contains a valid signature followed by more data" ); - case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_HW_ACCEL_FAILED): - return( "ECP - The ECP hardware accelerator failed" ); case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS): return( "ECP - Operation in progress, call again with the same parameters to continue" ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */ @@ -284,8 +254,6 @@ const char *mbedtls_high_level_strerr(int error_code) return( "MD - Failed to allocate memory" ); case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_FILE_IO_ERROR): return( "MD - Opening or reading of file failed" ); - case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_HW_ACCEL_FAILED): - return( "MD - MD hardware accelerator failed" ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_WRITE_C) @@ -338,8 +306,8 @@ const char *mbedtls_high_level_strerr(int error_code) return( "PK - Unavailable feature, e.g. RSA disabled for RSA key" ); case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_SIG_LEN_MISMATCH): return( "PK - The buffer contains a valid signature followed by more data" ); - case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_HW_ACCEL_FAILED): - return( "PK - PK hardware accelerator failed" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL): + return( "PK - The output buffer is too small" ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C) @@ -364,6 +332,33 @@ const char *mbedtls_high_level_strerr(int error_code) return( "PKCS5 - Given private key password does not allow for correct decryption" ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS7_C) + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_INVALID_FORMAT): + return( "PKCS7 - The format is invalid, e.g. different type expected" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE): + return( "PKCS7 - Unavailable feature, e.g. anything other than signed data" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_INVALID_VERSION): + return( "PKCS7 - The PKCS #7 version element is invalid or cannot be parsed" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_INVALID_CONTENT_INFO): + return( "PKCS7 - The PKCS #7 content info is invalid or cannot be parsed" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_INVALID_ALG): + return( "PKCS7 - The algorithm tag or value is invalid or cannot be parsed" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_INVALID_CERT): + return( "PKCS7 - The certificate tag or value is invalid or cannot be parsed" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_INVALID_SIGNATURE): + return( "PKCS7 - Error parsing the signature" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_INVALID_SIGNER_INFO): + return( "PKCS7 - Error parsing the signer's info" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_BAD_INPUT_DATA): + return( "PKCS7 - Input invalid" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_ALLOC_FAILED): + return( "PKCS7 - Allocation of memory failed" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_VERIFY_FAIL): + return( "PKCS7 - Verification Failed" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_CERT_DATE_INVALID): + return( "PKCS7 - The PKCS #7 date issued/expired dates are invalid" ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS7_C */ + #if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA): return( "RSA - Bad input parameters to function" ); @@ -383,13 +378,11 @@ const char *mbedtls_high_level_strerr(int error_code) return( "RSA - The output buffer for decryption is not large enough" ); case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_RNG_FAILED): return( "RSA - The random generator failed to generate non-zeros" ); - case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_UNSUPPORTED_OPERATION): - return( "RSA - The implementation does not offer the requested operation, for example, because of security violations or lack of functionality" ); - case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_HW_ACCEL_FAILED): - return( "RSA - RSA hardware accelerator failed" ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C) + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS): + return( "SSL - A cryptographic operation is in progress. Try again later" ); case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE): return( "SSL - The requested feature is not available" ); case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA): @@ -400,18 +393,16 @@ const char *mbedtls_high_level_strerr(int error_code) return( "SSL - An invalid SSL record was received" ); case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CONN_EOF): return( "SSL - The connection indicated an EOF" ); - case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNKNOWN_CIPHER): - return( "SSL - An unknown cipher was received" ); - case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NO_CIPHER_CHOSEN): - return( "SSL - The server has no ciphersuites in common with the client" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR): + return( "SSL - A message could not be parsed due to a syntactic error" ); case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NO_RNG): return( "SSL - No RNG was provided to the SSL module" ); case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NO_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE): return( "SSL - No client certification received from the client, but required by the authentication mode" ); - case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CERTIFICATE_TOO_LARGE): - return( "SSL - Our own certificate(s) is/are too large to send in an SSL message" ); - case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CERTIFICATE_REQUIRED): - return( "SSL - The own certificate is not set, but needed by the server" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION): + return( "SSL - Client received an extended server hello containing an unsupported extension" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL): + return( "SSL - No ALPN protocols supported that the client advertises" ); case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PRIVATE_KEY_REQUIRED): return( "SSL - The own private key or pre-shared key is not set, but needed" ); case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CA_CHAIN_REQUIRED): @@ -420,46 +411,32 @@ const char *mbedtls_high_level_strerr(int error_code) return( "SSL - An unexpected message was received from our peer" ); case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FATAL_ALERT_MESSAGE): return( "SSL - A fatal alert message was received from our peer" ); - case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PEER_VERIFY_FAILED): - return( "SSL - Verification of our peer failed" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME): + return( "SSL - No server could be identified matching the client's SNI" ); case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PEER_CLOSE_NOTIFY): return( "SSL - The peer notified us that the connection is going to be closed" ); - case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO): - return( "SSL - Processing of the ClientHello handshake message failed" ); - case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO): - return( "SSL - Processing of the ServerHello handshake message failed" ); - case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE): + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_CERTIFICATE): return( "SSL - Processing of the Certificate handshake message failed" ); - case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST): - return( "SSL - Processing of the CertificateRequest handshake message failed" ); - case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE): - return( "SSL - Processing of the ServerKeyExchange handshake message failed" ); - case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO_DONE): - return( "SSL - Processing of the ServerHelloDone handshake message failed" ); - case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE): - return( "SSL - Processing of the ClientKeyExchange handshake message failed" ); - case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_RP): - return( "SSL - Processing of the ClientKeyExchange handshake message failed in DHM / ECDH Read Public" ); - case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_CS): - return( "SSL - Processing of the ClientKeyExchange handshake message failed in DHM / ECDH Calculate Secret" ); - case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY): - return( "SSL - Processing of the CertificateVerify handshake message failed" ); - case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC): - return( "SSL - Processing of the ChangeCipherSpec handshake message failed" ); - case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_FINISHED): - return( "SSL - Processing of the Finished handshake message failed" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_RECEIVED_NEW_SESSION_TICKET): + return( "SSL - * Received NewSessionTicket Post Handshake Message. This error code is experimental and may be changed or removed without notice" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CANNOT_READ_EARLY_DATA): + return( "SSL - Not possible to read early data" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_RECEIVED_EARLY_DATA): + return( "SSL - * Early data has been received as part of an on-going handshake. This error code can be returned only on server side if and only if early data has been enabled by means of the mbedtls_ssl_conf_early_data() API. This error code can then be returned by mbedtls_ssl_handshake(), mbedtls_ssl_handshake_step(), mbedtls_ssl_read() or mbedtls_ssl_write() if early data has been received as part of the handshake sequence they triggered. To read the early data, call mbedtls_ssl_read_early_data()" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CANNOT_WRITE_EARLY_DATA): + return( "SSL - Not possible to write early data" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CACHE_ENTRY_NOT_FOUND): + return( "SSL - Cache entry not found" ); case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED): return( "SSL - Memory allocation failed" ); case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED): return( "SSL - Hardware acceleration function returned with error" ); case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FALLTHROUGH): return( "SSL - Hardware acceleration function skipped / left alone data" ); - case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_COMPRESSION_FAILED): - return( "SSL - Processing of the compression / decompression failed" ); - case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_PROTOCOL_VERSION): + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION): return( "SSL - Handshake protocol not within min/max boundaries" ); - case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET): - return( "SSL - Processing of the NewSessionTicket handshake message failed" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE): + return( "SSL - The handshake negotiation failed" ); case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_SESSION_TICKET_EXPIRED): return( "SSL - Session ticket has expired" ); case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH): @@ -476,8 +453,6 @@ const char *mbedtls_high_level_strerr(int error_code) return( "SSL - DTLS client must retry for hello verification" ); case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL): return( "SSL - A buffer is too small to receive or write a message" ); - case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NO_USABLE_CIPHERSUITE): - return( "SSL - None of the common ciphersuites is usable (eg, no suitable certificate, see debug messages)" ); case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ): return( "SSL - No data of requested type currently available on underlying transport" ); case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE): @@ -490,8 +465,8 @@ const char *mbedtls_high_level_strerr(int error_code) return( "SSL - Record header looks valid but is not expected" ); case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NON_FATAL): return( "SSL - The alert message received indicates a non-fatal error" ); - case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_VERIFY_HASH): - return( "SSL - Couldn't set the hash for verifying CertificateVerify" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER): + return( "SSL - A field in a message was incorrect or inconsistent with other fields" ); case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CONTINUE_PROCESSING): return( "SSL - Internal-only message signaling that further message-processing should be done" ); case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ASYNC_IN_PROGRESS): @@ -502,12 +477,8 @@ const char *mbedtls_high_level_strerr(int error_code) return( "SSL - An encrypted DTLS-frame with an unexpected CID was received" ); case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_VERSION_MISMATCH): return( "SSL - An operation failed due to an unexpected version or configuration" ); - case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS): - return( "SSL - A cryptographic operation is in progress. Try again later" ); case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_CONFIG): return( "SSL - Invalid value in SSL config" ); - case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CACHE_ENTRY_NOT_FOUND): - return( "SSL - Cache entry not found" ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CREATE_C) @@ -581,26 +552,13 @@ const char *mbedtls_low_level_strerr(int error_code) return( "AES - Invalid data input length" ); case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_BAD_INPUT_DATA): return( "AES - Invalid input data" ); - case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE): - return( "AES - Feature not available. For example, an unsupported AES key size" ); - case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_HW_ACCEL_FAILED): - return( "AES - AES hardware accelerator failed" ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_AES_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARC4_C) - case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ARC4_HW_ACCEL_FAILED): - return( "ARC4 - ARC4 hardware accelerator failed" ); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ARC4_C */ - #if defined(MBEDTLS_ARIA_C) case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ARIA_BAD_INPUT_DATA): return( "ARIA - Bad input data" ); case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ARIA_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH): return( "ARIA - Invalid data input length" ); - case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ARIA_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE): - return( "ARIA - Feature not available. For example, an unsupported ARIA key size" ); - case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ARIA_HW_ACCEL_FAILED): - return( "ARIA - ARIA hardware accelerator failed" ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_ARIA_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C) @@ -646,22 +604,11 @@ const char *mbedtls_low_level_strerr(int error_code) return( "BIGNUM - Memory allocation failed" ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C) - case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_BLOWFISH_BAD_INPUT_DATA): - return( "BLOWFISH - Bad input data" ); - case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_BLOWFISH_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH): - return( "BLOWFISH - Invalid data input length" ); - case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_BLOWFISH_HW_ACCEL_FAILED): - return( "BLOWFISH - Blowfish hardware accelerator failed" ); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C */ - #if defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C) case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_CAMELLIA_BAD_INPUT_DATA): return( "CAMELLIA - Bad input data" ); case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_CAMELLIA_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH): return( "CAMELLIA - Invalid data input length" ); - case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_CAMELLIA_HW_ACCEL_FAILED): - return( "CAMELLIA - Camellia hardware accelerator failed" ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C) @@ -669,17 +616,11 @@ const char *mbedtls_low_level_strerr(int error_code) return( "CCM - Bad input parameters to the function" ); case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_AUTH_FAILED): return( "CCM - Authenticated decryption failed" ); - case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_HW_ACCEL_FAILED): - return( "CCM - CCM hardware accelerator failed" ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_CCM_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_C) case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_CHACHA20_BAD_INPUT_DATA): return( "CHACHA20 - Invalid input parameter(s)" ); - case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_CHACHA20_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE): - return( "CHACHA20 - Feature not available. For example, s part of the API is not implemented" ); - case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_CHACHA20_HW_ACCEL_FAILED): - return( "CHACHA20 - Chacha20 hardware accelerator failed" ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C) @@ -689,11 +630,6 @@ const char *mbedtls_low_level_strerr(int error_code) return( "CHACHAPOLY - Authenticated decryption failed: data was not authentic" ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CMAC_C) - case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_CMAC_HW_ACCEL_FAILED): - return( "CMAC - CMAC hardware accelerator failed" ); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CMAC_C */ - #if defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C) case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED): return( "CTR_DRBG - The entropy source failed" ); @@ -708,8 +644,6 @@ const char *mbedtls_low_level_strerr(int error_code) #if defined(MBEDTLS_DES_C) case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_DES_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH): return( "DES - The data input has an invalid length" ); - case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_DES_HW_ACCEL_FAILED): - return( "DES - DES hardware accelerator failed" ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_DES_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C) @@ -732,13 +666,20 @@ const char *mbedtls_low_level_strerr(int error_code) return( "ERROR - This is a bug in the library" ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_ERROR_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_HW_ACCEL_FAILED): + return( "PLATFORM - Hardware accelerator failed" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED): + return( "PLATFORM - The requested feature is not supported by the platform" ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C */ + #if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_AUTH_FAILED): return( "GCM - Authenticated decryption failed" ); - case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_HW_ACCEL_FAILED): - return( "GCM - GCM hardware accelerator failed" ); case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BAD_INPUT): return( "GCM - Bad input parameters to function" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL): + return( "GCM - An output buffer is too small" ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_HKDF_C) @@ -757,20 +698,18 @@ const char *mbedtls_low_level_strerr(int error_code) return( "HMAC_DRBG - The entropy source failed" ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD2_C) - case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_MD2_HW_ACCEL_FAILED): - return( "MD2 - MD2 hardware accelerator failed" ); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD2_C */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD4_C) - case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_MD4_HW_ACCEL_FAILED): - return( "MD4 - MD4 hardware accelerator failed" ); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD4_C */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C) - case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_MD5_HW_ACCEL_FAILED): - return( "MD5 - MD5 hardware accelerator failed" ); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD5_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_LMS_C) + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_BAD_INPUT_DATA): + return( "LMS - Bad data has been input to an LMS function" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_OUT_OF_PRIVATE_KEYS): + return( "LMS - Specified LMS key has utilised all of its private keys" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_VERIFY_FAILED): + return( "LMS - LMS signature verification failed" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_ALLOC_FAILED): + return( "LMS - LMS failed to allocate space for a private key" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL): + return( "LMS - Input/output buffer is too small to contain requited data" ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_LMS_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_NET_C) case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_SOCKET_FAILED): @@ -808,68 +747,37 @@ const char *mbedtls_low_level_strerr(int error_code) return( "OID - output buffer is too small" ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_OID_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_C) - case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PADLOCK_DATA_MISALIGNED): - return( "PADLOCK - Input data should be aligned" ); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_C */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) - case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_HW_ACCEL_FAILED): - return( "PLATFORM - Hardware accelerator failed" ); - case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED): - return( "PLATFORM - The requested feature is not supported by the platform" ); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C */ - #if defined(MBEDTLS_POLY1305_C) case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_POLY1305_BAD_INPUT_DATA): return( "POLY1305 - Invalid input parameter(s)" ); - case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_POLY1305_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE): - return( "POLY1305 - Feature not available. For example, s part of the API is not implemented" ); - case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_POLY1305_HW_ACCEL_FAILED): - return( "POLY1305 - Poly1305 hardware accelerator failed" ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_POLY1305_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C) - case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_RIPEMD160_HW_ACCEL_FAILED): - return( "RIPEMD160 - RIPEMD160 hardware accelerator failed" ); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C */ - #if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) - case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SHA1_HW_ACCEL_FAILED): - return( "SHA1 - SHA-1 hardware accelerator failed" ); case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SHA1_BAD_INPUT_DATA): return( "SHA1 - SHA-1 input data was malformed" ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) - case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SHA256_HW_ACCEL_FAILED): - return( "SHA256 - SHA-256 hardware accelerator failed" ); case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SHA256_BAD_INPUT_DATA): return( "SHA256 - SHA-256 input data was malformed" ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA3_C) + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SHA3_BAD_INPUT_DATA): + return( "SHA3 - SHA-3 input data was malformed" ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA3_C */ + #if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) - case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SHA512_HW_ACCEL_FAILED): - return( "SHA512 - SHA-512 hardware accelerator failed" ); case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SHA512_BAD_INPUT_DATA): return( "SHA512 - SHA-512 input data was malformed" ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) - case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_THREADING_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE): - return( "THREADING - The selected feature is not available" ); case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_THREADING_BAD_INPUT_DATA): return( "THREADING - Bad input parameters to function" ); case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_THREADING_MUTEX_ERROR): return( "THREADING - Locking / unlocking / free failed with error code" ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_THREADING_C */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_XTEA_C) - case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_XTEA_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH): - return( "XTEA - The data input has an invalid length" ); - case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_XTEA_HW_ACCEL_FAILED): - return( "XTEA - XTEA hardware accelerator failed" ); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_XTEA_C */ /* End Auto-Generated Code. */ default: diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/gcm.c b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/gcm.c index d3e773278fbb..5dfac2349c82 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/gcm.c +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/gcm.c @@ -25,29 +25,69 @@ #include "mbedtls/error.h" #include "mbedtls/constant_time.h" +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_C) +#include "block_cipher_internal.h" +#endif + #include #if defined(MBEDTLS_AESNI_C) -#include "mbedtls/aesni.h" +#include "aesni.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AESCE_C) +#include "aesce.h" #endif #if !defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_ALT) -/* Parameter validation macros */ -#define GCM_VALIDATE_RET(cond) \ - MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE_RET(cond, MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BAD_INPUT) -#define GCM_VALIDATE(cond) \ - MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE(cond) +/* Used to select the acceleration mechanism */ +#define MBEDTLS_GCM_ACC_SMALLTABLE 0 +#define MBEDTLS_GCM_ACC_LARGETABLE 1 +#define MBEDTLS_GCM_ACC_AESNI 2 +#define MBEDTLS_GCM_ACC_AESCE 3 /* * Initialize a context */ void mbedtls_gcm_init(mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx) { - GCM_VALIDATE(ctx != NULL); memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_gcm_context)); } +static inline void gcm_set_acceleration(mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_LARGE_TABLE) + ctx->acceleration = MBEDTLS_GCM_ACC_LARGETABLE; +#else + ctx->acceleration = MBEDTLS_GCM_ACC_SMALLTABLE; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AESNI_HAVE_CODE) + /* With CLMUL support, we need only h, not the rest of the table */ + if (mbedtls_aesni_has_support(MBEDTLS_AESNI_CLMUL)) { + ctx->acceleration = MBEDTLS_GCM_ACC_AESNI; + } +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AESCE_HAVE_CODE) + if (MBEDTLS_AESCE_HAS_SUPPORT()) { + ctx->acceleration = MBEDTLS_GCM_ACC_AESCE; + } +#endif +} + +static inline void gcm_gen_table_rightshift(uint64_t dst[2], const uint64_t src[2]) +{ + uint8_t *u8Dst = (uint8_t *) dst; + uint8_t *u8Src = (uint8_t *) src; + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT64_BE(MBEDTLS_GET_UINT64_BE(&src[1], 0) >> 1, &dst[1], 0); + u8Dst[8] |= (u8Src[7] & 0x01) << 7; + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT64_BE(MBEDTLS_GET_UINT64_BE(&src[0], 0) >> 1, &dst[0], 0); + u8Dst[0] ^= (u8Src[15] & 0x01) ? 0xE1 : 0; +} + /* * Precompute small multiples of H, that is set * HH[i] || HL[i] = H times i, @@ -59,57 +99,61 @@ void mbedtls_gcm_init(mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx) static int gcm_gen_table(mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx) { int ret, i, j; - uint64_t hi, lo; - uint64_t vl, vh; - unsigned char h[16]; - size_t olen = 0; + uint64_t u64h[2] = { 0 }; + uint8_t *h = (uint8_t *) u64h; - memset(h, 0, 16); - if ((ret = mbedtls_cipher_update(&ctx->cipher_ctx, h, 16, h, &olen)) != 0) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_C) + ret = mbedtls_block_cipher_encrypt(&ctx->block_cipher_ctx, h, h); +#else + size_t olen = 0; + ret = mbedtls_cipher_update(&ctx->cipher_ctx, h, 16, h, &olen); +#endif + if (ret != 0) { return ret; } - /* pack h as two 64-bits ints, big-endian */ - hi = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE(h, 0); - lo = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE(h, 4); - vh = (uint64_t) hi << 32 | lo; - - hi = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE(h, 8); - lo = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE(h, 12); - vl = (uint64_t) hi << 32 | lo; + gcm_set_acceleration(ctx); - /* 8 = 1000 corresponds to 1 in GF(2^128) */ - ctx->HL[8] = vl; - ctx->HH[8] = vh; + /* MBEDTLS_GCM_HTABLE_SIZE/2 = 1000 corresponds to 1 in GF(2^128) */ + ctx->H[MBEDTLS_GCM_HTABLE_SIZE/2][0] = u64h[0]; + ctx->H[MBEDTLS_GCM_HTABLE_SIZE/2][1] = u64h[1]; + switch (ctx->acceleration) { #if defined(MBEDTLS_AESNI_HAVE_CODE) - /* With CLMUL support, we need only h, not the rest of the table */ - if (mbedtls_aesni_has_support(MBEDTLS_AESNI_CLMUL)) { - return 0; - } + case MBEDTLS_GCM_ACC_AESNI: + return 0; #endif - /* 0 corresponds to 0 in GF(2^128) */ - ctx->HH[0] = 0; - ctx->HL[0] = 0; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AESCE_HAVE_CODE) + case MBEDTLS_GCM_ACC_AESCE: + return 0; +#endif - for (i = 4; i > 0; i >>= 1) { - uint32_t T = (vl & 1) * 0xe1000000U; - vl = (vh << 63) | (vl >> 1); - vh = (vh >> 1) ^ ((uint64_t) T << 32); + default: + /* 0 corresponds to 0 in GF(2^128) */ + ctx->H[0][0] = 0; + ctx->H[0][1] = 0; - ctx->HL[i] = vl; - ctx->HH[i] = vh; - } + for (i = MBEDTLS_GCM_HTABLE_SIZE/4; i > 0; i >>= 1) { + gcm_gen_table_rightshift(ctx->H[i], ctx->H[i*2]); + } - for (i = 2; i <= 8; i *= 2) { - uint64_t *HiL = ctx->HL + i, *HiH = ctx->HH + i; - vh = *HiH; - vl = *HiL; - for (j = 1; j < i; j++) { - HiH[j] = vh ^ ctx->HH[j]; - HiL[j] = vl ^ ctx->HL[j]; - } +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_LARGE_TABLE) + /* pack elements of H as 64-bits ints, big-endian */ + for (i = MBEDTLS_GCM_HTABLE_SIZE/2; i > 0; i >>= 1) { + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT64_BE(ctx->H[i][0], &ctx->H[i][0], 0); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT64_BE(ctx->H[i][1], &ctx->H[i][1], 0); + } +#endif + + for (i = 2; i < MBEDTLS_GCM_HTABLE_SIZE; i <<= 1) { + for (j = 1; j < i; j++) { + mbedtls_xor_no_simd((unsigned char *) ctx->H[i+j], + (unsigned char *) ctx->H[i], + (unsigned char *) ctx->H[j], + 16); + } + } } return 0; @@ -121,11 +165,23 @@ int mbedtls_gcm_setkey(mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx, unsigned int keybits) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *cipher_info; - GCM_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - GCM_VALIDATE_RET(key != NULL); - GCM_VALIDATE_RET(keybits == 128 || keybits == 192 || keybits == 256); + if (keybits != 128 && keybits != 192 && keybits != 256) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BAD_INPUT; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_C) + mbedtls_block_cipher_free(&ctx->block_cipher_ctx); + + if ((ret = mbedtls_block_cipher_setup(&ctx->block_cipher_ctx, cipher)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + + if ((ret = mbedtls_block_cipher_setkey(&ctx->block_cipher_ctx, key, keybits)) != 0) { + return ret; + } +#else + const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *cipher_info; cipher_info = mbedtls_cipher_info_from_values(cipher, keybits, MBEDTLS_MODE_ECB); @@ -133,7 +189,7 @@ int mbedtls_gcm_setkey(mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx, return MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BAD_INPUT; } - if (cipher_info->block_size != 16) { + if (mbedtls_cipher_info_get_block_size(cipher_info) != 16) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BAD_INPUT; } @@ -147,6 +203,7 @@ int mbedtls_gcm_setkey(mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx, MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT)) != 0) { return ret; } +#endif if ((ret = gcm_gen_table(ctx)) != 0) { return ret; @@ -155,12 +212,86 @@ int mbedtls_gcm_setkey(mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx, return 0; } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_LARGE_TABLE) +static const uint16_t last8[256] = { + 0x0000, 0xc201, 0x8403, 0x4602, 0x0807, 0xca06, 0x8c04, 0x4e05, + 0x100e, 0xd20f, 0x940d, 0x560c, 0x1809, 0xda08, 0x9c0a, 0x5e0b, + 0x201c, 0xe21d, 0xa41f, 0x661e, 0x281b, 0xea1a, 0xac18, 0x6e19, + 0x3012, 0xf213, 0xb411, 0x7610, 0x3815, 0xfa14, 0xbc16, 0x7e17, + 0x4038, 0x8239, 0xc43b, 0x063a, 0x483f, 0x8a3e, 0xcc3c, 0x0e3d, + 0x5036, 0x9237, 0xd435, 0x1634, 0x5831, 0x9a30, 0xdc32, 0x1e33, + 0x6024, 0xa225, 0xe427, 0x2626, 0x6823, 0xaa22, 0xec20, 0x2e21, + 0x702a, 0xb22b, 0xf429, 0x3628, 0x782d, 0xba2c, 0xfc2e, 0x3e2f, + 0x8070, 0x4271, 0x0473, 0xc672, 0x8877, 0x4a76, 0x0c74, 0xce75, + 0x907e, 0x527f, 0x147d, 0xd67c, 0x9879, 0x5a78, 0x1c7a, 0xde7b, + 0xa06c, 0x626d, 0x246f, 0xe66e, 0xa86b, 0x6a6a, 0x2c68, 0xee69, + 0xb062, 0x7263, 0x3461, 0xf660, 0xb865, 0x7a64, 0x3c66, 0xfe67, + 0xc048, 0x0249, 0x444b, 0x864a, 0xc84f, 0x0a4e, 0x4c4c, 0x8e4d, + 0xd046, 0x1247, 0x5445, 0x9644, 0xd841, 0x1a40, 0x5c42, 0x9e43, + 0xe054, 0x2255, 0x6457, 0xa656, 0xe853, 0x2a52, 0x6c50, 0xae51, + 0xf05a, 0x325b, 0x7459, 0xb658, 0xf85d, 0x3a5c, 0x7c5e, 0xbe5f, + 0x00e1, 0xc2e0, 0x84e2, 0x46e3, 0x08e6, 0xcae7, 0x8ce5, 0x4ee4, + 0x10ef, 0xd2ee, 0x94ec, 0x56ed, 0x18e8, 0xdae9, 0x9ceb, 0x5eea, + 0x20fd, 0xe2fc, 0xa4fe, 0x66ff, 0x28fa, 0xeafb, 0xacf9, 0x6ef8, + 0x30f3, 0xf2f2, 0xb4f0, 0x76f1, 0x38f4, 0xfaf5, 0xbcf7, 0x7ef6, + 0x40d9, 0x82d8, 0xc4da, 0x06db, 0x48de, 0x8adf, 0xccdd, 0x0edc, + 0x50d7, 0x92d6, 0xd4d4, 0x16d5, 0x58d0, 0x9ad1, 0xdcd3, 0x1ed2, + 0x60c5, 0xa2c4, 0xe4c6, 0x26c7, 0x68c2, 0xaac3, 0xecc1, 0x2ec0, + 0x70cb, 0xb2ca, 0xf4c8, 0x36c9, 0x78cc, 0xbacd, 0xfccf, 0x3ece, + 0x8091, 0x4290, 0x0492, 0xc693, 0x8896, 0x4a97, 0x0c95, 0xce94, + 0x909f, 0x529e, 0x149c, 0xd69d, 0x9898, 0x5a99, 0x1c9b, 0xde9a, + 0xa08d, 0x628c, 0x248e, 0xe68f, 0xa88a, 0x6a8b, 0x2c89, 0xee88, + 0xb083, 0x7282, 0x3480, 0xf681, 0xb884, 0x7a85, 0x3c87, 0xfe86, + 0xc0a9, 0x02a8, 0x44aa, 0x86ab, 0xc8ae, 0x0aaf, 0x4cad, 0x8eac, + 0xd0a7, 0x12a6, 0x54a4, 0x96a5, 0xd8a0, 0x1aa1, 0x5ca3, 0x9ea2, + 0xe0b5, 0x22b4, 0x64b6, 0xa6b7, 0xe8b2, 0x2ab3, 0x6cb1, 0xaeb0, + 0xf0bb, 0x32ba, 0x74b8, 0xb6b9, 0xf8bc, 0x3abd, 0x7cbf, 0xbebe +}; + +static void gcm_mult_largetable(uint8_t *output, const uint8_t *x, uint64_t H[256][2]) +{ + int i; + uint64_t u64z[2]; + uint16_t *u16z = (uint16_t *) u64z; + uint8_t *u8z = (uint8_t *) u64z; + uint8_t rem; + + u64z[0] = 0; + u64z[1] = 0; + + if (MBEDTLS_IS_BIG_ENDIAN) { + for (i = 15; i > 0; i--) { + mbedtls_xor_no_simd(u8z, u8z, (uint8_t *) H[x[i]], 16); + rem = u8z[15]; + + u64z[1] >>= 8; + u8z[8] = u8z[7]; + u64z[0] >>= 8; + + u16z[0] ^= MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_LE(&last8[rem], 0); + } + } else { + for (i = 15; i > 0; i--) { + mbedtls_xor_no_simd(u8z, u8z, (uint8_t *) H[x[i]], 16); + rem = u8z[15]; + + u64z[1] <<= 8; + u8z[8] = u8z[7]; + u64z[0] <<= 8; + + u16z[0] ^= last8[rem]; + } + } + + mbedtls_xor_no_simd(output, u8z, (uint8_t *) H[x[0]], 16); +} +#else /* * Shoup's method for multiplication use this table with * last4[x] = x times P^128 * where x and last4[x] are seen as elements of GF(2^128) as in [MGV] */ -static const uint64_t last4[16] = +static const uint16_t last4[16] = { 0x0000, 0x1c20, 0x3840, 0x2460, 0x7080, 0x6ca0, 0x48c0, 0x54e0, @@ -168,87 +299,97 @@ static const uint64_t last4[16] = 0x9180, 0x8da0, 0xa9c0, 0xb5e0 }; -/* - * Sets output to x times H using the precomputed tables. - * x and output are seen as elements of GF(2^128) as in [MGV]. - */ -static void gcm_mult(mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx, const unsigned char x[16], - unsigned char output[16]) +static void gcm_mult_smalltable(uint8_t *output, const uint8_t *x, uint64_t H[16][2]) { int i = 0; unsigned char lo, hi, rem; - uint64_t zh, zl; - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_AESNI_HAVE_CODE) - if (mbedtls_aesni_has_support(MBEDTLS_AESNI_CLMUL)) { - unsigned char h[16]; - - MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE(ctx->HH[8] >> 32, h, 0); - MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE(ctx->HH[8], h, 4); - MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE(ctx->HL[8] >> 32, h, 8); - MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE(ctx->HL[8], h, 12); - - mbedtls_aesni_gcm_mult(output, x, h); - return; - } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_AESNI_HAVE_CODE */ + uint64_t u64z[2]; + const uint64_t *pu64z = NULL; + uint8_t *u8z = (uint8_t *) u64z; lo = x[15] & 0xf; + hi = (x[15] >> 4) & 0xf; - zh = ctx->HH[lo]; - zl = ctx->HL[lo]; + pu64z = H[lo]; - for (i = 15; i >= 0; i--) { + rem = (unsigned char) pu64z[1] & 0xf; + u64z[1] = (pu64z[0] << 60) | (pu64z[1] >> 4); + u64z[0] = (pu64z[0] >> 4); + u64z[0] ^= (uint64_t) last4[rem] << 48; + mbedtls_xor_no_simd(u8z, u8z, (uint8_t *) H[hi], 16); + + for (i = 14; i >= 0; i--) { lo = x[i] & 0xf; hi = (x[i] >> 4) & 0xf; - if (i != 15) { - rem = (unsigned char) zl & 0xf; - zl = (zh << 60) | (zl >> 4); - zh = (zh >> 4); - zh ^= (uint64_t) last4[rem] << 48; - zh ^= ctx->HH[lo]; - zl ^= ctx->HL[lo]; + rem = (unsigned char) u64z[1] & 0xf; + u64z[1] = (u64z[0] << 60) | (u64z[1] >> 4); + u64z[0] = (u64z[0] >> 4); + u64z[0] ^= (uint64_t) last4[rem] << 48; + mbedtls_xor_no_simd(u8z, u8z, (uint8_t *) H[lo], 16); + + rem = (unsigned char) u64z[1] & 0xf; + u64z[1] = (u64z[0] << 60) | (u64z[1] >> 4); + u64z[0] = (u64z[0] >> 4); + u64z[0] ^= (uint64_t) last4[rem] << 48; + mbedtls_xor_no_simd(u8z, u8z, (uint8_t *) H[hi], 16); + } - } + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT64_BE(u64z[0], output, 0); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT64_BE(u64z[1], output, 8); +} +#endif + +/* + * Sets output to x times H using the precomputed tables. + * x and output are seen as elements of GF(2^128) as in [MGV]. + */ +static void gcm_mult(mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx, const unsigned char x[16], + unsigned char output[16]) +{ + switch (ctx->acceleration) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AESNI_HAVE_CODE) + case MBEDTLS_GCM_ACC_AESNI: + mbedtls_aesni_gcm_mult(output, x, (uint8_t *) ctx->H[MBEDTLS_GCM_HTABLE_SIZE/2]); + break; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AESCE_HAVE_CODE) + case MBEDTLS_GCM_ACC_AESCE: + mbedtls_aesce_gcm_mult(output, x, (uint8_t *) ctx->H[MBEDTLS_GCM_HTABLE_SIZE/2]); + break; +#endif - rem = (unsigned char) zl & 0xf; - zl = (zh << 60) | (zl >> 4); - zh = (zh >> 4); - zh ^= (uint64_t) last4[rem] << 48; - zh ^= ctx->HH[hi]; - zl ^= ctx->HL[hi]; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_LARGE_TABLE) + case MBEDTLS_GCM_ACC_LARGETABLE: + gcm_mult_largetable(output, x, ctx->H); + break; +#else + case MBEDTLS_GCM_ACC_SMALLTABLE: + gcm_mult_smalltable(output, x, ctx->H); + break; +#endif } - MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE(zh >> 32, output, 0); - MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE(zh, output, 4); - MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE(zl >> 32, output, 8); - MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE(zl, output, 12); + return; } int mbedtls_gcm_starts(mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx, int mode, - const unsigned char *iv, - size_t iv_len, - const unsigned char *add, - size_t add_len) + const unsigned char *iv, size_t iv_len) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; unsigned char work_buf[16]; - size_t i; const unsigned char *p; - size_t use_len, olen = 0; + size_t use_len; uint64_t iv_bits; +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_C) + size_t olen = 0; +#endif - GCM_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - GCM_VALIDATE_RET(iv_len == 0 || iv != NULL); - GCM_VALIDATE_RET(add_len == 0 || add != NULL); - - /* IV and AD are limited to 2^64 bits, so 2^61 bytes */ + /* IV is limited to 2^64 bits, so 2^61 bytes */ /* IV is not allowed to be zero length */ - if (iv_len == 0 || - ((uint64_t) iv_len) >> 61 != 0 || - ((uint64_t) add_len) >> 61 != 0) { + if (iv_len == 0 || (uint64_t) iv_len >> 61 != 0) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BAD_INPUT; } @@ -271,9 +412,16 @@ int mbedtls_gcm_starts(mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx, while (iv_len > 0) { use_len = (iv_len < 16) ? iv_len : 16; - for (i = 0; i < use_len; i++) { - ctx->y[i] ^= p[i]; - } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_COMPILER_IS_GCC) && (MBEDTLS_GCC_VERSION >= 70110) +#pragma GCC diagnostic push +#pragma GCC diagnostic warning "-Wstringop-overflow=0" +#endif + + mbedtls_xor(ctx->y, ctx->y, p, use_len); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_COMPILER_IS_GCC) && (MBEDTLS_GCC_VERSION >= 70110) +#pragma GCC diagnostic pop +#endif gcm_mult(ctx, ctx->y, ctx->y); @@ -281,119 +429,257 @@ int mbedtls_gcm_starts(mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx, p += use_len; } - for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) { - ctx->y[i] ^= work_buf[i]; - } + mbedtls_xor(ctx->y, ctx->y, work_buf, 16); gcm_mult(ctx, ctx->y, ctx->y); } - if ((ret = mbedtls_cipher_update(&ctx->cipher_ctx, ctx->y, 16, - ctx->base_ectr, &olen)) != 0) { + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_C) + ret = mbedtls_block_cipher_encrypt(&ctx->block_cipher_ctx, ctx->y, ctx->base_ectr); +#else + ret = mbedtls_cipher_update(&ctx->cipher_ctx, ctx->y, 16, ctx->base_ectr, &olen); +#endif + if (ret != 0) { return ret; } - ctx->add_len = add_len; + return 0; +} + +/** + * mbedtls_gcm_context::buf contains the partial state of the computation of + * the authentication tag. + * mbedtls_gcm_context::add_len and mbedtls_gcm_context::len indicate + * different stages of the computation: + * * len == 0 && add_len == 0: initial state + * * len == 0 && add_len % 16 != 0: the first `add_len % 16` bytes have + * a partial block of AD that has been + * xored in but not yet multiplied in. + * * len == 0 && add_len % 16 == 0: the authentication tag is correct if + * the data ends now. + * * len % 16 != 0: the first `len % 16` bytes have + * a partial block of ciphertext that has + * been xored in but not yet multiplied in. + * * len > 0 && len % 16 == 0: the authentication tag is correct if + * the data ends now. + */ +int mbedtls_gcm_update_ad(mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *add, size_t add_len) +{ + const unsigned char *p; + size_t use_len, offset; + uint64_t new_add_len; + + /* AD is limited to 2^64 bits, ie 2^61 bytes + * Also check for possible overflow */ +#if SIZE_MAX > 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL + if (add_len > 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BAD_INPUT; + } +#endif + new_add_len = ctx->add_len + (uint64_t) add_len; + if (new_add_len < ctx->add_len || new_add_len >> 61 != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BAD_INPUT; + } + + offset = ctx->add_len % 16; p = add; - while (add_len > 0) { - use_len = (add_len < 16) ? add_len : 16; - for (i = 0; i < use_len; i++) { - ctx->buf[i] ^= p[i]; + if (offset != 0) { + use_len = 16 - offset; + if (use_len > add_len) { + use_len = add_len; } - gcm_mult(ctx, ctx->buf, ctx->buf); + mbedtls_xor(ctx->buf + offset, ctx->buf + offset, p, use_len); + + if (offset + use_len == 16) { + gcm_mult(ctx, ctx->buf, ctx->buf); + } + ctx->add_len += use_len; add_len -= use_len; p += use_len; } + ctx->add_len += add_len; + + while (add_len >= 16) { + mbedtls_xor(ctx->buf, ctx->buf, p, 16); + + gcm_mult(ctx, ctx->buf, ctx->buf); + + add_len -= 16; + p += 16; + } + + if (add_len > 0) { + mbedtls_xor(ctx->buf, ctx->buf, p, add_len); + } + + return 0; +} + +/* Increment the counter. */ +static void gcm_incr(unsigned char y[16]) +{ + uint32_t x = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE(y, 12); + x++; + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE(x, y, 12); +} + +/* Calculate and apply the encryption mask. Process use_len bytes of data, + * starting at position offset in the mask block. */ +static int gcm_mask(mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx, + unsigned char ectr[16], + size_t offset, size_t use_len, + const unsigned char *input, + unsigned char *output) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_C) + ret = mbedtls_block_cipher_encrypt(&ctx->block_cipher_ctx, ctx->y, ectr); +#else + size_t olen = 0; + ret = mbedtls_cipher_update(&ctx->cipher_ctx, ctx->y, 16, ectr, &olen); +#endif + if (ret != 0) { + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(ectr, 16); + return ret; + } + + if (ctx->mode == MBEDTLS_GCM_DECRYPT) { + mbedtls_xor(ctx->buf + offset, ctx->buf + offset, input, use_len); + } + mbedtls_xor(output, ectr + offset, input, use_len); + if (ctx->mode == MBEDTLS_GCM_ENCRYPT) { + mbedtls_xor(ctx->buf + offset, ctx->buf + offset, output, use_len); + } + return 0; } int mbedtls_gcm_update(mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx, - size_t length, - const unsigned char *input, - unsigned char *output) + const unsigned char *input, size_t input_length, + unsigned char *output, size_t output_size, + size_t *output_length) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - unsigned char ectr[16]; - size_t i; - const unsigned char *p; + const unsigned char *p = input; unsigned char *out_p = output; - size_t use_len, olen = 0; + size_t offset; + unsigned char ectr[16] = { 0 }; - GCM_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - GCM_VALIDATE_RET(length == 0 || input != NULL); - GCM_VALIDATE_RET(length == 0 || output != NULL); + if (output_size < input_length) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + } + *output_length = input_length; + + /* Exit early if input_length==0 so that we don't do any pointer arithmetic + * on a potentially null pointer. + * Returning early also means that the last partial block of AD remains + * untouched for mbedtls_gcm_finish */ + if (input_length == 0) { + return 0; + } - if (output > input && (size_t) (output - input) < length) { + if (output > input && (size_t) (output - input) < input_length) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BAD_INPUT; } /* Total length is restricted to 2^39 - 256 bits, ie 2^36 - 2^5 bytes * Also check for possible overflow */ - if (ctx->len + length < ctx->len || - (uint64_t) ctx->len + length > 0xFFFFFFFE0ull) { + if (ctx->len + input_length < ctx->len || + (uint64_t) ctx->len + input_length > 0xFFFFFFFE0ull) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BAD_INPUT; } - ctx->len += length; - - p = input; - while (length > 0) { - use_len = (length < 16) ? length : 16; + if (ctx->len == 0 && ctx->add_len % 16 != 0) { + gcm_mult(ctx, ctx->buf, ctx->buf); + } - for (i = 16; i > 12; i--) { - if (++ctx->y[i - 1] != 0) { - break; - } + offset = ctx->len % 16; + if (offset != 0) { + size_t use_len = 16 - offset; + if (use_len > input_length) { + use_len = input_length; } - if ((ret = mbedtls_cipher_update(&ctx->cipher_ctx, ctx->y, 16, ectr, - &olen)) != 0) { + if ((ret = gcm_mask(ctx, ectr, offset, use_len, p, out_p)) != 0) { return ret; } - for (i = 0; i < use_len; i++) { - if (ctx->mode == MBEDTLS_GCM_DECRYPT) { - ctx->buf[i] ^= p[i]; - } - out_p[i] = ectr[i] ^ p[i]; - if (ctx->mode == MBEDTLS_GCM_ENCRYPT) { - ctx->buf[i] ^= out_p[i]; - } + if (offset + use_len == 16) { + gcm_mult(ctx, ctx->buf, ctx->buf); } - gcm_mult(ctx, ctx->buf, ctx->buf); - - length -= use_len; + ctx->len += use_len; + input_length -= use_len; p += use_len; out_p += use_len; } + ctx->len += input_length; + + while (input_length >= 16) { + gcm_incr(ctx->y); + if ((ret = gcm_mask(ctx, ectr, 0, 16, p, out_p)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + + gcm_mult(ctx, ctx->buf, ctx->buf); + + input_length -= 16; + p += 16; + out_p += 16; + } + + if (input_length > 0) { + gcm_incr(ctx->y); + if ((ret = gcm_mask(ctx, ectr, 0, input_length, p, out_p)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + } + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(ectr, sizeof(ectr)); return 0; } int mbedtls_gcm_finish(mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx, - unsigned char *tag, - size_t tag_len) + unsigned char *output, size_t output_size, + size_t *output_length, + unsigned char *tag, size_t tag_len) { unsigned char work_buf[16]; - size_t i; uint64_t orig_len; uint64_t orig_add_len; - GCM_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - GCM_VALIDATE_RET(tag != NULL); + /* We never pass any output in finish(). The output parameter exists only + * for the sake of alternative implementations. */ + (void) output; + (void) output_size; + *output_length = 0; + /* Total length is restricted to 2^39 - 256 bits, ie 2^36 - 2^5 bytes + * and AD length is restricted to 2^64 bits, ie 2^61 bytes so neither of + * the two multiplications would overflow. */ orig_len = ctx->len * 8; orig_add_len = ctx->add_len * 8; + if (ctx->len == 0 && ctx->add_len % 16 != 0) { + gcm_mult(ctx, ctx->buf, ctx->buf); + } + if (tag_len > 16 || tag_len < 4) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BAD_INPUT; } + if (ctx->len % 16 != 0) { + gcm_mult(ctx, ctx->buf, ctx->buf); + } + memcpy(tag, ctx->base_ectr, tag_len); if (orig_len || orig_add_len) { @@ -404,15 +690,11 @@ int mbedtls_gcm_finish(mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx, MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE((orig_len >> 32), work_buf, 8); MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE((orig_len), work_buf, 12); - for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) { - ctx->buf[i] ^= work_buf[i]; - } + mbedtls_xor(ctx->buf, ctx->buf, work_buf, 16); gcm_mult(ctx, ctx->buf, ctx->buf); - for (i = 0; i < tag_len; i++) { - tag[i] ^= ctx->buf[i]; - } + mbedtls_xor(tag, tag, ctx->buf, tag_len); } return 0; @@ -431,23 +713,22 @@ int mbedtls_gcm_crypt_and_tag(mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx, unsigned char *tag) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t olen; - GCM_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - GCM_VALIDATE_RET(iv_len == 0 || iv != NULL); - GCM_VALIDATE_RET(add_len == 0 || add != NULL); - GCM_VALIDATE_RET(length == 0 || input != NULL); - GCM_VALIDATE_RET(length == 0 || output != NULL); - GCM_VALIDATE_RET(tag != NULL); + if ((ret = mbedtls_gcm_starts(ctx, mode, iv, iv_len)) != 0) { + return ret; + } - if ((ret = mbedtls_gcm_starts(ctx, mode, iv, iv_len, add, add_len)) != 0) { + if ((ret = mbedtls_gcm_update_ad(ctx, add, add_len)) != 0) { return ret; } - if ((ret = mbedtls_gcm_update(ctx, length, input, output)) != 0) { + if ((ret = mbedtls_gcm_update(ctx, input, length, + output, length, &olen)) != 0) { return ret; } - if ((ret = mbedtls_gcm_finish(ctx, tag, tag_len)) != 0) { + if ((ret = mbedtls_gcm_finish(ctx, NULL, 0, &olen, tag, tag_len)) != 0) { return ret; } @@ -469,13 +750,6 @@ int mbedtls_gcm_auth_decrypt(mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx, unsigned char check_tag[16]; int diff; - GCM_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - GCM_VALIDATE_RET(iv_len == 0 || iv != NULL); - GCM_VALIDATE_RET(add_len == 0 || add != NULL); - GCM_VALIDATE_RET(tag != NULL); - GCM_VALIDATE_RET(length == 0 || input != NULL); - GCM_VALIDATE_RET(length == 0 || output != NULL); - if ((ret = mbedtls_gcm_crypt_and_tag(ctx, MBEDTLS_GCM_DECRYPT, length, iv, iv_len, add, add_len, input, output, tag_len, check_tag)) != 0) { @@ -498,13 +772,17 @@ void mbedtls_gcm_free(mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx) if (ctx == NULL) { return; } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_C) + mbedtls_block_cipher_free(&ctx->block_cipher_ctx); +#else mbedtls_cipher_free(&ctx->cipher_ctx); +#endif mbedtls_platform_zeroize(ctx, sizeof(mbedtls_gcm_context)); } #endif /* !MBEDTLS_GCM_ALT */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) && defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) && defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_GCM_CAN_AES) /* * AES-GCM test vectors from: * @@ -515,7 +793,7 @@ void mbedtls_gcm_free(mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx) static const int key_index_test_data[MAX_TESTS] = { 0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 1 }; -static const unsigned char key_test_data[MAX_TESTS][32] = +static const unsigned char key_test_data[][32] = { { 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, @@ -533,7 +811,7 @@ static const size_t iv_len_test_data[MAX_TESTS] = static const int iv_index_test_data[MAX_TESTS] = { 0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 2 }; -static const unsigned char iv_test_data[MAX_TESTS][64] = +static const unsigned char iv_test_data[][64] = { { 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 }, @@ -555,7 +833,7 @@ static const size_t add_len_test_data[MAX_TESTS] = static const int add_index_test_data[MAX_TESTS] = { 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1 }; -static const unsigned char additional_test_data[MAX_TESTS][64] = +static const unsigned char additional_test_data[][64] = { { 0x00 }, { 0xfe, 0xed, 0xfa, 0xce, 0xde, 0xad, 0xbe, 0xef, @@ -569,7 +847,7 @@ static const size_t pt_len_test_data[MAX_TESTS] = static const int pt_index_test_data[MAX_TESTS] = { 0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 1 }; -static const unsigned char pt_test_data[MAX_TESTS][64] = +static const unsigned char pt_test_data[][64] = { { 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 }, @@ -583,7 +861,7 @@ static const unsigned char pt_test_data[MAX_TESTS][64] = 0xba, 0x63, 0x7b, 0x39, 0x1a, 0xaf, 0xd2, 0x55 }, }; -static const unsigned char ct_test_data[MAX_TESTS * 3][64] = +static const unsigned char ct_test_data[][64] = { { 0x00 }, { 0x03, 0x88, 0xda, 0xce, 0x60, 0xb6, 0xa3, 0x92, @@ -620,6 +898,7 @@ static const unsigned char ct_test_data[MAX_TESTS * 3][64] = 0xcc, 0xdc, 0xb2, 0x81, 0xd4, 0x8c, 0x7c, 0x6f, 0xd6, 0x28, 0x75, 0xd2, 0xac, 0xa4, 0x17, 0x03, 0x4c, 0x34, 0xae, 0xe5 }, +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH) { 0x00 }, { 0x98, 0xe7, 0x24, 0x7c, 0x07, 0xf0, 0xfe, 0x41, 0x1c, 0x26, 0x7e, 0x43, 0x84, 0xb0, 0xf6, 0x00 }, @@ -690,9 +969,10 @@ static const unsigned char ct_test_data[MAX_TESTS * 3][64] = 0x2d, 0xa3, 0xeb, 0xf1, 0xc5, 0xd8, 0x2c, 0xde, 0xa2, 0x41, 0x89, 0x97, 0x20, 0x0e, 0xf8, 0x2e, 0x44, 0xae, 0x7e, 0x3f }, +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH */ }; -static const unsigned char tag_test_data[MAX_TESTS * 3][16] = +static const unsigned char tag_test_data[][16] = { { 0x58, 0xe2, 0xfc, 0xce, 0xfa, 0x7e, 0x30, 0x61, 0x36, 0x7f, 0x1d, 0x57, 0xa4, 0xe7, 0x45, 0x5a }, @@ -706,6 +986,7 @@ static const unsigned char tag_test_data[MAX_TESTS * 3][16] = 0x56, 0x1b, 0xe1, 0x4a, 0xac, 0xa2, 0xfc, 0xcb }, { 0x61, 0x9c, 0xc5, 0xae, 0xff, 0xfe, 0x0b, 0xfa, 0x46, 0x2a, 0xf4, 0x3c, 0x16, 0x99, 0xd0, 0x50 }, +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH) { 0xcd, 0x33, 0xb2, 0x8a, 0xc7, 0x73, 0xf7, 0x4b, 0xa0, 0x0e, 0xd1, 0xf3, 0x12, 0x57, 0x24, 0x35 }, { 0x2f, 0xf5, 0x8d, 0x80, 0x03, 0x39, 0x27, 0xab, @@ -730,6 +1011,7 @@ static const unsigned char tag_test_data[MAX_TESTS * 3][16] = 0x5e, 0x45, 0x49, 0x13, 0xfe, 0x2e, 0xa8, 0xf2 }, { 0xa4, 0x4a, 0x82, 0x66, 0xee, 0x1c, 0x8e, 0xb0, 0xc8, 0xb5, 0xd4, 0xcf, 0x5a, 0xe9, 0xf1, 0x9a }, +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH */ }; int mbedtls_gcm_self_test(int verbose) @@ -739,6 +1021,7 @@ int mbedtls_gcm_self_test(int verbose) unsigned char tag_buf[16]; int i, j, ret; mbedtls_cipher_id_t cipher = MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES; + size_t olen; if (verbose != 0) { #if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_ALT) @@ -746,32 +1029,34 @@ int mbedtls_gcm_self_test(int verbose) #else /* MBEDTLS_GCM_ALT */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_AESNI_HAVE_CODE) if (mbedtls_aesni_has_support(MBEDTLS_AESNI_CLMUL)) { - mbedtls_printf(" GCM note: using AESNI via "); -#if MBEDTLS_AESNI_HAVE_CODE == 1 - mbedtls_printf("assembly"); -#elif MBEDTLS_AESNI_HAVE_CODE == 2 - mbedtls_printf("intrinsics"); -#else - mbedtls_printf("(unknown)"); + mbedtls_printf(" GCM note: using AESNI.\n"); + } else #endif - mbedtls_printf(".\n"); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AESCE_HAVE_CODE) + if (MBEDTLS_AESCE_HAS_SUPPORT()) { + mbedtls_printf(" GCM note: using AESCE.\n"); } else #endif + mbedtls_printf(" GCM note: built-in implementation.\n"); #endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_ALT */ } - for (j = 0; j < 3; j++) { + static const int loop_limit = + (sizeof(ct_test_data) / sizeof(*ct_test_data)) / MAX_TESTS; + + for (j = 0; j < loop_limit; j++) { int key_len = 128 + 64 * j; for (i = 0; i < MAX_TESTS; i++) { - mbedtls_gcm_init(&ctx); - if (verbose != 0) { mbedtls_printf(" AES-GCM-%3d #%d (%s): ", key_len, i, "enc"); } + mbedtls_gcm_init(&ctx); + ret = mbedtls_gcm_setkey(&ctx, cipher, key_test_data[key_index_test_data[i]], key_len); @@ -875,38 +1160,55 @@ int mbedtls_gcm_self_test(int verbose) ret = mbedtls_gcm_starts(&ctx, MBEDTLS_GCM_ENCRYPT, iv_test_data[iv_index_test_data[i]], - iv_len_test_data[i], - additional_test_data[add_index_test_data[i]], - add_len_test_data[i]); + iv_len_test_data[i]); + if (ret != 0) { + goto exit; + } + + ret = mbedtls_gcm_update_ad(&ctx, + additional_test_data[add_index_test_data[i]], + add_len_test_data[i]); if (ret != 0) { goto exit; } if (pt_len_test_data[i] > 32) { size_t rest_len = pt_len_test_data[i] - 32; - ret = mbedtls_gcm_update(&ctx, 32, + ret = mbedtls_gcm_update(&ctx, pt_test_data[pt_index_test_data[i]], - buf); + 32, + buf, sizeof(buf), &olen); if (ret != 0) { goto exit; } + if (olen != 32) { + goto exit; + } - ret = mbedtls_gcm_update(&ctx, rest_len, + ret = mbedtls_gcm_update(&ctx, pt_test_data[pt_index_test_data[i]] + 32, - buf + 32); + rest_len, + buf + 32, sizeof(buf) - 32, &olen); if (ret != 0) { goto exit; } + if (olen != rest_len) { + goto exit; + } } else { - ret = mbedtls_gcm_update(&ctx, pt_len_test_data[i], + ret = mbedtls_gcm_update(&ctx, pt_test_data[pt_index_test_data[i]], - buf); + pt_len_test_data[i], + buf, sizeof(buf), &olen); if (ret != 0) { goto exit; } + if (olen != pt_len_test_data[i]) { + goto exit; + } } - ret = mbedtls_gcm_finish(&ctx, tag_buf, 16); + ret = mbedtls_gcm_finish(&ctx, NULL, 0, &olen, tag_buf, 16); if (ret != 0) { goto exit; } @@ -940,37 +1242,53 @@ int mbedtls_gcm_self_test(int verbose) ret = mbedtls_gcm_starts(&ctx, MBEDTLS_GCM_DECRYPT, iv_test_data[iv_index_test_data[i]], - iv_len_test_data[i], - additional_test_data[add_index_test_data[i]], - add_len_test_data[i]); + iv_len_test_data[i]); + if (ret != 0) { + goto exit; + } + ret = mbedtls_gcm_update_ad(&ctx, + additional_test_data[add_index_test_data[i]], + add_len_test_data[i]); if (ret != 0) { goto exit; } if (pt_len_test_data[i] > 32) { size_t rest_len = pt_len_test_data[i] - 32; - ret = mbedtls_gcm_update(&ctx, 32, ct_test_data[j * 6 + i], - buf); + ret = mbedtls_gcm_update(&ctx, + ct_test_data[j * 6 + i], 32, + buf, sizeof(buf), &olen); if (ret != 0) { goto exit; } + if (olen != 32) { + goto exit; + } - ret = mbedtls_gcm_update(&ctx, rest_len, + ret = mbedtls_gcm_update(&ctx, ct_test_data[j * 6 + i] + 32, - buf + 32); + rest_len, + buf + 32, sizeof(buf) - 32, &olen); if (ret != 0) { goto exit; } + if (olen != rest_len) { + goto exit; + } } else { - ret = mbedtls_gcm_update(&ctx, pt_len_test_data[i], + ret = mbedtls_gcm_update(&ctx, ct_test_data[j * 6 + i], - buf); + pt_len_test_data[i], + buf, sizeof(buf), &olen); if (ret != 0) { goto exit; } + if (olen != pt_len_test_data[i]) { + goto exit; + } } - ret = mbedtls_gcm_finish(&ctx, tag_buf, 16); + ret = mbedtls_gcm_finish(&ctx, NULL, 0, &olen, tag_buf, 16); if (ret != 0) { goto exit; } diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/godot_core_mbedtls_platform.c b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/godot_core_mbedtls_platform.c index 901872607240..cc87563eedf0 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/godot_core_mbedtls_platform.c +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/godot_core_mbedtls_platform.c @@ -15,4 +15,3 @@ void mbedtls_platform_zeroize(void *buf, size_t len) { memset_func( buf, 0, len ); } #endif - diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/havege.c b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/havege.c deleted file mode 100644 index 3d1f6f48cef5..000000000000 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/havege.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,226 +0,0 @@ -/** - * \brief HAVEGE: HArdware Volatile Entropy Gathering and Expansion - * - * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later - */ -/* - * The HAVEGE RNG was designed by Andre Seznec in 2002. - * - * http://www.irisa.fr/caps/projects/hipsor/publi.php - * - * Contact: seznec(at)irisa_dot_fr - orocheco(at)irisa_dot_fr - */ - -#include "common.h" - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVEGE_C) - -#include "mbedtls/havege.h" -#include "mbedtls/timing.h" -#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" - -#include -#include - -/* ------------------------------------------------------------------------ - * On average, one iteration accesses two 8-word blocks in the havege WALK - * table, and generates 16 words in the RES array. - * - * The data read in the WALK table is updated and permuted after each use. - * The result of the hardware clock counter read is used for this update. - * - * 25 conditional tests are present. The conditional tests are grouped in - * two nested groups of 12 conditional tests and 1 test that controls the - * permutation; on average, there should be 6 tests executed and 3 of them - * should be mispredicted. - * ------------------------------------------------------------------------ - */ - -#define SWAP(X, Y) { uint32_t *T = (X); (X) = (Y); (Y) = T; } - -#define TST1_ENTER if (PTEST & 1) { PTEST ^= 3; PTEST >>= 1; -#define TST2_ENTER if (PTEST & 1) { PTEST ^= 3; PTEST >>= 1; - -#define TST1_LEAVE U1++; } -#define TST2_LEAVE U2++; } - -#define ONE_ITERATION \ - \ - PTEST = PT1 >> 20; \ - \ - TST1_ENTER TST1_ENTER TST1_ENTER TST1_ENTER \ - TST1_ENTER TST1_ENTER TST1_ENTER TST1_ENTER \ - TST1_ENTER TST1_ENTER TST1_ENTER TST1_ENTER \ - \ - TST1_LEAVE TST1_LEAVE TST1_LEAVE TST1_LEAVE \ - TST1_LEAVE TST1_LEAVE TST1_LEAVE TST1_LEAVE \ - TST1_LEAVE TST1_LEAVE TST1_LEAVE TST1_LEAVE \ - \ - PTX = (PT1 >> 18) & 7; \ - PT1 &= 0x1FFF; \ - PT2 &= 0x1FFF; \ - CLK = (uint32_t) mbedtls_timing_hardclock(); \ - \ - i = 0; \ - A = &WALK[PT1]; RES[i++] ^= *A; \ - B = &WALK[PT2]; RES[i++] ^= *B; \ - C = &WALK[PT1 ^ 1]; RES[i++] ^= *C; \ - D = &WALK[PT2 ^ 4]; RES[i++] ^= *D; \ - \ - IN = (*A >> (1)) ^ (*A << (31)) ^ CLK; \ - *A = (*B >> (2)) ^ (*B << (30)) ^ CLK; \ - *B = IN ^ U1; \ - *C = (*C >> (3)) ^ (*C << (29)) ^ CLK; \ - *D = (*D >> (4)) ^ (*D << (28)) ^ CLK; \ - \ - A = &WALK[PT1 ^ 2]; RES[i++] ^= *A; \ - B = &WALK[PT2 ^ 2]; RES[i++] ^= *B; \ - C = &WALK[PT1 ^ 3]; RES[i++] ^= *C; \ - D = &WALK[PT2 ^ 6]; RES[i++] ^= *D; \ - \ - if (PTEST & 1) SWAP(A, C); \ - \ - IN = (*A >> (5)) ^ (*A << (27)) ^ CLK; \ - *A = (*B >> (6)) ^ (*B << (26)) ^ CLK; \ - *B = IN; CLK = (uint32_t) mbedtls_timing_hardclock(); \ - *C = (*C >> (7)) ^ (*C << (25)) ^ CLK; \ - *D = (*D >> (8)) ^ (*D << (24)) ^ CLK; \ - \ - A = &WALK[PT1 ^ 4]; \ - B = &WALK[PT2 ^ 1]; \ - \ - PTEST = PT2 >> 1; \ - \ - PT2 = (RES[(i - 8) ^ PTY] ^ WALK[PT2 ^ PTY ^ 7]); \ - PT2 = ((PT2 & 0x1FFF) & (~8)) ^ ((PT1 ^ 8) & 0x8); \ - PTY = (PT2 >> 10) & 7; \ - \ - TST2_ENTER TST2_ENTER TST2_ENTER TST2_ENTER \ - TST2_ENTER TST2_ENTER TST2_ENTER TST2_ENTER \ - TST2_ENTER TST2_ENTER TST2_ENTER TST2_ENTER \ - \ - TST2_LEAVE TST2_LEAVE TST2_LEAVE TST2_LEAVE \ - TST2_LEAVE TST2_LEAVE TST2_LEAVE TST2_LEAVE \ - TST2_LEAVE TST2_LEAVE TST2_LEAVE TST2_LEAVE \ - \ - C = &WALK[PT1 ^ 5]; \ - D = &WALK[PT2 ^ 5]; \ - \ - RES[i++] ^= *A; \ - RES[i++] ^= *B; \ - RES[i++] ^= *C; \ - RES[i++] ^= *D; \ - \ - IN = (*A >> (9)) ^ (*A << (23)) ^ CLK; \ - *A = (*B >> (10)) ^ (*B << (22)) ^ CLK; \ - *B = IN ^ U2; \ - *C = (*C >> (11)) ^ (*C << (21)) ^ CLK; \ - *D = (*D >> (12)) ^ (*D << (20)) ^ CLK; \ - \ - A = &WALK[PT1 ^ 6]; RES[i++] ^= *A; \ - B = &WALK[PT2 ^ 3]; RES[i++] ^= *B; \ - C = &WALK[PT1 ^ 7]; RES[i++] ^= *C; \ - D = &WALK[PT2 ^ 7]; RES[i++] ^= *D; \ - \ - IN = (*A >> (13)) ^ (*A << (19)) ^ CLK; \ - *A = (*B >> (14)) ^ (*B << (18)) ^ CLK; \ - *B = IN; \ - *C = (*C >> (15)) ^ (*C << (17)) ^ CLK; \ - *D = (*D >> (16)) ^ (*D << (16)) ^ CLK; \ - \ - PT1 = (RES[(i - 8) ^ PTX] ^ \ - WALK[PT1 ^ PTX ^ 7]) & (~1); \ - PT1 ^= (PT2 ^ 0x10) & 0x10; \ - \ - for (n++, i = 0; i < 16; i++) \ - hs->pool[n % MBEDTLS_HAVEGE_COLLECT_SIZE] ^= RES[i]; - -/* - * Entropy gathering function - */ -static void havege_fill(mbedtls_havege_state *hs) -{ - size_t n = 0; - size_t i; - uint32_t U1, U2, *A, *B, *C, *D; - uint32_t PT1, PT2, *WALK, RES[16]; - uint32_t PTX, PTY, CLK, PTEST, IN; - - WALK = hs->WALK; - PT1 = hs->PT1; - PT2 = hs->PT2; - - PTX = U1 = 0; - PTY = U2 = 0; - - (void) PTX; - - memset(RES, 0, sizeof(RES)); - - while (n < MBEDTLS_HAVEGE_COLLECT_SIZE * 4) { - ONE_ITERATION - ONE_ITERATION - ONE_ITERATION - ONE_ITERATION - } - - hs->PT1 = PT1; - hs->PT2 = PT2; - - hs->offset[0] = 0; - hs->offset[1] = MBEDTLS_HAVEGE_COLLECT_SIZE / 2; -} - -/* - * HAVEGE initialization - */ -void mbedtls_havege_init(mbedtls_havege_state *hs) -{ - memset(hs, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_havege_state)); - - havege_fill(hs); -} - -void mbedtls_havege_free(mbedtls_havege_state *hs) -{ - if (hs == NULL) { - return; - } - - mbedtls_platform_zeroize(hs, sizeof(mbedtls_havege_state)); -} - -/* - * HAVEGE rand function - */ -int mbedtls_havege_random(void *p_rng, unsigned char *buf, size_t len) -{ - uint32_t val; - size_t use_len; - mbedtls_havege_state *hs = (mbedtls_havege_state *) p_rng; - unsigned char *p = buf; - - while (len > 0) { - use_len = len; - if (use_len > sizeof(val)) { - use_len = sizeof(val); - } - - if (hs->offset[1] >= MBEDTLS_HAVEGE_COLLECT_SIZE) { - havege_fill(hs); - } - - val = hs->pool[hs->offset[0]++]; - val ^= hs->pool[hs->offset[1]++]; - - memcpy(p, &val, use_len); - - len -= use_len; - p += use_len; - } - - return 0; -} - -#endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVEGE_C */ diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/hmac_drbg.c b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/hmac_drbg.c index ee8f8e332538..90174d5d17d5 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/hmac_drbg.c +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/hmac_drbg.c @@ -40,9 +40,9 @@ void mbedtls_hmac_drbg_init(mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx) /* * HMAC_DRBG update, using optional additional data (10.1.2.2) */ -int mbedtls_hmac_drbg_update_ret(mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx, - const unsigned char *additional, - size_t add_len) +int mbedtls_hmac_drbg_update(mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *additional, + size_t add_len) { size_t md_len = mbedtls_md_get_size(ctx->md_ctx.md_info); unsigned char rounds = (additional != NULL && add_len != 0) ? 2 : 1; @@ -91,15 +91,6 @@ int mbedtls_hmac_drbg_update_ret(mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx, return ret; } -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) -void mbedtls_hmac_drbg_update(mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx, - const unsigned char *additional, - size_t add_len) -{ - (void) mbedtls_hmac_drbg_update_ret(ctx, additional, add_len); -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ - /* * Simplified HMAC_DRBG initialisation (for use with deterministic ECDSA) */ @@ -128,7 +119,7 @@ int mbedtls_hmac_drbg_seed_buf(mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx, } memset(ctx->V, 0x01, mbedtls_md_get_size(md_info)); - if ((ret = mbedtls_hmac_drbg_update_ret(ctx, data, data_len)) != 0) { + if ((ret = mbedtls_hmac_drbg_update(ctx, data, data_len)) != 0) { return ret; } @@ -200,7 +191,7 @@ static int hmac_drbg_reseed_core(mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx, } /* 2. Update state */ - if ((ret = mbedtls_hmac_drbg_update_ret(ctx, seed, seedlen)) != 0) { + if ((ret = mbedtls_hmac_drbg_update(ctx, seed, seedlen)) != 0) { goto exit; } @@ -345,8 +336,8 @@ int mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random_with_add(void *p_rng, /* 2. Use additional data if any */ if (additional != NULL && add_len != 0) { - if ((ret = mbedtls_hmac_drbg_update_ret(ctx, - additional, add_len)) != 0) { + if ((ret = mbedtls_hmac_drbg_update(ctx, + additional, add_len)) != 0) { goto exit; } } @@ -372,8 +363,8 @@ int mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random_with_add(void *p_rng, } /* 6. Update */ - if ((ret = mbedtls_hmac_drbg_update_ret(ctx, - additional, add_len)) != 0) { + if ((ret = mbedtls_hmac_drbg_update(ctx, + additional, add_len)) != 0) { goto exit; } @@ -442,6 +433,9 @@ int mbedtls_hmac_drbg_write_seed_file(mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx, const char return MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_FILE_IO_ERROR; } + /* Ensure no stdio buffering of secrets, as such buffers cannot be wiped. */ + mbedtls_setbuf(f, NULL); + if ((ret = mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random(ctx, buf, sizeof(buf))) != 0) { goto exit; } @@ -472,6 +466,9 @@ int mbedtls_hmac_drbg_update_seed_file(mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx, const cha return MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_FILE_IO_ERROR; } + /* Ensure no stdio buffering of secrets, as such buffers cannot be wiped. */ + mbedtls_setbuf(f, NULL); + n = fread(buf, 1, sizeof(buf), f); if (fread(&c, 1, 1, f) != 0) { ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_INPUT_TOO_BIG; @@ -484,7 +481,7 @@ int mbedtls_hmac_drbg_update_seed_file(mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx, const cha fclose(f); f = NULL; - ret = mbedtls_hmac_drbg_update_ret(ctx, buf, n); + ret = mbedtls_hmac_drbg_update(ctx, buf, n); exit: mbedtls_platform_zeroize(buf, sizeof(buf)); @@ -501,7 +498,7 @@ int mbedtls_hmac_drbg_update_seed_file(mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx, const cha #if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1) /* Dummy checkup routine */ int mbedtls_hmac_drbg_self_test(int verbose) { @@ -630,7 +627,7 @@ int mbedtls_hmac_drbg_self_test(int verbose) return 0; } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1 */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C */ diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/lmots.c b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/lmots.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..c7091b49e187 --- /dev/null +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/lmots.c @@ -0,0 +1,778 @@ +/* + * The LM-OTS one-time public-key signature scheme + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +/* + * The following sources were referenced in the design of this implementation + * of the LM-OTS algorithm: + * + * [1] IETF RFC8554 + * D. McGrew, M. Curcio, S.Fluhrer + * https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8554 + * + * [2] NIST Special Publication 800-208 + * David A. Cooper et. al. + * https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-208.pdf + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_LMS_C) + +#include + +#include "lmots.h" + +#include "mbedtls/lms.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" +#include "psa_util_internal.h" + +#include "psa/crypto.h" + +/* Define a local translating function to save code size by not using too many + * arguments in each translating place. */ +static int local_err_translation(psa_status_t status) +{ + return psa_status_to_mbedtls(status, psa_to_lms_errors, + ARRAY_LENGTH(psa_to_lms_errors), + psa_generic_status_to_mbedtls); +} +#define PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status) local_err_translation(status) + +#define PUBLIC_KEY_TYPE_OFFSET (0) +#define PUBLIC_KEY_I_KEY_ID_OFFSET (PUBLIC_KEY_TYPE_OFFSET + \ + MBEDTLS_LMOTS_TYPE_LEN) +#define PUBLIC_KEY_Q_LEAF_ID_OFFSET (PUBLIC_KEY_I_KEY_ID_OFFSET + \ + MBEDTLS_LMOTS_I_KEY_ID_LEN) +#define PUBLIC_KEY_KEY_HASH_OFFSET (PUBLIC_KEY_Q_LEAF_ID_OFFSET + \ + MBEDTLS_LMOTS_Q_LEAF_ID_LEN) + +/* We only support parameter sets that use 8-bit digits, as it does not require + * translation logic between digits and bytes */ +#define W_WINTERNITZ_PARAMETER (8u) +#define CHECKSUM_LEN (2) +#define I_DIGIT_IDX_LEN (2) +#define J_HASH_IDX_LEN (1) +#define D_CONST_LEN (2) + +#define DIGIT_MAX_VALUE ((1u << W_WINTERNITZ_PARAMETER) - 1u) + +#define D_CONST_LEN (2) +static const unsigned char D_PUBLIC_CONSTANT_BYTES[D_CONST_LEN] = { 0x80, 0x80 }; +static const unsigned char D_MESSAGE_CONSTANT_BYTES[D_CONST_LEN] = { 0x81, 0x81 }; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS) +int (*mbedtls_lmots_sign_private_key_invalidated_hook)(unsigned char *) = NULL; +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS) */ + +/* Calculate the checksum digits that are appended to the end of the LMOTS digit + * string. See NIST SP800-208 section 3.1 or RFC8554 Algorithm 2 for details of + * the checksum algorithm. + * + * params The LMOTS parameter set, I and q values which + * describe the key being used. + * + * digest The digit string to create the digest from. As + * this does not contain a checksum, it is the same + * size as a hash output. + */ +static unsigned short lmots_checksum_calculate(const mbedtls_lmots_parameters_t *params, + const unsigned char *digest) +{ + size_t idx; + unsigned sum = 0; + + for (idx = 0; idx < MBEDTLS_LMOTS_N_HASH_LEN(params->type); idx++) { + sum += DIGIT_MAX_VALUE - digest[idx]; + } + + return sum; +} + +/* Create the string of digest digits (in the base determined by the Winternitz + * parameter with the checksum appended to the end (Q || cksm(Q)). See NIST + * SP800-208 section 3.1 or RFC8554 Algorithm 3 step 5 (also used in Algorithm + * 4b step 3) for details. + * + * params The LMOTS parameter set, I and q values which + * describe the key being used. + * + * msg The message that will be hashed to create the + * digest. + * + * msg_size The size of the message. + * + * C_random_value The random value that will be combined with the + * message digest. This is always the same size as a + * hash output for whichever hash algorithm is + * determined by the parameter set. + * + * output An output containing the digit string (+ + * checksum) of length P digits (in the case of + * MBEDTLS_LMOTS_SHA256_N32_W8, this means it is of + * size P bytes). + */ +static int create_digit_array_with_checksum(const mbedtls_lmots_parameters_t *params, + const unsigned char *msg, + size_t msg_len, + const unsigned char *C_random_value, + unsigned char *out) +{ + psa_hash_operation_t op = PSA_HASH_OPERATION_INIT; + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t output_hash_len; + unsigned short checksum; + + status = psa_hash_setup(&op, PSA_ALG_SHA_256); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_hash_update(&op, params->I_key_identifier, + MBEDTLS_LMOTS_I_KEY_ID_LEN); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_hash_update(&op, params->q_leaf_identifier, + MBEDTLS_LMOTS_Q_LEAF_ID_LEN); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_hash_update(&op, D_MESSAGE_CONSTANT_BYTES, D_CONST_LEN); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_hash_update(&op, C_random_value, + MBEDTLS_LMOTS_C_RANDOM_VALUE_LEN(params->type)); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_hash_update(&op, msg, msg_len); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_hash_finish(&op, out, + MBEDTLS_LMOTS_N_HASH_LEN(params->type), + &output_hash_len); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + checksum = lmots_checksum_calculate(params, out); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(checksum, out, MBEDTLS_LMOTS_N_HASH_LEN(params->type)); + +exit: + psa_hash_abort(&op); + + return PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); +} + +/* Hash each element of the string of digits (+ checksum), producing a hash + * output for each element. This is used in several places (by varying the + * hash_idx_min/max_values) in order to calculate a public key from a private + * key (RFC8554 Algorithm 1 step 4), in order to sign a message (RFC8554 + * Algorithm 3 step 5), and to calculate a public key candidate from a + * signature and message (RFC8554 Algorithm 4b step 3). + * + * params The LMOTS parameter set, I and q values which + * describe the key being used. + * + * x_digit_array The array of digits (of size P, 34 in the case of + * MBEDTLS_LMOTS_SHA256_N32_W8). + * + * hash_idx_min_values An array of the starting values of the j iterator + * for each of the members of the digit array. If + * this value in NULL, then all iterators will start + * at 0. + * + * hash_idx_max_values An array of the upper bound values of the j + * iterator for each of the members of the digit + * array. If this value in NULL, then iterator is + * bounded to be less than 2^w - 1 (255 in the case + * of MBEDTLS_LMOTS_SHA256_N32_W8) + * + * output An array containing a hash output for each member + * of the digit string P. In the case of + * MBEDTLS_LMOTS_SHA256_N32_W8, this is of size 32 * + * 34. + */ +static int hash_digit_array(const mbedtls_lmots_parameters_t *params, + const unsigned char *x_digit_array, + const unsigned char *hash_idx_min_values, + const unsigned char *hash_idx_max_values, + unsigned char *output) +{ + unsigned int i_digit_idx; + unsigned char i_digit_idx_bytes[I_DIGIT_IDX_LEN]; + unsigned int j_hash_idx; + unsigned char j_hash_idx_bytes[J_HASH_IDX_LEN]; + unsigned int j_hash_idx_min; + unsigned int j_hash_idx_max; + psa_hash_operation_t op = PSA_HASH_OPERATION_INIT; + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t output_hash_len; + unsigned char tmp_hash[MBEDTLS_LMOTS_N_HASH_LEN_MAX]; + + for (i_digit_idx = 0; + i_digit_idx < MBEDTLS_LMOTS_P_SIG_DIGIT_COUNT(params->type); + i_digit_idx++) { + + memcpy(tmp_hash, + &x_digit_array[i_digit_idx * MBEDTLS_LMOTS_N_HASH_LEN(params->type)], + MBEDTLS_LMOTS_N_HASH_LEN(params->type)); + + j_hash_idx_min = hash_idx_min_values != NULL ? + hash_idx_min_values[i_digit_idx] : 0; + j_hash_idx_max = hash_idx_max_values != NULL ? + hash_idx_max_values[i_digit_idx] : DIGIT_MAX_VALUE; + + for (j_hash_idx = j_hash_idx_min; + j_hash_idx < j_hash_idx_max; + j_hash_idx++) { + status = psa_hash_setup(&op, PSA_ALG_SHA_256); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_hash_update(&op, + params->I_key_identifier, + MBEDTLS_LMOTS_I_KEY_ID_LEN); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_hash_update(&op, + params->q_leaf_identifier, + MBEDTLS_LMOTS_Q_LEAF_ID_LEN); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(i_digit_idx, i_digit_idx_bytes, 0); + status = psa_hash_update(&op, i_digit_idx_bytes, I_DIGIT_IDX_LEN); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + j_hash_idx_bytes[0] = (uint8_t) j_hash_idx; + status = psa_hash_update(&op, j_hash_idx_bytes, J_HASH_IDX_LEN); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_hash_update(&op, tmp_hash, + MBEDTLS_LMOTS_N_HASH_LEN(params->type)); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_hash_finish(&op, tmp_hash, sizeof(tmp_hash), + &output_hash_len); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + psa_hash_abort(&op); + } + + memcpy(&output[i_digit_idx * MBEDTLS_LMOTS_N_HASH_LEN(params->type)], + tmp_hash, MBEDTLS_LMOTS_N_HASH_LEN(params->type)); + } + +exit: + psa_hash_abort(&op); + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(tmp_hash, sizeof(tmp_hash)); + + return PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); +} + +/* Combine the hashes of the digit array into a public key. This is used in + * in order to calculate a public key from a private key (RFC8554 Algorithm 1 + * step 4), and to calculate a public key candidate from a signature and message + * (RFC8554 Algorithm 4b step 3). + * + * params The LMOTS parameter set, I and q values which describe + * the key being used. + * y_hashed_digits The array of hashes, one hash for each digit of the + * symbol array (which is of size P, 34 in the case of + * MBEDTLS_LMOTS_SHA256_N32_W8) + * + * pub_key The output public key (or candidate public key in + * case this is being run as part of signature + * verification), in the form of a hash output. + */ +static int public_key_from_hashed_digit_array(const mbedtls_lmots_parameters_t *params, + const unsigned char *y_hashed_digits, + unsigned char *pub_key) +{ + psa_hash_operation_t op = PSA_HASH_OPERATION_INIT; + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t output_hash_len; + + status = psa_hash_setup(&op, PSA_ALG_SHA_256); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_hash_update(&op, + params->I_key_identifier, + MBEDTLS_LMOTS_I_KEY_ID_LEN); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_hash_update(&op, params->q_leaf_identifier, + MBEDTLS_LMOTS_Q_LEAF_ID_LEN); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_hash_update(&op, D_PUBLIC_CONSTANT_BYTES, D_CONST_LEN); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_hash_update(&op, y_hashed_digits, + MBEDTLS_LMOTS_P_SIG_DIGIT_COUNT(params->type) * + MBEDTLS_LMOTS_N_HASH_LEN(params->type)); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_hash_finish(&op, pub_key, + MBEDTLS_LMOTS_N_HASH_LEN(params->type), + &output_hash_len); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + +exit: + psa_hash_abort(&op); + } + + return PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); +} + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) +int mbedtls_lms_error_from_psa(psa_status_t status) +{ + switch (status) { + case PSA_SUCCESS: + return 0; + case PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE: + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_HW_ACCEL_FAILED; + case PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED: + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED; + case PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL: + return MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + case PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT: + return MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + default: + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_GENERIC_ERROR; + } +} +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ + +void mbedtls_lmots_public_init(mbedtls_lmots_public_t *ctx) +{ + memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(*ctx)); +} + +void mbedtls_lmots_public_free(mbedtls_lmots_public_t *ctx) +{ + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(ctx, sizeof(*ctx)); +} + +int mbedtls_lmots_import_public_key(mbedtls_lmots_public_t *ctx, + const unsigned char *key, size_t key_len) +{ + if (key_len < MBEDTLS_LMOTS_SIG_TYPE_OFFSET + MBEDTLS_LMOTS_TYPE_LEN) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + ctx->params.type = (mbedtls_lmots_algorithm_type_t) + MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE(key, MBEDTLS_LMOTS_SIG_TYPE_OFFSET); + + if (key_len != MBEDTLS_LMOTS_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN(ctx->params.type)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + memcpy(ctx->params.I_key_identifier, + key + PUBLIC_KEY_I_KEY_ID_OFFSET, + MBEDTLS_LMOTS_I_KEY_ID_LEN); + + memcpy(ctx->params.q_leaf_identifier, + key + PUBLIC_KEY_Q_LEAF_ID_OFFSET, + MBEDTLS_LMOTS_Q_LEAF_ID_LEN); + + memcpy(ctx->public_key, + key + PUBLIC_KEY_KEY_HASH_OFFSET, + MBEDTLS_LMOTS_N_HASH_LEN(ctx->params.type)); + + ctx->have_public_key = 1; + + return 0; +} + +int mbedtls_lmots_export_public_key(const mbedtls_lmots_public_t *ctx, + unsigned char *key, size_t key_size, + size_t *key_len) +{ + if (key_size < MBEDTLS_LMOTS_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN(ctx->params.type)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + } + + if (!ctx->have_public_key) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE(ctx->params.type, key, MBEDTLS_LMOTS_SIG_TYPE_OFFSET); + + memcpy(key + PUBLIC_KEY_I_KEY_ID_OFFSET, + ctx->params.I_key_identifier, + MBEDTLS_LMOTS_I_KEY_ID_LEN); + + memcpy(key + PUBLIC_KEY_Q_LEAF_ID_OFFSET, + ctx->params.q_leaf_identifier, + MBEDTLS_LMOTS_Q_LEAF_ID_LEN); + + memcpy(key + PUBLIC_KEY_KEY_HASH_OFFSET, ctx->public_key, + MBEDTLS_LMOTS_N_HASH_LEN(ctx->params.type)); + + if (key_len != NULL) { + *key_len = MBEDTLS_LMOTS_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN(ctx->params.type); + } + + return 0; +} + +int mbedtls_lmots_calculate_public_key_candidate(const mbedtls_lmots_parameters_t *params, + const unsigned char *msg, + size_t msg_size, + const unsigned char *sig, + size_t sig_size, + unsigned char *out, + size_t out_size, + size_t *out_len) +{ + unsigned char tmp_digit_array[MBEDTLS_LMOTS_P_SIG_DIGIT_COUNT_MAX]; + unsigned char y_hashed_digits[MBEDTLS_LMOTS_P_SIG_DIGIT_COUNT_MAX][MBEDTLS_LMOTS_N_HASH_LEN_MAX]; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + if (msg == NULL && msg_size != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + if (sig_size != MBEDTLS_LMOTS_SIG_LEN(params->type) || + out_size < MBEDTLS_LMOTS_N_HASH_LEN(params->type)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + ret = create_digit_array_with_checksum(params, msg, msg_size, + sig + MBEDTLS_LMOTS_SIG_C_RANDOM_OFFSET, + tmp_digit_array); + if (ret) { + return ret; + } + + ret = hash_digit_array(params, + sig + MBEDTLS_LMOTS_SIG_SIGNATURE_OFFSET(params->type), + tmp_digit_array, NULL, (unsigned char *) y_hashed_digits); + if (ret) { + return ret; + } + + ret = public_key_from_hashed_digit_array(params, + (unsigned char *) y_hashed_digits, + out); + if (ret) { + return ret; + } + + if (out_len != NULL) { + *out_len = MBEDTLS_LMOTS_N_HASH_LEN(params->type); + } + + return 0; +} + +int mbedtls_lmots_verify(const mbedtls_lmots_public_t *ctx, + const unsigned char *msg, size_t msg_size, + const unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_size) +{ + unsigned char Kc_public_key_candidate[MBEDTLS_LMOTS_N_HASH_LEN_MAX]; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + if (msg == NULL && msg_size != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + if (!ctx->have_public_key) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + if (ctx->params.type != MBEDTLS_LMOTS_SHA256_N32_W8) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + if (sig_size < MBEDTLS_LMOTS_SIG_TYPE_OFFSET + MBEDTLS_LMOTS_TYPE_LEN) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_VERIFY_FAILED; + } + + if (MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE(sig, MBEDTLS_LMOTS_SIG_TYPE_OFFSET) != MBEDTLS_LMOTS_SHA256_N32_W8) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_VERIFY_FAILED; + } + + ret = mbedtls_lmots_calculate_public_key_candidate(&ctx->params, + msg, msg_size, sig, sig_size, + Kc_public_key_candidate, + MBEDTLS_LMOTS_N_HASH_LEN(ctx->params.type), + NULL); + if (ret) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_VERIFY_FAILED; + } + + if (memcmp(&Kc_public_key_candidate, ctx->public_key, + sizeof(ctx->public_key))) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_VERIFY_FAILED; + } + + return 0; +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_LMS_PRIVATE) + +void mbedtls_lmots_private_init(mbedtls_lmots_private_t *ctx) +{ + memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(*ctx)); +} + +void mbedtls_lmots_private_free(mbedtls_lmots_private_t *ctx) +{ + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(ctx, + sizeof(*ctx)); +} + +int mbedtls_lmots_generate_private_key(mbedtls_lmots_private_t *ctx, + mbedtls_lmots_algorithm_type_t type, + const unsigned char I_key_identifier[MBEDTLS_LMOTS_I_KEY_ID_LEN], + uint32_t q_leaf_identifier, + const unsigned char *seed, + size_t seed_size) +{ + psa_hash_operation_t op = PSA_HASH_OPERATION_INIT; + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t output_hash_len; + unsigned int i_digit_idx; + unsigned char i_digit_idx_bytes[2]; + unsigned char const_bytes[1] = { 0xFF }; + + if (ctx->have_private_key) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + if (type != MBEDTLS_LMOTS_SHA256_N32_W8) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + ctx->params.type = type; + + memcpy(ctx->params.I_key_identifier, + I_key_identifier, + sizeof(ctx->params.I_key_identifier)); + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE(q_leaf_identifier, ctx->params.q_leaf_identifier, 0); + + for (i_digit_idx = 0; + i_digit_idx < MBEDTLS_LMOTS_P_SIG_DIGIT_COUNT(ctx->params.type); + i_digit_idx++) { + status = psa_hash_setup(&op, PSA_ALG_SHA_256); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_hash_update(&op, + ctx->params.I_key_identifier, + sizeof(ctx->params.I_key_identifier)); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_hash_update(&op, + ctx->params.q_leaf_identifier, + MBEDTLS_LMOTS_Q_LEAF_ID_LEN); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(i_digit_idx, i_digit_idx_bytes, 0); + status = psa_hash_update(&op, i_digit_idx_bytes, I_DIGIT_IDX_LEN); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_hash_update(&op, const_bytes, sizeof(const_bytes)); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_hash_update(&op, seed, seed_size); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_hash_finish(&op, + ctx->private_key[i_digit_idx], + MBEDTLS_LMOTS_N_HASH_LEN(ctx->params.type), + &output_hash_len); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + psa_hash_abort(&op); + } + + ctx->have_private_key = 1; + +exit: + psa_hash_abort(&op); + + return PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); +} + +int mbedtls_lmots_calculate_public_key(mbedtls_lmots_public_t *ctx, + const mbedtls_lmots_private_t *priv_ctx) +{ + unsigned char y_hashed_digits[MBEDTLS_LMOTS_P_SIG_DIGIT_COUNT_MAX][MBEDTLS_LMOTS_N_HASH_LEN_MAX]; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + /* Check that a private key is loaded */ + if (!priv_ctx->have_private_key) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + ret = hash_digit_array(&priv_ctx->params, + (unsigned char *) priv_ctx->private_key, NULL, + NULL, (unsigned char *) y_hashed_digits); + if (ret) { + goto exit; + } + + ret = public_key_from_hashed_digit_array(&priv_ctx->params, + (unsigned char *) y_hashed_digits, + ctx->public_key); + if (ret) { + goto exit; + } + + memcpy(&ctx->params, &priv_ctx->params, + sizeof(ctx->params)); + + ctx->have_public_key = 1; + +exit: + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(y_hashed_digits, sizeof(y_hashed_digits)); + + return ret; +} + +int mbedtls_lmots_sign(mbedtls_lmots_private_t *ctx, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng, const unsigned char *msg, size_t msg_size, + unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_size, size_t *sig_len) +{ + unsigned char tmp_digit_array[MBEDTLS_LMOTS_P_SIG_DIGIT_COUNT_MAX]; + /* Create a temporary buffer to prepare the signature in. This allows us to + * finish creating a signature (ensuring the process doesn't fail), and then + * erase the private key **before** writing any data into the sig parameter + * buffer. If data were directly written into the sig buffer, it might leak + * a partial signature on failure, which effectively compromises the private + * key. + */ + unsigned char tmp_sig[MBEDTLS_LMOTS_P_SIG_DIGIT_COUNT_MAX][MBEDTLS_LMOTS_N_HASH_LEN_MAX]; + unsigned char tmp_c_random[MBEDTLS_LMOTS_N_HASH_LEN_MAX]; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + if (msg == NULL && msg_size != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + if (sig_size < MBEDTLS_LMOTS_SIG_LEN(ctx->params.type)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + } + + /* Check that a private key is loaded */ + if (!ctx->have_private_key) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + ret = f_rng(p_rng, tmp_c_random, + MBEDTLS_LMOTS_N_HASH_LEN(ctx->params.type)); + if (ret) { + return ret; + } + + ret = create_digit_array_with_checksum(&ctx->params, + msg, msg_size, + tmp_c_random, + tmp_digit_array); + if (ret) { + goto exit; + } + + ret = hash_digit_array(&ctx->params, (unsigned char *) ctx->private_key, + NULL, tmp_digit_array, (unsigned char *) tmp_sig); + if (ret) { + goto exit; + } + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE(ctx->params.type, sig, MBEDTLS_LMOTS_SIG_TYPE_OFFSET); + + /* Test hook to check if sig is being written to before we invalidate the + * private key. + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS) + if (mbedtls_lmots_sign_private_key_invalidated_hook != NULL) { + ret = (*mbedtls_lmots_sign_private_key_invalidated_hook)(sig); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + } +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS) */ + + /* We've got a valid signature now, so it's time to make sure the private + * key can't be reused. + */ + ctx->have_private_key = 0; + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(ctx->private_key, + sizeof(ctx->private_key)); + + memcpy(sig + MBEDTLS_LMOTS_SIG_C_RANDOM_OFFSET, tmp_c_random, + MBEDTLS_LMOTS_C_RANDOM_VALUE_LEN(ctx->params.type)); + + memcpy(sig + MBEDTLS_LMOTS_SIG_SIGNATURE_OFFSET(ctx->params.type), tmp_sig, + MBEDTLS_LMOTS_P_SIG_DIGIT_COUNT(ctx->params.type) + * MBEDTLS_LMOTS_N_HASH_LEN(ctx->params.type)); + + if (sig_len != NULL) { + *sig_len = MBEDTLS_LMOTS_SIG_LEN(ctx->params.type); + } + + ret = 0; + +exit: + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(tmp_digit_array, sizeof(tmp_digit_array)); + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(tmp_sig, sizeof(tmp_sig)); + + return ret; +} + +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_LMS_PRIVATE) */ +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_LMS_C) */ diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/lmots.h b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/lmots.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..cf92d326c987 --- /dev/null +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/lmots.h @@ -0,0 +1,288 @@ +/** + * \file lmots.h + * + * \brief This file provides an API for the LM-OTS post-quantum-safe one-time + * public-key signature scheme as defined in RFC8554 and NIST.SP.200-208. + * This implementation currently only supports a single parameter set + * MBEDTLS_LMOTS_SHA256_N32_W8 in order to reduce complexity. + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +#ifndef MBEDTLS_LMOTS_H +#define MBEDTLS_LMOTS_H + +#include "mbedtls/build_info.h" + +#include "psa/crypto.h" + +#include "mbedtls/lms.h" + +#include +#include + + +#define MBEDTLS_LMOTS_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN(type) (MBEDTLS_LMOTS_TYPE_LEN + \ + MBEDTLS_LMOTS_I_KEY_ID_LEN + \ + MBEDTLS_LMOTS_Q_LEAF_ID_LEN + \ + MBEDTLS_LMOTS_N_HASH_LEN(type)) + +#define MBEDTLS_LMOTS_SIG_TYPE_OFFSET (0) +#define MBEDTLS_LMOTS_SIG_C_RANDOM_OFFSET (MBEDTLS_LMOTS_SIG_TYPE_OFFSET + \ + MBEDTLS_LMOTS_TYPE_LEN) +#define MBEDTLS_LMOTS_SIG_SIGNATURE_OFFSET(type) (MBEDTLS_LMOTS_SIG_C_RANDOM_OFFSET + \ + MBEDTLS_LMOTS_C_RANDOM_VALUE_LEN(type)) + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS) +extern int (*mbedtls_lmots_sign_private_key_invalidated_hook)(unsigned char *); +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS) */ + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) +/** + * \brief This function converts a \ref psa_status_t to a + * low-level LMS error code. + * + * \param status The psa_status_t to convert + * + * \return The corresponding LMS error code. + */ +int MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED mbedtls_lms_error_from_psa(psa_status_t status); +#endif + +/** + * \brief This function initializes a public LMOTS context + * + * \param ctx The uninitialized LMOTS context that will then be + * initialized. + */ +void mbedtls_lmots_public_init(mbedtls_lmots_public_t *ctx); + +/** + * \brief This function uninitializes a public LMOTS context + * + * \param ctx The initialized LMOTS context that will then be + * uninitialized. + */ +void mbedtls_lmots_public_free(mbedtls_lmots_public_t *ctx); + +/** + * \brief This function imports an LMOTS public key into a + * LMOTS context. + * + * \note Before this function is called, the context must + * have been initialized. + * + * \note See IETF RFC8554 for details of the encoding of + * this public key. + * + * \param ctx The initialized LMOTS context store the key in. + * \param key The buffer from which the key will be read. + * #MBEDTLS_LMOTS_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN bytes will be read + * from this. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return A non-zero error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_lmots_import_public_key(mbedtls_lmots_public_t *ctx, + const unsigned char *key, size_t key_size); + +/** + * \brief This function exports an LMOTS public key from a + * LMOTS context that already contains a public key. + * + * \note Before this function is called, the context must + * have been initialized and the context must contain + * a public key. + * + * \note See IETF RFC8554 for details of the encoding of + * this public key. + * + * \param ctx The initialized LMOTS context that contains the + * public key. + * \param key The buffer into which the key will be output. Must + * be at least #MBEDTLS_LMOTS_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN in size. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return A non-zero error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_lmots_export_public_key(const mbedtls_lmots_public_t *ctx, + unsigned char *key, size_t key_size, + size_t *key_len); + +/** + * \brief This function creates a candidate public key from + * an LMOTS signature. This can then be compared to + * the real public key to determine the validity of + * the signature. + * + * \note This function is exposed publicly to be used in LMS + * signature verification, it is expected that + * mbedtls_lmots_verify will be used for LMOTS + * signature verification. + * + * \param params The LMOTS parameter set, q and I values as an + * mbedtls_lmots_parameters_t struct. + * \param msg The buffer from which the message will be read. + * \param msg_size The size of the message that will be read. + * \param sig The buffer from which the signature will be read. + * #MBEDTLS_LMOTS_SIG_LEN bytes will be read from + * this. + * \param out The buffer where the candidate public key will be + * stored. Must be at least #MBEDTLS_LMOTS_N_HASH_LEN + * bytes in size. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return A non-zero error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_lmots_calculate_public_key_candidate(const mbedtls_lmots_parameters_t *params, + const unsigned char *msg, + size_t msg_size, + const unsigned char *sig, + size_t sig_size, + unsigned char *out, + size_t out_size, + size_t *out_len); + +/** + * \brief This function verifies a LMOTS signature, using a + * LMOTS context that contains a public key. + * + * \warning This function is **not intended for use in + * production**, due to as-yet unsolved problems with + * handling stateful keys. The API for this function + * may change considerably in future versions. + * + * \note Before this function is called, the context must + * have been initialized and must contain a public key + * (either by import or calculation from a private + * key). + * + * \param ctx The initialized LMOTS context from which the public + * key will be read. + * \param msg The buffer from which the message will be read. + * \param msg_size The size of the message that will be read. + * \param sig The buf from which the signature will be read. + * #MBEDTLS_LMOTS_SIG_LEN bytes will be read from + * this. + * + * \return \c 0 on successful verification. + * \return A non-zero error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_lmots_verify(const mbedtls_lmots_public_t *ctx, + const unsigned char *msg, + size_t msg_size, const unsigned char *sig, + size_t sig_size); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_LMS_PRIVATE) + +/** + * \brief This function initializes a private LMOTS context + * + * \param ctx The uninitialized LMOTS context that will then be + * initialized. + */ +void mbedtls_lmots_private_init(mbedtls_lmots_private_t *ctx); + +/** + * \brief This function uninitializes a private LMOTS context + * + * \param ctx The initialized LMOTS context that will then be + * uninitialized. + */ +void mbedtls_lmots_private_free(mbedtls_lmots_private_t *ctx); + +/** + * \brief This function calculates an LMOTS private key, and + * stores in into an LMOTS context. + * + * \warning This function is **not intended for use in + * production**, due to as-yet unsolved problems with + * handling stateful keys. The API for this function + * may change considerably in future versions. + * + * \note The seed must have at least 256 bits of entropy. + * + * \param ctx The initialized LMOTS context to generate the key + * into. + * \param I_key_identifier The key identifier of the key, as a 16-byte string. + * \param q_leaf_identifier The leaf identifier of key. If this LMOTS key is + * not being used as part of an LMS key, this should + * be set to 0. + * \param seed The seed used to deterministically generate the + * key. + * \param seed_size The length of the seed. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return A non-zero error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_lmots_generate_private_key(mbedtls_lmots_private_t *ctx, + mbedtls_lmots_algorithm_type_t type, + const unsigned char I_key_identifier[MBEDTLS_LMOTS_I_KEY_ID_LEN], + uint32_t q_leaf_identifier, + const unsigned char *seed, + size_t seed_size); + +/** + * \brief This function generates an LMOTS public key from a + * LMOTS context that already contains a private key. + * + * \note Before this function is called, the context must + * have been initialized and the context must contain + * a private key. + * + * \param ctx The initialized LMOTS context to generate the key + * from and store it into. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return A non-zero error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_lmots_calculate_public_key(mbedtls_lmots_public_t *ctx, + const mbedtls_lmots_private_t *priv_ctx); + +/** + * \brief This function creates a LMOTS signature, using a + * LMOTS context that contains a private key. + * + * \note Before this function is called, the context must + * have been initialized and must contain a private + * key. + * + * \note LMOTS private keys can only be used once, otherwise + * attackers may be able to create forged signatures. + * If the signing operation is successful, the private + * key in the context will be erased, and no further + * signing will be possible until another private key + * is loaded + * + * \param ctx The initialized LMOTS context from which the + * private key will be read. + * \param f_rng The RNG function to be used for signature + * generation. + * \param p_rng The RNG context to be passed to f_rng + * \param msg The buffer from which the message will be read. + * \param msg_size The size of the message that will be read. + * \param sig The buf into which the signature will be stored. + * Must be at least #MBEDTLS_LMOTS_SIG_LEN in size. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return A non-zero error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_lmots_sign(mbedtls_lmots_private_t *ctx, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng, const unsigned char *msg, size_t msg_size, + unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_size, size_t *sig_len); + +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_LMS_PRIVATE) */ + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_LMOTS_H */ diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/lms.c b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/lms.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..8d3cae052493 --- /dev/null +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/lms.c @@ -0,0 +1,761 @@ +/* + * The LMS stateful-hash public-key signature scheme + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +/* + * The following sources were referenced in the design of this implementation + * of the LMS algorithm: + * + * [1] IETF RFC8554 + * D. McGrew, M. Curcio, S.Fluhrer + * https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8554 + * + * [2] NIST Special Publication 800-208 + * David A. Cooper et. al. + * https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-208.pdf + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_LMS_C) + +#include + +#include "lmots.h" + +#include "psa/crypto.h" +#include "psa_util_internal.h" +#include "mbedtls/lms.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" + +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" + +/* Define a local translating function to save code size by not using too many + * arguments in each translating place. */ +static int local_err_translation(psa_status_t status) +{ + return psa_status_to_mbedtls(status, psa_to_lms_errors, + ARRAY_LENGTH(psa_to_lms_errors), + psa_generic_status_to_mbedtls); +} +#define PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status) local_err_translation(status) + +#define SIG_Q_LEAF_ID_OFFSET (0) +#define SIG_OTS_SIG_OFFSET (SIG_Q_LEAF_ID_OFFSET + \ + MBEDTLS_LMOTS_Q_LEAF_ID_LEN) +#define SIG_TYPE_OFFSET(otstype) (SIG_OTS_SIG_OFFSET + \ + MBEDTLS_LMOTS_SIG_LEN(otstype)) +#define SIG_PATH_OFFSET(otstype) (SIG_TYPE_OFFSET(otstype) + \ + MBEDTLS_LMS_TYPE_LEN) + +#define PUBLIC_KEY_TYPE_OFFSET (0) +#define PUBLIC_KEY_OTSTYPE_OFFSET (PUBLIC_KEY_TYPE_OFFSET + \ + MBEDTLS_LMS_TYPE_LEN) +#define PUBLIC_KEY_I_KEY_ID_OFFSET (PUBLIC_KEY_OTSTYPE_OFFSET + \ + MBEDTLS_LMOTS_TYPE_LEN) +#define PUBLIC_KEY_ROOT_NODE_OFFSET (PUBLIC_KEY_I_KEY_ID_OFFSET + \ + MBEDTLS_LMOTS_I_KEY_ID_LEN) + + +/* Currently only support H=10 */ +#define H_TREE_HEIGHT_MAX 10 +#define MERKLE_TREE_NODE_AM(type) ((size_t) 1 << (MBEDTLS_LMS_H_TREE_HEIGHT(type) + 1u)) +#define MERKLE_TREE_LEAF_NODE_AM(type) ((size_t) 1 << MBEDTLS_LMS_H_TREE_HEIGHT(type)) +#define MERKLE_TREE_INTERNAL_NODE_AM(type) ((unsigned int) \ + (1u << MBEDTLS_LMS_H_TREE_HEIGHT(type))) + +#define D_CONST_LEN (2) +static const unsigned char D_LEAF_CONSTANT_BYTES[D_CONST_LEN] = { 0x82, 0x82 }; +static const unsigned char D_INTR_CONSTANT_BYTES[D_CONST_LEN] = { 0x83, 0x83 }; + + +/* Calculate the value of a leaf node of the Merkle tree (which is a hash of a + * public key and some other parameters like the leaf index). This function + * implements RFC8554 section 5.3, in the case where r >= 2^h. + * + * params The LMS parameter set, the underlying LMOTS + * parameter set, and I value which describe the key + * being used. + * + * pub_key The public key of the private whose index + * corresponds to the index of this leaf node. This + * is a hash output. + * + * r_node_idx The index of this node in the Merkle tree. Note + * that the root node of the Merkle tree is + * 1-indexed. + * + * out The output node value, which is a hash output. + */ +static int create_merkle_leaf_value(const mbedtls_lms_parameters_t *params, + unsigned char *pub_key, + unsigned int r_node_idx, + unsigned char *out) +{ + psa_hash_operation_t op; + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t output_hash_len; + unsigned char r_node_idx_bytes[4]; + + op = psa_hash_operation_init(); + status = psa_hash_setup(&op, PSA_ALG_SHA_256); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_hash_update(&op, params->I_key_identifier, + MBEDTLS_LMOTS_I_KEY_ID_LEN); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE(r_node_idx, r_node_idx_bytes, 0); + status = psa_hash_update(&op, r_node_idx_bytes, 4); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_hash_update(&op, D_LEAF_CONSTANT_BYTES, D_CONST_LEN); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_hash_update(&op, pub_key, + MBEDTLS_LMOTS_N_HASH_LEN(params->otstype)); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_hash_finish(&op, out, MBEDTLS_LMS_M_NODE_BYTES(params->type), + &output_hash_len); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + +exit: + psa_hash_abort(&op); + + return PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); +} + +/* Calculate the value of an internal node of the Merkle tree (which is a hash + * of a public key and some other parameters like the node index). This function + * implements RFC8554 section 5.3, in the case where r < 2^h. + * + * params The LMS parameter set, the underlying LMOTS + * parameter set, and I value which describe the key + * being used. + * + * left_node The value of the child of this node which is on + * the left-hand side. As with all nodes on the + * Merkle tree, this is a hash output. + * + * right_node The value of the child of this node which is on + * the right-hand side. As with all nodes on the + * Merkle tree, this is a hash output. + * + * r_node_idx The index of this node in the Merkle tree. Note + * that the root node of the Merkle tree is + * 1-indexed. + * + * out The output node value, which is a hash output. + */ +static int create_merkle_internal_value(const mbedtls_lms_parameters_t *params, + const unsigned char *left_node, + const unsigned char *right_node, + unsigned int r_node_idx, + unsigned char *out) +{ + psa_hash_operation_t op; + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t output_hash_len; + unsigned char r_node_idx_bytes[4]; + + op = psa_hash_operation_init(); + status = psa_hash_setup(&op, PSA_ALG_SHA_256); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_hash_update(&op, params->I_key_identifier, + MBEDTLS_LMOTS_I_KEY_ID_LEN); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE(r_node_idx, r_node_idx_bytes, 0); + status = psa_hash_update(&op, r_node_idx_bytes, 4); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_hash_update(&op, D_INTR_CONSTANT_BYTES, D_CONST_LEN); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_hash_update(&op, left_node, + MBEDTLS_LMS_M_NODE_BYTES(params->type)); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_hash_update(&op, right_node, + MBEDTLS_LMS_M_NODE_BYTES(params->type)); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_hash_finish(&op, out, MBEDTLS_LMS_M_NODE_BYTES(params->type), + &output_hash_len); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + +exit: + psa_hash_abort(&op); + + return PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); +} + +void mbedtls_lms_public_init(mbedtls_lms_public_t *ctx) +{ + memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(*ctx)); +} + +void mbedtls_lms_public_free(mbedtls_lms_public_t *ctx) +{ + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(ctx, sizeof(*ctx)); +} + +int mbedtls_lms_import_public_key(mbedtls_lms_public_t *ctx, + const unsigned char *key, size_t key_size) +{ + mbedtls_lms_algorithm_type_t type; + mbedtls_lmots_algorithm_type_t otstype; + + type = (mbedtls_lms_algorithm_type_t) MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE(key, PUBLIC_KEY_TYPE_OFFSET); + if (type != MBEDTLS_LMS_SHA256_M32_H10) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + ctx->params.type = type; + + if (key_size != MBEDTLS_LMS_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN(ctx->params.type)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + otstype = (mbedtls_lmots_algorithm_type_t) + MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE(key, PUBLIC_KEY_OTSTYPE_OFFSET); + if (otstype != MBEDTLS_LMOTS_SHA256_N32_W8) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + ctx->params.otstype = otstype; + + memcpy(ctx->params.I_key_identifier, + key + PUBLIC_KEY_I_KEY_ID_OFFSET, + MBEDTLS_LMOTS_I_KEY_ID_LEN); + memcpy(ctx->T_1_pub_key, key + PUBLIC_KEY_ROOT_NODE_OFFSET, + MBEDTLS_LMS_M_NODE_BYTES(ctx->params.type)); + + ctx->have_public_key = 1; + + return 0; +} + +int mbedtls_lms_export_public_key(const mbedtls_lms_public_t *ctx, + unsigned char *key, + size_t key_size, size_t *key_len) +{ + if (key_size < MBEDTLS_LMS_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN(ctx->params.type)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + } + + if (!ctx->have_public_key) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE(ctx->params.type, key, PUBLIC_KEY_TYPE_OFFSET); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE(ctx->params.otstype, key, PUBLIC_KEY_OTSTYPE_OFFSET); + memcpy(key + PUBLIC_KEY_I_KEY_ID_OFFSET, + ctx->params.I_key_identifier, + MBEDTLS_LMOTS_I_KEY_ID_LEN); + memcpy(key +PUBLIC_KEY_ROOT_NODE_OFFSET, + ctx->T_1_pub_key, + MBEDTLS_LMS_M_NODE_BYTES(ctx->params.type)); + + if (key_len != NULL) { + *key_len = MBEDTLS_LMS_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN(ctx->params.type); + } + + return 0; +} + +int mbedtls_lms_verify(const mbedtls_lms_public_t *ctx, + const unsigned char *msg, size_t msg_size, + const unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_size) +{ + unsigned int q_leaf_identifier; + unsigned char Kc_candidate_ots_pub_key[MBEDTLS_LMOTS_N_HASH_LEN_MAX]; + unsigned char Tc_candidate_root_node[MBEDTLS_LMS_M_NODE_BYTES_MAX]; + unsigned int height; + unsigned int curr_node_id; + unsigned int parent_node_id; + const unsigned char *left_node; + const unsigned char *right_node; + mbedtls_lmots_parameters_t ots_params; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + if (!ctx->have_public_key) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + if (ctx->params.type + != MBEDTLS_LMS_SHA256_M32_H10) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + if (ctx->params.otstype + != MBEDTLS_LMOTS_SHA256_N32_W8) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + if (sig_size != MBEDTLS_LMS_SIG_LEN(ctx->params.type, ctx->params.otstype)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_VERIFY_FAILED; + } + + if (sig_size < SIG_OTS_SIG_OFFSET + MBEDTLS_LMOTS_TYPE_LEN) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_VERIFY_FAILED; + } + + if (MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE(sig, SIG_OTS_SIG_OFFSET + MBEDTLS_LMOTS_SIG_TYPE_OFFSET) + != MBEDTLS_LMOTS_SHA256_N32_W8) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_VERIFY_FAILED; + } + + if (sig_size < SIG_TYPE_OFFSET(ctx->params.otstype) + MBEDTLS_LMS_TYPE_LEN) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_VERIFY_FAILED; + } + + if (MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE(sig, SIG_TYPE_OFFSET(ctx->params.otstype)) + != MBEDTLS_LMS_SHA256_M32_H10) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_VERIFY_FAILED; + } + + + q_leaf_identifier = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE(sig, SIG_Q_LEAF_ID_OFFSET); + + if (q_leaf_identifier >= MERKLE_TREE_LEAF_NODE_AM(ctx->params.type)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_VERIFY_FAILED; + } + + memcpy(ots_params.I_key_identifier, + ctx->params.I_key_identifier, + MBEDTLS_LMOTS_I_KEY_ID_LEN); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE(q_leaf_identifier, ots_params.q_leaf_identifier, 0); + ots_params.type = ctx->params.otstype; + + ret = mbedtls_lmots_calculate_public_key_candidate(&ots_params, + msg, + msg_size, + sig + SIG_OTS_SIG_OFFSET, + MBEDTLS_LMOTS_SIG_LEN(ctx->params.otstype), + Kc_candidate_ots_pub_key, + sizeof(Kc_candidate_ots_pub_key), + NULL); + if (ret != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_VERIFY_FAILED; + } + + create_merkle_leaf_value( + &ctx->params, + Kc_candidate_ots_pub_key, + MERKLE_TREE_INTERNAL_NODE_AM(ctx->params.type) + q_leaf_identifier, + Tc_candidate_root_node); + + curr_node_id = MERKLE_TREE_INTERNAL_NODE_AM(ctx->params.type) + + q_leaf_identifier; + + for (height = 0; height < MBEDTLS_LMS_H_TREE_HEIGHT(ctx->params.type); + height++) { + parent_node_id = curr_node_id / 2; + + /* Left/right node ordering matters for the hash */ + if (curr_node_id & 1) { + left_node = sig + SIG_PATH_OFFSET(ctx->params.otstype) + + height * MBEDTLS_LMS_M_NODE_BYTES(ctx->params.type); + right_node = Tc_candidate_root_node; + } else { + left_node = Tc_candidate_root_node; + right_node = sig + SIG_PATH_OFFSET(ctx->params.otstype) + + height * MBEDTLS_LMS_M_NODE_BYTES(ctx->params.type); + } + + create_merkle_internal_value(&ctx->params, left_node, right_node, + parent_node_id, Tc_candidate_root_node); + + curr_node_id /= 2; + } + + if (memcmp(Tc_candidate_root_node, ctx->T_1_pub_key, + MBEDTLS_LMS_M_NODE_BYTES(ctx->params.type))) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_VERIFY_FAILED; + } + + return 0; +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_LMS_PRIVATE) + +/* Calculate a full Merkle tree based on a private key. This function + * implements RFC8554 section 5.3, and is used to generate a public key (as the + * public key is the root node of the Merkle tree). + * + * ctx The LMS private context, containing a parameter + * set and private key material consisting of both + * public and private OTS. + * + * tree The output tree, which is 2^(H + 1) hash outputs. + * In the case of H=10 we have 2048 tree nodes (of + * which 1024 of them are leaf nodes). Note that + * because the Merkle tree root is 1-indexed, the 0 + * index tree node is never used. + */ +static int calculate_merkle_tree(const mbedtls_lms_private_t *ctx, + unsigned char *tree) +{ + unsigned int priv_key_idx; + unsigned int r_node_idx; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + /* First create the leaf nodes, in ascending order */ + for (priv_key_idx = 0; + priv_key_idx < MERKLE_TREE_INTERNAL_NODE_AM(ctx->params.type); + priv_key_idx++) { + r_node_idx = MERKLE_TREE_INTERNAL_NODE_AM(ctx->params.type) + priv_key_idx; + + ret = create_merkle_leaf_value(&ctx->params, + ctx->ots_public_keys[priv_key_idx].public_key, + r_node_idx, + &tree[r_node_idx * MBEDTLS_LMS_M_NODE_BYTES( + ctx->params.type)]); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + } + + /* Then the internal nodes, in reverse order so that we can guarantee the + * parent has been created */ + for (r_node_idx = MERKLE_TREE_INTERNAL_NODE_AM(ctx->params.type) - 1; + r_node_idx > 0; + r_node_idx--) { + ret = create_merkle_internal_value(&ctx->params, + &tree[(r_node_idx * 2) * + MBEDTLS_LMS_M_NODE_BYTES(ctx->params.type)], + &tree[(r_node_idx * 2 + 1) * + MBEDTLS_LMS_M_NODE_BYTES(ctx->params.type)], + r_node_idx, + &tree[r_node_idx * + MBEDTLS_LMS_M_NODE_BYTES(ctx->params.type)]); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + } + + return 0; +} + +/* Calculate a path from a leaf node of the Merkle tree to the root of the tree, + * and return the full path. This function implements RFC8554 section 5.4.1, as + * the Merkle path is the main component of an LMS signature. + * + * ctx The LMS private context, containing a parameter + * set and private key material consisting of both + * public and private OTS. + * + * leaf_node_id Which leaf node to calculate the path from. + * + * path The output path, which is H hash outputs. + */ +static int get_merkle_path(mbedtls_lms_private_t *ctx, + unsigned int leaf_node_id, + unsigned char *path) +{ + const size_t node_bytes = MBEDTLS_LMS_M_NODE_BYTES(ctx->params.type); + unsigned int curr_node_id = leaf_node_id; + unsigned int adjacent_node_id; + unsigned char *tree = NULL; + unsigned int height; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + tree = mbedtls_calloc((size_t) MERKLE_TREE_NODE_AM(ctx->params.type), + node_bytes); + if (tree == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_ALLOC_FAILED; + } + + ret = calculate_merkle_tree(ctx, tree); + if (ret != 0) { + goto exit; + } + + for (height = 0; height < MBEDTLS_LMS_H_TREE_HEIGHT(ctx->params.type); + height++) { + adjacent_node_id = curr_node_id ^ 1; + + memcpy(&path[height * node_bytes], + &tree[adjacent_node_id * node_bytes], node_bytes); + + curr_node_id >>= 1; + } + + ret = 0; + +exit: + mbedtls_zeroize_and_free(tree, node_bytes * + (size_t) MERKLE_TREE_NODE_AM(ctx->params.type)); + + return ret; +} + +void mbedtls_lms_private_init(mbedtls_lms_private_t *ctx) +{ + memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(*ctx)); +} + +void mbedtls_lms_private_free(mbedtls_lms_private_t *ctx) +{ + unsigned int idx; + + if (ctx->have_private_key) { + if (ctx->ots_private_keys != NULL) { + for (idx = 0; idx < MERKLE_TREE_LEAF_NODE_AM(ctx->params.type); idx++) { + mbedtls_lmots_private_free(&ctx->ots_private_keys[idx]); + } + } + + if (ctx->ots_public_keys != NULL) { + for (idx = 0; idx < MERKLE_TREE_LEAF_NODE_AM(ctx->params.type); idx++) { + mbedtls_lmots_public_free(&ctx->ots_public_keys[idx]); + } + } + + mbedtls_free(ctx->ots_private_keys); + mbedtls_free(ctx->ots_public_keys); + } + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(ctx, sizeof(*ctx)); +} + + +int mbedtls_lms_generate_private_key(mbedtls_lms_private_t *ctx, + mbedtls_lms_algorithm_type_t type, + mbedtls_lmots_algorithm_type_t otstype, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng, const unsigned char *seed, + size_t seed_size) +{ + unsigned int idx = 0; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + if (type != MBEDTLS_LMS_SHA256_M32_H10) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + if (otstype != MBEDTLS_LMOTS_SHA256_N32_W8) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + if (ctx->have_private_key) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + ctx->params.type = type; + ctx->params.otstype = otstype; + ctx->have_private_key = 1; + + ret = f_rng(p_rng, + ctx->params.I_key_identifier, + MBEDTLS_LMOTS_I_KEY_ID_LEN); + if (ret != 0) { + goto exit; + } + + /* Requires a cast to size_t to avoid an implicit cast warning on certain + * platforms (particularly Windows) */ + ctx->ots_private_keys = mbedtls_calloc((size_t) MERKLE_TREE_LEAF_NODE_AM(ctx->params.type), + sizeof(*ctx->ots_private_keys)); + if (ctx->ots_private_keys == NULL) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_ALLOC_FAILED; + goto exit; + } + + /* Requires a cast to size_t to avoid an implicit cast warning on certain + * platforms (particularly Windows) */ + ctx->ots_public_keys = mbedtls_calloc((size_t) MERKLE_TREE_LEAF_NODE_AM(ctx->params.type), + sizeof(*ctx->ots_public_keys)); + if (ctx->ots_public_keys == NULL) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_ALLOC_FAILED; + goto exit; + } + + for (idx = 0; idx < MERKLE_TREE_LEAF_NODE_AM(ctx->params.type); idx++) { + mbedtls_lmots_private_init(&ctx->ots_private_keys[idx]); + mbedtls_lmots_public_init(&ctx->ots_public_keys[idx]); + } + + + for (idx = 0; idx < MERKLE_TREE_LEAF_NODE_AM(ctx->params.type); idx++) { + ret = mbedtls_lmots_generate_private_key(&ctx->ots_private_keys[idx], + otstype, + ctx->params.I_key_identifier, + idx, seed, seed_size); + if (ret != 0) { + goto exit; + } + + ret = mbedtls_lmots_calculate_public_key(&ctx->ots_public_keys[idx], + &ctx->ots_private_keys[idx]); + if (ret != 0) { + goto exit; + } + } + + ctx->q_next_usable_key = 0; + +exit: + if (ret != 0) { + mbedtls_lms_private_free(ctx); + } + + return ret; +} + +int mbedtls_lms_calculate_public_key(mbedtls_lms_public_t *ctx, + const mbedtls_lms_private_t *priv_ctx) +{ + const size_t node_bytes = MBEDTLS_LMS_M_NODE_BYTES(priv_ctx->params.type); + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char *tree = NULL; + + if (!priv_ctx->have_private_key) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + if (priv_ctx->params.type + != MBEDTLS_LMS_SHA256_M32_H10) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + if (priv_ctx->params.otstype + != MBEDTLS_LMOTS_SHA256_N32_W8) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + tree = mbedtls_calloc((size_t) MERKLE_TREE_NODE_AM(priv_ctx->params.type), + node_bytes); + if (tree == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_ALLOC_FAILED; + } + + memcpy(&ctx->params, &priv_ctx->params, + sizeof(mbedtls_lmots_parameters_t)); + + ret = calculate_merkle_tree(priv_ctx, tree); + if (ret != 0) { + goto exit; + } + + /* Root node is always at position 1, due to 1-based indexing */ + memcpy(ctx->T_1_pub_key, &tree[node_bytes], node_bytes); + + ctx->have_public_key = 1; + + ret = 0; + +exit: + mbedtls_zeroize_and_free(tree, node_bytes * + (size_t) MERKLE_TREE_NODE_AM(priv_ctx->params.type)); + + return ret; +} + + +int mbedtls_lms_sign(mbedtls_lms_private_t *ctx, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng, const unsigned char *msg, + unsigned int msg_size, unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_size, + size_t *sig_len) +{ + uint32_t q_leaf_identifier; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + if (!ctx->have_private_key) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + if (sig_size < MBEDTLS_LMS_SIG_LEN(ctx->params.type, ctx->params.otstype)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + } + + if (ctx->params.type != MBEDTLS_LMS_SHA256_M32_H10) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + if (ctx->params.otstype + != MBEDTLS_LMOTS_SHA256_N32_W8) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + if (ctx->q_next_usable_key >= MERKLE_TREE_LEAF_NODE_AM(ctx->params.type)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_OUT_OF_PRIVATE_KEYS; + } + + + q_leaf_identifier = ctx->q_next_usable_key; + /* This new value must _always_ be written back to the disk before the + * signature is returned. + */ + ctx->q_next_usable_key += 1; + + if (MBEDTLS_LMS_SIG_LEN(ctx->params.type, ctx->params.otstype) + < SIG_OTS_SIG_OFFSET) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + ret = mbedtls_lmots_sign(&ctx->ots_private_keys[q_leaf_identifier], + f_rng, + p_rng, + msg, + msg_size, + sig + SIG_OTS_SIG_OFFSET, + MBEDTLS_LMS_SIG_LEN(ctx->params.type, + ctx->params.otstype) - SIG_OTS_SIG_OFFSET, + NULL); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE(ctx->params.type, sig, SIG_TYPE_OFFSET(ctx->params.otstype)); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE(q_leaf_identifier, sig, SIG_Q_LEAF_ID_OFFSET); + + ret = get_merkle_path(ctx, + MERKLE_TREE_INTERNAL_NODE_AM(ctx->params.type) + q_leaf_identifier, + sig + SIG_PATH_OFFSET(ctx->params.otstype)); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + + if (sig_len != NULL) { + *sig_len = MBEDTLS_LMS_SIG_LEN(ctx->params.type, ctx->params.otstype); + } + + + return 0; +} + +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_LMS_PRIVATE) */ +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_LMS_C) */ diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/md.c b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/md.c index 3e4a1c10a35e..12a3ea2374a6 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/md.c +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/md.c @@ -11,20 +11,45 @@ #include "common.h" -#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_C) +/* + * Availability of functions in this module is controlled by two + * feature macros: + * - MBEDTLS_MD_C enables the whole module; + * - MBEDTLS_MD_LIGHT enables only functions for hashing and accessing + * most hash metadata (everything except string names); is it + * automatically set whenever MBEDTLS_MD_C is defined. + * + * In this file, functions from MD_LIGHT are at the top, MD_C at the end. + * + * In the future we may want to change the contract of some functions + * (behaviour with NULL arguments) depending on whether MD_C is defined or + * only MD_LIGHT. Also, the exact scope of MD_LIGHT might vary. + * + * For these reasons, we're keeping MD_LIGHT internal for now. + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_LIGHT) #include "mbedtls/md.h" -#include "mbedtls/md_internal.h" +#include "md_wrap.h" #include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" #include "mbedtls/error.h" -#include "mbedtls/md2.h" -#include "mbedtls/md4.h" #include "mbedtls/md5.h" #include "mbedtls/ripemd160.h" #include "mbedtls/sha1.h" #include "mbedtls/sha256.h" #include "mbedtls/sha512.h" +#include "mbedtls/sha3.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) +#include +#include "md_psa.h" +#include "psa_util_internal.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_SOME_PSA) +#include "psa_crypto_core.h" +#endif #include "mbedtls/platform.h" @@ -34,227 +59,202 @@ #include #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD2_C) -const mbedtls_md_info_t mbedtls_md2_info = { - "MD2", - MBEDTLS_MD_MD2, - 16, - 16, -}; +/* See comment above MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE in md.h */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) && MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE < PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE +#error "Internal error: MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE < PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE" #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD4_C) -const mbedtls_md_info_t mbedtls_md4_info = { - "MD4", - MBEDTLS_MD_MD4, - 16, - 64, -}; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_C) +#define MD_INFO(type, out_size, block_size) type, out_size, block_size, +#else +#define MD_INFO(type, out_size, block_size) type, out_size, #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C) -const mbedtls_md_info_t mbedtls_md5_info = { - "MD5", - MBEDTLS_MD_MD5, - 16, - 64, +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_MD5) +static const mbedtls_md_info_t mbedtls_md5_info = { + MD_INFO(MBEDTLS_MD_MD5, 16, 64) }; #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C) -const mbedtls_md_info_t mbedtls_ripemd160_info = { - "RIPEMD160", - MBEDTLS_MD_RIPEMD160, - 20, - 64, +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_RIPEMD160) +static const mbedtls_md_info_t mbedtls_ripemd160_info = { + MD_INFO(MBEDTLS_MD_RIPEMD160, 20, 64) }; #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) -const mbedtls_md_info_t mbedtls_sha1_info = { - "SHA1", - MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, - 20, - 64, +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1) +static const mbedtls_md_info_t mbedtls_sha1_info = { + MD_INFO(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, 20, 64) }; #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) -const mbedtls_md_info_t mbedtls_sha224_info = { - "SHA224", - MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224, - 28, - 64, +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA224) +static const mbedtls_md_info_t mbedtls_sha224_info = { + MD_INFO(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224, 28, 64) }; +#endif -const mbedtls_md_info_t mbedtls_sha256_info = { - "SHA256", - MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, - 32, - 64, +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) +static const mbedtls_md_info_t mbedtls_sha256_info = { + MD_INFO(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, 32, 64) }; #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384) -const mbedtls_md_info_t mbedtls_sha384_info = { - "SHA384", - MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, - 48, - 128, +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) +static const mbedtls_md_info_t mbedtls_sha384_info = { + MD_INFO(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, 48, 128) }; #endif -const mbedtls_md_info_t mbedtls_sha512_info = { - "SHA512", - MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512, - 64, - 128, +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA512) +static const mbedtls_md_info_t mbedtls_sha512_info = { + MD_INFO(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512, 64, 128) }; #endif -/* - * Reminder: update profiles in x509_crt.c when adding a new hash! - */ -static const int supported_digests[] = { - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) - MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512, -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384) - MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, -#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA3_224) +static const mbedtls_md_info_t mbedtls_sha3_224_info = { + MD_INFO(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_224, 28, 144) +}; #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) - MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, - MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224, +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA3_256) +static const mbedtls_md_info_t mbedtls_sha3_256_info = { + MD_INFO(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_256, 32, 136) +}; #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) - MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA3_384) +static const mbedtls_md_info_t mbedtls_sha3_384_info = { + MD_INFO(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_384, 48, 104) +}; #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C) - MBEDTLS_MD_RIPEMD160, +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA3_512) +static const mbedtls_md_info_t mbedtls_sha3_512_info = { + MD_INFO(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_512, 64, 72) +}; #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C) - MBEDTLS_MD_MD5, +const mbedtls_md_info_t *mbedtls_md_info_from_type(mbedtls_md_type_t md_type) +{ + switch (md_type) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_MD5) + case MBEDTLS_MD_MD5: + return &mbedtls_md5_info; #endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD4_C) - MBEDTLS_MD_MD4, +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_RIPEMD160) + case MBEDTLS_MD_RIPEMD160: + return &mbedtls_ripemd160_info; #endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD2_C) - MBEDTLS_MD_MD2, +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1: + return &mbedtls_sha1_info; #endif - - MBEDTLS_MD_NONE -}; - -const int *mbedtls_md_list(void) -{ - return supported_digests; -} - -const mbedtls_md_info_t *mbedtls_md_info_from_string(const char *md_name) -{ - if (NULL == md_name) { - return NULL; - } - - /* Get the appropriate digest information */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD2_C) - if (!strcmp("MD2", md_name)) { - return mbedtls_md_info_from_type(MBEDTLS_MD_MD2); - } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA224) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224: + return &mbedtls_sha224_info; #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD4_C) - if (!strcmp("MD4", md_name)) { - return mbedtls_md_info_from_type(MBEDTLS_MD_MD4); - } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256: + return &mbedtls_sha256_info; #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C) - if (!strcmp("MD5", md_name)) { - return mbedtls_md_info_from_type(MBEDTLS_MD_MD5); - } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384: + return &mbedtls_sha384_info; #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C) - if (!strcmp("RIPEMD160", md_name)) { - return mbedtls_md_info_from_type(MBEDTLS_MD_RIPEMD160); - } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA512) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512: + return &mbedtls_sha512_info; #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) - if (!strcmp("SHA1", md_name) || !strcmp("SHA", md_name)) { - return mbedtls_md_info_from_type(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1); - } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA3_224) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_224: + return &mbedtls_sha3_224_info; #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) - if (!strcmp("SHA224", md_name)) { - return mbedtls_md_info_from_type(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224); - } - if (!strcmp("SHA256", md_name)) { - return mbedtls_md_info_from_type(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256); - } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA3_256) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_256: + return &mbedtls_sha3_256_info; #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384) - if (!strcmp("SHA384", md_name)) { - return mbedtls_md_info_from_type(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384); - } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA3_384) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_384: + return &mbedtls_sha3_384_info; #endif - if (!strcmp("SHA512", md_name)) { - return mbedtls_md_info_from_type(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512); - } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA3_512) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_512: + return &mbedtls_sha3_512_info; #endif - return NULL; + default: + return NULL; + } } -const mbedtls_md_info_t *mbedtls_md_info_from_type(mbedtls_md_type_t md_type) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_SOME_PSA) +static psa_algorithm_t psa_alg_of_md(const mbedtls_md_info_t *info) { - switch (md_type) { -#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD2_C) - case MBEDTLS_MD_MD2: - return &mbedtls_md2_info; -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD4_C) - case MBEDTLS_MD_MD4: - return &mbedtls_md4_info; -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C) + switch (info->type) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_MD5_VIA_PSA) case MBEDTLS_MD_MD5: - return &mbedtls_md5_info; + return PSA_ALG_MD5; #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_RIPEMD160_VIA_PSA) case MBEDTLS_MD_RIPEMD160: - return &mbedtls_ripemd160_info; + return PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160; #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1_VIA_PSA) case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1: - return &mbedtls_sha1_info; + return PSA_ALG_SHA_1; #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224_VIA_PSA) case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224: - return &mbedtls_sha224_info; + return PSA_ALG_SHA_224; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256_VIA_PSA) case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256: - return &mbedtls_sha256_info; + return PSA_ALG_SHA_256; #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384_VIA_PSA) case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384: - return &mbedtls_sha384_info; + return PSA_ALG_SHA_384; #endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512_VIA_PSA) case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512: - return &mbedtls_sha512_info; + return PSA_ALG_SHA_512; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_224_VIA_PSA) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_224: + return PSA_ALG_SHA3_224; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_256_VIA_PSA) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_256: + return PSA_ALG_SHA3_256; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_384_VIA_PSA) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_384: + return PSA_ALG_SHA3_384; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_512_VIA_PSA) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_512: + return PSA_ALG_SHA3_512; #endif default: - return NULL; + return PSA_ALG_NONE; } } +static int md_can_use_psa(const mbedtls_md_info_t *info) +{ + psa_algorithm_t alg = psa_alg_of_md(info); + if (alg == PSA_ALG_NONE) { + return 0; + } + + return psa_can_do_hash(alg); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_SOME_PSA */ + void mbedtls_md_init(mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx) { + /* Note: this sets engine (if present) to MBEDTLS_MD_ENGINE_LEGACY */ memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_md_context_t)); } @@ -265,17 +265,12 @@ void mbedtls_md_free(mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx) } if (ctx->md_ctx != NULL) { - switch (ctx->md_info->type) { -#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD2_C) - case MBEDTLS_MD_MD2: - mbedtls_md2_free(ctx->md_ctx); - break; -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD4_C) - case MBEDTLS_MD_MD4: - mbedtls_md4_free(ctx->md_ctx); - break; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_SOME_PSA) + if (ctx->engine == MBEDTLS_MD_ENGINE_PSA) { + psa_hash_abort(ctx->md_ctx); + } else #endif + switch (ctx->md_info->type) { #if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C) case MBEDTLS_MD_MD5: mbedtls_md5_free(ctx->md_ctx); @@ -291,19 +286,33 @@ void mbedtls_md_free(mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx) mbedtls_sha1_free(ctx->md_ctx); break; #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA224_C) case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224: + mbedtls_sha256_free(ctx->md_ctx); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256: mbedtls_sha256_free(ctx->md_ctx); break; #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C) case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384: + mbedtls_sha512_free(ctx->md_ctx); + break; #endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512: mbedtls_sha512_free(ctx->md_ctx); break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA3_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_224: + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_256: + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_384: + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_512: + mbedtls_sha3_free(ctx->md_ctx); + break; #endif default: /* Shouldn't happen */ @@ -312,11 +321,12 @@ void mbedtls_md_free(mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx) mbedtls_free(ctx->md_ctx); } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_C) if (ctx->hmac_ctx != NULL) { - mbedtls_platform_zeroize(ctx->hmac_ctx, + mbedtls_zeroize_and_free(ctx->hmac_ctx, 2 * ctx->md_info->block_size); - mbedtls_free(ctx->hmac_ctx); } +#endif mbedtls_platform_zeroize(ctx, sizeof(mbedtls_md_context_t)); } @@ -330,17 +340,22 @@ int mbedtls_md_clone(mbedtls_md_context_t *dst, return MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } - switch (src->md_info->type) { -#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD2_C) - case MBEDTLS_MD_MD2: - mbedtls_md2_clone(dst->md_ctx, src->md_ctx); - break; -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD4_C) - case MBEDTLS_MD_MD4: - mbedtls_md4_clone(dst->md_ctx, src->md_ctx); - break; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_SOME_PSA) + if (src->engine != dst->engine) { + /* This can happen with src set to legacy because PSA wasn't ready + * yet, and dst to PSA because it became ready in the meantime. + * We currently don't support that case (we'd need to re-allocate + * md_ctx to the size of the appropriate MD context). */ + return MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + } + + if (src->engine == MBEDTLS_MD_ENGINE_PSA) { + psa_status_t status = psa_hash_clone(src->md_ctx, dst->md_ctx); + return mbedtls_md_error_from_psa(status); + } #endif + + switch (src->md_info->type) { #if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C) case MBEDTLS_MD_MD5: mbedtls_md5_clone(dst->md_ctx, src->md_ctx); @@ -356,19 +371,33 @@ int mbedtls_md_clone(mbedtls_md_context_t *dst, mbedtls_sha1_clone(dst->md_ctx, src->md_ctx); break; #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA224_C) case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224: + mbedtls_sha256_clone(dst->md_ctx, src->md_ctx); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256: mbedtls_sha256_clone(dst->md_ctx, src->md_ctx); break; #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C) case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384: + mbedtls_sha512_clone(dst->md_ctx, src->md_ctx); + break; #endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512: mbedtls_sha512_clone(dst->md_ctx, src->md_ctx); break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA3_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_224: + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_256: + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_384: + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_512: + mbedtls_sha3_clone(dst->md_ctx, src->md_ctx); + break; #endif default: return MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA; @@ -377,13 +406,6 @@ int mbedtls_md_clone(mbedtls_md_context_t *dst, return 0; } -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) -int mbedtls_md_init_ctx(mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx, const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info) -{ - return mbedtls_md_setup(ctx, md_info, 1); -} -#endif - #define ALLOC(type) \ do { \ ctx->md_ctx = mbedtls_calloc(1, sizeof(mbedtls_##type##_context)); \ @@ -395,25 +417,35 @@ int mbedtls_md_init_ctx(mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx, const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_i int mbedtls_md_setup(mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx, const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info, int hmac) { - if (md_info == NULL || ctx == NULL) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_C) + if (ctx == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } +#endif + if (md_info == NULL) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } ctx->md_info = md_info; ctx->md_ctx = NULL; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_C) ctx->hmac_ctx = NULL; - - switch (md_info->type) { -#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD2_C) - case MBEDTLS_MD_MD2: - ALLOC(md2); - break; +#else + if (hmac != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD4_C) - case MBEDTLS_MD_MD4: - ALLOC(md4); - break; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_SOME_PSA) + if (md_can_use_psa(ctx->md_info)) { + ctx->md_ctx = mbedtls_calloc(1, sizeof(psa_hash_operation_t)); + if (ctx->md_ctx == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_ALLOC_FAILED; + } + ctx->engine = MBEDTLS_MD_ENGINE_PSA; + } else #endif + switch (md_info->type) { #if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C) case MBEDTLS_MD_MD5: ALLOC(md5); @@ -429,24 +461,39 @@ int mbedtls_md_setup(mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx, const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info ALLOC(sha1); break; #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA224_C) case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224: + ALLOC(sha256); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256: ALLOC(sha256); break; #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C) case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384: + ALLOC(sha512); + break; #endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512: ALLOC(sha512); break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA3_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_224: + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_256: + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_384: + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_512: + ALLOC(sha3); + break; #endif default: return MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_C) if (hmac != 0) { ctx->hmac_ctx = mbedtls_calloc(2, md_info->block_size); if (ctx->hmac_ctx == NULL) { @@ -454,6 +501,7 @@ int mbedtls_md_setup(mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx, const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info return MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_ALLOC_FAILED; } } +#endif return 0; } @@ -461,44 +509,59 @@ int mbedtls_md_setup(mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx, const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info int mbedtls_md_starts(mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_C) if (ctx == NULL || ctx->md_info == NULL) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } - - switch (ctx->md_info->type) { -#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD2_C) - case MBEDTLS_MD_MD2: - return mbedtls_md2_starts_ret(ctx->md_ctx); #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD4_C) - case MBEDTLS_MD_MD4: - return mbedtls_md4_starts_ret(ctx->md_ctx); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_SOME_PSA) + if (ctx->engine == MBEDTLS_MD_ENGINE_PSA) { + psa_algorithm_t alg = psa_alg_of_md(ctx->md_info); + psa_hash_abort(ctx->md_ctx); + psa_status_t status = psa_hash_setup(ctx->md_ctx, alg); + return mbedtls_md_error_from_psa(status); + } #endif + + switch (ctx->md_info->type) { #if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C) case MBEDTLS_MD_MD5: - return mbedtls_md5_starts_ret(ctx->md_ctx); + return mbedtls_md5_starts(ctx->md_ctx); #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C) case MBEDTLS_MD_RIPEMD160: - return mbedtls_ripemd160_starts_ret(ctx->md_ctx); + return mbedtls_ripemd160_starts(ctx->md_ctx); #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1: - return mbedtls_sha1_starts_ret(ctx->md_ctx); + return mbedtls_sha1_starts(ctx->md_ctx); #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA224_C) case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224: - return mbedtls_sha256_starts_ret(ctx->md_ctx, 1); + return mbedtls_sha256_starts(ctx->md_ctx, 1); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256: - return mbedtls_sha256_starts_ret(ctx->md_ctx, 0); + return mbedtls_sha256_starts(ctx->md_ctx, 0); #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C) case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384: - return mbedtls_sha512_starts_ret(ctx->md_ctx, 1); + return mbedtls_sha512_starts(ctx->md_ctx, 1); #endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512: - return mbedtls_sha512_starts_ret(ctx->md_ctx, 0); + return mbedtls_sha512_starts(ctx->md_ctx, 0); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA3_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_224: + return mbedtls_sha3_starts(ctx->md_ctx, MBEDTLS_SHA3_224); + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_256: + return mbedtls_sha3_starts(ctx->md_ctx, MBEDTLS_SHA3_256); + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_384: + return mbedtls_sha3_starts(ctx->md_ctx, MBEDTLS_SHA3_384); + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_512: + return mbedtls_sha3_starts(ctx->md_ctx, MBEDTLS_SHA3_512); #endif default: return MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA; @@ -507,42 +570,54 @@ int mbedtls_md_starts(mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx) int mbedtls_md_update(mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx, const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_C) if (ctx == NULL || ctx->md_info == NULL) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } - - switch (ctx->md_info->type) { -#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD2_C) - case MBEDTLS_MD_MD2: - return mbedtls_md2_update_ret(ctx->md_ctx, input, ilen); #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD4_C) - case MBEDTLS_MD_MD4: - return mbedtls_md4_update_ret(ctx->md_ctx, input, ilen); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_SOME_PSA) + if (ctx->engine == MBEDTLS_MD_ENGINE_PSA) { + psa_status_t status = psa_hash_update(ctx->md_ctx, input, ilen); + return mbedtls_md_error_from_psa(status); + } #endif + + switch (ctx->md_info->type) { #if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C) case MBEDTLS_MD_MD5: - return mbedtls_md5_update_ret(ctx->md_ctx, input, ilen); + return mbedtls_md5_update(ctx->md_ctx, input, ilen); #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C) case MBEDTLS_MD_RIPEMD160: - return mbedtls_ripemd160_update_ret(ctx->md_ctx, input, ilen); + return mbedtls_ripemd160_update(ctx->md_ctx, input, ilen); #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1: - return mbedtls_sha1_update_ret(ctx->md_ctx, input, ilen); + return mbedtls_sha1_update(ctx->md_ctx, input, ilen); #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA224_C) case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224: + return mbedtls_sha256_update(ctx->md_ctx, input, ilen); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256: - return mbedtls_sha256_update_ret(ctx->md_ctx, input, ilen); + return mbedtls_sha256_update(ctx->md_ctx, input, ilen); #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C) case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384: + return mbedtls_sha512_update(ctx->md_ctx, input, ilen); #endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512: - return mbedtls_sha512_update_ret(ctx->md_ctx, input, ilen); + return mbedtls_sha512_update(ctx->md_ctx, input, ilen); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA3_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_224: + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_256: + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_384: + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_512: + return mbedtls_sha3_update(ctx->md_ctx, input, ilen); #endif default: return MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA; @@ -551,42 +626,56 @@ int mbedtls_md_update(mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx, const unsigned char *input, siz int mbedtls_md_finish(mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx, unsigned char *output) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_C) if (ctx == NULL || ctx->md_info == NULL) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } - - switch (ctx->md_info->type) { -#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD2_C) - case MBEDTLS_MD_MD2: - return mbedtls_md2_finish_ret(ctx->md_ctx, output); #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD4_C) - case MBEDTLS_MD_MD4: - return mbedtls_md4_finish_ret(ctx->md_ctx, output); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_SOME_PSA) + if (ctx->engine == MBEDTLS_MD_ENGINE_PSA) { + size_t size = ctx->md_info->size; + psa_status_t status = psa_hash_finish(ctx->md_ctx, + output, size, &size); + return mbedtls_md_error_from_psa(status); + } #endif + + switch (ctx->md_info->type) { #if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C) case MBEDTLS_MD_MD5: - return mbedtls_md5_finish_ret(ctx->md_ctx, output); + return mbedtls_md5_finish(ctx->md_ctx, output); #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C) case MBEDTLS_MD_RIPEMD160: - return mbedtls_ripemd160_finish_ret(ctx->md_ctx, output); + return mbedtls_ripemd160_finish(ctx->md_ctx, output); #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1: - return mbedtls_sha1_finish_ret(ctx->md_ctx, output); + return mbedtls_sha1_finish(ctx->md_ctx, output); #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA224_C) case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224: + return mbedtls_sha256_finish(ctx->md_ctx, output); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256: - return mbedtls_sha256_finish_ret(ctx->md_ctx, output); + return mbedtls_sha256_finish(ctx->md_ctx, output); #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C) case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384: + return mbedtls_sha512_finish(ctx->md_ctx, output); #endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512: - return mbedtls_sha512_finish_ret(ctx->md_ctx, output); + return mbedtls_sha512_finish(ctx->md_ctx, output); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA3_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_224: + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_256: + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_384: + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_512: + return mbedtls_sha3_finish(ctx->md_ctx, output, ctx->md_info->size); #endif default: return MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA; @@ -600,46 +689,232 @@ int mbedtls_md(const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info, const unsigned char *input, siz return MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } - switch (md_info->type) { -#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD2_C) - case MBEDTLS_MD_MD2: - return mbedtls_md2_ret(input, ilen, output); -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD4_C) - case MBEDTLS_MD_MD4: - return mbedtls_md4_ret(input, ilen, output); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_SOME_PSA) + if (md_can_use_psa(md_info)) { + size_t size = md_info->size; + psa_status_t status = psa_hash_compute(psa_alg_of_md(md_info), + input, ilen, + output, size, &size); + return mbedtls_md_error_from_psa(status); + } #endif + + switch (md_info->type) { #if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C) case MBEDTLS_MD_MD5: - return mbedtls_md5_ret(input, ilen, output); + return mbedtls_md5(input, ilen, output); #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C) case MBEDTLS_MD_RIPEMD160: - return mbedtls_ripemd160_ret(input, ilen, output); + return mbedtls_ripemd160(input, ilen, output); #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1: - return mbedtls_sha1_ret(input, ilen, output); + return mbedtls_sha1(input, ilen, output); #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA224_C) case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224: - return mbedtls_sha256_ret(input, ilen, output, 1); + return mbedtls_sha256(input, ilen, output, 1); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256: - return mbedtls_sha256_ret(input, ilen, output, 0); + return mbedtls_sha256(input, ilen, output, 0); #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C) case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384: - return mbedtls_sha512_ret(input, ilen, output, 1); + return mbedtls_sha512(input, ilen, output, 1); #endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512: - return mbedtls_sha512_ret(input, ilen, output, 0); + return mbedtls_sha512(input, ilen, output, 0); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA3_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_224: + return mbedtls_sha3(MBEDTLS_SHA3_224, input, ilen, output, md_info->size); + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_256: + return mbedtls_sha3(MBEDTLS_SHA3_256, input, ilen, output, md_info->size); + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_384: + return mbedtls_sha3(MBEDTLS_SHA3_384, input, ilen, output, md_info->size); + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_512: + return mbedtls_sha3(MBEDTLS_SHA3_512, input, ilen, output, md_info->size); #endif default: return MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } } +unsigned char mbedtls_md_get_size(const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info) +{ + if (md_info == NULL) { + return 0; + } + + return md_info->size; +} + +mbedtls_md_type_t mbedtls_md_get_type(const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info) +{ + if (md_info == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_MD_NONE; + } + + return md_info->type; +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) +int mbedtls_md_error_from_psa(psa_status_t status) +{ + return PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR_LIST(status, psa_to_md_errors, + psa_generic_status_to_mbedtls); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C */ + + +/************************************************************************ + * Functions above this separator are part of MBEDTLS_MD_LIGHT, * + * functions below are only available when MBEDTLS_MD_C is set. * + ************************************************************************/ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_C) + +/* + * Reminder: update profiles in x509_crt.c when adding a new hash! + */ +static const int supported_digests[] = { + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA512) + MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512, +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) + MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) + MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA224) + MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224, +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1) + MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_RIPEMD160) + MBEDTLS_MD_RIPEMD160, +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_MD5) + MBEDTLS_MD_MD5, +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA3_224) + MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_224, +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA3_256) + MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_256, +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA3_384) + MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_384, +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA3_512) + MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_512, +#endif + + MBEDTLS_MD_NONE +}; + +const int *mbedtls_md_list(void) +{ + return supported_digests; +} + +typedef struct { + const char *md_name; + mbedtls_md_type_t md_type; +} md_name_entry; + +static const md_name_entry md_names[] = { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_MD5) + { "MD5", MBEDTLS_MD_MD5 }, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_RIPEMD160) + { "RIPEMD160", MBEDTLS_MD_RIPEMD160 }, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1) + { "SHA1", MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1 }, + { "SHA", MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1 }, // compatibility fallback +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA224) + { "SHA224", MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224 }, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) + { "SHA256", MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256 }, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) + { "SHA384", MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384 }, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA512) + { "SHA512", MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512 }, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA3_224) + { "SHA3-224", MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_224 }, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA3_256) + { "SHA3-256", MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_256 }, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA3_384) + { "SHA3-384", MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_384 }, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA3_512) + { "SHA3-512", MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_512 }, +#endif + { NULL, MBEDTLS_MD_NONE }, +}; + +const mbedtls_md_info_t *mbedtls_md_info_from_string(const char *md_name) +{ + if (NULL == md_name) { + return NULL; + } + + const md_name_entry *entry = md_names; + while (entry->md_name != NULL && + strcmp(entry->md_name, md_name) != 0) { + ++entry; + } + + return mbedtls_md_info_from_type(entry->md_type); +} + +const char *mbedtls_md_get_name(const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info) +{ + if (md_info == NULL) { + return NULL; + } + + const md_name_entry *entry = md_names; + while (entry->md_type != MBEDTLS_MD_NONE && + entry->md_type != md_info->type) { + ++entry; + } + + return entry->md_name; +} + +const mbedtls_md_info_t *mbedtls_md_info_from_ctx( + const mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx) +{ + if (ctx == NULL) { + return NULL; + } + + return ctx->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(md_info); +} + #if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) int mbedtls_md_file(const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info, const char *path, unsigned char *output) { @@ -657,6 +932,9 @@ int mbedtls_md_file(const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info, const char *path, unsigned return MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_FILE_IO_ERROR; } + /* Ensure no stdio buffering of secrets, as such buffers cannot be wiped. */ + mbedtls_setbuf(f, NULL); + mbedtls_md_init(&ctx); if ((ret = mbedtls_md_setup(&ctx, md_info, 0)) != 0) { @@ -693,7 +971,6 @@ int mbedtls_md_hmac_starts(mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx, const unsigned char *key, int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; unsigned char sum[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE]; unsigned char *ipad, *opad; - size_t i; if (ctx == NULL || ctx->md_info == NULL || ctx->hmac_ctx == NULL) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA; @@ -720,10 +997,8 @@ int mbedtls_md_hmac_starts(mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx, const unsigned char *key, memset(ipad, 0x36, ctx->md_info->block_size); memset(opad, 0x5C, ctx->md_info->block_size); - for (i = 0; i < keylen; i++) { - ipad[i] = (unsigned char) (ipad[i] ^ key[i]); - opad[i] = (unsigned char) (opad[i] ^ key[i]); - } + mbedtls_xor(ipad, ipad, key, keylen); + mbedtls_xor(opad, opad, key, keylen); if ((ret = mbedtls_md_starts(ctx)) != 0) { goto cleanup; @@ -828,75 +1103,6 @@ int mbedtls_md_hmac(const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info, return ret; } -int mbedtls_md_process(mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx, const unsigned char *data) -{ - if (ctx == NULL || ctx->md_info == NULL) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA; - } - - switch (ctx->md_info->type) { -#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD2_C) - case MBEDTLS_MD_MD2: - return mbedtls_internal_md2_process(ctx->md_ctx); -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD4_C) - case MBEDTLS_MD_MD4: - return mbedtls_internal_md4_process(ctx->md_ctx, data); -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C) - case MBEDTLS_MD_MD5: - return mbedtls_internal_md5_process(ctx->md_ctx, data); -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C) - case MBEDTLS_MD_RIPEMD160: - return mbedtls_internal_ripemd160_process(ctx->md_ctx, data); -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) - case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1: - return mbedtls_internal_sha1_process(ctx->md_ctx, data); -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) - case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224: - case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256: - return mbedtls_internal_sha256_process(ctx->md_ctx, data); -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384) - case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384: -#endif - case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512: - return mbedtls_internal_sha512_process(ctx->md_ctx, data); -#endif - default: - return MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA; - } -} - -unsigned char mbedtls_md_get_size(const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info) -{ - if (md_info == NULL) { - return 0; - } - - return md_info->size; -} - -mbedtls_md_type_t mbedtls_md_get_type(const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info) -{ - if (md_info == NULL) { - return MBEDTLS_MD_NONE; - } - - return md_info->type; -} - -const char *mbedtls_md_get_name(const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info) -{ - if (md_info == NULL) { - return NULL; - } - - return md_info->name; -} - #endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_C */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_LIGHT */ diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/md2.c b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/md2.c deleted file mode 100644 index b552d5f7e114..000000000000 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/md2.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,347 +0,0 @@ -/* - * RFC 1115/1319 compliant MD2 implementation - * - * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later - */ -/* - * The MD2 algorithm was designed by Ron Rivest in 1989. - * - * http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc1115.txt - * http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc1319.txt - */ - -#include "common.h" - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD2_C) - -#include "mbedtls/md2.h" -#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" -#include "mbedtls/error.h" - -#include - -#include "mbedtls/platform.h" - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_MD2_ALT) - -static const unsigned char PI_SUBST[256] = -{ - 0x29, 0x2E, 0x43, 0xC9, 0xA2, 0xD8, 0x7C, 0x01, 0x3D, 0x36, - 0x54, 0xA1, 0xEC, 0xF0, 0x06, 0x13, 0x62, 0xA7, 0x05, 0xF3, - 0xC0, 0xC7, 0x73, 0x8C, 0x98, 0x93, 0x2B, 0xD9, 0xBC, 0x4C, - 0x82, 0xCA, 0x1E, 0x9B, 0x57, 0x3C, 0xFD, 0xD4, 0xE0, 0x16, - 0x67, 0x42, 0x6F, 0x18, 0x8A, 0x17, 0xE5, 0x12, 0xBE, 0x4E, - 0xC4, 0xD6, 0xDA, 0x9E, 0xDE, 0x49, 0xA0, 0xFB, 0xF5, 0x8E, - 0xBB, 0x2F, 0xEE, 0x7A, 0xA9, 0x68, 0x79, 0x91, 0x15, 0xB2, - 0x07, 0x3F, 0x94, 0xC2, 0x10, 0x89, 0x0B, 0x22, 0x5F, 0x21, - 0x80, 0x7F, 0x5D, 0x9A, 0x5A, 0x90, 0x32, 0x27, 0x35, 0x3E, - 0xCC, 0xE7, 0xBF, 0xF7, 0x97, 0x03, 0xFF, 0x19, 0x30, 0xB3, - 0x48, 0xA5, 0xB5, 0xD1, 0xD7, 0x5E, 0x92, 0x2A, 0xAC, 0x56, - 0xAA, 0xC6, 0x4F, 0xB8, 0x38, 0xD2, 0x96, 0xA4, 0x7D, 0xB6, - 0x76, 0xFC, 0x6B, 0xE2, 0x9C, 0x74, 0x04, 0xF1, 0x45, 0x9D, - 0x70, 0x59, 0x64, 0x71, 0x87, 0x20, 0x86, 0x5B, 0xCF, 0x65, - 0xE6, 0x2D, 0xA8, 0x02, 0x1B, 0x60, 0x25, 0xAD, 0xAE, 0xB0, - 0xB9, 0xF6, 0x1C, 0x46, 0x61, 0x69, 0x34, 0x40, 0x7E, 0x0F, - 0x55, 0x47, 0xA3, 0x23, 0xDD, 0x51, 0xAF, 0x3A, 0xC3, 0x5C, - 0xF9, 0xCE, 0xBA, 0xC5, 0xEA, 0x26, 0x2C, 0x53, 0x0D, 0x6E, - 0x85, 0x28, 0x84, 0x09, 0xD3, 0xDF, 0xCD, 0xF4, 0x41, 0x81, - 0x4D, 0x52, 0x6A, 0xDC, 0x37, 0xC8, 0x6C, 0xC1, 0xAB, 0xFA, - 0x24, 0xE1, 0x7B, 0x08, 0x0C, 0xBD, 0xB1, 0x4A, 0x78, 0x88, - 0x95, 0x8B, 0xE3, 0x63, 0xE8, 0x6D, 0xE9, 0xCB, 0xD5, 0xFE, - 0x3B, 0x00, 0x1D, 0x39, 0xF2, 0xEF, 0xB7, 0x0E, 0x66, 0x58, - 0xD0, 0xE4, 0xA6, 0x77, 0x72, 0xF8, 0xEB, 0x75, 0x4B, 0x0A, - 0x31, 0x44, 0x50, 0xB4, 0x8F, 0xED, 0x1F, 0x1A, 0xDB, 0x99, - 0x8D, 0x33, 0x9F, 0x11, 0x83, 0x14 -}; - -void mbedtls_md2_init(mbedtls_md2_context *ctx) -{ - memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_md2_context)); -} - -void mbedtls_md2_free(mbedtls_md2_context *ctx) -{ - if (ctx == NULL) { - return; - } - - mbedtls_platform_zeroize(ctx, sizeof(mbedtls_md2_context)); -} - -void mbedtls_md2_clone(mbedtls_md2_context *dst, - const mbedtls_md2_context *src) -{ - *dst = *src; -} - -/* - * MD2 context setup - */ -int mbedtls_md2_starts_ret(mbedtls_md2_context *ctx) -{ - memset(ctx->cksum, 0, 16); - memset(ctx->state, 0, 46); - memset(ctx->buffer, 0, 16); - ctx->left = 0; - - return 0; -} - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) -void mbedtls_md2_starts(mbedtls_md2_context *ctx) -{ - mbedtls_md2_starts_ret(ctx); -} -#endif - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_MD2_PROCESS_ALT) -int mbedtls_internal_md2_process(mbedtls_md2_context *ctx) -{ - int i, j; - unsigned char t = 0; - - for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) { - ctx->state[i + 16] = ctx->buffer[i]; - ctx->state[i + 32] = - (unsigned char) (ctx->buffer[i] ^ ctx->state[i]); - } - - for (i = 0; i < 18; i++) { - for (j = 0; j < 48; j++) { - ctx->state[j] = (unsigned char) - (ctx->state[j] ^ PI_SUBST[t]); - t = ctx->state[j]; - } - - t = (unsigned char) (t + i); - } - - t = ctx->cksum[15]; - - for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) { - ctx->cksum[i] = (unsigned char) - (ctx->cksum[i] ^ PI_SUBST[ctx->buffer[i] ^ t]); - t = ctx->cksum[i]; - } - - /* Zeroise variables to clear sensitive data from memory. */ - mbedtls_platform_zeroize(&t, sizeof(t)); - - return 0; -} - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) -void mbedtls_md2_process(mbedtls_md2_context *ctx) -{ - mbedtls_internal_md2_process(ctx); -} -#endif -#endif /* !MBEDTLS_MD2_PROCESS_ALT */ - -/* - * MD2 process buffer - */ -int mbedtls_md2_update_ret(mbedtls_md2_context *ctx, - const unsigned char *input, - size_t ilen) -{ - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - size_t fill; - - while (ilen > 0) { - if (ilen > 16 - ctx->left) { - fill = 16 - ctx->left; - } else { - fill = ilen; - } - - memcpy(ctx->buffer + ctx->left, input, fill); - - ctx->left += fill; - input += fill; - ilen -= fill; - - if (ctx->left == 16) { - ctx->left = 0; - if ((ret = mbedtls_internal_md2_process(ctx)) != 0) { - return ret; - } - } - } - - return 0; -} - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) -void mbedtls_md2_update(mbedtls_md2_context *ctx, - const unsigned char *input, - size_t ilen) -{ - mbedtls_md2_update_ret(ctx, input, ilen); -} -#endif - -/* - * MD2 final digest - */ -int mbedtls_md2_finish_ret(mbedtls_md2_context *ctx, - unsigned char output[16]) -{ - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - size_t i; - unsigned char x; - - x = (unsigned char) (16 - ctx->left); - - for (i = ctx->left; i < 16; i++) { - ctx->buffer[i] = x; - } - - if ((ret = mbedtls_internal_md2_process(ctx)) != 0) { - return ret; - } - - memcpy(ctx->buffer, ctx->cksum, 16); - if ((ret = mbedtls_internal_md2_process(ctx)) != 0) { - return ret; - } - - memcpy(output, ctx->state, 16); - - return 0; -} - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) -void mbedtls_md2_finish(mbedtls_md2_context *ctx, - unsigned char output[16]) -{ - mbedtls_md2_finish_ret(ctx, output); -} -#endif - -#endif /* !MBEDTLS_MD2_ALT */ - -/* - * output = MD2( input buffer ) - */ -int mbedtls_md2_ret(const unsigned char *input, - size_t ilen, - unsigned char output[16]) -{ - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - mbedtls_md2_context ctx; - - mbedtls_md2_init(&ctx); - - if ((ret = mbedtls_md2_starts_ret(&ctx)) != 0) { - goto exit; - } - - if ((ret = mbedtls_md2_update_ret(&ctx, input, ilen)) != 0) { - goto exit; - } - - if ((ret = mbedtls_md2_finish_ret(&ctx, output)) != 0) { - goto exit; - } - -exit: - mbedtls_md2_free(&ctx); - - return ret; -} - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) -void mbedtls_md2(const unsigned char *input, - size_t ilen, - unsigned char output[16]) -{ - mbedtls_md2_ret(input, ilen, output); -} -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) - -/* - * RFC 1319 test vectors - */ -static const unsigned char md2_test_str[7][81] = -{ - { "" }, - { "a" }, - { "abc" }, - { "message digest" }, - { "abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz" }, - { "ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789" }, - { "12345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890" } -}; - -static const size_t md2_test_strlen[7] = -{ - 0, 1, 3, 14, 26, 62, 80 -}; - -static const unsigned char md2_test_sum[7][16] = -{ - { 0x83, 0x50, 0xE5, 0xA3, 0xE2, 0x4C, 0x15, 0x3D, - 0xF2, 0x27, 0x5C, 0x9F, 0x80, 0x69, 0x27, 0x73 }, - { 0x32, 0xEC, 0x01, 0xEC, 0x4A, 0x6D, 0xAC, 0x72, - 0xC0, 0xAB, 0x96, 0xFB, 0x34, 0xC0, 0xB5, 0xD1 }, - { 0xDA, 0x85, 0x3B, 0x0D, 0x3F, 0x88, 0xD9, 0x9B, - 0x30, 0x28, 0x3A, 0x69, 0xE6, 0xDE, 0xD6, 0xBB }, - { 0xAB, 0x4F, 0x49, 0x6B, 0xFB, 0x2A, 0x53, 0x0B, - 0x21, 0x9F, 0xF3, 0x30, 0x31, 0xFE, 0x06, 0xB0 }, - { 0x4E, 0x8D, 0xDF, 0xF3, 0x65, 0x02, 0x92, 0xAB, - 0x5A, 0x41, 0x08, 0xC3, 0xAA, 0x47, 0x94, 0x0B }, - { 0xDA, 0x33, 0xDE, 0xF2, 0xA4, 0x2D, 0xF1, 0x39, - 0x75, 0x35, 0x28, 0x46, 0xC3, 0x03, 0x38, 0xCD }, - { 0xD5, 0x97, 0x6F, 0x79, 0xD8, 0x3D, 0x3A, 0x0D, - 0xC9, 0x80, 0x6C, 0x3C, 0x66, 0xF3, 0xEF, 0xD8 } -}; - -/* - * Checkup routine - */ -int mbedtls_md2_self_test(int verbose) -{ - int i, ret = 0; - unsigned char md2sum[16]; - - for (i = 0; i < 7; i++) { - if (verbose != 0) { - mbedtls_printf(" MD2 test #%d: ", i + 1); - } - - ret = mbedtls_md2_ret(md2_test_str[i], md2_test_strlen[i], md2sum); - if (ret != 0) { - goto fail; - } - - if (memcmp(md2sum, md2_test_sum[i], 16) != 0) { - ret = 1; - goto fail; - } - - if (verbose != 0) { - mbedtls_printf("passed\n"); - } - } - - if (verbose != 0) { - mbedtls_printf("\n"); - } - - return 0; - -fail: - if (verbose != 0) { - mbedtls_printf("failed\n"); - } - - return ret; -} - -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ - -#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD2_C */ diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/md4.c b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/md4.c deleted file mode 100644 index 8de85fba2e68..000000000000 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/md4.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,451 +0,0 @@ -/* - * RFC 1186/1320 compliant MD4 implementation - * - * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later - */ -/* - * The MD4 algorithm was designed by Ron Rivest in 1990. - * - * http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc1186.txt - * http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc1320.txt - */ - -#include "common.h" - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD4_C) - -#include "mbedtls/md4.h" -#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" -#include "mbedtls/error.h" - -#include - -#include "mbedtls/platform.h" - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_MD4_ALT) - -void mbedtls_md4_init(mbedtls_md4_context *ctx) -{ - memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_md4_context)); -} - -void mbedtls_md4_free(mbedtls_md4_context *ctx) -{ - if (ctx == NULL) { - return; - } - - mbedtls_platform_zeroize(ctx, sizeof(mbedtls_md4_context)); -} - -void mbedtls_md4_clone(mbedtls_md4_context *dst, - const mbedtls_md4_context *src) -{ - *dst = *src; -} - -/* - * MD4 context setup - */ -int mbedtls_md4_starts_ret(mbedtls_md4_context *ctx) -{ - ctx->total[0] = 0; - ctx->total[1] = 0; - - ctx->state[0] = 0x67452301; - ctx->state[1] = 0xEFCDAB89; - ctx->state[2] = 0x98BADCFE; - ctx->state[3] = 0x10325476; - - return 0; -} - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) -void mbedtls_md4_starts(mbedtls_md4_context *ctx) -{ - mbedtls_md4_starts_ret(ctx); -} -#endif - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_MD4_PROCESS_ALT) -int mbedtls_internal_md4_process(mbedtls_md4_context *ctx, - const unsigned char data[64]) -{ - struct { - uint32_t X[16], A, B, C, D; - } local; - - local.X[0] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE(data, 0); - local.X[1] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE(data, 4); - local.X[2] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE(data, 8); - local.X[3] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE(data, 12); - local.X[4] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE(data, 16); - local.X[5] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE(data, 20); - local.X[6] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE(data, 24); - local.X[7] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE(data, 28); - local.X[8] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE(data, 32); - local.X[9] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE(data, 36); - local.X[10] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE(data, 40); - local.X[11] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE(data, 44); - local.X[12] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE(data, 48); - local.X[13] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE(data, 52); - local.X[14] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE(data, 56); - local.X[15] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE(data, 60); - -#define S(x, n) (((x) << (n)) | (((x) & 0xFFFFFFFF) >> (32 - (n)))) - - local.A = ctx->state[0]; - local.B = ctx->state[1]; - local.C = ctx->state[2]; - local.D = ctx->state[3]; - -#define F(x, y, z) (((x) & (y)) | ((~(x)) & (z))) -#define P(a, b, c, d, x, s) \ - do \ - { \ - (a) += F((b), (c), (d)) + (x); \ - (a) = S((a), (s)); \ - } while (0) - - - P(local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, local.X[0], 3); - P(local.D, local.A, local.B, local.C, local.X[1], 7); - P(local.C, local.D, local.A, local.B, local.X[2], 11); - P(local.B, local.C, local.D, local.A, local.X[3], 19); - P(local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, local.X[4], 3); - P(local.D, local.A, local.B, local.C, local.X[5], 7); - P(local.C, local.D, local.A, local.B, local.X[6], 11); - P(local.B, local.C, local.D, local.A, local.X[7], 19); - P(local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, local.X[8], 3); - P(local.D, local.A, local.B, local.C, local.X[9], 7); - P(local.C, local.D, local.A, local.B, local.X[10], 11); - P(local.B, local.C, local.D, local.A, local.X[11], 19); - P(local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, local.X[12], 3); - P(local.D, local.A, local.B, local.C, local.X[13], 7); - P(local.C, local.D, local.A, local.B, local.X[14], 11); - P(local.B, local.C, local.D, local.A, local.X[15], 19); - -#undef P -#undef F - -#define F(x, y, z) (((x) & (y)) | ((x) & (z)) | ((y) & (z))) -#define P(a, b, c, d, x, s) \ - do \ - { \ - (a) += F((b), (c), (d)) + (x) + 0x5A827999; \ - (a) = S((a), (s)); \ - } while (0) - - P(local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, local.X[0], 3); - P(local.D, local.A, local.B, local.C, local.X[4], 5); - P(local.C, local.D, local.A, local.B, local.X[8], 9); - P(local.B, local.C, local.D, local.A, local.X[12], 13); - P(local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, local.X[1], 3); - P(local.D, local.A, local.B, local.C, local.X[5], 5); - P(local.C, local.D, local.A, local.B, local.X[9], 9); - P(local.B, local.C, local.D, local.A, local.X[13], 13); - P(local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, local.X[2], 3); - P(local.D, local.A, local.B, local.C, local.X[6], 5); - P(local.C, local.D, local.A, local.B, local.X[10], 9); - P(local.B, local.C, local.D, local.A, local.X[14], 13); - P(local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, local.X[3], 3); - P(local.D, local.A, local.B, local.C, local.X[7], 5); - P(local.C, local.D, local.A, local.B, local.X[11], 9); - P(local.B, local.C, local.D, local.A, local.X[15], 13); - -#undef P -#undef F - -#define F(x, y, z) ((x) ^ (y) ^ (z)) -#define P(a, b, c, d, x, s) \ - do \ - { \ - (a) += F((b), (c), (d)) + (x) + 0x6ED9EBA1; \ - (a) = S((a), (s)); \ - } while (0) - - P(local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, local.X[0], 3); - P(local.D, local.A, local.B, local.C, local.X[8], 9); - P(local.C, local.D, local.A, local.B, local.X[4], 11); - P(local.B, local.C, local.D, local.A, local.X[12], 15); - P(local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, local.X[2], 3); - P(local.D, local.A, local.B, local.C, local.X[10], 9); - P(local.C, local.D, local.A, local.B, local.X[6], 11); - P(local.B, local.C, local.D, local.A, local.X[14], 15); - P(local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, local.X[1], 3); - P(local.D, local.A, local.B, local.C, local.X[9], 9); - P(local.C, local.D, local.A, local.B, local.X[5], 11); - P(local.B, local.C, local.D, local.A, local.X[13], 15); - P(local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, local.X[3], 3); - P(local.D, local.A, local.B, local.C, local.X[11], 9); - P(local.C, local.D, local.A, local.B, local.X[7], 11); - P(local.B, local.C, local.D, local.A, local.X[15], 15); - -#undef F -#undef P - - ctx->state[0] += local.A; - ctx->state[1] += local.B; - ctx->state[2] += local.C; - ctx->state[3] += local.D; - - /* Zeroise variables to clear sensitive data from memory. */ - mbedtls_platform_zeroize(&local, sizeof(local)); - - return 0; -} - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) -void mbedtls_md4_process(mbedtls_md4_context *ctx, - const unsigned char data[64]) -{ - mbedtls_internal_md4_process(ctx, data); -} -#endif -#endif /* !MBEDTLS_MD4_PROCESS_ALT */ - -/* - * MD4 process buffer - */ -int mbedtls_md4_update_ret(mbedtls_md4_context *ctx, - const unsigned char *input, - size_t ilen) -{ - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - size_t fill; - uint32_t left; - - if (ilen == 0) { - return 0; - } - - left = ctx->total[0] & 0x3F; - fill = 64 - left; - - ctx->total[0] += (uint32_t) ilen; - ctx->total[0] &= 0xFFFFFFFF; - - if (ctx->total[0] < (uint32_t) ilen) { - ctx->total[1]++; - } - - if (left && ilen >= fill) { - memcpy((void *) (ctx->buffer + left), - (void *) input, fill); - - if ((ret = mbedtls_internal_md4_process(ctx, ctx->buffer)) != 0) { - return ret; - } - - input += fill; - ilen -= fill; - left = 0; - } - - while (ilen >= 64) { - if ((ret = mbedtls_internal_md4_process(ctx, input)) != 0) { - return ret; - } - - input += 64; - ilen -= 64; - } - - if (ilen > 0) { - memcpy((void *) (ctx->buffer + left), - (void *) input, ilen); - } - - return 0; -} - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) -void mbedtls_md4_update(mbedtls_md4_context *ctx, - const unsigned char *input, - size_t ilen) -{ - mbedtls_md4_update_ret(ctx, input, ilen); -} -#endif - -static const unsigned char md4_padding[64] = -{ - 0x80, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, - 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, - 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, - 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 -}; - -/* - * MD4 final digest - */ -int mbedtls_md4_finish_ret(mbedtls_md4_context *ctx, - unsigned char output[16]) -{ - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - uint32_t last, padn; - uint32_t high, low; - unsigned char msglen[8]; - - high = (ctx->total[0] >> 29) - | (ctx->total[1] << 3); - low = (ctx->total[0] << 3); - - MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_LE(low, msglen, 0); - MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_LE(high, msglen, 4); - - last = ctx->total[0] & 0x3F; - padn = (last < 56) ? (56 - last) : (120 - last); - - ret = mbedtls_md4_update_ret(ctx, (unsigned char *) md4_padding, padn); - if (ret != 0) { - return ret; - } - - if ((ret = mbedtls_md4_update_ret(ctx, msglen, 8)) != 0) { - return ret; - } - - - MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_LE(ctx->state[0], output, 0); - MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_LE(ctx->state[1], output, 4); - MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_LE(ctx->state[2], output, 8); - MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_LE(ctx->state[3], output, 12); - - return 0; -} - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) -void mbedtls_md4_finish(mbedtls_md4_context *ctx, - unsigned char output[16]) -{ - mbedtls_md4_finish_ret(ctx, output); -} -#endif - -#endif /* !MBEDTLS_MD4_ALT */ - -/* - * output = MD4( input buffer ) - */ -int mbedtls_md4_ret(const unsigned char *input, - size_t ilen, - unsigned char output[16]) -{ - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - mbedtls_md4_context ctx; - - mbedtls_md4_init(&ctx); - - if ((ret = mbedtls_md4_starts_ret(&ctx)) != 0) { - goto exit; - } - - if ((ret = mbedtls_md4_update_ret(&ctx, input, ilen)) != 0) { - goto exit; - } - - if ((ret = mbedtls_md4_finish_ret(&ctx, output)) != 0) { - goto exit; - } - -exit: - mbedtls_md4_free(&ctx); - - return ret; -} - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) -void mbedtls_md4(const unsigned char *input, - size_t ilen, - unsigned char output[16]) -{ - mbedtls_md4_ret(input, ilen, output); -} -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) - -/* - * RFC 1320 test vectors - */ -static const unsigned char md4_test_str[7][81] = -{ - { "" }, - { "a" }, - { "abc" }, - { "message digest" }, - { "abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz" }, - { "ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789" }, - { "12345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890" } -}; - -static const size_t md4_test_strlen[7] = -{ - 0, 1, 3, 14, 26, 62, 80 -}; - -static const unsigned char md4_test_sum[7][16] = -{ - { 0x31, 0xD6, 0xCF, 0xE0, 0xD1, 0x6A, 0xE9, 0x31, - 0xB7, 0x3C, 0x59, 0xD7, 0xE0, 0xC0, 0x89, 0xC0 }, - { 0xBD, 0xE5, 0x2C, 0xB3, 0x1D, 0xE3, 0x3E, 0x46, - 0x24, 0x5E, 0x05, 0xFB, 0xDB, 0xD6, 0xFB, 0x24 }, - { 0xA4, 0x48, 0x01, 0x7A, 0xAF, 0x21, 0xD8, 0x52, - 0x5F, 0xC1, 0x0A, 0xE8, 0x7A, 0xA6, 0x72, 0x9D }, - { 0xD9, 0x13, 0x0A, 0x81, 0x64, 0x54, 0x9F, 0xE8, - 0x18, 0x87, 0x48, 0x06, 0xE1, 0xC7, 0x01, 0x4B }, - { 0xD7, 0x9E, 0x1C, 0x30, 0x8A, 0xA5, 0xBB, 0xCD, - 0xEE, 0xA8, 0xED, 0x63, 0xDF, 0x41, 0x2D, 0xA9 }, - { 0x04, 0x3F, 0x85, 0x82, 0xF2, 0x41, 0xDB, 0x35, - 0x1C, 0xE6, 0x27, 0xE1, 0x53, 0xE7, 0xF0, 0xE4 }, - { 0xE3, 0x3B, 0x4D, 0xDC, 0x9C, 0x38, 0xF2, 0x19, - 0x9C, 0x3E, 0x7B, 0x16, 0x4F, 0xCC, 0x05, 0x36 } -}; - -/* - * Checkup routine - */ -int mbedtls_md4_self_test(int verbose) -{ - int i, ret = 0; - unsigned char md4sum[16]; - - for (i = 0; i < 7; i++) { - if (verbose != 0) { - mbedtls_printf(" MD4 test #%d: ", i + 1); - } - - ret = mbedtls_md4_ret(md4_test_str[i], md4_test_strlen[i], md4sum); - if (ret != 0) { - goto fail; - } - - if (memcmp(md4sum, md4_test_sum[i], 16) != 0) { - ret = 1; - goto fail; - } - - if (verbose != 0) { - mbedtls_printf("passed\n"); - } - } - - if (verbose != 0) { - mbedtls_printf("\n"); - } - - return 0; - -fail: - if (verbose != 0) { - mbedtls_printf("failed\n"); - } - - return ret; -} - -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ - -#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD4_C */ diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/md5.c b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/md5.c index 4ad24fc8b1b1..e4a87a2e093d 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/md5.c +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/md5.c @@ -47,7 +47,7 @@ void mbedtls_md5_clone(mbedtls_md5_context *dst, /* * MD5 context setup */ -int mbedtls_md5_starts_ret(mbedtls_md5_context *ctx) +int mbedtls_md5_starts(mbedtls_md5_context *ctx) { ctx->total[0] = 0; ctx->total[1] = 0; @@ -60,13 +60,6 @@ int mbedtls_md5_starts_ret(mbedtls_md5_context *ctx) return 0; } -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) -void mbedtls_md5_starts(mbedtls_md5_context *ctx) -{ - mbedtls_md5_starts_ret(ctx); -} -#endif - #if !defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_PROCESS_ALT) int mbedtls_internal_md5_process(mbedtls_md5_context *ctx, const unsigned char data[64]) @@ -202,21 +195,14 @@ int mbedtls_internal_md5_process(mbedtls_md5_context *ctx, return 0; } -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) -void mbedtls_md5_process(mbedtls_md5_context *ctx, - const unsigned char data[64]) -{ - mbedtls_internal_md5_process(ctx, data); -} -#endif #endif /* !MBEDTLS_MD5_PROCESS_ALT */ /* * MD5 process buffer */ -int mbedtls_md5_update_ret(mbedtls_md5_context *ctx, - const unsigned char *input, - size_t ilen) +int mbedtls_md5_update(mbedtls_md5_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *input, + size_t ilen) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t fill; @@ -263,20 +249,11 @@ int mbedtls_md5_update_ret(mbedtls_md5_context *ctx, return 0; } -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) -void mbedtls_md5_update(mbedtls_md5_context *ctx, - const unsigned char *input, - size_t ilen) -{ - mbedtls_md5_update_ret(ctx, input, ilen); -} -#endif - /* * MD5 final digest */ -int mbedtls_md5_finish_ret(mbedtls_md5_context *ctx, - unsigned char output[16]) +int mbedtls_md5_finish(mbedtls_md5_context *ctx, + unsigned char output[16]) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; uint32_t used; @@ -297,7 +274,7 @@ int mbedtls_md5_finish_ret(mbedtls_md5_context *ctx, memset(ctx->buffer + used, 0, 64 - used); if ((ret = mbedtls_internal_md5_process(ctx, ctx->buffer)) != 0) { - return ret; + goto exit; } memset(ctx->buffer, 0, 56); @@ -314,7 +291,7 @@ int mbedtls_md5_finish_ret(mbedtls_md5_context *ctx, MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_LE(high, ctx->buffer, 60); if ((ret = mbedtls_internal_md5_process(ctx, ctx->buffer)) != 0) { - return ret; + goto exit; } /* @@ -325,40 +302,36 @@ int mbedtls_md5_finish_ret(mbedtls_md5_context *ctx, MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_LE(ctx->state[2], output, 8); MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_LE(ctx->state[3], output, 12); - return 0; -} + ret = 0; -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) -void mbedtls_md5_finish(mbedtls_md5_context *ctx, - unsigned char output[16]) -{ - mbedtls_md5_finish_ret(ctx, output); +exit: + mbedtls_md5_free(ctx); + return ret; } -#endif #endif /* !MBEDTLS_MD5_ALT */ /* * output = MD5( input buffer ) */ -int mbedtls_md5_ret(const unsigned char *input, - size_t ilen, - unsigned char output[16]) +int mbedtls_md5(const unsigned char *input, + size_t ilen, + unsigned char output[16]) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; mbedtls_md5_context ctx; mbedtls_md5_init(&ctx); - if ((ret = mbedtls_md5_starts_ret(&ctx)) != 0) { + if ((ret = mbedtls_md5_starts(&ctx)) != 0) { goto exit; } - if ((ret = mbedtls_md5_update_ret(&ctx, input, ilen)) != 0) { + if ((ret = mbedtls_md5_update(&ctx, input, ilen)) != 0) { goto exit; } - if ((ret = mbedtls_md5_finish_ret(&ctx, output)) != 0) { + if ((ret = mbedtls_md5_finish(&ctx, output)) != 0) { goto exit; } @@ -368,15 +341,6 @@ int mbedtls_md5_ret(const unsigned char *input, return ret; } -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) -void mbedtls_md5(const unsigned char *input, - size_t ilen, - unsigned char output[16]) -{ - mbedtls_md5_ret(input, ilen, output); -} -#endif - #if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) /* * RFC 1321 test vectors @@ -428,7 +392,7 @@ int mbedtls_md5_self_test(int verbose) mbedtls_printf(" MD5 test #%d: ", i + 1); } - ret = mbedtls_md5_ret(md5_test_buf[i], md5_test_buflen[i], md5sum); + ret = mbedtls_md5(md5_test_buf[i], md5_test_buflen[i], md5sum); if (ret != 0) { goto fail; } diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/md_psa.h b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/md_psa.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..028ba2409cd5 --- /dev/null +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/md_psa.h @@ -0,0 +1,26 @@ +/** + * Translation between MD and PSA identifiers (algorithms, errors). + * + * Note: this internal module will go away when everything becomes based on + * PSA Crypto; it is a helper for the transition period. + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ +#ifndef MBEDTLS_MD_PSA_H +#define MBEDTLS_MD_PSA_H + +#include "common.h" + +#include "mbedtls/md.h" +#include "psa/crypto.h" + +/** Convert PSA status to MD error code. + * + * \param status PSA status. + * + * \return The corresponding MD error code, + */ +int mbedtls_md_error_from_psa(psa_status_t status); + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_PSA_H */ diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/md_wrap.h b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/md_wrap.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..dad123540a1d --- /dev/null +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/md_wrap.h @@ -0,0 +1,46 @@ +/** + * \file md_wrap.h + * + * \brief Message digest wrappers. + * + * \warning This in an internal header. Do not include directly. + * + * \author Adriaan de Jong + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ +#ifndef MBEDTLS_MD_WRAP_H +#define MBEDTLS_MD_WRAP_H + +#include "mbedtls/build_info.h" + +#include "mbedtls/md.h" + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +/** + * Message digest information. + * Allows message digest functions to be called in a generic way. + */ +struct mbedtls_md_info_t { + /** Digest identifier */ + mbedtls_md_type_t type; + + /** Output length of the digest function in bytes */ + unsigned char size; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_C) + /** Block length of the digest function in bytes */ + unsigned char block_size; +#endif +}; + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_WRAP_H */ diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/memory_buffer_alloc.c b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/memory_buffer_alloc.c index d6a47ba93da9..79b0a8b8fa97 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/memory_buffer_alloc.c +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/memory_buffer_alloc.c @@ -508,6 +508,12 @@ void mbedtls_memory_buffer_alloc_status(void) } } +void mbedtls_memory_buffer_alloc_count_get(size_t *alloc_count, size_t *free_count) +{ + *alloc_count = heap.alloc_count; + *free_count = heap.free_count; +} + void mbedtls_memory_buffer_alloc_max_get(size_t *max_used, size_t *max_blocks) { *max_used = heap.maximum_used; diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/mps_common.h b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/mps_common.h index a41eb9aa6728..f9fe09988042 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/mps_common.h +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/mps_common.h @@ -155,7 +155,7 @@ * */ typedef size_t mbedtls_mps_stored_size_t; -#define MBEDTLS_MPS_STORED_SIZE_MAX ((mbedtls_mps_stored_size_t) -1) +#define MBEDTLS_MPS_STORED_SIZE_MAX (SIZE_MAX) /** \brief The type of buffer sizes and offsets used in the MPS API * and implementation. @@ -169,7 +169,7 @@ typedef size_t mbedtls_mps_stored_size_t; * so almost 10%. */ typedef size_t mbedtls_mps_size_t; -#define MBEDTLS_MPS_SIZE_MAX ((mbedtls_mps_size_t) -1) +#define MBEDTLS_MPS_SIZE_MAX (SIZE_MAX) #if MBEDTLS_MPS_STORED_SIZE_MAX > MBEDTLS_MPS_SIZE_MAX #error "Misconfiguration of mbedtls_mps_size_t and mbedtls_mps_stored_size_t." diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/mps_reader.c b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/mps_reader.c index 36ca070e39ea..27d0c04c1080 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/mps_reader.c +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/mps_reader.c @@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ #include "common.h" -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) #include "mps_reader.h" #include "mps_common.h" @@ -535,4 +535,4 @@ int mbedtls_mps_reader_reclaim(mbedtls_mps_reader *rd, MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_RETURN(0); } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 */ diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/mps_trace.c b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/mps_trace.c index 4f580d71ca83..69f6e5a0f950 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/mps_trace.c +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/mps_trace.c @@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ #include "common.h" -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) #include "mps_common.h" @@ -109,4 +109,4 @@ void mbedtls_mps_trace_indent(int level, mbedtls_mps_trace_type ty) } #endif /* MBEDTLS_MPS_ENABLE_TRACE */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 */ diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/net_sockets.c b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/net_sockets.c index 5d985ef00119..edec5876ad8a 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/net_sockets.c +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/net_sockets.c @@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ */ /* Enable definition of getaddrinfo() even when compiling with -std=c99. Must - * be set before config.h, which pulls in glibc's features.h indirectly. + * be set before mbedtls_config.h, which pulls in glibc's features.h indirectly. * Harmless on other platforms. */ #ifndef _POSIX_C_SOURCE #define _POSIX_C_SOURCE 200112L @@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ #if !defined(unix) && !defined(__unix__) && !defined(__unix) && \ !defined(__APPLE__) && !defined(_WIN32) && !defined(__QNXNTO__) && \ !defined(__HAIKU__) && !defined(__midipix__) -#error "This module only works on Unix and Windows, see MBEDTLS_NET_C in config.h" +#error "This module only works on Unix and Windows, see MBEDTLS_NET_C in mbedtls_config.h" #endif #include "mbedtls/platform.h" @@ -37,11 +37,6 @@ #define IS_EINTR(ret) ((ret) == WSAEINTR) -#if !defined(_WIN32_WINNT) -/* Enables getaddrinfo() & Co */ -#define _WIN32_WINNT 0x0501 -#endif - #include #include diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/nist_kw.c b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/nist_kw.c index 5a5b995c1674..f15425b8bd63 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/nist_kw.c +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/nist_kw.c @@ -64,7 +64,7 @@ int mbedtls_nist_kw_setkey(mbedtls_nist_kw_context *ctx, return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } - if (cipher_info->block_size != 16) { + if (mbedtls_cipher_info_get_block_size(cipher_info) != 16) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } @@ -322,9 +322,9 @@ int mbedtls_nist_kw_unwrap(mbedtls_nist_kw_context *ctx, unsigned char *output, size_t *out_len, size_t out_size) { int ret = 0; - size_t i, olen; + size_t olen; unsigned char A[KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH]; - unsigned char diff; + int diff; *out_len = 0; if (out_size < in_len - KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH) { @@ -409,14 +409,15 @@ int mbedtls_nist_kw_unwrap(mbedtls_nist_kw_context *ctx, * larger than 8, because of the type wrap around. */ padlen = in_len - KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH - Plen; - ret = -(int) mbedtls_ct_uint_if(padlen & ~7, -MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_AUTH_FAILED, -ret); + ret = mbedtls_ct_error_if(mbedtls_ct_uint_gt(padlen, 7), + MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_AUTH_FAILED, ret); padlen &= 7; /* Check padding in "constant-time" */ - for (diff = 0, i = 0; i < KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH; i++) { - size_t mask = mbedtls_ct_size_mask_ge(i, KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH - padlen); - diff |= (unsigned char) (mask & output[*out_len - KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH + i]); - } + const uint8_t zero[KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH] = { 0 }; + diff = mbedtls_ct_memcmp_partial( + &output[*out_len - KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH], zero, + KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH, KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH - padlen, 0); if (diff != 0) { ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_AUTH_FAILED; @@ -448,17 +449,22 @@ int mbedtls_nist_kw_unwrap(mbedtls_nist_kw_context *ctx, #if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) && defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) -#define KW_TESTS 3 - /* * Test vectors taken from NIST * https://csrc.nist.gov/Projects/Cryptographic-Algorithm-Validation-Program/CAVP-TESTING-BLOCK-CIPHER-MODES#KW */ -static const unsigned int key_len[KW_TESTS] = { 16, 24, 32 }; +static const unsigned int key_len[] = { + 16, +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH) + 24, + 32 +#endif +}; -static const unsigned char kw_key[KW_TESTS][32] = { +static const unsigned char kw_key[][32] = { { 0x75, 0x75, 0xda, 0x3a, 0x93, 0x60, 0x7c, 0xc2, 0xbf, 0xd8, 0xce, 0xc7, 0xaa, 0xdf, 0xd9, 0xa6 }, +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH) { 0x2d, 0x85, 0x26, 0x08, 0x1d, 0x02, 0xfb, 0x5b, 0x85, 0xf6, 0x9a, 0xc2, 0x86, 0xec, 0xd5, 0x7d, 0x40, 0xdf, 0x5d, 0xf3, 0x49, 0x47, 0x44, 0xd3 }, @@ -466,11 +472,13 @@ static const unsigned char kw_key[KW_TESTS][32] = { 0x4a, 0x98, 0x48, 0xd3, 0x0f, 0xdd, 0x78, 0x33, 0x5b, 0x03, 0x9a, 0x48, 0xa8, 0x96, 0x2c, 0x4d, 0x1c, 0xb7, 0x8e, 0xab, 0xd5, 0xda, 0xd7, 0x88 } +#endif }; -static const unsigned char kw_msg[KW_TESTS][40] = { +static const unsigned char kw_msg[][40] = { { 0x42, 0x13, 0x6d, 0x3c, 0x38, 0x4a, 0x3e, 0xea, 0xc9, 0x5a, 0x06, 0x6f, 0xd2, 0x8f, 0xed, 0x3f }, +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH) { 0x95, 0xc1, 0x1b, 0xf5, 0x35, 0x3a, 0xfe, 0xdb, 0x98, 0xfd, 0xd6, 0xc8, 0xca, 0x6f, 0xdb, 0x6d, 0xa5, 0x4b, 0x74, 0xb4, 0x99, 0x0f, 0xdc, 0x45, @@ -479,14 +487,28 @@ static const unsigned char kw_msg[KW_TESTS][40] = { { 0x1b, 0x20, 0xbf, 0x19, 0x90, 0xb0, 0x65, 0xd7, 0x98, 0xe1, 0xb3, 0x22, 0x64, 0xad, 0x50, 0xa8, 0x74, 0x74, 0x92, 0xba, 0x09, 0xa0, 0x4d, 0xd1 } +#endif }; -static const size_t kw_msg_len[KW_TESTS] = { 16, 40, 24 }; -static const size_t kw_out_len[KW_TESTS] = { 24, 48, 32 }; -static const unsigned char kw_res[KW_TESTS][48] = { +static const size_t kw_msg_len[] = { + 16, +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH) + 40, + 24 +#endif +}; +static const size_t kw_out_len[] = { + 24, +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH) + 48, + 32 +#endif +}; +static const unsigned char kw_res[][48] = { { 0x03, 0x1f, 0x6b, 0xd7, 0xe6, 0x1e, 0x64, 0x3d, 0xf6, 0x85, 0x94, 0x81, 0x6f, 0x64, 0xca, 0xa3, 0xf5, 0x6f, 0xab, 0xea, 0x25, 0x48, 0xf5, 0xfb }, +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH) { 0x44, 0x3c, 0x6f, 0x15, 0x09, 0x83, 0x71, 0x91, 0x3e, 0x5c, 0x81, 0x4c, 0xa1, 0xa0, 0x42, 0xec, 0x68, 0x2f, 0x7b, 0x13, 0x6d, 0x24, 0x3a, 0x4d, @@ -497,11 +519,13 @@ static const unsigned char kw_res[KW_TESTS][48] = { 0xd5, 0xd5, 0x40, 0xec, 0x25, 0xd4, 0x3d, 0x87, 0x20, 0x0f, 0xda, 0xdc, 0x6d, 0x1f, 0x05, 0xd9, 0x16, 0x58, 0x4f, 0xa9, 0xf6, 0xcb, 0xf5, 0x12 } +#endif }; -static const unsigned char kwp_key[KW_TESTS][32] = { +static const unsigned char kwp_key[][32] = { { 0x78, 0x65, 0xe2, 0x0f, 0x3c, 0x21, 0x65, 0x9a, 0xb4, 0x69, 0x0b, 0x62, 0x9c, 0xdf, 0x3c, 0xc4 }, +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH) { 0xf5, 0xf8, 0x96, 0xa3, 0xbd, 0x2f, 0x4a, 0x98, 0x23, 0xef, 0x16, 0x2b, 0x00, 0xb8, 0x05, 0xd7, 0xde, 0x1e, 0xa4, 0x66, 0x26, 0x96, 0xa2, 0x58 }, @@ -509,23 +533,33 @@ static const unsigned char kwp_key[KW_TESTS][32] = { 0x25, 0x54, 0xee, 0x2a, 0x8d, 0xf1, 0x38, 0x6f, 0x5b, 0x94, 0xa1, 0xa6, 0x0e, 0xd8, 0xa4, 0xae, 0xf6, 0x0a, 0x8d, 0x61, 0xab, 0x5f, 0x22, 0x5a } +#endif }; -static const unsigned char kwp_msg[KW_TESTS][31] = { +static const unsigned char kwp_msg[][31] = { { 0xbd, 0x68, 0x43, 0xd4, 0x20, 0x37, 0x8d, 0xc8, 0x96 }, +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH) { 0x6c, 0xcd, 0xd5, 0x85, 0x18, 0x40, 0x97, 0xeb, 0xd5, 0xc3, 0xaf, 0x3e, 0x47, 0xd0, 0x2c, 0x19, 0x14, 0x7b, 0x4d, 0x99, 0x5f, 0x96, 0x43, 0x66, 0x91, 0x56, 0x75, 0x8c, 0x13, 0x16, 0x8f }, { 0xd1 } +#endif +}; +static const size_t kwp_msg_len[] = { + 9, +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH) + 31, + 1 +#endif }; -static const size_t kwp_msg_len[KW_TESTS] = { 9, 31, 1 }; -static const unsigned char kwp_res[KW_TESTS][48] = { +static const unsigned char kwp_res[][48] = { { 0x41, 0xec, 0xa9, 0x56, 0xd4, 0xaa, 0x04, 0x7e, 0xb5, 0xcf, 0x4e, 0xfe, 0x65, 0x96, 0x61, 0xe7, 0x4d, 0xb6, 0xf8, 0xc5, 0x64, 0xe2, 0x35, 0x00 }, +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH) { 0x4e, 0x9b, 0xc2, 0xbc, 0xbc, 0x6c, 0x1e, 0x13, 0xd3, 0x35, 0xbc, 0xc0, 0xf7, 0x73, 0x6a, 0x88, 0xfa, 0x87, 0x53, 0x66, 0x15, 0xbb, 0x8e, 0x63, @@ -533,8 +567,15 @@ static const unsigned char kwp_res[KW_TESTS][48] = { 0x67, 0xcf, 0xa9, 0x8a, 0x9d, 0x0e, 0x33, 0x26 }, { 0x06, 0xba, 0x7a, 0xe6, 0xf3, 0x24, 0x8c, 0xfd, 0xcf, 0x26, 0x75, 0x07, 0xfa, 0x00, 0x1b, 0xc4 } +#endif +}; +static const size_t kwp_out_len[] = { + 24, +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH) + 40, + 16 +#endif }; -static const size_t kwp_out_len[KW_TESTS] = { 24, 40, 16 }; int mbedtls_nist_kw_self_test(int verbose) { @@ -545,114 +586,128 @@ int mbedtls_nist_kw_self_test(int verbose) int ret = 0; mbedtls_nist_kw_init(&ctx); - for (i = 0; i < KW_TESTS; i++) { - if (verbose != 0) { - mbedtls_printf(" KW-AES-%u ", (unsigned int) key_len[i] * 8); - } + /* + * KW mode + */ + { + static const int num_tests = sizeof(kw_key) / sizeof(*kw_key); - ret = mbedtls_nist_kw_setkey(&ctx, MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES, - kw_key[i], key_len[i] * 8, 1); - if (ret != 0) { + for (i = 0; i < num_tests; i++) { if (verbose != 0) { - mbedtls_printf(" KW: setup failed "); + mbedtls_printf(" KW-AES-%u ", (unsigned int) key_len[i] * 8); } - goto end; - } + ret = mbedtls_nist_kw_setkey(&ctx, MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES, + kw_key[i], key_len[i] * 8, 1); + if (ret != 0) { + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf(" KW: setup failed "); + } - ret = mbedtls_nist_kw_wrap(&ctx, MBEDTLS_KW_MODE_KW, kw_msg[i], - kw_msg_len[i], out, &olen, sizeof(out)); - if (ret != 0 || kw_out_len[i] != olen || - memcmp(out, kw_res[i], kw_out_len[i]) != 0) { - if (verbose != 0) { - mbedtls_printf("failed. "); + goto end; } - ret = 1; - goto end; - } + ret = mbedtls_nist_kw_wrap(&ctx, MBEDTLS_KW_MODE_KW, kw_msg[i], + kw_msg_len[i], out, &olen, sizeof(out)); + if (ret != 0 || kw_out_len[i] != olen || + memcmp(out, kw_res[i], kw_out_len[i]) != 0) { + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf("failed. "); + } - if ((ret = mbedtls_nist_kw_setkey(&ctx, MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES, - kw_key[i], key_len[i] * 8, 0)) - != 0) { - if (verbose != 0) { - mbedtls_printf(" KW: setup failed "); + ret = 1; + goto end; } - goto end; - } - - ret = mbedtls_nist_kw_unwrap(&ctx, MBEDTLS_KW_MODE_KW, - out, olen, out, &olen, sizeof(out)); + if ((ret = mbedtls_nist_kw_setkey(&ctx, MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES, + kw_key[i], key_len[i] * 8, 0)) + != 0) { + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf(" KW: setup failed "); + } - if (ret != 0 || olen != kw_msg_len[i] || - memcmp(out, kw_msg[i], kw_msg_len[i]) != 0) { - if (verbose != 0) { - mbedtls_printf("failed\n"); + goto end; } - ret = 1; - goto end; - } + ret = mbedtls_nist_kw_unwrap(&ctx, MBEDTLS_KW_MODE_KW, + out, olen, out, &olen, sizeof(out)); - if (verbose != 0) { - mbedtls_printf(" passed\n"); - } - } + if (ret != 0 || olen != kw_msg_len[i] || + memcmp(out, kw_msg[i], kw_msg_len[i]) != 0) { + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf("failed\n"); + } - for (i = 0; i < KW_TESTS; i++) { - olen = sizeof(out); - if (verbose != 0) { - mbedtls_printf(" KWP-AES-%u ", (unsigned int) key_len[i] * 8); - } + ret = 1; + goto end; + } - ret = mbedtls_nist_kw_setkey(&ctx, MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES, kwp_key[i], - key_len[i] * 8, 1); - if (ret != 0) { if (verbose != 0) { - mbedtls_printf(" KWP: setup failed "); + mbedtls_printf(" passed\n"); } - - goto end; } - ret = mbedtls_nist_kw_wrap(&ctx, MBEDTLS_KW_MODE_KWP, kwp_msg[i], - kwp_msg_len[i], out, &olen, sizeof(out)); + } + + /* + * KWP mode + */ + { + static const int num_tests = sizeof(kwp_key) / sizeof(*kwp_key); - if (ret != 0 || kwp_out_len[i] != olen || - memcmp(out, kwp_res[i], kwp_out_len[i]) != 0) { + for (i = 0; i < num_tests; i++) { + olen = sizeof(out); if (verbose != 0) { - mbedtls_printf("failed. "); + mbedtls_printf(" KWP-AES-%u ", (unsigned int) key_len[i] * 8); } - ret = 1; - goto end; - } + ret = mbedtls_nist_kw_setkey(&ctx, MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES, kwp_key[i], + key_len[i] * 8, 1); + if (ret != 0) { + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf(" KWP: setup failed "); + } - if ((ret = mbedtls_nist_kw_setkey(&ctx, MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES, - kwp_key[i], key_len[i] * 8, 0)) - != 0) { - if (verbose != 0) { - mbedtls_printf(" KWP: setup failed "); + goto end; } + ret = mbedtls_nist_kw_wrap(&ctx, MBEDTLS_KW_MODE_KWP, kwp_msg[i], + kwp_msg_len[i], out, &olen, sizeof(out)); - goto end; - } + if (ret != 0 || kwp_out_len[i] != olen || + memcmp(out, kwp_res[i], kwp_out_len[i]) != 0) { + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf("failed. "); + } - ret = mbedtls_nist_kw_unwrap(&ctx, MBEDTLS_KW_MODE_KWP, out, - olen, out, &olen, sizeof(out)); + ret = 1; + goto end; + } - if (ret != 0 || olen != kwp_msg_len[i] || - memcmp(out, kwp_msg[i], kwp_msg_len[i]) != 0) { - if (verbose != 0) { - mbedtls_printf("failed. "); + if ((ret = mbedtls_nist_kw_setkey(&ctx, MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES, + kwp_key[i], key_len[i] * 8, 0)) + != 0) { + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf(" KWP: setup failed "); + } + + goto end; } - ret = 1; - goto end; - } + ret = mbedtls_nist_kw_unwrap(&ctx, MBEDTLS_KW_MODE_KWP, out, + olen, out, &olen, sizeof(out)); + + if (ret != 0 || olen != kwp_msg_len[i] || + memcmp(out, kwp_msg[i], kwp_msg_len[i]) != 0) { + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf("failed. "); + } + + ret = 1; + goto end; + } - if (verbose != 0) { - mbedtls_printf(" passed\n"); + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf(" passed\n"); + } } } end: diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/oid.c b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/oid.c index 7d7f1bfdaecf..1d6b1eb866b9 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/oid.c +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/oid.c @@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ #include "mbedtls/oid.h" #include "mbedtls/rsa.h" #include "mbedtls/error.h" +#include "mbedtls/pk.h" #include #include @@ -25,6 +26,17 @@ */ #define ADD_LEN(s) s, MBEDTLS_OID_SIZE(s) +/* + * Macro to generate mbedtls_oid_descriptor_t + */ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_REMOVE_INFO) +#define OID_DESCRIPTOR(s, name, description) { ADD_LEN(s), name, description } +#define NULL_OID_DESCRIPTOR { NULL, 0, NULL, NULL } +#else +#define OID_DESCRIPTOR(s, name, description) { ADD_LEN(s) } +#define NULL_OID_DESCRIPTOR { NULL, 0 } +#endif + /* * Macro to generate an internal function for oid_XXX_from_asn1() (used by * the other functions) @@ -48,6 +60,7 @@ return NULL; \ } +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_REMOVE_INFO) /* * Macro to generate a function for retrieving a single attribute from the * descriptor of an mbedtls_oid_descriptor_t wrapper. @@ -60,6 +73,7 @@ *ATTR1 = data->descriptor.ATTR1; \ return 0; \ } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_REMOVE_INFO */ /* * Macro to generate a function for retrieving a single attribute from an @@ -141,88 +155,102 @@ typedef struct { static const oid_x520_attr_t oid_x520_attr_type[] = { { - { ADD_LEN(MBEDTLS_OID_AT_CN), "id-at-commonName", "Common Name" }, + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_AT_CN, "id-at-commonName", "Common Name"), "CN", }, { - { ADD_LEN(MBEDTLS_OID_AT_COUNTRY), "id-at-countryName", "Country" }, + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_AT_COUNTRY, "id-at-countryName", "Country"), "C", }, { - { ADD_LEN(MBEDTLS_OID_AT_LOCALITY), "id-at-locality", "Locality" }, + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_AT_LOCALITY, "id-at-locality", "Locality"), "L", }, { - { ADD_LEN(MBEDTLS_OID_AT_STATE), "id-at-state", "State" }, + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_AT_STATE, "id-at-state", "State"), "ST", }, { - { ADD_LEN(MBEDTLS_OID_AT_ORGANIZATION), "id-at-organizationName", "Organization" }, + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_AT_ORGANIZATION, "id-at-organizationName", + "Organization"), "O", }, { - { ADD_LEN(MBEDTLS_OID_AT_ORG_UNIT), "id-at-organizationalUnitName", "Org Unit" }, + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_AT_ORG_UNIT, "id-at-organizationalUnitName", "Org Unit"), "OU", }, { - { ADD_LEN(MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS9_EMAIL), "emailAddress", "E-mail address" }, + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS9_EMAIL, + "emailAddress", + "E-mail address"), "emailAddress", }, { - { ADD_LEN(MBEDTLS_OID_AT_SERIAL_NUMBER), "id-at-serialNumber", "Serial number" }, + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_AT_SERIAL_NUMBER, + "id-at-serialNumber", + "Serial number"), "serialNumber", }, { - { ADD_LEN(MBEDTLS_OID_AT_POSTAL_ADDRESS), "id-at-postalAddress", - "Postal address" }, + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_AT_POSTAL_ADDRESS, + "id-at-postalAddress", + "Postal address"), "postalAddress", }, { - { ADD_LEN(MBEDTLS_OID_AT_POSTAL_CODE), "id-at-postalCode", "Postal code" }, + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_AT_POSTAL_CODE, "id-at-postalCode", "Postal code"), "postalCode", }, { - { ADD_LEN(MBEDTLS_OID_AT_SUR_NAME), "id-at-surName", "Surname" }, + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_AT_SUR_NAME, "id-at-surName", "Surname"), "SN", }, { - { ADD_LEN(MBEDTLS_OID_AT_GIVEN_NAME), "id-at-givenName", "Given name" }, + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_AT_GIVEN_NAME, "id-at-givenName", "Given name"), "GN", }, { - { ADD_LEN(MBEDTLS_OID_AT_INITIALS), "id-at-initials", "Initials" }, + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_AT_INITIALS, "id-at-initials", "Initials"), "initials", }, { - { ADD_LEN(MBEDTLS_OID_AT_GENERATION_QUALIFIER), "id-at-generationQualifier", - "Generation qualifier" }, + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_AT_GENERATION_QUALIFIER, + "id-at-generationQualifier", + "Generation qualifier"), "generationQualifier", }, { - { ADD_LEN(MBEDTLS_OID_AT_TITLE), "id-at-title", "Title" }, + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_AT_TITLE, "id-at-title", "Title"), "title", }, { - { ADD_LEN(MBEDTLS_OID_AT_DN_QUALIFIER), "id-at-dnQualifier", - "Distinguished Name qualifier" }, + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_AT_DN_QUALIFIER, + "id-at-dnQualifier", + "Distinguished Name qualifier"), "dnQualifier", }, { - { ADD_LEN(MBEDTLS_OID_AT_PSEUDONYM), "id-at-pseudonym", "Pseudonym" }, + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_AT_PSEUDONYM, "id-at-pseudonym", "Pseudonym"), "pseudonym", }, { - { ADD_LEN(MBEDTLS_OID_DOMAIN_COMPONENT), "id-domainComponent", - "Domain component" }, + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_UID, "id-uid", "User Id"), + "uid", + }, + { + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_DOMAIN_COMPONENT, + "id-domainComponent", + "Domain component"), "DC", }, { - { ADD_LEN(MBEDTLS_OID_AT_UNIQUE_IDENTIFIER), "id-at-uniqueIdentifier", - "Unique Identifier" }, + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_AT_UNIQUE_IDENTIFIER, + "id-at-uniqueIdentifier", + "Unique Identifier"), "uniqueIdentifier", }, { - { NULL, 0, NULL, NULL }, + NULL_OID_DESCRIPTOR, NULL, } }; @@ -245,36 +273,53 @@ typedef struct { static const oid_x509_ext_t oid_x509_ext[] = { { - { ADD_LEN(MBEDTLS_OID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS), "id-ce-basicConstraints", - "Basic Constraints" }, + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS, + "id-ce-basicConstraints", + "Basic Constraints"), MBEDTLS_OID_X509_EXT_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS, }, { - { ADD_LEN(MBEDTLS_OID_KEY_USAGE), "id-ce-keyUsage", "Key Usage" }, + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_KEY_USAGE, "id-ce-keyUsage", "Key Usage"), MBEDTLS_OID_X509_EXT_KEY_USAGE, }, { - { ADD_LEN(MBEDTLS_OID_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE), "id-ce-extKeyUsage", - "Extended Key Usage" }, + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE, + "id-ce-extKeyUsage", + "Extended Key Usage"), MBEDTLS_OID_X509_EXT_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE, }, { - { ADD_LEN(MBEDTLS_OID_SUBJECT_ALT_NAME), "id-ce-subjectAltName", - "Subject Alt Name" }, + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_SUBJECT_ALT_NAME, + "id-ce-subjectAltName", + "Subject Alt Name"), MBEDTLS_OID_X509_EXT_SUBJECT_ALT_NAME, }, { - { ADD_LEN(MBEDTLS_OID_NS_CERT_TYPE), "id-netscape-certtype", - "Netscape Certificate Type" }, + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_NS_CERT_TYPE, + "id-netscape-certtype", + "Netscape Certificate Type"), MBEDTLS_OID_X509_EXT_NS_CERT_TYPE, }, { - { ADD_LEN(MBEDTLS_OID_CERTIFICATE_POLICIES), "id-ce-certificatePolicies", - "Certificate Policies" }, + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_CERTIFICATE_POLICIES, + "id-ce-certificatePolicies", + "Certificate Policies"), MBEDTLS_OID_X509_EXT_CERTIFICATE_POLICIES, }, { - { NULL, 0, NULL, NULL }, + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_SUBJECT_KEY_IDENTIFIER, + "id-ce-subjectKeyIdentifier", + "Subject Key Identifier"), + MBEDTLS_OID_X509_EXT_SUBJECT_KEY_IDENTIFIER, + }, + { + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_AUTHORITY_KEY_IDENTIFIER, + "id-ce-authorityKeyIdentifier", + "Authority Key Identifier"), + MBEDTLS_OID_X509_EXT_AUTHORITY_KEY_IDENTIFIER, + }, + { + NULL_OID_DESCRIPTOR, 0, }, }; @@ -282,19 +327,23 @@ static const oid_x509_ext_t oid_x509_ext[] = FN_OID_TYPED_FROM_ASN1(oid_x509_ext_t, x509_ext, oid_x509_ext) FN_OID_GET_ATTR1(mbedtls_oid_get_x509_ext_type, oid_x509_ext_t, x509_ext, int, ext_type) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_REMOVE_INFO) static const mbedtls_oid_descriptor_t oid_ext_key_usage[] = { - { ADD_LEN(MBEDTLS_OID_SERVER_AUTH), "id-kp-serverAuth", - "TLS Web Server Authentication" }, - { ADD_LEN(MBEDTLS_OID_CLIENT_AUTH), "id-kp-clientAuth", - "TLS Web Client Authentication" }, - { ADD_LEN(MBEDTLS_OID_CODE_SIGNING), "id-kp-codeSigning", "Code Signing" }, - { ADD_LEN(MBEDTLS_OID_EMAIL_PROTECTION), "id-kp-emailProtection", "E-mail Protection" }, - { ADD_LEN(MBEDTLS_OID_TIME_STAMPING), "id-kp-timeStamping", "Time Stamping" }, - { ADD_LEN(MBEDTLS_OID_OCSP_SIGNING), "id-kp-OCSPSigning", "OCSP Signing" }, - { ADD_LEN(MBEDTLS_OID_WISUN_FAN), "id-kp-wisun-fan-device", - "Wi-SUN Alliance Field Area Network (FAN)" }, - { NULL, 0, NULL, NULL }, + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_SERVER_AUTH, + "id-kp-serverAuth", + "TLS Web Server Authentication"), + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_CLIENT_AUTH, + "id-kp-clientAuth", + "TLS Web Client Authentication"), + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_CODE_SIGNING, "id-kp-codeSigning", "Code Signing"), + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_EMAIL_PROTECTION, "id-kp-emailProtection", "E-mail Protection"), + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_TIME_STAMPING, "id-kp-timeStamping", "Time Stamping"), + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_OCSP_SIGNING, "id-kp-OCSPSigning", "OCSP Signing"), + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_WISUN_FAN, + "id-kp-wisun-fan-device", + "Wi-SUN Alliance Field Area Network (FAN)"), + NULL_OID_DESCRIPTOR, }; FN_OID_TYPED_FROM_ASN1(mbedtls_oid_descriptor_t, ext_key_usage, oid_ext_key_usage) @@ -306,8 +355,8 @@ FN_OID_GET_ATTR1(mbedtls_oid_get_extended_key_usage, static const mbedtls_oid_descriptor_t oid_certificate_policies[] = { - { ADD_LEN(MBEDTLS_OID_ANY_POLICY), "anyPolicy", "Any Policy" }, - { NULL, 0, NULL, NULL }, + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_ANY_POLICY, "anyPolicy", "Any Policy"), + NULL_OID_DESCRIPTOR, }; FN_OID_TYPED_FROM_ASN1(mbedtls_oid_descriptor_t, certificate_policies, oid_certificate_policies) @@ -316,8 +365,8 @@ FN_OID_GET_ATTR1(mbedtls_oid_get_certificate_policies, certificate_policies, const char *, description) +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_REMOVE_INFO */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_C) /* * For SignatureAlgorithmIdentifier */ @@ -330,103 +379,107 @@ typedef struct { static const oid_sig_alg_t oid_sig_alg[] = { #if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD2_C) - { - { ADD_LEN(MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1_MD2), "md2WithRSAEncryption", "RSA with MD2" }, - MBEDTLS_MD_MD2, MBEDTLS_PK_RSA, - }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD2_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD4_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_MD5) { - { ADD_LEN(MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1_MD4), "md4WithRSAEncryption", "RSA with MD4" }, - MBEDTLS_MD_MD4, MBEDTLS_PK_RSA, - }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD4_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C) - { - { ADD_LEN(MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1_MD5), "md5WithRSAEncryption", "RSA with MD5" }, + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1_MD5, "md5WithRSAEncryption", "RSA with MD5"), MBEDTLS_MD_MD5, MBEDTLS_PK_RSA, }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD5_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_MD5 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1) { - { ADD_LEN(MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1_SHA1), "sha-1WithRSAEncryption", "RSA with SHA1" }, + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1_SHA1, "sha-1WithRSAEncryption", "RSA with SHA1"), MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_PK_RSA, }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA224) { - { ADD_LEN(MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1_SHA224), "sha224WithRSAEncryption", "RSA with SHA-224" }, + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1_SHA224, "sha224WithRSAEncryption", + "RSA with SHA-224"), MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224, MBEDTLS_PK_RSA, }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA224 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) { - { ADD_LEN(MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1_SHA256), "sha256WithRSAEncryption", "RSA with SHA-256" }, + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1_SHA256, "sha256WithRSAEncryption", + "RSA with SHA-256"), MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_PK_RSA, }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) { - { ADD_LEN(MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1_SHA384), "sha384WithRSAEncryption", "RSA with SHA-384" }, + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1_SHA384, "sha384WithRSAEncryption", + "RSA with SHA-384"), MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_PK_RSA, }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA512) { - { ADD_LEN(MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1_SHA512), "sha512WithRSAEncryption", "RSA with SHA-512" }, + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1_SHA512, "sha512WithRSAEncryption", + "RSA with SHA-512"), MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512, MBEDTLS_PK_RSA, }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA512 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1) { - { ADD_LEN(MBEDTLS_OID_RSA_SHA_OBS), "sha-1WithRSAEncryption", "RSA with SHA1" }, + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_RSA_SHA_OBS, "sha-1WithRSAEncryption", "RSA with SHA1"), MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_PK_RSA, }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1 */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SOME) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1) { - { ADD_LEN(MBEDTLS_OID_ECDSA_SHA1), "ecdsa-with-SHA1", "ECDSA with SHA1" }, + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_ECDSA_SHA1, "ecdsa-with-SHA1", "ECDSA with SHA1"), MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA, }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA224) { - { ADD_LEN(MBEDTLS_OID_ECDSA_SHA224), "ecdsa-with-SHA224", "ECDSA with SHA224" }, + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_ECDSA_SHA224, "ecdsa-with-SHA224", "ECDSA with SHA224"), MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224, MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA, }, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) { - { ADD_LEN(MBEDTLS_OID_ECDSA_SHA256), "ecdsa-with-SHA256", "ECDSA with SHA256" }, + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_ECDSA_SHA256, "ecdsa-with-SHA256", "ECDSA with SHA256"), MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA, }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) { - { ADD_LEN(MBEDTLS_OID_ECDSA_SHA384), "ecdsa-with-SHA384", "ECDSA with SHA384" }, + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_ECDSA_SHA384, "ecdsa-with-SHA384", "ECDSA with SHA384"), MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA, }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA512) { - { ADD_LEN(MBEDTLS_OID_ECDSA_SHA512), "ecdsa-with-SHA512", "ECDSA with SHA512" }, + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_ECDSA_SHA512, "ecdsa-with-SHA512", "ECDSA with SHA512"), MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512, MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA, }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_C */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA512 */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SOME */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) { - { ADD_LEN(MBEDTLS_OID_RSASSA_PSS), "RSASSA-PSS", "RSASSA-PSS" }, + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_RSASSA_PSS, "RSASSA-PSS", "RSASSA-PSS"), MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, MBEDTLS_PK_RSASSA_PSS, }, #endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */ { - { NULL, 0, NULL, NULL }, + NULL_OID_DESCRIPTOR, MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, MBEDTLS_PK_NONE, }, }; FN_OID_TYPED_FROM_ASN1(oid_sig_alg_t, sig_alg, oid_sig_alg) + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_REMOVE_INFO) FN_OID_GET_DESCRIPTOR_ATTR1(mbedtls_oid_get_sig_alg_desc, oid_sig_alg_t, sig_alg, const char *, description) +#endif + FN_OID_GET_ATTR2(mbedtls_oid_get_sig_alg, oid_sig_alg_t, sig_alg, @@ -441,7 +494,6 @@ FN_OID_GET_OID_BY_ATTR2(mbedtls_oid_get_oid_by_sig_alg, pk_alg, mbedtls_md_type_t, md_alg) -#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_C */ /* * For PublicKeyInfo (PKCS1, RFC 5480) @@ -454,19 +506,19 @@ typedef struct { static const oid_pk_alg_t oid_pk_alg[] = { { - { ADD_LEN(MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1_RSA), "rsaEncryption", "RSA" }, + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1_RSA, "rsaEncryption", "RSA"), MBEDTLS_PK_RSA, }, { - { ADD_LEN(MBEDTLS_OID_EC_ALG_UNRESTRICTED), "id-ecPublicKey", "Generic EC key" }, + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_EC_ALG_UNRESTRICTED, "id-ecPublicKey", "Generic EC key"), MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY, }, { - { ADD_LEN(MBEDTLS_OID_EC_ALG_ECDH), "id-ecDH", "EC key for ECDH" }, + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_EC_ALG_ECDH, "id-ecDH", "EC key for ECDH"), MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY_DH, }, { - { NULL, 0, NULL, NULL }, + NULL_OID_DESCRIPTOR, MBEDTLS_PK_NONE, }, }; @@ -479,9 +531,9 @@ FN_OID_GET_OID_BY_ATTR1(mbedtls_oid_get_oid_by_pk_alg, mbedtls_pk_type_t, pk_alg) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS) /* - * For namedCurve (RFC 5480) + * For elliptic curves that use namedCurve inside ECParams (RFC 5480) */ typedef struct { mbedtls_oid_descriptor_t descriptor; @@ -490,74 +542,74 @@ typedef struct { static const oid_ecp_grp_t oid_ecp_grp[] = { -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP192R1) { - { ADD_LEN(MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP192R1), "secp192r1", "secp192r1" }, + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP192R1, "secp192r1", "secp192r1"), MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1, }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED) +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP192R1 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP224R1) { - { ADD_LEN(MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP224R1), "secp224r1", "secp224r1" }, + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP224R1, "secp224r1", "secp224r1"), MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1, }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED) +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP224R1 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP256R1) { - { ADD_LEN(MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP256R1), "secp256r1", "secp256r1" }, + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP256R1, "secp256r1", "secp256r1"), MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1, }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED) +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP256R1 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP384R1) { - { ADD_LEN(MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP384R1), "secp384r1", "secp384r1" }, + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP384R1, "secp384r1", "secp384r1"), MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1, }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED) +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP384R1 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP521R1) { - { ADD_LEN(MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP521R1), "secp521r1", "secp521r1" }, + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP521R1, "secp521r1", "secp521r1"), MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1, }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED) +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP521R1 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP192K1) { - { ADD_LEN(MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP192K1), "secp192k1", "secp192k1" }, + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP192K1, "secp192k1", "secp192k1"), MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1, }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED) +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP192K1 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP224K1) { - { ADD_LEN(MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP224K1), "secp224k1", "secp224k1" }, + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP224K1, "secp224k1", "secp224k1"), MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1, }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED) +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP224K1 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP256K1) { - { ADD_LEN(MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP256K1), "secp256k1", "secp256k1" }, + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP256K1, "secp256k1", "secp256k1"), MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1, }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED) +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP256K1 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_BP256R1) { - { ADD_LEN(MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_BP256R1), "brainpoolP256r1", "brainpool256r1" }, + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_BP256R1, "brainpoolP256r1", "brainpool256r1"), MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1, }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLED) +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_BP256R1 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_BP384R1) { - { ADD_LEN(MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_BP384R1), "brainpoolP384r1", "brainpool384r1" }, + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_BP384R1, "brainpoolP384r1", "brainpool384r1"), MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1, }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLED */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED) +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_BP384R1 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_BP512R1) { - { ADD_LEN(MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_BP512R1), "brainpoolP512r1", "brainpool512r1" }, + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_BP512R1, "brainpoolP512r1", "brainpool512r1"), MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1, }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_BP512R1 */ { - { NULL, 0, NULL, NULL }, + NULL_OID_DESCRIPTOR, MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE, }, }; @@ -569,7 +621,48 @@ FN_OID_GET_OID_BY_ATTR1(mbedtls_oid_get_oid_by_ec_grp, oid_ecp_grp, mbedtls_ecp_group_id, grp_id) -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */ + +/* + * For Elliptic Curve algorithms that are directly + * encoded in the AlgorithmIdentifier (RFC 8410) + */ +typedef struct { + mbedtls_oid_descriptor_t descriptor; + mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id; +} oid_ecp_grp_algid_t; + +static const oid_ecp_grp_algid_t oid_ecp_grp_algid[] = +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_CURVE25519) + { + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_X25519, "X25519", "X25519"), + MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519, + }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_CURVE25519 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_CURVE448) + { + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_X448, "X448", "X448"), + MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448, + }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_CURVE448 */ + { + NULL_OID_DESCRIPTOR, + MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE, + }, +}; + +FN_OID_TYPED_FROM_ASN1(oid_ecp_grp_algid_t, grp_id_algid, oid_ecp_grp_algid) +FN_OID_GET_ATTR1(mbedtls_oid_get_ec_grp_algid, + oid_ecp_grp_algid_t, + grp_id_algid, + mbedtls_ecp_group_id, + grp_id) +FN_OID_GET_OID_BY_ATTR1(mbedtls_oid_get_oid_by_ec_grp_algid, + oid_ecp_grp_algid_t, + oid_ecp_grp_algid, + mbedtls_ecp_group_id, + grp_id) +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C) /* @@ -583,15 +676,27 @@ typedef struct { static const oid_cipher_alg_t oid_cipher_alg[] = { { - { ADD_LEN(MBEDTLS_OID_DES_CBC), "desCBC", "DES-CBC" }, + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_DES_CBC, "desCBC", "DES-CBC"), MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_CBC, }, { - { ADD_LEN(MBEDTLS_OID_DES_EDE3_CBC), "des-ede3-cbc", "DES-EDE3-CBC" }, + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_DES_EDE3_CBC, "des-ede3-cbc", "DES-EDE3-CBC"), MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC, }, { - { NULL, 0, NULL, NULL }, + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_AES_128_CBC, "aes128-cbc", "AES128-CBC"), + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC, + }, + { + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_AES_192_CBC, "aes192-cbc", "AES192-CBC"), + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC, + }, + { + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_AES_256_CBC, "aes256-cbc", "AES256-CBC"), + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC, + }, + { + NULL_OID_DESCRIPTOR, MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NONE, }, }; @@ -604,7 +709,6 @@ FN_OID_GET_ATTR1(mbedtls_oid_get_cipher_alg, cipher_alg) #endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_C) /* * For digestAlgorithm */ @@ -615,58 +719,74 @@ typedef struct { static const oid_md_alg_t oid_md_alg[] = { -#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD2_C) - { - { ADD_LEN(MBEDTLS_OID_DIGEST_ALG_MD2), "id-md2", "MD2" }, - MBEDTLS_MD_MD2, - }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD2_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD4_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_MD5) { - { ADD_LEN(MBEDTLS_OID_DIGEST_ALG_MD4), "id-md4", "MD4" }, - MBEDTLS_MD_MD4, - }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD4_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C) - { - { ADD_LEN(MBEDTLS_OID_DIGEST_ALG_MD5), "id-md5", "MD5" }, + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_DIGEST_ALG_MD5, "id-md5", "MD5"), MBEDTLS_MD_MD5, }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD5_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1) { - { ADD_LEN(MBEDTLS_OID_DIGEST_ALG_SHA1), "id-sha1", "SHA-1" }, + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_DIGEST_ALG_SHA1, "id-sha1", "SHA-1"), MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA224) { - { ADD_LEN(MBEDTLS_OID_DIGEST_ALG_SHA224), "id-sha224", "SHA-224" }, + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_DIGEST_ALG_SHA224, "id-sha224", "SHA-224"), MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224, }, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) { - { ADD_LEN(MBEDTLS_OID_DIGEST_ALG_SHA256), "id-sha256", "SHA-256" }, + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_DIGEST_ALG_SHA256, "id-sha256", "SHA-256"), MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) { - { ADD_LEN(MBEDTLS_OID_DIGEST_ALG_SHA384), "id-sha384", "SHA-384" }, + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_DIGEST_ALG_SHA384, "id-sha384", "SHA-384"), MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, }, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA512) { - { ADD_LEN(MBEDTLS_OID_DIGEST_ALG_SHA512), "id-sha512", "SHA-512" }, + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_DIGEST_ALG_SHA512, "id-sha512", "SHA-512"), MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512, }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C) +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_RIPEMD160) { - { ADD_LEN(MBEDTLS_OID_DIGEST_ALG_RIPEMD160), "id-ripemd160", "RIPEMD-160" }, + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_DIGEST_ALG_RIPEMD160, "id-ripemd160", "RIPEMD-160"), MBEDTLS_MD_RIPEMD160, }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C */ +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA3_224) { - { NULL, 0, NULL, NULL }, + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_DIGEST_ALG_SHA3_224, "id-sha3-224", "SHA-3-224"), + MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_224, + }, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA3_256) + { + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_DIGEST_ALG_SHA3_256, "id-sha3-256", "SHA-3-256"), + MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_256, + }, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA3_384) + { + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_DIGEST_ALG_SHA3_384, "id-sha3-384", "SHA-3-384"), + MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_384, + }, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA3_512) + { + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_DIGEST_ALG_SHA3_512, "id-sha3-512", "SHA-3-512"), + MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_512, + }, +#endif + { + NULL_OID_DESCRIPTOR, MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, }, }; @@ -689,43 +809,76 @@ typedef struct { static const oid_md_hmac_t oid_md_hmac[] = { -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1) { - { ADD_LEN(MBEDTLS_OID_HMAC_SHA1), "hmacSHA1", "HMAC-SHA-1" }, + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_HMAC_SHA1, "hmacSHA1", "HMAC-SHA-1"), MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA224) { - { ADD_LEN(MBEDTLS_OID_HMAC_SHA224), "hmacSHA224", "HMAC-SHA-224" }, + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_HMAC_SHA224, "hmacSHA224", "HMAC-SHA-224"), MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224, }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA224 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) { - { ADD_LEN(MBEDTLS_OID_HMAC_SHA256), "hmacSHA256", "HMAC-SHA-256" }, + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_HMAC_SHA256, "hmacSHA256", "HMAC-SHA-256"), MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) { - { ADD_LEN(MBEDTLS_OID_HMAC_SHA384), "hmacSHA384", "HMAC-SHA-384" }, + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_HMAC_SHA384, "hmacSHA384", "HMAC-SHA-384"), MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA512) { - { ADD_LEN(MBEDTLS_OID_HMAC_SHA512), "hmacSHA512", "HMAC-SHA-512" }, + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_HMAC_SHA512, "hmacSHA512", "HMAC-SHA-512"), MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512, }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA512 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA3_224) { - { NULL, 0, NULL, NULL }, + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_HMAC_SHA3_224, "hmacSHA3-224", "HMAC-SHA3-224"), + MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_224, + }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA3_224 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA3_256) + { + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_HMAC_SHA3_256, "hmacSHA3-256", "HMAC-SHA3-256"), + MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_256, + }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA3_256 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA3_384) + { + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_HMAC_SHA3_384, "hmacSHA3-384", "HMAC-SHA3-384"), + MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_384, + }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA3_384 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA3_512) + { + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_HMAC_SHA3_512, "hmacSHA3-512", "HMAC-SHA3-512"), + MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_512, + }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA3_512 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_RIPEMD160) + { + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_HMAC_RIPEMD160, "hmacRIPEMD160", "HMAC-RIPEMD160"), + MBEDTLS_MD_RIPEMD160, + }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_RIPEMD160 */ + { + NULL_OID_DESCRIPTOR, MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, }, }; FN_OID_TYPED_FROM_ASN1(oid_md_hmac_t, md_hmac, oid_md_hmac) FN_OID_GET_ATTR1(mbedtls_oid_get_md_hmac, oid_md_hmac_t, md_hmac, mbedtls_md_type_t, md_hmac) -#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C) /* * For PKCS#12 PBEs */ @@ -738,17 +891,19 @@ typedef struct { static const oid_pkcs12_pbe_alg_t oid_pkcs12_pbe_alg[] = { { - { ADD_LEN(MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS12_PBE_SHA1_DES3_EDE_CBC), "pbeWithSHAAnd3-KeyTripleDES-CBC", - "PBE with SHA1 and 3-Key 3DES" }, + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS12_PBE_SHA1_DES3_EDE_CBC, + "pbeWithSHAAnd3-KeyTripleDES-CBC", + "PBE with SHA1 and 3-Key 3DES"), MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC, }, { - { ADD_LEN(MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS12_PBE_SHA1_DES2_EDE_CBC), "pbeWithSHAAnd2-KeyTripleDES-CBC", - "PBE with SHA1 and 2-Key 3DES" }, + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS12_PBE_SHA1_DES2_EDE_CBC, + "pbeWithSHAAnd2-KeyTripleDES-CBC", + "PBE with SHA1 and 2-Key 3DES"), MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE_CBC, }, { - { NULL, 0, NULL, NULL }, + NULL_OID_DESCRIPTOR, MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NONE, }, }; @@ -761,7 +916,7 @@ FN_OID_GET_ATTR2(mbedtls_oid_get_pkcs12_pbe_alg, md_alg, mbedtls_cipher_type_t, cipher_alg) -#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C && MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C */ /* Return the x.y.z.... style numeric string for the given OID */ int mbedtls_oid_get_numeric_string(char *buf, size_t size, @@ -832,4 +987,180 @@ int mbedtls_oid_get_numeric_string(char *buf, size_t size, return (int) (size - n); } +static int oid_parse_number(unsigned int *num, const char **p, const char *bound) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_DATA; + + *num = 0; + + while (*p < bound && **p >= '0' && **p <= '9') { + ret = 0; + if (*num > (UINT_MAX / 10)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_DATA; + } + *num *= 10; + *num += **p - '0'; + (*p)++; + } + return ret; +} + +static size_t oid_subidentifier_num_bytes(unsigned int value) +{ + size_t num_bytes = 0; + + do { + value >>= 7; + num_bytes++; + } while (value != 0); + + return num_bytes; +} + +static int oid_subidentifier_encode_into(unsigned char **p, + unsigned char *bound, + unsigned int value) +{ + size_t num_bytes = oid_subidentifier_num_bytes(value); + + if ((size_t) (bound - *p) < num_bytes) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_OID_BUF_TOO_SMALL; + } + (*p)[num_bytes - 1] = (unsigned char) (value & 0x7f); + value >>= 7; + + for (size_t i = 2; i <= num_bytes; i++) { + (*p)[num_bytes - i] = 0x80 | (unsigned char) (value & 0x7f); + value >>= 7; + } + *p += num_bytes; + + return 0; +} + +/* Return the OID for the given x.y.z.... style numeric string */ +int mbedtls_oid_from_numeric_string(mbedtls_asn1_buf *oid, + const char *oid_str, size_t size) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_DATA; + const char *str_ptr = oid_str; + const char *str_bound = oid_str + size; + unsigned int val = 0; + unsigned int component1, component2; + size_t encoded_len; + unsigned char *resized_mem; + + /* Count the number of dots to get a worst-case allocation size. */ + size_t num_dots = 0; + for (size_t i = 0; i < size; i++) { + if (oid_str[i] == '.') { + num_dots++; + } + } + /* Allocate maximum possible required memory: + * There are (num_dots + 1) integer components, but the first 2 share the + * same subidentifier, so we only need num_dots subidentifiers maximum. */ + if (num_dots == 0 || (num_dots > MBEDTLS_OID_MAX_COMPONENTS - 1)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_DATA; + } + /* Each byte can store 7 bits, calculate number of bytes for a + * subidentifier: + * + * bytes = ceil(subidentifer_size * 8 / 7) + */ + size_t bytes_per_subidentifier = (((sizeof(unsigned int) * 8) - 1) / 7) + + 1; + size_t max_possible_bytes = num_dots * bytes_per_subidentifier; + oid->p = mbedtls_calloc(max_possible_bytes, 1); + if (oid->p == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_ALLOC_FAILED; + } + unsigned char *out_ptr = oid->p; + unsigned char *out_bound = oid->p + max_possible_bytes; + + ret = oid_parse_number(&component1, &str_ptr, str_bound); + if (ret != 0) { + goto error; + } + if (component1 > 2) { + /* First component can't be > 2 */ + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_DATA; + goto error; + } + if (str_ptr >= str_bound || *str_ptr != '.') { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_DATA; + goto error; + } + str_ptr++; + + ret = oid_parse_number(&component2, &str_ptr, str_bound); + if (ret != 0) { + goto error; + } + if ((component1 < 2) && (component2 > 39)) { + /* Root nodes 0 and 1 may have up to 40 children, numbered 0-39 */ + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_DATA; + goto error; + } + if (str_ptr < str_bound) { + if (*str_ptr == '.') { + str_ptr++; + } else { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_DATA; + goto error; + } + } + + if (component2 > (UINT_MAX - (component1 * 40))) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_DATA; + goto error; + } + ret = oid_subidentifier_encode_into(&out_ptr, out_bound, + (component1 * 40) + component2); + if (ret != 0) { + goto error; + } + + while (str_ptr < str_bound) { + ret = oid_parse_number(&val, &str_ptr, str_bound); + if (ret != 0) { + goto error; + } + if (str_ptr < str_bound) { + if (*str_ptr == '.') { + str_ptr++; + } else { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_DATA; + goto error; + } + } + + ret = oid_subidentifier_encode_into(&out_ptr, out_bound, val); + if (ret != 0) { + goto error; + } + } + + encoded_len = (size_t) (out_ptr - oid->p); + resized_mem = mbedtls_calloc(encoded_len, 1); + if (resized_mem == NULL) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_ALLOC_FAILED; + goto error; + } + memcpy(resized_mem, oid->p, encoded_len); + mbedtls_free(oid->p); + oid->p = resized_mem; + oid->len = encoded_len; + + oid->tag = MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID; + + return 0; + +error: + mbedtls_free(oid->p); + oid->p = NULL; + oid->len = 0; + return ret; +} + #endif /* MBEDTLS_OID_C */ diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/padlock.c b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/padlock.c index 0b4b610f9642..1f006910c2e9 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/padlock.c +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/padlock.c @@ -15,16 +15,10 @@ #if defined(MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_C) -#include "mbedtls/padlock.h" +#include "padlock.h" #include -/* *INDENT-OFF* */ -#ifndef asm -#define asm __asm -#endif -/* *INDENT-ON* */ - #if defined(MBEDTLS_VIA_PADLOCK_HAVE_CODE) /* @@ -71,7 +65,12 @@ int mbedtls_padlock_xcryptecb(mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, uint32_t *ctrl; unsigned char buf[256]; - rk = ctx->rk; + rk = ctx->buf + ctx->rk_offset; + + if (((long) rk & 15) != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PADLOCK_DATA_MISALIGNED; + } + blk = MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_ALIGN16(buf); memcpy(blk, input, 16); @@ -97,6 +96,7 @@ int mbedtls_padlock_xcryptecb(mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, return 0; } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) /* * PadLock AES-CBC buffer en(de)cryption */ @@ -114,12 +114,14 @@ int mbedtls_padlock_xcryptcbc(mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, uint32_t *ctrl; unsigned char buf[256]; + rk = ctx->buf + ctx->rk_offset; + if (((long) input & 15) != 0 || - ((long) output & 15) != 0) { + ((long) output & 15) != 0 || + ((long) rk & 15) != 0) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_PADLOCK_DATA_MISALIGNED; } - rk = ctx->rk; iw = MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_ALIGN16(buf); memcpy(iw, iv, 16); @@ -148,6 +150,7 @@ int mbedtls_padlock_xcryptcbc(mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, return 0; } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_VIA_PADLOCK_HAVE_CODE */ diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/padlock.h b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/padlock.h similarity index 85% rename from thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/padlock.h rename to thirdparty/mbedtls/library/padlock.h index 0821105f1a6b..92d72af516e7 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/padlock.h +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/padlock.h @@ -14,16 +14,11 @@ #ifndef MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_H #define MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_H -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "mbedtls/build_info.h" #include "mbedtls/aes.h" -/** Input data should be aligned. */ -#define MBEDTLS_ERR_PADLOCK_DATA_MISALIGNED -0x0030 +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_PADLOCK_DATA_MISALIGNED -0x0030 /**< Input data should be aligned. */ #if defined(__has_feature) #if __has_feature(address_sanitizer) @@ -31,17 +26,17 @@ #endif #endif -/* Some versions of ASan result in errors about not enough registers */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM) && \ - defined(__GNUC__) && defined(__i386__) && \ +/* + * - `padlock` is implements with GNUC assembly for x86 target. + * - Some versions of ASan result in errors about not enough registers. + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_C) && \ + defined(__GNUC__) && defined(MBEDTLS_ARCH_IS_X86) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM) && \ !defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASAN) #define MBEDTLS_VIA_PADLOCK_HAVE_CODE -#ifndef MBEDTLS_HAVE_X86 -#define MBEDTLS_HAVE_X86 -#endif - #include #define MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_RNG 0x000C @@ -111,7 +106,6 @@ int mbedtls_padlock_xcryptcbc(mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, } #endif -#endif /* MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_C && MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM && - __GNUC__ && __i386__ && !MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASAN */ +#endif /* HAVE_X86 */ #endif /* padlock.h */ diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/pem.c b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/pem.c index c1a47b0da47c..0fee5df43a5b 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/pem.c +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/pem.c @@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ #include "mbedtls/base64.h" #include "mbedtls/des.h" #include "mbedtls/aes.h" -#include "mbedtls/md5.h" +#include "mbedtls/md.h" #include "mbedtls/cipher.h" #include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" #include "mbedtls/error.h" @@ -22,14 +22,25 @@ #include "mbedtls/platform.h" +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +#include "psa/crypto.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_MD5) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) && \ + (defined(MBEDTLS_DES_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C)) +#define PEM_RFC1421 +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_MD5 && + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC && + ( MBEDTLS_AES_C || MBEDTLS_DES_C ) */ + #if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C) void mbedtls_pem_init(mbedtls_pem_context *ctx) { memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_pem_context)); } -#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) && \ - (defined(MBEDTLS_DES_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C)) +#if defined(PEM_RFC1421) /* * Read a 16-byte hex string and convert it to binary */ @@ -65,26 +76,33 @@ static int pem_pbkdf1(unsigned char *key, size_t keylen, unsigned char *iv, const unsigned char *pwd, size_t pwdlen) { - mbedtls_md5_context md5_ctx; + mbedtls_md_context_t md5_ctx; + const mbedtls_md_info_t *md5_info; unsigned char md5sum[16]; size_t use_len; int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - mbedtls_md5_init(&md5_ctx); + mbedtls_md_init(&md5_ctx); + + /* Prepare the context. (setup() errors gracefully on NULL info.) */ + md5_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type(MBEDTLS_MD_MD5); + if ((ret = mbedtls_md_setup(&md5_ctx, md5_info, 0)) != 0) { + goto exit; + } /* * key[ 0..15] = MD5(pwd || IV) */ - if ((ret = mbedtls_md5_starts_ret(&md5_ctx)) != 0) { + if ((ret = mbedtls_md_starts(&md5_ctx)) != 0) { goto exit; } - if ((ret = mbedtls_md5_update_ret(&md5_ctx, pwd, pwdlen)) != 0) { + if ((ret = mbedtls_md_update(&md5_ctx, pwd, pwdlen)) != 0) { goto exit; } - if ((ret = mbedtls_md5_update_ret(&md5_ctx, iv, 8)) != 0) { + if ((ret = mbedtls_md_update(&md5_ctx, iv, 8)) != 0) { goto exit; } - if ((ret = mbedtls_md5_finish_ret(&md5_ctx, md5sum)) != 0) { + if ((ret = mbedtls_md_finish(&md5_ctx, md5sum)) != 0) { goto exit; } @@ -98,19 +116,19 @@ static int pem_pbkdf1(unsigned char *key, size_t keylen, /* * key[16..23] = MD5(key[ 0..15] || pwd || IV]) */ - if ((ret = mbedtls_md5_starts_ret(&md5_ctx)) != 0) { + if ((ret = mbedtls_md_starts(&md5_ctx)) != 0) { goto exit; } - if ((ret = mbedtls_md5_update_ret(&md5_ctx, md5sum, 16)) != 0) { + if ((ret = mbedtls_md_update(&md5_ctx, md5sum, 16)) != 0) { goto exit; } - if ((ret = mbedtls_md5_update_ret(&md5_ctx, pwd, pwdlen)) != 0) { + if ((ret = mbedtls_md_update(&md5_ctx, pwd, pwdlen)) != 0) { goto exit; } - if ((ret = mbedtls_md5_update_ret(&md5_ctx, iv, 8)) != 0) { + if ((ret = mbedtls_md_update(&md5_ctx, iv, 8)) != 0) { goto exit; } - if ((ret = mbedtls_md5_finish_ret(&md5_ctx, md5sum)) != 0) { + if ((ret = mbedtls_md_finish(&md5_ctx, md5sum)) != 0) { goto exit; } @@ -122,7 +140,7 @@ static int pem_pbkdf1(unsigned char *key, size_t keylen, memcpy(key + 16, md5sum, use_len); exit: - mbedtls_md5_free(&md5_ctx); + mbedtls_md_free(&md5_ctx); mbedtls_platform_zeroize(md5sum, 16); return ret; @@ -222,8 +240,30 @@ static int pem_aes_decrypt(unsigned char aes_iv[16], unsigned int keylen, } #endif /* MBEDTLS_AES_C */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD5_C && MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC && - ( MBEDTLS_AES_C || MBEDTLS_DES_C ) */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DES_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) +static int pem_check_pkcs_padding(unsigned char *input, size_t input_len, size_t *data_len) +{ + /* input_len > 0 is guaranteed by mbedtls_pem_read_buffer(). */ + size_t pad_len = input[input_len - 1]; + size_t i; + + if (pad_len > input_len) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_PASSWORD_MISMATCH; + } + + *data_len = input_len - pad_len; + + for (i = *data_len; i < input_len; i++) { + if (input[i] != pad_len) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_PASSWORD_MISMATCH; + } + } + + return 0; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DES_C || MBEDTLS_AES_C */ + +#endif /* PEM_RFC1421 */ int mbedtls_pem_read_buffer(mbedtls_pem_context *ctx, const char *header, const char *footer, const unsigned char *data, const unsigned char *pwd, @@ -233,15 +273,13 @@ int mbedtls_pem_read_buffer(mbedtls_pem_context *ctx, const char *header, const size_t len; unsigned char *buf; const unsigned char *s1, *s2, *end; -#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) && \ - (defined(MBEDTLS_DES_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C)) +#if defined(PEM_RFC1421) unsigned char pem_iv[16]; mbedtls_cipher_type_t enc_alg = MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NONE; #else ((void) pwd); ((void) pwdlen); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD5_C && MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC && - ( MBEDTLS_AES_C || MBEDTLS_DES_C ) */ +#endif /* PEM_RFC1421 */ if (ctx == NULL) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_BAD_INPUT_DATA; @@ -283,13 +321,12 @@ int mbedtls_pem_read_buffer(mbedtls_pem_context *ctx, const char *header, const if (*end == '\n') { end++; } - *use_len = end - data; + *use_len = (size_t) (end - data); enc = 0; if (s2 - s1 >= 22 && memcmp(s1, "Proc-Type: 4,ENCRYPTED", 22) == 0) { -#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) && \ - (defined(MBEDTLS_DES_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C)) +#if defined(PEM_RFC1421) enc++; s1 += 22; @@ -362,36 +399,36 @@ int mbedtls_pem_read_buffer(mbedtls_pem_context *ctx, const char *header, const } #else return MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; -#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD5_C && MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC && - ( MBEDTLS_AES_C || MBEDTLS_DES_C ) */ +#endif /* PEM_RFC1421 */ } if (s1 >= s2) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_INVALID_DATA; } - ret = mbedtls_base64_decode(NULL, 0, &len, s1, s2 - s1); + ret = mbedtls_base64_decode(NULL, 0, &len, s1, (size_t) (s2 - s1)); if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_BASE64_INVALID_CHARACTER) { return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_INVALID_DATA, ret); } + if (len == 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + if ((buf = mbedtls_calloc(1, len)) == NULL) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_ALLOC_FAILED; } - if ((ret = mbedtls_base64_decode(buf, len, &len, s1, s2 - s1)) != 0) { - mbedtls_platform_zeroize(buf, len); - mbedtls_free(buf); + if ((ret = mbedtls_base64_decode(buf, len, &len, s1, (size_t) (s2 - s1))) != 0) { + mbedtls_zeroize_and_free(buf, len); return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_INVALID_DATA, ret); } if (enc != 0) { -#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) && \ - (defined(MBEDTLS_DES_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C)) +#if defined(PEM_RFC1421) if (pwd == NULL) { - mbedtls_platform_zeroize(buf, len); - mbedtls_free(buf); + mbedtls_zeroize_and_free(buf, len); return MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_PASSWORD_REQUIRED; } @@ -416,27 +453,24 @@ int mbedtls_pem_read_buffer(mbedtls_pem_context *ctx, const char *header, const #endif /* MBEDTLS_AES_C */ if (ret != 0) { - mbedtls_free(buf); + mbedtls_zeroize_and_free(buf, len); return ret; } - /* - * The result will be ASN.1 starting with a SEQUENCE tag, with 1 to 3 - * length bytes (allow 4 to be sure) in all known use cases. - * - * Use that as a heuristic to try to detect password mismatches. - */ - if (len <= 2 || buf[0] != 0x30 || buf[1] > 0x83) { - mbedtls_platform_zeroize(buf, len); - mbedtls_free(buf); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_PASSWORD_MISMATCH; + /* Check PKCS padding and update data length based on padding info. + * This can be used to detect invalid padding data and password + * mismatches. */ + size_t unpadded_len; + ret = pem_check_pkcs_padding(buf, len, &unpadded_len); + if (ret != 0) { + mbedtls_zeroize_and_free(buf, len); + return ret; } + len = unpadded_len; #else - mbedtls_platform_zeroize(buf, len); - mbedtls_free(buf); + mbedtls_zeroize_and_free(buf, len); return MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; -#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD5_C && MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC && - ( MBEDTLS_AES_C || MBEDTLS_DES_C ) */ +#endif /* PEM_RFC1421 */ } ctx->buf = buf; @@ -448,8 +482,7 @@ int mbedtls_pem_read_buffer(mbedtls_pem_context *ctx, const char *header, const void mbedtls_pem_free(mbedtls_pem_context *ctx) { if (ctx->buf != NULL) { - mbedtls_platform_zeroize(ctx->buf, ctx->buflen); - mbedtls_free(ctx->buf); + mbedtls_zeroize_and_free(ctx->buf, ctx->buflen); } mbedtls_free(ctx->info); @@ -467,7 +500,7 @@ int mbedtls_pem_write_buffer(const char *header, const char *footer, size_t len = 0, use_len, add_len = 0; mbedtls_base64_encode(NULL, 0, &use_len, der_data, der_len); - add_len = strlen(header) + strlen(footer) + (use_len / 64) + 1; + add_len = strlen(header) + strlen(footer) + (((use_len > 2) ? (use_len - 2) : 0) / 64) + 1; if (use_len + add_len > buf_len) { *olen = use_len + add_len; @@ -502,7 +535,7 @@ int mbedtls_pem_write_buffer(const char *header, const char *footer, p += strlen(footer); *p++ = '\0'; - *olen = p - buf; + *olen = (size_t) (p - buf); /* Clean any remaining data previously written to the buffer */ memset(buf + *olen, 0, buf_len - *olen); diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/pk.c b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/pk.c index 6b5008df2aab..097777f2c092 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/pk.c +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/pk.c @@ -9,43 +9,52 @@ #if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_C) #include "mbedtls/pk.h" -#include "mbedtls/pk_internal.h" +#include "pk_wrap.h" +#include "pkwrite.h" +#include "pk_internal.h" #include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" #include "mbedtls/error.h" #if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) #include "mbedtls/rsa.h" +#include "rsa_internal.h" #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS) #include "mbedtls/ecp.h" #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) #include "mbedtls/ecdsa.h" #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT) +#include "psa_util_internal.h" #include "mbedtls/psa_util.h" #endif #include #include -/* Parameter validation macros based on platform_util.h */ -#define PK_VALIDATE_RET(cond) \ - MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE_RET(cond, MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA) -#define PK_VALIDATE(cond) \ - MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE(cond) +#define PSA_EXPORT_KEY_PAIR_OR_PUBLIC_MAX_SIZE \ + (PSA_EXPORT_KEY_PAIR_MAX_SIZE > PSA_EXPORT_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE) ? \ + PSA_EXPORT_KEY_PAIR_MAX_SIZE : PSA_EXPORT_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE /* * Initialise a mbedtls_pk_context */ void mbedtls_pk_init(mbedtls_pk_context *ctx) { - PK_VALIDATE(ctx != NULL); - ctx->pk_info = NULL; ctx->pk_ctx = NULL; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + ctx->priv_id = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA) + memset(ctx->pub_raw, 0, sizeof(ctx->pub_raw)); + ctx->pub_raw_len = 0; + ctx->ec_family = 0; + ctx->ec_bits = 0; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA */ } /* @@ -57,10 +66,18 @@ void mbedtls_pk_free(mbedtls_pk_context *ctx) return; } - if (ctx->pk_info != NULL) { + if ((ctx->pk_info != NULL) && (ctx->pk_info->ctx_free_func != NULL)) { ctx->pk_info->ctx_free_func(ctx->pk_ctx); } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA) + /* The ownership of the priv_id key for opaque keys is external of the PK + * module. It's the user responsibility to clear it after use. */ + if ((ctx->pk_info != NULL) && (ctx->pk_info->type != MBEDTLS_PK_OPAQUE)) { + psa_destroy_key(ctx->priv_id); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA */ + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(ctx, sizeof(mbedtls_pk_context)); } @@ -70,7 +87,6 @@ void mbedtls_pk_free(mbedtls_pk_context *ctx) */ void mbedtls_pk_restart_init(mbedtls_pk_restart_ctx *ctx) { - PK_VALIDATE(ctx != NULL); ctx->pk_info = NULL; ctx->rs_ctx = NULL; } @@ -101,17 +117,17 @@ const mbedtls_pk_info_t *mbedtls_pk_info_from_type(mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_type) #if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) case MBEDTLS_PK_RSA: return &mbedtls_rsa_info; -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) +#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS) case MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY: return &mbedtls_eckey_info; case MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY_DH: return &mbedtls_eckeydh_info; -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SOME) case MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA: return &mbedtls_ecdsa_info; -#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SOME */ /* MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT omitted on purpose */ default: return NULL; @@ -123,12 +139,12 @@ const mbedtls_pk_info_t *mbedtls_pk_info_from_type(mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_type) */ int mbedtls_pk_setup(mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, const mbedtls_pk_info_t *info) { - PK_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); if (info == NULL || ctx->pk_info != NULL) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } - if ((ctx->pk_ctx = info->ctx_alloc_func()) == NULL) { + if ((info->ctx_alloc_func != NULL) && + ((ctx->pk_ctx = info->ctx_alloc_func()) == NULL)) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_ALLOC_FAILED; } @@ -142,11 +158,10 @@ int mbedtls_pk_setup(mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, const mbedtls_pk_info_t *info) * Initialise a PSA-wrapping context */ int mbedtls_pk_setup_opaque(mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, - const psa_key_id_t key) + const mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key) { - const mbedtls_pk_info_t * const info = &mbedtls_pk_opaque_info; + const mbedtls_pk_info_t *info = NULL; psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; - psa_key_id_t *pk_ctx; psa_key_type_t type; if (ctx == NULL || ctx->pk_info != NULL) { @@ -159,19 +174,19 @@ int mbedtls_pk_setup_opaque(mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, type = psa_get_key_type(&attributes); psa_reset_key_attributes(&attributes); - /* Current implementation of can_do() relies on this. */ - if (!PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC_KEY_PAIR(type)) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS) + if (PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC_KEY_PAIR(type)) { + info = &mbedtls_ecdsa_opaque_info; + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS */ + if (type == PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR) { + info = &mbedtls_rsa_opaque_info; + } else { return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; } - if ((ctx->pk_ctx = info->ctx_alloc_func()) == NULL) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_ALLOC_FAILED; - } - ctx->pk_info = info; - - pk_ctx = (psa_key_id_t *) ctx->pk_ctx; - *pk_ctx = key; + ctx->priv_id = key; return 0; } @@ -189,7 +204,6 @@ int mbedtls_pk_setup_rsa_alt(mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, void *key, mbedtls_rsa_alt_context *rsa_alt; const mbedtls_pk_info_t *info = &mbedtls_rsa_alt_info; - PK_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); if (ctx->pk_info != NULL) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } @@ -226,26 +240,772 @@ int mbedtls_pk_can_do(const mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, mbedtls_pk_type_t type) return ctx->pk_info->can_do(type); } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) /* - * Helper for mbedtls_pk_sign and mbedtls_pk_verify + * Tell if a PK can do the operations of the given PSA algorithm */ -static inline int pk_hashlen_helper(mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, size_t *hash_len) +int mbedtls_pk_can_do_ext(const mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, psa_algorithm_t alg, + psa_key_usage_t usage) { - const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info; + psa_key_usage_t key_usage; + + /* A context with null pk_info is not set up yet and can't do anything. + * For backward compatibility, also accept NULL instead of a context + * pointer. */ + if (ctx == NULL || ctx->pk_info == NULL) { + return 0; + } - if (*hash_len != 0 && md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE) { + /* Filter out non allowed algorithms */ + if (PSA_ALG_IS_ECDSA(alg) == 0 && + PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(alg) == 0 && + PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_PSS(alg) == 0 && + alg != PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT && + PSA_ALG_IS_ECDH(alg) == 0) { return 0; } - if ((md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type(md_alg)) == NULL) { - return -1; + /* Filter out non allowed usage flags */ + if (usage == 0 || + (usage & ~(PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | + PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | + PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE)) != 0) { + return 0; + } + + /* Wildcard hash is not allowed */ + if (PSA_ALG_IS_SIGN_HASH(alg) && + PSA_ALG_SIGN_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH) { + return 0; + } + + if (mbedtls_pk_get_type(ctx) != MBEDTLS_PK_OPAQUE) { + mbedtls_pk_type_t type; + + if (PSA_ALG_IS_ECDSA(alg) || PSA_ALG_IS_ECDH(alg)) { + type = MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY; + } else if (PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(alg) || + alg == PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT) { + type = MBEDTLS_PK_RSA; + } else if (PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_PSS(alg)) { + type = MBEDTLS_PK_RSASSA_PSS; + } else { + return 0; + } + + if (ctx->pk_info->can_do(type) == 0) { + return 0; + } + + switch (type) { + case MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY: + key_usage = PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE; + break; + case MBEDTLS_PK_RSA: + case MBEDTLS_PK_RSASSA_PSS: + key_usage = PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | + PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | + PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT; + break; + default: + /* Should never happen */ + return 0; + } + + return (key_usage & usage) == usage; + } + + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + psa_status_t status; + + status = psa_get_key_attributes(ctx->priv_id, &attributes); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return 0; + } + + psa_algorithm_t key_alg = psa_get_key_algorithm(&attributes); + /* Key's enrollment is available only when an Mbed TLS implementation of PSA + * Crypto is being used, i.e. when MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C is defined. + * Even though we don't officially support using other implementations of PSA + * Crypto with TLS and X.509 (yet), we try to keep vendor's customizations + * separated. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) + psa_algorithm_t key_alg2 = psa_get_key_enrollment_algorithm(&attributes); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C */ + key_usage = psa_get_key_usage_flags(&attributes); + psa_reset_key_attributes(&attributes); + + if ((key_usage & usage) != usage) { + return 0; + } + + /* + * Common case: the key alg [or alg2] only allows alg. + * This will match PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT & PSA_ALG_IS_ECDH + * directly. + * This would also match ECDSA/RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN/RSA_PSS with + * a fixed hash on key_alg [or key_alg2]. + */ + if (alg == key_alg) { + return 1; + } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) + if (alg == key_alg2) { + return 1; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C */ + + /* + * If key_alg [or key_alg2] is a hash-and-sign with a wildcard for the hash, + * and alg is the same hash-and-sign family with any hash, + * then alg is compliant with this key alg + */ + if (PSA_ALG_IS_SIGN_HASH(alg)) { + if (PSA_ALG_IS_SIGN_HASH(key_alg) && + PSA_ALG_SIGN_GET_HASH(key_alg) == PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH && + (alg & ~PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK) == (key_alg & ~PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK)) { + return 1; + } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) + if (PSA_ALG_IS_SIGN_HASH(key_alg2) && + PSA_ALG_SIGN_GET_HASH(key_alg2) == PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH && + (alg & ~PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK) == (key_alg2 & ~PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK)) { + return 1; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C */ + } + + return 0; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) +static psa_algorithm_t psa_algorithm_for_rsa(const mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa, + int want_crypt) +{ + if (mbedtls_rsa_get_padding_mode(rsa) == MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21) { + if (want_crypt) { + mbedtls_md_type_t md_type = (mbedtls_md_type_t) mbedtls_rsa_get_md_alg(rsa); + return PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type(md_type)); + } else { + return PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH); + } + } else { + if (want_crypt) { + return PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT; + } else { + return PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH); + } + } +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */ + +int mbedtls_pk_get_psa_attributes(const mbedtls_pk_context *pk, + psa_key_usage_t usage, + psa_key_attributes_t *attributes) +{ + mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_type = mbedtls_pk_get_type(pk); + + psa_key_usage_t more_usage = usage; + if (usage == PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE) { + more_usage |= PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE; + } else if (usage == PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH) { + more_usage |= PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH; + } else if (usage == PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT) { + more_usage |= PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT; + } + more_usage |= PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY; + + int want_private = !(usage == PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE || + usage == PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH || + usage == PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT); + + switch (pk_type) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) + case MBEDTLS_PK_RSA: + { + int want_crypt = 0; /* 0: sign/verify; 1: encrypt/decrypt */ + switch (usage) { + case PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE: + case PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH: + case PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE: + case PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH: + /* Nothing to do. */ + break; + case PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT: + case PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT: + want_crypt = 1; + break; + default: + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH; + } + /* Detect the presence of a private key in a way that works both + * in CRT and non-CRT configurations. */ + mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa = mbedtls_pk_rsa(*pk); + int has_private = (mbedtls_rsa_check_privkey(rsa) == 0); + if (want_private && !has_private) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH; + } + psa_set_key_type(attributes, (want_private ? + PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR : + PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY)); + psa_set_key_bits(attributes, mbedtls_pk_get_bitlen(pk)); + psa_set_key_algorithm(attributes, + psa_algorithm_for_rsa(rsa, want_crypt)); + break; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS) + case MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY: + case MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY_DH: + case MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA: + { + int sign_ok = (pk_type != MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY_DH); + int derive_ok = (pk_type != MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA) + psa_ecc_family_t family = pk->ec_family; + size_t bits = pk->ec_bits; + int has_private = 0; + if (pk->priv_id != MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT) { + has_private = 1; + } +#else + const mbedtls_ecp_keypair *ec = mbedtls_pk_ec_ro(*pk); + int has_private = (ec->d.n != 0); + size_t bits = 0; + psa_ecc_family_t family = + mbedtls_ecc_group_to_psa(ec->grp.id, &bits); +#endif + psa_algorithm_t alg = 0; + switch (usage) { + case PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE: + case PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH: + case PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE: + case PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH: + if (!sign_ok) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH; + } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC) + alg = PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH); +#else + alg = PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH); +#endif + break; + case PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE: + alg = PSA_ALG_ECDH; + if (!derive_ok) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH; + } + break; + default: + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH; + } + if (want_private && !has_private) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH; + } + psa_set_key_type(attributes, (want_private ? + PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(family) : + PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(family))); + psa_set_key_bits(attributes, bits); + psa_set_key_algorithm(attributes, alg); + break; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT_SUPPORT) + case MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT: + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT_SUPPORT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + case MBEDTLS_PK_OPAQUE: + { + psa_key_attributes_t old_attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + status = psa_get_key_attributes(pk->priv_id, &old_attributes); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + psa_key_type_t old_type = psa_get_key_type(&old_attributes); + switch (usage) { + case PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE: + case PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH: + case PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE: + case PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH: + if (!(PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC_KEY_PAIR(old_type) || + old_type == PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH; + } + break; + case PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT: + case PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT: + if (old_type != PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH; + } + break; + case PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE: + if (!(PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC_KEY_PAIR(old_type))) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH; + } + break; + default: + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH; + } + psa_key_type_t new_type = old_type; + /* Opaque keys are always key pairs, so we don't need a check + * on the input if the required usage is private. We just need + * to adjust the type correctly if the required usage is public. */ + if (!want_private) { + new_type = PSA_KEY_TYPE_PUBLIC_KEY_OF_KEY_PAIR(new_type); + } + more_usage = psa_get_key_usage_flags(&old_attributes); + if ((usage & more_usage) == 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH; + } + psa_set_key_type(attributes, new_type); + psa_set_key_bits(attributes, psa_get_key_bits(&old_attributes)); + psa_set_key_algorithm(attributes, psa_get_key_algorithm(&old_attributes)); + break; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + + default: + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + psa_set_key_usage_flags(attributes, more_usage); + /* Key's enrollment is available only when an Mbed TLS implementation of PSA + * Crypto is being used, i.e. when MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C is defined. + * Even though we don't officially support using other implementations of PSA + * Crypto with TLS and X.509 (yet), we try to keep vendor's customizations + * separated. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) + psa_set_key_enrollment_algorithm(attributes, PSA_ALG_NONE); +#endif + + return 0; +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA) || defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +static psa_status_t export_import_into_psa(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t old_key_id, + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t *new_key_id) +{ + unsigned char key_buffer[PSA_EXPORT_KEY_PAIR_MAX_SIZE]; + size_t key_length = 0; + psa_status_t status = psa_export_key(old_key_id, + key_buffer, sizeof(key_buffer), + &key_length); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return status; + } + status = psa_import_key(attributes, key_buffer, key_length, new_key_id); + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(key_buffer, key_length); + return status; +} + +static int copy_into_psa(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t old_key_id, + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t *new_key_id) +{ + /* Normally, we prefer copying: it's more efficient and works even + * for non-exportable keys. */ + psa_status_t status = psa_copy_key(old_key_id, attributes, new_key_id); + if (status == PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED /*missing COPY usage*/ || + status == PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT /*incompatible policy*/) { + /* There are edge cases where copying won't work, but export+import + * might: + * - If the old key does not allow PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY. + * - If the old key's usage does not allow what attributes wants. + * Because the key was intended for use in the pk module, and may + * have had a policy chosen solely for what pk needs rather than + * based on a detailed understanding of PSA policies, we are a bit + * more liberal than psa_copy_key() here. + */ + /* Here we need to check that the types match, otherwise we risk + * importing nonsensical data. */ + psa_key_attributes_t old_attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + status = psa_get_key_attributes(old_key_id, &old_attributes); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + psa_key_type_t old_type = psa_get_key_type(&old_attributes); + psa_reset_key_attributes(&old_attributes); + if (old_type != psa_get_key_type(attributes)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH; + } + status = export_import_into_psa(old_key_id, attributes, new_key_id); + } + return PSA_PK_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA || MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + +static int import_pair_into_psa(const mbedtls_pk_context *pk, + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t *key_id) +{ + switch (mbedtls_pk_get_type(pk)) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) + case MBEDTLS_PK_RSA: + { + if (psa_get_key_type(attributes) != PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH; + } + unsigned char key_buffer[ + PSA_KEY_EXPORT_RSA_KEY_PAIR_MAX_SIZE(PSA_VENDOR_RSA_MAX_KEY_BITS)]; + unsigned char *const key_end = key_buffer + sizeof(key_buffer); + unsigned char *key_data = key_end; + int ret = mbedtls_rsa_write_key(mbedtls_pk_rsa(*pk), + key_buffer, &key_data); + if (ret < 0) { + return ret; + } + size_t key_length = key_end - key_data; + ret = PSA_PK_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(psa_import_key(attributes, + key_data, key_length, + key_id)); + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(key_data, key_length); + return ret; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS) + case MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY: + case MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY_DH: + case MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA: + { + /* We need to check the curve family, otherwise the import could + * succeed with nonsensical data. + * We don't check the bit-size: it's optional in attributes, + * and if it's specified, psa_import_key() will know from the key + * data length and will check that the bit-size matches. */ + psa_key_type_t to_type = psa_get_key_type(attributes); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA) + psa_ecc_family_t from_family = pk->ec_family; +#else /* MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA */ + const mbedtls_ecp_keypair *ec = mbedtls_pk_ec_ro(*pk); + size_t from_bits = 0; + psa_ecc_family_t from_family = mbedtls_ecc_group_to_psa(ec->grp.id, + &from_bits); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA */ + if (to_type != PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(from_family)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA) + if (mbedtls_svc_key_id_is_null(pk->priv_id)) { + /* We have a public key and want a key pair. */ + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH; + } + return copy_into_psa(pk->priv_id, attributes, key_id); +#else /* MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA */ + if (ec->d.n == 0) { + /* Private key not set. Assume the input is a public key only. + * (The other possibility is that it's an incomplete object + * where the group is set but neither the public key nor + * the private key. This is not possible through ecp.h + * functions, so we don't bother reporting a more suitable + * error in that case.) */ + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH; + } + unsigned char key_buffer[PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS)]; + size_t key_length = 0; + int ret = mbedtls_ecp_write_key_ext(ec, &key_length, + key_buffer, sizeof(key_buffer)); + if (ret < 0) { + return ret; + } + ret = PSA_PK_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(psa_import_key(attributes, + key_buffer, key_length, + key_id)); + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(key_buffer, key_length); + return ret; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA */ + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + case MBEDTLS_PK_OPAQUE: + return copy_into_psa(pk->priv_id, attributes, key_id); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + + default: + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } +} + +static int import_public_into_psa(const mbedtls_pk_context *pk, + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t *key_id) +{ + psa_key_type_t psa_type = psa_get_key_type(attributes); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) || \ + (defined(MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA)) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + unsigned char key_buffer[PSA_EXPORT_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE]; +#endif + unsigned char *key_data = NULL; + size_t key_length = 0; + + switch (mbedtls_pk_get_type(pk)) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) + case MBEDTLS_PK_RSA: + { + if (psa_type != PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH; + } + unsigned char *const key_end = key_buffer + sizeof(key_buffer); + key_data = key_end; + int ret = mbedtls_rsa_write_pubkey(mbedtls_pk_rsa(*pk), + key_buffer, &key_data); + if (ret < 0) { + return ret; + } + key_length = (size_t) ret; + break; + } +#endif /*MBEDTLS_RSA_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS) + case MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY: + case MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY_DH: + case MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA: + { + /* We need to check the curve family, otherwise the import could + * succeed with nonsensical data. + * We don't check the bit-size: it's optional in attributes, + * and if it's specified, psa_import_key() will know from the key + * data length and will check that the bit-size matches. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA) + if (psa_type != PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(pk->ec_family)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH; + } + key_data = (unsigned char *) pk->pub_raw; + key_length = pk->pub_raw_len; +#else /* MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA */ + const mbedtls_ecp_keypair *ec = mbedtls_pk_ec_ro(*pk); + size_t from_bits = 0; + psa_ecc_family_t from_family = mbedtls_ecc_group_to_psa(ec->grp.id, + &from_bits); + if (psa_type != PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(from_family)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH; + } + int ret = mbedtls_ecp_write_public_key( + ec, MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_UNCOMPRESSED, + &key_length, key_buffer, sizeof(key_buffer)); + if (ret < 0) { + return ret; + } + key_data = key_buffer; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA */ + break; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + case MBEDTLS_PK_OPAQUE: + { + psa_key_attributes_t old_attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + psa_status_t status = + psa_get_key_attributes(pk->priv_id, &old_attributes); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + psa_key_type_t old_type = psa_get_key_type(&old_attributes); + psa_reset_key_attributes(&old_attributes); + if (psa_type != PSA_KEY_TYPE_PUBLIC_KEY_OF_KEY_PAIR(old_type)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH; + } + status = psa_export_public_key(pk->priv_id, + key_buffer, sizeof(key_buffer), + &key_length); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return PSA_PK_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + } + key_data = key_buffer; + break; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + + default: + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + return PSA_PK_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(psa_import_key(attributes, + key_data, key_length, + key_id)); +} + +int mbedtls_pk_import_into_psa(const mbedtls_pk_context *pk, + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t *key_id) +{ + /* Set the output immediately so that it won't contain garbage even + * if we error out before calling psa_import_key(). */ + *key_id = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT_SUPPORT) + if (mbedtls_pk_get_type(pk) == MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT_SUPPORT */ + + int want_public = PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_PUBLIC_KEY(psa_get_key_type(attributes)); + if (want_public) { + return import_public_into_psa(pk, attributes, key_id); + } else { + return import_pair_into_psa(pk, attributes, key_id); + } +} + +static int copy_from_psa(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key_id, + mbedtls_pk_context *pk, + int public_only) +{ + psa_status_t status; + psa_key_attributes_t key_attr = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + psa_key_type_t key_type; + psa_algorithm_t alg_type; + size_t key_bits; + /* Use a buffer size large enough to contain either a key pair or public key. */ + unsigned char exp_key[PSA_EXPORT_KEY_PAIR_OR_PUBLIC_MAX_SIZE]; + size_t exp_key_len; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + + if (pk == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + status = psa_get_key_attributes(key_id, &key_attr); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + if (public_only) { + status = psa_export_public_key(key_id, exp_key, sizeof(exp_key), &exp_key_len); + } else { + status = psa_export_key(key_id, exp_key, sizeof(exp_key), &exp_key_len); + } + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + ret = PSA_PK_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + goto exit; + } + + key_type = psa_get_key_type(&key_attr); + if (public_only) { + key_type = PSA_KEY_TYPE_PUBLIC_KEY_OF_KEY_PAIR(key_type); + } + key_bits = psa_get_key_bits(&key_attr); + alg_type = psa_get_key_algorithm(&key_attr); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) + if ((key_type == PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR) || + (key_type == PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY)) { + + ret = mbedtls_pk_setup(pk, mbedtls_pk_info_from_type(MBEDTLS_PK_RSA)); + if (ret != 0) { + goto exit; + } + + if (key_type == PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR) { + ret = mbedtls_rsa_parse_key(mbedtls_pk_rsa(*pk), exp_key, exp_key_len); + } else { + ret = mbedtls_rsa_parse_pubkey(mbedtls_pk_rsa(*pk), exp_key, exp_key_len); + } + if (ret != 0) { + goto exit; + } + + mbedtls_md_type_t md_type = MBEDTLS_MD_NONE; + if (PSA_ALG_GET_HASH(alg_type) != PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH) { + md_type = mbedtls_md_type_from_psa_alg(alg_type); + } + + if (PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_OAEP(alg_type) || PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_PSS(alg_type)) { + ret = mbedtls_rsa_set_padding(mbedtls_pk_rsa(*pk), MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21, md_type); + } else if (PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(alg_type) || + alg_type == PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT) { + ret = mbedtls_rsa_set_padding(mbedtls_pk_rsa(*pk), MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15, md_type); + } + if (ret != 0) { + goto exit; + } + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS) + if (PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC_KEY_PAIR(key_type) || + PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(key_type)) { + mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id; + + ret = mbedtls_pk_setup(pk, mbedtls_pk_info_from_type(MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY)); + if (ret != 0) { + goto exit; + } + + grp_id = mbedtls_ecc_group_from_psa(PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_GET_FAMILY(key_type), key_bits); + ret = mbedtls_pk_ecc_set_group(pk, grp_id); + if (ret != 0) { + goto exit; + } + + if (PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC_KEY_PAIR(key_type)) { + ret = mbedtls_pk_ecc_set_key(pk, exp_key, exp_key_len); + if (ret != 0) { + goto exit; + } + ret = mbedtls_pk_ecc_set_pubkey_from_prv(pk, exp_key, exp_key_len, + mbedtls_psa_get_random, + MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_STATE); + } else { + ret = mbedtls_pk_ecc_set_pubkey(pk, exp_key, exp_key_len); + } + if (ret != 0) { + goto exit; + } + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS */ + { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } - if (*hash_len != 0 && *hash_len != mbedtls_md_get_size(md_info)) { +exit: + psa_reset_key_attributes(&key_attr); + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(exp_key, sizeof(exp_key)); + + return ret; +} + +int mbedtls_pk_copy_from_psa(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key_id, + mbedtls_pk_context *pk) +{ + return copy_from_psa(key_id, pk, 0); +} + +int mbedtls_pk_copy_public_from_psa(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key_id, + mbedtls_pk_context *pk) +{ + return copy_from_psa(key_id, pk, 1); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT */ + +/* + * Helper for mbedtls_pk_sign and mbedtls_pk_verify + */ +static inline int pk_hashlen_helper(mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, size_t *hash_len) +{ + if (*hash_len != 0) { + return 0; + } + + *hash_len = mbedtls_md_get_size_from_type(md_alg); + + if (*hash_len == 0) { return -1; } - *hash_len = mbedtls_md_get_size(md_info); return 0; } @@ -285,10 +1045,9 @@ int mbedtls_pk_verify_restartable(mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, const unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_len, mbedtls_pk_restart_ctx *rs_ctx) { - PK_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - PK_VALIDATE_RET((md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE && hash_len == 0) || - hash != NULL); - PK_VALIDATE_RET(sig != NULL); + if ((md_alg != MBEDTLS_MD_NONE || hash_len != 0) && hash == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } if (ctx->pk_info == NULL || pk_hashlen_helper(md_alg, &hash_len) != 0) { @@ -306,7 +1065,7 @@ int mbedtls_pk_verify_restartable(mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, return ret; } - ret = ctx->pk_info->verify_rs_func(ctx->pk_ctx, + ret = ctx->pk_info->verify_rs_func(ctx, md_alg, hash, hash_len, sig, sig_len, rs_ctx->rs_ctx); if (ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS) { @@ -323,7 +1082,7 @@ int mbedtls_pk_verify_restartable(mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH; } - return ctx->pk_info->verify_func(ctx->pk_ctx, md_alg, hash, hash_len, + return ctx->pk_info->verify_func(ctx, md_alg, hash, hash_len, sig, sig_len); } @@ -346,10 +1105,9 @@ int mbedtls_pk_verify_ext(mbedtls_pk_type_t type, const void *options, const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len, const unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_len) { - PK_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - PK_VALIDATE_RET((md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE && hash_len == 0) || - hash != NULL); - PK_VALIDATE_RET(sig != NULL); + if ((md_alg != MBEDTLS_MD_NONE || hash_len != 0) && hash == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } if (ctx->pk_info == NULL) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA; @@ -359,29 +1117,97 @@ int mbedtls_pk_verify_ext(mbedtls_pk_type_t type, const void *options, return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH; } - if (type == MBEDTLS_PK_RSASSA_PSS) { + if (type != MBEDTLS_PK_RSASSA_PSS) { + /* General case: no options */ + if (options != NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + return mbedtls_pk_verify(ctx, md_alg, hash, hash_len, sig, sig_len); + } + + /* Ensure the PK context is of the right type otherwise mbedtls_pk_rsa() + * below would return a NULL pointer. */ + if (mbedtls_pk_get_type(ctx) != MBEDTLS_PK_RSA) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + } + #if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21) - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - const mbedtls_pk_rsassa_pss_options *pss_opts; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + const mbedtls_pk_rsassa_pss_options *pss_opts; #if SIZE_MAX > UINT_MAX - if (md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE && UINT_MAX < hash_len) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + if (md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE && UINT_MAX < hash_len) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } +#endif + + if (options == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + pss_opts = (const mbedtls_pk_rsassa_pss_options *) options; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + if (pss_opts->mgf1_hash_id == md_alg) { + unsigned char buf[MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_PUB_DER_MAX_BYTES]; + unsigned char *p; + int key_len; + size_t signature_length; + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT; + psa_status_t destruction_status = PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT; + + psa_algorithm_t psa_md_alg = mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type(md_alg); + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key_id = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + psa_algorithm_t psa_sig_alg = PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(psa_md_alg); + p = buf + sizeof(buf); + key_len = mbedtls_rsa_write_pubkey(mbedtls_pk_rsa(*ctx), buf, &p); + + if (key_len < 0) { + return key_len; } -#endif /* SIZE_MAX > UINT_MAX */ - if (options == NULL) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + psa_set_key_type(&attributes, PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY); + psa_set_key_usage_flags(&attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH); + psa_set_key_algorithm(&attributes, psa_sig_alg); + + status = psa_import_key(&attributes, + buf + sizeof(buf) - key_len, key_len, + &key_id); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + psa_destroy_key(key_id); + return PSA_PK_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); } - pss_opts = (const mbedtls_pk_rsassa_pss_options *) options; + /* This function requires returning MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_SIG_LEN_MISMATCH + * on a valid signature with trailing data in a buffer, but + * mbedtls_psa_rsa_verify_hash requires the sig_len to be exact, + * so for this reason the passed sig_len is overwritten. Smaller + * signature lengths should not be accepted for verification. */ + signature_length = sig_len > mbedtls_pk_get_len(ctx) ? + mbedtls_pk_get_len(ctx) : sig_len; + status = psa_verify_hash(key_id, psa_sig_alg, hash, + hash_len, sig, signature_length); + destruction_status = psa_destroy_key(key_id); + + if (status == PSA_SUCCESS && sig_len > mbedtls_pk_get_len(ctx)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_SIG_LEN_MISMATCH; + } + + if (status == PSA_SUCCESS) { + status = destruction_status; + } + return PSA_PK_RSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + { if (sig_len < mbedtls_pk_get_len(ctx)) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_VERIFY_FAILED; } ret = mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_verify_ext(mbedtls_pk_rsa(*ctx), - NULL, NULL, MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC, md_alg, (unsigned int) hash_len, hash, pss_opts->mgf1_hash_id, pss_opts->expected_salt_len, @@ -395,17 +1221,10 @@ int mbedtls_pk_verify_ext(mbedtls_pk_type_t type, const void *options, } return 0; + } #else - return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; #endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C && MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21 */ - } - - /* General case: no options */ - if (options != NULL) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA; - } - - return mbedtls_pk_verify(ctx, md_alg, hash, hash_len, sig, sig_len); } /* @@ -414,17 +1233,15 @@ int mbedtls_pk_verify_ext(mbedtls_pk_type_t type, const void *options, int mbedtls_pk_sign_restartable(mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len, - unsigned char *sig, size_t *sig_len, + unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_size, size_t *sig_len, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng, mbedtls_pk_restart_ctx *rs_ctx) { - PK_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - PK_VALIDATE_RET((md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE && hash_len == 0) || - hash != NULL); - PK_VALIDATE_RET(sig != NULL); + if ((md_alg != MBEDTLS_MD_NONE || hash_len != 0) && hash == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } - if (ctx->pk_info == NULL || - pk_hashlen_helper(md_alg, &hash_len) != 0) { + if (ctx->pk_info == NULL || pk_hashlen_helper(md_alg, &hash_len) != 0) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } @@ -439,9 +1256,10 @@ int mbedtls_pk_sign_restartable(mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, return ret; } - ret = ctx->pk_info->sign_rs_func(ctx->pk_ctx, md_alg, - hash, hash_len, sig, sig_len, f_rng, p_rng, - rs_ctx->rs_ctx); + ret = ctx->pk_info->sign_rs_func(ctx, md_alg, + hash, hash_len, + sig, sig_size, sig_len, + f_rng, p_rng, rs_ctx->rs_ctx); if (ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS) { mbedtls_pk_restart_free(rs_ctx); @@ -457,8 +1275,10 @@ int mbedtls_pk_sign_restartable(mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH; } - return ctx->pk_info->sign_func(ctx->pk_ctx, md_alg, hash, hash_len, - sig, sig_len, f_rng, p_rng); + return ctx->pk_info->sign_func(ctx, md_alg, + hash, hash_len, + sig, sig_size, sig_len, + f_rng, p_rng); } /* @@ -466,11 +1286,114 @@ int mbedtls_pk_sign_restartable(mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, */ int mbedtls_pk_sign(mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len, - unsigned char *sig, size_t *sig_len, + unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_size, size_t *sig_len, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng) { return mbedtls_pk_sign_restartable(ctx, md_alg, hash, hash_len, - sig, sig_len, f_rng, p_rng, NULL); + sig, sig_size, sig_len, + f_rng, p_rng, NULL); +} + +/* + * Make a signature given a signature type. + */ +int mbedtls_pk_sign_ext(mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_type, + mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, + mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len, + unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_size, size_t *sig_len, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng) +{ + if (ctx->pk_info == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + if (!mbedtls_pk_can_do(ctx, pk_type)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH; + } + + if (pk_type != MBEDTLS_PK_RSASSA_PSS) { + return mbedtls_pk_sign(ctx, md_alg, hash, hash_len, + sig, sig_size, sig_len, f_rng, p_rng); + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21) + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + const psa_algorithm_t psa_md_alg = mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type(md_alg); + if (psa_md_alg == 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + if (mbedtls_pk_get_type(ctx) == MBEDTLS_PK_OPAQUE) { + psa_key_attributes_t key_attr = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + psa_algorithm_t psa_alg, sign_alg; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) + psa_algorithm_t psa_enrollment_alg; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C */ + psa_status_t status; + + status = psa_get_key_attributes(ctx->priv_id, &key_attr); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return PSA_PK_RSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + } + psa_alg = psa_get_key_algorithm(&key_attr); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) + psa_enrollment_alg = psa_get_key_enrollment_algorithm(&key_attr); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C */ + psa_reset_key_attributes(&key_attr); + + /* Since we're PK type is MBEDTLS_PK_RSASSA_PSS at least one between + * alg and enrollment alg should be of type RSA_PSS. */ + if (PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_PSS(psa_alg)) { + sign_alg = psa_alg; + } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) + else if (PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_PSS(psa_enrollment_alg)) { + sign_alg = psa_enrollment_alg; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C */ + else { + /* The opaque key has no RSA PSS algorithm associated. */ + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + /* Adjust the hashing algorithm. */ + sign_alg = (sign_alg & ~PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK) | PSA_ALG_GET_HASH(psa_md_alg); + + status = psa_sign_hash(ctx->priv_id, sign_alg, + hash, hash_len, + sig, sig_size, sig_len); + return PSA_PK_RSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + } + + return mbedtls_pk_psa_rsa_sign_ext(PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(psa_md_alg), + ctx->pk_ctx, hash, hash_len, + sig, sig_size, sig_len); +#else /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + + if (sig_size < mbedtls_pk_get_len(ctx)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + } + + if (pk_hashlen_helper(md_alg, &hash_len) != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + mbedtls_rsa_context *const rsa_ctx = mbedtls_pk_rsa(*ctx); + + const int ret = mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_sign_no_mode_check(rsa_ctx, f_rng, p_rng, md_alg, + (unsigned int) hash_len, hash, sig); + if (ret == 0) { + *sig_len = rsa_ctx->len; + } + return ret; + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + +#else + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C && MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21 */ } /* @@ -481,11 +1404,6 @@ int mbedtls_pk_decrypt(mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, unsigned char *output, size_t *olen, size_t osize, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng) { - PK_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - PK_VALIDATE_RET(input != NULL || ilen == 0); - PK_VALIDATE_RET(output != NULL || osize == 0); - PK_VALIDATE_RET(olen != NULL); - if (ctx->pk_info == NULL) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } @@ -494,7 +1412,7 @@ int mbedtls_pk_decrypt(mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH; } - return ctx->pk_info->decrypt_func(ctx->pk_ctx, input, ilen, + return ctx->pk_info->decrypt_func(ctx, input, ilen, output, olen, osize, f_rng, p_rng); } @@ -506,11 +1424,6 @@ int mbedtls_pk_encrypt(mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, unsigned char *output, size_t *olen, size_t osize, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng) { - PK_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - PK_VALIDATE_RET(input != NULL || ilen == 0); - PK_VALIDATE_RET(output != NULL || osize == 0); - PK_VALIDATE_RET(olen != NULL); - if (ctx->pk_info == NULL) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } @@ -519,23 +1432,27 @@ int mbedtls_pk_encrypt(mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH; } - return ctx->pk_info->encrypt_func(ctx->pk_ctx, input, ilen, + return ctx->pk_info->encrypt_func(ctx, input, ilen, output, olen, osize, f_rng, p_rng); } /* * Check public-private key pair */ -int mbedtls_pk_check_pair(const mbedtls_pk_context *pub, const mbedtls_pk_context *prv) +int mbedtls_pk_check_pair(const mbedtls_pk_context *pub, + const mbedtls_pk_context *prv, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng) { - PK_VALIDATE_RET(pub != NULL); - PK_VALIDATE_RET(prv != NULL); - if (pub->pk_info == NULL || prv->pk_info == NULL) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } + if (f_rng == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + if (prv->pk_info->check_pair_func == NULL) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; } @@ -545,12 +1462,15 @@ int mbedtls_pk_check_pair(const mbedtls_pk_context *pub, const mbedtls_pk_contex return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH; } } else { - if (pub->pk_info != prv->pk_info) { + if ((prv->pk_info->type != MBEDTLS_PK_OPAQUE) && + (pub->pk_info != prv->pk_info)) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH; } } - return prv->pk_info->check_pair_func(pub->pk_ctx, prv->pk_ctx); + return prv->pk_info->check_pair_func((mbedtls_pk_context *) pub, + (mbedtls_pk_context *) prv, + f_rng, p_rng); } /* @@ -564,7 +1484,7 @@ size_t mbedtls_pk_get_bitlen(const mbedtls_pk_context *ctx) return 0; } - return ctx->pk_info->get_bitlen(ctx->pk_ctx); + return ctx->pk_info->get_bitlen((mbedtls_pk_context *) ctx); } /* @@ -572,7 +1492,6 @@ size_t mbedtls_pk_get_bitlen(const mbedtls_pk_context *ctx) */ int mbedtls_pk_debug(const mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, mbedtls_pk_debug_item *items) { - PK_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); if (ctx->pk_info == NULL) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } @@ -581,7 +1500,7 @@ int mbedtls_pk_debug(const mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, mbedtls_pk_debug_item *items return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH; } - ctx->pk_info->debug_func(ctx->pk_ctx, items); + ctx->pk_info->debug_func((mbedtls_pk_context *) ctx, items); return 0; } @@ -609,66 +1528,4 @@ mbedtls_pk_type_t mbedtls_pk_get_type(const mbedtls_pk_context *ctx) return ctx->pk_info->type; } -#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) -/* - * Load the key to a PSA key slot, - * then turn the PK context into a wrapper for that key slot. - * - * Currently only works for EC private keys. - */ -int mbedtls_pk_wrap_as_opaque(mbedtls_pk_context *pk, - psa_key_id_t *key, - psa_algorithm_t hash_alg) -{ -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) - ((void) pk); - ((void) key); - ((void) hash_alg); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH; -#else - const mbedtls_ecp_keypair *ec; - unsigned char d[MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BYTES]; - size_t d_len; - psa_ecc_family_t curve_id; - psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; - psa_key_type_t key_type; - size_t bits; - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - psa_status_t status; - - /* export the private key material in the format PSA wants */ - if (mbedtls_pk_get_type(pk) != MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH; - } - - ec = mbedtls_pk_ec(*pk); - d_len = (ec->grp.nbits + 7) / 8; - if ((ret = mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(&ec->d, d, d_len)) != 0) { - return ret; - } - - curve_id = mbedtls_ecc_group_to_psa(ec->grp.id, &bits); - key_type = PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(curve_id); - - /* prepare the key attributes */ - psa_set_key_type(&attributes, key_type); - psa_set_key_bits(&attributes, bits); - psa_set_key_usage_flags(&attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH); - psa_set_key_algorithm(&attributes, PSA_ALG_ECDSA(hash_alg)); - - /* import private key into PSA */ - status = psa_import_key(&attributes, d, d_len, key); - mbedtls_platform_zeroize(d, sizeof(d)); - if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_HW_ACCEL_FAILED; - } - - /* make PK context wrap the key slot */ - mbedtls_pk_free(pk); - mbedtls_pk_init(pk); - - return mbedtls_pk_setup_opaque(pk, *key); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */ -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_C */ diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/pk_ecc.c b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/pk_ecc.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..86218fffc898 --- /dev/null +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/pk_ecc.c @@ -0,0 +1,255 @@ +/* + * ECC setters for PK. + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#include "mbedtls/pk.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" +#include "mbedtls/ecp.h" +#include "pk_internal.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS) + +int mbedtls_pk_ecc_set_group(mbedtls_pk_context *pk, mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA) + size_t ec_bits; + psa_ecc_family_t ec_family = mbedtls_ecc_group_to_psa(grp_id, &ec_bits); + + /* group may already be initialized; if so, make sure IDs match */ + if ((pk->ec_family != 0 && pk->ec_family != ec_family) || + (pk->ec_bits != 0 && pk->ec_bits != ec_bits)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT; + } + + /* set group */ + pk->ec_family = ec_family; + pk->ec_bits = ec_bits; + + return 0; +#else /* MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA */ + mbedtls_ecp_keypair *ecp = mbedtls_pk_ec_rw(*pk); + + /* grp may already be initialized; if so, make sure IDs match */ + if (mbedtls_pk_ec_ro(*pk)->grp.id != MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE && + mbedtls_pk_ec_ro(*pk)->grp.id != grp_id) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT; + } + + /* set group */ + return mbedtls_ecp_group_load(&(ecp->grp), grp_id); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA */ +} + +int mbedtls_pk_ecc_set_key(mbedtls_pk_context *pk, unsigned char *key, size_t key_len) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA) + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + psa_key_usage_t flags; + psa_status_t status; + + psa_set_key_type(&attributes, PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(pk->ec_family)); + if (pk->ec_family == PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY) { + /* Do not set algorithm here because Montgomery keys cannot do ECDSA and + * the PK module cannot do ECDH. When the key will be used in TLS for + * ECDH, it will be exported and then re-imported with proper flags + * and algorithm. */ + flags = PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT; + } else { + psa_set_key_algorithm(&attributes, + MBEDTLS_PK_PSA_ALG_ECDSA_MAYBE_DET(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH)); + flags = PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | + PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT; + } + psa_set_key_usage_flags(&attributes, flags); + + status = psa_import_key(&attributes, key, key_len, &pk->priv_id); + return psa_pk_status_to_mbedtls(status); + +#else /* MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA */ + + mbedtls_ecp_keypair *eck = mbedtls_pk_ec_rw(*pk); + int ret = mbedtls_ecp_read_key(eck->grp.id, eck, key, key_len); + if (ret != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, ret); + } + return 0; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA */ +} + +int mbedtls_pk_ecc_set_pubkey_from_prv(mbedtls_pk_context *pk, + const unsigned char *prv, size_t prv_len, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA) + + (void) f_rng; + (void) p_rng; + (void) prv; + (void) prv_len; + psa_status_t status; + + status = psa_export_public_key(pk->priv_id, pk->pub_raw, sizeof(pk->pub_raw), + &pk->pub_raw_len); + return psa_pk_status_to_mbedtls(status); + +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) /* && !MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA */ + + (void) f_rng; + (void) p_rng; + psa_status_t status; + + mbedtls_ecp_keypair *eck = (mbedtls_ecp_keypair *) pk->pk_ctx; + size_t curve_bits; + psa_ecc_family_t curve = mbedtls_ecc_group_to_psa(eck->grp.id, &curve_bits); + + /* Import private key into PSA, from serialized input */ + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key_id = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + psa_key_attributes_t key_attr = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + psa_set_key_type(&key_attr, PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(curve)); + psa_set_key_usage_flags(&key_attr, PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT); + status = psa_import_key(&key_attr, prv, prv_len, &key_id); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return psa_pk_status_to_mbedtls(status); + } + + /* Export public key from PSA */ + unsigned char pub[MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_LENGTH]; + size_t pub_len; + status = psa_export_public_key(key_id, pub, sizeof(pub), &pub_len); + psa_status_t destruction_status = psa_destroy_key(key_id); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return psa_pk_status_to_mbedtls(status); + } else if (destruction_status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return psa_pk_status_to_mbedtls(destruction_status); + } + + /* Load serialized public key into ecp_keypair structure */ + return mbedtls_ecp_point_read_binary(&eck->grp, &eck->Q, pub, pub_len); + +#else /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + + (void) prv; + (void) prv_len; + + mbedtls_ecp_keypair *eck = (mbedtls_ecp_keypair *) pk->pk_ctx; + return mbedtls_ecp_mul(&eck->grp, &eck->Q, &eck->d, &eck->grp.G, f_rng, p_rng); + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA) +/* + * Set the public key: fallback using ECP_LIGHT in the USE_PSA_EC_DATA case. + * + * Normally, when MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA is enabled, we only use PSA + * functions to handle keys. However, currently psa_import_key() does not + * support compressed points. In case that support was explicitly requested, + * this fallback uses ECP functions to get the job done. This is the reason + * why MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_EC_COMPRESSED auto-enables MBEDTLS_ECP_LIGHT. + * + * [in/out] pk: in: must have the group set, see mbedtls_pk_ecc_set_group(). + * out: will have the public key set. + * [in] pub, pub_len: the public key as an ECPoint, + * in any format supported by ECP. + * + * Return: + * - 0 on success; + * - MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE if the format is potentially valid + * but not supported; + * - another error code otherwise. + */ +static int pk_ecc_set_pubkey_psa_ecp_fallback(mbedtls_pk_context *pk, + const unsigned char *pub, + size_t pub_len) +{ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_EC_COMPRESSED) + (void) pk; + (void) pub; + (void) pub_len; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; +#else /* MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_EC_COMPRESSED */ + mbedtls_ecp_keypair ecp_key; + mbedtls_ecp_group_id ecp_group_id; + int ret; + + ecp_group_id = mbedtls_ecc_group_from_psa(pk->ec_family, pk->ec_bits); + + mbedtls_ecp_keypair_init(&ecp_key); + ret = mbedtls_ecp_group_load(&(ecp_key.grp), ecp_group_id); + if (ret != 0) { + goto exit; + } + ret = mbedtls_ecp_point_read_binary(&(ecp_key.grp), &ecp_key.Q, + pub, pub_len); + if (ret != 0) { + goto exit; + } + ret = mbedtls_ecp_point_write_binary(&(ecp_key.grp), &ecp_key.Q, + MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_UNCOMPRESSED, + &pk->pub_raw_len, pk->pub_raw, + sizeof(pk->pub_raw)); + +exit: + mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free(&ecp_key); + return ret; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_EC_COMPRESSED */ +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA */ + +int mbedtls_pk_ecc_set_pubkey(mbedtls_pk_context *pk, const unsigned char *pub, size_t pub_len) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA) + + /* Load the key */ + if (!PSA_ECC_FAMILY_IS_WEIERSTRASS(pk->ec_family) || *pub == 0x04) { + /* Format directly supported by PSA: + * - non-Weierstrass curves that only have one format; + * - uncompressed format for Weierstrass curves. */ + if (pub_len > sizeof(pk->pub_raw)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + } + memcpy(pk->pub_raw, pub, pub_len); + pk->pub_raw_len = pub_len; + } else { + /* Other format, try the fallback */ + int ret = pk_ecc_set_pubkey_psa_ecp_fallback(pk, pub, pub_len); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + } + + /* Validate the key by trying to import it */ + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key_id = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + psa_key_attributes_t key_attrs = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + + psa_set_key_usage_flags(&key_attrs, 0); + psa_set_key_type(&key_attrs, PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(pk->ec_family)); + psa_set_key_bits(&key_attrs, pk->ec_bits); + + if ((psa_import_key(&key_attrs, pk->pub_raw, pk->pub_raw_len, + &key_id) != PSA_SUCCESS) || + (psa_destroy_key(key_id) != PSA_SUCCESS)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_PUBKEY; + } + + return 0; + +#else /* MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA */ + + int ret; + mbedtls_ecp_keypair *ec_key = (mbedtls_ecp_keypair *) pk->pk_ctx; + ret = mbedtls_ecp_point_read_binary(&ec_key->grp, &ec_key->Q, pub, pub_len); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + return mbedtls_ecp_check_pubkey(&ec_key->grp, &ec_key->Q); + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA */ +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_C && MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS */ diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/pk_internal.h b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/pk_internal.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..e86a3a09d2c5 --- /dev/null +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/pk_internal.h @@ -0,0 +1,207 @@ +/** + * \file pk_internal.h + * + * \brief Public Key abstraction layer: internal (i.e. library only) functions + * and definitions. + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ +#ifndef MBEDTLS_PK_INTERNAL_H +#define MBEDTLS_PK_INTERNAL_H + +#include "mbedtls/pk.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS) +#include "mbedtls/ecp.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT) +#include "psa/crypto.h" + +#include "psa_util_internal.h" +#define PSA_PK_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status) psa_pk_status_to_mbedtls(status) +#define PSA_PK_RSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status) PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR_LIST(status, \ + psa_to_pk_rsa_errors, \ + psa_pk_status_to_mbedtls) +#define PSA_PK_ECDSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status) PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR_LIST(status, \ + psa_to_pk_ecdsa_errors, \ + psa_pk_status_to_mbedtls) +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT */ + +/* Headers/footers for PEM files */ +#define PEM_BEGIN_PUBLIC_KEY "-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----" +#define PEM_END_PUBLIC_KEY "-----END PUBLIC KEY-----" +#define PEM_BEGIN_PRIVATE_KEY_RSA "-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----" +#define PEM_END_PRIVATE_KEY_RSA "-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----" +#define PEM_BEGIN_PUBLIC_KEY_RSA "-----BEGIN RSA PUBLIC KEY-----" +#define PEM_END_PUBLIC_KEY_RSA "-----END RSA PUBLIC KEY-----" +#define PEM_BEGIN_PRIVATE_KEY_EC "-----BEGIN EC PRIVATE KEY-----" +#define PEM_END_PRIVATE_KEY_EC "-----END EC PRIVATE KEY-----" +#define PEM_BEGIN_PRIVATE_KEY_PKCS8 "-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----" +#define PEM_END_PRIVATE_KEY_PKCS8 "-----END PRIVATE KEY-----" +#define PEM_BEGIN_ENCRYPTED_PRIVATE_KEY_PKCS8 "-----BEGIN ENCRYPTED PRIVATE KEY-----" +#define PEM_END_ENCRYPTED_PRIVATE_KEY_PKCS8 "-----END ENCRYPTED PRIVATE KEY-----" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA) +/** + * Public function mbedtls_pk_ec() can be used to get direct access to the + * wrapped ecp_keypair structure pointed to the pk_ctx. However this is not + * ideal because it bypasses the PK module on the control of its internal + * structure (pk_context) fields. + * For backward compatibility we keep mbedtls_pk_ec() when ECP_C is defined, but + * we provide 2 very similar functions when only ECP_LIGHT is enabled and not + * ECP_C. + * These variants embed the "ro" or "rw" keywords in their name to make the + * usage of the returned pointer explicit. Of course the returned value is + * const or non-const accordingly. + */ +static inline const mbedtls_ecp_keypair *mbedtls_pk_ec_ro(const mbedtls_pk_context pk) +{ + switch (mbedtls_pk_get_type(&pk)) { + case MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY: + case MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY_DH: + case MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA: + return (const mbedtls_ecp_keypair *) (pk).MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(pk_ctx); + default: + return NULL; + } +} + +static inline mbedtls_ecp_keypair *mbedtls_pk_ec_rw(const mbedtls_pk_context pk) +{ + switch (mbedtls_pk_get_type(&pk)) { + case MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY: + case MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY_DH: + case MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA: + return (mbedtls_ecp_keypair *) (pk).MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(pk_ctx); + default: + return NULL; + } +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS && !MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS) +static inline mbedtls_ecp_group_id mbedtls_pk_get_ec_group_id(const mbedtls_pk_context *pk) +{ + mbedtls_ecp_group_id id; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + if (mbedtls_pk_get_type(pk) == MBEDTLS_PK_OPAQUE) { + psa_key_attributes_t opaque_attrs = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + psa_key_type_t opaque_key_type; + psa_ecc_family_t curve; + + if (psa_get_key_attributes(pk->priv_id, &opaque_attrs) != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE; + } + opaque_key_type = psa_get_key_type(&opaque_attrs); + curve = PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_GET_FAMILY(opaque_key_type); + id = mbedtls_ecc_group_from_psa(curve, psa_get_key_bits(&opaque_attrs)); + psa_reset_key_attributes(&opaque_attrs); + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA) + id = mbedtls_ecc_group_from_psa(pk->ec_family, pk->ec_bits); +#else /* MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA */ + id = mbedtls_pk_ec_ro(*pk)->grp.id; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA */ + } + + return id; +} + +/* Helper for Montgomery curves */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_CURVE25519) || defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_CURVE448) +#define MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_RFC8410_CURVES +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_CURVE25519 || MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448 */ + +#define MBEDTLS_PK_IS_RFC8410_GROUP_ID(id) \ + ((id == MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519) || (id == MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448)) + +static inline int mbedtls_pk_is_rfc8410(const mbedtls_pk_context *pk) +{ + mbedtls_ecp_group_id id = mbedtls_pk_get_ec_group_id(pk); + + return MBEDTLS_PK_IS_RFC8410_GROUP_ID(id); +} + +/* + * Set the group used by this key. + * + * [in/out] pk: in: must have been pk_setup() to an ECC type + * out: will have group (curve) information set + * [in] grp_in: a supported group ID (not NONE) + */ +int mbedtls_pk_ecc_set_group(mbedtls_pk_context *pk, mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id); + +/* + * Set the private key material + * + * [in/out] pk: in: must have the group set already, see mbedtls_pk_ecc_set_group(). + * out: will have the private key set. + * [in] key, key_len: the raw private key (no ASN.1 wrapping). + */ +int mbedtls_pk_ecc_set_key(mbedtls_pk_context *pk, unsigned char *key, size_t key_len); + +/* + * Set the public key. + * + * [in/out] pk: in: must have its group set, see mbedtls_pk_ecc_set_group(). + * out: will have the public key set. + * [in] pub, pub_len: the raw public key (an ECPoint). + * + * Return: + * - 0 on success; + * - MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE if the format is potentially valid + * but not supported; + * - another error code otherwise. + */ +int mbedtls_pk_ecc_set_pubkey(mbedtls_pk_context *pk, const unsigned char *pub, size_t pub_len); + +/* + * Derive a public key from its private counterpart. + * Computationally intensive, only use when public key is not available. + * + * [in/out] pk: in: must have the private key set, see mbedtls_pk_ecc_set_key(). + * out: will have the public key set. + * [in] prv, prv_len: the raw private key (see note below). + * [in] f_rng, p_rng: RNG function and context. + * + * Note: the private key information is always available from pk, + * however for convenience the serialized version is also passed, + * as it's available at each calling site, and useful in some configs + * (as otherwise we would have to re-serialize it from the pk context). + * + * There are three implementations of this function: + * 1. MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA, + * 2. MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO but not MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA, + * 3. not MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO. + */ +int mbedtls_pk_ecc_set_pubkey_from_prv(mbedtls_pk_context *pk, + const unsigned char *prv, size_t prv_len, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS */ + +/* Helper for (deterministic) ECDSA */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC) +#define MBEDTLS_PK_PSA_ALG_ECDSA_MAYBE_DET PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA +#else +#define MBEDTLS_PK_PSA_ALG_ECDSA_MAYBE_DET PSA_ALG_ECDSA +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS) +MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE int mbedtls_pk_parse_key_pkcs8_encrypted_der( + mbedtls_pk_context *pk, + unsigned char *key, size_t keylen, + const unsigned char *pwd, size_t pwdlen, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng); +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) +int mbedtls_pk_load_file(const char *path, unsigned char **buf, size_t *n); +#endif + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_INTERNAL_H */ diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/pk_wrap.c b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/pk_wrap.c index dd460a6a0c83..19196b559ae9 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/pk_wrap.c +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/pk_wrap.c @@ -7,15 +7,17 @@ #include "common.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" + #if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_C) -#include "mbedtls/pk_internal.h" +#include "pk_wrap.h" +#include "pk_internal.h" #include "mbedtls/error.h" +#include "mbedtls/psa_util.h" /* Even if RSA not activated, for the sake of RSA-alt */ #include "mbedtls/rsa.h" -#include - #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) #include "mbedtls/ecp.h" #endif @@ -25,23 +27,26 @@ #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) -#include "mbedtls/asn1write.h" -#endif +#include "psa_util_internal.h" +#include "psa/crypto.h" +#include "mbedtls/psa_util.h" -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT_SUPPORT) -#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) +#include "pkwrite.h" +#include "rsa_internal.h" #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) -#include "psa/crypto.h" -#include "mbedtls/psa_util.h" +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SOME) +#include "mbedtls/asn1write.h" #include "mbedtls/asn1.h" #endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ #include "mbedtls/platform.h" #include #include +#include #if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) static int rsa_can_do(mbedtls_pk_type_t type) @@ -50,49 +55,99 @@ static int rsa_can_do(mbedtls_pk_type_t type) type == MBEDTLS_PK_RSASSA_PSS; } -static size_t rsa_get_bitlen(const void *ctx) +static size_t rsa_get_bitlen(mbedtls_pk_context *pk) { - const mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa = (const mbedtls_rsa_context *) ctx; - /* Unfortunately, the rsa.h interface does not have a direct way - * to access the bit-length that works with MBEDTLS_RSA_ALT. - * So we have to do a little work here. - */ - mbedtls_mpi N; - mbedtls_mpi_init(&N); - int ret = mbedtls_rsa_export(rsa, &N, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL); - /* If the export fails for some reason (e.g. the RSA_ALT implementation - * does not support export, or there is not enough memory), - * we have no way of returning an error from this function. - * As a fallback, return the byte-length converted in bits, which is - * the correct value if the modulus size is a multiple of 8 bits, which - * is very often the case in practice. */ - size_t bitlen = (ret == 0 ? mbedtls_mpi_bitlen(&N) : - 8 * mbedtls_rsa_get_len(rsa)); - mbedtls_mpi_free(&N); - return bitlen; + const mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa = (const mbedtls_rsa_context *) pk->pk_ctx; + return mbedtls_rsa_get_bitlen(rsa); } -static int rsa_verify_wrap(void *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +static int rsa_verify_wrap(mbedtls_pk_context *pk, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len, const unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_len) { + mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa = (mbedtls_rsa_context *) pk->pk_ctx; int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa = (mbedtls_rsa_context *) ctx; + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key_id = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + psa_status_t status; + int key_len; + unsigned char buf[MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_PUB_DER_MAX_BYTES]; + unsigned char *p = buf + sizeof(buf); + psa_algorithm_t psa_alg_md; size_t rsa_len = mbedtls_rsa_get_len(rsa); #if SIZE_MAX > UINT_MAX if (md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE && UINT_MAX < hash_len) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } -#endif /* SIZE_MAX > UINT_MAX */ +#endif + + if (mbedtls_rsa_get_padding_mode(rsa) == MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21) { + psa_alg_md = PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type(md_alg)); + } else { + psa_alg_md = PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type(md_alg)); + } if (sig_len < rsa_len) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_VERIFY_FAILED; } - if ((ret = mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_verify(rsa, NULL, NULL, - MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC, md_alg, - (unsigned int) hash_len, hash, sig)) != 0) { + key_len = mbedtls_rsa_write_pubkey(rsa, buf, &p); + if (key_len <= 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + psa_set_key_usage_flags(&attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH); + psa_set_key_algorithm(&attributes, psa_alg_md); + psa_set_key_type(&attributes, PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY); + + status = psa_import_key(&attributes, + buf + sizeof(buf) - key_len, key_len, + &key_id); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + ret = PSA_PK_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + goto cleanup; + } + + status = psa_verify_hash(key_id, psa_alg_md, hash, hash_len, + sig, sig_len); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + ret = PSA_PK_RSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + goto cleanup; + } + ret = 0; + +cleanup: + status = psa_destroy_key(key_id); + if (ret == 0 && status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + ret = PSA_PK_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + } + + return ret; +} +#else /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ +static int rsa_verify_wrap(mbedtls_pk_context *pk, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len, + const unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_len) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa = (mbedtls_rsa_context *) pk->pk_ctx; + size_t rsa_len = mbedtls_rsa_get_len(rsa); + +#if SIZE_MAX > UINT_MAX + if (md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE && UINT_MAX < hash_len) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } +#endif + + if (sig_len < rsa_len) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_VERIFY_FAILED; + } + + if ((ret = mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_verify(rsa, md_alg, + (unsigned int) hash_len, + hash, sig)) != 0) { return ret; } @@ -107,61 +162,293 @@ static int rsa_verify_wrap(void *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, return 0; } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +int mbedtls_pk_psa_rsa_sign_ext(psa_algorithm_t alg, + mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa_ctx, + const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len, + unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_size, + size_t *sig_len) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key_id = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + psa_status_t status; + int key_len; + unsigned char *buf = NULL; + unsigned char *p; + + buf = mbedtls_calloc(1, MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_PRV_DER_MAX_BYTES); + if (buf == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_ALLOC_FAILED; + } + p = buf + MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_PRV_DER_MAX_BYTES; + + *sig_len = mbedtls_rsa_get_len(rsa_ctx); + if (sig_size < *sig_len) { + mbedtls_free(buf); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + } + + key_len = mbedtls_rsa_write_key(rsa_ctx, buf, &p); + if (key_len <= 0) { + mbedtls_free(buf); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + psa_set_key_usage_flags(&attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH); + psa_set_key_algorithm(&attributes, alg); + psa_set_key_type(&attributes, PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR); + + status = psa_import_key(&attributes, + buf + MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_PRV_DER_MAX_BYTES - key_len, key_len, + &key_id); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + ret = PSA_PK_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + goto cleanup; + } + status = psa_sign_hash(key_id, alg, hash, hash_len, + sig, sig_size, sig_len); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + ret = PSA_PK_RSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + goto cleanup; + } + + ret = 0; + +cleanup: + mbedtls_free(buf); + status = psa_destroy_key(key_id); + if (ret == 0 && status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + ret = PSA_PK_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + } + return ret; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ -static int rsa_sign_wrap(void *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +static int rsa_sign_wrap(mbedtls_pk_context *pk, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len, - unsigned char *sig, size_t *sig_len, + unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_size, size_t *sig_len, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng) { - mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa = (mbedtls_rsa_context *) ctx; + ((void) f_rng); + ((void) p_rng); + + psa_algorithm_t psa_md_alg; + psa_md_alg = mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type(md_alg); + if (psa_md_alg == 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + psa_algorithm_t psa_alg; + if (mbedtls_rsa_get_padding_mode(mbedtls_pk_rsa(*pk)) == MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21) { + psa_alg = PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(psa_md_alg); + } else { + psa_alg = PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(psa_md_alg); + } + + return mbedtls_pk_psa_rsa_sign_ext(psa_alg, pk->pk_ctx, hash, hash_len, + sig, sig_size, sig_len); +} +#else /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ +static int rsa_sign_wrap(mbedtls_pk_context *pk, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len, + unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_size, size_t *sig_len, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng) +{ + mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa = (mbedtls_rsa_context *) pk->pk_ctx; #if SIZE_MAX > UINT_MAX if (md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE && UINT_MAX < hash_len) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } -#endif /* SIZE_MAX > UINT_MAX */ +#endif *sig_len = mbedtls_rsa_get_len(rsa); + if (sig_size < *sig_len) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + } - return mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_sign(rsa, f_rng, p_rng, MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE, - md_alg, (unsigned int) hash_len, hash, sig); + return mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_sign(rsa, f_rng, p_rng, + md_alg, (unsigned int) hash_len, + hash, sig); } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ -static int rsa_decrypt_wrap(void *ctx, +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +static int rsa_decrypt_wrap(mbedtls_pk_context *pk, const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen, unsigned char *output, size_t *olen, size_t osize, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng) { - mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa = (mbedtls_rsa_context *) ctx; + mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa = (mbedtls_rsa_context *) pk->pk_ctx; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key_id = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + psa_algorithm_t psa_md_alg, decrypt_alg; + psa_status_t status; + int key_len; + unsigned char buf[MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_PRV_DER_MAX_BYTES]; + unsigned char *p = buf + sizeof(buf); + + ((void) f_rng); + ((void) p_rng); + + if (ilen != mbedtls_rsa_get_len(rsa)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + key_len = mbedtls_rsa_write_key(rsa, buf, &p); + if (key_len <= 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + psa_set_key_type(&attributes, PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR); + psa_set_key_usage_flags(&attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT); + if (mbedtls_rsa_get_padding_mode(rsa) == MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21) { + psa_md_alg = mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type((mbedtls_md_type_t) mbedtls_rsa_get_md_alg(rsa)); + decrypt_alg = PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(psa_md_alg); + } else { + decrypt_alg = PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT; + } + psa_set_key_algorithm(&attributes, decrypt_alg); + + status = psa_import_key(&attributes, + buf + sizeof(buf) - key_len, key_len, + &key_id); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + ret = PSA_PK_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + goto cleanup; + } + + status = psa_asymmetric_decrypt(key_id, decrypt_alg, + input, ilen, + NULL, 0, + output, osize, olen); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + ret = PSA_PK_RSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + goto cleanup; + } + + ret = 0; + +cleanup: + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(buf, sizeof(buf)); + status = psa_destroy_key(key_id); + if (ret == 0 && status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + ret = PSA_PK_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + } + + return ret; +} +#else /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ +static int rsa_decrypt_wrap(mbedtls_pk_context *pk, + const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen, + unsigned char *output, size_t *olen, size_t osize, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng) +{ + mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa = (mbedtls_rsa_context *) pk->pk_ctx; if (ilen != mbedtls_rsa_get_len(rsa)) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } return mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_decrypt(rsa, f_rng, p_rng, - MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE, olen, input, output, osize); + olen, input, output, osize); } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ -static int rsa_encrypt_wrap(void *ctx, +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +static int rsa_encrypt_wrap(mbedtls_pk_context *pk, const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen, unsigned char *output, size_t *olen, size_t osize, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng) { - mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa = (mbedtls_rsa_context *) ctx; + mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa = (mbedtls_rsa_context *) pk->pk_ctx; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key_id = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + psa_algorithm_t psa_md_alg, psa_encrypt_alg; + psa_status_t status; + int key_len; + unsigned char buf[MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_PUB_DER_MAX_BYTES]; + unsigned char *p = buf + sizeof(buf); + + ((void) f_rng); + ((void) p_rng); + + if (mbedtls_rsa_get_len(rsa) > osize) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_OUTPUT_TOO_LARGE; + } + + key_len = mbedtls_rsa_write_pubkey(rsa, buf, &p); + if (key_len <= 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + psa_set_key_usage_flags(&attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT); + if (mbedtls_rsa_get_padding_mode(rsa) == MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21) { + psa_md_alg = mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type((mbedtls_md_type_t) mbedtls_rsa_get_md_alg(rsa)); + psa_encrypt_alg = PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(psa_md_alg); + } else { + psa_encrypt_alg = PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT; + } + psa_set_key_algorithm(&attributes, psa_encrypt_alg); + psa_set_key_type(&attributes, PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY); + + status = psa_import_key(&attributes, + buf + sizeof(buf) - key_len, key_len, + &key_id); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + ret = PSA_PK_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + goto cleanup; + } + + status = psa_asymmetric_encrypt(key_id, psa_encrypt_alg, + input, ilen, + NULL, 0, + output, osize, olen); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + ret = PSA_PK_RSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + goto cleanup; + } + + ret = 0; + +cleanup: + status = psa_destroy_key(key_id); + if (ret == 0 && status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + ret = PSA_PK_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + } + + return ret; +} +#else /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ +static int rsa_encrypt_wrap(mbedtls_pk_context *pk, + const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen, + unsigned char *output, size_t *olen, size_t osize, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng) +{ + mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa = (mbedtls_rsa_context *) pk->pk_ctx; *olen = mbedtls_rsa_get_len(rsa); if (*olen > osize) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_OUTPUT_TOO_LARGE; } - return mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_encrypt(rsa, f_rng, p_rng, MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC, + return mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_encrypt(rsa, f_rng, p_rng, ilen, input, output); } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ -static int rsa_check_pair_wrap(const void *pub, const void *prv) +static int rsa_check_pair_wrap(mbedtls_pk_context *pub, mbedtls_pk_context *prv, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng) { - return mbedtls_rsa_check_pub_priv((const mbedtls_rsa_context *) pub, - (const mbedtls_rsa_context *) prv); + (void) f_rng; + (void) p_rng; + return mbedtls_rsa_check_pub_priv((const mbedtls_rsa_context *) pub->pk_ctx, + (const mbedtls_rsa_context *) prv->pk_ctx); } static void *rsa_alloc_wrap(void) @@ -169,7 +456,7 @@ static void *rsa_alloc_wrap(void) void *ctx = mbedtls_calloc(1, sizeof(mbedtls_rsa_context)); if (ctx != NULL) { - mbedtls_rsa_init((mbedtls_rsa_context *) ctx, 0, 0); + mbedtls_rsa_init((mbedtls_rsa_context *) ctx); } return ctx; @@ -181,44 +468,50 @@ static void rsa_free_wrap(void *ctx) mbedtls_free(ctx); } -static void rsa_debug(const void *ctx, mbedtls_pk_debug_item *items) +static void rsa_debug(mbedtls_pk_context *pk, mbedtls_pk_debug_item *items) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_ALT) + /* Not supported */ + (void) pk; + (void) items; +#else + mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa = (mbedtls_rsa_context *) pk->pk_ctx; + items->type = MBEDTLS_PK_DEBUG_MPI; items->name = "rsa.N"; - items->value = &(((mbedtls_rsa_context *) ctx)->N); + items->value = &(rsa->N); items++; items->type = MBEDTLS_PK_DEBUG_MPI; items->name = "rsa.E"; - items->value = &(((mbedtls_rsa_context *) ctx)->E); + items->value = &(rsa->E); +#endif } const mbedtls_pk_info_t mbedtls_rsa_info = { - MBEDTLS_PK_RSA, - "RSA", - rsa_get_bitlen, - rsa_can_do, - rsa_verify_wrap, - rsa_sign_wrap, + .type = MBEDTLS_PK_RSA, + .name = "RSA", + .get_bitlen = rsa_get_bitlen, + .can_do = rsa_can_do, + .verify_func = rsa_verify_wrap, + .sign_func = rsa_sign_wrap, #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) - NULL, - NULL, -#endif - rsa_decrypt_wrap, - rsa_encrypt_wrap, - rsa_check_pair_wrap, - rsa_alloc_wrap, - rsa_free_wrap, -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) - NULL, - NULL, -#endif - rsa_debug, + .verify_rs_func = NULL, + .sign_rs_func = NULL, + .rs_alloc_func = NULL, + .rs_free_func = NULL, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C && MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */ + .decrypt_func = rsa_decrypt_wrap, + .encrypt_func = rsa_encrypt_wrap, + .check_pair_func = rsa_check_pair_wrap, + .ctx_alloc_func = rsa_alloc_wrap, + .ctx_free_func = rsa_free_wrap, + .debug_func = rsa_debug, }; #endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS) /* * Generic EC key */ @@ -229,70 +522,313 @@ static int eckey_can_do(mbedtls_pk_type_t type) type == MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA; } -static size_t eckey_get_bitlen(const void *ctx) +static size_t eckey_get_bitlen(mbedtls_pk_context *pk) { - return ((mbedtls_ecp_keypair *) ctx)->grp.pbits; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA) + return pk->ec_bits; +#else /* MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA */ + mbedtls_ecp_keypair *ecp = (mbedtls_ecp_keypair *) pk->pk_ctx; + return ecp->grp.pbits; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA */ } -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) -/* Forward declarations */ -static int ecdsa_verify_wrap(void *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_VERIFY) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +/* Common helper for ECDSA verify using PSA functions. */ +static int ecdsa_verify_psa(unsigned char *key, size_t key_len, + psa_ecc_family_t curve, size_t curve_bits, + const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len, + const unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_len) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key_id = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + psa_algorithm_t psa_sig_md = PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY; + size_t signature_len = PSA_ECDSA_SIGNATURE_SIZE(curve_bits); + size_t converted_sig_len; + unsigned char extracted_sig[PSA_VENDOR_ECDSA_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE]; + unsigned char *p; + psa_status_t status; + + if (curve == 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + psa_set_key_type(&attributes, PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(curve)); + psa_set_key_usage_flags(&attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH); + psa_set_key_algorithm(&attributes, psa_sig_md); + + status = psa_import_key(&attributes, key, key_len, &key_id); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + ret = PSA_PK_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + goto cleanup; + } + + if (signature_len > sizeof(extracted_sig)) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + goto cleanup; + } + + p = (unsigned char *) sig; + ret = mbedtls_ecdsa_der_to_raw(curve_bits, p, sig_len, extracted_sig, + sizeof(extracted_sig), &converted_sig_len); + if (ret != 0) { + goto cleanup; + } + + if (converted_sig_len != signature_len) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + goto cleanup; + } + + status = psa_verify_hash(key_id, psa_sig_md, hash, hash_len, + extracted_sig, signature_len); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + ret = PSA_PK_ECDSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + goto cleanup; + } + + ret = 0; + +cleanup: + status = psa_destroy_key(key_id); + if (ret == 0 && status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + ret = PSA_PK_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + } + + return ret; +} + +static int ecdsa_opaque_verify_wrap(mbedtls_pk_context *pk, + mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len, + const unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_len) +{ + (void) md_alg; + unsigned char key[MBEDTLS_PK_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_RAW_LEN]; + size_t key_len; + psa_key_attributes_t key_attr = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + psa_ecc_family_t curve; + size_t curve_bits; + psa_status_t status; + + status = psa_get_key_attributes(pk->priv_id, &key_attr); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return PSA_PK_ECDSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + } + curve = PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_GET_FAMILY(psa_get_key_type(&key_attr)); + curve_bits = psa_get_key_bits(&key_attr); + psa_reset_key_attributes(&key_attr); + + status = psa_export_public_key(pk->priv_id, key, sizeof(key), &key_len); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return PSA_PK_ECDSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + } + + return ecdsa_verify_psa(key, key_len, curve, curve_bits, + hash, hash_len, sig, sig_len); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA) +static int ecdsa_verify_wrap(mbedtls_pk_context *pk, + mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len, + const unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_len) +{ + (void) md_alg; + psa_ecc_family_t curve = pk->ec_family; + size_t curve_bits = pk->ec_bits; + + return ecdsa_verify_psa(pk->pub_raw, pk->pub_raw_len, curve, curve_bits, + hash, hash_len, sig, sig_len); +} +#else /* MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA */ +static int ecdsa_verify_wrap(mbedtls_pk_context *pk, + mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len, - const unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_len); + const unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_len) +{ + (void) md_alg; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_ecp_keypair *ctx = pk->pk_ctx; + unsigned char key[MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_LENGTH]; + size_t key_len; + size_t curve_bits; + psa_ecc_family_t curve = mbedtls_ecc_group_to_psa(ctx->grp.id, &curve_bits); -static int ecdsa_sign_wrap(void *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, - const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len, - unsigned char *sig, size_t *sig_len, - int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng); + ret = mbedtls_ecp_point_write_binary(&ctx->grp, &ctx->Q, + MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_UNCOMPRESSED, + &key_len, key, sizeof(key)); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } -static int eckey_verify_wrap(void *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + return ecdsa_verify_psa(key, key_len, curve, curve_bits, + hash, hash_len, sig, sig_len); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA */ +#else /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ +static int ecdsa_verify_wrap(mbedtls_pk_context *pk, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len, const unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_len) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - mbedtls_ecdsa_context ecdsa; + ((void) md_alg); - mbedtls_ecdsa_init(&ecdsa); + ret = mbedtls_ecdsa_read_signature((mbedtls_ecdsa_context *) pk->pk_ctx, + hash, hash_len, sig, sig_len); - if ((ret = mbedtls_ecdsa_from_keypair(&ecdsa, ctx)) == 0) { - ret = ecdsa_verify_wrap(&ecdsa, md_alg, hash, hash_len, sig, sig_len); + if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_SIG_LEN_MISMATCH) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_SIG_LEN_MISMATCH; } - mbedtls_ecdsa_free(&ecdsa); + return ret; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_VERIFY */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SIGN) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +/* Common helper for ECDSA sign using PSA functions. + * Instead of extracting key's properties in order to check which kind of ECDSA + * signature it supports, we try both deterministic and non-deterministic. + */ +static int ecdsa_sign_psa(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key_id, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len, + unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_size, size_t *sig_len) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_status_t status; + psa_key_attributes_t key_attr = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + size_t key_bits = 0; + + status = psa_get_key_attributes(key_id, &key_attr); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return PSA_PK_ECDSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + } + key_bits = psa_get_key_bits(&key_attr); + psa_reset_key_attributes(&key_attr); + + status = psa_sign_hash(key_id, + PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type(md_alg)), + hash, hash_len, sig, sig_size, sig_len); + if (status == PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto done; + } else if (status != PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED) { + return PSA_PK_ECDSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + } + + status = psa_sign_hash(key_id, + PSA_ALG_ECDSA(mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type(md_alg)), + hash, hash_len, sig, sig_size, sig_len); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return PSA_PK_ECDSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + } + +done: + ret = mbedtls_ecdsa_raw_to_der(key_bits, sig, *sig_len, sig, sig_size, sig_len); return ret; } -static int eckey_sign_wrap(void *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, +static int ecdsa_opaque_sign_wrap(mbedtls_pk_context *pk, + mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len, + unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_size, + size_t *sig_len, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng) +{ + ((void) f_rng); + ((void) p_rng); + + return ecdsa_sign_psa(pk->priv_id, md_alg, hash, hash_len, sig, sig_size, + sig_len); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA) +/* When PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA is defined opaque and non-opaque keys end up + * using the same function. */ +#define ecdsa_sign_wrap ecdsa_opaque_sign_wrap +#else /* MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA */ +static int ecdsa_sign_wrap(mbedtls_pk_context *pk, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len, - unsigned char *sig, size_t *sig_len, + unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_size, size_t *sig_len, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - mbedtls_ecdsa_context ecdsa; + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key_id = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + psa_status_t status; + mbedtls_ecp_keypair *ctx = pk->pk_ctx; + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + unsigned char buf[MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_KEY_PAIR_LENGTH]; + size_t curve_bits; + psa_ecc_family_t curve = + mbedtls_ecc_group_to_psa(ctx->grp.id, &curve_bits); + size_t key_len = PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(curve_bits); + psa_algorithm_t psa_hash = mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type(md_alg); + psa_algorithm_t psa_sig_md = MBEDTLS_PK_PSA_ALG_ECDSA_MAYBE_DET(psa_hash); + ((void) f_rng); + ((void) p_rng); + + if (curve == 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + if (key_len > sizeof(buf)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + } + ret = mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(&ctx->d, buf, key_len); + if (ret != 0) { + goto cleanup; + } - mbedtls_ecdsa_init(&ecdsa); + psa_set_key_type(&attributes, PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(curve)); + psa_set_key_usage_flags(&attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH); + psa_set_key_algorithm(&attributes, psa_sig_md); - if ((ret = mbedtls_ecdsa_from_keypair(&ecdsa, ctx)) == 0) { - ret = ecdsa_sign_wrap(&ecdsa, md_alg, hash, hash_len, sig, sig_len, - f_rng, p_rng); + status = psa_import_key(&attributes, buf, key_len, &key_id); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + ret = PSA_PK_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + goto cleanup; } - mbedtls_ecdsa_free(&ecdsa); + ret = ecdsa_sign_psa(key_id, md_alg, hash, hash_len, sig, sig_size, sig_len); + +cleanup: + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(buf, sizeof(buf)); + status = psa_destroy_key(key_id); + if (ret == 0 && status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + ret = PSA_PK_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + } return ret; } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA */ +#else /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ +static int ecdsa_sign_wrap(mbedtls_pk_context *pk, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len, + unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_size, size_t *sig_len, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng) +{ + return mbedtls_ecdsa_write_signature((mbedtls_ecdsa_context *) pk->pk_ctx, + md_alg, hash, hash_len, + sig, sig_size, sig_len, + f_rng, p_rng); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SIGN */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) /* Forward declarations */ -static int ecdsa_verify_rs_wrap(void *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, +static int ecdsa_verify_rs_wrap(mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len, const unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_len, void *rs_ctx); -static int ecdsa_sign_rs_wrap(void *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, +static int ecdsa_sign_rs_wrap(mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len, - unsigned char *sig, size_t *sig_len, + unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_size, size_t *sig_len, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng, void *rs_ctx); @@ -337,7 +873,7 @@ static void eckey_rs_free(void *ctx) mbedtls_free(ctx); } -static int eckey_verify_rs_wrap(void *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, +static int eckey_verify_rs_wrap(mbedtls_pk_context *pk, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len, const unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_len, void *rs_ctx) @@ -352,52 +888,196 @@ static int eckey_verify_rs_wrap(void *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, /* set up our own sub-context if needed (that is, on first run) */ if (rs->ecdsa_ctx.grp.pbits == 0) { - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_ecdsa_from_keypair(&rs->ecdsa_ctx, ctx)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_ecdsa_from_keypair(&rs->ecdsa_ctx, pk->pk_ctx)); } - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(ecdsa_verify_rs_wrap(&rs->ecdsa_ctx, + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(ecdsa_verify_rs_wrap(pk, md_alg, hash, hash_len, sig, sig_len, &rs->ecdsa_rs)); -cleanup: - return ret; -} +cleanup: + return ret; +} + +static int eckey_sign_rs_wrap(mbedtls_pk_context *pk, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len, + unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_size, size_t *sig_len, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng, + void *rs_ctx) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + eckey_restart_ctx *rs = rs_ctx; + + /* Should never happen */ + if (rs == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + /* set up our own sub-context if needed (that is, on first run) */ + if (rs->ecdsa_ctx.grp.pbits == 0) { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_ecdsa_from_keypair(&rs->ecdsa_ctx, pk->pk_ctx)); + } + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(ecdsa_sign_rs_wrap(pk, md_alg, + hash, hash_len, sig, sig_size, sig_len, + f_rng, p_rng, &rs->ecdsa_rs)); + +cleanup: + return ret; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C && MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA) +static int eckey_check_pair_psa(mbedtls_pk_context *pub, mbedtls_pk_context *prv) +{ + psa_status_t status; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + uint8_t prv_key_buf[MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_LENGTH]; + size_t prv_key_len; + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key_id = prv->priv_id; + + status = psa_export_public_key(key_id, prv_key_buf, sizeof(prv_key_buf), + &prv_key_len); + ret = PSA_PK_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + + if (memcmp(prv_key_buf, pub->pub_raw, pub->pub_raw_len) != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + return 0; +} +#else /* MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA */ +static int eckey_check_pair_psa(mbedtls_pk_context *pub, mbedtls_pk_context *prv) +{ + psa_status_t status; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + uint8_t prv_key_buf[MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_LENGTH]; + size_t prv_key_len; + psa_status_t destruction_status; + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key_id = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + psa_key_attributes_t key_attr = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + uint8_t pub_key_buf[MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_LENGTH]; + size_t pub_key_len; + size_t curve_bits; + const psa_ecc_family_t curve = + mbedtls_ecc_group_to_psa(mbedtls_pk_ec_ro(*prv)->grp.id, &curve_bits); + const size_t curve_bytes = PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(curve_bits); + + if (curve == 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + psa_set_key_type(&key_attr, PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(curve)); + psa_set_key_usage_flags(&key_attr, PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT); + + ret = mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(&mbedtls_pk_ec_ro(*prv)->d, + prv_key_buf, curve_bytes); + if (ret != 0) { + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(prv_key_buf, sizeof(prv_key_buf)); + return ret; + } + + status = psa_import_key(&key_attr, prv_key_buf, curve_bytes, &key_id); + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(prv_key_buf, sizeof(prv_key_buf)); + ret = PSA_PK_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } -static int eckey_sign_rs_wrap(void *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, - const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len, - unsigned char *sig, size_t *sig_len, - int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng, - void *rs_ctx) -{ - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - eckey_restart_ctx *rs = rs_ctx; + // From now on prv_key_buf is used to store the public key of prv. + status = psa_export_public_key(key_id, prv_key_buf, sizeof(prv_key_buf), + &prv_key_len); + ret = PSA_PK_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + destruction_status = psa_destroy_key(key_id); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } else if (destruction_status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return PSA_PK_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(destruction_status); + } - /* Should never happen */ - if (rs == NULL) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + ret = mbedtls_ecp_point_write_binary(&mbedtls_pk_ec_rw(*pub)->grp, + &mbedtls_pk_ec_rw(*pub)->Q, + MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_UNCOMPRESSED, + &pub_key_len, pub_key_buf, + sizeof(pub_key_buf)); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; } - /* set up our own sub-context if needed (that is, on first run) */ - if (rs->ecdsa_ctx.grp.pbits == 0) { - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_ecdsa_from_keypair(&rs->ecdsa_ctx, ctx)); + if (memcmp(prv_key_buf, pub_key_buf, curve_bytes) != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(ecdsa_sign_rs_wrap(&rs->ecdsa_ctx, md_alg, - hash, hash_len, sig, sig_len, - f_rng, p_rng, &rs->ecdsa_rs)); + return 0; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA */ -cleanup: - return ret; +static int eckey_check_pair_wrap(mbedtls_pk_context *pub, mbedtls_pk_context *prv, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng) +{ + (void) f_rng; + (void) p_rng; + return eckey_check_pair_psa(pub, prv); } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C */ +#else /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ +static int eckey_check_pair_wrap(mbedtls_pk_context *pub, mbedtls_pk_context *prv, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng) +{ + return mbedtls_ecp_check_pub_priv((const mbedtls_ecp_keypair *) pub->pk_ctx, + (const mbedtls_ecp_keypair *) prv->pk_ctx, + f_rng, p_rng); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ -static int eckey_check_pair(const void *pub, const void *prv) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA) +/* When PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA is defined opaque and non-opaque keys end up + * using the same function. */ +#define ecdsa_opaque_check_pair_wrap eckey_check_pair_wrap +#else /* MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA */ +static int ecdsa_opaque_check_pair_wrap(mbedtls_pk_context *pub, + mbedtls_pk_context *prv, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng) { - return mbedtls_ecp_check_pub_priv((const mbedtls_ecp_keypair *) pub, - (const mbedtls_ecp_keypair *) prv); + psa_status_t status; + uint8_t exp_pub_key[MBEDTLS_PK_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_RAW_LEN]; + size_t exp_pub_key_len = 0; + uint8_t pub_key[MBEDTLS_PK_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_RAW_LEN]; + size_t pub_key_len = 0; + int ret; + (void) f_rng; + (void) p_rng; + + status = psa_export_public_key(prv->priv_id, exp_pub_key, sizeof(exp_pub_key), + &exp_pub_key_len); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + ret = psa_pk_status_to_mbedtls(status); + return ret; + } + ret = mbedtls_ecp_point_write_binary(&(mbedtls_pk_ec_ro(*pub)->grp), + &(mbedtls_pk_ec_ro(*pub)->Q), + MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_UNCOMPRESSED, + &pub_key_len, pub_key, sizeof(pub_key)); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + if ((exp_pub_key_len != pub_key_len) || + memcmp(exp_pub_key, pub_key, exp_pub_key_len)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + return 0; } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA) static void *eckey_alloc_wrap(void) { void *ctx = mbedtls_calloc(1, sizeof(mbedtls_ecp_keypair)); @@ -414,40 +1094,54 @@ static void eckey_free_wrap(void *ctx) mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free((mbedtls_ecp_keypair *) ctx); mbedtls_free(ctx); } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA */ -static void eckey_debug(const void *ctx, mbedtls_pk_debug_item *items) +static void eckey_debug(mbedtls_pk_context *pk, mbedtls_pk_debug_item *items) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA) + items->type = MBEDTLS_PK_DEBUG_PSA_EC; + items->name = "eckey.Q"; + items->value = pk; +#else /* MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA */ + mbedtls_ecp_keypair *ecp = (mbedtls_ecp_keypair *) pk->pk_ctx; items->type = MBEDTLS_PK_DEBUG_ECP; items->name = "eckey.Q"; - items->value = &(((mbedtls_ecp_keypair *) ctx)->Q); + items->value = &(ecp->Q); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA */ } const mbedtls_pk_info_t mbedtls_eckey_info = { - MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY, - "EC", - eckey_get_bitlen, - eckey_can_do, -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) - eckey_verify_wrap, - eckey_sign_wrap, -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) - eckey_verify_rs_wrap, - eckey_sign_rs_wrap, -#endif -#else /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C */ - NULL, - NULL, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C */ - NULL, - NULL, - eckey_check_pair, - eckey_alloc_wrap, - eckey_free_wrap, + .type = MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY, + .name = "EC", + .get_bitlen = eckey_get_bitlen, + .can_do = eckey_can_do, +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_VERIFY) + .verify_func = ecdsa_verify_wrap, /* Compatible key structures */ +#else /* MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_VERIFY */ + .verify_func = NULL, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_VERIFY */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SIGN) + .sign_func = ecdsa_sign_wrap, /* Compatible key structures */ +#else /* MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_VERIFY */ + .sign_func = NULL, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_VERIFY */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) - eckey_rs_alloc, - eckey_rs_free, -#endif - eckey_debug, + .verify_rs_func = eckey_verify_rs_wrap, + .sign_rs_func = eckey_sign_rs_wrap, + .rs_alloc_func = eckey_rs_alloc, + .rs_free_func = eckey_rs_free, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C && MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */ + .decrypt_func = NULL, + .encrypt_func = NULL, + .check_pair_func = eckey_check_pair_wrap, +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA) + .ctx_alloc_func = NULL, + .ctx_free_func = NULL, +#else /* MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA */ + .ctx_alloc_func = eckey_alloc_wrap, + .ctx_free_func = eckey_free_wrap, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA */ + .debug_func = eckey_debug, }; /* @@ -460,205 +1154,37 @@ static int eckeydh_can_do(mbedtls_pk_type_t type) } const mbedtls_pk_info_t mbedtls_eckeydh_info = { - MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY_DH, - "EC_DH", - eckey_get_bitlen, /* Same underlying key structure */ - eckeydh_can_do, - NULL, - NULL, -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) - NULL, - NULL, -#endif - NULL, - NULL, - eckey_check_pair, - eckey_alloc_wrap, /* Same underlying key structure */ - eckey_free_wrap, /* Same underlying key structure */ + .type = MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY_DH, + .name = "EC_DH", + .get_bitlen = eckey_get_bitlen, /* Same underlying key structure */ + .can_do = eckeydh_can_do, + .verify_func = NULL, + .sign_func = NULL, #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) - NULL, - NULL, -#endif - eckey_debug, /* Same underlying key structure */ + .verify_rs_func = NULL, + .sign_rs_func = NULL, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C && MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */ + .decrypt_func = NULL, + .encrypt_func = NULL, + .check_pair_func = eckey_check_pair_wrap, +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA) + .ctx_alloc_func = NULL, + .ctx_free_func = NULL, +#else /* MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA */ + .ctx_alloc_func = eckey_alloc_wrap, /* Same underlying key structure */ + .ctx_free_func = eckey_free_wrap, /* Same underlying key structure */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA */ + .debug_func = eckey_debug, /* Same underlying key structure */ }; -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SOME) static int ecdsa_can_do(mbedtls_pk_type_t type) { return type == MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA; } -#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) -/* - * An ASN.1 encoded signature is a sequence of two ASN.1 integers. Parse one of - * those integers and convert it to the fixed-length encoding expected by PSA. - */ -static int extract_ecdsa_sig_int(unsigned char **from, const unsigned char *end, - unsigned char *to, size_t to_len) -{ - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - size_t unpadded_len, padding_len; - - if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(from, end, &unpadded_len, - MBEDTLS_ASN1_INTEGER)) != 0) { - return ret; - } - - while (unpadded_len > 0 && **from == 0x00) { - (*from)++; - unpadded_len--; - } - - if (unpadded_len > to_len || unpadded_len == 0) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH; - } - - padding_len = to_len - unpadded_len; - memset(to, 0x00, padding_len); - memcpy(to + padding_len, *from, unpadded_len); - (*from) += unpadded_len; - - return 0; -} - -/* - * Convert a signature from an ASN.1 sequence of two integers - * to a raw {r,s} buffer. Note: the provided sig buffer must be at least - * twice as big as int_size. - */ -static int extract_ecdsa_sig(unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, - unsigned char *sig, size_t int_size) -{ - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - size_t tmp_size; - - if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(p, end, &tmp_size, - MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)) != 0) { - return ret; - } - - /* Extract r */ - if ((ret = extract_ecdsa_sig_int(p, end, sig, int_size)) != 0) { - return ret; - } - /* Extract s */ - if ((ret = extract_ecdsa_sig_int(p, end, sig + int_size, int_size)) != 0) { - return ret; - } - - return 0; -} - -static int ecdsa_verify_wrap(void *ctx_arg, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, - const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len, - const unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_len) -{ - mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ctx = ctx_arg; - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; - psa_key_id_t key_id = 0; - psa_status_t status; - mbedtls_pk_context key; - int key_len; - /* see ECP_PUB_DER_MAX_BYTES in pkwrite.c */ - unsigned char buf[30 + 2 * MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BYTES]; - unsigned char *p; - mbedtls_pk_info_t pk_info = mbedtls_eckey_info; - psa_algorithm_t psa_sig_md = PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY; - size_t curve_bits; - psa_ecc_family_t curve = - mbedtls_ecc_group_to_psa(ctx->grp.id, &curve_bits); - const size_t signature_part_size = (ctx->grp.nbits + 7) / 8; - ((void) md_alg); - - if (curve == 0) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA; - } - - /* mbedtls_pk_write_pubkey() expects a full PK context; - * re-construct one to make it happy */ - key.pk_info = &pk_info; - key.pk_ctx = ctx; - p = buf + sizeof(buf); - key_len = mbedtls_pk_write_pubkey(&p, buf, &key); - if (key_len <= 0) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA; - } - - psa_set_key_type(&attributes, PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(curve)); - psa_set_key_usage_flags(&attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH); - psa_set_key_algorithm(&attributes, psa_sig_md); - - status = psa_import_key(&attributes, - buf + sizeof(buf) - key_len, key_len, - &key_id); - if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { - ret = mbedtls_psa_err_translate_pk(status); - goto cleanup; - } - - /* We don't need the exported key anymore and can - * reuse its buffer for signature extraction. */ - if (2 * signature_part_size > sizeof(buf)) { - ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA; - goto cleanup; - } - - p = (unsigned char *) sig; - if ((ret = extract_ecdsa_sig(&p, sig + sig_len, buf, - signature_part_size)) != 0) { - goto cleanup; - } - - if (psa_verify_hash(key_id, psa_sig_md, - hash, hash_len, - buf, 2 * signature_part_size) - != PSA_SUCCESS) { - ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_VERIFY_FAILED; - goto cleanup; - } - - if (p != sig + sig_len) { - ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_SIG_LEN_MISMATCH; - goto cleanup; - } - ret = 0; - -cleanup: - psa_destroy_key(key_id); - return ret; -} -#else /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ -static int ecdsa_verify_wrap(void *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, - const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len, - const unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_len) -{ - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - ((void) md_alg); - - ret = mbedtls_ecdsa_read_signature((mbedtls_ecdsa_context *) ctx, - hash, hash_len, sig, sig_len); - - if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_SIG_LEN_MISMATCH) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_SIG_LEN_MISMATCH; - } - - return ret; -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ - -static int ecdsa_sign_wrap(void *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, - const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len, - unsigned char *sig, size_t *sig_len, - int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng) -{ - return mbedtls_ecdsa_write_signature((mbedtls_ecdsa_context *) ctx, - md_alg, hash, hash_len, sig, sig_len, f_rng, p_rng); -} - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) -static int ecdsa_verify_rs_wrap(void *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) +static int ecdsa_verify_rs_wrap(mbedtls_pk_context *pk, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len, const unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_len, void *rs_ctx) @@ -667,7 +1193,7 @@ static int ecdsa_verify_rs_wrap(void *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, ((void) md_alg); ret = mbedtls_ecdsa_read_signature_restartable( - (mbedtls_ecdsa_context *) ctx, + (mbedtls_ecdsa_context *) pk->pk_ctx, hash, hash_len, sig, sig_len, (mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_ctx *) rs_ctx); @@ -678,38 +1204,19 @@ static int ecdsa_verify_rs_wrap(void *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, return ret; } -static int ecdsa_sign_rs_wrap(void *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, +static int ecdsa_sign_rs_wrap(mbedtls_pk_context *pk, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len, - unsigned char *sig, size_t *sig_len, + unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_size, size_t *sig_len, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng, void *rs_ctx) { return mbedtls_ecdsa_write_signature_restartable( - (mbedtls_ecdsa_context *) ctx, - md_alg, hash, hash_len, sig, sig_len, f_rng, p_rng, + (mbedtls_ecdsa_context *) pk->pk_ctx, + md_alg, hash, hash_len, sig, sig_size, sig_len, f_rng, p_rng, (mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_ctx *) rs_ctx); } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */ - -static void *ecdsa_alloc_wrap(void) -{ - void *ctx = mbedtls_calloc(1, sizeof(mbedtls_ecdsa_context)); - - if (ctx != NULL) { - mbedtls_ecdsa_init((mbedtls_ecdsa_context *) ctx); - } - - return ctx; -} - -static void ecdsa_free_wrap(void *ctx) -{ - mbedtls_ecdsa_free((mbedtls_ecdsa_context *) ctx); - mbedtls_free(ctx); -} -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) static void *ecdsa_rs_alloc(void) { void *ctx = mbedtls_calloc(1, sizeof(mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_ctx)); @@ -726,31 +1233,43 @@ static void ecdsa_rs_free(void *ctx) mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_free(ctx); mbedtls_free(ctx); } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C && MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */ const mbedtls_pk_info_t mbedtls_ecdsa_info = { - MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA, - "ECDSA", - eckey_get_bitlen, /* Compatible key structures */ - ecdsa_can_do, - ecdsa_verify_wrap, - ecdsa_sign_wrap, -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) - ecdsa_verify_rs_wrap, - ecdsa_sign_rs_wrap, -#endif - NULL, - NULL, - eckey_check_pair, /* Compatible key structures */ - ecdsa_alloc_wrap, - ecdsa_free_wrap, -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) - ecdsa_rs_alloc, - ecdsa_rs_free, -#endif - eckey_debug, /* Compatible key structures */ + .type = MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA, + .name = "ECDSA", + .get_bitlen = eckey_get_bitlen, /* Compatible key structures */ + .can_do = ecdsa_can_do, +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_VERIFY) + .verify_func = ecdsa_verify_wrap, /* Compatible key structures */ +#else /* MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_VERIFY */ + .verify_func = NULL, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_VERIFY */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SIGN) + .sign_func = ecdsa_sign_wrap, /* Compatible key structures */ +#else /* MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SIGN */ + .sign_func = NULL, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SIGN */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + .verify_rs_func = ecdsa_verify_rs_wrap, + .sign_rs_func = ecdsa_sign_rs_wrap, + .rs_alloc_func = ecdsa_rs_alloc, + .rs_free_func = ecdsa_rs_free, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C && MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */ + .decrypt_func = NULL, + .encrypt_func = NULL, + .check_pair_func = eckey_check_pair_wrap, /* Compatible key structures */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA) + .ctx_alloc_func = NULL, + .ctx_free_func = NULL, +#else /* MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA */ + .ctx_alloc_func = eckey_alloc_wrap, /* Compatible key structures */ + .ctx_free_func = eckey_free_wrap, /* Compatible key structures */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA */ + .debug_func = eckey_debug, /* Compatible key structures */ }; -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SOME */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT_SUPPORT) /* @@ -762,41 +1281,44 @@ static int rsa_alt_can_do(mbedtls_pk_type_t type) return type == MBEDTLS_PK_RSA; } -static size_t rsa_alt_get_bitlen(const void *ctx) +static size_t rsa_alt_get_bitlen(mbedtls_pk_context *pk) { - const mbedtls_rsa_alt_context *rsa_alt = (const mbedtls_rsa_alt_context *) ctx; + const mbedtls_rsa_alt_context *rsa_alt = pk->pk_ctx; return 8 * rsa_alt->key_len_func(rsa_alt->key); } -static int rsa_alt_sign_wrap(void *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, +static int rsa_alt_sign_wrap(mbedtls_pk_context *pk, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len, - unsigned char *sig, size_t *sig_len, + unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_size, size_t *sig_len, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng) { - mbedtls_rsa_alt_context *rsa_alt = (mbedtls_rsa_alt_context *) ctx; + mbedtls_rsa_alt_context *rsa_alt = pk->pk_ctx; #if SIZE_MAX > UINT_MAX if (UINT_MAX < hash_len) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } -#endif /* SIZE_MAX > UINT_MAX */ +#endif *sig_len = rsa_alt->key_len_func(rsa_alt->key); if (*sig_len > MBEDTLS_PK_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } + if (*sig_len > sig_size) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + } - return rsa_alt->sign_func(rsa_alt->key, f_rng, p_rng, MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE, + return rsa_alt->sign_func(rsa_alt->key, f_rng, p_rng, md_alg, (unsigned int) hash_len, hash, sig); } -static int rsa_alt_decrypt_wrap(void *ctx, +static int rsa_alt_decrypt_wrap(mbedtls_pk_context *pk, const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen, unsigned char *output, size_t *olen, size_t osize, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng) { - mbedtls_rsa_alt_context *rsa_alt = (mbedtls_rsa_alt_context *) ctx; + mbedtls_rsa_alt_context *rsa_alt = pk->pk_ctx; ((void) f_rng); ((void) p_rng); @@ -806,11 +1328,13 @@ static int rsa_alt_decrypt_wrap(void *ctx, } return rsa_alt->decrypt_func(rsa_alt->key, - MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE, olen, input, output, osize); + olen, input, output, osize); } #if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) -static int rsa_alt_check_pair(const void *pub, const void *prv) +static int rsa_alt_check_pair(mbedtls_pk_context *pub, mbedtls_pk_context *prv, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng) { unsigned char sig[MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE]; unsigned char hash[32]; @@ -823,13 +1347,14 @@ static int rsa_alt_check_pair(const void *pub, const void *prv) memset(hash, 0x2a, sizeof(hash)); - if ((ret = rsa_alt_sign_wrap((void *) prv, MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, + if ((ret = rsa_alt_sign_wrap(prv, MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, hash, sizeof(hash), - sig, &sig_len, NULL, NULL)) != 0) { + sig, sizeof(sig), &sig_len, + f_rng, p_rng)) != 0) { return ret; } - if (rsa_verify_wrap((void *) pub, MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, + if (rsa_verify_wrap(pub, MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, hash, sizeof(hash), sig, sig_len) != 0) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED; } @@ -851,63 +1376,42 @@ static void *rsa_alt_alloc_wrap(void) static void rsa_alt_free_wrap(void *ctx) { - mbedtls_platform_zeroize(ctx, sizeof(mbedtls_rsa_alt_context)); - mbedtls_free(ctx); + mbedtls_zeroize_and_free(ctx, sizeof(mbedtls_rsa_alt_context)); } const mbedtls_pk_info_t mbedtls_rsa_alt_info = { - MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT, - "RSA-alt", - rsa_alt_get_bitlen, - rsa_alt_can_do, - NULL, - rsa_alt_sign_wrap, + .type = MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT, + .name = "RSA-alt", + .get_bitlen = rsa_alt_get_bitlen, + .can_do = rsa_alt_can_do, + .verify_func = NULL, + .sign_func = rsa_alt_sign_wrap, #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) - NULL, - NULL, -#endif - rsa_alt_decrypt_wrap, - NULL, + .verify_rs_func = NULL, + .sign_rs_func = NULL, + .rs_alloc_func = NULL, + .rs_free_func = NULL, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C && MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */ + .decrypt_func = rsa_alt_decrypt_wrap, + .encrypt_func = NULL, #if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) - rsa_alt_check_pair, + .check_pair_func = rsa_alt_check_pair, #else - NULL, + .check_pair_func = NULL, #endif - rsa_alt_alloc_wrap, - rsa_alt_free_wrap, -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) - NULL, - NULL, -#endif - NULL, + .ctx_alloc_func = rsa_alt_alloc_wrap, + .ctx_free_func = rsa_alt_free_wrap, + .debug_func = NULL, }; - #endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT_SUPPORT */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) - -static void *pk_opaque_alloc_wrap(void) -{ - void *ctx = mbedtls_calloc(1, sizeof(psa_key_id_t)); - - /* no _init() function to call, as calloc() already zeroized */ - - return ctx; -} - -static void pk_opaque_free_wrap(void *ctx) -{ - mbedtls_platform_zeroize(ctx, sizeof(psa_key_id_t)); - mbedtls_free(ctx); -} - -static size_t pk_opaque_get_bitlen(const void *ctx) +static size_t opaque_get_bitlen(mbedtls_pk_context *pk) { - const psa_key_id_t *key = (const psa_key_id_t *) ctx; size_t bits; psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; - if (PSA_SUCCESS != psa_get_key_attributes(*key, &attributes)) { + if (PSA_SUCCESS != psa_get_key_attributes(pk->priv_id, &attributes)) { return 0; } @@ -916,176 +1420,163 @@ static size_t pk_opaque_get_bitlen(const void *ctx) return bits; } -static int pk_opaque_can_do(mbedtls_pk_type_t type) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS) +static int ecdsa_opaque_can_do(mbedtls_pk_type_t type) { - /* For now opaque PSA keys can only wrap ECC keypairs, - * as checked by setup_psa(). - * Also, ECKEY_DH does not really make sense with the current API. */ return type == MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY || type == MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA; } -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) +const mbedtls_pk_info_t mbedtls_ecdsa_opaque_info = { + .type = MBEDTLS_PK_OPAQUE, + .name = "Opaque", + .get_bitlen = opaque_get_bitlen, + .can_do = ecdsa_opaque_can_do, +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_VERIFY) + .verify_func = ecdsa_opaque_verify_wrap, +#else /* MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_VERIFY */ + .verify_func = NULL, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_VERIFY */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SIGN) + .sign_func = ecdsa_opaque_sign_wrap, +#else /* MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SIGN */ + .sign_func = NULL, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SIGN */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + .verify_rs_func = NULL, + .sign_rs_func = NULL, + .rs_alloc_func = NULL, + .rs_free_func = NULL, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C && MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */ + .decrypt_func = NULL, + .encrypt_func = NULL, + .check_pair_func = ecdsa_opaque_check_pair_wrap, + .ctx_alloc_func = NULL, + .ctx_free_func = NULL, + .debug_func = NULL, +}; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS */ -/* - * Simultaneously convert and move raw MPI from the beginning of a buffer - * to an ASN.1 MPI at the end of the buffer. - * See also mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi(). - * - * p: pointer to the end of the output buffer - * start: start of the output buffer, and also of the mpi to write at the end - * n_len: length of the mpi to read from start - */ -static int asn1_write_mpibuf(unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, - size_t n_len) +static int rsa_opaque_can_do(mbedtls_pk_type_t type) { - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - size_t len = 0; - - if ((size_t) (*p - start) < n_len) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL; - } + return type == MBEDTLS_PK_RSA || + type == MBEDTLS_PK_RSASSA_PSS; +} - len = n_len; - *p -= len; - memmove(*p, start, len); +#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_BASIC) +static int rsa_opaque_decrypt(mbedtls_pk_context *pk, + const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen, + unsigned char *output, size_t *olen, size_t osize, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng) +{ + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + psa_algorithm_t alg; + psa_key_type_t type; + psa_status_t status; - /* ASN.1 DER encoding requires minimal length, so skip leading 0s. - * Neither r nor s should be 0, but as a failsafe measure, still detect - * that rather than overflowing the buffer in case of a PSA error. */ - while (len > 0 && **p == 0x00) { - ++(*p); - --len; - } + /* PSA has its own RNG */ + (void) f_rng; + (void) p_rng; - /* this is only reached if the signature was invalid */ - if (len == 0) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_HW_ACCEL_FAILED; + status = psa_get_key_attributes(pk->priv_id, &attributes); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return PSA_PK_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); } - /* if the msb is 1, ASN.1 requires that we prepend a 0. - * Neither r nor s can be 0, so we can assume len > 0 at all times. */ - if (**p & 0x80) { - if (*p - start < 1) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL; - } + type = psa_get_key_type(&attributes); + alg = psa_get_key_algorithm(&attributes); + psa_reset_key_attributes(&attributes); - *--(*p) = 0x00; - len += 1; + if (!PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_RSA(type)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; } - MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len(p, start, len)); - MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag(p, start, - MBEDTLS_ASN1_INTEGER)); - - return (int) len; -} - -/* Transcode signature from PSA format to ASN.1 sequence. - * See ecdsa_signature_to_asn1 in ecdsa.c, but with byte buffers instead of - * MPIs, and in-place. - * - * [in/out] sig: the signature pre- and post-transcoding - * [in/out] sig_len: signature length pre- and post-transcoding - * [int] buf_len: the available size the in/out buffer - */ -static int pk_ecdsa_sig_asn1_from_psa(unsigned char *sig, size_t *sig_len, - size_t buf_len) -{ - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - size_t len = 0; - const size_t rs_len = *sig_len / 2; - unsigned char *p = sig + buf_len; - - MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, asn1_write_mpibuf(&p, sig + rs_len, rs_len)); - MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, asn1_write_mpibuf(&p, sig, rs_len)); - - MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len(&p, sig, len)); - MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag(&p, sig, - MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | - MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)); - - memmove(sig, p, len); - *sig_len = len; + status = psa_asymmetric_decrypt(pk->priv_id, alg, input, ilen, NULL, 0, output, osize, olen); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return PSA_PK_RSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + } return 0; } +#endif /* PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_BASIC */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C */ - -static int pk_opaque_sign_wrap(void *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, - const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len, - unsigned char *sig, size_t *sig_len, - int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng) +static int rsa_opaque_sign_wrap(mbedtls_pk_context *pk, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len, + unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_size, size_t *sig_len, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng) { -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) - ((void) ctx); - ((void) md_alg); - ((void) hash); - ((void) hash_len); - ((void) sig); - ((void) sig_len); - ((void) f_rng); - ((void) p_rng); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; -#else /* !MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C */ - const psa_key_id_t *key = (const psa_key_id_t *) ctx; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; - psa_algorithm_t alg = PSA_ALG_ECDSA(mbedtls_psa_translate_md(md_alg)); - size_t buf_len; + psa_algorithm_t alg; + psa_key_type_t type; psa_status_t status; /* PSA has its own RNG */ (void) f_rng; (void) p_rng; - /* PSA needs an output buffer of known size, but our API doesn't provide - * that information. Assume that the buffer is large enough for a - * maximal-length signature with that key (otherwise the application is - * buggy anyway). */ - status = psa_get_key_attributes(*key, &attributes); + status = psa_get_key_attributes(pk->priv_id, &attributes); if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { - return mbedtls_psa_err_translate_pk(status); + return PSA_PK_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); } - buf_len = MBEDTLS_ECDSA_MAX_SIG_LEN(psa_get_key_bits(&attributes)); + + type = psa_get_key_type(&attributes); + alg = psa_get_key_algorithm(&attributes); psa_reset_key_attributes(&attributes); - if (buf_len > MBEDTLS_PK_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + + if (PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_RSA(type)) { + alg = (alg & ~PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK) | mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type(md_alg); + } else { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; } - /* make the signature */ - status = psa_sign_hash(*key, alg, hash, hash_len, - sig, buf_len, sig_len); + status = psa_sign_hash(pk->priv_id, alg, hash, hash_len, sig, sig_size, sig_len); if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { - return mbedtls_psa_err_translate_pk(status); + if (PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_RSA(type)) { + return PSA_PK_RSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + } else { + return PSA_PK_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + } } - /* transcode it to ASN.1 sequence */ - return pk_ecdsa_sig_asn1_from_psa(sig, sig_len, buf_len); -#endif /* !MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C */ + return 0; +#else /* !MBEDTLS_RSA_C */ + ((void) pk); + ((void) md_alg); + ((void) hash); + ((void) hash_len); + ((void) sig); + ((void) sig_size); + ((void) sig_len); + ((void) f_rng); + ((void) p_rng); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_RSA_C */ } -const mbedtls_pk_info_t mbedtls_pk_opaque_info = { - MBEDTLS_PK_OPAQUE, - "Opaque", - pk_opaque_get_bitlen, - pk_opaque_can_do, - NULL, /* verify - will be done later */ - pk_opaque_sign_wrap, -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) - NULL, /* restartable verify - not relevant */ - NULL, /* restartable sign - not relevant */ -#endif - NULL, /* decrypt - will be done later */ - NULL, /* encrypt - will be done later */ - NULL, /* check_pair - could be done later or left NULL */ - pk_opaque_alloc_wrap, - pk_opaque_free_wrap, +const mbedtls_pk_info_t mbedtls_rsa_opaque_info = { + .type = MBEDTLS_PK_OPAQUE, + .name = "Opaque", + .get_bitlen = opaque_get_bitlen, + .can_do = rsa_opaque_can_do, + .verify_func = NULL, + .sign_func = rsa_opaque_sign_wrap, #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) - NULL, /* restart alloc - not relevant */ - NULL, /* restart free - not relevant */ -#endif - NULL, /* debug - could be done later, or even left NULL */ + .verify_rs_func = NULL, + .sign_rs_func = NULL, + .rs_alloc_func = NULL, + .rs_free_func = NULL, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C && MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */ +#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_BASIC) + .decrypt_func = rsa_opaque_decrypt, +#else /* PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_BASIC */ + .decrypt_func = NULL, +#endif /* PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_BASIC */ + .encrypt_func = NULL, + .check_pair_func = NULL, + .ctx_alloc_func = NULL, + .ctx_free_func = NULL, + .debug_func = NULL, }; #endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/pk_internal.h b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/pk_wrap.h similarity index 65% rename from thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/pk_internal.h rename to thirdparty/mbedtls/library/pk_wrap.h index 15165acdf803..be096da53ac8 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/pk_internal.h +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/pk_wrap.h @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ /** - * \file pk_internal.h + * \file pk_wrap.h * * \brief Public Key abstraction layer: wrapper functions */ @@ -11,14 +11,14 @@ #ifndef MBEDTLS_PK_WRAP_H #define MBEDTLS_PK_WRAP_H -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "mbedtls/build_info.h" #include "mbedtls/pk.h" +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +#include "psa/crypto.h" +#endif + struct mbedtls_pk_info_t { /** Public key type */ mbedtls_pk_type_t type; @@ -27,52 +27,54 @@ struct mbedtls_pk_info_t { const char *name; /** Get key size in bits */ - size_t (*get_bitlen)(const void *); + size_t (*get_bitlen)(mbedtls_pk_context *pk); /** Tell if the context implements this type (e.g. ECKEY can do ECDSA) */ int (*can_do)(mbedtls_pk_type_t type); /** Verify signature */ - int (*verify_func)(void *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + int (*verify_func)(mbedtls_pk_context *pk, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len, const unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_len); /** Make signature */ - int (*sign_func)(void *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + int (*sign_func)(mbedtls_pk_context *pk, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len, - unsigned char *sig, size_t *sig_len, + unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_size, size_t *sig_len, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng); #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) /** Verify signature (restartable) */ - int (*verify_rs_func)(void *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + int (*verify_rs_func)(mbedtls_pk_context *pk, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len, const unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_len, void *rs_ctx); /** Make signature (restartable) */ - int (*sign_rs_func)(void *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + int (*sign_rs_func)(mbedtls_pk_context *pk, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len, - unsigned char *sig, size_t *sig_len, + unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_size, size_t *sig_len, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng, void *rs_ctx); #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C && MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */ /** Decrypt message */ - int (*decrypt_func)(void *ctx, const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen, + int (*decrypt_func)(mbedtls_pk_context *pk, const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen, unsigned char *output, size_t *olen, size_t osize, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng); /** Encrypt message */ - int (*encrypt_func)(void *ctx, const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen, + int (*encrypt_func)(mbedtls_pk_context *pk, const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen, unsigned char *output, size_t *olen, size_t osize, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng); /** Check public-private key pair */ - int (*check_pair_func)(const void *pub, const void *prv); + int (*check_pair_func)(mbedtls_pk_context *pub, mbedtls_pk_context *prv, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng); /** Allocate a new context */ void * (*ctx_alloc_func)(void); @@ -89,7 +91,7 @@ struct mbedtls_pk_info_t { #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C && MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */ /** Interface with the debug module */ - void (*debug_func)(const void *ctx, mbedtls_pk_debug_item *items); + void (*debug_func)(mbedtls_pk_context *pk, mbedtls_pk_debug_item *items); }; #if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT_SUPPORT) @@ -106,12 +108,12 @@ typedef struct { extern const mbedtls_pk_info_t mbedtls_rsa_info; #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS) extern const mbedtls_pk_info_t mbedtls_eckey_info; extern const mbedtls_pk_info_t mbedtls_eckeydh_info; #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SOME) extern const mbedtls_pk_info_t mbedtls_ecdsa_info; #endif @@ -120,7 +122,17 @@ extern const mbedtls_pk_info_t mbedtls_rsa_alt_info; #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) -extern const mbedtls_pk_info_t mbedtls_pk_opaque_info; -#endif +extern const mbedtls_pk_info_t mbedtls_ecdsa_opaque_info; +extern const mbedtls_pk_info_t mbedtls_rsa_opaque_info; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) +int mbedtls_pk_psa_rsa_sign_ext(psa_algorithm_t psa_alg_md, + mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa_ctx, + const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len, + unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_size, + size_t *sig_len); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_WRAP_H */ diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/pkcs11.c b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/pkcs11.c deleted file mode 100644 index 45ea4afcc69c..000000000000 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/pkcs11.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,221 +0,0 @@ -/** - * \file pkcs11.c - * - * \brief Wrapper for PKCS#11 library libpkcs11-helper - * - * \author Adriaan de Jong - * - * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later - */ - -#include "mbedtls/pkcs11.h" - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS11_C) - -#include "mbedtls/md.h" -#include "mbedtls/oid.h" -#include "mbedtls/x509_crt.h" - -#include "mbedtls/platform.h" - -#include - -void mbedtls_pkcs11_init(mbedtls_pkcs11_context *ctx) -{ - memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_pkcs11_context)); -} - -int mbedtls_pkcs11_x509_cert_bind(mbedtls_x509_crt *cert, pkcs11h_certificate_t pkcs11_cert) -{ - int ret = 1; - unsigned char *cert_blob = NULL; - size_t cert_blob_size = 0; - - if (cert == NULL) { - ret = 2; - goto cleanup; - } - - if (pkcs11h_certificate_getCertificateBlob(pkcs11_cert, NULL, - &cert_blob_size) != CKR_OK) { - ret = 3; - goto cleanup; - } - - cert_blob = mbedtls_calloc(1, cert_blob_size); - if (NULL == cert_blob) { - ret = 4; - goto cleanup; - } - - if (pkcs11h_certificate_getCertificateBlob(pkcs11_cert, cert_blob, - &cert_blob_size) != CKR_OK) { - ret = 5; - goto cleanup; - } - - if (0 != mbedtls_x509_crt_parse(cert, cert_blob, cert_blob_size)) { - ret = 6; - goto cleanup; - } - - ret = 0; - -cleanup: - if (NULL != cert_blob) { - mbedtls_free(cert_blob); - } - - return ret; -} - - -int mbedtls_pkcs11_priv_key_bind(mbedtls_pkcs11_context *priv_key, - pkcs11h_certificate_t pkcs11_cert) -{ - int ret = 1; - mbedtls_x509_crt cert; - - mbedtls_x509_crt_init(&cert); - - if (priv_key == NULL) { - goto cleanup; - } - - if (0 != mbedtls_pkcs11_x509_cert_bind(&cert, pkcs11_cert)) { - goto cleanup; - } - - priv_key->len = mbedtls_pk_get_len(&cert.pk); - priv_key->pkcs11h_cert = pkcs11_cert; - - ret = 0; - -cleanup: - mbedtls_x509_crt_free(&cert); - - return ret; -} - -void mbedtls_pkcs11_priv_key_free(mbedtls_pkcs11_context *priv_key) -{ - if (NULL != priv_key) { - pkcs11h_certificate_freeCertificate(priv_key->pkcs11h_cert); - } -} - -int mbedtls_pkcs11_decrypt(mbedtls_pkcs11_context *ctx, - int mode, size_t *olen, - const unsigned char *input, - unsigned char *output, - size_t output_max_len) -{ - size_t input_len, output_len; - - if (NULL == ctx) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; - } - - if (MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE != mode) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; - } - - output_len = input_len = ctx->len; - - if (input_len < 16 || input_len > output_max_len) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; - } - - /* Determine size of output buffer */ - if (pkcs11h_certificate_decryptAny(ctx->pkcs11h_cert, CKM_RSA_PKCS, input, - input_len, NULL, &output_len) != CKR_OK) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; - } - - if (output_len > output_max_len) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_OUTPUT_TOO_LARGE; - } - - if (pkcs11h_certificate_decryptAny(ctx->pkcs11h_cert, CKM_RSA_PKCS, input, - input_len, output, &output_len) != CKR_OK) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; - } - *olen = output_len; - return 0; -} - -int mbedtls_pkcs11_sign(mbedtls_pkcs11_context *ctx, - int mode, - mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, - unsigned int hashlen, - const unsigned char *hash, - unsigned char *sig) -{ - size_t sig_len = 0, asn_len = 0, oid_size = 0; - unsigned char *p = sig; - const char *oid; - - if (NULL == ctx) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; - } - - if (MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE != mode) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; - } - - if (md_alg != MBEDTLS_MD_NONE) { - const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type(md_alg); - if (md_info == NULL) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; - } - - if (mbedtls_oid_get_oid_by_md(md_alg, &oid, &oid_size) != 0) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; - } - - hashlen = mbedtls_md_get_size(md_info); - asn_len = 10 + oid_size; - } - - sig_len = ctx->len; - if (hashlen > sig_len || asn_len > sig_len || - hashlen + asn_len > sig_len) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; - } - - if (md_alg != MBEDTLS_MD_NONE) { - /* - * DigestInfo ::= SEQUENCE { - * digestAlgorithm DigestAlgorithmIdentifier, - * digest Digest } - * - * DigestAlgorithmIdentifier ::= AlgorithmIdentifier - * - * Digest ::= OCTET STRING - */ - *p++ = MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE | MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED; - *p++ = (unsigned char) (0x08 + oid_size + hashlen); - *p++ = MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE | MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED; - *p++ = (unsigned char) (0x04 + oid_size); - *p++ = MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID; - *p++ = oid_size & 0xFF; - memcpy(p, oid, oid_size); - p += oid_size; - *p++ = MBEDTLS_ASN1_NULL; - *p++ = 0x00; - *p++ = MBEDTLS_ASN1_OCTET_STRING; - *p++ = hashlen; - } - - memcpy(p, hash, hashlen); - - if (pkcs11h_certificate_signAny(ctx->pkcs11h_cert, CKM_RSA_PKCS, sig, - asn_len + hashlen, sig, &sig_len) != CKR_OK) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; - } - - return 0; -} - -#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS11_C) */ diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/pkcs12.c b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/pkcs12.c index 55de216edb17..a3467b982089 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/pkcs12.c +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/pkcs12.c @@ -17,21 +17,21 @@ #include "mbedtls/pkcs12.h" #include "mbedtls/asn1.h" +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C) #include "mbedtls/cipher.h" +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C */ #include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" #include "mbedtls/error.h" #include -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARC4_C) -#include "mbedtls/arc4.h" -#endif - #if defined(MBEDTLS_DES_C) #include "mbedtls/des.h" #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C) +#include "psa_util_internal.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C) static int pkcs12_parse_pbe_params(mbedtls_asn1_buf *params, mbedtls_asn1_buf *salt, int *iterations) @@ -119,47 +119,6 @@ static int pkcs12_pbe_derive_key_iv(mbedtls_asn1_buf *pbe_params, mbedtls_md_typ #undef PKCS12_MAX_PWDLEN -int mbedtls_pkcs12_pbe_sha1_rc4_128(mbedtls_asn1_buf *pbe_params, int mode, - const unsigned char *pwd, size_t pwdlen, - const unsigned char *data, size_t len, - unsigned char *output) -{ -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ARC4_C) - ((void) pbe_params); - ((void) mode); - ((void) pwd); - ((void) pwdlen); - ((void) data); - ((void) len); - ((void) output); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS12_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; -#else - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - unsigned char key[16]; - mbedtls_arc4_context ctx; - ((void) mode); - - mbedtls_arc4_init(&ctx); - - if ((ret = pkcs12_pbe_derive_key_iv(pbe_params, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, - pwd, pwdlen, - key, 16, NULL, 0)) != 0) { - return ret; - } - - mbedtls_arc4_setup(&ctx, key, 16); - if ((ret = mbedtls_arc4_crypt(&ctx, len, data, output)) != 0) { - goto exit; - } - -exit: - mbedtls_platform_zeroize(key, sizeof(key)); - mbedtls_arc4_free(&ctx); - - return ret; -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ARC4_C */ -} - #if !defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7) int mbedtls_pkcs12_pbe_ext(mbedtls_asn1_buf *pbe_params, int mode, mbedtls_cipher_type_t cipher_type, mbedtls_md_type_t md_type, @@ -169,6 +128,7 @@ int mbedtls_pkcs12_pbe_ext(mbedtls_asn1_buf *pbe_params, int mode, size_t *output_len); #endif +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) int mbedtls_pkcs12_pbe(mbedtls_asn1_buf *pbe_params, int mode, mbedtls_cipher_type_t cipher_type, mbedtls_md_type_t md_type, const unsigned char *pwd, size_t pwdlen, @@ -185,6 +145,7 @@ int mbedtls_pkcs12_pbe(mbedtls_asn1_buf *pbe_params, int mode, pwd, pwdlen, data, len, output, SIZE_MAX, &output_len); } +#endif int mbedtls_pkcs12_pbe_ext(mbedtls_asn1_buf *pbe_params, int mode, mbedtls_cipher_type_t cipher_type, mbedtls_md_type_t md_type, @@ -198,6 +159,7 @@ int mbedtls_pkcs12_pbe_ext(mbedtls_asn1_buf *pbe_params, int mode, unsigned char iv[16]; const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *cipher_info; mbedtls_cipher_context_t cipher_ctx; + size_t iv_len = 0; size_t finish_olen = 0; unsigned int padlen = 0; @@ -210,7 +172,7 @@ int mbedtls_pkcs12_pbe_ext(mbedtls_asn1_buf *pbe_params, int mode, return MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS12_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; } - keylen = cipher_info->key_bitlen / 8; + keylen = (int) mbedtls_cipher_info_get_key_bitlen(cipher_info) / 8; if (mode == MBEDTLS_PKCS12_PBE_DECRYPT) { if (output_size < len) { @@ -225,9 +187,10 @@ int mbedtls_pkcs12_pbe_ext(mbedtls_asn1_buf *pbe_params, int mode, } } + iv_len = mbedtls_cipher_info_get_iv_size(cipher_info); if ((ret = pkcs12_pbe_derive_key_iv(pbe_params, md_type, pwd, pwdlen, key, keylen, - iv, cipher_info->iv_size)) != 0) { + iv, iv_len)) != 0) { return ret; } @@ -237,9 +200,8 @@ int mbedtls_pkcs12_pbe_ext(mbedtls_asn1_buf *pbe_params, int mode, goto exit; } - if ((ret = - mbedtls_cipher_setkey(&cipher_ctx, key, 8 * keylen, - (mbedtls_operation_t) mode)) != 0) { + if ((ret = mbedtls_cipher_setkey(&cipher_ctx, key, 8 * keylen, + (mbedtls_operation_t) mode)) != 0) { goto exit; } @@ -263,20 +225,8 @@ int mbedtls_pkcs12_pbe_ext(mbedtls_asn1_buf *pbe_params, int mode, } #endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_WITH_PADDING */ - if ((ret = mbedtls_cipher_set_iv(&cipher_ctx, iv, cipher_info->iv_size)) != 0) { - goto exit; - } - - if ((ret = mbedtls_cipher_reset(&cipher_ctx)) != 0) { - goto exit; - } - - if ((ret = mbedtls_cipher_update(&cipher_ctx, data, len, - output, output_len)) != 0) { - goto exit; - } - - if ((ret = mbedtls_cipher_finish(&cipher_ctx, output + (*output_len), &finish_olen)) != 0) { + ret = mbedtls_cipher_crypt(&cipher_ctx, iv, iv_len, data, len, output, &finish_olen); + if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_INVALID_PADDING) { ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS12_PASSWORD_MISMATCH; } @@ -290,7 +240,7 @@ int mbedtls_pkcs12_pbe_ext(mbedtls_asn1_buf *pbe_params, int mode, return ret; } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C && MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C */ static void pkcs12_fill_buffer(unsigned char *data, size_t data_len, const unsigned char *filler, size_t fill_len) @@ -314,6 +264,65 @@ static void pkcs12_fill_buffer(unsigned char *data, size_t data_len, } } + +static int calculate_hashes(mbedtls_md_type_t md_type, int iterations, + unsigned char *diversifier, unsigned char *salt_block, + unsigned char *pwd_block, unsigned char *hash_output, int use_salt, + int use_password, size_t hlen, size_t v) +{ + int ret = -1; + size_t i; + const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info; + mbedtls_md_context_t md_ctx; + md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type(md_type); + if (md_info == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS12_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + } + + mbedtls_md_init(&md_ctx); + + if ((ret = mbedtls_md_setup(&md_ctx, md_info, 0)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + // Calculate hash( diversifier || salt_block || pwd_block ) + if ((ret = mbedtls_md_starts(&md_ctx)) != 0) { + goto exit; + } + + if ((ret = mbedtls_md_update(&md_ctx, diversifier, v)) != 0) { + goto exit; + } + + if (use_salt != 0) { + if ((ret = mbedtls_md_update(&md_ctx, salt_block, v)) != 0) { + goto exit; + } + } + + if (use_password != 0) { + if ((ret = mbedtls_md_update(&md_ctx, pwd_block, v)) != 0) { + goto exit; + } + } + + if ((ret = mbedtls_md_finish(&md_ctx, hash_output)) != 0) { + goto exit; + } + + // Perform remaining ( iterations - 1 ) recursive hash calculations + for (i = 1; i < (size_t) iterations; i++) { + if ((ret = mbedtls_md(md_info, hash_output, hlen, hash_output)) + != 0) { + goto exit; + } + } + +exit: + mbedtls_md_free(&md_ctx); + return ret; +} + + int mbedtls_pkcs12_derivation(unsigned char *data, size_t datalen, const unsigned char *pwd, size_t pwdlen, const unsigned char *salt, size_t saltlen, @@ -323,7 +332,7 @@ int mbedtls_pkcs12_derivation(unsigned char *data, size_t datalen, unsigned int j; unsigned char diversifier[128]; - unsigned char salt_block[128], pwd_block[128], hash_block[128]; + unsigned char salt_block[128], pwd_block[128], hash_block[128] = { 0 }; unsigned char hash_output[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE]; unsigned char *p; unsigned char c; @@ -332,9 +341,6 @@ int mbedtls_pkcs12_derivation(unsigned char *data, size_t datalen, size_t hlen, use_len, v, i; - const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info; - mbedtls_md_context_t md_ctx; - // This version only allows max of 64 bytes of password or salt if (datalen > 128 || pwdlen > 64 || saltlen > 64) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS12_BAD_INPUT_DATA; @@ -351,17 +357,7 @@ int mbedtls_pkcs12_derivation(unsigned char *data, size_t datalen, use_password = (pwd && pwdlen != 0); use_salt = (salt && saltlen != 0); - md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type(md_type); - if (md_info == NULL) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS12_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; - } - - mbedtls_md_init(&md_ctx); - - if ((ret = mbedtls_md_setup(&md_ctx, md_info, 0)) != 0) { - return ret; - } - hlen = mbedtls_md_get_size(md_info); + hlen = mbedtls_md_get_size_from_type(md_type); if (hlen <= 32) { v = 64; @@ -381,38 +377,12 @@ int mbedtls_pkcs12_derivation(unsigned char *data, size_t datalen, p = data; while (datalen > 0) { - // Calculate hash( diversifier || salt_block || pwd_block ) - if ((ret = mbedtls_md_starts(&md_ctx)) != 0) { - goto exit; - } - - if ((ret = mbedtls_md_update(&md_ctx, diversifier, v)) != 0) { - goto exit; - } - - if (use_salt != 0) { - if ((ret = mbedtls_md_update(&md_ctx, salt_block, v)) != 0) { - goto exit; - } - } - - if (use_password != 0) { - if ((ret = mbedtls_md_update(&md_ctx, pwd_block, v)) != 0) { - goto exit; - } - } - - if ((ret = mbedtls_md_finish(&md_ctx, hash_output)) != 0) { + if (calculate_hashes(md_type, iterations, diversifier, salt_block, + pwd_block, hash_output, use_salt, use_password, hlen, + v) != 0) { goto exit; } - // Perform remaining ( iterations - 1 ) recursive hash calculations - for (i = 1; i < (size_t) iterations; i++) { - if ((ret = mbedtls_md(md_info, hash_output, hlen, hash_output)) != 0) { - goto exit; - } - } - use_len = (datalen > hlen) ? hlen : datalen; memcpy(p, hash_output, use_len); datalen -= use_len; @@ -461,8 +431,6 @@ int mbedtls_pkcs12_derivation(unsigned char *data, size_t datalen, mbedtls_platform_zeroize(hash_block, sizeof(hash_block)); mbedtls_platform_zeroize(hash_output, sizeof(hash_output)); - mbedtls_md_free(&md_ctx); - return ret; } diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/pkcs5.c b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/pkcs5.c index 90703c45f9d3..c6c53054b621 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/pkcs5.c +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/pkcs5.c @@ -24,7 +24,9 @@ #if defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C) #include "mbedtls/asn1.h" +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C) #include "mbedtls/cipher.h" +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C */ #include "mbedtls/oid.h" #endif /* MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C */ @@ -32,8 +34,9 @@ #include "mbedtls/platform.h" +#include "psa_util_internal.h" -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C) static int pkcs5_parse_pbkdf2_params(const mbedtls_asn1_buf *params, mbedtls_asn1_buf *salt, int *iterations, int *keylen, mbedtls_md_type_t *md_type) @@ -106,6 +109,7 @@ int mbedtls_pkcs5_pbes2_ext(const mbedtls_asn1_buf *pbe_params, int mode, size_t *output_len); #endif +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) int mbedtls_pkcs5_pbes2(const mbedtls_asn1_buf *pbe_params, int mode, const unsigned char *pwd, size_t pwdlen, const unsigned char *data, size_t datalen, @@ -120,6 +124,7 @@ int mbedtls_pkcs5_pbes2(const mbedtls_asn1_buf *pbe_params, int mode, return mbedtls_pkcs5_pbes2_ext(pbe_params, mode, pwd, pwdlen, data, datalen, output, SIZE_MAX, &output_len); } +#endif int mbedtls_pkcs5_pbes2_ext(const mbedtls_asn1_buf *pbe_params, int mode, const unsigned char *pwd, size_t pwdlen, @@ -133,9 +138,7 @@ int mbedtls_pkcs5_pbes2_ext(const mbedtls_asn1_buf *pbe_params, int mode, mbedtls_asn1_buf salt; mbedtls_md_type_t md_type = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1; unsigned char key[32], iv[32]; - const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info; const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *cipher_info; - mbedtls_md_context_t md_ctx; mbedtls_cipher_type_t cipher_alg; mbedtls_cipher_context_t cipher_ctx; unsigned int padlen = 0; @@ -171,11 +174,6 @@ int mbedtls_pkcs5_pbes2_ext(const mbedtls_asn1_buf *pbe_params, int mode, return ret; } - md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type(md_type); - if (md_info == NULL) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; - } - if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_alg(&p, end, &enc_scheme_oid, &enc_scheme_params)) != 0) { return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_INVALID_FORMAT, ret); @@ -194,10 +192,10 @@ int mbedtls_pkcs5_pbes2_ext(const mbedtls_asn1_buf *pbe_params, int mode, * The value of keylen from pkcs5_parse_pbkdf2_params() is ignored * since it is optional and we don't know if it was set or not */ - keylen = cipher_info->key_bitlen / 8; + keylen = (int) mbedtls_cipher_info_get_key_bitlen(cipher_info) / 8; if (enc_scheme_params.tag != MBEDTLS_ASN1_OCTET_STRING || - enc_scheme_params.len != cipher_info->iv_size) { + enc_scheme_params.len != mbedtls_cipher_info_get_iv_size(cipher_info)) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_INVALID_FORMAT; } @@ -214,18 +212,13 @@ int mbedtls_pkcs5_pbes2_ext(const mbedtls_asn1_buf *pbe_params, int mode, } } - mbedtls_md_init(&md_ctx); - mbedtls_cipher_init(&cipher_ctx); memcpy(iv, enc_scheme_params.p, enc_scheme_params.len); - if ((ret = mbedtls_md_setup(&md_ctx, md_info, 1)) != 0) { - goto exit; - } - - if ((ret = mbedtls_pkcs5_pbkdf2_hmac(&md_ctx, pwd, pwdlen, salt.p, salt.len, - iterations, keylen, key)) != 0) { + if ((ret = mbedtls_pkcs5_pbkdf2_hmac_ext(md_type, pwd, pwdlen, salt.p, + salt.len, iterations, keylen, + key)) != 0) { goto exit; } @@ -266,21 +259,19 @@ int mbedtls_pkcs5_pbes2_ext(const mbedtls_asn1_buf *pbe_params, int mode, } exit: - mbedtls_md_free(&md_ctx); mbedtls_cipher_free(&cipher_ctx); return ret; } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C && MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C */ -int mbedtls_pkcs5_pbkdf2_hmac(mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx, - const unsigned char *password, - size_t plen, const unsigned char *salt, size_t slen, - unsigned int iteration_count, - uint32_t key_length, unsigned char *output) +static int pkcs5_pbkdf2_hmac(mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx, + const unsigned char *password, + size_t plen, const unsigned char *salt, size_t slen, + unsigned int iteration_count, + uint32_t key_length, unsigned char *output) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - int j; unsigned int i; unsigned char md1[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE]; unsigned char work[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE]; @@ -339,9 +330,7 @@ int mbedtls_pkcs5_pbkdf2_hmac(mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx, // U1 xor U2 // - for (j = 0; j < md_size; j++) { - work[j] ^= md1[j]; - } + mbedtls_xor(work, work, md1, md_size); } use_len = (key_length < md_size) ? key_length : md_size; @@ -365,9 +354,48 @@ int mbedtls_pkcs5_pbkdf2_hmac(mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx, return ret; } +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) +int mbedtls_pkcs5_pbkdf2_hmac(mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx, + const unsigned char *password, + size_t plen, const unsigned char *salt, size_t slen, + unsigned int iteration_count, + uint32_t key_length, unsigned char *output) +{ + return pkcs5_pbkdf2_hmac(ctx, password, plen, salt, slen, iteration_count, + key_length, output); +} +#endif + +int mbedtls_pkcs5_pbkdf2_hmac_ext(mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + const unsigned char *password, + size_t plen, const unsigned char *salt, size_t slen, + unsigned int iteration_count, + uint32_t key_length, unsigned char *output) +{ + mbedtls_md_context_t md_ctx; + const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info = NULL; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type(md_alg); + if (md_info == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + } + + mbedtls_md_init(&md_ctx); + + if ((ret = mbedtls_md_setup(&md_ctx, md_info, 1)) != 0) { + goto exit; + } + ret = pkcs5_pbkdf2_hmac(&md_ctx, password, plen, salt, slen, + iteration_count, key_length, output); +exit: + mbedtls_md_free(&md_ctx); + return ret; +} + #if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1) int mbedtls_pkcs5_self_test(int verbose) { if (verbose != 0) { @@ -431,33 +459,18 @@ static const unsigned char result_key_test_data[MAX_TESTS][32] = int mbedtls_pkcs5_self_test(int verbose) { - mbedtls_md_context_t sha1_ctx; - const mbedtls_md_info_t *info_sha1; int ret, i; unsigned char key[64]; - mbedtls_md_init(&sha1_ctx); - - info_sha1 = mbedtls_md_info_from_type(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1); - if (info_sha1 == NULL) { - ret = 1; - goto exit; - } - - if ((ret = mbedtls_md_setup(&sha1_ctx, info_sha1, 1)) != 0) { - ret = 1; - goto exit; - } - for (i = 0; i < MAX_TESTS; i++) { if (verbose != 0) { mbedtls_printf(" PBKDF2 (SHA1) #%d: ", i); } - ret = mbedtls_pkcs5_pbkdf2_hmac(&sha1_ctx, password_test_data[i], - plen_test_data[i], salt_test_data[i], - slen_test_data[i], it_cnt_test_data[i], - key_len_test_data[i], key); + ret = mbedtls_pkcs5_pbkdf2_hmac_ext(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, password_test_data[i], + plen_test_data[i], salt_test_data[i], + slen_test_data[i], it_cnt_test_data[i], + key_len_test_data[i], key); if (ret != 0 || memcmp(result_key_test_data[i], key, key_len_test_data[i]) != 0) { if (verbose != 0) { @@ -478,11 +491,9 @@ int mbedtls_pkcs5_self_test(int verbose) } exit: - mbedtls_md_free(&sha1_ctx); - return ret; } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1 */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/pkcs7.c b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/pkcs7.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..3aac662ba698 --- /dev/null +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/pkcs7.c @@ -0,0 +1,773 @@ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ +#include "common.h" + +#include "mbedtls/build_info.h" +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS7_C) +#include "mbedtls/pkcs7.h" +#include "x509_internal.h" +#include "mbedtls/asn1.h" +#include "mbedtls/x509_crt.h" +#include "mbedtls/x509_crl.h" +#include "mbedtls/oid.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) +#include +#include +#endif + +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) +#include "mbedtls/platform_time.h" +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE) +#include +#endif + +/** + * Initializes the mbedtls_pkcs7 structure. + */ +void mbedtls_pkcs7_init(mbedtls_pkcs7 *pkcs7) +{ + memset(pkcs7, 0, sizeof(*pkcs7)); +} + +static int pkcs7_get_next_content_len(unsigned char **p, unsigned char *end, + size_t *len) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(p, end, len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED + | MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC); + if (ret != 0) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_INVALID_CONTENT_INFO, ret); + } else if ((size_t) (end - *p) != *len) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_INVALID_CONTENT_INFO, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + } + + return ret; +} + +/** + * version Version + * Version ::= INTEGER + **/ +static int pkcs7_get_version(unsigned char **p, unsigned char *end, int *ver) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_int(p, end, ver); + if (ret != 0) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_INVALID_VERSION, ret); + } + + /* If version != 1, return invalid version */ + if (*ver != MBEDTLS_PKCS7_SUPPORTED_VERSION) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_INVALID_VERSION; + } + + return ret; +} + +/** + * ContentInfo ::= SEQUENCE { + * contentType ContentType, + * content + * [0] EXPLICIT ANY DEFINED BY contentType OPTIONAL } + **/ +static int pkcs7_get_content_info_type(unsigned char **p, unsigned char *end, + unsigned char **seq_end, + mbedtls_pkcs7_buf *pkcs7) +{ + size_t len = 0; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char *start = *p; + + ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(p, end, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED + | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE); + if (ret != 0) { + *p = start; + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_INVALID_CONTENT_INFO, ret); + } + *seq_end = *p + len; + ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(p, *seq_end, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID); + if (ret != 0) { + *p = start; + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_INVALID_CONTENT_INFO, ret); + } + + pkcs7->tag = MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID; + pkcs7->len = len; + pkcs7->p = *p; + *p += len; + + return ret; +} + +/** + * DigestAlgorithmIdentifier ::= AlgorithmIdentifier + * + * This is from x509.h + **/ +static int pkcs7_get_digest_algorithm(unsigned char **p, unsigned char *end, + mbedtls_x509_buf *alg) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_alg_null(p, end, alg)) != 0) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_INVALID_ALG, ret); + } + + return ret; +} + +/** + * DigestAlgorithmIdentifiers :: SET of DigestAlgorithmIdentifier + **/ +static int pkcs7_get_digest_algorithm_set(unsigned char **p, + unsigned char *end, + mbedtls_x509_buf *alg) +{ + size_t len = 0; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(p, end, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED + | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SET); + if (ret != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_INVALID_ALG, ret); + } + + end = *p + len; + + ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_alg_null(p, end, alg); + if (ret != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_INVALID_ALG, ret); + } + + /** For now, it assumes there is only one digest algorithm specified **/ + if (*p != end) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + } + + return 0; +} + +/** + * certificates :: SET OF ExtendedCertificateOrCertificate, + * ExtendedCertificateOrCertificate ::= CHOICE { + * certificate Certificate -- x509, + * extendedCertificate[0] IMPLICIT ExtendedCertificate } + * Return number of certificates added to the signed data, + * 0 or higher is valid. + * Return negative error code for failure. + **/ +static int pkcs7_get_certificates(unsigned char **p, unsigned char *end, + mbedtls_x509_crt *certs) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t len1 = 0; + size_t len2 = 0; + unsigned char *end_set, *end_cert, *start; + + ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(p, end, &len1, MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED + | MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC); + if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG) { + return 0; + } + if (ret != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_INVALID_FORMAT, ret); + } + start = *p; + end_set = *p + len1; + + ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(p, end_set, &len2, MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED + | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE); + if (ret != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_INVALID_CERT, ret); + } + + end_cert = *p + len2; + + /* + * This is to verify that there is only one signer certificate. It seems it is + * not easy to differentiate between the chain vs different signer's certificate. + * So, we support only the root certificate and the single signer. + * The behaviour would be improved with addition of multiple signer support. + */ + if (end_cert != end_set) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + } + + if ((ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der(certs, start, len1)) < 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_INVALID_CERT; + } + + *p = end_cert; + + /* + * Since in this version we strictly support single certificate, and reaching + * here implies we have parsed successfully, we return 1. + */ + return 1; +} + +/** + * EncryptedDigest ::= OCTET STRING + **/ +static int pkcs7_get_signature(unsigned char **p, unsigned char *end, + mbedtls_pkcs7_buf *signature) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t len = 0; + + ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(p, end, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_OCTET_STRING); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + + signature->tag = MBEDTLS_ASN1_OCTET_STRING; + signature->len = len; + signature->p = *p; + + *p = *p + len; + + return 0; +} + +static void pkcs7_free_signer_info(mbedtls_pkcs7_signer_info *signer) +{ + mbedtls_x509_name *name_cur; + mbedtls_x509_name *name_prv; + + if (signer == NULL) { + return; + } + + name_cur = signer->issuer.next; + while (name_cur != NULL) { + name_prv = name_cur; + name_cur = name_cur->next; + mbedtls_free(name_prv); + } + signer->issuer.next = NULL; +} + +/** + * SignerInfo ::= SEQUENCE { + * version Version; + * issuerAndSerialNumber IssuerAndSerialNumber, + * digestAlgorithm DigestAlgorithmIdentifier, + * authenticatedAttributes + * [0] IMPLICIT Attributes OPTIONAL, + * digestEncryptionAlgorithm DigestEncryptionAlgorithmIdentifier, + * encryptedDigest EncryptedDigest, + * unauthenticatedAttributes + * [1] IMPLICIT Attributes OPTIONAL, + * Returns 0 if the signerInfo is valid. + * Return negative error code for failure. + * Structure must not contain vales for authenticatedAttributes + * and unauthenticatedAttributes. + **/ +static int pkcs7_get_signer_info(unsigned char **p, unsigned char *end, + mbedtls_pkcs7_signer_info *signer, + mbedtls_x509_buf *alg) +{ + unsigned char *end_signer, *end_issuer_and_sn; + int asn1_ret = 0, ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t len = 0; + + asn1_ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(p, end, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED + | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE); + if (asn1_ret != 0) { + goto out; + } + + end_signer = *p + len; + + ret = pkcs7_get_version(p, end_signer, &signer->version); + if (ret != 0) { + goto out; + } + + asn1_ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(p, end_signer, &len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE); + if (asn1_ret != 0) { + goto out; + } + + end_issuer_and_sn = *p + len; + /* Parsing IssuerAndSerialNumber */ + signer->issuer_raw.p = *p; + + asn1_ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(p, end_issuer_and_sn, &len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE); + if (asn1_ret != 0) { + goto out; + } + + ret = mbedtls_x509_get_name(p, *p + len, &signer->issuer); + if (ret != 0) { + goto out; + } + + signer->issuer_raw.len = (size_t) (*p - signer->issuer_raw.p); + + ret = mbedtls_x509_get_serial(p, end_issuer_and_sn, &signer->serial); + if (ret != 0) { + goto out; + } + + /* ensure no extra or missing bytes */ + if (*p != end_issuer_and_sn) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_INVALID_SIGNER_INFO; + goto out; + } + + ret = pkcs7_get_digest_algorithm(p, end_signer, &signer->alg_identifier); + if (ret != 0) { + goto out; + } + + /* Check that the digest algorithm used matches the one provided earlier */ + if (signer->alg_identifier.tag != alg->tag || + signer->alg_identifier.len != alg->len || + memcmp(signer->alg_identifier.p, alg->p, alg->len) != 0) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_INVALID_SIGNER_INFO; + goto out; + } + + /* Assume authenticatedAttributes is nonexistent */ + ret = pkcs7_get_digest_algorithm(p, end_signer, &signer->sig_alg_identifier); + if (ret != 0) { + goto out; + } + + ret = pkcs7_get_signature(p, end_signer, &signer->sig); + if (ret != 0) { + goto out; + } + + /* Do not permit any unauthenticated attributes */ + if (*p != end_signer) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_INVALID_SIGNER_INFO; + } + +out: + if (asn1_ret != 0 || ret != 0) { + pkcs7_free_signer_info(signer); + ret = MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_INVALID_SIGNER_INFO, + asn1_ret); + } + + return ret; +} + +/** + * SignerInfos ::= SET of SignerInfo + * Return number of signers added to the signed data, + * 0 or higher is valid. + * Return negative error code for failure. + **/ +static int pkcs7_get_signers_info_set(unsigned char **p, unsigned char *end, + mbedtls_pkcs7_signer_info *signers_set, + mbedtls_x509_buf *digest_alg) +{ + unsigned char *end_set; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + int count = 0; + size_t len = 0; + + ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(p, end, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED + | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SET); + if (ret != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_INVALID_SIGNER_INFO, ret); + } + + /* Detect zero signers */ + if (len == 0) { + return 0; + } + + end_set = *p + len; + + ret = pkcs7_get_signer_info(p, end_set, signers_set, digest_alg); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + count++; + + mbedtls_pkcs7_signer_info *prev = signers_set; + while (*p != end_set) { + mbedtls_pkcs7_signer_info *signer = + mbedtls_calloc(1, sizeof(mbedtls_pkcs7_signer_info)); + if (!signer) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_ALLOC_FAILED; + goto cleanup; + } + + ret = pkcs7_get_signer_info(p, end_set, signer, digest_alg); + if (ret != 0) { + mbedtls_free(signer); + goto cleanup; + } + prev->next = signer; + prev = signer; + count++; + } + + return count; + +cleanup: + pkcs7_free_signer_info(signers_set); + mbedtls_pkcs7_signer_info *signer = signers_set->next; + while (signer != NULL) { + prev = signer; + signer = signer->next; + pkcs7_free_signer_info(prev); + mbedtls_free(prev); + } + signers_set->next = NULL; + return ret; +} + +/** + * SignedData ::= SEQUENCE { + * version Version, + * digestAlgorithms DigestAlgorithmIdentifiers, + * contentInfo ContentInfo, + * certificates + * [0] IMPLICIT ExtendedCertificatesAndCertificates + * OPTIONAL, + * crls + * [0] IMPLICIT CertificateRevocationLists OPTIONAL, + * signerInfos SignerInfos } + */ +static int pkcs7_get_signed_data(unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen, + mbedtls_pkcs7_signed_data *signed_data) +{ + unsigned char *p = buf; + unsigned char *end = buf + buflen; + unsigned char *end_content_info = NULL; + size_t len = 0; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg; + + ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p, end, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED + | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE); + if (ret != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_INVALID_FORMAT, ret); + } + + if (p + len != end) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_INVALID_FORMAT, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + } + + /* Get version of signed data */ + ret = pkcs7_get_version(&p, end, &signed_data->version); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + + /* Get digest algorithm */ + ret = pkcs7_get_digest_algorithm_set(&p, end, + &signed_data->digest_alg_identifiers); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + + ret = mbedtls_oid_get_md_alg(&signed_data->digest_alg_identifiers, &md_alg); + if (ret != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_INVALID_ALG; + } + + mbedtls_pkcs7_buf content_type; + memset(&content_type, 0, sizeof(content_type)); + ret = pkcs7_get_content_info_type(&p, end, &end_content_info, &content_type); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + if (MBEDTLS_OID_CMP(MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS7_DATA, &content_type)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_INVALID_CONTENT_INFO; + } + + if (p != end_content_info) { + /* Determine if valid content is present */ + ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p, + end_content_info, + &len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC); + if (ret != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_INVALID_CONTENT_INFO, ret); + } + p += len; + if (p != end_content_info) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_INVALID_CONTENT_INFO, ret); + } + /* Valid content is present - this is not supported */ + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + } + + /* Look for certificates, there may or may not be any */ + mbedtls_x509_crt_init(&signed_data->certs); + ret = pkcs7_get_certificates(&p, end, &signed_data->certs); + if (ret < 0) { + return ret; + } + + signed_data->no_of_certs = ret; + + /* + * Currently CRLs are not supported. If CRL exist, the parsing will fail + * at next step of getting signers info and return error as invalid + * signer info. + */ + + signed_data->no_of_crls = 0; + + /* Get signers info */ + ret = pkcs7_get_signers_info_set(&p, + end, + &signed_data->signers, + &signed_data->digest_alg_identifiers); + if (ret < 0) { + return ret; + } + + signed_data->no_of_signers = ret; + + /* Don't permit trailing data */ + if (p != end) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_INVALID_FORMAT; + } + + return 0; +} + +int mbedtls_pkcs7_parse_der(mbedtls_pkcs7 *pkcs7, const unsigned char *buf, + const size_t buflen) +{ + unsigned char *p; + unsigned char *end; + size_t len = 0; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + if (pkcs7 == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + /* make an internal copy of the buffer for parsing */ + pkcs7->raw.p = p = mbedtls_calloc(1, buflen); + if (pkcs7->raw.p == NULL) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_ALLOC_FAILED; + goto out; + } + memcpy(p, buf, buflen); + pkcs7->raw.len = buflen; + end = p + buflen; + + ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p, end, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED + | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE); + if (ret != 0) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_INVALID_FORMAT, ret); + goto out; + } + + if ((size_t) (end - p) != len) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_INVALID_FORMAT, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + goto out; + } + + if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p, end, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID)) != 0) { + if (ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG) { + goto out; + } + p = pkcs7->raw.p; + len = buflen; + goto try_data; + } + + if (MBEDTLS_OID_CMP_RAW(MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS7_SIGNED_DATA, p, len)) { + /* OID is not MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS7_SIGNED_DATA, which is the only supported feature */ + if (!MBEDTLS_OID_CMP_RAW(MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS7_DATA, p, len) + || !MBEDTLS_OID_CMP_RAW(MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS7_ENCRYPTED_DATA, p, len) + || !MBEDTLS_OID_CMP_RAW(MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS7_ENVELOPED_DATA, p, len) + || !MBEDTLS_OID_CMP_RAW(MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS7_SIGNED_AND_ENVELOPED_DATA, p, len) + || !MBEDTLS_OID_CMP_RAW(MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS7_DIGESTED_DATA, p, len)) { + /* OID is valid according to the spec, but unsupported */ + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + } else { + /* OID is invalid according to the spec */ + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + goto out; + } + + p += len; + + ret = pkcs7_get_next_content_len(&p, end, &len); + if (ret != 0) { + goto out; + } + + /* ensure no extra/missing data */ + if (p + len != end) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + goto out; + } + +try_data: + ret = pkcs7_get_signed_data(p, len, &pkcs7->signed_data); + if (ret != 0) { + goto out; + } + + ret = MBEDTLS_PKCS7_SIGNED_DATA; + +out: + if (ret < 0) { + mbedtls_pkcs7_free(pkcs7); + } + + return ret; +} + +static int mbedtls_pkcs7_data_or_hash_verify(mbedtls_pkcs7 *pkcs7, + const mbedtls_x509_crt *cert, + const unsigned char *data, + size_t datalen, + const int is_data_hash) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char *hash; + mbedtls_pk_context pk_cxt = cert->pk; + const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info; + mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg; + mbedtls_pkcs7_signer_info *signer; + + if (pkcs7->signed_data.no_of_signers == 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_INVALID_CERT; + } + + if (mbedtls_x509_time_is_past(&cert->valid_to) || + mbedtls_x509_time_is_future(&cert->valid_from)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_CERT_DATE_INVALID; + } + + ret = mbedtls_oid_get_md_alg(&pkcs7->signed_data.digest_alg_identifiers, &md_alg); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + + md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type(md_alg); + if (md_info == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_VERIFY_FAIL; + } + + hash = mbedtls_calloc(mbedtls_md_get_size(md_info), 1); + if (hash == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_ALLOC_FAILED; + } + + /* BEGIN must free hash before jumping out */ + if (is_data_hash) { + if (datalen != mbedtls_md_get_size(md_info)) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_VERIFY_FAIL; + } else { + memcpy(hash, data, datalen); + } + } else { + ret = mbedtls_md(md_info, data, datalen, hash); + } + if (ret != 0) { + mbedtls_free(hash); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_VERIFY_FAIL; + } + + /* assume failure */ + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_VERIFY_FAIL; + + /* + * Potential TODOs + * Currently we iterate over all signers and return success if any of them + * verify. + * + * However, we could make this better by checking against the certificate's + * identification and SignerIdentifier fields first. That would also allow + * us to distinguish between 'no signature for key' and 'signature for key + * failed to validate'. + */ + for (signer = &pkcs7->signed_data.signers; signer; signer = signer->next) { + ret = mbedtls_pk_verify(&pk_cxt, md_alg, hash, + mbedtls_md_get_size(md_info), + signer->sig.p, signer->sig.len); + + if (ret == 0) { + break; + } + } + + mbedtls_free(hash); + /* END must free hash before jumping out */ + return ret; +} + +int mbedtls_pkcs7_signed_data_verify(mbedtls_pkcs7 *pkcs7, + const mbedtls_x509_crt *cert, + const unsigned char *data, + size_t datalen) +{ + if (data == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + return mbedtls_pkcs7_data_or_hash_verify(pkcs7, cert, data, datalen, 0); +} + +int mbedtls_pkcs7_signed_hash_verify(mbedtls_pkcs7 *pkcs7, + const mbedtls_x509_crt *cert, + const unsigned char *hash, + size_t hashlen) +{ + if (hash == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + return mbedtls_pkcs7_data_or_hash_verify(pkcs7, cert, hash, hashlen, 1); +} + +/* + * Unallocate all pkcs7 data + */ +void mbedtls_pkcs7_free(mbedtls_pkcs7 *pkcs7) +{ + mbedtls_pkcs7_signer_info *signer_cur; + mbedtls_pkcs7_signer_info *signer_prev; + + if (pkcs7 == NULL || pkcs7->raw.p == NULL) { + return; + } + + mbedtls_free(pkcs7->raw.p); + + mbedtls_x509_crt_free(&pkcs7->signed_data.certs); + mbedtls_x509_crl_free(&pkcs7->signed_data.crl); + + signer_cur = pkcs7->signed_data.signers.next; + pkcs7_free_signer_info(&pkcs7->signed_data.signers); + while (signer_cur != NULL) { + signer_prev = signer_cur; + signer_cur = signer_prev->next; + pkcs7_free_signer_info(signer_prev); + mbedtls_free(signer_prev); + } + + pkcs7->raw.p = NULL; +} + +#endif diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/pkparse.c b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/pkparse.c index 37d501640d24..4f6ee139862d 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/pkparse.c +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/pkparse.c @@ -13,19 +13,25 @@ #include "mbedtls/asn1.h" #include "mbedtls/oid.h" #include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" #include "mbedtls/error.h" +#include "mbedtls/ecp.h" +#include "pk_internal.h" #include +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +#include "mbedtls/psa_util.h" +#include "psa/crypto.h" +#endif + +/* Key types */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) #include "mbedtls/rsa.h" +#include "rsa_internal.h" #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) -#include "mbedtls/ecp.h" -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) -#include "mbedtls/ecdsa.h" -#endif + +/* Extended formats */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C) #include "mbedtls/pem.h" #endif @@ -36,175 +42,55 @@ #include "mbedtls/pkcs12.h" #endif -#include "mbedtls/platform.h" - -/* Parameter validation macros based on platform_util.h */ -#define PK_VALIDATE_RET(cond) \ - MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE_RET(cond, MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA) -#define PK_VALIDATE(cond) \ - MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE(cond) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) -/* - * Load all data from a file into a given buffer. +/*********************************************************************** * - * The file is expected to contain either PEM or DER encoded data. - * A terminating null byte is always appended. It is included in the announced - * length only if the data looks like it is PEM encoded. - */ -int mbedtls_pk_load_file(const char *path, unsigned char **buf, size_t *n) -{ - FILE *f; - long size; - - PK_VALIDATE_RET(path != NULL); - PK_VALIDATE_RET(buf != NULL); - PK_VALIDATE_RET(n != NULL); - - if ((f = fopen(path, "rb")) == NULL) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FILE_IO_ERROR; - } - - fseek(f, 0, SEEK_END); - if ((size = ftell(f)) == -1) { - fclose(f); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FILE_IO_ERROR; - } - fseek(f, 0, SEEK_SET); - - *n = (size_t) size; - - if (*n + 1 == 0 || - (*buf = mbedtls_calloc(1, *n + 1)) == NULL) { - fclose(f); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_ALLOC_FAILED; - } - - if (fread(*buf, 1, *n, f) != *n) { - fclose(f); - - mbedtls_platform_zeroize(*buf, *n); - mbedtls_free(*buf); - - return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FILE_IO_ERROR; - } - - fclose(f); - - (*buf)[*n] = '\0'; - - if (strstr((const char *) *buf, "-----BEGIN ") != NULL) { - ++*n; - } + * Low-level ECC parsing: optional support for SpecifiedECDomain + * + * There are two functions here that are used by the rest of the code: + * - pk_ecc_tag_is_speficied_ec_domain() + * - pk_ecc_group_id_from_specified() + * + * All the other functions are internal to this section. + * + * The two "public" functions have a dummy variant provided + * in configs without MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_EC_EXTENDED. This acts as an + * abstraction layer for this macro, which should not appear outside + * this section. + * + **********************************************************************/ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_EC_EXTENDED) +/* See the "real" version for documentation */ +static int pk_ecc_tag_is_specified_ec_domain(int tag) +{ + (void) tag; return 0; } -/* - * Load and parse a private key - */ -int mbedtls_pk_parse_keyfile(mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, - const char *path, const char *pwd) +/* See the "real" version for documentation */ +static int pk_ecc_group_id_from_specified(const mbedtls_asn1_buf *params, + mbedtls_ecp_group_id *grp_id) { - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - size_t n; - unsigned char *buf; - - PK_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - PK_VALIDATE_RET(path != NULL); - - if ((ret = mbedtls_pk_load_file(path, &buf, &n)) != 0) { - return ret; - } - - if (pwd == NULL) { - ret = mbedtls_pk_parse_key(ctx, buf, n, NULL, 0); - } else { - ret = mbedtls_pk_parse_key(ctx, buf, n, - (const unsigned char *) pwd, strlen(pwd)); - } - - mbedtls_platform_zeroize(buf, n); - mbedtls_free(buf); - - return ret; + (void) params; + (void) grp_id; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; } - +#else /* MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_EC_EXTENDED */ /* - * Load and parse a public key + * Tell if the passed tag might be the start of SpecifiedECDomain + * (that is, a sequence). */ -int mbedtls_pk_parse_public_keyfile(mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, const char *path) +static int pk_ecc_tag_is_specified_ec_domain(int tag) { - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - size_t n; - unsigned char *buf; - - PK_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - PK_VALIDATE_RET(path != NULL); - - if ((ret = mbedtls_pk_load_file(path, &buf, &n)) != 0) { - return ret; - } - - ret = mbedtls_pk_parse_public_key(ctx, buf, n); - - mbedtls_platform_zeroize(buf, n); - mbedtls_free(buf); - - return ret; + return tag == (MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE); } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_FS_IO */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) -/* Minimally parse an ECParameters buffer to and mbedtls_asn1_buf - * - * ECParameters ::= CHOICE { - * namedCurve OBJECT IDENTIFIER - * specifiedCurve SpecifiedECDomain -- = SEQUENCE { ... } - * -- implicitCurve NULL - * } - */ -static int pk_get_ecparams(unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, - mbedtls_asn1_buf *params) -{ - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - - if (end - *p < 1) { - return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, - MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA); - } - - /* Tag may be either OID or SEQUENCE */ - params->tag = **p; - if (params->tag != MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_EC_EXTENDED) - && params->tag != (MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE) -#endif - ) { - return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, - MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG); - } - - if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(p, end, ¶ms->len, params->tag)) != 0) { - return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, ret); - } - - params->p = *p; - *p += params->len; - - if (*p != end) { - return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, - MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH); - } - - return 0; -} - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_EC_EXTENDED) /* * Parse a SpecifiedECDomain (SEC 1 C.2) and (mostly) fill the group with it. * WARNING: the resulting group should only be used with - * pk_group_id_from_specified(), since its base point may not be set correctly + * pk_ecc_group_id_from_specified(), since its base point may not be set correctly * if it was encoded compressed. * * SpecifiedECDomain ::= SEQUENCE { @@ -224,7 +110,7 @@ static int pk_group_from_specified(const mbedtls_asn1_buf *params, mbedtls_ecp_g { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; unsigned char *p = params->p; - const unsigned char * const end = params->p + params->len; + const unsigned char *const end = params->p + params->len; const unsigned char *end_field, *end_curve; size_t len; int ver; @@ -396,7 +282,6 @@ static int pk_group_id_from_group(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_grou mbedtls_mpi_get_bit(&grp->G.Y, 0) == mbedtls_mpi_get_bit(&ref.G.Y, 0)) { break; } - } cleanup: @@ -414,8 +299,8 @@ static int pk_group_id_from_group(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_grou /* * Parse a SpecifiedECDomain (SEC 1 C.2) and find the associated group ID */ -static int pk_group_id_from_specified(const mbedtls_asn1_buf *params, - mbedtls_ecp_group_id *grp_id) +static int pk_ecc_group_id_from_specified(const mbedtls_asn1_buf *params, + mbedtls_ecp_group_id *grp_id) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; mbedtls_ecp_group grp; @@ -429,12 +314,70 @@ static int pk_group_id_from_specified(const mbedtls_asn1_buf *params, ret = pk_group_id_from_group(&grp, grp_id); cleanup: - mbedtls_ecp_group_free(&grp); + /* The API respecting lifecycle for mbedtls_ecp_group struct is + * _init(), _load() and _free(). In pk_ecc_group_id_from_specified() the + * temporary grp breaks that flow and it's members are populated + * by pk_group_id_from_group(). As such mbedtls_ecp_group_free() + * which is assuming a group populated by _setup() may not clean-up + * properly -> Manually free it's members. + */ + mbedtls_mpi_free(&grp.N); + mbedtls_mpi_free(&grp.P); + mbedtls_mpi_free(&grp.A); + mbedtls_mpi_free(&grp.B); + mbedtls_ecp_point_free(&grp.G); return ret; } #endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_EC_EXTENDED */ +/*********************************************************************** + * + * Unsorted (yet!) from this point on until the next section header + * + **********************************************************************/ + +/* Minimally parse an ECParameters buffer to and mbedtls_asn1_buf + * + * ECParameters ::= CHOICE { + * namedCurve OBJECT IDENTIFIER + * specifiedCurve SpecifiedECDomain -- = SEQUENCE { ... } + * -- implicitCurve NULL + * } + */ +static int pk_get_ecparams(unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, + mbedtls_asn1_buf *params) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + if (end - *p < 1) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA); + } + + /* Acceptable tags: OID for namedCurve, or specifiedECDomain */ + params->tag = **p; + if (params->tag != MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID && + !pk_ecc_tag_is_specified_ec_domain(params->tag)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG); + } + + if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(p, end, ¶ms->len, params->tag)) != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, ret); + } + + params->p = *p; + *p += params->len; + + if (*p != end) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + } + + return 0; +} + /* * Use EC parameters to initialise an EC group * @@ -443,7 +386,7 @@ static int pk_group_id_from_specified(const mbedtls_asn1_buf *params, * specifiedCurve SpecifiedECDomain -- = SEQUENCE { ... } * -- implicitCurve NULL */ -static int pk_use_ecparams(const mbedtls_asn1_buf *params, mbedtls_ecp_group *grp) +static int pk_use_ecparams(const mbedtls_asn1_buf *params, mbedtls_pk_context *pk) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id; @@ -453,116 +396,71 @@ static int pk_use_ecparams(const mbedtls_asn1_buf *params, mbedtls_ecp_group *gr return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_UNKNOWN_NAMED_CURVE; } } else { -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_EC_EXTENDED) - if ((ret = pk_group_id_from_specified(params, &grp_id)) != 0) { + ret = pk_ecc_group_id_from_specified(params, &grp_id); + if (ret != 0) { return ret; } -#else - return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT; -#endif } - /* - * grp may already be initialized; if so, make sure IDs match - */ - if (grp->id != MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE && grp->id != grp_id) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT; - } - - if ((ret = mbedtls_ecp_group_load(grp, grp_id)) != 0) { - return ret; - } - - return 0; + return mbedtls_pk_ecc_set_group(pk, grp_id); } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_RFC8410_CURVES) + /* - * EC public key is an EC point - * - * The caller is responsible for clearing the structure upon failure if - * desired. Take care to pass along the possible ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE - * return code of mbedtls_ecp_point_read_binary() and leave p in a usable state. + * Load an RFC8410 EC key, which doesn't have any parameters */ -static int pk_get_ecpubkey(unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, - mbedtls_ecp_keypair *key) +static int pk_use_ecparams_rfc8410(const mbedtls_asn1_buf *params, + mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id, + mbedtls_pk_context *pk) { - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - - if ((ret = mbedtls_ecp_point_read_binary(&key->grp, &key->Q, - (const unsigned char *) *p, end - *p)) == 0) { - ret = mbedtls_ecp_check_pubkey(&key->grp, &key->Q); + if (params->tag != 0 || params->len != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT; } - /* - * We know mbedtls_ecp_point_read_binary consumed all bytes or failed - */ - *p = (unsigned char *) end; - - return ret; + return mbedtls_pk_ecc_set_group(pk, grp_id); } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) /* - * RSAPublicKey ::= SEQUENCE { - * modulus INTEGER, -- n - * publicExponent INTEGER -- e - * } + * Parse an RFC 8410 encoded private EC key + * + * CurvePrivateKey ::= OCTET STRING */ -static int pk_get_rsapubkey(unsigned char **p, - const unsigned char *end, - mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa) +static int pk_parse_key_rfc8410_der(mbedtls_pk_context *pk, + unsigned char *key, size_t keylen, const unsigned char *end, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t len; - if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(p, end, &len, - MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)) != 0) { - return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_PUBKEY, ret); - } - - if (*p + len != end) { - return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_PUBKEY, - MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH); - } - - /* Import N */ - if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(p, end, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_INTEGER)) != 0) { - return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_PUBKEY, ret); - } - - if ((ret = mbedtls_rsa_import_raw(rsa, *p, len, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, - NULL, 0, NULL, 0)) != 0) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_PUBKEY; - } - - *p += len; - - /* Import E */ - if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(p, end, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_INTEGER)) != 0) { - return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_PUBKEY, ret); + if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&key, (key + keylen), &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_OCTET_STRING)) != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, ret); } - if ((ret = mbedtls_rsa_import_raw(rsa, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, - NULL, 0, *p, len)) != 0) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_PUBKEY; + if (key + len != end) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT; } - *p += len; - - if (mbedtls_rsa_complete(rsa) != 0 || - mbedtls_rsa_check_pubkey(rsa) != 0) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_PUBKEY; + /* + * Load the private key + */ + ret = mbedtls_pk_ecc_set_key(pk, key, len); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; } - if (*p != end) { - return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_PUBKEY, - MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + /* pk_parse_key_pkcs8_unencrypted_der() only supports version 1 PKCS8 keys, + * which never contain a public key. As such, derive the public key + * unconditionally. */ + if ((ret = mbedtls_pk_ecc_set_pubkey_from_prv(pk, key, len, f_rng, p_rng)) != 0) { + return ret; } return 0; } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_RFC8410_CURVES */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS */ /* Get a PK algorithm identifier * @@ -572,7 +470,8 @@ static int pk_get_rsapubkey(unsigned char **p, */ static int pk_get_pk_alg(unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, - mbedtls_pk_type_t *pk_alg, mbedtls_asn1_buf *params) + mbedtls_pk_type_t *pk_alg, mbedtls_asn1_buf *params, + mbedtls_ecp_group_id *ec_grp_id) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; mbedtls_asn1_buf alg_oid; @@ -583,7 +482,18 @@ static int pk_get_pk_alg(unsigned char **p, return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_ALG, ret); } - if (mbedtls_oid_get_pk_alg(&alg_oid, pk_alg) != 0) { + ret = mbedtls_oid_get_pk_alg(&alg_oid, pk_alg); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS) + if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_OID_NOT_FOUND) { + ret = mbedtls_oid_get_ec_grp_algid(&alg_oid, ec_grp_id); + if (ret == 0) { + *pk_alg = MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY; + } + } +#else + (void) ec_grp_id; +#endif + if (ret != 0) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_UNKNOWN_PK_ALG; } @@ -611,13 +521,9 @@ int mbedtls_pk_parse_subpubkey(unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, size_t len; mbedtls_asn1_buf alg_params; mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_alg = MBEDTLS_PK_NONE; + mbedtls_ecp_group_id ec_grp_id = MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE; const mbedtls_pk_info_t *pk_info; - PK_VALIDATE_RET(p != NULL); - PK_VALIDATE_RET(*p != NULL); - PK_VALIDATE_RET(end != NULL); - PK_VALIDATE_RET(pk != NULL); - if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(p, end, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)) != 0) { return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, ret); @@ -625,7 +531,7 @@ int mbedtls_pk_parse_subpubkey(unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, end = *p + len; - if ((ret = pk_get_pk_alg(p, end, &pk_alg, &alg_params)) != 0) { + if ((ret = pk_get_pk_alg(p, end, &pk_alg, &alg_params, &ec_grp_id)) != 0) { return ret; } @@ -648,17 +554,35 @@ int mbedtls_pk_parse_subpubkey(unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, #if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) if (pk_alg == MBEDTLS_PK_RSA) { - ret = pk_get_rsapubkey(p, end, mbedtls_pk_rsa(*pk)); + ret = mbedtls_rsa_parse_pubkey(mbedtls_pk_rsa(*pk), *p, (size_t) (end - *p)); + if (ret == 0) { + /* On success all the input has been consumed by the parsing function. */ + *p += end - *p; + } else if ((ret <= MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA) && + (ret >= MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL)) { + /* In case of ASN1 error codes add MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_PUBKEY. */ + ret = MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_PUBKEY, ret); + } else { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_PUBKEY; + } } else #endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS) if (pk_alg == MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY_DH || pk_alg == MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY) { - ret = pk_use_ecparams(&alg_params, &mbedtls_pk_ec(*pk)->grp); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_RFC8410_CURVES) + if (MBEDTLS_PK_IS_RFC8410_GROUP_ID(ec_grp_id)) { + ret = pk_use_ecparams_rfc8410(&alg_params, ec_grp_id, pk); + } else +#endif + { + ret = pk_use_ecparams(&alg_params, pk); + } if (ret == 0) { - ret = pk_get_ecpubkey(p, end, mbedtls_pk_ec(*pk)); + ret = mbedtls_pk_ecc_set_pubkey(pk, *p, (size_t) (end - *p)); + *p += end - *p; } } else -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS */ ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_UNKNOWN_PK_ALG; if (ret == 0 && *p != end) { @@ -673,208 +597,20 @@ int mbedtls_pk_parse_subpubkey(unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, return ret; } -#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) -/* - * Wrapper around mbedtls_asn1_get_mpi() that rejects zero. - * - * The value zero is: - * - never a valid value for an RSA parameter - * - interpreted as "omitted, please reconstruct" by mbedtls_rsa_complete(). - * - * Since values can't be omitted in PKCS#1, passing a zero value to - * rsa_complete() would be incorrect, so reject zero values early. - */ -static int asn1_get_nonzero_mpi(unsigned char **p, - const unsigned char *end, - mbedtls_mpi *X) -{ - int ret; - - ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_mpi(p, end, X); - if (ret != 0) { - return ret; - } - - if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(X, 0) == 0) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT; - } - - return 0; -} - -/* - * Parse a PKCS#1 encoded private RSA key - */ -static int pk_parse_key_pkcs1_der(mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa, - const unsigned char *key, - size_t keylen) -{ - int ret, version; - size_t len; - unsigned char *p, *end; - - mbedtls_mpi T; - mbedtls_mpi_init(&T); - - p = (unsigned char *) key; - end = p + keylen; - - /* - * This function parses the RSAPrivateKey (PKCS#1) - * - * RSAPrivateKey ::= SEQUENCE { - * version Version, - * modulus INTEGER, -- n - * publicExponent INTEGER, -- e - * privateExponent INTEGER, -- d - * prime1 INTEGER, -- p - * prime2 INTEGER, -- q - * exponent1 INTEGER, -- d mod (p-1) - * exponent2 INTEGER, -- d mod (q-1) - * coefficient INTEGER, -- (inverse of q) mod p - * otherPrimeInfos OtherPrimeInfos OPTIONAL - * } - */ - if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p, end, &len, - MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)) != 0) { - return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, ret); - } - - end = p + len; - - if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_int(&p, end, &version)) != 0) { - return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, ret); - } - - if (version != 0) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_VERSION; - } - - /* Import N */ - if ((ret = asn1_get_nonzero_mpi(&p, end, &T)) != 0 || - (ret = mbedtls_rsa_import(rsa, &T, NULL, NULL, - NULL, NULL)) != 0) { - goto cleanup; - } - - /* Import E */ - if ((ret = asn1_get_nonzero_mpi(&p, end, &T)) != 0 || - (ret = mbedtls_rsa_import(rsa, NULL, NULL, NULL, - NULL, &T)) != 0) { - goto cleanup; - } - - /* Import D */ - if ((ret = asn1_get_nonzero_mpi(&p, end, &T)) != 0 || - (ret = mbedtls_rsa_import(rsa, NULL, NULL, NULL, - &T, NULL)) != 0) { - goto cleanup; - } - - /* Import P */ - if ((ret = asn1_get_nonzero_mpi(&p, end, &T)) != 0 || - (ret = mbedtls_rsa_import(rsa, NULL, &T, NULL, - NULL, NULL)) != 0) { - goto cleanup; - } - - /* Import Q */ - if ((ret = asn1_get_nonzero_mpi(&p, end, &T)) != 0 || - (ret = mbedtls_rsa_import(rsa, NULL, NULL, &T, - NULL, NULL)) != 0) { - goto cleanup; - } - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT) && !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_ALT) - /* - * The RSA CRT parameters DP, DQ and QP are nominally redundant, in - * that they can be easily recomputed from D, P and Q. However by - * parsing them from the PKCS1 structure it is possible to avoid - * recalculating them which both reduces the overhead of loading - * RSA private keys into memory and also avoids side channels which - * can arise when computing those values, since all of D, P, and Q - * are secret. See https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/055 for a - * description of one such attack. - */ - - /* Import DP */ - if ((ret = asn1_get_nonzero_mpi(&p, end, &T)) != 0 || - (ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy(&rsa->DP, &T)) != 0) { - goto cleanup; - } - - /* Import DQ */ - if ((ret = asn1_get_nonzero_mpi(&p, end, &T)) != 0 || - (ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy(&rsa->DQ, &T)) != 0) { - goto cleanup; - } - - /* Import QP */ - if ((ret = asn1_get_nonzero_mpi(&p, end, &T)) != 0 || - (ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy(&rsa->QP, &T)) != 0) { - goto cleanup; - } - -#else - /* Verify existence of the CRT params */ - if ((ret = asn1_get_nonzero_mpi(&p, end, &T)) != 0 || - (ret = asn1_get_nonzero_mpi(&p, end, &T)) != 0 || - (ret = asn1_get_nonzero_mpi(&p, end, &T)) != 0) { - goto cleanup; - } -#endif - - /* rsa_complete() doesn't complete anything with the default - * implementation but is still called: - * - for the benefit of alternative implementation that may want to - * pre-compute stuff beyond what's provided (eg Montgomery factors) - * - as is also sanity-checks the key - * - * Furthermore, we also check the public part for consistency with - * mbedtls_pk_parse_pubkey(), as it includes size minima for example. - */ - if ((ret = mbedtls_rsa_complete(rsa)) != 0 || - (ret = mbedtls_rsa_check_pubkey(rsa)) != 0) { - goto cleanup; - } - - if (p != end) { - ret = MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, - MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH); - } - -cleanup: - - mbedtls_mpi_free(&T); - - if (ret != 0) { - /* Wrap error code if it's coming from a lower level */ - if ((ret & 0xff80) == 0) { - ret = MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, ret); - } else { - ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT; - } - - mbedtls_rsa_free(rsa); - } - - return ret; -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS) /* * Parse a SEC1 encoded private EC key */ -static int pk_parse_key_sec1_der(mbedtls_ecp_keypair *eck, - const unsigned char *key, - size_t keylen) +static int pk_parse_key_sec1_der(mbedtls_pk_context *pk, + const unsigned char *key, size_t keylen, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; int version, pubkey_done; - size_t len; - mbedtls_asn1_buf params; + size_t len, d_len; + mbedtls_asn1_buf params = { 0, 0, NULL }; unsigned char *p = (unsigned char *) key; + unsigned char *d; unsigned char *end = p + keylen; unsigned char *end2; @@ -907,10 +643,10 @@ static int pk_parse_key_sec1_der(mbedtls_ecp_keypair *eck, return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, ret); } - if ((ret = mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(&eck->d, p, len)) != 0) { - mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free(eck); - return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, ret); - } + /* Keep a reference to the position fo the private key. It will be used + * later in this function. */ + d = p; + d_len = len; p += len; @@ -923,16 +659,22 @@ static int pk_parse_key_sec1_der(mbedtls_ecp_keypair *eck, MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | 0)) == 0) { if ((ret = pk_get_ecparams(&p, p + len, ¶ms)) != 0 || - (ret = pk_use_ecparams(¶ms, &eck->grp)) != 0) { - mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free(eck); + (ret = pk_use_ecparams(¶ms, pk)) != 0) { return ret; } } else if (ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG) { - mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free(eck); return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, ret); } } + /* + * Load the private key + */ + ret = mbedtls_pk_ecc_set_key(pk, d, d_len); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + if (p != end) { /* * Is 'publickey' present? If not, or if we can't read it (eg because it @@ -952,11 +694,11 @@ static int pk_parse_key_sec1_der(mbedtls_ecp_keypair *eck, MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH); } - if ((ret = pk_get_ecpubkey(&p, end2, eck)) == 0) { + if ((ret = mbedtls_pk_ecc_set_pubkey(pk, p, (size_t) (end2 - p))) == 0) { pubkey_done = 1; } else { /* - * The only acceptable failure mode of pk_get_ecpubkey() above + * The only acceptable failure mode of mbedtls_pk_ecc_set_pubkey() above * is if the point format is not recognized. */ if (ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE) { @@ -964,26 +706,25 @@ static int pk_parse_key_sec1_der(mbedtls_ecp_keypair *eck, } } } else if (ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG) { - mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free(eck); return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, ret); } } - if (!pubkey_done && - (ret = mbedtls_ecp_mul(&eck->grp, &eck->Q, &eck->d, &eck->grp.G, - NULL, NULL)) != 0) { - mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free(eck); - return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, ret); - } - - if ((ret = mbedtls_ecp_check_privkey(&eck->grp, &eck->d)) != 0) { - mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free(eck); - return ret; + if (!pubkey_done) { + if ((ret = mbedtls_pk_ecc_set_pubkey_from_prv(pk, d, d_len, f_rng, p_rng)) != 0) { + return ret; + } } return 0; } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS */ + +/*********************************************************************** + * + * PKCS#8 parsing functions + * + **********************************************************************/ /* * Parse an unencrypted PKCS#8 encoded private key @@ -1000,8 +741,8 @@ static int pk_parse_key_sec1_der(mbedtls_ecp_keypair *eck, */ static int pk_parse_key_pkcs8_unencrypted_der( mbedtls_pk_context *pk, - const unsigned char *key, - size_t keylen) + const unsigned char *key, size_t keylen, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng) { int ret, version; size_t len; @@ -1009,8 +750,14 @@ static int pk_parse_key_pkcs8_unencrypted_der( unsigned char *p = (unsigned char *) key; unsigned char *end = p + keylen; mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_alg = MBEDTLS_PK_NONE; + mbedtls_ecp_group_id ec_grp_id = MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE; const mbedtls_pk_info_t *pk_info; +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS) + (void) f_rng; + (void) p_rng; +#endif + /* * This function parses the PrivateKeyInfo object (PKCS#8 v1.2 = RFC 5208) * @@ -1042,7 +789,7 @@ static int pk_parse_key_pkcs8_unencrypted_der( return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_VERSION, ret); } - if ((ret = pk_get_pk_alg(&p, end, &pk_alg, ¶ms)) != 0) { + if ((ret = pk_get_pk_alg(&p, end, &pk_alg, ¶ms, &ec_grp_id)) != 0) { return ret; } @@ -1065,23 +812,43 @@ static int pk_parse_key_pkcs8_unencrypted_der( #if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) if (pk_alg == MBEDTLS_PK_RSA) { - if ((ret = pk_parse_key_pkcs1_der(mbedtls_pk_rsa(*pk), p, len)) != 0) { + if ((ret = mbedtls_rsa_parse_key(mbedtls_pk_rsa(*pk), p, len)) != 0) { mbedtls_pk_free(pk); return ret; } } else #endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS) if (pk_alg == MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY || pk_alg == MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY_DH) { - if ((ret = pk_use_ecparams(¶ms, &mbedtls_pk_ec(*pk)->grp)) != 0 || - (ret = pk_parse_key_sec1_der(mbedtls_pk_ec(*pk), p, len)) != 0) { - mbedtls_pk_free(pk); - return ret; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_RFC8410_CURVES) + if (MBEDTLS_PK_IS_RFC8410_GROUP_ID(ec_grp_id)) { + if ((ret = + pk_use_ecparams_rfc8410(¶ms, ec_grp_id, pk)) != 0 || + (ret = + pk_parse_key_rfc8410_der(pk, p, len, end, f_rng, + p_rng)) != 0) { + mbedtls_pk_free(pk); + return ret; + } + } else +#endif + { + if ((ret = pk_use_ecparams(¶ms, pk)) != 0 || + (ret = pk_parse_key_sec1_der(pk, p, len, f_rng, p_rng)) != 0) { + mbedtls_pk_free(pk); + return ret; + } } } else -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS */ return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_UNKNOWN_PK_ALG; + end = p + len; + if (end != (key + keylen)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + } + return 0; } @@ -1095,20 +862,22 @@ static int pk_parse_key_pkcs8_unencrypted_der( * */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C) -static int pk_parse_key_pkcs8_encrypted_der( +MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE int mbedtls_pk_parse_key_pkcs8_encrypted_der( mbedtls_pk_context *pk, unsigned char *key, size_t keylen, - const unsigned char *pwd, size_t pwdlen) + const unsigned char *pwd, size_t pwdlen, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng) { int ret, decrypted = 0; size_t len; unsigned char *buf; unsigned char *p, *end; mbedtls_asn1_buf pbe_alg_oid, pbe_params; -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7) && defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C) mbedtls_cipher_type_t cipher_alg; mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg; #endif + size_t outlen = 0; p = key; end = p + keylen; @@ -1152,11 +921,11 @@ static int pk_parse_key_pkcs8_encrypted_der( /* * Decrypt EncryptedData with appropriate PBE */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7) && defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C) if (mbedtls_oid_get_pkcs12_pbe_alg(&pbe_alg_oid, &md_alg, &cipher_alg) == 0) { - if ((ret = mbedtls_pkcs12_pbe(&pbe_params, MBEDTLS_PKCS12_PBE_DECRYPT, - cipher_alg, md_alg, - pwd, pwdlen, p, len, buf)) != 0) { + if ((ret = mbedtls_pkcs12_pbe_ext(&pbe_params, MBEDTLS_PKCS12_PBE_DECRYPT, + cipher_alg, md_alg, + pwd, pwdlen, p, len, buf, len, &outlen)) != 0) { if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS12_PASSWORD_MISMATCH) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_PASSWORD_MISMATCH; } @@ -1164,29 +933,13 @@ static int pk_parse_key_pkcs8_encrypted_der( return ret; } - decrypted = 1; - } else if (MBEDTLS_OID_CMP(MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS12_PBE_SHA1_RC4_128, &pbe_alg_oid) == 0) { - if ((ret = mbedtls_pkcs12_pbe_sha1_rc4_128(&pbe_params, - MBEDTLS_PKCS12_PBE_DECRYPT, - pwd, pwdlen, - p, len, buf)) != 0) { - return ret; - } - - // Best guess for password mismatch when using RC4. If first tag is - // not MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE - // - if (*buf != (MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_PASSWORD_MISMATCH; - } - decrypted = 1; } else -#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C) +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C && MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 && MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7) && defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C) if (MBEDTLS_OID_CMP(MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS5_PBES2, &pbe_alg_oid) == 0) { - if ((ret = mbedtls_pkcs5_pbes2(&pbe_params, MBEDTLS_PKCS5_DECRYPT, pwd, pwdlen, - p, len, buf)) != 0) { + if ((ret = mbedtls_pkcs5_pbes2_ext(&pbe_params, MBEDTLS_PKCS5_DECRYPT, pwd, pwdlen, + p, len, buf, len, &outlen)) != 0) { if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_PASSWORD_MISMATCH) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_PASSWORD_MISMATCH; } @@ -1196,7 +949,7 @@ static int pk_parse_key_pkcs8_encrypted_der( decrypted = 1; } else -#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C && MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 && MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C */ { ((void) pwd); } @@ -1204,17 +957,23 @@ static int pk_parse_key_pkcs8_encrypted_der( if (decrypted == 0) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; } - - return pk_parse_key_pkcs8_unencrypted_der(pk, buf, len); + return pk_parse_key_pkcs8_unencrypted_der(pk, buf, outlen, f_rng, p_rng); } #endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C || MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C */ +/*********************************************************************** + * + * Top-level functions, with format auto-discovery + * + **********************************************************************/ + /* * Parse a private key */ int mbedtls_pk_parse_key(mbedtls_pk_context *pk, const unsigned char *key, size_t keylen, - const unsigned char *pwd, size_t pwdlen) + const unsigned char *pwd, size_t pwdlen, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; const mbedtls_pk_info_t *pk_info; @@ -1223,13 +982,9 @@ int mbedtls_pk_parse_key(mbedtls_pk_context *pk, mbedtls_pem_context pem; #endif - (void) pk_info; - - PK_VALIDATE_RET(pk != NULL); if (keylen == 0) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT; } - PK_VALIDATE_RET(key != NULL); #if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C) mbedtls_pem_init(&pem); @@ -1240,16 +995,15 @@ int mbedtls_pk_parse_key(mbedtls_pk_context *pk, ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_NO_HEADER_FOOTER_PRESENT; } else { ret = mbedtls_pem_read_buffer(&pem, - "-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----", - "-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----", + PEM_BEGIN_PRIVATE_KEY_RSA, PEM_END_PRIVATE_KEY_RSA, key, pwd, pwdlen, &len); } if (ret == 0) { pk_info = mbedtls_pk_info_from_type(MBEDTLS_PK_RSA); if ((ret = mbedtls_pk_setup(pk, pk_info)) != 0 || - (ret = pk_parse_key_pkcs1_der(mbedtls_pk_rsa(*pk), - pem.buf, pem.buflen)) != 0) { + (ret = mbedtls_rsa_parse_key(mbedtls_pk_rsa(*pk), + pem.buf, pem.buflen)) != 0) { mbedtls_pk_free(pk); } @@ -1264,22 +1018,23 @@ int mbedtls_pk_parse_key(mbedtls_pk_context *pk, } #endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS) /* Avoid calling mbedtls_pem_read_buffer() on non-null-terminated string */ if (key[keylen - 1] != '\0') { ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_NO_HEADER_FOOTER_PRESENT; } else { ret = mbedtls_pem_read_buffer(&pem, - "-----BEGIN EC PRIVATE KEY-----", - "-----END EC PRIVATE KEY-----", + PEM_BEGIN_PRIVATE_KEY_EC, + PEM_END_PRIVATE_KEY_EC, key, pwd, pwdlen, &len); } if (ret == 0) { pk_info = mbedtls_pk_info_from_type(MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY); if ((ret = mbedtls_pk_setup(pk, pk_info)) != 0 || - (ret = pk_parse_key_sec1_der(mbedtls_pk_ec(*pk), - pem.buf, pem.buflen)) != 0) { + (ret = pk_parse_key_sec1_der(pk, + pem.buf, pem.buflen, + f_rng, p_rng)) != 0) { mbedtls_pk_free(pk); } @@ -1292,20 +1047,19 @@ int mbedtls_pk_parse_key(mbedtls_pk_context *pk, } else if (ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_NO_HEADER_FOOTER_PRESENT) { return ret; } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS */ /* Avoid calling mbedtls_pem_read_buffer() on non-null-terminated string */ if (key[keylen - 1] != '\0') { ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_NO_HEADER_FOOTER_PRESENT; } else { ret = mbedtls_pem_read_buffer(&pem, - "-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----", - "-----END PRIVATE KEY-----", + PEM_BEGIN_PRIVATE_KEY_PKCS8, PEM_END_PRIVATE_KEY_PKCS8, key, NULL, 0, &len); } if (ret == 0) { if ((ret = pk_parse_key_pkcs8_unencrypted_der(pk, - pem.buf, pem.buflen)) != 0) { + pem.buf, pem.buflen, f_rng, p_rng)) != 0) { mbedtls_pk_free(pk); } @@ -1321,14 +1075,13 @@ int mbedtls_pk_parse_key(mbedtls_pk_context *pk, ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_NO_HEADER_FOOTER_PRESENT; } else { ret = mbedtls_pem_read_buffer(&pem, - "-----BEGIN ENCRYPTED PRIVATE KEY-----", - "-----END ENCRYPTED PRIVATE KEY-----", + PEM_BEGIN_ENCRYPTED_PRIVATE_KEY_PKCS8, + PEM_END_ENCRYPTED_PRIVATE_KEY_PKCS8, key, NULL, 0, &len); } if (ret == 0) { - if ((ret = pk_parse_key_pkcs8_encrypted_der(pk, - pem.buf, pem.buflen, - pwd, pwdlen)) != 0) { + if ((ret = mbedtls_pk_parse_key_pkcs8_encrypted_der(pk, pem.buf, pem.buflen, + pwd, pwdlen, f_rng, p_rng)) != 0) { mbedtls_pk_free(pk); } @@ -1351,7 +1104,7 @@ int mbedtls_pk_parse_key(mbedtls_pk_context *pk, * error */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C) - { + if (pwdlen != 0) { unsigned char *key_copy; if ((key_copy = mbedtls_calloc(1, keylen)) == NULL) { @@ -1360,11 +1113,10 @@ int mbedtls_pk_parse_key(mbedtls_pk_context *pk, memcpy(key_copy, key, keylen); - ret = pk_parse_key_pkcs8_encrypted_der(pk, key_copy, keylen, - pwd, pwdlen); + ret = mbedtls_pk_parse_key_pkcs8_encrypted_der(pk, key_copy, keylen, + pwd, pwdlen, f_rng, p_rng); - mbedtls_platform_zeroize(key_copy, keylen); - mbedtls_free(key_copy); + mbedtls_zeroize_and_free(key_copy, keylen); } if (ret == 0) { @@ -1379,7 +1131,7 @@ int mbedtls_pk_parse_key(mbedtls_pk_context *pk, } #endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C || MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C */ - ret = pk_parse_key_pkcs8_unencrypted_der(pk, key, keylen); + ret = pk_parse_key_pkcs8_unencrypted_der(pk, key, keylen, f_rng, p_rng); if (ret == 0) { return 0; } @@ -1391,7 +1143,7 @@ int mbedtls_pk_parse_key(mbedtls_pk_context *pk, pk_info = mbedtls_pk_info_from_type(MBEDTLS_PK_RSA); if (mbedtls_pk_setup(pk, pk_info) == 0 && - pk_parse_key_pkcs1_der(mbedtls_pk_rsa(*pk), key, keylen) == 0) { + mbedtls_rsa_parse_key(mbedtls_pk_rsa(*pk), key, keylen) == 0) { return 0; } @@ -1399,21 +1151,21 @@ int mbedtls_pk_parse_key(mbedtls_pk_context *pk, mbedtls_pk_init(pk); #endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS) pk_info = mbedtls_pk_info_from_type(MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY); if (mbedtls_pk_setup(pk, pk_info) == 0 && - pk_parse_key_sec1_der(mbedtls_pk_ec(*pk), - key, keylen) == 0) { + pk_parse_key_sec1_der(pk, + key, keylen, f_rng, p_rng) == 0) { return 0; } mbedtls_pk_free(pk); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS */ - /* If MBEDTLS_RSA_C is defined but MBEDTLS_ECP_C isn't, + /* If MBEDTLS_RSA_C is defined but MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS isn't, * it is ok to leave the PK context initialized but not * freed: It is the caller's responsibility to call pk_init() * before calling this function, and to call pk_free() - * when it fails. If MBEDTLS_ECP_C is defined but MBEDTLS_RSA_C + * when it fails. If MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS is defined but MBEDTLS_RSA_C * isn't, this leads to mbedtls_pk_free() being called * twice, once here and once by the caller, but this is * also ok and in line with the mbedtls_pk_free() calls @@ -1438,11 +1190,9 @@ int mbedtls_pk_parse_public_key(mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, mbedtls_pem_context pem; #endif - PK_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); if (keylen == 0) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT; } - PK_VALIDATE_RET(key != NULL || keylen == 0); #if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C) mbedtls_pem_init(&pem); @@ -1452,8 +1202,7 @@ int mbedtls_pk_parse_public_key(mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_NO_HEADER_FOOTER_PRESENT; } else { ret = mbedtls_pem_read_buffer(&pem, - "-----BEGIN RSA PUBLIC KEY-----", - "-----END RSA PUBLIC KEY-----", + PEM_BEGIN_PUBLIC_KEY_RSA, PEM_END_PUBLIC_KEY_RSA, key, NULL, 0, &len); } @@ -1469,7 +1218,7 @@ int mbedtls_pk_parse_public_key(mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, return ret; } - if ((ret = pk_get_rsapubkey(&p, p + pem.buflen, mbedtls_pk_rsa(*ctx))) != 0) { + if ((ret = mbedtls_rsa_parse_pubkey(mbedtls_pk_rsa(*ctx), p, pem.buflen)) != 0) { mbedtls_pk_free(ctx); } @@ -1486,8 +1235,7 @@ int mbedtls_pk_parse_public_key(mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_NO_HEADER_FOOTER_PRESENT; } else { ret = mbedtls_pem_read_buffer(&pem, - "-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----", - "-----END PUBLIC KEY-----", + PEM_BEGIN_PUBLIC_KEY, PEM_END_PUBLIC_KEY, key, NULL, 0, &len); } @@ -1497,7 +1245,7 @@ int mbedtls_pk_parse_public_key(mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, */ p = pem.buf; - ret = mbedtls_pk_parse_subpubkey(&p, p + pem.buflen, ctx); + ret = mbedtls_pk_parse_subpubkey(&p, p + pem.buflen, ctx); mbedtls_pem_free(&pem); return ret; } else if (ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_NO_HEADER_FOOTER_PRESENT) { @@ -1517,13 +1265,12 @@ int mbedtls_pk_parse_public_key(mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, } p = (unsigned char *) key; - ret = pk_get_rsapubkey(&p, p + keylen, mbedtls_pk_rsa(*ctx)); + ret = mbedtls_rsa_parse_pubkey(mbedtls_pk_rsa(*ctx), p, keylen); if (ret == 0) { return ret; } mbedtls_pk_free(ctx); - if (ret != (MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_PUBKEY, - MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG))) { + if (ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG) { return ret; } #endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */ @@ -1534,4 +1281,112 @@ int mbedtls_pk_parse_public_key(mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, return ret; } +/*********************************************************************** + * + * Top-level functions, with filesystem support + * + **********************************************************************/ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) +/* + * Load all data from a file into a given buffer. + * + * The file is expected to contain either PEM or DER encoded data. + * A terminating null byte is always appended. It is included in the announced + * length only if the data looks like it is PEM encoded. + */ +int mbedtls_pk_load_file(const char *path, unsigned char **buf, size_t *n) +{ + FILE *f; + long size; + + if ((f = fopen(path, "rb")) == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FILE_IO_ERROR; + } + + /* Ensure no stdio buffering of secrets, as such buffers cannot be wiped. */ + mbedtls_setbuf(f, NULL); + + fseek(f, 0, SEEK_END); + if ((size = ftell(f)) == -1) { + fclose(f); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FILE_IO_ERROR; + } + fseek(f, 0, SEEK_SET); + + *n = (size_t) size; + + if (*n + 1 == 0 || + (*buf = mbedtls_calloc(1, *n + 1)) == NULL) { + fclose(f); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_ALLOC_FAILED; + } + + if (fread(*buf, 1, *n, f) != *n) { + fclose(f); + + mbedtls_zeroize_and_free(*buf, *n); + + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FILE_IO_ERROR; + } + + fclose(f); + + (*buf)[*n] = '\0'; + + if (strstr((const char *) *buf, "-----BEGIN ") != NULL) { + ++*n; + } + + return 0; +} + +/* + * Load and parse a private key + */ +int mbedtls_pk_parse_keyfile(mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, + const char *path, const char *pwd, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t n; + unsigned char *buf; + + if ((ret = mbedtls_pk_load_file(path, &buf, &n)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + + if (pwd == NULL) { + ret = mbedtls_pk_parse_key(ctx, buf, n, NULL, 0, f_rng, p_rng); + } else { + ret = mbedtls_pk_parse_key(ctx, buf, n, + (const unsigned char *) pwd, strlen(pwd), f_rng, p_rng); + } + + mbedtls_zeroize_and_free(buf, n); + + return ret; +} + +/* + * Load and parse a public key + */ +int mbedtls_pk_parse_public_keyfile(mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, const char *path) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t n; + unsigned char *buf; + + if ((ret = mbedtls_pk_load_file(path, &buf, &n)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + + ret = mbedtls_pk_parse_public_key(ctx, buf, n); + + mbedtls_zeroize_and_free(buf, n); + + return ret; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_FS_IO */ + #endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C */ diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/pkwrite.c b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/pkwrite.c index 534290df4e97..5e009c565ea4 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/pkwrite.c +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/pkwrite.c @@ -14,96 +14,128 @@ #include "mbedtls/oid.h" #include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" #include "mbedtls/error.h" +#include "pk_internal.h" #include -#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) -#include "mbedtls/rsa.h" -#endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) #include "mbedtls/bignum.h" #include "mbedtls/ecp.h" #include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) -#include "mbedtls/ecdsa.h" +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS) +#include "pk_internal.h" +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS) +#include "pkwrite.h" #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_WRITE_C) #include "mbedtls/pem.h" #endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) +#include "rsa_internal.h" +#endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) #include "psa/crypto.h" -#include "mbedtls/psa_util.h" +#include "psa_util_internal.h" #endif #include "mbedtls/platform.h" -/* Parameter validation macros based on platform_util.h */ -#define PK_VALIDATE_RET(cond) \ - MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE_RET(cond, MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA) -#define PK_VALIDATE(cond) \ - MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE(cond) +/* Helpers for properly sizing buffers aimed at holding public keys or + * key-pairs based on build symbols. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA) +#define PK_MAX_EC_PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE PSA_EXPORT_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE +#define PK_MAX_EC_KEY_PAIR_SIZE MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_KEY_PAIR_LENGTH +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +#define PK_MAX_EC_PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE PSA_EXPORT_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE +#define PK_MAX_EC_KEY_PAIR_SIZE MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_KEY_PAIR_LENGTH +#else +#define PK_MAX_EC_PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_PT_LEN +#define PK_MAX_EC_KEY_PAIR_SIZE MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BYTES +#endif +/****************************************************************************** + * Internal functions for RSA keys. + ******************************************************************************/ #if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) -/* - * RSAPublicKey ::= SEQUENCE { - * modulus INTEGER, -- n - * publicExponent INTEGER -- e - * } - */ -static int pk_write_rsa_pubkey(unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, - mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa) +static int pk_write_rsa_der(unsigned char **p, unsigned char *buf, + const mbedtls_pk_context *pk) { - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - size_t len = 0; - mbedtls_mpi T; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + if (mbedtls_pk_get_type(pk) == MBEDTLS_PK_OPAQUE) { + uint8_t tmp[PSA_EXPORT_KEY_PAIR_MAX_SIZE]; + size_t len = 0, tmp_len = 0; - mbedtls_mpi_init(&T); + if (psa_export_key(pk->priv_id, tmp, sizeof(tmp), &tmp_len) != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + *p -= tmp_len; + memcpy(*p, tmp, tmp_len); + len += tmp_len; + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(tmp, sizeof(tmp)); - /* Export E */ - if ((ret = mbedtls_rsa_export(rsa, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, &T)) != 0 || - (ret = mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi(p, start, &T)) < 0) { - goto end_of_export; + return (int) len; } - len += ret; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + return mbedtls_rsa_write_key(mbedtls_pk_rsa(*pk), buf, p); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */ - /* Export N */ - if ((ret = mbedtls_rsa_export(rsa, &T, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL)) != 0 || - (ret = mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi(p, start, &T)) < 0) { - goto end_of_export; - } - len += ret; +/****************************************************************************** + * Internal functions for EC keys. + ******************************************************************************/ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA) +static int pk_write_ec_pubkey(unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, + const mbedtls_pk_context *pk) +{ + size_t len = 0; + uint8_t buf[PK_MAX_EC_PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE]; -end_of_export: + if (mbedtls_pk_get_type(pk) == MBEDTLS_PK_OPAQUE) { + if (psa_export_public_key(pk->priv_id, buf, sizeof(buf), &len) != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + } else { + len = pk->pub_raw_len; + memcpy(buf, pk->pub_raw, len); + } - mbedtls_mpi_free(&T); - if (ret < 0) { - return ret; + if (*p < start || (size_t) (*p - start) < len) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL; } - MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len(p, start, len)); - MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag(p, start, MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | - MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)); + *p -= len; + memcpy(*p, buf, len); return (int) len; } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) -/* - * EC public key is an EC point - */ +#else /* MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA */ static int pk_write_ec_pubkey(unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, - mbedtls_ecp_keypair *ec) + const mbedtls_pk_context *pk) { - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t len = 0; - unsigned char buf[MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_PT_LEN]; + unsigned char buf[PK_MAX_EC_PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE]; + mbedtls_ecp_keypair *ec = mbedtls_pk_ec(*pk); + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - if ((ret = mbedtls_ecp_point_write_binary(&ec->grp, &ec->Q, - MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_UNCOMPRESSED, - &len, buf, sizeof(buf))) != 0) { - return ret; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + if (mbedtls_pk_get_type(pk) == MBEDTLS_PK_OPAQUE) { + if (psa_export_public_key(pk->priv_id, buf, sizeof(buf), &len) != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + *p -= len; + memcpy(*p, buf, len); + return (int) len; + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + { + if ((ret = mbedtls_ecp_point_write_binary(&ec->grp, &ec->Q, + MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_UNCOMPRESSED, + &len, buf, sizeof(buf))) != 0) { + return ret; + } } if (*p < start || (size_t) (*p - start) < len) { @@ -115,6 +147,72 @@ static int pk_write_ec_pubkey(unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, return (int) len; } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA */ + +/* + * privateKey OCTET STRING -- always of length ceil(log2(n)/8) + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA) +static int pk_write_ec_private(unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, + const mbedtls_pk_context *pk) +{ + size_t byte_length; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char tmp[PK_MAX_EC_KEY_PAIR_SIZE]; + psa_status_t status; + + if (mbedtls_pk_get_type(pk) == MBEDTLS_PK_OPAQUE) { + status = psa_export_key(pk->priv_id, tmp, sizeof(tmp), &byte_length); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + ret = PSA_PK_ECDSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + return ret; + } + } else { + status = psa_export_key(pk->priv_id, tmp, sizeof(tmp), &byte_length); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + ret = PSA_PK_ECDSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + goto exit; + } + } + + ret = mbedtls_asn1_write_octet_string(p, start, tmp, byte_length); +exit: + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(tmp, sizeof(tmp)); + return ret; +} +#else /* MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA */ +static int pk_write_ec_private(unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, + const mbedtls_pk_context *pk) +{ + size_t byte_length; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char tmp[PK_MAX_EC_KEY_PAIR_SIZE]; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + psa_status_t status; + if (mbedtls_pk_get_type(pk) == MBEDTLS_PK_OPAQUE) { + status = psa_export_key(pk->priv_id, tmp, sizeof(tmp), &byte_length); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + ret = PSA_PK_ECDSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + return ret; + } + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + { + mbedtls_ecp_keypair *ec = mbedtls_pk_ec_rw(*pk); + byte_length = (ec->grp.pbits + 7) / 8; + + ret = mbedtls_ecp_write_key_ext(ec, &byte_length, tmp, sizeof(tmp)); + if (ret != 0) { + goto exit; + } + } + ret = mbedtls_asn1_write_octet_string(p, start, tmp, byte_length); +exit: + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(tmp, sizeof(tmp)); + return ret; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA */ /* * ECParameters ::= CHOICE { @@ -122,14 +220,14 @@ static int pk_write_ec_pubkey(unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, * } */ static int pk_write_ec_param(unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, - mbedtls_ecp_keypair *ec) + mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t len = 0; const char *oid; size_t oid_len; - if ((ret = mbedtls_oid_get_oid_by_ec_grp(ec->grp.id, &oid, &oid_len)) != 0) { + if ((ret = mbedtls_oid_get_oid_by_ec_grp(grp_id, &oid, &oid_len)) != 0) { return ret; } @@ -138,71 +236,197 @@ static int pk_write_ec_param(unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, return (int) len; } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_RFC8410_CURVES) /* - * privateKey OCTET STRING -- always of length ceil(log2(n)/8) + * RFC8410 section 7 + * + * OneAsymmetricKey ::= SEQUENCE { + * version Version, + * privateKeyAlgorithm PrivateKeyAlgorithmIdentifier, + * privateKey PrivateKey, + * attributes [0] IMPLICIT Attributes OPTIONAL, + * ..., + * [[2: publicKey [1] IMPLICIT PublicKey OPTIONAL ]], + * ... + * } + * ... + * CurvePrivateKey ::= OCTET STRING */ -static int pk_write_ec_private(unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, - mbedtls_ecp_keypair *ec) +static int pk_write_ec_rfc8410_der(unsigned char **p, unsigned char *buf, + const mbedtls_pk_context *pk) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - size_t byte_length = (ec->grp.pbits + 7) / 8; - unsigned char tmp[MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BYTES]; + size_t len = 0; + size_t oid_len = 0; + const char *oid; + mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id; + + /* privateKey */ + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, pk_write_ec_private(p, buf, pk)); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len(p, buf, len)); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag(p, buf, MBEDTLS_ASN1_OCTET_STRING)); - ret = mbedtls_ecp_write_key(ec, tmp, byte_length); - if (ret != 0) { - goto exit; + grp_id = mbedtls_pk_get_ec_group_id(pk); + /* privateKeyAlgorithm */ + if ((ret = mbedtls_oid_get_oid_by_ec_grp_algid(grp_id, &oid, &oid_len)) != 0) { + return ret; } - ret = mbedtls_asn1_write_octet_string(p, start, tmp, byte_length); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, + mbedtls_asn1_write_algorithm_identifier_ext(p, buf, oid, oid_len, 0, 0)); -exit: - mbedtls_platform_zeroize(tmp, byte_length); - return ret; + /* version */ + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_int(p, buf, 0)); + + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len(p, buf, len)); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag(p, buf, MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | + MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)); + + return (int) len; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_RFC8410_CURVES */ + +/* + * RFC 5915, or SEC1 Appendix C.4 + * + * ECPrivateKey ::= SEQUENCE { + * version INTEGER { ecPrivkeyVer1(1) } (ecPrivkeyVer1), + * privateKey OCTET STRING, + * parameters [0] ECParameters {{ NamedCurve }} OPTIONAL, + * publicKey [1] BIT STRING OPTIONAL + * } + */ +static int pk_write_ec_der(unsigned char **p, unsigned char *buf, + const mbedtls_pk_context *pk) +{ + size_t len = 0; + int ret; + size_t pub_len = 0, par_len = 0; + mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id; + + /* publicKey */ + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(pub_len, pk_write_ec_pubkey(p, buf, pk)); + + if (*p - buf < 1) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL; + } + (*p)--; + **p = 0; + pub_len += 1; + + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(pub_len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len(p, buf, pub_len)); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(pub_len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag(p, buf, MBEDTLS_ASN1_BIT_STRING)); + + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(pub_len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len(p, buf, pub_len)); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(pub_len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag(p, buf, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | 1)); + len += pub_len; + + /* parameters */ + grp_id = mbedtls_pk_get_ec_group_id(pk); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(par_len, pk_write_ec_param(p, buf, grp_id)); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(par_len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len(p, buf, par_len)); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(par_len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag(p, buf, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | 0)); + len += par_len; + + /* privateKey */ + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, pk_write_ec_private(p, buf, pk)); + + /* version */ + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_int(p, buf, 1)); + + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len(p, buf, len)); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag(p, buf, MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | + MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)); + + return (int) len; } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS */ + +/****************************************************************************** + * Internal functions for Opaque keys. + ******************************************************************************/ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +static int pk_write_opaque_pubkey(unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, + const mbedtls_pk_context *pk) +{ + size_t buffer_size; + size_t len = 0; + + if (*p < start) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + buffer_size = (size_t) (*p - start); + if (psa_export_public_key(pk->priv_id, start, buffer_size, + &len) != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + *p -= len; + memmove(*p, start, len); + return (int) len; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + +/****************************************************************************** + * Generic helpers + ******************************************************************************/ + +/* Extend the public mbedtls_pk_get_type() by getting key type also in case of + * opaque keys. */ +static mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_get_type_ext(const mbedtls_pk_context *pk) +{ + mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_type = mbedtls_pk_get_type(pk); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + if (pk_type == MBEDTLS_PK_OPAQUE) { + psa_key_attributes_t opaque_attrs = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + psa_key_type_t opaque_key_type; + + if (psa_get_key_attributes(pk->priv_id, &opaque_attrs) != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return MBEDTLS_PK_NONE; + } + opaque_key_type = psa_get_key_type(&opaque_attrs); + psa_reset_key_attributes(&opaque_attrs); + + if (PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC(opaque_key_type)) { + return MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY; + } else if (PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_RSA(opaque_key_type)) { + return MBEDTLS_PK_RSA; + } else { + return MBEDTLS_PK_NONE; + } + } else +#endif + return pk_type; +} + +/****************************************************************************** + * Public functions for writing private/public DER keys. + ******************************************************************************/ int mbedtls_pk_write_pubkey(unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, const mbedtls_pk_context *key) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t len = 0; - (void) p; - (void) start; - (void) key; - (void) ret; - - PK_VALIDATE_RET(p != NULL); - PK_VALIDATE_RET(*p != NULL); - PK_VALIDATE_RET(start != NULL); - PK_VALIDATE_RET(key != NULL); - #if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) if (mbedtls_pk_get_type(key) == MBEDTLS_PK_RSA) { - MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, pk_write_rsa_pubkey(p, start, mbedtls_pk_rsa(*key))); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_rsa_write_pubkey(mbedtls_pk_rsa(*key), start, p)); } else #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS) if (mbedtls_pk_get_type(key) == MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY) { - MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, pk_write_ec_pubkey(p, start, mbedtls_pk_ec(*key))); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, pk_write_ec_pubkey(p, start, key)); } else #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) if (mbedtls_pk_get_type(key) == MBEDTLS_PK_OPAQUE) { - size_t buffer_size; - psa_key_id_t *key_id = (psa_key_id_t *) key->pk_ctx; - - if (*p < start) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA; - } - - buffer_size = (size_t) (*p - start); - if (psa_export_public_key(*key_id, start, buffer_size, &len) - != PSA_SUCCESS) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA; - } else { - *p -= len; - memmove(*p, start, len); - } + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, pk_write_opaque_pubkey(p, start, key)); } else #endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; @@ -210,19 +434,18 @@ int mbedtls_pk_write_pubkey(unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, return (int) len; } -int mbedtls_pk_write_pubkey_der(mbedtls_pk_context *key, unsigned char *buf, size_t size) +int mbedtls_pk_write_pubkey_der(const mbedtls_pk_context *key, unsigned char *buf, size_t size) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; unsigned char *c; - size_t len = 0, par_len = 0, oid_len; + int has_par = 1; + size_t len = 0, par_len = 0, oid_len = 0; mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_type; - const char *oid; + const char *oid = NULL; - PK_VALIDATE_RET(key != NULL); if (size == 0) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL; } - PK_VALIDATE_RET(buf != NULL); c = buf + size; @@ -243,55 +466,33 @@ int mbedtls_pk_write_pubkey_der(mbedtls_pk_context *key, unsigned char *buf, siz MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len(&c, buf, len)); MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag(&c, buf, MBEDTLS_ASN1_BIT_STRING)); - pk_type = mbedtls_pk_get_type(key); -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) - if (pk_type == MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY) { - MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(par_len, pk_write_ec_param(&c, buf, mbedtls_pk_ec(*key))); - } -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) - if (pk_type == MBEDTLS_PK_OPAQUE) { - psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; - psa_key_type_t key_type; - psa_key_id_t key_id; - psa_ecc_family_t curve; - size_t bits; - - key_id = *((psa_key_id_t *) key->pk_ctx); - if (PSA_SUCCESS != psa_get_key_attributes(key_id, &attributes)) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_HW_ACCEL_FAILED; - } - key_type = psa_get_key_type(&attributes); - bits = psa_get_key_bits(&attributes); - psa_reset_key_attributes(&attributes); - - curve = PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_GET_FAMILY(key_type); - if (curve == 0) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + pk_type = pk_get_type_ext(key); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS) + if (pk_get_type_ext(key) == MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY) { + mbedtls_ecp_group_id ec_grp_id = mbedtls_pk_get_ec_group_id(key); + if (MBEDTLS_PK_IS_RFC8410_GROUP_ID(ec_grp_id)) { + ret = mbedtls_oid_get_oid_by_ec_grp_algid(ec_grp_id, &oid, &oid_len); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + has_par = 0; + } else { + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(par_len, pk_write_ec_param(&c, buf, ec_grp_id)); } + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS */ - ret = mbedtls_psa_get_ecc_oid_from_id(curve, bits, &oid, &oid_len); + /* At this point oid_len is not null only for EC Montgomery keys. */ + if (oid_len == 0) { + ret = mbedtls_oid_get_oid_by_pk_alg(pk_type, &oid, &oid_len); if (ret != 0) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + return ret; } - - /* Write EC algorithm parameters; that's akin - * to pk_write_ec_param() above. */ - MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(par_len, mbedtls_asn1_write_oid(&c, buf, - oid, oid_len)); - - /* The rest of the function works as for legacy EC contexts. */ - pk_type = MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY; - } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ - - if ((ret = mbedtls_oid_get_oid_by_pk_alg(pk_type, &oid, - &oid_len)) != 0) { - return ret; } - MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_algorithm_identifier(&c, buf, oid, oid_len, - par_len)); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_algorithm_identifier_ext(&c, buf, oid, oid_len, + par_len, has_par)); MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len(&c, buf, len)); MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag(&c, buf, MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | @@ -300,263 +501,47 @@ int mbedtls_pk_write_pubkey_der(mbedtls_pk_context *key, unsigned char *buf, siz return (int) len; } -int mbedtls_pk_write_key_der(mbedtls_pk_context *key, unsigned char *buf, size_t size) +int mbedtls_pk_write_key_der(const mbedtls_pk_context *key, unsigned char *buf, size_t size) { - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; unsigned char *c; - size_t len = 0; - (void) ret; - (void) c; - (void) key; - - PK_VALIDATE_RET(key != NULL); if (size == 0) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL; } - PK_VALIDATE_RET(buf != NULL); c = buf + size; #if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) - if (mbedtls_pk_get_type(key) == MBEDTLS_PK_RSA) { - mbedtls_mpi T; /* Temporary holding the exported parameters */ - mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa = mbedtls_pk_rsa(*key); - - /* - * Export the parameters one after another to avoid simultaneous copies. - */ - - mbedtls_mpi_init(&T); - - /* Export QP */ - if ((ret = mbedtls_rsa_export_crt(rsa, NULL, NULL, &T)) != 0 || - (ret = mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi(&c, buf, &T)) < 0) { - goto end_of_export; - } - len += ret; - - /* Export DQ */ - if ((ret = mbedtls_rsa_export_crt(rsa, NULL, &T, NULL)) != 0 || - (ret = mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi(&c, buf, &T)) < 0) { - goto end_of_export; - } - len += ret; - - /* Export DP */ - if ((ret = mbedtls_rsa_export_crt(rsa, &T, NULL, NULL)) != 0 || - (ret = mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi(&c, buf, &T)) < 0) { - goto end_of_export; - } - len += ret; - - /* Export Q */ - if ((ret = mbedtls_rsa_export(rsa, NULL, NULL, - &T, NULL, NULL)) != 0 || - (ret = mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi(&c, buf, &T)) < 0) { - goto end_of_export; - } - len += ret; - - /* Export P */ - if ((ret = mbedtls_rsa_export(rsa, NULL, &T, - NULL, NULL, NULL)) != 0 || - (ret = mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi(&c, buf, &T)) < 0) { - goto end_of_export; - } - len += ret; - - /* Export D */ - if ((ret = mbedtls_rsa_export(rsa, NULL, NULL, - NULL, &T, NULL)) != 0 || - (ret = mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi(&c, buf, &T)) < 0) { - goto end_of_export; - } - len += ret; - - /* Export E */ - if ((ret = mbedtls_rsa_export(rsa, NULL, NULL, - NULL, NULL, &T)) != 0 || - (ret = mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi(&c, buf, &T)) < 0) { - goto end_of_export; - } - len += ret; - - /* Export N */ - if ((ret = mbedtls_rsa_export(rsa, &T, NULL, - NULL, NULL, NULL)) != 0 || - (ret = mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi(&c, buf, &T)) < 0) { - goto end_of_export; - } - len += ret; - -end_of_export: - - mbedtls_mpi_free(&T); - if (ret < 0) { - return ret; - } - - MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_int(&c, buf, 0)); - MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len(&c, buf, len)); - MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag(&c, - buf, MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | - MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)); + if (pk_get_type_ext(key) == MBEDTLS_PK_RSA) { + return pk_write_rsa_der(&c, buf, key); } else #endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) - if (mbedtls_pk_get_type(key) == MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY) { - mbedtls_ecp_keypair *ec = mbedtls_pk_ec(*key); - size_t pub_len = 0, par_len = 0; - - /* - * RFC 5915, or SEC1 Appendix C.4 - * - * ECPrivateKey ::= SEQUENCE { - * version INTEGER { ecPrivkeyVer1(1) } (ecPrivkeyVer1), - * privateKey OCTET STRING, - * parameters [0] ECParameters {{ NamedCurve }} OPTIONAL, - * publicKey [1] BIT STRING OPTIONAL - * } - */ - - /* publicKey */ - MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(pub_len, pk_write_ec_pubkey(&c, buf, ec)); - - if (c - buf < 1) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS) + if (pk_get_type_ext(key) == MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_RFC8410_CURVES) + if (mbedtls_pk_is_rfc8410(key)) { + return pk_write_ec_rfc8410_der(&c, buf, key); } - *--c = 0; - pub_len += 1; - - MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(pub_len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len(&c, buf, pub_len)); - MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(pub_len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag(&c, buf, MBEDTLS_ASN1_BIT_STRING)); - - MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(pub_len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len(&c, buf, pub_len)); - MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(pub_len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag(&c, buf, - MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | - MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | 1)); - len += pub_len; - - /* parameters */ - MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(par_len, pk_write_ec_param(&c, buf, ec)); - - MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(par_len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len(&c, buf, par_len)); - MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(par_len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag(&c, buf, - MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | - MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | 0)); - len += par_len; - - /* privateKey */ - MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, pk_write_ec_private(&c, buf, ec)); - - /* version */ - MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_int(&c, buf, 1)); - - MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len(&c, buf, len)); - MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag(&c, buf, MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | - MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_RFC8410_CURVES */ + return pk_write_ec_der(&c, buf, key); } else -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS */ return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; - - return (int) len; } +/****************************************************************************** + * Public functions for wrinting private/public PEM keys. + ******************************************************************************/ #if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_WRITE_C) -#define PEM_BEGIN_PUBLIC_KEY "-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----\n" -#define PEM_END_PUBLIC_KEY "-----END PUBLIC KEY-----\n" +#define PUB_DER_MAX_BYTES \ + (MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_PUB_DER_MAX_BYTES > MBEDTLS_PK_ECP_PUB_DER_MAX_BYTES ? \ + MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_PUB_DER_MAX_BYTES : MBEDTLS_PK_ECP_PUB_DER_MAX_BYTES) +#define PRV_DER_MAX_BYTES \ + (MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_PRV_DER_MAX_BYTES > MBEDTLS_PK_ECP_PRV_DER_MAX_BYTES ? \ + MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_PRV_DER_MAX_BYTES : MBEDTLS_PK_ECP_PRV_DER_MAX_BYTES) -#define PEM_BEGIN_PRIVATE_KEY_RSA "-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----\n" -#define PEM_END_PRIVATE_KEY_RSA "-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----\n" -#define PEM_BEGIN_PRIVATE_KEY_EC "-----BEGIN EC PRIVATE KEY-----\n" -#define PEM_END_PRIVATE_KEY_EC "-----END EC PRIVATE KEY-----\n" - -/* - * Max sizes of key per types. Shown as tag + len (+ content). - */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) -/* - * RSA public keys: - * SubjectPublicKeyInfo ::= SEQUENCE { 1 + 3 - * algorithm AlgorithmIdentifier, 1 + 1 (sequence) - * + 1 + 1 + 9 (rsa oid) - * + 1 + 1 (params null) - * subjectPublicKey BIT STRING } 1 + 3 + (1 + below) - * RSAPublicKey ::= SEQUENCE { 1 + 3 - * modulus INTEGER, -- n 1 + 3 + MPI_MAX + 1 - * publicExponent INTEGER -- e 1 + 3 + MPI_MAX + 1 - * } - */ -#define RSA_PUB_DER_MAX_BYTES (38 + 2 * MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE) - -/* - * RSA private keys: - * RSAPrivateKey ::= SEQUENCE { 1 + 3 - * version Version, 1 + 1 + 1 - * modulus INTEGER, 1 + 3 + MPI_MAX + 1 - * publicExponent INTEGER, 1 + 3 + MPI_MAX + 1 - * privateExponent INTEGER, 1 + 3 + MPI_MAX + 1 - * prime1 INTEGER, 1 + 3 + MPI_MAX / 2 + 1 - * prime2 INTEGER, 1 + 3 + MPI_MAX / 2 + 1 - * exponent1 INTEGER, 1 + 3 + MPI_MAX / 2 + 1 - * exponent2 INTEGER, 1 + 3 + MPI_MAX / 2 + 1 - * coefficient INTEGER, 1 + 3 + MPI_MAX / 2 + 1 - * otherPrimeInfos OtherPrimeInfos OPTIONAL 0 (not supported) - * } - */ -#define MPI_MAX_SIZE_2 (MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE / 2 + \ - MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE % 2) -#define RSA_PRV_DER_MAX_BYTES (47 + 3 * MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE \ - + 5 * MPI_MAX_SIZE_2) - -#else /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */ - -#define RSA_PUB_DER_MAX_BYTES 0 -#define RSA_PRV_DER_MAX_BYTES 0 - -#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) -/* - * EC public keys: - * SubjectPublicKeyInfo ::= SEQUENCE { 1 + 2 - * algorithm AlgorithmIdentifier, 1 + 1 (sequence) - * + 1 + 1 + 7 (ec oid) - * + 1 + 1 + 9 (namedCurve oid) - * subjectPublicKey BIT STRING 1 + 2 + 1 [1] - * + 1 (point format) [1] - * + 2 * ECP_MAX (coords) [1] - * } - */ -#define ECP_PUB_DER_MAX_BYTES (30 + 2 * MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BYTES) - -/* - * EC private keys: - * ECPrivateKey ::= SEQUENCE { 1 + 2 - * version INTEGER , 1 + 1 + 1 - * privateKey OCTET STRING, 1 + 1 + ECP_MAX - * parameters [0] ECParameters OPTIONAL, 1 + 1 + (1 + 1 + 9) - * publicKey [1] BIT STRING OPTIONAL 1 + 2 + [1] above - * } - */ -#define ECP_PRV_DER_MAX_BYTES (29 + 3 * MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BYTES) - -#else /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */ - -#define ECP_PUB_DER_MAX_BYTES 0 -#define ECP_PRV_DER_MAX_BYTES 0 - -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */ - -#define PUB_DER_MAX_BYTES (RSA_PUB_DER_MAX_BYTES > ECP_PUB_DER_MAX_BYTES ? \ - RSA_PUB_DER_MAX_BYTES : ECP_PUB_DER_MAX_BYTES) -#define PRV_DER_MAX_BYTES (RSA_PRV_DER_MAX_BYTES > ECP_PRV_DER_MAX_BYTES ? \ - RSA_PRV_DER_MAX_BYTES : ECP_PRV_DER_MAX_BYTES) - -int mbedtls_pk_write_pubkey_pem(mbedtls_pk_context *key, unsigned char *buf, size_t size) +int mbedtls_pk_write_pubkey_pem(const mbedtls_pk_context *key, unsigned char *buf, size_t size) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; unsigned char *output_buf = NULL; @@ -566,15 +551,12 @@ int mbedtls_pk_write_pubkey_pem(mbedtls_pk_context *key, unsigned char *buf, siz } size_t olen = 0; - PK_VALIDATE_RET(key != NULL); - PK_VALIDATE_RET(buf != NULL || size == 0); - if ((ret = mbedtls_pk_write_pubkey_der(key, output_buf, PUB_DER_MAX_BYTES)) < 0) { goto cleanup; } - if ((ret = mbedtls_pem_write_buffer(PEM_BEGIN_PUBLIC_KEY, PEM_END_PUBLIC_KEY, + if ((ret = mbedtls_pem_write_buffer(PEM_BEGIN_PUBLIC_KEY "\n", PEM_END_PUBLIC_KEY "\n", output_buf + PUB_DER_MAX_BYTES - ret, ret, buf, size, &olen)) != 0) { goto cleanup; @@ -586,7 +568,7 @@ int mbedtls_pk_write_pubkey_pem(mbedtls_pk_context *key, unsigned char *buf, siz return ret; } -int mbedtls_pk_write_key_pem(mbedtls_pk_context *key, unsigned char *buf, size_t size) +int mbedtls_pk_write_key_pem(const mbedtls_pk_context *key, unsigned char *buf, size_t size) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; unsigned char *output_buf = NULL; @@ -597,25 +579,27 @@ int mbedtls_pk_write_key_pem(mbedtls_pk_context *key, unsigned char *buf, size_t const char *begin, *end; size_t olen = 0; - PK_VALIDATE_RET(key != NULL); - PK_VALIDATE_RET(buf != NULL || size == 0); - if ((ret = mbedtls_pk_write_key_der(key, output_buf, PRV_DER_MAX_BYTES)) < 0) { goto cleanup; } #if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) - if (mbedtls_pk_get_type(key) == MBEDTLS_PK_RSA) { - begin = PEM_BEGIN_PRIVATE_KEY_RSA; - end = PEM_END_PRIVATE_KEY_RSA; + if (pk_get_type_ext(key) == MBEDTLS_PK_RSA) { + begin = PEM_BEGIN_PRIVATE_KEY_RSA "\n"; + end = PEM_END_PRIVATE_KEY_RSA "\n"; } else #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) - if (mbedtls_pk_get_type(key) == MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY) { - begin = PEM_BEGIN_PRIVATE_KEY_EC; - end = PEM_END_PRIVATE_KEY_EC; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS) + if (pk_get_type_ext(key) == MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY) { + if (mbedtls_pk_is_rfc8410(key)) { + begin = PEM_BEGIN_PRIVATE_KEY_PKCS8 "\n"; + end = PEM_END_PRIVATE_KEY_PKCS8 "\n"; + } else { + begin = PEM_BEGIN_PRIVATE_KEY_EC "\n"; + end = PEM_END_PRIVATE_KEY_EC "\n"; + } } else -#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS */ { ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; goto cleanup; @@ -629,8 +613,7 @@ int mbedtls_pk_write_key_pem(mbedtls_pk_context *key, unsigned char *buf, size_t ret = 0; cleanup: - mbedtls_platform_zeroize(output_buf, PRV_DER_MAX_BYTES); - mbedtls_free(output_buf); + mbedtls_zeroize_and_free(output_buf, PRV_DER_MAX_BYTES); return ret; } #endif /* MBEDTLS_PEM_WRITE_C */ diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/pkwrite.h b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/pkwrite.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..01dc3d2f0ffa --- /dev/null +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/pkwrite.h @@ -0,0 +1,121 @@ +/** + * \file pkwrite.h + * + * \brief Internal defines shared by the PK write module + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +#ifndef MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_H +#define MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_H + +#include "mbedtls/build_info.h" + +#include "mbedtls/pk.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +#include "psa/crypto.h" +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + +/* + * Max sizes of key per types. Shown as tag + len (+ content). + */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) +/* + * RSA public keys: + * SubjectPublicKeyInfo ::= SEQUENCE { 1 + 3 + * algorithm AlgorithmIdentifier, 1 + 1 (sequence) + * + 1 + 1 + 9 (rsa oid) + * + 1 + 1 (params null) + * subjectPublicKey BIT STRING } 1 + 3 + (1 + below) + * RSAPublicKey ::= SEQUENCE { 1 + 3 + * modulus INTEGER, -- n 1 + 3 + MPI_MAX + 1 + * publicExponent INTEGER -- e 1 + 3 + MPI_MAX + 1 + * } + */ +#define MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_PUB_DER_MAX_BYTES (38 + 2 * MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE) + +/* + * RSA private keys: + * RSAPrivateKey ::= SEQUENCE { 1 + 3 + * version Version, 1 + 1 + 1 + * modulus INTEGER, 1 + 3 + MPI_MAX + 1 + * publicExponent INTEGER, 1 + 3 + MPI_MAX + 1 + * privateExponent INTEGER, 1 + 3 + MPI_MAX + 1 + * prime1 INTEGER, 1 + 3 + MPI_MAX / 2 + 1 + * prime2 INTEGER, 1 + 3 + MPI_MAX / 2 + 1 + * exponent1 INTEGER, 1 + 3 + MPI_MAX / 2 + 1 + * exponent2 INTEGER, 1 + 3 + MPI_MAX / 2 + 1 + * coefficient INTEGER, 1 + 3 + MPI_MAX / 2 + 1 + * otherPrimeInfos OtherPrimeInfos OPTIONAL 0 (not supported) + * } + */ +#define MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE_2 (MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE / 2 + \ + MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE % 2) +#define MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_PRV_DER_MAX_BYTES (47 + 3 * MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE \ + + 5 * MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE_2) + +#else /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */ + +#define MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_PUB_DER_MAX_BYTES 0 +#define MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_PRV_DER_MAX_BYTES 0 + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS) + +/* Find the maximum number of bytes necessary to store an EC point. When USE_PSA + * is defined this means looking for the maximum between PSA and built-in + * supported curves. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +#define MBEDTLS_PK_MAX_ECC_BYTES (PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS) > \ + MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BYTES ? \ + PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS) : \ + MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BYTES) +#else /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ +#define MBEDTLS_PK_MAX_ECC_BYTES MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BYTES +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + +/* + * EC public keys: + * SubjectPublicKeyInfo ::= SEQUENCE { 1 + 2 + * algorithm AlgorithmIdentifier, 1 + 1 (sequence) + * + 1 + 1 + 7 (ec oid) + * + 1 + 1 + 9 (namedCurve oid) + * subjectPublicKey BIT STRING 1 + 2 + 1 [1] + * + 1 (point format) [1] + * + 2 * ECP_MAX (coords) [1] + * } + */ +#define MBEDTLS_PK_ECP_PUB_DER_MAX_BYTES (30 + 2 * MBEDTLS_PK_MAX_ECC_BYTES) + +/* + * EC private keys: + * ECPrivateKey ::= SEQUENCE { 1 + 2 + * version INTEGER , 1 + 1 + 1 + * privateKey OCTET STRING, 1 + 1 + ECP_MAX + * parameters [0] ECParameters OPTIONAL, 1 + 1 + (1 + 1 + 9) + * publicKey [1] BIT STRING OPTIONAL 1 + 2 + [1] above + * } + */ +#define MBEDTLS_PK_ECP_PRV_DER_MAX_BYTES (29 + 3 * MBEDTLS_PK_MAX_ECC_BYTES) + +#else /* MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS */ + +#define MBEDTLS_PK_ECP_PUB_DER_MAX_BYTES 0 +#define MBEDTLS_PK_ECP_PRV_DER_MAX_BYTES 0 + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS */ + +/* Define the maximum available public key DER length based on the supported + * key types (EC and/or RSA). */ +#if (MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_PUB_DER_MAX_BYTES > MBEDTLS_PK_ECP_PUB_DER_MAX_BYTES) +#define MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_PUBKEY_MAX_SIZE MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_PUB_DER_MAX_BYTES +#else +#define MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_PUBKEY_MAX_SIZE MBEDTLS_PK_ECP_PUB_DER_MAX_BYTES +#endif + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_H */ diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/platform.c b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/platform.c index e82cbeb6c619..890c4cbaba7f 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/platform.c +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/platform.c @@ -214,6 +214,28 @@ int mbedtls_platform_set_fprintf(int (*fprintf_func)(FILE *, const char *, ...)) } #endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_FPRINTF_ALT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SETBUF_ALT) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_SETBUF) +/* + * Make dummy function to prevent NULL pointer dereferences + */ +static void platform_setbuf_uninit(FILE *stream, char *buf) +{ + ((void) stream); + ((void) buf); +} + +#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_SETBUF platform_setbuf_uninit +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_SETBUF */ +void (*mbedtls_setbuf)(FILE *stream, char *buf) = MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_SETBUF; + +int mbedtls_platform_set_setbuf(void (*setbuf_func)(FILE *stream, char *buf)) +{ + mbedtls_setbuf = setbuf_func; + return 0; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SETBUF_ALT */ + #if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_EXIT_ALT) #if !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_EXIT) /* @@ -277,6 +299,9 @@ int mbedtls_platform_std_nv_seed_read(unsigned char *buf, size_t buf_len) return -1; } + /* Ensure no stdio buffering of secrets, as such buffers cannot be wiped. */ + mbedtls_setbuf(file, NULL); + if ((n = fread(buf, 1, buf_len, file)) != buf_len) { fclose(file); mbedtls_platform_zeroize(buf, buf_len); @@ -296,6 +321,9 @@ int mbedtls_platform_std_nv_seed_write(unsigned char *buf, size_t buf_len) return -1; } + /* Ensure no stdio buffering of secrets, as such buffers cannot be wiped. */ + mbedtls_setbuf(file, NULL); + if ((n = fwrite(buf, 1, buf_len, file)) != buf_len) { fclose(file); return -1; diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/platform_util.c b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/platform_util.c index df34167a8f93..0741bf575e93 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/platform_util.c +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/platform_util.c @@ -8,12 +8,18 @@ /* * Ensure gmtime_r is available even with -std=c99; must be defined before - * config.h, which pulls in glibc's features.h. Harmless on other platforms. + * mbedtls_config.h, which pulls in glibc's features.h. Harmless on other platforms + * except OpenBSD, where it stops us accessing explicit_bzero. */ -#if !defined(_POSIX_C_SOURCE) +#if !defined(_POSIX_C_SOURCE) && !defined(__OpenBSD__) #define _POSIX_C_SOURCE 200112L #endif +#if !defined(_GNU_SOURCE) +/* Clang requires this to get support for explicit_bzero */ +#define _GNU_SOURCE +#endif + #include "common.h" #include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" @@ -21,11 +27,40 @@ #include "mbedtls/threading.h" #include + +#ifndef __STDC_WANT_LIB_EXT1__ +#define __STDC_WANT_LIB_EXT1__ 1 /* Ask for the C11 gmtime_s() and memset_s() if available */ +#endif #include +#if defined(_WIN32) +#include +#endif + +// Detect platforms known to support explicit_bzero() +#if defined(__GLIBC__) && (__GLIBC__ >= 2) && (__GLIBC_MINOR__ >= 25) +#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_HAS_EXPLICIT_BZERO 1 +#elif (defined(__FreeBSD__) && (__FreeBSD_version >= 1100037)) || defined(__OpenBSD__) +#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_HAS_EXPLICIT_BZERO 1 +#endif + #if !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_ZEROIZE_ALT) + +#undef HAVE_MEMORY_SANITIZER +#if defined(__has_feature) +#if __has_feature(memory_sanitizer) +#include +#define HAVE_MEMORY_SANITIZER +#endif +#endif + /* - * This implementation should never be optimized out by the compiler + * Where possible, we try to detect the presence of a platform-provided + * secure memset, such as explicit_bzero(), that is safe against being optimized + * out, and use that. + * + * For other platforms, we provide an implementation that aims not to be + * optimized out by the compiler. * * This implementation for mbedtls_platform_zeroize() was inspired from Colin * Percival's blog article at: @@ -40,36 +75,84 @@ * (refer to http://www.daemonology.net/blog/2014-09-05-erratum.html for * details), optimizations of the following form are still possible: * - * if( memset_func != memset ) - * memset_func( buf, 0, len ); + * if (memset_func != memset) + * memset_func(buf, 0, len); * * Note that it is extremely difficult to guarantee that - * mbedtls_platform_zeroize() will not be optimized out by aggressive compilers + * the memset() call will not be optimized out by aggressive compilers * in a portable way. For this reason, Mbed TLS also provides the configuration * option MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_ZEROIZE_ALT, which allows users to configure * mbedtls_platform_zeroize() to use a suitable implementation for their * platform and needs. */ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_HAS_EXPLICIT_BZERO) && !(defined(__STDC_LIB_EXT1__) && \ + !defined(__IAR_SYSTEMS_ICC__)) \ + && !defined(_WIN32) static void *(*const volatile memset_func)(void *, int, size_t) = memset; +#endif void mbedtls_platform_zeroize(void *buf, size_t len) { - MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE(len == 0 || buf != NULL); - if (len > 0) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_HAS_EXPLICIT_BZERO) + explicit_bzero(buf, len); +#if defined(HAVE_MEMORY_SANITIZER) + /* You'd think that Msan would recognize explicit_bzero() as + * equivalent to bzero(), but it actually doesn't on several + * platforms, including Linux (Ubuntu 20.04). + * https://github.com/google/sanitizers/issues/1507 + * https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/commit/74433a19bb6f4cef607680fa4d1d7d81ca3826aa + */ + __msan_unpoison(buf, len); +#endif +#elif defined(__STDC_LIB_EXT1__) && !defined(__IAR_SYSTEMS_ICC__) + memset_s(buf, len, 0, len); +#elif defined(_WIN32) + SecureZeroMemory(buf, len); +#else memset_func(buf, 0, len); +#endif + +#if defined(__GNUC__) + /* For clang and recent gcc, pretend that we have some assembly that reads the + * zero'd memory as an additional protection against being optimised away. */ +#if defined(__clang__) || (__GNUC__ >= 10) +#if defined(__clang__) +#pragma clang diagnostic push +#pragma clang diagnostic ignored "-Wvla" +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_COMPILER_IS_GCC) +#pragma GCC diagnostic push +#pragma GCC diagnostic ignored "-Wvla" +#endif + asm volatile ("" : : "m" (*(char (*)[len]) buf) :); +#if defined(__clang__) +#pragma clang diagnostic pop +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_COMPILER_IS_GCC) +#pragma GCC diagnostic pop +#endif +#endif +#endif } } #endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_ZEROIZE_ALT */ +void mbedtls_zeroize_and_free(void *buf, size_t len) +{ + if (buf != NULL) { + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(buf, len); + } + + mbedtls_free(buf); +} + #if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_GMTIME_R_ALT) #include #if !defined(_WIN32) && (defined(unix) || \ defined(__unix) || defined(__unix__) || (defined(__APPLE__) && \ - defined(__MACH__)) || defined(__midipix__)) + defined(__MACH__)) || defined__midipix__) #include #endif /* !_WIN32 && (unix || __unix || __unix__ || - * (__APPLE__ && __MACH__)) || __midipix__ */ + * (__APPLE__ && __MACH__) || __midipix__) */ #if !((defined(_POSIX_VERSION) && _POSIX_VERSION >= 200809L) || \ (defined(_POSIX_THREAD_SAFE_FUNCTIONS) && \ @@ -81,9 +164,10 @@ void mbedtls_platform_zeroize(void *buf, size_t len) * threading.h. However, this macro is not part of the Mbed TLS public API, so * we keep it private by only defining it in this file */ -#if !(defined(_WIN32) && !defined(EFIX64) && !defined(EFI32)) +#if !(defined(_WIN32) && !defined(EFIX64) && !defined(EFI32)) || \ + (defined(__MINGW32__) && !defined(__MINGW64_VERSION_MAJOR)) #define PLATFORM_UTIL_USE_GMTIME -#endif /* ! ( defined(_WIN32) && !defined(EFIX64) && !defined(EFI32) ) */ +#endif #endif /* !( ( defined(_POSIX_VERSION) && _POSIX_VERSION >= 200809L ) || \ ( defined(_POSIX_THREAD_SAFE_FUNCTIONS ) && \ @@ -92,8 +176,13 @@ void mbedtls_platform_zeroize(void *buf, size_t len) struct tm *mbedtls_platform_gmtime_r(const mbedtls_time_t *tt, struct tm *tm_buf) { -#if defined(_WIN32) && !defined(EFIX64) && !defined(EFI32) +#if defined(_WIN32) && !defined(PLATFORM_UTIL_USE_GMTIME) +#if defined(__STDC_LIB_EXT1__) + return (gmtime_s(tt, tm_buf) == 0) ? NULL : tm_buf; +#else + /* MSVC and mingw64 argument order and return value are inconsistent with the C11 standard */ return (gmtime_s(tm_buf, tt) == 0) ? tm_buf : NULL; +#endif #elif !defined(PLATFORM_UTIL_USE_GMTIME) return gmtime_r(tt, tm_buf); #else @@ -121,3 +210,54 @@ struct tm *mbedtls_platform_gmtime_r(const mbedtls_time_t *tt, #endif /* _WIN32 && !EFIX64 && !EFI32 */ } #endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE && MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_GMTIME_R_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS) +void (*mbedtls_test_hook_test_fail)(const char *, int, const char *); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_MS_TIME_ALT) + +#include +#if !defined(_WIN32) && \ + (defined(unix) || defined(__unix) || defined(__unix__) || \ + (defined(__APPLE__) && defined(__MACH__)) || defined(__HAIKU__) || defined(__midipix__)) +#include +#endif \ + /* !_WIN32 && (unix || __unix || __unix__ || (__APPLE__ && __MACH__) || __HAIKU__ || __midipix__) */ +#if (defined(_POSIX_VERSION) && _POSIX_VERSION >= 199309L) || defined(__HAIKU__) +mbedtls_ms_time_t mbedtls_ms_time(void) +{ + int ret; + struct timespec tv; + mbedtls_ms_time_t current_ms; + +#if defined(__linux__) && defined(CLOCK_BOOTTIME) || defined(__midipix__) + ret = clock_gettime(CLOCK_BOOTTIME, &tv); +#else + ret = clock_gettime(CLOCK_MONOTONIC, &tv); +#endif + if (ret) { + return time(NULL) * 1000; + } + + current_ms = tv.tv_sec; + + return current_ms*1000 + tv.tv_nsec / 1000000; +} +#elif defined(_WIN32) || defined(WIN32) || defined(__CYGWIN__) || \ + defined(__MINGW32__) || defined(_WIN64) +#include +mbedtls_ms_time_t mbedtls_ms_time(void) +{ + FILETIME ct; + mbedtls_ms_time_t current_ms; + + GetSystemTimeAsFileTime(&ct); + current_ms = ((mbedtls_ms_time_t) ct.dwLowDateTime + + ((mbedtls_ms_time_t) (ct.dwHighDateTime) << 32LL))/10000; + return current_ms; +} +#else +#error "No mbedtls_ms_time available" +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME && !MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_MS_TIME_ALT */ diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/poly1305.c b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/poly1305.c index c78110760202..c9ebe9e1daa6 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/poly1305.c +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/poly1305.c @@ -20,12 +20,6 @@ #if !defined(MBEDTLS_POLY1305_ALT) -/* Parameter validation macros */ -#define POLY1305_VALIDATE_RET(cond) \ - MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE_RET(cond, MBEDTLS_ERR_POLY1305_BAD_INPUT_DATA) -#define POLY1305_VALIDATE(cond) \ - MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE(cond) - #define POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE_BYTES (16U) /* @@ -233,8 +227,6 @@ static void poly1305_compute_mac(const mbedtls_poly1305_context *ctx, void mbedtls_poly1305_init(mbedtls_poly1305_context *ctx) { - POLY1305_VALIDATE(ctx != NULL); - mbedtls_platform_zeroize(ctx, sizeof(mbedtls_poly1305_context)); } @@ -250,9 +242,6 @@ void mbedtls_poly1305_free(mbedtls_poly1305_context *ctx) int mbedtls_poly1305_starts(mbedtls_poly1305_context *ctx, const unsigned char key[32]) { - POLY1305_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - POLY1305_VALIDATE_RET(key != NULL); - /* r &= 0x0ffffffc0ffffffc0ffffffc0fffffff */ ctx->r[0] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE(key, 0) & 0x0FFFFFFFU; ctx->r[1] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE(key, 4) & 0x0FFFFFFCU; @@ -286,8 +275,6 @@ int mbedtls_poly1305_update(mbedtls_poly1305_context *ctx, size_t remaining = ilen; size_t queue_free_len; size_t nblocks; - POLY1305_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - POLY1305_VALIDATE_RET(ilen == 0 || input != NULL); if ((remaining > 0U) && (ctx->queue_len > 0U)) { queue_free_len = (POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE_BYTES - ctx->queue_len); @@ -339,9 +326,6 @@ int mbedtls_poly1305_update(mbedtls_poly1305_context *ctx, int mbedtls_poly1305_finish(mbedtls_poly1305_context *ctx, unsigned char mac[16]) { - POLY1305_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - POLY1305_VALIDATE_RET(mac != NULL); - /* Process any leftover data */ if (ctx->queue_len > 0U) { /* Add padding bit */ @@ -369,9 +353,6 @@ int mbedtls_poly1305_mac(const unsigned char key[32], { mbedtls_poly1305_context ctx; int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - POLY1305_VALIDATE_RET(key != NULL); - POLY1305_VALIDATE_RET(mac != NULL); - POLY1305_VALIDATE_RET(ilen == 0 || input != NULL); mbedtls_poly1305_init(&ctx); diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_aead.h b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_aead.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..a3392199f61a --- /dev/null +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_aead.h @@ -0,0 +1,499 @@ +/* + * PSA AEAD driver entry points + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +#ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_AEAD_H +#define PSA_CRYPTO_AEAD_H + +#include + +/** + * \brief Process an authenticated encryption operation. + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver + * aead_encrypt entry point. This function behaves as an aead_encrypt + * entry point as defined in the PSA driver interface specification for + * transparent drivers. + * + * \param[in] attributes The attributes of the key to use for the + * operation. + * \param[in] key_buffer The buffer containing the key context. + * \param key_buffer_size Size of the \p key_buffer buffer in bytes. + * \param alg The AEAD algorithm to compute. + * \param[in] nonce Nonce or IV to use. + * \param nonce_length Size of the nonce buffer in bytes. This must + * be appropriate for the selected algorithm. + * The default nonce size is + * PSA_AEAD_NONCE_LENGTH(key_type, alg) where + * key_type is the type of key. + * \param[in] additional_data Additional data that will be authenticated + * but not encrypted. + * \param additional_data_length Size of additional_data in bytes. + * \param[in] plaintext Data that will be authenticated and encrypted. + * \param plaintext_length Size of plaintext in bytes. + * \param[out] ciphertext Output buffer for the authenticated and + * encrypted data. The additional data is not + * part of this output. For algorithms where the + * encrypted data and the authentication tag are + * defined as separate outputs, the + * authentication tag is appended to the + * encrypted data. + * \param ciphertext_size Size of the ciphertext buffer in bytes. This + * must be appropriate for the selected algorithm + * and key: + * - A sufficient output size is + * PSA_AEAD_ENCRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE(key_type, alg, + * plaintext_length) where key_type is the type + * of key. + * - PSA_AEAD_ENCRYPT_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE( + * plaintext_length) evaluates to the maximum + * ciphertext size of any supported AEAD + * encryption. + * \param[out] ciphertext_length On success, the size of the output in the + * ciphertext buffer. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * \p alg is not supported. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL + * ciphertext_size is too small. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_aead_encrypt( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *nonce, size_t nonce_length, + const uint8_t *additional_data, size_t additional_data_length, + const uint8_t *plaintext, size_t plaintext_length, + uint8_t *ciphertext, size_t ciphertext_size, size_t *ciphertext_length); + +/** + * \brief Process an authenticated decryption operation. + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver + * aead_decrypt entry point. This function behaves as an aead_decrypt + * entry point as defined in the PSA driver interface specification for + * transparent drivers. + * + * \param[in] attributes The attributes of the key to use for the + * operation. + * \param[in] key_buffer The buffer containing the key context. + * \param key_buffer_size Size of the \p key_buffer buffer in bytes. + * \param alg The AEAD algorithm to compute. + * \param[in] nonce Nonce or IV to use. + * \param nonce_length Size of the nonce buffer in bytes. This must + * be appropriate for the selected algorithm. + * The default nonce size is + * PSA_AEAD_NONCE_LENGTH(key_type, alg) where + * key_type is the type of key. + * \param[in] additional_data Additional data that has been authenticated + * but not encrypted. + * \param additional_data_length Size of additional_data in bytes. + * \param[in] ciphertext Data that has been authenticated and + * encrypted. For algorithms where the encrypted + * data and the authentication tag are defined + * as separate inputs, the buffer contains + * encrypted data followed by the authentication + * tag. + * \param ciphertext_length Size of ciphertext in bytes. + * \param[out] plaintext Output buffer for the decrypted data. + * \param plaintext_size Size of the plaintext buffer in bytes. This + * must be appropriate for the selected algorithm + * and key: + * - A sufficient output size is + * PSA_AEAD_DECRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE(key_type, alg, + * ciphertext_length) where key_type is the + * type of key. + * - PSA_AEAD_DECRYPT_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE( + * ciphertext_length) evaluates to the maximum + * plaintext size of any supported AEAD + * decryption. + * \param[out] plaintext_length On success, the size of the output in the + * plaintext buffer. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE + * The cipher is not authentic. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * \p alg is not supported. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL + * plaintext_size is too small. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_aead_decrypt( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *nonce, size_t nonce_length, + const uint8_t *additional_data, size_t additional_data_length, + const uint8_t *ciphertext, size_t ciphertext_length, + uint8_t *plaintext, size_t plaintext_size, size_t *plaintext_length); + +/** Set the key for a multipart authenticated encryption operation. + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver + * aead_encrypt_setup entry point. This function behaves as an + * aead_encrypt_setup entry point as defined in the PSA driver interface + * specification for transparent drivers. + * + * If an error occurs at any step after a call to + * mbedtls_psa_aead_encrypt_setup(), the operation is reset by the PSA core by a + * call to mbedtls_psa_aead_abort(). The PSA core may call + * mbedtls_psa_aead_abort() at any time after the operation has been + * initialized, and is required to when the operation is no longer needed. + * + * \param[in,out] operation The operation object to set up. It must have + * been initialized as per the documentation for + * #mbedtls_psa_aead_operation_t and not yet in + * use. + * \param[in] attributes The attributes of the key to use for the + * operation. + * \param[in] key_buffer The buffer containing the key context. + * \param key_buffer_size Size of the \p key_buffer buffer in bytes. + It must be consistent with the size in bits + recorded in \p attributes. + * \param alg The AEAD algorithm to compute + * (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that + * #PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD(\p alg) is true). + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * An invalid block length was supplied. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * \p alg is not supported. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * Failed to allocate memory for key material + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_aead_encrypt_setup( + mbedtls_psa_aead_operation_t *operation, + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg); + +/** Set the key for a multipart authenticated decryption operation. + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver + * aead_decrypt_setup entry point. This function behaves as an + * aead_decrypt_setup entry point as defined in the PSA driver interface + * specification for transparent drivers. + * + * If an error occurs at any step after a call to + * mbedtls_psa_aead_decrypt_setup(), the PSA core resets the operation by a + * call to mbedtls_psa_aead_abort(). The PSA core may call + * mbedtls_psa_aead_abort() at any time after the operation has been + * initialized, and is required to when the operation is no longer needed. + * + * \param[in,out] operation The operation object to set up. It must have + * been initialized as per the documentation for + * #mbedtls_psa_aead_operation_t and not yet in + * use. + * \param[in] attributes The attributes of the key to use for the + * operation. + * \param[in] key_buffer The buffer containing the key context. + * \param key_buffer_size Size of the \p key_buffer buffer in bytes. + It must be consistent with the size in bits + recorded in \p attributes. + * \param alg The AEAD algorithm to compute + * (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that + * #PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD(\p alg) is true). + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * An invalid block length was supplied. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * \p alg is not supported. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * Failed to allocate memory for key material + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_aead_decrypt_setup( + mbedtls_psa_aead_operation_t *operation, + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg); + +/** Set the nonce for an authenticated encryption or decryption operation. + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver aead_set_nonce + * entry point. This function behaves as an aead_set_nonce entry point as + * defined in the PSA driver interface specification for transparent + * drivers. + * + * This function sets the nonce for the authenticated + * encryption or decryption operation. + * + * The PSA core calls mbedtls_psa_aead_encrypt_setup() or + * mbedtls_psa_aead_decrypt_setup() before calling this function. + * + * If this function returns an error status, the PSA core will call + * mbedtls_psa_aead_abort(). + * + * \param[in,out] operation Active AEAD operation. + * \param[in] nonce Buffer containing the nonce to use. + * \param nonce_length Size of the nonce in bytes. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * The size of \p nonce is not acceptable for the chosen algorithm. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * Algorithm previously set is not supported in this configuration of + * the library. + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_aead_set_nonce( + mbedtls_psa_aead_operation_t *operation, + const uint8_t *nonce, + size_t nonce_length); + +/** Declare the lengths of the message and additional data for AEAD. + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver aead_set_lengths + * entry point. This function behaves as an aead_set_lengths entry point + * as defined in the PSA driver interface specification for transparent + * drivers. + * + * The PSA core calls this function before calling mbedtls_psa_aead_update_ad() + * or mbedtls_psa_aead_update() if the algorithm for the operation requires it. + * If the algorithm does not require it, calling this function is optional, but + * if this function is called then the implementation must enforce the lengths. + * + * The PSA core may call this function before or after setting the nonce with + * mbedtls_psa_aead_set_nonce(). + * + * - For #PSA_ALG_CCM, calling this function is required. + * - For the other AEAD algorithms defined in this specification, calling + * this function is not required. + * + * If this function returns an error status, the PSA core calls + * mbedtls_psa_aead_abort(). + * + * \param[in,out] operation Active AEAD operation. + * \param ad_length Size of the non-encrypted additional + * authenticated data in bytes. + * \param plaintext_length Size of the plaintext to encrypt in bytes. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * At least one of the lengths is not acceptable for the chosen + * algorithm. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * Algorithm previously set is not supported in this configuration of + * the library. + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_aead_set_lengths( + mbedtls_psa_aead_operation_t *operation, + size_t ad_length, + size_t plaintext_length); + +/** Pass additional data to an active AEAD operation. + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver + * aead_update_ad entry point. This function behaves as an aead_update_ad + * entry point as defined in the PSA driver interface specification for + * transparent drivers. + * + * Additional data is authenticated, but not encrypted. + * + * The PSA core can call this function multiple times to pass successive + * fragments of the additional data. It will not call this function after + * passing data to encrypt or decrypt with mbedtls_psa_aead_update(). + * + * Before calling this function, the PSA core will: + * 1. Call either mbedtls_psa_aead_encrypt_setup() or + * mbedtls_psa_aead_decrypt_setup(). + * 2. Set the nonce with mbedtls_psa_aead_set_nonce(). + * + * If this function returns an error status, the PSA core will call + * mbedtls_psa_aead_abort(). + * + * \param[in,out] operation Active AEAD operation. + * \param[in] input Buffer containing the fragment of + * additional data. + * \param input_length Size of the \p input buffer in bytes. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * Algorithm previously set is not supported in this configuration of + * the library. + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_aead_update_ad( + mbedtls_psa_aead_operation_t *operation, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length); + +/** Encrypt or decrypt a message fragment in an active AEAD operation. + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver + * aead_update entry point. This function behaves as an aead_update entry + * point as defined in the PSA driver interface specification for + * transparent drivers. + * + * Before calling this function, the PSA core will: + * 1. Call either mbedtls_psa_aead_encrypt_setup() or + * mbedtls_psa_aead_decrypt_setup(). The choice of setup function + * determines whether this function encrypts or decrypts its input. + * 2. Set the nonce with mbedtls_psa_aead_set_nonce(). + * 3. Call mbedtls_psa_aead_update_ad() to pass all the additional data. + * + * If this function returns an error status, the PSA core will call + * mbedtls_psa_aead_abort(). + * + * This function does not require the input to be aligned to any + * particular block boundary. If the implementation can only process + * a whole block at a time, it must consume all the input provided, but + * it may delay the end of the corresponding output until a subsequent + * call to mbedtls_psa_aead_update(), mbedtls_psa_aead_finish() provides + * sufficient input. The amount of data that can be delayed in this way is + * bounded by #PSA_AEAD_UPDATE_OUTPUT_SIZE. + * + * \param[in,out] operation Active AEAD operation. + * \param[in] input Buffer containing the message fragment to + * encrypt or decrypt. + * \param input_length Size of the \p input buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] output Buffer where the output is to be written. + * \param output_size Size of the \p output buffer in bytes. + * This must be appropriate for the selected + * algorithm and key: + * - A sufficient output size is + * #PSA_AEAD_UPDATE_OUTPUT_SIZE(\c key_type, + * \c alg, \p input_length) where + * \c key_type is the type of key and \c alg is + * the algorithm that were used to set up the + * operation. + * - #PSA_AEAD_UPDATE_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE(\p + * input_length) evaluates to the maximum + * output size of any supported AEAD + * algorithm. + * \param[out] output_length On success, the number of bytes + * that make up the returned output. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL + * The size of the \p output buffer is too small. + * #PSA_AEAD_UPDATE_OUTPUT_SIZE(\c key_type, \c alg, \p input_length) or + * #PSA_AEAD_UPDATE_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE(\p input_length) can be used to + * determine the required buffer size. + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_aead_update( + mbedtls_psa_aead_operation_t *operation, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length, + uint8_t *output, + size_t output_size, + size_t *output_length); + +/** Finish encrypting a message in an AEAD operation. + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver + * aead_finish entry point. This function behaves as an aead_finish entry + * point as defined in the PSA driver interface specification for + * transparent drivers. + * + * The operation must have been set up by the PSA core with + * mbedtls_psa_aead_encrypt_setup(). + * + * This function finishes the authentication of the additional data + * formed by concatenating the inputs passed to preceding calls to + * mbedtls_psa_aead_update_ad() with the plaintext formed by concatenating the + * inputs passed to preceding calls to mbedtls_psa_aead_update(). + * + * This function has two output buffers: + * - \p ciphertext contains trailing ciphertext that was buffered from + * preceding calls to mbedtls_psa_aead_update(). + * - \p tag contains the authentication tag. + * + * Whether or not this function returns successfully, the PSA core subsequently + * calls mbedtls_psa_aead_abort() to deactivate the operation. + * + * \param[in,out] operation Active AEAD operation. + * \param[out] ciphertext Buffer where the last part of the ciphertext + * is to be written. + * \param ciphertext_size Size of the \p ciphertext buffer in bytes. + * This must be appropriate for the selected + * algorithm and key: + * - A sufficient output size is + * #PSA_AEAD_FINISH_OUTPUT_SIZE(\c key_type, + * \c alg) where \c key_type is the type of key + * and \c alg is the algorithm that were used to + * set up the operation. + * - #PSA_AEAD_FINISH_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE evaluates to + * the maximum output size of any supported AEAD + * algorithm. + * \param[out] ciphertext_length On success, the number of bytes of + * returned ciphertext. + * \param[out] tag Buffer where the authentication tag is + * to be written. + * \param tag_size Size of the \p tag buffer in bytes. + * This must be appropriate for the selected + * algorithm and key: + * - The exact tag size is #PSA_AEAD_TAG_LENGTH(\c + * key_type, \c key_bits, \c alg) where + * \c key_type and \c key_bits are the type and + * bit-size of the key, and \c alg are the + * algorithm that were used in the call to + * mbedtls_psa_aead_encrypt_setup(). + * - #PSA_AEAD_TAG_MAX_SIZE evaluates to the + * maximum tag size of any supported AEAD + * algorithm. + * \param[out] tag_length On success, the number of bytes + * that make up the returned tag. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL + * The size of the \p tag buffer is too small. + * #PSA_AEAD_TAG_LENGTH(\c key_type, key_bits, \c alg) or + * #PSA_AEAD_TAG_MAX_SIZE can be used to determine the required \p tag + * buffer size. + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_aead_finish( + mbedtls_psa_aead_operation_t *operation, + uint8_t *ciphertext, + size_t ciphertext_size, + size_t *ciphertext_length, + uint8_t *tag, + size_t tag_size, + size_t *tag_length); + +/** Abort an AEAD operation. + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver + * aead_abort entry point. This function behaves as an aead_abort entry + * point as defined in the PSA driver interface specification for + * transparent drivers. + * + * Aborting an operation frees all associated resources except for the + * \p operation structure itself. Once aborted, the operation object + * can be reused for another operation by the PSA core by it calling + * mbedtls_psa_aead_encrypt_setup() or mbedtls_psa_aead_decrypt_setup() again. + * + * The PSA core may call this function any time after the operation object has + * been initialized as described in #mbedtls_psa_aead_operation_t. + * + * In particular, calling mbedtls_psa_aead_abort() after the operation has been + * terminated by a call to mbedtls_psa_aead_abort() or + * mbedtls_psa_aead_finish() is safe and has no effect. + * + * \param[in,out] operation Initialized AEAD operation. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_aead_abort( + mbedtls_psa_aead_operation_t *operation); + +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_AEAD_H */ diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_cipher.h b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_cipher.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..cc565851cc8b --- /dev/null +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_cipher.h @@ -0,0 +1,316 @@ +/* + * PSA cipher driver entry points and associated auxiliary functions + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +#ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_CIPHER_H +#define PSA_CRYPTO_CIPHER_H + +#include +#include + +/** Get Mbed TLS cipher information given the cipher algorithm PSA identifier + * as well as the PSA type and size of the key to be used with the cipher + * algorithm. + * + * \param[in] alg PSA cipher algorithm identifier + * \param[in] key_type PSA key type + * \param[in,out] key_bits Size of the key in bits. The value provided in input + * might be updated if necessary. + * \param[out] mode Mbed TLS cipher mode + * \param[out] cipher_id Mbed TLS cipher algorithm identifier + * + * \return On success \c PSA_SUCCESS is returned and key_bits, mode and cipher_id + * are properly updated. + * \c PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED is returned if the cipher algorithm is not + * supported. + */ + +psa_status_t mbedtls_cipher_values_from_psa(psa_algorithm_t alg, psa_key_type_t key_type, + size_t *key_bits, mbedtls_cipher_mode_t *mode, + mbedtls_cipher_id_t *cipher_id); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C) +/** Get Mbed TLS cipher information given the cipher algorithm PSA identifier + * as well as the PSA type and size of the key to be used with the cipher + * algorithm. + * + * \param alg PSA cipher algorithm identifier + * \param key_type PSA key type + * \param key_bits Size of the key in bits + * \param[out] cipher_id Mbed TLS cipher algorithm identifier + * + * \return The Mbed TLS cipher information of the cipher algorithm. + * \c NULL if the PSA cipher algorithm is not supported. + */ +const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *mbedtls_cipher_info_from_psa( + psa_algorithm_t alg, psa_key_type_t key_type, size_t key_bits, + mbedtls_cipher_id_t *cipher_id); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C */ + +/** + * \brief Set the key for a multipart symmetric encryption operation. + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver + * cipher_encrypt_setup entry point. This function behaves as a + * cipher_encrypt_setup entry point as defined in the PSA driver + * interface specification for transparent drivers. + * + * \param[in,out] operation The operation object to set up. It has been + * initialized as per the documentation for + * #psa_cipher_operation_t and not yet in use. + * \param[in] attributes The attributes of the key to use for the + * operation. + * \param[in] key_buffer The buffer containing the key context. + * \param[in] key_buffer_size Size of the \p key_buffer buffer in bytes. + * \param[in] alg The cipher algorithm to compute + * (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that + * #PSA_ALG_IS_CIPHER(\p alg) is true). + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_cipher_encrypt_setup( + mbedtls_psa_cipher_operation_t *operation, + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg); + +/** + * \brief Set the key for a multipart symmetric decryption operation. + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver + * cipher_decrypt_setup entry point. This function behaves as a + * cipher_decrypt_setup entry point as defined in the PSA driver + * interface specification for transparent drivers. + * + * \param[in,out] operation The operation object to set up. It has been + * initialized as per the documentation for + * #psa_cipher_operation_t and not yet in use. + * \param[in] attributes The attributes of the key to use for the + * operation. + * \param[in] key_buffer The buffer containing the key context. + * \param[in] key_buffer_size Size of the \p key_buffer buffer in bytes. + * \param[in] alg The cipher algorithm to compute + * (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that + * #PSA_ALG_IS_CIPHER(\p alg) is true). + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_cipher_decrypt_setup( + mbedtls_psa_cipher_operation_t *operation, + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg); + +/** Set the IV for a symmetric encryption or decryption operation. + * + * This function sets the IV (initialization vector), nonce + * or initial counter value for the encryption or decryption operation. + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver + * cipher_set_iv entry point. This function behaves as a + * cipher_set_iv entry point as defined in the PSA driver + * interface specification for transparent drivers. + * + * \param[in,out] operation Active cipher operation. + * \param[in] iv Buffer containing the IV to use. + * \param[in] iv_length Size of the IV in bytes. It is guaranteed by + * the core to be less or equal to + * PSA_CIPHER_IV_MAX_SIZE. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * The size of \p iv is not acceptable for the chosen algorithm, + * or the chosen algorithm does not use an IV. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_cipher_set_iv( + mbedtls_psa_cipher_operation_t *operation, + const uint8_t *iv, size_t iv_length); + +/** Encrypt or decrypt a message fragment in an active cipher operation. + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver + * cipher_update entry point. This function behaves as a + * cipher_update entry point as defined in the PSA driver + * interface specification for transparent drivers. + * + * \param[in,out] operation Active cipher operation. + * \param[in] input Buffer containing the message fragment to + * encrypt or decrypt. + * \param[in] input_length Size of the \p input buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] output Buffer where the output is to be written. + * \param[in] output_size Size of the \p output buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] output_length On success, the number of bytes + * that make up the returned output. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL + * The size of the \p output buffer is too small. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_cipher_update( + mbedtls_psa_cipher_operation_t *operation, + const uint8_t *input, size_t input_length, + uint8_t *output, size_t output_size, size_t *output_length); + +/** Finish encrypting or decrypting a message in a cipher operation. + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver + * cipher_finish entry point. This function behaves as a + * cipher_finish entry point as defined in the PSA driver + * interface specification for transparent drivers. + * + * \param[in,out] operation Active cipher operation. + * \param[out] output Buffer where the output is to be written. + * \param[in] output_size Size of the \p output buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] output_length On success, the number of bytes + * that make up the returned output. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * The total input size passed to this operation is not valid for + * this particular algorithm. For example, the algorithm is a based + * on block cipher and requires a whole number of blocks, but the + * total input size is not a multiple of the block size. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_PADDING + * This is a decryption operation for an algorithm that includes + * padding, and the ciphertext does not contain valid padding. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL + * The size of the \p output buffer is too small. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_cipher_finish( + mbedtls_psa_cipher_operation_t *operation, + uint8_t *output, size_t output_size, size_t *output_length); + +/** Abort a cipher operation. + * + * Aborting an operation frees all associated resources except for the + * \p operation structure itself. Once aborted, the operation object + * can be reused for another operation. + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver + * cipher_abort entry point. This function behaves as a + * cipher_abort entry point as defined in the PSA driver + * interface specification for transparent drivers. + * + * \param[in,out] operation Initialized cipher operation. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS \emptydescription + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_cipher_abort(mbedtls_psa_cipher_operation_t *operation); + +/** Encrypt a message using a symmetric cipher. + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver + * cipher_encrypt entry point. This function behaves as a + * cipher_encrypt entry point as defined in the PSA driver + * interface specification for transparent drivers. + * + * \param[in] attributes The attributes of the key to use for the + * operation. + * \param[in] key_buffer The buffer containing the key context. + * \param[in] key_buffer_size Size of the \p key_buffer buffer in bytes. + * \param[in] alg The cipher algorithm to compute + * (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that + * #PSA_ALG_IS_CIPHER(\p alg) is true). + * \param[in] iv Buffer containing the IV for encryption. The + * IV has been generated by the core. + * \param[in] iv_length Size of the \p iv in bytes. + * \param[in] input Buffer containing the message to encrypt. + * \param[in] input_length Size of the \p input buffer in bytes. + * \param[in,out] output Buffer where the output is to be written. + * \param[in] output_size Size of the \p output buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] output_length On success, the number of bytes that make up + * the returned output. Initialized to zero + * by the core. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL + * The size of the \p output buffer is too small. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * The size \p iv_length is not acceptable for the chosen algorithm, + * or the chosen algorithm does not use an IV. + * The total input size passed to this operation is not valid for + * this particular algorithm. For example, the algorithm is a based + * on block cipher and requires a whole number of blocks, but the + * total input size is not a multiple of the block size. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_PADDING + * This is a decryption operation for an algorithm that includes + * padding, and the ciphertext does not contain valid padding. + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_cipher_encrypt(const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *iv, + size_t iv_length, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length, + uint8_t *output, + size_t output_size, + size_t *output_length); + +/** Decrypt a message using a symmetric cipher. + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver + * cipher_decrypt entry point. This function behaves as a + * cipher_decrypt entry point as defined in the PSA driver + * interface specification for transparent drivers. + * + * \param[in] attributes The attributes of the key to use for the + * operation. + * \param[in] key_buffer The buffer containing the key context. + * \param[in] key_buffer_size Size of the \p key_buffer buffer in bytes. + * \param[in] alg The cipher algorithm to compute + * (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that + * #PSA_ALG_IS_CIPHER(\p alg) is true). + * \param[in] input Buffer containing the iv and the ciphertext. + * \param[in] input_length Size of the \p input buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] output Buffer where the output is to be written. + * \param[in] output_size Size of the \p output buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] output_length On success, the number of bytes that make up + * the returned output. Initialized to zero + * by the core. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL + * The size of the \p output buffer is too small. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * The size of \p iv is not acceptable for the chosen algorithm, + * or the chosen algorithm does not use an IV. + * The total input size passed to this operation is not valid for + * this particular algorithm. For example, the algorithm is a based + * on block cipher and requires a whole number of blocks, but the + * total input size is not a multiple of the block size. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_PADDING + * This is a decryption operation for an algorithm that includes + * padding, and the ciphertext does not contain valid padding. + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_cipher_decrypt(const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length, + uint8_t *output, + size_t output_size, + size_t *output_length); + +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_CIPHER_H */ diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_core.h b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_core.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..c059162efe78 --- /dev/null +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_core.h @@ -0,0 +1,961 @@ +/* + * PSA crypto core internal interfaces + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +#ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_CORE_H +#define PSA_CRYPTO_CORE_H + +/* + * Include the build-time configuration information header. Here, we do not + * include `"mbedtls/build_info.h"` directly but `"psa/build_info.h"`, which + * is basically just an alias to it. This is to ease the maintenance of the + * TF-PSA-Crypto repository which has a different build system and + * configuration. + */ +#include "psa/build_info.h" + +#include "psa/crypto.h" +#include "psa/crypto_se_driver.h" +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) +#include "mbedtls/threading.h" +#endif + +/** + * Tell if PSA is ready for this hash. + * + * \note For now, only checks the state of the driver subsystem, + * not the algorithm. Might do more in the future. + * + * \param hash_alg The hash algorithm (ignored for now). + * + * \return 1 if the driver subsytem is ready, 0 otherwise. + */ +int psa_can_do_hash(psa_algorithm_t hash_alg); + +/** + * Tell if PSA is ready for this cipher. + * + * \note For now, only checks the state of the driver subsystem, + * not the algorithm. Might do more in the future. + * + * \param cipher_alg The cipher algorithm (ignored for now). + * + * \return 1 if the driver subsytem is ready, 0 otherwise. + */ +int psa_can_do_cipher(psa_key_type_t key_type, psa_algorithm_t cipher_alg); + +typedef enum { + PSA_SLOT_EMPTY = 0, + PSA_SLOT_FILLING, + PSA_SLOT_FULL, + PSA_SLOT_PENDING_DELETION, +} psa_key_slot_state_t; + +/** The data structure representing a key slot, containing key material + * and metadata for one key. + */ +typedef struct { + psa_key_attributes_t attr; + + /* + * The current state of the key slot, as described in + * docs/architecture/psa-thread-safety/psa-thread-safety.md. + * + * Library functions can modify the state of a key slot by calling + * psa_key_slot_state_transition. + * + * The state variable is used to help determine whether library functions + * which operate on the slot succeed. For example, psa_finish_key_creation, + * which transfers the state of a slot from PSA_SLOT_FILLING to + * PSA_SLOT_FULL, must fail with error code PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * if the state of the slot is not PSA_SLOT_FILLING. + * + * Library functions which traverse the array of key slots only consider + * slots that are in a suitable state for the function. + * For example, psa_get_and_lock_key_slot_in_memory, which finds a slot + * containing a given key ID, will only check slots whose state variable is + * PSA_SLOT_FULL. */ + psa_key_slot_state_t state; + + /* + * Number of functions registered as reading the material in the key slot. + * + * Library functions must not write directly to registered_readers + * + * A function must call psa_register_read(slot) before reading the current + * contents of the slot for an operation. + * They then must call psa_unregister_read(slot) once they have finished + * reading the current contents of the slot. If the key slot mutex is not + * held (when mutexes are enabled), this call must be done via a call to + * psa_unregister_read_under_mutex(slot). + * A function must call psa_key_slot_has_readers(slot) to check if + * the slot is in use for reading. + * + * This counter is used to prevent resetting the key slot while the library + * may access it. For example, such control is needed in the following + * scenarios: + * . In case of key slot starvation, all key slots contain the description + * of a key, and the library asks for the description of a persistent + * key not present in the key slots, the key slots currently accessed by + * the library cannot be reclaimed to free a key slot to load the + * persistent key. + * . In case of a multi-threaded application where one thread asks to close + * or purge or destroy a key while it is in use by the library through + * another thread. */ + size_t registered_readers; + + /* Dynamically allocated key data buffer. + * Format as specified in psa_export_key(). */ + struct key_data { + uint8_t *data; + size_t bytes; + } key; +} psa_key_slot_t; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + +/** Perform a mutex operation and return immediately upon failure. + * + * Returns PSA_ERROR_SERVICE_FAILURE if the operation fails + * and status was PSA_SUCCESS. + * + * Assumptions: + * psa_status_t status exists. + * f is a mutex operation which returns 0 upon success. + */ +#define PSA_THREADING_CHK_RET(f) \ + do \ + { \ + if ((f) != 0) { \ + if (status == PSA_SUCCESS) { \ + return PSA_ERROR_SERVICE_FAILURE; \ + } \ + return status; \ + } \ + } while (0); + +/** Perform a mutex operation and goto exit on failure. + * + * Sets status to PSA_ERROR_SERVICE_FAILURE if status was PSA_SUCCESS. + * + * Assumptions: + * psa_status_t status exists. + * Label exit: exists. + * f is a mutex operation which returns 0 upon success. + */ +#define PSA_THREADING_CHK_GOTO_EXIT(f) \ + do \ + { \ + if ((f) != 0) { \ + if (status == PSA_SUCCESS) { \ + status = PSA_ERROR_SERVICE_FAILURE; \ + } \ + goto exit; \ + } \ + } while (0); +#endif + +/** Test whether a key slot has any registered readers. + * If multi-threading is enabled, the caller must hold the + * global key slot mutex. + * + * \param[in] slot The key slot to test. + * + * \return 1 if the slot has any registered readers, 0 otherwise. + */ +static inline int psa_key_slot_has_readers(const psa_key_slot_t *slot) +{ + return slot->registered_readers > 0; +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C) +/** Get the SE slot number of a key from the key slot storing its description. + * + * \param[in] slot The key slot to query. This must be a key slot storing + * the description of a key of a dynamically registered + * secure element, otherwise the behaviour is undefined. + */ +static inline psa_key_slot_number_t psa_key_slot_get_slot_number( + const psa_key_slot_t *slot) +{ + return *((psa_key_slot_number_t *) (slot->key.data)); +} +#endif + +/** Completely wipe a slot in memory, including its policy. + * + * Persistent storage is not affected. + * Sets the slot's state to PSA_SLOT_EMPTY. + * If multi-threading is enabled, the caller must hold the + * global key slot mutex. + * + * \param[in,out] slot The key slot to wipe. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * The slot has been successfully wiped. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * The slot's state was PSA_SLOT_FULL or PSA_SLOT_PENDING_DELETION, and + * the amount of registered readers was not equal to 1. Or, + * the slot's state was PSA_SLOT_EMPTY. Or, + * the slot's state was PSA_SLOT_FILLING, and the amount + * of registered readers was not equal to 0. + */ +psa_status_t psa_wipe_key_slot(psa_key_slot_t *slot); + +/** Try to allocate a buffer to an empty key slot. + * + * \param[in,out] slot Key slot to attach buffer to. + * \param[in] buffer_length Requested size of the buffer. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * The buffer has been successfully allocated. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * Not enough memory was available for allocation. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS + * Trying to allocate a buffer to a non-empty key slot. + */ +psa_status_t psa_allocate_buffer_to_slot(psa_key_slot_t *slot, + size_t buffer_length); + +/** Wipe key data from a slot. Preserves metadata such as the policy. */ +psa_status_t psa_remove_key_data_from_memory(psa_key_slot_t *slot); + +/** Copy key data (in export format) into an empty key slot. + * + * This function assumes that the slot does not contain + * any key material yet. On failure, the slot content is unchanged. + * + * \param[in,out] slot Key slot to copy the key into. + * \param[in] data Buffer containing the key material. + * \param data_length Size of the key buffer. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * The key has been copied successfully. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * Not enough memory was available for allocation of the + * copy buffer. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS + * There was other key material already present in the slot. + */ +psa_status_t psa_copy_key_material_into_slot(psa_key_slot_t *slot, + const uint8_t *data, + size_t data_length); + +/** Convert an Mbed TLS error code to a PSA error code + * + * \note This function is provided solely for the convenience of + * Mbed TLS and may be removed at any time without notice. + * + * \param ret An Mbed TLS-thrown error code + * + * \return The corresponding PSA error code + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_to_psa_error(int ret); + +/** Import a key in binary format. + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver + * import_key entry point. This function behaves as an import_key + * entry point as defined in the PSA driver interface specification for + * transparent drivers. + * + * \param[in] attributes The attributes for the key to import. + * \param[in] data The buffer containing the key data in import + * format. + * \param[in] data_length Size of the \p data buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] key_buffer The buffer to contain the key data in output + * format upon successful return. + * \param[in] key_buffer_size Size of the \p key_buffer buffer in bytes. This + * size is greater or equal to \p data_length. + * \param[out] key_buffer_length The length of the data written in \p + * key_buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] bits The key size in number of bits. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS The key was imported successfully. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * The key data is not correctly formatted. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription + */ +psa_status_t psa_import_key_into_slot( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *data, size_t data_length, + uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + size_t *key_buffer_length, size_t *bits); + +/** Export a key in binary format + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver export_key + * entry point. This function behaves as an export_key entry point as + * defined in the PSA driver interface specification. + * + * \param[in] attributes The attributes for the key to export. + * \param[in] key_buffer Material or context of the key to export. + * \param[in] key_buffer_size Size of the \p key_buffer buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] data Buffer where the key data is to be written. + * \param[in] data_size Size of the \p data buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] data_length On success, the number of bytes written in + * \p data + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS The key was exported successfully. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription + */ +psa_status_t psa_export_key_internal( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + uint8_t *data, size_t data_size, size_t *data_length); + +/** Export a public key or the public part of a key pair in binary format. + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver + * export_public_key entry point. This function behaves as an + * export_public_key entry point as defined in the PSA driver interface + * specification. + * + * \param[in] attributes The attributes for the key to export. + * \param[in] key_buffer Material or context of the key to export. + * \param[in] key_buffer_size Size of the \p key_buffer buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] data Buffer where the key data is to be written. + * \param[in] data_size Size of the \p data buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] data_length On success, the number of bytes written in + * \p data + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS The public key was exported successfully. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription + */ +psa_status_t psa_export_public_key_internal( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + uint8_t *data, size_t data_size, size_t *data_length); + +/** Whether a key production parameters structure is the default. + * + * Calls to a key generation driver with non-default production parameters + * require a driver supporting custom production parameters. + * + * \param[in] params The key production parameters to check. + * \param params_data_length Size of `params->data` in bytes. + */ +#ifndef __cplusplus +int psa_key_production_parameters_are_default( + const psa_key_production_parameters_t *params, + size_t params_data_length); +#endif + +/** + * \brief Generate a key. + * + * \note The signature of the function is that of a PSA driver generate_key + * entry point. + * + * \param[in] attributes The attributes for the key to generate. + * \param[in] params The production parameters from + * psa_generate_key_ext(). + * \param params_data_length The size of `params->data` in bytes. + * \param[out] key_buffer Buffer where the key data is to be written. + * \param[in] key_buffer_size Size of \p key_buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] key_buffer_length On success, the number of bytes written in + * \p key_buffer. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * The key was generated successfully. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * Key size in bits or type not supported. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL + * The size of \p key_buffer is too small. + */ +#ifndef __cplusplus +psa_status_t psa_generate_key_internal(const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const psa_key_production_parameters_t *params, + size_t params_data_length, + uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, + size_t *key_buffer_length); +#endif + +/** Sign a message with a private key. For hash-and-sign algorithms, + * this includes the hashing step. + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver + * sign_message entry point. This function behaves as a sign_message + * entry point as defined in the PSA driver interface specification for + * transparent drivers. + * + * \note This function will call the driver for psa_sign_hash + * and go through driver dispatch again. + * + * \param[in] attributes The attributes of the key to use for the + * operation. + * \param[in] key_buffer The buffer containing the key context. + * \param[in] key_buffer_size Size of the \p key_buffer buffer in bytes. + * \param[in] alg A signature algorithm that is compatible with + * the type of the key. + * \param[in] input The input message to sign. + * \param[in] input_length Size of the \p input buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] signature Buffer where the signature is to be written. + * \param[in] signature_size Size of the \p signature buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] signature_length On success, the number of bytes + * that make up the returned signature value. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL + * The size of the \p signature buffer is too small. You can + * determine a sufficient buffer size by calling + * #PSA_SIGN_OUTPUT_SIZE(\c key_type, \c key_bits, \p alg) + * where \c key_type and \c key_bits are the type and bit-size + * respectively of the key. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY \emptydescription + */ +psa_status_t psa_sign_message_builtin( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, const uint8_t *input, size_t input_length, + uint8_t *signature, size_t signature_size, size_t *signature_length); + +/** Verify the signature of a message with a public key, using + * a hash-and-sign verification algorithm. + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver + * verify_message entry point. This function behaves as a verify_message + * entry point as defined in the PSA driver interface specification for + * transparent drivers. + * + * \note This function will call the driver for psa_verify_hash + * and go through driver dispatch again. + * + * \param[in] attributes The attributes of the key to use for the + * operation. + * \param[in] key_buffer The buffer containing the key context. + * \param[in] key_buffer_size Size of the \p key_buffer buffer in bytes. + * \param[in] alg A signature algorithm that is compatible with + * the type of the key. + * \param[in] input The message whose signature is to be verified. + * \param[in] input_length Size of the \p input buffer in bytes. + * \param[in] signature Buffer containing the signature to verify. + * \param[in] signature_length Size of the \p signature buffer in bytes. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * The signature is valid. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE + * The calculation was performed successfully, but the passed + * signature is not a valid signature. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription + */ +psa_status_t psa_verify_message_builtin( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, const uint8_t *input, size_t input_length, + const uint8_t *signature, size_t signature_length); + +/** Sign an already-calculated hash with a private key. + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver + * sign_hash entry point. This function behaves as a sign_hash + * entry point as defined in the PSA driver interface specification for + * transparent drivers. + * + * \param[in] attributes The attributes of the key to use for the + * operation. + * \param[in] key_buffer The buffer containing the key context. + * \param[in] key_buffer_size Size of the \p key_buffer buffer in bytes. + * \param[in] alg A signature algorithm that is compatible with + * the type of the key. + * \param[in] hash The hash or message to sign. + * \param[in] hash_length Size of the \p hash buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] signature Buffer where the signature is to be written. + * \param[in] signature_size Size of the \p signature buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] signature_length On success, the number of bytes + * that make up the returned signature value. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL + * The size of the \p signature buffer is too small. You can + * determine a sufficient buffer size by calling + * #PSA_SIGN_OUTPUT_SIZE(\c key_type, \c key_bits, \p alg) + * where \c key_type and \c key_bits are the type and bit-size + * respectively of the key. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY \emptydescription + */ +psa_status_t psa_sign_hash_builtin( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, const uint8_t *hash, size_t hash_length, + uint8_t *signature, size_t signature_size, size_t *signature_length); + +/** + * \brief Verify the signature a hash or short message using a public key. + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver + * verify_hash entry point. This function behaves as a verify_hash + * entry point as defined in the PSA driver interface specification for + * transparent drivers. + * + * \param[in] attributes The attributes of the key to use for the + * operation. + * \param[in] key_buffer The buffer containing the key context. + * \param[in] key_buffer_size Size of the \p key_buffer buffer in bytes. + * \param[in] alg A signature algorithm that is compatible with + * the type of the key. + * \param[in] hash The hash or message whose signature is to be + * verified. + * \param[in] hash_length Size of the \p hash buffer in bytes. + * \param[in] signature Buffer containing the signature to verify. + * \param[in] signature_length Size of the \p signature buffer in bytes. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * The signature is valid. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE + * The calculation was performed successfully, but the passed + * signature is not a valid signature. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription + */ +psa_status_t psa_verify_hash_builtin( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, const uint8_t *hash, size_t hash_length, + const uint8_t *signature, size_t signature_length); + +/** + * \brief Validate the key bit size for unstructured keys. + * + * \note Check that the bit size is acceptable for a given key type for + * unstructured keys. + * + * \param[in] type The key type + * \param[in] bits The number of bits of the key + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * The key type and size are valid. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * The size in bits of the key is not valid. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * The type and/or the size in bits of the key or the combination of + * the two is not supported. + */ +psa_status_t psa_validate_unstructured_key_bit_size(psa_key_type_t type, + size_t bits); + +/** Perform a key agreement and return the raw shared secret, using + built-in raw key agreement functions. + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver + * key_agreement entry point. This function behaves as a key_agreement + * entry point as defined in the PSA driver interface specification for + * transparent drivers. + * + * \param[in] attributes The attributes of the key to use for the + * operation. + * \param[in] key_buffer The buffer containing the private key + * context. + * \param[in] key_buffer_size Size of the \p key_buffer buffer in + * bytes. + * \param[in] alg A key agreement algorithm that is + * compatible with the type of the key. + * \param[in] peer_key The buffer containing the key context + * of the peer's public key. + * \param[in] peer_key_length Size of the \p peer_key buffer in + * bytes. + * \param[out] shared_secret The buffer to which the shared secret + * is to be written. + * \param[in] shared_secret_size Size of the \p shared_secret buffer in + * bytes. + * \param[out] shared_secret_length On success, the number of bytes that make + * up the returned shared secret. + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. Shared secret successfully calculated. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * \p alg is not a key agreement algorithm, or + * \p private_key is not compatible with \p alg, + * or \p peer_key is not valid for \p alg or not compatible with + * \p private_key. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL + * \p shared_secret_size is too small + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * \p alg is not a supported key agreement algorithm. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE \emptydescription + */ +psa_status_t psa_key_agreement_raw_builtin( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *peer_key, + size_t peer_key_length, + uint8_t *shared_secret, + size_t shared_secret_size, + size_t *shared_secret_length); + +/** + * \brief Set the maximum number of ops allowed to be executed by an + * interruptible function in a single call. + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver + * interruptible_set_max_ops entry point. This function behaves as an + * interruptible_set_max_ops entry point as defined in the PSA driver + * interface specification for transparent drivers. + * + * \param[in] max_ops The maximum number of ops to be executed in a + * single call, this can be a number from 0 to + * #PSA_INTERRUPTIBLE_MAX_OPS_UNLIMITED, where 0 + * is obviously the least amount of work done per + * call. + */ +void mbedtls_psa_interruptible_set_max_ops(uint32_t max_ops); + +/** + * \brief Get the maximum number of ops allowed to be executed by an + * interruptible function in a single call. + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver + * interruptible_get_max_ops entry point. This function behaves as an + * interruptible_get_max_ops entry point as defined in the PSA driver + * interface specification for transparent drivers. + * + * \return Maximum number of ops allowed to be executed + * by an interruptible function in a single call. + */ +uint32_t mbedtls_psa_interruptible_get_max_ops(void); + +/** + * \brief Get the number of ops that a hash signing operation has taken for the + * previous call. If no call or work has taken place, this will return + * zero. + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver + * sign_hash_get_num_ops entry point. This function behaves as an + * sign_hash_get_num_ops entry point as defined in the PSA driver + * interface specification for transparent drivers. + * + * \param operation The \c + * mbedtls_psa_sign_hash_interruptible_operation_t + * to use. This must be initialized first. + * + * \return Number of ops that were completed + * in the last call to \c + * mbedtls_psa_sign_hash_complete(). + */ +uint32_t mbedtls_psa_sign_hash_get_num_ops( + const mbedtls_psa_sign_hash_interruptible_operation_t *operation); + +/** + * \brief Get the number of ops that a hash verification operation has taken for + * the previous call. If no call or work has taken place, this will + * return zero. + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver + * verify_hash_get_num_ops entry point. This function behaves as an + * verify_hash_get_num_ops entry point as defined in the PSA driver + * interface specification for transparent drivers. + * + * \param operation The \c + * mbedtls_psa_verify_hash_interruptible_operation_t + * to use. This must be initialized first. + * + * \return Number of ops that were completed + * in the last call to \c + * mbedtls_psa_verify_hash_complete(). + */ +uint32_t mbedtls_psa_verify_hash_get_num_ops( + const mbedtls_psa_verify_hash_interruptible_operation_t *operation); + +/** + * \brief Start signing a hash or short message with a private key, in an + * interruptible manner. + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver + * sign_hash_start entry point. This function behaves as a + * sign_hash_start entry point as defined in the PSA driver interface + * specification for transparent drivers. + * + * \param[in] operation The \c + * mbedtls_psa_sign_hash_interruptible_operation_t + * to use. This must be initialized first. + * \param[in] attributes The attributes of the key to use for the + * operation. + * \param[in] key_buffer The buffer containing the key context. + * \param[in] key_buffer_size Size of the \p key_buffer buffer in bytes. + * \param[in] alg A signature algorithm that is compatible with + * the type of the key. + * \param[in] hash The hash or message to sign. + * \param hash_length Size of the \p hash buffer in bytes. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * The operation started successfully - call \c psa_sign_hash_complete() + * with the same context to complete the operation + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * An unsupported, incorrectly formatted or incorrect type of key was + * used. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED Either no internal interruptible operations + * are currently supported, or the key type is currently unsupported. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * There was insufficient memory to load the key representation. + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_sign_hash_start( + mbedtls_psa_sign_hash_interruptible_operation_t *operation, + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, const uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *hash, size_t hash_length); + +/** + * \brief Continue and eventually complete the action of signing a hash or + * short message with a private key, in an interruptible manner. + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver + * sign_hash_complete entry point. This function behaves as a + * sign_hash_complete entry point as defined in the PSA driver interface + * specification for transparent drivers. + * + * \param[in] operation The \c + * mbedtls_psa_sign_hash_interruptible_operation_t + * to use. This must be initialized first. + * + * \param[out] signature Buffer where the signature is to be written. + * \param signature_size Size of the \p signature buffer in bytes. This + * must be appropriate for the selected + * algorithm and key. + * \param[out] signature_length On success, the number of bytes that make up + * the returned signature value. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Operation completed successfully + * + * \retval #PSA_OPERATION_INCOMPLETE + * Operation was interrupted due to the setting of \c + * psa_interruptible_set_max_ops(), there is still work to be done, + * please call this function again with the same operation object. + * + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL + * The size of the \p signature buffer is too small. You can + * determine a sufficient buffer size by calling + * #PSA_SIGN_OUTPUT_SIZE(\c key_type, \c key_bits, \p alg) + * where \c key_type and \c key_bits are the type and bit-size + * respectively of \p key. + * + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY \emptydescription + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_sign_hash_complete( + mbedtls_psa_sign_hash_interruptible_operation_t *operation, + uint8_t *signature, size_t signature_size, + size_t *signature_length); + +/** + * \brief Abort a sign hash operation. + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver sign_hash_abort + * entry point. This function behaves as a sign_hash_abort entry point as + * defined in the PSA driver interface specification for transparent + * drivers. + * + * \param[in] operation The \c + * mbedtls_psa_sign_hash_interruptible_operation_t + * to abort. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * The operation was aborted successfully. + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_sign_hash_abort( + mbedtls_psa_sign_hash_interruptible_operation_t *operation); + +/** + * \brief Start reading and verifying a hash or short message, in an + * interruptible manner. + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver + * verify_hash_start entry point. This function behaves as a + * verify_hash_start entry point as defined in the PSA driver interface + * specification for transparent drivers. + * + * \param[in] operation The \c + * mbedtls_psa_verify_hash_interruptible_operation_t + * to use. This must be initialized first. + * \param[in] attributes The attributes of the key to use for the + * operation. + * \param[in] key_buffer The buffer containing the key context. + * \param[in] key_buffer_size Size of the \p key_buffer buffer in bytes. + * \param[in] alg A signature algorithm that is compatible with + * the type of the key. + * \param[in] hash The hash whose signature is to be verified. + * \param hash_length Size of the \p hash buffer in bytes. + * \param[in] signature Buffer containing the signature to verify. + * \param signature_length Size of the \p signature buffer in bytes. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * The operation started successfully - call \c psa_sign_hash_complete() + * with the same context to complete the operation + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * An unsupported or incorrect type of key was used. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * Either no internal interruptible operations are currently supported, + * or the key type is currently unsupported. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * There was insufficient memory either to load the key representation, + * or to prepare the operation. + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_verify_hash_start( + mbedtls_psa_verify_hash_interruptible_operation_t *operation, + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *hash, size_t hash_length, + const uint8_t *signature, size_t signature_length); + +/** + * \brief Continue and eventually complete the action of signing a hash or + * short message with a private key, in an interruptible manner. + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver + * sign_hash_complete entry point. This function behaves as a + * sign_hash_complete entry point as defined in the PSA driver interface + * specification for transparent drivers. + * + * \param[in] operation The \c + * mbedtls_psa_sign_hash_interruptible_operation_t + * to use. This must be initialized first. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Operation completed successfully, and the passed signature is valid. + * + * \retval #PSA_OPERATION_INCOMPLETE + * Operation was interrupted due to the setting of \c + * psa_interruptible_set_max_ops(), there is still work to be done, + * please call this function again with the same operation object. + * + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE + * The calculation was performed successfully, but the passed + * signature is not a valid signature. + * + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_verify_hash_complete( + mbedtls_psa_verify_hash_interruptible_operation_t *operation); + +/** + * \brief Abort a verify signed hash operation. + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver + * verify_hash_abort entry point. This function behaves as a + * verify_hash_abort entry point as defined in the PSA driver interface + * specification for transparent drivers. + * + * \param[in] operation The \c + * mbedtls_psa_verify_hash_interruptible_operation_t + * to abort. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * The operation was aborted successfully. + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_verify_hash_abort( + mbedtls_psa_verify_hash_interruptible_operation_t *operation); + +typedef struct psa_crypto_local_input_s { + uint8_t *buffer; + size_t length; +} psa_crypto_local_input_t; + +#define PSA_CRYPTO_LOCAL_INPUT_INIT ((psa_crypto_local_input_t) { NULL, 0 }) + +/** Allocate a local copy of an input buffer and copy the contents into it. + * + * \param[in] input Pointer to input buffer. + * \param[in] input_len Length of the input buffer. + * \param[out] local_input Pointer to a psa_crypto_local_input_t struct + * containing a local input copy. + * \return #PSA_SUCCESS, if the buffer was successfully + * copied. + * \return #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY, if a copy of + * the buffer cannot be allocated. + */ +psa_status_t psa_crypto_local_input_alloc(const uint8_t *input, size_t input_len, + psa_crypto_local_input_t *local_input); + +/** Free a local copy of an input buffer. + * + * \param[in] local_input Pointer to a psa_crypto_local_input_t struct + * populated by a previous call to + * psa_crypto_local_input_alloc(). + */ +void psa_crypto_local_input_free(psa_crypto_local_input_t *local_input); + +typedef struct psa_crypto_local_output_s { + uint8_t *original; + uint8_t *buffer; + size_t length; +} psa_crypto_local_output_t; + +#define PSA_CRYPTO_LOCAL_OUTPUT_INIT ((psa_crypto_local_output_t) { NULL, NULL, 0 }) + +/** Allocate a local copy of an output buffer. + * + * \note This does not copy any data from the original + * output buffer but only allocates a buffer + * whose contents will be copied back to the + * original in a future call to + * psa_crypto_local_output_free(). + * + * \param[in] output Pointer to output buffer. + * \param[in] output_len Length of the output buffer. + * \param[out] local_output Pointer to a psa_crypto_local_output_t struct to + * populate with the local output copy. + * \return #PSA_SUCCESS, if the buffer was successfully + * copied. + * \return #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY, if a copy of + * the buffer cannot be allocated. + */ +psa_status_t psa_crypto_local_output_alloc(uint8_t *output, size_t output_len, + psa_crypto_local_output_t *local_output); + +/** Copy from a local copy of an output buffer back to the original, then + * free the local copy. + * + * \param[in] local_output Pointer to a psa_crypto_local_output_t struct + * populated by a previous call to + * psa_crypto_local_output_alloc(). + * \return #PSA_SUCCESS, if the local output was + * successfully copied back to the original. + * \return #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED, if the output + * could not be copied back to the original. + */ +psa_status_t psa_crypto_local_output_free(psa_crypto_local_output_t *local_output); + +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_CORE_H */ diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_core_common.h b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_core_common.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..98fce2cca4e4 --- /dev/null +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_core_common.h @@ -0,0 +1,52 @@ +/** + * \file psa_crypto_core_common.h + * + * \brief Utility macros for internal use in the PSA cryptography core. + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +#ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_CORE_COMMON_H +#define PSA_CRYPTO_CORE_COMMON_H + +/** Return an offset into a buffer. + * + * This is just the addition of an offset to a pointer, except that this + * function also accepts an offset of 0 into a buffer whose pointer is null. + * (`p + n` has undefined behavior when `p` is null, even when `n == 0`. + * A null pointer is a valid buffer pointer when the size is 0, for example + * as the result of `malloc(0)` on some platforms.) + * + * \param p Pointer to a buffer of at least n bytes. + * This may be \p NULL if \p n is zero. + * \param n An offset in bytes. + * \return Pointer to offset \p n in the buffer \p p. + * Note that this is only a valid pointer if the size of the + * buffer is at least \p n + 1. + */ +static inline unsigned char *psa_crypto_buffer_offset( + unsigned char *p, size_t n) +{ + return p == NULL ? NULL : p + n; +} + +/** Return an offset into a read-only buffer. + * + * Similar to mbedtls_buffer_offset(), but for const pointers. + * + * \param p Pointer to a buffer of at least n bytes. + * This may be \p NULL if \p n is zero. + * \param n An offset in bytes. + * \return Pointer to offset \p n in the buffer \p p. + * Note that this is only a valid pointer if the size of the + * buffer is at least \p n + 1. + */ +static inline const unsigned char *psa_crypto_buffer_offset_const( + const unsigned char *p, size_t n) +{ + return p == NULL ? NULL : p + n; +} + +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_CORE_COMMON_H */ diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_driver_wrappers.h b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_driver_wrappers.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..6919971aca03 --- /dev/null +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_driver_wrappers.h @@ -0,0 +1,2899 @@ +/* + * Functions to delegate cryptographic operations to an available + * and appropriate accelerator. + * Warning: This file is now auto-generated. + */ +/* Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + + +/* BEGIN-common headers */ +#include "common.h" +#include "psa_crypto_aead.h" +#include "psa_crypto_cipher.h" +#include "psa_crypto_core.h" +#include "psa_crypto_driver_wrappers_no_static.h" +#include "psa_crypto_hash.h" +#include "psa_crypto_mac.h" +#include "psa_crypto_pake.h" +#include "psa_crypto_rsa.h" + +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" +#include "mbedtls/constant_time.h" +/* END-common headers */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) + +/* BEGIN-driver headers */ +/* Headers for mbedtls_test opaque driver */ +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) +#include "test/drivers/test_driver.h" + +#endif +/* Headers for mbedtls_test transparent driver */ +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) +#include "test/drivers/test_driver.h" + +#endif +/* Headers for p256 transparent driver */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_P256M_DRIVER_ENABLED) +#include "../3rdparty/p256-m/p256-m_driver_entrypoints.h" + +#endif + +/* END-driver headers */ + +/* Auto-generated values depending on which drivers are registered. + * ID 0 is reserved for unallocated operations. + * ID 1 is reserved for the Mbed TLS software driver. */ +/* BEGIN-driver id definition */ +#define PSA_CRYPTO_MBED_TLS_DRIVER_ID (1) +#define MBEDTLS_TEST_OPAQUE_DRIVER_ID (2) +#define MBEDTLS_TEST_TRANSPARENT_DRIVER_ID (3) +#define P256_TRANSPARENT_DRIVER_ID (4) + +/* END-driver id */ + +/* BEGIN-Common Macro definitions */ + +/* END-Common Macro definitions */ + +/* Support the 'old' SE interface when asked to */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C) +/* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_PRESENT is defined when either a new-style or old-style + * SE driver is present, to avoid unused argument errors at compile time. */ +#ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_PRESENT +#define PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_PRESENT +#endif +#include "psa_crypto_se.h" +#endif + +static inline psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_init( void ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C) + status = psa_init_all_se_drivers( ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( status ); +#endif + +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + status = mbedtls_test_transparent_init( ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( status ); + + status = mbedtls_test_opaque_init( ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( status ); +#endif + + (void) status; + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); +} + +static inline void psa_driver_wrapper_free( void ) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C) + /* Unregister all secure element drivers, so that we restart from + * a pristine state. */ + psa_unregister_all_se_drivers( ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C */ + +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + mbedtls_test_transparent_free( ); + mbedtls_test_opaque_free( ); +#endif +} + +/* Start delegation functions */ +static inline psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_sign_message( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length, + uint8_t *signature, + size_t signature_size, + size_t *signature_length ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_location_t location = + PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION( psa_get_key_lifetime(attributes) ); + + switch( location ) + { + case PSA_KEY_LOCATION_LOCAL_STORAGE: + /* Key is stored in the slot in export representation, so + * cycle through all known transparent accelerators */ +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + status = mbedtls_test_transparent_signature_sign_message( + attributes, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + alg, + input, + input_length, + signature, + signature_size, + signature_length ); + /* Declared with fallback == true */ + if( status != PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ) + return( status ); +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + break; + + /* Add cases for opaque driver here */ +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + case PSA_CRYPTO_TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION: + status = mbedtls_test_opaque_signature_sign_message( + attributes, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + alg, + input, + input_length, + signature, + signature_size, + signature_length ); + if( status != PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ) + return( status ); + break; +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + default: + /* Key is declared with a lifetime not known to us */ + (void)status; + break; + } + + return( psa_sign_message_builtin( attributes, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + alg, + input, + input_length, + signature, + signature_size, + signature_length ) ); +} + +static inline psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_verify_message( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length, + const uint8_t *signature, + size_t signature_length ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_location_t location = + PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION( psa_get_key_lifetime(attributes) ); + + switch( location ) + { + case PSA_KEY_LOCATION_LOCAL_STORAGE: + /* Key is stored in the slot in export representation, so + * cycle through all known transparent accelerators */ +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + status = mbedtls_test_transparent_signature_verify_message( + attributes, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + alg, + input, + input_length, + signature, + signature_length ); + /* Declared with fallback == true */ + if( status != PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ) + return( status ); +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + break; + + /* Add cases for opaque driver here */ +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + case PSA_CRYPTO_TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION: + return( mbedtls_test_opaque_signature_verify_message( + attributes, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + alg, + input, + input_length, + signature, + signature_length ) ); + if( status != PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ) + return( status ); + break; +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + default: + /* Key is declared with a lifetime not known to us */ + (void)status; + break; + } + + return( psa_verify_message_builtin( attributes, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + alg, + input, + input_length, + signature, + signature_length ) ); +} + +static inline psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_sign_hash( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, const uint8_t *hash, size_t hash_length, + uint8_t *signature, size_t signature_size, size_t *signature_length ) +{ + /* Try dynamically-registered SE interface first */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C) + const psa_drv_se_t *drv; + psa_drv_se_context_t *drv_context; + + if( psa_get_se_driver( psa_get_key_lifetime(attributes), &drv, &drv_context ) ) + { + if( drv->asymmetric == NULL || + drv->asymmetric->p_sign == NULL ) + { + /* Key is defined in SE, but we have no way to exercise it */ + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + } + return( drv->asymmetric->p_sign( + drv_context, *( (psa_key_slot_number_t *)key_buffer ), + alg, hash, hash_length, + signature, signature_size, signature_length ) ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C */ + + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_location_t location = + PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION( psa_get_key_lifetime(attributes) ); + + switch( location ) + { + case PSA_KEY_LOCATION_LOCAL_STORAGE: + /* Key is stored in the slot in export representation, so + * cycle through all known transparent accelerators */ +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + status = mbedtls_test_transparent_signature_sign_hash( attributes, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + alg, + hash, + hash_length, + signature, + signature_size, + signature_length ); + /* Declared with fallback == true */ + if( status != PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ) + return( status ); +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#if defined (MBEDTLS_PSA_P256M_DRIVER_ENABLED) + if( PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC( psa_get_key_type(attributes) ) && + PSA_ALG_IS_ECDSA(alg) && + !PSA_ALG_ECDSA_IS_DETERMINISTIC( alg ) && + PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_GET_FAMILY(psa_get_key_type(attributes)) == PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1 && + psa_get_key_bits(attributes) == 256 ) + { + status = p256_transparent_sign_hash( attributes, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + alg, + hash, + hash_length, + signature, + signature_size, + signature_length ); + if( status != PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ) + return( status ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_P256M_DRIVER_ENABLED */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + /* Fell through, meaning no accelerator supports this operation */ + return( psa_sign_hash_builtin( attributes, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + alg, + hash, + hash_length, + signature, + signature_size, + signature_length ) ); + + /* Add cases for opaque driver here */ +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + case PSA_CRYPTO_TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION: + return( mbedtls_test_opaque_signature_sign_hash( attributes, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + alg, + hash, + hash_length, + signature, + signature_size, + signature_length ) ); +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + default: + /* Key is declared with a lifetime not known to us */ + (void)status; + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + } +} + +static inline psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_verify_hash( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, const uint8_t *hash, size_t hash_length, + const uint8_t *signature, size_t signature_length ) +{ + /* Try dynamically-registered SE interface first */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C) + const psa_drv_se_t *drv; + psa_drv_se_context_t *drv_context; + + if( psa_get_se_driver( psa_get_key_lifetime(attributes), &drv, &drv_context ) ) + { + if( drv->asymmetric == NULL || + drv->asymmetric->p_verify == NULL ) + { + /* Key is defined in SE, but we have no way to exercise it */ + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + } + return( drv->asymmetric->p_verify( + drv_context, *( (psa_key_slot_number_t *)key_buffer ), + alg, hash, hash_length, + signature, signature_length ) ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C */ + + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_location_t location = + PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION( psa_get_key_lifetime(attributes) ); + + switch( location ) + { + case PSA_KEY_LOCATION_LOCAL_STORAGE: + /* Key is stored in the slot in export representation, so + * cycle through all known transparent accelerators */ +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + status = mbedtls_test_transparent_signature_verify_hash( + attributes, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + alg, + hash, + hash_length, + signature, + signature_length ); + /* Declared with fallback == true */ + if( status != PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ) + return( status ); +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#if defined (MBEDTLS_PSA_P256M_DRIVER_ENABLED) + if( PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC( psa_get_key_type(attributes) ) && + PSA_ALG_IS_ECDSA(alg) && + !PSA_ALG_ECDSA_IS_DETERMINISTIC( alg ) && + PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_GET_FAMILY(psa_get_key_type(attributes)) == PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1 && + psa_get_key_bits(attributes) == 256 ) + { + status = p256_transparent_verify_hash( attributes, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + alg, + hash, + hash_length, + signature, + signature_length ); + if( status != PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ) + return( status ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_P256M_DRIVER_ENABLED */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + + return( psa_verify_hash_builtin( attributes, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + alg, + hash, + hash_length, + signature, + signature_length ) ); + + /* Add cases for opaque driver here */ +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + case PSA_CRYPTO_TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION: + return( mbedtls_test_opaque_signature_verify_hash( attributes, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + alg, + hash, + hash_length, + signature, + signature_length ) ); +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + default: + /* Key is declared with a lifetime not known to us */ + (void)status; + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + } +} + +static inline uint32_t psa_driver_wrapper_sign_hash_get_num_ops( + psa_sign_hash_interruptible_operation_t *operation ) +{ + switch( operation->id ) + { + /* If uninitialised, return 0, as no work can have been done. */ + case 0: + return 0; + + case PSA_CRYPTO_MBED_TLS_DRIVER_ID: + return(mbedtls_psa_sign_hash_get_num_ops(&operation->ctx.mbedtls_ctx)); + +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + /* Add test driver tests here */ + +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + } + + /* Can't happen (see discussion in #8271) */ + return 0; +} + +static inline uint32_t psa_driver_wrapper_verify_hash_get_num_ops( + psa_verify_hash_interruptible_operation_t *operation ) +{ + switch( operation->id ) + { + /* If uninitialised, return 0, as no work can have been done. */ + case 0: + return 0; + + case PSA_CRYPTO_MBED_TLS_DRIVER_ID: + return (mbedtls_psa_verify_hash_get_num_ops(&operation->ctx.mbedtls_ctx)); + +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + /* Add test driver tests here */ + +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + + } + + /* Can't happen (see discussion in #8271) */ + return 0; +} + +static inline psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_sign_hash_start( + psa_sign_hash_interruptible_operation_t *operation, + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, const uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *hash, size_t hash_length ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_location_t location = PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION( + psa_get_key_lifetime(attributes) ); + + switch( location ) + { + case PSA_KEY_LOCATION_LOCAL_STORAGE: + /* Key is stored in the slot in export representation, so + * cycle through all known transparent accelerators */ + +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + + /* Add test driver tests here */ + + /* Declared with fallback == true */ + +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + + /* Fell through, meaning no accelerator supports this operation */ + operation->id = PSA_CRYPTO_MBED_TLS_DRIVER_ID; + status = mbedtls_psa_sign_hash_start( &operation->ctx.mbedtls_ctx, + attributes, + key_buffer, key_buffer_size, + alg, hash, hash_length ); + break; + + /* Add cases for opaque driver here */ + + default: + /* Key is declared with a lifetime not known to us */ + status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + break; + } + + return( status ); +} + +static inline psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_sign_hash_complete( + psa_sign_hash_interruptible_operation_t *operation, + uint8_t *signature, size_t signature_size, + size_t *signature_length ) +{ + switch( operation->id ) + { + case PSA_CRYPTO_MBED_TLS_DRIVER_ID: + return( mbedtls_psa_sign_hash_complete( &operation->ctx.mbedtls_ctx, + signature, signature_size, + signature_length ) ); + +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + /* Add test driver tests here */ + +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + } + + ( void ) signature; + ( void ) signature_size; + ( void ) signature_length; + + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); +} + +static inline psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_sign_hash_abort( + psa_sign_hash_interruptible_operation_t *operation ) +{ + switch( operation->id ) + { + case PSA_CRYPTO_MBED_TLS_DRIVER_ID: + return( mbedtls_psa_sign_hash_abort( &operation->ctx.mbedtls_ctx ) ); + +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + /* Add test driver tests here */ + +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + } + + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); +} + +static inline psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_verify_hash_start( + psa_verify_hash_interruptible_operation_t *operation, + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, const uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *hash, size_t hash_length, + const uint8_t *signature, size_t signature_length ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_location_t location = PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION( + psa_get_key_lifetime(attributes) ); + + switch( location ) + { + case PSA_KEY_LOCATION_LOCAL_STORAGE: + /* Key is stored in the slot in export representation, so + * cycle through all known transparent accelerators */ + +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + + /* Add test driver tests here */ + + /* Declared with fallback == true */ + +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + + /* Fell through, meaning no accelerator supports this operation */ + operation->id = PSA_CRYPTO_MBED_TLS_DRIVER_ID; + status = mbedtls_psa_verify_hash_start( &operation->ctx.mbedtls_ctx, + attributes, + key_buffer, key_buffer_size, + alg, hash, hash_length, + signature, signature_length ); + break; + + /* Add cases for opaque driver here */ + + default: + /* Key is declared with a lifetime not known to us */ + status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + break; + } + + return( status ); +} + +static inline psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_verify_hash_complete( + psa_verify_hash_interruptible_operation_t *operation ) +{ + switch( operation->id ) + { + case PSA_CRYPTO_MBED_TLS_DRIVER_ID: + return( mbedtls_psa_verify_hash_complete( + &operation->ctx.mbedtls_ctx + ) ); + +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + /* Add test driver tests here */ + +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + } + + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); +} + +static inline psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_verify_hash_abort( + psa_verify_hash_interruptible_operation_t *operation ) +{ + switch( operation->id ) + { + case PSA_CRYPTO_MBED_TLS_DRIVER_ID: + return( mbedtls_psa_verify_hash_abort( &operation->ctx.mbedtls_ctx + ) ); + +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + /* Add test driver tests here */ + +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + } + + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); +} + +/** Calculate the key buffer size required to store the key material of a key + * associated with an opaque driver from input key data. + * + * \param[in] attributes The key attributes + * \param[in] data The input key data. + * \param[in] data_length The input data length. + * \param[out] key_buffer_size Minimum buffer size to contain the key material. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED \emptydescription + */ +static inline psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_get_key_buffer_size_from_key_data( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *data, + size_t data_length, + size_t *key_buffer_size ) +{ + psa_key_location_t location = + PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION( psa_get_key_lifetime(attributes) ); + psa_key_type_t key_type = psa_get_key_type(attributes); + + *key_buffer_size = 0; + switch( location ) + { +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + case PSA_CRYPTO_TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION: + *key_buffer_size = mbedtls_test_opaque_size_function( key_type, + PSA_BYTES_TO_BITS( data_length ) ); + return( ( *key_buffer_size != 0 ) ? + PSA_SUCCESS : PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ + + default: + (void)key_type; + (void)data; + (void)data_length; + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + } +} + +#ifndef __cplusplus +static inline psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_generate_key( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const psa_key_production_parameters_t *params, size_t params_data_length, + uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, size_t *key_buffer_length ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_location_t location = + PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION(psa_get_key_lifetime(attributes)); + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE) + int is_default_production = + psa_key_production_parameters_are_default(params, params_data_length); + if( location != PSA_KEY_LOCATION_LOCAL_STORAGE && !is_default_production ) + { + /* We don't support passing custom production parameters + * to drivers yet. */ + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + } +#else + int is_default_production = 1; + (void) is_default_production; +#endif + + /* Try dynamically-registered SE interface first */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C) + const psa_drv_se_t *drv; + psa_drv_se_context_t *drv_context; + + if( psa_get_se_driver( psa_get_key_lifetime(attributes), &drv, &drv_context ) ) + { + size_t pubkey_length = 0; /* We don't support this feature yet */ + if( drv->key_management == NULL || + drv->key_management->p_generate == NULL ) + { + /* Key is defined as being in SE, but we have no way to generate it */ + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + } + return( drv->key_management->p_generate( + drv_context, + *( (psa_key_slot_number_t *)key_buffer ), + attributes, NULL, 0, &pubkey_length ) ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C */ + + switch( location ) + { + case PSA_KEY_LOCATION_LOCAL_STORAGE: +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) + /* Transparent drivers are limited to generating asymmetric keys. */ + /* We don't support passing custom production parameters + * to drivers yet. */ + if( PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ASYMMETRIC( psa_get_key_type(attributes) ) && + is_default_production ) + { + /* Cycle through all known transparent accelerators */ +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + status = mbedtls_test_transparent_generate_key( + attributes, key_buffer, key_buffer_size, + key_buffer_length ); + /* Declared with fallback == true */ + if( status != PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ) + break; +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_P256M_DRIVER_ENABLED) + if( PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC( psa_get_key_type(attributes) ) && + psa_get_key_type(attributes) == PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1) && + psa_get_key_bits(attributes) == 256 ) + { + status = p256_transparent_generate_key( attributes, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + key_buffer_length ); + if( status != PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ) + break; + } + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_P256M_DRIVER_ENABLED */ + } +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + + /* Software fallback */ + status = psa_generate_key_internal( + attributes, params, params_data_length, + key_buffer, key_buffer_size, key_buffer_length ); + break; + + /* Add cases for opaque driver here */ +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + case PSA_CRYPTO_TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION: + status = mbedtls_test_opaque_generate_key( + attributes, key_buffer, key_buffer_size, key_buffer_length ); + break; +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + + default: + /* Key is declared with a lifetime not known to us */ + status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + break; + } + + return( status ); +} +#endif + +static inline psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_import_key( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *data, + size_t data_length, + uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, + size_t *key_buffer_length, + size_t *bits ) +{ + + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_location_t location = PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION( + psa_get_key_lifetime( attributes ) ); + + /* Try dynamically-registered SE interface first */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C) + const psa_drv_se_t *drv; + psa_drv_se_context_t *drv_context; + + if( psa_get_se_driver( psa_get_key_lifetime(attributes), &drv, &drv_context ) ) + { + if( drv->key_management == NULL || + drv->key_management->p_import == NULL ) + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + + /* The driver should set the number of key bits, however in + * case it doesn't, we initialize bits to an invalid value. */ + *bits = PSA_MAX_KEY_BITS + 1; + status = drv->key_management->p_import( + drv_context, + *( (psa_key_slot_number_t *)key_buffer ), + attributes, data, data_length, bits ); + + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( status ); + + if( (*bits) > PSA_MAX_KEY_BITS ) + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C */ + + switch( location ) + { + case PSA_KEY_LOCATION_LOCAL_STORAGE: + /* Key is stored in the slot in export representation, so + * cycle through all known transparent accelerators */ +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) + +#if (defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) ) + status = mbedtls_test_transparent_import_key + (attributes, + data, + data_length, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + key_buffer_length, + bits + ); + + if( status != PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ) + return( status ); +#endif + +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_P256M_DRIVER_ENABLED) ) + status = p256_transparent_import_key + (attributes, + data, + data_length, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + key_buffer_length, + bits + ); + + if( status != PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ) + return( status ); +#endif + + +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + + /* Fell through, meaning no accelerator supports this operation */ + return( psa_import_key_into_slot( attributes, + data, data_length, + key_buffer, key_buffer_size, + key_buffer_length, bits ) ); + /* Add cases for opaque driver here */ +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) + +#if (defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) ) + case 0x7fffff: + return( mbedtls_test_opaque_import_key + (attributes, + data, + data_length, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + key_buffer_length, + bits + )); +#endif + + +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + default: + (void)status; + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + } + +} + +static inline psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_export_key( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + uint8_t *data, size_t data_size, size_t *data_length ) + +{ + + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + psa_key_location_t location = PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION( + psa_get_key_lifetime( attributes ) ); + + /* Try dynamically-registered SE interface first */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C) + const psa_drv_se_t *drv; + psa_drv_se_context_t *drv_context; + + if( psa_get_se_driver( psa_get_key_lifetime(attributes), &drv, &drv_context ) ) + { + if( ( drv->key_management == NULL ) || + ( drv->key_management->p_export == NULL ) ) + { + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + } + + return( drv->key_management->p_export( + drv_context, + *( (psa_key_slot_number_t *)key_buffer ), + data, data_size, data_length ) ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C */ + + switch( location ) + { + case PSA_KEY_LOCATION_LOCAL_STORAGE: + return( psa_export_key_internal( attributes, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + data, + data_size, + data_length ) ); + + /* Add cases for opaque driver here */ +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) + +#if (defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) ) + case 0x7fffff: + return( mbedtls_test_opaque_export_key + (attributes, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + data, + data_size, + data_length + )); +#endif + + +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + default: + /* Key is declared with a lifetime not known to us */ + return( status ); + } + +} + +static inline psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_copy_key( + psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *source_key, size_t source_key_length, + uint8_t *target_key_buffer, size_t target_key_buffer_size, + size_t *target_key_buffer_length ) +{ + + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_location_t location = + PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION( psa_get_key_lifetime(attributes) ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C) + const psa_drv_se_t *drv; + psa_drv_se_context_t *drv_context; + + if( psa_get_se_driver( psa_get_key_lifetime(attributes), &drv, &drv_context ) ) + { + /* Copying to a secure element is not implemented yet. */ + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C */ + + switch( location ) + { +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) + +#if (defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) ) + case 0x7fffff: + return( mbedtls_test_opaque_copy_key + (attributes, + source_key, + source_key_length, + target_key_buffer, + target_key_buffer_size, + target_key_buffer_length + )); +#endif + + +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + default: + (void)source_key; + (void)source_key_length; + (void)target_key_buffer; + (void)target_key_buffer_size; + (void)target_key_buffer_length; + status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + } + return( status ); + +} + +/* + * Cipher functions + */ +static inline psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_cipher_encrypt( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *iv, + size_t iv_length, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length, + uint8_t *output, + size_t output_size, + size_t *output_length ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_location_t location = + PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION( psa_get_key_lifetime(attributes) ); + + switch( location ) + { + case PSA_KEY_LOCATION_LOCAL_STORAGE: + /* Key is stored in the slot in export representation, so + * cycle through all known transparent accelerators */ +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + status = mbedtls_test_transparent_cipher_encrypt( attributes, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + alg, + iv, + iv_length, + input, + input_length, + output, + output_size, + output_length ); + /* Declared with fallback == true */ + if( status != PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ) + return( status ); +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_CIPHER) + return( mbedtls_psa_cipher_encrypt( attributes, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + alg, + iv, + iv_length, + input, + input_length, + output, + output_size, + output_length ) ); +#else + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_CIPHER */ + + /* Add cases for opaque driver here */ +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + case PSA_CRYPTO_TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION: + return( mbedtls_test_opaque_cipher_encrypt( attributes, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + alg, + iv, + iv_length, + input, + input_length, + output, + output_size, + output_length ) ); +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + + default: + /* Key is declared with a lifetime not known to us */ + (void)status; + (void)key_buffer; + (void)key_buffer_size; + (void)alg; + (void)iv; + (void)iv_length; + (void)input; + (void)input_length; + (void)output; + (void)output_size; + (void)output_length; + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + } +} + +static inline psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_cipher_decrypt( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length, + uint8_t *output, + size_t output_size, + size_t *output_length ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_location_t location = + PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION( psa_get_key_lifetime(attributes) ); + + switch( location ) + { + case PSA_KEY_LOCATION_LOCAL_STORAGE: + /* Key is stored in the slot in export representation, so + * cycle through all known transparent accelerators */ +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + status = mbedtls_test_transparent_cipher_decrypt( attributes, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + alg, + input, + input_length, + output, + output_size, + output_length ); + /* Declared with fallback == true */ + if( status != PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ) + return( status ); +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_CIPHER) + return( mbedtls_psa_cipher_decrypt( attributes, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + alg, + input, + input_length, + output, + output_size, + output_length ) ); +#else + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_CIPHER */ + + /* Add cases for opaque driver here */ +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + case PSA_CRYPTO_TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION: + return( mbedtls_test_opaque_cipher_decrypt( attributes, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + alg, + input, + input_length, + output, + output_size, + output_length ) ); +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + + default: + /* Key is declared with a lifetime not known to us */ + (void)status; + (void)key_buffer; + (void)key_buffer_size; + (void)alg; + (void)input; + (void)input_length; + (void)output; + (void)output_size; + (void)output_length; + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + } +} + +static inline psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_cipher_encrypt_setup( + psa_cipher_operation_t *operation, + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_location_t location = + PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION( psa_get_key_lifetime(attributes) ); + + switch( location ) + { + case PSA_KEY_LOCATION_LOCAL_STORAGE: + /* Key is stored in the slot in export representation, so + * cycle through all known transparent accelerators */ +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + status = mbedtls_test_transparent_cipher_encrypt_setup( + &operation->ctx.transparent_test_driver_ctx, + attributes, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + alg ); + /* Declared with fallback == true */ + if( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) + operation->id = MBEDTLS_TEST_TRANSPARENT_DRIVER_ID; + + if( status != PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ) + return( status ); +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_CIPHER) + /* Fell through, meaning no accelerator supports this operation */ + status = mbedtls_psa_cipher_encrypt_setup( &operation->ctx.mbedtls_ctx, + attributes, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + alg ); + if( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) + operation->id = PSA_CRYPTO_MBED_TLS_DRIVER_ID; + + if( status != PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ) + return( status ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_CIPHER */ + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + + /* Add cases for opaque driver here */ +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + case PSA_CRYPTO_TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION: + status = mbedtls_test_opaque_cipher_encrypt_setup( + &operation->ctx.opaque_test_driver_ctx, + attributes, + key_buffer, key_buffer_size, + alg ); + + if( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) + operation->id = MBEDTLS_TEST_OPAQUE_DRIVER_ID; + + return( status ); +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + default: + /* Key is declared with a lifetime not known to us */ + (void)status; + (void)operation; + (void)key_buffer; + (void)key_buffer_size; + (void)alg; + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + } +} + +static inline psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_cipher_decrypt_setup( + psa_cipher_operation_t *operation, + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + psa_key_location_t location = + PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION( psa_get_key_lifetime(attributes) ); + + switch( location ) + { + case PSA_KEY_LOCATION_LOCAL_STORAGE: + /* Key is stored in the slot in export representation, so + * cycle through all known transparent accelerators */ +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + status = mbedtls_test_transparent_cipher_decrypt_setup( + &operation->ctx.transparent_test_driver_ctx, + attributes, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + alg ); + /* Declared with fallback == true */ + if( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) + operation->id = MBEDTLS_TEST_TRANSPARENT_DRIVER_ID; + + if( status != PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ) + return( status ); +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_CIPHER) + /* Fell through, meaning no accelerator supports this operation */ + status = mbedtls_psa_cipher_decrypt_setup( &operation->ctx.mbedtls_ctx, + attributes, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + alg ); + if( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) + operation->id = PSA_CRYPTO_MBED_TLS_DRIVER_ID; + + return( status ); +#else /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_CIPHER */ + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_CIPHER */ + + /* Add cases for opaque driver here */ +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + case PSA_CRYPTO_TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION: + status = mbedtls_test_opaque_cipher_decrypt_setup( + &operation->ctx.opaque_test_driver_ctx, + attributes, + key_buffer, key_buffer_size, + alg ); + + if( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) + operation->id = MBEDTLS_TEST_OPAQUE_DRIVER_ID; + + return( status ); +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + default: + /* Key is declared with a lifetime not known to us */ + (void)status; + (void)operation; + (void)key_buffer; + (void)key_buffer_size; + (void)alg; + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + } +} + +static inline psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_cipher_set_iv( + psa_cipher_operation_t *operation, + const uint8_t *iv, + size_t iv_length ) +{ + switch( operation->id ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_CIPHER) + case PSA_CRYPTO_MBED_TLS_DRIVER_ID: + return( mbedtls_psa_cipher_set_iv( &operation->ctx.mbedtls_ctx, + iv, + iv_length ) ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_CIPHER */ + +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + case MBEDTLS_TEST_TRANSPARENT_DRIVER_ID: + return( mbedtls_test_transparent_cipher_set_iv( + &operation->ctx.transparent_test_driver_ctx, + iv, iv_length ) ); + + case MBEDTLS_TEST_OPAQUE_DRIVER_ID: + return( mbedtls_test_opaque_cipher_set_iv( + &operation->ctx.opaque_test_driver_ctx, + iv, iv_length ) ); +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + } + + (void)iv; + (void)iv_length; + + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); +} + +static inline psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_cipher_update( + psa_cipher_operation_t *operation, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length, + uint8_t *output, + size_t output_size, + size_t *output_length ) +{ + switch( operation->id ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_CIPHER) + case PSA_CRYPTO_MBED_TLS_DRIVER_ID: + return( mbedtls_psa_cipher_update( &operation->ctx.mbedtls_ctx, + input, + input_length, + output, + output_size, + output_length ) ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_CIPHER */ + +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + case MBEDTLS_TEST_TRANSPARENT_DRIVER_ID: + return( mbedtls_test_transparent_cipher_update( + &operation->ctx.transparent_test_driver_ctx, + input, input_length, + output, output_size, output_length ) ); + + case MBEDTLS_TEST_OPAQUE_DRIVER_ID: + return( mbedtls_test_opaque_cipher_update( + &operation->ctx.opaque_test_driver_ctx, + input, input_length, + output, output_size, output_length ) ); +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + } + + (void)input; + (void)input_length; + (void)output; + (void)output_size; + (void)output_length; + + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); +} + +static inline psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_cipher_finish( + psa_cipher_operation_t *operation, + uint8_t *output, + size_t output_size, + size_t *output_length ) +{ + switch( operation->id ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_CIPHER) + case PSA_CRYPTO_MBED_TLS_DRIVER_ID: + return( mbedtls_psa_cipher_finish( &operation->ctx.mbedtls_ctx, + output, + output_size, + output_length ) ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_CIPHER */ + +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + case MBEDTLS_TEST_TRANSPARENT_DRIVER_ID: + return( mbedtls_test_transparent_cipher_finish( + &operation->ctx.transparent_test_driver_ctx, + output, output_size, output_length ) ); + + case MBEDTLS_TEST_OPAQUE_DRIVER_ID: + return( mbedtls_test_opaque_cipher_finish( + &operation->ctx.opaque_test_driver_ctx, + output, output_size, output_length ) ); +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + } + + (void)output; + (void)output_size; + (void)output_length; + + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); +} + +static inline psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_cipher_abort( + psa_cipher_operation_t *operation ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + switch( operation->id ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_CIPHER) + case PSA_CRYPTO_MBED_TLS_DRIVER_ID: + return( mbedtls_psa_cipher_abort( &operation->ctx.mbedtls_ctx ) ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_CIPHER */ + +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + case MBEDTLS_TEST_TRANSPARENT_DRIVER_ID: + status = mbedtls_test_transparent_cipher_abort( + &operation->ctx.transparent_test_driver_ctx ); + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( + &operation->ctx.transparent_test_driver_ctx, + sizeof( operation->ctx.transparent_test_driver_ctx ) ); + return( status ); + + case MBEDTLS_TEST_OPAQUE_DRIVER_ID: + status = mbedtls_test_opaque_cipher_abort( + &operation->ctx.opaque_test_driver_ctx ); + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( + &operation->ctx.opaque_test_driver_ctx, + sizeof( operation->ctx.opaque_test_driver_ctx ) ); + return( status ); +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + } + + (void)status; + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); +} + +/* + * Hashing functions + */ +static inline psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_hash_compute( + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length, + uint8_t *hash, + size_t hash_size, + size_t *hash_length) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + /* Try accelerators first */ +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + status = mbedtls_test_transparent_hash_compute( + alg, input, input_length, hash, hash_size, hash_length ); + if( status != PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ) + return( status ); +#endif + + /* If software fallback is compiled in, try fallback */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_HASH) + status = mbedtls_psa_hash_compute( alg, input, input_length, + hash, hash_size, hash_length ); + if( status != PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ) + return( status ); +#endif + (void) status; + (void) alg; + (void) input; + (void) input_length; + (void) hash; + (void) hash_size; + (void) hash_length; + + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); +} + +static inline psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_hash_setup( + psa_hash_operation_t *operation, + psa_algorithm_t alg ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + /* Try setup on accelerators first */ +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + status = mbedtls_test_transparent_hash_setup( + &operation->ctx.test_driver_ctx, alg ); + if( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) + operation->id = MBEDTLS_TEST_TRANSPARENT_DRIVER_ID; + + if( status != PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ) + return( status ); +#endif + + /* If software fallback is compiled in, try fallback */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_HASH) + status = mbedtls_psa_hash_setup( &operation->ctx.mbedtls_ctx, alg ); + if( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) + operation->id = PSA_CRYPTO_MBED_TLS_DRIVER_ID; + + if( status != PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ) + return( status ); +#endif + /* Nothing left to try if we fall through here */ + (void) status; + (void) operation; + (void) alg; + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); +} + +static inline psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_hash_clone( + const psa_hash_operation_t *source_operation, + psa_hash_operation_t *target_operation ) +{ + switch( source_operation->id ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_HASH) + case PSA_CRYPTO_MBED_TLS_DRIVER_ID: + target_operation->id = PSA_CRYPTO_MBED_TLS_DRIVER_ID; + return( mbedtls_psa_hash_clone( &source_operation->ctx.mbedtls_ctx, + &target_operation->ctx.mbedtls_ctx ) ); +#endif +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + case MBEDTLS_TEST_TRANSPARENT_DRIVER_ID: + target_operation->id = MBEDTLS_TEST_TRANSPARENT_DRIVER_ID; + return( mbedtls_test_transparent_hash_clone( + &source_operation->ctx.test_driver_ctx, + &target_operation->ctx.test_driver_ctx ) ); +#endif + default: + (void) target_operation; + return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE ); + } +} + +static inline psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_hash_update( + psa_hash_operation_t *operation, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length ) +{ + switch( operation->id ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_HASH) + case PSA_CRYPTO_MBED_TLS_DRIVER_ID: + return( mbedtls_psa_hash_update( &operation->ctx.mbedtls_ctx, + input, input_length ) ); +#endif +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + case MBEDTLS_TEST_TRANSPARENT_DRIVER_ID: + return( mbedtls_test_transparent_hash_update( + &operation->ctx.test_driver_ctx, + input, input_length ) ); +#endif + default: + (void) input; + (void) input_length; + return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE ); + } +} + +static inline psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_hash_finish( + psa_hash_operation_t *operation, + uint8_t *hash, + size_t hash_size, + size_t *hash_length ) +{ + switch( operation->id ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_HASH) + case PSA_CRYPTO_MBED_TLS_DRIVER_ID: + return( mbedtls_psa_hash_finish( &operation->ctx.mbedtls_ctx, + hash, hash_size, hash_length ) ); +#endif +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + case MBEDTLS_TEST_TRANSPARENT_DRIVER_ID: + return( mbedtls_test_transparent_hash_finish( + &operation->ctx.test_driver_ctx, + hash, hash_size, hash_length ) ); +#endif + default: + (void) hash; + (void) hash_size; + (void) hash_length; + return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE ); + } +} + +static inline psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_hash_abort( + psa_hash_operation_t *operation ) +{ + switch( operation->id ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_HASH) + case PSA_CRYPTO_MBED_TLS_DRIVER_ID: + return( mbedtls_psa_hash_abort( &operation->ctx.mbedtls_ctx ) ); +#endif +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + case MBEDTLS_TEST_TRANSPARENT_DRIVER_ID: + return( mbedtls_test_transparent_hash_abort( + &operation->ctx.test_driver_ctx ) ); +#endif + default: + return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE ); + } +} + +static inline psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_aead_encrypt( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *nonce, size_t nonce_length, + const uint8_t *additional_data, size_t additional_data_length, + const uint8_t *plaintext, size_t plaintext_length, + uint8_t *ciphertext, size_t ciphertext_size, size_t *ciphertext_length ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_location_t location = + PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION( psa_get_key_lifetime(attributes) ); + + switch( location ) + { + case PSA_KEY_LOCATION_LOCAL_STORAGE: + /* Key is stored in the slot in export representation, so + * cycle through all known transparent accelerators */ + +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + status = mbedtls_test_transparent_aead_encrypt( + attributes, key_buffer, key_buffer_size, + alg, + nonce, nonce_length, + additional_data, additional_data_length, + plaintext, plaintext_length, + ciphertext, ciphertext_size, ciphertext_length ); + /* Declared with fallback == true */ + if( status != PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ) + return( status ); +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + + /* Fell through, meaning no accelerator supports this operation */ + return( mbedtls_psa_aead_encrypt( + attributes, key_buffer, key_buffer_size, + alg, + nonce, nonce_length, + additional_data, additional_data_length, + plaintext, plaintext_length, + ciphertext, ciphertext_size, ciphertext_length ) ); + + /* Add cases for opaque driver here */ + + default: + /* Key is declared with a lifetime not known to us */ + (void)status; + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + } +} + +static inline psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_aead_decrypt( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *nonce, size_t nonce_length, + const uint8_t *additional_data, size_t additional_data_length, + const uint8_t *ciphertext, size_t ciphertext_length, + uint8_t *plaintext, size_t plaintext_size, size_t *plaintext_length ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_location_t location = + PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION( psa_get_key_lifetime(attributes) ); + + switch( location ) + { + case PSA_KEY_LOCATION_LOCAL_STORAGE: + /* Key is stored in the slot in export representation, so + * cycle through all known transparent accelerators */ + +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + status = mbedtls_test_transparent_aead_decrypt( + attributes, key_buffer, key_buffer_size, + alg, + nonce, nonce_length, + additional_data, additional_data_length, + ciphertext, ciphertext_length, + plaintext, plaintext_size, plaintext_length ); + /* Declared with fallback == true */ + if( status != PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ) + return( status ); +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + + /* Fell through, meaning no accelerator supports this operation */ + return( mbedtls_psa_aead_decrypt( + attributes, key_buffer, key_buffer_size, + alg, + nonce, nonce_length, + additional_data, additional_data_length, + ciphertext, ciphertext_length, + plaintext, plaintext_size, plaintext_length ) ); + + /* Add cases for opaque driver here */ + + default: + /* Key is declared with a lifetime not known to us */ + (void)status; + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + } +} + +static inline psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_aead_encrypt_setup( + psa_aead_operation_t *operation, + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_location_t location = + PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION( psa_get_key_lifetime(attributes) ); + + switch( location ) + { + case PSA_KEY_LOCATION_LOCAL_STORAGE: + /* Key is stored in the slot in export representation, so + * cycle through all known transparent accelerators */ + +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + operation->id = MBEDTLS_TEST_TRANSPARENT_DRIVER_ID; + status = mbedtls_test_transparent_aead_encrypt_setup( + &operation->ctx.transparent_test_driver_ctx, + attributes, key_buffer, key_buffer_size, + alg ); + + /* Declared with fallback == true */ + if( status != PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ) + return( status ); +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + + /* Fell through, meaning no accelerator supports this operation */ + operation->id = PSA_CRYPTO_MBED_TLS_DRIVER_ID; + status = mbedtls_psa_aead_encrypt_setup( + &operation->ctx.mbedtls_ctx, attributes, + key_buffer, key_buffer_size, + alg ); + + return( status ); + + /* Add cases for opaque driver here */ + + default: + /* Key is declared with a lifetime not known to us */ + (void)status; + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + } +} + +static inline psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_aead_decrypt_setup( + psa_aead_operation_t *operation, + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_location_t location = + PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION( psa_get_key_lifetime(attributes) ); + + switch( location ) + { + case PSA_KEY_LOCATION_LOCAL_STORAGE: + /* Key is stored in the slot in export representation, so + * cycle through all known transparent accelerators */ + +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + operation->id = MBEDTLS_TEST_TRANSPARENT_DRIVER_ID; + status = mbedtls_test_transparent_aead_decrypt_setup( + &operation->ctx.transparent_test_driver_ctx, + attributes, + key_buffer, key_buffer_size, + alg ); + + /* Declared with fallback == true */ + if( status != PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ) + return( status ); +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + + /* Fell through, meaning no accelerator supports this operation */ + operation->id = PSA_CRYPTO_MBED_TLS_DRIVER_ID; + status = mbedtls_psa_aead_decrypt_setup( + &operation->ctx.mbedtls_ctx, + attributes, + key_buffer, key_buffer_size, + alg ); + + return( status ); + + /* Add cases for opaque driver here */ + + default: + /* Key is declared with a lifetime not known to us */ + (void)status; + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + } +} + +static inline psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_aead_set_nonce( + psa_aead_operation_t *operation, + const uint8_t *nonce, + size_t nonce_length ) +{ + switch( operation->id ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_AEAD) + case PSA_CRYPTO_MBED_TLS_DRIVER_ID: + return( mbedtls_psa_aead_set_nonce( &operation->ctx.mbedtls_ctx, + nonce, + nonce_length ) ); + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_AEAD */ + +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + case MBEDTLS_TEST_TRANSPARENT_DRIVER_ID: + return( mbedtls_test_transparent_aead_set_nonce( + &operation->ctx.transparent_test_driver_ctx, + nonce, nonce_length ) ); + + /* Add cases for opaque driver here */ + +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + } + + (void)nonce; + (void)nonce_length; + + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); +} + +static inline psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_aead_set_lengths( + psa_aead_operation_t *operation, + size_t ad_length, + size_t plaintext_length ) +{ + switch( operation->id ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_AEAD) + case PSA_CRYPTO_MBED_TLS_DRIVER_ID: + return( mbedtls_psa_aead_set_lengths( &operation->ctx.mbedtls_ctx, + ad_length, + plaintext_length ) ); + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_AEAD */ + +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + case MBEDTLS_TEST_TRANSPARENT_DRIVER_ID: + return( mbedtls_test_transparent_aead_set_lengths( + &operation->ctx.transparent_test_driver_ctx, + ad_length, plaintext_length ) ); + + /* Add cases for opaque driver here */ + +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + } + + (void)ad_length; + (void)plaintext_length; + + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); +} + +static inline psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_aead_update_ad( + psa_aead_operation_t *operation, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length ) +{ + switch( operation->id ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_AEAD) + case PSA_CRYPTO_MBED_TLS_DRIVER_ID: + return( mbedtls_psa_aead_update_ad( &operation->ctx.mbedtls_ctx, + input, + input_length ) ); + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_AEAD */ + +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + case MBEDTLS_TEST_TRANSPARENT_DRIVER_ID: + return( mbedtls_test_transparent_aead_update_ad( + &operation->ctx.transparent_test_driver_ctx, + input, input_length ) ); + + /* Add cases for opaque driver here */ + +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + } + + (void)input; + (void)input_length; + + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); +} + +static inline psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_aead_update( + psa_aead_operation_t *operation, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length, + uint8_t *output, + size_t output_size, + size_t *output_length ) +{ + switch( operation->id ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_AEAD) + case PSA_CRYPTO_MBED_TLS_DRIVER_ID: + return( mbedtls_psa_aead_update( &operation->ctx.mbedtls_ctx, + input, input_length, + output, output_size, + output_length ) ); + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_AEAD */ + +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + case MBEDTLS_TEST_TRANSPARENT_DRIVER_ID: + return( mbedtls_test_transparent_aead_update( + &operation->ctx.transparent_test_driver_ctx, + input, input_length, output, output_size, + output_length ) ); + + /* Add cases for opaque driver here */ + +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + } + + (void)input; + (void)input_length; + (void)output; + (void)output_size; + (void)output_length; + + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); +} + +static inline psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_aead_finish( + psa_aead_operation_t *operation, + uint8_t *ciphertext, + size_t ciphertext_size, + size_t *ciphertext_length, + uint8_t *tag, + size_t tag_size, + size_t *tag_length ) +{ + switch( operation->id ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_AEAD) + case PSA_CRYPTO_MBED_TLS_DRIVER_ID: + return( mbedtls_psa_aead_finish( &operation->ctx.mbedtls_ctx, + ciphertext, + ciphertext_size, + ciphertext_length, tag, + tag_size, tag_length ) ); + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_AEAD */ + +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + case MBEDTLS_TEST_TRANSPARENT_DRIVER_ID: + return( mbedtls_test_transparent_aead_finish( + &operation->ctx.transparent_test_driver_ctx, + ciphertext, ciphertext_size, + ciphertext_length, tag, tag_size, tag_length ) ); + + /* Add cases for opaque driver here */ + +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + } + + (void)ciphertext; + (void)ciphertext_size; + (void)ciphertext_length; + (void)tag; + (void)tag_size; + (void)tag_length; + + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); +} + +static inline psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_aead_verify( + psa_aead_operation_t *operation, + uint8_t *plaintext, + size_t plaintext_size, + size_t *plaintext_length, + const uint8_t *tag, + size_t tag_length ) +{ + switch( operation->id ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_AEAD) + case PSA_CRYPTO_MBED_TLS_DRIVER_ID: + { + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + uint8_t check_tag[PSA_AEAD_TAG_MAX_SIZE]; + size_t check_tag_length; + + status = mbedtls_psa_aead_finish( &operation->ctx.mbedtls_ctx, + plaintext, + plaintext_size, + plaintext_length, + check_tag, + sizeof( check_tag ), + &check_tag_length ); + + if( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) + { + if( tag_length != check_tag_length || + mbedtls_ct_memcmp( tag, check_tag, tag_length ) + != 0 ) + status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE; + } + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( check_tag, sizeof( check_tag ) ); + + return( status ); + } + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_AEAD */ + +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + case MBEDTLS_TEST_TRANSPARENT_DRIVER_ID: + return( mbedtls_test_transparent_aead_verify( + &operation->ctx.transparent_test_driver_ctx, + plaintext, plaintext_size, + plaintext_length, tag, tag_length ) ); + + /* Add cases for opaque driver here */ + +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + } + + (void)plaintext; + (void)plaintext_size; + (void)plaintext_length; + (void)tag; + (void)tag_length; + + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); +} + +static inline psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_aead_abort( + psa_aead_operation_t *operation ) +{ + switch( operation->id ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_AEAD) + case PSA_CRYPTO_MBED_TLS_DRIVER_ID: + return( mbedtls_psa_aead_abort( &operation->ctx.mbedtls_ctx ) ); + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_AEAD */ + +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + case MBEDTLS_TEST_TRANSPARENT_DRIVER_ID: + return( mbedtls_test_transparent_aead_abort( + &operation->ctx.transparent_test_driver_ctx ) ); + + /* Add cases for opaque driver here */ + +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + } + + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); +} + +/* + * MAC functions + */ +static inline psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_mac_compute( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length, + uint8_t *mac, + size_t mac_size, + size_t *mac_length ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_location_t location = + PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION( psa_get_key_lifetime(attributes) ); + + switch( location ) + { + case PSA_KEY_LOCATION_LOCAL_STORAGE: + /* Key is stored in the slot in export representation, so + * cycle through all known transparent accelerators */ +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + status = mbedtls_test_transparent_mac_compute( + attributes, key_buffer, key_buffer_size, alg, + input, input_length, + mac, mac_size, mac_length ); + /* Declared with fallback == true */ + if( status != PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ) + return( status ); +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_MAC) + /* Fell through, meaning no accelerator supports this operation */ + status = mbedtls_psa_mac_compute( + attributes, key_buffer, key_buffer_size, alg, + input, input_length, + mac, mac_size, mac_length ); + if( status != PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ) + return( status ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_MAC */ + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + + /* Add cases for opaque driver here */ +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + case PSA_CRYPTO_TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION: + status = mbedtls_test_opaque_mac_compute( + attributes, key_buffer, key_buffer_size, alg, + input, input_length, + mac, mac_size, mac_length ); + return( status ); +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + default: + /* Key is declared with a lifetime not known to us */ + (void) key_buffer; + (void) key_buffer_size; + (void) alg; + (void) input; + (void) input_length; + (void) mac; + (void) mac_size; + (void) mac_length; + (void) status; + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + } +} + +static inline psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_mac_sign_setup( + psa_mac_operation_t *operation, + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_location_t location = + PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION( psa_get_key_lifetime(attributes) ); + + switch( location ) + { + case PSA_KEY_LOCATION_LOCAL_STORAGE: + /* Key is stored in the slot in export representation, so + * cycle through all known transparent accelerators */ +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + status = mbedtls_test_transparent_mac_sign_setup( + &operation->ctx.transparent_test_driver_ctx, + attributes, + key_buffer, key_buffer_size, + alg ); + /* Declared with fallback == true */ + if( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) + operation->id = MBEDTLS_TEST_TRANSPARENT_DRIVER_ID; + + if( status != PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ) + return( status ); +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_MAC) + /* Fell through, meaning no accelerator supports this operation */ + status = mbedtls_psa_mac_sign_setup( &operation->ctx.mbedtls_ctx, + attributes, + key_buffer, key_buffer_size, + alg ); + if( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) + operation->id = PSA_CRYPTO_MBED_TLS_DRIVER_ID; + + if( status != PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ) + return( status ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_MAC */ + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + + /* Add cases for opaque driver here */ +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + case PSA_CRYPTO_TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION: + status = mbedtls_test_opaque_mac_sign_setup( + &operation->ctx.opaque_test_driver_ctx, + attributes, + key_buffer, key_buffer_size, + alg ); + + if( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) + operation->id = MBEDTLS_TEST_OPAQUE_DRIVER_ID; + + return( status ); +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + default: + /* Key is declared with a lifetime not known to us */ + (void) status; + (void) operation; + (void) key_buffer; + (void) key_buffer_size; + (void) alg; + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + } +} + +static inline psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_mac_verify_setup( + psa_mac_operation_t *operation, + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_location_t location = + PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION( psa_get_key_lifetime(attributes) ); + + switch( location ) + { + case PSA_KEY_LOCATION_LOCAL_STORAGE: + /* Key is stored in the slot in export representation, so + * cycle through all known transparent accelerators */ +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + status = mbedtls_test_transparent_mac_verify_setup( + &operation->ctx.transparent_test_driver_ctx, + attributes, + key_buffer, key_buffer_size, + alg ); + /* Declared with fallback == true */ + if( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) + operation->id = MBEDTLS_TEST_TRANSPARENT_DRIVER_ID; + + if( status != PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ) + return( status ); +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_MAC) + /* Fell through, meaning no accelerator supports this operation */ + status = mbedtls_psa_mac_verify_setup( &operation->ctx.mbedtls_ctx, + attributes, + key_buffer, key_buffer_size, + alg ); + if( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) + operation->id = PSA_CRYPTO_MBED_TLS_DRIVER_ID; + + if( status != PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ) + return( status ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_MAC */ + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + + /* Add cases for opaque driver here */ +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + case PSA_CRYPTO_TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION: + status = mbedtls_test_opaque_mac_verify_setup( + &operation->ctx.opaque_test_driver_ctx, + attributes, + key_buffer, key_buffer_size, + alg ); + + if( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) + operation->id = MBEDTLS_TEST_OPAQUE_DRIVER_ID; + + return( status ); +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + default: + /* Key is declared with a lifetime not known to us */ + (void) status; + (void) operation; + (void) key_buffer; + (void) key_buffer_size; + (void) alg; + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + } +} + +static inline psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_mac_update( + psa_mac_operation_t *operation, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length ) +{ + switch( operation->id ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_MAC) + case PSA_CRYPTO_MBED_TLS_DRIVER_ID: + return( mbedtls_psa_mac_update( &operation->ctx.mbedtls_ctx, + input, input_length ) ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_MAC */ + +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + case MBEDTLS_TEST_TRANSPARENT_DRIVER_ID: + return( mbedtls_test_transparent_mac_update( + &operation->ctx.transparent_test_driver_ctx, + input, input_length ) ); + + case MBEDTLS_TEST_OPAQUE_DRIVER_ID: + return( mbedtls_test_opaque_mac_update( + &operation->ctx.opaque_test_driver_ctx, + input, input_length ) ); +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + default: + (void) input; + (void) input_length; + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + } +} + +static inline psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_mac_sign_finish( + psa_mac_operation_t *operation, + uint8_t *mac, + size_t mac_size, + size_t *mac_length ) +{ + switch( operation->id ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_MAC) + case PSA_CRYPTO_MBED_TLS_DRIVER_ID: + return( mbedtls_psa_mac_sign_finish( &operation->ctx.mbedtls_ctx, + mac, mac_size, mac_length ) ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_MAC */ + +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + case MBEDTLS_TEST_TRANSPARENT_DRIVER_ID: + return( mbedtls_test_transparent_mac_sign_finish( + &operation->ctx.transparent_test_driver_ctx, + mac, mac_size, mac_length ) ); + + case MBEDTLS_TEST_OPAQUE_DRIVER_ID: + return( mbedtls_test_opaque_mac_sign_finish( + &operation->ctx.opaque_test_driver_ctx, + mac, mac_size, mac_length ) ); +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + default: + (void) mac; + (void) mac_size; + (void) mac_length; + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + } +} + +static inline psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_mac_verify_finish( + psa_mac_operation_t *operation, + const uint8_t *mac, + size_t mac_length ) +{ + switch( operation->id ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_MAC) + case PSA_CRYPTO_MBED_TLS_DRIVER_ID: + return( mbedtls_psa_mac_verify_finish( &operation->ctx.mbedtls_ctx, + mac, mac_length ) ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_MAC */ + +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + case MBEDTLS_TEST_TRANSPARENT_DRIVER_ID: + return( mbedtls_test_transparent_mac_verify_finish( + &operation->ctx.transparent_test_driver_ctx, + mac, mac_length ) ); + + case MBEDTLS_TEST_OPAQUE_DRIVER_ID: + return( mbedtls_test_opaque_mac_verify_finish( + &operation->ctx.opaque_test_driver_ctx, + mac, mac_length ) ); +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + default: + (void) mac; + (void) mac_length; + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + } +} + +static inline psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_mac_abort( + psa_mac_operation_t *operation ) +{ + switch( operation->id ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_MAC) + case PSA_CRYPTO_MBED_TLS_DRIVER_ID: + return( mbedtls_psa_mac_abort( &operation->ctx.mbedtls_ctx ) ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_MAC */ + +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + case MBEDTLS_TEST_TRANSPARENT_DRIVER_ID: + return( mbedtls_test_transparent_mac_abort( + &operation->ctx.transparent_test_driver_ctx ) ); + case MBEDTLS_TEST_OPAQUE_DRIVER_ID: + return( mbedtls_test_opaque_mac_abort( + &operation->ctx.opaque_test_driver_ctx ) ); +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + default: + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + } +} + +/* + * Asymmetric cryptography + */ +static inline psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_asymmetric_encrypt( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, const uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, psa_algorithm_t alg, const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length, const uint8_t *salt, size_t salt_length, + uint8_t *output, size_t output_size, size_t *output_length ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_location_t location = + PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION( psa_get_key_lifetime(attributes) ); + + switch( location ) + { + case PSA_KEY_LOCATION_LOCAL_STORAGE: + /* Key is stored in the slot in export representation, so + * cycle through all known transparent accelerators */ +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + status = mbedtls_test_transparent_asymmetric_encrypt( attributes, + key_buffer, key_buffer_size, alg, input, input_length, + salt, salt_length, output, output_size, + output_length ); + /* Declared with fallback == true */ + if( status != PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ) + return( status ); +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + return( mbedtls_psa_asymmetric_encrypt( attributes, + key_buffer, key_buffer_size, alg, input, input_length, + salt, salt_length, output, output_size, output_length ) + ); + /* Add cases for opaque driver here */ +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + case PSA_CRYPTO_TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION: + return( mbedtls_test_opaque_asymmetric_encrypt( attributes, + key_buffer, key_buffer_size, alg, input, input_length, + salt, salt_length, output, output_size, output_length ) + ); +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + + default: + /* Key is declared with a lifetime not known to us */ + (void)status; + (void)key_buffer; + (void)key_buffer_size; + (void)alg; + (void)input; + (void)input_length; + (void)salt; + (void)salt_length; + (void)output; + (void)output_size; + (void)output_length; + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + } +} + +static inline psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_asymmetric_decrypt( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, const uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, psa_algorithm_t alg, const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length, const uint8_t *salt, size_t salt_length, + uint8_t *output, size_t output_size, size_t *output_length ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_location_t location = + PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION( psa_get_key_lifetime(attributes) ); + + switch( location ) + { + case PSA_KEY_LOCATION_LOCAL_STORAGE: + /* Key is stored in the slot in export representation, so + * cycle through all known transparent accelerators */ +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + status = mbedtls_test_transparent_asymmetric_decrypt( attributes, + key_buffer, key_buffer_size, alg, input, input_length, + salt, salt_length, output, output_size, + output_length ); + /* Declared with fallback == true */ + if( status != PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ) + return( status ); +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + return( mbedtls_psa_asymmetric_decrypt( attributes, + key_buffer, key_buffer_size, alg,input, input_length, + salt, salt_length, output, output_size, + output_length ) ); + /* Add cases for opaque driver here */ +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + case PSA_CRYPTO_TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION: + return( mbedtls_test_opaque_asymmetric_decrypt( attributes, + key_buffer, key_buffer_size, alg, input, input_length, + salt, salt_length, output, output_size, + output_length ) ); +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + + default: + /* Key is declared with a lifetime not known to us */ + (void)status; + (void)key_buffer; + (void)key_buffer_size; + (void)alg; + (void)input; + (void)input_length; + (void)salt; + (void)salt_length; + (void)output; + (void)output_size; + (void)output_length; + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + } +} + +static inline psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_key_agreement( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *peer_key, + size_t peer_key_length, + uint8_t *shared_secret, + size_t shared_secret_size, + size_t *shared_secret_length + ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_location_t location = + PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION( psa_get_key_lifetime(attributes) ); + + switch( location ) + { + case PSA_KEY_LOCATION_LOCAL_STORAGE: + /* Key is stored in the slot in export representation, so + * cycle through all known transparent accelerators */ +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + status = + mbedtls_test_transparent_key_agreement( attributes, + key_buffer, key_buffer_size, alg, peer_key, + peer_key_length, shared_secret, shared_secret_size, + shared_secret_length ); + if( status != PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ) + return( status ); +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_P256M_DRIVER_ENABLED) + if( PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC( psa_get_key_type(attributes) ) && + PSA_ALG_IS_ECDH(alg) && + PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_GET_FAMILY(psa_get_key_type(attributes)) == PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1 && + psa_get_key_bits(attributes) == 256 ) + { + status = p256_transparent_key_agreement( attributes, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + alg, + peer_key, + peer_key_length, + shared_secret, + shared_secret_size, + shared_secret_length ); + if( status != PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED) + return( status ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_P256M_DRIVER_ENABLED */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + + /* Software Fallback */ + status = psa_key_agreement_raw_builtin( attributes, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + alg, + peer_key, + peer_key_length, + shared_secret, + shared_secret_size, + shared_secret_length ); + return( status ); +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + case PSA_CRYPTO_TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION: + return( mbedtls_test_opaque_key_agreement( attributes, + key_buffer, key_buffer_size, alg, peer_key, + peer_key_length, shared_secret, shared_secret_size, + shared_secret_length ) ); +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + + default: + (void) attributes; + (void) key_buffer; + (void) key_buffer_size; + (void) peer_key; + (void) peer_key_length; + (void) shared_secret; + (void) shared_secret_size; + (void) shared_secret_length; + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + + } +} + +static inline psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_pake_setup( + psa_pake_operation_t *operation, + const psa_crypto_driver_pake_inputs_t *inputs ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + psa_key_location_t location = + PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION( psa_get_key_lifetime( &inputs->attributes ) ); + + switch( location ) + { + case PSA_KEY_LOCATION_LOCAL_STORAGE: + /* Key is stored in the slot in export representation, so + * cycle through all known transparent accelerators */ + status = PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + status = mbedtls_test_transparent_pake_setup( + &operation->data.ctx.transparent_test_driver_ctx, + inputs ); + if( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) + operation->id = MBEDTLS_TEST_TRANSPARENT_DRIVER_ID; + /* Declared with fallback == true */ + if( status != PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ) + return( status ); +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_PAKE) + status = mbedtls_psa_pake_setup( &operation->data.ctx.mbedtls_ctx, + inputs ); + if( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) + operation->id = PSA_CRYPTO_MBED_TLS_DRIVER_ID; +#endif + return status; + /* Add cases for opaque driver here */ + default: + /* Key is declared with a lifetime not known to us */ + (void)operation; + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + } +} + +static inline psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_pake_output( + psa_pake_operation_t *operation, + psa_crypto_driver_pake_step_t step, + uint8_t *output, + size_t output_size, + size_t *output_length ) +{ + switch( operation->id ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_PAKE) + case PSA_CRYPTO_MBED_TLS_DRIVER_ID: + return( mbedtls_psa_pake_output( &operation->data.ctx.mbedtls_ctx, step, + output, output_size, output_length ) ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_PAKE */ + +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + case MBEDTLS_TEST_TRANSPARENT_DRIVER_ID: + return( mbedtls_test_transparent_pake_output( + &operation->data.ctx.transparent_test_driver_ctx, + step, output, output_size, output_length ) ); +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + default: + (void) step; + (void) output; + (void) output_size; + (void) output_length; + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + } +} + +static inline psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_pake_input( + psa_pake_operation_t *operation, + psa_crypto_driver_pake_step_t step, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length ) +{ + switch( operation->id ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_PAKE) + case PSA_CRYPTO_MBED_TLS_DRIVER_ID: + return( mbedtls_psa_pake_input( &operation->data.ctx.mbedtls_ctx, + step, input, + input_length ) ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_PAKE */ + +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + case MBEDTLS_TEST_TRANSPARENT_DRIVER_ID: + return( mbedtls_test_transparent_pake_input( + &operation->data.ctx.transparent_test_driver_ctx, + step, + input, input_length ) ); +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + default: + (void) step; + (void) input; + (void) input_length; + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + } +} + +static inline psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_pake_get_implicit_key( + psa_pake_operation_t *operation, + uint8_t *output, size_t output_size, + size_t *output_length ) +{ + switch( operation->id ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_PAKE) + case PSA_CRYPTO_MBED_TLS_DRIVER_ID: + return( mbedtls_psa_pake_get_implicit_key( &operation->data.ctx.mbedtls_ctx, + output, output_size, output_length ) ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_PAKE */ + +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + case MBEDTLS_TEST_TRANSPARENT_DRIVER_ID: + return( mbedtls_test_transparent_pake_get_implicit_key( + &operation->data.ctx.transparent_test_driver_ctx, + output, output_size, output_length ) ); +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + default: + (void) output; + (void) output_size; + (void) output_length; + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + } +} + +static inline psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_pake_abort( + psa_pake_operation_t * operation ) +{ + switch( operation->id ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_PAKE) + case PSA_CRYPTO_MBED_TLS_DRIVER_ID: + return( mbedtls_psa_pake_abort( &operation->data.ctx.mbedtls_ctx ) ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_PAKE */ + +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + case MBEDTLS_TEST_TRANSPARENT_DRIVER_ID: + return( mbedtls_test_transparent_pake_abort( + &operation->data.ctx.transparent_test_driver_ctx ) ); +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + default: + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + } +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C */ diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_driver_wrappers_no_static.h b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_driver_wrappers_no_static.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..cd617f60ee6c --- /dev/null +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_driver_wrappers_no_static.h @@ -0,0 +1,31 @@ +/* + * Function signatures for functionality that can be provided by + * cryptographic accelerators. + */ +/* Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +#ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_WRAPPERS_NO_STATIC_H +#define PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_WRAPPERS_NO_STATIC_H + +#include "psa/crypto.h" +#include "psa/crypto_driver_common.h" + +psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_export_public_key( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + uint8_t *data, size_t data_size, size_t *data_length); + +psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_get_key_buffer_size( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + size_t *key_buffer_size); + +psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_get_builtin_key( + psa_drv_slot_number_t slot_number, + psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, size_t *key_buffer_length); + +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_WRAPPERS_NO_STATIC_H */ + +/* End of automatically generated file. */ diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_ecp.h b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_ecp.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..a9f5d59de484 --- /dev/null +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_ecp.h @@ -0,0 +1,267 @@ +/* + * PSA ECP layer on top of Mbed TLS crypto + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +#ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_ECP_H +#define PSA_CRYPTO_ECP_H + +#include +#include + +/** Load the contents of a key buffer into an internal ECP representation + * + * \param[in] type The type of key contained in \p data. + * \param[in] curve_bits The nominal bit-size of the curve. + * It must be consistent with the representation + * passed in \p data. + * This can be 0, in which case the bit-size + * is inferred from \p data_length (which is possible + * for all key types and representation formats + * formats that are currently supported or will + * be in the foreseeable future). + * \param[in] data The buffer from which to load the representation. + * \param[in] data_length The size in bytes of \p data. + * \param[out] p_ecp Returns a pointer to an ECP context on success. + * The caller is responsible for freeing both the + * contents of the context and the context itself + * when done. + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_ecp_load_representation(psa_key_type_t type, + size_t curve_bits, + const uint8_t *data, + size_t data_length, + mbedtls_ecp_keypair **p_ecp); + +/** Load the public part of an internal ECP, if required. + * + * \param ecp The ECP context to load the public part for. + * + * \return PSA_SUCCESS on success, otherwise an MPI error. + */ + +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_ecp_load_public_part(mbedtls_ecp_keypair *ecp); + +/** Import an ECP key in binary format. + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver + * import_key entry point. This function behaves as an import_key + * entry point as defined in the PSA driver interface specification for + * transparent drivers. + * + * \param[in] attributes The attributes for the key to import. + * \param[in] data The buffer containing the key data in import + * format. + * \param[in] data_length Size of the \p data buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] key_buffer The buffer containing the key data in output + * format. + * \param[in] key_buffer_size Size of the \p key_buffer buffer in bytes. This + * size is greater or equal to \p data_length. + * \param[out] key_buffer_length The length of the data written in \p + * key_buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] bits The key size in number of bits. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS The ECP key was imported successfully. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * The key data is not correctly formatted. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_ecp_import_key( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *data, size_t data_length, + uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + size_t *key_buffer_length, size_t *bits); + +/** Export an ECP key to export representation + * + * \param[in] type The type of key (public/private) to export + * \param[in] ecp The internal ECP representation from which to export + * \param[out] data The buffer to export to + * \param[in] data_size The length of the buffer to export to + * \param[out] data_length The amount of bytes written to \p data + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_ecp_export_key(psa_key_type_t type, + mbedtls_ecp_keypair *ecp, + uint8_t *data, + size_t data_size, + size_t *data_length); + +/** Export an ECP public key or the public part of an ECP key pair in binary + * format. + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver + * export_public_key entry point. This function behaves as an + * export_public_key entry point as defined in the PSA driver interface + * specification. + * + * \param[in] attributes The attributes for the key to export. + * \param[in] key_buffer Material or context of the key to export. + * \param[in] key_buffer_size Size of the \p key_buffer buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] data Buffer where the key data is to be written. + * \param[in] data_size Size of the \p data buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] data_length On success, the number of bytes written in + * \p data + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS The ECP public key was exported successfully. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_ecp_export_public_key( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + uint8_t *data, size_t data_size, size_t *data_length); + +/** + * \brief Generate an ECP key. + * + * \note The signature of the function is that of a PSA driver generate_key + * entry point. + * + * \param[in] attributes The attributes for the ECP key to generate. + * \param[out] key_buffer Buffer where the key data is to be written. + * \param[in] key_buffer_size Size of \p key_buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] key_buffer_length On success, the number of bytes written in + * \p key_buffer. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * The key was successfully generated. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * Key length or type not supported. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL + * The size of \p key_buffer is too small. + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_ecp_generate_key( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, size_t *key_buffer_length); + +/** Sign an already-calculated hash with ECDSA. + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver + * sign_hash entry point. This function behaves as a sign_hash + * entry point as defined in the PSA driver interface specification for + * transparent drivers. + * + * \param[in] attributes The attributes of the ECC key to use for the + * operation. + * \param[in] key_buffer The buffer containing the ECC key context. + * format. + * \param[in] key_buffer_size Size of the \p key_buffer buffer in bytes. + * \param[in] alg Randomized or deterministic ECDSA algorithm. + * \param[in] hash The hash or message to sign. + * \param[in] hash_length Size of the \p hash buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] signature Buffer where the signature is to be written. + * \param[in] signature_size Size of the \p signature buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] signature_length On success, the number of bytes + * that make up the returned signature value. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL + * The size of the \p signature buffer is too small. You can + * determine a sufficient buffer size by calling + * #PSA_SIGN_OUTPUT_SIZE(\c PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR, \c key_bits, + * \p alg) where \c key_bits is the bit-size of the ECC key. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY \emptydescription + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_ecdsa_sign_hash( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, const uint8_t *hash, size_t hash_length, + uint8_t *signature, size_t signature_size, size_t *signature_length); + +/** + * \brief Verify an ECDSA hash or short message signature. + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver + * verify_hash entry point. This function behaves as a verify_hash + * entry point as defined in the PSA driver interface specification for + * transparent drivers. + * + * \param[in] attributes The attributes of the ECC key to use for the + * operation. + * \param[in] key_buffer The buffer containing the ECC key context. + * format. + * \param[in] key_buffer_size Size of the \p key_buffer buffer in bytes. + * \param[in] alg Randomized or deterministic ECDSA algorithm. + * \param[in] hash The hash or message whose signature is to be + * verified. + * \param[in] hash_length Size of the \p hash buffer in bytes. + * \param[in] signature Buffer containing the signature to verify. + * \param[in] signature_length Size of the \p signature buffer in bytes. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * The signature is valid. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE + * The calculation was performed successfully, but the passed + * signature is not a valid signature. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_ecdsa_verify_hash( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, const uint8_t *hash, size_t hash_length, + const uint8_t *signature, size_t signature_length); + + +/** Perform a key agreement and return the raw ECDH shared secret. + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver + * key_agreement entry point. This function behaves as a key_agreement + * entry point as defined in the PSA driver interface specification for + * transparent drivers. + * + * \param[in] attributes The attributes of the key to use for the + * operation. + * \param[in] key_buffer The buffer containing the private key + * context. + * \param[in] key_buffer_size Size of the \p key_buffer buffer in + * bytes. + * \param[in] alg A key agreement algorithm that is + * compatible with the type of the key. + * \param[in] peer_key The buffer containing the key context + * of the peer's public key. + * \param[in] peer_key_length Size of the \p peer_key buffer in + * bytes. + * \param[out] shared_secret The buffer to which the shared secret + * is to be written. + * \param[in] shared_secret_size Size of the \p shared_secret buffer in + * bytes. + * \param[out] shared_secret_length On success, the number of bytes that make + * up the returned shared secret. + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. Shared secret successfully calculated. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * \p alg is not a key agreement algorithm, or + * \p private_key is not compatible with \p alg, + * or \p peer_key is not valid for \p alg or not compatible with + * \p private_key. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL + * \p shared_secret_size is too small + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * \p alg is not a supported key agreement algorithm. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_key_agreement_ecdh( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, const uint8_t *peer_key, size_t peer_key_length, + uint8_t *shared_secret, size_t shared_secret_size, + size_t *shared_secret_length); +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ECP_H */ diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_ffdh.h b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_ffdh.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..79accd15ac89 --- /dev/null +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_ffdh.h @@ -0,0 +1,131 @@ +/* + * PSA FFDH layer on top of Mbed TLS crypto + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +#ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_FFDH_H +#define PSA_CRYPTO_FFDH_H + +#include + +/** Perform a key agreement and return the FFDH shared secret. + * + * \param[in] attributes The attributes of the key to use for the + * operation. + * \param[in] peer_key The buffer containing the key context + * of the peer's public key. + * \param[in] peer_key_length Size of the \p peer_key buffer in + * bytes. + * \param[in] key_buffer The buffer containing the private key + * context. + * \param[in] key_buffer_size Size of the \p key_buffer buffer in + * bytes. + * \param[out] shared_secret The buffer to which the shared secret + * is to be written. + * \param[in] shared_secret_size Size of the \p shared_secret buffer in + * bytes. + * \param[out] shared_secret_length On success, the number of bytes that make + * up the returned shared secret. + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. Shared secret successfully calculated. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * \p key_buffer_size, \p peer_key_length, \p shared_secret_size + * do not match + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_ffdh_key_agreement( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *peer_key, + size_t peer_key_length, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, + uint8_t *shared_secret, + size_t shared_secret_size, + size_t *shared_secret_length); + +/** Export a public key or the public part of a DH key pair in binary format. + * + * \param[in] attributes The attributes for the key to export. + * \param[in] key_buffer Material or context of the key to export. + * \param[in] key_buffer_size Size of the \p key_buffer buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] data Buffer where the key data is to be written. + * \param[in] data_size Size of the \p data buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] data_length On success, the number of bytes written in + * \p data + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS The public key was exported successfully. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL + * The size of \p key_buffer is too small. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_ffdh_export_public_key( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, + uint8_t *data, + size_t data_size, + size_t *data_length); + +/** + * \brief Generate DH key. + * + * \note The signature of the function is that of a PSA driver generate_key + * entry point. + * + * \param[in] attributes The attributes for the key to generate. + * \param[out] key_buffer Buffer where the key data is to be written. + * \param[in] key_buffer_size Size of \p key_buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] key_buffer_length On success, the number of bytes written in + * \p key_buffer. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * The key was generated successfully. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * Key size in bits is invalid. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL + * The size of \p key_buffer is too small. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_ffdh_generate_key( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, + size_t *key_buffer_length); + +/** + * \brief Import DH key. + * + * \note The signature of the function is that of a PSA driver import_key + * entry point. + * + * \param[in] attributes The attributes for the key to import. + * \param[in] data The buffer containing the key data in import + * format. + * \param[in] data_length Size of the \p data buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] key_buffer The buffer containing the key data in output + * format. + * \param[in] key_buffer_size Size of the \p key_buffer buffer in bytes. This + * size is greater or equal to \p data_length. + * \param[out] key_buffer_length The length of the data written in \p + * key_buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] bits The key size in number of bits. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * The key was generated successfully. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL + * The size of \p key_buffer is too small. + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_ffdh_import_key( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *data, size_t data_length, + uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + size_t *key_buffer_length, size_t *bits); + +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_FFDH_H */ diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_hash.h b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_hash.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..0a7be8055201 --- /dev/null +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_hash.h @@ -0,0 +1,211 @@ +/* + * PSA hashing layer on top of Mbed TLS software crypto + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +#ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_HASH_H +#define PSA_CRYPTO_HASH_H + +#include + +/** Calculate the hash (digest) of a message using Mbed TLS routines. + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver hash_compute + * entry point. This function behaves as a hash_compute entry point as + * defined in the PSA driver interface specification for transparent + * drivers. + * + * \param alg The hash algorithm to compute (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value + * such that #PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(\p alg) is true). + * \param[in] input Buffer containing the message to hash. + * \param input_length Size of the \p input buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] hash Buffer where the hash is to be written. + * \param hash_size Size of the \p hash buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] hash_length On success, the number of bytes + * that make up the hash value. This is always + * #PSA_HASH_LENGTH(\p alg). + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * \p alg is not supported + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL + * \p hash_size is too small + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_hash_compute( + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length, + uint8_t *hash, + size_t hash_size, + size_t *hash_length); + +/** Set up a multipart hash operation using Mbed TLS routines. + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver hash_setup + * entry point. This function behaves as a hash_setup entry point as + * defined in the PSA driver interface specification for transparent + * drivers. + * + * If an error occurs at any step after a call to mbedtls_psa_hash_setup(), the + * operation will need to be reset by a call to mbedtls_psa_hash_abort(). The + * core may call mbedtls_psa_hash_abort() at any time after the operation + * has been initialized. + * + * After a successful call to mbedtls_psa_hash_setup(), the core must + * eventually terminate the operation. The following events terminate an + * operation: + * - A successful call to mbedtls_psa_hash_finish() or mbedtls_psa_hash_verify(). + * - A call to mbedtls_psa_hash_abort(). + * + * \param[in,out] operation The operation object to set up. It must have + * been initialized to all-zero and not yet be in use. + * \param alg The hash algorithm to compute (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value + * such that #PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(\p alg) is true). + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * \p alg is not supported + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The operation state is not valid (it must be inactive). + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_hash_setup( + mbedtls_psa_hash_operation_t *operation, + psa_algorithm_t alg); + +/** Clone an Mbed TLS hash operation. + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver hash_clone + * entry point. This function behaves as a hash_clone entry point as + * defined in the PSA driver interface specification for transparent + * drivers. + * + * This function copies the state of an ongoing hash operation to + * a new operation object. In other words, this function is equivalent + * to calling mbedtls_psa_hash_setup() on \p target_operation with the same + * algorithm that \p source_operation was set up for, then + * mbedtls_psa_hash_update() on \p target_operation with the same input that + * that was passed to \p source_operation. After this function returns, the + * two objects are independent, i.e. subsequent calls involving one of + * the objects do not affect the other object. + * + * \param[in] source_operation The active hash operation to clone. + * \param[in,out] target_operation The operation object to set up. + * It must be initialized but not active. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The \p source_operation state is not valid (it must be active). + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The \p target_operation state is not valid (it must be inactive). + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_hash_clone( + const mbedtls_psa_hash_operation_t *source_operation, + mbedtls_psa_hash_operation_t *target_operation); + +/** Add a message fragment to a multipart Mbed TLS hash operation. + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver hash_update + * entry point. This function behaves as a hash_update entry point as + * defined in the PSA driver interface specification for transparent + * drivers. + * + * The application must call mbedtls_psa_hash_setup() before calling this function. + * + * If this function returns an error status, the operation enters an error + * state and must be aborted by calling mbedtls_psa_hash_abort(). + * + * \param[in,out] operation Active hash operation. + * \param[in] input Buffer containing the message fragment to hash. + * \param input_length Size of the \p input buffer in bytes. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The operation state is not valid (it must be active). + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_hash_update( + mbedtls_psa_hash_operation_t *operation, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length); + +/** Finish the calculation of the Mbed TLS-calculated hash of a message. + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver hash_finish + * entry point. This function behaves as a hash_finish entry point as + * defined in the PSA driver interface specification for transparent + * drivers. + * + * The application must call mbedtls_psa_hash_setup() before calling this function. + * This function calculates the hash of the message formed by concatenating + * the inputs passed to preceding calls to mbedtls_psa_hash_update(). + * + * When this function returns successfully, the operation becomes inactive. + * If this function returns an error status, the operation enters an error + * state and must be aborted by calling mbedtls_psa_hash_abort(). + * + * \param[in,out] operation Active hash operation. + * \param[out] hash Buffer where the hash is to be written. + * \param hash_size Size of the \p hash buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] hash_length On success, the number of bytes + * that make up the hash value. This is always + * #PSA_HASH_LENGTH(\c alg) where \c alg is the + * hash algorithm that is calculated. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The operation state is not valid (it must be active). + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL + * The size of the \p hash buffer is too small. You can determine a + * sufficient buffer size by calling #PSA_HASH_LENGTH(\c alg) + * where \c alg is the hash algorithm that is calculated. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_hash_finish( + mbedtls_psa_hash_operation_t *operation, + uint8_t *hash, + size_t hash_size, + size_t *hash_length); + +/** Abort an Mbed TLS hash operation. + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver hash_abort + * entry point. This function behaves as a hash_abort entry point as + * defined in the PSA driver interface specification for transparent + * drivers. + * + * Aborting an operation frees all associated resources except for the + * \p operation structure itself. Once aborted, the operation object + * can be reused for another operation by calling + * mbedtls_psa_hash_setup() again. + * + * You may call this function any time after the operation object has + * been initialized by one of the methods described in #psa_hash_operation_t. + * + * In particular, calling mbedtls_psa_hash_abort() after the operation has been + * terminated by a call to mbedtls_psa_hash_abort(), mbedtls_psa_hash_finish() or + * mbedtls_psa_hash_verify() is safe and has no effect. + * + * \param[in,out] operation Initialized hash operation. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_hash_abort( + mbedtls_psa_hash_operation_t *operation); + +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_HASH_H */ diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_invasive.h b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_invasive.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..51c90c64a4d3 --- /dev/null +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_invasive.h @@ -0,0 +1,92 @@ +/** + * \file psa_crypto_invasive.h + * + * \brief PSA cryptography module: invasive interfaces for test only. + * + * The interfaces in this file are intended for testing purposes only. + * They MUST NOT be made available to clients over IPC in integrations + * with isolation, and they SHOULD NOT be made available in library + * integrations except when building the library for testing. + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +#ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_INVASIVE_H +#define PSA_CRYPTO_INVASIVE_H + +/* + * Include the build-time configuration information header. Here, we do not + * include `"mbedtls/build_info.h"` directly but `"psa/build_info.h"`, which + * is basically just an alias to it. This is to ease the maintenance of the + * TF-PSA-Crypto repository which has a different build system and + * configuration. + */ +#include "psa/build_info.h" + +#include "psa/crypto.h" +#include "common.h" + +#include "mbedtls/entropy.h" + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG) +/** \brief Configure entropy sources. + * + * This function may only be called before a call to psa_crypto_init(), + * or after a call to mbedtls_psa_crypto_free() and before any + * subsequent call to psa_crypto_init(). + * + * This function is only intended for test purposes. The functionality + * it provides is also useful for system integrators, but + * system integrators should configure entropy drivers instead of + * breaking through to the Mbed TLS API. + * + * \param entropy_init Function to initialize the entropy context + * and set up the desired entropy sources. + * It is called by psa_crypto_init(). + * By default this is mbedtls_entropy_init(). + * This function cannot report failures directly. + * To indicate a failure, set the entropy context + * to a state where mbedtls_entropy_func() will + * return an error. + * \param entropy_free Function to free the entropy context + * and associated resources. + * It is called by mbedtls_psa_crypto_free(). + * By default this is mbedtls_entropy_free(). + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED + * The caller does not have the permission to configure + * entropy sources. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The library has already been initialized. + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_crypto_configure_entropy_sources( + void (* entropy_init)(mbedtls_entropy_context *ctx), + void (* entropy_free)(mbedtls_entropy_context *ctx)); +#endif /* !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG) */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS) && defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) +psa_status_t psa_mac_key_can_do( + psa_algorithm_t algorithm, + psa_key_type_t key_type); + +psa_status_t psa_crypto_copy_input(const uint8_t *input, size_t input_len, + uint8_t *input_copy, size_t input_copy_len); + +psa_status_t psa_crypto_copy_output(const uint8_t *output_copy, size_t output_copy_len, + uint8_t *output, size_t output_len); + +/* + * Test hooks to use for memory unpoisoning/poisoning in copy functions. + */ +extern void (*psa_input_pre_copy_hook)(const uint8_t *input, size_t input_len); +extern void (*psa_input_post_copy_hook)(const uint8_t *input, size_t input_len); +extern void (*psa_output_pre_copy_hook)(const uint8_t *output, size_t output_len); +extern void (*psa_output_post_copy_hook)(const uint8_t *output, size_t output_len); + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS && MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C */ + +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_INVASIVE_H */ diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_its.h b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_its.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..877063b87866 --- /dev/null +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_its.h @@ -0,0 +1,131 @@ +/** \file psa_crypto_its.h + * \brief Interface of trusted storage that crypto is built on. + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +#ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_ITS_H +#define PSA_CRYPTO_ITS_H + +#include +#include + +#include +#include + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +/** \brief Flags used when creating a data entry + */ +typedef uint32_t psa_storage_create_flags_t; + +/** \brief A type for UIDs used for identifying data + */ +typedef uint64_t psa_storage_uid_t; + +#define PSA_STORAGE_FLAG_NONE 0 /**< No flags to pass */ +#define PSA_STORAGE_FLAG_WRITE_ONCE (1 << 0) /**< The data associated with the uid will not be able to be modified or deleted. Intended to be used to set bits in `psa_storage_create_flags_t`*/ + +/** + * \brief A container for metadata associated with a specific uid + */ +struct psa_storage_info_t { + uint32_t size; /**< The size of the data associated with a uid **/ + psa_storage_create_flags_t flags; /**< The flags set when the uid was created **/ +}; + +/** Flag indicating that \ref psa_storage_create and \ref psa_storage_set_extended are supported */ +#define PSA_STORAGE_SUPPORT_SET_EXTENDED (1 << 0) + +#define PSA_ITS_API_VERSION_MAJOR 1 /**< The major version number of the PSA ITS API. It will be incremented on significant updates that may include breaking changes */ +#define PSA_ITS_API_VERSION_MINOR 1 /**< The minor version number of the PSA ITS API. It will be incremented in small updates that are unlikely to include breaking changes */ + +/** + * \brief create a new or modify an existing uid/value pair + * + * \param[in] uid the identifier for the data + * \param[in] data_length The size in bytes of the data in `p_data` + * \param[in] p_data A buffer containing the data + * \param[in] create_flags The flags that the data will be stored with + * + * \return A status indicating the success/failure of the operation + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS The operation completed successfully + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED The operation failed because the provided `uid` value was already created with PSA_STORAGE_FLAG_WRITE_ONCE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED The operation failed because one or more of the flags provided in `create_flags` is not supported or is not valid + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_STORAGE The operation failed because there was insufficient space on the storage medium + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE The operation failed because the physical storage has failed (Fatal error) + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT The operation failed because one of the provided pointers(`p_data`) + * is invalid, for example is `NULL` or references memory the caller cannot access + */ +psa_status_t psa_its_set(psa_storage_uid_t uid, + uint32_t data_length, + const void *p_data, + psa_storage_create_flags_t create_flags); + +/** + * \brief Retrieve the value associated with a provided uid + * + * \param[in] uid The uid value + * \param[in] data_offset The starting offset of the data requested + * \param[in] data_length the amount of data requested (and the minimum allocated size of the `p_data` buffer) + * \param[out] p_data The buffer where the data will be placed upon successful completion + * \param[out] p_data_length The amount of data returned in the p_data buffer + * + * + * \return A status indicating the success/failure of the operation + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS The operation completed successfully + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST The operation failed because the provided `uid` value was not found in the storage + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE The operation failed because the physical storage has failed (Fatal error) + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT The operation failed because stored data has been corrupted + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT The operation failed because one of the provided pointers(`p_data`, `p_data_length`) + * is invalid. For example is `NULL` or references memory the caller cannot access. + * In addition, this can also happen if an invalid offset was provided. + */ +psa_status_t psa_its_get(psa_storage_uid_t uid, + uint32_t data_offset, + uint32_t data_length, + void *p_data, + size_t *p_data_length); + +/** + * \brief Retrieve the metadata about the provided uid + * + * \param[in] uid The uid value + * \param[out] p_info A pointer to the `psa_storage_info_t` struct that will be populated with the metadata + * + * \return A status indicating the success/failure of the operation + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS The operation completed successfully + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST The operation failed because the provided uid value was not found in the storage + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT The operation failed because stored data has been corrupted + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT The operation failed because one of the provided pointers(`p_info`) + * is invalid, for example is `NULL` or references memory the caller cannot access + */ +psa_status_t psa_its_get_info(psa_storage_uid_t uid, + struct psa_storage_info_t *p_info); + +/** + * \brief Remove the provided key and its associated data from the storage + * + * \param[in] uid The uid value + * + * \return A status indicating the success/failure of the operation + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS The operation completed successfully + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST The operation failed because the provided key value was not found in the storage + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED The operation failed because the provided key value was created with PSA_STORAGE_FLAG_WRITE_ONCE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE The operation failed because the physical storage has failed (Fatal error) + */ +psa_status_t psa_its_remove(psa_storage_uid_t uid); + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ITS_H */ diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_mac.h b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_mac.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..2f614bcc6e7e --- /dev/null +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_mac.h @@ -0,0 +1,264 @@ +/* + * PSA MAC layer on top of Mbed TLS software crypto + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +#ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_MAC_H +#define PSA_CRYPTO_MAC_H + +#include + +/** Calculate the MAC (message authentication code) of a message using Mbed TLS. + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver mac_compute + * entry point. This function behaves as a mac_compute entry point as + * defined in the PSA driver interface specification for transparent + * drivers. + * + * \param[in] attributes The attributes of the key to use for the + * operation. + * \param[in] key_buffer The buffer containing the key to use for + * computing the MAC. This buffer contains the key + * in export representation as defined by + * psa_export_key() (i.e. the raw key bytes). + * \param key_buffer_size Size of the \p key_buffer buffer in bytes. + * \param alg The MAC algorithm to use (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value + * such that #PSA_ALG_IS_MAC(\p alg) is true). + * \param[in] input Buffer containing the input message. + * \param input_length Size of the \p input buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] mac Buffer where the MAC value is to be written. + * \param mac_size Size of the \p mac buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] mac_length On success, the number of bytes + * that make up the MAC value. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * \p alg is not supported. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL + * \p mac_size is too small + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_mac_compute( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length, + uint8_t *mac, + size_t mac_size, + size_t *mac_length); + +/** Set up a multipart MAC calculation operation using Mbed TLS. + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver mac_sign_setup + * entry point. This function behaves as a mac_sign_setup entry point as + * defined in the PSA driver interface specification for transparent + * drivers. + * + * \param[in,out] operation The operation object to set up. It must have + * been initialized and not yet in use. + * \param[in] attributes The attributes of the key to use for the + * operation. + * \param[in] key_buffer The buffer containing the key to use for + * computing the MAC. This buffer contains the key + * in export representation as defined by + * psa_export_key() (i.e. the raw key bytes). + * \param key_buffer_size Size of the \p key_buffer buffer in bytes. + * \param alg The MAC algorithm to use (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value + * such that #PSA_ALG_IS_MAC(\p alg) is true). + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * \p alg is not supported. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The operation state is not valid (it must be inactive). + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_mac_sign_setup( + mbedtls_psa_mac_operation_t *operation, + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg); + +/** Set up a multipart MAC verification operation using Mbed TLS. + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver mac_verify_setup + * entry point. This function behaves as a mac_verify_setup entry point as + * defined in the PSA driver interface specification for transparent + * drivers. + * + * \param[in,out] operation The operation object to set up. It must have + * been initialized and not yet in use. + * \param[in] attributes The attributes of the key to use for the + * operation. + * \param[in] key_buffer The buffer containing the key to use for + * computing the MAC. This buffer contains the key + * in export representation as defined by + * psa_export_key() (i.e. the raw key bytes). + * \param key_buffer_size Size of the \p key_buffer buffer in bytes. + * \param alg The MAC algorithm to use (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value + * such that #PSA_ALG_IS_MAC(\p alg) is true). + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * \p alg is not supported. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The operation state is not valid (it must be inactive). + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_mac_verify_setup( + mbedtls_psa_mac_operation_t *operation, + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg); + +/** Add a message fragment to a multipart MAC operation using Mbed TLS. + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver mac_update + * entry point. This function behaves as a mac_update entry point as + * defined in the PSA driver interface specification for transparent + * drivers. + * + * The PSA core calls mbedtls_psa_mac_sign_setup() or + * mbedtls_psa_mac_verify_setup() before calling this function. + * + * If this function returns an error status, the PSA core aborts the + * operation by calling mbedtls_psa_mac_abort(). + * + * \param[in,out] operation Active MAC operation. + * \param[in] input Buffer containing the message fragment to add to + * the MAC calculation. + * \param input_length Size of the \p input buffer in bytes. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The operation state is not valid (it must be active). + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_mac_update( + mbedtls_psa_mac_operation_t *operation, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length); + +/** Finish the calculation of the MAC of a message using Mbed TLS. + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver mac_sign_finish + * entry point. This function behaves as a mac_sign_finish entry point as + * defined in the PSA driver interface specification for transparent + * drivers. + * + * The PSA core calls mbedtls_psa_mac_sign_setup() before calling this function. + * This function calculates the MAC of the message formed by concatenating + * the inputs passed to preceding calls to mbedtls_psa_mac_update(). + * + * Whether this function returns successfully or not, the PSA core subsequently + * aborts the operation by calling mbedtls_psa_mac_abort(). + * + * \param[in,out] operation Active MAC operation. + * \param[out] mac Buffer where the MAC value is to be written. + * \param mac_size Output size requested for the MAC algorithm. The PSA + * core guarantees this is a valid MAC length for the + * algorithm and key combination passed to + * mbedtls_psa_mac_sign_setup(). It also guarantees the + * \p mac buffer is large enough to contain the + * requested output size. + * \param[out] mac_length On success, the number of bytes output to buffer + * \p mac, which will be equal to the requested length + * \p mac_size. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The operation state is not valid (it must be an active mac sign + * operation). + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL + * The size of the \p mac buffer is too small. A sufficient buffer size + * can be determined by calling PSA_MAC_LENGTH(). + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_mac_sign_finish( + mbedtls_psa_mac_operation_t *operation, + uint8_t *mac, + size_t mac_size, + size_t *mac_length); + +/** Finish the calculation of the MAC of a message and compare it with + * an expected value using Mbed TLS. + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver + * mac_verify_finish entry point. This function behaves as a + * mac_verify_finish entry point as defined in the PSA driver interface + * specification for transparent drivers. + * + * The PSA core calls mbedtls_psa_mac_verify_setup() before calling this + * function. This function calculates the MAC of the message formed by + * concatenating the inputs passed to preceding calls to + * mbedtls_psa_mac_update(). It then compares the calculated MAC with the + * expected MAC passed as a parameter to this function. + * + * Whether this function returns successfully or not, the PSA core subsequently + * aborts the operation by calling mbedtls_psa_mac_abort(). + * + * \param[in,out] operation Active MAC operation. + * \param[in] mac Buffer containing the expected MAC value. + * \param mac_length Length in bytes of the expected MAC value. The PSA + * core guarantees that this length is a valid MAC + * length for the algorithm and key combination passed + * to mbedtls_psa_mac_verify_setup(). + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * The expected MAC is identical to the actual MAC of the message. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE + * The MAC of the message was calculated successfully, but it + * differs from the expected MAC. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The operation state is not valid (it must be an active mac verify + * operation). + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_mac_verify_finish( + mbedtls_psa_mac_operation_t *operation, + const uint8_t *mac, + size_t mac_length); + +/** Abort a MAC operation using Mbed TLS. + * + * Aborting an operation frees all associated resources except for the + * \p operation structure itself. Once aborted, the operation object + * can be reused for another operation by calling + * mbedtls_psa_mac_sign_setup() or mbedtls_psa_mac_verify_setup() again. + * + * The PSA core may call this function any time after the operation object has + * been initialized by one of the methods described in + * #mbedtls_psa_mac_operation_t. + * + * In particular, calling mbedtls_psa_mac_abort() after the operation has been + * terminated by a call to mbedtls_psa_mac_abort(), + * mbedtls_psa_mac_sign_finish() or mbedtls_psa_mac_verify_finish() is safe and + * has no effect. + * + * \param[in,out] operation Initialized MAC operation. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_mac_abort( + mbedtls_psa_mac_operation_t *operation); + +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_MAC_H */ diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_pake.h b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_pake.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..3d3ee0cc9af1 --- /dev/null +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_pake.h @@ -0,0 +1,159 @@ +/* + * PSA PAKE layer on top of Mbed TLS software crypto + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +#ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_PAKE_H +#define PSA_CRYPTO_PAKE_H + +#include + +/** Set the session information for a password-authenticated key exchange. + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver + * pake_setup entry point. This function behaves as a pake_setup + * entry point as defined in the PSA driver interface specification for + * transparent drivers. + * + * \param[in,out] operation The operation object to set up. It must have + * been initialized but not set up yet. + * \param[in] inputs Inputs required for PAKE operation (role, password, + * key lifetime, cipher suite) + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * The algorithm in \p cipher_suite is not a supported PAKE algorithm, + * or the PAKE primitive in \p cipher_suite is not supported or not + * compatible with the PAKE algorithm, or the hash algorithm in + * \p cipher_suite is not supported or not compatible with the PAKE + * algorithm and primitive. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_pake_setup(mbedtls_psa_pake_operation_t *operation, + const psa_crypto_driver_pake_inputs_t *inputs); + + +/** Get output for a step of a password-authenticated key exchange. + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver + * pake_output entry point. This function behaves as a pake_output + * entry point as defined in the PSA driver interface specification for + * transparent drivers. + * + * \param[in,out] operation Active PAKE operation. + * \param step The step of the algorithm for which the output is + * requested. + * \param[out] output Buffer where the output is to be written in the + * format appropriate for this driver \p step. Refer to + * the documentation of psa_crypto_driver_pake_step_t for + * more information. + * \param output_size Size of the \p output buffer in bytes. This must + * be at least #PSA_PAKE_OUTPUT_SIZE(\p alg, \p + * primitive, \p step) where \p alg and + * \p primitive are the PAKE algorithm and primitive + * in the operation's cipher suite, and \p step is + * the output step. + * + * \param[out] output_length On success, the number of bytes of the returned + * output. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL + * The size of the \p output buffer is too small. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID \emptydescription + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_pake_output(mbedtls_psa_pake_operation_t *operation, + psa_crypto_driver_pake_step_t step, + uint8_t *output, + size_t output_size, + size_t *output_length); + +/** Provide input for a step of a password-authenticated key exchange. + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver + * pake_input entry point. This function behaves as a pake_input + * entry point as defined in the PSA driver interface specification for + * transparent drivers. + * + * \note The core checks that input_length is smaller than PSA_PAKE_INPUT_MAX_SIZE. + * + * \param[in,out] operation Active PAKE operation. + * \param step The driver step for which the input is provided. + * \param[in] input Buffer containing the input in the format + * appropriate for this \p step. Refer to the + * documentation of psa_crypto_driver_pake_step_t + * for more information. + * \param input_length Size of the \p input buffer in bytes. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE + * The verification fails for a zero-knowledge input step. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * the \p input is not valid for the \p operation's algorithm, cipher suite + * or \p step. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * the \p input is not supported for the \p operation's algorithm, cipher + * suite or \p step. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID \emptydescription + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_pake_input(mbedtls_psa_pake_operation_t *operation, + psa_crypto_driver_pake_step_t step, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length); + +/** Get implicitly confirmed shared secret from a PAKE. + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver + * pake_get_implicit_key entry point. This function behaves as a + * pake_get_implicit_key entry point as defined in the PSA driver + * interface specification for transparent drivers. + * + * \param[in,out] operation Active PAKE operation. + * \param[out] output Output buffer for implicit key. + * \param output_size Size of the output buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] output_length On success, the number of bytes of the implicit key. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * Input from a PAKE is not supported by the algorithm in the \p output + * key derivation operation. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID \emptydescription + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_pake_get_implicit_key( + mbedtls_psa_pake_operation_t *operation, + uint8_t *output, size_t output_size, + size_t *output_length); + +/** Abort a PAKE operation. + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver + * pake_abort entry point. This function behaves as a pake_abort + * entry point as defined in the PSA driver interface specification for + * transparent drivers. + * + * \param[in,out] operation The operation to abort. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_pake_abort(mbedtls_psa_pake_operation_t *operation); + +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_PAKE_H */ diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_random_impl.h b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_random_impl.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..533fb2e94040 --- /dev/null +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_random_impl.h @@ -0,0 +1,135 @@ +/** \file psa_crypto_random_impl.h + * + * \brief PSA crypto random generator implementation abstraction. + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +#ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_RANDOM_IMPL_H +#define PSA_CRYPTO_RANDOM_IMPL_H + +#include "psa_util_internal.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG) + +typedef mbedtls_psa_external_random_context_t mbedtls_psa_random_context_t; + +#else /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG */ + +#include "mbedtls/entropy.h" + +/* Choose a DRBG based on configuration and availability */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_HMAC_DRBG_MD_TYPE) + +#include "mbedtls/hmac_drbg.h" + +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C) + +#include "mbedtls/ctr_drbg.h" + +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C) + +#include "mbedtls/hmac_drbg.h" +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA512) && defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) +#include +#if SIZE_MAX > 0xffffffff +/* Looks like a 64-bit system, so prefer SHA-512. */ +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_HMAC_DRBG_MD_TYPE MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512 +#else +/* Looks like a 32-bit system, so prefer SHA-256. */ +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_HMAC_DRBG_MD_TYPE MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256 +#endif +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA512) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_HMAC_DRBG_MD_TYPE MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512 +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_HMAC_DRBG_MD_TYPE MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256 +#else +#error "No hash algorithm available for HMAC_DBRG." +#endif + +#else /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_HMAC_DRBG_MD_TYPE && !MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C && !MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C*/ + +#error "No DRBG module available for the psa_crypto module." + +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_HMAC_DRBG_MD_TYPE && !MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C && !MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C*/ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C) +#include "mbedtls/ctr_drbg.h" +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C) +#include "mbedtls/hmac_drbg.h" +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C && !MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C */ + +/* The maximum number of bytes that mbedtls_psa_get_random() is expected to return. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_MAX_REQUEST MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_REQUEST +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_MAX_REQUEST MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_REQUEST +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C) +typedef mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context mbedtls_psa_drbg_context_t; +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C) +typedef mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context mbedtls_psa_drbg_context_t; +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C && !MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C */ + +typedef struct { + void (* entropy_init)(mbedtls_entropy_context *ctx); + void (* entropy_free)(mbedtls_entropy_context *ctx); + mbedtls_entropy_context entropy; + mbedtls_psa_drbg_context_t drbg; +} mbedtls_psa_random_context_t; + +/** Initialize the PSA DRBG. + * + * \param p_rng Pointer to the Mbed TLS DRBG state. + */ +static inline void mbedtls_psa_drbg_init(mbedtls_psa_drbg_context_t *p_rng) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C) + mbedtls_ctr_drbg_init(p_rng); +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C) + mbedtls_hmac_drbg_init(p_rng); +#endif +} + +/** Deinitialize the PSA DRBG. + * + * \param p_rng Pointer to the Mbed TLS DRBG state. + */ +static inline void mbedtls_psa_drbg_free(mbedtls_psa_drbg_context_t *p_rng) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C) + mbedtls_ctr_drbg_free(p_rng); +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C) + mbedtls_hmac_drbg_free(p_rng); +#endif +} + +/** Seed the PSA DRBG. + * + * \param entropy An entropy context to read the seed from. + * \param custom The personalization string. + * This can be \c NULL, in which case the personalization + * string is empty regardless of the value of \p len. + * \param len The length of the personalization string. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return An Mbed TLS error code (\c MBEDTLS_ERR_xxx) on failure. + */ +static inline int mbedtls_psa_drbg_seed(mbedtls_psa_drbg_context_t *drbg_ctx, + mbedtls_entropy_context *entropy, + const unsigned char *custom, size_t len) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C) + return mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed(drbg_ctx, mbedtls_entropy_func, entropy, custom, len); +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C) + const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type(MBEDTLS_PSA_HMAC_DRBG_MD_TYPE); + return mbedtls_hmac_drbg_seed(drbg_ctx, md_info, mbedtls_entropy_func, entropy, custom, len); +#endif +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG */ + +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_RANDOM_IMPL_H */ diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_rsa.h b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_rsa.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..6d695ddf502d --- /dev/null +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_rsa.h @@ -0,0 +1,329 @@ +/* + * PSA RSA layer on top of Mbed TLS crypto + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +#ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_RSA_H +#define PSA_CRYPTO_RSA_H + +#include +#include + +/** Load the contents of a key buffer into an internal RSA representation + * + * \param[in] type The type of key contained in \p data. + * \param[in] data The buffer from which to load the representation. + * \param[in] data_length The size in bytes of \p data. + * \param[out] p_rsa Returns a pointer to an RSA context on success. + * The caller is responsible for freeing both the + * contents of the context and the context itself + * when done. + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_rsa_load_representation(psa_key_type_t type, + const uint8_t *data, + size_t data_length, + mbedtls_rsa_context **p_rsa); + +/** Import an RSA key in binary format. + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver + * import_key entry point. This function behaves as an import_key + * entry point as defined in the PSA driver interface specification for + * transparent drivers. + * + * \param[in] attributes The attributes for the key to import. + * \param[in] data The buffer containing the key data in import + * format. + * \param[in] data_length Size of the \p data buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] key_buffer The buffer containing the key data in output + * format. + * \param[in] key_buffer_size Size of the \p key_buffer buffer in bytes. This + * size is greater or equal to \p data_length. + * \param[out] key_buffer_length The length of the data written in \p + * key_buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] bits The key size in number of bits. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS The RSA key was imported successfully. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * The key data is not correctly formatted. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_rsa_import_key( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *data, size_t data_length, + uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + size_t *key_buffer_length, size_t *bits); + +/** Export an RSA key to export representation + * + * \param[in] type The type of key (public/private) to export + * \param[in] rsa The internal RSA representation from which to export + * \param[out] data The buffer to export to + * \param[in] data_size The length of the buffer to export to + * \param[out] data_length The amount of bytes written to \p data + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_rsa_export_key(psa_key_type_t type, + mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa, + uint8_t *data, + size_t data_size, + size_t *data_length); + +/** Export a public RSA key or the public part of an RSA key pair in binary + * format. + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver + * export_public_key entry point. This function behaves as an + * export_public_key entry point as defined in the PSA driver interface + * specification. + * + * \param[in] attributes The attributes for the key to export. + * \param[in] key_buffer Material or context of the key to export. + * \param[in] key_buffer_size Size of the \p key_buffer buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] data Buffer where the key data is to be written. + * \param[in] data_size Size of the \p data buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] data_length On success, the number of bytes written in + * \p data. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS The RSA public key was exported successfully. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_rsa_export_public_key( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + uint8_t *data, size_t data_size, size_t *data_length); + +/** + * \brief Generate an RSA key. + * + * \note The signature of the function is that of a PSA driver generate_key + * entry point. + * + * \param[in] attributes The attributes for the RSA key to generate. + * \param[in] params Production parameters for the key + * generation. This function only uses + * `params->data`, + * which contains the public exponent. + * This can be a null pointer if + * \c params_data_length is 0. + * \param params_data_length Length of `params->data` in bytes. + * This can be 0, in which case the + * public exponent will be 65537. + * \param[out] key_buffer Buffer where the key data is to be written. + * \param[in] key_buffer_size Size of \p key_buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] key_buffer_length On success, the number of bytes written in + * \p key_buffer. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * The key was successfully generated. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * Key length or type not supported. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL + * The size of \p key_buffer is too small. + */ +#ifndef __cplusplus +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_rsa_generate_key( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const psa_key_production_parameters_t *params, size_t params_data_length, + uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, size_t *key_buffer_length); +#endif + +/** Sign an already-calculated hash with an RSA private key. + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver + * sign_hash entry point. This function behaves as a sign_hash + * entry point as defined in the PSA driver interface specification for + * transparent drivers. + * + * \param[in] attributes The attributes of the RSA key to use for the + * operation. + * \param[in] key_buffer The buffer containing the RSA key context. + * format. + * \param[in] key_buffer_size Size of the \p key_buffer buffer in bytes. + * \param[in] alg A signature algorithm that is compatible with + * an RSA key. + * \param[in] hash The hash or message to sign. + * \param[in] hash_length Size of the \p hash buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] signature Buffer where the signature is to be written. + * \param[in] signature_size Size of the \p signature buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] signature_length On success, the number of bytes + * that make up the returned signature value. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL + * The size of the \p signature buffer is too small. You can + * determine a sufficient buffer size by calling + * #PSA_SIGN_OUTPUT_SIZE(\c PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR, \c key_bits, + * \p alg) where \c key_bits is the bit-size of the RSA key. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY \emptydescription + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_rsa_sign_hash( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, const uint8_t *hash, size_t hash_length, + uint8_t *signature, size_t signature_size, size_t *signature_length); + +/** + * \brief Verify the signature a hash or short message using a public RSA key. + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver + * verify_hash entry point. This function behaves as a verify_hash + * entry point as defined in the PSA driver interface specification for + * transparent drivers. + * + * \param[in] attributes The attributes of the RSA key to use for the + * operation. + * \param[in] key_buffer The buffer containing the RSA key context. + * format. + * \param[in] key_buffer_size Size of the \p key_buffer buffer in bytes. + * \param[in] alg A signature algorithm that is compatible with + * an RSA key. + * \param[in] hash The hash or message whose signature is to be + * verified. + * \param[in] hash_length Size of the \p hash buffer in bytes. + * \param[in] signature Buffer containing the signature to verify. + * \param[in] signature_length Size of the \p signature buffer in bytes. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * The signature is valid. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE + * The calculation was performed successfully, but the passed + * signature is not a valid signature. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_rsa_verify_hash( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, const uint8_t *hash, size_t hash_length, + const uint8_t *signature, size_t signature_length); + +/** + * \brief Encrypt a short message with a public key. + * + * \param attributes The attributes for the key to import. + * \param key_buffer Buffer where the key data is to be written. + * \param key_buffer_size Size of the \p key_buffer buffer in bytes. + * \param input_length Size of the \p input buffer in bytes. + * \param[in] salt A salt or label, if supported by the + * encryption algorithm. + * If the algorithm does not support a + * salt, pass \c NULL. + * If the algorithm supports an optional + * salt and you do not want to pass a salt, + * pass \c NULL. + * + * - For #PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT, no salt is + * supported. + * \param salt_length Size of the \p salt buffer in bytes. + * If \p salt is \c NULL, pass 0. + * \param[out] output Buffer where the encrypted message is to + * be written. + * \param output_size Size of the \p output buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] output_length On success, the number of bytes + * that make up the returned output. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL + * The size of the \p output buffer is too small. You can + * determine a sufficient buffer size by calling + * #PSA_ASYMMETRIC_ENCRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE(\c key_type, \c key_bits, \p alg) + * where \c key_type and \c key_bits are the type and bit-size + * respectively of \p key. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_asymmetric_encrypt(const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length, + const uint8_t *salt, + size_t salt_length, + uint8_t *output, + size_t output_size, + size_t *output_length); + +/** + * \brief Decrypt a short message with a private key. + * + * \param attributes The attributes for the key to import. + * \param key_buffer Buffer where the key data is to be written. + * \param key_buffer_size Size of the \p key_buffer buffer in bytes. + * \param[in] input The message to decrypt. + * \param input_length Size of the \p input buffer in bytes. + * \param[in] salt A salt or label, if supported by the + * encryption algorithm. + * If the algorithm does not support a + * salt, pass \c NULL. + * If the algorithm supports an optional + * salt and you do not want to pass a salt, + * pass \c NULL. + * + * - For #PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT, no salt is + * supported. + * \param salt_length Size of the \p salt buffer in bytes. + * If \p salt is \c NULL, pass 0. + * \param[out] output Buffer where the decrypted message is to + * be written. + * \param output_size Size of the \c output buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] output_length On success, the number of bytes + * that make up the returned output. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL + * The size of the \p output buffer is too small. You can + * determine a sufficient buffer size by calling + * #PSA_ASYMMETRIC_DECRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE(\c key_type, \c key_bits, \p alg) + * where \c key_type and \c key_bits are the type and bit-size + * respectively of \p key. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_PADDING \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_asymmetric_decrypt(const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length, + const uint8_t *salt, + size_t salt_length, + uint8_t *output, + size_t output_size, + size_t *output_length); + +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_RSA_H */ diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_se.h b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_se.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..e0bd5acfb3ab --- /dev/null +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_se.h @@ -0,0 +1,192 @@ +/* + * PSA crypto support for secure element drivers + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +#ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_SE_H +#define PSA_CRYPTO_SE_H + +/* + * Include the build-time configuration information header. Here, we do not + * include `"mbedtls/build_info.h"` directly but `"psa/build_info.h"`, which + * is basically just an alias to it. This is to ease the maintenance of the + * TF-PSA-Crypto repository which has a different build system and + * configuration. + */ +#include "psa/build_info.h" + +#include "psa/crypto.h" +#include "psa/crypto_se_driver.h" + +/** The maximum location value that this implementation supports + * for a secure element. + * + * This is not a characteristic that each PSA implementation has, but a + * limitation of the current implementation due to the constraints imposed + * by storage. See #PSA_CRYPTO_SE_DRIVER_ITS_UID_BASE. + * + * The minimum location value for a secure element is 1, like on any + * PSA implementation (0 means a transparent key). + */ +#define PSA_MAX_SE_LOCATION 255 + +/** The base of the range of ITS file identifiers for secure element + * driver persistent data. + * + * We use a slice of the implementation reserved range 0xffff0000..0xffffffff, + * specifically the range 0xfffffe00..0xfffffeff. The length of this range + * drives the value of #PSA_MAX_SE_LOCATION. The identifier 0xfffffe00 is + * actually not used since it corresponds to #PSA_KEY_LOCATION_LOCAL_STORAGE + * which doesn't have a driver. + */ +#define PSA_CRYPTO_SE_DRIVER_ITS_UID_BASE ((psa_key_id_t) 0xfffffe00) + +/** The maximum number of registered secure element driver locations. */ +#define PSA_MAX_SE_DRIVERS 4 + +/** Unregister all secure element drivers. + * + * \warning Do not call this function while the library is in the initialized + * state. This function is only intended to be called at the end + * of mbedtls_psa_crypto_free(). + */ +void psa_unregister_all_se_drivers(void); + +/** Initialize all secure element drivers. + * + * Called from psa_crypto_init(). + */ +psa_status_t psa_init_all_se_drivers(void); + +/** A structure that describes a registered secure element driver. + * + * A secure element driver table entry contains a pointer to the + * driver's method table as well as the driver context structure. + */ +typedef struct psa_se_drv_table_entry_s psa_se_drv_table_entry_t; + +/** Return the secure element driver information for a lifetime value. + * + * \param lifetime The lifetime value to query. + * \param[out] p_methods On output, if there is a driver, + * \c *methods points to its method table. + * Otherwise \c *methods is \c NULL. + * \param[out] p_drv_context On output, if there is a driver, + * \c *drv_context points to its context + * structure. + * Otherwise \c *drv_context is \c NULL. + * + * \retval 1 + * \p lifetime corresponds to a registered driver. + * \retval 0 + * \p lifetime does not correspond to a registered driver. + */ +int psa_get_se_driver(psa_key_lifetime_t lifetime, + const psa_drv_se_t **p_methods, + psa_drv_se_context_t **p_drv_context); + +/** Return the secure element driver table entry for a lifetime value. + * + * \param lifetime The lifetime value to query. + * + * \return The driver table entry for \p lifetime, or + * \p NULL if \p lifetime does not correspond to a registered driver. + */ +psa_se_drv_table_entry_t *psa_get_se_driver_entry( + psa_key_lifetime_t lifetime); + +/** Return the method table for a secure element driver. + * + * \param[in] driver The driver table entry to access, or \c NULL. + * + * \return The driver's method table. + * \c NULL if \p driver is \c NULL. + */ +const psa_drv_se_t *psa_get_se_driver_methods( + const psa_se_drv_table_entry_t *driver); + +/** Return the context of a secure element driver. + * + * \param[in] driver The driver table entry to access, or \c NULL. + * + * \return A pointer to the driver context. + * \c NULL if \p driver is \c NULL. + */ +psa_drv_se_context_t *psa_get_se_driver_context( + psa_se_drv_table_entry_t *driver); + +/** Find a free slot for a key that is to be created. + * + * This function calls the relevant method in the driver to find a suitable + * slot for a key with the given attributes. + * + * \param[in] attributes Metadata about the key that is about to be created. + * \param[in] driver The driver table entry to query. + * \param[out] slot_number On success, a slot number that is free in this + * secure element. + */ +psa_status_t psa_find_se_slot_for_key( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + psa_key_creation_method_t method, + psa_se_drv_table_entry_t *driver, + psa_key_slot_number_t *slot_number); + +/** Destroy a key in a secure element. + * + * This function calls the relevant driver method to destroy a key + * and updates the driver's persistent data. + */ +psa_status_t psa_destroy_se_key(psa_se_drv_table_entry_t *driver, + psa_key_slot_number_t slot_number); + +/** Load the persistent data of a secure element driver. + * + * \param driver The driver table entry containing the persistent + * data to load from storage. + * + * \return #PSA_SUCCESS + * \return #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * \return #PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST + * \return #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE + * \return #PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT + * \return #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + */ +psa_status_t psa_load_se_persistent_data( + const psa_se_drv_table_entry_t *driver); + +/** Save the persistent data of a secure element driver. + * + * \param[in] driver The driver table entry containing the persistent + * data to save to storage. + * + * \return #PSA_SUCCESS + * \return #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * \return #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED + * \return #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * \return #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_STORAGE + * \return #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE + * \return #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + */ +psa_status_t psa_save_se_persistent_data( + const psa_se_drv_table_entry_t *driver); + +/** Destroy the persistent data of a secure element driver. + * + * This is currently only used for testing. + * + * \param[in] location The location identifier for the driver whose + * persistent data is to be erased. + */ +psa_status_t psa_destroy_se_persistent_data(psa_key_location_t location); + + +/** The storage representation of a key whose data is in a secure element. + */ +typedef struct { + uint8_t slot_number[sizeof(psa_key_slot_number_t)]; +} psa_se_key_data_storage_t; + +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_SE_H */ diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_slot_management.h b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_slot_management.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..bcfc9d8adc77 --- /dev/null +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_slot_management.h @@ -0,0 +1,285 @@ +/* + * PSA crypto layer on top of Mbed TLS crypto + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +#ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_SLOT_MANAGEMENT_H +#define PSA_CRYPTO_SLOT_MANAGEMENT_H + +#include "psa/crypto.h" +#include "psa_crypto_core.h" +#include "psa_crypto_se.h" + +/** Range of volatile key identifiers. + * + * The last #MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_SLOT_COUNT identifiers of the implementation + * range of key identifiers are reserved for volatile key identifiers. + * A volatile key identifier is equal to #PSA_KEY_ID_VOLATILE_MIN plus the + * index of the key slot containing the volatile key definition. + */ + +/** The minimum value for a volatile key identifier. + */ +#define PSA_KEY_ID_VOLATILE_MIN (PSA_KEY_ID_VENDOR_MAX - \ + MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_SLOT_COUNT + 1) + +/** The maximum value for a volatile key identifier. + */ +#define PSA_KEY_ID_VOLATILE_MAX PSA_KEY_ID_VENDOR_MAX + +/** Test whether a key identifier is a volatile key identifier. + * + * \param key_id Key identifier to test. + * + * \retval 1 + * The key identifier is a volatile key identifier. + * \retval 0 + * The key identifier is not a volatile key identifier. + */ +static inline int psa_key_id_is_volatile(psa_key_id_t key_id) +{ + return (key_id >= PSA_KEY_ID_VOLATILE_MIN) && + (key_id <= PSA_KEY_ID_VOLATILE_MAX); +} + +/** Get the description of a key given its identifier and lock it. + * + * The descriptions of volatile keys and loaded persistent keys are stored in + * key slots. This function returns a pointer to the key slot containing the + * description of a key given its identifier. + * + * In case of a persistent key, the function loads the description of the key + * into a key slot if not already done. + * + * On success, the returned key slot has been registered for reading. + * It is the responsibility of the caller to call psa_unregister_read(slot) + * when they have finished reading the contents of the slot. + * + * \param key Key identifier to query. + * \param[out] p_slot On success, `*p_slot` contains a pointer to the + * key slot containing the description of the key + * identified by \p key. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * \p *p_slot contains a pointer to the key slot containing the + * description of the key identified by \p key. + * The key slot counter has been incremented. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The library has not been initialized. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE + * \p key is not a valid key identifier. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \p key is a persistent key identifier. The implementation does not + * have sufficient resources to load the persistent key. This can be + * due to a lack of empty key slot, or available memory. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST + * There is no key with key identifier \p key. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT \emptydescription + */ +psa_status_t psa_get_and_lock_key_slot(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + psa_key_slot_t **p_slot); + +/** Initialize the key slot structures. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Currently this function always succeeds. + */ +psa_status_t psa_initialize_key_slots(void); + +/** Delete all data from key slots in memory. + * This function is not thread safe, it wipes every key slot regardless of + * state and reader count. It should only be called when no slot is in use. + * + * This does not affect persistent storage. */ +void psa_wipe_all_key_slots(void); + +/** Find a free key slot and reserve it to be filled with a key. + * + * This function finds a key slot that is free, + * sets its state to PSA_SLOT_FILLING and then returns the slot. + * + * On success, the key slot's state is PSA_SLOT_FILLING. + * It is the responsibility of the caller to change the slot's state to + * PSA_SLOT_EMPTY/FULL once key creation has finished. + * + * If multi-threading is enabled, the caller must hold the + * global key slot mutex. + * + * \param[out] volatile_key_id On success, volatile key identifier + * associated to the returned slot. + * \param[out] p_slot On success, a pointer to the slot. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * There were no free key slots. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * This function attempted to operate on a key slot which was in an + * unexpected state. + */ +psa_status_t psa_reserve_free_key_slot(psa_key_id_t *volatile_key_id, + psa_key_slot_t **p_slot); + +/** Change the state of a key slot. + * + * This function changes the state of the key slot from expected_state to + * new state. If the state of the slot was not expected_state, the state is + * unchanged. + * + * If multi-threading is enabled, the caller must hold the + * global key slot mutex. + * + * \param[in] slot The key slot. + * \param[in] expected_state The current state of the slot. + * \param[in] new_state The new state of the slot. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + The key slot's state variable is new_state. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * The slot's state was not expected_state. + */ +static inline psa_status_t psa_key_slot_state_transition( + psa_key_slot_t *slot, psa_key_slot_state_t expected_state, + psa_key_slot_state_t new_state) +{ + if (slot->state != expected_state) { + return PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + } + slot->state = new_state; + return PSA_SUCCESS; +} + +/** Register as a reader of a key slot. + * + * This function increments the key slot registered reader counter by one. + * If multi-threading is enabled, the caller must hold the + * global key slot mutex. + * + * \param[in] slot The key slot. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + The key slot registered reader counter was incremented. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * The reader counter already reached its maximum value and was not + * increased, or the slot's state was not PSA_SLOT_FULL. + */ +static inline psa_status_t psa_register_read(psa_key_slot_t *slot) +{ + if ((slot->state != PSA_SLOT_FULL) || + (slot->registered_readers >= SIZE_MAX)) { + return PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + } + slot->registered_readers++; + + return PSA_SUCCESS; +} + +/** Unregister from reading a key slot. + * + * This function decrements the key slot registered reader counter by one. + * If the state of the slot is PSA_SLOT_PENDING_DELETION, + * and there is only one registered reader (the caller), + * this function will call psa_wipe_key_slot(). + * If multi-threading is enabled, the caller must hold the + * global key slot mutex. + * + * \note To ease the handling of errors in retrieving a key slot + * a NULL input pointer is valid, and the function returns + * successfully without doing anything in that case. + * + * \param[in] slot The key slot. + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * \p slot is NULL or the key slot reader counter has been + * decremented (and potentially wiped) successfully. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * The slot's state was neither PSA_SLOT_FULL nor + * PSA_SLOT_PENDING_DELETION. + * Or a wipe was attempted and the slot's state was not + * PSA_SLOT_PENDING_DELETION. + * Or registered_readers was equal to 0. + */ +psa_status_t psa_unregister_read(psa_key_slot_t *slot); + +/** Wrap a call to psa_unregister_read in the global key slot mutex. + * + * If threading is disabled, this simply calls psa_unregister_read. + * + * \note To ease the handling of errors in retrieving a key slot + * a NULL input pointer is valid, and the function returns + * successfully without doing anything in that case. + * + * \param[in] slot The key slot. + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * \p slot is NULL or the key slot reader counter has been + * decremented (and potentially wiped) successfully. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * The slot's state was neither PSA_SLOT_FULL nor + * PSA_SLOT_PENDING_DELETION. + * Or a wipe was attempted and the slot's state was not + * PSA_SLOT_PENDING_DELETION. + * Or registered_readers was equal to 0. + */ +psa_status_t psa_unregister_read_under_mutex(psa_key_slot_t *slot); + +/** Test whether a lifetime designates a key in an external cryptoprocessor. + * + * \param lifetime The lifetime to test. + * + * \retval 1 + * The lifetime designates an external key. There should be a + * registered driver for this lifetime, otherwise the key cannot + * be created or manipulated. + * \retval 0 + * The lifetime designates a key that is volatile or in internal + * storage. + */ +static inline int psa_key_lifetime_is_external(psa_key_lifetime_t lifetime) +{ + return PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION(lifetime) + != PSA_KEY_LOCATION_LOCAL_STORAGE; +} + +/** Validate a key's location. + * + * This function checks whether the key's attributes point to a location that + * is known to the PSA Core, and returns the driver function table if the key + * is to be found in an external location. + * + * \param[in] lifetime The key lifetime attribute. + * \param[out] p_drv On success, when a key is located in external + * storage, returns a pointer to the driver table + * associated with the key's storage location. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT \emptydescription + */ +psa_status_t psa_validate_key_location(psa_key_lifetime_t lifetime, + psa_se_drv_table_entry_t **p_drv); + +/** Validate the persistence of a key. + * + * \param[in] lifetime The key lifetime attribute. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED The key is persistent but persistent keys + * are not supported. + */ +psa_status_t psa_validate_key_persistence(psa_key_lifetime_t lifetime); + +/** Validate a key identifier. + * + * \param[in] key The key identifier. + * \param[in] vendor_ok Non-zero to indicate that key identifiers in the + * vendor range are allowed, volatile key identifiers + * excepted \c 0 otherwise. + * + * \retval <> 0 if the key identifier is valid, 0 otherwise. + */ +int psa_is_valid_key_id(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, int vendor_ok); + +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_SLOT_MANAGEMENT_H */ diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_storage.h b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_storage.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..d7f5b1895397 --- /dev/null +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_storage.h @@ -0,0 +1,385 @@ +/** + * \file psa_crypto_storage.h + * + * \brief PSA cryptography module: Mbed TLS key storage + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +#ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_H +#define PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_H + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +#include "psa/crypto.h" +#include "psa/crypto_se_driver.h" + +#include +#include + +/* Limit the maximum key size in storage. This should have no effect + * since the key size is limited in memory. */ +#define PSA_CRYPTO_MAX_STORAGE_SIZE (PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(PSA_MAX_KEY_BITS)) +/* Sanity check: a file size must fit in 32 bits. Allow a generous + * 64kB of metadata. */ +#if PSA_CRYPTO_MAX_STORAGE_SIZE > 0xffff0000 +#error "PSA_CRYPTO_MAX_STORAGE_SIZE > 0xffff0000" +#endif + +/** The maximum permitted persistent slot number. + * + * In Mbed Crypto 0.1.0b: + * - Using the file backend, all key ids are ok except 0. + * - Using the ITS backend, all key ids are ok except 0xFFFFFF52 + * (#PSA_CRYPTO_ITS_RANDOM_SEED_UID) for which the file contains the + * device's random seed (if this feature is enabled). + * - Only key ids from 1 to #MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_SLOT_COUNT are actually used. + * + * Since we need to preserve the random seed, avoid using that key slot. + * Reserve a whole range of key slots just in case something else comes up. + * + * This limitation will probably become moot when we implement client + * separation for key storage. + */ +#define PSA_MAX_PERSISTENT_KEY_IDENTIFIER PSA_KEY_ID_VENDOR_MAX + +/** + * \brief Checks if persistent data is stored for the given key slot number + * + * This function checks if any key data or metadata exists for the key slot in + * the persistent storage. + * + * \param key Persistent identifier to check. + * + * \retval 0 + * No persistent data present for slot number + * \retval 1 + * Persistent data present for slot number + */ +int psa_is_key_present_in_storage(const mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key); + +/** + * \brief Format key data and metadata and save to a location for given key + * slot. + * + * This function formats the key data and metadata and saves it to a + * persistent storage backend. The storage location corresponding to the + * key slot must be empty, otherwise this function will fail. This function + * should be called after loading the key into an internal slot to ensure the + * persistent key is not saved into a storage location corresponding to an + * already occupied non-persistent key, as well as ensuring the key data is + * validated. + * + * Note: This function will only succeed for key buffers which are not + * empty. If passed a NULL pointer or zero-length, the function will fail + * with #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT. + * + * \param[in] attr The attributes of the key to save. + * The key identifier field in the attributes + * determines the key's location. + * \param[in] data Buffer containing the key data. + * \param data_length The number of bytes that make up the key data. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_STORAGE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT \emptydescription + */ +psa_status_t psa_save_persistent_key(const psa_key_attributes_t *attr, + const uint8_t *data, + const size_t data_length); + +/** + * \brief Parses key data and metadata and load persistent key for given + * key slot number. + * + * This function reads from a storage backend, parses the key data and + * metadata and writes them to the appropriate output parameters. + * + * Note: This function allocates a buffer and returns a pointer to it through + * the data parameter. On successful return, the pointer is guaranteed to be + * valid and the buffer contains at least one byte of data. + * psa_free_persistent_key_data() must be called on the data buffer + * afterwards to zeroize and free this buffer. + * + * \param[in,out] attr On input, the key identifier field identifies + * the key to load. Other fields are ignored. + * On success, the attribute structure contains + * the key metadata that was loaded from storage. + * \param[out] data Pointer to an allocated key data buffer on return. + * \param[out] data_length The number of bytes that make up the key data. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST \emptydescription + */ +psa_status_t psa_load_persistent_key(psa_key_attributes_t *attr, + uint8_t **data, + size_t *data_length); + +/** + * \brief Remove persistent data for the given key slot number. + * + * \param key Persistent identifier of the key to remove + * from persistent storage. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * The key was successfully removed, + * or the key did not exist. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID \emptydescription + */ +psa_status_t psa_destroy_persistent_key(const mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key); + +/** + * \brief Free the temporary buffer allocated by psa_load_persistent_key(). + * + * This function must be called at some point after psa_load_persistent_key() + * to zeroize and free the memory allocated to the buffer in that function. + * + * \param key_data Buffer for the key data. + * \param key_data_length Size of the key data buffer. + * + */ +void psa_free_persistent_key_data(uint8_t *key_data, size_t key_data_length); + +/** + * \brief Formats key data and metadata for persistent storage + * + * \param[in] data Buffer containing the key data. + * \param data_length Length of the key data buffer. + * \param[in] attr The core attributes of the key. + * \param[out] storage_data Output buffer for the formatted data. + * + */ +void psa_format_key_data_for_storage(const uint8_t *data, + const size_t data_length, + const psa_key_attributes_t *attr, + uint8_t *storage_data); + +/** + * \brief Parses persistent storage data into key data and metadata + * + * \param[in] storage_data Buffer for the storage data. + * \param storage_data_length Length of the storage data buffer + * \param[out] key_data On output, pointer to a newly allocated buffer + * containing the key data. This must be freed + * using psa_free_persistent_key_data() + * \param[out] key_data_length Length of the key data buffer + * \param[out] attr On success, the attribute structure is filled + * with the loaded key metadata. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID \emptydescription + */ +psa_status_t psa_parse_key_data_from_storage(const uint8_t *storage_data, + size_t storage_data_length, + uint8_t **key_data, + size_t *key_data_length, + psa_key_attributes_t *attr); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C) +/** This symbol is defined if transaction support is required. */ +#define PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_HAS_TRANSACTIONS 1 +#endif + +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_HAS_TRANSACTIONS) + +/** The type of transaction that is in progress. + */ +/* This is an integer type rather than an enum for two reasons: to support + * unknown values when loading a transaction file, and to ensure that the + * type has a known size. + */ +typedef uint16_t psa_crypto_transaction_type_t; + +/** No transaction is in progress. + * + * This has the value 0, so zero-initialization sets a transaction's type to + * this value. + */ +#define PSA_CRYPTO_TRANSACTION_NONE ((psa_crypto_transaction_type_t) 0x0000) + +/** A key creation transaction. + * + * This is only used for keys in an external cryptoprocessor (secure element). + * Keys in RAM or in internal storage are created atomically in storage + * (simple file creation), so they do not need a transaction mechanism. + */ +#define PSA_CRYPTO_TRANSACTION_CREATE_KEY ((psa_crypto_transaction_type_t) 0x0001) + +/** A key destruction transaction. + * + * This is only used for keys in an external cryptoprocessor (secure element). + * Keys in RAM or in internal storage are destroyed atomically in storage + * (simple file deletion), so they do not need a transaction mechanism. + */ +#define PSA_CRYPTO_TRANSACTION_DESTROY_KEY ((psa_crypto_transaction_type_t) 0x0002) + +/** Transaction data. + * + * This type is designed to be serialized by writing the memory representation + * and reading it back on the same device. + * + * \note The transaction mechanism is not thread-safe. There can only be one + * single active transaction at a time. + * The transaction object is #psa_crypto_transaction. + * + * \note If an API call starts a transaction, it must complete this transaction + * before returning to the application. + * + * The lifetime of a transaction is the following (note that only one + * transaction may be active at a time): + * + * -# Call psa_crypto_prepare_transaction() to initialize the transaction + * object in memory and declare the type of transaction that is starting. + * -# Fill in the type-specific fields of #psa_crypto_transaction. + * -# Call psa_crypto_save_transaction() to start the transaction. This + * saves the transaction data to internal storage. + * -# Perform the work of the transaction by modifying files, contacting + * external entities, or whatever needs doing. Note that the transaction + * may be interrupted by a power failure, so you need to have a way + * recover from interruptions either by undoing what has been done + * so far or by resuming where you left off. + * -# If there are intermediate stages in the transaction, update + * the fields of #psa_crypto_transaction and call + * psa_crypto_save_transaction() again when each stage is reached. + * -# When the transaction is over, call psa_crypto_stop_transaction() to + * remove the transaction data in storage and in memory. + * + * If the system crashes while a transaction is in progress, psa_crypto_init() + * calls psa_crypto_load_transaction() and takes care of completing or + * rewinding the transaction. This is done in psa_crypto_recover_transaction() + * in psa_crypto.c. If you add a new type of transaction, be + * sure to add code for it in psa_crypto_recover_transaction(). + */ +typedef union { + /* Each element of this union must have the following properties + * to facilitate serialization and deserialization: + * + * - The element is a struct. + * - The first field of the struct is `psa_crypto_transaction_type_t type`. + * - Elements of the struct are arranged such a way that there is + * no padding. + */ + struct psa_crypto_transaction_unknown_s { + psa_crypto_transaction_type_t type; + uint16_t unused1; + uint32_t unused2; + uint64_t unused3; + uint64_t unused4; + } unknown; + /* ::type is #PSA_CRYPTO_TRANSACTION_CREATE_KEY or + * #PSA_CRYPTO_TRANSACTION_DESTROY_KEY. */ + struct psa_crypto_transaction_key_s { + psa_crypto_transaction_type_t type; + uint16_t unused1; + psa_key_lifetime_t lifetime; + psa_key_slot_number_t slot; + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t id; + } key; +} psa_crypto_transaction_t; + +/** The single active transaction. + */ +extern psa_crypto_transaction_t psa_crypto_transaction; + +/** Prepare for a transaction. + * + * There must not be an ongoing transaction. + * + * \param type The type of transaction to start. + */ +static inline void psa_crypto_prepare_transaction( + psa_crypto_transaction_type_t type) +{ + psa_crypto_transaction.unknown.type = type; +} + +/** Save the transaction data to storage. + * + * You may call this function multiple times during a transaction to + * atomically update the transaction state. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_STORAGE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription + */ +psa_status_t psa_crypto_save_transaction(void); + +/** Load the transaction data from storage, if any. + * + * This function is meant to be called from psa_crypto_init() to recover + * in case a transaction was interrupted by a system crash. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * The data about the ongoing transaction has been loaded to + * #psa_crypto_transaction. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST + * There is no ongoing transaction. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT \emptydescription + */ +psa_status_t psa_crypto_load_transaction(void); + +/** Indicate that the current transaction is finished. + * + * Call this function at the very end of transaction processing. + * This function does not "commit" or "abort" the transaction: the storage + * subsystem has no concept of "commit" and "abort", just saving and + * removing the transaction information in storage. + * + * This function erases the transaction data in storage (if any) and + * resets the transaction data in memory. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * There was transaction data in storage. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST + * There was no transaction data in storage. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE + * It was impossible to determine whether there was transaction data + * in storage, or the transaction data could not be erased. + */ +psa_status_t psa_crypto_stop_transaction(void); + +/** The ITS file identifier for the transaction data. + * + * 0xffffffNN = special file; 0x74 = 't' for transaction. + */ +#define PSA_CRYPTO_ITS_TRANSACTION_UID ((psa_key_id_t) 0xffffff74) + +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_HAS_TRANSACTIONS */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_INJECT_ENTROPY) +/** Backend side of mbedtls_psa_inject_entropy(). + * + * This function stores the supplied data into the entropy seed file. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_STORAGE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED + * The entropy seed file already exists. + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_storage_inject_entropy(const unsigned char *seed, + size_t seed_size); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_INJECT_ENTROPY */ + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_H */ diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/psa_util_internal.h b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/psa_util_internal.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..70a08a02cd8e --- /dev/null +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/psa_util_internal.h @@ -0,0 +1,100 @@ +/** + * \file psa_util_internal.h + * + * \brief Internal utility functions for use of PSA Crypto. + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +#ifndef MBEDTLS_PSA_UTIL_INTERNAL_H +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_UTIL_INTERNAL_H + +/* Include the public header so that users only need one include. */ +#include "mbedtls/psa_util.h" + +#include "psa/crypto.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT) + +/************************************************************************* + * FFDH + ************************************************************************/ + +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_FFDH_PUBKEY_LENGTH \ + PSA_KEY_EXPORT_FFDH_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE(PSA_VENDOR_FFDH_MAX_KEY_BITS) + +/************************************************************************* + * ECC + ************************************************************************/ + +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_LENGTH \ + PSA_KEY_EXPORT_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE(PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS) + +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_KEY_PAIR_LENGTH \ + PSA_KEY_EXPORT_ECC_KEY_PAIR_MAX_SIZE(PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS) + +/************************************************************************* + * Error translation + ************************************************************************/ + +typedef struct { + /* Error codes used by PSA crypto are in -255..-128, fitting in 16 bits. */ + int16_t psa_status; + /* Error codes used by Mbed TLS are in one of the ranges + * -127..-1 (low-level) or -32767..-4096 (high-level with a low-level + * code optionally added), fitting in 16 bits. */ + int16_t mbedtls_error; +} mbedtls_error_pair_t; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_LIGHT) +extern const mbedtls_error_pair_t psa_to_md_errors[4]; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_SOME_PSA) +extern const mbedtls_error_pair_t psa_to_cipher_errors[4]; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_LMS_C) +extern const mbedtls_error_pair_t psa_to_lms_errors[3]; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) +extern const mbedtls_error_pair_t psa_to_ssl_errors[7]; +#endif + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY) || \ + defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_BASIC) +extern const mbedtls_error_pair_t psa_to_pk_rsa_errors[8]; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && \ + defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY) +extern const mbedtls_error_pair_t psa_to_pk_ecdsa_errors[7]; +#endif + +/* Generic fallback function for error translation, + * when the received state was not module-specific. */ +int psa_generic_status_to_mbedtls(psa_status_t status); + +/* This function iterates over provided local error translations, + * and if no match was found - calls the fallback error translation function. */ +int psa_status_to_mbedtls(psa_status_t status, + const mbedtls_error_pair_t *local_translations, + size_t local_errors_num, + int (*fallback_f)(psa_status_t)); + +/* The second out of three-stage error handling functions of the pk module, + * acts as a fallback after RSA / ECDSA error translation, and if no match + * is found, it itself calls psa_generic_status_to_mbedtls. */ +int psa_pk_status_to_mbedtls(psa_status_t status); + +/* Utility macro to shorten the defines of error translator in modules. */ +#define PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR_LIST(status, error_list, fallback_f) \ + psa_status_to_mbedtls(status, error_list, \ + sizeof(error_list)/sizeof(error_list[0]), \ + fallback_f) + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_UTIL_INTERNAL_H */ diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ripemd160.c b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ripemd160.c index 3e8ede30510c..b4fc3cdba1fc 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ripemd160.c +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ripemd160.c @@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ void mbedtls_ripemd160_clone(mbedtls_ripemd160_context *dst, /* * RIPEMD-160 context setup */ -int mbedtls_ripemd160_starts_ret(mbedtls_ripemd160_context *ctx) +int mbedtls_ripemd160_starts(mbedtls_ripemd160_context *ctx) { ctx->total[0] = 0; ctx->total[1] = 0; @@ -62,13 +62,6 @@ int mbedtls_ripemd160_starts_ret(mbedtls_ripemd160_context *ctx) return 0; } -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) -void mbedtls_ripemd160_starts(mbedtls_ripemd160_context *ctx) -{ - mbedtls_ripemd160_starts_ret(ctx); -} -#endif - #if !defined(MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_PROCESS_ALT) /* * Process one block @@ -265,21 +258,14 @@ int mbedtls_internal_ripemd160_process(mbedtls_ripemd160_context *ctx, return 0; } -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) -void mbedtls_ripemd160_process(mbedtls_ripemd160_context *ctx, - const unsigned char data[64]) -{ - mbedtls_internal_ripemd160_process(ctx, data); -} -#endif #endif /* !MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_PROCESS_ALT */ /* * RIPEMD-160 process buffer */ -int mbedtls_ripemd160_update_ret(mbedtls_ripemd160_context *ctx, - const unsigned char *input, - size_t ilen) +int mbedtls_ripemd160_update(mbedtls_ripemd160_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *input, + size_t ilen) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t fill; @@ -327,15 +313,6 @@ int mbedtls_ripemd160_update_ret(mbedtls_ripemd160_context *ctx, return 0; } -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) -void mbedtls_ripemd160_update(mbedtls_ripemd160_context *ctx, - const unsigned char *input, - size_t ilen) -{ - mbedtls_ripemd160_update_ret(ctx, input, ilen); -} -#endif - static const unsigned char ripemd160_padding[64] = { 0x80, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, @@ -347,8 +324,8 @@ static const unsigned char ripemd160_padding[64] = /* * RIPEMD-160 final digest */ -int mbedtls_ripemd160_finish_ret(mbedtls_ripemd160_context *ctx, - unsigned char output[20]) +int mbedtls_ripemd160_finish(mbedtls_ripemd160_context *ctx, + unsigned char output[20]) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; uint32_t last, padn; @@ -365,14 +342,14 @@ int mbedtls_ripemd160_finish_ret(mbedtls_ripemd160_context *ctx, last = ctx->total[0] & 0x3F; padn = (last < 56) ? (56 - last) : (120 - last); - ret = mbedtls_ripemd160_update_ret(ctx, ripemd160_padding, padn); + ret = mbedtls_ripemd160_update(ctx, ripemd160_padding, padn); if (ret != 0) { - return ret; + goto exit; } - ret = mbedtls_ripemd160_update_ret(ctx, msglen, 8); + ret = mbedtls_ripemd160_update(ctx, msglen, 8); if (ret != 0) { - return ret; + goto exit; } MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_LE(ctx->state[0], output, 0); @@ -381,40 +358,36 @@ int mbedtls_ripemd160_finish_ret(mbedtls_ripemd160_context *ctx, MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_LE(ctx->state[3], output, 12); MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_LE(ctx->state[4], output, 16); - return 0; -} + ret = 0; -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) -void mbedtls_ripemd160_finish(mbedtls_ripemd160_context *ctx, - unsigned char output[20]) -{ - mbedtls_ripemd160_finish_ret(ctx, output); +exit: + mbedtls_ripemd160_free(ctx); + return ret; } -#endif #endif /* ! MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_ALT */ /* * output = RIPEMD-160( input buffer ) */ -int mbedtls_ripemd160_ret(const unsigned char *input, - size_t ilen, - unsigned char output[20]) +int mbedtls_ripemd160(const unsigned char *input, + size_t ilen, + unsigned char output[20]) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; mbedtls_ripemd160_context ctx; mbedtls_ripemd160_init(&ctx); - if ((ret = mbedtls_ripemd160_starts_ret(&ctx)) != 0) { + if ((ret = mbedtls_ripemd160_starts(&ctx)) != 0) { goto exit; } - if ((ret = mbedtls_ripemd160_update_ret(&ctx, input, ilen)) != 0) { + if ((ret = mbedtls_ripemd160_update(&ctx, input, ilen)) != 0) { goto exit; } - if ((ret = mbedtls_ripemd160_finish_ret(&ctx, output)) != 0) { + if ((ret = mbedtls_ripemd160_finish(&ctx, output)) != 0) { goto exit; } @@ -424,15 +397,6 @@ int mbedtls_ripemd160_ret(const unsigned char *input, return ret; } -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) -void mbedtls_ripemd160(const unsigned char *input, - size_t ilen, - unsigned char output[20]) -{ - mbedtls_ripemd160_ret(input, ilen, output); -} -#endif - #if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) /* * Test vectors from the RIPEMD-160 paper and @@ -491,8 +455,8 @@ int mbedtls_ripemd160_self_test(int verbose) mbedtls_printf(" RIPEMD-160 test #%d: ", i + 1); } - ret = mbedtls_ripemd160_ret(ripemd160_test_str[i], - ripemd160_test_strlen[i], output); + ret = mbedtls_ripemd160(ripemd160_test_str[i], + ripemd160_test_strlen[i], output); if (ret != 0) { goto fail; } diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/rsa.c b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/rsa.c index 0a0c2e388097..7eb4a259ea8c 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/rsa.c +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/rsa.c @@ -28,33 +28,545 @@ #if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) #include "mbedtls/rsa.h" -#include "mbedtls/rsa_internal.h" +#include "bignum_core.h" +#include "rsa_alt_helpers.h" +#include "rsa_internal.h" #include "mbedtls/oid.h" +#include "mbedtls/asn1write.h" #include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" #include "mbedtls/error.h" #include "constant_time_internal.h" #include "mbedtls/constant_time.h" -#include "bignum_internal.h" +#include "md_psa.h" #include -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21) -#include "mbedtls/md.h" -#endif - #if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15) && !defined(__OpenBSD__) && !defined(__NetBSD__) #include #endif #include "mbedtls/platform.h" -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_ALT) +/* + * Wrapper around mbedtls_asn1_get_mpi() that rejects zero. + * + * The value zero is: + * - never a valid value for an RSA parameter + * - interpreted as "omitted, please reconstruct" by mbedtls_rsa_complete(). + * + * Since values can't be omitted in PKCS#1, passing a zero value to + * rsa_complete() would be incorrect, so reject zero values early. + */ +static int asn1_get_nonzero_mpi(unsigned char **p, + const unsigned char *end, + mbedtls_mpi *X) +{ + int ret; + + ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_mpi(p, end, X); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + + if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(X, 0) == 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + return 0; +} + +int mbedtls_rsa_parse_key(mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa, const unsigned char *key, size_t keylen) +{ + int ret, version; + size_t len; + unsigned char *p, *end; + + mbedtls_mpi T; + mbedtls_mpi_init(&T); + + p = (unsigned char *) key; + end = p + keylen; + + /* + * This function parses the RSAPrivateKey (PKCS#1) + * + * RSAPrivateKey ::= SEQUENCE { + * version Version, + * modulus INTEGER, -- n + * publicExponent INTEGER, -- e + * privateExponent INTEGER, -- d + * prime1 INTEGER, -- p + * prime2 INTEGER, -- q + * exponent1 INTEGER, -- d mod (p-1) + * exponent2 INTEGER, -- d mod (q-1) + * coefficient INTEGER, -- (inverse of q) mod p + * otherPrimeInfos OtherPrimeInfos OPTIONAL + * } + */ + if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p, end, &len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + + if (end != p + len) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_int(&p, end, &version)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + + if (version != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + /* Import N */ + if ((ret = asn1_get_nonzero_mpi(&p, end, &T)) != 0 || + (ret = mbedtls_rsa_import(rsa, &T, NULL, NULL, + NULL, NULL)) != 0) { + goto cleanup; + } + + /* Import E */ + if ((ret = asn1_get_nonzero_mpi(&p, end, &T)) != 0 || + (ret = mbedtls_rsa_import(rsa, NULL, NULL, NULL, + NULL, &T)) != 0) { + goto cleanup; + } + + /* Import D */ + if ((ret = asn1_get_nonzero_mpi(&p, end, &T)) != 0 || + (ret = mbedtls_rsa_import(rsa, NULL, NULL, NULL, + &T, NULL)) != 0) { + goto cleanup; + } + + /* Import P */ + if ((ret = asn1_get_nonzero_mpi(&p, end, &T)) != 0 || + (ret = mbedtls_rsa_import(rsa, NULL, &T, NULL, + NULL, NULL)) != 0) { + goto cleanup; + } + + /* Import Q */ + if ((ret = asn1_get_nonzero_mpi(&p, end, &T)) != 0 || + (ret = mbedtls_rsa_import(rsa, NULL, NULL, &T, + NULL, NULL)) != 0) { + goto cleanup; + } + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT) && !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_ALT) + /* + * The RSA CRT parameters DP, DQ and QP are nominally redundant, in + * that they can be easily recomputed from D, P and Q. However by + * parsing them from the PKCS1 structure it is possible to avoid + * recalculating them which both reduces the overhead of loading + * RSA private keys into memory and also avoids side channels which + * can arise when computing those values, since all of D, P, and Q + * are secret. See https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/055 for a + * description of one such attack. + */ + + /* Import DP */ + if ((ret = asn1_get_nonzero_mpi(&p, end, &T)) != 0 || + (ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy(&rsa->DP, &T)) != 0) { + goto cleanup; + } + + /* Import DQ */ + if ((ret = asn1_get_nonzero_mpi(&p, end, &T)) != 0 || + (ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy(&rsa->DQ, &T)) != 0) { + goto cleanup; + } + + /* Import QP */ + if ((ret = asn1_get_nonzero_mpi(&p, end, &T)) != 0 || + (ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy(&rsa->QP, &T)) != 0) { + goto cleanup; + } + +#else + /* Verify existence of the CRT params */ + if ((ret = asn1_get_nonzero_mpi(&p, end, &T)) != 0 || + (ret = asn1_get_nonzero_mpi(&p, end, &T)) != 0 || + (ret = asn1_get_nonzero_mpi(&p, end, &T)) != 0) { + goto cleanup; + } +#endif + + /* rsa_complete() doesn't complete anything with the default + * implementation but is still called: + * - for the benefit of alternative implementation that may want to + * pre-compute stuff beyond what's provided (eg Montgomery factors) + * - as is also sanity-checks the key + * + * Furthermore, we also check the public part for consistency with + * mbedtls_pk_parse_pubkey(), as it includes size minima for example. + */ + if ((ret = mbedtls_rsa_complete(rsa)) != 0 || + (ret = mbedtls_rsa_check_pubkey(rsa)) != 0) { + goto cleanup; + } + + if (p != end) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH; + } + +cleanup: + + mbedtls_mpi_free(&T); -/* Parameter validation macros */ -#define RSA_VALIDATE_RET(cond) \ - MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE_RET(cond, MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA) -#define RSA_VALIDATE(cond) \ - MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE(cond) + if (ret != 0) { + mbedtls_rsa_free(rsa); + } + + return ret; +} + +int mbedtls_rsa_parse_pubkey(mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa, const unsigned char *key, size_t keylen) +{ + unsigned char *p = (unsigned char *) key; + unsigned char *end = (unsigned char *) (key + keylen); + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t len; + + /* + * RSAPublicKey ::= SEQUENCE { + * modulus INTEGER, -- n + * publicExponent INTEGER -- e + * } + */ + + if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p, end, &len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + + if (end != p + len) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + /* Import N */ + if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p, end, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_INTEGER)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + + if ((ret = mbedtls_rsa_import_raw(rsa, p, len, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, + NULL, 0, NULL, 0)) != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + p += len; + + /* Import E */ + if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p, end, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_INTEGER)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + + if ((ret = mbedtls_rsa_import_raw(rsa, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, + NULL, 0, p, len)) != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + p += len; + + if (mbedtls_rsa_complete(rsa) != 0 || + mbedtls_rsa_check_pubkey(rsa) != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + if (p != end) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH; + } + + return 0; +} + +int mbedtls_rsa_write_key(const mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa, unsigned char *start, + unsigned char **p) +{ + size_t len = 0; + int ret; + + mbedtls_mpi T; /* Temporary holding the exported parameters */ + + /* + * Export the parameters one after another to avoid simultaneous copies. + */ + + mbedtls_mpi_init(&T); + + /* Export QP */ + if ((ret = mbedtls_rsa_export_crt(rsa, NULL, NULL, &T)) != 0 || + (ret = mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi(p, start, &T)) < 0) { + goto end_of_export; + } + len += ret; + + /* Export DQ */ + if ((ret = mbedtls_rsa_export_crt(rsa, NULL, &T, NULL)) != 0 || + (ret = mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi(p, start, &T)) < 0) { + goto end_of_export; + } + len += ret; + + /* Export DP */ + if ((ret = mbedtls_rsa_export_crt(rsa, &T, NULL, NULL)) != 0 || + (ret = mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi(p, start, &T)) < 0) { + goto end_of_export; + } + len += ret; + + /* Export Q */ + if ((ret = mbedtls_rsa_export(rsa, NULL, NULL, &T, NULL, NULL)) != 0 || + (ret = mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi(p, start, &T)) < 0) { + goto end_of_export; + } + len += ret; + + /* Export P */ + if ((ret = mbedtls_rsa_export(rsa, NULL, &T, NULL, NULL, NULL)) != 0 || + (ret = mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi(p, start, &T)) < 0) { + goto end_of_export; + } + len += ret; + + /* Export D */ + if ((ret = mbedtls_rsa_export(rsa, NULL, NULL, NULL, &T, NULL)) != 0 || + (ret = mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi(p, start, &T)) < 0) { + goto end_of_export; + } + len += ret; + + /* Export E */ + if ((ret = mbedtls_rsa_export(rsa, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, &T)) != 0 || + (ret = mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi(p, start, &T)) < 0) { + goto end_of_export; + } + len += ret; + + /* Export N */ + if ((ret = mbedtls_rsa_export(rsa, &T, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL)) != 0 || + (ret = mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi(p, start, &T)) < 0) { + goto end_of_export; + } + len += ret; + +end_of_export: + + mbedtls_mpi_free(&T); + if (ret < 0) { + return ret; + } + + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_int(p, start, 0)); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len(p, start, len)); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag(p, start, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | + MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)); + + return (int) len; +} + +/* + * RSAPublicKey ::= SEQUENCE { + * modulus INTEGER, -- n + * publicExponent INTEGER -- e + * } + */ +int mbedtls_rsa_write_pubkey(const mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa, unsigned char *start, + unsigned char **p) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t len = 0; + mbedtls_mpi T; + + mbedtls_mpi_init(&T); + + /* Export E */ + if ((ret = mbedtls_rsa_export(rsa, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, &T)) != 0 || + (ret = mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi(p, start, &T)) < 0) { + goto end_of_export; + } + len += ret; + + /* Export N */ + if ((ret = mbedtls_rsa_export(rsa, &T, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL)) != 0 || + (ret = mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi(p, start, &T)) < 0) { + goto end_of_export; + } + len += ret; + +end_of_export: + + mbedtls_mpi_free(&T); + if (ret < 0) { + return ret; + } + + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len(p, start, len)); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag(p, start, MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | + MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)); + + return (int) len; +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15) && defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_ALT) + +/** This function performs the unpadding part of a PKCS#1 v1.5 decryption + * operation (EME-PKCS1-v1_5 decoding). + * + * \note The return value from this function is a sensitive value + * (this is unusual). #MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_OUTPUT_TOO_LARGE shouldn't happen + * in a well-written application, but 0 vs #MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING + * is often a situation that an attacker can provoke and leaking which + * one is the result is precisely the information the attacker wants. + * + * \param input The input buffer which is the payload inside PKCS#1v1.5 + * encryption padding, called the "encoded message EM" + * by the terminology. + * \param ilen The length of the payload in the \p input buffer. + * \param output The buffer for the payload, called "message M" by the + * PKCS#1 terminology. This must be a writable buffer of + * length \p output_max_len bytes. + * \param olen The address at which to store the length of + * the payload. This must not be \c NULL. + * \param output_max_len The length in bytes of the output buffer \p output. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_OUTPUT_TOO_LARGE + * The output buffer is too small for the unpadded payload. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING + * The input doesn't contain properly formatted padding. + */ +static int mbedtls_ct_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_unpadding(unsigned char *input, + size_t ilen, + unsigned char *output, + size_t output_max_len, + size_t *olen) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t i, plaintext_max_size; + + /* The following variables take sensitive values: their value must + * not leak into the observable behavior of the function other than + * the designated outputs (output, olen, return value). Otherwise + * this would open the execution of the function to + * side-channel-based variants of the Bleichenbacher padding oracle + * attack. Potential side channels include overall timing, memory + * access patterns (especially visible to an adversary who has access + * to a shared memory cache), and branches (especially visible to + * an adversary who has access to a shared code cache or to a shared + * branch predictor). */ + size_t pad_count = 0; + mbedtls_ct_condition_t bad; + mbedtls_ct_condition_t pad_done; + size_t plaintext_size = 0; + mbedtls_ct_condition_t output_too_large; + + plaintext_max_size = (output_max_len > ilen - 11) ? ilen - 11 + : output_max_len; + + /* Check and get padding length in constant time and constant + * memory trace. The first byte must be 0. */ + bad = mbedtls_ct_bool(input[0]); + + + /* Decode EME-PKCS1-v1_5 padding: 0x00 || 0x02 || PS || 0x00 + * where PS must be at least 8 nonzero bytes. */ + bad = mbedtls_ct_bool_or(bad, mbedtls_ct_uint_ne(input[1], MBEDTLS_RSA_CRYPT)); + + /* Read the whole buffer. Set pad_done to nonzero if we find + * the 0x00 byte and remember the padding length in pad_count. */ + pad_done = MBEDTLS_CT_FALSE; + for (i = 2; i < ilen; i++) { + mbedtls_ct_condition_t found = mbedtls_ct_uint_eq(input[i], 0); + pad_done = mbedtls_ct_bool_or(pad_done, found); + pad_count += mbedtls_ct_uint_if_else_0(mbedtls_ct_bool_not(pad_done), 1); + } + + /* If pad_done is still zero, there's no data, only unfinished padding. */ + bad = mbedtls_ct_bool_or(bad, mbedtls_ct_bool_not(pad_done)); + + /* There must be at least 8 bytes of padding. */ + bad = mbedtls_ct_bool_or(bad, mbedtls_ct_uint_gt(8, pad_count)); + + /* If the padding is valid, set plaintext_size to the number of + * remaining bytes after stripping the padding. If the padding + * is invalid, avoid leaking this fact through the size of the + * output: use the maximum message size that fits in the output + * buffer. Do it without branches to avoid leaking the padding + * validity through timing. RSA keys are small enough that all the + * size_t values involved fit in unsigned int. */ + plaintext_size = mbedtls_ct_uint_if( + bad, (unsigned) plaintext_max_size, + (unsigned) (ilen - pad_count - 3)); + + /* Set output_too_large to 0 if the plaintext fits in the output + * buffer and to 1 otherwise. */ + output_too_large = mbedtls_ct_uint_gt(plaintext_size, + plaintext_max_size); + + /* Set ret without branches to avoid timing attacks. Return: + * - INVALID_PADDING if the padding is bad (bad != 0). + * - OUTPUT_TOO_LARGE if the padding is good but the decrypted + * plaintext does not fit in the output buffer. + * - 0 if the padding is correct. */ + ret = mbedtls_ct_error_if( + bad, + MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING, + mbedtls_ct_error_if_else_0(output_too_large, MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_OUTPUT_TOO_LARGE) + ); + + /* If the padding is bad or the plaintext is too large, zero the + * data that we're about to copy to the output buffer. + * We need to copy the same amount of data + * from the same buffer whether the padding is good or not to + * avoid leaking the padding validity through overall timing or + * through memory or cache access patterns. */ + mbedtls_ct_zeroize_if(mbedtls_ct_bool_or(bad, output_too_large), input + 11, ilen - 11); + + /* If the plaintext is too large, truncate it to the buffer size. + * Copy anyway to avoid revealing the length through timing, because + * revealing the length is as bad as revealing the padding validity + * for a Bleichenbacher attack. */ + plaintext_size = mbedtls_ct_uint_if(output_too_large, + (unsigned) plaintext_max_size, + (unsigned) plaintext_size); + + /* Move the plaintext to the leftmost position where it can start in + * the working buffer, i.e. make it start plaintext_max_size from + * the end of the buffer. Do this with a memory access trace that + * does not depend on the plaintext size. After this move, the + * starting location of the plaintext is no longer sensitive + * information. */ + mbedtls_ct_memmove_left(input + ilen - plaintext_max_size, + plaintext_max_size, + plaintext_max_size - plaintext_size); + + /* Finally copy the decrypted plaintext plus trailing zeros into the output + * buffer. If output_max_len is 0, then output may be an invalid pointer + * and the result of memcpy() would be undefined; prevent undefined + * behavior making sure to depend only on output_max_len (the size of the + * user-provided output buffer), which is independent from plaintext + * length, validity of padding, success of the decryption, and other + * secrets. */ + if (output_max_len != 0) { + memcpy(output, input + ilen - plaintext_max_size, plaintext_max_size); + } + + /* Report the amount of data we copied to the output buffer. In case + * of errors (bad padding or output too large), the value of *olen + * when this function returns is not specified. Making it equivalent + * to the good case limits the risks of leaking the padding validity. */ + *olen = plaintext_size; + + return ret; +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 && MBEDTLS_RSA_C && ! MBEDTLS_RSA_ALT */ + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_ALT) int mbedtls_rsa_import(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, const mbedtls_mpi *N, @@ -62,7 +574,6 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_import(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, const mbedtls_mpi *D, const mbedtls_mpi *E) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - RSA_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); if ((N != NULL && (ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy(&ctx->N, N)) != 0) || (P != NULL && (ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy(&ctx->P, P)) != 0) || @@ -87,7 +598,6 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_import_raw(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, unsigned char const *E, size_t E_len) { int ret = 0; - RSA_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); if (N != NULL) { MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(&ctx->N, N, N_len)); @@ -217,8 +727,6 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_complete(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx) #endif int n_missing, pq_missing, d_missing, is_pub, is_priv; - RSA_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - have_N = (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&ctx->N, 0) != 0); have_P = (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&ctx->P, 0) != 0); have_Q = (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&ctx->Q, 0) != 0); @@ -317,7 +825,6 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_export_raw(const mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, { int ret = 0; int is_priv; - RSA_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); /* Check if key is private or public */ is_priv = @@ -367,7 +874,6 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_export(const mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; int is_priv; - RSA_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); /* Check if key is private or public */ is_priv = @@ -410,7 +916,6 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_export_crt(const mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; int is_priv; - RSA_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); /* Check if key is private or public */ is_priv = @@ -444,17 +949,12 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_export_crt(const mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, /* * Initialize an RSA context */ -void mbedtls_rsa_init(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, - int padding, - int hash_id) +void mbedtls_rsa_init(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx) { - RSA_VALIDATE(ctx != NULL); - RSA_VALIDATE(padding == MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15 || - padding == MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21); - memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_rsa_context)); - mbedtls_rsa_set_padding(ctx, padding, hash_id); + ctx->padding = MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15; + ctx->hash_id = MBEDTLS_MD_NONE; #if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) /* Set ctx->ver to nonzero to indicate that the mutex has been @@ -467,27 +967,71 @@ void mbedtls_rsa_init(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, /* * Set padding for an existing RSA context */ -void mbedtls_rsa_set_padding(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, int padding, - int hash_id) +int mbedtls_rsa_set_padding(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, int padding, + mbedtls_md_type_t hash_id) { - RSA_VALIDATE(ctx != NULL); - RSA_VALIDATE(padding == MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15 || - padding == MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21); + switch (padding) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15) + case MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15: + break; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21) + case MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21: + break; +#endif + default: + return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21) + if ((padding == MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21) && + (hash_id != MBEDTLS_MD_NONE)) { + /* Just make sure this hash is supported in this build. */ + if (mbedtls_md_info_from_type(hash_id) == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING; + } + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21 */ ctx->padding = padding; ctx->hash_id = hash_id; + + return 0; } /* - * Get length in bytes of RSA modulus + * Get padding mode of initialized RSA context + */ +int mbedtls_rsa_get_padding_mode(const mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx) +{ + return ctx->padding; +} + +/* + * Get hash identifier of mbedtls_md_type_t type */ +int mbedtls_rsa_get_md_alg(const mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx) +{ + return ctx->hash_id; +} +/* + * Get length in bits of RSA modulus + */ +size_t mbedtls_rsa_get_bitlen(const mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx) +{ + return mbedtls_mpi_bitlen(&ctx->N); +} + +/* + * Get length in bytes of RSA modulus + */ size_t mbedtls_rsa_get_len(const mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx) { return ctx->len; } - #if defined(MBEDTLS_GENPRIME) /* @@ -504,8 +1048,6 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_gen_key(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; mbedtls_mpi H, G, L; int prime_quality = 0; - RSA_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - RSA_VALIDATE_RET(f_rng != NULL); /* * If the modulus is 1024 bit long or shorter, then the security strength of @@ -520,7 +1062,12 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_gen_key(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, mbedtls_mpi_init(&G); mbedtls_mpi_init(&L); - if (nbits < 128 || exponent < 3 || nbits % 2 != 0) { + if (exponent < 3 || nbits % 2 != 0) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + goto cleanup; + } + + if (nbits < MBEDTLS_RSA_GEN_KEY_MIN_BITS) { ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; goto cleanup; } @@ -620,8 +1167,6 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_gen_key(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, */ int mbedtls_rsa_check_pubkey(const mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx) { - RSA_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - if (rsa_check_context(ctx, 0 /* public */, 0 /* no blinding */) != 0) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED; } @@ -644,8 +1189,6 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_check_pubkey(const mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx) */ int mbedtls_rsa_check_privkey(const mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx) { - RSA_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - if (mbedtls_rsa_check_pubkey(ctx) != 0 || rsa_check_context(ctx, 1 /* private */, 1 /* blinding */) != 0) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED; @@ -672,9 +1215,6 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_check_privkey(const mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx) int mbedtls_rsa_check_pub_priv(const mbedtls_rsa_context *pub, const mbedtls_rsa_context *prv) { - RSA_VALIDATE_RET(pub != NULL); - RSA_VALIDATE_RET(prv != NULL); - if (mbedtls_rsa_check_pubkey(pub) != 0 || mbedtls_rsa_check_privkey(prv) != 0) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED; @@ -698,9 +1238,6 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_public(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t olen; mbedtls_mpi T; - RSA_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - RSA_VALIDATE_RET(input != NULL); - RSA_VALIDATE_RET(output != NULL); if (rsa_check_context(ctx, 0 /* public */, 0 /* no blinding */)) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; @@ -812,17 +1349,15 @@ static int rsa_prepare_blinding(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, static int rsa_unblind(mbedtls_mpi *T, mbedtls_mpi *Vf, const mbedtls_mpi *N) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + const mbedtls_mpi_uint mm = mbedtls_mpi_core_montmul_init(N->p); const size_t nlimbs = N->n; - const size_t tlimbs = 2 * (nlimbs + 1); - - mbedtls_mpi_uint mm = mbedtls_mpi_montmul_init(N->p); - + const size_t tlimbs = mbedtls_mpi_core_montmul_working_limbs(nlimbs); mbedtls_mpi RR, M_T; mbedtls_mpi_init(&RR); mbedtls_mpi_init(&M_T); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_get_mont_r2_unsafe(&RR, N)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_core_get_mont_r2_unsafe(&RR, N)); MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_grow(&M_T, tlimbs)); MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_grow(T, nlimbs)); @@ -830,12 +1365,13 @@ static int rsa_unblind(mbedtls_mpi *T, mbedtls_mpi *Vf, const mbedtls_mpi *N) /* T = T * Vf mod N * Reminder: montmul(A, B, N) = A * B * R^-1 mod N - * Usually both operands are multiplied by R mod N beforehand, yielding a - * result that's also * R mod N (aka "in the Montgomery domain"). Here we - * only multiply one operand by R mod N, so the result is directly what we - * want - no need to call `mpi_montred()` on it. */ - mbedtls_mpi_montmul(T, &RR, N, mm, &M_T); - mbedtls_mpi_montmul(T, Vf, N, mm, &M_T); + * Usually both operands are multiplied by R mod N beforehand (by calling + * `to_mont_rep()` on them), yielding a result that's also * R mod N (aka + * "in the Montgomery domain"). Here we only multiply one operand by R mod + * N, so the result is directly what we want - no need to call + * `from_mont_rep()` on it. */ + mbedtls_mpi_core_to_mont_rep(T->p, T->p, N->p, nlimbs, mm, RR.p, M_T.p); + mbedtls_mpi_core_montmul(T->p, T->p, Vf->p, nlimbs, N->p, nlimbs, mm, M_T.p); cleanup: @@ -892,30 +1428,21 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_private(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, /* Temporaries holding the blinded exponents for * the mod p resp. mod q computation (if used). */ mbedtls_mpi DP_blind, DQ_blind; - - /* Pointers to actual exponents to be used - either the unblinded - * or the blinded ones, depending on the presence of a PRNG. */ - mbedtls_mpi *DP = &ctx->DP; - mbedtls_mpi *DQ = &ctx->DQ; #else /* Temporary holding the blinded exponent (if used). */ mbedtls_mpi D_blind; - - /* Pointer to actual exponent to be used - either the unblinded - * or the blinded one, depending on the presence of a PRNG. */ - mbedtls_mpi *D = &ctx->D; #endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT */ /* Temporaries holding the initial input and the double * checked result; should be the same in the end. */ mbedtls_mpi input_blinded, check_result_blinded; - RSA_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - RSA_VALIDATE_RET(input != NULL); - RSA_VALIDATE_RET(output != NULL); + if (f_rng == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } if (rsa_check_context(ctx, 1 /* private key checks */, - f_rng != NULL /* blinding y/n */) != 0) { + 1 /* blinding on */) != 0) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } @@ -932,14 +1459,12 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_private(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, mbedtls_mpi_init(&Q1); mbedtls_mpi_init(&R); - if (f_rng != NULL) { #if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT) - mbedtls_mpi_init(&D_blind); + mbedtls_mpi_init(&D_blind); #else - mbedtls_mpi_init(&DP_blind); - mbedtls_mpi_init(&DQ_blind); + mbedtls_mpi_init(&DP_blind); + mbedtls_mpi_init(&DQ_blind); #endif - } #if !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT) mbedtls_mpi_init(&TP); mbedtls_mpi_init(&TQ); @@ -956,62 +1481,53 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_private(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, goto cleanup; } - if (f_rng != NULL) { - /* - * Blinding - * T = T * Vi mod N - */ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(rsa_prepare_blinding(ctx, f_rng, p_rng)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi(&T, &T, &ctx->Vi)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi(&T, &T, &ctx->N)); + /* + * Blinding + * T = T * Vi mod N + */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(rsa_prepare_blinding(ctx, f_rng, p_rng)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi(&T, &T, &ctx->Vi)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi(&T, &T, &ctx->N)); - /* - * Exponent blinding - */ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_int(&P1, &ctx->P, 1)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_int(&Q1, &ctx->Q, 1)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_copy(&input_blinded, &T)); -#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT) - /* - * D_blind = ( P - 1 ) * ( Q - 1 ) * R + D - */ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_fill_random(&R, RSA_EXPONENT_BLINDING, - f_rng, p_rng)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi(&D_blind, &P1, &Q1)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi(&D_blind, &D_blind, &R)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi(&D_blind, &D_blind, &ctx->D)); + /* + * Exponent blinding + */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_int(&P1, &ctx->P, 1)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_int(&Q1, &ctx->Q, 1)); - D = &D_blind; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT) + /* + * D_blind = ( P - 1 ) * ( Q - 1 ) * R + D + */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_fill_random(&R, RSA_EXPONENT_BLINDING, + f_rng, p_rng)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi(&D_blind, &P1, &Q1)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi(&D_blind, &D_blind, &R)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi(&D_blind, &D_blind, &ctx->D)); #else - /* - * DP_blind = ( P - 1 ) * R + DP - */ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_fill_random(&R, RSA_EXPONENT_BLINDING, - f_rng, p_rng)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi(&DP_blind, &P1, &R)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi(&DP_blind, &DP_blind, - &ctx->DP)); - - DP = &DP_blind; - - /* - * DQ_blind = ( Q - 1 ) * R + DQ - */ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_fill_random(&R, RSA_EXPONENT_BLINDING, - f_rng, p_rng)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi(&DQ_blind, &Q1, &R)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi(&DQ_blind, &DQ_blind, - &ctx->DQ)); + /* + * DP_blind = ( P - 1 ) * R + DP + */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_fill_random(&R, RSA_EXPONENT_BLINDING, + f_rng, p_rng)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi(&DP_blind, &P1, &R)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi(&DP_blind, &DP_blind, + &ctx->DP)); - DQ = &DQ_blind; + /* + * DQ_blind = ( Q - 1 ) * R + DQ + */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_fill_random(&R, RSA_EXPONENT_BLINDING, + f_rng, p_rng)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi(&DQ_blind, &Q1, &R)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi(&DQ_blind, &DQ_blind, + &ctx->DQ)); #endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT */ - } - - /* Make a copy of the input (after blinding if there was any) */ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_copy(&input_blinded, &T)); #if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT) - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod(&T, &T, D, &ctx->N, &ctx->RN)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod(&T, &T, &D_blind, &ctx->N, &ctx->RN)); #else /* * Faster decryption using the CRT @@ -1020,8 +1536,8 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_private(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, * TQ = input ^ dQ mod Q */ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod(&TP, &T, DP, &ctx->P, &ctx->RP)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod(&TQ, &T, DQ, &ctx->Q, &ctx->RQ)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod(&TP, &T, &DP_blind, &ctx->P, &ctx->RP)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod(&TQ, &T, &DQ_blind, &ctx->Q, &ctx->RQ)); /* * T = (TP - TQ) * (Q^-1 mod P) mod P @@ -1045,13 +1561,11 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_private(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, goto cleanup; } - if (f_rng != NULL) { - /* - * Unblind - * T = T * Vf mod N - */ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(rsa_unblind(&T, &ctx->Vf, &ctx->N)); - } + /* + * Unblind + * T = T * Vf mod N + */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(rsa_unblind(&T, &ctx->Vf, &ctx->N)); olen = ctx->len; MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(&T, output, olen)); @@ -1067,14 +1581,12 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_private(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, mbedtls_mpi_free(&Q1); mbedtls_mpi_free(&R); - if (f_rng != NULL) { #if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT) - mbedtls_mpi_free(&D_blind); + mbedtls_mpi_free(&D_blind); #else - mbedtls_mpi_free(&DP_blind); - mbedtls_mpi_free(&DQ_blind); + mbedtls_mpi_free(&DP_blind); + mbedtls_mpi_free(&DQ_blind); #endif - } mbedtls_mpi_free(&T); @@ -1100,22 +1612,35 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_private(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, * \param dlen length of destination buffer * \param src source of the mask generation * \param slen length of the source buffer - * \param md_ctx message digest context to use + * \param md_alg message digest to use */ static int mgf_mask(unsigned char *dst, size_t dlen, unsigned char *src, - size_t slen, mbedtls_md_context_t *md_ctx) + size_t slen, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg) { - unsigned char mask[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE]; unsigned char counter[4]; unsigned char *p; unsigned int hlen; size_t i, use_len; + unsigned char mask[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE]; int ret = 0; + const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info; + mbedtls_md_context_t md_ctx; - memset(mask, 0, MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE); - memset(counter, 0, 4); + mbedtls_md_init(&md_ctx); + md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type(md_alg); + if (md_info == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + mbedtls_md_init(&md_ctx); + if ((ret = mbedtls_md_setup(&md_ctx, md_info, 0)) != 0) { + goto exit; + } + + hlen = mbedtls_md_get_size(md_info); - hlen = mbedtls_md_get_size(md_ctx->md_info); + memset(mask, 0, sizeof(mask)); + memset(counter, 0, 4); /* Generate and apply dbMask */ p = dst; @@ -1126,16 +1651,16 @@ static int mgf_mask(unsigned char *dst, size_t dlen, unsigned char *src, use_len = dlen; } - if ((ret = mbedtls_md_starts(md_ctx)) != 0) { + if ((ret = mbedtls_md_starts(&md_ctx)) != 0) { goto exit; } - if ((ret = mbedtls_md_update(md_ctx, src, slen)) != 0) { + if ((ret = mbedtls_md_update(&md_ctx, src, slen)) != 0) { goto exit; } - if ((ret = mbedtls_md_update(md_ctx, counter, 4)) != 0) { + if ((ret = mbedtls_md_update(&md_ctx, counter, 4)) != 0) { goto exit; } - if ((ret = mbedtls_md_finish(md_ctx, mask)) != 0) { + if ((ret = mbedtls_md_finish(&md_ctx, mask)) != 0) { goto exit; } @@ -1150,9 +1675,82 @@ static int mgf_mask(unsigned char *dst, size_t dlen, unsigned char *src, exit: mbedtls_platform_zeroize(mask, sizeof(mask)); + mbedtls_md_free(&md_ctx); + + return ret; +} + +/** + * Generate Hash(M') as in RFC 8017 page 43 points 5 and 6. + * + * \param hash the input hash + * \param hlen length of the input hash + * \param salt the input salt + * \param slen length of the input salt + * \param out the output buffer - must be large enough for \p md_alg + * \param md_alg message digest to use + */ +static int hash_mprime(const unsigned char *hash, size_t hlen, + const unsigned char *salt, size_t slen, + unsigned char *out, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg) +{ + const unsigned char zeros[8] = { 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 }; + + mbedtls_md_context_t md_ctx; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type(md_alg); + if (md_info == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + mbedtls_md_init(&md_ctx); + if ((ret = mbedtls_md_setup(&md_ctx, md_info, 0)) != 0) { + goto exit; + } + if ((ret = mbedtls_md_starts(&md_ctx)) != 0) { + goto exit; + } + if ((ret = mbedtls_md_update(&md_ctx, zeros, sizeof(zeros))) != 0) { + goto exit; + } + if ((ret = mbedtls_md_update(&md_ctx, hash, hlen)) != 0) { + goto exit; + } + if ((ret = mbedtls_md_update(&md_ctx, salt, slen)) != 0) { + goto exit; + } + if ((ret = mbedtls_md_finish(&md_ctx, out)) != 0) { + goto exit; + } + +exit: + mbedtls_md_free(&md_ctx); return ret; } + +/** + * Compute a hash. + * + * \param md_alg algorithm to use + * \param input input message to hash + * \param ilen input length + * \param output the output buffer - must be large enough for \p md_alg + */ +static int compute_hash(mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen, + unsigned char *output) +{ + const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info; + + md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type(md_alg); + if (md_info == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + return mbedtls_md(md_info, input, ilen, output); +} #endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21 */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21) @@ -1162,7 +1760,6 @@ static int mgf_mask(unsigned char *dst, size_t dlen, unsigned char *src, int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_oaep_encrypt(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng, - int mode, const unsigned char *label, size_t label_len, size_t ilen, const unsigned char *input, @@ -1172,31 +1769,17 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_oaep_encrypt(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; unsigned char *p = output; unsigned int hlen; - const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info; - mbedtls_md_context_t md_ctx; - - RSA_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - RSA_VALIDATE_RET(mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE || - mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC); - RSA_VALIDATE_RET(output != NULL); - RSA_VALIDATE_RET(ilen == 0 || input != NULL); - RSA_VALIDATE_RET(label_len == 0 || label != NULL); - - if (mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE && ctx->padding != MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; - } if (f_rng == NULL) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } - md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type((mbedtls_md_type_t) ctx->hash_id); - if (md_info == NULL) { + hlen = mbedtls_md_get_size_from_type((mbedtls_md_type_t) ctx->hash_id); + if (hlen == 0) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } olen = ctx->len; - hlen = mbedtls_md_get_size(md_info); /* first comparison checks for overflow */ if (ilen + 2 * hlen + 2 < ilen || olen < ilen + 2 * hlen + 2) { @@ -1215,7 +1798,8 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_oaep_encrypt(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, p += hlen; /* Construct DB */ - if ((ret = mbedtls_md(md_info, label, label_len, p)) != 0) { + ret = compute_hash((mbedtls_md_type_t) ctx->hash_id, label, label_len, p); + if (ret != 0) { return ret; } p += hlen; @@ -1225,33 +1809,19 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_oaep_encrypt(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, memcpy(p, input, ilen); } - mbedtls_md_init(&md_ctx); - if ((ret = mbedtls_md_setup(&md_ctx, md_info, 0)) != 0) { - goto exit; - } - /* maskedDB: Apply dbMask to DB */ if ((ret = mgf_mask(output + hlen + 1, olen - hlen - 1, output + 1, hlen, - &md_ctx)) != 0) { - goto exit; + (mbedtls_md_type_t) ctx->hash_id)) != 0) { + return ret; } /* maskedSeed: Apply seedMask to seed */ if ((ret = mgf_mask(output + 1, hlen, output + hlen + 1, olen - hlen - 1, - &md_ctx)) != 0) { - goto exit; - } - -exit: - mbedtls_md_free(&md_ctx); - - if (ret != 0) { + (mbedtls_md_type_t) ctx->hash_id)) != 0) { return ret; } - return (mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC) - ? mbedtls_rsa_public(ctx, output, output) - : mbedtls_rsa_private(ctx, f_rng, p_rng, output, output); + return mbedtls_rsa_public(ctx, output, output); } #endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21 */ @@ -1261,8 +1831,7 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_oaep_encrypt(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, */ int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_encrypt(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), - void *p_rng, - int mode, size_t ilen, + void *p_rng, size_t ilen, const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output) { @@ -1270,16 +1839,6 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_encrypt(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; unsigned char *p = output; - RSA_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - RSA_VALIDATE_RET(mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE || - mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC); - RSA_VALIDATE_RET(output != NULL); - RSA_VALIDATE_RET(ilen == 0 || input != NULL); - - if (mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE && ctx->padding != MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; - } - olen = ctx->len; /* first comparison checks for overflow */ @@ -1290,33 +1849,26 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_encrypt(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, nb_pad = olen - 3 - ilen; *p++ = 0; - if (mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC) { - if (f_rng == NULL) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; - } - *p++ = MBEDTLS_RSA_CRYPT; + if (f_rng == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } - while (nb_pad-- > 0) { - int rng_dl = 100; + *p++ = MBEDTLS_RSA_CRYPT; - do { - ret = f_rng(p_rng, p, 1); - } while (*p == 0 && --rng_dl && ret == 0); + while (nb_pad-- > 0) { + int rng_dl = 100; - /* Check if RNG failed to generate data */ - if (rng_dl == 0 || ret != 0) { - return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_RNG_FAILED, ret); - } + do { + ret = f_rng(p_rng, p, 1); + } while (*p == 0 && --rng_dl && ret == 0); - p++; + /* Check if RNG failed to generate data */ + if (rng_dl == 0 || ret != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_RNG_FAILED, ret); } - } else { - *p++ = MBEDTLS_RSA_SIGN; - while (nb_pad-- > 0) { - *p++ = 0xFF; - } + p++; } *p++ = 0; @@ -1324,9 +1876,7 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_encrypt(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, memcpy(p, input, ilen); } - return (mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC) - ? mbedtls_rsa_public(ctx, output, output) - : mbedtls_rsa_private(ctx, f_rng, p_rng, output, output); + return mbedtls_rsa_public(ctx, output, output); } #endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 */ @@ -1336,26 +1886,20 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_encrypt(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, int mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_encrypt(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng, - int mode, size_t ilen, + size_t ilen, const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output) { - RSA_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - RSA_VALIDATE_RET(mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE || - mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC); - RSA_VALIDATE_RET(output != NULL); - RSA_VALIDATE_RET(ilen == 0 || input != NULL); - switch (ctx->padding) { #if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15) case MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15: - return mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_encrypt(ctx, f_rng, p_rng, mode, ilen, - input, output); + return mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_encrypt(ctx, f_rng, p_rng, + ilen, input, output); #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21) case MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21: - return mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_oaep_encrypt(ctx, f_rng, p_rng, mode, NULL, 0, + return mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_oaep_encrypt(ctx, f_rng, p_rng, NULL, 0, ilen, input, output); #endif @@ -1371,7 +1915,6 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_encrypt(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_oaep_decrypt(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng, - int mode, const unsigned char *label, size_t label_len, size_t *olen, const unsigned char *input, @@ -1380,26 +1923,16 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_oaep_decrypt(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t ilen, i, pad_len; - unsigned char *p, pad_done; - int bad; + unsigned char *p; + mbedtls_ct_condition_t bad, in_padding; unsigned char buf[MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE]; unsigned char lhash[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE]; unsigned int hlen; - const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info; - mbedtls_md_context_t md_ctx; - - RSA_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - RSA_VALIDATE_RET(mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE || - mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC); - RSA_VALIDATE_RET(output_max_len == 0 || output != NULL); - RSA_VALIDATE_RET(label_len == 0 || label != NULL); - RSA_VALIDATE_RET(input != NULL); - RSA_VALIDATE_RET(olen != NULL); /* * Parameters sanity checks */ - if (mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE && ctx->padding != MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21) { + if (ctx->padding != MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } @@ -1409,13 +1942,11 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_oaep_decrypt(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } - md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type((mbedtls_md_type_t) ctx->hash_id); - if (md_info == NULL) { + hlen = mbedtls_md_get_size_from_type((mbedtls_md_type_t) ctx->hash_id); + if (hlen == 0) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } - hlen = mbedtls_md_get_size(md_info); - // checking for integer underflow if (2 * hlen + 2 > ilen) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; @@ -1424,9 +1955,7 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_oaep_decrypt(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, /* * RSA operation */ - ret = (mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC) - ? mbedtls_rsa_public(ctx, input, buf) - : mbedtls_rsa_private(ctx, f_rng, p_rng, input, buf); + ret = mbedtls_rsa_private(ctx, f_rng, p_rng, input, buf); if (ret != 0) { goto cleanup; @@ -1435,26 +1964,19 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_oaep_decrypt(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, /* * Unmask data and generate lHash */ - mbedtls_md_init(&md_ctx); - if ((ret = mbedtls_md_setup(&md_ctx, md_info, 0)) != 0) { - mbedtls_md_free(&md_ctx); - goto cleanup; - } - /* seed: Apply seedMask to maskedSeed */ if ((ret = mgf_mask(buf + 1, hlen, buf + hlen + 1, ilen - hlen - 1, - &md_ctx)) != 0 || + (mbedtls_md_type_t) ctx->hash_id)) != 0 || /* DB: Apply dbMask to maskedDB */ (ret = mgf_mask(buf + hlen + 1, ilen - hlen - 1, buf + 1, hlen, - &md_ctx)) != 0) { - mbedtls_md_free(&md_ctx); + (mbedtls_md_type_t) ctx->hash_id)) != 0) { goto cleanup; } - mbedtls_md_free(&md_ctx); - /* Generate lHash */ - if ((ret = mbedtls_md(md_info, label, label_len, lhash)) != 0) { + ret = compute_hash((mbedtls_md_type_t) ctx->hash_id, + label, label_len, lhash); + if (ret != 0) { goto cleanup; } @@ -1462,27 +1984,26 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_oaep_decrypt(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, * Check contents, in "constant-time" */ p = buf; - bad = 0; - bad |= *p++; /* First byte must be 0 */ + bad = mbedtls_ct_bool(*p++); /* First byte must be 0 */ p += hlen; /* Skip seed */ /* Check lHash */ - bad |= mbedtls_ct_memcmp(lhash, p, hlen); + bad = mbedtls_ct_bool_or(bad, mbedtls_ct_bool(mbedtls_ct_memcmp(lhash, p, hlen))); p += hlen; /* Get zero-padding len, but always read till end of buffer * (minus one, for the 01 byte) */ pad_len = 0; - pad_done = 0; + in_padding = MBEDTLS_CT_TRUE; for (i = 0; i < ilen - 2 * hlen - 2; i++) { - pad_done |= p[i]; - pad_len += ((pad_done | (unsigned char) -pad_done) >> 7) ^ 1; + in_padding = mbedtls_ct_bool_and(in_padding, mbedtls_ct_uint_eq(p[i], 0)); + pad_len += mbedtls_ct_uint_if_else_0(in_padding, 1); } p += pad_len; - bad |= *p++ ^ 0x01; + bad = mbedtls_ct_bool_or(bad, mbedtls_ct_uint_ne(*p++, 0x01)); /* * The only information "leaked" is whether the padding was correct or not @@ -1490,17 +2011,17 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_oaep_decrypt(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, * recommendations in PKCS#1 v2.2: an opponent cannot distinguish between * the different error conditions. */ - if (bad != 0) { + if (bad != MBEDTLS_CT_FALSE) { ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING; goto cleanup; } - if (ilen - (p - buf) > output_max_len) { + if (ilen - ((size_t) (p - buf)) > output_max_len) { ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_OUTPUT_TOO_LARGE; goto cleanup; } - *olen = ilen - (p - buf); + *olen = ilen - ((size_t) (p - buf)); if (*olen != 0) { memcpy(output, p, *olen); } @@ -1521,7 +2042,6 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_oaep_decrypt(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_decrypt(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng, - int mode, size_t *olen, const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output, @@ -1531,16 +2051,9 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_decrypt(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, size_t ilen; unsigned char buf[MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE]; - RSA_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - RSA_VALIDATE_RET(mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE || - mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC); - RSA_VALIDATE_RET(output_max_len == 0 || output != NULL); - RSA_VALIDATE_RET(input != NULL); - RSA_VALIDATE_RET(olen != NULL); - ilen = ctx->len; - if (mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE && ctx->padding != MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15) { + if (ctx->padding != MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } @@ -1548,15 +2061,13 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_decrypt(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } - ret = (mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC) - ? mbedtls_rsa_public(ctx, input, buf) - : mbedtls_rsa_private(ctx, f_rng, p_rng, input, buf); + ret = mbedtls_rsa_private(ctx, f_rng, p_rng, input, buf); if (ret != 0) { goto cleanup; } - ret = mbedtls_ct_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_unpadding(mode, buf, ilen, + ret = mbedtls_ct_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_unpadding(buf, ilen, output, output_max_len, olen); cleanup: @@ -1572,28 +2083,21 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_decrypt(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, int mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_decrypt(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng, - int mode, size_t *olen, + size_t *olen, const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output, size_t output_max_len) { - RSA_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - RSA_VALIDATE_RET(mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE || - mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC); - RSA_VALIDATE_RET(output_max_len == 0 || output != NULL); - RSA_VALIDATE_RET(input != NULL); - RSA_VALIDATE_RET(olen != NULL); - switch (ctx->padding) { #if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15) case MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15: - return mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_decrypt(ctx, f_rng, p_rng, mode, olen, + return mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_decrypt(ctx, f_rng, p_rng, olen, input, output, output_max_len); #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21) case MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21: - return mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_oaep_decrypt(ctx, f_rng, p_rng, mode, NULL, 0, + return mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_oaep_decrypt(ctx, f_rng, p_rng, NULL, 0, olen, input, output, output_max_len); #endif @@ -1604,15 +2108,14 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_decrypt(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, } #if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21) -static int rsa_rsassa_pss_sign(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, - int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), - void *p_rng, - int mode, - mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, - unsigned int hashlen, - const unsigned char *hash, - int saltlen, - unsigned char *sig) +static int rsa_rsassa_pss_sign_no_mode_check(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng, + mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + unsigned int hashlen, + const unsigned char *hash, + int saltlen, + unsigned char *sig) { size_t olen; unsigned char *p = sig; @@ -1620,17 +2123,9 @@ static int rsa_rsassa_pss_sign(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, size_t slen, min_slen, hlen, offset = 0; int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t msb; - const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info; - mbedtls_md_context_t md_ctx; - RSA_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - RSA_VALIDATE_RET(mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE || - mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC); - RSA_VALIDATE_RET((md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE && - hashlen == 0) || - hash != NULL); - RSA_VALIDATE_RET(sig != NULL); - - if (mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE && ctx->padding != MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21) { + mbedtls_md_type_t hash_id; + + if ((md_alg != MBEDTLS_MD_NONE || hashlen != 0) && hash == NULL) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } @@ -1642,21 +2137,25 @@ static int rsa_rsassa_pss_sign(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, if (md_alg != MBEDTLS_MD_NONE) { /* Gather length of hash to sign */ - md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type(md_alg); - if (md_info == NULL) { + size_t exp_hashlen = mbedtls_md_get_size_from_type(md_alg); + if (exp_hashlen == 0) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } - hashlen = mbedtls_md_get_size(md_info); + if (hashlen != exp_hashlen) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } } - md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type((mbedtls_md_type_t) ctx->hash_id); - if (md_info == NULL) { + hash_id = (mbedtls_md_type_t) ctx->hash_id; + if (hash_id == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE) { + hash_id = md_alg; + } + hlen = mbedtls_md_get_size_from_type(hash_id); + if (hlen == 0) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } - hlen = mbedtls_md_get_size(md_info); - if (saltlen == MBEDTLS_RSA_SALT_LEN_ANY) { /* Calculate the largest possible salt length, up to the hash size. * Normally this is the hash length, which is the maximum salt length @@ -1694,26 +2193,10 @@ static int rsa_rsassa_pss_sign(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, p += slen; - mbedtls_md_init(&md_ctx); - if ((ret = mbedtls_md_setup(&md_ctx, md_info, 0)) != 0) { - goto exit; - } - /* Generate H = Hash( M' ) */ - if ((ret = mbedtls_md_starts(&md_ctx)) != 0) { - goto exit; - } - if ((ret = mbedtls_md_update(&md_ctx, p, 8)) != 0) { - goto exit; - } - if ((ret = mbedtls_md_update(&md_ctx, hash, hashlen)) != 0) { - goto exit; - } - if ((ret = mbedtls_md_update(&md_ctx, salt, slen)) != 0) { - goto exit; - } - if ((ret = mbedtls_md_finish(&md_ctx, p)) != 0) { - goto exit; + ret = hash_mprime(hash, hashlen, salt, slen, p, hash_id); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; } /* Compensate for boundary condition when applying mask */ @@ -1722,9 +2205,9 @@ static int rsa_rsassa_pss_sign(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, } /* maskedDB: Apply dbMask to DB */ - if ((ret = mgf_mask(sig + offset, olen - hlen - 1 - offset, p, hlen, - &md_ctx)) != 0) { - goto exit; + ret = mgf_mask(sig + offset, olen - hlen - 1 - offset, p, hlen, hash_id); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; } msb = mbedtls_mpi_bitlen(&ctx->N) - 1; @@ -1733,16 +2216,38 @@ static int rsa_rsassa_pss_sign(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, p += hlen; *p++ = 0xBC; -exit: - mbedtls_md_free(&md_ctx); + return mbedtls_rsa_private(ctx, f_rng, p_rng, sig, sig); +} - if (ret != 0) { - return ret; +static int rsa_rsassa_pss_sign(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng, + mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + unsigned int hashlen, + const unsigned char *hash, + int saltlen, + unsigned char *sig) +{ + if (ctx->padding != MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + if ((ctx->hash_id == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE) && (md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } + return rsa_rsassa_pss_sign_no_mode_check(ctx, f_rng, p_rng, md_alg, hashlen, hash, saltlen, + sig); +} - return (mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC) - ? mbedtls_rsa_public(ctx, sig, sig) - : mbedtls_rsa_private(ctx, f_rng, p_rng, sig, sig); +int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_sign_no_mode_check(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng, + mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + unsigned int hashlen, + const unsigned char *hash, + unsigned char *sig) +{ + return rsa_rsassa_pss_sign_no_mode_check(ctx, f_rng, p_rng, md_alg, + hashlen, hash, MBEDTLS_RSA_SALT_LEN_ANY, sig); } /* @@ -1758,24 +2263,22 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_sign_ext(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, int saltlen, unsigned char *sig) { - return rsa_rsassa_pss_sign(ctx, f_rng, p_rng, MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE, md_alg, + return rsa_rsassa_pss_sign(ctx, f_rng, p_rng, md_alg, hashlen, hash, saltlen, sig); } - /* * Implementation of the PKCS#1 v2.1 RSASSA-PSS-SIGN function */ int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_sign(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng, - int mode, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, unsigned int hashlen, const unsigned char *hash, unsigned char *sig) { - return rsa_rsassa_pss_sign(ctx, f_rng, p_rng, mode, md_alg, + return rsa_rsassa_pss_sign(ctx, f_rng, p_rng, md_alg, hashlen, hash, MBEDTLS_RSA_SALT_LEN_ANY, sig); } #endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21 */ @@ -1792,14 +2295,13 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_sign(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, * Parameters: * - md_alg: Identifies the hash algorithm used to generate the given hash; * MBEDTLS_MD_NONE if raw data is signed. - * - hashlen: Length of hash in case hashlen is MBEDTLS_MD_NONE. + * - hashlen: Length of hash. Must match md_alg if that's not NONE. * - hash: Buffer containing the hashed message or the raw data. * - dst_len: Length of the encoded message. * - dst: Buffer to hold the encoded message. * * Assumptions: - * - hash has size hashlen if md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE. - * - hash has size corresponding to md_alg if md_alg != MBEDTLS_MD_NONE. + * - hash has size hashlen. * - dst points to a buffer of size at least dst_len. * */ @@ -1816,8 +2318,8 @@ static int rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_encode(mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, /* Are we signing hashed or raw data? */ if (md_alg != MBEDTLS_MD_NONE) { - const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type(md_alg); - if (md_info == NULL) { + unsigned char md_size = mbedtls_md_get_size_from_type(md_alg); + if (md_size == 0) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } @@ -1825,7 +2327,9 @@ static int rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_encode(mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } - hashlen = mbedtls_md_get_size(md_info); + if (hashlen != md_size) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } /* Double-check that 8 + hashlen + oid_size can be used as a * 1-byte ASN.1 length encoding and that there's no overflow. */ @@ -1922,7 +2426,6 @@ static int rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_encode(mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_sign(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng, - int mode, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, unsigned int hashlen, const unsigned char *hash, @@ -1931,15 +2434,11 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_sign(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; unsigned char *sig_try = NULL, *verif = NULL; - RSA_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - RSA_VALIDATE_RET(mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE || - mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC); - RSA_VALIDATE_RET((md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE && - hashlen == 0) || - hash != NULL); - RSA_VALIDATE_RET(sig != NULL); + if ((md_alg != MBEDTLS_MD_NONE || hashlen != 0) && hash == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } - if (mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE && ctx->padding != MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15) { + if (ctx->padding != MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } @@ -1952,15 +2451,6 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_sign(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, return ret; } - /* - * Call respective RSA primitive - */ - - if (mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC) { - /* Skip verification on a public key operation */ - return mbedtls_rsa_public(ctx, sig, sig); - } - /* Private key operation * * In order to prevent Lenstra's attack, make the signature in a @@ -1989,10 +2479,8 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_sign(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, memcpy(sig, sig_try, ctx->len); cleanup: - mbedtls_platform_zeroize(sig_try, ctx->len); - mbedtls_platform_zeroize(verif, ctx->len); - mbedtls_free(sig_try); - mbedtls_free(verif); + mbedtls_zeroize_and_free(sig_try, ctx->len); + mbedtls_zeroize_and_free(verif, ctx->len); if (ret != 0) { memset(sig, '!', ctx->len); @@ -2007,30 +2495,25 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_sign(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, int mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_sign(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng, - int mode, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, unsigned int hashlen, const unsigned char *hash, unsigned char *sig) { - RSA_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - RSA_VALIDATE_RET(mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE || - mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC); - RSA_VALIDATE_RET((md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE && - hashlen == 0) || - hash != NULL); - RSA_VALIDATE_RET(sig != NULL); + if ((md_alg != MBEDTLS_MD_NONE || hashlen != 0) && hash == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } switch (ctx->padding) { #if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15) case MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15: - return mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_sign(ctx, f_rng, p_rng, mode, md_alg, - hashlen, hash, sig); + return mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_sign(ctx, f_rng, p_rng, + md_alg, hashlen, hash, sig); #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21) case MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21: - return mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_sign(ctx, f_rng, p_rng, mode, md_alg, + return mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_sign(ctx, f_rng, p_rng, md_alg, hashlen, hash, sig); #endif @@ -2044,9 +2527,6 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_sign(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, * Implementation of the PKCS#1 v2.1 RSASSA-PSS-VERIFY function */ int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_verify_ext(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, - int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), - void *p_rng, - int mode, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, unsigned int hashlen, const unsigned char *hash, @@ -2059,22 +2539,11 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_verify_ext(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, unsigned char *p; unsigned char *hash_start; unsigned char result[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE]; - unsigned char zeros[8]; unsigned int hlen; size_t observed_salt_len, msb; - const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info; - mbedtls_md_context_t md_ctx; - unsigned char buf[MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE]; + unsigned char buf[MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE] = { 0 }; - RSA_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - RSA_VALIDATE_RET(mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE || - mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC); - RSA_VALIDATE_RET(sig != NULL); - RSA_VALIDATE_RET((md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE && - hashlen == 0) || - hash != NULL); - - if (mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE && ctx->padding != MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21) { + if ((md_alg != MBEDTLS_MD_NONE || hashlen != 0) && hash == NULL) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } @@ -2084,9 +2553,7 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_verify_ext(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } - ret = (mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC) - ? mbedtls_rsa_public(ctx, sig, buf) - : mbedtls_rsa_private(ctx, f_rng, p_rng, sig, buf); + ret = mbedtls_rsa_public(ctx, sig, buf); if (ret != 0) { return ret; @@ -2100,23 +2567,21 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_verify_ext(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, if (md_alg != MBEDTLS_MD_NONE) { /* Gather length of hash to sign */ - md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type(md_alg); - if (md_info == NULL) { + size_t exp_hashlen = mbedtls_md_get_size_from_type(md_alg); + if (exp_hashlen == 0) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } - hashlen = mbedtls_md_get_size(md_info); + if (hashlen != exp_hashlen) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } } - md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type(mgf1_hash_id); - if (md_info == NULL) { + hlen = mbedtls_md_get_size_from_type(mgf1_hash_id); + if (hlen == 0) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } - hlen = mbedtls_md_get_size(md_info); - - memset(zeros, 0, 8); - /* * Note: EMSA-PSS verification is over the length of N - 1 bits */ @@ -2137,14 +2602,9 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_verify_ext(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, } hash_start = p + siglen - hlen - 1; - mbedtls_md_init(&md_ctx); - if ((ret = mbedtls_md_setup(&md_ctx, md_info, 0)) != 0) { - goto exit; - } - - ret = mgf_mask(p, siglen - hlen - 1, hash_start, hlen, &md_ctx); + ret = mgf_mask(p, siglen - hlen - 1, hash_start, hlen, mgf1_hash_id); if (ret != 0) { - goto exit; + return ret; } buf[0] &= 0xFF >> (siglen * 8 - msb); @@ -2154,81 +2614,54 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_verify_ext(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, } if (*p++ != 0x01) { - ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING; - goto exit; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING; } - observed_salt_len = hash_start - p; + observed_salt_len = (size_t) (hash_start - p); if (expected_salt_len != MBEDTLS_RSA_SALT_LEN_ANY && observed_salt_len != (size_t) expected_salt_len) { - ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING; - goto exit; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING; } /* * Generate H = Hash( M' ) */ - ret = mbedtls_md_starts(&md_ctx); + ret = hash_mprime(hash, hashlen, p, observed_salt_len, + result, mgf1_hash_id); if (ret != 0) { - goto exit; - } - ret = mbedtls_md_update(&md_ctx, zeros, 8); - if (ret != 0) { - goto exit; - } - ret = mbedtls_md_update(&md_ctx, hash, hashlen); - if (ret != 0) { - goto exit; - } - ret = mbedtls_md_update(&md_ctx, p, observed_salt_len); - if (ret != 0) { - goto exit; - } - ret = mbedtls_md_finish(&md_ctx, result); - if (ret != 0) { - goto exit; + return ret; } if (memcmp(hash_start, result, hlen) != 0) { - ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_VERIFY_FAILED; - goto exit; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_VERIFY_FAILED; } -exit: - mbedtls_md_free(&md_ctx); - - return ret; + return 0; } /* * Simplified PKCS#1 v2.1 RSASSA-PSS-VERIFY function */ int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_verify(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, - int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), - void *p_rng, - int mode, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, unsigned int hashlen, const unsigned char *hash, const unsigned char *sig) { mbedtls_md_type_t mgf1_hash_id; - RSA_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - RSA_VALIDATE_RET(mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE || - mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC); - RSA_VALIDATE_RET(sig != NULL); - RSA_VALIDATE_RET((md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE && - hashlen == 0) || - hash != NULL); + if ((md_alg != MBEDTLS_MD_NONE || hashlen != 0) && hash == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } mgf1_hash_id = (ctx->hash_id != MBEDTLS_MD_NONE) ? (mbedtls_md_type_t) ctx->hash_id : md_alg; - return mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_verify_ext(ctx, f_rng, p_rng, mode, + return mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_verify_ext(ctx, md_alg, hashlen, hash, - mgf1_hash_id, MBEDTLS_RSA_SALT_LEN_ANY, + mgf1_hash_id, + MBEDTLS_RSA_SALT_LEN_ANY, sig); } @@ -2239,9 +2672,6 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_verify(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, * Implementation of the PKCS#1 v2.1 RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5-VERIFY function */ int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_verify(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, - int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), - void *p_rng, - int mode, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, unsigned int hashlen, const unsigned char *hash, @@ -2251,20 +2681,12 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_verify(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, size_t sig_len; unsigned char *encoded = NULL, *encoded_expected = NULL; - RSA_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - RSA_VALIDATE_RET(mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE || - mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC); - RSA_VALIDATE_RET(sig != NULL); - RSA_VALIDATE_RET((md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE && - hashlen == 0) || - hash != NULL); - - sig_len = ctx->len; - - if (mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE && ctx->padding != MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15) { + if ((md_alg != MBEDTLS_MD_NONE || hashlen != 0) && hash == NULL) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } + sig_len = ctx->len; + /* * Prepare expected PKCS1 v1.5 encoding of hash. */ @@ -2284,9 +2706,7 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_verify(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, * Apply RSA primitive to get what should be PKCS1 encoded hash. */ - ret = (mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC) - ? mbedtls_rsa_public(ctx, sig, encoded) - : mbedtls_rsa_private(ctx, f_rng, p_rng, sig, encoded); + ret = mbedtls_rsa_public(ctx, sig, encoded); if (ret != 0) { goto cleanup; } @@ -2304,13 +2724,11 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_verify(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, cleanup: if (encoded != NULL) { - mbedtls_platform_zeroize(encoded, sig_len); - mbedtls_free(encoded); + mbedtls_zeroize_and_free(encoded, sig_len); } if (encoded_expected != NULL) { - mbedtls_platform_zeroize(encoded_expected, sig_len); - mbedtls_free(encoded_expected); + mbedtls_zeroize_and_free(encoded_expected, sig_len); } return ret; @@ -2321,32 +2739,25 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_verify(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, * Do an RSA operation and check the message digest */ int mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_verify(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, - int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), - void *p_rng, - int mode, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, unsigned int hashlen, const unsigned char *hash, const unsigned char *sig) { - RSA_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - RSA_VALIDATE_RET(mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE || - mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC); - RSA_VALIDATE_RET(sig != NULL); - RSA_VALIDATE_RET((md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE && - hashlen == 0) || - hash != NULL); + if ((md_alg != MBEDTLS_MD_NONE || hashlen != 0) && hash == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } switch (ctx->padding) { #if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15) case MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15: - return mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_verify(ctx, f_rng, p_rng, mode, md_alg, + return mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_verify(ctx, md_alg, hashlen, hash, sig); #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21) case MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21: - return mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_verify(ctx, f_rng, p_rng, mode, md_alg, + return mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_verify(ctx, md_alg, hashlen, hash, sig); #endif @@ -2361,8 +2772,6 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_verify(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, int mbedtls_rsa_copy(mbedtls_rsa_context *dst, const mbedtls_rsa_context *src) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - RSA_VALIDATE_RET(dst != NULL); - RSA_VALIDATE_RET(src != NULL); dst->len = src->len; @@ -2436,7 +2845,6 @@ void mbedtls_rsa_free(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx) #if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) -#include "mbedtls/sha1.h" /* * Example RSA-1024 keypair, for test purposes @@ -2514,14 +2922,14 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_self_test(int verbose) unsigned char rsa_plaintext[PT_LEN]; unsigned char rsa_decrypted[PT_LEN]; unsigned char rsa_ciphertext[KEY_LEN]; -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1) unsigned char sha1sum[20]; #endif mbedtls_mpi K; mbedtls_mpi_init(&K); - mbedtls_rsa_init(&rsa, MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15, 0); + mbedtls_rsa_init(&rsa); MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_read_string(&K, 16, RSA_N)); MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_rsa_import(&rsa, &K, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL)); @@ -2556,7 +2964,7 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_self_test(int verbose) memcpy(rsa_plaintext, RSA_PT, PT_LEN); - if (mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_encrypt(&rsa, myrand, NULL, MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC, + if (mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_encrypt(&rsa, myrand, NULL, PT_LEN, rsa_plaintext, rsa_ciphertext) != 0) { if (verbose != 0) { @@ -2571,7 +2979,7 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_self_test(int verbose) mbedtls_printf("passed\n PKCS#1 decryption : "); } - if (mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_decrypt(&rsa, myrand, NULL, MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE, + if (mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_decrypt(&rsa, myrand, NULL, &len, rsa_ciphertext, rsa_decrypted, sizeof(rsa_decrypted)) != 0) { if (verbose != 0) { @@ -2595,12 +3003,13 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_self_test(int verbose) mbedtls_printf("passed\n"); } -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1) if (verbose != 0) { mbedtls_printf(" PKCS#1 data sign : "); } - if (mbedtls_sha1_ret(rsa_plaintext, PT_LEN, sha1sum) != 0) { + if (mbedtls_md(mbedtls_md_info_from_type(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1), + rsa_plaintext, PT_LEN, sha1sum) != 0) { if (verbose != 0) { mbedtls_printf("failed\n"); } @@ -2609,7 +3018,7 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_self_test(int verbose) } if (mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_sign(&rsa, myrand, NULL, - MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, 0, + MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, 20, sha1sum, rsa_ciphertext) != 0) { if (verbose != 0) { mbedtls_printf("failed\n"); @@ -2623,8 +3032,7 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_self_test(int verbose) mbedtls_printf("passed\n PKCS#1 sig. verify: "); } - if (mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_verify(&rsa, NULL, NULL, - MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, 0, + if (mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_verify(&rsa, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, 20, sha1sum, rsa_ciphertext) != 0) { if (verbose != 0) { mbedtls_printf("failed\n"); @@ -2637,7 +3045,7 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_self_test(int verbose) if (verbose != 0) { mbedtls_printf("passed\n"); } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1 */ if (verbose != 0) { mbedtls_printf("\n"); diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/rsa_internal.c b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/rsa_alt_helpers.c similarity index 99% rename from thirdparty/mbedtls/library/rsa_internal.c rename to thirdparty/mbedtls/library/rsa_alt_helpers.c index 5a9e5c34fc06..5c265a9921b5 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/rsa_internal.c +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/rsa_alt_helpers.c @@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ #include "mbedtls/rsa.h" #include "mbedtls/bignum.h" -#include "mbedtls/rsa_internal.h" +#include "rsa_alt_helpers.h" /* * Compute RSA prime factors from public and private exponents @@ -222,80 +222,33 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_deduce_private_exponent(mbedtls_mpi const *P, return ret; } -/* - * Check that RSA CRT parameters are in accordance with core parameters. - */ -int mbedtls_rsa_validate_crt(const mbedtls_mpi *P, const mbedtls_mpi *Q, - const mbedtls_mpi *D, const mbedtls_mpi *DP, - const mbedtls_mpi *DQ, const mbedtls_mpi *QP) +int mbedtls_rsa_deduce_crt(const mbedtls_mpi *P, const mbedtls_mpi *Q, + const mbedtls_mpi *D, mbedtls_mpi *DP, + mbedtls_mpi *DQ, mbedtls_mpi *QP) { int ret = 0; - - mbedtls_mpi K, L; + mbedtls_mpi K; mbedtls_mpi_init(&K); - mbedtls_mpi_init(&L); - /* Check that DP - D == 0 mod P - 1 */ + /* DP = D mod P-1 */ if (DP != NULL) { - if (P == NULL) { - ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; - goto cleanup; - } - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_int(&K, P, 1)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi(&L, DP, D)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi(&L, &L, &K)); - - if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&L, 0) != 0) { - ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED; - goto cleanup; - } + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi(DP, D, &K)); } - /* Check that DQ - D == 0 mod Q - 1 */ + /* DQ = D mod Q-1 */ if (DQ != NULL) { - if (Q == NULL) { - ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; - goto cleanup; - } - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_int(&K, Q, 1)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi(&L, DQ, D)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi(&L, &L, &K)); - - if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&L, 0) != 0) { - ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED; - goto cleanup; - } + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi(DQ, D, &K)); } - /* Check that QP * Q - 1 == 0 mod P */ + /* QP = Q^{-1} mod P */ if (QP != NULL) { - if (P == NULL || Q == NULL) { - ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; - goto cleanup; - } - - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi(&K, QP, Q)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_int(&K, &K, 1)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi(&K, &K, P)); - if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&K, 0) != 0) { - ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED; - goto cleanup; - } + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_inv_mod(QP, Q, P)); } cleanup: - - /* Wrap MPI error codes by RSA check failure error code */ - if (ret != 0 && - ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED && - ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA) { - ret += MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED; - } - mbedtls_mpi_free(&K); - mbedtls_mpi_free(&L); return ret; } @@ -413,33 +366,80 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_validate_params(const mbedtls_mpi *N, const mbedtls_mpi *P, return ret; } -int mbedtls_rsa_deduce_crt(const mbedtls_mpi *P, const mbedtls_mpi *Q, - const mbedtls_mpi *D, mbedtls_mpi *DP, - mbedtls_mpi *DQ, mbedtls_mpi *QP) +/* + * Check that RSA CRT parameters are in accordance with core parameters. + */ +int mbedtls_rsa_validate_crt(const mbedtls_mpi *P, const mbedtls_mpi *Q, + const mbedtls_mpi *D, const mbedtls_mpi *DP, + const mbedtls_mpi *DQ, const mbedtls_mpi *QP) { int ret = 0; - mbedtls_mpi K; + + mbedtls_mpi K, L; mbedtls_mpi_init(&K); + mbedtls_mpi_init(&L); - /* DP = D mod P-1 */ + /* Check that DP - D == 0 mod P - 1 */ if (DP != NULL) { + if (P == NULL) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + goto cleanup; + } + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_int(&K, P, 1)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi(DP, D, &K)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi(&L, DP, D)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi(&L, &L, &K)); + + if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&L, 0) != 0) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED; + goto cleanup; + } } - /* DQ = D mod Q-1 */ + /* Check that DQ - D == 0 mod Q - 1 */ if (DQ != NULL) { + if (Q == NULL) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + goto cleanup; + } + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_int(&K, Q, 1)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi(DQ, D, &K)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi(&L, DQ, D)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi(&L, &L, &K)); + + if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&L, 0) != 0) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED; + goto cleanup; + } } - /* QP = Q^{-1} mod P */ + /* Check that QP * Q - 1 == 0 mod P */ if (QP != NULL) { - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_inv_mod(QP, Q, P)); + if (P == NULL || Q == NULL) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + goto cleanup; + } + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi(&K, QP, Q)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_int(&K, &K, 1)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi(&K, &K, P)); + if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&K, 0) != 0) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED; + goto cleanup; + } } cleanup: + + /* Wrap MPI error codes by RSA check failure error code */ + if (ret != 0 && + ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED && + ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA) { + ret += MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED; + } + mbedtls_mpi_free(&K); + mbedtls_mpi_free(&L); return ret; } diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/rsa_internal.h b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/rsa_alt_helpers.h similarity index 97% rename from thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/rsa_internal.h rename to thirdparty/mbedtls/library/rsa_alt_helpers.h index 286cff258280..052b02491e10 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/rsa_internal.h +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/rsa_alt_helpers.h @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ /** - * \file rsa_internal.h + * \file rsa_alt_helpers.h * * \brief Context-independent RSA helper functions * @@ -37,17 +37,11 @@ /* * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later - * */ +#ifndef MBEDTLS_RSA_ALT_HELPERS_H +#define MBEDTLS_RSA_ALT_HELPERS_H -#ifndef MBEDTLS_RSA_INTERNAL_H -#define MBEDTLS_RSA_INTERNAL_H - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "mbedtls/build_info.h" #include "mbedtls/bignum.h" @@ -209,4 +203,4 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_validate_crt(const mbedtls_mpi *P, const mbedtls_mpi *Q, } #endif -#endif /* rsa_internal.h */ +#endif /* rsa_alt_helpers.h */ diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/rsa_internal.h b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/rsa_internal.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..f79c3b712283 --- /dev/null +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/rsa_internal.h @@ -0,0 +1,121 @@ +/** + * \file rsa_internal.h + * + * \brief Internal-only RSA public-key cryptosystem API. + * + * This file declares RSA-related functions that are to be used + * only from within the Mbed TLS library itself. + * + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ +#ifndef MBEDTLS_RSA_INTERNAL_H +#define MBEDTLS_RSA_INTERNAL_H + +#include "mbedtls/rsa.h" +#include "mbedtls/asn1.h" + +/** + * \brief Parse a PKCS#1 (ASN.1) encoded private RSA key. + * + * \param rsa The RSA context where parsed data will be stored. + * \param key The buffer that contains the key. + * \param keylen The length of the key buffer in bytes. + * + * \return 0 on success. + * \return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_xxx in case of ASN.1 parsing errors. + * \return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_xxx in case of RSA internal failures while + * parsing data. + * \return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED if validity checks on the + * provided key fail. + */ +int mbedtls_rsa_parse_key(mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa, const unsigned char *key, size_t keylen); + +/** + * \brief Parse a PKCS#1 (ASN.1) encoded public RSA key. + * + * \param rsa The RSA context where parsed data will be stored. + * \param key The buffer that contains the key. + * \param keylen The length of the key buffer in bytes. + * + * \return 0 on success. + * \return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_xxx in case of ASN.1 parsing errors. + * \return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_xxx in case of RSA internal failures while + * parsing data. + * \return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED if validity checks on the + * provided key fail. + */ +int mbedtls_rsa_parse_pubkey(mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa, const unsigned char *key, size_t keylen); + +/** + * \brief Write a PKCS#1 (ASN.1) encoded private RSA key. + * + * \param rsa The RSA context which contains the data to be written. + * \param start Beginning of the buffer that will be filled with the + * private key. + * \param p End of the buffer that will be filled with the private key. + * On successful return, the referenced pointer will be + * updated in order to point to the beginning of written data. + * + * \return On success, the number of bytes written to the output buffer + * (i.e. a value > 0). + * \return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA if the RSA context does not + * contain a valid key pair. + * \return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_xxx in case of failure while writing to the + * output buffer. + * + * \note The output buffer is filled backward, i.e. starting from its + * end and moving toward its start. + */ +int mbedtls_rsa_write_key(const mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa, unsigned char *start, + unsigned char **p); + +/** + * \brief Parse a PKCS#1 (ASN.1) encoded public RSA key. + * + * \param rsa The RSA context which contains the data to be written. + * \param start Beginning of the buffer that will be filled with the + * private key. + * \param p End of the buffer that will be filled with the private key. + * On successful return, the referenced pointer will be + * updated in order to point to the beginning of written data. + * + * \return On success, the number of bytes written to the output buffer + * (i.e. a value > 0). + * \return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA if the RSA context does not + * contain a valid public key. + * \return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_xxx in case of failure while writing to the + * output buffer. + * + * \note The output buffer is filled backward, i.e. starting from its + * end and moving toward its start. + */ +int mbedtls_rsa_write_pubkey(const mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa, unsigned char *start, + unsigned char **p); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21) +/** + * \brief This function is analogue to \c mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_sign(). + * The only difference between them is that this function is more flexible + * on the parameters of \p ctx that are set with \c mbedtls_rsa_set_padding(). + * + * \note Compared to its counterpart, this function: + * - does not check the padding setting of \p ctx. + * - allows the hash_id of \p ctx to be MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, + * in which case it uses \p md_alg as the hash_id. + * + * \note Refer to \c mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_sign() for a description + * of the functioning and parameters of this function. + */ +int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_sign_no_mode_check(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng, + mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + unsigned int hashlen, + const unsigned char *hash, + unsigned char *sig); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21 */ + +#endif /* rsa_internal.h */ diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/sha1.c b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/sha1.c index 9dd958ef4c4f..dfbe481f39ac 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/sha1.c +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/sha1.c @@ -22,17 +22,10 @@ #include "mbedtls/platform.h" -#define SHA1_VALIDATE_RET(cond) \ - MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE_RET(cond, MBEDTLS_ERR_SHA1_BAD_INPUT_DATA) - -#define SHA1_VALIDATE(cond) MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE(cond) - #if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_ALT) void mbedtls_sha1_init(mbedtls_sha1_context *ctx) { - SHA1_VALIDATE(ctx != NULL); - memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_sha1_context)); } @@ -48,19 +41,14 @@ void mbedtls_sha1_free(mbedtls_sha1_context *ctx) void mbedtls_sha1_clone(mbedtls_sha1_context *dst, const mbedtls_sha1_context *src) { - SHA1_VALIDATE(dst != NULL); - SHA1_VALIDATE(src != NULL); - *dst = *src; } /* * SHA-1 context setup */ -int mbedtls_sha1_starts_ret(mbedtls_sha1_context *ctx) +int mbedtls_sha1_starts(mbedtls_sha1_context *ctx) { - SHA1_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - ctx->total[0] = 0; ctx->total[1] = 0; @@ -73,13 +61,6 @@ int mbedtls_sha1_starts_ret(mbedtls_sha1_context *ctx) return 0; } -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) -void mbedtls_sha1_starts(mbedtls_sha1_context *ctx) -{ - mbedtls_sha1_starts_ret(ctx); -} -#endif - #if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_PROCESS_ALT) int mbedtls_internal_sha1_process(mbedtls_sha1_context *ctx, const unsigned char data[64]) @@ -88,9 +69,6 @@ int mbedtls_internal_sha1_process(mbedtls_sha1_context *ctx, uint32_t temp, W[16], A, B, C, D, E; } local; - SHA1_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - SHA1_VALIDATE_RET((const unsigned char *) data != NULL); - local.W[0] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE(data, 0); local.W[1] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE(data, 4); local.W[2] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE(data, 8); @@ -252,29 +230,19 @@ int mbedtls_internal_sha1_process(mbedtls_sha1_context *ctx, return 0; } -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) -void mbedtls_sha1_process(mbedtls_sha1_context *ctx, - const unsigned char data[64]) -{ - mbedtls_internal_sha1_process(ctx, data); -} -#endif #endif /* !MBEDTLS_SHA1_PROCESS_ALT */ /* * SHA-1 process buffer */ -int mbedtls_sha1_update_ret(mbedtls_sha1_context *ctx, - const unsigned char *input, - size_t ilen) +int mbedtls_sha1_update(mbedtls_sha1_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *input, + size_t ilen) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t fill; uint32_t left; - SHA1_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - SHA1_VALIDATE_RET(ilen == 0 || input != NULL); - if (ilen == 0) { return 0; } @@ -317,28 +285,16 @@ int mbedtls_sha1_update_ret(mbedtls_sha1_context *ctx, return 0; } -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) -void mbedtls_sha1_update(mbedtls_sha1_context *ctx, - const unsigned char *input, - size_t ilen) -{ - mbedtls_sha1_update_ret(ctx, input, ilen); -} -#endif - /* * SHA-1 final digest */ -int mbedtls_sha1_finish_ret(mbedtls_sha1_context *ctx, - unsigned char output[20]) +int mbedtls_sha1_finish(mbedtls_sha1_context *ctx, + unsigned char output[20]) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; uint32_t used; uint32_t high, low; - SHA1_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - SHA1_VALIDATE_RET((unsigned char *) output != NULL); - /* * Add padding: 0x80 then 0x00 until 8 bytes remain for the length */ @@ -354,7 +310,7 @@ int mbedtls_sha1_finish_ret(mbedtls_sha1_context *ctx, memset(ctx->buffer + used, 0, 64 - used); if ((ret = mbedtls_internal_sha1_process(ctx, ctx->buffer)) != 0) { - return ret; + goto exit; } memset(ctx->buffer, 0, 56); @@ -371,7 +327,7 @@ int mbedtls_sha1_finish_ret(mbedtls_sha1_context *ctx, MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE(low, ctx->buffer, 60); if ((ret = mbedtls_internal_sha1_process(ctx, ctx->buffer)) != 0) { - return ret; + goto exit; } /* @@ -383,61 +339,44 @@ int mbedtls_sha1_finish_ret(mbedtls_sha1_context *ctx, MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE(ctx->state[3], output, 12); MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE(ctx->state[4], output, 16); - return 0; -} + ret = 0; -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) -void mbedtls_sha1_finish(mbedtls_sha1_context *ctx, - unsigned char output[20]) -{ - mbedtls_sha1_finish_ret(ctx, output); +exit: + mbedtls_sha1_free(ctx); + return ret; } -#endif #endif /* !MBEDTLS_SHA1_ALT */ /* * output = SHA-1( input buffer ) */ -int mbedtls_sha1_ret(const unsigned char *input, - size_t ilen, - unsigned char output[20]) +int mbedtls_sha1(const unsigned char *input, + size_t ilen, + unsigned char output[20]) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; mbedtls_sha1_context ctx; - SHA1_VALIDATE_RET(ilen == 0 || input != NULL); - SHA1_VALIDATE_RET((unsigned char *) output != NULL); - mbedtls_sha1_init(&ctx); - if ((ret = mbedtls_sha1_starts_ret(&ctx)) != 0) { + if ((ret = mbedtls_sha1_starts(&ctx)) != 0) { goto exit; } - if ((ret = mbedtls_sha1_update_ret(&ctx, input, ilen)) != 0) { + if ((ret = mbedtls_sha1_update(&ctx, input, ilen)) != 0) { goto exit; } - if ((ret = mbedtls_sha1_finish_ret(&ctx, output)) != 0) { + if ((ret = mbedtls_sha1_finish(&ctx, output)) != 0) { goto exit; } exit: mbedtls_sha1_free(&ctx); - return ret; } -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) -void mbedtls_sha1(const unsigned char *input, - size_t ilen, - unsigned char output[20]) -{ - mbedtls_sha1_ret(input, ilen, output); -} -#endif - #if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) /* * FIPS-180-1 test vectors @@ -484,7 +423,7 @@ int mbedtls_sha1_self_test(int verbose) mbedtls_printf(" SHA-1 test #%d: ", i + 1); } - if ((ret = mbedtls_sha1_starts_ret(&ctx)) != 0) { + if ((ret = mbedtls_sha1_starts(&ctx)) != 0) { goto fail; } @@ -492,20 +431,20 @@ int mbedtls_sha1_self_test(int verbose) memset(buf, 'a', buflen = 1000); for (j = 0; j < 1000; j++) { - ret = mbedtls_sha1_update_ret(&ctx, buf, buflen); + ret = mbedtls_sha1_update(&ctx, buf, buflen); if (ret != 0) { goto fail; } } } else { - ret = mbedtls_sha1_update_ret(&ctx, sha1_test_buf[i], - sha1_test_buflen[i]); + ret = mbedtls_sha1_update(&ctx, sha1_test_buf[i], + sha1_test_buflen[i]); if (ret != 0) { goto fail; } } - if ((ret = mbedtls_sha1_finish_ret(&ctx, sha1sum)) != 0) { + if ((ret = mbedtls_sha1_finish(&ctx, sha1sum)) != 0) { goto fail; } diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/sha256.c b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/sha256.c index 74f32369bb72..87889817a4ea 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/sha256.c +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/sha256.c @@ -10,9 +10,45 @@ * http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips180-2/fips180-2.pdf */ +#if defined(__clang__) && (__clang_major__ >= 4) + +/* Ideally, we would simply use MBEDTLS_ARCH_IS_ARMV8_A in the following #if, + * but that is defined by build_info.h, and we need this block to happen first. */ +#if defined(__ARM_ARCH) && (__ARM_ARCH_PROFILE == 'A') +#if __ARM_ARCH >= 8 +#define MBEDTLS_SHA256_ARCH_IS_ARMV8_A +#endif +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_ARCH_IS_ARMV8_A) && !defined(__ARM_FEATURE_CRYPTO) +/* TODO: Re-consider above after https://reviews.llvm.org/D131064 merged. + * + * The intrinsic declaration are guarded by predefined ACLE macros in clang: + * these are normally only enabled by the -march option on the command line. + * By defining the macros ourselves we gain access to those declarations without + * requiring -march on the command line. + * + * `arm_neon.h` is included by common.h, so we put these defines + * at the top of this file, before any includes. + */ +#define __ARM_FEATURE_CRYPTO 1 +/* See: https://arm-software.github.io/acle/main/acle.html#cryptographic-extensions + * + * `__ARM_FEATURE_CRYPTO` is deprecated, but we need to continue to specify it + * for older compilers. + */ +#define __ARM_FEATURE_SHA2 1 +#define MBEDTLS_ENABLE_ARM_CRYPTO_EXTENSIONS_COMPILER_FLAG +#endif + +#endif /* defined(__clang__) && (__clang_major__ >= 4) */ + +/* Ensure that SIG_SETMASK is defined when -std=c99 is used. */ +#define _GNU_SOURCE + #include "common.h" -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_SHA224_C) #include "mbedtls/sha256.h" #include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" @@ -22,16 +58,168 @@ #include "mbedtls/platform.h" -#define SHA256_VALIDATE_RET(cond) \ - MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE_RET(cond, MBEDTLS_ERR_SHA256_BAD_INPUT_DATA) -#define SHA256_VALIDATE(cond) MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE(cond) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARCH_IS_ARMV8_A) + +# if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_USE_ARMV8_A_CRYPTO_IF_PRESENT) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_USE_ARMV8_A_CRYPTO_ONLY) +# if !defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_NEON_INTRINSICS) +# if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_USE_ARMV8_A_CRYPTO_IF_PRESENT) +# warning "Target does not support NEON instructions" +# undef MBEDTLS_SHA256_USE_ARMV8_A_CRYPTO_IF_PRESENT +# else +# error "Target does not support NEON instructions" +# endif +# endif +# endif + +# if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_USE_ARMV8_A_CRYPTO_IF_PRESENT) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_USE_ARMV8_A_CRYPTO_ONLY) +/* *INDENT-OFF* */ + +# if !defined(__ARM_FEATURE_CRYPTO) || defined(MBEDTLS_ENABLE_ARM_CRYPTO_EXTENSIONS_COMPILER_FLAG) +# if defined(__ARMCOMPILER_VERSION) +# if __ARMCOMPILER_VERSION <= 6090000 +# error "Must use minimum -march=armv8-a+crypto for MBEDTLS_SHA256_USE_ARMV8_A_CRYPTO_*" +# endif +# pragma clang attribute push (__attribute__((target("sha2"))), apply_to=function) +# define MBEDTLS_POP_TARGET_PRAGMA +# elif defined(__clang__) +# if __clang_major__ < 4 +# error "A more recent Clang is required for MBEDTLS_SHA256_USE_ARMV8_A_CRYPTO_*" +# endif +# pragma clang attribute push (__attribute__((target("crypto"))), apply_to=function) +# define MBEDTLS_POP_TARGET_PRAGMA +# elif defined(__GNUC__) + /* FIXME: GCC 5 claims to support Armv8 Crypto Extensions, but some + * intrinsics are missing. Missing intrinsics could be worked around. + */ +# if __GNUC__ < 6 +# error "A more recent GCC is required for MBEDTLS_SHA256_USE_ARMV8_A_CRYPTO_*" +# else +# pragma GCC push_options +# pragma GCC target ("arch=armv8-a+crypto") +# define MBEDTLS_POP_TARGET_PRAGMA +# endif +# else +# error "Only GCC and Clang supported for MBEDTLS_SHA256_USE_ARMV8_A_CRYPTO_*" +# endif +# endif +/* *INDENT-ON* */ + +# endif +# if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_USE_ARMV8_A_CRYPTO_IF_PRESENT) +# if defined(__unix__) +# if defined(__linux__) +/* Our preferred method of detection is getauxval() */ +# include +/* These are not always defined via sys/auxv.h */ +# if !defined(HWCAP_SHA2) +# define HWCAP_SHA2 (1 << 6) +# endif +# if !defined(HWCAP2_SHA2) +# define HWCAP2_SHA2 (1 << 3) +# endif +# endif +/* Use SIGILL on Unix, and fall back to it on Linux */ +# include +# endif +# endif +#elif !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_IS_WINDOWS_ON_ARM64) +# undef MBEDTLS_SHA256_USE_ARMV8_A_CRYPTO_ONLY +# undef MBEDTLS_SHA256_USE_ARMV8_A_CRYPTO_IF_PRESENT +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_USE_ARMV8_A_CRYPTO_IF_PRESENT) +/* + * Capability detection code comes early, so we can disable + * MBEDTLS_SHA256_USE_ARMV8_A_CRYPTO_IF_PRESENT if no detection mechanism found + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARCH_IS_ARM64) && defined(HWCAP_SHA2) +static int mbedtls_a64_crypto_sha256_determine_support(void) +{ + return (getauxval(AT_HWCAP) & HWCAP_SHA2) ? 1 : 0; +} +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_ARCH_IS_ARM32) && defined(HWCAP2_SHA2) +static int mbedtls_a64_crypto_sha256_determine_support(void) +{ + return (getauxval(AT_HWCAP2) & HWCAP2_SHA2) ? 1 : 0; +} +#elif defined(__APPLE__) +static int mbedtls_a64_crypto_sha256_determine_support(void) +{ + return 1; +} +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_IS_WINDOWS_ON_ARM64) +#define WIN32_LEAN_AND_MEAN +#include +#include + +static int mbedtls_a64_crypto_sha256_determine_support(void) +{ + return IsProcessorFeaturePresent(PF_ARM_V8_CRYPTO_INSTRUCTIONS_AVAILABLE) ? + 1 : 0; +} +#elif defined(__unix__) && defined(SIG_SETMASK) +/* Detection with SIGILL, setjmp() and longjmp() */ +#include +#include + +static jmp_buf return_from_sigill; + +/* + * Armv8-A SHA256 support detection via SIGILL + */ +static void sigill_handler(int signal) +{ + (void) signal; + longjmp(return_from_sigill, 1); +} + +static int mbedtls_a64_crypto_sha256_determine_support(void) +{ + struct sigaction old_action, new_action; + + sigset_t old_mask; + if (sigprocmask(0, NULL, &old_mask)) { + return 0; + } + + sigemptyset(&new_action.sa_mask); + new_action.sa_flags = 0; + new_action.sa_handler = sigill_handler; + + sigaction(SIGILL, &new_action, &old_action); + + static int ret = 0; + + if (setjmp(return_from_sigill) == 0) { /* First return only */ + /* If this traps, we will return a second time from setjmp() with 1 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARCH_IS_ARM64) + asm volatile ("sha256h q0, q0, v0.4s" : : : "v0"); +#else + asm volatile ("sha256h.32 q0, q0, q0" : : : "q0"); +#endif + ret = 1; + } + + sigaction(SIGILL, &old_action, NULL); + sigprocmask(SIG_SETMASK, &old_mask, NULL); + + return ret; +} +#else +#warning "No mechanism to detect ARMV8_CRYPTO found, using C code only" +#undef MBEDTLS_SHA256_USE_ARMV8_A_CRYPTO_IF_PRESENT +#endif /* HWCAP_SHA2, __APPLE__, __unix__ && SIG_SETMASK */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_USE_ARMV8_A_CRYPTO_IF_PRESENT */ #if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_ALT) +#define SHA256_BLOCK_SIZE 64 + void mbedtls_sha256_init(mbedtls_sha256_context *ctx) { - SHA256_VALIDATE(ctx != NULL); - memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_sha256_context)); } @@ -47,25 +235,33 @@ void mbedtls_sha256_free(mbedtls_sha256_context *ctx) void mbedtls_sha256_clone(mbedtls_sha256_context *dst, const mbedtls_sha256_context *src) { - SHA256_VALIDATE(dst != NULL); - SHA256_VALIDATE(src != NULL); - *dst = *src; } /* * SHA-256 context setup */ -int mbedtls_sha256_starts_ret(mbedtls_sha256_context *ctx, int is224) +int mbedtls_sha256_starts(mbedtls_sha256_context *ctx, int is224) { - SHA256_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - SHA256_VALIDATE_RET(is224 == 0 || is224 == 1); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA224_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) + if (is224 != 0 && is224 != 1) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SHA256_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) + if (is224 != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SHA256_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } +#else /* defined MBEDTLS_SHA224_C only */ + if (is224 == 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SHA256_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } +#endif ctx->total[0] = 0; ctx->total[1] = 0; if (is224 == 0) { - /* SHA-256 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) ctx->state[0] = 0x6A09E667; ctx->state[1] = 0xBB67AE85; ctx->state[2] = 0x3C6EF372; @@ -74,8 +270,9 @@ int mbedtls_sha256_starts_ret(mbedtls_sha256_context *ctx, int is224) ctx->state[5] = 0x9B05688C; ctx->state[6] = 0x1F83D9AB; ctx->state[7] = 0x5BE0CD19; +#endif } else { - /* SHA-224 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA224_C) ctx->state[0] = 0xC1059ED8; ctx->state[1] = 0x367CD507; ctx->state[2] = 0x3070DD17; @@ -84,21 +281,16 @@ int mbedtls_sha256_starts_ret(mbedtls_sha256_context *ctx, int is224) ctx->state[5] = 0x68581511; ctx->state[6] = 0x64F98FA7; ctx->state[7] = 0xBEFA4FA4; +#endif } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA224_C) ctx->is224 = is224; +#endif return 0; } -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) -void mbedtls_sha256_starts(mbedtls_sha256_context *ctx, - int is224) -{ - mbedtls_sha256_starts_ret(ctx, is224); -} -#endif - #if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_PROCESS_ALT) static const uint32_t K[] = { @@ -120,6 +312,146 @@ static const uint32_t K[] = 0x90BEFFFA, 0xA4506CEB, 0xBEF9A3F7, 0xC67178F2, }; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_USE_ARMV8_A_CRYPTO_IF_PRESENT) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_USE_ARMV8_A_CRYPTO_ONLY) + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_USE_ARMV8_A_CRYPTO_ONLY) +# define mbedtls_internal_sha256_process_many_a64_crypto mbedtls_internal_sha256_process_many +# define mbedtls_internal_sha256_process_a64_crypto mbedtls_internal_sha256_process +#endif + +static size_t mbedtls_internal_sha256_process_many_a64_crypto( + mbedtls_sha256_context *ctx, const uint8_t *msg, size_t len) +{ + uint32x4_t abcd = vld1q_u32(&ctx->state[0]); + uint32x4_t efgh = vld1q_u32(&ctx->state[4]); + + size_t processed = 0; + + for (; + len >= SHA256_BLOCK_SIZE; + processed += SHA256_BLOCK_SIZE, + msg += SHA256_BLOCK_SIZE, + len -= SHA256_BLOCK_SIZE) { + uint32x4_t tmp, abcd_prev; + + uint32x4_t abcd_orig = abcd; + uint32x4_t efgh_orig = efgh; + + uint32x4_t sched0 = vreinterpretq_u32_u8(vld1q_u8(msg + 16 * 0)); + uint32x4_t sched1 = vreinterpretq_u32_u8(vld1q_u8(msg + 16 * 1)); + uint32x4_t sched2 = vreinterpretq_u32_u8(vld1q_u8(msg + 16 * 2)); + uint32x4_t sched3 = vreinterpretq_u32_u8(vld1q_u8(msg + 16 * 3)); + +#if __BYTE_ORDER__ == __ORDER_LITTLE_ENDIAN__ /* Will be true if not defined */ + /* Untested on BE */ + sched0 = vreinterpretq_u32_u8(vrev32q_u8(vreinterpretq_u8_u32(sched0))); + sched1 = vreinterpretq_u32_u8(vrev32q_u8(vreinterpretq_u8_u32(sched1))); + sched2 = vreinterpretq_u32_u8(vrev32q_u8(vreinterpretq_u8_u32(sched2))); + sched3 = vreinterpretq_u32_u8(vrev32q_u8(vreinterpretq_u8_u32(sched3))); +#endif + + /* Rounds 0 to 3 */ + tmp = vaddq_u32(sched0, vld1q_u32(&K[0])); + abcd_prev = abcd; + abcd = vsha256hq_u32(abcd_prev, efgh, tmp); + efgh = vsha256h2q_u32(efgh, abcd_prev, tmp); + + /* Rounds 4 to 7 */ + tmp = vaddq_u32(sched1, vld1q_u32(&K[4])); + abcd_prev = abcd; + abcd = vsha256hq_u32(abcd_prev, efgh, tmp); + efgh = vsha256h2q_u32(efgh, abcd_prev, tmp); + + /* Rounds 8 to 11 */ + tmp = vaddq_u32(sched2, vld1q_u32(&K[8])); + abcd_prev = abcd; + abcd = vsha256hq_u32(abcd_prev, efgh, tmp); + efgh = vsha256h2q_u32(efgh, abcd_prev, tmp); + + /* Rounds 12 to 15 */ + tmp = vaddq_u32(sched3, vld1q_u32(&K[12])); + abcd_prev = abcd; + abcd = vsha256hq_u32(abcd_prev, efgh, tmp); + efgh = vsha256h2q_u32(efgh, abcd_prev, tmp); + + for (int t = 16; t < 64; t += 16) { + /* Rounds t to t + 3 */ + sched0 = vsha256su1q_u32(vsha256su0q_u32(sched0, sched1), sched2, sched3); + tmp = vaddq_u32(sched0, vld1q_u32(&K[t])); + abcd_prev = abcd; + abcd = vsha256hq_u32(abcd_prev, efgh, tmp); + efgh = vsha256h2q_u32(efgh, abcd_prev, tmp); + + /* Rounds t + 4 to t + 7 */ + sched1 = vsha256su1q_u32(vsha256su0q_u32(sched1, sched2), sched3, sched0); + tmp = vaddq_u32(sched1, vld1q_u32(&K[t + 4])); + abcd_prev = abcd; + abcd = vsha256hq_u32(abcd_prev, efgh, tmp); + efgh = vsha256h2q_u32(efgh, abcd_prev, tmp); + + /* Rounds t + 8 to t + 11 */ + sched2 = vsha256su1q_u32(vsha256su0q_u32(sched2, sched3), sched0, sched1); + tmp = vaddq_u32(sched2, vld1q_u32(&K[t + 8])); + abcd_prev = abcd; + abcd = vsha256hq_u32(abcd_prev, efgh, tmp); + efgh = vsha256h2q_u32(efgh, abcd_prev, tmp); + + /* Rounds t + 12 to t + 15 */ + sched3 = vsha256su1q_u32(vsha256su0q_u32(sched3, sched0), sched1, sched2); + tmp = vaddq_u32(sched3, vld1q_u32(&K[t + 12])); + abcd_prev = abcd; + abcd = vsha256hq_u32(abcd_prev, efgh, tmp); + efgh = vsha256h2q_u32(efgh, abcd_prev, tmp); + } + + abcd = vaddq_u32(abcd, abcd_orig); + efgh = vaddq_u32(efgh, efgh_orig); + } + + vst1q_u32(&ctx->state[0], abcd); + vst1q_u32(&ctx->state[4], efgh); + + return processed; +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_USE_ARMV8_A_CRYPTO_IF_PRESENT) +/* + * This function is for internal use only if we are building both C and Armv8-A + * versions, otherwise it is renamed to be the public mbedtls_internal_sha256_process() + */ +static +#endif +int mbedtls_internal_sha256_process_a64_crypto(mbedtls_sha256_context *ctx, + const unsigned char data[SHA256_BLOCK_SIZE]) +{ + return (mbedtls_internal_sha256_process_many_a64_crypto(ctx, data, + SHA256_BLOCK_SIZE) == + SHA256_BLOCK_SIZE) ? 0 : -1; +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_USE_ARMV8_A_CRYPTO_IF_PRESENT || MBEDTLS_SHA256_USE_ARMV8_A_CRYPTO_ONLY */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_POP_TARGET_PRAGMA) +#if defined(__clang__) +#pragma clang attribute pop +#elif defined(__GNUC__) +#pragma GCC pop_options +#endif +#undef MBEDTLS_POP_TARGET_PRAGMA +#endif + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_USE_ARMV8_A_CRYPTO_IF_PRESENT) +#define mbedtls_internal_sha256_process_many_c mbedtls_internal_sha256_process_many +#define mbedtls_internal_sha256_process_c mbedtls_internal_sha256_process +#endif + + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_PROCESS_ALT) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_USE_ARMV8_A_CRYPTO_ONLY) + #define SHR(x, n) (((x) & 0xFFFFFFFF) >> (n)) #define ROTR(x, n) (SHR(x, n) | ((x) << (32 - (n)))) @@ -146,8 +478,15 @@ static const uint32_t K[] = (d) += local.temp1; (h) = local.temp1 + local.temp2; \ } while (0) -int mbedtls_internal_sha256_process(mbedtls_sha256_context *ctx, - const unsigned char data[64]) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_USE_ARMV8_A_CRYPTO_IF_PRESENT) +/* + * This function is for internal use only if we are building both C and Armv8 + * versions, otherwise it is renamed to be the public mbedtls_internal_sha256_process() + */ +static +#endif +int mbedtls_internal_sha256_process_c(mbedtls_sha256_context *ctx, + const unsigned char data[SHA256_BLOCK_SIZE]) { struct { uint32_t temp1, temp2, W[64]; @@ -156,9 +495,6 @@ int mbedtls_internal_sha256_process(mbedtls_sha256_context *ctx, unsigned int i; - SHA256_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - SHA256_VALIDATE_RET((const unsigned char *) data != NULL); - for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) { local.A[i] = ctx->state[i]; } @@ -234,35 +570,88 @@ int mbedtls_internal_sha256_process(mbedtls_sha256_context *ctx, return 0; } -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) -void mbedtls_sha256_process(mbedtls_sha256_context *ctx, - const unsigned char data[64]) +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_SHA256_PROCESS_ALT && !MBEDTLS_SHA256_USE_ARMV8_A_CRYPTO_ONLY */ + + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_USE_ARMV8_A_CRYPTO_ONLY) + +static size_t mbedtls_internal_sha256_process_many_c( + mbedtls_sha256_context *ctx, const uint8_t *data, size_t len) { - mbedtls_internal_sha256_process(ctx, data); + size_t processed = 0; + + while (len >= SHA256_BLOCK_SIZE) { + if (mbedtls_internal_sha256_process_c(ctx, data) != 0) { + return 0; + } + + data += SHA256_BLOCK_SIZE; + len -= SHA256_BLOCK_SIZE; + + processed += SHA256_BLOCK_SIZE; + } + + return processed; +} + +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_SHA256_USE_ARMV8_A_CRYPTO_ONLY */ + + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_USE_ARMV8_A_CRYPTO_IF_PRESENT) + +static int mbedtls_a64_crypto_sha256_has_support(void) +{ + static int done = 0; + static int supported = 0; + + if (!done) { + supported = mbedtls_a64_crypto_sha256_determine_support(); + done = 1; + } + + return supported; +} + +static size_t mbedtls_internal_sha256_process_many(mbedtls_sha256_context *ctx, + const uint8_t *msg, size_t len) +{ + if (mbedtls_a64_crypto_sha256_has_support()) { + return mbedtls_internal_sha256_process_many_a64_crypto(ctx, msg, len); + } else { + return mbedtls_internal_sha256_process_many_c(ctx, msg, len); + } } -#endif -#endif /* !MBEDTLS_SHA256_PROCESS_ALT */ + +int mbedtls_internal_sha256_process(mbedtls_sha256_context *ctx, + const unsigned char data[SHA256_BLOCK_SIZE]) +{ + if (mbedtls_a64_crypto_sha256_has_support()) { + return mbedtls_internal_sha256_process_a64_crypto(ctx, data); + } else { + return mbedtls_internal_sha256_process_c(ctx, data); + } +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_USE_ARMV8_A_CRYPTO_IF_PRESENT */ + /* * SHA-256 process buffer */ -int mbedtls_sha256_update_ret(mbedtls_sha256_context *ctx, - const unsigned char *input, - size_t ilen) +int mbedtls_sha256_update(mbedtls_sha256_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *input, + size_t ilen) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t fill; uint32_t left; - SHA256_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - SHA256_VALIDATE_RET(ilen == 0 || input != NULL); - if (ilen == 0) { return 0; } left = ctx->total[0] & 0x3F; - fill = 64 - left; + fill = SHA256_BLOCK_SIZE - left; ctx->total[0] += (uint32_t) ilen; ctx->total[0] &= 0xFFFFFFFF; @@ -283,13 +672,15 @@ int mbedtls_sha256_update_ret(mbedtls_sha256_context *ctx, left = 0; } - while (ilen >= 64) { - if ((ret = mbedtls_internal_sha256_process(ctx, input)) != 0) { - return ret; + while (ilen >= SHA256_BLOCK_SIZE) { + size_t processed = + mbedtls_internal_sha256_process_many(ctx, input, ilen); + if (processed < SHA256_BLOCK_SIZE) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_GENERIC_ERROR; } - input += 64; - ilen -= 64; + input += processed; + ilen -= processed; } if (ilen > 0) { @@ -299,27 +690,16 @@ int mbedtls_sha256_update_ret(mbedtls_sha256_context *ctx, return 0; } -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) -void mbedtls_sha256_update(mbedtls_sha256_context *ctx, - const unsigned char *input, - size_t ilen) -{ - mbedtls_sha256_update_ret(ctx, input, ilen); -} -#endif - /* * SHA-256 final digest */ -int mbedtls_sha256_finish_ret(mbedtls_sha256_context *ctx, - unsigned char output[32]) +int mbedtls_sha256_finish(mbedtls_sha256_context *ctx, + unsigned char *output) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; uint32_t used; uint32_t high, low; - - SHA256_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - SHA256_VALIDATE_RET((unsigned char *) output != NULL); + int truncated = 0; /* * Add padding: 0x80 then 0x00 until 8 bytes remain for the length @@ -333,10 +713,10 @@ int mbedtls_sha256_finish_ret(mbedtls_sha256_context *ctx, memset(ctx->buffer + used, 0, 56 - used); } else { /* We'll need an extra block */ - memset(ctx->buffer + used, 0, 64 - used); + memset(ctx->buffer + used, 0, SHA256_BLOCK_SIZE - used); if ((ret = mbedtls_internal_sha256_process(ctx, ctx->buffer)) != 0) { - return ret; + goto exit; } memset(ctx->buffer, 0, 56); @@ -353,7 +733,7 @@ int mbedtls_sha256_finish_ret(mbedtls_sha256_context *ctx, MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE(low, ctx->buffer, 60); if ((ret = mbedtls_internal_sha256_process(ctx, ctx->buffer)) != 0) { - return ret; + goto exit; } /* @@ -367,49 +747,58 @@ int mbedtls_sha256_finish_ret(mbedtls_sha256_context *ctx, MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE(ctx->state[5], output, 20); MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE(ctx->state[6], output, 24); - if (ctx->is224 == 0) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA224_C) + truncated = ctx->is224; +#endif + if (!truncated) { MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE(ctx->state[7], output, 28); } - return 0; -} + ret = 0; -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) -void mbedtls_sha256_finish(mbedtls_sha256_context *ctx, - unsigned char output[32]) -{ - mbedtls_sha256_finish_ret(ctx, output); +exit: + mbedtls_sha256_free(ctx); + return ret; } -#endif #endif /* !MBEDTLS_SHA256_ALT */ /* * output = SHA-256( input buffer ) */ -int mbedtls_sha256_ret(const unsigned char *input, - size_t ilen, - unsigned char output[32], - int is224) +int mbedtls_sha256(const unsigned char *input, + size_t ilen, + unsigned char *output, + int is224) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; mbedtls_sha256_context ctx; - SHA256_VALIDATE_RET(is224 == 0 || is224 == 1); - SHA256_VALIDATE_RET(ilen == 0 || input != NULL); - SHA256_VALIDATE_RET((unsigned char *) output != NULL); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA224_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) + if (is224 != 0 && is224 != 1) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SHA256_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) + if (is224 != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SHA256_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } +#else /* defined MBEDTLS_SHA224_C only */ + if (is224 == 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SHA256_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } +#endif mbedtls_sha256_init(&ctx); - if ((ret = mbedtls_sha256_starts_ret(&ctx, is224)) != 0) { + if ((ret = mbedtls_sha256_starts(&ctx, is224)) != 0) { goto exit; } - if ((ret = mbedtls_sha256_update_ret(&ctx, input, ilen)) != 0) { + if ((ret = mbedtls_sha256_update(&ctx, input, ilen)) != 0) { goto exit; } - if ((ret = mbedtls_sha256_finish_ret(&ctx, output)) != 0) { + if ((ret = mbedtls_sha256_finish(&ctx, output)) != 0) { goto exit; } @@ -419,37 +808,30 @@ int mbedtls_sha256_ret(const unsigned char *input, return ret; } -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) -void mbedtls_sha256(const unsigned char *input, - size_t ilen, - unsigned char output[32], - int is224) -{ - mbedtls_sha256_ret(input, ilen, output, is224); -} -#endif - #if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) /* * FIPS-180-2 test vectors */ -static const unsigned char sha256_test_buf[3][57] = +static const unsigned char sha_test_buf[3][57] = { { "abc" }, { "abcdbcdecdefdefgefghfghighijhijkijkljklmklmnlmnomnopnopq" }, { "" } }; -static const size_t sha256_test_buflen[3] = +static const size_t sha_test_buflen[3] = { 3, 56, 1000 }; -static const unsigned char sha256_test_sum[6][32] = +typedef const unsigned char (sha_test_sum_t)[32]; + +/* + * SHA-224 test vectors + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA224_C) +static sha_test_sum_t sha224_test_sum[] = { - /* - * SHA-224 test vectors - */ { 0x23, 0x09, 0x7D, 0x22, 0x34, 0x05, 0xD8, 0x22, 0x86, 0x42, 0xA4, 0x77, 0xBD, 0xA2, 0x55, 0xB3, 0x2A, 0xAD, 0xBC, 0xE4, 0xBD, 0xA0, 0xB3, 0xF7, @@ -461,11 +843,16 @@ static const unsigned char sha256_test_sum[6][32] = { 0x20, 0x79, 0x46, 0x55, 0x98, 0x0C, 0x91, 0xD8, 0xBB, 0xB4, 0xC1, 0xEA, 0x97, 0x61, 0x8A, 0x4B, 0xF0, 0x3F, 0x42, 0x58, 0x19, 0x48, 0xB2, 0xEE, - 0x4E, 0xE7, 0xAD, 0x67 }, + 0x4E, 0xE7, 0xAD, 0x67 } +}; +#endif - /* - * SHA-256 test vectors - */ +/* + * SHA-256 test vectors + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) +static sha_test_sum_t sha256_test_sum[] = +{ { 0xBA, 0x78, 0x16, 0xBF, 0x8F, 0x01, 0xCF, 0xEA, 0x41, 0x41, 0x40, 0xDE, 0x5D, 0xAE, 0x22, 0x23, 0xB0, 0x03, 0x61, 0xA3, 0x96, 0x17, 0x7A, 0x9C, @@ -479,17 +866,26 @@ static const unsigned char sha256_test_sum[6][32] = 0xF1, 0x80, 0x9A, 0x48, 0xA4, 0x97, 0x20, 0x0E, 0x04, 0x6D, 0x39, 0xCC, 0xC7, 0x11, 0x2C, 0xD0 } }; +#endif /* * Checkup routine */ -int mbedtls_sha256_self_test(int verbose) +static int mbedtls_sha256_common_self_test(int verbose, int is224) { - int i, j, k, buflen, ret = 0; + int i, buflen, ret = 0; unsigned char *buf; unsigned char sha256sum[32]; mbedtls_sha256_context ctx; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA224_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) + sha_test_sum_t *sha_test_sum = (is224) ? sha224_test_sum : sha256_test_sum; +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) + sha_test_sum_t *sha_test_sum = sha256_test_sum; +#else + sha_test_sum_t *sha_test_sum = sha224_test_sum; +#endif + buf = mbedtls_calloc(1024, sizeof(unsigned char)); if (NULL == buf) { if (verbose != 0) { @@ -501,42 +897,39 @@ int mbedtls_sha256_self_test(int verbose) mbedtls_sha256_init(&ctx); - for (i = 0; i < 6; i++) { - j = i % 3; - k = i < 3; - + for (i = 0; i < 3; i++) { if (verbose != 0) { - mbedtls_printf(" SHA-%d test #%d: ", 256 - k * 32, j + 1); + mbedtls_printf(" SHA-%d test #%d: ", 256 - is224 * 32, i + 1); } - if ((ret = mbedtls_sha256_starts_ret(&ctx, k)) != 0) { + if ((ret = mbedtls_sha256_starts(&ctx, is224)) != 0) { goto fail; } - if (j == 2) { + if (i == 2) { memset(buf, 'a', buflen = 1000); - for (j = 0; j < 1000; j++) { - ret = mbedtls_sha256_update_ret(&ctx, buf, buflen); + for (int j = 0; j < 1000; j++) { + ret = mbedtls_sha256_update(&ctx, buf, buflen); if (ret != 0) { goto fail; } } } else { - ret = mbedtls_sha256_update_ret(&ctx, sha256_test_buf[j], - sha256_test_buflen[j]); + ret = mbedtls_sha256_update(&ctx, sha_test_buf[i], + sha_test_buflen[i]); if (ret != 0) { goto fail; } } - if ((ret = mbedtls_sha256_finish_ret(&ctx, sha256sum)) != 0) { + if ((ret = mbedtls_sha256_finish(&ctx, sha256sum)) != 0) { goto fail; } - if (memcmp(sha256sum, sha256_test_sum[i], 32 - k * 4) != 0) { + if (memcmp(sha256sum, sha_test_sum[i], 32 - is224 * 4) != 0) { ret = 1; goto fail; } @@ -564,6 +957,20 @@ int mbedtls_sha256_self_test(int verbose) return ret; } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) +int mbedtls_sha256_self_test(int verbose) +{ + return mbedtls_sha256_common_self_test(verbose, 0); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA224_C) +int mbedtls_sha224_self_test(int verbose) +{ + return mbedtls_sha256_common_self_test(verbose, 1); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA224_C */ + #endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C || MBEDTLS_SHA224_C */ diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/sha3.c b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/sha3.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..57385595f565 --- /dev/null +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/sha3.c @@ -0,0 +1,721 @@ +/* + * FIPS-202 compliant SHA3 implementation + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ +/* + * The SHA-3 Secure Hash Standard was published by NIST in 2015. + * + * https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/fips/nist.fips.202.pdf + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA3_C) + +/* + * These macros select manually unrolled implementations of parts of the main permutation function. + * + * Unrolling has a major impact on both performance and code size. gcc performance benefits a lot + * from manually unrolling at higher optimisation levels. + * + * Depending on your size/perf priorities, compiler and target, it may be beneficial to adjust + * these; the defaults here should give sensible trade-offs for gcc and clang on aarch64 and + * x86-64. + */ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA3_THETA_UNROLL) + #define MBEDTLS_SHA3_THETA_UNROLL 0 //no-check-names +#endif +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA3_CHI_UNROLL) + #if defined(__OPTIMIZE_SIZE__) + #define MBEDTLS_SHA3_CHI_UNROLL 0 //no-check-names + #else + #define MBEDTLS_SHA3_CHI_UNROLL 1 //no-check-names + #endif +#endif +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA3_PI_UNROLL) + #define MBEDTLS_SHA3_PI_UNROLL 1 //no-check-names +#endif +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA3_RHO_UNROLL) + #define MBEDTLS_SHA3_RHO_UNROLL 1 //no-check-names +#endif + +#include "mbedtls/sha3.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" + +#include + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ + +#define XOR_BYTE 0x6 + +/* Precomputed masks for the iota transform. + * + * Each round uses a 64-bit mask value. In each mask values, only + * bits whose position is of the form 2^k-1 can be set, thus only + * 7 of 64 bits of the mask need to be known for each mask value. + * + * We use a compressed encoding of the mask where bits 63, 31 and 15 + * are moved to bits 4-6. This allows us to make each mask value + * 1 byte rather than 8 bytes, saving 7*24 = 168 bytes of data (with + * perhaps a little variation due to alignment). Decompressing this + * requires a little code, but much less than the savings on the table. + * + * The impact on performance depends on the platform and compiler. + * There's a bit more computation, but less memory bandwidth. A quick + * benchmark on x86_64 shows a 7% speed improvement with GCC and a + * 5% speed penalty with Clang, compared to the naive uint64_t[24] table. + * YMMV. + */ +/* Helper macro to set the values of the higher bits in unused low positions */ +#define H(b63, b31, b15) (b63 << 6 | b31 << 5 | b15 << 4) +static const uint8_t iota_r_packed[24] = { + H(0, 0, 0) | 0x01, H(0, 0, 1) | 0x82, H(1, 0, 1) | 0x8a, H(1, 1, 1) | 0x00, + H(0, 0, 1) | 0x8b, H(0, 1, 0) | 0x01, H(1, 1, 1) | 0x81, H(1, 0, 1) | 0x09, + H(0, 0, 0) | 0x8a, H(0, 0, 0) | 0x88, H(0, 1, 1) | 0x09, H(0, 1, 0) | 0x0a, + H(0, 1, 1) | 0x8b, H(1, 0, 0) | 0x8b, H(1, 0, 1) | 0x89, H(1, 0, 1) | 0x03, + H(1, 0, 1) | 0x02, H(1, 0, 0) | 0x80, H(0, 0, 1) | 0x0a, H(1, 1, 0) | 0x0a, + H(1, 1, 1) | 0x81, H(1, 0, 1) | 0x80, H(0, 1, 0) | 0x01, H(1, 1, 1) | 0x08, +}; +#undef H + +static const uint32_t rho[6] = { + 0x3f022425, 0x1c143a09, 0x2c3d3615, 0x27191713, 0x312b382e, 0x3e030832 +}; + +static const uint32_t pi[6] = { + 0x110b070a, 0x10050312, 0x04181508, 0x0d13170f, 0x0e14020c, 0x01060916 +}; + +#define ROTR64(x, y) (((x) << (64U - (y))) | ((x) >> (y))) // 64-bit rotate right +#define ABSORB(ctx, idx, v) do { ctx->state[(idx) >> 3] ^= ((uint64_t) (v)) << (((idx) & 0x7) << 3); \ +} while (0) +#define SQUEEZE(ctx, idx) ((uint8_t) (ctx->state[(idx) >> 3] >> (((idx) & 0x7) << 3))) +#define SWAP(x, y) do { uint64_t tmp = (x); (x) = (y); (y) = tmp; } while (0) + +/* The permutation function. */ +static void keccak_f1600(mbedtls_sha3_context *ctx) +{ + uint64_t lane[5]; + uint64_t *s = ctx->state; + int i; + + for (int round = 0; round < 24; round++) { + uint64_t t; + + /* Theta */ +#if MBEDTLS_SHA3_THETA_UNROLL == 0 //no-check-names + for (i = 0; i < 5; i++) { + lane[i] = s[i] ^ s[i + 5] ^ s[i + 10] ^ s[i + 15] ^ s[i + 20]; + } + for (i = 0; i < 5; i++) { + t = lane[(i + 4) % 5] ^ ROTR64(lane[(i + 1) % 5], 63); + s[i] ^= t; s[i + 5] ^= t; s[i + 10] ^= t; s[i + 15] ^= t; s[i + 20] ^= t; + } +#else + lane[0] = s[0] ^ s[5] ^ s[10] ^ s[15] ^ s[20]; + lane[1] = s[1] ^ s[6] ^ s[11] ^ s[16] ^ s[21]; + lane[2] = s[2] ^ s[7] ^ s[12] ^ s[17] ^ s[22]; + lane[3] = s[3] ^ s[8] ^ s[13] ^ s[18] ^ s[23]; + lane[4] = s[4] ^ s[9] ^ s[14] ^ s[19] ^ s[24]; + + t = lane[4] ^ ROTR64(lane[1], 63); + s[0] ^= t; s[5] ^= t; s[10] ^= t; s[15] ^= t; s[20] ^= t; + + t = lane[0] ^ ROTR64(lane[2], 63); + s[1] ^= t; s[6] ^= t; s[11] ^= t; s[16] ^= t; s[21] ^= t; + + t = lane[1] ^ ROTR64(lane[3], 63); + s[2] ^= t; s[7] ^= t; s[12] ^= t; s[17] ^= t; s[22] ^= t; + + t = lane[2] ^ ROTR64(lane[4], 63); + s[3] ^= t; s[8] ^= t; s[13] ^= t; s[18] ^= t; s[23] ^= t; + + t = lane[3] ^ ROTR64(lane[0], 63); + s[4] ^= t; s[9] ^= t; s[14] ^= t; s[19] ^= t; s[24] ^= t; +#endif + + /* Rho */ + for (i = 1; i < 25; i += 4) { + uint32_t r = rho[(i - 1) >> 2]; +#if MBEDTLS_SHA3_RHO_UNROLL == 0 + for (int j = i; j < i + 4; j++) { + uint8_t r8 = (uint8_t) (r >> 24); + r <<= 8; + s[j] = ROTR64(s[j], r8); + } +#else + s[i + 0] = ROTR64(s[i + 0], MBEDTLS_BYTE_3(r)); + s[i + 1] = ROTR64(s[i + 1], MBEDTLS_BYTE_2(r)); + s[i + 2] = ROTR64(s[i + 2], MBEDTLS_BYTE_1(r)); + s[i + 3] = ROTR64(s[i + 3], MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(r)); +#endif + } + + /* Pi */ + t = s[1]; +#if MBEDTLS_SHA3_PI_UNROLL == 0 + for (i = 0; i < 24; i += 4) { + uint32_t p = pi[i >> 2]; + for (unsigned j = 0; j < 4; j++) { + SWAP(s[p & 0xff], t); + p >>= 8; + } + } +#else + uint32_t p = pi[0]; + SWAP(s[MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(p)], t); SWAP(s[MBEDTLS_BYTE_1(p)], t); + SWAP(s[MBEDTLS_BYTE_2(p)], t); SWAP(s[MBEDTLS_BYTE_3(p)], t); + p = pi[1]; + SWAP(s[MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(p)], t); SWAP(s[MBEDTLS_BYTE_1(p)], t); + SWAP(s[MBEDTLS_BYTE_2(p)], t); SWAP(s[MBEDTLS_BYTE_3(p)], t); + p = pi[2]; + SWAP(s[MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(p)], t); SWAP(s[MBEDTLS_BYTE_1(p)], t); + SWAP(s[MBEDTLS_BYTE_2(p)], t); SWAP(s[MBEDTLS_BYTE_3(p)], t); + p = pi[3]; + SWAP(s[MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(p)], t); SWAP(s[MBEDTLS_BYTE_1(p)], t); + SWAP(s[MBEDTLS_BYTE_2(p)], t); SWAP(s[MBEDTLS_BYTE_3(p)], t); + p = pi[4]; + SWAP(s[MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(p)], t); SWAP(s[MBEDTLS_BYTE_1(p)], t); + SWAP(s[MBEDTLS_BYTE_2(p)], t); SWAP(s[MBEDTLS_BYTE_3(p)], t); + p = pi[5]; + SWAP(s[MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(p)], t); SWAP(s[MBEDTLS_BYTE_1(p)], t); + SWAP(s[MBEDTLS_BYTE_2(p)], t); SWAP(s[MBEDTLS_BYTE_3(p)], t); +#endif + + /* Chi */ +#if MBEDTLS_SHA3_CHI_UNROLL == 0 //no-check-names + for (i = 0; i <= 20; i += 5) { + lane[0] = s[i]; lane[1] = s[i + 1]; lane[2] = s[i + 2]; + lane[3] = s[i + 3]; lane[4] = s[i + 4]; + s[i + 0] ^= (~lane[1]) & lane[2]; + s[i + 1] ^= (~lane[2]) & lane[3]; + s[i + 2] ^= (~lane[3]) & lane[4]; + s[i + 3] ^= (~lane[4]) & lane[0]; + s[i + 4] ^= (~lane[0]) & lane[1]; + } +#else + lane[0] = s[0]; lane[1] = s[1]; lane[2] = s[2]; lane[3] = s[3]; lane[4] = s[4]; + s[0] ^= (~lane[1]) & lane[2]; + s[1] ^= (~lane[2]) & lane[3]; + s[2] ^= (~lane[3]) & lane[4]; + s[3] ^= (~lane[4]) & lane[0]; + s[4] ^= (~lane[0]) & lane[1]; + + lane[0] = s[5]; lane[1] = s[6]; lane[2] = s[7]; lane[3] = s[8]; lane[4] = s[9]; + s[5] ^= (~lane[1]) & lane[2]; + s[6] ^= (~lane[2]) & lane[3]; + s[7] ^= (~lane[3]) & lane[4]; + s[8] ^= (~lane[4]) & lane[0]; + s[9] ^= (~lane[0]) & lane[1]; + + lane[0] = s[10]; lane[1] = s[11]; lane[2] = s[12]; lane[3] = s[13]; lane[4] = s[14]; + s[10] ^= (~lane[1]) & lane[2]; + s[11] ^= (~lane[2]) & lane[3]; + s[12] ^= (~lane[3]) & lane[4]; + s[13] ^= (~lane[4]) & lane[0]; + s[14] ^= (~lane[0]) & lane[1]; + + lane[0] = s[15]; lane[1] = s[16]; lane[2] = s[17]; lane[3] = s[18]; lane[4] = s[19]; + s[15] ^= (~lane[1]) & lane[2]; + s[16] ^= (~lane[2]) & lane[3]; + s[17] ^= (~lane[3]) & lane[4]; + s[18] ^= (~lane[4]) & lane[0]; + s[19] ^= (~lane[0]) & lane[1]; + + lane[0] = s[20]; lane[1] = s[21]; lane[2] = s[22]; lane[3] = s[23]; lane[4] = s[24]; + s[20] ^= (~lane[1]) & lane[2]; + s[21] ^= (~lane[2]) & lane[3]; + s[22] ^= (~lane[3]) & lane[4]; + s[23] ^= (~lane[4]) & lane[0]; + s[24] ^= (~lane[0]) & lane[1]; +#endif + + /* Iota */ + /* Decompress the round masks (see definition of rc) */ + s[0] ^= ((iota_r_packed[round] & 0x40ull) << 57 | + (iota_r_packed[round] & 0x20ull) << 26 | + (iota_r_packed[round] & 0x10ull) << 11 | + (iota_r_packed[round] & 0x8f)); + } +} + +void mbedtls_sha3_init(mbedtls_sha3_context *ctx) +{ + memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_sha3_context)); +} + +void mbedtls_sha3_free(mbedtls_sha3_context *ctx) +{ + if (ctx == NULL) { + return; + } + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(ctx, sizeof(mbedtls_sha3_context)); +} + +void mbedtls_sha3_clone(mbedtls_sha3_context *dst, + const mbedtls_sha3_context *src) +{ + *dst = *src; +} + +/* + * SHA-3 context setup + */ +int mbedtls_sha3_starts(mbedtls_sha3_context *ctx, mbedtls_sha3_id id) +{ + switch (id) { + case MBEDTLS_SHA3_224: + ctx->olen = 224 / 8; + ctx->max_block_size = 1152 / 8; + break; + case MBEDTLS_SHA3_256: + ctx->olen = 256 / 8; + ctx->max_block_size = 1088 / 8; + break; + case MBEDTLS_SHA3_384: + ctx->olen = 384 / 8; + ctx->max_block_size = 832 / 8; + break; + case MBEDTLS_SHA3_512: + ctx->olen = 512 / 8; + ctx->max_block_size = 576 / 8; + break; + default: + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SHA3_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + memset(ctx->state, 0, sizeof(ctx->state)); + ctx->index = 0; + + return 0; +} + +/* + * SHA-3 process buffer + */ +int mbedtls_sha3_update(mbedtls_sha3_context *ctx, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t ilen) +{ + if (ilen >= 8) { + // 8-byte align index + int align_bytes = 8 - (ctx->index % 8); + if (align_bytes) { + for (; align_bytes > 0; align_bytes--) { + ABSORB(ctx, ctx->index, *input++); + ilen--; + ctx->index++; + } + if ((ctx->index = ctx->index % ctx->max_block_size) == 0) { + keccak_f1600(ctx); + } + } + + // process input in 8-byte chunks + while (ilen >= 8) { + ABSORB(ctx, ctx->index, MBEDTLS_GET_UINT64_LE(input, 0)); + input += 8; + ilen -= 8; + if ((ctx->index = (ctx->index + 8) % ctx->max_block_size) == 0) { + keccak_f1600(ctx); + } + } + } + + // handle remaining bytes + while (ilen-- > 0) { + ABSORB(ctx, ctx->index, *input++); + if ((ctx->index = (ctx->index + 1) % ctx->max_block_size) == 0) { + keccak_f1600(ctx); + } + } + + return 0; +} + +int mbedtls_sha3_finish(mbedtls_sha3_context *ctx, + uint8_t *output, size_t olen) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + /* Catch SHA-3 families, with fixed output length */ + if (ctx->olen > 0) { + if (ctx->olen > olen) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SHA3_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + goto exit; + } + olen = ctx->olen; + } + + ABSORB(ctx, ctx->index, XOR_BYTE); + ABSORB(ctx, ctx->max_block_size - 1, 0x80); + keccak_f1600(ctx); + ctx->index = 0; + + while (olen-- > 0) { + *output++ = SQUEEZE(ctx, ctx->index); + + if ((ctx->index = (ctx->index + 1) % ctx->max_block_size) == 0) { + keccak_f1600(ctx); + } + } + + ret = 0; + +exit: + mbedtls_sha3_free(ctx); + return ret; +} + +/* + * output = SHA-3( input buffer ) + */ +int mbedtls_sha3(mbedtls_sha3_id id, const uint8_t *input, + size_t ilen, uint8_t *output, size_t olen) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_sha3_context ctx; + + mbedtls_sha3_init(&ctx); + + /* Sanity checks are performed in every mbedtls_sha3_xxx() */ + if ((ret = mbedtls_sha3_starts(&ctx, id)) != 0) { + goto exit; + } + + if ((ret = mbedtls_sha3_update(&ctx, input, ilen)) != 0) { + goto exit; + } + + if ((ret = mbedtls_sha3_finish(&ctx, output, olen)) != 0) { + goto exit; + } + +exit: + mbedtls_sha3_free(&ctx); + + return ret; +} + +/**************** Self-tests ****************/ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) + +static const unsigned char test_data[2][4] = +{ + "", + "abc", +}; + +static const size_t test_data_len[2] = +{ + 0, /* "" */ + 3 /* "abc" */ +}; + +static const unsigned char test_hash_sha3_224[2][28] = +{ + { /* "" */ + 0x6B, 0x4E, 0x03, 0x42, 0x36, 0x67, 0xDB, 0xB7, + 0x3B, 0x6E, 0x15, 0x45, 0x4F, 0x0E, 0xB1, 0xAB, + 0xD4, 0x59, 0x7F, 0x9A, 0x1B, 0x07, 0x8E, 0x3F, + 0x5B, 0x5A, 0x6B, 0xC7 + }, + { /* "abc" */ + 0xE6, 0x42, 0x82, 0x4C, 0x3F, 0x8C, 0xF2, 0x4A, + 0xD0, 0x92, 0x34, 0xEE, 0x7D, 0x3C, 0x76, 0x6F, + 0xC9, 0xA3, 0xA5, 0x16, 0x8D, 0x0C, 0x94, 0xAD, + 0x73, 0xB4, 0x6F, 0xDF + } +}; + +static const unsigned char test_hash_sha3_256[2][32] = +{ + { /* "" */ + 0xA7, 0xFF, 0xC6, 0xF8, 0xBF, 0x1E, 0xD7, 0x66, + 0x51, 0xC1, 0x47, 0x56, 0xA0, 0x61, 0xD6, 0x62, + 0xF5, 0x80, 0xFF, 0x4D, 0xE4, 0x3B, 0x49, 0xFA, + 0x82, 0xD8, 0x0A, 0x4B, 0x80, 0xF8, 0x43, 0x4A + }, + { /* "abc" */ + 0x3A, 0x98, 0x5D, 0xA7, 0x4F, 0xE2, 0x25, 0xB2, + 0x04, 0x5C, 0x17, 0x2D, 0x6B, 0xD3, 0x90, 0xBD, + 0x85, 0x5F, 0x08, 0x6E, 0x3E, 0x9D, 0x52, 0x5B, + 0x46, 0xBF, 0xE2, 0x45, 0x11, 0x43, 0x15, 0x32 + } +}; + +static const unsigned char test_hash_sha3_384[2][48] = +{ + { /* "" */ + 0x0C, 0x63, 0xA7, 0x5B, 0x84, 0x5E, 0x4F, 0x7D, + 0x01, 0x10, 0x7D, 0x85, 0x2E, 0x4C, 0x24, 0x85, + 0xC5, 0x1A, 0x50, 0xAA, 0xAA, 0x94, 0xFC, 0x61, + 0x99, 0x5E, 0x71, 0xBB, 0xEE, 0x98, 0x3A, 0x2A, + 0xC3, 0x71, 0x38, 0x31, 0x26, 0x4A, 0xDB, 0x47, + 0xFB, 0x6B, 0xD1, 0xE0, 0x58, 0xD5, 0xF0, 0x04 + }, + { /* "abc" */ + 0xEC, 0x01, 0x49, 0x82, 0x88, 0x51, 0x6F, 0xC9, + 0x26, 0x45, 0x9F, 0x58, 0xE2, 0xC6, 0xAD, 0x8D, + 0xF9, 0xB4, 0x73, 0xCB, 0x0F, 0xC0, 0x8C, 0x25, + 0x96, 0xDA, 0x7C, 0xF0, 0xE4, 0x9B, 0xE4, 0xB2, + 0x98, 0xD8, 0x8C, 0xEA, 0x92, 0x7A, 0xC7, 0xF5, + 0x39, 0xF1, 0xED, 0xF2, 0x28, 0x37, 0x6D, 0x25 + } +}; + +static const unsigned char test_hash_sha3_512[2][64] = +{ + { /* "" */ + 0xA6, 0x9F, 0x73, 0xCC, 0xA2, 0x3A, 0x9A, 0xC5, + 0xC8, 0xB5, 0x67, 0xDC, 0x18, 0x5A, 0x75, 0x6E, + 0x97, 0xC9, 0x82, 0x16, 0x4F, 0xE2, 0x58, 0x59, + 0xE0, 0xD1, 0xDC, 0xC1, 0x47, 0x5C, 0x80, 0xA6, + 0x15, 0xB2, 0x12, 0x3A, 0xF1, 0xF5, 0xF9, 0x4C, + 0x11, 0xE3, 0xE9, 0x40, 0x2C, 0x3A, 0xC5, 0x58, + 0xF5, 0x00, 0x19, 0x9D, 0x95, 0xB6, 0xD3, 0xE3, + 0x01, 0x75, 0x85, 0x86, 0x28, 0x1D, 0xCD, 0x26 + }, + { /* "abc" */ + 0xB7, 0x51, 0x85, 0x0B, 0x1A, 0x57, 0x16, 0x8A, + 0x56, 0x93, 0xCD, 0x92, 0x4B, 0x6B, 0x09, 0x6E, + 0x08, 0xF6, 0x21, 0x82, 0x74, 0x44, 0xF7, 0x0D, + 0x88, 0x4F, 0x5D, 0x02, 0x40, 0xD2, 0x71, 0x2E, + 0x10, 0xE1, 0x16, 0xE9, 0x19, 0x2A, 0xF3, 0xC9, + 0x1A, 0x7E, 0xC5, 0x76, 0x47, 0xE3, 0x93, 0x40, + 0x57, 0x34, 0x0B, 0x4C, 0xF4, 0x08, 0xD5, 0xA5, + 0x65, 0x92, 0xF8, 0x27, 0x4E, 0xEC, 0x53, 0xF0 + } +}; + +static const unsigned char long_kat_hash_sha3_224[28] = +{ + 0xD6, 0x93, 0x35, 0xB9, 0x33, 0x25, 0x19, 0x2E, + 0x51, 0x6A, 0x91, 0x2E, 0x6D, 0x19, 0xA1, 0x5C, + 0xB5, 0x1C, 0x6E, 0xD5, 0xC1, 0x52, 0x43, 0xE7, + 0xA7, 0xFD, 0x65, 0x3C +}; + +static const unsigned char long_kat_hash_sha3_256[32] = +{ + 0x5C, 0x88, 0x75, 0xAE, 0x47, 0x4A, 0x36, 0x34, + 0xBA, 0x4F, 0xD5, 0x5E, 0xC8, 0x5B, 0xFF, 0xD6, + 0x61, 0xF3, 0x2A, 0xCA, 0x75, 0xC6, 0xD6, 0x99, + 0xD0, 0xCD, 0xCB, 0x6C, 0x11, 0x58, 0x91, 0xC1 +}; + +static const unsigned char long_kat_hash_sha3_384[48] = +{ + 0xEE, 0xE9, 0xE2, 0x4D, 0x78, 0xC1, 0x85, 0x53, + 0x37, 0x98, 0x34, 0x51, 0xDF, 0x97, 0xC8, 0xAD, + 0x9E, 0xED, 0xF2, 0x56, 0xC6, 0x33, 0x4F, 0x8E, + 0x94, 0x8D, 0x25, 0x2D, 0x5E, 0x0E, 0x76, 0x84, + 0x7A, 0xA0, 0x77, 0x4D, 0xDB, 0x90, 0xA8, 0x42, + 0x19, 0x0D, 0x2C, 0x55, 0x8B, 0x4B, 0x83, 0x40 +}; + +static const unsigned char long_kat_hash_sha3_512[64] = +{ + 0x3C, 0x3A, 0x87, 0x6D, 0xA1, 0x40, 0x34, 0xAB, + 0x60, 0x62, 0x7C, 0x07, 0x7B, 0xB9, 0x8F, 0x7E, + 0x12, 0x0A, 0x2A, 0x53, 0x70, 0x21, 0x2D, 0xFF, + 0xB3, 0x38, 0x5A, 0x18, 0xD4, 0xF3, 0x88, 0x59, + 0xED, 0x31, 0x1D, 0x0A, 0x9D, 0x51, 0x41, 0xCE, + 0x9C, 0xC5, 0xC6, 0x6E, 0xE6, 0x89, 0xB2, 0x66, + 0xA8, 0xAA, 0x18, 0xAC, 0xE8, 0x28, 0x2A, 0x0E, + 0x0D, 0xB5, 0x96, 0xC9, 0x0B, 0x0A, 0x7B, 0x87 +}; + +static int mbedtls_sha3_kat_test(int verbose, + const char *type_name, + mbedtls_sha3_id id, + int test_num) +{ + uint8_t hash[64]; + int result; + + result = mbedtls_sha3(id, + test_data[test_num], test_data_len[test_num], + hash, sizeof(hash)); + if (result != 0) { + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf(" %s test %d error code: %d\n", + type_name, test_num, result); + } + + return result; + } + + switch (id) { + case MBEDTLS_SHA3_224: + result = memcmp(hash, test_hash_sha3_224[test_num], 28); + break; + case MBEDTLS_SHA3_256: + result = memcmp(hash, test_hash_sha3_256[test_num], 32); + break; + case MBEDTLS_SHA3_384: + result = memcmp(hash, test_hash_sha3_384[test_num], 48); + break; + case MBEDTLS_SHA3_512: + result = memcmp(hash, test_hash_sha3_512[test_num], 64); + break; + default: + break; + } + + if (0 != result) { + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf(" %s test %d failed\n", type_name, test_num); + } + + return -1; + } + + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf(" %s test %d passed\n", type_name, test_num); + } + + return 0; +} + +static int mbedtls_sha3_long_kat_test(int verbose, + const char *type_name, + mbedtls_sha3_id id) +{ + mbedtls_sha3_context ctx; + unsigned char buffer[1000]; + unsigned char hash[64]; + int result = 0; + + memset(buffer, 'a', 1000); + + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf(" %s long KAT test ", type_name); + } + + mbedtls_sha3_init(&ctx); + + result = mbedtls_sha3_starts(&ctx, id); + if (result != 0) { + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf("setup failed\n "); + } + } + + /* Process 1,000,000 (one million) 'a' characters */ + for (int i = 0; i < 1000; i++) { + result = mbedtls_sha3_update(&ctx, buffer, 1000); + if (result != 0) { + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf("update error code: %i\n", result); + } + + goto cleanup; + } + } + + result = mbedtls_sha3_finish(&ctx, hash, sizeof(hash)); + if (result != 0) { + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf("finish error code: %d\n", result); + } + + goto cleanup; + } + + switch (id) { + case MBEDTLS_SHA3_224: + result = memcmp(hash, long_kat_hash_sha3_224, 28); + break; + case MBEDTLS_SHA3_256: + result = memcmp(hash, long_kat_hash_sha3_256, 32); + break; + case MBEDTLS_SHA3_384: + result = memcmp(hash, long_kat_hash_sha3_384, 48); + break; + case MBEDTLS_SHA3_512: + result = memcmp(hash, long_kat_hash_sha3_512, 64); + break; + default: + break; + } + + if (result != 0) { + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf("failed\n"); + } + } + + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf("passed\n"); + } + +cleanup: + mbedtls_sha3_free(&ctx); + return result; +} + +int mbedtls_sha3_self_test(int verbose) +{ + int i; + + /* SHA-3 Known Answer Tests (KAT) */ + for (i = 0; i < 2; i++) { + if (0 != mbedtls_sha3_kat_test(verbose, + "SHA3-224", MBEDTLS_SHA3_224, i)) { + return 1; + } + + if (0 != mbedtls_sha3_kat_test(verbose, + "SHA3-256", MBEDTLS_SHA3_256, i)) { + return 1; + } + + if (0 != mbedtls_sha3_kat_test(verbose, + "SHA3-384", MBEDTLS_SHA3_384, i)) { + return 1; + } + + if (0 != mbedtls_sha3_kat_test(verbose, + "SHA3-512", MBEDTLS_SHA3_512, i)) { + return 1; + } + } + + /* SHA-3 long KAT tests */ + if (0 != mbedtls_sha3_long_kat_test(verbose, + "SHA3-224", MBEDTLS_SHA3_224)) { + return 1; + } + + if (0 != mbedtls_sha3_long_kat_test(verbose, + "SHA3-256", MBEDTLS_SHA3_256)) { + return 1; + } + + if (0 != mbedtls_sha3_long_kat_test(verbose, + "SHA3-384", MBEDTLS_SHA3_384)) { + return 1; + } + + if (0 != mbedtls_sha3_long_kat_test(verbose, + "SHA3-512", MBEDTLS_SHA3_512)) { + return 1; + } + + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf("\n"); + } + + return 0; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA3_C */ diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/sha512.c b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/sha512.c index 77bdc2ec2342..6dcea8da5d5c 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/sha512.c +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/sha512.c @@ -10,9 +10,25 @@ * http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips180-2/fips180-2.pdf */ +#if defined(__aarch64__) && !defined(__ARM_FEATURE_SHA512) && \ + defined(__clang__) && __clang_major__ >= 7 +/* TODO: Re-consider above after https://reviews.llvm.org/D131064 merged. + * + * The intrinsic declaration are guarded by predefined ACLE macros in clang: + * these are normally only enabled by the -march option on the command line. + * By defining the macros ourselves we gain access to those declarations without + * requiring -march on the command line. + * + * `arm_neon.h` is included by common.h, so we put these defines + * at the top of this file, before any includes. + */ +#define __ARM_FEATURE_SHA512 1 +#define MBEDTLS_ENABLE_ARM_SHA3_EXTENSIONS_COMPILER_FLAG +#endif + #include "common.h" -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C) #include "mbedtls/sha512.h" #include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" @@ -28,12 +44,171 @@ #include "mbedtls/platform.h" -#define SHA512_VALIDATE_RET(cond) \ - MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE_RET(cond, MBEDTLS_ERR_SHA512_BAD_INPUT_DATA) -#define SHA512_VALIDATE(cond) MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE(cond) +#if defined(__aarch64__) +# if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_USE_A64_CRYPTO_IF_PRESENT) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_USE_A64_CRYPTO_ONLY) +/* *INDENT-OFF* */ +# if !defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_NEON_INTRINSICS) +# error "Target does not support NEON instructions" +# endif +/* + * Best performance comes from most recent compilers, with intrinsics and -O3. + * Must compile with -march=armv8.2-a+sha3, but we can't detect armv8.2-a, and + * can't always detect __ARM_FEATURE_SHA512 (notably clang 7-12). + * + * GCC < 8 won't work at all (lacks the sha512 instructions) + * GCC >= 8 uses intrinsics, sets __ARM_FEATURE_SHA512 + * + * Clang < 7 won't work at all (lacks the sha512 instructions) + * Clang 7-12 don't have intrinsics (but we work around that with inline + * assembler) or __ARM_FEATURE_SHA512 + * Clang == 13.0.0 same as clang 12 (only seen on macOS) + * Clang >= 13.0.1 has __ARM_FEATURE_SHA512 and intrinsics + */ +# if !defined(__ARM_FEATURE_SHA512) || defined(MBEDTLS_ENABLE_ARM_SHA3_EXTENSIONS_COMPILER_FLAG) + /* Test Clang first, as it defines __GNUC__ */ +# if defined(__ARMCOMPILER_VERSION) +# if __ARMCOMPILER_VERSION < 6090000 +# error "A more recent armclang is required for MBEDTLS_SHA512_USE_A64_CRYPTO_*" +# elif __ARMCOMPILER_VERSION == 6090000 +# error "Must use minimum -march=armv8.2-a+sha3 for MBEDTLS_SHA512_USE_A64_CRYPTO_*" +# else +# pragma clang attribute push (__attribute__((target("sha3"))), apply_to=function) +# define MBEDTLS_POP_TARGET_PRAGMA +# endif +# elif defined(__clang__) +# if __clang_major__ < 7 +# error "A more recent Clang is required for MBEDTLS_SHA512_USE_A64_CRYPTO_*" +# else +# pragma clang attribute push (__attribute__((target("sha3"))), apply_to=function) +# define MBEDTLS_POP_TARGET_PRAGMA +# endif +# elif defined(__GNUC__) +# if __GNUC__ < 8 +# error "A more recent GCC is required for MBEDTLS_SHA512_USE_A64_CRYPTO_*" +# else +# pragma GCC push_options +# pragma GCC target ("arch=armv8.2-a+sha3") +# define MBEDTLS_POP_TARGET_PRAGMA +# endif +# else +# error "Only GCC and Clang supported for MBEDTLS_SHA512_USE_A64_CRYPTO_*" +# endif +# endif +/* *INDENT-ON* */ +# endif +# if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_USE_A64_CRYPTO_IF_PRESENT) +# if defined(__unix__) +# if defined(__linux__) +/* Our preferred method of detection is getauxval() */ +# include +# if !defined(HWCAP_SHA512) +/* The same header that declares getauxval() should provide the HWCAP_xxx + * constants to analyze its return value. However, the libc may be too + * old to have the constant that we need. So if it's missing, assume that + * the value is the same one used by the Linux kernel ABI. + */ +# define HWCAP_SHA512 (1 << 21) +# endif +# endif +/* Use SIGILL on Unix, and fall back to it on Linux */ +# include +# endif +# endif +#elif !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_IS_WINDOWS_ON_ARM64) +# undef MBEDTLS_SHA512_USE_A64_CRYPTO_ONLY +# undef MBEDTLS_SHA512_USE_A64_CRYPTO_IF_PRESENT +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_USE_A64_CRYPTO_IF_PRESENT) +/* + * Capability detection code comes early, so we can disable + * MBEDTLS_SHA512_USE_A64_CRYPTO_IF_PRESENT if no detection mechanism found + */ +#if defined(HWCAP_SHA512) +static int mbedtls_a64_crypto_sha512_determine_support(void) +{ + return (getauxval(AT_HWCAP) & HWCAP_SHA512) ? 1 : 0; +} +#elif defined(__APPLE__) +#include +#include + +static int mbedtls_a64_crypto_sha512_determine_support(void) +{ + int value = 0; + size_t value_len = sizeof(value); + + int ret = sysctlbyname("hw.optional.armv8_2_sha512", &value, &value_len, + NULL, 0); + return ret == 0 && value != 0; +} +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_IS_WINDOWS_ON_ARM64) +/* + * As of March 2022, there don't appear to be any PF_ARM_V8_* flags + * available to pass to IsProcessorFeaturePresent() to check for + * SHA-512 support. So we fall back to the C code only. + */ +#if defined(_MSC_VER) +#pragma message "No mechanism to detect A64_CRYPTO found, using C code only" +#else +#warning "No mechanism to detect A64_CRYPTO found, using C code only" +#endif +#elif defined(__unix__) && defined(SIG_SETMASK) +/* Detection with SIGILL, setjmp() and longjmp() */ +#include +#include + +static jmp_buf return_from_sigill; + +/* + * A64 SHA512 support detection via SIGILL + */ +static void sigill_handler(int signal) +{ + (void) signal; + longjmp(return_from_sigill, 1); +} + +static int mbedtls_a64_crypto_sha512_determine_support(void) +{ + struct sigaction old_action, new_action; + + sigset_t old_mask; + if (sigprocmask(0, NULL, &old_mask)) { + return 0; + } + + sigemptyset(&new_action.sa_mask); + new_action.sa_flags = 0; + new_action.sa_handler = sigill_handler; + + sigaction(SIGILL, &new_action, &old_action); + + static int ret = 0; + + if (setjmp(return_from_sigill) == 0) { /* First return only */ + /* If this traps, we will return a second time from setjmp() with 1 */ + asm ("sha512h q0, q0, v0.2d" : : : "v0"); + ret = 1; + } + + sigaction(SIGILL, &old_action, NULL); + sigprocmask(SIG_SETMASK, &old_mask, NULL); + + return ret; +} +#else +#warning "No mechanism to detect A64_CRYPTO found, using C code only" +#undef MBEDTLS_SHA512_USE_A64_CRYPTO_IF_PRESENT +#endif /* HWCAP_SHA512, __APPLE__, __unix__ && SIG_SETMASK */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_USE_A64_CRYPTO_IF_PRESENT */ #if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_ALT) +#define SHA512_BLOCK_SIZE 128 + #if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_SMALLER) static void sha512_put_uint64_be(uint64_t n, unsigned char *b, uint8_t i) { @@ -45,8 +220,6 @@ static void sha512_put_uint64_be(uint64_t n, unsigned char *b, uint8_t i) void mbedtls_sha512_init(mbedtls_sha512_context *ctx) { - SHA512_VALIDATE(ctx != NULL); - memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_sha512_context)); } @@ -62,29 +235,33 @@ void mbedtls_sha512_free(mbedtls_sha512_context *ctx) void mbedtls_sha512_clone(mbedtls_sha512_context *dst, const mbedtls_sha512_context *src) { - SHA512_VALIDATE(dst != NULL); - SHA512_VALIDATE(src != NULL); - *dst = *src; } /* * SHA-512 context setup */ -int mbedtls_sha512_starts_ret(mbedtls_sha512_context *ctx, int is384) +int mbedtls_sha512_starts(mbedtls_sha512_context *ctx, int is384) { - SHA512_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384) - SHA512_VALIDATE_RET(is384 == 0 || is384 == 1); -#else - SHA512_VALIDATE_RET(is384 == 0); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) + if (is384 != 0 && is384 != 1) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SHA512_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) + if (is384 != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SHA512_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } +#else /* defined MBEDTLS_SHA384_C only */ + if (is384 == 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SHA512_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } #endif ctx->total[0] = 0; ctx->total[1] = 0; if (is384 == 0) { - /* SHA-512 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) ctx->state[0] = UL64(0x6A09E667F3BCC908); ctx->state[1] = UL64(0xBB67AE8584CAA73B); ctx->state[2] = UL64(0x3C6EF372FE94F82B); @@ -93,11 +270,9 @@ int mbedtls_sha512_starts_ret(mbedtls_sha512_context *ctx, int is384) ctx->state[5] = UL64(0x9B05688C2B3E6C1F); ctx->state[6] = UL64(0x1F83D9ABFB41BD6B); ctx->state[7] = UL64(0x5BE0CD19137E2179); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_C */ } else { -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384) - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SHA512_BAD_INPUT_DATA; -#else - /* SHA-384 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C) ctx->state[0] = UL64(0xCBBB9D5DC1059ED8); ctx->state[1] = UL64(0x629A292A367CD507); ctx->state[2] = UL64(0x9159015A3070DD17); @@ -106,24 +281,16 @@ int mbedtls_sha512_starts_ret(mbedtls_sha512_context *ctx, int is384) ctx->state[5] = UL64(0x8EB44A8768581511); ctx->state[6] = UL64(0xDB0C2E0D64F98FA7); ctx->state[7] = UL64(0x47B5481DBEFA4FA4); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA384_C */ } -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C) ctx->is384 = is384; #endif return 0; } -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) -void mbedtls_sha512_starts(mbedtls_sha512_context *ctx, - int is384) -{ - mbedtls_sha512_starts_ret(ctx, is384); -} -#endif - #if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_PROCESS_ALT) /* @@ -172,9 +339,267 @@ static const uint64_t K[80] = UL64(0x4CC5D4BECB3E42B6), UL64(0x597F299CFC657E2A), UL64(0x5FCB6FAB3AD6FAEC), UL64(0x6C44198C4A475817) }; +#endif -int mbedtls_internal_sha512_process(mbedtls_sha512_context *ctx, - const unsigned char data[128]) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_USE_A64_CRYPTO_IF_PRESENT) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_USE_A64_CRYPTO_ONLY) + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_USE_A64_CRYPTO_ONLY) +# define mbedtls_internal_sha512_process_many_a64_crypto mbedtls_internal_sha512_process_many +# define mbedtls_internal_sha512_process_a64_crypto mbedtls_internal_sha512_process +#endif + +/* Accelerated SHA-512 implementation originally written by Simon Tatham for PuTTY, + * under the MIT licence; dual-licensed as Apache 2 with his kind permission. + */ + +#if defined(__clang__) && \ + (__clang_major__ < 13 || \ + (__clang_major__ == 13 && __clang_minor__ == 0 && __clang_patchlevel__ == 0)) +static inline uint64x2_t vsha512su0q_u64(uint64x2_t x, uint64x2_t y) +{ + asm ("sha512su0 %0.2D,%1.2D" : "+w" (x) : "w" (y)); + return x; +} +static inline uint64x2_t vsha512su1q_u64(uint64x2_t x, uint64x2_t y, uint64x2_t z) +{ + asm ("sha512su1 %0.2D,%1.2D,%2.2D" : "+w" (x) : "w" (y), "w" (z)); + return x; +} +static inline uint64x2_t vsha512hq_u64(uint64x2_t x, uint64x2_t y, uint64x2_t z) +{ + asm ("sha512h %0,%1,%2.2D" : "+w" (x) : "w" (y), "w" (z)); + return x; +} +static inline uint64x2_t vsha512h2q_u64(uint64x2_t x, uint64x2_t y, uint64x2_t z) +{ + asm ("sha512h2 %0,%1,%2.2D" : "+w" (x) : "w" (y), "w" (z)); + return x; +} +#endif /* __clang__ etc */ + +static size_t mbedtls_internal_sha512_process_many_a64_crypto( + mbedtls_sha512_context *ctx, const uint8_t *msg, size_t len) +{ + uint64x2_t ab = vld1q_u64(&ctx->state[0]); + uint64x2_t cd = vld1q_u64(&ctx->state[2]); + uint64x2_t ef = vld1q_u64(&ctx->state[4]); + uint64x2_t gh = vld1q_u64(&ctx->state[6]); + + size_t processed = 0; + + for (; + len >= SHA512_BLOCK_SIZE; + processed += SHA512_BLOCK_SIZE, + msg += SHA512_BLOCK_SIZE, + len -= SHA512_BLOCK_SIZE) { + uint64x2_t initial_sum, sum, intermed; + + uint64x2_t ab_orig = ab; + uint64x2_t cd_orig = cd; + uint64x2_t ef_orig = ef; + uint64x2_t gh_orig = gh; + + uint64x2_t s0 = (uint64x2_t) vld1q_u8(msg + 16 * 0); + uint64x2_t s1 = (uint64x2_t) vld1q_u8(msg + 16 * 1); + uint64x2_t s2 = (uint64x2_t) vld1q_u8(msg + 16 * 2); + uint64x2_t s3 = (uint64x2_t) vld1q_u8(msg + 16 * 3); + uint64x2_t s4 = (uint64x2_t) vld1q_u8(msg + 16 * 4); + uint64x2_t s5 = (uint64x2_t) vld1q_u8(msg + 16 * 5); + uint64x2_t s6 = (uint64x2_t) vld1q_u8(msg + 16 * 6); + uint64x2_t s7 = (uint64x2_t) vld1q_u8(msg + 16 * 7); + +#if __BYTE_ORDER__ == __ORDER_LITTLE_ENDIAN__ /* assume LE if these not defined; untested on BE */ + s0 = vreinterpretq_u64_u8(vrev64q_u8(vreinterpretq_u8_u64(s0))); + s1 = vreinterpretq_u64_u8(vrev64q_u8(vreinterpretq_u8_u64(s1))); + s2 = vreinterpretq_u64_u8(vrev64q_u8(vreinterpretq_u8_u64(s2))); + s3 = vreinterpretq_u64_u8(vrev64q_u8(vreinterpretq_u8_u64(s3))); + s4 = vreinterpretq_u64_u8(vrev64q_u8(vreinterpretq_u8_u64(s4))); + s5 = vreinterpretq_u64_u8(vrev64q_u8(vreinterpretq_u8_u64(s5))); + s6 = vreinterpretq_u64_u8(vrev64q_u8(vreinterpretq_u8_u64(s6))); + s7 = vreinterpretq_u64_u8(vrev64q_u8(vreinterpretq_u8_u64(s7))); +#endif + + /* Rounds 0 and 1 */ + initial_sum = vaddq_u64(s0, vld1q_u64(&K[0])); + sum = vaddq_u64(vextq_u64(initial_sum, initial_sum, 1), gh); + intermed = vsha512hq_u64(sum, vextq_u64(ef, gh, 1), vextq_u64(cd, ef, 1)); + gh = vsha512h2q_u64(intermed, cd, ab); + cd = vaddq_u64(cd, intermed); + + /* Rounds 2 and 3 */ + initial_sum = vaddq_u64(s1, vld1q_u64(&K[2])); + sum = vaddq_u64(vextq_u64(initial_sum, initial_sum, 1), ef); + intermed = vsha512hq_u64(sum, vextq_u64(cd, ef, 1), vextq_u64(ab, cd, 1)); + ef = vsha512h2q_u64(intermed, ab, gh); + ab = vaddq_u64(ab, intermed); + + /* Rounds 4 and 5 */ + initial_sum = vaddq_u64(s2, vld1q_u64(&K[4])); + sum = vaddq_u64(vextq_u64(initial_sum, initial_sum, 1), cd); + intermed = vsha512hq_u64(sum, vextq_u64(ab, cd, 1), vextq_u64(gh, ab, 1)); + cd = vsha512h2q_u64(intermed, gh, ef); + gh = vaddq_u64(gh, intermed); + + /* Rounds 6 and 7 */ + initial_sum = vaddq_u64(s3, vld1q_u64(&K[6])); + sum = vaddq_u64(vextq_u64(initial_sum, initial_sum, 1), ab); + intermed = vsha512hq_u64(sum, vextq_u64(gh, ab, 1), vextq_u64(ef, gh, 1)); + ab = vsha512h2q_u64(intermed, ef, cd); + ef = vaddq_u64(ef, intermed); + + /* Rounds 8 and 9 */ + initial_sum = vaddq_u64(s4, vld1q_u64(&K[8])); + sum = vaddq_u64(vextq_u64(initial_sum, initial_sum, 1), gh); + intermed = vsha512hq_u64(sum, vextq_u64(ef, gh, 1), vextq_u64(cd, ef, 1)); + gh = vsha512h2q_u64(intermed, cd, ab); + cd = vaddq_u64(cd, intermed); + + /* Rounds 10 and 11 */ + initial_sum = vaddq_u64(s5, vld1q_u64(&K[10])); + sum = vaddq_u64(vextq_u64(initial_sum, initial_sum, 1), ef); + intermed = vsha512hq_u64(sum, vextq_u64(cd, ef, 1), vextq_u64(ab, cd, 1)); + ef = vsha512h2q_u64(intermed, ab, gh); + ab = vaddq_u64(ab, intermed); + + /* Rounds 12 and 13 */ + initial_sum = vaddq_u64(s6, vld1q_u64(&K[12])); + sum = vaddq_u64(vextq_u64(initial_sum, initial_sum, 1), cd); + intermed = vsha512hq_u64(sum, vextq_u64(ab, cd, 1), vextq_u64(gh, ab, 1)); + cd = vsha512h2q_u64(intermed, gh, ef); + gh = vaddq_u64(gh, intermed); + + /* Rounds 14 and 15 */ + initial_sum = vaddq_u64(s7, vld1q_u64(&K[14])); + sum = vaddq_u64(vextq_u64(initial_sum, initial_sum, 1), ab); + intermed = vsha512hq_u64(sum, vextq_u64(gh, ab, 1), vextq_u64(ef, gh, 1)); + ab = vsha512h2q_u64(intermed, ef, cd); + ef = vaddq_u64(ef, intermed); + + for (unsigned int t = 16; t < 80; t += 16) { + /* Rounds t and t + 1 */ + s0 = vsha512su1q_u64(vsha512su0q_u64(s0, s1), s7, vextq_u64(s4, s5, 1)); + initial_sum = vaddq_u64(s0, vld1q_u64(&K[t])); + sum = vaddq_u64(vextq_u64(initial_sum, initial_sum, 1), gh); + intermed = vsha512hq_u64(sum, vextq_u64(ef, gh, 1), vextq_u64(cd, ef, 1)); + gh = vsha512h2q_u64(intermed, cd, ab); + cd = vaddq_u64(cd, intermed); + + /* Rounds t + 2 and t + 3 */ + s1 = vsha512su1q_u64(vsha512su0q_u64(s1, s2), s0, vextq_u64(s5, s6, 1)); + initial_sum = vaddq_u64(s1, vld1q_u64(&K[t + 2])); + sum = vaddq_u64(vextq_u64(initial_sum, initial_sum, 1), ef); + intermed = vsha512hq_u64(sum, vextq_u64(cd, ef, 1), vextq_u64(ab, cd, 1)); + ef = vsha512h2q_u64(intermed, ab, gh); + ab = vaddq_u64(ab, intermed); + + /* Rounds t + 4 and t + 5 */ + s2 = vsha512su1q_u64(vsha512su0q_u64(s2, s3), s1, vextq_u64(s6, s7, 1)); + initial_sum = vaddq_u64(s2, vld1q_u64(&K[t + 4])); + sum = vaddq_u64(vextq_u64(initial_sum, initial_sum, 1), cd); + intermed = vsha512hq_u64(sum, vextq_u64(ab, cd, 1), vextq_u64(gh, ab, 1)); + cd = vsha512h2q_u64(intermed, gh, ef); + gh = vaddq_u64(gh, intermed); + + /* Rounds t + 6 and t + 7 */ + s3 = vsha512su1q_u64(vsha512su0q_u64(s3, s4), s2, vextq_u64(s7, s0, 1)); + initial_sum = vaddq_u64(s3, vld1q_u64(&K[t + 6])); + sum = vaddq_u64(vextq_u64(initial_sum, initial_sum, 1), ab); + intermed = vsha512hq_u64(sum, vextq_u64(gh, ab, 1), vextq_u64(ef, gh, 1)); + ab = vsha512h2q_u64(intermed, ef, cd); + ef = vaddq_u64(ef, intermed); + + /* Rounds t + 8 and t + 9 */ + s4 = vsha512su1q_u64(vsha512su0q_u64(s4, s5), s3, vextq_u64(s0, s1, 1)); + initial_sum = vaddq_u64(s4, vld1q_u64(&K[t + 8])); + sum = vaddq_u64(vextq_u64(initial_sum, initial_sum, 1), gh); + intermed = vsha512hq_u64(sum, vextq_u64(ef, gh, 1), vextq_u64(cd, ef, 1)); + gh = vsha512h2q_u64(intermed, cd, ab); + cd = vaddq_u64(cd, intermed); + + /* Rounds t + 10 and t + 11 */ + s5 = vsha512su1q_u64(vsha512su0q_u64(s5, s6), s4, vextq_u64(s1, s2, 1)); + initial_sum = vaddq_u64(s5, vld1q_u64(&K[t + 10])); + sum = vaddq_u64(vextq_u64(initial_sum, initial_sum, 1), ef); + intermed = vsha512hq_u64(sum, vextq_u64(cd, ef, 1), vextq_u64(ab, cd, 1)); + ef = vsha512h2q_u64(intermed, ab, gh); + ab = vaddq_u64(ab, intermed); + + /* Rounds t + 12 and t + 13 */ + s6 = vsha512su1q_u64(vsha512su0q_u64(s6, s7), s5, vextq_u64(s2, s3, 1)); + initial_sum = vaddq_u64(s6, vld1q_u64(&K[t + 12])); + sum = vaddq_u64(vextq_u64(initial_sum, initial_sum, 1), cd); + intermed = vsha512hq_u64(sum, vextq_u64(ab, cd, 1), vextq_u64(gh, ab, 1)); + cd = vsha512h2q_u64(intermed, gh, ef); + gh = vaddq_u64(gh, intermed); + + /* Rounds t + 14 and t + 15 */ + s7 = vsha512su1q_u64(vsha512su0q_u64(s7, s0), s6, vextq_u64(s3, s4, 1)); + initial_sum = vaddq_u64(s7, vld1q_u64(&K[t + 14])); + sum = vaddq_u64(vextq_u64(initial_sum, initial_sum, 1), ab); + intermed = vsha512hq_u64(sum, vextq_u64(gh, ab, 1), vextq_u64(ef, gh, 1)); + ab = vsha512h2q_u64(intermed, ef, cd); + ef = vaddq_u64(ef, intermed); + } + + ab = vaddq_u64(ab, ab_orig); + cd = vaddq_u64(cd, cd_orig); + ef = vaddq_u64(ef, ef_orig); + gh = vaddq_u64(gh, gh_orig); + } + + vst1q_u64(&ctx->state[0], ab); + vst1q_u64(&ctx->state[2], cd); + vst1q_u64(&ctx->state[4], ef); + vst1q_u64(&ctx->state[6], gh); + + return processed; +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_USE_A64_CRYPTO_IF_PRESENT) +/* + * This function is for internal use only if we are building both C and A64 + * versions, otherwise it is renamed to be the public mbedtls_internal_sha512_process() + */ +static +#endif +int mbedtls_internal_sha512_process_a64_crypto(mbedtls_sha512_context *ctx, + const unsigned char data[SHA512_BLOCK_SIZE]) +{ + return (mbedtls_internal_sha512_process_many_a64_crypto(ctx, data, + SHA512_BLOCK_SIZE) == + SHA512_BLOCK_SIZE) ? 0 : -1; +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_USE_A64_CRYPTO_IF_PRESENT || MBEDTLS_SHA512_USE_A64_CRYPTO_ONLY */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_POP_TARGET_PRAGMA) +#if defined(__clang__) +#pragma clang attribute pop +#elif defined(__GNUC__) +#pragma GCC pop_options +#endif +#undef MBEDTLS_POP_TARGET_PRAGMA +#endif + + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_USE_A64_CRYPTO_IF_PRESENT) +#define mbedtls_internal_sha512_process_many_c mbedtls_internal_sha512_process_many +#define mbedtls_internal_sha512_process_c mbedtls_internal_sha512_process +#endif + + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_PROCESS_ALT) && !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_USE_A64_CRYPTO_ONLY) + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_USE_A64_CRYPTO_IF_PRESENT) +/* + * This function is for internal use only if we are building both C and A64 + * versions, otherwise it is renamed to be the public mbedtls_internal_sha512_process() + */ +static +#endif +int mbedtls_internal_sha512_process_c(mbedtls_sha512_context *ctx, + const unsigned char data[SHA512_BLOCK_SIZE]) { int i; struct { @@ -182,9 +607,6 @@ int mbedtls_internal_sha512_process(mbedtls_sha512_context *ctx, uint64_t A[8]; } local; - SHA512_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - SHA512_VALIDATE_RET((const unsigned char *) data != NULL); - #define SHR(x, n) ((x) >> (n)) #define ROTR(x, n) (SHR((x), (n)) | ((x) << (64 - (n)))) @@ -268,35 +690,87 @@ int mbedtls_internal_sha512_process(mbedtls_sha512_context *ctx, return 0; } -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) -void mbedtls_sha512_process(mbedtls_sha512_context *ctx, - const unsigned char data[128]) +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_SHA512_PROCESS_ALT && !MBEDTLS_SHA512_USE_A64_CRYPTO_ONLY */ + + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_USE_A64_CRYPTO_ONLY) + +static size_t mbedtls_internal_sha512_process_many_c( + mbedtls_sha512_context *ctx, const uint8_t *data, size_t len) { - mbedtls_internal_sha512_process(ctx, data); + size_t processed = 0; + + while (len >= SHA512_BLOCK_SIZE) { + if (mbedtls_internal_sha512_process_c(ctx, data) != 0) { + return 0; + } + + data += SHA512_BLOCK_SIZE; + len -= SHA512_BLOCK_SIZE; + + processed += SHA512_BLOCK_SIZE; + } + + return processed; } -#endif -#endif /* !MBEDTLS_SHA512_PROCESS_ALT */ + +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_SHA512_USE_A64_CRYPTO_ONLY */ + + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_USE_A64_CRYPTO_IF_PRESENT) + +static int mbedtls_a64_crypto_sha512_has_support(void) +{ + static int done = 0; + static int supported = 0; + + if (!done) { + supported = mbedtls_a64_crypto_sha512_determine_support(); + done = 1; + } + + return supported; +} + +static size_t mbedtls_internal_sha512_process_many(mbedtls_sha512_context *ctx, + const uint8_t *msg, size_t len) +{ + if (mbedtls_a64_crypto_sha512_has_support()) { + return mbedtls_internal_sha512_process_many_a64_crypto(ctx, msg, len); + } else { + return mbedtls_internal_sha512_process_many_c(ctx, msg, len); + } +} + +int mbedtls_internal_sha512_process(mbedtls_sha512_context *ctx, + const unsigned char data[SHA512_BLOCK_SIZE]) +{ + if (mbedtls_a64_crypto_sha512_has_support()) { + return mbedtls_internal_sha512_process_a64_crypto(ctx, data); + } else { + return mbedtls_internal_sha512_process_c(ctx, data); + } +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_USE_A64_CRYPTO_IF_PRESENT */ /* * SHA-512 process buffer */ -int mbedtls_sha512_update_ret(mbedtls_sha512_context *ctx, - const unsigned char *input, - size_t ilen) +int mbedtls_sha512_update(mbedtls_sha512_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *input, + size_t ilen) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t fill; unsigned int left; - SHA512_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - SHA512_VALIDATE_RET(ilen == 0 || input != NULL); - if (ilen == 0) { return 0; } left = (unsigned int) (ctx->total[0] & 0x7F); - fill = 128 - left; + fill = SHA512_BLOCK_SIZE - left; ctx->total[0] += (uint64_t) ilen; @@ -316,13 +790,15 @@ int mbedtls_sha512_update_ret(mbedtls_sha512_context *ctx, left = 0; } - while (ilen >= 128) { - if ((ret = mbedtls_internal_sha512_process(ctx, input)) != 0) { - return ret; + while (ilen >= SHA512_BLOCK_SIZE) { + size_t processed = + mbedtls_internal_sha512_process_many(ctx, input, ilen); + if (processed < SHA512_BLOCK_SIZE) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_GENERIC_ERROR; } - input += 128; - ilen -= 128; + input += processed; + ilen -= processed; } if (ilen > 0) { @@ -332,27 +808,16 @@ int mbedtls_sha512_update_ret(mbedtls_sha512_context *ctx, return 0; } -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) -void mbedtls_sha512_update(mbedtls_sha512_context *ctx, - const unsigned char *input, - size_t ilen) -{ - mbedtls_sha512_update_ret(ctx, input, ilen); -} -#endif - /* * SHA-512 final digest */ -int mbedtls_sha512_finish_ret(mbedtls_sha512_context *ctx, - unsigned char output[64]) +int mbedtls_sha512_finish(mbedtls_sha512_context *ctx, + unsigned char *output) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; unsigned used; uint64_t high, low; - - SHA512_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - SHA512_VALIDATE_RET((unsigned char *) output != NULL); + int truncated = 0; /* * Add padding: 0x80 then 0x00 until 16 bytes remain for the length @@ -366,10 +831,10 @@ int mbedtls_sha512_finish_ret(mbedtls_sha512_context *ctx, memset(ctx->buffer + used, 0, 112 - used); } else { /* We'll need an extra block */ - memset(ctx->buffer + used, 0, 128 - used); + memset(ctx->buffer + used, 0, SHA512_BLOCK_SIZE - used); if ((ret = mbedtls_internal_sha512_process(ctx, ctx->buffer)) != 0) { - return ret; + goto exit; } memset(ctx->buffer, 0, 112); @@ -386,7 +851,7 @@ int mbedtls_sha512_finish_ret(mbedtls_sha512_context *ctx, sha512_put_uint64_be(low, ctx->buffer, 120); if ((ret = mbedtls_internal_sha512_process(ctx, ctx->buffer)) != 0) { - return ret; + goto exit; } /* @@ -399,8 +864,7 @@ int mbedtls_sha512_finish_ret(mbedtls_sha512_context *ctx, sha512_put_uint64_be(ctx->state[4], output, 32); sha512_put_uint64_be(ctx->state[5], output, 40); - int truncated = 0; -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C) truncated = ctx->is384; #endif if (!truncated) { @@ -408,49 +872,51 @@ int mbedtls_sha512_finish_ret(mbedtls_sha512_context *ctx, sha512_put_uint64_be(ctx->state[7], output, 56); } - return 0; -} + ret = 0; -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) -void mbedtls_sha512_finish(mbedtls_sha512_context *ctx, - unsigned char output[64]) -{ - mbedtls_sha512_finish_ret(ctx, output); +exit: + mbedtls_sha512_free(ctx); + return ret; } -#endif #endif /* !MBEDTLS_SHA512_ALT */ /* * output = SHA-512( input buffer ) */ -int mbedtls_sha512_ret(const unsigned char *input, - size_t ilen, - unsigned char output[64], - int is384) +int mbedtls_sha512(const unsigned char *input, + size_t ilen, + unsigned char *output, + int is384) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; mbedtls_sha512_context ctx; -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384) - SHA512_VALIDATE_RET(is384 == 0 || is384 == 1); -#else - SHA512_VALIDATE_RET(is384 == 0); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) + if (is384 != 0 && is384 != 1) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SHA512_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) + if (is384 != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SHA512_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } +#else /* defined MBEDTLS_SHA384_C only */ + if (is384 == 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SHA512_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } #endif - SHA512_VALIDATE_RET(ilen == 0 || input != NULL); - SHA512_VALIDATE_RET((unsigned char *) output != NULL); mbedtls_sha512_init(&ctx); - if ((ret = mbedtls_sha512_starts_ret(&ctx, is384)) != 0) { + if ((ret = mbedtls_sha512_starts(&ctx, is384)) != 0) { goto exit; } - if ((ret = mbedtls_sha512_update_ret(&ctx, input, ilen)) != 0) { + if ((ret = mbedtls_sha512_update(&ctx, input, ilen)) != 0) { goto exit; } - if ((ret = mbedtls_sha512_finish_ret(&ctx, output)) != 0) { + if ((ret = mbedtls_sha512_finish(&ctx, output)) != 0) { goto exit; } @@ -460,22 +926,12 @@ int mbedtls_sha512_ret(const unsigned char *input, return ret; } -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) -void mbedtls_sha512(const unsigned char *input, - size_t ilen, - unsigned char output[64], - int is384) -{ - mbedtls_sha512_ret(input, ilen, output, is384); -} -#endif - #if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) /* * FIPS-180-2 test vectors */ -static const unsigned char sha512_test_buf[3][113] = +static const unsigned char sha_test_buf[3][113] = { { "abc" }, { @@ -484,17 +940,19 @@ static const unsigned char sha512_test_buf[3][113] = { "" } }; -static const size_t sha512_test_buflen[3] = +static const size_t sha_test_buflen[3] = { 3, 112, 1000 }; -static const unsigned char sha512_test_sum[][64] = +typedef const unsigned char (sha_test_sum_t)[64]; + +/* + * SHA-384 test vectors + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C) +static sha_test_sum_t sha384_test_sum[] = { -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384) - /* - * SHA-384 test vectors - */ { 0xCB, 0x00, 0x75, 0x3F, 0x45, 0xA3, 0x5E, 0x8B, 0xB5, 0xA0, 0x3D, 0x69, 0x9A, 0xC6, 0x50, 0x07, 0x27, 0x2C, 0x32, 0xAB, 0x0E, 0xDE, 0xD1, 0x63, @@ -512,12 +970,16 @@ static const unsigned char sha512_test_sum[][64] = 0xED, 0x14, 0x9E, 0x9C, 0x00, 0xF2, 0x48, 0x52, 0x79, 0x72, 0xCE, 0xC5, 0x70, 0x4C, 0x2A, 0x5B, 0x07, 0xB8, 0xB3, 0xDC, 0x38, 0xEC, 0xC4, 0xEB, - 0xAE, 0x97, 0xDD, 0xD8, 0x7F, 0x3D, 0x89, 0x85 }, -#endif /* !MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 */ + 0xAE, 0x97, 0xDD, 0xD8, 0x7F, 0x3D, 0x89, 0x85 } +}; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA384_C */ - /* - * SHA-512 test vectors - */ +/* + * SHA-512 test vectors + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) +static sha_test_sum_t sha512_test_sum[] = +{ { 0xDD, 0xAF, 0x35, 0xA1, 0x93, 0x61, 0x7A, 0xBA, 0xCC, 0x41, 0x73, 0x49, 0xAE, 0x20, 0x41, 0x31, 0x12, 0xE6, 0xFA, 0x4E, 0x89, 0xA9, 0x7E, 0xA2, @@ -543,19 +1005,23 @@ static const unsigned char sha512_test_sum[][64] = 0xEB, 0x00, 0x9C, 0x5C, 0x2C, 0x49, 0xAA, 0x2E, 0x4E, 0xAD, 0xB2, 0x17, 0xAD, 0x8C, 0xC0, 0x9B } }; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_C */ -#define ARRAY_LENGTH(a) (sizeof(a) / sizeof((a)[0])) - -/* - * Checkup routine - */ -int mbedtls_sha512_self_test(int verbose) +static int mbedtls_sha512_common_self_test(int verbose, int is384) { - int i, j, k, buflen, ret = 0; + int i, buflen, ret = 0; unsigned char *buf; unsigned char sha512sum[64]; mbedtls_sha512_context ctx; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) + sha_test_sum_t *sha_test_sum = (is384) ? sha384_test_sum : sha512_test_sum; +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) + sha_test_sum_t *sha_test_sum = sha512_test_sum; +#else + sha_test_sum_t *sha_test_sum = sha384_test_sum; +#endif + buf = mbedtls_calloc(1024, sizeof(unsigned char)); if (NULL == buf) { if (verbose != 0) { @@ -567,44 +1033,37 @@ int mbedtls_sha512_self_test(int verbose) mbedtls_sha512_init(&ctx); - for (i = 0; i < (int) ARRAY_LENGTH(sha512_test_sum); i++) { - j = i % 3; -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384) - k = i < 3; -#else - k = 0; -#endif - + for (i = 0; i < 3; i++) { if (verbose != 0) { - mbedtls_printf(" SHA-%d test #%d: ", 512 - k * 128, j + 1); + mbedtls_printf(" SHA-%d test #%d: ", 512 - is384 * 128, i + 1); } - if ((ret = mbedtls_sha512_starts_ret(&ctx, k)) != 0) { + if ((ret = mbedtls_sha512_starts(&ctx, is384)) != 0) { goto fail; } - if (j == 2) { + if (i == 2) { memset(buf, 'a', buflen = 1000); - for (j = 0; j < 1000; j++) { - ret = mbedtls_sha512_update_ret(&ctx, buf, buflen); + for (int j = 0; j < 1000; j++) { + ret = mbedtls_sha512_update(&ctx, buf, buflen); if (ret != 0) { goto fail; } } } else { - ret = mbedtls_sha512_update_ret(&ctx, sha512_test_buf[j], - sha512_test_buflen[j]); + ret = mbedtls_sha512_update(&ctx, sha_test_buf[i], + sha_test_buflen[i]); if (ret != 0) { goto fail; } } - if ((ret = mbedtls_sha512_finish_ret(&ctx, sha512sum)) != 0) { + if ((ret = mbedtls_sha512_finish(&ctx, sha512sum)) != 0) { goto fail; } - if (memcmp(sha512sum, sha512_test_sum[i], 64 - k * 16) != 0) { + if (memcmp(sha512sum, sha_test_sum[i], 64 - is384 * 16) != 0) { ret = 1; goto fail; } @@ -632,8 +1091,22 @@ int mbedtls_sha512_self_test(int verbose) return ret; } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) +int mbedtls_sha512_self_test(int verbose) +{ + return mbedtls_sha512_common_self_test(verbose, 0); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C) +int mbedtls_sha384_self_test(int verbose) +{ + return mbedtls_sha512_common_self_test(verbose, 1); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA384_C */ + #undef ARRAY_LENGTH #endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_C || MBEDTLS_SHA384_C */ diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ssl_cache.c b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ssl_cache.c index 21e38cd86a3a..772cb8fdfe6d 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ssl_cache.c +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ssl_cache.c @@ -14,10 +14,10 @@ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_C) #include "mbedtls/platform.h" -#include "mbedtls/error.h" #include "mbedtls/ssl_cache.h" -#include "mbedtls/ssl_internal.h" +#include "ssl_misc.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" #include @@ -33,76 +33,73 @@ void mbedtls_ssl_cache_init(mbedtls_ssl_cache_context *cache) #endif } -int mbedtls_ssl_cache_get(void *data, mbedtls_ssl_session *session) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_cache_find_entry(mbedtls_ssl_cache_context *cache, + unsigned char const *session_id, + size_t session_id_len, + mbedtls_ssl_cache_entry **dst) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CACHE_ENTRY_NOT_FOUND; #if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) mbedtls_time_t t = mbedtls_time(NULL); #endif - mbedtls_ssl_cache_context *cache = (mbedtls_ssl_cache_context *) data; - mbedtls_ssl_cache_entry *cur, *entry; - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) - if ((ret = mbedtls_mutex_lock(&cache->mutex)) != 0) { - return ret; - } -#endif - - cur = cache->chain; - entry = NULL; - - while (cur != NULL) { - entry = cur; - cur = cur->next; + mbedtls_ssl_cache_entry *cur; + for (cur = cache->chain; cur != NULL; cur = cur->next) { #if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) if (cache->timeout != 0 && - (int) (t - entry->timestamp) > cache->timeout) { + (int) (t - cur->timestamp) > cache->timeout) { continue; } #endif - if (session->id_len != entry->session.id_len || - memcmp(session->id, entry->session.id, - entry->session.id_len) != 0) { + if (session_id_len != cur->session_id_len || + memcmp(session_id, cur->session_id, + cur->session_id_len) != 0) { continue; } - ret = mbedtls_ssl_session_copy(session, &entry->session); - if (ret != 0) { - goto exit; - } - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) && \ - defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) - /* - * Restore peer certificate (without rest of the original chain) - */ - if (entry->peer_cert.p != NULL) { - /* `session->peer_cert` is NULL after the call to - * mbedtls_ssl_session_copy(), because cache entries - * have the `peer_cert` field set to NULL. */ - - if ((session->peer_cert = mbedtls_calloc(1, - sizeof(mbedtls_x509_crt))) == NULL) { - ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED; - goto exit; - } - - mbedtls_x509_crt_init(session->peer_cert); - if ((ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_parse(session->peer_cert, entry->peer_cert.p, - entry->peer_cert.len)) != 0) { - mbedtls_free(session->peer_cert); - session->peer_cert = NULL; - goto exit; - } - } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C && MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ + break; + } + if (cur != NULL) { + *dst = cur; ret = 0; + } + + return ret; +} + + +int mbedtls_ssl_cache_get(void *data, + unsigned char const *session_id, + size_t session_id_len, + mbedtls_ssl_session *session) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_ssl_cache_context *cache = (mbedtls_ssl_cache_context *) data; + mbedtls_ssl_cache_entry *entry; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + if ((ret = mbedtls_mutex_lock(&cache->mutex)) != 0) { + return ret; + } +#endif + + ret = ssl_cache_find_entry(cache, session_id, session_id_len, &entry); + if (ret != 0) { goto exit; } + ret = mbedtls_ssl_session_load(session, + entry->session, + entry->session_len); + if (ret != 0) { + goto exit; + } + + ret = 0; + exit: #if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) if (mbedtls_mutex_unlock(&cache->mutex) != 0) { @@ -113,149 +110,251 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_cache_get(void *data, mbedtls_ssl_session *session) return ret; } -int mbedtls_ssl_cache_set(void *data, const mbedtls_ssl_session *session) +/* zeroize a cache entry */ +static void ssl_cache_entry_zeroize(mbedtls_ssl_cache_entry *entry) +{ + if (entry == NULL) { + return; + } + + /* zeroize and free session structure */ + if (entry->session != NULL) { + mbedtls_zeroize_and_free(entry->session, entry->session_len); + } + + /* zeroize the whole entry structure */ + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(entry, sizeof(mbedtls_ssl_cache_entry)); +} + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_cache_pick_writing_slot(mbedtls_ssl_cache_context *cache, + unsigned char const *session_id, + size_t session_id_len, + mbedtls_ssl_cache_entry **dst) { - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; #if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) mbedtls_time_t t = mbedtls_time(NULL), oldest = 0; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME */ + mbedtls_ssl_cache_entry *old = NULL; -#endif - mbedtls_ssl_cache_context *cache = (mbedtls_ssl_cache_context *) data; - mbedtls_ssl_cache_entry *cur, *prv; int count = 0; - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) - if ((ret = mbedtls_mutex_lock(&cache->mutex)) != 0) { - return ret; + mbedtls_ssl_cache_entry *cur, *last; + + /* Check 1: Is there already an entry with the given session ID? + * + * If yes, overwrite it. + * + * If not, `count` will hold the size of the session cache + * at the end of this loop, and `last` will point to the last + * entry, both of which will be used later. */ + + last = NULL; + for (cur = cache->chain; cur != NULL; cur = cur->next) { + count++; + if (session_id_len == cur->session_id_len && + memcmp(session_id, cur->session_id, cur->session_id_len) == 0) { + goto found; + } + last = cur; } -#endif - cur = cache->chain; - prv = NULL; - - while (cur != NULL) { - count++; + /* Check 2: Is there an outdated entry in the cache? + * + * If so, overwrite it. + * + * If not, remember the oldest entry in `old` for later. + */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) + for (cur = cache->chain; cur != NULL; cur = cur->next) { if (cache->timeout != 0 && (int) (t - cur->timestamp) > cache->timeout) { - cur->timestamp = t; - break; /* expired, reuse this slot, update timestamp */ + goto found; } -#endif - - if (memcmp(session->id, cur->session.id, cur->session.id_len) == 0) { - break; /* client reconnected, keep timestamp for session id */ - } -#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) if (oldest == 0 || cur->timestamp < oldest) { oldest = cur->timestamp; old = cur; } -#endif + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME */ - prv = cur; - cur = cur->next; + /* Check 3: Is there free space in the cache? */ + + if (count < cache->max_entries) { + /* Create new entry */ + cur = mbedtls_calloc(1, sizeof(mbedtls_ssl_cache_entry)); + if (cur == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED; + } + + /* Append to the end of the linked list. */ + if (last == NULL) { + cache->chain = cur; + } else { + last->next = cur; + } + + goto found; } - if (cur == NULL) { + /* Last resort: The cache is full and doesn't contain any outdated + * elements. In this case, we evict the oldest one, judged by timestamp + * (if present) or cache-order. */ + #if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) - /* - * Reuse oldest entry if max_entries reached - */ - if (count >= cache->max_entries) { - if (old == NULL) { - /* This should only happen on an ill-configured cache - * with max_entries == 0. */ - ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; - goto exit; - } - - cur = old; - } + if (old == NULL) { + /* This should only happen on an ill-configured cache + * with max_entries == 0. */ + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } #else /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME */ - /* - * Reuse first entry in chain if max_entries reached, - * but move to last place - */ - if (count >= cache->max_entries) { - if (cache->chain == NULL) { - ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; - goto exit; - } - - cur = cache->chain; - cache->chain = cur->next; - cur->next = NULL; - prv->next = cur; - } + /* Reuse first entry in chain, but move to last place. */ + if (cache->chain == NULL) { + /* This should never happen */ + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + } + + old = cache->chain; + cache->chain = old->next; + old->next = NULL; + last->next = old; #endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME */ - else { - /* - * max_entries not reached, create new entry - */ - cur = mbedtls_calloc(1, sizeof(mbedtls_ssl_cache_entry)); - if (cur == NULL) { - ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED; - goto exit; - } - - if (prv == NULL) { - cache->chain = cur; - } else { - prv->next = cur; - } - } + + /* Now `old` points to the oldest entry to be overwritten. */ + cur = old; + +found: + + /* If we're reusing an entry, free it first. */ + if (cur->session != NULL) { + /* `ssl_cache_entry_zeroize` would break the chain, + * so we reuse `old` to record `next` temporarily. */ + old = cur->next; + ssl_cache_entry_zeroize(cur); + cur->next = old; + } #if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) - cur->timestamp = t; + cur->timestamp = t; +#endif + + *dst = cur; + return 0; +} + +int mbedtls_ssl_cache_set(void *data, + unsigned char const *session_id, + size_t session_id_len, + const mbedtls_ssl_session *session) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_ssl_cache_context *cache = (mbedtls_ssl_cache_context *) data; + mbedtls_ssl_cache_entry *cur; + + size_t session_serialized_len = 0; + unsigned char *session_serialized = NULL; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + if ((ret = mbedtls_mutex_lock(&cache->mutex)) != 0) { + return ret; + } #endif + + ret = ssl_cache_pick_writing_slot(cache, + session_id, session_id_len, + &cur); + if (ret != 0) { + goto exit; } -#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) && \ - defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) - /* - * If we're reusing an entry, free its certificate first - */ - if (cur->peer_cert.p != NULL) { - mbedtls_free(cur->peer_cert.p); - memset(&cur->peer_cert, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_x509_buf)); + /* Check how much space we need to serialize the session + * and allocate a sufficiently large buffer. */ + ret = mbedtls_ssl_session_save(session, NULL, 0, &session_serialized_len); + if (ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) { + goto exit; + } + + session_serialized = mbedtls_calloc(1, session_serialized_len); + if (session_serialized == NULL) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED; + goto exit; } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C && MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ - - /* Copy the entire session; this temporarily makes a copy of the - * X.509 CRT structure even though we only want to store the raw CRT. - * This inefficiency will go away as soon as we implement on-demand - * parsing of CRTs, in which case there's no need for the `peer_cert` - * field anymore in the first place, and we're done after this call. */ - ret = mbedtls_ssl_session_copy(&cur->session, session); + + /* Now serialize the session into the allocated buffer. */ + ret = mbedtls_ssl_session_save(session, + session_serialized, + session_serialized_len, + &session_serialized_len); if (ret != 0) { goto exit; } -#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) && \ - defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) - /* If present, free the X.509 structure and only store the raw CRT data. */ - if (cur->session.peer_cert != NULL) { - cur->peer_cert.p = - mbedtls_calloc(1, cur->session.peer_cert->raw.len); - if (cur->peer_cert.p == NULL) { - ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED; - goto exit; - } + if (session_id_len > sizeof(cur->session_id)) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + goto exit; + } + cur->session_id_len = session_id_len; + memcpy(cur->session_id, session_id, session_id_len); + + cur->session = session_serialized; + cur->session_len = session_serialized_len; + session_serialized = NULL; - memcpy(cur->peer_cert.p, - cur->session.peer_cert->raw.p, - cur->session.peer_cert->raw.len); - cur->peer_cert.len = session->peer_cert->raw.len; + ret = 0; - mbedtls_x509_crt_free(cur->session.peer_cert); - mbedtls_free(cur->session.peer_cert); - cur->session.peer_cert = NULL; +exit: +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + if (mbedtls_mutex_unlock(&cache->mutex) != 0) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_THREADING_MUTEX_ERROR; + } +#endif + + if (session_serialized != NULL) { + mbedtls_zeroize_and_free(session_serialized, session_serialized_len); + session_serialized = NULL; } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C && MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ + return ret; +} + +int mbedtls_ssl_cache_remove(void *data, + unsigned char const *session_id, + size_t session_id_len) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_ssl_cache_context *cache = (mbedtls_ssl_cache_context *) data; + mbedtls_ssl_cache_entry *entry; + mbedtls_ssl_cache_entry *prev; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + if ((ret = mbedtls_mutex_lock(&cache->mutex)) != 0) { + return ret; + } +#endif + + ret = ssl_cache_find_entry(cache, session_id, session_id_len, &entry); + /* No valid entry found, exit with success */ + if (ret != 0) { + ret = 0; + goto exit; + } + + /* Now we remove the entry from the chain */ + if (entry == cache->chain) { + cache->chain = entry->next; + goto free; + } + for (prev = cache->chain; prev->next != NULL; prev = prev->next) { + if (prev->next == entry) { + prev->next = entry->next; + break; + } + } + +free: + ssl_cache_entry_zeroize(entry); + mbedtls_free(entry); ret = 0; exit: @@ -298,13 +397,7 @@ void mbedtls_ssl_cache_free(mbedtls_ssl_cache_context *cache) prv = cur; cur = cur->next; - mbedtls_ssl_session_free(&prv->session); - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) && \ - defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) - mbedtls_free(prv->peer_cert.p); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C && MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ - + ssl_cache_entry_zeroize(prv); mbedtls_free(prv); } diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ssl_ciphersuites.c b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ssl_ciphersuites.c index 7a46537809cd..23619a26c88f 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ssl_ciphersuites.c +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ssl_ciphersuites.c @@ -15,18 +15,17 @@ #include "mbedtls/ssl_ciphersuites.h" #include "mbedtls/ssl.h" +#include "ssl_misc.h" +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +#include "mbedtls/psa_util.h" +#endif #include -#undef HAVE_SHA384 -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384) -#define HAVE_SHA384 -#endif - /* * Ordered from most preferred to least preferred in terms of security. * - * Current rule (except RC4 and 3DES, weak and null which come last): + * Current rule (except weak and null which come last): * 1. By key exchange: * Forward-secure non-PSK > forward-secure PSK > ECJPAKE > other non-PSK > other PSK * 2. By key length and cipher: @@ -40,6 +39,15 @@ static const int ciphersuite_preference[] = #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CIPHERSUITES) MBEDTLS_SSL_CIPHERSUITES, #else +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) + /* TLS 1.3 ciphersuites */ + MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, + MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_AES_128_CCM_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_AES_128_CCM_8_SHA256, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 */ + /* Chacha-Poly ephemeral suites */ MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256, MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256, @@ -243,34 +251,6 @@ static const int ciphersuite_preference[] = MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256, MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256, - /* 3DES suites */ - MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, - MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, - MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, - MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, - MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, - MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, - MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, - MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, - MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, - MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, - - /* RC4 suites */ - MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, - MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, - MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, - MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, - MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, - MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5, - MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, - MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, - MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, - MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, - - /* Weak suites */ - MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA, - MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA, - /* NULL suites */ MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA, MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA, @@ -299,1877 +279,1517 @@ static const int ciphersuite_preference[] = static const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t ciphersuite_definitions[] = { -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C) && \ - defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) && \ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_AES) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) + { MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, "TLS1-3-AES-256-GCM-SHA384", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_NONE, /* Key exchange not part of ciphersuite in TLS 1.3 */ + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_3 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) + { MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, "TLS1-3-AES-128-GCM-SHA256", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_NONE, /* Key exchange not part of ciphersuite in TLS 1.3 */ + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_3 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256 */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CCM) && defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) + { MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_AES_128_CCM_SHA256, "TLS1-3-AES-128-CCM-SHA256", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_NONE, /* Key exchange not part of ciphersuite in TLS 1.3 */ + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_3 }, + { MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_AES_128_CCM_8_SHA256, "TLS1-3-AES-128-CCM-8-SHA256", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_NONE, /* Key exchange not part of ciphersuite in TLS 1.3 */ + MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_SHORT_TAG, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_3 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256 && MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CCM */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_AES */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CHACHAPOLY) && defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) + { MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256, + "TLS1-3-CHACHA20-POLY1305-SHA256", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20_POLY1305, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_NONE, /* Key exchange not part of ciphersuite in TLS 1.3 */ + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_3 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CHACHAPOLY && MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256 */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CHACHAPOLY) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) && \ defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED) { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256, "TLS-ECDHE-RSA-WITH-CHACHA20-POLY1305-SHA256", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20_POLY1305, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED) { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256, "TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-CHACHA20-POLY1305-SHA256", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20_POLY1305, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED) { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256, "TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-CHACHA20-POLY1305-SHA256", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20_POLY1305, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED) { MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256, "TLS-PSK-WITH-CHACHA20-POLY1305-SHA256", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20_POLY1305, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED) { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256, "TLS-ECDHE-PSK-WITH-CHACHA20-POLY1305-SHA256", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20_POLY1305, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED) { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256, "TLS-DHE-PSK-WITH-CHACHA20-POLY1305-SHA256", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20_POLY1305, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED) { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256, "TLS-RSA-PSK-WITH-CHACHA20-POLY1305-SHA256", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20_POLY1305, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, #endif -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C && - MBEDTLS_SHA256_C && +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CHACHAPOLY && + MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256 && MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_AES) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC) { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, "TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, "TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC) { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, "TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA256", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM) { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, "TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-AES-128-GCM-SHA256", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ -#if defined(HAVE_SHA384) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC) { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384, "TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA384", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM) { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, "TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-AES-256-GCM-SHA384", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C */ -#endif /* HAVE_SHA384 */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C) + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CCM) { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM, "TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-AES-256-CCM", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8, "TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-AES-256-CCM-8", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_SHORT_TAG }, + MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_SHORT_TAG, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM, "TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-AES-128-CCM", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8, "TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-AES-128-CCM-8", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_SHORT_TAG }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CCM_C */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_AES_C */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) + MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_SHORT_TAG, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CCM */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_AES */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CAMELLIA) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256, "TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-128-CBC-SHA256", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ -#if defined(HAVE_SHA384) + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384, "TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-CBC-SHA384", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, -#endif /* HAVE_SHA384 */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384 */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256, "TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-128-GCM-SHA256", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ -#if defined(HAVE_SHA384) + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384, "TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-GCM-SHA384", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, -#endif /* HAVE_SHA384 */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_DES_C) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) - { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, "TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHA", - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_DES_C */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARC4_C) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) - { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, "TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-RC4-128-SHA", - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_NODTLS }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ARC4_C */ + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384 */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CAMELLIA */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1) { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA, "TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-NULL-SHA", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_WEAK }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ + MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_WEAK, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1 */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_AES) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC) { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, "TLS-ECDHE-RSA-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, "TLS-ECDHE-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC) { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, "TLS-ECDHE-RSA-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA256", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM) { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, "TLS-ECDHE-RSA-WITH-AES-128-GCM-SHA256", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ -#if defined(HAVE_SHA384) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC) { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384, "TLS-ECDHE-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA384", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM) { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, "TLS-ECDHE-RSA-WITH-AES-256-GCM-SHA384", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C */ -#endif /* HAVE_SHA384 */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_AES_C */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384 */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_AES */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CAMELLIA) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256, "TLS-ECDHE-RSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-128-CBC-SHA256", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ -#if defined(HAVE_SHA384) + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384, "TLS-ECDHE-RSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-CBC-SHA384", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, -#endif /* HAVE_SHA384 */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384 */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256, "TLS-ECDHE-RSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-128-GCM-SHA256", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ -#if defined(HAVE_SHA384) + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384, "TLS-ECDHE-RSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-GCM-SHA384", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, -#endif /* HAVE_SHA384 */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_DES_C) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) - { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, "TLS-ECDHE-RSA-WITH-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHA", - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_DES_C */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARC4_C) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) - { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, "TLS-ECDHE-RSA-WITH-RC4-128-SHA", - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_NODTLS }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ARC4_C */ + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384 */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CAMELLIA */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1) { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA, "TLS-ECDHE-RSA-WITH-NULL-SHA", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_WEAK }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ + MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_WEAK, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1 */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) -#if defined(HAVE_SHA384) && defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_AES) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM) { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, "TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-AES-256-GCM-SHA384", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, -#endif /* HAVE_SHA384 && MBEDTLS_GCM_C */ + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384 && MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM) { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, "TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-AES-128-GCM-SHA256", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C */ + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC) { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, "TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA256", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256, "TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA256", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256 */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1) { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, "TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, "TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C) + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1 */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CCM) { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM, "TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CCM", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8, "TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CCM-8", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_SHORT_TAG }, + MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_SHORT_TAG, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM, "TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-AES-128-CCM", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8, "TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-AES-128-CCM-8", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_SHORT_TAG }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CCM_C */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_AES_C */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) + MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_SHORT_TAG, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CCM */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_AES */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CAMELLIA) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256, "TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-128-CBC-SHA256", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256, "TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-CBC-SHA256", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256 */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1) { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA, "TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-128-CBC-SHA", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA, "TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-CBC-SHA", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1 */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256, "TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-128-GCM-SHA256", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256 */ -#if defined(HAVE_SHA384) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384, "TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-GCM-SHA384", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, -#endif /* HAVE_SHA384 */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_DES_C) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) - { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, "TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHA", - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_DES_C */ + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384 */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CAMELLIA */ + #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) -#if defined(HAVE_SHA384) && defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_AES) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM) { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, "TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-256-GCM-SHA384", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, -#endif /* HAVE_SHA384 && MBEDTLS_GCM_C */ + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384 && MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM) { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, "TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-128-GCM-SHA256", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C */ + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC) { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, "TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA256", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256, "TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA256", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256 */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC) { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, "TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, "TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C) + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CCM) { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM, "TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CCM", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8, "TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CCM-8", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_SHORT_TAG }, + MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_SHORT_TAG, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM, "TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-128-CCM", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8, "TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-128-CCM-8", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_SHORT_TAG }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CCM_C */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_AES_C */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) + MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_SHORT_TAG, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CCM */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_AES */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CAMELLIA) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256, "TLS-RSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-128-CBC-SHA256", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256, "TLS-RSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-CBC-SHA256", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256 */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1) { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA, "TLS-RSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-128-CBC-SHA", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA, "TLS-RSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-CBC-SHA", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1 */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256, "TLS-RSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-128-GCM-SHA256", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256 */ -#if defined(HAVE_SHA384) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384, "TLS-RSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-GCM-SHA384", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, -#endif /* HAVE_SHA384 */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_DES_C) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) - { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, "TLS-RSA-WITH-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHA", - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_DES_C */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARC4_C) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C) - { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5, "TLS-RSA-WITH-RC4-128-MD5", - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128, MBEDTLS_MD_MD5, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_NODTLS }, -#endif + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384 */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CAMELLIA */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) - { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, "TLS-RSA-WITH-RC4-128-SHA", - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_NODTLS }, -#endif -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ARC4_C */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_AES) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC) { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, "TLS-ECDH-RSA-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, "TLS-ECDH-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC) { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, "TLS-ECDH-RSA-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA256", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM) { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, "TLS-ECDH-RSA-WITH-AES-128-GCM-SHA256", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ -#if defined(HAVE_SHA384) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC) { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384, "TLS-ECDH-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA384", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM) { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, "TLS-ECDH-RSA-WITH-AES-256-GCM-SHA384", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C */ -#endif /* HAVE_SHA384 */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_AES_C */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384 */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_AES */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CAMELLIA) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256, "TLS-ECDH-RSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-128-CBC-SHA256", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ -#if defined(HAVE_SHA384) + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384, "TLS-ECDH-RSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-CBC-SHA384", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, -#endif /* HAVE_SHA384 */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384 */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256, "TLS-ECDH-RSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-128-GCM-SHA256", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ -#if defined(HAVE_SHA384) + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384, "TLS-ECDH-RSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-GCM-SHA384", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, -#endif /* HAVE_SHA384 */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_DES_C) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) - { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, "TLS-ECDH-RSA-WITH-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHA", - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_DES_C */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARC4_C) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) - { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, "TLS-ECDH-RSA-WITH-RC4-128-SHA", - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_NODTLS }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ARC4_C */ + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384 */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CAMELLIA */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1) { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA, "TLS-ECDH-RSA-WITH-NULL-SHA", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_WEAK }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ + MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_WEAK, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1 */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_AES) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC) { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, "TLS-ECDH-ECDSA-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, "TLS-ECDH-ECDSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC) { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, "TLS-ECDH-ECDSA-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA256", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM) { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, "TLS-ECDH-ECDSA-WITH-AES-128-GCM-SHA256", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ -#if defined(HAVE_SHA384) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC) { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384, "TLS-ECDH-ECDSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA384", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM) { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, "TLS-ECDH-ECDSA-WITH-AES-256-GCM-SHA384", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C */ -#endif /* HAVE_SHA384 */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_AES_C */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384 */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_AES */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CAMELLIA) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256, "TLS-ECDH-ECDSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-128-CBC-SHA256", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ -#if defined(HAVE_SHA384) + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384, "TLS-ECDH-ECDSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-CBC-SHA384", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, -#endif /* HAVE_SHA384 */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384 */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256, "TLS-ECDH-ECDSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-128-GCM-SHA256", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ -#if defined(HAVE_SHA384) + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384, "TLS-ECDH-ECDSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-GCM-SHA384", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, -#endif /* HAVE_SHA384 */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_DES_C) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) - { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, "TLS-ECDH-ECDSA-WITH-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHA", - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_DES_C */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARC4_C) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) - { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, "TLS-ECDH-ECDSA-WITH-RC4-128-SHA", - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_NODTLS }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ARC4_C */ + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384 */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CAMELLIA */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1) { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA, "TLS-ECDH-ECDSA-WITH-NULL-SHA", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_WEAK }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ + MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_WEAK, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1 */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_AES) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) { MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, "TLS-PSK-WITH-AES-128-GCM-SHA256", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256 */ -#if defined(HAVE_SHA384) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) { MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, "TLS-PSK-WITH-AES-256-GCM-SHA384", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, -#endif /* HAVE_SHA384 */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384 */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) { MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, "TLS-PSK-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA256", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256 */ -#if defined(HAVE_SHA384) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) { MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384, "TLS-PSK-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA384", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, -#endif /* HAVE_SHA384 */ + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384 */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1) { MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, "TLS-PSK-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, { MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, "TLS-PSK-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C) + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1 */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CCM) { MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM, "TLS-PSK-WITH-AES-256-CCM", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, { MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8, "TLS-PSK-WITH-AES-256-CCM-8", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_SHORT_TAG }, + MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_SHORT_TAG, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, { MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM, "TLS-PSK-WITH-AES-128-CCM", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, { MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8, "TLS-PSK-WITH-AES-128-CCM-8", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_SHORT_TAG }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CCM_C */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_AES_C */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) + MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_SHORT_TAG, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CCM */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_AES */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CAMELLIA) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) { MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256, "TLS-PSK-WITH-CAMELLIA-128-CBC-SHA256", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256 */ -#if defined(HAVE_SHA384) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) { MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384, "TLS-PSK-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-CBC-SHA384", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, -#endif /* HAVE_SHA384 */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384 */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) { MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256, "TLS-PSK-WITH-CAMELLIA-128-GCM-SHA256", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256 */ -#if defined(HAVE_SHA384) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) { MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384, "TLS-PSK-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-GCM-SHA384", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, -#endif /* HAVE_SHA384 */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_DES_C) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) - { MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, "TLS-PSK-WITH-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHA", - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_DES_C */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARC4_C) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) - { MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, "TLS-PSK-WITH-RC4-128-SHA", - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_NODTLS }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ARC4_C */ + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384 */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CAMELLIA */ + #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_AES) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, "TLS-DHE-PSK-WITH-AES-128-GCM-SHA256", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256 */ -#if defined(HAVE_SHA384) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, "TLS-DHE-PSK-WITH-AES-256-GCM-SHA384", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, -#endif /* HAVE_SHA384 */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384 */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, "TLS-DHE-PSK-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA256", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256 */ -#if defined(HAVE_SHA384) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384, "TLS-DHE-PSK-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA384", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, -#endif /* HAVE_SHA384 */ + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384 */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1) { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, "TLS-DHE-PSK-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, "TLS-DHE-PSK-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C) + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1 */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CCM) { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM, "TLS-DHE-PSK-WITH-AES-256-CCM", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8, "TLS-DHE-PSK-WITH-AES-256-CCM-8", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_SHORT_TAG }, + MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_SHORT_TAG, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM, "TLS-DHE-PSK-WITH-AES-128-CCM", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8, "TLS-DHE-PSK-WITH-AES-128-CCM-8", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_SHORT_TAG }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CCM_C */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_AES_C */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) + MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_SHORT_TAG, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CCM */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_AES */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CAMELLIA) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256, "TLS-DHE-PSK-WITH-CAMELLIA-128-CBC-SHA256", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256 */ -#if defined(HAVE_SHA384) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384, "TLS-DHE-PSK-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-CBC-SHA384", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, -#endif /* HAVE_SHA384 */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384 */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256, "TLS-DHE-PSK-WITH-CAMELLIA-128-GCM-SHA256", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256 */ -#if defined(HAVE_SHA384) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384, "TLS-DHE-PSK-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-GCM-SHA384", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, -#endif /* HAVE_SHA384 */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_DES_C) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) - { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, "TLS-DHE-PSK-WITH-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHA", - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_DES_C */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARC4_C) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) - { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, "TLS-DHE-PSK-WITH-RC4-128-SHA", - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_NODTLS }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ARC4_C */ + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384 */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CAMELLIA */ + #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_AES) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, "TLS-ECDHE-PSK-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA256", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256 */ -#if defined(HAVE_SHA384) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384, "TLS-ECDHE-PSK-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA384", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, -#endif /* HAVE_SHA384 */ + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384 */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1) { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, "TLS-ECDHE-PSK-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, "TLS-ECDHE-PSK-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_AES_C */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1 */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_AES */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CAMELLIA) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256, "TLS-ECDHE-PSK-WITH-CAMELLIA-128-CBC-SHA256", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256 */ -#if defined(HAVE_SHA384) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384, "TLS-ECDHE-PSK-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-CBC-SHA384", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, -#endif /* HAVE_SHA384 */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_DES_C) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) - { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, "TLS-ECDHE-PSK-WITH-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHA", - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_DES_C */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARC4_C) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) - { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, "TLS-ECDHE-PSK-WITH-RC4-128-SHA", - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_NODTLS }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ARC4_C */ + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384 */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CAMELLIA */ + #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_AES) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, "TLS-RSA-PSK-WITH-AES-128-GCM-SHA256", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256 */ -#if defined(HAVE_SHA384) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, "TLS-RSA-PSK-WITH-AES-256-GCM-SHA384", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, -#endif /* HAVE_SHA384 */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384 */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, "TLS-RSA-PSK-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA256", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256 */ -#if defined(HAVE_SHA384) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384, "TLS-RSA-PSK-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA384", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, -#endif /* HAVE_SHA384 */ + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384 */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1) { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, "TLS-RSA-PSK-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, "TLS-RSA-PSK-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_AES_C */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1 */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_AES */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CAMELLIA) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256, "TLS-RSA-PSK-WITH-CAMELLIA-128-CBC-SHA256", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256 */ -#if defined(HAVE_SHA384) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384, "TLS-RSA-PSK-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-CBC-SHA384", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, -#endif /* HAVE_SHA384 */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384 */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256, "TLS-RSA-PSK-WITH-CAMELLIA-128-GCM-SHA256", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256 */ -#if defined(HAVE_SHA384) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384, "TLS-RSA-PSK-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-GCM-SHA384", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, -#endif /* HAVE_SHA384 */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_DES_C) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) - { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, "TLS-RSA-PSK-WITH-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHA", - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_DES_C */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARC4_C) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) - { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, "TLS-RSA-PSK-WITH-RC4-128-SHA", - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_NODTLS }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ARC4_C */ + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384 */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CAMELLIA */ + #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_AES) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CCM) { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECJPAKE_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8, "TLS-ECJPAKE-WITH-AES-128-CCM-8", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_SHORT_TAG }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CCM_C */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_AES_C */ + MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_SHORT_TAG, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CCM */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_AES */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ENABLE_WEAK_CIPHERSUITES) #if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER) #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_MD5) { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_MD5, "TLS-RSA-WITH-NULL-MD5", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL, MBEDTLS_MD_MD5, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_WEAK }, + MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_WEAK, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1) { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA, "TLS-RSA-WITH-NULL-SHA", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_WEAK }, + MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_WEAK, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA256, "TLS-RSA-WITH-NULL-SHA256", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_WEAK }, + MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_WEAK, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, #endif #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1) { MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA, "TLS-PSK-WITH-NULL-SHA", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_WEAK }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ + MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_WEAK, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1 */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) { MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256, "TLS-PSK-WITH-NULL-SHA256", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_WEAK }, + MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_WEAK, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, #endif -#if defined(HAVE_SHA384) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) { MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384, "TLS-PSK-WITH-NULL-SHA384", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_WEAK }, -#endif + MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_WEAK, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384 */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1) { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA, "TLS-DHE-PSK-WITH-NULL-SHA", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_WEAK }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ + MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_WEAK, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1 */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256, "TLS-DHE-PSK-WITH-NULL-SHA256", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_WEAK }, + MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_WEAK, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, #endif -#if defined(HAVE_SHA384) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384, "TLS-DHE-PSK-WITH-NULL-SHA384", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_WEAK }, -#endif + MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_WEAK, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384 */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1) { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA, "TLS-ECDHE-PSK-WITH-NULL-SHA", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_WEAK }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ + MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_WEAK, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1 */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256, "TLS-ECDHE-PSK-WITH-NULL-SHA256", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_WEAK }, + MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_WEAK, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, #endif -#if defined(HAVE_SHA384) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384, "TLS-ECDHE-PSK-WITH-NULL-SHA384", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_WEAK }, -#endif + MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_WEAK, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384 */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1) { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA, "TLS-RSA-PSK-WITH-NULL-SHA", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_WEAK }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ + MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_WEAK, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1 */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256, "TLS-RSA-PSK-WITH-NULL-SHA256", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_WEAK }, + MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_WEAK, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, #endif -#if defined(HAVE_SHA384) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384, "TLS-RSA-PSK-WITH-NULL-SHA384", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_WEAK }, -#endif + MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_WEAK, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384 */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_DES_C) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) - { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA, "TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-DES-CBC-SHA", - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_WEAK }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_ARIA) #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) - { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA, "TLS-RSA-WITH-DES-CBC-SHA", - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_WEAK }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_DES_C */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ENABLE_WEAK_CIPHERSUITES */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARIA_C) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED) - -#if (defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) && defined(HAVE_SHA384)) +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM) && defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384)) { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384, "TLS-RSA-WITH-ARIA-256-GCM-SHA384", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, #endif -#if (defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) && defined(HAVE_SHA384)) +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384)) { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384, "TLS-RSA-WITH-ARIA-256-CBC-SHA384", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, #endif -#if (defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C)) +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM) && defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256)) { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256, "TLS-RSA-WITH-ARIA-128-GCM-SHA256", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, #endif -#if (defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) && defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C)) +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256)) { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256, "TLS-RSA-WITH-ARIA-128-CBC-SHA256", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, #endif #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED) -#if (defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) && defined(HAVE_SHA384)) +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM) && defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384)) { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384, "TLS-RSA-PSK-WITH-ARIA-256-GCM-SHA384", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, #endif -#if (defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) && defined(HAVE_SHA384)) +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384)) { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384, "TLS-RSA-PSK-WITH-ARIA-256-CBC-SHA384", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, #endif -#if (defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C)) +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM) && defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256)) { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256, "TLS-RSA-PSK-WITH-ARIA-128-GCM-SHA256", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, #endif -#if (defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) && defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C)) +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256)) { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256, "TLS-RSA-PSK-WITH-ARIA-128-CBC-SHA256", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, #endif #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED) -#if (defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) && defined(HAVE_SHA384)) +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM) && defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384)) { MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384, "TLS-PSK-WITH-ARIA-256-GCM-SHA384", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, #endif -#if (defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) && defined(HAVE_SHA384)) +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384)) { MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384, "TLS-PSK-WITH-ARIA-256-CBC-SHA384", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, #endif -#if (defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C)) +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM) && defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256)) { MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256, "TLS-PSK-WITH-ARIA-128-GCM-SHA256", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, #endif -#if (defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) && defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C)) +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256)) { MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256, "TLS-PSK-WITH-ARIA-128-CBC-SHA256", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, #endif #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED) -#if (defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) && defined(HAVE_SHA384)) +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM) && defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384)) { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384, "TLS-ECDH-RSA-WITH-ARIA-256-GCM-SHA384", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, #endif -#if (defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) && defined(HAVE_SHA384)) +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384)) { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384, "TLS-ECDH-RSA-WITH-ARIA-256-CBC-SHA384", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, #endif -#if (defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C)) +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM) && defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256)) { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256, "TLS-ECDH-RSA-WITH-ARIA-128-GCM-SHA256", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, #endif -#if (defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) && defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C)) +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256)) { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256, "TLS-ECDH-RSA-WITH-ARIA-128-CBC-SHA256", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, #endif #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED) -#if (defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) && defined(HAVE_SHA384)) +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM) && defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384)) { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384, "TLS-ECDHE-RSA-WITH-ARIA-256-GCM-SHA384", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, #endif -#if (defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) && defined(HAVE_SHA384)) +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384)) { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384, "TLS-ECDHE-RSA-WITH-ARIA-256-CBC-SHA384", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, #endif -#if (defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C)) +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM) && defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256)) { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256, "TLS-ECDHE-RSA-WITH-ARIA-128-GCM-SHA256", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, #endif -#if (defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) && defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C)) +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256)) { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256, "TLS-ECDHE-RSA-WITH-ARIA-128-CBC-SHA256", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, #endif #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED) -#if (defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) && defined(HAVE_SHA384)) +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384)) { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384, "TLS-ECDHE-PSK-WITH-ARIA-256-CBC-SHA384", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, #endif -#if (defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) && defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C)) +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256)) { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256, "TLS-ECDHE-PSK-WITH-ARIA-128-CBC-SHA256", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, #endif #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED) -#if (defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) && defined(HAVE_SHA384)) +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM) && defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384)) { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384, "TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-ARIA-256-GCM-SHA384", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, #endif -#if (defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) && defined(HAVE_SHA384)) +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384)) { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384, "TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-ARIA-256-CBC-SHA384", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, #endif -#if (defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C)) +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM) && defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256)) { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256, "TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-ARIA-128-GCM-SHA256", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, #endif -#if (defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) && defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C)) +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256)) { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256, "TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-ARIA-128-CBC-SHA256", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, #endif #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED) -#if (defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) && defined(HAVE_SHA384)) +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM) && defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384)) { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384, "TLS-ECDH-ECDSA-WITH-ARIA-256-GCM-SHA384", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, #endif -#if (defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) && defined(HAVE_SHA384)) +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384)) { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384, "TLS-ECDH-ECDSA-WITH-ARIA-256-CBC-SHA384", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, #endif -#if (defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C)) +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM) && defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256)) { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256, "TLS-ECDH-ECDSA-WITH-ARIA-128-GCM-SHA256", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, #endif -#if (defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) && defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C)) +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256)) { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256, "TLS-ECDH-ECDSA-WITH-ARIA-128-CBC-SHA256", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, #endif #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED) -#if (defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) && defined(HAVE_SHA384)) +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM) && defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384)) { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384, "TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-ARIA-256-GCM-SHA384", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, #endif -#if (defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) && defined(HAVE_SHA384)) +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384)) { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384, "TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-ARIA-256-CBC-SHA384", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, #endif -#if (defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C)) +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM) && defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256)) { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256, "TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-ARIA-128-GCM-SHA256", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, #endif -#if (defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) && defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C)) +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256)) { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256, "TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-ARIA-128-CBC-SHA256", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, #endif #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED) -#if (defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) && defined(HAVE_SHA384)) +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM) && defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384)) { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384, "TLS-DHE-PSK-WITH-ARIA-256-GCM-SHA384", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, #endif -#if (defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) && defined(HAVE_SHA384)) +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384)) { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384, "TLS-DHE-PSK-WITH-ARIA-256-CBC-SHA384", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, #endif -#if (defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C)) +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM) && defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256)) { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256, "TLS-DHE-PSK-WITH-ARIA-128-GCM-SHA256", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, #endif -#if (defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) && defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C)) +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256)) { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256, "TLS-DHE-PSK-WITH-ARIA-128-CBC-SHA256", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, #endif #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ARIA_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_ARIA */ { 0, "", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NONE, MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_NONE, - 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 } + 0, 0, 0 } }; #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CIPHERSUITES) @@ -2188,19 +1808,6 @@ static int ciphersuite_is_removed(const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *cs_info) { (void) cs_info; -#if defined(MBEDTLS_REMOVE_ARC4_CIPHERSUITES) - if (cs_info->cipher == MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128) { - return 1; - } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_REMOVE_ARC4_CIPHERSUITES */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_REMOVE_3DES_CIPHERSUITES) - if (cs_info->cipher == MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_ECB || - cs_info->cipher == MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC) { - return 1; - } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_REMOVE_3DES_CIPHERSUITES */ - return 0; } @@ -2293,6 +1900,31 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_id(const char *ciphersuite_name) return cur->id; } +size_t mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_get_cipher_key_bitlen(const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *info) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_type_t key_type; + psa_algorithm_t alg; + size_t key_bits; + + status = mbedtls_ssl_cipher_to_psa((mbedtls_cipher_type_t) info->cipher, + info->flags & MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_SHORT_TAG ? 8 : 16, + &alg, &key_type, &key_bits); + + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return 0; + } + + return key_bits; +#else + const mbedtls_cipher_info_t * const cipher_info = + mbedtls_cipher_info_from_type((mbedtls_cipher_type_t) info->cipher); + + return mbedtls_cipher_info_get_key_bitlen(cipher_info); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ +} + #if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_C) mbedtls_pk_type_t mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_sig_pk_alg(const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *info) { @@ -2315,10 +1947,54 @@ mbedtls_pk_type_t mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_sig_pk_alg(const mbedtls_ssl_ciphe } } -mbedtls_pk_type_t mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_sig_alg(const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *info) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +psa_algorithm_t mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_sig_pk_psa_alg(const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *info) { switch (info->key_exchange) { case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK: + return PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT; + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA: + return PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN( + mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type((mbedtls_md_type_t) info->mac)); + + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA: + return PSA_ALG_ECDSA(mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type((mbedtls_md_type_t) info->mac)); + + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA: + return PSA_ALG_ECDH; + + default: + return PSA_ALG_NONE; + } +} + +psa_key_usage_t mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_sig_pk_psa_usage(const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *info) +{ + switch (info->key_exchange) { + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK: + return PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT; + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA: + return PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH; + + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA: + return PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE; + + default: + return 0; + } +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + +mbedtls_pk_type_t mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_sig_alg(const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *info) +{ + switch (info->key_exchange) { case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA: case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA: return MBEDTLS_PK_RSA; @@ -2333,7 +2009,8 @@ mbedtls_pk_type_t mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_sig_alg(const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersu #endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) || \ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDH_OR_ECDHE_1_2_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDSA_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED) || \ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) int mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_ec(const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *info) { @@ -2350,7 +2027,9 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_ec(const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *info) return 0; } } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDH_C || MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C || MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED*/ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDH_OR_ECDHE_1_2_ENABLED || + * MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDSA_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED || + * MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED*/ #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED) int mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_psk(const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *info) diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ssl_ciphersuites_internal.h b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ssl_ciphersuites_internal.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..27ff72106ef6 --- /dev/null +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ssl_ciphersuites_internal.h @@ -0,0 +1,154 @@ +/** + * \file ssl_ciphersuites_internal.h + * + * \brief Internal part of the public "ssl_ciphersuites.h". + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ +#ifndef MBEDTLS_SSL_CIPHERSUITES_INTERNAL_H +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CIPHERSUITES_INTERNAL_H + +#include "mbedtls/pk.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_C) +mbedtls_pk_type_t mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_sig_pk_alg(const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *info); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +psa_algorithm_t mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_sig_pk_psa_alg(const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *info); +psa_key_usage_t mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_sig_pk_psa_usage(const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *info); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ +mbedtls_pk_type_t mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_sig_alg(const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *info); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_C */ + +int mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_ec(const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *info); +int mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_psk(const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *info); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PFS_ENABLED) +static inline int mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_has_pfs(const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *info) +{ + switch (info->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(key_exchange)) { + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE: + return 1; + + default: + return 0; + } +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PFS_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_NON_PFS_ENABLED) +static inline int mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_no_pfs(const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *info) +{ + switch (info->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(key_exchange)) { + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK: + return 1; + + default: + return 0; + } +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_NON_PFS_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDH_ENABLED) +static inline int mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_ecdh(const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *info) +{ + switch (info->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(key_exchange)) { + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA: + return 1; + + default: + return 0; + } +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDH_ENABLED */ + +static inline int mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_cert_req_allowed(const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *info) +{ + switch (info->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(key_exchange)) { + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA: + return 1; + + default: + return 0; + } +} + +static inline int mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_srv_cert(const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *info) +{ + switch (info->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(key_exchange)) { + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA: + return 1; + + default: + return 0; + } +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_DHE_ENABLED) +static inline int mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_dhe(const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *info) +{ + switch (info->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(key_exchange)) { + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK: + return 1; + + default: + return 0; + } +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_DHE_ENABLED) */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDHE_ENABLED) +static inline int mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_ecdhe(const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *info) +{ + switch (info->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(key_exchange)) { + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK: + return 1; + + default: + return 0; + } +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDHE_ENABLED) */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE_ENABLED) +static inline int mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_server_signature( + const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *info) +{ + switch (info->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(key_exchange)) { + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA: + return 1; + + default: + return 0; + } +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE_ENABLED */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CIPHERSUITES_INTERNAL_H */ diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ssl_client.c b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ssl_client.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..345e60893829 --- /dev/null +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ssl_client.c @@ -0,0 +1,1017 @@ +/* + * TLS 1.2 and 1.3 client-side functions + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) + +#include + +#include "debug_internal.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" + +#include "ssl_client.h" +#include "ssl_misc.h" +#include "ssl_tls13_keys.h" +#include "ssl_debug_helpers.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_write_hostname_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *buf, + const unsigned char *end, + size_t *olen) +{ + unsigned char *p = buf; + size_t hostname_len; + + *olen = 0; + + if (ssl->hostname == NULL) { + return 0; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, + ("client hello, adding server name extension: %s", + ssl->hostname)); + + hostname_len = strlen(ssl->hostname); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR(p, end, hostname_len + 9); + + /* + * Sect. 3, RFC 6066 (TLS Extensions Definitions) + * + * In order to provide any of the server names, clients MAY include an + * extension of type "server_name" in the (extended) client hello. The + * "extension_data" field of this extension SHALL contain + * "ServerNameList" where: + * + * struct { + * NameType name_type; + * select (name_type) { + * case host_name: HostName; + * } name; + * } ServerName; + * + * enum { + * host_name(0), (255) + * } NameType; + * + * opaque HostName<1..2^16-1>; + * + * struct { + * ServerName server_name_list<1..2^16-1> + * } ServerNameList; + * + */ + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SERVERNAME, p, 0); + p += 2; + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(hostname_len + 5, p, 0); + p += 2; + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(hostname_len + 3, p, 0); + p += 2; + + *p++ = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SERVERNAME_HOSTNAME); + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(hostname_len, p, 0); + p += 2; + + memcpy(p, ssl->hostname, hostname_len); + + *olen = hostname_len + 9; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) + mbedtls_ssl_tls13_set_hs_sent_ext_mask(ssl, MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SERVERNAME); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 */ + return 0; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN) +/* + * ssl_write_alpn_ext() + * + * Structure of the application_layer_protocol_negotiation extension in + * ClientHello: + * + * opaque ProtocolName<1..2^8-1>; + * + * struct { + * ProtocolName protocol_name_list<2..2^16-1> + * } ProtocolNameList; + * + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_write_alpn_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *buf, + const unsigned char *end, + size_t *out_len) +{ + unsigned char *p = buf; + + *out_len = 0; + + if (ssl->conf->alpn_list == NULL) { + return 0; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("client hello, adding alpn extension")); + + + /* Check we have enough space for the extension type (2 bytes), the + * extension length (2 bytes) and the protocol_name_list length (2 bytes). + */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR(p, end, 6); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ALPN, p, 0); + /* Skip writing extension and list length for now */ + p += 6; + + /* + * opaque ProtocolName<1..2^8-1>; + * + * struct { + * ProtocolName protocol_name_list<2..2^16-1> + * } ProtocolNameList; + */ + for (const char **cur = ssl->conf->alpn_list; *cur != NULL; cur++) { + /* + * mbedtls_ssl_conf_set_alpn_protocols() checked that the length of + * protocol names is less than 255. + */ + size_t protocol_name_len = strlen(*cur); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR(p, end, 1 + protocol_name_len); + *p++ = (unsigned char) protocol_name_len; + memcpy(p, *cur, protocol_name_len); + p += protocol_name_len; + } + + *out_len = (size_t) (p - buf); + + /* List length = *out_len - 2 (ext_type) - 2 (ext_len) - 2 (list_len) */ + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(*out_len - 6, buf, 4); + + /* Extension length = *out_len - 2 (ext_type) - 2 (ext_len) */ + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(*out_len - 4, buf, 2); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) + mbedtls_ssl_tls13_set_hs_sent_ext_mask(ssl, MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ALPN); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 */ + return 0; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_2_SOME_ECC) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED) +/* + * Function for writing a supported groups (TLS 1.3) or supported elliptic + * curves (TLS 1.2) extension. + * + * The "extension_data" field of a supported groups extension contains a + * "NamedGroupList" value (TLS 1.3 RFC8446): + * enum { + * secp256r1(0x0017), secp384r1(0x0018), secp521r1(0x0019), + * x25519(0x001D), x448(0x001E), + * ffdhe2048(0x0100), ffdhe3072(0x0101), ffdhe4096(0x0102), + * ffdhe6144(0x0103), ffdhe8192(0x0104), + * ffdhe_private_use(0x01FC..0x01FF), + * ecdhe_private_use(0xFE00..0xFEFF), + * (0xFFFF) + * } NamedGroup; + * struct { + * NamedGroup named_group_list<2..2^16-1>; + * } NamedGroupList; + * + * The "extension_data" field of a supported elliptic curves extension contains + * a "NamedCurveList" value (TLS 1.2 RFC 8422): + * enum { + * deprecated(1..22), + * secp256r1 (23), secp384r1 (24), secp521r1 (25), + * x25519(29), x448(30), + * reserved (0xFE00..0xFEFF), + * deprecated(0xFF01..0xFF02), + * (0xFFFF) + * } NamedCurve; + * struct { + * NamedCurve named_curve_list<2..2^16-1> + * } NamedCurveList; + * + * The TLS 1.3 supported groups extension was defined to be a compatible + * generalization of the TLS 1.2 supported elliptic curves extension. They both + * share the same extension identifier. + * + */ +#define SSL_WRITE_SUPPORTED_GROUPS_EXT_TLS1_2_FLAG 1 +#define SSL_WRITE_SUPPORTED_GROUPS_EXT_TLS1_3_FLAG 2 + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_write_supported_groups_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *buf, + const unsigned char *end, + int flags, + size_t *out_len) +{ + unsigned char *p = buf; + unsigned char *named_group_list; /* Start of named_group_list */ + size_t named_group_list_len; /* Length of named_group_list */ + const uint16_t *group_list = mbedtls_ssl_get_groups(ssl); + + *out_len = 0; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("client hello, adding supported_groups extension")); + + /* Check if we have space for header and length fields: + * - extension_type (2 bytes) + * - extension_data_length (2 bytes) + * - named_group_list_length (2 bytes) + */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR(p, end, 6); + p += 6; + + named_group_list = p; + + if (group_list == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_CONFIG; + } + + for (; *group_list != 0; group_list++) { + int propose_group = 0; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("got supported group(%04x)", *group_list)); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED) + if (flags & SSL_WRITE_SUPPORTED_GROUPS_EXT_TLS1_3_FLAG) { +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH) + if (mbedtls_ssl_tls13_named_group_is_ecdhe(*group_list) && + (mbedtls_ssl_get_ecp_group_id_from_tls_id(*group_list) != + MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE)) { + propose_group = 1; + } +#endif +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH) + if (mbedtls_ssl_tls13_named_group_is_ffdh(*group_list)) { + propose_group = 1; + } +#endif + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_2_SOME_ECC) + if ((flags & SSL_WRITE_SUPPORTED_GROUPS_EXT_TLS1_2_FLAG) && + mbedtls_ssl_tls12_named_group_is_ecdhe(*group_list) && + (mbedtls_ssl_get_ecp_group_id_from_tls_id(*group_list) != + MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE)) { + propose_group = 1; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_2_SOME_ECC */ + + if (propose_group) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR(p, end, 2); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(*group_list, p, 0); + p += 2; + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("NamedGroup: %s ( %x )", + mbedtls_ssl_named_group_to_str(*group_list), + *group_list)); + } + } + + /* Length of named_group_list */ + named_group_list_len = (size_t) (p - named_group_list); + if (named_group_list_len == 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("No group available.")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } + + /* Write extension_type */ + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_GROUPS, buf, 0); + /* Write extension_data_length */ + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(named_group_list_len + 2, buf, 2); + /* Write length of named_group_list */ + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(named_group_list_len, buf, 4); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "Supported groups extension", + buf + 4, named_group_list_len + 2); + + *out_len = (size_t) (p - buf); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) + mbedtls_ssl_tls13_set_hs_sent_ext_mask( + ssl, MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_GROUPS); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 */ + + return 0; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_2_SOME_ECC || + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED */ + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_write_client_hello_cipher_suites( + mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *buf, + unsigned char *end, + int *tls12_uses_ec, + size_t *out_len) +{ + unsigned char *p = buf; + const int *ciphersuite_list; + unsigned char *cipher_suites; /* Start of the cipher_suites list */ + size_t cipher_suites_len; + + *tls12_uses_ec = 0; + *out_len = 0; + + /* + * Ciphersuite list + * + * This is a list of the symmetric cipher options supported by + * the client, specifically the record protection algorithm + * ( including secret key length ) and a hash to be used with + * HKDF, in descending order of client preference. + */ + ciphersuite_list = ssl->conf->ciphersuite_list; + + /* Check there is space for the cipher suite list length (2 bytes). */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR(p, end, 2); + p += 2; + + /* Write cipher_suites + * CipherSuite cipher_suites<2..2^16-2>; + */ + cipher_suites = p; + for (size_t i = 0; ciphersuite_list[i] != 0; i++) { + int cipher_suite = ciphersuite_list[i]; + const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info; + + ciphersuite_info = mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_from_id(cipher_suite); + + if (mbedtls_ssl_validate_ciphersuite(ssl, ciphersuite_info, + ssl->handshake->min_tls_version, + ssl->tls_version) != 0) { + continue; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && \ + (defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDH_OR_ECDHE_1_2_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDSA_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED)) + *tls12_uses_ec |= mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_ec(ciphersuite_info); +#endif + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("client hello, add ciphersuite: %04x, %s", + (unsigned int) cipher_suite, + ciphersuite_info->name)); + + /* Check there is space for the cipher suite identifier (2 bytes). */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR(p, end, 2); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(cipher_suite, p, 0); + p += 2; + } + + /* + * Add TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV + */ + int renegotiating = 0; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) + renegotiating = (ssl->renego_status != MBEDTLS_SSL_INITIAL_HANDSHAKE); +#endif + if (!renegotiating) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("adding EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV")); + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR(p, end, 2); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(MBEDTLS_SSL_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO, p, 0); + p += 2; + } + + /* Write the cipher_suites length in number of bytes */ + cipher_suites_len = (size_t) (p - cipher_suites); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(cipher_suites_len, buf, 0); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, + ("client hello, got %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET " cipher suites", + cipher_suites_len/2)); + + /* Output the total length of cipher_suites field. */ + *out_len = (size_t) (p - buf); + + return 0; +} + +/* + * Structure of the TLS 1.3 ClientHello message: + * + * struct { + * ProtocolVersion legacy_version = 0x0303; // TLS v1.2 + * Random random; + * opaque legacy_session_id<0..32>; + * CipherSuite cipher_suites<2..2^16-2>; + * opaque legacy_compression_methods<1..2^8-1>; + * Extension extensions<8..2^16-1>; + * } ClientHello; + * + * Structure of the (D)TLS 1.2 ClientHello message: + * + * struct { + * ProtocolVersion client_version; + * Random random; + * SessionID session_id; + * opaque cookie<0..2^8-1>; // DTLS 1.2 ONLY + * CipherSuite cipher_suites<2..2^16-2>; + * CompressionMethod compression_methods<1..2^8-1>; + * select (extensions_present) { + * case false: + * struct {}; + * case true: + * Extension extensions<0..2^16-1>; + * }; + * } ClientHello; + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_write_client_hello_body(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *buf, + unsigned char *end, + size_t *out_len, + size_t *binders_len) +{ + int ret; + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *handshake = ssl->handshake; + unsigned char *p = buf; + unsigned char *p_extensions_len; /* Pointer to extensions length */ + size_t output_len; /* Length of buffer used by function */ + size_t extensions_len; /* Length of the list of extensions*/ + int tls12_uses_ec = 0; + + *out_len = 0; + *binders_len = 0; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) + unsigned char propose_tls12 = + (handshake->min_tls_version <= MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2) + && + (MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 <= ssl->tls_version); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) + unsigned char propose_tls13 = + (handshake->min_tls_version <= MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_3) + && + (MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_3 <= ssl->tls_version); +#endif + + /* + * Write client_version (TLS 1.2) or legacy_version (TLS 1.3) + * + * In all cases this is the TLS 1.2 version. + */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR(p, end, 2); + mbedtls_ssl_write_version(p, ssl->conf->transport, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2); + p += 2; + + /* ... + * Random random; + * ... + * + * The random bytes have been prepared by ssl_prepare_client_hello() into + * the handshake->randbytes buffer and are copied here into the output + * buffer. + */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR(p, end, MBEDTLS_CLIENT_HELLO_RANDOM_LEN); + memcpy(p, handshake->randbytes, MBEDTLS_CLIENT_HELLO_RANDOM_LEN); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "client hello, random bytes", + p, MBEDTLS_CLIENT_HELLO_RANDOM_LEN); + p += MBEDTLS_CLIENT_HELLO_RANDOM_LEN; + + /* TLS 1.2: + * ... + * SessionID session_id; + * ... + * with + * opaque SessionID<0..32>; + * + * TLS 1.3: + * ... + * opaque legacy_session_id<0..32>; + * ... + * + * The (legacy) session identifier bytes have been prepared by + * ssl_prepare_client_hello() into the ssl->session_negotiate->id buffer + * and are copied here into the output buffer. + */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR(p, end, ssl->session_negotiate->id_len + 1); + *p++ = (unsigned char) ssl->session_negotiate->id_len; + memcpy(p, ssl->session_negotiate->id, ssl->session_negotiate->id_len); + p += ssl->session_negotiate->id_len; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "session id", ssl->session_negotiate->id, + ssl->session_negotiate->id_len); + + /* DTLS 1.2 ONLY + * ... + * opaque cookie<0..2^8-1>; + * ... + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM) { +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) + uint8_t cookie_len = 0; +#else + uint16_t cookie_len = 0; +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 */ + + if (handshake->cookie != NULL) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "client hello, cookie", + handshake->cookie, + handshake->cookie_len); + cookie_len = handshake->cookie_len; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR(p, end, cookie_len + 1); + *p++ = (unsigned char) cookie_len; + if (cookie_len > 0) { + memcpy(p, handshake->cookie, cookie_len); + p += cookie_len; + } + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 && MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ + + /* Write cipher_suites */ + ret = ssl_write_client_hello_cipher_suites(ssl, p, end, + &tls12_uses_ec, + &output_len); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + p += output_len; + + /* Write legacy_compression_methods (TLS 1.3) or + * compression_methods (TLS 1.2) + * + * For every TLS 1.3 ClientHello, this vector MUST contain exactly + * one byte set to zero, which corresponds to the 'null' compression + * method in prior versions of TLS. + * + * For TLS 1.2 ClientHello, for security reasons we do not support + * compression anymore, thus also just the 'null' compression method. + */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR(p, end, 2); + *p++ = 1; + *p++ = MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_NULL; + + /* Write extensions */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) + /* Keeping track of the included extensions */ + handshake->sent_extensions = MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK_NONE; +#endif + + /* First write extensions, then the total length */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR(p, end, 2); + p_extensions_len = p; + p += 2; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) + /* Write server name extension */ + ret = ssl_write_hostname_ext(ssl, p, end, &output_len); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + p += output_len; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN) + ret = ssl_write_alpn_ext(ssl, p, end, &output_len); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + p += output_len; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) + if (propose_tls13) { + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_write_client_hello_exts(ssl, p, end, + &output_len); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + p += output_len; + } +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_2_SOME_ECC) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED) + { + int ssl_write_supported_groups_ext_flags = 0; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED) + if (propose_tls13 && mbedtls_ssl_conf_tls13_is_some_ephemeral_enabled(ssl)) { + ssl_write_supported_groups_ext_flags |= + SSL_WRITE_SUPPORTED_GROUPS_EXT_TLS1_3_FLAG; + } +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_2_SOME_ECC) + if (propose_tls12 && tls12_uses_ec) { + ssl_write_supported_groups_ext_flags |= + SSL_WRITE_SUPPORTED_GROUPS_EXT_TLS1_2_FLAG; + } +#endif + if (ssl_write_supported_groups_ext_flags != 0) { + ret = ssl_write_supported_groups_ext(ssl, p, end, + ssl_write_supported_groups_ext_flags, + &output_len); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + p += output_len; + } + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_2_SOME_ECC || + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) + int write_sig_alg_ext = 0; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) + write_sig_alg_ext = write_sig_alg_ext || + (propose_tls13 && mbedtls_ssl_conf_tls13_is_ephemeral_enabled(ssl)); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) + write_sig_alg_ext = write_sig_alg_ext || propose_tls12; +#endif + + if (write_sig_alg_ext) { + ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_sig_alg_ext(ssl, p, end, &output_len); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + p += output_len; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) + if (propose_tls12) { + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls12_write_client_hello_exts(ssl, p, end, + tls12_uses_ec, + &output_len); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + p += output_len; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED) + /* The "pre_shared_key" extension (RFC 8446 Section 4.2.11) + * MUST be the last extension in the ClientHello. + */ + if (propose_tls13 && mbedtls_ssl_conf_tls13_is_some_psk_enabled(ssl)) { + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_write_identities_of_pre_shared_key_ext( + ssl, p, end, &output_len, binders_len); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + p += output_len; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED */ + + /* Write the length of the list of extensions. */ + extensions_len = (size_t) (p - p_extensions_len) - 2; + + if (extensions_len == 0) { + p = p_extensions_len; + } else { + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(extensions_len, p_extensions_len, 0); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("client hello, total extension length: %" \ + MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET, extensions_len)); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "client hello extensions", + p_extensions_len, extensions_len); + } + + *out_len = (size_t) (p - buf); + return 0; +} + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_generate_random(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char *randbytes = ssl->handshake->randbytes; + size_t gmt_unix_time_len = 0; + + /* + * Generate the random bytes + * + * TLS 1.2 case: + * struct { + * uint32 gmt_unix_time; + * opaque random_bytes[28]; + * } Random; + * + * TLS 1.3 case: + * opaque Random[32]; + */ + if (ssl->tls_version == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) + mbedtls_time_t gmt_unix_time = mbedtls_time(NULL); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE(gmt_unix_time, randbytes, 0); + gmt_unix_time_len = 4; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, + ("client hello, current time: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_LONGLONG, + (long long) gmt_unix_time)); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME */ + } + + ret = ssl->conf->f_rng(ssl->conf->p_rng, + randbytes + gmt_unix_time_len, + MBEDTLS_CLIENT_HELLO_RANDOM_LEN - gmt_unix_time_len); + return ret; +} + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_prepare_client_hello(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + int ret; + size_t session_id_len; + mbedtls_ssl_session *session_negotiate = ssl->session_negotiate; + + if (session_negotiate == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) + + /* Check if a tls13 ticket has been configured. */ + if (ssl->handshake->resume != 0 && + session_negotiate->tls_version == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_3 && + session_negotiate->ticket != NULL) { + mbedtls_ms_time_t now = mbedtls_ms_time(); + mbedtls_ms_time_t age = now - session_negotiate->ticket_reception_time; + if (age < 0 || + age > (mbedtls_ms_time_t) session_negotiate->ticket_lifetime * 1000) { + /* Without valid ticket, disable session resumption.*/ + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( + 3, ("Ticket expired, disable session resumption")); + ssl->handshake->resume = 0; + } + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 && + MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS && + MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME */ + + /* Bet on the highest configured version if we are not in a TLS 1.2 + * renegotiation or session resumption. + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) + if (ssl->renego_status != MBEDTLS_SSL_INITIAL_HANDSHAKE) { + ssl->handshake->min_tls_version = ssl->tls_version; + } else +#endif + { + if (ssl->handshake->resume) { + ssl->tls_version = session_negotiate->tls_version; + ssl->handshake->min_tls_version = ssl->tls_version; + } else { + ssl->handshake->min_tls_version = ssl->conf->min_tls_version; + } + } + + /* + * Generate the random bytes, except when responding to a verify request + * where we MUST reuse the previously generated random bytes + * (RFC 6347 4.2.1). + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if ((ssl->conf->transport != MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM) || + (ssl->handshake->cookie == NULL)) +#endif + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) + if (!ssl->handshake->hello_retry_request_flag) +#endif + { + ret = ssl_generate_random(ssl); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "Random bytes generation failed", ret); + return ret; + } + } + } + + /* + * Prepare session identifier. At that point, the length of the session + * identifier in the SSL context `ssl->session_negotiate->id_len` is equal + * to zero, except in the case of a TLS 1.2 session renegotiation or + * session resumption. + */ + session_id_len = session_negotiate->id_len; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) + if (ssl->tls_version == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2) { + if (session_id_len < 16 || session_id_len > 32 || +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) + ssl->renego_status != MBEDTLS_SSL_INITIAL_HANDSHAKE || +#endif + ssl->handshake->resume == 0) { + session_id_len = 0; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) + /* + * RFC 5077 section 3.4: "When presenting a ticket, the client MAY + * generate and include a Session ID in the TLS ClientHello." + */ + int renegotiating = 0; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) + if (ssl->renego_status != MBEDTLS_SSL_INITIAL_HANDSHAKE) { + renegotiating = 1; + } +#endif + if (!renegotiating) { + if ((session_negotiate->ticket != NULL) && + (session_negotiate->ticket_len != 0)) { + session_id_len = 32; + } + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */ + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE) + if (ssl->tls_version == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_3) { + /* + * Create a legacy session identifier for the purpose of middlebox + * compatibility only if one has not been created already, which is + * the case if we are here for the TLS 1.3 second ClientHello. + * + * Versions of TLS before TLS 1.3 supported a "session resumption" + * feature which has been merged with pre-shared keys in TLS 1.3 + * version. A client which has a cached session ID set by a pre-TLS 1.3 + * server SHOULD set this field to that value. In compatibility mode, + * this field MUST be non-empty, so a client not offering a pre-TLS 1.3 + * session MUST generate a new 32-byte value. This value need not be + * random but SHOULD be unpredictable to avoid implementations fixating + * on a specific value (also known as ossification). Otherwise, it MUST + * be set as a zero-length vector ( i.e., a zero-valued single byte + * length field ). + */ + session_id_len = 32; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE */ + + if (session_id_len != session_negotiate->id_len) { + session_negotiate->id_len = session_id_len; + if (session_id_len > 0) { + ret = ssl->conf->f_rng(ssl->conf->p_rng, + session_negotiate->id, + session_id_len); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "creating session id failed", ret); + return ret; + } + } + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) + if (ssl->tls_version == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_3 && + ssl->handshake->resume) { + int hostname_mismatch = ssl->hostname != NULL || + session_negotiate->hostname != NULL; + if (ssl->hostname != NULL && session_negotiate->hostname != NULL) { + hostname_mismatch = strcmp( + ssl->hostname, session_negotiate->hostname) != 0; + } + + if (hostname_mismatch) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( + 1, ("Hostname mismatch the session ticket, " + "disable session resumption.")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + } else { + return mbedtls_ssl_session_set_hostname(session_negotiate, + ssl->hostname); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 && + MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS && + MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION */ + + return 0; +} +/* + * Write ClientHello handshake message. + * Handler for MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_HELLO + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_write_client_hello(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + int ret = 0; + unsigned char *buf; + size_t buf_len, msg_len, binders_len; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> write client hello")); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(ssl_prepare_client_hello(ssl)); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(mbedtls_ssl_start_handshake_msg( + ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CLIENT_HELLO, + &buf, &buf_len)); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(ssl_write_client_hello_body(ssl, buf, + buf + buf_len, + &msg_len, + &binders_len)); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM) { + ssl->out_msglen = msg_len + 4; + mbedtls_ssl_send_flight_completed(ssl); + + /* + * The two functions below may try to send data on the network and + * can return with the MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ error code when they + * fail to do so and the transmission has to be retried later. In that + * case as in fatal error cases, we return immediately. But we must have + * set the handshake state to the next state at that point to ensure + * that we will not write and send again a ClientHello when we + * eventually succeed in sending the pending data. + */ + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_HELLO); + + if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg(ssl)) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg", ret); + return ret; + } + + if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_flight_transmit(ssl)) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_flight_transmit", ret); + return ret; + } + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 && MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ + { + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_add_hs_hdr_to_checksum(ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CLIENT_HELLO, + msg_len); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_add_hs_hdr_to_checksum", ret); + return ret; + } + ret = ssl->handshake->update_checksum(ssl, buf, msg_len - binders_len); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "update_checksum", ret); + return ret; + } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED) + if (binders_len > 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK( + mbedtls_ssl_tls13_write_binders_of_pre_shared_key_ext( + ssl, buf + msg_len - binders_len, buf + msg_len)); + ret = ssl->handshake->update_checksum(ssl, buf + msg_len - binders_len, + binders_len); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "update_checksum", ret); + return ret; + } + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED */ + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(mbedtls_ssl_finish_handshake_msg(ssl, + buf_len, + msg_len)); + + /* + * Set next state. Note that if TLS 1.3 is proposed, this may be + * overwritten by mbedtls_ssl_tls13_finalize_client_hello(). + */ + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_HELLO); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) + if (ssl->handshake->min_tls_version <= MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_3 && + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_3 <= ssl->tls_version) { + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_finalize_client_hello(ssl); + } +#endif + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) + MBEDTLS_SSL_PRINT_EXTS( + 3, MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CLIENT_HELLO, ssl->handshake->sent_extensions); +#endif + +cleanup: + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= write client hello")); + return ret; +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 || MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */ diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ssl_client.h b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ssl_client.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..05ee7e4cc311 --- /dev/null +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ssl_client.h @@ -0,0 +1,22 @@ +/** + * TLS 1.2 and 1.3 client-side functions + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +#ifndef MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_H +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_H + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C) +#include "ssl_misc.h" +#endif + +#include + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_write_client_hello(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_H */ diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ssl_cookie.c b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ssl_cookie.c index 067a4916a5c1..2772cac4beb8 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ssl_cookie.c +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ssl_cookie.c @@ -16,32 +16,40 @@ #include "mbedtls/platform.h" #include "mbedtls/ssl_cookie.h" -#include "mbedtls/ssl_internal.h" +#include "ssl_misc.h" #include "mbedtls/error.h" #include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" #include "mbedtls/constant_time.h" #include +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +#include "mbedtls/psa_util.h" +/* Define a local translating function to save code size by not using too many + * arguments in each translating place. */ +static int local_err_translation(psa_status_t status) +{ + return psa_status_to_mbedtls(status, psa_to_ssl_errors, + ARRAY_LENGTH(psa_to_ssl_errors), + psa_generic_status_to_mbedtls); +} +#define PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status) local_err_translation(status) +#endif + /* - * If DTLS is in use, then at least one of SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-512 is - * available. Try SHA-256 first, 512 wastes resources since we need to stay - * with max 32 bytes of cookie for DTLS 1.0 + * If DTLS is in use, then at least one of SHA-256 or SHA-384 is + * available. Try SHA-256 first as 384 wastes resources */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) -#define COOKIE_MD MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224 +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) +#define COOKIE_MD MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256 #define COOKIE_MD_OUTLEN 32 #define COOKIE_HMAC_LEN 28 -#elif defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) #define COOKIE_MD MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384 #define COOKIE_MD_OUTLEN 48 #define COOKIE_HMAC_LEN 28 -#elif defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) -#define COOKIE_MD MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1 -#define COOKIE_MD_OUTLEN 20 -#define COOKIE_HMAC_LEN 20 #else -#error "DTLS hello verify needs SHA-1 or SHA-2" +#error "DTLS hello verify needs SHA-256 or SHA-384" #endif /* @@ -52,15 +60,21 @@ void mbedtls_ssl_cookie_init(mbedtls_ssl_cookie_ctx *ctx) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + ctx->psa_hmac_key = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; +#else mbedtls_md_init(&ctx->hmac_ctx); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ #if !defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) ctx->serial = 0; #endif ctx->timeout = MBEDTLS_SSL_COOKIE_TIMEOUT; +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) #if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) mbedtls_mutex_init(&ctx->mutex); #endif +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ } void mbedtls_ssl_cookie_set_timeout(mbedtls_ssl_cookie_ctx *ctx, unsigned long delay) @@ -70,11 +84,15 @@ void mbedtls_ssl_cookie_set_timeout(mbedtls_ssl_cookie_ctx *ctx, unsigned long d void mbedtls_ssl_cookie_free(mbedtls_ssl_cookie_ctx *ctx) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + psa_destroy_key(ctx->psa_hmac_key); +#else mbedtls_md_free(&ctx->hmac_ctx); #if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) mbedtls_mutex_free(&ctx->mutex); #endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ mbedtls_platform_zeroize(ctx, sizeof(mbedtls_ssl_cookie_ctx)); } @@ -83,6 +101,33 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_cookie_setup(mbedtls_ssl_cookie_ctx *ctx, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_algorithm_t alg; + + (void) f_rng; + (void) p_rng; + + alg = mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type(COOKIE_MD); + if (alg == 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + ctx->psa_hmac_alg = PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(alg), + COOKIE_HMAC_LEN); + + psa_set_key_usage_flags(&attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE | + PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE); + psa_set_key_algorithm(&attributes, ctx->psa_hmac_alg); + psa_set_key_type(&attributes, PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC); + psa_set_key_bits(&attributes, PSA_BYTES_TO_BITS(COOKIE_MD_OUTLEN)); + + if ((status = psa_generate_key(&attributes, + &ctx->psa_hmac_key)) != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + } +#else int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; unsigned char key[COOKIE_MD_OUTLEN]; @@ -101,10 +146,12 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_cookie_setup(mbedtls_ssl_cookie_ctx *ctx, } mbedtls_platform_zeroize(key, sizeof(key)); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ return 0; } +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) /* * Generate the HMAC part of a cookie */ @@ -130,6 +177,7 @@ static int ssl_cookie_hmac(mbedtls_md_context_t *hmac_ctx, return 0; } +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ /* * Generate cookie for DTLS ClientHello verification @@ -138,6 +186,11 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_cookie_write(void *p_ctx, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *end, const unsigned char *cli_id, size_t cli_id_len) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + psa_mac_operation_t operation = PSA_MAC_OPERATION_INIT; + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t sign_mac_length = 0; +#endif int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; mbedtls_ssl_cookie_ctx *ctx = (mbedtls_ssl_cookie_ctx *) p_ctx; unsigned long t; @@ -157,6 +210,37 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_cookie_write(void *p_ctx, MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE(t, *p, 0); *p += 4; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + status = psa_mac_sign_setup(&operation, ctx->psa_hmac_key, + ctx->psa_hmac_alg); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + ret = PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_mac_update(&operation, *p - 4, 4); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + ret = PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_mac_update(&operation, cli_id, cli_id_len); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + ret = PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_mac_sign_finish(&operation, *p, COOKIE_MD_OUTLEN, + &sign_mac_length); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + ret = PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + goto exit; + } + + *p += COOKIE_HMAC_LEN; + + ret = 0; +#else #if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) if ((ret = mbedtls_mutex_lock(&ctx->mutex)) != 0) { return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR, ret); @@ -172,7 +256,15 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_cookie_write(void *p_ctx, MBEDTLS_ERR_THREADING_MUTEX_ERROR); } #endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +exit: + status = psa_mac_abort(&operation); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + ret = PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ return ret; } @@ -183,9 +275,14 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_cookie_check(void *p_ctx, const unsigned char *cookie, size_t cookie_len, const unsigned char *cli_id, size_t cli_id_len) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + psa_mac_operation_t operation = PSA_MAC_OPERATION_INIT; + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; +#else unsigned char ref_hmac[COOKIE_HMAC_LEN]; - int ret = 0; unsigned char *p = ref_hmac; +#endif + int ret = 0; mbedtls_ssl_cookie_ctx *ctx = (mbedtls_ssl_cookie_ctx *) p_ctx; unsigned long cur_time, cookie_time; @@ -197,6 +294,36 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_cookie_check(void *p_ctx, return -1; } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + status = psa_mac_verify_setup(&operation, ctx->psa_hmac_key, + ctx->psa_hmac_alg); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + ret = PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_mac_update(&operation, cookie, 4); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + ret = PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_mac_update(&operation, cli_id, + cli_id_len); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + ret = PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_mac_verify_finish(&operation, cookie + 4, + COOKIE_HMAC_LEN); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + ret = PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + goto exit; + } + + ret = 0; +#else #if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) if ((ret = mbedtls_mutex_lock(&ctx->mutex)) != 0) { return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR, ret); @@ -224,6 +351,7 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_cookie_check(void *p_ctx, ret = -1; goto exit; } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) cur_time = (unsigned long) mbedtls_time(NULL); @@ -231,10 +359,7 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_cookie_check(void *p_ctx, cur_time = ctx->serial; #endif - cookie_time = ((unsigned long) cookie[0] << 24) | - ((unsigned long) cookie[1] << 16) | - ((unsigned long) cookie[2] << 8) | - ((unsigned long) cookie[3]); + cookie_time = (unsigned long) MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE(cookie, 0); if (ctx->timeout != 0 && cur_time - cookie_time > ctx->timeout) { ret = -1; @@ -242,7 +367,14 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_cookie_check(void *p_ctx, } exit: +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + status = psa_mac_abort(&operation); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + ret = PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + } +#else mbedtls_platform_zeroize(ref_hmac, sizeof(ref_hmac)); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ return ret; } #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_COOKIE_C */ diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ssl_debug_helpers.h b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ssl_debug_helpers.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..4889e77e04b9 --- /dev/null +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ssl_debug_helpers.h @@ -0,0 +1,83 @@ +/** + * \file ssl_debug_helpers.h + * + * \brief Automatically generated helper functions for debugging + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +#ifndef MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_HELPERS_H +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_HELPERS_H + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C) + +#include "mbedtls/ssl.h" +#include "ssl_misc.h" + + +const char *mbedtls_ssl_states_str(mbedtls_ssl_states in); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) +const char *mbedtls_ssl_early_data_status_str(mbedtls_ssl_early_data_status in); +const char *mbedtls_ssl_early_data_state_str(mbedtls_ssl_early_data_state in); +#endif + +const char *mbedtls_ssl_protocol_version_str(mbedtls_ssl_protocol_version in); + +const char *mbedtls_tls_prf_types_str(mbedtls_tls_prf_types in); + +const char *mbedtls_ssl_key_export_type_str(mbedtls_ssl_key_export_type in); + +const char *mbedtls_ssl_sig_alg_to_str(uint16_t in); + +const char *mbedtls_ssl_named_group_to_str(uint16_t in); + +const char *mbedtls_ssl_get_extension_name(unsigned int extension_type); + +void mbedtls_ssl_print_extensions(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + int level, const char *file, int line, + int hs_msg_type, uint32_t extensions_mask, + const char *extra); + +void mbedtls_ssl_print_extension(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + int level, const char *file, int line, + int hs_msg_type, unsigned int extension_type, + const char *extra_msg0, const char *extra_msg1); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) +void mbedtls_ssl_print_ticket_flags(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + int level, const char *file, int line, + unsigned int flags); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 && MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */ + +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_PRINT_EXTS(level, hs_msg_type, extensions_mask) \ + mbedtls_ssl_print_extensions(ssl, level, __FILE__, __LINE__, \ + hs_msg_type, extensions_mask, NULL) + +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_PRINT_EXT(level, hs_msg_type, extension_type, extra) \ + mbedtls_ssl_print_extension(ssl, level, __FILE__, __LINE__, \ + hs_msg_type, extension_type, \ + extra, NULL) + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_PRINT_TICKET_FLAGS(level, flags) \ + mbedtls_ssl_print_ticket_flags(ssl, level, __FILE__, __LINE__, flags) +#endif + +#else + +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_PRINT_EXTS(level, hs_msg_type, extension_mask) + +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_PRINT_EXT(level, hs_msg_type, extension_type, extra) + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_PRINT_TICKET_FLAGS(level, flags) +#endif + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_HELPERS_H */ diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ssl_debug_helpers_generated.c b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ssl_debug_helpers_generated.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..f8b4448c86ef --- /dev/null +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ssl_debug_helpers_generated.c @@ -0,0 +1,251 @@ +/* Automatically generated by generate_ssl_debug_helpers.py. DO NOT EDIT. */ + +/** + * \file ssl_debug_helpers_generated.c + * + * \brief Automatically generated helper functions for debugging + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + * + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C) + +#include "ssl_debug_helpers.h" + + +const char *mbedtls_ssl_named_group_to_str( uint16_t in ) +{ + switch( in ) + { + case MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_SECP192K1: + return "secp192k1"; + case MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_SECP192R1: + return "secp192r1"; + case MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_SECP224K1: + return "secp224k1"; + case MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_SECP224R1: + return "secp224r1"; + case MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_SECP256K1: + return "secp256k1"; + case MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_SECP256R1: + return "secp256r1"; + case MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_SECP384R1: + return "secp384r1"; + case MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_SECP521R1: + return "secp521r1"; + case MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_BP256R1: + return "bp256r1"; + case MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_BP384R1: + return "bp384r1"; + case MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_BP512R1: + return "bp512r1"; + case MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_X25519: + return "x25519"; + case MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_X448: + return "x448"; + case MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_FFDHE2048: + return "ffdhe2048"; + case MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_FFDHE3072: + return "ffdhe3072"; + case MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_FFDHE4096: + return "ffdhe4096"; + case MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_FFDHE6144: + return "ffdhe6144"; + case MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_FFDHE8192: + return "ffdhe8192"; + }; + + return "UNKOWN"; +} +const char *mbedtls_ssl_sig_alg_to_str( uint16_t in ) +{ + switch( in ) + { + case MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PKCS1_SHA256: + return "rsa_pkcs1_sha256"; + case MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PKCS1_SHA384: + return "rsa_pkcs1_sha384"; + case MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PKCS1_SHA512: + return "rsa_pkcs1_sha512"; + case MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_ECDSA_SECP256R1_SHA256: + return "ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256"; + case MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_ECDSA_SECP384R1_SHA384: + return "ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384"; + case MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_ECDSA_SECP521R1_SHA512: + return "ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512"; + case MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PSS_RSAE_SHA256: + return "rsa_pss_rsae_sha256"; + case MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PSS_RSAE_SHA384: + return "rsa_pss_rsae_sha384"; + case MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PSS_RSAE_SHA512: + return "rsa_pss_rsae_sha512"; + case MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_ED25519: + return "ed25519"; + case MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_ED448: + return "ed448"; + case MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PSS_PSS_SHA256: + return "rsa_pss_pss_sha256"; + case MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PSS_PSS_SHA384: + return "rsa_pss_pss_sha384"; + case MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PSS_PSS_SHA512: + return "rsa_pss_pss_sha512"; + case MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PKCS1_SHA1: + return "rsa_pkcs1_sha1"; + case MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_ECDSA_SHA1: + return "ecdsa_sha1"; + case MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_NONE: + return "none"; + }; + + return "UNKNOWN"; +} +const char *mbedtls_ssl_states_str( mbedtls_ssl_states in ) +{ + switch (in) { + case MBEDTLS_SSL_HELLO_REQUEST: + return "MBEDTLS_SSL_HELLO_REQUEST"; + case MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_HELLO: + return "MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_HELLO"; + case MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_HELLO: + return "MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_HELLO"; + case MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_CERTIFICATE: + return "MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_CERTIFICATE"; + case MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE: + return "MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE"; + case MBEDTLS_SSL_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST: + return "MBEDTLS_SSL_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST"; + case MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_HELLO_DONE: + return "MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_HELLO_DONE"; + case MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE: + return "MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE"; + case MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE: + return "MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE"; + case MBEDTLS_SSL_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY: + return "MBEDTLS_SSL_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY"; + case MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC: + return "MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC"; + case MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_FINISHED: + return "MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_FINISHED"; + case MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC: + return "MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC"; + case MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_FINISHED: + return "MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_FINISHED"; + case MBEDTLS_SSL_FLUSH_BUFFERS: + return "MBEDTLS_SSL_FLUSH_BUFFERS"; + case MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WRAPUP: + return "MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WRAPUP"; + case MBEDTLS_SSL_NEW_SESSION_TICKET: + return "MBEDTLS_SSL_NEW_SESSION_TICKET"; + case MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_SENT: + return "MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_SENT"; + case MBEDTLS_SSL_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST: + return "MBEDTLS_SSL_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST"; + case MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS: + return "MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS"; + case MBEDTLS_SSL_END_OF_EARLY_DATA: + return "MBEDTLS_SSL_END_OF_EARLY_DATA"; + case MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY: + return "MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY"; + case MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CCS_AFTER_SERVER_FINISHED: + return "MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CCS_AFTER_SERVER_FINISHED"; + case MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CCS_BEFORE_2ND_CLIENT_HELLO: + return "MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CCS_BEFORE_2ND_CLIENT_HELLO"; + case MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_CCS_AFTER_SERVER_HELLO: + return "MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_CCS_AFTER_SERVER_HELLO"; + case MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CCS_AFTER_CLIENT_HELLO: + return "MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CCS_AFTER_CLIENT_HELLO"; + case MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_CCS_AFTER_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST: + return "MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_CCS_AFTER_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST"; + case MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER: + return "MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER"; + case MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET: + return "MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET"; + case MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET_FLUSH: + return "MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET_FLUSH"; + default: + return "UNKNOWN_VALUE"; + } +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) +const char *mbedtls_ssl_early_data_status_str( mbedtls_ssl_early_data_status in ) +{ + switch (in) { + case MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_NOT_INDICATED: + return "MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_NOT_INDICATED"; + case MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_ACCEPTED: + return "MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_ACCEPTED"; + case MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_REJECTED: + return "MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_REJECTED"; + default: + return "UNKNOWN_VALUE"; + } +} + +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) */ +const char *mbedtls_ssl_protocol_version_str( mbedtls_ssl_protocol_version in ) +{ + switch (in) { + case MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_UNKNOWN: + return "MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_UNKNOWN"; + case MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2: + return "MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2"; + case MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_3: + return "MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_3"; + default: + return "UNKNOWN_VALUE"; + } +} + +const char *mbedtls_tls_prf_types_str( mbedtls_tls_prf_types in ) +{ + switch (in) { + case MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_PRF_NONE: + return "MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_PRF_NONE"; + case MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_PRF_SHA384: + return "MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_PRF_SHA384"; + case MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_PRF_SHA256: + return "MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_PRF_SHA256"; + case MBEDTLS_SSL_HKDF_EXPAND_SHA384: + return "MBEDTLS_SSL_HKDF_EXPAND_SHA384"; + case MBEDTLS_SSL_HKDF_EXPAND_SHA256: + return "MBEDTLS_SSL_HKDF_EXPAND_SHA256"; + default: + return "UNKNOWN_VALUE"; + } +} + +const char *mbedtls_ssl_key_export_type_str( mbedtls_ssl_key_export_type in ) +{ + switch (in) { + case MBEDTLS_SSL_KEY_EXPORT_TLS12_MASTER_SECRET: + return "MBEDTLS_SSL_KEY_EXPORT_TLS12_MASTER_SECRET"; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) + case MBEDTLS_SSL_KEY_EXPORT_TLS1_3_CLIENT_EARLY_SECRET: + return "MBEDTLS_SSL_KEY_EXPORT_TLS1_3_CLIENT_EARLY_SECRET"; + case MBEDTLS_SSL_KEY_EXPORT_TLS1_3_EARLY_EXPORTER_SECRET: + return "MBEDTLS_SSL_KEY_EXPORT_TLS1_3_EARLY_EXPORTER_SECRET"; + case MBEDTLS_SSL_KEY_EXPORT_TLS1_3_CLIENT_HANDSHAKE_TRAFFIC_SECRET: + return "MBEDTLS_SSL_KEY_EXPORT_TLS1_3_CLIENT_HANDSHAKE_TRAFFIC_SECRET"; + case MBEDTLS_SSL_KEY_EXPORT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HANDSHAKE_TRAFFIC_SECRET: + return "MBEDTLS_SSL_KEY_EXPORT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HANDSHAKE_TRAFFIC_SECRET"; + case MBEDTLS_SSL_KEY_EXPORT_TLS1_3_CLIENT_APPLICATION_TRAFFIC_SECRET: + return "MBEDTLS_SSL_KEY_EXPORT_TLS1_3_CLIENT_APPLICATION_TRAFFIC_SECRET"; + case MBEDTLS_SSL_KEY_EXPORT_TLS1_3_SERVER_APPLICATION_TRAFFIC_SECRET: + return "MBEDTLS_SSL_KEY_EXPORT_TLS1_3_SERVER_APPLICATION_TRAFFIC_SECRET"; +#endif + default: + return "UNKNOWN_VALUE"; + } +} + + + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C */ +/* End of automatically generated file. */ + diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ssl_misc.h b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ssl_misc.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..a8807f67c63a --- /dev/null +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ssl_misc.h @@ -0,0 +1,2983 @@ +/** + * \file ssl_misc.h + * + * \brief Internal functions shared by the SSL modules + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ +#ifndef MBEDTLS_SSL_MISC_H +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MISC_H + +#include "mbedtls/build_info.h" + +#include "mbedtls/error.h" + +#include "mbedtls/ssl.h" +#include "mbedtls/cipher.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) +#include "psa/crypto.h" +#include "psa_util_internal.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_MD5) +#include "mbedtls/md5.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1) +#include "mbedtls/sha1.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) +#include "mbedtls/sha256.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA512) +#include "mbedtls/sha512.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +#include "mbedtls/ecjpake.h" +#endif + +#include "mbedtls/pk.h" +#include "ssl_ciphersuites_internal.h" +#include "x509_internal.h" +#include "pk_internal.h" +#include "common.h" + +/* Shorthand for restartable ECC */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED) +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED +#endif + +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_INITIAL_HANDSHAKE 0 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_IN_PROGRESS 1 /* In progress */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_DONE 2 /* Done or aborted */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_PENDING 3 /* Requested (server only) */ + +/* Faked handshake message identity for HelloRetryRequest. */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_HS_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST (-MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_SERVER_HELLO) + +/* + * Internal identity of handshake extensions + */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_UNRECOGNIZED 0 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_SERVERNAME 1 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_SERVERNAME_HOSTNAME 1 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH 2 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_STATUS_REQUEST 3 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_SUPPORTED_GROUPS 4 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_SUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVES 4 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_SIG_ALG 5 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_USE_SRTP 6 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_HEARTBEAT 7 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_ALPN 8 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_SCT 9 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_CLI_CERT_TYPE 10 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_SERV_CERT_TYPE 11 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_PADDING 12 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_PRE_SHARED_KEY 13 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_EARLY_DATA 14 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS 15 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_COOKIE 16 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_PSK_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODES 17 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_CERT_AUTH 18 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_OID_FILTERS 19 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_POST_HANDSHAKE_AUTH 20 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_SIG_ALG_CERT 21 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_KEY_SHARE 22 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_TRUNCATED_HMAC 23 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_SUPPORTED_POINT_FORMATS 24 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC 25 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET 26 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_SESSION_TICKET 27 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT 28 + +/* Utility for translating IANA extension type. */ +uint32_t mbedtls_ssl_get_extension_id(unsigned int extension_type); +uint32_t mbedtls_ssl_get_extension_mask(unsigned int extension_type); +/* Macros used to define mask constants */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(id) (1ULL << (MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_##id)) +/* Reset value of extension mask */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK_NONE 0 + +/* In messages containing extension requests, we should ignore unrecognized + * extensions. In messages containing extension responses, unrecognized + * extensions should result in handshake abortion. Messages containing + * extension requests include ClientHello, CertificateRequest and + * NewSessionTicket. Messages containing extension responses include + * ServerHello, HelloRetryRequest, EncryptedExtensions and Certificate. + * + * RFC 8446 section 4.1.3 + * + * The ServerHello MUST only include extensions which are required to establish + * the cryptographic context and negotiate the protocol version. + * + * RFC 8446 section 4.2 + * + * If an implementation receives an extension which it recognizes and which is + * not specified for the message in which it appears, it MUST abort the handshake + * with an "illegal_parameter" alert. + */ + +/* Extensions that are not recognized by TLS 1.3 */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_EXT_MASK_UNRECOGNIZED \ + (MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(SUPPORTED_POINT_FORMATS) | \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) | \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET) | \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(SESSION_TICKET) | \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(TRUNCATED_HMAC) | \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(UNRECOGNIZED)) + +/* RFC 8446 section 4.2. Allowed extensions for ClientHello */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_ALLOWED_EXTS_OF_CH \ + (MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(SERVERNAME) | \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH) | \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(STATUS_REQUEST) | \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(SUPPORTED_GROUPS) | \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(SIG_ALG) | \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(USE_SRTP) | \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(HEARTBEAT) | \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(ALPN) | \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(SCT) | \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(CLI_CERT_TYPE) | \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(SERV_CERT_TYPE) | \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(PADDING) | \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(KEY_SHARE) | \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(PRE_SHARED_KEY) | \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(PSK_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODES) | \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(EARLY_DATA) | \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(COOKIE) | \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(SUPPORTED_VERSIONS) | \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(CERT_AUTH) | \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(POST_HANDSHAKE_AUTH) | \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(SIG_ALG_CERT) | \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT) | \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_EXT_MASK_UNRECOGNIZED) + +/* RFC 8446 section 4.2. Allowed extensions for EncryptedExtensions */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_ALLOWED_EXTS_OF_EE \ + (MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(SERVERNAME) | \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH) | \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(SUPPORTED_GROUPS) | \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(USE_SRTP) | \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(HEARTBEAT) | \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(ALPN) | \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(CLI_CERT_TYPE) | \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(SERV_CERT_TYPE) | \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(EARLY_DATA) | \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT)) + +/* RFC 8446 section 4.2. Allowed extensions for CertificateRequest */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_ALLOWED_EXTS_OF_CR \ + (MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(STATUS_REQUEST) | \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(SIG_ALG) | \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(SCT) | \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(CERT_AUTH) | \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(OID_FILTERS) | \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(SIG_ALG_CERT) | \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_EXT_MASK_UNRECOGNIZED) + +/* RFC 8446 section 4.2. Allowed extensions for Certificate */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_ALLOWED_EXTS_OF_CT \ + (MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(STATUS_REQUEST) | \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(SCT)) + +/* RFC 8446 section 4.2. Allowed extensions for ServerHello */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_ALLOWED_EXTS_OF_SH \ + (MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(KEY_SHARE) | \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(PRE_SHARED_KEY) | \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(SUPPORTED_VERSIONS)) + +/* RFC 8446 section 4.2. Allowed extensions for HelloRetryRequest */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_ALLOWED_EXTS_OF_HRR \ + (MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(KEY_SHARE) | \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(COOKIE) | \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(SUPPORTED_VERSIONS)) + +/* RFC 8446 section 4.2. Allowed extensions for NewSessionTicket */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_ALLOWED_EXTS_OF_NST \ + (MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(EARLY_DATA) | \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_EXT_MASK_UNRECOGNIZED) + +/* + * Helper macros for function call with return check. + */ +/* + * Exit when return non-zero value + */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(f) \ + do { \ + ret = (f); \ + if (ret != 0) \ + { \ + goto cleanup; \ + } \ + } while (0) +/* + * Exit when return negative value + */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK_NEG(f) \ + do { \ + ret = (f); \ + if (ret < 0) \ + { \ + goto cleanup; \ + } \ + } while (0) + +/* + * DTLS retransmission states, see RFC 6347 4.2.4 + * + * The SENDING state is merged in PREPARING for initial sends, + * but is distinct for resends. + * + * Note: initial state is wrong for server, but is not used anyway. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_PREPARING 0 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_SENDING 1 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_WAITING 2 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_FINISHED 3 + +/* + * Allow extra bytes for record, authentication and encryption overhead: + * counter (8) + header (5) + IV(16) + MAC (16-48) + padding (0-256). + */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) + +/* This macro determines whether CBC is supported. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC) && \ + (defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_AES) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CAMELLIA) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_ARIA)) +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_CBC +#endif + +/* This macro determines whether a ciphersuite using a + * stream cipher can be used. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER) +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_STREAM +#endif + +/* This macro determines whether the CBC construct used in TLS 1.2 is supported. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_CBC) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_TLS_CBC +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_STREAM) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_CBC) +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_MAC +#endif + +/* This macro determines whether a ciphersuite uses Encrypt-then-MAC with CBC */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_CBC) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_CBC_ETM +#endif + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_MAC) +/* Ciphersuites using HMAC */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAC_ADD 48 /* SHA-384 used for HMAC */ +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAC_ADD 32 /* SHA-256 used for HMAC */ +#else +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAC_ADD 20 /* SHA-1 used for HMAC */ +#endif +#else /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_MAC */ +/* AEAD ciphersuites: GCM and CCM use a 128 bits tag */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAC_ADD 16 +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC) +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_PADDING_ADD 256 +#else +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_PADDING_ADD 0 +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CID_EXPANSION MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_TLS1_3_PADDING_GRANULARITY +#else +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CID_EXPANSION 0 +#endif + +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_PAYLOAD_OVERHEAD (MBEDTLS_MAX_IV_LENGTH + \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAC_ADD + \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_PADDING_ADD + \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CID_EXPANSION \ + ) + +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_PAYLOAD_LEN (MBEDTLS_SSL_PAYLOAD_OVERHEAD + \ + (MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN)) + +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_PAYLOAD_LEN (MBEDTLS_SSL_PAYLOAD_OVERHEAD + \ + (MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN)) + +/* The maximum number of buffered handshake messages. */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_BUFFERED_HS 4 + +/* Maximum length we can advertise as our max content length for + RFC 6066 max_fragment_length extension negotiation purposes + (the lesser of both sizes, if they are unequal.) + */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ADV_CONTENT_LEN ( \ + (MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN > MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN) \ + ? (MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN) \ + : (MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN) \ + ) + +/* Maximum size in bytes of list in signature algorithms ext., RFC 5246/8446 */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_SIG_ALG_LIST_LEN 65534 + +/* Minimum size in bytes of list in signature algorithms ext., RFC 5246/8446 */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MIN_SIG_ALG_LIST_LEN 2 + +/* Maximum size in bytes of list in supported elliptic curve ext., RFC 4492 */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CURVE_LIST_LEN 65535 + +#define MBEDTLS_RECEIVED_SIG_ALGS_SIZE 20 + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) + +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_SIG_NONE MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_NONE + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS12_SIG_AND_HASH_ALG(sig, hash) ((hash << 8) | sig) +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS12_SIG_ALG_FROM_SIG_AND_HASH_ALG(alg) (alg & 0xFF) +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS12_HASH_ALG_FROM_SIG_AND_HASH_ALG(alg) (alg >> 8) +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */ + +/* + * Check that we obey the standard's message size bounds + */ + +#if MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN > 16384 +#error "Bad configuration - incoming record content too large." +#endif + +#if MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN > 16384 +#error "Bad configuration - outgoing record content too large." +#endif + +#if MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_PAYLOAD_LEN > MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN + 2048 +#error "Bad configuration - incoming protected record payload too large." +#endif + +#if MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_PAYLOAD_LEN > MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN + 2048 +#error "Bad configuration - outgoing protected record payload too large." +#endif + +/* Calculate buffer sizes */ + +/* Note: Even though the TLS record header is only 5 bytes + long, we're internally using 8 bytes to store the + implicit sequence number. */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_HEADER_LEN 13 + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_BUFFER_LEN \ + ((MBEDTLS_SSL_HEADER_LEN) + (MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_PAYLOAD_LEN)) +#else +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_BUFFER_LEN \ + ((MBEDTLS_SSL_HEADER_LEN) + (MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_PAYLOAD_LEN) \ + + (MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_IN_LEN_MAX)) +#endif + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_BUFFER_LEN \ + ((MBEDTLS_SSL_HEADER_LEN) + (MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_PAYLOAD_LEN)) +#else +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_BUFFER_LEN \ + ((MBEDTLS_SSL_HEADER_LEN) + (MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_PAYLOAD_LEN) \ + + (MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX)) +#endif + +#define MBEDTLS_CLIENT_HELLO_RANDOM_LEN 32 +#define MBEDTLS_SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_LEN 32 + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH) +/** + * \brief Return the maximum fragment length (payload, in bytes) for + * the output buffer. For the client, this is the configured + * value. For the server, it is the minimum of two - the + * configured value and the negotiated one. + * + * \sa mbedtls_ssl_conf_max_frag_len() + * \sa mbedtls_ssl_get_max_out_record_payload() + * + * \param ssl SSL context + * + * \return Current maximum fragment length for the output buffer. + */ +size_t mbedtls_ssl_get_output_max_frag_len(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); + +/** + * \brief Return the maximum fragment length (payload, in bytes) for + * the input buffer. This is the negotiated maximum fragment + * length, or, if there is none, MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN. + * If it is not defined either, the value is 2^14. This function + * works as its predecessor, \c mbedtls_ssl_get_max_frag_len(). + * + * \sa mbedtls_ssl_conf_max_frag_len() + * \sa mbedtls_ssl_get_max_in_record_payload() + * + * \param ssl SSL context + * + * \return Current maximum fragment length for the output buffer. + */ +size_t mbedtls_ssl_get_input_max_frag_len(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT) +/** + * \brief Get the size limit in bytes for the protected outgoing records + * as defined in RFC 8449 + * + * \param ssl SSL context + * + * \return The size limit in bytes for the protected outgoing + * records as defined in RFC 8449. + */ +size_t mbedtls_ssl_get_output_record_size_limit(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH) +static inline size_t mbedtls_ssl_get_output_buflen(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ctx) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) + return mbedtls_ssl_get_output_max_frag_len(ctx) + + MBEDTLS_SSL_HEADER_LEN + MBEDTLS_SSL_PAYLOAD_OVERHEAD + + MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX; +#else + return mbedtls_ssl_get_output_max_frag_len(ctx) + + MBEDTLS_SSL_HEADER_LEN + MBEDTLS_SSL_PAYLOAD_OVERHEAD; +#endif +} + +static inline size_t mbedtls_ssl_get_input_buflen(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ctx) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) + return mbedtls_ssl_get_input_max_frag_len(ctx) + + MBEDTLS_SSL_HEADER_LEN + MBEDTLS_SSL_PAYLOAD_OVERHEAD + + MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_IN_LEN_MAX; +#else + return mbedtls_ssl_get_input_max_frag_len(ctx) + + MBEDTLS_SSL_HEADER_LEN + MBEDTLS_SSL_PAYLOAD_OVERHEAD; +#endif +} +#endif + +/* + * TLS extension flags (for extensions with outgoing ServerHello content + * that need it (e.g. for RENEGOTIATION_INFO the server already knows because + * of state of the renegotiation flag, so no indicator is required) + */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_POINT_FORMATS_PRESENT (1 << 0) +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ECJPAKE_KKPP_OK (1 << 1) + +/** + * \brief This function checks if the remaining size in a buffer is + * greater or equal than a needed space. + * + * \param cur Pointer to the current position in the buffer. + * \param end Pointer to one past the end of the buffer. + * \param need Needed space in bytes. + * + * \return Zero if the needed space is available in the buffer, non-zero + * otherwise. + */ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS) +static inline int mbedtls_ssl_chk_buf_ptr(const uint8_t *cur, + const uint8_t *end, size_t need) +{ + return (cur > end) || (need > (size_t) (end - cur)); +} +#else +typedef struct { + const uint8_t *cur; + const uint8_t *end; + size_t need; +} mbedtls_ssl_chk_buf_ptr_args; + +void mbedtls_ssl_set_chk_buf_ptr_fail_args( + const uint8_t *cur, const uint8_t *end, size_t need); +void mbedtls_ssl_reset_chk_buf_ptr_fail_args(void); + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_cmp_chk_buf_ptr_fail_args(mbedtls_ssl_chk_buf_ptr_args *args); + +static inline int mbedtls_ssl_chk_buf_ptr(const uint8_t *cur, + const uint8_t *end, size_t need) +{ + if ((cur > end) || (need > (size_t) (end - cur))) { + mbedtls_ssl_set_chk_buf_ptr_fail_args(cur, end, need); + return 1; + } + return 0; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS */ + +/** + * \brief This macro checks if the remaining size in a buffer is + * greater or equal than a needed space. If it is not the case, + * it returns an SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL error. + * + * \param cur Pointer to the current position in the buffer. + * \param end Pointer to one past the end of the buffer. + * \param need Needed space in bytes. + * + */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR(cur, end, need) \ + do { \ + if (mbedtls_ssl_chk_buf_ptr((cur), (end), (need)) != 0) \ + { \ + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; \ + } \ + } while (0) + +/** + * \brief This macro checks if the remaining length in an input buffer is + * greater or equal than a needed length. If it is not the case, it + * returns #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR error and pends a + * #MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR alert message. + * + * This is a function-like macro. It is guaranteed to evaluate each + * argument exactly once. + * + * \param cur Pointer to the current position in the buffer. + * \param end Pointer to one past the end of the buffer. + * \param need Needed length in bytes. + * + */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(cur, end, need) \ + do { \ + if (mbedtls_ssl_chk_buf_ptr((cur), (end), (need)) != 0) \ + { \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, \ + ("missing input data in %s", __func__)); \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR, \ + MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR); \ + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; \ + } \ + } while (0) + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +typedef int mbedtls_ssl_tls_prf_cb(const unsigned char *secret, size_t slen, + const char *label, + const unsigned char *random, size_t rlen, + unsigned char *dstbuf, size_t dlen); + +/* cipher.h exports the maximum IV, key and block length from + * all ciphers enabled in the config, regardless of whether those + * ciphers are actually usable in SSL/TLS. Notably, XTS is enabled + * in the default configuration and uses 64 Byte keys, but it is + * not used for record protection in SSL/TLS. + * + * In order to prevent unnecessary inflation of key structures, + * we introduce SSL-specific variants of the max-{key,block,IV} + * macros here which are meant to only take those ciphers into + * account which can be negotiated in SSL/TLS. + * + * Since the current definitions of MBEDTLS_MAX_{KEY|BLOCK|IV}_LENGTH + * in cipher.h are rough overapproximations of the real maxima, here + * we content ourselves with replicating those overapproximations + * for the maximum block and IV length, and excluding XTS from the + * computation of the maximum key length. */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH 16 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_IV_LENGTH 16 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_KEY_LENGTH 32 + +/** + * \brief The data structure holding the cryptographic material (key and IV) + * used for record protection in TLS 1.3. + */ +struct mbedtls_ssl_key_set { + /*! The key for client->server records. */ + unsigned char client_write_key[MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_KEY_LENGTH]; + /*! The key for server->client records. */ + unsigned char server_write_key[MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_KEY_LENGTH]; + /*! The IV for client->server records. */ + unsigned char client_write_iv[MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_IV_LENGTH]; + /*! The IV for server->client records. */ + unsigned char server_write_iv[MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_IV_LENGTH]; + + size_t key_len; /*!< The length of client_write_key and + * server_write_key, in Bytes. */ + size_t iv_len; /*!< The length of client_write_iv and + * server_write_iv, in Bytes. */ +}; +typedef struct mbedtls_ssl_key_set mbedtls_ssl_key_set; + +typedef struct { + unsigned char binder_key[MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_MD_MAX_SIZE]; + unsigned char client_early_traffic_secret[MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_MD_MAX_SIZE]; + unsigned char early_exporter_master_secret[MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_MD_MAX_SIZE]; +} mbedtls_ssl_tls13_early_secrets; + +typedef struct { + unsigned char client_handshake_traffic_secret[MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_MD_MAX_SIZE]; + unsigned char server_handshake_traffic_secret[MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_MD_MAX_SIZE]; +} mbedtls_ssl_tls13_handshake_secrets; + +/* + * This structure contains the parameters only needed during handshake. + */ +struct mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params { + /* Frequently-used boolean or byte fields (placed early to take + * advantage of smaller code size for indirect access on Arm Thumb) */ + uint8_t resume; /*!< session resume indicator*/ + uint8_t cli_exts; /*!< client extension presence*/ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) + uint8_t sni_authmode; /*!< authmode from SNI callback */ +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) + /* Flag indicating if a CertificateRequest message has been sent + * to the client or not. */ + uint8_t certificate_request_sent; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) + /* Flag indicating if the server has accepted early data or not. */ + uint8_t early_data_accepted; +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) + uint8_t new_session_ticket; /*!< use NewSessionTicket? */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) + /** Minimum TLS version to be negotiated. + * + * It is set up in the ClientHello writing preparation stage and used + * throughout the ClientHello writing. Not relevant anymore as soon as + * the protocol version has been negotiated thus as soon as the + * ServerHello is received. + * For a fresh handshake not linked to any previous handshake, it is + * equal to the configured minimum minor version to be negotiated. When + * renegotiating or resuming a session, it is equal to the previously + * negotiated minor version. + * + * There is no maximum TLS version field in this handshake context. + * From the start of the handshake, we need to define a current protocol + * version for the record layer which we define as the maximum TLS + * version to be negotiated. The `tls_version` field of the SSL context is + * used to store this maximum value until it contains the actual + * negotiated value. + */ + mbedtls_ssl_protocol_version min_tls_version; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET) + uint8_t extended_ms; /*!< use Extended Master Secret? */ +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE) + uint8_t async_in_progress; /*!< an asynchronous operation is in progress */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + unsigned char retransmit_state; /*!< Retransmission state */ +#endif + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) + unsigned char group_list_heap_allocated; + unsigned char sig_algs_heap_allocated; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED) + uint8_t ecrs_enabled; /*!< Handshake supports EC restart? */ + enum { /* this complements ssl->state with info on intra-state operations */ + ssl_ecrs_none = 0, /*!< nothing going on (yet) */ + ssl_ecrs_crt_verify, /*!< Certificate: crt_verify() */ + ssl_ecrs_ske_start_processing, /*!< ServerKeyExchange: pk_verify() */ + ssl_ecrs_cke_ecdh_calc_secret, /*!< ClientKeyExchange: ECDH step 2 */ + ssl_ecrs_crt_vrfy_sign, /*!< CertificateVerify: pk_sign() */ + } ecrs_state; /*!< current (or last) operation */ + mbedtls_x509_crt *ecrs_peer_cert; /*!< The peer's CRT chain. */ + size_t ecrs_n; /*!< place for saving a length */ +#endif + + mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t const *ciphersuite_info; + + MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL + int (*update_checksum)(mbedtls_ssl_context *, const unsigned char *, size_t); + MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL + int (*calc_verify)(const mbedtls_ssl_context *, unsigned char *, size_t *); + MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL + int (*calc_finished)(mbedtls_ssl_context *, unsigned char *, int); + mbedtls_ssl_tls_prf_cb *tls_prf; + + /* + * Handshake specific crypto variables + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) + uint8_t key_exchange_mode; /*!< Selected key exchange mode */ + + /** + * Flag indicating if, in the course of the current handshake, an + * HelloRetryRequest message has been sent by the server or received by + * the client (<> 0) or not (0). + */ + uint8_t hello_retry_request_flag; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE) + /** + * Flag indicating if, in the course of the current handshake, a dummy + * change_cipher_spec (CCS) record has already been sent. Used to send only + * one CCS per handshake while not complicating the handshake state + * transitions for that purpose. + */ + uint8_t ccs_sent; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED) + uint8_t tls13_kex_modes; /*!< Key exchange modes supported by the client */ +#endif + /** selected_group of key_share extension in HelloRetryRequest message. */ + uint16_t hrr_selected_group; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) + uint16_t new_session_tickets_count; /*!< number of session tickets */ +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) + uint16_t received_sig_algs[MBEDTLS_RECEIVED_SIG_ALGS_SIZE]; +#endif + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) + const uint16_t *group_list; + const uint16_t *sig_algs; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_C) + mbedtls_dhm_context dhm_ctx; /*!< DHM key exchange */ +#endif + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDH_OR_ECDHE_1_2_ENABLED) + mbedtls_ecdh_context ecdh_ctx; /*!< ECDH key exchange */ +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO && + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDH_OR_ECDHE_1_2_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_XXDH_PSA_ANY_ENABLED) + psa_key_type_t xxdh_psa_type; + size_t xxdh_psa_bits; + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t xxdh_psa_privkey; + uint8_t xxdh_psa_privkey_is_external; + unsigned char xxdh_psa_peerkey[PSA_EXPORT_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE]; + size_t xxdh_psa_peerkey_len; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_XXDH_PSA_ANY_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + psa_pake_operation_t psa_pake_ctx; /*!< EC J-PAKE key exchange */ + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t psa_pake_password; + uint8_t psa_pake_ctx_is_ok; +#else + mbedtls_ecjpake_context ecjpake_ctx; /*!< EC J-PAKE key exchange */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) + unsigned char *ecjpake_cache; /*!< Cache for ClientHello ext */ + size_t ecjpake_cache_len; /*!< Length of cached data */ +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDH_OR_ECDHE_ANY_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDSA_CERT_REQ_ANY_ALLOWED_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) + uint16_t *curves_tls_id; /*!< List of TLS IDs of supported elliptic curves */ +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_PSK_ENABLED) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t psk_opaque; /*!< Opaque PSK from the callback */ + uint8_t psk_opaque_is_internal; +#else + unsigned char *psk; /*!< PSK from the callback */ + size_t psk_len; /*!< Length of PSK from callback */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + uint16_t selected_identity; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_PSK_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED) + mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_ctx ecrs_ctx; /*!< restart context */ +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) + mbedtls_ssl_key_cert *key_cert; /*!< chosen key/cert pair (server) */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) + mbedtls_ssl_key_cert *sni_key_cert; /*!< key/cert list from SNI */ + mbedtls_x509_crt *sni_ca_chain; /*!< trusted CAs from SNI callback */ + mbedtls_x509_crl *sni_ca_crl; /*!< trusted CAs CRLs from SNI */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) + mbedtls_pk_context peer_pubkey; /*!< The public key from the peer. */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C && !MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ + + struct { + size_t total_bytes_buffered; /*!< Cumulative size of heap allocated + * buffers used for message buffering. */ + + uint8_t seen_ccs; /*!< Indicates if a CCS message has + * been seen in the current flight. */ + + struct mbedtls_ssl_hs_buffer { + unsigned is_valid : 1; + unsigned is_fragmented : 1; + unsigned is_complete : 1; + unsigned char *data; + size_t data_len; + } hs[MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_BUFFERED_HS]; + + struct { + unsigned char *data; + size_t len; + unsigned epoch; + } future_record; + + } buffering; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) && \ + (defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3)) + unsigned char *cookie; /*!< HelloVerifyRequest cookie for DTLS + * HelloRetryRequest cookie for TLS 1.3 */ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) + /* RFC 6347 page 15 + ... + opaque cookie<0..2^8-1>; + ... + */ + uint8_t cookie_len; +#else + /* RFC 8446 page 39 + ... + opaque cookie<0..2^16-1>; + ... + If TLS1_3 is enabled, the max length is 2^16 - 1 + */ + uint16_t cookie_len; /*!< DTLS: HelloVerifyRequest cookie length + * TLS1_3: HelloRetryRequest cookie length */ +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C && + ( MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS || + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 ) */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + unsigned char cookie_verify_result; /*!< Srv: flag for sending a cookie */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C && MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + unsigned int out_msg_seq; /*!< Outgoing handshake sequence number */ + unsigned int in_msg_seq; /*!< Incoming handshake sequence number */ + + uint32_t retransmit_timeout; /*!< Current value of timeout */ + mbedtls_ssl_flight_item *flight; /*!< Current outgoing flight */ + mbedtls_ssl_flight_item *cur_msg; /*!< Current message in flight */ + unsigned char *cur_msg_p; /*!< Position in current message */ + unsigned int in_flight_start_seq; /*!< Minimum message sequence in the + flight being received */ + mbedtls_ssl_transform *alt_transform_out; /*!< Alternative transform for + resending messages */ + unsigned char alt_out_ctr[MBEDTLS_SSL_SEQUENCE_NUMBER_LEN]; /*!< Alternative record epoch/counter + for resending messages */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) + /* The state of CID configuration in this handshake. */ + + uint8_t cid_in_use; /*!< This indicates whether the use of the CID extension + * has been negotiated. Possible values are + * #MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_ENABLED and + * #MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_DISABLED. */ + unsigned char peer_cid[MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX]; /*! The peer's CID */ + uint8_t peer_cid_len; /*!< The length of + * \c peer_cid. */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ + + uint16_t mtu; /*!< Handshake mtu, used to fragment outgoing messages */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ + + /* + * Checksum contexts + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + psa_hash_operation_t fin_sha256_psa; +#else + mbedtls_md_context_t fin_sha256; +#endif +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + psa_hash_operation_t fin_sha384_psa; +#else + mbedtls_md_context_t fin_sha384; +#endif +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) + uint16_t offered_group_id; /* The NamedGroup value for the group + * that is being used for ephemeral + * key exchange. + * + * On the client: Defaults to the first + * entry in the client's group list, + * but can be overwritten by the HRR. */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) + uint8_t client_auth; /*!< used to check if CertificateRequest has been + received from server side. If CertificateRequest + has been received, Certificate and CertificateVerify + should be sent to server */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */ + /* + * State-local variables used during the processing + * of a specific handshake state. + */ + union { + /* Outgoing Finished message */ + struct { + uint8_t preparation_done; + + /* Buffer holding digest of the handshake up to + * but excluding the outgoing finished message. */ + unsigned char digest[MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_MD_MAX_SIZE]; + size_t digest_len; + } finished_out; + + /* Incoming Finished message */ + struct { + uint8_t preparation_done; + + /* Buffer holding digest of the handshake up to but + * excluding the peer's incoming finished message. */ + unsigned char digest[MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_MD_MAX_SIZE]; + size_t digest_len; + } finished_in; + + } state_local; + + /* End of state-local variables. */ + + unsigned char randbytes[MBEDTLS_CLIENT_HELLO_RANDOM_LEN + + MBEDTLS_SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_LEN]; + /*!< random bytes */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) + unsigned char premaster[MBEDTLS_PREMASTER_SIZE]; + /*!< premaster secret */ + size_t pmslen; /*!< premaster length */ +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) + uint32_t sent_extensions; /*!< extensions sent by endpoint */ + uint32_t received_extensions; /*!< extensions received by endpoint */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) + unsigned char certificate_request_context_len; + unsigned char *certificate_request_context; +#endif + + /** TLS 1.3 transform for encrypted handshake messages. */ + mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform_handshake; + union { + unsigned char early[MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_MD_MAX_SIZE]; + unsigned char handshake[MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_MD_MAX_SIZE]; + unsigned char app[MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_MD_MAX_SIZE]; + } tls13_master_secrets; + + mbedtls_ssl_tls13_handshake_secrets tls13_hs_secrets; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) + /** TLS 1.3 transform for early data and handshake messages. */ + mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform_earlydata; +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE) + /** Asynchronous operation context. This field is meant for use by the + * asynchronous operation callbacks (mbedtls_ssl_config::f_async_sign_start, + * mbedtls_ssl_config::f_async_decrypt_start, + * mbedtls_ssl_config::f_async_resume, mbedtls_ssl_config::f_async_cancel). + * The library does not use it internally. */ + void *user_async_ctx; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) + const unsigned char *sni_name; /*!< raw SNI */ + size_t sni_name_len; /*!< raw SNI len */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED) + const mbedtls_x509_crt *dn_hints; /*!< acceptable client cert issuers */ +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION */ +}; + +typedef struct mbedtls_ssl_hs_buffer mbedtls_ssl_hs_buffer; + +/* + * Representation of decryption/encryption transformations on records + * + * There are the following general types of record transformations: + * - Stream transformations (TLS versions == 1.2 only) + * Transformation adding a MAC and applying a stream-cipher + * to the authenticated message. + * - CBC block cipher transformations ([D]TLS versions == 1.2 only) + * For TLS 1.2, no IV is generated at key extraction time, but every + * encrypted record is explicitly prefixed by the IV with which it was + * encrypted. + * - AEAD transformations ([D]TLS versions == 1.2 only) + * These come in two fundamentally different versions, the first one + * used in TLS 1.2, excluding ChaChaPoly ciphersuites, and the second + * one used for ChaChaPoly ciphersuites in TLS 1.2 as well as for TLS 1.3. + * In the first transformation, the IV to be used for a record is obtained + * as the concatenation of an explicit, static 4-byte IV and the 8-byte + * record sequence number, and explicitly prepending this sequence number + * to the encrypted record. In contrast, in the second transformation + * the IV is obtained by XOR'ing a static IV obtained at key extraction + * time with the 8-byte record sequence number, without prepending the + * latter to the encrypted record. + * + * Additionally, DTLS 1.2 + CID as well as TLS 1.3 use an inner plaintext + * which allows to add flexible length padding and to hide a record's true + * content type. + * + * In addition to type and version, the following parameters are relevant: + * - The symmetric cipher algorithm to be used. + * - The (static) encryption/decryption keys for the cipher. + * - For stream/CBC, the type of message digest to be used. + * - For stream/CBC, (static) encryption/decryption keys for the digest. + * - For AEAD transformations, the size (potentially 0) of an explicit, + * random initialization vector placed in encrypted records. + * - For some transformations (currently AEAD) an implicit IV. It is static + * and (if present) is combined with the explicit IV in a transformation- + * -dependent way (e.g. appending in TLS 1.2 and XOR'ing in TLS 1.3). + * - For stream/CBC, a flag determining the order of encryption and MAC. + * - The details of the transformation depend on the SSL/TLS version. + * - The length of the authentication tag. + * + * The struct below refines this abstract view as follows: + * - The cipher underlying the transformation is managed in + * cipher contexts cipher_ctx_{enc/dec}, which must have the + * same cipher type. The mode of these cipher contexts determines + * the type of the transformation in the sense above: e.g., if + * the type is MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC resp. MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_GCM + * then the transformation has type CBC resp. AEAD. + * - The cipher keys are never stored explicitly but + * are maintained within cipher_ctx_{enc/dec}. + * - For stream/CBC transformations, the message digest contexts + * used for the MAC's are stored in md_ctx_{enc/dec}. These contexts + * are unused for AEAD transformations. + * - For stream/CBC transformations, the MAC keys are not stored explicitly + * but maintained within md_ctx_{enc/dec}. + * - The mac_enc and mac_dec fields are unused for EAD transformations. + * - For transformations using an implicit IV maintained within + * the transformation context, its contents are stored within + * iv_{enc/dec}. + * - The value of ivlen indicates the length of the IV. + * This is redundant in case of stream/CBC transformations + * which always use 0 resp. the cipher's block length as the + * IV length, but is needed for AEAD ciphers and may be + * different from the underlying cipher's block length + * in this case. + * - The field fixed_ivlen is nonzero for AEAD transformations only + * and indicates the length of the static part of the IV which is + * constant throughout the communication, and which is stored in + * the first fixed_ivlen bytes of the iv_{enc/dec} arrays. + * - tls_version denotes the 2-byte TLS version + * - For stream/CBC transformations, maclen denotes the length of the + * authentication tag, while taglen is unused and 0. + * - For AEAD transformations, taglen denotes the length of the + * authentication tag, while maclen is unused and 0. + * - For CBC transformations, encrypt_then_mac determines the + * order of encryption and authentication. This field is unused + * in other transformations. + * + */ +struct mbedtls_ssl_transform { + /* + * Session specific crypto layer + */ + size_t minlen; /*!< min. ciphertext length */ + size_t ivlen; /*!< IV length */ + size_t fixed_ivlen; /*!< Fixed part of IV (AEAD) */ + size_t maclen; /*!< MAC(CBC) len */ + size_t taglen; /*!< TAG(AEAD) len */ + + unsigned char iv_enc[16]; /*!< IV (encryption) */ + unsigned char iv_dec[16]; /*!< IV (decryption) */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_MAC) + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t psa_mac_enc; /*!< MAC (encryption) */ + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t psa_mac_dec; /*!< MAC (decryption) */ + psa_algorithm_t psa_mac_alg; /*!< psa MAC algorithm */ +#else + mbedtls_md_context_t md_ctx_enc; /*!< MAC (encryption) */ + mbedtls_md_context_t md_ctx_dec; /*!< MAC (decryption) */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) + int encrypt_then_mac; /*!< flag for EtM activation */ +#endif + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_MAC */ + + mbedtls_ssl_protocol_version tls_version; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t psa_key_enc; /*!< psa encryption key */ + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t psa_key_dec; /*!< psa decryption key */ + psa_algorithm_t psa_alg; /*!< psa algorithm */ +#else + mbedtls_cipher_context_t cipher_ctx_enc; /*!< encryption context */ + mbedtls_cipher_context_t cipher_ctx_dec; /*!< decryption context */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) + uint8_t in_cid_len; + uint8_t out_cid_len; + unsigned char in_cid[MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_IN_LEN_MAX]; + unsigned char out_cid[MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX]; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CONTEXT_SERIALIZATION) + /* We need the Hello random bytes in order to re-derive keys from the + * Master Secret and other session info, + * see ssl_tls12_populate_transform() */ + unsigned char randbytes[MBEDTLS_SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_LEN + + MBEDTLS_CLIENT_HELLO_RANDOM_LEN]; + /*!< ServerHello.random+ClientHello.random */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CONTEXT_SERIALIZATION */ +}; + +/* + * Return 1 if the transform uses an AEAD cipher, 0 otherwise. + * Equivalently, return 0 if a separate MAC is used, 1 otherwise. + */ +static inline int mbedtls_ssl_transform_uses_aead( + const mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_MAC) + return transform->maclen == 0 && transform->taglen != 0; +#else + (void) transform; + return 1; +#endif +} + +/* + * Internal representation of record frames + * + * Instances come in two flavors: + * (1) Encrypted + * These always have data_offset = 0 + * (2) Unencrypted + * These have data_offset set to the amount of + * pre-expansion during record protection. Concretely, + * this is the length of the fixed part of the explicit IV + * used for encryption, or 0 if no explicit IV is used + * (e.g. for stream ciphers). + * + * The reason for the data_offset in the unencrypted case + * is to allow for in-place conversion of an unencrypted to + * an encrypted record. If the offset wasn't included, the + * encrypted content would need to be shifted afterwards to + * make space for the fixed IV. + * + */ +#if MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX > MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_IN_LEN_MAX +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_LEN_MAX MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX +#else +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_LEN_MAX MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_IN_LEN_MAX +#endif + +typedef struct { + uint8_t ctr[MBEDTLS_SSL_SEQUENCE_NUMBER_LEN]; /* In TLS: The implicit record sequence number. + * In DTLS: The 2-byte epoch followed by + * the 6-byte sequence number. + * This is stored as a raw big endian byte array + * as opposed to a uint64_t because we rarely + * need to perform arithmetic on this, but do + * need it as a Byte array for the purpose of + * MAC computations. */ + uint8_t type; /* The record content type. */ + uint8_t ver[2]; /* SSL/TLS version as present on the wire. + * Convert to internal presentation of versions + * using mbedtls_ssl_read_version() and + * mbedtls_ssl_write_version(). + * Keep wire-format for MAC computations. */ + + unsigned char *buf; /* Memory buffer enclosing the record content */ + size_t buf_len; /* Buffer length */ + size_t data_offset; /* Offset of record content */ + size_t data_len; /* Length of record content */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) + uint8_t cid_len; /* Length of the CID (0 if not present) */ + unsigned char cid[MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_LEN_MAX]; /* The CID */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ +} mbedtls_record; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) +/* + * List of certificate + private key pairs + */ +struct mbedtls_ssl_key_cert { + mbedtls_x509_crt *cert; /*!< cert */ + mbedtls_pk_context *key; /*!< private key */ + mbedtls_ssl_key_cert *next; /*!< next key/cert pair */ +}; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) +/* + * List of handshake messages kept around for resending + */ +struct mbedtls_ssl_flight_item { + unsigned char *p; /*!< message, including handshake headers */ + size_t len; /*!< length of p */ + unsigned char type; /*!< type of the message: handshake or CCS */ + mbedtls_ssl_flight_item *next; /*!< next handshake message(s) */ +}; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) +/** + * \brief Given an SSL context and its associated configuration, write the TLS + * 1.2 specific extensions of the ClientHello message. + * + * \param[in] ssl SSL context + * \param[in] buf Base address of the buffer where to write the extensions + * \param[in] end End address of the buffer where to write the extensions + * \param uses_ec Whether one proposed ciphersuite uses an elliptic curve + * (<> 0) or not ( 0 ). + * \param[out] out_len Length of the data written into the buffer \p buf + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_tls12_write_client_hello_exts(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *buf, + const unsigned char *end, + int uses_ec, + size_t *out_len); +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) + +/** + * \brief Find the preferred hash for a given signature algorithm. + * + * \param[in] ssl SSL context + * \param[in] sig_alg A signature algorithm identifier as defined in the + * TLS 1.2 SignatureAlgorithm enumeration. + * + * \return The preferred hash algorithm for \p sig_alg. It is a hash algorithm + * identifier as defined in the TLS 1.2 HashAlgorithm enumeration. + */ +unsigned int mbedtls_ssl_tls12_get_preferred_hash_for_sig_alg( + mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned int sig_alg); + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 && + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */ + +/** + * \brief Free referenced items in an SSL transform context and clear + * memory + * + * \param transform SSL transform context + */ +void mbedtls_ssl_transform_free(mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform); + +/** + * \brief Free referenced items in an SSL handshake context and clear + * memory + * + * \param ssl SSL context + */ +void mbedtls_ssl_handshake_free(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); + +/* set inbound transform of ssl context */ +void mbedtls_ssl_set_inbound_transform(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform); + +/* set outbound transform of ssl context */ +void mbedtls_ssl_set_outbound_transform(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform); + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_handshake_client_step(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_handshake_server_step(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); +void mbedtls_ssl_handshake_wrapup(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); +static inline void mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + mbedtls_ssl_states state) +{ + ssl->state = (int) state; +} + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_send_fatal_handshake_failure(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_reset_checksum(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_derive_keys(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_handle_message_type(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_prepare_handshake_record(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_update_handshake_status(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); + +/** + * \brief Update record layer + * + * This function roughly separates the implementation + * of the logic of (D)TLS from the implementation + * of the secure transport. + * + * \param ssl The SSL context to use. + * \param update_hs_digest This indicates if the handshake digest + * should be automatically updated in case + * a handshake message is found. + * + * \return 0 or non-zero error code. + * + * \note A clarification on what is called 'record layer' here + * is in order, as many sensible definitions are possible: + * + * The record layer takes as input an untrusted underlying + * transport (stream or datagram) and transforms it into + * a serially multiplexed, secure transport, which + * conceptually provides the following: + * + * (1) Three datagram based, content-agnostic transports + * for handshake, alert and CCS messages. + * (2) One stream- or datagram-based transport + * for application data. + * (3) Functionality for changing the underlying transform + * securing the contents. + * + * The interface to this functionality is given as follows: + * + * a Updating + * [Currently implemented by mbedtls_ssl_read_record] + * + * Check if and on which of the four 'ports' data is pending: + * Nothing, a controlling datagram of type (1), or application + * data (2). In any case data is present, internal buffers + * provide access to the data for the user to process it. + * Consumption of type (1) datagrams is done automatically + * on the next update, invalidating that the internal buffers + * for previous datagrams, while consumption of application + * data (2) is user-controlled. + * + * b Reading of application data + * [Currently manual adaption of ssl->in_offt pointer] + * + * As mentioned in the last paragraph, consumption of data + * is different from the automatic consumption of control + * datagrams (1) because application data is treated as a stream. + * + * c Tracking availability of application data + * [Currently manually through decreasing ssl->in_msglen] + * + * For efficiency and to retain datagram semantics for + * application data in case of DTLS, the record layer + * provides functionality for checking how much application + * data is still available in the internal buffer. + * + * d Changing the transformation securing the communication. + * + * Given an opaque implementation of the record layer in the + * above sense, it should be possible to implement the logic + * of (D)TLS on top of it without the need to know anything + * about the record layer's internals. This is done e.g. + * in all the handshake handling functions, and in the + * application data reading function mbedtls_ssl_read. + * + * \note The above tries to give a conceptual picture of the + * record layer, but the current implementation deviates + * from it in some places. For example, our implementation of + * the update functionality through mbedtls_ssl_read_record + * discards datagrams depending on the current state, which + * wouldn't fall under the record layer's responsibility + * following the above definition. + * + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_read_record(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned update_hs_digest); +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_fetch_input(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, size_t nb_want); + +/* + * Write handshake message header + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_start_handshake_msg(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char hs_type, + unsigned char **buf, size_t *buf_len); + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + int update_checksum, + int force_flush); +static inline int mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + return mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg_ext(ssl, 1 /* update checksum */, 1 /* force flush */); +} + +/* + * Write handshake message tail + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_finish_handshake_msg(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + size_t buf_len, size_t msg_len); + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_write_record(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int force_flush); +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_flush_output(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_parse_certificate(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_write_certificate(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_parse_change_cipher_spec(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_write_change_cipher_spec(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_parse_finished(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_write_finished(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); + +void mbedtls_ssl_optimize_checksum(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info); + +/* + * Update checksum of handshake messages. + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_add_hs_msg_to_checksum(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned hs_type, + unsigned char const *msg, + size_t msg_len); + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_add_hs_hdr_to_checksum(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned hs_type, + size_t total_hs_len); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_psk_derive_premaster(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + mbedtls_key_exchange_type_t key_ex); +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_PSK_ENABLED) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_conf_has_static_psk(mbedtls_ssl_config const *conf); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +/** + * Get the first defined opaque PSK by order of precedence: + * 1. handshake PSK set by \c mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_psk_opaque() in the PSK + * callback + * 2. static PSK configured by \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk_opaque() + * Return an opaque PSK + */ +static inline mbedtls_svc_key_id_t mbedtls_ssl_get_opaque_psk( + const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + if (!mbedtls_svc_key_id_is_null(ssl->handshake->psk_opaque)) { + return ssl->handshake->psk_opaque; + } + + if (!mbedtls_svc_key_id_is_null(ssl->conf->psk_opaque)) { + return ssl->conf->psk_opaque; + } + + return MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; +} +#else +/** + * Get the first defined PSK by order of precedence: + * 1. handshake PSK set by \c mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_psk() in the PSK callback + * 2. static PSK configured by \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk() + * Return a code and update the pair (PSK, PSK length) passed to this function + */ +static inline int mbedtls_ssl_get_psk(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char **psk, size_t *psk_len) +{ + if (ssl->handshake->psk != NULL && ssl->handshake->psk_len > 0) { + *psk = ssl->handshake->psk; + *psk_len = ssl->handshake->psk_len; + } else if (ssl->conf->psk != NULL && ssl->conf->psk_len > 0) { + *psk = ssl->conf->psk; + *psk_len = ssl->conf->psk_len; + } else { + *psk = NULL; + *psk_len = 0; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PRIVATE_KEY_REQUIRED; + } + + return 0; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_PSK_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_C) +unsigned char mbedtls_ssl_sig_from_pk(mbedtls_pk_context *pk); +unsigned char mbedtls_ssl_sig_from_pk_alg(mbedtls_pk_type_t type); +mbedtls_pk_type_t mbedtls_ssl_pk_alg_from_sig(unsigned char sig); +#endif + +mbedtls_md_type_t mbedtls_ssl_md_alg_from_hash(unsigned char hash); +unsigned char mbedtls_ssl_hash_from_md_alg(int md); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_set_calc_verify_md(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int md); +#endif + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_check_curve_tls_id(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, uint16_t tls_id); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_check_curve(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS */ + +/** + * \brief Return PSA EC info for the specified TLS ID. + * + * \param tls_id The TLS ID to look for + * \param type If the TLD ID is supported, then proper \c psa_key_type_t + * value is returned here. Can be NULL. + * \param bits If the TLD ID is supported, then proper bit size is returned + * here. Can be NULL. + * \return PSA_SUCCESS if the TLS ID is supported, + * PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED otherwise + * + * \note If either \c family or \c bits parameters are NULL, then + * the corresponding value is not returned. + * The function can be called with both parameters as NULL + * simply to check if a specific TLS ID is supported. + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_get_psa_curve_info_from_tls_id(uint16_t tls_id, + psa_key_type_t *type, + size_t *bits); + +/** + * \brief Return \c mbedtls_ecp_group_id for the specified TLS ID. + * + * \param tls_id The TLS ID to look for + * \return Proper \c mbedtls_ecp_group_id if the TLS ID is supported, + * or MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE otherwise + */ +mbedtls_ecp_group_id mbedtls_ssl_get_ecp_group_id_from_tls_id(uint16_t tls_id); + +/** + * \brief Return TLS ID for the specified \c mbedtls_ecp_group_id. + * + * \param grp_id The \c mbedtls_ecp_group_id ID to look for + * \return Proper TLS ID if the \c mbedtls_ecp_group_id is supported, + * or 0 otherwise + */ +uint16_t mbedtls_ssl_get_tls_id_from_ecp_group_id(mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C) +/** + * \brief Return EC's name for the specified TLS ID. + * + * \param tls_id The TLS ID to look for + * \return A pointer to a const string with the proper name. If TLS + * ID is not supported, a NULL pointer is returned instead. + */ +const char *mbedtls_ssl_get_curve_name_from_tls_id(uint16_t tls_id); +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP) +static inline mbedtls_ssl_srtp_profile mbedtls_ssl_check_srtp_profile_value + (const uint16_t srtp_profile_value) +{ + switch (srtp_profile_value) { + case MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_AES128_CM_HMAC_SHA1_80: + case MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_AES128_CM_HMAC_SHA1_32: + case MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_NULL_HMAC_SHA1_80: + case MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_NULL_HMAC_SHA1_32: + return srtp_profile_value; + default: break; + } + return MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_UNSET; +} +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) +static inline mbedtls_pk_context *mbedtls_ssl_own_key(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + mbedtls_ssl_key_cert *key_cert; + + if (ssl->handshake != NULL && ssl->handshake->key_cert != NULL) { + key_cert = ssl->handshake->key_cert; + } else { + key_cert = ssl->conf->key_cert; + } + + return key_cert == NULL ? NULL : key_cert->key; +} + +static inline mbedtls_x509_crt *mbedtls_ssl_own_cert(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + mbedtls_ssl_key_cert *key_cert; + + if (ssl->handshake != NULL && ssl->handshake->key_cert != NULL) { + key_cert = ssl->handshake->key_cert; + } else { + key_cert = ssl->conf->key_cert; + } + + return key_cert == NULL ? NULL : key_cert->cert; +} + +/* + * Check usage of a certificate wrt extensions: + * keyUsage, extendedKeyUsage (later), and nSCertType (later). + * + * Warning: cert_endpoint is the endpoint of the cert (ie, of our peer when we + * check a cert we received from them)! + * + * Return 0 if everything is OK, -1 if not. + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_check_cert_usage(const mbedtls_x509_crt *cert, + const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite, + int cert_endpoint, + uint32_t *flags); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ + +void mbedtls_ssl_write_version(unsigned char version[2], int transport, + mbedtls_ssl_protocol_version tls_version); +uint16_t mbedtls_ssl_read_version(const unsigned char version[2], + int transport); + +static inline size_t mbedtls_ssl_in_hdr_len(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + ((void) ssl); +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM) { + return 13; + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ + { + return 5; + } +} + +static inline size_t mbedtls_ssl_out_hdr_len(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + return (size_t) (ssl->out_iv - ssl->out_hdr); +} + +static inline size_t mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM) { + return 12; + } +#else + ((void) ssl); +#endif + return 4; +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) +void mbedtls_ssl_send_flight_completed(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); +void mbedtls_ssl_recv_flight_completed(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_resend(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_flight_transmit(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); +#endif + +/* Visible for testing purposes only */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_dtls_replay_check(mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl); +void mbedtls_ssl_dtls_replay_update(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); +#endif + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_session_copy(mbedtls_ssl_session *dst, + const mbedtls_ssl_session *src); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) +/* The hash buffer must have at least MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE bytes of length. */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_get_key_exchange_md_tls1_2(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *hash, size_t *hashlen, + unsigned char *data, size_t data_len, + mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +void mbedtls_ssl_transform_init(mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform); +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_encrypt_buf(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform, + mbedtls_record *rec, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng); +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_decrypt_buf(mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl, + mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform, + mbedtls_record *rec); + +/* Length of the "epoch" field in the record header */ +static inline size_t mbedtls_ssl_ep_len(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM) { + return 2; + } +#else + ((void) ssl); +#endif + return 0; +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_resend_hello_request(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ + +void mbedtls_ssl_set_timer(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, uint32_t millisecs); +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_check_timer(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); + +void mbedtls_ssl_reset_in_out_pointers(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); +void mbedtls_ssl_update_out_pointers(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform); +void mbedtls_ssl_update_in_pointers(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_session_reset_int(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int partial); +void mbedtls_ssl_session_reset_msg_layer(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + int partial); + +/* + * Send pending alert + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_handle_pending_alert(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); + +/* + * Set pending fatal alert flag. + */ +void mbedtls_ssl_pend_fatal_alert(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char alert_type, + int alert_reason); + +/* Alias of mbedtls_ssl_pend_fatal_alert */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT(type, user_return_value) \ + mbedtls_ssl_pend_fatal_alert(ssl, type, user_return_value) + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY) +void mbedtls_ssl_dtls_replay_reset(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); +#endif + +void mbedtls_ssl_handshake_wrapup_free_hs_transform(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_start_renegotiation(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) +size_t mbedtls_ssl_get_current_mtu(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); +void mbedtls_ssl_buffering_free(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); +void mbedtls_ssl_flight_free(mbedtls_ssl_flight_item *flight); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ + +/** + * ssl utils functions for checking configuration. + */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) +static inline int mbedtls_ssl_conf_is_tls13_only(const mbedtls_ssl_config *conf) +{ + return conf->min_tls_version == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_3 && + conf->max_tls_version == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_3; +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) +static inline int mbedtls_ssl_conf_is_tls12_only(const mbedtls_ssl_config *conf) +{ + return conf->min_tls_version == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 && + conf->max_tls_version == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2; +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ + +static inline int mbedtls_ssl_conf_is_tls13_enabled(const mbedtls_ssl_config *conf) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) + return conf->min_tls_version <= MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_3 && + conf->max_tls_version >= MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_3; +#else + ((void) conf); + return 0; +#endif +} + +static inline int mbedtls_ssl_conf_is_tls12_enabled(const mbedtls_ssl_config *conf) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) + return conf->min_tls_version <= MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 && + conf->max_tls_version >= MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2; +#else + ((void) conf); + return 0; +#endif +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) +static inline int mbedtls_ssl_conf_is_hybrid_tls12_tls13(const mbedtls_ssl_config *conf) +{ + return conf->min_tls_version == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 && + conf->max_tls_version == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_3; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 && MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) +extern const uint8_t mbedtls_ssl_tls13_hello_retry_request_magic[ + MBEDTLS_SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_LEN]; +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_process_finished_message(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_write_finished_message(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); +void mbedtls_ssl_tls13_handshake_wrapup(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); + +/** + * \brief Given an SSL context and its associated configuration, write the TLS + * 1.3 specific extensions of the ClientHello message. + * + * \param[in] ssl SSL context + * \param[in] buf Base address of the buffer where to write the extensions + * \param[in] end End address of the buffer where to write the extensions + * \param[out] out_len Length of the data written into the buffer \p buf + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_write_client_hello_exts(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *buf, + unsigned char *end, + size_t *out_len); + +/** + * \brief TLS 1.3 client side state machine entry + * + * \param ssl SSL context + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_handshake_client_step(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); + +/** + * \brief TLS 1.3 server side state machine entry + * + * \param ssl SSL context + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_handshake_server_step(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); + + +/* + * Helper functions around key exchange modes. + */ +static inline int mbedtls_ssl_conf_tls13_is_kex_mode_enabled(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + int kex_mode_mask) +{ + return (ssl->conf->tls13_kex_modes & kex_mode_mask) != 0; +} + +static inline int mbedtls_ssl_conf_tls13_is_psk_enabled(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + return mbedtls_ssl_conf_tls13_is_kex_mode_enabled(ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK); +} + +static inline int mbedtls_ssl_conf_tls13_is_psk_ephemeral_enabled(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + return mbedtls_ssl_conf_tls13_is_kex_mode_enabled(ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_EPHEMERAL); +} + +static inline int mbedtls_ssl_conf_tls13_is_ephemeral_enabled(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + return mbedtls_ssl_conf_tls13_is_kex_mode_enabled(ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL); +} + +static inline int mbedtls_ssl_conf_tls13_is_some_ephemeral_enabled(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + return mbedtls_ssl_conf_tls13_is_kex_mode_enabled(ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ALL); +} + +static inline int mbedtls_ssl_conf_tls13_is_some_psk_enabled(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + return mbedtls_ssl_conf_tls13_is_kex_mode_enabled(ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_ALL); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED) +/** + * Given a list of key exchange modes, check if at least one of them is + * supported by peer. + * + * \param[in] ssl SSL context + * \param kex_modes_mask Mask of the key exchange modes to check + * + * \return Non-zero if at least one of the key exchange modes is supported by + * the peer, otherwise \c 0. + */ +static inline int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_is_kex_mode_supported(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + int kex_modes_mask) +{ + return (ssl->handshake->tls13_kex_modes & kex_modes_mask) != 0; +} + +static inline int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_is_psk_supported(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + return mbedtls_ssl_tls13_is_kex_mode_supported(ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK); +} + +static inline int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_is_psk_ephemeral_supported( + mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + return mbedtls_ssl_tls13_is_kex_mode_supported(ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_EPHEMERAL); +} + +static inline int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_is_ephemeral_supported(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + return mbedtls_ssl_tls13_is_kex_mode_supported(ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL); +} + +static inline int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_is_some_ephemeral_supported(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + return mbedtls_ssl_tls13_is_kex_mode_supported(ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ALL); +} + +static inline int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_is_some_psk_supported(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + return mbedtls_ssl_tls13_is_kex_mode_supported(ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_ALL); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C && + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED */ + +/* + * Helper functions for extensions checking. + */ + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_check_received_extension( + mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + int hs_msg_type, + unsigned int received_extension_type, + uint32_t hs_msg_allowed_extensions_mask); + +static inline void mbedtls_ssl_tls13_set_hs_sent_ext_mask( + mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned int extension_type) +{ + ssl->handshake->sent_extensions |= + mbedtls_ssl_get_extension_mask(extension_type); +} + +/* + * Helper functions to check the selected key exchange mode. + */ +static inline int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_key_exchange_mode_check( + mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int kex_mask) +{ + return (ssl->handshake->key_exchange_mode & kex_mask) != 0; +} + +static inline int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_key_exchange_mode_with_psk( + mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + return mbedtls_ssl_tls13_key_exchange_mode_check(ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_ALL); +} + +static inline int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_key_exchange_mode_with_ephemeral( + mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + return mbedtls_ssl_tls13_key_exchange_mode_check(ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ALL); +} + +/* + * Fetch TLS 1.3 handshake message header + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_fetch_handshake_msg(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned hs_type, + unsigned char **buf, + size_t *buf_len); + +/** + * \brief Detect if a list of extensions contains a supported_versions + * extension or not. + * + * \param[in] ssl SSL context + * \param[in] buf Address of the first byte of the extensions vector. + * \param[in] end End of the buffer containing the list of extensions. + * \param[out] supported_versions_data If the extension is present, address of + * its first byte of data, NULL otherwise. + * \param[out] supported_versions_data_end If the extension is present, address + * of the first byte immediately + * following the extension data, NULL + * otherwise. + * \return 0 if the list of extensions does not contain a supported_versions + * extension. + * \return 1 if the list of extensions contains a supported_versions + * extension. + * \return A negative value if an error occurred while parsing the + * extensions. + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_is_supported_versions_ext_present_in_exts( + mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *buf, const unsigned char *end, + const unsigned char **supported_versions_data, + const unsigned char **supported_versions_data_end); + +/* + * Handler of TLS 1.3 server certificate message + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_process_certificate(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED) +/* + * Handler of TLS 1.3 write Certificate message + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_write_certificate(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); + +/* + * Handler of TLS 1.3 write Certificate Verify message + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_write_certificate_verify(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED */ + +/* + * Generic handler of Certificate Verify + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_process_certificate_verify(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); + +/* + * Write of dummy-CCS's for middlebox compatibility + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_write_change_cipher_spec(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_reset_transcript_for_hrr(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH) || defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_generate_and_write_xxdh_key_exchange( + mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + uint16_t named_group, + unsigned char *buf, + unsigned char *end, + size_t *out_len); +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH || PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) +int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_write_early_data_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + int in_new_session_ticket, + unsigned char *buf, + const unsigned char *end, + size_t *out_len); + +int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_check_early_data_len(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + size_t early_data_len); + +typedef enum { +/* + * The client has not sent the first ClientHello yet, the negotiation of early + * data has not started yet. + */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATE_IDLE, + +/* + * In its ClientHello, the client has not included an early data indication + * extension. + */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATE_NO_IND_SENT, + +/* + * The client has sent an early data indication extension in its first + * ClientHello, it has not received the response (ServerHello or + * HelloRetryRequest) from the server yet. The transform to protect early data + * is not set either as for middlebox compatibility a dummy CCS may have to be + * sent in clear. Early data cannot be sent to the server yet. + */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATE_IND_SENT, + +/* + * The client has sent an early data indication extension in its first + * ClientHello, it has not received the response (ServerHello or + * HelloRetryRequest) from the server yet. The transform to protect early data + * has been set and early data can be written now. + */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATE_CAN_WRITE, + +/* + * The client has indicated the use of early data and the server has accepted + * it. + */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATE_ACCEPTED, + +/* + * The client has indicated the use of early data but the server has rejected + * it. + */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATE_REJECTED, + +/* + * The client has sent an early data indication extension in its first + * ClientHello, the server has accepted them and the client has received the + * server Finished message. It cannot send early data to the server anymore. + */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATE_SERVER_FINISHED_RECEIVED, + +} mbedtls_ssl_early_data_state; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) +/* + * Write Signature Algorithm extension + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_write_sig_alg_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char *buf, + const unsigned char *end, size_t *out_len); +/* + * Parse TLS Signature Algorithm extension + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_parse_sig_alg_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *buf, + const unsigned char *end); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */ + +/* Get handshake transcript */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_get_handshake_transcript(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const mbedtls_md_type_t md, + unsigned char *dst, + size_t dst_len, + size_t *olen); + +/* + * Return supported groups. + * + * In future, invocations can be changed to ssl->conf->group_list + * when mbedtls_ssl_conf_curves() is deleted. + * + * ssl->handshake->group_list is either a translation of curve_list to IANA TLS group + * identifiers when mbedtls_ssl_conf_curves() has been used, or a pointer to + * ssl->conf->group_list when mbedtls_ssl_conf_groups() has been more recently invoked. + * + */ +static inline const void *mbedtls_ssl_get_groups(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + #if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) || !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) + return ssl->conf->group_list; + #else + if ((ssl->handshake != NULL) && (ssl->handshake->group_list != NULL)) { + return ssl->handshake->group_list; + } else { + return ssl->conf->group_list; + } + #endif +} + +/* + * Helper functions for NamedGroup. + */ +static inline int mbedtls_ssl_tls12_named_group_is_ecdhe(uint16_t named_group) +{ + /* + * RFC 8422 section 5.1.1 + */ + return named_group == MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_X25519 || + named_group == MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_BP256R1 || + named_group == MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_BP384R1 || + named_group == MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_BP512R1 || + named_group == MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_X448 || + /* Below deprecated curves should be removed with notice to users */ + named_group == MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_SECP192K1 || + named_group == MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_SECP192R1 || + named_group == MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_SECP224K1 || + named_group == MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_SECP224R1 || + named_group == MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_SECP256K1 || + named_group == MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_SECP256R1 || + named_group == MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_SECP384R1 || + named_group == MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_SECP521R1; +} + +static inline int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_named_group_is_ecdhe(uint16_t named_group) +{ + return named_group == MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_X25519 || + named_group == MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_SECP256R1 || + named_group == MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_SECP384R1 || + named_group == MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_SECP521R1 || + named_group == MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_X448; +} + +static inline int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_named_group_is_ffdh(uint16_t named_group) +{ + return named_group >= MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_FFDHE2048 && + named_group <= MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_FFDHE8192; +} + +static inline int mbedtls_ssl_named_group_is_offered( + const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, uint16_t named_group) +{ + const uint16_t *group_list = mbedtls_ssl_get_groups(ssl); + + if (group_list == NULL) { + return 0; + } + + for (; *group_list != 0; group_list++) { + if (*group_list == named_group) { + return 1; + } + } + + return 0; +} + +static inline int mbedtls_ssl_named_group_is_supported(uint16_t named_group) +{ +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH) + if (mbedtls_ssl_tls13_named_group_is_ecdhe(named_group)) { + if (mbedtls_ssl_get_ecp_group_id_from_tls_id(named_group) != + MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE) { + return 1; + } + } +#endif +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH) + if (mbedtls_ssl_tls13_named_group_is_ffdh(named_group)) { + return 1; + } +#endif +#if !defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH) && !defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH) + (void) named_group; +#endif + return 0; +} + +/* + * Return supported signature algorithms. + * + * In future, invocations can be changed to ssl->conf->sig_algs when + * mbedtls_ssl_conf_sig_hashes() is deleted. + * + * ssl->handshake->sig_algs is either a translation of sig_hashes to IANA TLS + * signature algorithm identifiers when mbedtls_ssl_conf_sig_hashes() has been + * used, or a pointer to ssl->conf->sig_algs when mbedtls_ssl_conf_sig_algs() has + * been more recently invoked. + * + */ +static inline const void *mbedtls_ssl_get_sig_algs( + const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) + if (ssl->handshake != NULL && + ssl->handshake->sig_algs_heap_allocated == 1 && + ssl->handshake->sig_algs != NULL) { + return ssl->handshake->sig_algs; + } +#endif + return ssl->conf->sig_algs; + +#else /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */ + + ((void) ssl); + return NULL; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */ +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED) +static inline int mbedtls_ssl_sig_alg_is_received(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + uint16_t own_sig_alg) +{ + const uint16_t *sig_alg = ssl->handshake->received_sig_algs; + if (sig_alg == NULL) { + return 0; + } + + for (; *sig_alg != MBEDTLS_TLS_SIG_NONE; sig_alg++) { + if (*sig_alg == own_sig_alg) { + return 1; + } + } + return 0; +} + +static inline int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_sig_alg_for_cert_verify_is_supported( + const uint16_t sig_alg) +{ + switch (sig_alg) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SOME) +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256) && defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256) + case MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_ECDSA_SECP256R1_SHA256: + break; +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256 && MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED */ +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384) && defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_384) + case MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_ECDSA_SECP384R1_SHA384: + break; +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384 && MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED */ +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512) && defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_521) + case MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_ECDSA_SECP521R1_SHA512: + break; +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512 && MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SOME */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21) +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256) + case MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PSS_RSAE_SHA256: + break; +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256 */ +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384) + case MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PSS_RSAE_SHA384: + break; +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384 */ +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512) + case MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PSS_RSAE_SHA512: + break; +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512 */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21 */ + default: + return 0; + } + return 1; + +} + +static inline int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_sig_alg_is_supported( + const uint16_t sig_alg) +{ + switch (sig_alg) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) + case MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PKCS1_SHA256: + break; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) + case MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PKCS1_SHA384: + break; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA512) + case MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PKCS1_SHA512: + break; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA512 */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 */ + default: + return mbedtls_ssl_tls13_sig_alg_for_cert_verify_is_supported( + sig_alg); + } + return 1; +} + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_check_sig_alg_cert_key_match(uint16_t sig_alg, + mbedtls_pk_context *key); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) +static inline int mbedtls_ssl_sig_alg_is_offered(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + uint16_t proposed_sig_alg) +{ + const uint16_t *sig_alg = mbedtls_ssl_get_sig_algs(ssl); + if (sig_alg == NULL) { + return 0; + } + + for (; *sig_alg != MBEDTLS_TLS_SIG_NONE; sig_alg++) { + if (*sig_alg == proposed_sig_alg) { + return 1; + } + } + return 0; +} + +static inline int mbedtls_ssl_get_pk_type_and_md_alg_from_sig_alg( + uint16_t sig_alg, mbedtls_pk_type_t *pk_type, mbedtls_md_type_t *md_alg) +{ + *pk_type = mbedtls_ssl_pk_alg_from_sig(sig_alg & 0xff); + *md_alg = mbedtls_ssl_md_alg_from_hash((sig_alg >> 8) & 0xff); + + if (*pk_type != MBEDTLS_PK_NONE && *md_alg != MBEDTLS_MD_NONE) { + return 0; + } + + switch (sig_alg) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) + case MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PSS_RSAE_SHA256: + *md_alg = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256; + *pk_type = MBEDTLS_PK_RSASSA_PSS; + break; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) + case MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PSS_RSAE_SHA384: + *md_alg = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384; + *pk_type = MBEDTLS_PK_RSASSA_PSS; + break; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA512) + case MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PSS_RSAE_SHA512: + *md_alg = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512; + *pk_type = MBEDTLS_PK_RSASSA_PSS; + break; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA512 */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21 */ + default: + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + } + return 0; +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) +static inline int mbedtls_ssl_tls12_sig_alg_is_supported( + const uint16_t sig_alg) +{ + /* High byte is hash */ + unsigned char hash = MBEDTLS_BYTE_1(sig_alg); + unsigned char sig = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(sig_alg); + + switch (hash) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_MD5) + case MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_MD5: + break; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1) + case MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA1: + break; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA224) + case MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA224: + break; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) + case MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA256: + break; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) + case MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA384: + break; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA512) + case MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA512: + break; +#endif + + default: + return 0; + } + + switch (sig) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) + case MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_RSA: + break; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDSA_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED) + case MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_ECDSA: + break; +#endif + + default: + return 0; + } + + return 1; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ + +static inline int mbedtls_ssl_sig_alg_is_supported( + const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const uint16_t sig_alg) +{ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) + if (ssl->tls_version == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2) { + return mbedtls_ssl_tls12_sig_alg_is_supported(sig_alg); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED) + if (ssl->tls_version == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_3) { + return mbedtls_ssl_tls13_sig_alg_is_supported(sig_alg); + } +#endif + ((void) ssl); + ((void) sig_alg); + return 0; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) +/* Corresponding PSA algorithm for MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL. + * Same value is used for PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_CIPHER, hence it is + * guaranteed to not be a valid PSA algorithm identifier. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_NULL_CIPHER 0x04000000 + +/** + * \brief Translate mbedtls cipher type/taglen pair to psa: + * algorithm, key type and key size. + * + * \param mbedtls_cipher_type [in] given mbedtls cipher type + * \param taglen [in] given tag length + * 0 - default tag length + * \param alg [out] corresponding PSA alg + * There is no corresponding PSA + * alg for MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL, so + * in this case MBEDTLS_SSL_NULL_CIPHER + * is returned via this parameter + * \param key_type [out] corresponding PSA key type + * \param key_size [out] corresponding PSA key size + * + * \return PSA_SUCCESS on success or PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED if + * conversion is not supported. + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_ssl_cipher_to_psa(mbedtls_cipher_type_t mbedtls_cipher_type, + size_t taglen, + psa_algorithm_t *alg, + psa_key_type_t *key_type, + size_t *key_size); + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) +/** + * \brief Convert given PSA status to mbedtls error code. + * + * \param status [in] given PSA status + * + * \return corresponding mbedtls error code + */ +static inline MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED int psa_ssl_status_to_mbedtls(psa_status_t status) +{ + switch (status) { + case PSA_SUCCESS: + return 0; + case PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY: + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED; + case PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED: + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + case PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE: + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC; + case PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT: + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + case PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE: + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + case PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL: + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + default: + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_HW_ACCEL_FAILED; + } +} +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO || MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + +typedef enum { + MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_ROUND_ONE, + MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_ROUND_TWO +} mbedtls_ecjpake_rounds_t; + +/** + * \brief Parse the provided input buffer for getting the first round + * of key exchange. This code is common between server and client + * + * \param pake_ctx [in] the PAKE's operation/context structure + * \param buf [in] input buffer to parse + * \param len [in] length of the input buffer + * \param round [in] either MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_ROUND_ONE or + * MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_ROUND_TWO + * + * \return 0 on success or a negative error code in case of failure + */ +int mbedtls_psa_ecjpake_read_round( + psa_pake_operation_t *pake_ctx, + const unsigned char *buf, + size_t len, mbedtls_ecjpake_rounds_t round); + +/** + * \brief Write the first round of key exchange into the provided output + * buffer. This code is common between server and client + * + * \param pake_ctx [in] the PAKE's operation/context structure + * \param buf [out] the output buffer in which data will be written to + * \param len [in] length of the output buffer + * \param olen [out] the length of the data really written on the buffer + * \param round [in] either MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_ROUND_ONE or + * MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_ROUND_TWO + * + * \return 0 on success or a negative error code in case of failure + */ +int mbedtls_psa_ecjpake_write_round( + psa_pake_operation_t *pake_ctx, + unsigned char *buf, + size_t len, size_t *olen, + mbedtls_ecjpake_rounds_t round); + +#endif //MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED && MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO + +/** + * \brief TLS record protection modes + */ +typedef enum { + MBEDTLS_SSL_MODE_STREAM = 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MODE_CBC, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MODE_CBC_ETM, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MODE_AEAD +} mbedtls_ssl_mode_t; + +mbedtls_ssl_mode_t mbedtls_ssl_get_mode_from_transform( + const mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_CBC_ETM) +mbedtls_ssl_mode_t mbedtls_ssl_get_mode_from_ciphersuite( + int encrypt_then_mac, + const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *suite); +#else +mbedtls_ssl_mode_t mbedtls_ssl_get_mode_from_ciphersuite( + const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *suite); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_CBC_ETM */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH) || defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH) + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_read_public_xxdhe_share(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *buf, + size_t buf_len); + +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH || PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH */ + +static inline int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_cipher_suite_is_offered( + mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int cipher_suite) +{ + const int *ciphersuite_list = ssl->conf->ciphersuite_list; + + /* Check whether we have offered this ciphersuite */ + for (size_t i = 0; ciphersuite_list[i] != 0; i++) { + if (ciphersuite_list[i] == cipher_suite) { + return 1; + } + } + return 0; +} + +/** + * \brief Validate cipher suite against config in SSL context. + * + * \param ssl SSL context + * \param suite_info Cipher suite to validate + * \param min_tls_version Minimal TLS version to accept a cipher suite + * \param max_tls_version Maximal TLS version to accept a cipher suite + * + * \return 0 if valid, negative value otherwise. + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_validate_ciphersuite( + const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *suite_info, + mbedtls_ssl_protocol_version min_tls_version, + mbedtls_ssl_protocol_version max_tls_version); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_parse_server_name_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *buf, + const unsigned char *end); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT) +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT_EXTENSION_DATA_LENGTH (2) +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT_MIN (64) /* As defined in RFC 8449 */ + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_parse_record_size_limit_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *buf, + const unsigned char *end); + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_write_record_size_limit_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *buf, + const unsigned char *end, + size_t *out_len); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_parse_alpn_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *buf, + const unsigned char *end); + + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_write_alpn_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *buf, + unsigned char *end, + size_t *out_len); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS) +int mbedtls_ssl_check_dtls_clihlo_cookie( + mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *cli_id, size_t cli_id_len, + const unsigned char *in, size_t in_len, + unsigned char *obuf, size_t buf_len, size_t *olen); +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED) +/** + * \brief Given an SSL context and its associated configuration, write the TLS + * 1.3 specific Pre-Shared key extension. + * + * \param[in] ssl SSL context + * \param[in] buf Base address of the buffer where to write the extension + * \param[in] end End address of the buffer where to write the extension + * \param[out] out_len Length in bytes of the Pre-Shared key extension: data + * written into the buffer \p buf by this function plus + * the length of the binders to be written. + * \param[out] binders_len Length of the binders to be written at the end of + * the extension. + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_write_identities_of_pre_shared_key_ext( + mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *buf, unsigned char *end, + size_t *out_len, size_t *binders_len); + +/** + * \brief Given an SSL context and its associated configuration, write the TLS + * 1.3 specific Pre-Shared key extension binders at the end of the + * ClientHello. + * + * \param[in] ssl SSL context + * \param[in] buf Base address of the buffer where to write the binders + * \param[in] end End address of the buffer where to write the binders + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_write_binders_of_pre_shared_key_ext( + mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *buf, unsigned char *end); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_session_set_hostname(mbedtls_ssl_session *session, + const char *hostname); +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_session_set_ticket_alpn(mbedtls_ssl_session *session, + const char *alpn); +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) + +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_MAX_ALLOWED_TICKET_LIFETIME (604800) + +static inline unsigned int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_session_get_ticket_flags( + mbedtls_ssl_session *session, unsigned int flags) +{ + return session->ticket_flags & + (flags & MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_TICKET_FLAGS_MASK); +} + +/** + * Check if at least one of the given flags is set in + * the session ticket. See the definition of + * `MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_TICKET_FLAGS_MASK` to get all + * permitted flags. + */ +static inline int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_session_ticket_has_flags( + mbedtls_ssl_session *session, unsigned int flags) +{ + return mbedtls_ssl_tls13_session_get_ticket_flags(session, flags) != 0; +} + +static inline int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_session_ticket_allow_psk( + mbedtls_ssl_session *session) +{ + return mbedtls_ssl_tls13_session_ticket_has_flags( + session, MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_TICKET_ALLOW_PSK_RESUMPTION); +} + +static inline int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_session_ticket_allow_psk_ephemeral( + mbedtls_ssl_session *session) +{ + return mbedtls_ssl_tls13_session_ticket_has_flags( + session, MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_TICKET_ALLOW_PSK_EPHEMERAL_RESUMPTION); +} + +static inline unsigned int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_session_ticket_allow_early_data( + mbedtls_ssl_session *session) +{ + return mbedtls_ssl_tls13_session_ticket_has_flags( + session, MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_TICKET_ALLOW_EARLY_DATA); +} + +static inline void mbedtls_ssl_tls13_session_set_ticket_flags( + mbedtls_ssl_session *session, unsigned int flags) +{ + session->ticket_flags |= (flags & MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_TICKET_FLAGS_MASK); +} + +static inline void mbedtls_ssl_tls13_session_clear_ticket_flags( + mbedtls_ssl_session *session, unsigned int flags) +{ + session->ticket_flags &= ~(flags & MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_TICKET_FLAGS_MASK); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 && MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) +int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_finalize_client_hello(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_MAC) + +/** Compute the HMAC of variable-length data with constant flow. + * + * This function computes the HMAC of the concatenation of \p add_data and \p + * data, and does with a code flow and memory access pattern that does not + * depend on \p data_len_secret, but only on \p min_data_len and \p + * max_data_len. In particular, this function always reads exactly \p + * max_data_len bytes from \p data. + * + * \param ctx The HMAC context. It must have keys configured + * with mbedtls_md_hmac_starts() and use one of the + * following hashes: SHA-384, SHA-256, SHA-1 or MD-5. + * It is reset using mbedtls_md_hmac_reset() after + * the computation is complete to prepare for the + * next computation. + * \param add_data The first part of the message whose HMAC is being + * calculated. This must point to a readable buffer + * of \p add_data_len bytes. + * \param add_data_len The length of \p add_data in bytes. + * \param data The buffer containing the second part of the + * message. This must point to a readable buffer + * of \p max_data_len bytes. + * \param data_len_secret The length of the data to process in \p data. + * This must be no less than \p min_data_len and no + * greater than \p max_data_len. + * \param min_data_len The minimal length of the second part of the + * message, read from \p data. + * \param max_data_len The maximal length of the second part of the + * message, read from \p data. + * \param output The HMAC will be written here. This must point to + * a writable buffer of sufficient size to hold the + * HMAC value. + * + * \retval 0 on success. + * \retval #MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_HW_ACCEL_FAILED + * The hardware accelerator failed. + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +int mbedtls_ct_hmac(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + psa_algorithm_t mac_alg, + const unsigned char *add_data, + size_t add_data_len, + const unsigned char *data, + size_t data_len_secret, + size_t min_data_len, + size_t max_data_len, + unsigned char *output); +#else +int mbedtls_ct_hmac(mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx, + const unsigned char *add_data, + size_t add_data_len, + const unsigned char *data, + size_t data_len_secret, + size_t min_data_len, + size_t max_data_len, + unsigned char *output); +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_MAC) */ + +#endif /* ssl_misc.h */ diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ssl_msg.c b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ssl_msg.c index 5e8567959317..b07cd96f1bcf 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ssl_msg.c +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ssl_msg.c @@ -6,10 +6,6 @@ * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later */ /* - * The SSL 3.0 specification was drafted by Netscape in 1996, - * and became an IETF standard in 1999. - * - * http://wp.netscape.com/eng/ssl3/ * http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2246.txt * http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc4346.txt */ @@ -21,8 +17,8 @@ #include "mbedtls/platform.h" #include "mbedtls/ssl.h" -#include "mbedtls/ssl_internal.h" -#include "mbedtls/debug.h" +#include "ssl_misc.h" +#include "debug_internal.h" #include "mbedtls/error.h" #include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" #include "mbedtls/version.h" @@ -32,7 +28,7 @@ #include #if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) -#include "mbedtls/psa_util.h" +#include "psa_util_internal.h" #include "psa/crypto.h" #endif @@ -40,6 +36,246 @@ #include "mbedtls/oid.h" #endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +/* Define a local translating function to save code size by not using too many + * arguments in each translating place. */ +static int local_err_translation(psa_status_t status) +{ + return psa_status_to_mbedtls(status, psa_to_ssl_errors, + ARRAY_LENGTH(psa_to_ssl_errors), + psa_generic_status_to_mbedtls); +} +#define PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status) local_err_translation(status) +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_MAC) + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384) +#define MAX_HASH_BLOCK_LENGTH PSA_HASH_BLOCK_LENGTH(PSA_ALG_SHA_384) +#elif defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256) +#define MAX_HASH_BLOCK_LENGTH PSA_HASH_BLOCK_LENGTH(PSA_ALG_SHA_256) +#else /* See check_config.h */ +#define MAX_HASH_BLOCK_LENGTH PSA_HASH_BLOCK_LENGTH(PSA_ALG_SHA_1) +#endif + +MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE +int mbedtls_ct_hmac(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + psa_algorithm_t mac_alg, + const unsigned char *add_data, + size_t add_data_len, + const unsigned char *data, + size_t data_len_secret, + size_t min_data_len, + size_t max_data_len, + unsigned char *output) +{ + /* + * This function breaks the HMAC abstraction and uses psa_hash_clone() + * extension in order to get constant-flow behaviour. + * + * HMAC(msg) is defined as HASH(okey + HASH(ikey + msg)) where + means + * concatenation, and okey/ikey are the XOR of the key with some fixed bit + * patterns (see RFC 2104, sec. 2). + * + * We'll first compute ikey/okey, then inner_hash = HASH(ikey + msg) by + * hashing up to minlen, then cloning the context, and for each byte up + * to maxlen finishing up the hash computation, keeping only the + * correct result. + * + * Then we only need to compute HASH(okey + inner_hash) and we're done. + */ + psa_algorithm_t hash_alg = PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(mac_alg); + const size_t block_size = PSA_HASH_BLOCK_LENGTH(hash_alg); + unsigned char key_buf[MAX_HASH_BLOCK_LENGTH]; + const size_t hash_size = PSA_HASH_LENGTH(hash_alg); + psa_hash_operation_t operation = PSA_HASH_OPERATION_INIT; + size_t hash_length; + + unsigned char aux_out[PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE]; + psa_hash_operation_t aux_operation = PSA_HASH_OPERATION_INIT; + size_t offset; + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + size_t mac_key_length; + size_t i; + +#define PSA_CHK(func_call) \ + do { \ + status = (func_call); \ + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) \ + goto cleanup; \ + } while (0) + + /* Export MAC key + * We assume key length is always exactly the output size + * which is never more than the block size, thus we use block_size + * as the key buffer size. + */ + PSA_CHK(psa_export_key(key, key_buf, block_size, &mac_key_length)); + + /* Calculate ikey */ + for (i = 0; i < mac_key_length; i++) { + key_buf[i] = (unsigned char) (key_buf[i] ^ 0x36); + } + for (; i < block_size; ++i) { + key_buf[i] = 0x36; + } + + PSA_CHK(psa_hash_setup(&operation, hash_alg)); + + /* Now compute inner_hash = HASH(ikey + msg) */ + PSA_CHK(psa_hash_update(&operation, key_buf, block_size)); + PSA_CHK(psa_hash_update(&operation, add_data, add_data_len)); + PSA_CHK(psa_hash_update(&operation, data, min_data_len)); + + /* Fill the hash buffer in advance with something that is + * not a valid hash (barring an attack on the hash and + * deliberately-crafted input), in case the caller doesn't + * check the return status properly. */ + memset(output, '!', hash_size); + + /* For each possible length, compute the hash up to that point */ + for (offset = min_data_len; offset <= max_data_len; offset++) { + PSA_CHK(psa_hash_clone(&operation, &aux_operation)); + PSA_CHK(psa_hash_finish(&aux_operation, aux_out, + PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE, &hash_length)); + /* Keep only the correct inner_hash in the output buffer */ + mbedtls_ct_memcpy_if(mbedtls_ct_uint_eq(offset, data_len_secret), + output, aux_out, NULL, hash_size); + + if (offset < max_data_len) { + PSA_CHK(psa_hash_update(&operation, data + offset, 1)); + } + } + + /* Abort current operation to prepare for final operation */ + PSA_CHK(psa_hash_abort(&operation)); + + /* Calculate okey */ + for (i = 0; i < mac_key_length; i++) { + key_buf[i] = (unsigned char) ((key_buf[i] ^ 0x36) ^ 0x5C); + } + for (; i < block_size; ++i) { + key_buf[i] = 0x5C; + } + + /* Now compute HASH(okey + inner_hash) */ + PSA_CHK(psa_hash_setup(&operation, hash_alg)); + PSA_CHK(psa_hash_update(&operation, key_buf, block_size)); + PSA_CHK(psa_hash_update(&operation, output, hash_size)); + PSA_CHK(psa_hash_finish(&operation, output, hash_size, &hash_length)); + +#undef PSA_CHK + +cleanup: + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(key_buf, MAX_HASH_BLOCK_LENGTH); + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(aux_out, PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE); + + psa_hash_abort(&operation); + psa_hash_abort(&aux_operation); + return PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); +} + +#undef MAX_HASH_BLOCK_LENGTH + +#else +MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE +int mbedtls_ct_hmac(mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx, + const unsigned char *add_data, + size_t add_data_len, + const unsigned char *data, + size_t data_len_secret, + size_t min_data_len, + size_t max_data_len, + unsigned char *output) +{ + /* + * This function breaks the HMAC abstraction and uses the md_clone() + * extension to the MD API in order to get constant-flow behaviour. + * + * HMAC(msg) is defined as HASH(okey + HASH(ikey + msg)) where + means + * concatenation, and okey/ikey are the XOR of the key with some fixed bit + * patterns (see RFC 2104, sec. 2), which are stored in ctx->hmac_ctx. + * + * We'll first compute inner_hash = HASH(ikey + msg) by hashing up to + * minlen, then cloning the context, and for each byte up to maxlen + * finishing up the hash computation, keeping only the correct result. + * + * Then we only need to compute HASH(okey + inner_hash) and we're done. + */ + const mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg = mbedtls_md_get_type(ctx->md_info); + /* TLS 1.2 only supports SHA-384, SHA-256, SHA-1, MD-5, + * all of which have the same block size except SHA-384. */ + const size_t block_size = md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384 ? 128 : 64; + const unsigned char * const ikey = ctx->hmac_ctx; + const unsigned char * const okey = ikey + block_size; + const size_t hash_size = mbedtls_md_get_size(ctx->md_info); + + unsigned char aux_out[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE]; + mbedtls_md_context_t aux; + size_t offset; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + mbedtls_md_init(&aux); + +#define MD_CHK(func_call) \ + do { \ + ret = (func_call); \ + if (ret != 0) \ + goto cleanup; \ + } while (0) + + MD_CHK(mbedtls_md_setup(&aux, ctx->md_info, 0)); + + /* After hmac_start() of hmac_reset(), ikey has already been hashed, + * so we can start directly with the message */ + MD_CHK(mbedtls_md_update(ctx, add_data, add_data_len)); + MD_CHK(mbedtls_md_update(ctx, data, min_data_len)); + + /* Fill the hash buffer in advance with something that is + * not a valid hash (barring an attack on the hash and + * deliberately-crafted input), in case the caller doesn't + * check the return status properly. */ + memset(output, '!', hash_size); + + /* For each possible length, compute the hash up to that point */ + for (offset = min_data_len; offset <= max_data_len; offset++) { + MD_CHK(mbedtls_md_clone(&aux, ctx)); + MD_CHK(mbedtls_md_finish(&aux, aux_out)); + /* Keep only the correct inner_hash in the output buffer */ + mbedtls_ct_memcpy_if(mbedtls_ct_uint_eq(offset, data_len_secret), + output, aux_out, NULL, hash_size); + + if (offset < max_data_len) { + MD_CHK(mbedtls_md_update(ctx, data + offset, 1)); + } + } + + /* The context needs to finish() before it starts() again */ + MD_CHK(mbedtls_md_finish(ctx, aux_out)); + + /* Now compute HASH(okey + inner_hash) */ + MD_CHK(mbedtls_md_starts(ctx)); + MD_CHK(mbedtls_md_update(ctx, okey, block_size)); + MD_CHK(mbedtls_md_update(ctx, output, hash_size)); + MD_CHK(mbedtls_md_finish(ctx, output)); + + /* Done, get ready for next time */ + MD_CHK(mbedtls_md_hmac_reset(ctx)); + +#undef MD_CHK + +cleanup: + mbedtls_md_free(&aux); + return ret; +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_MAC */ + static uint32_t ssl_get_hs_total_len(mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl); /* @@ -73,7 +309,6 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_check_timer(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) return 0; } -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_CHECKING) MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL static int ssl_parse_record_header(mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl, unsigned char *buf, @@ -89,9 +324,7 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_check_record(mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "record buffer", buf, buflen); /* We don't support record checking in TLS because - * (a) there doesn't seem to be a usecase for it, and - * (b) In SSLv3 and TLS 1.0, CBC record decryption has state - * and we'd need to backup the transform here. + * there doesn't seem to be a usecase for it. */ if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_STREAM) { ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; @@ -132,7 +365,6 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_check_record(mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("<= mbedtls_ssl_check_record")); return ret; } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_CHECKING */ #define SSL_DONT_FORCE_FLUSH 0 #define SSL_FORCE_FLUSH 1 @@ -288,27 +520,11 @@ static void ssl_reset_retransmit_timeout(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) } #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL) -int (*mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_init)(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - const unsigned char *key_enc, const unsigned char *key_dec, - size_t keylen, - const unsigned char *iv_enc, const unsigned char *iv_dec, - size_t ivlen, - const unsigned char *mac_enc, const unsigned char *mac_dec, - size_t maclen) = NULL; -int (*mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_activate)(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int direction) = NULL; -int (*mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_reset)(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) = NULL; -int (*mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_write)(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) = NULL; -int (*mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_read)(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) = NULL; -int (*mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_finish)(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) = NULL; -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL */ - /* * Encryption/decryption functions */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) static size_t ssl_compute_padding_length(size_t len, size_t granularity) @@ -394,162 +610,248 @@ static int ssl_parse_inner_plaintext(unsigned char const *content, return 0; } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID || - MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID || MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 */ -/* `add_data` must have size 13 Bytes if the CID extension is disabled, - * and 13 + 1 + CID-length Bytes if the CID extension is enabled. */ +/* The size of the `add_data` structure depends on various + * factors, namely + * + * 1) CID functionality disabled + * + * additional_data = + * 8: seq_num + + * 1: type + + * 2: version + + * 2: length of inner plaintext + + * + * size = 13 bytes + * + * 2) CID functionality based on RFC 9146 enabled + * + * size = 8 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 2 + 2 + 6 + 2 + CID-length + * = 23 + CID-length + * + * 3) CID functionality based on legacy CID version + according to draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-05 + * https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-05 + * + * size = 13 + 1 + CID-length + * + * More information about the CID usage: + * + * Per Section 5.3 of draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-05 the + * size of the additional data structure is calculated as: + * + * additional_data = + * 8: seq_num + + * 1: tls12_cid + + * 2: DTLSCipherText.version + + * n: cid + + * 1: cid_length + + * 2: length_of_DTLSInnerPlaintext + * + * Per RFC 9146 the size of the add_data structure is calculated as: + * + * additional_data = + * 8: seq_num_placeholder + + * 1: tls12_cid + + * 1: cid_length + + * 1: tls12_cid + + * 2: DTLSCiphertext.version + + * 2: epoch + + * 6: sequence_number + + * n: cid + + * 2: length_of_DTLSInnerPlaintext + * + */ static void ssl_extract_add_data_from_record(unsigned char *add_data, size_t *add_data_len, mbedtls_record *rec, - unsigned minor_ver) + mbedtls_ssl_protocol_version + tls_version, + size_t taglen) { - /* Quoting RFC 5246 (TLS 1.2): + /* Several types of ciphers have been defined for use with TLS and DTLS, + * and the MAC calculations for those ciphers differ slightly. Further + * variants were added when the CID functionality was added with RFC 9146. + * This implementations also considers the use of a legacy version of the + * CID specification published in draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-05, + * which is used in deployments. * - * additional_data = seq_num + TLSCompressed.type + - * TLSCompressed.version + TLSCompressed.length; + * We will distinguish between the non-CID and the CID cases below. + * + * --- Non-CID cases --- * - * For the CID extension, this is extended as follows - * (quoting draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-05, - * https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-05): + * Quoting RFC 5246 (TLS 1.2): * - * additional_data = seq_num + DTLSPlaintext.type + - * DTLSPlaintext.version + - * cid + - * cid_length + - * length_of_DTLSInnerPlaintext; + * additional_data = seq_num + TLSCompressed.type + + * TLSCompressed.version + TLSCompressed.length; * * For TLS 1.3, the record sequence number is dropped from the AAD * and encoded within the nonce of the AEAD operation instead. + * Moreover, the additional data involves the length of the TLS + * ciphertext, not the TLS plaintext as in earlier versions. + * Quoting RFC 8446 (TLS 1.3): + * + * additional_data = TLSCiphertext.opaque_type || + * TLSCiphertext.legacy_record_version || + * TLSCiphertext.length + * + * We pass the tag length to this function in order to compute the + * ciphertext length from the inner plaintext length rec->data_len via + * + * TLSCiphertext.length = TLSInnerPlaintext.length + taglen. + * + * --- CID cases --- + * + * RFC 9146 uses a common pattern when constructing the data + * passed into a MAC / AEAD cipher. + * + * Data concatenation for MACs used with block ciphers with + * Encrypt-then-MAC Processing (with CID): + * + * data = seq_num_placeholder + + * tls12_cid + + * cid_length + + * tls12_cid + + * DTLSCiphertext.version + + * epoch + + * sequence_number + + * cid + + * DTLSCiphertext.length + + * IV + + * ENC(content + padding + padding_length) + * + * Data concatenation for MACs used with block ciphers (with CID): + * + * data = seq_num_placeholder + + * tls12_cid + + * cid_length + + * tls12_cid + + * DTLSCiphertext.version + + * epoch + + * sequence_number + + * cid + + * length_of_DTLSInnerPlaintext + + * DTLSInnerPlaintext.content + + * DTLSInnerPlaintext.real_type + + * DTLSInnerPlaintext.zeros + * + * AEAD ciphers use the following additional data calculation (with CIDs): + * + * additional_data = seq_num_placeholder + + * tls12_cid + + * cid_length + + * tls12_cid + + * DTLSCiphertext.version + + * epoch + + * sequence_number + + * cid + + * length_of_DTLSInnerPlaintext + * + * Section 5.3 of draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-05 (for legacy CID use) + * defines the additional data calculation as follows: + * + * additional_data = seq_num + + * tls12_cid + + * DTLSCipherText.version + + * cid + + * cid_length + + * length_of_DTLSInnerPlaintext */ unsigned char *cur = add_data; + size_t ad_len_field = rec->data_len; - int is_tls13 = 0; -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL) - if (minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_4) { - is_tls13 = 1; - } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL */ - if (!is_tls13) { - ((void) minor_ver); - memcpy(cur, rec->ctr, sizeof(rec->ctr)); - cur += sizeof(rec->ctr); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) && \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID_COMPAT == 0 + const unsigned char seq_num_placeholder[] = { 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff }; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) + if (tls_version == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_3) { + /* In TLS 1.3, the AAD contains the length of the TLSCiphertext, + * which differs from the length of the TLSInnerPlaintext + * by the length of the authentication tag. */ + ad_len_field += taglen; + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 */ + { + ((void) tls_version); + ((void) taglen); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) && \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID_COMPAT == 0 + if (rec->cid_len != 0) { + // seq_num_placeholder + memcpy(cur, seq_num_placeholder, sizeof(seq_num_placeholder)); + cur += sizeof(seq_num_placeholder); + + // tls12_cid type + *cur = rec->type; + cur++; + + // cid_length + *cur = rec->cid_len; + cur++; + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ + { + // epoch + sequence number + memcpy(cur, rec->ctr, sizeof(rec->ctr)); + cur += sizeof(rec->ctr); + } } + // type *cur = rec->type; cur++; + // version memcpy(cur, rec->ver, sizeof(rec->ver)); cur += sizeof(rec->ver); -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) && \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID_COMPAT == 1 + if (rec->cid_len != 0) { + // CID memcpy(cur, rec->cid, rec->cid_len); cur += rec->cid_len; + // cid_length *cur = rec->cid_len; cur++; - MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(rec->data_len, cur, 0); + // length of inner plaintext + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(ad_len_field, cur, 0); cur += 2; } else -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ - { - MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(rec->data_len, cur, 0); - cur += 2; - } - - *add_data_len = cur - add_data; -} - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) - -#define SSL3_MAC_MAX_BYTES 20 /* MD-5 or SHA-1 */ - -/* - * SSLv3.0 MAC functions - */ -MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL -static int ssl_mac(mbedtls_md_context_t *md_ctx, - const unsigned char *secret, - const unsigned char *buf, size_t len, - const unsigned char *ctr, int type, - unsigned char out[SSL3_MAC_MAX_BYTES]) -{ - unsigned char header[11]; - unsigned char padding[48]; - int padlen; - int md_size = mbedtls_md_get_size(md_ctx->md_info); - int md_type = mbedtls_md_get_type(md_ctx->md_info); - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - - /* Only MD5 and SHA-1 supported */ - if (md_type == MBEDTLS_MD_MD5) { - padlen = 48; - } else { - padlen = 40; - } +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) && \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID_COMPAT == 0 - memcpy(header, ctr, 8); - header[8] = (unsigned char) type; - MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(len, header, 9); + if (rec->cid_len != 0) { + // epoch + sequence number + memcpy(cur, rec->ctr, sizeof(rec->ctr)); + cur += sizeof(rec->ctr); - memset(padding, 0x36, padlen); - ret = mbedtls_md_starts(md_ctx); - if (ret != 0) { - return ret; - } - ret = mbedtls_md_update(md_ctx, secret, md_size); - if (ret != 0) { - return ret; - } - ret = mbedtls_md_update(md_ctx, padding, padlen); - if (ret != 0) { - return ret; - } - ret = mbedtls_md_update(md_ctx, header, 11); - if (ret != 0) { - return ret; - } - ret = mbedtls_md_update(md_ctx, buf, len); - if (ret != 0) { - return ret; - } - ret = mbedtls_md_finish(md_ctx, out); - if (ret != 0) { - return ret; - } + // CID + memcpy(cur, rec->cid, rec->cid_len); + cur += rec->cid_len; - memset(padding, 0x5C, padlen); - ret = mbedtls_md_starts(md_ctx); - if (ret != 0) { - return ret; - } - ret = mbedtls_md_update(md_ctx, secret, md_size); - if (ret != 0) { - return ret; - } - ret = mbedtls_md_update(md_ctx, padding, padlen); - if (ret != 0) { - return ret; - } - ret = mbedtls_md_update(md_ctx, out, md_size); - if (ret != 0) { - return ret; - } - ret = mbedtls_md_finish(md_ctx, out); - if (ret != 0) { - return ret; + // length of inner plaintext + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(ad_len_field, cur, 0); + cur += 2; + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ + { + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(ad_len_field, cur, 0); + cur += 2; } - return 0; + *add_data_len = (size_t) (cur - add_data); } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_AEAD) MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL static int ssl_transform_aead_dynamic_iv_is_explicit( mbedtls_ssl_transform const *transform) @@ -587,18 +889,14 @@ static void ssl_build_record_nonce(unsigned char *dst_iv, unsigned char const *dynamic_iv, size_t dynamic_iv_len) { - size_t i; - /* Start with Fixed IV || 0 */ memset(dst_iv, 0, dst_iv_len); memcpy(dst_iv, fixed_iv, fixed_iv_len); dst_iv += dst_iv_len - dynamic_iv_len; - for (i = 0; i < dynamic_iv_len; i++) { - dst_iv[i] ^= dynamic_iv[i]; - } + mbedtls_xor(dst_iv, dst_iv, dynamic_iv, dynamic_iv_len); } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C || MBEDTLS_CCM_C || MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_AEAD */ int mbedtls_ssl_encrypt_buf(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform, @@ -606,10 +904,17 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_encrypt_buf(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng) { - mbedtls_cipher_mode_t mode; + mbedtls_ssl_mode_t ssl_mode; int auth_done = 0; unsigned char *data; - unsigned char add_data[13 + 1 + MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX]; + /* For an explanation of the additional data length see + * the description of ssl_extract_add_data_from_record(). + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) + unsigned char add_data[23 + MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX]; +#else + unsigned char add_data[13]; +#endif size_t add_data_len; size_t post_avail; @@ -620,9 +925,9 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_encrypt_buf(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, #endif /* The PRNG is used for dynamic IV generation that's used - * for CBC transformations in TLS 1.1 and TLS 1.2. */ + * for CBC transformations in TLS 1.2. */ #if !(defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_CBC) && \ - (defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2))) + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)) ((void) f_rng); ((void) p_rng); #endif @@ -645,13 +950,13 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_encrypt_buf(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; } + ssl_mode = mbedtls_ssl_get_mode_from_transform(transform); + data = rec->buf + rec->data_offset; post_avail = rec->buf_len - (rec->data_len + rec->data_offset); MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "before encrypt: output payload", data, rec->data_len); - mode = mbedtls_cipher_get_cipher_mode(&transform->cipher_ctx_enc); - if (rec->data_len > MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("Record content %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET " too large, maximum %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET, @@ -672,11 +977,11 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_encrypt_buf(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, * since they apply to different versions of the protocol. There * is hence no risk of double-addition of the inner plaintext. */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL) - if (transform->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_4) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) + if (transform->tls_version == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_3) { size_t padding = ssl_compute_padding_length(rec->data_len, - MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_PADDING_GRANULARITY); + MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_TLS1_3_PADDING_GRANULARITY); if (ssl_build_inner_plaintext(data, &rec->data_len, post_avail, @@ -687,7 +992,7 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_encrypt_buf(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, rec->type = MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_APPLICATION_DATA; } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) /* @@ -700,7 +1005,7 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_encrypt_buf(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, if (rec->cid_len != 0) { size_t padding = ssl_compute_padding_length(rec->data_len, - MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_PADDING_GRANULARITY); + MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_TLS1_3_PADDING_GRANULARITY); /* * Wrap plaintext into DTLSInnerPlaintext structure. * See ssl_build_inner_plaintext() for more information. @@ -725,76 +1030,70 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_encrypt_buf(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, /* * Add MAC before if needed */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_MODES_USE_MAC) - if (mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_STREAM || - (mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) - && transform->encrypt_then_mac == MBEDTLS_SSL_ETM_DISABLED -#endif - )) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_MAC) + if (ssl_mode == MBEDTLS_SSL_MODE_STREAM || + ssl_mode == MBEDTLS_SSL_MODE_CBC) { if (post_avail < transform->maclen) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("Buffer provided for encrypted record not large enough")); return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) + unsigned char mac[MBEDTLS_SSL_MAC_ADD]; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + psa_mac_operation_t operation = PSA_MAC_OPERATION_INIT; + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t sign_mac_length = 0; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) - if (transform->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0) { - unsigned char mac[SSL3_MAC_MAX_BYTES]; - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - ret = ssl_mac(&transform->md_ctx_enc, transform->mac_enc, - data, rec->data_len, rec->ctr, rec->type, mac); - if (ret == 0) { - memcpy(data + rec->data_len, mac, transform->maclen); - } - mbedtls_platform_zeroize(mac, transform->maclen); - if (ret != 0) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "ssl_mac", ret); - return ret; - } - } else -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) - if (transform->minor_ver >= MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1) { - unsigned char mac[MBEDTLS_SSL_MAC_ADD]; - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + ssl_extract_add_data_from_record(add_data, &add_data_len, rec, + transform->tls_version, + transform->taglen); - ssl_extract_add_data_from_record(add_data, &add_data_len, rec, - transform->minor_ver); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + status = psa_mac_sign_setup(&operation, transform->psa_mac_enc, + transform->psa_mac_alg); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto hmac_failed_etm_disabled; + } - ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_update(&transform->md_ctx_enc, - add_data, add_data_len); - if (ret != 0) { - goto hmac_failed_etm_disabled; - } - ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_update(&transform->md_ctx_enc, - data, rec->data_len); - if (ret != 0) { - goto hmac_failed_etm_disabled; - } - ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_finish(&transform->md_ctx_enc, mac); - if (ret != 0) { - goto hmac_failed_etm_disabled; - } - ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_reset(&transform->md_ctx_enc); - if (ret != 0) { - goto hmac_failed_etm_disabled; - } + status = psa_mac_update(&operation, add_data, add_data_len); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto hmac_failed_etm_disabled; + } - memcpy(data + rec->data_len, mac, transform->maclen); + status = psa_mac_update(&operation, data, rec->data_len); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto hmac_failed_etm_disabled; + } -hmac_failed_etm_disabled: - mbedtls_platform_zeroize(mac, transform->maclen); - if (ret != 0) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_md_hmac_xxx", ret); - return ret; - } - } else -#endif - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("should never happen")); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + status = psa_mac_sign_finish(&operation, mac, MBEDTLS_SSL_MAC_ADD, + &sign_mac_length); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto hmac_failed_etm_disabled; + } +#else + ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_update(&transform->md_ctx_enc, add_data, + add_data_len); + if (ret != 0) { + goto hmac_failed_etm_disabled; } + ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_update(&transform->md_ctx_enc, data, rec->data_len); + if (ret != 0) { + goto hmac_failed_etm_disabled; + } + ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_finish(&transform->md_ctx_enc, mac); + if (ret != 0) { + goto hmac_failed_etm_disabled; + } + ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_reset(&transform->md_ctx_enc); + if (ret != 0) { + goto hmac_failed_etm_disabled; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + + memcpy(data + rec->data_len, mac, transform->maclen); +#endif MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "computed mac", data + rec->data_len, transform->maclen); @@ -802,47 +1101,48 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_encrypt_buf(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, rec->data_len += transform->maclen; post_avail -= transform->maclen; auth_done++; + +hmac_failed_etm_disabled: + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(mac, transform->maclen); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + ret = PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + status = psa_mac_abort(&operation); + if (ret == 0 && status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + ret = PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_md_hmac_xxx", ret); + return ret; + } } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_MODES_USE_MAC */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_MAC */ /* * Encrypt */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARC4_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER) - if (mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_STREAM) { - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - size_t olen; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_STREAM) + if (ssl_mode == MBEDTLS_SSL_MODE_STREAM) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("before encrypt: msglen = %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET ", " "including %d bytes of padding", rec->data_len, 0)); - if ((ret = mbedtls_cipher_crypt(&transform->cipher_ctx_enc, - transform->iv_enc, transform->ivlen, - data, rec->data_len, - data, &olen)) != 0) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_cipher_crypt", ret); - return ret; - } + /* The only supported stream cipher is "NULL", + * so there's nothing to do here.*/ + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_STREAM */ - if (rec->data_len != olen) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("should never happen")); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; - } - } else -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ARC4_C || MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C) - if (mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM || - mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM || - mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_CHACHAPOLY) { - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_AEAD) + if (ssl_mode == MBEDTLS_SSL_MODE_AEAD) { unsigned char iv[12]; unsigned char *dynamic_iv; size_t dynamic_iv_len; int dynamic_iv_is_explicit = ssl_transform_aead_dynamic_iv_is_explicit(transform); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; /* Check that there's space for the authentication tag. */ if (post_avail < transform->taglen) { @@ -876,7 +1176,8 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_encrypt_buf(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, * This depends on the TLS version. */ ssl_extract_add_data_from_record(add_data, &add_data_len, rec, - transform->minor_ver); + transform->tls_version, + transform->taglen); MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "IV used (internal)", iv, transform->ivlen); @@ -892,17 +1193,33 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_encrypt_buf(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, /* * Encrypt and authenticate */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + status = psa_aead_encrypt(transform->psa_key_enc, + transform->psa_alg, + iv, transform->ivlen, + add_data, add_data_len, + data, rec->data_len, + data, rec->buf_len - (data - rec->buf), + &rec->data_len); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + ret = PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_encrypt_buf", ret); + return ret; + } +#else if ((ret = mbedtls_cipher_auth_encrypt_ext(&transform->cipher_ctx_enc, iv, transform->ivlen, add_data, add_data_len, data, rec->data_len, /* src */ - data, rec->buf_len - (data - rec->buf), /* dst */ + data, rec->buf_len - (size_t) (data - rec->buf), /* dst */ &rec->data_len, transform->taglen)) != 0) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_cipher_auth_encrypt", ret); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_cipher_auth_encrypt_ext", ret); return ret; } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "after encrypt: tag", data + rec->data_len - transform->taglen, transform->taglen); @@ -925,12 +1242,18 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_encrypt_buf(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, auth_done++; } else -#endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C || MBEDTLS_CCM_C || MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_AEAD */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_CBC) - if (mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC) { + if (ssl_mode == MBEDTLS_SSL_MODE_CBC || + ssl_mode == MBEDTLS_SSL_MODE_CBC_ETM) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t padlen, i; size_t olen; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t part_len; + psa_cipher_operation_t cipher_op = PSA_CIPHER_OPERATION_INIT; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ /* Currently we're always using minimal padding * (up to 255 bytes would be allowed). */ @@ -952,35 +1275,31 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_encrypt_buf(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, rec->data_len += padlen + 1; post_avail -= padlen + 1; -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) /* - * Prepend per-record IV for block cipher in TLS v1.1 and up as per + * Prepend per-record IV for block cipher in TLS v1.2 as per * Method 1 (6.2.3.2. in RFC4346 and RFC5246) */ - if (transform->minor_ver >= MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2) { - if (f_rng == NULL) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("No PRNG provided to encrypt_record routine")); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; - } - - if (rec->data_offset < transform->ivlen) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("Buffer provided for encrypted record not large enough")); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; - } - - /* - * Generate IV - */ - ret = f_rng(p_rng, transform->iv_enc, transform->ivlen); - if (ret != 0) { - return ret; - } + if (f_rng == NULL) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("No PRNG provided to encrypt_record routine")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } - memcpy(data - transform->ivlen, transform->iv_enc, - transform->ivlen); + if (rec->data_offset < transform->ivlen) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("Buffer provided for encrypted record not large enough")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + } + /* + * Generate IV + */ + ret = f_rng(p_rng, transform->iv_enc, transform->ivlen); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 || MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ + + memcpy(data - transform->ivlen, transform->iv_enc, transform->ivlen); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("before encrypt: msglen = %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET ", " "including %" @@ -989,6 +1308,49 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_encrypt_buf(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, rec->data_len, transform->ivlen, padlen + 1)); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + status = psa_cipher_encrypt_setup(&cipher_op, + transform->psa_key_enc, transform->psa_alg); + + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + ret = PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "psa_cipher_encrypt_setup", ret); + return ret; + } + + status = psa_cipher_set_iv(&cipher_op, transform->iv_enc, transform->ivlen); + + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + ret = PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "psa_cipher_set_iv", ret); + return ret; + + } + + status = psa_cipher_update(&cipher_op, + data, rec->data_len, + data, rec->data_len, &olen); + + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + ret = PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "psa_cipher_update", ret); + return ret; + + } + + status = psa_cipher_finish(&cipher_op, + data + olen, rec->data_len - olen, + &part_len); + + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + ret = PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "psa_cipher_finish", ret); + return ret; + + } + + olen += part_len; +#else if ((ret = mbedtls_cipher_crypt(&transform->cipher_ctx_enc, transform->iv_enc, transform->ivlen, @@ -997,38 +1359,26 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_encrypt_buf(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_cipher_crypt", ret); return ret; } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ if (rec->data_len != olen) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("should never happen")); return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; } -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) - if (transform->minor_ver < MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2) { - /* - * Save IV in SSL3 and TLS1 - */ - memcpy(transform->iv_enc, transform->cipher_ctx_enc.iv, - transform->ivlen); - } else -#endif - { - data -= transform->ivlen; - rec->data_offset -= transform->ivlen; - rec->data_len += transform->ivlen; - } + data -= transform->ivlen; + rec->data_offset -= transform->ivlen; + rec->data_len += transform->ivlen; #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) if (auth_done == 0) { unsigned char mac[MBEDTLS_SSL_MAC_ADD]; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + psa_mac_operation_t operation = PSA_MAC_OPERATION_INIT; + size_t sign_mac_length = 0; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ - /* - * MAC(MAC_write_key, seq_num + - * TLSCipherText.type + - * TLSCipherText.version + - * length_of( (IV +) ENC(...) ) + - * IV + // except for TLS 1.0 - * ENC(content + padding + padding_length)); + /* MAC(MAC_write_key, add_data, IV, ENC(content + padding + padding_length)) */ if (post_avail < transform->maclen) { @@ -1037,11 +1387,35 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_encrypt_buf(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, } ssl_extract_add_data_from_record(add_data, &add_data_len, - rec, transform->minor_ver); + rec, transform->tls_version, + transform->taglen); MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("using encrypt then mac")); MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "MAC'd meta-data", add_data, add_data_len); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + status = psa_mac_sign_setup(&operation, transform->psa_mac_enc, + transform->psa_mac_alg); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto hmac_failed_etm_enabled; + } + + status = psa_mac_update(&operation, add_data, add_data_len); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto hmac_failed_etm_enabled; + } + + status = psa_mac_update(&operation, data, rec->data_len); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto hmac_failed_etm_enabled; + } + + status = psa_mac_sign_finish(&operation, mac, MBEDTLS_SSL_MAC_ADD, + &sign_mac_length); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto hmac_failed_etm_enabled; + } +#else ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_update(&transform->md_ctx_enc, add_data, add_data_len); @@ -1061,6 +1435,7 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_encrypt_buf(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, if (ret != 0) { goto hmac_failed_etm_enabled; } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ memcpy(data + rec->data_len, mac, transform->maclen); @@ -1070,6 +1445,13 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_encrypt_buf(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, hmac_failed_etm_enabled: mbedtls_platform_zeroize(mac, transform->maclen); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + ret = PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + status = psa_mac_abort(&operation); + if (ret == 0 && status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + ret = PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ if (ret != 0) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "HMAC calculation failed", ret); return ret; @@ -1098,14 +1480,26 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_decrypt_buf(mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl, mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform, mbedtls_record *rec) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_CBC) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_AEAD) size_t olen; - mbedtls_cipher_mode_t mode; - int ret, auth_done = 0; -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_MODES_USE_MAC) - size_t padlen = 0, correct = 1; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_CBC || MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_AEAD */ + mbedtls_ssl_mode_t ssl_mode; + int ret; + + int auth_done = 0; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_MAC) + size_t padlen = 0; + mbedtls_ct_condition_t correct = MBEDTLS_CT_TRUE; #endif unsigned char *data; - unsigned char add_data[13 + 1 + MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_IN_LEN_MAX]; + /* For an explanation of the additional data length see + * the description of ssl_extract_add_data_from_record(). + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) + unsigned char add_data[23 + MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_IN_LEN_MAX]; +#else + unsigned char add_data[13]; +#endif size_t add_data_len; #if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C) @@ -1123,7 +1517,7 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_decrypt_buf(mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl, } data = rec->buf + rec->data_offset; - mode = mbedtls_cipher_get_cipher_mode(&transform->cipher_ctx_dec); + ssl_mode = mbedtls_ssl_get_mode_from_transform(transform); #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) /* @@ -1135,8 +1529,8 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_decrypt_buf(mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl, } #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARC4_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER) - if (mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_STREAM) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_STREAM) + if (ssl_mode == MBEDTLS_SSL_MODE_STREAM) { if (rec->data_len < transform->maclen) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("Record too short for MAC:" @@ -1145,31 +1539,18 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_decrypt_buf(mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl, return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC; } - padlen = 0; - if ((ret = mbedtls_cipher_crypt(&transform->cipher_ctx_dec, - transform->iv_dec, - transform->ivlen, - data, rec->data_len, - data, &olen)) != 0) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_cipher_crypt", ret); - return ret; - } - - if (rec->data_len != olen) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("should never happen")); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; - } + /* The only supported stream cipher is "NULL", + * so there's no encryption to do here.*/ } else -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ARC4_C || MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C) - if (mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM || - mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM || - mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_CHACHAPOLY) { +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_STREAM */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_AEAD) + if (ssl_mode == MBEDTLS_SSL_MODE_AEAD) { unsigned char iv[12]; unsigned char *dynamic_iv; size_t dynamic_iv_len; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ /* * Extract dynamic part of nonce for AEAD decryption. @@ -1221,7 +1602,8 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_decrypt_buf(mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl, * This depends on the TLS version. */ ssl_extract_add_data_from_record(add_data, &add_data_len, rec, - transform->minor_ver); + transform->tls_version, + transform->taglen); MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "additional data used for AEAD", add_data, add_data_len); @@ -1229,7 +1611,7 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_decrypt_buf(mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl, * explicit_iv_len Bytes preceding data, and taglen * bytes following data + data_len. This justifies * the debug message and the invocation of - * mbedtls_cipher_auth_decrypt() below. */ + * mbedtls_cipher_auth_decrypt_ext() below. */ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "IV used", iv, transform->ivlen); MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "TAG used", data + rec->data_len, @@ -1238,13 +1620,29 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_decrypt_buf(mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl, /* * Decrypt and authenticate */ - if ((ret = mbedtls_cipher_auth_decrypt_ext(&transform->cipher_ctx_dec, - iv, transform->ivlen, - add_data, add_data_len, - data, rec->data_len + transform->taglen, /* src */ - data, rec->buf_len - (data - rec->buf), &olen, /* dst */ - transform->taglen)) != 0) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_cipher_auth_decrypt", ret); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + status = psa_aead_decrypt(transform->psa_key_dec, + transform->psa_alg, + iv, transform->ivlen, + add_data, add_data_len, + data, rec->data_len + transform->taglen, + data, rec->buf_len - (data - rec->buf), + &olen); + + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + ret = PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "psa_aead_decrypt", ret); + return ret; + } +#else + if ((ret = mbedtls_cipher_auth_decrypt_ext + (&transform->cipher_ctx_dec, + iv, transform->ivlen, + add_data, add_data_len, + data, rec->data_len + transform->taglen, /* src */ + data, rec->buf_len - (size_t) (data - rec->buf), &olen, /* dst */ + transform->taglen)) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_cipher_auth_decrypt_ext", ret); if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_AUTH_FAILED) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC; @@ -1252,6 +1650,8 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_decrypt_buf(mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl, return ret; } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + auth_done++; /* Double-check that AEAD decryption doesn't change content length. */ @@ -1260,19 +1660,23 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_decrypt_buf(mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl, return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; } } else -#endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C || MBEDTLS_CCM_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_AEAD */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_CBC) - if (mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC) { + if (ssl_mode == MBEDTLS_SSL_MODE_CBC || + ssl_mode == MBEDTLS_SSL_MODE_CBC_ETM) { size_t minlen = 0; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t part_len; + psa_cipher_operation_t cipher_op = PSA_CIPHER_OPERATION_INIT; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ /* * Check immediate ciphertext sanity */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) - if (transform->minor_ver >= MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2) { - /* The ciphertext is prefixed with the CBC IV. */ - minlen += transform->ivlen; - } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) + /* The ciphertext is prefixed with the CBC IV. */ + minlen += transform->ivlen; #endif /* Size considerations: @@ -1312,8 +1716,12 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_decrypt_buf(mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl, * Authenticate before decrypt if enabled */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) - if (transform->encrypt_then_mac == MBEDTLS_SSL_ETM_ENABLED) { + if (ssl_mode == MBEDTLS_SSL_MODE_CBC_ETM) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + psa_mac_operation_t operation = PSA_MAC_OPERATION_INIT; +#else unsigned char mac_expect[MBEDTLS_SSL_MAC_ADD]; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("using encrypt then mac")); @@ -1329,11 +1737,36 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_decrypt_buf(mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl, * Further, we still know that data_len > minlen */ rec->data_len -= transform->maclen; ssl_extract_add_data_from_record(add_data, &add_data_len, rec, - transform->minor_ver); + transform->tls_version, + transform->taglen); /* Calculate expected MAC. */ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "MAC'd meta-data", add_data, add_data_len); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + status = psa_mac_verify_setup(&operation, transform->psa_mac_dec, + transform->psa_mac_alg); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto hmac_failed_etm_enabled; + } + + status = psa_mac_update(&operation, add_data, add_data_len); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto hmac_failed_etm_enabled; + } + + status = psa_mac_update(&operation, data, rec->data_len); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto hmac_failed_etm_enabled; + } + + /* Compare expected MAC with MAC at the end of the record. */ + status = psa_mac_verify_finish(&operation, data + rec->data_len, + transform->maclen); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto hmac_failed_etm_enabled; + } +#else ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_update(&transform->md_ctx_dec, add_data, add_data_len); if (ret != 0) { @@ -1365,10 +1798,19 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_decrypt_buf(mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl, ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC; goto hmac_failed_etm_enabled; } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ auth_done++; hmac_failed_etm_enabled: +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + ret = PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + status = psa_mac_abort(&operation); + if (ret == 0 && status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + ret = PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + } +#else mbedtls_platform_zeroize(mac_expect, transform->maclen); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ if (ret != 0) { if (ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_hmac_xxx", ret); @@ -1392,28 +1834,68 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_decrypt_buf(mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl, return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC; } -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) /* - * Initialize for prepended IV for block cipher in TLS v1.1 and up + * Initialize for prepended IV for block cipher in TLS v1.2 */ - if (transform->minor_ver >= MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2) { - /* Safe because data_len >= minlen + ivlen = 2 * ivlen. */ - memcpy(transform->iv_dec, data, transform->ivlen); + /* Safe because data_len >= minlen + ivlen = 2 * ivlen. */ + memcpy(transform->iv_dec, data, transform->ivlen); - data += transform->ivlen; - rec->data_offset += transform->ivlen; - rec->data_len -= transform->ivlen; - } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 || MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ + data += transform->ivlen; + rec->data_offset += transform->ivlen; + rec->data_len -= transform->ivlen; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ /* We still have data_len % ivlen == 0 and data_len >= ivlen here. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + status = psa_cipher_decrypt_setup(&cipher_op, + transform->psa_key_dec, transform->psa_alg); + + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + ret = PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "psa_cipher_decrypt_setup", ret); + return ret; + } + + status = psa_cipher_set_iv(&cipher_op, transform->iv_dec, transform->ivlen); + + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + ret = PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "psa_cipher_set_iv", ret); + return ret; + } + + status = psa_cipher_update(&cipher_op, + data, rec->data_len, + data, rec->data_len, &olen); + + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + ret = PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "psa_cipher_update", ret); + return ret; + } + + status = psa_cipher_finish(&cipher_op, + data + olen, rec->data_len - olen, + &part_len); + + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + ret = PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "psa_cipher_finish", ret); + return ret; + } + + olen += part_len; +#else + if ((ret = mbedtls_cipher_crypt(&transform->cipher_ctx_dec, transform->iv_dec, transform->ivlen, data, rec->data_len, data, &olen)) != 0) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_cipher_crypt", ret); return ret; } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ /* Double-check that length hasn't changed during decryption. */ if (rec->data_len != olen) { @@ -1421,19 +1903,6 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_decrypt_buf(mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl, return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; } -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) - if (transform->minor_ver < MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2) { - /* - * Save IV in SSL3 and TLS1, where CBC decryption of consecutive - * records is equivalent to CBC decryption of the concatenation - * of the records; in other words, IVs are maintained across - * record decryptions. - */ - memcpy(transform->iv_dec, transform->cipher_ctx_dec.iv, - transform->ivlen); - } -#endif - /* Safe since data_len >= minlen + maclen + 1, so after having * subtracted at most minlen and maclen up to this point, * data_len > 0 (because of data_len % ivlen == 0, it's actually @@ -1441,11 +1910,11 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_decrypt_buf(mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl, padlen = data[rec->data_len - 1]; if (auth_done == 1) { - const size_t mask = mbedtls_ct_size_mask_ge( + const mbedtls_ct_condition_t ge = mbedtls_ct_uint_ge( rec->data_len, padlen + 1); - correct &= mask; - padlen &= mask; + correct = mbedtls_ct_bool_and(ge, correct); + padlen = mbedtls_ct_size_if_else_0(ge, padlen); } else { #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ALL) if (rec->data_len < transform->maclen + padlen + 1) { @@ -1457,12 +1926,11 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_decrypt_buf(mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl, padlen + 1)); } #endif - - const size_t mask = mbedtls_ct_size_mask_ge( + const mbedtls_ct_condition_t ge = mbedtls_ct_uint_ge( rec->data_len, transform->maclen + padlen + 1); - correct &= mask; - padlen &= mask; + correct = mbedtls_ct_bool_and(ge, correct); + padlen = mbedtls_ct_size_if_else_0(ge, padlen); } padlen++; @@ -1470,66 +1938,43 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_decrypt_buf(mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl, /* Regardless of the validity of the padding, * we have data_len >= padlen here. */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) - if (transform->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0) { - /* This is the SSL 3.0 path, we don't have to worry about Lucky - * 13, because there's a strictly worse padding attack built in - * the protocol (known as part of POODLE), so we don't care if the - * code is not constant-time, in particular branches are OK. */ - if (padlen > transform->ivlen) { -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ALL) - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad padding length: is %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET ", " - "should be no more than %" - MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET, - padlen, transform->ivlen)); -#endif - correct = 0; - } - } else -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) - if (transform->minor_ver > MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0) { - /* The padding check involves a series of up to 256 - * consecutive memory reads at the end of the record - * plaintext buffer. In order to hide the length and - * validity of the padding, always perform exactly - * `min(256,plaintext_len)` reads (but take into account - * only the last `padlen` bytes for the padding check). */ - size_t pad_count = 0; - volatile unsigned char * const check = data; - - /* Index of first padding byte; it has been ensured above - * that the subtraction is safe. */ - size_t const padding_idx = rec->data_len - padlen; - size_t const num_checks = rec->data_len <= 256 ? rec->data_len : 256; - size_t const start_idx = rec->data_len - num_checks; - size_t idx; - - for (idx = start_idx; idx < rec->data_len; idx++) { - /* pad_count += (idx >= padding_idx) && - * (check[idx] == padlen - 1); - */ - const size_t mask = mbedtls_ct_size_mask_ge(idx, padding_idx); - const size_t equal = mbedtls_ct_size_bool_eq(check[idx], - padlen - 1); - pad_count += mask & equal; - } - correct &= mbedtls_ct_size_bool_eq(pad_count, padlen); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) + /* The padding check involves a series of up to 256 + * consecutive memory reads at the end of the record + * plaintext buffer. In order to hide the length and + * validity of the padding, always perform exactly + * `min(256,plaintext_len)` reads (but take into account + * only the last `padlen` bytes for the padding check). */ + size_t pad_count = 0; + volatile unsigned char * const check = data; + + /* Index of first padding byte; it has been ensured above + * that the subtraction is safe. */ + size_t const padding_idx = rec->data_len - padlen; + size_t const num_checks = rec->data_len <= 256 ? rec->data_len : 256; + size_t const start_idx = rec->data_len - num_checks; + size_t idx; + + for (idx = start_idx; idx < rec->data_len; idx++) { + /* pad_count += (idx >= padding_idx) && + * (check[idx] == padlen - 1); + */ + const mbedtls_ct_condition_t a = mbedtls_ct_uint_ge(idx, padding_idx); + size_t increment = mbedtls_ct_size_if_else_0(a, 1); + const mbedtls_ct_condition_t b = mbedtls_ct_uint_eq(check[idx], padlen - 1); + increment = mbedtls_ct_size_if_else_0(b, increment); + pad_count += increment; + } + correct = mbedtls_ct_bool_and(mbedtls_ct_uint_eq(pad_count, padlen), correct); #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ALL) - if (padlen > 0 && correct == 0) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad padding byte detected")); - } -#endif - padlen &= mbedtls_ct_size_mask(correct); - } else -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 || MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 || \ - MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("should never happen")); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + if (padlen > 0 && correct == MBEDTLS_CT_FALSE) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad padding byte detected")); } +#endif + padlen = mbedtls_ct_size_if_else_0(correct, padlen); + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ /* If the padding was found to be invalid, padlen == 0 * and the subtraction is safe. If the padding was found valid, @@ -1552,7 +1997,7 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_decrypt_buf(mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl, * Authenticate if not done yet. * Compute the MAC regardless of the padding result (RFC4346, CBCTIME). */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_MODES_USE_MAC) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_MAC) if (auth_done == 0) { unsigned char mac_expect[MBEDTLS_SSL_MAC_ADD] = { 0 }; unsigned char mac_peer[MBEDTLS_SSL_MAC_ADD] = { 0 }; @@ -1575,59 +2020,46 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_decrypt_buf(mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl, */ rec->data_len -= transform->maclen; ssl_extract_add_data_from_record(add_data, &add_data_len, rec, - transform->minor_ver); - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) - if (transform->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0) { - ret = ssl_mac(&transform->md_ctx_dec, - transform->mac_dec, - data, rec->data_len, - rec->ctr, rec->type, - mac_expect); - if (ret != 0) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "ssl_mac", ret); - goto hmac_failed_etm_disabled; - } - memcpy(mac_peer, data + rec->data_len, transform->maclen); - } else -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) - if (transform->minor_ver > MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0) { - /* - * The next two sizes are the minimum and maximum values of - * data_len over all padlen values. - * - * They're independent of padlen, since we previously did - * data_len -= padlen. - * - * Note that max_len + maclen is never more than the buffer - * length, as we previously did in_msglen -= maclen too. - */ - const size_t max_len = rec->data_len + padlen; - const size_t min_len = (max_len > 256) ? max_len - 256 : 0; + transform->tls_version, + transform->taglen); - ret = mbedtls_ct_hmac(&transform->md_ctx_dec, - add_data, add_data_len, - data, rec->data_len, min_len, max_len, - mac_expect); - if (ret != 0) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ct_hmac", ret); - goto hmac_failed_etm_disabled; - } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) + /* + * The next two sizes are the minimum and maximum values of + * data_len over all padlen values. + * + * They're independent of padlen, since we previously did + * data_len -= padlen. + * + * Note that max_len + maclen is never more than the buffer + * length, as we previously did in_msglen -= maclen too. + */ + const size_t max_len = rec->data_len + padlen; + const size_t min_len = (max_len > 256) ? max_len - 256 : 0; - mbedtls_ct_memcpy_offset(mac_peer, data, - rec->data_len, - min_len, max_len, - transform->maclen); - } else -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 || MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 || \ - MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("should never happen")); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + ret = mbedtls_ct_hmac(transform->psa_mac_dec, + transform->psa_mac_alg, + add_data, add_data_len, + data, rec->data_len, min_len, max_len, + mac_expect); +#else + ret = mbedtls_ct_hmac(&transform->md_ctx_dec, + add_data, add_data_len, + data, rec->data_len, min_len, max_len, + mac_expect); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ct_hmac", ret); + goto hmac_failed_etm_disabled; } + mbedtls_ct_memcpy_offset(mac_peer, data, + rec->data_len, + min_len, max_len, + transform->maclen); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ + #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ALL) MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "expected mac", mac_expect, transform->maclen); MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "message mac", mac_peer, transform->maclen); @@ -1638,7 +2070,7 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_decrypt_buf(mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl, #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ALL) MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("message mac does not match")); #endif - correct = 0; + correct = MBEDTLS_CT_FALSE; } auth_done++; @@ -1653,10 +2085,10 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_decrypt_buf(mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl, /* * Finally check the correct flag */ - if (correct == 0) { + if (correct == MBEDTLS_CT_FALSE) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC; } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_MODES_USE_MAC */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_MAC */ /* Make extra sure authentication was performed, exactly once */ if (auth_done != 1) { @@ -1664,8 +2096,8 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_decrypt_buf(mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl, return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; } -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL) - if (transform->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_4) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) + if (transform->tls_version == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_3) { /* Remove inner padding and infer true content type. */ ret = ssl_parse_inner_plaintext(data, &rec->data_len, &rec->type); @@ -1674,7 +2106,7 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_decrypt_buf(mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl, return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD; } } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) if (rec->cid_len != 0) { @@ -1695,173 +2127,62 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_decrypt_buf(mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl, #undef MAC_PLAINTEXT #undef MAC_CIPHERTEXT -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT) /* - * Compression/decompression functions + * Fill the input message buffer by appending data to it. + * The amount of data already fetched is in ssl->in_left. + * + * If we return 0, is it guaranteed that (at least) nb_want bytes are + * available (from this read and/or a previous one). Otherwise, an error code + * is returned (possibly EOF or WANT_READ). + * + * With stream transport (TLS) on success ssl->in_left == nb_want, but + * with datagram transport (DTLS) on success ssl->in_left >= nb_want, + * since we always read a whole datagram at once. + * + * For DTLS, it is up to the caller to set ssl->next_record_offset when + * they're done reading a record. */ -MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL -static int ssl_compress_buf(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +int mbedtls_ssl_fetch_input(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, size_t nb_want) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - unsigned char *msg_post = ssl->out_msg; - ptrdiff_t bytes_written = ssl->out_msg - ssl->out_buf; - size_t len_pre = ssl->out_msglen; - unsigned char *msg_pre = ssl->compress_buf; + size_t len; #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH) - size_t out_buf_len = ssl->out_buf_len; + size_t in_buf_len = ssl->in_buf_len; #else - size_t out_buf_len = MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_BUFFER_LEN; + size_t in_buf_len = MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_BUFFER_LEN; #endif - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> compress buf")); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> fetch input")); - if (len_pre == 0) { - return 0; + if (ssl->f_recv == NULL && ssl->f_recv_timeout == NULL) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("Bad usage of mbedtls_ssl_set_bio() ")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } - memcpy(msg_pre, ssl->out_msg, len_pre); - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("before compression: msglen = %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET ", ", - ssl->out_msglen)); - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "before compression: output payload", - ssl->out_msg, ssl->out_msglen); - - ssl->transform_out->ctx_deflate.next_in = msg_pre; - ssl->transform_out->ctx_deflate.avail_in = len_pre; - ssl->transform_out->ctx_deflate.next_out = msg_post; - ssl->transform_out->ctx_deflate.avail_out = out_buf_len - bytes_written; - - ret = deflate(&ssl->transform_out->ctx_deflate, Z_SYNC_FLUSH); - if (ret != Z_OK) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("failed to perform compression (%d)", ret)); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_COMPRESSION_FAILED; + if (nb_want > in_buf_len - (size_t) (ssl->in_hdr - ssl->in_buf)) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("requesting more data than fits")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } - ssl->out_msglen = out_buf_len - - ssl->transform_out->ctx_deflate.avail_out - bytes_written; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM) { + uint32_t timeout; - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("after compression: msglen = %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET ", ", - ssl->out_msglen)); + /* + * The point is, we need to always read a full datagram at once, so we + * sometimes read more then requested, and handle the additional data. + * It could be the rest of the current record (while fetching the + * header) and/or some other records in the same datagram. + */ - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "after compression: output payload", - ssl->out_msg, ssl->out_msglen); - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= compress buf")); - - return 0; -} - -MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL -static int ssl_decompress_buf(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) -{ - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - unsigned char *msg_post = ssl->in_msg; - ptrdiff_t header_bytes = ssl->in_msg - ssl->in_buf; - size_t len_pre = ssl->in_msglen; - unsigned char *msg_pre = ssl->compress_buf; -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH) - size_t in_buf_len = ssl->in_buf_len; -#else - size_t in_buf_len = MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_BUFFER_LEN; -#endif - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> decompress buf")); - - if (len_pre == 0) { - return 0; - } - - memcpy(msg_pre, ssl->in_msg, len_pre); - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("before decompression: msglen = %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET ", ", - ssl->in_msglen)); - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "before decompression: input payload", - ssl->in_msg, ssl->in_msglen); - - ssl->transform_in->ctx_inflate.next_in = msg_pre; - ssl->transform_in->ctx_inflate.avail_in = len_pre; - ssl->transform_in->ctx_inflate.next_out = msg_post; - ssl->transform_in->ctx_inflate.avail_out = in_buf_len - header_bytes; - - ret = inflate(&ssl->transform_in->ctx_inflate, Z_SYNC_FLUSH); - if (ret != Z_OK) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("failed to perform decompression (%d)", ret)); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_COMPRESSION_FAILED; - } - - ssl->in_msglen = in_buf_len - - ssl->transform_in->ctx_inflate.avail_out - header_bytes; - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("after decompression: msglen = %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET ", ", - ssl->in_msglen)); - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "after decompression: input payload", - ssl->in_msg, ssl->in_msglen); - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= decompress buf")); - - return 0; -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT */ - -/* - * Fill the input message buffer by appending data to it. - * The amount of data already fetched is in ssl->in_left. - * - * If we return 0, is it guaranteed that (at least) nb_want bytes are - * available (from this read and/or a previous one). Otherwise, an error code - * is returned (possibly EOF or WANT_READ). - * - * With stream transport (TLS) on success ssl->in_left == nb_want, but - * with datagram transport (DTLS) on success ssl->in_left >= nb_want, - * since we always read a whole datagram at once. - * - * For DTLS, it is up to the caller to set ssl->next_record_offset when - * they're done reading a record. - */ -int mbedtls_ssl_fetch_input(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, size_t nb_want) -{ - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - size_t len; -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH) - size_t in_buf_len = ssl->in_buf_len; -#else - size_t in_buf_len = MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_BUFFER_LEN; -#endif - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> fetch input")); - - if (ssl->f_recv == NULL && ssl->f_recv_timeout == NULL) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("Bad usage of mbedtls_ssl_set_bio() ")); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; - } - - if (nb_want > in_buf_len - (size_t) (ssl->in_hdr - ssl->in_buf)) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("requesting more data than fits")); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; - } - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) - if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM) { - uint32_t timeout; - - /* - * The point is, we need to always read a full datagram at once, so we - * sometimes read more then requested, and handle the additional data. - * It could be the rest of the current record (while fetching the - * header) and/or some other records in the same datagram. - */ - - /* - * Move to the next record in the already read datagram if applicable - */ - if (ssl->next_record_offset != 0) { - if (ssl->in_left < ssl->next_record_offset) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("should never happen")); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; - } + /* + * Move to the next record in the already read datagram if applicable + */ + if (ssl->next_record_offset != 0) { + if (ssl->in_left < ssl->next_record_offset) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("should never happen")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } ssl->in_left -= ssl->next_record_offset; @@ -1908,9 +2229,9 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_fetch_input(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, size_t nb_want) MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("timer has expired")); ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_TIMEOUT; } else { - len = in_buf_len - (ssl->in_hdr - ssl->in_buf); + len = in_buf_len - (size_t) (ssl->in_hdr - ssl->in_buf); - if (ssl->state != MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER) { + if (mbedtls_ssl_is_handshake_over(ssl) == 0) { timeout = ssl->handshake->retransmit_timeout; } else { timeout = ssl->conf->read_timeout; @@ -2004,7 +2325,7 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_fetch_input(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, size_t nb_want) return ret; } - if ((size_t) ret > len || (INT_MAX > SIZE_MAX && ret > (int) SIZE_MAX)) { + if ((size_t) ret > len) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("f_recv returned %d bytes but only %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET " were requested", @@ -2056,7 +2377,7 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_flush_output(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) return ret; } - if ((size_t) ret > ssl->out_left || (INT_MAX > SIZE_MAX && ret > (int) SIZE_MAX)) { + if ((size_t) ret > ssl->out_left) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("f_send returned %d bytes but only %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET " bytes were sent", @@ -2157,7 +2478,7 @@ MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL static int ssl_swap_epochs(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) { mbedtls_ssl_transform *tmp_transform; - unsigned char tmp_out_ctr[8]; + unsigned char tmp_out_ctr[MBEDTLS_SSL_SEQUENCE_NUMBER_LEN]; if (ssl->transform_out == ssl->handshake->alt_transform_out) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("skip swap epochs")); @@ -2172,23 +2493,15 @@ static int ssl_swap_epochs(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) ssl->handshake->alt_transform_out = tmp_transform; /* Swap epoch + sequence_number */ - memcpy(tmp_out_ctr, ssl->cur_out_ctr, 8); - memcpy(ssl->cur_out_ctr, ssl->handshake->alt_out_ctr, 8); - memcpy(ssl->handshake->alt_out_ctr, tmp_out_ctr, 8); + memcpy(tmp_out_ctr, ssl->cur_out_ctr, sizeof(tmp_out_ctr)); + memcpy(ssl->cur_out_ctr, ssl->handshake->alt_out_ctr, + sizeof(ssl->cur_out_ctr)); + memcpy(ssl->handshake->alt_out_ctr, tmp_out_ctr, + sizeof(ssl->handshake->alt_out_ctr)); /* Adjust to the newly activated transform */ mbedtls_ssl_update_out_pointers(ssl, ssl->transform_out); -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL) - if (mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_activate != NULL) { - int ret = mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_activate(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_CHANNEL_OUTBOUND); - if (ret != 0) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_activate", ret); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED; - } - } -#endif - return 0; } @@ -2241,8 +2554,8 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_flight_transmit(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) (cur->type == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE && cur->p[0] == MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_FINISHED); - uint8_t const force_flush = ssl->disable_datagram_packing == 1 ? - SSL_FORCE_FLUSH : SSL_DONT_FORCE_FLUSH; + int const force_flush = ssl->disable_datagram_packing == 1 ? + SSL_FORCE_FLUSH : SSL_DONT_FORCE_FLUSH; /* Swap epochs before sending Finished: we can't do it after * sending ChangeCipherSpec, in case write returns WANT_READ. @@ -2280,7 +2593,7 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_flight_transmit(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) } else { const unsigned char * const p = ssl->handshake->cur_msg_p; const size_t hs_len = cur->len - 12; - const size_t frag_off = p - (cur->p + 12); + const size_t frag_off = (size_t) (p - (cur->p + 12)); const size_t rem_len = hs_len - frag_off; size_t cur_hs_frag_len, max_hs_frag_len; @@ -2356,7 +2669,7 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_flight_transmit(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) } /* Update state and set timer */ - if (ssl->state == MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER) { + if (mbedtls_ssl_is_handshake_over(ssl) == 1) { ssl->handshake->retransmit_state = MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_FINISHED; } else { ssl->handshake->retransmit_state = MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_WAITING; @@ -2418,6 +2731,24 @@ void mbedtls_ssl_send_flight_completed(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) /* * Handshake layer functions */ +int mbedtls_ssl_start_handshake_msg(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char hs_type, + unsigned char **buf, size_t *buf_len) +{ + /* + * Reserve 4 bytes for handshake header. ( Section 4,RFC 8446 ) + * ... + * HandshakeType msg_type; + * uint24 length; + * ... + */ + *buf = ssl->out_msg + 4; + *buf_len = MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN - 4; + + ssl->out_msgtype = MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE; + ssl->out_msg[0] = hs_type; + + return 0; +} /* * Write (DTLS: or queue) current handshake (including CCS) message. @@ -2441,7 +2772,9 @@ void mbedtls_ssl_send_flight_completed(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) * (including handshake headers but excluding record headers) * - ssl->out_msg: the record contents (handshake headers + content) */ -int mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +int mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + int update_checksum, + int force_flush) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; const size_t hs_len = ssl->out_msglen - 4; @@ -2454,16 +2787,8 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) */ if (ssl->out_msgtype != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE && ssl->out_msgtype != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) { - /* In SSLv3, the client might send a NoCertificate alert. */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) - if (!(ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 && - ssl->out_msgtype == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_ALERT && - ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT)) -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 && MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("should never happen")); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; - } + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("should never happen")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; } /* Whenever we send anything different from a @@ -2548,8 +2873,13 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ /* Update running hashes of handshake messages seen */ - if (hs_type != MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_HELLO_REQUEST) { - ssl->handshake->update_checksum(ssl, ssl->out_msg, ssl->out_msglen); + if (hs_type != MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_HELLO_REQUEST && update_checksum != 0) { + ret = ssl->handshake->update_checksum(ssl, ssl->out_msg, + ssl->out_msglen); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "update_checksum", ret); + return ret; + } } } @@ -2565,7 +2895,7 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) } else #endif { - if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_record(ssl, SSL_FORCE_FLUSH)) != 0) { + if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_record(ssl, force_flush)) != 0) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "ssl_write_record", ret); return ret; } @@ -2576,6 +2906,22 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) return 0; } +int mbedtls_ssl_finish_handshake_msg(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + size_t buf_len, size_t msg_len) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t msg_with_header_len; + ((void) buf_len); + + /* Add reserved 4 bytes for handshake header */ + msg_with_header_len = msg_len + 4; + ssl->out_msglen = msg_with_header_len; + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg_ext(ssl, 0, 0)); + +cleanup: + return ret; +} + /* * Record layer functions */ @@ -2588,41 +2934,14 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) * - ssl->out_msglen: length of the record content (excl headers) * - ssl->out_msg: record content */ -int mbedtls_ssl_write_record(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, uint8_t force_flush) +int mbedtls_ssl_write_record(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int force_flush) { int ret, done = 0; size_t len = ssl->out_msglen; - uint8_t flush = force_flush; + int flush = force_flush; MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> write record")); -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT) - if (ssl->transform_out != NULL && - ssl->session_out->compression == MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_DEFLATE) { - if ((ret = ssl_compress_buf(ssl)) != 0) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "ssl_compress_buf", ret); - return ret; - } - - len = ssl->out_msglen; - } -#endif /*MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL) - if (mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_write != NULL) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("going for mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_write()")); - - ret = mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_write(ssl); - if (ret != 0 && ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FALLTHROUGH) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_write", ret); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED; - } - - if (ret == 0) { - done = 1; - } - } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL */ if (!done) { unsigned i; size_t protected_record_size; @@ -2633,24 +2952,30 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_write_record(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, uint8_t force_flush) #endif /* Skip writing the record content type to after the encryption, * as it may change when using the CID extension. */ - - mbedtls_ssl_write_version(ssl->major_ver, ssl->minor_ver, - ssl->conf->transport, ssl->out_hdr + 1); - - memcpy(ssl->out_ctr, ssl->cur_out_ctr, 8); + mbedtls_ssl_protocol_version tls_ver = ssl->tls_version; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) + /* TLS 1.3 still uses the TLS 1.2 version identifier + * for backwards compatibility. */ + if (tls_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_3) { + tls_ver = MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 */ + mbedtls_ssl_write_version(ssl->out_hdr + 1, ssl->conf->transport, + tls_ver); + + memcpy(ssl->out_ctr, ssl->cur_out_ctr, MBEDTLS_SSL_SEQUENCE_NUMBER_LEN); MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(len, ssl->out_len, 0); if (ssl->transform_out != NULL) { mbedtls_record rec; rec.buf = ssl->out_iv; - rec.buf_len = out_buf_len - (ssl->out_iv - ssl->out_buf); + rec.buf_len = out_buf_len - (size_t) (ssl->out_iv - ssl->out_buf); rec.data_len = ssl->out_msglen; - rec.data_offset = ssl->out_msg - rec.buf; + rec.data_offset = (size_t) (ssl->out_msg - rec.buf); - memcpy(&rec.ctr[0], ssl->out_ctr, 8); - mbedtls_ssl_write_version(ssl->major_ver, ssl->minor_ver, - ssl->conf->transport, rec.ver); + memcpy(&rec.ctr[0], ssl->out_ctr, sizeof(rec.ctr)); + mbedtls_ssl_write_version(rec.ver, ssl->conf->transport, tls_ver); rec.type = ssl->out_msgtype; #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) @@ -2717,7 +3042,7 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_write_record(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, uint8_t force_flush) } } - /* The loop goes to its end iff the counter is wrapping */ + /* The loop goes to its end if the counter is wrapping */ if (i == mbedtls_ssl_ep_len(ssl)) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("outgoing message counter would wrap")); return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_COUNTER_WRAPPING; @@ -2772,16 +3097,12 @@ static int ssl_hs_is_proper_fragment(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) static uint32_t ssl_get_hs_frag_len(mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl) { - return (ssl->in_msg[9] << 16) | - (ssl->in_msg[10] << 8) | - ssl->in_msg[11]; + return MBEDTLS_GET_UINT24_BE(ssl->in_msg, 9); } static uint32_t ssl_get_hs_frag_off(mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl) { - return (ssl->in_msg[6] << 16) | - (ssl->in_msg[7] << 8) | - ssl->in_msg[8]; + return MBEDTLS_GET_UINT24_BE(ssl->in_msg, 6); } MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL @@ -2894,9 +3215,7 @@ static size_t ssl_get_reassembly_buffer_size(size_t msg_len, static uint32_t ssl_get_hs_total_len(mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl) { - return (ssl->in_msg[1] << 16) | - (ssl->in_msg[2] << 8) | - ssl->in_msg[3]; + return MBEDTLS_GET_UINT24_BE(ssl->in_msg, 1); } int mbedtls_ssl_prepare_handshake_record(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) @@ -2917,7 +3236,7 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_prepare_handshake_record(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - unsigned int recv_msg_seq = (ssl->in_msg[4] << 8) | ssl->in_msg[5]; + unsigned int recv_msg_seq = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(ssl->in_msg, 4); if (ssl_check_hs_header(ssl) != 0) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("invalid handshake header")); @@ -2925,9 +3244,9 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_prepare_handshake_record(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) } if (ssl->handshake != NULL && - ((ssl->state != MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER && + ((mbedtls_ssl_is_handshake_over(ssl) == 0 && recv_msg_seq != ssl->handshake->in_msg_seq) || - (ssl->state == MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER && + (mbedtls_ssl_is_handshake_over(ssl) == 1 && ssl->in_msg[0] != MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CLIENT_HELLO))) { if (recv_msg_seq > ssl->handshake->in_msg_seq) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, @@ -2982,12 +3301,17 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_prepare_handshake_record(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) return 0; } -void mbedtls_ssl_update_handshake_status(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +int mbedtls_ssl_update_handshake_status(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) { + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params * const hs = ssl->handshake; - if (ssl->state != MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER && hs != NULL) { - ssl->handshake->update_checksum(ssl, ssl->in_msg, ssl->in_hslen); + if (mbedtls_ssl_is_handshake_over(ssl) == 0 && hs != NULL) { + ret = ssl->handshake->update_checksum(ssl, ssl->in_msg, ssl->in_hslen); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "update_checksum", ret); + return ret; + } } /* Handshake message is complete, increment counter */ @@ -3018,6 +3342,7 @@ void mbedtls_ssl_update_handshake_status(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) memset(hs_buf, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_ssl_hs_buffer)); } #endif + return 0; } /* @@ -3150,7 +3475,7 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_check_dtls_clihlo_cookie( const unsigned char *in, size_t in_len, unsigned char *obuf, size_t buf_len, size_t *olen) { - size_t sid_len, cookie_len; + size_t sid_len, cookie_len, epoch, fragment_offset; unsigned char *p; /* @@ -3184,17 +3509,19 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_check_dtls_clihlo_cookie( MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "cli_id", cli_id, cli_id_len); if (in_len < 61) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(4, ("check cookie: record too short")); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; } - if (in[0] != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE || - in[3] != 0 || in[4] != 0 || - in[19] != 0 || in[20] != 0 || in[21] != 0) { + + epoch = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(in, 3); + fragment_offset = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT24_BE(in, 19); + + if (in[0] != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE || epoch != 0 || + fragment_offset != 0) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(4, ("check cookie: not a good ClientHello")); MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(4, (" type=%u epoch=%u fragment_offset=%u", - in[0], - (unsigned) in[3] << 8 | in[4], - (unsigned) in[19] << 16 | in[20] << 8 | in[21])); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO; + in[0], (unsigned) epoch, + (unsigned) fragment_offset)); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; } sid_len = in[59]; @@ -3202,7 +3529,7 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_check_dtls_clihlo_cookie( MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(4, ("check cookie: sid_len=%u > %u", (unsigned) sid_len, (unsigned) in_len - 61)); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; } MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "sid received from network", in + 60, sid_len); @@ -3212,7 +3539,7 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_check_dtls_clihlo_cookie( MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(4, ("check cookie: cookie_len=%u > %u", (unsigned) cookie_len, (unsigned) (in_len - sid_len - 61))); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; } MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "cookie received from network", @@ -3262,7 +3589,7 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_check_dtls_clihlo_cookie( return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; } - *olen = p - obuf; + *olen = (size_t) (p - obuf); /* Go back and fill length fields */ obuf[27] = (unsigned char) (*olen - 28); @@ -3300,7 +3627,7 @@ MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL static int ssl_handle_possible_reconnect(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - size_t len; + size_t len = 0; if (ssl->conf->f_cookie_write == NULL || ssl->conf->f_cookie_check == NULL) { @@ -3386,7 +3713,7 @@ static int ssl_parse_record_header(mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl, size_t len, mbedtls_record *rec) { - int major_ver, minor_ver; + mbedtls_ssl_protocol_version tls_version; size_t const rec_hdr_type_offset = 0; size_t const rec_hdr_type_len = 1; @@ -3448,7 +3775,7 @@ static int ssl_parse_record_header(mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl, rec->type == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_CID) { /* Shift pointers to account for record header including CID * struct { - * ContentType special_type = tls12_cid; + * ContentType outer_type = tls12_cid; * ProtocolVersion version; * uint16 epoch; * uint48 sequence_number; @@ -3492,21 +3819,15 @@ static int ssl_parse_record_header(mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl, */ rec->ver[0] = buf[rec_hdr_version_offset + 0]; rec->ver[1] = buf[rec_hdr_version_offset + 1]; - mbedtls_ssl_read_version(&major_ver, &minor_ver, - ssl->conf->transport, - &rec->ver[0]); - - if (major_ver != ssl->major_ver) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("major version mismatch: got %u, expected %u", - (unsigned) major_ver, - (unsigned) ssl->major_ver)); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD; - } + tls_version = (mbedtls_ssl_protocol_version) mbedtls_ssl_read_version( + buf + rec_hdr_version_offset, + ssl->conf->transport); + + if (tls_version > ssl->conf->max_tls_version) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("TLS version mismatch: got %u, expected max %u", + (unsigned) tls_version, + (unsigned) ssl->conf->max_tls_version)); - if (minor_ver > ssl->conf->max_minor_ver) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("minor version mismatch: got %u, expected max %u", - (unsigned) minor_ver, - (unsigned) ssl->conf->max_minor_ver)); return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD; } /* @@ -3530,14 +3851,12 @@ static int ssl_parse_record_header(mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl, */ rec->data_offset = rec_hdr_len_offset + rec_hdr_len_len; - rec->data_len = ((size_t) buf[rec_hdr_len_offset + 0] << 8) | - ((size_t) buf[rec_hdr_len_offset + 1] << 0); + rec->data_len = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(buf, rec_hdr_len_offset); MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "input record header", buf, rec->data_offset); MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("input record: msgtype = %u, " - "version = [%d:%d], msglen = %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET, - rec->type, - major_ver, minor_ver, rec->data_len)); + "version = [0x%x], msglen = %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET, + rec->type, (unsigned) tls_version, rec->data_len)); rec->buf = buf; rec->buf_len = rec->data_offset + rec->data_len; @@ -3560,7 +3879,7 @@ static int ssl_parse_record_header(mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl, */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM) { - rec_epoch = (rec->ctr[0] << 8) | rec->ctr[1]; + rec_epoch = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(rec->ctr, 0); /* Check that the datagram is large enough to contain a record * of the advertised length. */ @@ -3610,7 +3929,7 @@ static int ssl_parse_record_header(mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl, MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL static int ssl_check_client_reconnect(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) { - unsigned int rec_epoch = (ssl->in_ctr[0] << 8) | ssl->in_ctr[1]; + unsigned int rec_epoch = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(ssl->in_ctr, 0); /* * Check for an epoch 0 ClientHello. We can't use in_msg here to @@ -3620,7 +3939,7 @@ static int ssl_check_client_reconnect(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) */ if (rec_epoch == 0 && ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER && - ssl->state == MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER && + mbedtls_ssl_is_handshake_over(ssl) == 1 && ssl->in_msgtype == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE && ssl->in_left > 13 && ssl->in_buf[13] == MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CLIENT_HELLO) { @@ -3645,21 +3964,20 @@ static int ssl_prepare_record_content(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "input record from network", rec->buf, rec->buf_len); -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL) - if (mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_read != NULL) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("going for mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_read()")); - - ret = mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_read(ssl); - if (ret != 0 && ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FALLTHROUGH) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_read", ret); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED; - } - - if (ret == 0) { + /* + * In TLS 1.3, always treat ChangeCipherSpec records + * as unencrypted. The only thing we do with them is + * check the length and content and ignore them. + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) + if (ssl->transform_in != NULL && + ssl->transform_in->tls_version == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_3) { + if (rec->type == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) { done = 1; } } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 */ + if (!done && ssl->transform_in != NULL) { unsigned char const old_msg_type = rec->type; @@ -3667,6 +3985,35 @@ static int ssl_prepare_record_content(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, rec)) != 0) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "ssl_decrypt_buf", ret); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) + /* + * Although the server rejected early data, it might receive early + * data as long as it has not received the client Finished message. + * It is encrypted with early keys and should be ignored as stated + * in section 4.2.10 of RFC 8446: + * + * "Ignore the extension and return a regular 1-RTT response. The + * server then skips past early data by attempting to deprotect + * received records using the handshake traffic key, discarding + * records which fail deprotection (up to the configured + * max_early_data_size). Once a record is deprotected successfully, + * it is treated as the start of the client's second flight and the + * server proceeds as with an ordinary 1-RTT handshake." + */ + if ((old_msg_type == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_APPLICATION_DATA) && + (ssl->discard_early_data_record == + MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_TRY_TO_DEPROTECT_AND_DISCARD)) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( + 3, ("EarlyData: deprotect and discard app data records.")); + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_check_early_data_len(ssl, rec->data_len); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CONTINUE_PROCESSING; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA && MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ + #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_CID && ssl->conf->ignore_unexpected_cid @@ -3676,9 +4023,27 @@ static int ssl_prepare_record_content(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, } #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ + /* + * The decryption of the record failed, no reason to ignore it, + * return in error with the decryption error code. + */ return ret; } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) + /* + * If the server were discarding protected records that it fails to + * deprotect because it has rejected early data, as we have just + * deprotected successfully a record, the server has to resume normal + * operation and fail the connection if the deprotection of a record + * fails. + */ + if (ssl->discard_early_data_record == + MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_TRY_TO_DEPROTECT_AND_DISCARD) { + ssl->discard_early_data_record = MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_NO_DISCARD; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA && MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ + if (old_msg_type != rec->type) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(4, ("record type after decrypt (before %d): %d", old_msg_type, rec->type)); @@ -3703,7 +4068,7 @@ static int ssl_prepare_record_content(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, if (rec->data_len == 0) { #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) - if (ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 + if (ssl->tls_version == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 && rec->type != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_APPLICATION_DATA) { /* TLS v1.2 explicitly disallows zero-length messages which are not application data */ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("invalid zero-length message type: %d", ssl->in_msgtype)); @@ -3736,7 +4101,8 @@ static int ssl_prepare_record_content(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, #endif { unsigned i; - for (i = 8; i > mbedtls_ssl_ep_len(ssl); i--) { + for (i = MBEDTLS_SSL_SEQUENCE_NUMBER_LEN; + i > mbedtls_ssl_ep_len(ssl); i--) { if (++ssl->in_ctr[i - 1] != 0) { break; } @@ -3751,6 +4117,38 @@ static int ssl_prepare_record_content(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) + /* + * Although the server rejected early data because it needed to send an + * HelloRetryRequest message, it might receive early data as long as it has + * not received the client Finished message. + * The early data is encrypted with early keys and should be ignored as + * stated in section 4.2.10 of RFC 8446 (second case): + * + * "The server then ignores early data by skipping all records with an + * external content type of "application_data" (indicating that they are + * encrypted), up to the configured max_early_data_size. Ignore application + * data message before 2nd ClientHello when early_data was received in 1st + * ClientHello." + */ + if (ssl->discard_early_data_record == MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_DISCARD) { + if (rec->type == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_APPLICATION_DATA) { + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_check_early_data_len(ssl, rec->data_len); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( + 3, ("EarlyData: Ignore application message before 2nd ClientHello")); + + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CONTINUE_PROCESSING; + } else if (rec->type == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE) { + ssl->discard_early_data_record = MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_NO_DISCARD; + } + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA && MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ + #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY) if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM) { mbedtls_ssl_dtls_replay_update(ssl); @@ -3849,7 +4247,11 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_read_record(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, if (ssl->in_msgtype == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE && update_hs_digest == 1) { - mbedtls_ssl_update_handshake_status(ssl); + ret = mbedtls_ssl_update_handshake_status(ssl); + if (0 != ret) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, ("mbedtls_ssl_update_handshake_status"), ret); + return ret; + } } } else { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("reuse previously read message")); @@ -3928,9 +4330,7 @@ static int ssl_load_buffered_message(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) hs_buf = &hs->buffering.hs[0]; if ((hs_buf->is_valid == 1) && (hs_buf->is_complete == 1)) { /* Synthesize a record containing the buffered HS message. */ - size_t msg_len = (hs_buf->data[1] << 16) | - (hs_buf->data[2] << 8) | - hs_buf->data[3]; + size_t msg_len = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT24_BE(hs_buf->data, 1); /* Double-check that we haven't accidentally buffered * a message that doesn't fit into the input buffer. */ @@ -4027,7 +4427,7 @@ static int ssl_buffer_message(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) case MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE: { unsigned recv_msg_seq_offset; - unsigned recv_msg_seq = (ssl->in_msg[4] << 8) | ssl->in_msg[5]; + unsigned recv_msg_seq = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(ssl->in_msg, 4); mbedtls_ssl_hs_buffer *hs_buf; size_t msg_len = ssl->in_hslen - 12; @@ -4567,13 +4967,11 @@ static int ssl_get_next_record(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) return ret; } -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_BADMAC_LIMIT) if (ssl->conf->badmac_limit != 0 && ++ssl->badmac_seen >= ssl->conf->badmac_limit) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("too many records with bad MAC")); return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC; } -#endif /* As above, invalid records cause * dismissal of the whole datagram. */ @@ -4623,23 +5021,6 @@ static int ssl_get_next_record(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) ssl->in_msglen = rec.data_len; MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(rec.data_len, ssl->in_len, 0); -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT) - if (ssl->transform_in != NULL && - ssl->session_in->compression == MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_DEFLATE) { - if ((ret = ssl_decompress_buf(ssl)) != 0) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "ssl_decompress_buf", ret); - return ret; - } - - /* Check actual (decompress) record content length against - * configured maximum. */ - if (ssl->in_msglen > MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad message length")); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD; - } - } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT */ - return 0; } @@ -4682,6 +5063,20 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_handle_message_type(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_EARLY_MESSAGE; } #endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) + if (ssl->tls_version == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_3) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE) + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, + ("Ignore ChangeCipherSpec in TLS 1.3 compatibility mode")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CONTINUE_PROCESSING; +#else + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, + ("ChangeCipherSpec invalid in TLS 1.3 without compatibility mode")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE */ + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 */ } if (ssl->in_msgtype == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_ALERT) { @@ -4715,23 +5110,11 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_handle_message_type(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_ENABLED) if (ssl->in_msg[0] == MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_WARNING && ssl->in_msg[1] == MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_NO_RENEGOTIATION) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("is a SSLv3 no renegotiation alert")); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("is a no renegotiation alert")); /* Will be handled when trying to parse ServerHello */ return 0; } #endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) - if (ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 && - ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER && - ssl->in_msg[0] == MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_WARNING && - ssl->in_msg[1] == MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_NO_CERT) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("is a SSLv3 no_cert")); - /* Will be handled in mbedtls_ssl_parse_certificate() */ - return 0; - } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 && MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ - /* Silently ignore: fetch new message */ return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NON_FATAL; } @@ -4741,7 +5124,7 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_handle_message_type(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) /* Drop unexpected ApplicationData records, * except at the beginning of renegotiations */ if (ssl->in_msgtype == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_APPLICATION_DATA && - ssl->state != MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER + mbedtls_ssl_is_handshake_over(ssl) == 0 #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) && !(ssl->renego_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_IN_PROGRESS && ssl->state == MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_HELLO) @@ -4752,7 +5135,7 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_handle_message_type(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) } if (ssl->handshake != NULL && - ssl->state == MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER) { + mbedtls_ssl_is_handshake_over(ssl) == 1) { mbedtls_ssl_handshake_wrapup_free_hs_transform(ssl); } } @@ -4847,7 +5230,9 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_parse_change_cipher_spec(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) * data. */ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("switching to new transform spec for inbound data")); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) ssl->transform_in = ssl->transform_negotiate; +#endif ssl->session_in = ssl->session_negotiate; #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) @@ -4865,21 +5250,10 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_parse_change_cipher_spec(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) } } else #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ - memset(ssl->in_ctr, 0, 8); + memset(ssl->in_ctr, 0, MBEDTLS_SSL_SEQUENCE_NUMBER_LEN); mbedtls_ssl_update_in_pointers(ssl); -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL) - if (mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_activate != NULL) { - if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_activate(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_CHANNEL_INBOUND)) != 0) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_activate", ret); - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_INTERNAL_ERROR); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED; - } - } -#endif - ssl->state++; MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= parse change cipher spec")); @@ -4898,10 +5272,6 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_parse_change_cipher_spec(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) static size_t ssl_transform_get_explicit_iv_len( mbedtls_ssl_transform const *transform) { - if (transform->minor_ver < MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2) { - return 0; - } - return transform->ivlen - transform->fixed_ivlen; } @@ -4912,19 +5282,18 @@ void mbedtls_ssl_update_out_pointers(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM) { ssl->out_ctr = ssl->out_hdr + 3; #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) - ssl->out_cid = ssl->out_ctr + 8; + ssl->out_cid = ssl->out_ctr + MBEDTLS_SSL_SEQUENCE_NUMBER_LEN; ssl->out_len = ssl->out_cid; if (transform != NULL) { ssl->out_len += transform->out_cid_len; } #else /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ - ssl->out_len = ssl->out_ctr + 8; + ssl->out_len = ssl->out_ctr + MBEDTLS_SSL_SEQUENCE_NUMBER_LEN; #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ ssl->out_iv = ssl->out_len + 2; } else #endif { - ssl->out_ctr = ssl->out_hdr - 8; ssl->out_len = ssl->out_hdr + 3; #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) ssl->out_cid = ssl->out_len; @@ -4967,16 +5336,16 @@ void mbedtls_ssl_update_in_pointers(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) * ssl_parse_record_header(). */ ssl->in_ctr = ssl->in_hdr + 3; #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) - ssl->in_cid = ssl->in_ctr + 8; + ssl->in_cid = ssl->in_ctr + MBEDTLS_SSL_SEQUENCE_NUMBER_LEN; ssl->in_len = ssl->in_cid; /* Default: no CID */ #else /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ - ssl->in_len = ssl->in_ctr + 8; + ssl->in_len = ssl->in_ctr + MBEDTLS_SSL_SEQUENCE_NUMBER_LEN; #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ ssl->in_iv = ssl->in_len + 2; } else #endif { - ssl->in_ctr = ssl->in_hdr - 8; + ssl->in_ctr = ssl->in_hdr - MBEDTLS_SSL_SEQUENCE_NUMBER_LEN; ssl->in_len = ssl->in_hdr + 3; #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) ssl->in_cid = ssl->in_len; @@ -5002,6 +5371,7 @@ void mbedtls_ssl_reset_in_out_pointers(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) } else #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ { + ssl->out_ctr = ssl->out_buf; ssl->out_hdr = ssl->out_buf + 8; ssl->in_hdr = ssl->in_buf + 8; } @@ -5077,6 +5447,10 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_get_record_expansion(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) size_t transform_expansion = 0; const mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform = ssl->transform_out; unsigned block_size; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + psa_key_attributes_t attr = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + psa_key_type_t key_type; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ size_t out_hdr_len = mbedtls_ssl_out_hdr_len(ssl); @@ -5084,12 +5458,39 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_get_record_expansion(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) return (int) out_hdr_len; } -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT) - if (ssl->session_out->compression != MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_NULL) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; - } -#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + if (transform->psa_alg == PSA_ALG_GCM || + transform->psa_alg == PSA_ALG_CCM || + transform->psa_alg == PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, 8) || + transform->psa_alg == PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305 || + transform->psa_alg == MBEDTLS_SSL_NULL_CIPHER) { + transform_expansion = transform->minlen; + } else if (transform->psa_alg == PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING) { + (void) psa_get_key_attributes(transform->psa_key_enc, &attr); + key_type = psa_get_key_type(&attr); + + block_size = PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_LENGTH(key_type); + + /* Expansion due to the addition of the MAC. */ + transform_expansion += transform->maclen; + + /* Expansion due to the addition of CBC padding; + * Theoretically up to 256 bytes, but we never use + * more than the block size of the underlying cipher. */ + transform_expansion += block_size; + + /* For TLS 1.2 or higher, an explicit IV is added + * after the record header. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) + transform_expansion += block_size; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ + } else { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, + ("Unsupported psa_alg spotted in mbedtls_ssl_get_record_expansion()")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } +#else switch (mbedtls_cipher_get_cipher_mode(&transform->cipher_ctx_enc)) { case MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM: case MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM: @@ -5111,13 +5512,11 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_get_record_expansion(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) * more than the block size of the underlying cipher. */ transform_expansion += block_size; - /* For TLS 1.1 or higher, an explicit IV is added + /* For TLS 1.2 or higher, an explicit IV is added * after the record header. */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) - if (ssl->minor_ver >= MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2) { - transform_expansion += block_size; - } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 || MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) + transform_expansion += block_size; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ break; @@ -5125,6 +5524,7 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_get_record_expansion(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("should never happen")); return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) if (transform->out_cid_len != 0) { @@ -5146,16 +5546,18 @@ static int ssl_check_ctr_renegotiate(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) int in_ctr_cmp; int out_ctr_cmp; - if (ssl->state != MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER || + if (mbedtls_ssl_is_handshake_over(ssl) == 0 || ssl->renego_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_PENDING || ssl->conf->disable_renegotiation == MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED) { return 0; } in_ctr_cmp = memcmp(ssl->in_ctr + ep_len, - ssl->conf->renego_period + ep_len, 8 - ep_len); - out_ctr_cmp = memcmp(ssl->cur_out_ctr + ep_len, - ssl->conf->renego_period + ep_len, 8 - ep_len); + &ssl->conf->renego_period[ep_len], + MBEDTLS_SSL_SEQUENCE_NUMBER_LEN - ep_len); + out_ctr_cmp = memcmp(&ssl->cur_out_ctr[ep_len], + &ssl->conf->renego_period[ep_len], + sizeof(ssl->cur_out_ctr) - ep_len); if (in_ctr_cmp <= 0 && out_ctr_cmp <= 0) { return 0; @@ -5166,36 +5568,235 @@ static int ssl_check_ctr_renegotiate(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) } #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */ -/* - * Receive application data decrypted from the SSL layer - */ -int mbedtls_ssl_read(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char *buf, size_t len) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_check_new_session_ticket(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) { - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - size_t n; - if (ssl == NULL || ssl->conf == NULL) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + if ((ssl->in_hslen == mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len(ssl)) || + (ssl->in_msg[0] != MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET)) { + return 0; } - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> read")); + ssl->keep_current_message = 1; -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) - if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM) { - if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_flush_output(ssl)) != 0) { - return ret; - } + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("NewSessionTicket received")); + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state(ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET); - if (ssl->handshake != NULL && - ssl->handshake->retransmit_state == MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_SENDING) { - if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_flight_transmit(ssl)) != 0) { - return ret; - } + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS && MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */ + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_handle_hs_message_post_handshake(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("received post-handshake message")); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) + if (ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT) { + int ret = ssl_tls13_check_new_session_ticket(ssl); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; } } -#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS && MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */ - /* + /* Fail in all other cases. */ + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) +/* This function is called from mbedtls_ssl_read() when a handshake message is + * received after the initial handshake. In this context, handshake messages + * may only be sent for the purpose of initiating renegotiations. + * + * This function is introduced as a separate helper since the handling + * of post-handshake handshake messages changes significantly in TLS 1.3, + * and having a helper function allows to distinguish between TLS <= 1.2 and + * TLS 1.3 in the future without bloating the logic of mbedtls_ssl_read(). + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls12_handle_hs_message_post_handshake(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + /* + * - For client-side, expect SERVER_HELLO_REQUEST. + * - For server-side, expect CLIENT_HELLO. + * - Fail (TLS) or silently drop record (DTLS) in other cases. + */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) + if (ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT && + (ssl->in_msg[0] != MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_HELLO_REQUEST || + ssl->in_hslen != mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len(ssl))) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("handshake received (not HelloRequest)")); + + /* With DTLS, drop the packet (probably from last handshake) */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM) { + return 0; + } +#endif + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) + if (ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER && + ssl->in_msg[0] != MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CLIENT_HELLO) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("handshake received (not ClientHello)")); + + /* With DTLS, drop the packet (probably from last handshake) */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM) { + return 0; + } +#endif + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) + /* Determine whether renegotiation attempt should be accepted */ + if (!(ssl->conf->disable_renegotiation == MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED || + (ssl->secure_renegotiation == MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION && + ssl->conf->allow_legacy_renegotiation == + MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_NO_RENEGOTIATION))) { + /* + * Accept renegotiation request + */ + + /* DTLS clients need to know renego is server-initiated */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM && + ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT) { + ssl->renego_status = MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_PENDING; + } +#endif + ret = mbedtls_ssl_start_renegotiation(ssl); + if (ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WAITING_SERVER_HELLO_RENEGO && + ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_start_renegotiation", + ret); + return ret; + } + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */ + { + /* + * Refuse renegotiation + */ + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("refusing renegotiation, sending alert")); + + if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_WARNING, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_NO_RENEGOTIATION)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + } + + return 0; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_handle_hs_message_post_handshake(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + /* Check protocol version and dispatch accordingly. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) + if (ssl->tls_version == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_3) { + return ssl_tls13_handle_hs_message_post_handshake(ssl); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) + if (ssl->tls_version <= MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2) { + return ssl_tls12_handle_hs_message_post_handshake(ssl); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ + + /* Should never happen */ + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; +} + +/* + * brief Read at most 'len' application data bytes from the input + * buffer. + * + * param ssl SSL context: + * - First byte of application data not read yet in the input + * buffer located at address `in_offt`. + * - The number of bytes of data not read yet is `in_msglen`. + * param buf buffer that will hold the data + * param len maximum number of bytes to read + * + * note The function updates the fields `in_offt` and `in_msglen` + * according to the number of bytes read. + * + * return The number of bytes read. + */ +static int ssl_read_application_data( + mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char *buf, size_t len) +{ + size_t n = (len < ssl->in_msglen) ? len : ssl->in_msglen; + + if (len != 0) { + memcpy(buf, ssl->in_offt, n); + ssl->in_msglen -= n; + } + + /* Zeroising the plaintext buffer to erase unused application data + from the memory. */ + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(ssl->in_offt, n); + + if (ssl->in_msglen == 0) { + /* all bytes consumed */ + ssl->in_offt = NULL; + ssl->keep_current_message = 0; + } else { + /* more data available */ + ssl->in_offt += n; + } + + return (int) n; +} + +/* + * Receive application data decrypted from the SSL layer + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_read(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char *buf, size_t len) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + if (ssl == NULL || ssl->conf == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> read")); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM) { + if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_flush_output(ssl)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + + if (ssl->handshake != NULL && + ssl->handshake->retransmit_state == MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_SENDING) { + if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_flight_transmit(ssl)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + } + } +#endif + + /* * Check if renegotiation is necessary and/or handshake is * in process. If yes, perform/continue, and fall through * if an unexpected packet is received while the client @@ -5258,107 +5859,16 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_read(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char *buf, size_t len) } if (ssl->in_msgtype == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("received handshake message")); - - /* - * - For client-side, expect SERVER_HELLO_REQUEST. - * - For server-side, expect CLIENT_HELLO. - * - Fail (TLS) or silently drop record (DTLS) in other cases. - */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) - if (ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT && - (ssl->in_msg[0] != MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_HELLO_REQUEST || - ssl->in_hslen != mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len(ssl))) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("handshake received (not HelloRequest)")); - - /* With DTLS, drop the packet (probably from last handshake) */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) - if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM) { - continue; - } -#endif - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; - } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) - if (ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER && - ssl->in_msg[0] != MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CLIENT_HELLO) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("handshake received (not ClientHello)")); - - /* With DTLS, drop the packet (probably from last handshake) */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) - if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM) { - continue; - } -#endif - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; - } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) - /* Determine whether renegotiation attempt should be accepted */ - if (!(ssl->conf->disable_renegotiation == MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED || - (ssl->secure_renegotiation == MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION && - ssl->conf->allow_legacy_renegotiation == - MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_NO_RENEGOTIATION))) { - /* - * Accept renegotiation request - */ - - /* DTLS clients need to know renego is server-initiated */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) - if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM && - ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT) { - ssl->renego_status = MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_PENDING; - } -#endif - ret = mbedtls_ssl_start_renegotiation(ssl); - if (ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WAITING_SERVER_HELLO_RENEGO && - ret != 0) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_start_renegotiation", - ret); - return ret; - } - } else -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */ - { - /* - * Refuse renegotiation - */ - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("refusing renegotiation, sending alert")); - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) - if (ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0) { - /* SSLv3 does not have a "no_renegotiation" warning, so - we send a fatal alert and abort the connection. */ - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; - } else -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) - if (ssl->minor_ver >= MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1) { - if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_WARNING, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_NO_RENEGOTIATION)) - != 0) { - return ret; - } - } else -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 || MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 || - MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("should never happen")); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; - } + ret = ssl_handle_hs_message_post_handshake(ssl); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "ssl_handle_hs_message_post_handshake", + ret); + return ret; } - /* At this point, we don't know whether the renegotiation has been - * completed or not. The cases to consider are the following: + /* At this point, we don't know whether the renegotiation triggered + * by the post-handshake message has been completed or not. The cases + * to consider are the following: * 1) The renegotiation is complete. In this case, no new record * has been read yet. * 2) The renegotiation is incomplete because the client received @@ -5366,7 +5876,8 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_read(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char *buf, size_t len) * 3) The renegotiation is incomplete because the client received * a non-handshake, non-application data message while awaiting * the ServerHello. - * In each of these case, looping will be the proper action: + * + * In each of these cases, looping will be the proper action: * - For 1), the next iteration will read a new record and check * if it's application data. * - For 2), the loop condition isn't satisfied as application data @@ -5375,6 +5886,7 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_read(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char *buf, size_t len) * will re-deliver the message that was held back by the client * when expecting the ServerHello. */ + continue; } #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) @@ -5404,7 +5916,7 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_read(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char *buf, size_t len) /* We're going to return something now, cancel timer, * except if handshake (renegotiation) is in progress */ - if (ssl->state == MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER) { + if (mbedtls_ssl_is_handshake_over(ssl) == 1) { mbedtls_ssl_set_timer(ssl, 0); } @@ -5425,31 +5937,33 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_read(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char *buf, size_t len) #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ } - n = (len < ssl->in_msglen) - ? len : ssl->in_msglen; + ret = ssl_read_application_data(ssl, buf, len); - if (len != 0) { - memcpy(buf, ssl->in_offt, n); - ssl->in_msglen -= n; - } + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= read")); - /* Zeroising the plaintext buffer to erase unused application data - from the memory. */ - mbedtls_platform_zeroize(ssl->in_offt, n); + return ret; +} - if (ssl->in_msglen == 0) { - /* all bytes consumed */ - ssl->in_offt = NULL; - ssl->keep_current_message = 0; - } else { - /* more data available */ - ssl->in_offt += n; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) +int mbedtls_ssl_read_early_data(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *buf, size_t len) +{ + if (ssl == NULL || (ssl->conf == NULL)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= read")); + /* + * The server may receive early data only while waiting for the End of + * Early Data handshake message. + */ + if ((ssl->state != MBEDTLS_SSL_END_OF_EARLY_DATA) || + (ssl->in_offt == NULL)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CANNOT_READ_EARLY_DATA; + } - return (int) n; + return ssl_read_application_data(ssl, buf, len); } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C && MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA */ /* * Send application data to be encrypted by the SSL layer, taking care of max @@ -5520,45 +6034,6 @@ static int ssl_write_real(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, return (int) len; } -/* - * Write application data, doing 1/n-1 splitting if necessary. - * - * With non-blocking I/O, ssl_write_real() may return WANT_WRITE, - * then the caller will call us again with the same arguments, so - * remember whether we already did the split or not. - */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING) -MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL -static int ssl_write_split(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - const unsigned char *buf, size_t len) -{ - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - - if (ssl->conf->cbc_record_splitting == - MBEDTLS_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING_DISABLED || - len <= 1 || - ssl->minor_ver > MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1 || - mbedtls_cipher_get_cipher_mode(&ssl->transform_out->cipher_ctx_enc) - != MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC) { - return ssl_write_real(ssl, buf, len); - } - - if (ssl->split_done == 0) { - if ((ret = ssl_write_real(ssl, buf, 1)) <= 0) { - return ret; - } - ssl->split_done = 1; - } - - if ((ret = ssl_write_real(ssl, buf + 1, len - 1)) <= 0) { - return ret; - } - ssl->split_done = 0; - - return ret + 1; -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING */ - /* * Write application data (public-facing wrapper) */ @@ -5586,17 +6061,118 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_write(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, const unsigned char *buf, size_t } } -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING) - ret = ssl_write_split(ssl, buf, len); -#else ret = ssl_write_real(ssl, buf, len); -#endif MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= write")); return ret; } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) +int mbedtls_ssl_write_early_data(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *buf, size_t len) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + const struct mbedtls_ssl_config *conf; + uint32_t remaining; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> write early_data")); + + if (ssl == NULL || (conf = ssl->conf) == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + if (conf->endpoint != MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + if ((!mbedtls_ssl_conf_is_tls13_enabled(conf)) || + (conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM) || + (conf->early_data_enabled != MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_ENABLED)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CANNOT_WRITE_EARLY_DATA; + } + + if (ssl->tls_version != MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_3) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CANNOT_WRITE_EARLY_DATA; + } + + /* + * If we are at the beginning of the handshake, the early data state being + * equal to MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATE_IDLE or + * MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATE_IND_SENT advance the handshake just + * enough to be able to send early data if possible. That way, we can + * guarantee that when starting the handshake with this function we will + * send at least one record of early data. Note that when the state is + * MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATE_IND_SENT and not yet + * MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATE_CAN_WRITE, we cannot send early data + * as the early data outbound transform has not been set as we may have to + * first send a dummy CCS in clear. + */ + if ((ssl->early_data_state == MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATE_IDLE) || + (ssl->early_data_state == MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATE_IND_SENT)) { + while ((ssl->early_data_state == MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATE_IDLE) || + (ssl->early_data_state == MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATE_IND_SENT)) { + ret = mbedtls_ssl_handshake_step(ssl); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_handshake_step", ret); + return ret; + } + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_flush_output(ssl); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_flush_output", ret); + return ret; + } + } + remaining = ssl->session_negotiate->max_early_data_size; + } else { + /* + * If we are past the point where we can send early data or we have + * already reached the maximum early data size, return immediatly. + * Otherwise, progress the handshake as much as possible to not delay + * it too much. If we reach a point where we can still send early data, + * then we will send some. + */ + if ((ssl->early_data_state != MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATE_CAN_WRITE) && + (ssl->early_data_state != MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATE_ACCEPTED)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CANNOT_WRITE_EARLY_DATA; + } + + remaining = ssl->session_negotiate->max_early_data_size - + ssl->total_early_data_size; + + if (remaining == 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CANNOT_WRITE_EARLY_DATA; + } + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_handshake(ssl); + if ((ret != 0) && (ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ)) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_handshake", ret); + return ret; + } + } + + if (((ssl->early_data_state != MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATE_CAN_WRITE) && + (ssl->early_data_state != MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATE_ACCEPTED)) + || (remaining == 0)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CANNOT_WRITE_EARLY_DATA; + } + + if (len > remaining) { + len = remaining; + } + + ret = ssl_write_real(ssl, buf, len); + if (ret >= 0) { + ssl->total_early_data_size += ret; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= write early_data, ret=%d", ret)); + + return ret; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA && MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */ + /* * Notify the peer that the connection is being closed */ @@ -5610,7 +6186,7 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_close_notify(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> write close notify")); - if (ssl->state == MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER) { + if (mbedtls_ssl_is_handshake_over(ssl) == 1) { if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_WARNING, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_CLOSE_NOTIFY)) != 0) { @@ -5630,22 +6206,41 @@ void mbedtls_ssl_transform_free(mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform) return; } -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT) - deflateEnd(&transform->ctx_deflate); - inflateEnd(&transform->ctx_inflate); -#endif - +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + psa_destroy_key(transform->psa_key_enc); + psa_destroy_key(transform->psa_key_dec); +#else mbedtls_cipher_free(&transform->cipher_ctx_enc); mbedtls_cipher_free(&transform->cipher_ctx_dec); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_MODES_USE_MAC) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_MAC) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + psa_destroy_key(transform->psa_mac_enc); + psa_destroy_key(transform->psa_mac_dec); +#else mbedtls_md_free(&transform->md_ctx_enc); mbedtls_md_free(&transform->md_ctx_dec); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ #endif mbedtls_platform_zeroize(transform, sizeof(mbedtls_ssl_transform)); } +void mbedtls_ssl_set_inbound_transform(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform) +{ + ssl->transform_in = transform; + memset(ssl->in_ctr, 0, MBEDTLS_SSL_SEQUENCE_NUMBER_LEN); +} + +void mbedtls_ssl_set_outbound_transform(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform) +{ + ssl->transform_out = transform; + memset(ssl->cur_out_ctr, 0, sizeof(ssl->cur_out_ctr)); +} + #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) void mbedtls_ssl_buffering_free(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) @@ -5676,8 +6271,7 @@ static void ssl_buffering_free_slot(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, if (hs_buf->is_valid == 1) { hs->buffering.total_bytes_buffered -= hs_buf->data_len; - mbedtls_platform_zeroize(hs_buf->data, hs_buf->data_len); - mbedtls_free(hs_buf->data); + mbedtls_zeroize_and_free(hs_buf->data, hs_buf->data_len); memset(hs_buf, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_ssl_hs_buffer)); } } @@ -5689,50 +6283,86 @@ static void ssl_buffering_free_slot(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, * and, for DTLS, to/from TLS equivalent. * * For TLS this is the identity. - * For DTLS, use 1's complement (v -> 255 - v, and then map as follows: - * 1.0 <-> 3.2 (DTLS 1.0 is based on TLS 1.1) + * For DTLS, map as follows, then use 1's complement (v -> ~v): * 1.x <-> 3.x+1 for x != 0 (DTLS 1.2 based on TLS 1.2) + * DTLS 1.0 is stored as TLS 1.1 internally */ -void mbedtls_ssl_write_version(int major, int minor, int transport, - unsigned char ver[2]) +void mbedtls_ssl_write_version(unsigned char version[2], int transport, + mbedtls_ssl_protocol_version tls_version) { + uint16_t tls_version_formatted; #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) if (transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM) { - if (minor == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2) { - --minor; /* DTLS 1.0 stored as TLS 1.1 internally */ - - } - ver[0] = (unsigned char) (255 - (major - 2)); - ver[1] = (unsigned char) (255 - (minor - 1)); + tls_version_formatted = + ~(tls_version - (tls_version == 0x0302 ? 0x0202 : 0x0201)); } else #else ((void) transport); #endif { - ver[0] = (unsigned char) major; - ver[1] = (unsigned char) minor; + tls_version_formatted = (uint16_t) tls_version; } + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(tls_version_formatted, version, 0); } -void mbedtls_ssl_read_version(int *major, int *minor, int transport, - const unsigned char ver[2]) +uint16_t mbedtls_ssl_read_version(const unsigned char version[2], + int transport) { + uint16_t tls_version = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(version, 0); #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) if (transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM) { - *major = 255 - ver[0] + 2; - *minor = 255 - ver[1] + 1; - - if (*minor == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1) { - ++*minor; /* DTLS 1.0 stored as TLS 1.1 internally */ - } - } else + tls_version = + ~(tls_version - (tls_version == 0xfeff ? 0x0202 : 0x0201)); + } #else ((void) transport); #endif - { - *major = ver[0]; - *minor = ver[1]; + return tls_version; +} + +/* + * Send pending fatal alert. + * 0, No alert message. + * !0, if mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message() returned in error, the error code it + * returned, ssl->alert_reason otherwise. + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_handle_pending_alert(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + int ret; + + /* No pending alert, return success*/ + if (ssl->send_alert == 0) { + return 0; } + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + ssl->alert_type); + + /* If mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message() returned with MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE, + * do not clear the alert to be able to send it later. + */ + if (ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE) { + ssl->send_alert = 0; + } + + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + + return ssl->alert_reason; +} + +/* + * Set pending fatal alert flag. + */ +void mbedtls_ssl_pend_fatal_alert(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char alert_type, + int alert_reason) +{ + ssl->send_alert = 1; + ssl->alert_type = alert_type; + ssl->alert_reason = alert_reason; } #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C */ diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ssl_ticket.c b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ssl_ticket.c index f91029046604..6a31b0bee696 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ssl_ticket.c +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ssl_ticket.c @@ -11,13 +11,25 @@ #include "mbedtls/platform.h" -#include "mbedtls/ssl_internal.h" +#include "ssl_misc.h" #include "mbedtls/ssl_ticket.h" #include "mbedtls/error.h" #include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" #include +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +/* Define a local translating function to save code size by not using too many + * arguments in each translating place. */ +static int local_err_translation(psa_status_t status) +{ + return psa_status_to_mbedtls(status, psa_to_ssl_errors, + ARRAY_LENGTH(psa_to_ssl_errors), + psa_generic_status_to_mbedtls); +} +#define PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status) local_err_translation(status) +#endif + /* * Initialize context */ @@ -30,9 +42,9 @@ void mbedtls_ssl_ticket_init(mbedtls_ssl_ticket_context *ctx) #endif } -#define MAX_KEY_BYTES 32 /* 256 bits */ +#define MAX_KEY_BYTES MBEDTLS_SSL_TICKET_MAX_KEY_BYTES -#define TICKET_KEY_NAME_BYTES 4 +#define TICKET_KEY_NAME_BYTES MBEDTLS_SSL_TICKET_KEY_NAME_BYTES #define TICKET_IV_BYTES 12 #define TICKET_CRYPT_LEN_BYTES 2 #define TICKET_AUTH_TAG_BYTES 16 @@ -53,12 +65,20 @@ static int ssl_ticket_gen_key(mbedtls_ssl_ticket_context *ctx, unsigned char index) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - unsigned char buf[MAX_KEY_BYTES]; + unsigned char buf[MAX_KEY_BYTES] = { 0 }; mbedtls_ssl_ticket_key *key = ctx->keys + index; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; +#endif + #if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) - key->generation_time = (uint32_t) mbedtls_time(NULL); + key->generation_time = mbedtls_time(NULL); #endif + /* The lifetime of a key is the configured lifetime of the tickets when + * the key is created. + */ + key->lifetime = ctx->ticket_lifetime; if ((ret = ctx->f_rng(ctx->p_rng, key->name, sizeof(key->name))) != 0) { return ret; @@ -68,10 +88,23 @@ static int ssl_ticket_gen_key(mbedtls_ssl_ticket_context *ctx, return ret; } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + psa_set_key_usage_flags(&attributes, + PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT); + psa_set_key_algorithm(&attributes, key->alg); + psa_set_key_type(&attributes, key->key_type); + psa_set_key_bits(&attributes, key->key_bits); + + ret = PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR( + psa_import_key(&attributes, buf, + PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(key->key_bits), + &key->key)); +#else /* With GCM and CCM, same context can encrypt & decrypt */ ret = mbedtls_cipher_setkey(&key->ctx, buf, mbedtls_cipher_get_key_bitlen(&key->ctx), MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ mbedtls_platform_zeroize(buf, sizeof(buf)); @@ -87,23 +120,94 @@ static int ssl_ticket_update_keys(mbedtls_ssl_ticket_context *ctx) #if !defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) ((void) ctx); #else - if (ctx->ticket_lifetime != 0) { - uint32_t current_time = (uint32_t) mbedtls_time(NULL); - uint32_t key_time = ctx->keys[ctx->active].generation_time; + mbedtls_ssl_ticket_key * const key = ctx->keys + ctx->active; + if (key->lifetime != 0) { + mbedtls_time_t current_time = mbedtls_time(NULL); + mbedtls_time_t key_time = key->generation_time; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; +#endif if (current_time >= key_time && - current_time - key_time < ctx->ticket_lifetime) { + (uint64_t) (current_time - key_time) < key->lifetime) { return 0; } ctx->active = 1 - ctx->active; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + if ((status = psa_destroy_key(ctx->keys[ctx->active].key)) != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + return ssl_ticket_gen_key(ctx, ctx->active); } else #endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME */ return 0; } +/* + * Rotate active session ticket encryption key + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_ticket_rotate(mbedtls_ssl_ticket_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *name, size_t nlength, + const unsigned char *k, size_t klength, + uint32_t lifetime) +{ + const unsigned char idx = 1 - ctx->active; + mbedtls_ssl_ticket_key * const key = ctx->keys + idx; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + const size_t bitlen = key->key_bits; +#else + const int bitlen = mbedtls_cipher_get_key_bitlen(&key->ctx); +#endif + + if (nlength < TICKET_KEY_NAME_BYTES || klength * 8 < (size_t) bitlen) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + if ((status = psa_destroy_key(key->key)) != PSA_SUCCESS) { + ret = PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + return ret; + } + + psa_set_key_usage_flags(&attributes, + PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT); + psa_set_key_algorithm(&attributes, key->alg); + psa_set_key_type(&attributes, key->key_type); + psa_set_key_bits(&attributes, key->key_bits); + + if ((status = psa_import_key(&attributes, k, + PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(key->key_bits), + &key->key)) != PSA_SUCCESS) { + ret = PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + return ret; + } +#else + ret = mbedtls_cipher_setkey(&key->ctx, k, bitlen, MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + + ctx->active = idx; + ctx->ticket_lifetime = lifetime; + memcpy(key->name, name, TICKET_KEY_NAME_BYTES); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) + key->generation_time = mbedtls_time(NULL); +#endif + key->lifetime = lifetime; + + return 0; +} + /* * Setup context for actual use */ @@ -113,71 +217,62 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_ticket_setup(mbedtls_ssl_ticket_context *ctx, uint32_t lifetime) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *cipher_info; - - ctx->f_rng = f_rng; - ctx->p_rng = p_rng; + size_t key_bits; - ctx->ticket_lifetime = lifetime; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + psa_algorithm_t alg; + psa_key_type_t key_type; +#else + const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *cipher_info; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ - cipher_info = mbedtls_cipher_info_from_type(cipher); - if (cipher_info == NULL) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + if (mbedtls_ssl_cipher_to_psa(cipher, TICKET_AUTH_TAG_BYTES, + &alg, &key_type, &key_bits) != PSA_SUCCESS) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } - if (cipher_info->mode != MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM && - cipher_info->mode != MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM) { + if (PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD(alg) == 0) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } +#else + cipher_info = mbedtls_cipher_info_from_type(cipher); - if (cipher_info->key_bitlen > 8 * MAX_KEY_BYTES) { + if (mbedtls_cipher_info_get_mode(cipher_info) != MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM && + mbedtls_cipher_info_get_mode(cipher_info) != MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM && + mbedtls_cipher_info_get_mode(cipher_info) != MBEDTLS_MODE_CHACHAPOLY) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } - int do_mbedtls_cipher_setup = 1; -#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) - ret = mbedtls_cipher_setup_psa(&ctx->keys[0].ctx, - cipher_info, TICKET_AUTH_TAG_BYTES); - - switch (ret) { - case 0: - do_mbedtls_cipher_setup = 0; - break; - case MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE: - /* We don't yet expect to support all ciphers through PSA, - * so allow fallback to ordinary mbedtls_cipher_setup(). */ - do_mbedtls_cipher_setup = 1; - break; - default: - return ret; - } + key_bits = mbedtls_cipher_info_get_key_bitlen(cipher_info); #endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ - if (do_mbedtls_cipher_setup) { - if ((ret = mbedtls_cipher_setup(&ctx->keys[0].ctx, cipher_info)) - != 0) { - return ret; - } + + if (key_bits > 8 * MAX_KEY_BYTES) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } - do_mbedtls_cipher_setup = 1; + ctx->f_rng = f_rng; + ctx->p_rng = p_rng; + + ctx->ticket_lifetime = lifetime; + #if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) - do_mbedtls_cipher_setup = 0; + ctx->keys[0].alg = alg; + ctx->keys[0].key_type = key_type; + ctx->keys[0].key_bits = key_bits; - ret = mbedtls_cipher_setup_psa(&ctx->keys[1].ctx, - cipher_info, TICKET_AUTH_TAG_BYTES); - if (ret != 0 && ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE) { + ctx->keys[1].alg = alg; + ctx->keys[1].key_type = key_type; + ctx->keys[1].key_bits = key_bits; +#else + if ((ret = mbedtls_cipher_setup(&ctx->keys[0].ctx, cipher_info)) != 0) { return ret; } - if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE) { - do_mbedtls_cipher_setup = 1; + + if ((ret = mbedtls_cipher_setup(&ctx->keys[1].ctx, cipher_info)) != 0) { + return ret; } #endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ - if (do_mbedtls_cipher_setup) { - if ((ret = mbedtls_cipher_setup(&ctx->keys[1].ctx, cipher_info)) - != 0) { - return ret; - } - } if ((ret = ssl_ticket_gen_key(ctx, 0)) != 0 || (ret = ssl_ticket_gen_key(ctx, 1)) != 0) { @@ -217,6 +312,10 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_ticket_write(void *p_ticket, unsigned char *state = state_len_bytes + TICKET_CRYPT_LEN_BYTES; size_t clear_len, ciph_len; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; +#endif + *tlen = 0; if (ctx == NULL || ctx->f_rng == NULL) { @@ -239,7 +338,7 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_ticket_write(void *p_ticket, key = &ctx->keys[ctx->active]; - *ticket_lifetime = ctx->ticket_lifetime; + *ticket_lifetime = key->lifetime; memcpy(key_name, key->name, TICKET_KEY_NAME_BYTES); @@ -249,7 +348,7 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_ticket_write(void *p_ticket, /* Dump session state */ if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_session_save(session, - state, end - state, + state, (size_t) (end - state), &clear_len)) != 0 || (unsigned long) clear_len > 65535) { goto cleanup; @@ -257,15 +356,27 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_ticket_write(void *p_ticket, MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(clear_len, state_len_bytes, 0); /* Encrypt and authenticate */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + if ((status = psa_aead_encrypt(key->key, key->alg, iv, TICKET_IV_BYTES, + key_name, TICKET_ADD_DATA_LEN, + state, clear_len, + state, end - state, + &ciph_len)) != PSA_SUCCESS) { + ret = PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + goto cleanup; + } +#else if ((ret = mbedtls_cipher_auth_encrypt_ext(&key->ctx, iv, TICKET_IV_BYTES, /* Additional data: key name, IV and length */ key_name, TICKET_ADD_DATA_LEN, state, clear_len, - state, end - state, &ciph_len, + state, (size_t) (end - state), &ciph_len, TICKET_AUTH_TAG_BYTES)) != 0) { goto cleanup; } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + if (ciph_len != clear_len + TICKET_AUTH_TAG_BYTES) { ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; goto cleanup; @@ -318,6 +429,10 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_ticket_parse(void *p_ticket, unsigned char *ticket = enc_len_p + TICKET_CRYPT_LEN_BYTES; size_t enc_len, clear_len; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; +#endif + if (ctx == NULL || ctx->f_rng == NULL) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } @@ -336,7 +451,7 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_ticket_parse(void *p_ticket, goto cleanup; } - enc_len = (enc_len_p[0] << 8) | enc_len_p[1]; + enc_len = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(enc_len_p, 0); if (len != TICKET_MIN_LEN + enc_len) { ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; @@ -352,6 +467,15 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_ticket_parse(void *p_ticket, } /* Decrypt and authenticate */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + if ((status = psa_aead_decrypt(key->key, key->alg, iv, TICKET_IV_BYTES, + key_name, TICKET_ADD_DATA_LEN, + ticket, enc_len + TICKET_AUTH_TAG_BYTES, + ticket, enc_len, &clear_len)) != PSA_SUCCESS) { + ret = PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + goto cleanup; + } +#else if ((ret = mbedtls_cipher_auth_decrypt_ext(&key->ctx, iv, TICKET_IV_BYTES, /* Additional data: key name, IV and length */ @@ -365,6 +489,8 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_ticket_parse(void *p_ticket, goto cleanup; } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + if (clear_len != enc_len) { ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; goto cleanup; @@ -376,15 +502,20 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_ticket_parse(void *p_ticket, } #if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) - { - /* Check for expiration */ - mbedtls_time_t current_time = mbedtls_time(NULL); + mbedtls_ms_time_t ticket_creation_time, ticket_age; + mbedtls_ms_time_t ticket_lifetime = + (mbedtls_ms_time_t) key->lifetime * 1000; - if (current_time < session->start || - (uint32_t) (current_time - session->start) > ctx->ticket_lifetime) { - ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_SESSION_TICKET_EXPIRED; - goto cleanup; - } + ret = mbedtls_ssl_session_get_ticket_creation_time(session, + &ticket_creation_time); + if (ret != 0) { + goto cleanup; + } + + ticket_age = mbedtls_ms_time() - ticket_creation_time; + if (ticket_age < 0 || ticket_age > ticket_lifetime) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_SESSION_TICKET_EXPIRED; + goto cleanup; } #endif @@ -403,8 +534,13 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_ticket_parse(void *p_ticket, */ void mbedtls_ssl_ticket_free(mbedtls_ssl_ticket_context *ctx) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + psa_destroy_key(ctx->keys[0].key); + psa_destroy_key(ctx->keys[1].key); +#else mbedtls_cipher_free(&ctx->keys[0].ctx); mbedtls_cipher_free(&ctx->keys[1].ctx); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) mbedtls_mutex_free(&ctx->mutex); diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ssl_tls.c b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ssl_tls.c index c667a2923bf7..c5e06491c112 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ssl_tls.c +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ssl_tls.c @@ -1,14 +1,10 @@ /* - * SSLv3/TLSv1 shared functions + * TLS shared functions * * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later */ /* - * The SSL 3.0 specification was drafted by Netscape in 1996, - * and became an IETF standard in 1999. - * - * http://wp.netscape.com/eng/ssl3/ * http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2246.txt * http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc4346.txt */ @@ -20,8 +16,11 @@ #include "mbedtls/platform.h" #include "mbedtls/ssl.h" -#include "mbedtls/ssl_internal.h" -#include "mbedtls/debug.h" +#include "ssl_client.h" +#include "ssl_debug_helpers.h" +#include "ssl_misc.h" + +#include "debug_internal.h" #include "mbedtls/error.h" #include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" #include "mbedtls/version.h" @@ -31,6 +30,8 @@ #if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) #include "mbedtls/psa_util.h" +#include "md_psa.h" +#include "psa_util_internal.h" #include "psa/crypto.h" #endif @@ -38,6 +39,42 @@ #include "mbedtls/oid.h" #endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +/* Define local translating functions to save code size by not using too many + * arguments in each translating place. */ +static int local_err_translation(psa_status_t status) +{ + return psa_status_to_mbedtls(status, psa_to_ssl_errors, + ARRAY_LENGTH(psa_to_ssl_errors), + psa_generic_status_to_mbedtls); +} +#define PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status) local_err_translation(status) +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS) +static mbedtls_ssl_chk_buf_ptr_args chk_buf_ptr_fail_args; + +void mbedtls_ssl_set_chk_buf_ptr_fail_args( + const uint8_t *cur, const uint8_t *end, size_t need) +{ + chk_buf_ptr_fail_args.cur = cur; + chk_buf_ptr_fail_args.end = end; + chk_buf_ptr_fail_args.need = need; +} + +void mbedtls_ssl_reset_chk_buf_ptr_fail_args(void) +{ + memset(&chk_buf_ptr_fail_args, 0, sizeof(chk_buf_ptr_fail_args)); +} + +int mbedtls_ssl_cmp_chk_buf_ptr_fail_args(mbedtls_ssl_chk_buf_ptr_args *args) +{ + return (chk_buf_ptr_fail_args.cur != args->cur) || + (chk_buf_ptr_fail_args.end != args->end) || + (chk_buf_ptr_fail_args.need != args->need); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS */ + #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) @@ -93,6 +130,36 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_set_cid(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, return 0; } +int mbedtls_ssl_get_own_cid(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + int *enabled, + unsigned char own_cid[MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX], + size_t *own_cid_len) +{ + *enabled = MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_DISABLED; + + if (ssl->conf->transport != MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + /* We report MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_DISABLED in case the CID length is + * zero as this is indistinguishable from not requesting to use + * the CID extension. */ + if (ssl->own_cid_len == 0 || ssl->negotiate_cid == MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_DISABLED) { + return 0; + } + + if (own_cid_len != NULL) { + *own_cid_len = ssl->own_cid_len; + if (own_cid != NULL) { + memcpy(own_cid, ssl->own_cid, ssl->own_cid_len); + } + } + + *enabled = MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_ENABLED; + + return 0; +} + int mbedtls_ssl_get_peer_cid(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int *enabled, unsigned char peer_cid[MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX], @@ -101,7 +168,7 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_get_peer_cid(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, *enabled = MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_DISABLED; if (ssl->conf->transport != MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM || - ssl->state != MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER) { + mbedtls_ssl_is_handshake_over(ssl) == 0) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } @@ -163,9 +230,17 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_session_copy(mbedtls_ssl_session *dst, { mbedtls_ssl_session_free(dst); memcpy(dst, src, sizeof(mbedtls_ssl_session)); - #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) dst->ticket = NULL; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) + dst->hostname = NULL; +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS && MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) + dst->ticket_alpn = NULL; #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) @@ -205,6 +280,16 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_session_copy(mbedtls_ssl_session *dst, #endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) + { + int ret = mbedtls_ssl_session_set_ticket_alpn(dst, src->ticket_alpn); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C && MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN && MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA */ + #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) if (src->ticket != NULL) { dst->ticket = mbedtls_calloc(1, src->ticket_len); @@ -214,6 +299,18 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_session_copy(mbedtls_ssl_session *dst, memcpy(dst->ticket, src->ticket, src->ticket_len); } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) + if (src->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT) { + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + ret = mbedtls_ssl_session_set_hostname(dst, src->hostname); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 && + MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS && MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */ return 0; @@ -225,7 +322,7 @@ static int resize_buffer(unsigned char **buffer, size_t len_new, size_t *len_old { unsigned char *resized_buffer = mbedtls_calloc(1, len_new); if (resized_buffer == NULL) { - return -1; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED; } /* We want to copy len_new bytes when downsizing the buffer, and @@ -234,8 +331,7 @@ static int resize_buffer(unsigned char **buffer, size_t len_new, size_t *len_old * lost, are done outside of this function. */ memcpy(resized_buffer, *buffer, (len_new < *len_old) ? len_new : *len_old); - mbedtls_platform_zeroize(*buffer, *len_old); - mbedtls_free(*buffer); + mbedtls_zeroize_and_free(*buffer, *len_old); *buffer = resized_buffer; *len_old = len_new; @@ -299,7224 +395,8933 @@ static void handle_buffer_resizing(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int downsizing, } #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH */ -/* - * Key material generation - */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) -MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL -static int ssl3_prf(const unsigned char *secret, size_t slen, - const char *label, - const unsigned char *random, size_t rlen, - unsigned char *dstbuf, size_t dlen) -{ - int ret = 0; - size_t i; - mbedtls_md5_context md5; - mbedtls_sha1_context sha1; - unsigned char padding[16]; - unsigned char sha1sum[20]; - ((void) label); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CONTEXT_SERIALIZATION) +typedef int (*tls_prf_fn)(const unsigned char *secret, size_t slen, + const char *label, + const unsigned char *random, size_t rlen, + unsigned char *dstbuf, size_t dlen); - mbedtls_md5_init(&md5); - mbedtls_sha1_init(&sha1); +static tls_prf_fn ssl_tls12prf_from_cs(int ciphersuite_id); - /* - * SSLv3: - * block = - * MD5( secret + SHA1( 'A' + secret + random ) ) + - * MD5( secret + SHA1( 'BB' + secret + random ) ) + - * MD5( secret + SHA1( 'CCC' + secret + random ) ) + - * ... - */ - for (i = 0; i < dlen / 16; i++) { - memset(padding, (unsigned char) ('A' + i), 1 + i); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CONTEXT_SERIALIZATION */ - if ((ret = mbedtls_sha1_starts_ret(&sha1)) != 0) { - goto exit; - } - if ((ret = mbedtls_sha1_update_ret(&sha1, padding, 1 + i)) != 0) { - goto exit; - } - if ((ret = mbedtls_sha1_update_ret(&sha1, secret, slen)) != 0) { - goto exit; - } - if ((ret = mbedtls_sha1_update_ret(&sha1, random, rlen)) != 0) { - goto exit; - } - if ((ret = mbedtls_sha1_finish_ret(&sha1, sha1sum)) != 0) { - goto exit; - } +/* Type for the TLS PRF */ +typedef int ssl_tls_prf_t(const unsigned char *, size_t, const char *, + const unsigned char *, size_t, + unsigned char *, size_t); - if ((ret = mbedtls_md5_starts_ret(&md5)) != 0) { - goto exit; - } - if ((ret = mbedtls_md5_update_ret(&md5, secret, slen)) != 0) { - goto exit; - } - if ((ret = mbedtls_md5_update_ret(&md5, sha1sum, 20)) != 0) { - goto exit; - } - if ((ret = mbedtls_md5_finish_ret(&md5, dstbuf + i * 16)) != 0) { - goto exit; - } - } +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls12_populate_transform(mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform, + int ciphersuite, + const unsigned char master[48], +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_CBC_ETM) + int encrypt_then_mac, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_CBC_ETM */ + ssl_tls_prf_t tls_prf, + const unsigned char randbytes[64], + mbedtls_ssl_protocol_version tls_version, + unsigned endpoint, + const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int tls_prf_sha256(const unsigned char *secret, size_t slen, + const char *label, + const unsigned char *random, size_t rlen, + unsigned char *dstbuf, size_t dlen); +static int ssl_calc_verify_tls_sha256(const mbedtls_ssl_context *, unsigned char *, size_t *); +static int ssl_calc_finished_tls_sha256(mbedtls_ssl_context *, unsigned char *, int); -exit: - mbedtls_md5_free(&md5); - mbedtls_sha1_free(&sha1); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256*/ - mbedtls_platform_zeroize(padding, sizeof(padding)); - mbedtls_platform_zeroize(sha1sum, sizeof(sha1sum)); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int tls_prf_sha384(const unsigned char *secret, size_t slen, + const char *label, + const unsigned char *random, size_t rlen, + unsigned char *dstbuf, size_t dlen); - return ret; -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 */ +static int ssl_calc_verify_tls_sha384(const mbedtls_ssl_context *, unsigned char *, size_t *); +static int ssl_calc_finished_tls_sha384(mbedtls_ssl_context *, unsigned char *, int); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384*/ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL -static int tls1_prf(const unsigned char *secret, size_t slen, - const char *label, - const unsigned char *random, size_t rlen, - unsigned char *dstbuf, size_t dlen) -{ - size_t nb, hs; - size_t i, j, k; - const unsigned char *S1, *S2; - unsigned char *tmp; - size_t tmp_len = 0; - unsigned char h_i[20]; - const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info; - mbedtls_md_context_t md_ctx; - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; +static int ssl_tls12_session_load(mbedtls_ssl_session *session, + const unsigned char *buf, + size_t len); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ - mbedtls_md_init(&md_ctx); +static int ssl_update_checksum_start(mbedtls_ssl_context *, const unsigned char *, size_t); - tmp_len = 20 + strlen(label) + rlen; - tmp = mbedtls_calloc(1, tmp_len); - if (tmp == NULL) { - ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED; - goto exit; - } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) +static int ssl_update_checksum_sha256(mbedtls_ssl_context *, const unsigned char *, size_t); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256*/ - hs = (slen + 1) / 2; - S1 = secret; - S2 = secret + slen - hs; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) +static int ssl_update_checksum_sha384(mbedtls_ssl_context *, const unsigned char *, size_t); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384*/ - nb = strlen(label); - memcpy(tmp + 20, label, nb); - memcpy(tmp + 20 + nb, random, rlen); - nb += rlen; +int mbedtls_ssl_tls_prf(const mbedtls_tls_prf_types prf, + const unsigned char *secret, size_t slen, + const char *label, + const unsigned char *random, size_t rlen, + unsigned char *dstbuf, size_t dlen) +{ + mbedtls_ssl_tls_prf_cb *tls_prf = NULL; - /* - * First compute P_md5(secret,label+random)[0..dlen] - */ - if ((md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type(MBEDTLS_MD_MD5)) == NULL) { - ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; - goto exit; + switch (prf) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) + case MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_PRF_SHA384: + tls_prf = tls_prf_sha384; + break; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384*/ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) + case MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_PRF_SHA256: + tls_prf = tls_prf_sha256; + break; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256*/ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ + default: + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; } - if ((ret = mbedtls_md_setup(&md_ctx, md_info, 1)) != 0) { - goto exit; - } + return tls_prf(secret, slen, label, random, rlen, dstbuf, dlen); +} - ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_starts(&md_ctx, S1, hs); - if (ret != 0) { - goto exit; - } - ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_update(&md_ctx, tmp + 20, nb); - if (ret != 0) { - goto exit; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) +static void ssl_clear_peer_cert(mbedtls_ssl_session *session) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) + if (session->peer_cert != NULL) { + mbedtls_x509_crt_free(session->peer_cert); + mbedtls_free(session->peer_cert); + session->peer_cert = NULL; } - ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_finish(&md_ctx, 4 + tmp); - if (ret != 0) { - goto exit; +#else /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ + if (session->peer_cert_digest != NULL) { + /* Zeroization is not necessary. */ + mbedtls_free(session->peer_cert_digest); + session->peer_cert_digest = NULL; + session->peer_cert_digest_type = MBEDTLS_MD_NONE; + session->peer_cert_digest_len = 0; } +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ - for (i = 0; i < dlen; i += 16) { - ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_reset(&md_ctx); - if (ret != 0) { - goto exit; - } - ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_update(&md_ctx, 4 + tmp, 16 + nb); - if (ret != 0) { - goto exit; - } - ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_finish(&md_ctx, h_i); - if (ret != 0) { - goto exit; - } +uint32_t mbedtls_ssl_get_extension_id(unsigned int extension_type) +{ + switch (extension_type) { + case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SERVERNAME: + return MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_SERVERNAME; - ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_reset(&md_ctx); - if (ret != 0) { - goto exit; - } - ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_update(&md_ctx, 4 + tmp, 16); - if (ret != 0) { - goto exit; - } - ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_finish(&md_ctx, 4 + tmp); - if (ret != 0) { - goto exit; - } + case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH: + return MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH; - k = (i + 16 > dlen) ? dlen % 16 : 16; + case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_STATUS_REQUEST: + return MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_STATUS_REQUEST; - for (j = 0; j < k; j++) { - dstbuf[i + j] = h_i[j]; - } - } + case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_GROUPS: + return MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_SUPPORTED_GROUPS; - mbedtls_md_free(&md_ctx); + case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SIG_ALG: + return MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_SIG_ALG; - /* - * XOR out with P_sha1(secret,label+random)[0..dlen] - */ - if ((md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1)) == NULL) { - ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; - goto exit; - } + case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_USE_SRTP: + return MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_USE_SRTP; - if ((ret = mbedtls_md_setup(&md_ctx, md_info, 1)) != 0) { - goto exit; - } + case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_HEARTBEAT: + return MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_HEARTBEAT; - ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_starts(&md_ctx, S2, hs); - if (ret != 0) { - goto exit; - } - ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_update(&md_ctx, tmp + 20, nb); - if (ret != 0) { - goto exit; - } - ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_finish(&md_ctx, tmp); - if (ret != 0) { - goto exit; - } + case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ALPN: + return MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_ALPN; - for (i = 0; i < dlen; i += 20) { - ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_reset(&md_ctx); - if (ret != 0) { - goto exit; - } - ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_update(&md_ctx, tmp, 20 + nb); - if (ret != 0) { - goto exit; - } - ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_finish(&md_ctx, h_i); - if (ret != 0) { - goto exit; - } + case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SCT: + return MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_SCT; - ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_reset(&md_ctx); - if (ret != 0) { - goto exit; - } - ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_update(&md_ctx, tmp, 20); - if (ret != 0) { - goto exit; - } - ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_finish(&md_ctx, tmp); - if (ret != 0) { - goto exit; - } + case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_CLI_CERT_TYPE: + return MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_CLI_CERT_TYPE; - k = (i + 20 > dlen) ? dlen % 20 : 20; + case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SERV_CERT_TYPE: + return MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_SERV_CERT_TYPE; - for (j = 0; j < k; j++) { - dstbuf[i + j] = (unsigned char) (dstbuf[i + j] ^ h_i[j]); - } - } + case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_PADDING: + return MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_PADDING; -exit: - mbedtls_md_free(&md_ctx); + case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_PRE_SHARED_KEY: + return MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_PRE_SHARED_KEY; - mbedtls_platform_zeroize(tmp, tmp_len); - mbedtls_platform_zeroize(h_i, sizeof(h_i)); + case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_EARLY_DATA: + return MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_EARLY_DATA; - mbedtls_free(tmp); - return ret; -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 */ + case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS: + return MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS; -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_COOKIE: + return MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_COOKIE; -static psa_status_t setup_psa_key_derivation(psa_key_derivation_operation_t *derivation, - psa_key_id_t key, - psa_algorithm_t alg, - const unsigned char *seed, size_t seed_length, - const unsigned char *label, size_t label_length, - size_t capacity) -{ - psa_status_t status; - - status = psa_key_derivation_setup(derivation, alg); - if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { - return status; - } - - if (PSA_ALG_IS_TLS12_PRF(alg) || PSA_ALG_IS_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(alg)) { - status = psa_key_derivation_input_bytes(derivation, - PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SEED, - seed, seed_length); - if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { - return status; - } + case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_PSK_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODES: + return MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_PSK_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODES; - if (mbedtls_svc_key_id_is_null(key)) { - status = psa_key_derivation_input_bytes( - derivation, PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET, - NULL, 0); - } else { - status = psa_key_derivation_input_key( - derivation, PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET, key); - } - if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { - return status; - } + case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_CERT_AUTH: + return MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_CERT_AUTH; - status = psa_key_derivation_input_bytes(derivation, - PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_LABEL, - label, label_length); - if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { - return status; - } - } else { - return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; - } + case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_OID_FILTERS: + return MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_OID_FILTERS; - status = psa_key_derivation_set_capacity(derivation, capacity); - if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { - return status; - } + case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_POST_HANDSHAKE_AUTH: + return MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_POST_HANDSHAKE_AUTH; - return PSA_SUCCESS; -} + case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SIG_ALG_CERT: + return MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_SIG_ALG_CERT; -MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL -static int tls_prf_generic(mbedtls_md_type_t md_type, - const unsigned char *secret, size_t slen, - const char *label, - const unsigned char *random, size_t rlen, - unsigned char *dstbuf, size_t dlen) -{ - psa_status_t status; - psa_algorithm_t alg; - psa_key_id_t master_key = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; - psa_key_derivation_operation_t derivation = - PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_OPERATION_INIT; + case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_KEY_SHARE: + return MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_KEY_SHARE; - if (md_type == MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384) { - alg = PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384); - } else { - alg = PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256); - } + case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_TRUNCATED_HMAC: + return MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_TRUNCATED_HMAC; - /* Normally a "secret" should be long enough to be impossible to - * find by brute force, and in particular should not be empty. But - * this PRF is also used to derive an IV, in particular in EAP-TLS, - * and for this use case it makes sense to have a 0-length "secret". - * Since the key API doesn't allow importing a key of length 0, - * keep master_key=0, which setup_psa_key_derivation() understands - * to mean a 0-length "secret" input. */ - if (slen != 0) { - psa_key_attributes_t key_attributes = psa_key_attributes_init(); - psa_set_key_usage_flags(&key_attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE); - psa_set_key_algorithm(&key_attributes, alg); - psa_set_key_type(&key_attributes, PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE); + case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_POINT_FORMATS: + return MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_SUPPORTED_POINT_FORMATS; - status = psa_import_key(&key_attributes, secret, slen, &master_key); - if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED; - } - } + case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC: + return MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC; - status = setup_psa_key_derivation(&derivation, - master_key, alg, - random, rlen, - (unsigned char const *) label, - (size_t) strlen(label), - dlen); - if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { - psa_key_derivation_abort(&derivation); - psa_destroy_key(master_key); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED; - } + case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET: + return MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET; - status = psa_key_derivation_output_bytes(&derivation, dstbuf, dlen); - if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { - psa_key_derivation_abort(&derivation); - psa_destroy_key(master_key); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED; - } + case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT: + return MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT; - status = psa_key_derivation_abort(&derivation); - if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { - psa_destroy_key(master_key); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED; - } + case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SESSION_TICKET: + return MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_SESSION_TICKET; - if (!mbedtls_svc_key_id_is_null(master_key)) { - status = psa_destroy_key(master_key); - } - if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED; } - return 0; + return MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_UNRECOGNIZED; } -#else /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ - -MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL -static int tls_prf_generic(mbedtls_md_type_t md_type, - const unsigned char *secret, size_t slen, - const char *label, - const unsigned char *random, size_t rlen, - unsigned char *dstbuf, size_t dlen) +uint32_t mbedtls_ssl_get_extension_mask(unsigned int extension_type) { - size_t nb; - size_t i, j, k, md_len; - unsigned char *tmp; - size_t tmp_len = 0; - unsigned char h_i[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE]; - const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info; - mbedtls_md_context_t md_ctx; - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - - mbedtls_md_init(&md_ctx); - - if ((md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type(md_type)) == NULL) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; - } - - md_len = mbedtls_md_get_size(md_info); + return 1 << mbedtls_ssl_get_extension_id(extension_type); +} - tmp_len = md_len + strlen(label) + rlen; - tmp = mbedtls_calloc(1, tmp_len); - if (tmp == NULL) { - ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED; - goto exit; - } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C) +static const char *extension_name_table[] = { + [MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_UNRECOGNIZED] = "unrecognized", + [MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_SERVERNAME] = "server_name", + [MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH] = "max_fragment_length", + [MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_STATUS_REQUEST] = "status_request", + [MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_SUPPORTED_GROUPS] = "supported_groups", + [MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_SIG_ALG] = "signature_algorithms", + [MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_USE_SRTP] = "use_srtp", + [MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_HEARTBEAT] = "heartbeat", + [MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_ALPN] = "application_layer_protocol_negotiation", + [MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_SCT] = "signed_certificate_timestamp", + [MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_CLI_CERT_TYPE] = "client_certificate_type", + [MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_SERV_CERT_TYPE] = "server_certificate_type", + [MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_PADDING] = "padding", + [MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_PRE_SHARED_KEY] = "pre_shared_key", + [MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_EARLY_DATA] = "early_data", + [MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS] = "supported_versions", + [MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_COOKIE] = "cookie", + [MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_PSK_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODES] = "psk_key_exchange_modes", + [MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_CERT_AUTH] = "certificate_authorities", + [MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_OID_FILTERS] = "oid_filters", + [MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_POST_HANDSHAKE_AUTH] = "post_handshake_auth", + [MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_SIG_ALG_CERT] = "signature_algorithms_cert", + [MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_KEY_SHARE] = "key_share", + [MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_TRUNCATED_HMAC] = "truncated_hmac", + [MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_SUPPORTED_POINT_FORMATS] = "supported_point_formats", + [MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC] = "encrypt_then_mac", + [MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET] = "extended_master_secret", + [MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_SESSION_TICKET] = "session_ticket", + [MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT] = "record_size_limit" +}; - nb = strlen(label); - memcpy(tmp + md_len, label, nb); - memcpy(tmp + md_len + nb, random, rlen); - nb += rlen; +static const unsigned int extension_type_table[] = { + [MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_UNRECOGNIZED] = 0xff, + [MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_SERVERNAME] = MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SERVERNAME, + [MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH] = MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH, + [MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_STATUS_REQUEST] = MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_STATUS_REQUEST, + [MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_SUPPORTED_GROUPS] = MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_GROUPS, + [MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_SIG_ALG] = MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SIG_ALG, + [MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_USE_SRTP] = MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_USE_SRTP, + [MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_HEARTBEAT] = MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_HEARTBEAT, + [MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_ALPN] = MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ALPN, + [MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_SCT] = MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SCT, + [MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_CLI_CERT_TYPE] = MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_CLI_CERT_TYPE, + [MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_SERV_CERT_TYPE] = MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SERV_CERT_TYPE, + [MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_PADDING] = MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_PADDING, + [MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_PRE_SHARED_KEY] = MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_PRE_SHARED_KEY, + [MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_EARLY_DATA] = MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_EARLY_DATA, + [MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS] = MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS, + [MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_COOKIE] = MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_COOKIE, + [MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_PSK_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODES] = MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_PSK_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODES, + [MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_CERT_AUTH] = MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_CERT_AUTH, + [MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_OID_FILTERS] = MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_OID_FILTERS, + [MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_POST_HANDSHAKE_AUTH] = MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_POST_HANDSHAKE_AUTH, + [MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_SIG_ALG_CERT] = MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SIG_ALG_CERT, + [MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_KEY_SHARE] = MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_KEY_SHARE, + [MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_TRUNCATED_HMAC] = MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_TRUNCATED_HMAC, + [MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_SUPPORTED_POINT_FORMATS] = MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_POINT_FORMATS, + [MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC] = MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC, + [MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET] = MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET, + [MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_SESSION_TICKET] = MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SESSION_TICKET, + [MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT] = MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT +}; - /* - * Compute P_(secret, label + random)[0..dlen] - */ - if ((ret = mbedtls_md_setup(&md_ctx, md_info, 1)) != 0) { - goto exit; +const char *mbedtls_ssl_get_extension_name(unsigned int extension_type) +{ + return extension_name_table[ + mbedtls_ssl_get_extension_id(extension_type)]; +} + +static const char *ssl_tls13_get_hs_msg_name(int hs_msg_type) +{ + switch (hs_msg_type) { + case MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CLIENT_HELLO: + return "ClientHello"; + case MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_SERVER_HELLO: + return "ServerHello"; + case MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_HS_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST: + return "HelloRetryRequest"; + case MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET: + return "NewSessionTicket"; + case MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS: + return "EncryptedExtensions"; + case MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE: + return "Certificate"; + case MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST: + return "CertificateRequest"; + } + return "Unknown"; +} + +void mbedtls_ssl_print_extension(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + int level, const char *file, int line, + int hs_msg_type, unsigned int extension_type, + const char *extra_msg0, const char *extra_msg1) +{ + const char *extra_msg; + if (extra_msg0 && extra_msg1) { + mbedtls_debug_print_msg( + ssl, level, file, line, + "%s: %s(%u) extension %s %s.", + ssl_tls13_get_hs_msg_name(hs_msg_type), + mbedtls_ssl_get_extension_name(extension_type), + extension_type, + extra_msg0, extra_msg1); + return; } - ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_starts(&md_ctx, secret, slen); - if (ret != 0) { - goto exit; - } - ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_update(&md_ctx, tmp + md_len, nb); - if (ret != 0) { - goto exit; - } - ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_finish(&md_ctx, tmp); - if (ret != 0) { - goto exit; + extra_msg = extra_msg0 ? extra_msg0 : extra_msg1; + if (extra_msg) { + mbedtls_debug_print_msg( + ssl, level, file, line, + "%s: %s(%u) extension %s.", ssl_tls13_get_hs_msg_name(hs_msg_type), + mbedtls_ssl_get_extension_name(extension_type), extension_type, + extra_msg); + return; } - for (i = 0; i < dlen; i += md_len) { - ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_reset(&md_ctx); - if (ret != 0) { - goto exit; - } - ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_update(&md_ctx, tmp, md_len + nb); - if (ret != 0) { - goto exit; - } - ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_finish(&md_ctx, h_i); - if (ret != 0) { - goto exit; - } - - ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_reset(&md_ctx); - if (ret != 0) { - goto exit; - } - ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_update(&md_ctx, tmp, md_len); - if (ret != 0) { - goto exit; - } - ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_finish(&md_ctx, tmp); - if (ret != 0) { - goto exit; - } + mbedtls_debug_print_msg( + ssl, level, file, line, + "%s: %s(%u) extension.", ssl_tls13_get_hs_msg_name(hs_msg_type), + mbedtls_ssl_get_extension_name(extension_type), extension_type); +} - k = (i + md_len > dlen) ? dlen % md_len : md_len; +void mbedtls_ssl_print_extensions(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + int level, const char *file, int line, + int hs_msg_type, uint32_t extensions_mask, + const char *extra) +{ - for (j = 0; j < k; j++) { - dstbuf[i + j] = h_i[j]; - } + for (unsigned i = 0; + i < sizeof(extension_name_table) / sizeof(extension_name_table[0]); + i++) { + mbedtls_ssl_print_extension( + ssl, level, file, line, hs_msg_type, extension_type_table[i], + extensions_mask & (1 << i) ? "exists" : "does not exist", extra); } +} -exit: - mbedtls_md_free(&md_ctx); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) +static const char *ticket_flag_name_table[] = +{ + [0] = "ALLOW_PSK_RESUMPTION", + [2] = "ALLOW_PSK_EPHEMERAL_RESUMPTION", + [3] = "ALLOW_EARLY_DATA", +}; - if (tmp != NULL) { - mbedtls_platform_zeroize(tmp, tmp_len); - } +void mbedtls_ssl_print_ticket_flags(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + int level, const char *file, int line, + unsigned int flags) +{ + size_t i; - mbedtls_platform_zeroize(h_i, sizeof(h_i)); + mbedtls_debug_print_msg(ssl, level, file, line, + "print ticket_flags (0x%02x)", flags); - mbedtls_free(tmp); + flags = flags & MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_TICKET_FLAGS_MASK; - return ret; -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) -MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL -static int tls_prf_sha256(const unsigned char *secret, size_t slen, - const char *label, - const unsigned char *random, size_t rlen, - unsigned char *dstbuf, size_t dlen) -{ - return tls_prf_generic(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, secret, slen, - label, random, rlen, dstbuf, dlen); + for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_LENGTH(ticket_flag_name_table); i++) { + if ((flags & (1 << i))) { + mbedtls_debug_print_msg(ssl, level, file, line, "- %s is set.", + ticket_flag_name_table[i]); + } + } } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 && MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384) -MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL -static int tls_prf_sha384(const unsigned char *secret, size_t slen, - const char *label, - const unsigned char *random, size_t rlen, - unsigned char *dstbuf, size_t dlen) -{ - return tls_prf_generic(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, secret, slen, - label, random, rlen, dstbuf, dlen); -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_C && !MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C */ -static void ssl_update_checksum_start(mbedtls_ssl_context *, const unsigned char *, size_t); +void mbedtls_ssl_optimize_checksum(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info) +{ + ((void) ciphersuite_info); -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) -static void ssl_update_checksum_md5sha1(mbedtls_ssl_context *, const unsigned char *, size_t); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) + if (ciphersuite_info->mac == MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384) { + ssl->handshake->update_checksum = ssl_update_checksum_sha384; + } else #endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) -static void ssl_calc_verify_ssl(const mbedtls_ssl_context *, unsigned char *, size_t *); -static void ssl_calc_finished_ssl(mbedtls_ssl_context *, unsigned char *, int); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) + if (ciphersuite_info->mac != MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384) { + ssl->handshake->update_checksum = ssl_update_checksum_sha256; + } else #endif + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("should never happen")); + return; + } +} -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) -static void ssl_calc_verify_tls(const mbedtls_ssl_context *, unsigned char *, size_t *); -static void ssl_calc_finished_tls(mbedtls_ssl_context *, unsigned char *, int); -#endif +int mbedtls_ssl_add_hs_hdr_to_checksum(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned hs_type, + size_t total_hs_len) +{ + unsigned char hs_hdr[4]; -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) -static void ssl_update_checksum_sha256(mbedtls_ssl_context *, const unsigned char *, size_t); -static void ssl_calc_verify_tls_sha256(const mbedtls_ssl_context *, unsigned char *, size_t *); -static void ssl_calc_finished_tls_sha256(mbedtls_ssl_context *, unsigned char *, int); -#endif + /* Build HS header for checksum update. */ + hs_hdr[0] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(hs_type); + hs_hdr[1] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_2(total_hs_len); + hs_hdr[2] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_1(total_hs_len); + hs_hdr[3] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(total_hs_len); -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384) -static void ssl_update_checksum_sha384(mbedtls_ssl_context *, const unsigned char *, size_t); -static void ssl_calc_verify_tls_sha384(const mbedtls_ssl_context *, unsigned char *, size_t *); -static void ssl_calc_finished_tls_sha384(mbedtls_ssl_context *, unsigned char *, int); -#endif -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ + return ssl->handshake->update_checksum(ssl, hs_hdr, sizeof(hs_hdr)); +} -#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED) && \ - defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) -MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL -static int ssl_use_opaque_psk(mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl) +int mbedtls_ssl_add_hs_msg_to_checksum(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned hs_type, + unsigned char const *msg, + size_t msg_len) { - if (ssl->conf->f_psk != NULL) { - /* If we've used a callback to select the PSK, - * the static configuration is irrelevant. */ - if (!mbedtls_svc_key_id_is_null(ssl->handshake->psk_opaque)) { - return 1; - } - - return 0; + int ret; + ret = mbedtls_ssl_add_hs_hdr_to_checksum(ssl, hs_type, msg_len); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; } + return ssl->handshake->update_checksum(ssl, msg, msg_len); +} - if (!mbedtls_svc_key_id_is_null(ssl->conf->psk_opaque)) { - return 1; +int mbedtls_ssl_reset_checksum(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + psa_status_t status; +#else + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; +#endif +#else /* SHA-256 or SHA-384 */ + ((void) ssl); +#endif /* SHA-256 or SHA-384 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + status = psa_hash_abort(&ssl->handshake->fin_sha256_psa); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return mbedtls_md_error_from_psa(status); } - + status = psa_hash_setup(&ssl->handshake->fin_sha256_psa, PSA_ALG_SHA_256); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return mbedtls_md_error_from_psa(status); + } +#else + mbedtls_md_free(&ssl->handshake->fin_sha256); + mbedtls_md_init(&ssl->handshake->fin_sha256); + ret = mbedtls_md_setup(&ssl->handshake->fin_sha256, + mbedtls_md_info_from_type(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256), + 0); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + ret = mbedtls_md_starts(&ssl->handshake->fin_sha256); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } +#endif +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + status = psa_hash_abort(&ssl->handshake->fin_sha384_psa); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return mbedtls_md_error_from_psa(status); + } + status = psa_hash_setup(&ssl->handshake->fin_sha384_psa, PSA_ALG_SHA_384); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return mbedtls_md_error_from_psa(status); + } +#else + mbedtls_md_free(&ssl->handshake->fin_sha384); + mbedtls_md_init(&ssl->handshake->fin_sha384); + ret = mbedtls_md_setup(&ssl->handshake->fin_sha384, + mbedtls_md_info_from_type(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384), 0); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + ret = mbedtls_md_starts(&ssl->handshake->fin_sha384); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } +#endif +#endif return 0; } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO && - MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXPORT_KEYS) -static mbedtls_tls_prf_types tls_prf_get_type(mbedtls_ssl_tls_prf_cb *tls_prf) +static int ssl_update_checksum_start(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *buf, size_t len) { -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) - if (tls_prf == ssl3_prf) { - return MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_PRF_SSL3; - } else +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + psa_status_t status; +#else + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) - if (tls_prf == tls1_prf) { - return MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_PRF_TLS1; - } else +#else /* SHA-256 or SHA-384 */ + ((void) ssl); + (void) buf; + (void) len; +#endif /* SHA-256 or SHA-384 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + status = psa_hash_update(&ssl->handshake->fin_sha256_psa, buf, len); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return mbedtls_md_error_from_psa(status); + } +#else + ret = mbedtls_md_update(&ssl->handshake->fin_sha256, buf, len); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384) - if (tls_prf == tls_prf_sha384) { - return MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_PRF_SHA384; - } else #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) - if (tls_prf == tls_prf_sha256) { - return MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_PRF_SHA256; - } else +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + status = psa_hash_update(&ssl->handshake->fin_sha384_psa, buf, len); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return mbedtls_md_error_from_psa(status); + } +#else + ret = mbedtls_md_update(&ssl->handshake->fin_sha384, buf, len); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } #endif -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ - return MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_PRF_NONE; +#endif + return 0; } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EXPORT_KEYS */ -int mbedtls_ssl_tls_prf(const mbedtls_tls_prf_types prf, - const unsigned char *secret, size_t slen, - const char *label, - const unsigned char *random, size_t rlen, - unsigned char *dstbuf, size_t dlen) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) +static int ssl_update_checksum_sha256(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *buf, size_t len) { - mbedtls_ssl_tls_prf_cb *tls_prf = NULL; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + return mbedtls_md_error_from_psa(psa_hash_update( + &ssl->handshake->fin_sha256_psa, buf, len)); +#else + return mbedtls_md_update(&ssl->handshake->fin_sha256, buf, len); +#endif +} +#endif - switch (prf) { -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) - case MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_PRF_SSL3: - tls_prf = ssl3_prf; - break; -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) - case MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_PRF_TLS1: - tls_prf = tls1_prf; - break; -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 || MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) +static int ssl_update_checksum_sha384(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *buf, size_t len) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + return mbedtls_md_error_from_psa(psa_hash_update( + &ssl->handshake->fin_sha384_psa, buf, len)); +#else + return mbedtls_md_update(&ssl->handshake->fin_sha384, buf, len); +#endif +} +#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384) - case MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_PRF_SHA384: - tls_prf = tls_prf_sha384; - break; -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_C && !MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) - case MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_PRF_SHA256: - tls_prf = tls_prf_sha256; - break; -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ - default: - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; - } +static void ssl_handshake_params_init(mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *handshake) +{ + memset(handshake, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params)); - return tls_prf(secret, slen, label, random, rlen, dstbuf, dlen); -} +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + handshake->fin_sha256_psa = psa_hash_operation_init(); +#else + mbedtls_md_init(&handshake->fin_sha256); +#endif +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + handshake->fin_sha384_psa = psa_hash_operation_init(); +#else + mbedtls_md_init(&handshake->fin_sha384); +#endif +#endif -/* Type for the TLS PRF */ -typedef int ssl_tls_prf_t(const unsigned char *, size_t, const char *, - const unsigned char *, size_t, - unsigned char *, size_t); + handshake->update_checksum = ssl_update_checksum_start; -/* - * Populate a transform structure with session keys and all the other - * necessary information. - * - * Parameters: - * - [in/out]: transform: structure to populate - * [in] must be just initialised with mbedtls_ssl_transform_init() - * [out] fully populated, ready for use by mbedtls_ssl_{en,de}crypt_buf() - * - [in] ciphersuite - * - [in] master - * - [in] encrypt_then_mac - * - [in] trunc_hmac - * - [in] compression - * - [in] tls_prf: pointer to PRF to use for key derivation - * - [in] randbytes: buffer holding ServerHello.random + ClientHello.random - * - [in] minor_ver: SSL/TLS minor version - * - [in] endpoint: client or server - * - [in] ssl: optionally used for: - * - MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL: whole context (non-const) - * - MBEDTLS_SSL_EXPORT_KEYS: ssl->conf->{f,p}_export_keys - * - MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C: ssl->conf->{f,p}_dbg - */ -MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL -static int ssl_populate_transform(mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform, - int ciphersuite, - const unsigned char master[48], -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_MODES_USE_MAC) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) - int encrypt_then_mac, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC) - int trunc_hmac, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_MODES_USE_MAC */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT) - int compression, -#endif - ssl_tls_prf_t tls_prf, - const unsigned char randbytes[64], - int minor_ver, - unsigned endpoint, -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL) - const -#endif - mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) -{ - int ret = 0; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_C) + mbedtls_dhm_init(&handshake->dhm_ctx); +#endif +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDH_OR_ECDHE_1_2_ENABLED) + mbedtls_ecdh_init(&handshake->ecdh_ctx); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) #if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) - int psa_fallthrough; + handshake->psa_pake_ctx = psa_pake_operation_init(); + handshake->psa_pake_password = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; +#else + mbedtls_ecjpake_init(&handshake->ecjpake_ctx); #endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ - int do_mbedtls_cipher_setup; - unsigned char keyblk[256]; - unsigned char *key1; - unsigned char *key2; - unsigned char *mac_enc; - unsigned char *mac_dec; - size_t mac_key_len = 0; - size_t iv_copy_len; - unsigned keylen; - const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info; - const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *cipher_info; - const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) + handshake->ecjpake_cache = NULL; + handshake->ecjpake_cache_len = 0; +#endif +#endif -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL) && \ - !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXPORT_KEYS) && \ - !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) && \ - !defined(MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C) - (void) ssl; /* ssl is unused except for those cases */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED) + mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_init(&handshake->ecrs_ctx); #endif - /* - * Some data just needs copying into the structure - */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) && \ - defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_MODES_USE_MAC) - transform->encrypt_then_mac = encrypt_then_mac; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) + handshake->sni_authmode = MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_UNSET; #endif - transform->minor_ver = minor_ver; -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CONTEXT_SERIALIZATION) - memcpy(transform->randbytes, randbytes, sizeof(transform->randbytes)); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) + mbedtls_pk_init(&handshake->peer_pubkey); #endif +} - /* - * Get various info structures - */ - ciphersuite_info = mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_from_id(ciphersuite); - if (ciphersuite_info == NULL) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("ciphersuite info for %d not found", - ciphersuite)); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; - } +void mbedtls_ssl_transform_init(mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform) +{ + memset(transform, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_ssl_transform)); - cipher_info = mbedtls_cipher_info_from_type(ciphersuite_info->cipher); - if (cipher_info == NULL) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("cipher info for %u not found", - ciphersuite_info->cipher)); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; - } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + transform->psa_key_enc = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + transform->psa_key_dec = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; +#else + mbedtls_cipher_init(&transform->cipher_ctx_enc); + mbedtls_cipher_init(&transform->cipher_ctx_dec); +#endif - md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type(ciphersuite_info->mac); - if (md_info == NULL) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("mbedtls_md info for %u not found", - (unsigned) ciphersuite_info->mac)); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; - } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_MAC) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + transform->psa_mac_enc = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + transform->psa_mac_dec = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; +#else + mbedtls_md_init(&transform->md_ctx_enc); + mbedtls_md_init(&transform->md_ctx_dec); +#endif +#endif +} -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) - /* Copy own and peer's CID if the use of the CID - * extension has been negotiated. */ - if (ssl->handshake->cid_in_use == MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_ENABLED) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("Copy CIDs into SSL transform")); +void mbedtls_ssl_session_init(mbedtls_ssl_session *session) +{ + memset(session, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_ssl_session)); +} - transform->in_cid_len = ssl->own_cid_len; - memcpy(transform->in_cid, ssl->own_cid, ssl->own_cid_len); - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "Incoming CID", transform->in_cid, - transform->in_cid_len); +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_handshake_init(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - transform->out_cid_len = ssl->handshake->peer_cid_len; - memcpy(transform->out_cid, ssl->handshake->peer_cid, - ssl->handshake->peer_cid_len); - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "Outgoing CID", transform->out_cid, - transform->out_cid_len); + /* Clear old handshake information if present */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) + if (ssl->transform_negotiate) { + mbedtls_ssl_transform_free(ssl->transform_negotiate); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ + if (ssl->session_negotiate) { + mbedtls_ssl_session_free(ssl->session_negotiate); + } + if (ssl->handshake) { + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_free(ssl); } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) /* - * Compute key block using the PRF + * Either the pointers are now NULL or cleared properly and can be freed. + * Now allocate missing structures. */ - ret = tls_prf(master, 48, "key expansion", randbytes, 64, keyblk, 256); - if (ret != 0) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "prf", ret); - return ret; + if (ssl->transform_negotiate == NULL) { + ssl->transform_negotiate = mbedtls_calloc(1, sizeof(mbedtls_ssl_transform)); } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("ciphersuite = %s", - mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_name(ciphersuite))); - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "master secret", master, 48); - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "random bytes", randbytes, 64); - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "key block", keyblk, 256); - - /* - * Determine the appropriate key, IV and MAC length. - */ + if (ssl->session_negotiate == NULL) { + ssl->session_negotiate = mbedtls_calloc(1, sizeof(mbedtls_ssl_session)); + } - keylen = cipher_info->key_bitlen / 8; + if (ssl->handshake == NULL) { + ssl->handshake = mbedtls_calloc(1, sizeof(mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params)); + } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH) + /* If the buffers are too small - reallocate */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C) - if (cipher_info->mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM || - cipher_info->mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM || - cipher_info->mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_CHACHAPOLY) { - size_t explicit_ivlen; + handle_buffer_resizing(ssl, 0, MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_BUFFER_LEN, + MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_BUFFER_LEN); +#endif - transform->maclen = 0; - mac_key_len = 0; - transform->taglen = - ciphersuite_info->flags & MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_SHORT_TAG ? 8 : 16; + /* All pointers should exist and can be directly freed without issue */ + if (ssl->handshake == NULL || +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) + ssl->transform_negotiate == NULL || +#endif + ssl->session_negotiate == NULL) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("alloc() of ssl sub-contexts failed")); - /* All modes haves 96-bit IVs, but the length of the static parts vary - * with mode and version: - * - For GCM and CCM in TLS 1.2, there's a static IV of 4 Bytes - * (to be concatenated with a dynamically chosen IV of 8 Bytes) - * - For ChaChaPoly in TLS 1.2, and all modes in TLS 1.3, there's - * a static IV of 12 Bytes (to be XOR'ed with the 8 Byte record - * sequence number). - */ - transform->ivlen = 12; -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL) - if (minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_4) { - transform->fixed_ivlen = 12; - } else -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL */ - { - if (cipher_info->mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_CHACHAPOLY) { - transform->fixed_ivlen = 12; - } else { - transform->fixed_ivlen = 4; - } - } + mbedtls_free(ssl->handshake); + ssl->handshake = NULL; - /* Minimum length of encrypted record */ - explicit_ivlen = transform->ivlen - transform->fixed_ivlen; - transform->minlen = explicit_ivlen + transform->taglen; - } else -#endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C || MBEDTLS_CCM_C || MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_MODES_USE_MAC) - if (cipher_info->mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_STREAM || - cipher_info->mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC) { - /* Initialize HMAC contexts */ - if ((ret = mbedtls_md_setup(&transform->md_ctx_enc, md_info, 1)) != 0 || - (ret = mbedtls_md_setup(&transform->md_ctx_dec, md_info, 1)) != 0) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_md_setup", ret); - goto end; - } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) + mbedtls_free(ssl->transform_negotiate); + ssl->transform_negotiate = NULL; +#endif - /* Get MAC length */ - mac_key_len = mbedtls_md_get_size(md_info); - transform->maclen = mac_key_len; + mbedtls_free(ssl->session_negotiate); + ssl->session_negotiate = NULL; -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC) - /* - * If HMAC is to be truncated, we shall keep the leftmost bytes, - * (rfc 6066 page 13 or rfc 2104 section 4), - * so we only need to adjust the length here. - */ - if (trunc_hmac == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNC_HMAC_ENABLED) { - transform->maclen = MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC_LEN; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED; + } -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC_COMPAT) - /* Fall back to old, non-compliant version of the truncated - * HMAC implementation which also truncates the key - * (Mbed TLS versions from 1.3 to 2.6.0) */ - mac_key_len = transform->maclen; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) + ssl->early_data_state = MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATE_IDLE; #endif - } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) + ssl->discard_early_data_record = MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_NO_DISCARD; +#endif + ssl->total_early_data_size = 0; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA */ - /* IV length */ - transform->ivlen = cipher_info->iv_size; + /* Initialize structures */ + mbedtls_ssl_session_init(ssl->session_negotiate); + ssl_handshake_params_init(ssl->handshake); - /* Minimum length */ - if (cipher_info->mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_STREAM) { - transform->minlen = transform->maclen; - } else { - /* - * GenericBlockCipher: - * 1. if EtM is in use: one block plus MAC - * otherwise: * first multiple of blocklen greater than maclen - * 2. IV except for SSL3 and TLS 1.0 - */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) - if (encrypt_then_mac == MBEDTLS_SSL_ETM_ENABLED) { - transform->minlen = transform->maclen - + cipher_info->block_size; - } else +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) + mbedtls_ssl_transform_init(ssl->transform_negotiate); #endif - { - transform->minlen = transform->maclen - + cipher_info->block_size - - transform->maclen % cipher_info->block_size; - } -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) - if (minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 || - minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1) { - ; /* No need to adjust minlen */ - } else -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) - if (minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2 || - minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3) { - transform->minlen += transform->ivlen; - } else -#endif - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("should never happen")); - ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; - goto end; - } - } - } else -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_MODES_USE_MAC */ - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("should never happen")); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + /* Setup handshake checksums */ + ret = mbedtls_ssl_reset_checksum(ssl); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_reset_checksum", ret); + return ret; } - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("keylen: %u, minlen: %u, ivlen: %u, maclen: %u", - (unsigned) keylen, - (unsigned) transform->minlen, - (unsigned) transform->ivlen, - (unsigned) transform->maclen)); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) + ssl->handshake->new_session_tickets_count = + ssl->conf->new_session_tickets_count; +#endif - /* - * Finally setup the cipher contexts, IVs and MAC secrets. - */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) - if (endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT) { - key1 = keyblk + mac_key_len * 2; - key2 = keyblk + mac_key_len * 2 + keylen; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM) { + ssl->handshake->alt_transform_out = ssl->transform_out; - mac_enc = keyblk; - mac_dec = keyblk + mac_key_len; + if (ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT) { + ssl->handshake->retransmit_state = MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_PREPARING; + } else { + ssl->handshake->retransmit_state = MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_WAITING; + } - /* - * This is not used in TLS v1.1. - */ - iv_copy_len = (transform->fixed_ivlen) ? - transform->fixed_ivlen : transform->ivlen; - memcpy(transform->iv_enc, key2 + keylen, iv_copy_len); - memcpy(transform->iv_dec, key2 + keylen + iv_copy_len, - iv_copy_len); - } else -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) - if (endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER) { - key1 = keyblk + mac_key_len * 2 + keylen; - key2 = keyblk + mac_key_len * 2; + mbedtls_ssl_set_timer(ssl, 0); + } +#endif - mac_enc = keyblk + mac_key_len; - mac_dec = keyblk; +/* + * curve_list is translated to IANA TLS group identifiers here because + * mbedtls_ssl_conf_curves returns void and so can't return + * any error codes. + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) + /* Heap allocate and translate curve_list from internal to IANA group ids */ + if (ssl->conf->curve_list != NULL) { + size_t length; + const mbedtls_ecp_group_id *curve_list = ssl->conf->curve_list; - /* - * This is not used in TLS v1.1. - */ - iv_copy_len = (transform->fixed_ivlen) ? - transform->fixed_ivlen : transform->ivlen; - memcpy(transform->iv_dec, key1 + keylen, iv_copy_len); - memcpy(transform->iv_enc, key1 + keylen + iv_copy_len, - iv_copy_len); - } else -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("should never happen")); - ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; - goto end; - } + for (length = 0; (curve_list[length] != MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE); length++) { + } -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_MODES_USE_MAC) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) - if (minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0) { - if (mac_key_len > sizeof(transform->mac_enc)) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("should never happen")); - ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; - goto end; + /* Leave room for zero termination */ + uint16_t *group_list = mbedtls_calloc(length + 1, sizeof(uint16_t)); + if (group_list == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED; } - memcpy(transform->mac_enc, mac_enc, mac_key_len); - memcpy(transform->mac_dec, mac_dec, mac_key_len); - } else -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) - if (minor_ver >= MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1) { - /* For HMAC-based ciphersuites, initialize the HMAC transforms. - For AEAD-based ciphersuites, there is nothing to do here. */ - if (mac_key_len != 0) { - ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_starts(&transform->md_ctx_enc, - mac_enc, mac_key_len); - if (ret != 0) { - goto end; - } - ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_starts(&transform->md_ctx_dec, - mac_dec, mac_key_len); - if (ret != 0) { - goto end; + for (size_t i = 0; i < length; i++) { + uint16_t tls_id = mbedtls_ssl_get_tls_id_from_ecp_group_id( + curve_list[i]); + if (tls_id == 0) { + mbedtls_free(group_list); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_CONFIG; } + group_list[i] = tls_id; } - } else -#endif - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("should never happen")); - ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; - goto end; - } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_MODES_USE_MAC */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL) - if (mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_init != NULL) { - ret = 0; - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("going for mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_init()")); - if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_init(ssl, key1, key2, keylen, - transform->iv_enc, transform->iv_dec, - iv_copy_len, - mac_enc, mac_dec, - mac_key_len)) != 0) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_init", ret); - ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED; - goto end; - } - } -#else - ((void) mac_dec); - ((void) mac_enc); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL */ + group_list[length] = 0; -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXPORT_KEYS) - if (ssl->conf->f_export_keys != NULL) { - ssl->conf->f_export_keys(ssl->conf->p_export_keys, - master, keyblk, - mac_key_len, keylen, - iv_copy_len); + ssl->handshake->group_list = group_list; + ssl->handshake->group_list_heap_allocated = 1; + } else { + ssl->handshake->group_list = ssl->conf->group_list; + ssl->handshake->group_list_heap_allocated = 0; } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */ - if (ssl->conf->f_export_keys_ext != NULL) { - ssl->conf->f_export_keys_ext(ssl->conf->p_export_keys, - master, keyblk, - mac_key_len, keylen, - iv_copy_len, - randbytes + 32, - randbytes, - tls_prf_get_type(tls_prf)); - } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) + /* Heap allocate and translate sig_hashes from internal hash identifiers to + signature algorithms IANA identifiers. */ + if (mbedtls_ssl_conf_is_tls12_only(ssl->conf) && + ssl->conf->sig_hashes != NULL) { + const int *md; + const int *sig_hashes = ssl->conf->sig_hashes; + size_t sig_algs_len = 0; + uint16_t *p; + + MBEDTLS_STATIC_ASSERT(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_SIG_ALG_LIST_LEN + <= (SIZE_MAX - (2 * sizeof(uint16_t))), + "MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_SIG_ALG_LIST_LEN too big"); + + for (md = sig_hashes; *md != MBEDTLS_MD_NONE; md++) { + if (mbedtls_ssl_hash_from_md_alg(*md) == MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_NONE) { + continue; + } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDSA_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED) + sig_algs_len += sizeof(uint16_t); #endif - do_mbedtls_cipher_setup = 1; -#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) - - /* Only use PSA-based ciphers for TLS-1.2. - * That's relevant at least for TLS-1.0, where - * we assume that mbedtls_cipher_crypt() updates - * the structure field for the IV, which the PSA-based - * implementation currently doesn't. */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) - if (minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3) { - ret = mbedtls_cipher_setup_psa(&transform->cipher_ctx_enc, - cipher_info, transform->taglen); - if (ret != 0 && ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_cipher_setup_psa", ret); - goto end; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) + sig_algs_len += sizeof(uint16_t); +#endif + if (sig_algs_len > MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_SIG_ALG_LIST_LEN) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_CONFIG; + } } - if (ret == 0) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("Successfully setup PSA-based encryption cipher context")); - psa_fallthrough = 0; - } else { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, - ( - "Failed to setup PSA-based cipher context for record encryption - fall through to default setup.")); - psa_fallthrough = 1; + if (sig_algs_len < MBEDTLS_SSL_MIN_SIG_ALG_LIST_LEN) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_CONFIG; } - } else { - psa_fallthrough = 1; - } -#else - psa_fallthrough = 1; -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ - - if (psa_fallthrough == 0) { - do_mbedtls_cipher_setup = 0; - } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ - if (do_mbedtls_cipher_setup && - (ret = mbedtls_cipher_setup(&transform->cipher_ctx_enc, - cipher_info)) != 0) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_cipher_setup", ret); - goto end; - } - do_mbedtls_cipher_setup = 1; -#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) - /* Only use PSA-based ciphers for TLS-1.2. - * That's relevant at least for TLS-1.0, where - * we assume that mbedtls_cipher_crypt() updates - * the structure field for the IV, which the PSA-based - * implementation currently doesn't. */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) - if (minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3) { - ret = mbedtls_cipher_setup_psa(&transform->cipher_ctx_dec, - cipher_info, transform->taglen); - if (ret != 0 && ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_cipher_setup_psa", ret); - goto end; + ssl->handshake->sig_algs = mbedtls_calloc(1, sig_algs_len + + sizeof(uint16_t)); + if (ssl->handshake->sig_algs == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED; } - if (ret == 0) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("Successfully setup PSA-based decryption cipher context")); - psa_fallthrough = 0; - } else { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, - ( - "Failed to setup PSA-based cipher context for record decryption - fall through to default setup.")); - psa_fallthrough = 1; + p = (uint16_t *) ssl->handshake->sig_algs; + for (md = sig_hashes; *md != MBEDTLS_MD_NONE; md++) { + unsigned char hash = mbedtls_ssl_hash_from_md_alg(*md); + if (hash == MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_NONE) { + continue; + } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDSA_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED) + *p = ((hash << 8) | MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_ECDSA); + p++; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) + *p = ((hash << 8) | MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_RSA); + p++; +#endif } - } else { - psa_fallthrough = 1; - } -#else - psa_fallthrough = 1; + *p = MBEDTLS_TLS_SIG_NONE; + ssl->handshake->sig_algs_heap_allocated = 1; + } else #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ - - if (psa_fallthrough == 0) { - do_mbedtls_cipher_setup = 0; - } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ - if (do_mbedtls_cipher_setup && - (ret = mbedtls_cipher_setup(&transform->cipher_ctx_dec, - cipher_info)) != 0) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_cipher_setup", ret); - goto end; + { + ssl->handshake->sig_algs_heap_allocated = 0; } +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */ + return 0; +} - if ((ret = mbedtls_cipher_setkey(&transform->cipher_ctx_enc, key1, - cipher_info->key_bitlen, - MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT)) != 0) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_cipher_setkey", ret); - goto end; - } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) +/* Dummy cookie callbacks for defaults */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_cookie_write_dummy(void *ctx, + unsigned char **p, unsigned char *end, + const unsigned char *cli_id, size_t cli_id_len) +{ + ((void) ctx); + ((void) p); + ((void) end); + ((void) cli_id); + ((void) cli_id_len); - if ((ret = mbedtls_cipher_setkey(&transform->cipher_ctx_dec, key2, - cipher_info->key_bitlen, - MBEDTLS_DECRYPT)) != 0) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_cipher_setkey", ret); - goto end; - } + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; +} -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) - if (cipher_info->mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC) { - if ((ret = mbedtls_cipher_set_padding_mode(&transform->cipher_ctx_enc, - MBEDTLS_PADDING_NONE)) != 0) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_cipher_set_padding_mode", ret); - goto end; - } +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_cookie_check_dummy(void *ctx, + const unsigned char *cookie, size_t cookie_len, + const unsigned char *cli_id, size_t cli_id_len) +{ + ((void) ctx); + ((void) cookie); + ((void) cookie_len); + ((void) cli_id); + ((void) cli_id_len); - if ((ret = mbedtls_cipher_set_padding_mode(&transform->cipher_ctx_dec, - MBEDTLS_PADDING_NONE)) != 0) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_cipher_set_padding_mode", ret); - goto end; - } - } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY && MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ + +/* + * Initialize an SSL context + */ +void mbedtls_ssl_init(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + memset(ssl, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_ssl_context)); +} +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_conf_version_check(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + const mbedtls_ssl_config *conf = ssl->conf; - /* Initialize Zlib contexts */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT) - if (compression == MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_DEFLATE) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("Initializing zlib states")); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) + if (mbedtls_ssl_conf_is_tls13_only(conf)) { + if (conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("DTLS 1.3 is not yet supported.")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + } - memset(&transform->ctx_deflate, 0, sizeof(transform->ctx_deflate)); - memset(&transform->ctx_inflate, 0, sizeof(transform->ctx_inflate)); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(4, ("The SSL configuration is tls13 only.")); + return 0; + } +#endif - if (deflateInit(&transform->ctx_deflate, - Z_DEFAULT_COMPRESSION) != Z_OK || - inflateInit(&transform->ctx_inflate) != Z_OK) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("Failed to initialize compression")); - ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_COMPRESSION_FAILED; - goto end; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) + if (mbedtls_ssl_conf_is_tls12_only(conf)) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(4, ("The SSL configuration is tls12 only.")); + return 0; + } +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) + if (mbedtls_ssl_conf_is_hybrid_tls12_tls13(conf)) { + if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("DTLS not yet supported in Hybrid TLS 1.3 + TLS 1.2")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(4, ("The SSL configuration is TLS 1.3 or TLS 1.2.")); + return 0; } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT */ +#endif -end: - mbedtls_platform_zeroize(keyblk, sizeof(keyblk)); - return ret; + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("The SSL configuration is invalid.")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_CONFIG; } -/* - * Set appropriate PRF function and other SSL / TLS 1.0/1.1 / TLS1.2 functions - * - * Inputs: - * - SSL/TLS minor version - * - hash associated with the ciphersuite (only used by TLS 1.2) - * - * Outputs: - * - the tls_prf, calc_verify and calc_finished members of handshake structure - */ MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL -static int ssl_set_handshake_prfs(mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *handshake, - int minor_ver, - mbedtls_md_type_t hash) +static int ssl_conf_check(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) { -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) || \ - !(defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384)) - (void) hash; -#endif + int ret; + ret = ssl_conf_version_check(ssl); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) - if (minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0) { - handshake->tls_prf = ssl3_prf; - handshake->calc_verify = ssl_calc_verify_ssl; - handshake->calc_finished = ssl_calc_finished_ssl; - } else -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) - if (minor_ver < MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3) { - handshake->tls_prf = tls1_prf; - handshake->calc_verify = ssl_calc_verify_tls; - handshake->calc_finished = ssl_calc_finished_tls; - } else -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384) - if (minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 && - hash == MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384) { - handshake->tls_prf = tls_prf_sha384; - handshake->calc_verify = ssl_calc_verify_tls_sha384; - handshake->calc_finished = ssl_calc_finished_tls_sha384; - } else -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) - if (minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3) { - handshake->tls_prf = tls_prf_sha256; - handshake->calc_verify = ssl_calc_verify_tls_sha256; - handshake->calc_finished = ssl_calc_finished_tls_sha256; - } else -#endif -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ - { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) + /* RFC 8446 section 4.4.3 + * + * If the verification fails, the receiver MUST terminate the handshake with + * a "decrypt_error" alert. + * + * If the client is configured as TLS 1.3 only with optional verify, return + * bad config. + * + */ + if (mbedtls_ssl_conf_tls13_is_ephemeral_enabled( + (mbedtls_ssl_context *) ssl) && + ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT && + ssl->conf->max_tls_version == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_3 && + ssl->conf->min_tls_version == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_3 && + ssl->conf->authmode == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_OPTIONAL) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( + 1, ("Optional verify auth mode " + "is not available for TLS 1.3 client")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_CONFIG; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 */ + + if (ssl->conf->f_rng == NULL) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("no RNG provided")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NO_RNG; } + /* Space for further checks */ + return 0; } /* - * Compute master secret if needed - * - * Parameters: - * [in/out] handshake - * [in] resume, premaster, extended_ms, calc_verify, tls_prf - * (PSA-PSK) ciphersuite_info, psk_opaque - * [out] premaster (cleared) - * [out] master - * [in] ssl: optionally used for debugging, EMS and PSA-PSK - * debug: conf->f_dbg, conf->p_dbg - * EMS: passed to calc_verify (debug + (SSL3) session_negotiate) - * PSA-PSA: minor_ver, conf + * Setup an SSL context */ -MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL -static int ssl_compute_master(mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *handshake, - unsigned char *master, - const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) + +int mbedtls_ssl_setup(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const mbedtls_ssl_config *conf) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t in_buf_len = MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_BUFFER_LEN; + size_t out_buf_len = MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_BUFFER_LEN; - /* cf. RFC 5246, Section 8.1: - * "The master secret is always exactly 48 bytes in length." */ - size_t const master_secret_len = 48; + ssl->conf = conf; -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET) - unsigned char session_hash[48]; -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET */ + if ((ret = ssl_conf_check(ssl)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + ssl->tls_version = ssl->conf->max_tls_version; - /* The label for the KDF used for key expansion. - * This is either "master secret" or "extended master secret" - * depending on whether the Extended Master Secret extension - * is used. */ - char const *lbl = "master secret"; + /* + * Prepare base structures + */ - /* The salt for the KDF used for key expansion. - * - If the Extended Master Secret extension is not used, - * this is ClientHello.Random + ServerHello.Random - * (see Sect. 8.1 in RFC 5246). - * - If the Extended Master Secret extension is used, - * this is the transcript of the handshake so far. - * (see Sect. 4 in RFC 7627). */ - unsigned char const *salt = handshake->randbytes; - size_t salt_len = 64; + /* Set to NULL in case of an error condition */ + ssl->out_buf = NULL; -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C) && \ - !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET) && \ - !(defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && \ - defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED)) - ssl = NULL; /* make sure we don't use it except for those cases */ - (void) ssl; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH) + ssl->in_buf_len = in_buf_len; #endif - - if (handshake->resume != 0) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("no premaster (session resumed)")); - return 0; + ssl->in_buf = mbedtls_calloc(1, in_buf_len); + if (ssl->in_buf == NULL) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("alloc(%" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET " bytes) failed", in_buf_len)); + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED; + goto error; } -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET) - if (handshake->extended_ms == MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MS_ENABLED) { - lbl = "extended master secret"; - salt = session_hash; - handshake->calc_verify(ssl, session_hash, &salt_len); - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "session hash for extended master secret", - session_hash, salt_len); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH) + ssl->out_buf_len = out_buf_len; +#endif + ssl->out_buf = mbedtls_calloc(1, out_buf_len); + if (ssl->out_buf == NULL) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("alloc(%" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET " bytes) failed", out_buf_len)); + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED; + goto error; } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MS_ENABLED */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && \ - defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED) - if (handshake->ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK && - ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 && - ssl_use_opaque_psk(ssl) == 1) { - /* Perform PSK-to-MS expansion in a single step. */ - psa_status_t status; - psa_algorithm_t alg; - psa_key_id_t psk; - psa_key_derivation_operation_t derivation = - PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_OPERATION_INIT; - mbedtls_md_type_t hash_alg = handshake->ciphersuite_info->mac; - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("perform PSA-based PSK-to-MS expansion")); - - psk = mbedtls_ssl_get_opaque_psk(ssl); - - if (hash_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384) { - alg = PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_384); - } else { - alg = PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256); - } - - status = setup_psa_key_derivation(&derivation, psk, alg, - salt, salt_len, - (unsigned char const *) lbl, - (size_t) strlen(lbl), - master_secret_len); - if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { - psa_key_derivation_abort(&derivation); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED; - } - status = psa_key_derivation_output_bytes(&derivation, - master, - master_secret_len); - if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { - psa_key_derivation_abort(&derivation); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED; - } + mbedtls_ssl_reset_in_out_pointers(ssl); - status = psa_key_derivation_abort(&derivation); - if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED; - } - } else +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP) + memset(&ssl->dtls_srtp_info, 0, sizeof(ssl->dtls_srtp_info)); #endif - { - ret = handshake->tls_prf(handshake->premaster, handshake->pmslen, - lbl, salt, salt_len, - master, - master_secret_len); - if (ret != 0) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "prf", ret); - return ret; - } - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "premaster secret", - handshake->premaster, - handshake->pmslen); - mbedtls_platform_zeroize(handshake->premaster, - sizeof(handshake->premaster)); + if ((ret = ssl_handshake_init(ssl)) != 0) { + goto error; } return 0; -} -int mbedtls_ssl_derive_keys(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) -{ - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t * const ciphersuite_info = - ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info; +error: + mbedtls_free(ssl->in_buf); + mbedtls_free(ssl->out_buf); - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> derive keys")); + ssl->conf = NULL; - /* Set PRF, calc_verify and calc_finished function pointers */ - ret = ssl_set_handshake_prfs(ssl->handshake, - ssl->minor_ver, - ciphersuite_info->mac); - if (ret != 0) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "ssl_set_handshake_prfs", ret); - return ret; - } - - /* Compute master secret if needed */ - ret = ssl_compute_master(ssl->handshake, - ssl->session_negotiate->master, - ssl); - if (ret != 0) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "ssl_compute_master", ret); - return ret; - } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH) + ssl->in_buf_len = 0; + ssl->out_buf_len = 0; +#endif + ssl->in_buf = NULL; + ssl->out_buf = NULL; - /* Swap the client and server random values: - * - MS derivation wanted client+server (RFC 5246 8.1) - * - key derivation wants server+client (RFC 5246 6.3) */ - { - unsigned char tmp[64]; - memcpy(tmp, ssl->handshake->randbytes, 64); - memcpy(ssl->handshake->randbytes, tmp + 32, 32); - memcpy(ssl->handshake->randbytes + 32, tmp, 32); - mbedtls_platform_zeroize(tmp, sizeof(tmp)); - } + ssl->in_hdr = NULL; + ssl->in_ctr = NULL; + ssl->in_len = NULL; + ssl->in_iv = NULL; + ssl->in_msg = NULL; - /* Populate transform structure */ - ret = ssl_populate_transform(ssl->transform_negotiate, - ssl->session_negotiate->ciphersuite, - ssl->session_negotiate->master, -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_MODES_USE_MAC) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) - ssl->session_negotiate->encrypt_then_mac, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC) - ssl->session_negotiate->trunc_hmac, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_MODES_USE_MAC */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT) - ssl->session_negotiate->compression, -#endif - ssl->handshake->tls_prf, - ssl->handshake->randbytes, - ssl->minor_ver, - ssl->conf->endpoint, - ssl); - if (ret != 0) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "ssl_populate_transform", ret); - return ret; - } + ssl->out_hdr = NULL; + ssl->out_ctr = NULL; + ssl->out_len = NULL; + ssl->out_iv = NULL; + ssl->out_msg = NULL; - /* We no longer need Server/ClientHello.random values */ - mbedtls_platform_zeroize(ssl->handshake->randbytes, - sizeof(ssl->handshake->randbytes)); + return ret; +} - /* Allocate compression buffer */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT) - if (ssl->session_negotiate->compression == MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_DEFLATE && - ssl->compress_buf == NULL) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("Allocating compression buffer")); - ssl->compress_buf = mbedtls_calloc(1, MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_BUFFER_LEN); - if (ssl->compress_buf == NULL) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("alloc(%d bytes) failed", - MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_BUFFER_LEN)); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED; - } - } +/* + * Reset an initialized and used SSL context for re-use while retaining + * all application-set variables, function pointers and data. + * + * If partial is non-zero, keep data in the input buffer and client ID. + * (Use when a DTLS client reconnects from the same port.) + */ +void mbedtls_ssl_session_reset_msg_layer(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + int partial) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH) + size_t in_buf_len = ssl->in_buf_len; + size_t out_buf_len = ssl->out_buf_len; +#else + size_t in_buf_len = MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_BUFFER_LEN; + size_t out_buf_len = MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_BUFFER_LEN; #endif - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= derive keys")); - - return 0; -} +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CLIENT_PORT_REUSE) || !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) + partial = 0; +#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) -void ssl_calc_verify_ssl(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - unsigned char *hash, - size_t *hlen) -{ - mbedtls_md5_context md5; - mbedtls_sha1_context sha1; - unsigned char pad_1[48]; - unsigned char pad_2[48]; + /* Cancel any possibly running timer */ + mbedtls_ssl_set_timer(ssl, 0); - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> calc verify ssl")); + mbedtls_ssl_reset_in_out_pointers(ssl); - mbedtls_md5_init(&md5); - mbedtls_sha1_init(&sha1); + /* Reset incoming message parsing */ + ssl->in_offt = NULL; + ssl->nb_zero = 0; + ssl->in_msgtype = 0; + ssl->in_msglen = 0; + ssl->in_hslen = 0; + ssl->keep_current_message = 0; + ssl->transform_in = NULL; - mbedtls_md5_clone(&md5, &ssl->handshake->fin_md5); - mbedtls_sha1_clone(&sha1, &ssl->handshake->fin_sha1); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + ssl->next_record_offset = 0; + ssl->in_epoch = 0; +#endif - memset(pad_1, 0x36, 48); - memset(pad_2, 0x5C, 48); + /* Keep current datagram if partial == 1 */ + if (partial == 0) { + ssl->in_left = 0; + memset(ssl->in_buf, 0, in_buf_len); + } - mbedtls_md5_update_ret(&md5, ssl->session_negotiate->master, 48); - mbedtls_md5_update_ret(&md5, pad_1, 48); - mbedtls_md5_finish_ret(&md5, hash); + ssl->send_alert = 0; - mbedtls_md5_starts_ret(&md5); - mbedtls_md5_update_ret(&md5, ssl->session_negotiate->master, 48); - mbedtls_md5_update_ret(&md5, pad_2, 48); - mbedtls_md5_update_ret(&md5, hash, 16); - mbedtls_md5_finish_ret(&md5, hash); + /* Reset outgoing message writing */ + ssl->out_msgtype = 0; + ssl->out_msglen = 0; + ssl->out_left = 0; + memset(ssl->out_buf, 0, out_buf_len); + memset(ssl->cur_out_ctr, 0, sizeof(ssl->cur_out_ctr)); + ssl->transform_out = NULL; - mbedtls_sha1_update_ret(&sha1, ssl->session_negotiate->master, 48); - mbedtls_sha1_update_ret(&sha1, pad_1, 40); - mbedtls_sha1_finish_ret(&sha1, hash + 16); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY) + mbedtls_ssl_dtls_replay_reset(ssl); +#endif - mbedtls_sha1_starts_ret(&sha1); - mbedtls_sha1_update_ret(&sha1, ssl->session_negotiate->master, 48); - mbedtls_sha1_update_ret(&sha1, pad_2, 40); - mbedtls_sha1_update_ret(&sha1, hash + 16, 20); - mbedtls_sha1_finish_ret(&sha1, hash + 16); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) + if (ssl->transform) { + mbedtls_ssl_transform_free(ssl->transform); + mbedtls_free(ssl->transform); + ssl->transform = NULL; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ - *hlen = 36; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) + mbedtls_ssl_transform_free(ssl->transform_application); + mbedtls_free(ssl->transform_application); + ssl->transform_application = NULL; - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "calculated verify result", hash, *hlen); - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= calc verify")); + if (ssl->handshake != NULL) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) + mbedtls_ssl_transform_free(ssl->handshake->transform_earlydata); + mbedtls_free(ssl->handshake->transform_earlydata); + ssl->handshake->transform_earlydata = NULL; +#endif - mbedtls_md5_free(&md5); - mbedtls_sha1_free(&sha1); + mbedtls_ssl_transform_free(ssl->handshake->transform_handshake); + mbedtls_free(ssl->handshake->transform_handshake); + ssl->handshake->transform_handshake = NULL; + } - return; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 */ } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) -void ssl_calc_verify_tls(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - unsigned char *hash, - size_t *hlen) +int mbedtls_ssl_session_reset_int(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int partial) { - mbedtls_md5_context md5; - mbedtls_sha1_context sha1; - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> calc verify tls")); - - mbedtls_md5_init(&md5); - mbedtls_sha1_init(&sha1); - - mbedtls_md5_clone(&md5, &ssl->handshake->fin_md5); - mbedtls_sha1_clone(&sha1, &ssl->handshake->fin_sha1); + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - mbedtls_md5_finish_ret(&md5, hash); - mbedtls_sha1_finish_ret(&sha1, hash + 16); + ssl->state = MBEDTLS_SSL_HELLO_REQUEST; + ssl->tls_version = ssl->conf->max_tls_version; - *hlen = 36; + mbedtls_ssl_session_reset_msg_layer(ssl, partial); - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "calculated verify result", hash, *hlen); - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= calc verify")); + /* Reset renegotiation state */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) + ssl->renego_status = MBEDTLS_SSL_INITIAL_HANDSHAKE; + ssl->renego_records_seen = 0; - mbedtls_md5_free(&md5); - mbedtls_sha1_free(&sha1); + ssl->verify_data_len = 0; + memset(ssl->own_verify_data, 0, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_DATA_MAX_LEN); + memset(ssl->peer_verify_data, 0, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_DATA_MAX_LEN); +#endif + ssl->secure_renegotiation = MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION; - return; -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 || MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 */ + ssl->session_in = NULL; + ssl->session_out = NULL; + if (ssl->session) { + mbedtls_ssl_session_free(ssl->session); + mbedtls_free(ssl->session); + ssl->session = NULL; + } -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) -void ssl_calc_verify_tls_sha256(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - unsigned char *hash, - size_t *hlen) -{ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) - size_t hash_size; - psa_status_t status; - psa_hash_operation_t sha256_psa = psa_hash_operation_init(); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN) + ssl->alpn_chosen = NULL; +#endif - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> PSA calc verify sha256")); - status = psa_hash_clone(&ssl->handshake->fin_sha256_psa, &sha256_psa); - if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("PSA hash clone failed")); - return; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) + int free_cli_id = 1; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CLIENT_PORT_REUSE) + free_cli_id = (partial == 0); +#endif + if (free_cli_id) { + mbedtls_free(ssl->cli_id); + ssl->cli_id = NULL; + ssl->cli_id_len = 0; } +#endif - status = psa_hash_finish(&sha256_psa, hash, 32, &hash_size); - if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("PSA hash finish failed")); - return; + if ((ret = ssl_handshake_init(ssl)) != 0) { + return ret; } - *hlen = 32; - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "PSA calculated verify result", hash, *hlen); - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= PSA calc verify")); -#else - mbedtls_sha256_context sha256; - - mbedtls_sha256_init(&sha256); - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> calc verify sha256")); - - mbedtls_sha256_clone(&sha256, &ssl->handshake->fin_sha256); - mbedtls_sha256_finish_ret(&sha256, hash); - - *hlen = 32; - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "calculated verify result", hash, *hlen); - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= calc verify")); + return 0; +} - mbedtls_sha256_free(&sha256); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ - return; +/* + * Reset an initialized and used SSL context for re-use while retaining + * all application-set variables, function pointers and data. + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_session_reset(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + return mbedtls_ssl_session_reset_int(ssl, 0); } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384) -void ssl_calc_verify_tls_sha384(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - unsigned char *hash, - size_t *hlen) +/* + * SSL set accessors + */ +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_endpoint(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, int endpoint) { -#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) - size_t hash_size; - psa_status_t status; - psa_hash_operation_t sha384_psa = psa_hash_operation_init(); + conf->endpoint = endpoint; +} - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> PSA calc verify sha384")); - status = psa_hash_clone(&ssl->handshake->fin_sha384_psa, &sha384_psa); - if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("PSA hash clone failed")); - return; - } +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_transport(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, int transport) +{ + conf->transport = transport; +} - status = psa_hash_finish(&sha384_psa, hash, 48, &hash_size); - if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("PSA hash finish failed")); - return; - } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY) +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_dtls_anti_replay(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, char mode) +{ + conf->anti_replay = mode; +} +#endif - *hlen = 48; - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "PSA calculated verify result", hash, *hlen); - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= PSA calc verify")); -#else - mbedtls_sha512_context sha512; +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_dtls_badmac_limit(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, unsigned limit) +{ + conf->badmac_limit = limit; +} - mbedtls_sha512_init(&sha512); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> calc verify sha384")); +void mbedtls_ssl_set_datagram_packing(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned allow_packing) +{ + ssl->disable_datagram_packing = !allow_packing; +} - mbedtls_sha512_clone(&sha512, &ssl->handshake->fin_sha512); - mbedtls_sha512_finish_ret(&sha512, hash); +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_handshake_timeout(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + uint32_t min, uint32_t max) +{ + conf->hs_timeout_min = min; + conf->hs_timeout_max = max; +} +#endif - *hlen = 48; +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_authmode(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, int authmode) +{ + conf->authmode = authmode; +} - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "calculated verify result", hash, *hlen); - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= calc verify")); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_verify(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + int (*f_vrfy)(void *, mbedtls_x509_crt *, int, uint32_t *), + void *p_vrfy) +{ + conf->f_vrfy = f_vrfy; + conf->p_vrfy = p_vrfy; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ - mbedtls_sha512_free(&sha512); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ - return; +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_rng(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng) +{ + conf->f_rng = f_rng; + conf->p_rng = p_rng; } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_C && !MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED) -int mbedtls_ssl_psk_derive_premaster(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, mbedtls_key_exchange_type_t key_ex) +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_dbg(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + void (*f_dbg)(void *, int, const char *, int, const char *), + void *p_dbg) { - unsigned char *p = ssl->handshake->premaster; - unsigned char *end = p + sizeof(ssl->handshake->premaster); - const unsigned char *psk = NULL; - size_t psk_len = 0; + conf->f_dbg = f_dbg; + conf->p_dbg = p_dbg; +} - if (mbedtls_ssl_get_psk(ssl, &psk, &psk_len) - == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PRIVATE_KEY_REQUIRED) { - /* - * This should never happen because the existence of a PSK is always - * checked before calling this function - */ - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("should never happen")); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; - } - - /* - * PMS = struct { - * opaque other_secret<0..2^16-1>; - * opaque psk<0..2^16-1>; - * }; - * with "other_secret" depending on the particular key exchange - */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED) - if (key_ex == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK) { - if (end - p < 2) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; - } - - MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(psk_len, p, 0); - p += 2; - - if (end < p || (size_t) (end - p) < psk_len) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; - } +void mbedtls_ssl_set_bio(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + void *p_bio, + mbedtls_ssl_send_t *f_send, + mbedtls_ssl_recv_t *f_recv, + mbedtls_ssl_recv_timeout_t *f_recv_timeout) +{ + ssl->p_bio = p_bio; + ssl->f_send = f_send; + ssl->f_recv = f_recv; + ssl->f_recv_timeout = f_recv_timeout; +} - memset(p, 0, psk_len); - p += psk_len; - } else -#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED) - if (key_ex == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK) { - /* - * other_secret already set by the ClientKeyExchange message, - * and is 48 bytes long - */ - if (end - p < 2) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; - } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) +void mbedtls_ssl_set_mtu(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, uint16_t mtu) +{ + ssl->mtu = mtu; +} +#endif - *p++ = 0; - *p++ = 48; - p += 48; - } else -#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED) - if (key_ex == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK) { - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - size_t len; +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_read_timeout(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, uint32_t timeout) +{ + conf->read_timeout = timeout; +} - /* Write length only when we know the actual value */ - if ((ret = mbedtls_dhm_calc_secret(&ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx, - p + 2, end - (p + 2), &len, - ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng)) != 0) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_dhm_calc_secret", ret); - return ret; - } - MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(len, p, 0); - p += 2 + len; +void mbedtls_ssl_set_timer_cb(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + void *p_timer, + mbedtls_ssl_set_timer_t *f_set_timer, + mbedtls_ssl_get_timer_t *f_get_timer) +{ + ssl->p_timer = p_timer; + ssl->f_set_timer = f_set_timer; + ssl->f_get_timer = f_get_timer; - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MPI(3, "DHM: K ", &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.K); - } else -#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED) - if (key_ex == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK) { - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - size_t zlen; + /* Make sure we start with no timer running */ + mbedtls_ssl_set_timer(ssl, 0); +} - if ((ret = mbedtls_ecdh_calc_secret(&ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx, &zlen, - p + 2, end - (p + 2), - ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng)) != 0) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ecdh_calc_secret", ret); - return ret; - } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_session_cache(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + void *p_cache, + mbedtls_ssl_cache_get_t *f_get_cache, + mbedtls_ssl_cache_set_t *f_set_cache) +{ + conf->p_cache = p_cache; + conf->f_get_cache = f_get_cache; + conf->f_set_cache = f_set_cache; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ - MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(zlen, p, 0); - p += 2 + zlen; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) +int mbedtls_ssl_set_session(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, const mbedtls_ssl_session *session) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ECDH(3, &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx, - MBEDTLS_DEBUG_ECDH_Z); - } else -#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED */ - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("should never happen")); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + if (ssl == NULL || + session == NULL || + ssl->session_negotiate == NULL || + ssl->conf->endpoint != MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } - /* opaque psk<0..2^16-1>; */ - if (end - p < 2) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + if (ssl->handshake->resume == 1) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; } - MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(psk_len, p, 0); - p += 2; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) + if (session->tls_version == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_3) { + const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info = + mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_from_id(session->ciphersuite); - if (end < p || (size_t) (end - p) < psk_len) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + if (mbedtls_ssl_validate_ciphersuite( + ssl, ciphersuite_info, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_3, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_3) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(4, ("%d is not a valid TLS 1.3 ciphersuite.", + session->ciphersuite)); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 */ - memcpy(p, psk, psk_len); - p += psk_len; + if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_session_copy(ssl->session_negotiate, + session)) != 0) { + return ret; + } - ssl->handshake->pmslen = p - ssl->handshake->premaster; + ssl->handshake->resume = 1; return 0; } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) -MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL -static int ssl_write_hello_request(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) -int mbedtls_ssl_resend_hello_request(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_ciphersuites(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + const int *ciphersuites) { - /* If renegotiation is not enforced, retransmit until we would reach max - * timeout if we were using the usual handshake doubling scheme */ - if (ssl->conf->renego_max_records < 0) { - uint32_t ratio = ssl->conf->hs_timeout_max / ssl->conf->hs_timeout_min + 1; - unsigned char doublings = 1; - - while (ratio != 0) { - ++doublings; - ratio >>= 1; - } - - if (++ssl->renego_records_seen > doublings) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("no longer retransmitting hello request")); - return 0; - } - } - - return ssl_write_hello_request(ssl); + conf->ciphersuite_list = ciphersuites; } -#endif -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C && MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) -static void ssl_clear_peer_cert(mbedtls_ssl_session *session) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_tls13_key_exchange_modes(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + const int kex_modes) { -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) - if (session->peer_cert != NULL) { - mbedtls_x509_crt_free(session->peer_cert); - mbedtls_free(session->peer_cert); - session->peer_cert = NULL; - } -#else /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ - if (session->peer_cert_digest != NULL) { - /* Zeroization is not necessary. */ - mbedtls_free(session->peer_cert_digest); - session->peer_cert_digest = NULL; - session->peer_cert_digest_type = MBEDTLS_MD_NONE; - session->peer_cert_digest_len = 0; - } -#endif /* !MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ + conf->tls13_kex_modes = kex_modes & MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_ALL; } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ -/* - * Handshake functions - */ -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) -/* No certificate support -> dummy functions */ -int mbedtls_ssl_write_certificate(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_early_data(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + int early_data_enabled) { - const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info = - ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info; + conf->early_data_enabled = early_data_enabled; +} - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> write certificate")); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_max_early_data_size( + mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, uint32_t max_early_data_size) +{ + conf->max_early_data_size = max_early_data_size; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ - if (!mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_srv_cert(ciphersuite_info)) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= skip write certificate")); - ssl->state++; - return 0; - } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 */ - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("should never happen")); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_cert_profile(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile *profile) +{ + conf->cert_profile = profile; } -int mbedtls_ssl_parse_certificate(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +static void ssl_key_cert_free(mbedtls_ssl_key_cert *key_cert) { - const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info = - ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info; - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> parse certificate")); + mbedtls_ssl_key_cert *cur = key_cert, *next; - if (!mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_srv_cert(ciphersuite_info)) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= skip parse certificate")); - ssl->state++; - return 0; + while (cur != NULL) { + next = cur->next; + mbedtls_free(cur); + cur = next; } - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("should never happen")); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; } -#else /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */ -/* Some certificate support -> implement write and parse */ - -int mbedtls_ssl_write_certificate(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +/* Append a new keycert entry to a (possibly empty) list */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_append_key_cert(mbedtls_ssl_key_cert **head, + mbedtls_x509_crt *cert, + mbedtls_pk_context *key) { - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; - size_t i, n; - const mbedtls_x509_crt *crt; - const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info = - ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info; - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> write certificate")); + mbedtls_ssl_key_cert *new_cert; - if (!mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_srv_cert(ciphersuite_info)) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= skip write certificate")); - ssl->state++; + if (cert == NULL) { + /* Free list if cert is null */ + ssl_key_cert_free(*head); + *head = NULL; return 0; } -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) - if (ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT) { - if (ssl->client_auth == 0) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= skip write certificate")); - ssl->state++; - return 0; - } + new_cert = mbedtls_calloc(1, sizeof(mbedtls_ssl_key_cert)); + if (new_cert == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED; + } -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) - /* - * If using SSLv3 and got no cert, send an Alert message - * (otherwise an empty Certificate message will be sent). - */ - if (mbedtls_ssl_own_cert(ssl) == NULL && - ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0) { - ssl->out_msglen = 2; - ssl->out_msgtype = MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_ALERT; - ssl->out_msg[0] = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_WARNING; - ssl->out_msg[1] = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_NO_CERT; + new_cert->cert = cert; + new_cert->key = key; + new_cert->next = NULL; - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("got no certificate to send")); - goto write_msg; - } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 */ - } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) - if (ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER) { - if (mbedtls_ssl_own_cert(ssl) == NULL) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("got no certificate to send")); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CERTIFICATE_REQUIRED; + /* Update head if the list was null, else add to the end */ + if (*head == NULL) { + *head = new_cert; + } else { + mbedtls_ssl_key_cert *cur = *head; + while (cur->next != NULL) { + cur = cur->next; } + cur->next = new_cert; } -#endif - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_CRT(3, "own certificate", mbedtls_ssl_own_cert(ssl)); + return 0; +} - /* - * 0 . 0 handshake type - * 1 . 3 handshake length - * 4 . 6 length of all certs - * 7 . 9 length of cert. 1 - * 10 . n-1 peer certificate - * n . n+2 length of cert. 2 - * n+3 . ... upper level cert, etc. - */ - i = 7; - crt = mbedtls_ssl_own_cert(ssl); +int mbedtls_ssl_conf_own_cert(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + mbedtls_x509_crt *own_cert, + mbedtls_pk_context *pk_key) +{ + return ssl_append_key_cert(&conf->key_cert, own_cert, pk_key); +} - while (crt != NULL) { - n = crt->raw.len; - if (n > MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN - 3 - i) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("certificate too large, %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET - " > %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET, - i + 3 + n, (size_t) MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN)); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CERTIFICATE_TOO_LARGE; - } +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_ca_chain(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + mbedtls_x509_crt *ca_chain, + mbedtls_x509_crl *ca_crl) +{ + conf->ca_chain = ca_chain; + conf->ca_crl = ca_crl; - ssl->out_msg[i] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_2(n); - ssl->out_msg[i + 1] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_1(n); - ssl->out_msg[i + 2] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(n); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK) + /* mbedtls_ssl_conf_ca_chain() and mbedtls_ssl_conf_ca_cb() + * cannot be used together. */ + conf->f_ca_cb = NULL; + conf->p_ca_cb = NULL; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK */ +} - i += 3; memcpy(ssl->out_msg + i, crt->raw.p, n); - i += n; crt = crt->next; - } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK) +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_ca_cb(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + mbedtls_x509_crt_ca_cb_t f_ca_cb, + void *p_ca_cb) +{ + conf->f_ca_cb = f_ca_cb; + conf->p_ca_cb = p_ca_cb; - ssl->out_msg[4] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_2(i - 7); - ssl->out_msg[5] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_1(i - 7); - ssl->out_msg[6] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(i - 7); + /* mbedtls_ssl_conf_ca_chain() and mbedtls_ssl_conf_ca_cb() + * cannot be used together. */ + conf->ca_chain = NULL; + conf->ca_crl = NULL; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ - ssl->out_msglen = i; - ssl->out_msgtype = MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE; - ssl->out_msg[0] = MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) +const unsigned char *mbedtls_ssl_get_hs_sni(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + size_t *name_len) +{ + *name_len = ssl->handshake->sni_name_len; + return ssl->handshake->sni_name; +} -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) -write_msg: -#endif +int mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_own_cert(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + mbedtls_x509_crt *own_cert, + mbedtls_pk_context *pk_key) +{ + return ssl_append_key_cert(&ssl->handshake->sni_key_cert, + own_cert, pk_key); +} - ssl->state++; +void mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_ca_chain(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + mbedtls_x509_crt *ca_chain, + mbedtls_x509_crl *ca_crl) +{ + ssl->handshake->sni_ca_chain = ca_chain; + ssl->handshake->sni_ca_crl = ca_crl; +} - if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg(ssl)) != 0) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg", ret); - return ret; - } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED) +void mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_dn_hints(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const mbedtls_x509_crt *crt) +{ + ssl->handshake->dn_hints = crt; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED */ - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= write certificate")); +void mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_authmode(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + int authmode) +{ + ssl->handshake->sni_authmode = authmode; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION */ - return ret; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) +void mbedtls_ssl_set_verify(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + int (*f_vrfy)(void *, mbedtls_x509_crt *, int, uint32_t *), + void *p_vrfy) +{ + ssl->f_vrfy = f_vrfy; + ssl->p_vrfy = p_vrfy; } +#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) -MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL -static int ssl_check_peer_crt_unchanged(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - unsigned char *crt_buf, - size_t crt_buf_len) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +static const uint8_t jpake_server_id[] = { 's', 'e', 'r', 'v', 'e', 'r' }; +static const uint8_t jpake_client_id[] = { 'c', 'l', 'i', 'e', 'n', 't' }; + +static psa_status_t mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_ecjpake_password_common( + mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t pwd) { - mbedtls_x509_crt const * const peer_crt = ssl->session->peer_cert; + psa_status_t status; + psa_pake_cipher_suite_t cipher_suite = psa_pake_cipher_suite_init(); + const uint8_t *user = NULL; + size_t user_len = 0; + const uint8_t *peer = NULL; + size_t peer_len = 0; + psa_pake_cs_set_algorithm(&cipher_suite, PSA_ALG_JPAKE); + psa_pake_cs_set_primitive(&cipher_suite, + PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE(PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE_TYPE_ECC, + PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1, + 256)); + psa_pake_cs_set_hash(&cipher_suite, PSA_ALG_SHA_256); + + status = psa_pake_setup(&ssl->handshake->psa_pake_ctx, &cipher_suite); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return status; + } - if (peer_crt == NULL) { - return -1; + if (ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER) { + user = jpake_server_id; + user_len = sizeof(jpake_server_id); + peer = jpake_client_id; + peer_len = sizeof(jpake_client_id); + } else { + user = jpake_client_id; + user_len = sizeof(jpake_client_id); + peer = jpake_server_id; + peer_len = sizeof(jpake_server_id); } - if (peer_crt->raw.len != crt_buf_len) { - return -1; + status = psa_pake_set_user(&ssl->handshake->psa_pake_ctx, user, user_len); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return status; } - return memcmp(peer_crt->raw.p, crt_buf, peer_crt->raw.len); + status = psa_pake_set_peer(&ssl->handshake->psa_pake_ctx, peer, peer_len); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return status; + } + + status = psa_pake_set_password_key(&ssl->handshake->psa_pake_ctx, pwd); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return status; + } + + ssl->handshake->psa_pake_ctx_is_ok = 1; + + return PSA_SUCCESS; } -#else /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ -MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL -static int ssl_check_peer_crt_unchanged(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - unsigned char *crt_buf, - size_t crt_buf_len) + +int mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_ecjpake_password(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *pw, + size_t pw_len) { - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - unsigned char const * const peer_cert_digest = - ssl->session->peer_cert_digest; - mbedtls_md_type_t const peer_cert_digest_type = - ssl->session->peer_cert_digest_type; - mbedtls_md_info_t const * const digest_info = - mbedtls_md_info_from_type(peer_cert_digest_type); - unsigned char tmp_digest[MBEDTLS_SSL_PEER_CERT_DIGEST_MAX_LEN]; - size_t digest_len; + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + psa_status_t status; - if (peer_cert_digest == NULL || digest_info == NULL) { - return -1; + if (ssl->handshake == NULL || ssl->conf == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } - digest_len = mbedtls_md_get_size(digest_info); - if (digest_len > MBEDTLS_SSL_PEER_CERT_DIGEST_MAX_LEN) { - return -1; + /* Empty password is not valid */ + if ((pw == NULL) || (pw_len == 0)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } - ret = mbedtls_md(digest_info, crt_buf, crt_buf_len, tmp_digest); - if (ret != 0) { - return -1; + psa_set_key_usage_flags(&attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE); + psa_set_key_algorithm(&attributes, PSA_ALG_JPAKE); + psa_set_key_type(&attributes, PSA_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD); + + status = psa_import_key(&attributes, pw, pw_len, + &ssl->handshake->psa_pake_password); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED; } - return memcmp(tmp_digest, peer_cert_digest, digest_len); + status = mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_ecjpake_password_common(ssl, + ssl->handshake->psa_pake_password); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + psa_destroy_key(ssl->handshake->psa_pake_password); + psa_pake_abort(&ssl->handshake->psa_pake_ctx); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED; + } + + return 0; } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION && MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */ -/* - * Once the certificate message is read, parse it into a cert chain and - * perform basic checks, but leave actual verification to the caller - */ -MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL -static int ssl_parse_certificate_chain(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - mbedtls_x509_crt *chain) +int mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_ecjpake_password_opaque(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t pwd) { - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) - int crt_cnt = 0; -#endif - size_t i, n; - uint8_t alert; + psa_status_t status; - if (ssl->in_msgtype != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad certificate message")); - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; + if (ssl->handshake == NULL || ssl->conf == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } - if (ssl->in_msg[0] != MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE || - ssl->in_hslen < mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len(ssl) + 3 + 3) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad certificate message")); - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE; + if (mbedtls_svc_key_id_is_null(pwd)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } - i = mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len(ssl); + status = mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_ecjpake_password_common(ssl, pwd); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + psa_pake_abort(&ssl->handshake->psa_pake_ctx); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED; + } - /* - * Same message structure as in mbedtls_ssl_write_certificate() - */ - n = (ssl->in_msg[i+1] << 8) | ssl->in_msg[i+2]; + return 0; +} +#else /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ +int mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_ecjpake_password(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *pw, + size_t pw_len) +{ + mbedtls_ecjpake_role role; - if (ssl->in_msg[i] != 0 || - ssl->in_hslen != n + 3 + mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len(ssl)) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad certificate message")); - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE; + if (ssl->handshake == NULL || ssl->conf == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } - /* Make &ssl->in_msg[i] point to the beginning of the CRT chain. */ - i += 3; - - /* Iterate through and parse the CRTs in the provided chain. */ - while (i < ssl->in_hslen) { - /* Check that there's room for the next CRT's length fields. */ - if (i + 3 > ssl->in_hslen) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad certificate message")); - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE; - } - /* In theory, the CRT can be up to 2**24 Bytes, but we don't support - * anything beyond 2**16 ~ 64K. */ - if (ssl->in_msg[i] != 0) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad certificate message")); - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE; - } - - /* Read length of the next CRT in the chain. */ - n = ((unsigned int) ssl->in_msg[i + 1] << 8) - | (unsigned int) ssl->in_msg[i + 2]; - i += 3; - - if (n < 128 || i + n > ssl->in_hslen) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad certificate message")); - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE; - } - - /* Check if we're handling the first CRT in the chain. */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) - if (crt_cnt++ == 0 && - ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT && - ssl->renego_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_IN_PROGRESS) { - /* During client-side renegotiation, check that the server's - * end-CRTs hasn't changed compared to the initial handshake, - * mitigating the triple handshake attack. On success, reuse - * the original end-CRT instead of parsing it again. */ - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("Check that peer CRT hasn't changed during renegotiation")); - if (ssl_check_peer_crt_unchanged(ssl, - &ssl->in_msg[i], - n) != 0) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("new server cert during renegotiation")); - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ACCESS_DENIED); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE; - } - - /* Now we can safely free the original chain. */ - ssl_clear_peer_cert(ssl->session); - } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION && MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */ + /* Empty password is not valid */ + if ((pw == NULL) || (pw_len == 0)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } - /* Parse the next certificate in the chain. */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) - ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der(chain, ssl->in_msg + i, n); -#else - /* If we don't need to store the CRT chain permanently, parse - * it in-place from the input buffer instead of making a copy. */ - ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der_nocopy(chain, ssl->in_msg + i, n); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ - switch (ret) { - case 0: /*ok*/ - case MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_UNKNOWN_SIG_ALG + MBEDTLS_ERR_OID_NOT_FOUND: - /* Ignore certificate with an unknown algorithm: maybe a - prior certificate was already trusted. */ - break; + if (ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER) { + role = MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_SERVER; + } else { + role = MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_CLIENT; + } - case MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_ALLOC_FAILED: - alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_INTERNAL_ERROR; - goto crt_parse_der_failed; + return mbedtls_ecjpake_setup(&ssl->handshake->ecjpake_ctx, + role, + MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1, + pw, pw_len); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */ - case MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_UNKNOWN_VERSION: - alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_CERT; - goto crt_parse_der_failed; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_PSK_ENABLED) +int mbedtls_ssl_conf_has_static_psk(mbedtls_ssl_config const *conf) +{ + if (conf->psk_identity == NULL || + conf->psk_identity_len == 0) { + return 0; + } - default: - alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_BAD_CERT; -crt_parse_der_failed: - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, alert); - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, " mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der", ret); - return ret; - } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + if (!mbedtls_svc_key_id_is_null(conf->psk_opaque)) { + return 1; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ - i += n; + if (conf->psk != NULL && conf->psk_len != 0) { + return 1; } - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_CRT(3, "peer certificate", chain); return 0; } -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) -MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL -static int ssl_srv_check_client_no_crt_notification(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +static void ssl_conf_remove_psk(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf) { - if (ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT) { - return -1; + /* Remove reference to existing PSK, if any. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + if (!mbedtls_svc_key_id_is_null(conf->psk_opaque)) { + /* The maintenance of the PSK key slot is the + * user's responsibility. */ + conf->psk_opaque = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + if (conf->psk != NULL) { + mbedtls_zeroize_and_free(conf->psk, conf->psk_len); + conf->psk = NULL; + conf->psk_len = 0; } -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) - /* - * Check if the client sent an empty certificate - */ - if (ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0) { - if (ssl->in_msglen == 2 && - ssl->in_msgtype == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_ALERT && - ssl->in_msg[0] == MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_WARNING && - ssl->in_msg[1] == MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_NO_CERT) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("SSLv3 client has no certificate")); - return 0; - } + /* Remove reference to PSK identity, if any. */ + if (conf->psk_identity != NULL) { + mbedtls_free(conf->psk_identity); + conf->psk_identity = NULL; + conf->psk_identity_len = 0; + } +} - return -1; +/* This function assumes that PSK identity in the SSL config is unset. + * It checks that the provided identity is well-formed and attempts + * to make a copy of it in the SSL config. + * On failure, the PSK identity in the config remains unset. */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_conf_set_psk_identity(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + unsigned char const *psk_identity, + size_t psk_identity_len) +{ + /* Identity len will be encoded on two bytes */ + if (psk_identity == NULL || + psk_identity_len == 0 || + (psk_identity_len >> 16) != 0 || + psk_identity_len > MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) - if (ssl->in_hslen == 3 + mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len(ssl) && - ssl->in_msgtype == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE && - ssl->in_msg[0] == MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE && - memcmp(ssl->in_msg + mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len(ssl), "\0\0\0", 3) == 0) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("TLSv1 client has no certificate")); - return 0; + conf->psk_identity = mbedtls_calloc(1, psk_identity_len); + if (conf->psk_identity == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED; } - return -1; -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 || MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 || \ - MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ + conf->psk_identity_len = psk_identity_len; + memcpy(conf->psk_identity, psk_identity, conf->psk_identity_len); + + return 0; } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ -/* Check if a certificate message is expected. - * Return either - * - SSL_CERTIFICATE_EXPECTED, or - * - SSL_CERTIFICATE_SKIP - * indicating whether a Certificate message is expected or not. - */ -#define SSL_CERTIFICATE_EXPECTED 0 -#define SSL_CERTIFICATE_SKIP 1 -MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL -static int ssl_parse_certificate_coordinate(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - int authmode) +int mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + const unsigned char *psk, size_t psk_len, + const unsigned char *psk_identity, size_t psk_identity_len) { - const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info = - ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - if (!mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_srv_cert(ciphersuite_info)) { - return SSL_CERTIFICATE_SKIP; + /* We currently only support one PSK, raw or opaque. */ + if (mbedtls_ssl_conf_has_static_psk(conf)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; } -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) - if (ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER) { - if (ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK) { - return SSL_CERTIFICATE_SKIP; - } + /* Check and set raw PSK */ + if (psk == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + if (psk_len == 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + if (psk_len > MBEDTLS_PSK_MAX_LEN) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } - if (authmode == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_NONE) { - ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result = - MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_SKIP_VERIFY; - return SSL_CERTIFICATE_SKIP; + if ((conf->psk = mbedtls_calloc(1, psk_len)) == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED; + } + conf->psk_len = psk_len; + memcpy(conf->psk, psk, conf->psk_len); + + /* Check and set PSK Identity */ + ret = ssl_conf_set_psk_identity(conf, psk_identity, psk_identity_len); + if (ret != 0) { + ssl_conf_remove_psk(conf); + } + + return ret; +} + +static void ssl_remove_psk(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + if (!mbedtls_svc_key_id_is_null(ssl->handshake->psk_opaque)) { + /* The maintenance of the external PSK key slot is the + * user's responsibility. */ + if (ssl->handshake->psk_opaque_is_internal) { + psa_destroy_key(ssl->handshake->psk_opaque); + ssl->handshake->psk_opaque_is_internal = 0; } + ssl->handshake->psk_opaque = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; } #else - ((void) authmode); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ - - return SSL_CERTIFICATE_EXPECTED; + if (ssl->handshake->psk != NULL) { + mbedtls_zeroize_and_free(ssl->handshake->psk, + ssl->handshake->psk_len); + ssl->handshake->psk_len = 0; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ } -MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL -static int ssl_parse_certificate_verify(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - int authmode, - mbedtls_x509_crt *chain, - void *rs_ctx) +int mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_psk(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *psk, size_t psk_len) { - int ret = 0; - const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info = - ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info; - int have_ca_chain = 0; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + psa_key_attributes_t key_attributes = psa_key_attributes_init(); + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_algorithm_t alg = PSA_ALG_NONE; + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ - int (*f_vrfy)(void *, mbedtls_x509_crt *, int, uint32_t *); - void *p_vrfy; + if (psk == NULL || ssl->handshake == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } - if (authmode == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_NONE) { - return 0; + if (psk_len > MBEDTLS_PSK_MAX_LEN) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } - if (ssl->f_vrfy != NULL) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("Use context-specific verification callback")); - f_vrfy = ssl->f_vrfy; - p_vrfy = ssl->p_vrfy; - } else { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("Use configuration-specific verification callback")); - f_vrfy = ssl->conf->f_vrfy; - p_vrfy = ssl->conf->p_vrfy; - } - - /* - * Main check: verify certificate - */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK) - if (ssl->conf->f_ca_cb != NULL) { - ((void) rs_ctx); - have_ca_chain = 1; - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("use CA callback for X.509 CRT verification")); - ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_with_ca_cb( - chain, - ssl->conf->f_ca_cb, - ssl->conf->p_ca_cb, - ssl->conf->cert_profile, - ssl->hostname, - &ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result, - f_vrfy, p_vrfy); - } else -#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK */ - { - mbedtls_x509_crt *ca_chain; - mbedtls_x509_crl *ca_crl; - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) - if (ssl->handshake->sni_ca_chain != NULL) { - ca_chain = ssl->handshake->sni_ca_chain; - ca_crl = ssl->handshake->sni_ca_crl; - } else -#endif - { - ca_chain = ssl->conf->ca_chain; - ca_crl = ssl->conf->ca_crl; - } + ssl_remove_psk(ssl); - if (ca_chain != NULL) { - have_ca_chain = 1; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) + if (ssl->tls_version == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2) { + if (ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info->mac == MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384) { + alg = PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_384); + } else { + alg = PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256); } - - ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_restartable( - chain, - ca_chain, ca_crl, - ssl->conf->cert_profile, - ssl->hostname, - &ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result, - f_vrfy, p_vrfy, rs_ctx); + psa_set_key_usage_flags(&key_attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE); } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ - if (ret != 0) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "x509_verify_cert", ret); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) + if (ssl->tls_version == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_3) { + alg = PSA_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH); + psa_set_key_usage_flags(&key_attributes, + PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT); } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED) - if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS; - } -#endif + psa_set_key_algorithm(&key_attributes, alg); + psa_set_key_type(&key_attributes, PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE); - /* - * Secondary checks: always done, but change 'ret' only if it was 0 - */ + status = psa_import_key(&key_attributes, psk, psk_len, &key); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED; + } -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) - { - const mbedtls_pk_context *pk = &chain->pk; + /* Allow calling psa_destroy_key() on psk remove */ + ssl->handshake->psk_opaque_is_internal = 1; + return mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_psk_opaque(ssl, key); +#else + if ((ssl->handshake->psk = mbedtls_calloc(1, psk_len)) == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED; + } - /* If certificate uses an EC key, make sure the curve is OK. - * This is a public key, so it can't be opaque, so can_do() is a good - * enough check to ensure pk_ec() is safe to use here. */ - if (mbedtls_pk_can_do(pk, MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY) && - mbedtls_ssl_check_curve(ssl, mbedtls_pk_ec(*pk)->grp.id) != 0) { - ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_KEY; + ssl->handshake->psk_len = psk_len; + memcpy(ssl->handshake->psk, psk, ssl->handshake->psk_len); - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad certificate (EC key curve)")); - if (ret == 0) { - ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE; - } - } - } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */ + return 0; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ +} - if (mbedtls_ssl_check_cert_usage(chain, - ciphersuite_info, - !ssl->conf->endpoint, - &ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result) != 0) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad certificate (usage extensions)")); - if (ret == 0) { - ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE; - } - } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +int mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk_opaque(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t psk, + const unsigned char *psk_identity, + size_t psk_identity_len) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - /* mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_with_profile is supposed to report a - * verification failure through MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED, - * with details encoded in the verification flags. All other kinds - * of error codes, including those from the user provided f_vrfy - * functions, are treated as fatal and lead to a failure of - * ssl_parse_certificate even if verification was optional. */ - if (authmode == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_OPTIONAL && - (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED || - ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE)) { - ret = 0; + /* We currently only support one PSK, raw or opaque. */ + if (mbedtls_ssl_conf_has_static_psk(conf)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; } - if (have_ca_chain == 0 && authmode == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_REQUIRED) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("got no CA chain")); - ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CA_CHAIN_REQUIRED; + /* Check and set opaque PSK */ + if (mbedtls_svc_key_id_is_null(psk)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } + conf->psk_opaque = psk; + /* Check and set PSK Identity */ + ret = ssl_conf_set_psk_identity(conf, psk_identity, + psk_identity_len); if (ret != 0) { - uint8_t alert; - - /* The certificate may have been rejected for several reasons. - Pick one and send the corresponding alert. Which alert to send - may be a subject of debate in some cases. */ - if (ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result & MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_OTHER) { - alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ACCESS_DENIED; - } else if (ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result & MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_CN_MISMATCH) { - alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_BAD_CERT; - } else if (ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result & MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_KEY_USAGE) { - alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_CERT; - } else if (ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result & MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_EXT_KEY_USAGE) { - alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_CERT; - } else if (ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result & MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_NS_CERT_TYPE) { - alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_CERT; - } else if (ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result & MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_PK) { - alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_CERT; - } else if (ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result & MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_KEY) { - alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_CERT; - } else if (ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result & MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_EXPIRED) { - alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_CERT_EXPIRED; - } else if (ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result & MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_REVOKED) { - alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_CERT_REVOKED; - } else if (ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result & MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_NOT_TRUSTED) { - alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNKNOWN_CA; - } else { - alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_CERT_UNKNOWN; - } - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - alert); - } - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C) - if (ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result != 0) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("! Certificate verification flags %08x", - (unsigned int) ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result)); - } else { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("Certificate verification flags clear")); + ssl_conf_remove_psk(conf); } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C */ return ret; } -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) -MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL -static int ssl_remember_peer_crt_digest(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - unsigned char *start, size_t len) +int mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_psk_opaque(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t psk) { - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - /* Remember digest of the peer's end-CRT. */ - ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert_digest = - mbedtls_calloc(1, MBEDTLS_SSL_PEER_CERT_DIGEST_DFL_LEN); - if (ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert_digest == NULL) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("alloc(%d bytes) failed", - MBEDTLS_SSL_PEER_CERT_DIGEST_DFL_LEN)); - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_INTERNAL_ERROR); - - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED; + if ((mbedtls_svc_key_id_is_null(psk)) || + (ssl->handshake == NULL)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } - ret = mbedtls_md(mbedtls_md_info_from_type( - MBEDTLS_SSL_PEER_CERT_DIGEST_DFL_TYPE), - start, len, - ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert_digest); + ssl_remove_psk(ssl); + ssl->handshake->psk_opaque = psk; + return 0; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ - ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert_digest_type = - MBEDTLS_SSL_PEER_CERT_DIGEST_DFL_TYPE; - ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert_digest_len = - MBEDTLS_SSL_PEER_CERT_DIGEST_DFL_LEN; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk_cb(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + int (*f_psk)(void *, mbedtls_ssl_context *, const unsigned char *, + size_t), + void *p_psk) +{ + conf->f_psk = f_psk; + conf->p_psk = p_psk; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ - return ret; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_PSK_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +static mbedtls_ssl_mode_t mbedtls_ssl_get_base_mode( + psa_algorithm_t alg) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_MAC) + if (alg == PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING) { + return MBEDTLS_SSL_MODE_CBC; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_MAC */ + if (PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD(alg)) { + return MBEDTLS_SSL_MODE_AEAD; + } + return MBEDTLS_SSL_MODE_STREAM; } -MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL -static int ssl_remember_peer_pubkey(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - unsigned char *start, size_t len) +#else /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + +static mbedtls_ssl_mode_t mbedtls_ssl_get_base_mode( + mbedtls_cipher_mode_t mode) { - unsigned char *end = start + len; - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_MAC) + if (mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC) { + return MBEDTLS_SSL_MODE_CBC; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_MAC */ - /* Make a copy of the peer's raw public key. */ - mbedtls_pk_init(&ssl->handshake->peer_pubkey); - ret = mbedtls_pk_parse_subpubkey(&start, end, - &ssl->handshake->peer_pubkey); - if (ret != 0) { - /* We should have parsed the public key before. */ - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C) + if (mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM || + mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM || + mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_CHACHAPOLY) { + return MBEDTLS_SSL_MODE_AEAD; } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C || MBEDTLS_CCM_C || MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C */ - return 0; + return MBEDTLS_SSL_MODE_STREAM; } -#endif /* !MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ -int mbedtls_ssl_parse_certificate(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +static mbedtls_ssl_mode_t mbedtls_ssl_get_actual_mode( + mbedtls_ssl_mode_t base_mode, + int encrypt_then_mac) { - int ret = 0; - int crt_expected; -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) - const int authmode = ssl->handshake->sni_authmode != MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_UNSET - ? ssl->handshake->sni_authmode - : ssl->conf->authmode; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_CBC_ETM) + if (encrypt_then_mac == MBEDTLS_SSL_ETM_ENABLED && + base_mode == MBEDTLS_SSL_MODE_CBC) { + return MBEDTLS_SSL_MODE_CBC_ETM; + } #else - const int authmode = ssl->conf->authmode; + (void) encrypt_then_mac; #endif - void *rs_ctx = NULL; - mbedtls_x509_crt *chain = NULL; + return base_mode; +} - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> parse certificate")); +mbedtls_ssl_mode_t mbedtls_ssl_get_mode_from_transform( + const mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform) +{ + mbedtls_ssl_mode_t base_mode = mbedtls_ssl_get_base_mode( +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + transform->psa_alg +#else + mbedtls_cipher_get_cipher_mode(&transform->cipher_ctx_enc) +#endif + ); - crt_expected = ssl_parse_certificate_coordinate(ssl, authmode); - if (crt_expected == SSL_CERTIFICATE_SKIP) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= skip parse certificate")); - goto exit; - } + int encrypt_then_mac = 0; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_CBC_ETM) + encrypt_then_mac = transform->encrypt_then_mac; +#endif + return mbedtls_ssl_get_actual_mode(base_mode, encrypt_then_mac); +} -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED) - if (ssl->handshake->ecrs_enabled && - ssl->handshake->ecrs_state == ssl_ecrs_crt_verify) { - chain = ssl->handshake->ecrs_peer_cert; - ssl->handshake->ecrs_peer_cert = NULL; - goto crt_verify; - } -#endif - - if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_read_record(ssl, 1)) != 0) { - /* mbedtls_ssl_read_record may have sent an alert already. We - let it decide whether to alert. */ - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_read_record", ret); - goto exit; - } - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) - if (ssl_srv_check_client_no_crt_notification(ssl) == 0) { - ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result = MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_MISSING; - - if (authmode != MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_OPTIONAL) { - ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NO_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE; - } - - goto exit; - } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ - - /* Clear existing peer CRT structure in case we tried to - * reuse a session but it failed, and allocate a new one. */ - ssl_clear_peer_cert(ssl->session_negotiate); - - chain = mbedtls_calloc(1, sizeof(mbedtls_x509_crt)); - if (chain == NULL) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("alloc(%" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET " bytes) failed", - sizeof(mbedtls_x509_crt))); - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_INTERNAL_ERROR); - - ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED; - goto exit; - } - mbedtls_x509_crt_init(chain); - - ret = ssl_parse_certificate_chain(ssl, chain); - if (ret != 0) { - goto exit; - } - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED) - if (ssl->handshake->ecrs_enabled) { - ssl->handshake->ecrs_state = ssl_ecrs_crt_verify; - } - -crt_verify: - if (ssl->handshake->ecrs_enabled) { - rs_ctx = &ssl->handshake->ecrs_ctx; - } -#endif - - ret = ssl_parse_certificate_verify(ssl, authmode, - chain, rs_ctx); - if (ret != 0) { - goto exit; - } - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) - { - unsigned char *crt_start, *pk_start; - size_t crt_len, pk_len; - - /* We parse the CRT chain without copying, so - * these pointers point into the input buffer, - * and are hence still valid after freeing the - * CRT chain. */ - - crt_start = chain->raw.p; - crt_len = chain->raw.len; - - pk_start = chain->pk_raw.p; - pk_len = chain->pk_raw.len; - - /* Free the CRT structures before computing - * digest and copying the peer's public key. */ - mbedtls_x509_crt_free(chain); - mbedtls_free(chain); - chain = NULL; - - ret = ssl_remember_peer_crt_digest(ssl, crt_start, crt_len); - if (ret != 0) { - goto exit; - } +mbedtls_ssl_mode_t mbedtls_ssl_get_mode_from_ciphersuite( +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_CBC_ETM) + int encrypt_then_mac, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_CBC_ETM */ + const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *suite) +{ + mbedtls_ssl_mode_t base_mode = MBEDTLS_SSL_MODE_STREAM; - ret = ssl_remember_peer_pubkey(ssl, pk_start, pk_len); - if (ret != 0) { - goto exit; - } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + psa_status_t status; + psa_algorithm_t alg; + psa_key_type_t type; + size_t size; + status = mbedtls_ssl_cipher_to_psa((mbedtls_cipher_type_t) suite->cipher, + 0, &alg, &type, &size); + if (status == PSA_SUCCESS) { + base_mode = mbedtls_ssl_get_base_mode(alg); } -#else /* !MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ - /* Pass ownership to session structure. */ - ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert = chain; - chain = NULL; -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= parse certificate")); - -exit: - - if (ret == 0) { - ssl->state++; +#else + const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *cipher = + mbedtls_cipher_info_from_type((mbedtls_cipher_type_t) suite->cipher); + if (cipher != NULL) { + base_mode = + mbedtls_ssl_get_base_mode( + mbedtls_cipher_info_get_mode(cipher)); } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED) - if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS) { - ssl->handshake->ecrs_peer_cert = chain; - chain = NULL; - } +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_CBC_ETM) + int encrypt_then_mac = 0; #endif - - if (chain != NULL) { - mbedtls_x509_crt_free(chain); - mbedtls_free(chain); - } - - return ret; + return mbedtls_ssl_get_actual_mode(base_mode, encrypt_then_mac); } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */ -void mbedtls_ssl_optimize_checksum(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info) -{ - ((void) ciphersuite_info); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) - if (ssl->minor_ver < MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3) { - ssl->handshake->update_checksum = ssl_update_checksum_md5sha1; - } else +psa_status_t mbedtls_ssl_cipher_to_psa(mbedtls_cipher_type_t mbedtls_cipher_type, + size_t taglen, + psa_algorithm_t *alg, + psa_key_type_t *key_type, + size_t *key_size) +{ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CCM) + (void) taglen; #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384) - if (ciphersuite_info->mac == MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384) { - ssl->handshake->update_checksum = ssl_update_checksum_sha384; - } else + switch (mbedtls_cipher_type) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_AES) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC) + case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC: + *alg = PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING; + *key_type = PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES; + *key_size = 128; + break; #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) - if (ciphersuite_info->mac != MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384) { - ssl->handshake->update_checksum = ssl_update_checksum_sha256; - } else +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_AES) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CCM) + case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM: + *alg = taglen ? PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, taglen) : PSA_ALG_CCM; + *key_type = PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES; + *key_size = 128; + break; #endif -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("should never happen")); - return; - } -} - -void mbedtls_ssl_reset_checksum(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) -{ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) - mbedtls_md5_starts_ret(&ssl->handshake->fin_md5); - mbedtls_sha1_starts_ret(&ssl->handshake->fin_sha1); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_AES) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM) + case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_GCM: + *alg = PSA_ALG_GCM; + *key_type = PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES; + *key_size = 128; + break; #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) - psa_hash_abort(&ssl->handshake->fin_sha256_psa); - psa_hash_setup(&ssl->handshake->fin_sha256_psa, PSA_ALG_SHA_256); -#else - mbedtls_sha256_starts_ret(&ssl->handshake->fin_sha256, 0); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_AES) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CCM) + case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM: + *alg = taglen ? PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, taglen) : PSA_ALG_CCM; + *key_type = PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES; + *key_size = 192; + break; #endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_AES) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM) + case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_GCM: + *alg = PSA_ALG_GCM; + *key_type = PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES; + *key_size = 192; + break; #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) - psa_hash_abort(&ssl->handshake->fin_sha384_psa); - psa_hash_setup(&ssl->handshake->fin_sha384_psa, PSA_ALG_SHA_384); -#else - mbedtls_sha512_starts_ret(&ssl->handshake->fin_sha512, 1); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_AES) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC) + case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC: + *alg = PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING; + *key_type = PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES; + *key_size = 256; + break; #endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_AES) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CCM) + case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM: + *alg = taglen ? PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, taglen) : PSA_ALG_CCM; + *key_type = PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES; + *key_size = 256; + break; #endif -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ -} - -static void ssl_update_checksum_start(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - const unsigned char *buf, size_t len) -{ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) - mbedtls_md5_update_ret(&ssl->handshake->fin_md5, buf, len); - mbedtls_sha1_update_ret(&ssl->handshake->fin_sha1, buf, len); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_AES) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM) + case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_GCM: + *alg = PSA_ALG_GCM; + *key_type = PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES; + *key_size = 256; + break; #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) - psa_hash_update(&ssl->handshake->fin_sha256_psa, buf, len); -#else - mbedtls_sha256_update_ret(&ssl->handshake->fin_sha256, buf, len); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_ARIA) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC) + case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC: + *alg = PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING; + *key_type = PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA; + *key_size = 128; + break; #endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_ARIA) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CCM) + case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CCM: + *alg = taglen ? PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, taglen) : PSA_ALG_CCM; + *key_type = PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA; + *key_size = 128; + break; #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) - psa_hash_update(&ssl->handshake->fin_sha384_psa, buf, len); -#else - mbedtls_sha512_update_ret(&ssl->handshake->fin_sha512, buf, len); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_ARIA) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM) + case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_GCM: + *alg = PSA_ALG_GCM; + *key_type = PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA; + *key_size = 128; + break; #endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_ARIA) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CCM) + case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CCM: + *alg = taglen ? PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, taglen) : PSA_ALG_CCM; + *key_type = PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA; + *key_size = 192; + break; #endif -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ -} - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) -static void ssl_update_checksum_md5sha1(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - const unsigned char *buf, size_t len) -{ - mbedtls_md5_update_ret(&ssl->handshake->fin_md5, buf, len); - mbedtls_sha1_update_ret(&ssl->handshake->fin_sha1, buf, len); -} +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_ARIA) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM) + case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_GCM: + *alg = PSA_ALG_GCM; + *key_type = PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA; + *key_size = 192; + break; #endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) -static void ssl_update_checksum_sha256(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - const unsigned char *buf, size_t len) -{ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) - psa_hash_update(&ssl->handshake->fin_sha256_psa, buf, len); -#else - mbedtls_sha256_update_ret(&ssl->handshake->fin_sha256, buf, len); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_ARIA) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC) + case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC: + *alg = PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING; + *key_type = PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA; + *key_size = 256; + break; #endif -} +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_ARIA) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CCM) + case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CCM: + *alg = taglen ? PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, taglen) : PSA_ALG_CCM; + *key_type = PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA; + *key_size = 256; + break; #endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384) -static void ssl_update_checksum_sha384(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - const unsigned char *buf, size_t len) -{ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) - psa_hash_update(&ssl->handshake->fin_sha384_psa, buf, len); -#else - mbedtls_sha512_update_ret(&ssl->handshake->fin_sha512, buf, len); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_ARIA) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM) + case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_GCM: + *alg = PSA_ALG_GCM; + *key_type = PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA; + *key_size = 256; + break; #endif -} +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CAMELLIA) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC) + case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC: + *alg = PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING; + *key_type = PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA; + *key_size = 128; + break; #endif -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CAMELLIA) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CCM) + case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CCM: + *alg = taglen ? PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, taglen) : PSA_ALG_CCM; + *key_type = PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA; + *key_size = 128; + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CAMELLIA) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM) + case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_GCM: + *alg = PSA_ALG_GCM; + *key_type = PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA; + *key_size = 128; + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CAMELLIA) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CCM) + case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CCM: + *alg = taglen ? PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, taglen) : PSA_ALG_CCM; + *key_type = PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA; + *key_size = 192; + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CAMELLIA) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM) + case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_GCM: + *alg = PSA_ALG_GCM; + *key_type = PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA; + *key_size = 192; + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CAMELLIA) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC) + case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC: + *alg = PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING; + *key_type = PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA; + *key_size = 256; + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CAMELLIA) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CCM) + case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CCM: + *alg = taglen ? PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, taglen) : PSA_ALG_CCM; + *key_type = PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA; + *key_size = 256; + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CAMELLIA) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM) + case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_GCM: + *alg = PSA_ALG_GCM; + *key_type = PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA; + *key_size = 256; + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CHACHAPOLY) + case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20_POLY1305: + *alg = PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305; + *key_type = PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20; + *key_size = 256; + break; +#endif + case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL: + *alg = MBEDTLS_SSL_NULL_CIPHER; + *key_type = 0; + *key_size = 0; + break; + default: + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + } -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) -static void ssl_calc_finished_ssl( - mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char *buf, int from) + return PSA_SUCCESS; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO || MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) +int mbedtls_ssl_conf_dh_param_bin(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + const unsigned char *dhm_P, size_t P_len, + const unsigned char *dhm_G, size_t G_len) { - const char *sender; - mbedtls_md5_context md5; - mbedtls_sha1_context sha1; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - unsigned char padbuf[48]; - unsigned char md5sum[16]; - unsigned char sha1sum[20]; + mbedtls_mpi_free(&conf->dhm_P); + mbedtls_mpi_free(&conf->dhm_G); - mbedtls_ssl_session *session = ssl->session_negotiate; - if (!session) { - session = ssl->session; + if ((ret = mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(&conf->dhm_P, dhm_P, P_len)) != 0 || + (ret = mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(&conf->dhm_G, dhm_G, G_len)) != 0) { + mbedtls_mpi_free(&conf->dhm_P); + mbedtls_mpi_free(&conf->dhm_G); + return ret; } - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> calc finished ssl")); + return 0; +} - mbedtls_md5_init(&md5); - mbedtls_sha1_init(&sha1); +int mbedtls_ssl_conf_dh_param_ctx(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, mbedtls_dhm_context *dhm_ctx) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - mbedtls_md5_clone(&md5, &ssl->handshake->fin_md5); - mbedtls_sha1_clone(&sha1, &ssl->handshake->fin_sha1); + mbedtls_mpi_free(&conf->dhm_P); + mbedtls_mpi_free(&conf->dhm_G); - /* - * SSLv3: - * hash = - * MD5( master + pad2 + - * MD5( handshake + sender + master + pad1 ) ) - * + SHA1( master + pad2 + - * SHA1( handshake + sender + master + pad1 ) ) - */ + if ((ret = mbedtls_dhm_get_value(dhm_ctx, MBEDTLS_DHM_PARAM_P, + &conf->dhm_P)) != 0 || + (ret = mbedtls_dhm_get_value(dhm_ctx, MBEDTLS_DHM_PARAM_G, + &conf->dhm_G)) != 0) { + mbedtls_mpi_free(&conf->dhm_P); + mbedtls_mpi_free(&conf->dhm_G); + return ret; + } -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_ALT) - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "finished md5 state", (unsigned char *) - md5.state, sizeof(md5.state)); -#endif + return 0; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DHM_C && MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_ALT) - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "finished sha1 state", (unsigned char *) - sha1.state, sizeof(sha1.state)); -#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) +/* + * Set the minimum length for Diffie-Hellman parameters + */ +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_dhm_min_bitlen(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + unsigned int bitlen) +{ + conf->dhm_min_bitlen = bitlen; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DHM_C && MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */ - sender = (from == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT) ? "CLNT" - : "SRVR"; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) +/* + * Set allowed/preferred hashes for handshake signatures + */ +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_sig_hashes(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + const int *hashes) +{ + conf->sig_hashes = hashes; +} +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED && MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ - memset(padbuf, 0x36, 48); +/* Configure allowed signature algorithms for handshake */ +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_sig_algs(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + const uint16_t *sig_algs) +{ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) + conf->sig_hashes = NULL; +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ + conf->sig_algs = sig_algs; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */ - mbedtls_md5_update_ret(&md5, (const unsigned char *) sender, 4); - mbedtls_md5_update_ret(&md5, session->master, 48); - mbedtls_md5_update_ret(&md5, padbuf, 48); - mbedtls_md5_finish_ret(&md5, md5sum); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) +/* + * Set the allowed elliptic curves + * + * mbedtls_ssl_setup() takes the provided list + * and translates it to a list of IANA TLS group identifiers, + * stored in ssl->handshake->group_list. + * + */ +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_curves(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + const mbedtls_ecp_group_id *curve_list) +{ + conf->curve_list = curve_list; + conf->group_list = NULL; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */ - mbedtls_sha1_update_ret(&sha1, (const unsigned char *) sender, 4); - mbedtls_sha1_update_ret(&sha1, session->master, 48); - mbedtls_sha1_update_ret(&sha1, padbuf, 40); - mbedtls_sha1_finish_ret(&sha1, sha1sum); +/* + * Set the allowed groups + */ +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_groups(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + const uint16_t *group_list) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) + conf->curve_list = NULL; +#endif + conf->group_list = group_list; +} - memset(padbuf, 0x5C, 48); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) +int mbedtls_ssl_set_hostname(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, const char *hostname) +{ + /* Initialize to suppress unnecessary compiler warning */ + size_t hostname_len = 0; - mbedtls_md5_starts_ret(&md5); - mbedtls_md5_update_ret(&md5, session->master, 48); - mbedtls_md5_update_ret(&md5, padbuf, 48); - mbedtls_md5_update_ret(&md5, md5sum, 16); - mbedtls_md5_finish_ret(&md5, buf); + /* Check if new hostname is valid before + * making any change to current one */ + if (hostname != NULL) { + hostname_len = strlen(hostname); - mbedtls_sha1_starts_ret(&sha1); - mbedtls_sha1_update_ret(&sha1, session->master, 48); - mbedtls_sha1_update_ret(&sha1, padbuf, 40); - mbedtls_sha1_update_ret(&sha1, sha1sum, 20); - mbedtls_sha1_finish_ret(&sha1, buf + 16); + if (hostname_len > MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_HOST_NAME_LEN) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + } - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "calc finished result", buf, 36); + /* Now it's clear that we will overwrite the old hostname, + * so we can free it safely */ - mbedtls_md5_free(&md5); - mbedtls_sha1_free(&sha1); + if (ssl->hostname != NULL) { + mbedtls_zeroize_and_free(ssl->hostname, strlen(ssl->hostname)); + } - mbedtls_platform_zeroize(padbuf, sizeof(padbuf)); - mbedtls_platform_zeroize(md5sum, sizeof(md5sum)); - mbedtls_platform_zeroize(sha1sum, sizeof(sha1sum)); + /* Passing NULL as hostname shall clear the old one */ - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= calc finished")); -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 */ + if (hostname == NULL) { + ssl->hostname = NULL; + } else { + ssl->hostname = mbedtls_calloc(1, hostname_len + 1); + if (ssl->hostname == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED; + } -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) -static void ssl_calc_finished_tls( - mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char *buf, int from) -{ - int len = 12; - const char *sender; - mbedtls_md5_context md5; - mbedtls_sha1_context sha1; - unsigned char padbuf[36]; + memcpy(ssl->hostname, hostname, hostname_len); - mbedtls_ssl_session *session = ssl->session_negotiate; - if (!session) { - session = ssl->session; + ssl->hostname[hostname_len] = '\0'; } - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> calc finished tls")); + return 0; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ - mbedtls_md5_init(&md5); - mbedtls_sha1_init(&sha1); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_sni(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + int (*f_sni)(void *, mbedtls_ssl_context *, + const unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_sni) +{ + conf->f_sni = f_sni; + conf->p_sni = p_sni; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION */ - mbedtls_md5_clone(&md5, &ssl->handshake->fin_md5); - mbedtls_sha1_clone(&sha1, &ssl->handshake->fin_sha1); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN) +int mbedtls_ssl_conf_alpn_protocols(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, const char **protos) +{ + size_t cur_len, tot_len; + const char **p; /* - * TLSv1: - * hash = PRF( master, finished_label, - * MD5( handshake ) + SHA1( handshake ) )[0..11] + * RFC 7301 3.1: "Empty strings MUST NOT be included and byte strings + * MUST NOT be truncated." + * We check lengths now rather than later. */ + tot_len = 0; + for (p = protos; *p != NULL; p++) { + cur_len = strlen(*p); + tot_len += cur_len; -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_ALT) - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "finished md5 state", (unsigned char *) - md5.state, sizeof(md5.state)); -#endif - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_ALT) - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "finished sha1 state", (unsigned char *) - sha1.state, sizeof(sha1.state)); -#endif - - sender = (from == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT) - ? "client finished" - : "server finished"; - - mbedtls_md5_finish_ret(&md5, padbuf); - mbedtls_sha1_finish_ret(&sha1, padbuf + 16); - - ssl->handshake->tls_prf(session->master, 48, sender, - padbuf, 36, buf, len); - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "calc finished result", buf, len); + if ((cur_len == 0) || + (cur_len > MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_ALPN_NAME_LEN) || + (tot_len > MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_ALPN_LIST_LEN)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + } - mbedtls_md5_free(&md5); - mbedtls_sha1_free(&sha1); + conf->alpn_list = protos; - mbedtls_platform_zeroize(padbuf, sizeof(padbuf)); + return 0; +} - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= calc finished")); +const char *mbedtls_ssl_get_alpn_protocol(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + return ssl->alpn_chosen; } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 || MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) -static void ssl_calc_finished_tls_sha256( - mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char *buf, int from) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP) +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_srtp_mki_value_supported(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + int support_mki_value) { - int len = 12; - const char *sender; - unsigned char padbuf[32]; -#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) - size_t hash_size; - psa_hash_operation_t sha256_psa = PSA_HASH_OPERATION_INIT; - psa_status_t status; -#else - mbedtls_sha256_context sha256; -#endif + conf->dtls_srtp_mki_support = support_mki_value; +} - mbedtls_ssl_session *session = ssl->session_negotiate; - if (!session) { - session = ssl->session; +int mbedtls_ssl_dtls_srtp_set_mki_value(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *mki_value, + uint16_t mki_len) +{ + if (mki_len > MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_MAX_MKI_LENGTH) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } - sender = (from == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT) - ? "client finished" - : "server finished"; + if (ssl->conf->dtls_srtp_mki_support == MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP_MKI_UNSUPPORTED) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + } -#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) - sha256_psa = psa_hash_operation_init(); + memcpy(ssl->dtls_srtp_info.mki_value, mki_value, mki_len); + ssl->dtls_srtp_info.mki_len = mki_len; + return 0; +} - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> calc PSA finished tls sha256")); +int mbedtls_ssl_conf_dtls_srtp_protection_profiles(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + const mbedtls_ssl_srtp_profile *profiles) +{ + const mbedtls_ssl_srtp_profile *p; + size_t list_size = 0; - status = psa_hash_clone(&ssl->handshake->fin_sha256_psa, &sha256_psa); - if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("PSA hash clone failed")); - return; + /* check the profiles list: all entry must be valid, + * its size cannot be more than the total number of supported profiles, currently 4 */ + for (p = profiles; *p != MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_UNSET && + list_size <= MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_MAX_PROFILE_LIST_LENGTH; + p++) { + if (mbedtls_ssl_check_srtp_profile_value(*p) != MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_UNSET) { + list_size++; + } else { + /* unsupported value, stop parsing and set the size to an error value */ + list_size = MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_MAX_PROFILE_LIST_LENGTH + 1; + } } - status = psa_hash_finish(&sha256_psa, padbuf, sizeof(padbuf), &hash_size); - if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("PSA hash finish failed")); - return; + if (list_size > MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_MAX_PROFILE_LIST_LENGTH) { + conf->dtls_srtp_profile_list = NULL; + conf->dtls_srtp_profile_list_len = 0; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "PSA calculated padbuf", padbuf, 32); -#else - mbedtls_sha256_init(&sha256); + conf->dtls_srtp_profile_list = profiles; + conf->dtls_srtp_profile_list_len = list_size; + + return 0; +} - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> calc finished tls sha256")); +void mbedtls_ssl_get_dtls_srtp_negotiation_result(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + mbedtls_dtls_srtp_info *dtls_srtp_info) +{ + dtls_srtp_info->chosen_dtls_srtp_profile = ssl->dtls_srtp_info.chosen_dtls_srtp_profile; + /* do not copy the mki value if there is no chosen profile */ + if (dtls_srtp_info->chosen_dtls_srtp_profile == MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_UNSET) { + dtls_srtp_info->mki_len = 0; + } else { + dtls_srtp_info->mki_len = ssl->dtls_srtp_info.mki_len; + memcpy(dtls_srtp_info->mki_value, ssl->dtls_srtp_info.mki_value, + ssl->dtls_srtp_info.mki_len); + } +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP */ - mbedtls_sha256_clone(&sha256, &ssl->handshake->fin_sha256); +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_max_version(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, int major, int minor) +{ + conf->max_tls_version = (mbedtls_ssl_protocol_version) ((major << 8) | minor); +} - /* - * TLSv1.2: - * hash = PRF( master, finished_label, - * Hash( handshake ) )[0.11] - */ +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_min_version(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, int major, int minor) +{ + conf->min_tls_version = (mbedtls_ssl_protocol_version) ((major << 8) | minor); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_ALT) - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "finished sha2 state", (unsigned char *) - sha256.state, sizeof(sha256.state)); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_cert_req_ca_list(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + char cert_req_ca_list) +{ + conf->cert_req_ca_list = cert_req_ca_list; +} #endif - mbedtls_sha256_finish_ret(&sha256, padbuf); - mbedtls_sha256_free(&sha256); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_encrypt_then_mac(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, char etm) +{ + conf->encrypt_then_mac = etm; +} +#endif - ssl->handshake->tls_prf(session->master, 48, sender, - padbuf, 32, buf, len); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET) +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_extended_master_secret(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, char ems) +{ + conf->extended_ms = ems; +} +#endif - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "calc finished result", buf, len); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH) +int mbedtls_ssl_conf_max_frag_len(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, unsigned char mfl_code) +{ + if (mfl_code >= MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_INVALID || + ssl_mfl_code_to_length(mfl_code) > MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ADV_CONTENT_LEN) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } - mbedtls_platform_zeroize(padbuf, sizeof(padbuf)); + conf->mfl_code = mfl_code; - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= calc finished")); + return 0; } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384) +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_legacy_renegotiation(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, int allow_legacy) +{ + conf->allow_legacy_renegotiation = allow_legacy; +} -static void ssl_calc_finished_tls_sha384( - mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char *buf, int from) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_renegotiation(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, int renegotiation) { - int len = 12; - const char *sender; - unsigned char padbuf[48]; -#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) - size_t hash_size; - psa_hash_operation_t sha384_psa = PSA_HASH_OPERATION_INIT; - psa_status_t status; -#else - mbedtls_sha512_context sha512; -#endif - - mbedtls_ssl_session *session = ssl->session_negotiate; - if (!session) { - session = ssl->session; - } - - sender = (from == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT) - ? "client finished" - : "server finished"; - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) - sha384_psa = psa_hash_operation_init(); - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> calc PSA finished tls sha384")); - - status = psa_hash_clone(&ssl->handshake->fin_sha384_psa, &sha384_psa); - if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("PSA hash clone failed")); - return; - } + conf->disable_renegotiation = renegotiation; +} - status = psa_hash_finish(&sha384_psa, padbuf, sizeof(padbuf), &hash_size); - if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("PSA hash finish failed")); - return; - } - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "PSA calculated padbuf", padbuf, 48); -#else - mbedtls_sha512_init(&sha512); +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_renegotiation_enforced(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, int max_records) +{ + conf->renego_max_records = max_records; +} - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> calc finished tls sha384")); +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_renegotiation_period(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + const unsigned char period[8]) +{ + memcpy(conf->renego_period, period, 8); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */ - mbedtls_sha512_clone(&sha512, &ssl->handshake->fin_sha512); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_session_tickets(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, int use_tickets) +{ + conf->session_tickets = use_tickets; +} +#endif - /* - * TLSv1.2: - * hash = PRF( master, finished_label, - * Hash( handshake ) )[0.11] - */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_ALT) - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "finished sha512 state", (unsigned char *) - sha512.state, sizeof(sha512.state)); -#endif - /* mbedtls_sha512_finish_ret's output parameter is declared as a - * 64-byte buffer, but since we're using SHA-384, we know that the - * output fits in 48 bytes. This is correct C, but GCC 11.1 warns - * about it. - */ -#if defined(__GNUC__) && __GNUC__ >= 11 -#pragma GCC diagnostic push -#pragma GCC diagnostic ignored "-Wstringop-overflow" -#endif - mbedtls_sha512_finish_ret(&sha512, padbuf); -#if defined(__GNUC__) && __GNUC__ >= 11 -#pragma GCC diagnostic pop +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_new_session_tickets(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + uint16_t num_tickets) +{ + conf->new_session_tickets_count = num_tickets; +} #endif - mbedtls_sha512_free(&sha512); +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_session_tickets_cb(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + mbedtls_ssl_ticket_write_t *f_ticket_write, + mbedtls_ssl_ticket_parse_t *f_ticket_parse, + void *p_ticket) +{ + conf->f_ticket_write = f_ticket_write; + conf->f_ticket_parse = f_ticket_parse; + conf->p_ticket = p_ticket; +} #endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */ - ssl->handshake->tls_prf(session->master, 48, sender, - padbuf, 48, buf, len); +void mbedtls_ssl_set_export_keys_cb(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + mbedtls_ssl_export_keys_t *f_export_keys, + void *p_export_keys) +{ + ssl->f_export_keys = f_export_keys; + ssl->p_export_keys = p_export_keys; +} - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "calc finished result", buf, len); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE) +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_async_private_cb( + mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + mbedtls_ssl_async_sign_t *f_async_sign, + mbedtls_ssl_async_decrypt_t *f_async_decrypt, + mbedtls_ssl_async_resume_t *f_async_resume, + mbedtls_ssl_async_cancel_t *f_async_cancel, + void *async_config_data) +{ + conf->f_async_sign_start = f_async_sign; + conf->f_async_decrypt_start = f_async_decrypt; + conf->f_async_resume = f_async_resume; + conf->f_async_cancel = f_async_cancel; + conf->p_async_config_data = async_config_data; +} - mbedtls_platform_zeroize(padbuf, sizeof(padbuf)); +void *mbedtls_ssl_conf_get_async_config_data(const mbedtls_ssl_config *conf) +{ + return conf->p_async_config_data; +} - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= calc finished")); +void *mbedtls_ssl_get_async_operation_data(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + if (ssl->handshake == NULL) { + return NULL; + } else { + return ssl->handshake->user_async_ctx; + } } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_C && !MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ -void mbedtls_ssl_handshake_wrapup_free_hs_transform(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +void mbedtls_ssl_set_async_operation_data(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + void *ctx) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("=> handshake wrapup: final free")); + if (ssl->handshake != NULL) { + ssl->handshake->user_async_ctx = ctx; + } +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE */ - /* - * Free our handshake params - */ - mbedtls_ssl_handshake_free(ssl); - mbedtls_free(ssl->handshake); - ssl->handshake = NULL; +/* + * SSL get accessors + */ +uint32_t mbedtls_ssl_get_verify_result(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + if (ssl->session != NULL) { + return ssl->session->verify_result; + } - /* - * Free the previous transform and switch in the current one - */ - if (ssl->transform) { - mbedtls_ssl_transform_free(ssl->transform); - mbedtls_free(ssl->transform); + if (ssl->session_negotiate != NULL) { + return ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result; } - ssl->transform = ssl->transform_negotiate; - ssl->transform_negotiate = NULL; - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("<= handshake wrapup: final free")); + return 0xFFFFFFFF; } -void mbedtls_ssl_handshake_wrapup(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +int mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_id_from_ssl(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) { - int resume = ssl->handshake->resume; - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("=> handshake wrapup")); - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) - if (ssl->renego_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_IN_PROGRESS) { - ssl->renego_status = MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_DONE; - ssl->renego_records_seen = 0; + if (ssl == NULL || ssl->session == NULL) { + return 0; } -#endif - /* - * Free the previous session and switch in the current one - */ - if (ssl->session) { -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) - /* RFC 7366 3.1: keep the EtM state */ - ssl->session_negotiate->encrypt_then_mac = - ssl->session->encrypt_then_mac; -#endif + return ssl->session->ciphersuite; +} - mbedtls_ssl_session_free(ssl->session); - mbedtls_free(ssl->session); +const char *mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + if (ssl == NULL || ssl->session == NULL) { + return NULL; } - ssl->session = ssl->session_negotiate; - ssl->session_negotiate = NULL; - /* - * Add cache entry - */ - if (ssl->conf->f_set_cache != NULL && - ssl->session->id_len != 0 && - resume == 0) { - if (ssl->conf->f_set_cache(ssl->conf->p_cache, ssl->session) != 0) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("cache did not store session")); - } - } + return mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_name(ssl->session->ciphersuite); +} +const char *mbedtls_ssl_get_version(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) - if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM && - ssl->handshake->flight != NULL) { - /* Cancel handshake timer */ - mbedtls_ssl_set_timer(ssl, 0); - - /* Keep last flight around in case we need to resend it: - * we need the handshake and transform structures for that */ - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("skip freeing handshake and transform")); - } else + if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM) { + switch (ssl->tls_version) { + case MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2: + return "DTLSv1.2"; + default: + return "unknown (DTLS)"; + } + } #endif - mbedtls_ssl_handshake_wrapup_free_hs_transform(ssl); - - ssl->state++; - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("<= handshake wrapup")); + switch (ssl->tls_version) { + case MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2: + return "TLSv1.2"; + case MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_3: + return "TLSv1.3"; + default: + return "unknown"; + } } -int mbedtls_ssl_write_finished(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT) + +size_t mbedtls_ssl_get_output_record_size_limit(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) { - int ret, hash_len; + const size_t max_len = MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN; + size_t record_size_limit = max_len; - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> write finished")); + if (ssl->session != NULL && + ssl->session->record_size_limit >= MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT_MIN && + ssl->session->record_size_limit < max_len) { + record_size_limit = ssl->session->record_size_limit; + } - mbedtls_ssl_update_out_pointers(ssl, ssl->transform_negotiate); + // TODO: this is currently untested + /* During a handshake, use the value being negotiated */ + if (ssl->session_negotiate != NULL && + ssl->session_negotiate->record_size_limit >= MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT_MIN && + ssl->session_negotiate->record_size_limit < max_len) { + record_size_limit = ssl->session_negotiate->record_size_limit; + } - ssl->handshake->calc_finished(ssl, ssl->out_msg + 4, ssl->conf->endpoint); + return record_size_limit; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT */ - /* - * RFC 5246 7.4.9 (Page 63) says 12 is the default length and ciphersuites - * may define some other value. Currently (early 2016), no defined - * ciphersuite does this (and this is unlikely to change as activity has - * moved to TLS 1.3 now) so we can keep the hardcoded 12 here. - */ - hash_len = (ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0) ? 36 : 12; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH) +size_t mbedtls_ssl_get_input_max_frag_len(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + size_t max_len = MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN; + size_t read_mfl; -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) - ssl->verify_data_len = hash_len; - memcpy(ssl->own_verify_data, ssl->out_msg + 4, hash_len); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) + /* Use the configured MFL for the client if we're past SERVER_HELLO_DONE */ + if (ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT && + ssl->state >= MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_HELLO_DONE) { + return ssl_mfl_code_to_length(ssl->conf->mfl_code); + } #endif - ssl->out_msglen = 4 + hash_len; - ssl->out_msgtype = MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE; - ssl->out_msg[0] = MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_FINISHED; - - /* - * In case of session resuming, invert the client and server - * ChangeCipherSpec messages order. - */ - if (ssl->handshake->resume != 0) { -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) - if (ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT) { - ssl->state = MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WRAPUP; + /* Check if a smaller max length was negotiated */ + if (ssl->session_out != NULL) { + read_mfl = ssl_mfl_code_to_length(ssl->session_out->mfl_code); + if (read_mfl < max_len) { + max_len = read_mfl; } -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) - if (ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER) { - ssl->state = MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC; + } + + /* During a handshake, use the value being negotiated */ + if (ssl->session_negotiate != NULL) { + read_mfl = ssl_mfl_code_to_length(ssl->session_negotiate->mfl_code); + if (read_mfl < max_len) { + max_len = read_mfl; } -#endif - } else { - ssl->state++; } - /* - * Switch to our negotiated transform and session parameters for outbound - * data. - */ - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("switching to new transform spec for outbound data")); - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) - if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM) { - unsigned char i; - - /* Remember current epoch settings for resending */ - ssl->handshake->alt_transform_out = ssl->transform_out; - memcpy(ssl->handshake->alt_out_ctr, ssl->cur_out_ctr, 8); - - /* Set sequence_number to zero */ - memset(ssl->cur_out_ctr + 2, 0, 6); + return max_len; +} - /* Increment epoch */ - for (i = 2; i > 0; i--) { - if (++ssl->cur_out_ctr[i - 1] != 0) { - break; - } - } +size_t mbedtls_ssl_get_output_max_frag_len(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + size_t max_len; - /* The loop goes to its end iff the counter is wrapping */ - if (i == 0) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("DTLS epoch would wrap")); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_COUNTER_WRAPPING; - } - } else -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ - memset(ssl->cur_out_ctr, 0, 8); + /* + * Assume mfl_code is correct since it was checked when set + */ + max_len = ssl_mfl_code_to_length(ssl->conf->mfl_code); - ssl->transform_out = ssl->transform_negotiate; - ssl->session_out = ssl->session_negotiate; + /* Check if a smaller max length was negotiated */ + if (ssl->session_out != NULL && + ssl_mfl_code_to_length(ssl->session_out->mfl_code) < max_len) { + max_len = ssl_mfl_code_to_length(ssl->session_out->mfl_code); + } -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL) - if (mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_activate != NULL) { - if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_activate(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_CHANNEL_OUTBOUND)) != 0) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_activate", ret); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED; - } + /* During a handshake, use the value being negotiated */ + if (ssl->session_negotiate != NULL && + ssl_mfl_code_to_length(ssl->session_negotiate->mfl_code) < max_len) { + max_len = ssl_mfl_code_to_length(ssl->session_negotiate->mfl_code); } -#endif + + return max_len; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) - if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM) { - mbedtls_ssl_send_flight_completed(ssl); +size_t mbedtls_ssl_get_current_mtu(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + /* Return unlimited mtu for client hello messages to avoid fragmentation. */ + if (ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT && + (ssl->state == MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_HELLO || + ssl->state == MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_HELLO)) { + return 0; } -#endif - if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg(ssl)) != 0) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg", ret); - return ret; + if (ssl->handshake == NULL || ssl->handshake->mtu == 0) { + return ssl->mtu; } -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) - if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM && - (ret = mbedtls_ssl_flight_transmit(ssl)) != 0) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_flight_transmit", ret); - return ret; + if (ssl->mtu == 0) { + return ssl->handshake->mtu; } -#endif - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= write finished")); - - return 0; + return ssl->mtu < ssl->handshake->mtu ? + ssl->mtu : ssl->handshake->mtu; } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) -#define SSL_MAX_HASH_LEN 36 -#else -#define SSL_MAX_HASH_LEN 12 -#endif - -int mbedtls_ssl_parse_finished(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +int mbedtls_ssl_get_max_out_record_payload(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) { - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - unsigned int hash_len; - unsigned char buf[SSL_MAX_HASH_LEN]; - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> parse finished")); + size_t max_len = MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN; - /* There is currently no ciphersuite using another length with TLS 1.2 */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) - if (ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0) { - hash_len = 36; - } else +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + (void) ssl; #endif - hash_len = 12; - ssl->handshake->calc_finished(ssl, buf, ssl->conf->endpoint ^ 1); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH) + const size_t mfl = mbedtls_ssl_get_output_max_frag_len(ssl); - if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_read_record(ssl, 1)) != 0) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_read_record", ret); - goto exit; + if (max_len > mfl) { + max_len = mfl; } +#endif - if (ssl->in_msgtype != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad finished message")); - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); - ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; - goto exit; - } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT) + const size_t record_size_limit = mbedtls_ssl_get_output_record_size_limit(ssl); - if (ssl->in_msg[0] != MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_FINISHED || - ssl->in_hslen != mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len(ssl) + hash_len) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad finished message")); - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR); - ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_FINISHED; - goto exit; + if (max_len > record_size_limit) { + max_len = record_size_limit; } +#endif - if (mbedtls_ct_memcmp(ssl->in_msg + mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len(ssl), - buf, hash_len) != 0) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad finished message")); - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECRYPT_ERROR); - ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_FINISHED; - goto exit; + if (ssl->transform_out != NULL && + ssl->transform_out->tls_version == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_3) { + /* + * In TLS 1.3 case, when records are protected, `max_len` as computed + * above is the maximum length of the TLSInnerPlaintext structure that + * along the plaintext payload contains the inner content type (one byte) + * and some zero padding. Given the algorithm used for padding + * in mbedtls_ssl_encrypt_buf(), compute the maximum length for + * the plaintext payload. Round down to a multiple of + * MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_TLS1_3_PADDING_GRANULARITY and + * subtract 1. + */ + max_len = ((max_len / MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_TLS1_3_PADDING_GRANULARITY) * + MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_TLS1_3_PADDING_GRANULARITY) - 1; } -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) - ssl->verify_data_len = hash_len; - memcpy(ssl->peer_verify_data, buf, hash_len); -#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if (mbedtls_ssl_get_current_mtu(ssl) != 0) { + const size_t mtu = mbedtls_ssl_get_current_mtu(ssl); + const int ret = mbedtls_ssl_get_record_expansion(ssl); + const size_t overhead = (size_t) ret; - if (ssl->handshake->resume != 0) { -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) - if (ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT) { - ssl->state = MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC; + if (ret < 0) { + return ret; } -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) - if (ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER) { - ssl->state = MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WRAPUP; + + if (mtu <= overhead) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("MTU too low for record expansion")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; } -#endif - } else { - ssl->state++; - } -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) - if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM) { - mbedtls_ssl_recv_flight_completed(ssl); + if (max_len > mtu - overhead) { + max_len = mtu - overhead; + } } -#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= parse finished")); +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT) + ((void) ssl); +#endif -exit: - mbedtls_platform_zeroize(buf, hash_len); - return ret; + return (int) max_len; } -static void ssl_handshake_params_init(mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *handshake) +int mbedtls_ssl_get_max_in_record_payload(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) { - memset(handshake, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params)); - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) - mbedtls_md5_init(&handshake->fin_md5); - mbedtls_sha1_init(&handshake->fin_sha1); - mbedtls_md5_starts_ret(&handshake->fin_md5); - mbedtls_sha1_starts_ret(&handshake->fin_sha1); -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) - handshake->fin_sha256_psa = psa_hash_operation_init(); - psa_hash_setup(&handshake->fin_sha256_psa, PSA_ALG_SHA_256); -#else - mbedtls_sha256_init(&handshake->fin_sha256); - mbedtls_sha256_starts_ret(&handshake->fin_sha256, 0); -#endif -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) - handshake->fin_sha384_psa = psa_hash_operation_init(); - psa_hash_setup(&handshake->fin_sha384_psa, PSA_ALG_SHA_384); -#else - mbedtls_sha512_init(&handshake->fin_sha512); - mbedtls_sha512_starts_ret(&handshake->fin_sha512, 1); -#endif -#endif -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ - - handshake->update_checksum = ssl_update_checksum_start; + size_t max_len = MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN; -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && \ - defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) - mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_init(&handshake->hash_algs); -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_C) - mbedtls_dhm_init(&handshake->dhm_ctx); -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) - mbedtls_ecdh_init(&handshake->ecdh_ctx); -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) - mbedtls_ecjpake_init(&handshake->ecjpake_ctx); -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) - handshake->ecjpake_cache = NULL; - handshake->ecjpake_cache_len = 0; -#endif +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH) + (void) ssl; #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED) - mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_init(&handshake->ecrs_ctx); -#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH) + const size_t mfl = mbedtls_ssl_get_input_max_frag_len(ssl); -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) - handshake->sni_authmode = MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_UNSET; + if (max_len > mfl) { + max_len = mfl; + } #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) && \ - !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) - mbedtls_pk_init(&handshake->peer_pubkey); -#endif + return (int) max_len; } -void mbedtls_ssl_transform_init(mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) +const mbedtls_x509_crt *mbedtls_ssl_get_peer_cert(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) { - memset(transform, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_ssl_transform)); - - mbedtls_cipher_init(&transform->cipher_ctx_enc); - mbedtls_cipher_init(&transform->cipher_ctx_dec); + if (ssl == NULL || ssl->session == NULL) { + return NULL; + } -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_MODES_USE_MAC) - mbedtls_md_init(&transform->md_ctx_enc); - mbedtls_md_init(&transform->md_ctx_dec); -#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) + return ssl->session->peer_cert; +#else + return NULL; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ -void mbedtls_ssl_session_init(mbedtls_ssl_session *session) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) +int mbedtls_ssl_get_session(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + mbedtls_ssl_session *dst) { - memset(session, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_ssl_session)); -} + int ret; -MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL -static int ssl_handshake_init(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) -{ - /* Clear old handshake information if present */ - if (ssl->transform_negotiate) { - mbedtls_ssl_transform_free(ssl->transform_negotiate); - } - if (ssl->session_negotiate) { - mbedtls_ssl_session_free(ssl->session_negotiate); - } - if (ssl->handshake) { - mbedtls_ssl_handshake_free(ssl); + if (ssl == NULL || + dst == NULL || + ssl->session == NULL || + ssl->conf->endpoint != MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } - /* - * Either the pointers are now NULL or cleared properly and can be freed. - * Now allocate missing structures. + /* Since Mbed TLS 3.0, mbedtls_ssl_get_session() is no longer + * idempotent: Each session can only be exported once. + * + * (This is in preparation for TLS 1.3 support where we will + * need the ability to export multiple sessions (aka tickets), + * which will be achieved by calling mbedtls_ssl_get_session() + * multiple times until it fails.) + * + * Check whether we have already exported the current session, + * and fail if so. */ - if (ssl->transform_negotiate == NULL) { - ssl->transform_negotiate = mbedtls_calloc(1, sizeof(mbedtls_ssl_transform)); + if (ssl->session->exported == 1) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; } - if (ssl->session_negotiate == NULL) { - ssl->session_negotiate = mbedtls_calloc(1, sizeof(mbedtls_ssl_session)); + ret = mbedtls_ssl_session_copy(dst, ssl->session); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; } - if (ssl->handshake == NULL) { - ssl->handshake = mbedtls_calloc(1, sizeof(mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params)); - } -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH) - /* If the buffers are too small - reallocate */ + /* Remember that we've exported the session. */ + ssl->session->exported = 1; + return 0; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */ - handle_buffer_resizing(ssl, 0, MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_BUFFER_LEN, - MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_BUFFER_LEN); -#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) - /* All pointers should exist and can be directly freed without issue */ - if (ssl->handshake == NULL || - ssl->transform_negotiate == NULL || - ssl->session_negotiate == NULL) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("alloc() of ssl sub-contexts failed")); +/* Serialization of TLS 1.2 sessions + * + * For more detail, see the description of ssl_session_save(). + */ +static size_t ssl_tls12_session_save(const mbedtls_ssl_session *session, + unsigned char *buf, + size_t buf_len) +{ + unsigned char *p = buf; + size_t used = 0; - mbedtls_free(ssl->handshake); - mbedtls_free(ssl->transform_negotiate); - mbedtls_free(ssl->session_negotiate); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) + uint64_t start; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) + size_t cert_len; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ - ssl->handshake = NULL; - ssl->transform_negotiate = NULL; - ssl->session_negotiate = NULL; + /* + * Time + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) + used += 8; - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED; + if (used <= buf_len) { + start = (uint64_t) session->start; + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT64_BE(start, p, 0); + p += 8; } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME */ - /* Initialize structures */ - mbedtls_ssl_session_init(ssl->session_negotiate); - mbedtls_ssl_transform_init(ssl->transform_negotiate); - ssl_handshake_params_init(ssl->handshake); + /* + * Basic mandatory fields + */ + used += 1 /* id_len */ + + sizeof(session->id) + + sizeof(session->master) + + 4; /* verify_result */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) - if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM) { - ssl->handshake->alt_transform_out = ssl->transform_out; + if (used <= buf_len) { + *p++ = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(session->id_len); + memcpy(p, session->id, 32); + p += 32; - if (ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT) { - ssl->handshake->retransmit_state = MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_PREPARING; - } else { - ssl->handshake->retransmit_state = MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_WAITING; - } + memcpy(p, session->master, 48); + p += 48; - mbedtls_ssl_set_timer(ssl, 0); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE(session->verify_result, p, 0); + p += 4; } -#endif - return 0; -} + /* + * Peer's end-entity certificate + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) + if (session->peer_cert == NULL) { + cert_len = 0; + } else { + cert_len = session->peer_cert->raw.len; + } -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) -/* Dummy cookie callbacks for defaults */ -MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL -static int ssl_cookie_write_dummy(void *ctx, - unsigned char **p, unsigned char *end, - const unsigned char *cli_id, size_t cli_id_len) -{ - ((void) ctx); - ((void) p); - ((void) end); - ((void) cli_id); - ((void) cli_id_len); + used += 3 + cert_len; - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; -} + if (used <= buf_len) { + *p++ = MBEDTLS_BYTE_2(cert_len); + *p++ = MBEDTLS_BYTE_1(cert_len); + *p++ = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(cert_len); -MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL -static int ssl_cookie_check_dummy(void *ctx, - const unsigned char *cookie, size_t cookie_len, - const unsigned char *cli_id, size_t cli_id_len) -{ - ((void) ctx); - ((void) cookie); - ((void) cookie_len); - ((void) cli_id); - ((void) cli_id_len); + if (session->peer_cert != NULL) { + memcpy(p, session->peer_cert->raw.p, cert_len); + p += cert_len; + } + } +#else /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ + if (session->peer_cert_digest != NULL) { + used += 1 /* type */ + 1 /* length */ + session->peer_cert_digest_len; + if (used <= buf_len) { + *p++ = (unsigned char) session->peer_cert_digest_type; + *p++ = (unsigned char) session->peer_cert_digest_len; + memcpy(p, session->peer_cert_digest, + session->peer_cert_digest_len); + p += session->peer_cert_digest_len; + } + } else { + used += 2; + if (used <= buf_len) { + *p++ = (unsigned char) MBEDTLS_MD_NONE; + *p++ = 0; + } + } +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY && MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ + /* + * Session ticket if any, plus associated data + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) + if (session->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT) { + used += 3 + session->ticket_len + 4; /* len + ticket + lifetime */ -/* - * Initialize an SSL context - */ -void mbedtls_ssl_init(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) -{ - memset(ssl, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_ssl_context)); -} + if (used <= buf_len) { + *p++ = MBEDTLS_BYTE_2(session->ticket_len); + *p++ = MBEDTLS_BYTE_1(session->ticket_len); + *p++ = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(session->ticket_len); -/* - * Setup an SSL context - */ + if (session->ticket != NULL) { + memcpy(p, session->ticket, session->ticket_len); + p += session->ticket_len; + } -int mbedtls_ssl_setup(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - const mbedtls_ssl_config *conf) -{ - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - size_t in_buf_len = MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_BUFFER_LEN; - size_t out_buf_len = MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_BUFFER_LEN; + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE(session->ticket_lifetime, p, 0); + p += 4; + } + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) + if (session->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER) { + used += 8; - ssl->conf = conf; + if (used <= buf_len) { + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT64_BE((uint64_t) session->ticket_creation_time, p, 0); + p += 8; + } + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME && MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */ /* - * Prepare base structures + * Misc extension-related info */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH) + used += 1; - /* Set to NULL in case of an error condition */ - ssl->out_buf = NULL; - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH) - ssl->in_buf_len = in_buf_len; -#endif - ssl->in_buf = mbedtls_calloc(1, in_buf_len); - if (ssl->in_buf == NULL) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("alloc(%" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET " bytes) failed", in_buf_len)); - ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED; - goto error; + if (used <= buf_len) { + *p++ = session->mfl_code; } - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH) - ssl->out_buf_len = out_buf_len; #endif - ssl->out_buf = mbedtls_calloc(1, out_buf_len); - if (ssl->out_buf == NULL) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("alloc(%" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET " bytes) failed", out_buf_len)); - ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED; - goto error; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) + used += 1; + + if (used <= buf_len) { + *p++ = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(session->encrypt_then_mac); } +#endif - mbedtls_ssl_reset_in_out_pointers(ssl); + return used; +} -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP) - memset(&ssl->dtls_srtp_info, 0, sizeof(ssl->dtls_srtp_info)); +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls12_session_load(mbedtls_ssl_session *session, + const unsigned char *buf, + size_t len) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) + uint64_t start; #endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) + size_t cert_len; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ - if ((ret = ssl_handshake_init(ssl)) != 0) { - goto error; + const unsigned char *p = buf; + const unsigned char * const end = buf + len; + + /* + * Time + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) + if (8 > (size_t) (end - p)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } - return 0; + start = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT64_BE(p, 0); + p += 8; -error: - mbedtls_free(ssl->in_buf); - mbedtls_free(ssl->out_buf); + session->start = (time_t) start; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME */ - ssl->conf = NULL; + /* + * Basic mandatory fields + */ + if (1 + 32 + 48 + 4 > (size_t) (end - p)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH) - ssl->in_buf_len = 0; - ssl->out_buf_len = 0; -#endif - ssl->in_buf = NULL; - ssl->out_buf = NULL; - - ssl->in_hdr = NULL; - ssl->in_ctr = NULL; - ssl->in_len = NULL; - ssl->in_iv = NULL; - ssl->in_msg = NULL; + session->id_len = *p++; + memcpy(session->id, p, 32); + p += 32; - ssl->out_hdr = NULL; - ssl->out_ctr = NULL; - ssl->out_len = NULL; - ssl->out_iv = NULL; - ssl->out_msg = NULL; + memcpy(session->master, p, 48); + p += 48; - return ret; -} + session->verify_result = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE(p, 0); + p += 4; -/* - * Reset an initialized and used SSL context for re-use while retaining - * all application-set variables, function pointers and data. - * - * If partial is non-zero, keep data in the input buffer and client ID. - * (Use when a DTLS client reconnects from the same port.) - */ -int mbedtls_ssl_session_reset_int(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int partial) -{ - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH) - size_t in_buf_len = ssl->in_buf_len; - size_t out_buf_len = ssl->out_buf_len; + /* Immediately clear invalid pointer values that have been read, in case + * we exit early before we replaced them with valid ones. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) + session->peer_cert = NULL; #else - size_t in_buf_len = MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_BUFFER_LEN; - size_t out_buf_len = MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_BUFFER_LEN; -#endif - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CLIENT_PORT_REUSE) || \ - !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) - ((void) partial); -#endif + session->peer_cert_digest = NULL; +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) + session->ticket = NULL; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS && MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */ - ssl->state = MBEDTLS_SSL_HELLO_REQUEST; + /* + * Peer certificate + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) + /* Deserialize CRT from the end of the ticket. */ + if (3 > (size_t) (end - p)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } - /* Cancel any possibly running timer */ - mbedtls_ssl_set_timer(ssl, 0); + cert_len = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT24_BE(p, 0); + p += 3; -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) - ssl->renego_status = MBEDTLS_SSL_INITIAL_HANDSHAKE; - ssl->renego_records_seen = 0; + if (cert_len != 0) { + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - ssl->verify_data_len = 0; - memset(ssl->own_verify_data, 0, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_DATA_MAX_LEN); - memset(ssl->peer_verify_data, 0, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_DATA_MAX_LEN); -#endif - ssl->secure_renegotiation = MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION; + if (cert_len > (size_t) (end - p)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } - ssl->in_offt = NULL; - mbedtls_ssl_reset_in_out_pointers(ssl); + session->peer_cert = mbedtls_calloc(1, sizeof(mbedtls_x509_crt)); - ssl->in_msgtype = 0; - ssl->in_msglen = 0; -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) - ssl->next_record_offset = 0; - ssl->in_epoch = 0; -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY) - mbedtls_ssl_dtls_replay_reset(ssl); -#endif + if (session->peer_cert == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED; + } - ssl->in_hslen = 0; - ssl->nb_zero = 0; + mbedtls_x509_crt_init(session->peer_cert); - ssl->keep_current_message = 0; + if ((ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der(session->peer_cert, + p, cert_len)) != 0) { + mbedtls_x509_crt_free(session->peer_cert); + mbedtls_free(session->peer_cert); + session->peer_cert = NULL; + return ret; + } - ssl->out_msgtype = 0; - ssl->out_msglen = 0; - ssl->out_left = 0; -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING) - if (ssl->split_done != MBEDTLS_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING_DISABLED) { - ssl->split_done = 0; + p += cert_len; + } +#else /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ + /* Deserialize CRT digest from the end of the ticket. */ + if (2 > (size_t) (end - p)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } -#endif - memset(ssl->cur_out_ctr, 0, sizeof(ssl->cur_out_ctr)); + session->peer_cert_digest_type = (mbedtls_md_type_t) *p++; + session->peer_cert_digest_len = (size_t) *p++; - ssl->transform_in = NULL; - ssl->transform_out = NULL; + if (session->peer_cert_digest_len != 0) { + const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info = + mbedtls_md_info_from_type(session->peer_cert_digest_type); + if (md_info == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + if (session->peer_cert_digest_len != mbedtls_md_get_size(md_info)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } - ssl->session_in = NULL; - ssl->session_out = NULL; + if (session->peer_cert_digest_len > (size_t) (end - p)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } - memset(ssl->out_buf, 0, out_buf_len); + session->peer_cert_digest = + mbedtls_calloc(1, session->peer_cert_digest_len); + if (session->peer_cert_digest == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED; + } - int clear_in_buf = 1; -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CLIENT_PORT_REUSE) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) - if (partial != 0) { - clear_in_buf = 0; - } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CLIENT_PORT_REUSE && MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ - if (clear_in_buf) { - ssl->in_left = 0; - memset(ssl->in_buf, 0, in_buf_len); + memcpy(session->peer_cert_digest, p, + session->peer_cert_digest_len); + p += session->peer_cert_digest_len; } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL) - if (mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_reset != NULL) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("going for mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_reset()")); - if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_reset(ssl)) != 0) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_reset", ret); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED; + /* + * Session ticket and associated data + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) + if (session->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT) { + if (3 > (size_t) (end - p)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } - } -#endif - if (ssl->transform) { - mbedtls_ssl_transform_free(ssl->transform); - mbedtls_free(ssl->transform); - ssl->transform = NULL; + session->ticket_len = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT24_BE(p, 0); + p += 3; + + if (session->ticket_len != 0) { + if (session->ticket_len > (size_t) (end - p)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + session->ticket = mbedtls_calloc(1, session->ticket_len); + if (session->ticket == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED; + } + + memcpy(session->ticket, p, session->ticket_len); + p += session->ticket_len; + } + + if (4 > (size_t) (end - p)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + session->ticket_lifetime = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE(p, 0); + p += 4; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) + if (session->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER) { + if (8 > (size_t) (end - p)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + session->ticket_creation_time = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT64_BE(p, 0); + p += 8; } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME && MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */ - if (ssl->session) { - mbedtls_ssl_session_free(ssl->session); - mbedtls_free(ssl->session); - ssl->session = NULL; + /* + * Misc extension-related info + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH) + if (1 > (size_t) (end - p)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN) - ssl->alpn_chosen = NULL; + session->mfl_code = *p++; #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) - int free_cli_id = 1; -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CLIENT_PORT_REUSE) - if (partial != 0) { - free_cli_id = 0; - } -#endif - if (free_cli_id) { - mbedtls_free(ssl->cli_id); - ssl->cli_id = NULL; - ssl->cli_id_len = 0; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) + if (1 > (size_t) (end - p)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } + + session->encrypt_then_mac = *p++; #endif - if ((ret = ssl_handshake_init(ssl)) != 0) { - return ret; + /* Done, should have consumed entire buffer */ + if (p != end) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } return 0; } -/* - * Reset an initialized and used SSL context for re-use while retaining - * all application-set variables, function pointers and data. - */ -int mbedtls_ssl_session_reset(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) -{ - return mbedtls_ssl_session_reset_int(ssl, 0); -} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ -/* - * SSL set accessors +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) +/* Serialization of TLS 1.3 sessions: + * + * For more detail, see the description of ssl_session_save(). */ -void mbedtls_ssl_conf_endpoint(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, int endpoint) -{ - conf->endpoint = endpoint; -} - -void mbedtls_ssl_conf_transport(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, int transport) -{ - conf->transport = transport; -} - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY) -void mbedtls_ssl_conf_dtls_anti_replay(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, char mode) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_session_save(const mbedtls_ssl_session *session, + unsigned char *buf, + size_t buf_len, + size_t *olen) { - conf->anti_replay = mode; -} + unsigned char *p = buf; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) + size_t hostname_len = (session->hostname == NULL) ? + 0 : strlen(session->hostname) + 1; #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_BADMAC_LIMIT) -void mbedtls_ssl_conf_dtls_badmac_limit(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, unsigned limit) -{ - conf->badmac_limit = limit; -} +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN) + const size_t alpn_len = (session->ticket_alpn == NULL) ? + 0 : strlen(session->ticket_alpn) + 1; #endif + size_t needed = 4 /* ticket_age_add */ + + 1 /* ticket_flags */ + + 1; /* resumption_key length */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + *olen = 0; -void mbedtls_ssl_set_datagram_packing(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - unsigned allow_packing) -{ - ssl->disable_datagram_packing = !allow_packing; -} + if (session->resumption_key_len > MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_TICKET_RESUMPTION_KEY_LEN) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + needed += session->resumption_key_len; /* resumption_key */ -void mbedtls_ssl_conf_handshake_timeout(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, - uint32_t min, uint32_t max) -{ - conf->hs_timeout_min = min; - conf->hs_timeout_max = max; -} +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) + needed += 4; /* max_early_data_size */ #endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT) + needed += 2; /* record_size_limit */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT */ -void mbedtls_ssl_conf_authmode(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, int authmode) -{ - conf->authmode = authmode; -} +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) + needed += 8; /* ticket_creation_time or ticket_reception_time */ +#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) -void mbedtls_ssl_conf_verify(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, - int (*f_vrfy)(void *, mbedtls_x509_crt *, int, uint32_t *), - void *p_vrfy) -{ - conf->f_vrfy = f_vrfy; - conf->p_vrfy = p_vrfy; -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) + if (session->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN) + needed += 2 /* alpn_len */ + + alpn_len; /* alpn */ +#endif + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ -void mbedtls_ssl_conf_rng(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, - int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), - void *p_rng) -{ - conf->f_rng = f_rng; - conf->p_rng = p_rng; -} +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) + if (session->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) + needed += 2 /* hostname_len */ + + hostname_len; /* hostname */ +#endif -void mbedtls_ssl_conf_dbg(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, - void (*f_dbg)(void *, int, const char *, int, const char *), - void *p_dbg) -{ - conf->f_dbg = f_dbg; - conf->p_dbg = p_dbg; -} + needed += 4 /* ticket_lifetime */ + + 2; /* ticket_len */ -void mbedtls_ssl_set_bio(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - void *p_bio, - mbedtls_ssl_send_t *f_send, - mbedtls_ssl_recv_t *f_recv, - mbedtls_ssl_recv_timeout_t *f_recv_timeout) -{ - ssl->p_bio = p_bio; - ssl->f_send = f_send; - ssl->f_recv = f_recv; - ssl->f_recv_timeout = f_recv_timeout; -} + /* Check size_t overflow */ + if (session->ticket_len > SIZE_MAX - needed) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) -void mbedtls_ssl_set_mtu(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, uint16_t mtu) -{ - ssl->mtu = mtu; -} -#endif + needed += session->ticket_len; /* ticket */ + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */ -void mbedtls_ssl_conf_read_timeout(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, uint32_t timeout) -{ - conf->read_timeout = timeout; -} + *olen = needed; + if (needed > buf_len) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + } -void mbedtls_ssl_set_timer_cb(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - void *p_timer, - mbedtls_ssl_set_timer_t *f_set_timer, - mbedtls_ssl_get_timer_t *f_get_timer) -{ - ssl->p_timer = p_timer; - ssl->f_set_timer = f_set_timer; - ssl->f_get_timer = f_get_timer; + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE(session->ticket_age_add, p, 0); + p[4] = session->ticket_flags; - /* Make sure we start with no timer running */ - mbedtls_ssl_set_timer(ssl, 0); -} + /* save resumption_key */ + p[5] = session->resumption_key_len; + p += 6; + memcpy(p, session->resumption_key, session->resumption_key_len); + p += session->resumption_key_len; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE(session->max_early_data_size, p, 0); + p += 4; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT) + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(session->record_size_limit, p, 0); + p += 2; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) -void mbedtls_ssl_conf_session_cache(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, - void *p_cache, - int (*f_get_cache)(void *, mbedtls_ssl_session *), - int (*f_set_cache)(void *, const mbedtls_ssl_session *)) -{ - conf->p_cache = p_cache; - conf->f_get_cache = f_get_cache; - conf->f_set_cache = f_set_cache; -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ + if (session->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT64_BE((uint64_t) session->ticket_creation_time, p, 0); + p += 8; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) -int mbedtls_ssl_set_session(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, const mbedtls_ssl_session *session) -{ - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN) + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(alpn_len, p, 0); + p += 2; - if (ssl == NULL || - session == NULL || - ssl->session_negotiate == NULL || - ssl->conf->endpoint != MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + if (alpn_len > 0) { + /* save chosen alpn */ + memcpy(p, session->ticket_alpn, alpn_len); + p += alpn_len; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA && MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN */ } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ - if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_session_copy(ssl->session_negotiate, - session)) != 0) { - return ret; - } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) + if (session->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(hostname_len, p, 0); + p += 2; + if (hostname_len > 0) { + /* save host name */ + memcpy(p, session->hostname, hostname_len); + p += hostname_len; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION */ - ssl->handshake->resume = 1; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT64_BE((uint64_t) session->ticket_reception_time, p, 0); + p += 8; +#endif + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE(session->ticket_lifetime, p, 0); + p += 4; + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(session->ticket_len, p, 0); + p += 2; + + if (session->ticket != NULL && session->ticket_len > 0) { + memcpy(p, session->ticket, session->ticket_len); + p += session->ticket_len; + } + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */ return 0; } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */ -void mbedtls_ssl_conf_ciphersuites(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, - const int *ciphersuites) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_session_load(mbedtls_ssl_session *session, + const unsigned char *buf, + size_t len) { - conf->ciphersuite_list[MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0] = ciphersuites; - conf->ciphersuite_list[MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1] = ciphersuites; - conf->ciphersuite_list[MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2] = ciphersuites; - conf->ciphersuite_list[MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3] = ciphersuites; -} + const unsigned char *p = buf; + const unsigned char *end = buf + len; -void mbedtls_ssl_conf_ciphersuites_for_version(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, - const int *ciphersuites, - int major, int minor) -{ - if (major != MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3) { - return; + if (end - p < 6) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } + session->ticket_age_add = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE(p, 0); + session->ticket_flags = p[4]; - if (minor < MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 || minor > MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3) { - return; + /* load resumption_key */ + session->resumption_key_len = p[5]; + p += 6; + + if (end - p < session->resumption_key_len) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } - conf->ciphersuite_list[minor] = ciphersuites; -} + if (sizeof(session->resumption_key) < session->resumption_key_len) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + memcpy(session->resumption_key, p, session->resumption_key_len); + p += session->resumption_key_len; -#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) -void mbedtls_ssl_conf_cert_profile(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, - const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile *profile) -{ - conf->cert_profile = profile; -} +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) + if (end - p < 4) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + session->max_early_data_size = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE(p, 0); + p += 4; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT) + if (end - p < 2) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + session->record_size_limit = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(p, 0); + p += 2; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT */ -/* Append a new keycert entry to a (possibly empty) list */ -MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL -static int ssl_append_key_cert(mbedtls_ssl_key_cert **head, - mbedtls_x509_crt *cert, - mbedtls_pk_context *key) -{ - mbedtls_ssl_key_cert *new_cert; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) + if (session->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) + if (end - p < 8) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + session->ticket_creation_time = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT64_BE(p, 0); + p += 8; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME */ - new_cert = mbedtls_calloc(1, sizeof(mbedtls_ssl_key_cert)); - if (new_cert == NULL) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN) + size_t alpn_len; + + if (end - p < 2) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + alpn_len = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(p, 0); + p += 2; + + if (end - p < (long int) alpn_len) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + if (alpn_len > 0) { + int ret = mbedtls_ssl_session_set_ticket_alpn(session, (char *) p); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + p += alpn_len; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA && MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN */ } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ - new_cert->cert = cert; - new_cert->key = key; - new_cert->next = NULL; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) + if (session->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) + size_t hostname_len; + /* load host name */ + if (end - p < 2) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + hostname_len = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(p, 0); + p += 2; - /* Update head is the list was null, else add to the end */ - if (*head == NULL) { - *head = new_cert; - } else { - mbedtls_ssl_key_cert *cur = *head; - while (cur->next != NULL) { - cur = cur->next; + if (end - p < (long int) hostname_len) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + if (hostname_len > 0) { + session->hostname = mbedtls_calloc(1, hostname_len); + if (session->hostname == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED; + } + memcpy(session->hostname, p, hostname_len); + p += hostname_len; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) + if (end - p < 8) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + session->ticket_reception_time = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT64_BE(p, 0); + p += 8; +#endif + if (end - p < 4) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + session->ticket_lifetime = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE(p, 0); + p += 4; + + if (end - p < 2) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + session->ticket_len = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(p, 0); + p += 2; + + if (end - p < (long int) session->ticket_len) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + if (session->ticket_len > 0) { + session->ticket = mbedtls_calloc(1, session->ticket_len); + if (session->ticket == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED; + } + memcpy(session->ticket, p, session->ticket_len); + p += session->ticket_len; } - cur->next = new_cert; } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */ return 0; -} -int mbedtls_ssl_conf_own_cert(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, - mbedtls_x509_crt *own_cert, - mbedtls_pk_context *pk_key) -{ - return ssl_append_key_cert(&conf->key_cert, own_cert, pk_key); } - -void mbedtls_ssl_conf_ca_chain(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, - mbedtls_x509_crt *ca_chain, - mbedtls_x509_crl *ca_crl) -{ - conf->ca_chain = ca_chain; - conf->ca_crl = ca_crl; - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK) - /* mbedtls_ssl_conf_ca_chain() and mbedtls_ssl_conf_ca_cb() - * cannot be used together. */ - conf->f_ca_cb = NULL; - conf->p_ca_cb = NULL; -#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK */ +#else /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_session_save(const mbedtls_ssl_session *session, + unsigned char *buf, + size_t buf_len, + size_t *olen) +{ + ((void) session); + ((void) buf); + ((void) buf_len); + *olen = 0; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; } -#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK) -void mbedtls_ssl_conf_ca_cb(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, - mbedtls_x509_crt_ca_cb_t f_ca_cb, - void *p_ca_cb) +static int ssl_tls13_session_load(const mbedtls_ssl_session *session, + unsigned char *buf, + size_t buf_len) { - conf->f_ca_cb = f_ca_cb; - conf->p_ca_cb = p_ca_cb; - - /* mbedtls_ssl_conf_ca_chain() and mbedtls_ssl_conf_ca_cb() - * cannot be used together. */ - conf->ca_chain = NULL; - conf->ca_crl = NULL; + ((void) session); + ((void) buf); + ((void) buf_len); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) -int mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_own_cert(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - mbedtls_x509_crt *own_cert, - mbedtls_pk_context *pk_key) -{ - return ssl_append_key_cert(&ssl->handshake->sni_key_cert, - own_cert, pk_key); -} +/* + * Define ticket header determining Mbed TLS version + * and structure of the ticket. + */ -void mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_ca_chain(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - mbedtls_x509_crt *ca_chain, - mbedtls_x509_crl *ca_crl) -{ - ssl->handshake->sni_ca_chain = ca_chain; - ssl->handshake->sni_ca_crl = ca_crl; -} +/* + * Define bitflag determining compile-time settings influencing + * structure of serialized SSL sessions. + */ -void mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_authmode(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - int authmode) -{ - ssl->handshake->sni_authmode = authmode; -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_TIME 1 +#else +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_TIME 0 +#endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) -void mbedtls_ssl_set_verify(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - int (*f_vrfy)(void *, mbedtls_x509_crt *, int, uint32_t *), - void *p_vrfy) -{ - ssl->f_vrfy = f_vrfy; - ssl->p_vrfy = p_vrfy; -} -#endif +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_CRT 1 +#else +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_CRT 0 +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) -/* - * Set EC J-PAKE password for current handshake - */ -int mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_ecjpake_password(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - const unsigned char *pw, - size_t pw_len) -{ - mbedtls_ecjpake_role role; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_KEEP_PEER_CRT 1 +#else +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_KEEP_PEER_CRT 0 +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */ - if (ssl->handshake == NULL || ssl->conf == NULL) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; - } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_CLIENT_TICKET 1 +#else +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_CLIENT_TICKET 0 +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C && MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */ - if (ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER) { - role = MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_SERVER; - } else { - role = MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_CLIENT; - } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH) +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_MFL 1 +#else +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_MFL 0 +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH */ - return mbedtls_ecjpake_setup(&ssl->handshake->ecjpake_ctx, - role, - MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, - MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1, - pw, pw_len); -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_ETM 1 +#else +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_ETM 0 +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_TICKET 1 +#else +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_TICKET 0 +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */ -static void ssl_conf_remove_psk(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf) -{ - /* Remove reference to existing PSK, if any. */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) - if (!mbedtls_svc_key_id_is_null(conf->psk_opaque)) { - /* The maintenance of the PSK key slot is the - * user's responsibility. */ - conf->psk_opaque = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; - } - /* This and the following branch should never - * be taken simultaneously as we maintain the - * invariant that raw and opaque PSKs are never - * configured simultaneously. As a safeguard, - * though, `else` is omitted here. */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ - if (conf->psk != NULL) { - mbedtls_platform_zeroize(conf->psk, conf->psk_len); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_SNI 1 +#else +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_SNI 0 +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION */ - mbedtls_free(conf->psk); - conf->psk = NULL; - conf->psk_len = 0; - } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_EARLY_DATA 1 +#else +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_EARLY_DATA 0 +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA */ - /* Remove reference to PSK identity, if any. */ - if (conf->psk_identity != NULL) { - mbedtls_free(conf->psk_identity); - conf->psk_identity = NULL; - conf->psk_identity_len = 0; - } -} +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT) +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_RECORD_SIZE 1 +#else +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_RECORD_SIZE 0 +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT */ -/* This function assumes that PSK identity in the SSL config is unset. - * It checks that the provided identity is well-formed and attempts - * to make a copy of it in the SSL config. - * On failure, the PSK identity in the config remains unset. */ -MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL -static int ssl_conf_set_psk_identity(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, - unsigned char const *psk_identity, - size_t psk_identity_len) -{ - /* Identity len will be encoded on two bytes */ - if (psk_identity == NULL || - (psk_identity_len >> 16) != 0 || - psk_identity_len > MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; - } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_ALPN 1 +#else +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_ALPN 0 +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN */ - conf->psk_identity = mbedtls_calloc(1, psk_identity_len); - if (conf->psk_identity == NULL) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED; - } +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_TIME_BIT 0 +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_CRT_BIT 1 +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_CLIENT_TICKET_BIT 2 +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_MFL_BIT 3 +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_ETM_BIT 4 +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_TICKET_BIT 5 +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_KEEP_PEER_CRT_BIT 6 +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_SNI_BIT 7 +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_EARLY_DATA_BIT 8 +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_RECORD_SIZE_BIT 9 +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_ALPN_BIT 10 - conf->psk_identity_len = psk_identity_len; - memcpy(conf->psk_identity, psk_identity, conf->psk_identity_len); +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_BITFLAG \ + ((uint16_t) ( \ + (SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_TIME << SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_TIME_BIT) | \ + (SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_CRT << SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_CRT_BIT) | \ + (SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_CLIENT_TICKET << \ + SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_CLIENT_TICKET_BIT) | \ + (SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_MFL << SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_MFL_BIT) | \ + (SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_ETM << SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_ETM_BIT) | \ + (SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_TICKET << SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_TICKET_BIT) | \ + (SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_KEEP_PEER_CRT << \ + SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_KEEP_PEER_CRT_BIT) | \ + (SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_SNI << SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_SNI_BIT) | \ + (SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_EARLY_DATA << \ + SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_EARLY_DATA_BIT) | \ + (SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_RECORD_SIZE << \ + SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_RECORD_SIZE_BIT) | \ + (SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_ALPN << \ + SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_ALPN_BIT))) - return 0; -} +static const unsigned char ssl_serialized_session_header[] = { + MBEDTLS_VERSION_MAJOR, + MBEDTLS_VERSION_MINOR, + MBEDTLS_VERSION_PATCH, + MBEDTLS_BYTE_1(SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_BITFLAG), + MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_BITFLAG), +}; -int mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, - const unsigned char *psk, size_t psk_len, - const unsigned char *psk_identity, size_t psk_identity_len) +/* + * Serialize a session in the following format: + * (in the presentation language of TLS, RFC 8446 section 3) + * + * TLS 1.2 session: + * + * struct { + * #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) + * opaque ticket<0..2^24-1>; // length 0 means no ticket + * uint32 ticket_lifetime; + * #endif + * } ClientOnlyData; + * + * struct { + * #if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) + * uint64 start_time; + * #endif + * uint8 session_id_len; // at most 32 + * opaque session_id[32]; + * opaque master[48]; // fixed length in the standard + * uint32 verify_result; + * #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE + * opaque peer_cert<0..2^24-1>; // length 0 means no peer cert + * #else + * uint8 peer_cert_digest_type; + * opaque peer_cert_digest<0..2^8-1> + * #endif + * select (endpoint) { + * case client: ClientOnlyData; + * case server: uint64 ticket_creation_time; + * }; + * #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH) + * uint8 mfl_code; // up to 255 according to standard + * #endif + * #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) + * uint8 encrypt_then_mac; // 0 or 1 + * #endif + * } serialized_session_tls12; + * + * + * TLS 1.3 Session: + * + * struct { + * #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) + * opaque hostname<0..2^16-1>; + * #endif + * #if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) + * uint64 ticket_reception_time; + * #endif + * uint32 ticket_lifetime; + * opaque ticket<1..2^16-1>; + * } ClientOnlyData; + * + * struct { + * uint32 ticket_age_add; + * uint8 ticket_flags; + * opaque resumption_key<0..255>; + * #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) + * uint32 max_early_data_size; + * #endif + * #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT) + * uint16 record_size_limit; + * #endif + * select ( endpoint ) { + * case client: ClientOnlyData; + * case server: + * #if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) + * uint64 ticket_creation_time; + * #endif + * #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN) + * opaque ticket_alpn<0..256>; + * #endif + * }; + * } serialized_session_tls13; + * + * + * SSL session: + * + * struct { + * + * opaque mbedtls_version[3]; // library version: major, minor, patch + * opaque session_format[2]; // library-version specific 16-bit field + * // determining the format of the remaining + * // serialized data. + * + * Note: When updating the format, remember to keep + * these version+format bytes. + * + * // In this version, `session_format` determines + * // the setting of those compile-time + * // configuration options which influence + * // the structure of mbedtls_ssl_session. + * + * uint8_t minor_ver; // Protocol minor version. Possible values: + * // - TLS 1.2 (0x0303) + * // - TLS 1.3 (0x0304) + * uint8_t endpoint; + * uint16_t ciphersuite; + * + * select (serialized_session.tls_version) { + * + * case MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2: + * serialized_session_tls12 data; + * case MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_3: + * serialized_session_tls13 data; + * + * }; + * + * } serialized_session; + * + */ + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_session_save(const mbedtls_ssl_session *session, + unsigned char omit_header, + unsigned char *buf, + size_t buf_len, + size_t *olen) { + unsigned char *p = buf; + size_t used = 0; + size_t remaining_len; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) + size_t out_len; int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - /* Remove opaque/raw PSK + PSK Identity */ - ssl_conf_remove_psk(conf); - - /* Check and set raw PSK */ - if (psk == NULL) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; - } - if (psk_len == 0) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; - } - if (psk_len > MBEDTLS_PSK_MAX_LEN) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; +#endif + if (session == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; } - if ((conf->psk = mbedtls_calloc(1, psk_len)) == NULL) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED; + if (!omit_header) { + /* + * Add Mbed TLS version identifier + */ + used += sizeof(ssl_serialized_session_header); + + if (used <= buf_len) { + memcpy(p, ssl_serialized_session_header, + sizeof(ssl_serialized_session_header)); + p += sizeof(ssl_serialized_session_header); + } } - conf->psk_len = psk_len; - memcpy(conf->psk, psk, conf->psk_len); - /* Check and set PSK Identity */ - ret = ssl_conf_set_psk_identity(conf, psk_identity, psk_identity_len); - if (ret != 0) { - ssl_conf_remove_psk(conf); + /* + * TLS version identifier, endpoint, ciphersuite + */ + used += 1 /* TLS version */ + + 1 /* endpoint */ + + 2; /* ciphersuite */ + if (used <= buf_len) { + *p++ = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(session->tls_version); + *p++ = session->endpoint; + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(session->ciphersuite, p, 0); + p += 2; } - return ret; + /* Forward to version-specific serialization routine. */ + remaining_len = (buf_len >= used) ? buf_len - used : 0; + switch (session->tls_version) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) + case MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2: + used += ssl_tls12_session_save(session, p, remaining_len); + break; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) + case MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_3: + ret = ssl_tls13_session_save(session, p, remaining_len, &out_len); + if (ret != 0 && ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) { + return ret; + } + used += out_len; + break; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 */ + + default: + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + } + + *olen = used; + if (used > buf_len) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + } + + return 0; } -static void ssl_remove_psk(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +/* + * Public wrapper for ssl_session_save() + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_session_save(const mbedtls_ssl_session *session, + unsigned char *buf, + size_t buf_len, + size_t *olen) { -#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) - if (!mbedtls_svc_key_id_is_null(ssl->handshake->psk_opaque)) { - ssl->handshake->psk_opaque = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; - } else -#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ - if (ssl->handshake->psk != NULL) { - mbedtls_platform_zeroize(ssl->handshake->psk, - ssl->handshake->psk_len); - mbedtls_free(ssl->handshake->psk); - ssl->handshake->psk_len = 0; - } + return ssl_session_save(session, 0, buf, buf_len, olen); } -int mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_psk(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - const unsigned char *psk, size_t psk_len) +/* + * Deserialize session, see mbedtls_ssl_session_save() for format. + * + * This internal version is wrapped by a public function that cleans up in + * case of error, and has an extra option omit_header. + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_session_load(mbedtls_ssl_session *session, + unsigned char omit_header, + const unsigned char *buf, + size_t len) { - if (psk == NULL || ssl->handshake == NULL) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + const unsigned char *p = buf; + const unsigned char * const end = buf + len; + size_t remaining_len; + + + if (session == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; } - if (psk_len > MBEDTLS_PSK_MAX_LEN) { + if (!omit_header) { + /* + * Check Mbed TLS version identifier + */ + + if ((size_t) (end - p) < sizeof(ssl_serialized_session_header)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + if (memcmp(p, ssl_serialized_session_header, + sizeof(ssl_serialized_session_header)) != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_VERSION_MISMATCH; + } + p += sizeof(ssl_serialized_session_header); + } + + /* + * TLS version identifier, endpoint, ciphersuite + */ + if (4 > (size_t) (end - p)) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } + session->tls_version = (mbedtls_ssl_protocol_version) (0x0300 | *p++); + session->endpoint = *p++; + session->ciphersuite = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(p, 0); + p += 2; - ssl_remove_psk(ssl); + /* Dispatch according to TLS version. */ + remaining_len = (size_t) (end - p); + switch (session->tls_version) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) + case MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2: + return ssl_tls12_session_load(session, p, remaining_len); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ - if ((ssl->handshake->psk = mbedtls_calloc(1, psk_len)) == NULL) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) + case MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_3: + return ssl_tls13_session_load(session, p, remaining_len); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 */ + + default: + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } +} - ssl->handshake->psk_len = psk_len; - memcpy(ssl->handshake->psk, psk, ssl->handshake->psk_len); +/* + * Deserialize session: public wrapper for error cleaning + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_session_load(mbedtls_ssl_session *session, + const unsigned char *buf, + size_t len) +{ + int ret = ssl_session_load(session, 0, buf, len); - return 0; + if (ret != 0) { + mbedtls_ssl_session_free(session); + } + + return ret; } -#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) -int mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk_opaque(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, - psa_key_id_t psk, - const unsigned char *psk_identity, - size_t psk_identity_len) +/* + * Perform a single step of the SSL handshake + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_prepare_handshake_step(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - /* Clear opaque/raw PSK + PSK Identity, if present. */ - ssl_conf_remove_psk(conf); - /* Check and set opaque PSK */ - if (mbedtls_svc_key_id_is_null(psk)) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + /* + * We may have not been able to send to the peer all the handshake data + * that were written into the output buffer by the previous handshake step, + * if the write to the network callback returned with the + * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE error code. + * We proceed to the next handshake step only when all data from the + * previous one have been sent to the peer, thus we make sure that this is + * the case here by calling `mbedtls_ssl_flush_output()`. The function may + * return with the #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE error code in which case + * we have to wait before to go ahead. + * In the case of TLS 1.3, handshake step handlers do not send data to the + * peer. Data are only sent here and through + * `mbedtls_ssl_handle_pending_alert` in case an error that triggered an + * alert occurred. + */ + if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_flush_output(ssl)) != 0) { + return ret; } - conf->psk_opaque = psk; - /* Check and set PSK Identity */ - ret = ssl_conf_set_psk_identity(conf, psk_identity, - psk_identity_len); - if (ret != 0) { - ssl_conf_remove_psk(conf); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM && + ssl->handshake->retransmit_state == MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_SENDING) { + if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_flight_transmit(ssl)) != 0) { + return ret; + } } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ return ret; } -int mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_psk_opaque(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - psa_key_id_t psk) +int mbedtls_ssl_handshake_step(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) { - if ((mbedtls_svc_key_id_is_null(psk)) || - (ssl->handshake == NULL)) { + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + if (ssl == NULL || + ssl->conf == NULL || + ssl->handshake == NULL || + ssl->state == MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } - ssl_remove_psk(ssl); - ssl->handshake->psk_opaque = psk; - return 0; -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + ret = ssl_prepare_handshake_step(ssl); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } -void mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk_cb(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, - int (*f_psk)(void *, mbedtls_ssl_context *, const unsigned char *, - size_t), - void *p_psk) -{ - conf->f_psk = f_psk; - conf->p_psk = p_psk; -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED */ + ret = mbedtls_ssl_handle_pending_alert(ssl); + if (ret != 0) { + goto cleanup; + } -#if defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) + /* If ssl->conf->endpoint is not one of MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT or + * MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER, this is the return code we give */ + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) -int mbedtls_ssl_conf_dh_param(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, const char *dhm_P, const char *dhm_G) -{ - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) + if (ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("client state: %s", + mbedtls_ssl_states_str((mbedtls_ssl_states) ssl->state))); - if ((ret = mbedtls_mpi_read_string(&conf->dhm_P, 16, dhm_P)) != 0 || - (ret = mbedtls_mpi_read_string(&conf->dhm_G, 16, dhm_G)) != 0) { - mbedtls_mpi_free(&conf->dhm_P); - mbedtls_mpi_free(&conf->dhm_G); - return ret; + switch (ssl->state) { + case MBEDTLS_SSL_HELLO_REQUEST: + ssl->state = MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_HELLO; + ret = 0; + break; + + case MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_HELLO: + ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_client_hello(ssl); + break; + + default: +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) + if (ssl->tls_version == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_3) { + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_handshake_client_step(ssl); + } else { + ret = mbedtls_ssl_handshake_client_step(ssl); + } +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) + ret = mbedtls_ssl_handshake_client_step(ssl); +#else + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_handshake_client_step(ssl); +#endif + } } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */ - return 0; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) + if (ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) + if (ssl->tls_version == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_3) { + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_handshake_server_step(ssl); + } else { + ret = mbedtls_ssl_handshake_server_step(ssl); + } +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) + ret = mbedtls_ssl_handshake_server_step(ssl); +#else + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_handshake_server_step(ssl); +#endif + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ + + if (ret != 0) { + /* handshake_step return error. And it is same + * with alert_reason. + */ + if (ssl->send_alert) { + ret = mbedtls_ssl_handle_pending_alert(ssl); + goto cleanup; + } + } + +cleanup: + return ret; } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ -int mbedtls_ssl_conf_dh_param_bin(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, - const unsigned char *dhm_P, size_t P_len, - const unsigned char *dhm_G, size_t G_len) +/* + * Perform the SSL handshake + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_handshake(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) { - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + int ret = 0; - mbedtls_mpi_free(&conf->dhm_P); - mbedtls_mpi_free(&conf->dhm_G); + /* Sanity checks */ - if ((ret = mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(&conf->dhm_P, dhm_P, P_len)) != 0 || - (ret = mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(&conf->dhm_G, dhm_G, G_len)) != 0) { - mbedtls_mpi_free(&conf->dhm_P); - mbedtls_mpi_free(&conf->dhm_G); - return ret; + if (ssl == NULL || ssl->conf == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } - return 0; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM && + (ssl->f_set_timer == NULL || ssl->f_get_timer == NULL)) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("You must use " + "mbedtls_ssl_set_timer_cb() for DTLS")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> handshake")); + + /* Main handshake loop */ + while (ssl->state != MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER) { + ret = mbedtls_ssl_handshake_step(ssl); + + if (ret != 0) { + break; + } + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= handshake")); + + return ret; } -int mbedtls_ssl_conf_dh_param_ctx(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, mbedtls_dhm_context *dhm_ctx) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) +/* + * Write HelloRequest to request renegotiation on server + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_write_hello_request(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - mbedtls_mpi_free(&conf->dhm_P); - mbedtls_mpi_free(&conf->dhm_G); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> write hello request")); - if ((ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy(&conf->dhm_P, &dhm_ctx->P)) != 0 || - (ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy(&conf->dhm_G, &dhm_ctx->G)) != 0) { - mbedtls_mpi_free(&conf->dhm_P); - mbedtls_mpi_free(&conf->dhm_G); + ssl->out_msglen = 4; + ssl->out_msgtype = MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE; + ssl->out_msg[0] = MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_HELLO_REQUEST; + + if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg(ssl)) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg", ret); return ret; } + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= write hello request")); + return 0; } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_DHM_C && MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) /* - * Set the minimum length for Diffie-Hellman parameters - */ -void mbedtls_ssl_conf_dhm_min_bitlen(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, - unsigned int bitlen) -{ - conf->dhm_min_bitlen = bitlen; -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_DHM_C && MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) -/* - * Set allowed/preferred hashes for handshake signatures - */ -void mbedtls_ssl_conf_sig_hashes(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, - const int *hashes) -{ - conf->sig_hashes = hashes; -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) -/* - * Set the allowed elliptic curves + * Actually renegotiate current connection, triggered by either: + * - any side: calling mbedtls_ssl_renegotiate(), + * - client: receiving a HelloRequest during mbedtls_ssl_read(), + * - server: receiving any handshake message on server during mbedtls_ssl_read() after + * the initial handshake is completed. + * If the handshake doesn't complete due to waiting for I/O, it will continue + * during the next calls to mbedtls_ssl_renegotiate() or mbedtls_ssl_read() respectively. */ -void mbedtls_ssl_conf_curves(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, - const mbedtls_ecp_group_id *curve_list) +int mbedtls_ssl_start_renegotiation(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) { - conf->curve_list = curve_list; -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; -#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) -int mbedtls_ssl_set_hostname(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, const char *hostname) -{ - /* Initialize to suppress unnecessary compiler warning */ - size_t hostname_len = 0; + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> renegotiate")); - /* Check if new hostname is valid before - * making any change to current one */ - if (hostname != NULL) { - hostname_len = strlen(hostname); + if ((ret = ssl_handshake_init(ssl)) != 0) { + return ret; + } - if (hostname_len > MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_HOST_NAME_LEN) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + /* RFC 6347 4.2.2: "[...] the HelloRequest will have message_seq = 0 and + * the ServerHello will have message_seq = 1" */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM && + ssl->renego_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_PENDING) { + if (ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER) { + ssl->handshake->out_msg_seq = 1; + } else { + ssl->handshake->in_msg_seq = 1; } } +#endif - /* Now it's clear that we will overwrite the old hostname, - * so we can free it safely */ + ssl->state = MBEDTLS_SSL_HELLO_REQUEST; + ssl->renego_status = MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_IN_PROGRESS; - if (ssl->hostname != NULL) { - mbedtls_platform_zeroize(ssl->hostname, strlen(ssl->hostname)); - mbedtls_free(ssl->hostname); + if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_handshake(ssl)) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_handshake", ret); + return ret; } - /* Passing NULL as hostname shall clear the old one */ - - if (hostname == NULL) { - ssl->hostname = NULL; - } else { - ssl->hostname = mbedtls_calloc(1, hostname_len + 1); - if (ssl->hostname == NULL) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED; - } - - memcpy(ssl->hostname, hostname, hostname_len); - - ssl->hostname[hostname_len] = '\0'; - } + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= renegotiate")); return 0; } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) -void mbedtls_ssl_conf_sni(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, - int (*f_sni)(void *, mbedtls_ssl_context *, - const unsigned char *, size_t), - void *p_sni) -{ - conf->f_sni = f_sni; - conf->p_sni = p_sni; -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN) -int mbedtls_ssl_conf_alpn_protocols(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, const char **protos) +/* + * Renegotiate current connection on client, + * or request renegotiation on server + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_renegotiate(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) { - size_t cur_len, tot_len; - const char **p; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; - /* - * RFC 7301 3.1: "Empty strings MUST NOT be included and byte strings - * MUST NOT be truncated." - * We check lengths now rather than later. - */ - tot_len = 0; - for (p = protos; *p != NULL; p++) { - cur_len = strlen(*p); - tot_len += cur_len; + if (ssl == NULL || ssl->conf == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } - if ((cur_len == 0) || - (cur_len > MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_ALPN_NAME_LEN) || - (tot_len > MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_ALPN_LIST_LEN)) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) + /* On server, just send the request */ + if (ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER) { + if (mbedtls_ssl_is_handshake_over(ssl) == 0) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } - } - - conf->alpn_list = protos; - return 0; -} - -const char *mbedtls_ssl_get_alpn_protocol(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) -{ - return ssl->alpn_chosen; -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN */ + ssl->renego_status = MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_PENDING; -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP) -void mbedtls_ssl_conf_srtp_mki_value_supported(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, - int support_mki_value) -{ - conf->dtls_srtp_mki_support = support_mki_value; -} + /* Did we already try/start sending HelloRequest? */ + if (ssl->out_left != 0) { + return mbedtls_ssl_flush_output(ssl); + } -int mbedtls_ssl_dtls_srtp_set_mki_value(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - unsigned char *mki_value, - uint16_t mki_len) -{ - if (mki_len > MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_MAX_MKI_LENGTH) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + return ssl_write_hello_request(ssl); } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ - if (ssl->conf->dtls_srtp_mki_support == MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP_MKI_UNSUPPORTED) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) + /* + * On client, either start the renegotiation process or, + * if already in progress, continue the handshake + */ + if (ssl->renego_status != MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_IN_PROGRESS) { + if (mbedtls_ssl_is_handshake_over(ssl) == 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_start_renegotiation(ssl)) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_start_renegotiation", ret); + return ret; + } + } else { + if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_handshake(ssl)) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_handshake", ret); + return ret; + } } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */ - memcpy(ssl->dtls_srtp_info.mki_value, mki_value, mki_len); - ssl->dtls_srtp_info.mki_len = mki_len; - return 0; + return ret; } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */ -int mbedtls_ssl_conf_dtls_srtp_protection_profiles(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, - const mbedtls_ssl_srtp_profile *profiles) +void mbedtls_ssl_handshake_free(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) { - const mbedtls_ssl_srtp_profile *p; - size_t list_size = 0; + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *handshake = ssl->handshake; - /* check the profiles list: all entry must be valid, - * its size cannot be more than the total number of supported profiles, currently 4 */ - for (p = profiles; *p != MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_UNSET && - list_size <= MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_MAX_PROFILE_LIST_LENGTH; - p++) { - if (mbedtls_ssl_check_srtp_profile_value(*p) != MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_UNSET) { - list_size++; - } else { - /* unsupported value, stop parsing and set the size to an error value */ - list_size = MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_MAX_PROFILE_LIST_LENGTH + 1; - } + if (handshake == NULL) { + return; } - if (list_size > MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_MAX_PROFILE_LIST_LENGTH) { - conf->dtls_srtp_profile_list = NULL; - conf->dtls_srtp_profile_list_len = 0; - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) + if (ssl->handshake->group_list_heap_allocated) { + mbedtls_free((void *) handshake->group_list); } + handshake->group_list = NULL; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS */ - conf->dtls_srtp_profile_list = profiles; - conf->dtls_srtp_profile_list_len = list_size; - - return 0; -} - -void mbedtls_ssl_get_dtls_srtp_negotiation_result(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - mbedtls_dtls_srtp_info *dtls_srtp_info) -{ - dtls_srtp_info->chosen_dtls_srtp_profile = ssl->dtls_srtp_info.chosen_dtls_srtp_profile; - /* do not copy the mki value if there is no chosen profile */ - if (dtls_srtp_info->chosen_dtls_srtp_profile == MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_UNSET) { - dtls_srtp_info->mki_len = 0; - } else { - dtls_srtp_info->mki_len = ssl->dtls_srtp_info.mki_len; - memcpy(dtls_srtp_info->mki_value, ssl->dtls_srtp_info.mki_value, - ssl->dtls_srtp_info.mki_len); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) + if (ssl->handshake->sig_algs_heap_allocated) { + mbedtls_free((void *) handshake->sig_algs); } -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP */ + handshake->sig_algs = NULL; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) + if (ssl->handshake->certificate_request_context) { + mbedtls_free((void *) handshake->certificate_request_context); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */ -void mbedtls_ssl_conf_max_version(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, int major, int minor) -{ - conf->max_major_ver = major; - conf->max_minor_ver = minor; -} +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE) + if (ssl->conf->f_async_cancel != NULL && handshake->async_in_progress != 0) { + ssl->conf->f_async_cancel(ssl); + handshake->async_in_progress = 0; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE */ -void mbedtls_ssl_conf_min_version(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, int major, int minor) -{ - conf->min_major_ver = major; - conf->min_minor_ver = minor; -} +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + psa_hash_abort(&handshake->fin_sha256_psa); +#else + mbedtls_md_free(&handshake->fin_sha256); +#endif +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + psa_hash_abort(&handshake->fin_sha384_psa); +#else + mbedtls_md_free(&handshake->fin_sha384); +#endif +#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_FALLBACK_SCSV) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) -void mbedtls_ssl_conf_fallback(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, char fallback) -{ - conf->fallback = fallback; -} +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_C) + mbedtls_dhm_free(&handshake->dhm_ctx); +#endif +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDH_OR_ECDHE_1_2_ENABLED) + mbedtls_ecdh_free(&handshake->ecdh_ctx); #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) -void mbedtls_ssl_conf_cert_req_ca_list(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, - char cert_req_ca_list) -{ - conf->cert_req_ca_list = cert_req_ca_list; -} -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) -void mbedtls_ssl_conf_encrypt_then_mac(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, char etm) -{ - conf->encrypt_then_mac = etm; -} +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + psa_pake_abort(&handshake->psa_pake_ctx); + /* + * Opaque keys are not stored in the handshake's data and it's the user + * responsibility to destroy them. Clear ones, instead, are created by + * the TLS library and should be destroyed at the same level + */ + if (!mbedtls_svc_key_id_is_null(handshake->psa_pake_password)) { + psa_destroy_key(handshake->psa_pake_password); + } + handshake->psa_pake_password = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; +#else + mbedtls_ecjpake_free(&handshake->ecjpake_ctx); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) + mbedtls_free(handshake->ecjpake_cache); + handshake->ecjpake_cache = NULL; + handshake->ecjpake_cache_len = 0; #endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET) -void mbedtls_ssl_conf_extended_master_secret(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, char ems) -{ - conf->extended_ms = ems; -} #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARC4_C) -void mbedtls_ssl_conf_arc4_support(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, char arc4) -{ - conf->arc4_disabled = arc4; -} +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDH_OR_ECDHE_ANY_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_ECDSA_ANY_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) + /* explicit void pointer cast for buggy MS compiler */ + mbedtls_free((void *) handshake->curves_tls_id); #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH) -int mbedtls_ssl_conf_max_frag_len(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, unsigned char mfl_code) -{ - if (mfl_code >= MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_INVALID || - ssl_mfl_code_to_length(mfl_code) > MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ADV_CONTENT_LEN) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_PSK_ENABLED) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + if (!mbedtls_svc_key_id_is_null(ssl->handshake->psk_opaque)) { + /* The maintenance of the external PSK key slot is the + * user's responsibility. */ + if (ssl->handshake->psk_opaque_is_internal) { + psa_destroy_key(ssl->handshake->psk_opaque); + ssl->handshake->psk_opaque_is_internal = 0; + } + ssl->handshake->psk_opaque = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; } +#else + if (handshake->psk != NULL) { + mbedtls_zeroize_and_free(handshake->psk, handshake->psk_len); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_PSK_ENABLED */ - conf->mfl_code = mfl_code; - - return 0; -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC) -void mbedtls_ssl_conf_truncated_hmac(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, int truncate) -{ - conf->trunc_hmac = truncate; -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) + /* + * Free only the linked list wrapper, not the keys themselves + * since the belong to the SNI callback + */ + ssl_key_cert_free(handshake->sni_key_cert); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C && MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING) -void mbedtls_ssl_conf_cbc_record_splitting(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, char split) -{ - conf->cbc_record_splitting = split; -} +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED) + mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_free(&handshake->ecrs_ctx); + if (handshake->ecrs_peer_cert != NULL) { + mbedtls_x509_crt_free(handshake->ecrs_peer_cert); + mbedtls_free(handshake->ecrs_peer_cert); + } #endif -void mbedtls_ssl_conf_legacy_renegotiation(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, int allow_legacy) -{ - conf->allow_legacy_renegotiation = allow_legacy; -} - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) -void mbedtls_ssl_conf_renegotiation(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, int renegotiation) -{ - conf->disable_renegotiation = renegotiation; -} +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) + mbedtls_pk_free(&handshake->peer_pubkey); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C && !MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ -void mbedtls_ssl_conf_renegotiation_enforced(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, int max_records) -{ - conf->renego_max_records = max_records; -} +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) && \ + (defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3)) + mbedtls_free(handshake->cookie); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C && + ( MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS || MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 ) */ -void mbedtls_ssl_conf_renegotiation_period(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, - const unsigned char period[8]) -{ - memcpy(conf->renego_period, period, 8); -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + mbedtls_ssl_flight_free(handshake->flight); + mbedtls_ssl_buffering_free(ssl); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) -void mbedtls_ssl_conf_session_tickets(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, int use_tickets) -{ - conf->session_tickets = use_tickets; -} -#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_XXDH_PSA_ANY_ENABLED) + if (handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey_is_external == 0) { + psa_destroy_key(handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_XXDH_PSA_ANY_ENABLED */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) -void mbedtls_ssl_conf_session_tickets_cb(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, - mbedtls_ssl_ticket_write_t *f_ticket_write, - mbedtls_ssl_ticket_parse_t *f_ticket_parse, - void *p_ticket) -{ - conf->f_ticket_write = f_ticket_write; - conf->f_ticket_parse = f_ticket_parse; - conf->p_ticket = p_ticket; -} +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) + mbedtls_ssl_transform_free(handshake->transform_handshake); + mbedtls_free(handshake->transform_handshake); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) + mbedtls_ssl_transform_free(handshake->transform_earlydata); + mbedtls_free(handshake->transform_earlydata); #endif -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXPORT_KEYS) -void mbedtls_ssl_conf_export_keys_cb(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, - mbedtls_ssl_export_keys_t *f_export_keys, - void *p_export_keys) -{ - conf->f_export_keys = f_export_keys; - conf->p_export_keys = p_export_keys; -} -void mbedtls_ssl_conf_export_keys_ext_cb(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, - mbedtls_ssl_export_keys_ext_t *f_export_keys_ext, - void *p_export_keys) -{ - conf->f_export_keys_ext = f_export_keys_ext; - conf->p_export_keys = p_export_keys; -} +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH) + /* If the buffers are too big - reallocate. Because of the way Mbed TLS + * processes datagrams and the fact that a datagram is allowed to have + * several records in it, it is possible that the I/O buffers are not + * empty at this stage */ + handle_buffer_resizing(ssl, 1, mbedtls_ssl_get_input_buflen(ssl), + mbedtls_ssl_get_output_buflen(ssl)); #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE) -void mbedtls_ssl_conf_async_private_cb( - mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, - mbedtls_ssl_async_sign_t *f_async_sign, - mbedtls_ssl_async_decrypt_t *f_async_decrypt, - mbedtls_ssl_async_resume_t *f_async_resume, - mbedtls_ssl_async_cancel_t *f_async_cancel, - void *async_config_data) -{ - conf->f_async_sign_start = f_async_sign; - conf->f_async_decrypt_start = f_async_decrypt; - conf->f_async_resume = f_async_resume; - conf->f_async_cancel = f_async_cancel; - conf->p_async_config_data = async_config_data; -} - -void *mbedtls_ssl_conf_get_async_config_data(const mbedtls_ssl_config *conf) -{ - return conf->p_async_config_data; -} - -void *mbedtls_ssl_get_async_operation_data(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) -{ - if (ssl->handshake == NULL) { - return NULL; - } else { - return ssl->handshake->user_async_ctx; - } -} - -void mbedtls_ssl_set_async_operation_data(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - void *ctx) -{ - if (ssl->handshake != NULL) { - ssl->handshake->user_async_ctx = ctx; - } + /* mbedtls_platform_zeroize MUST be last one in this function */ + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(handshake, + sizeof(mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params)); } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE */ -/* - * SSL get accessors - */ -uint32_t mbedtls_ssl_get_verify_result(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +void mbedtls_ssl_session_free(mbedtls_ssl_session *session) { - if (ssl->session != NULL) { - return ssl->session->verify_result; + if (session == NULL) { + return; } - if (ssl->session_negotiate != NULL) { - return ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result; - } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) + ssl_clear_peer_cert(session); +#endif - return 0xFFFFFFFF; -} +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) + mbedtls_free(session->hostname); +#endif + mbedtls_free(session->ticket); +#endif -const char *mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) -{ - if (ssl == NULL || ssl->session == NULL) { - return NULL; - } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) + mbedtls_free(session->ticket_alpn); +#endif - return mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_name(ssl->session->ciphersuite); + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(session, sizeof(mbedtls_ssl_session)); } -const char *mbedtls_ssl_get_version(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) -{ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) - if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM) { - switch (ssl->minor_ver) { - case MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2: - return "DTLSv1.0"; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CONTEXT_SERIALIZATION) - case MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3: - return "DTLSv1.2"; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_CONTEXT_CONFIG_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID 1u +#else +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_CONTEXT_CONFIG_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID 0u +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ - default: - return "unknown (DTLS)"; - } - } -#endif +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_CONTEXT_CONFIG_DTLS_BADMAC_LIMIT 1u - switch (ssl->minor_ver) { - case MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0: - return "SSLv3.0"; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY) +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_CONTEXT_CONFIG_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY 1u +#else +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_CONTEXT_CONFIG_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY 0u +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY */ - case MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1: - return "TLSv1.0"; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN) +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_CONTEXT_CONFIG_ALPN 1u +#else +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_CONTEXT_CONFIG_ALPN 0u +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN */ - case MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2: - return "TLSv1.1"; +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_CONTEXT_CONFIG_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID_BIT 0 +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_CONTEXT_CONFIG_DTLS_BADMAC_LIMIT_BIT 1 +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_CONTEXT_CONFIG_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY_BIT 2 +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_CONTEXT_CONFIG_ALPN_BIT 3 - case MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3: - return "TLSv1.2"; +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_CONTEXT_CONFIG_BITFLAG \ + ((uint32_t) ( \ + (SSL_SERIALIZED_CONTEXT_CONFIG_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID << \ + SSL_SERIALIZED_CONTEXT_CONFIG_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID_BIT) | \ + (SSL_SERIALIZED_CONTEXT_CONFIG_DTLS_BADMAC_LIMIT << \ + SSL_SERIALIZED_CONTEXT_CONFIG_DTLS_BADMAC_LIMIT_BIT) | \ + (SSL_SERIALIZED_CONTEXT_CONFIG_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY << \ + SSL_SERIALIZED_CONTEXT_CONFIG_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY_BIT) | \ + (SSL_SERIALIZED_CONTEXT_CONFIG_ALPN << SSL_SERIALIZED_CONTEXT_CONFIG_ALPN_BIT) | \ + 0u)) - default: - return "unknown"; - } -} +static const unsigned char ssl_serialized_context_header[] = { + MBEDTLS_VERSION_MAJOR, + MBEDTLS_VERSION_MINOR, + MBEDTLS_VERSION_PATCH, + MBEDTLS_BYTE_1(SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_BITFLAG), + MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_BITFLAG), + MBEDTLS_BYTE_2(SSL_SERIALIZED_CONTEXT_CONFIG_BITFLAG), + MBEDTLS_BYTE_1(SSL_SERIALIZED_CONTEXT_CONFIG_BITFLAG), + MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(SSL_SERIALIZED_CONTEXT_CONFIG_BITFLAG), +}; -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH) -size_t mbedtls_ssl_get_input_max_frag_len(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +/* + * Serialize a full SSL context + * + * The format of the serialized data is: + * (in the presentation language of TLS, RFC 8446 section 3) + * + * // header + * opaque mbedtls_version[3]; // major, minor, patch + * opaque context_format[5]; // version-specific field determining + * // the format of the remaining + * // serialized data. + * Note: When updating the format, remember to keep these + * version+format bytes. (We may make their size part of the API.) + * + * // session sub-structure + * opaque session<1..2^32-1>; // see mbedtls_ssl_session_save() + * // transform sub-structure + * uint8 random[64]; // ServerHello.random+ClientHello.random + * uint8 in_cid<0..2^8-1> // Connection ID: expected incoming value + * uint8 out_cid<0..2^8-1> // Connection ID: outgoing value to use + * // fields from ssl_context + * uint32 badmac_seen; // DTLS: number of records with failing MAC + * uint64 in_window_top; // DTLS: last validated record seq_num + * uint64 in_window; // DTLS: bitmask for replay protection + * uint8 disable_datagram_packing; // DTLS: only one record per datagram + * uint64 cur_out_ctr; // Record layer: outgoing sequence number + * uint16 mtu; // DTLS: path mtu (max outgoing fragment size) + * uint8 alpn_chosen<0..2^8-1> // ALPN: negotiated application protocol + * + * Note that many fields of the ssl_context or sub-structures are not + * serialized, as they fall in one of the following categories: + * + * 1. forced value (eg in_left must be 0) + * 2. pointer to dynamically-allocated memory (eg session, transform) + * 3. value can be re-derived from other data (eg session keys from MS) + * 4. value was temporary (eg content of input buffer) + * 5. value will be provided by the user again (eg I/O callbacks and context) + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_context_save(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *buf, + size_t buf_len, + size_t *olen) { - size_t max_len = MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN; - size_t read_mfl; + unsigned char *p = buf; + size_t used = 0; + size_t session_len; + int ret = 0; - /* Use the configured MFL for the client if we're past SERVER_HELLO_DONE */ - if (ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT && - ssl->state >= MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_HELLO_DONE) { - return ssl_mfl_code_to_length(ssl->conf->mfl_code); + /* + * Enforce usage restrictions, see "return BAD_INPUT_DATA" in + * this function's documentation. + * + * These are due to assumptions/limitations in the implementation. Some of + * them are likely to stay (no handshake in progress) some might go away + * (only DTLS) but are currently used to simplify the implementation. + */ + /* The initial handshake must be over */ + if (mbedtls_ssl_is_handshake_over(ssl) == 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("Initial handshake isn't over")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } + if (ssl->handshake != NULL) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("Handshake isn't completed")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + /* Double-check that sub-structures are indeed ready */ + if (ssl->transform == NULL || ssl->session == NULL) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("Serialised structures aren't ready")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + /* There must be no pending incoming or outgoing data */ + if (mbedtls_ssl_check_pending(ssl) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("There is pending incoming data")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + if (ssl->out_left != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("There is pending outgoing data")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + /* Protocol must be DTLS, not TLS */ + if (ssl->conf->transport != MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("Only DTLS is supported")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + /* Version must be 1.2 */ + if (ssl->tls_version != MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("Only version 1.2 supported")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + /* We must be using an AEAD ciphersuite */ + if (mbedtls_ssl_transform_uses_aead(ssl->transform) != 1) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("Only AEAD ciphersuites supported")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + /* Renegotiation must not be enabled */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) + if (ssl->conf->disable_renegotiation != MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("Renegotiation must not be enabled")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } +#endif - /* Check if a smaller max length was negotiated */ - if (ssl->session_out != NULL) { - read_mfl = ssl_mfl_code_to_length(ssl->session_out->mfl_code); - if (read_mfl < max_len) { - max_len = read_mfl; - } + /* + * Version and format identifier + */ + used += sizeof(ssl_serialized_context_header); + + if (used <= buf_len) { + memcpy(p, ssl_serialized_context_header, + sizeof(ssl_serialized_context_header)); + p += sizeof(ssl_serialized_context_header); } - // During a handshake, use the value being negotiated - if (ssl->session_negotiate != NULL) { - read_mfl = ssl_mfl_code_to_length(ssl->session_negotiate->mfl_code); - if (read_mfl < max_len) { - max_len = read_mfl; - } + /* + * Session (length + data) + */ + ret = ssl_session_save(ssl->session, 1, NULL, 0, &session_len); + if (ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) { + return ret; } - return max_len; -} + used += 4 + session_len; + if (used <= buf_len) { + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE(session_len, p, 0); + p += 4; -size_t mbedtls_ssl_get_output_max_frag_len(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) -{ - size_t max_len; + ret = ssl_session_save(ssl->session, 1, + p, session_len, &session_len); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + + p += session_len; + } /* - * Assume mfl_code is correct since it was checked when set + * Transform */ - max_len = ssl_mfl_code_to_length(ssl->conf->mfl_code); + used += sizeof(ssl->transform->randbytes); + if (used <= buf_len) { + memcpy(p, ssl->transform->randbytes, + sizeof(ssl->transform->randbytes)); + p += sizeof(ssl->transform->randbytes); + } - /* Check if a smaller max length was negotiated */ - if (ssl->session_out != NULL && - ssl_mfl_code_to_length(ssl->session_out->mfl_code) < max_len) { - max_len = ssl_mfl_code_to_length(ssl->session_out->mfl_code); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) + used += 2U + ssl->transform->in_cid_len + ssl->transform->out_cid_len; + if (used <= buf_len) { + *p++ = ssl->transform->in_cid_len; + memcpy(p, ssl->transform->in_cid, ssl->transform->in_cid_len); + p += ssl->transform->in_cid_len; + + *p++ = ssl->transform->out_cid_len; + memcpy(p, ssl->transform->out_cid, ssl->transform->out_cid_len); + p += ssl->transform->out_cid_len; } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ - /* During a handshake, use the value being negotiated */ - if (ssl->session_negotiate != NULL && - ssl_mfl_code_to_length(ssl->session_negotiate->mfl_code) < max_len) { - max_len = ssl_mfl_code_to_length(ssl->session_negotiate->mfl_code); + /* + * Saved fields from top-level ssl_context structure + */ + used += 4; + if (used <= buf_len) { + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE(ssl->badmac_seen, p, 0); + p += 4; } - return max_len; -} +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY) + used += 16; + if (used <= buf_len) { + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT64_BE(ssl->in_window_top, p, 0); + p += 8; -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) -size_t mbedtls_ssl_get_max_frag_len(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) -{ - return mbedtls_ssl_get_output_max_frag_len(ssl); -} -#endif /* !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH */ + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT64_BE(ssl->in_window, p, 0); + p += 8; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) -size_t mbedtls_ssl_get_current_mtu(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) -{ - /* Return unlimited mtu for client hello messages to avoid fragmentation. */ - if (ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT && - (ssl->state == MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_HELLO || - ssl->state == MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_HELLO)) { - return 0; + used += 1; + if (used <= buf_len) { + *p++ = ssl->disable_datagram_packing; } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ - if (ssl->handshake == NULL || ssl->handshake->mtu == 0) { - return ssl->mtu; + used += MBEDTLS_SSL_SEQUENCE_NUMBER_LEN; + if (used <= buf_len) { + memcpy(p, ssl->cur_out_ctr, MBEDTLS_SSL_SEQUENCE_NUMBER_LEN); + p += MBEDTLS_SSL_SEQUENCE_NUMBER_LEN; } - if (ssl->mtu == 0) { - return ssl->handshake->mtu; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + used += 2; + if (used <= buf_len) { + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(ssl->mtu, p, 0); + p += 2; } - - return ssl->mtu < ssl->handshake->mtu ? - ssl->mtu : ssl->handshake->mtu; -} #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ -int mbedtls_ssl_get_max_out_record_payload(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) -{ - size_t max_len = MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN) + { + const uint8_t alpn_len = ssl->alpn_chosen + ? (uint8_t) strlen(ssl->alpn_chosen) + : 0; -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH) && \ - !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) - (void) ssl; -#endif + used += 1 + alpn_len; + if (used <= buf_len) { + *p++ = alpn_len; -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH) - const size_t mfl = mbedtls_ssl_get_output_max_frag_len(ssl); + if (ssl->alpn_chosen != NULL) { + memcpy(p, ssl->alpn_chosen, alpn_len); + p += alpn_len; + } + } + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN */ - if (max_len > mfl) { - max_len = mfl; + /* + * Done + */ + *olen = used; + + if (used > buf_len) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; } -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) - if (mbedtls_ssl_get_current_mtu(ssl) != 0) { - const size_t mtu = mbedtls_ssl_get_current_mtu(ssl); - const int ret = mbedtls_ssl_get_record_expansion(ssl); - const size_t overhead = (size_t) ret; + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "saved context", buf, used); - if (ret < 0) { - return ret; - } + return mbedtls_ssl_session_reset_int(ssl, 0); +} - if (mtu <= overhead) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("MTU too low for record expansion")); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; - } +/* + * Deserialize context, see mbedtls_ssl_context_save() for format. + * + * This internal version is wrapped by a public function that cleans up in + * case of error. + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_context_load(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *buf, + size_t len) +{ + const unsigned char *p = buf; + const unsigned char * const end = buf + len; + size_t session_len; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) + tls_prf_fn prf_func = NULL; +#endif - if (max_len > mtu - overhead) { - max_len = mtu - overhead; - } + /* + * The context should have been freshly setup or reset. + * Give the user an error in case of obvious misuse. + * (Checking session is useful because it won't be NULL if we're + * renegotiating, or if the user mistakenly loaded a session first.) + */ + if (ssl->state != MBEDTLS_SSL_HELLO_REQUEST || + ssl->session != NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH) && \ - !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) - ((void) ssl); + /* + * We can't check that the config matches the initial one, but we can at + * least check it matches the requirements for serializing. + */ + if ( +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) + ssl->conf->disable_renegotiation != MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED || #endif + ssl->conf->transport != MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM || + ssl->conf->max_tls_version < MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 || + ssl->conf->min_tls_version > MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 + ) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } - return (int) max_len; -} + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "context to load", buf, len); -#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) -const mbedtls_x509_crt *mbedtls_ssl_get_peer_cert(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) -{ - if (ssl == NULL || ssl->session == NULL) { - return NULL; + /* + * Check version identifier + */ + if ((size_t) (end - p) < sizeof(ssl_serialized_context_header)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) - return ssl->session->peer_cert; -#else - return NULL; -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ + if (memcmp(p, ssl_serialized_context_header, + sizeof(ssl_serialized_context_header)) != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_VERSION_MISMATCH; + } + p += sizeof(ssl_serialized_context_header); -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) -int mbedtls_ssl_get_session(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - mbedtls_ssl_session *dst) -{ - if (ssl == NULL || - dst == NULL || - ssl->session == NULL || - ssl->conf->endpoint != MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT) { + /* + * Session + */ + if ((size_t) (end - p) < 4) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } - return mbedtls_ssl_session_copy(dst, ssl->session); -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */ + session_len = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE(p, 0); + p += 4; -const mbedtls_ssl_session *mbedtls_ssl_get_session_pointer(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) -{ - if (ssl == NULL) { - return NULL; + /* This has been allocated by ssl_handshake_init(), called by + * by either mbedtls_ssl_session_reset_int() or mbedtls_ssl_setup(). */ + ssl->session = ssl->session_negotiate; + ssl->session_in = ssl->session; + ssl->session_out = ssl->session; + ssl->session_negotiate = NULL; + + if ((size_t) (end - p) < session_len) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } - return ssl->session; -} + ret = ssl_session_load(ssl->session, 1, p, session_len); + if (ret != 0) { + mbedtls_ssl_session_free(ssl->session); + return ret; + } -/* - * Define ticket header determining Mbed TLS version - * and structure of the ticket. - */ + p += session_len; -/* - * Define bitflag determining compile-time settings influencing - * structure of serialized SSL sessions. - */ + /* + * Transform + */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) -#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_TIME 1 -#else -#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_TIME 0 -#endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME */ + /* This has been allocated by ssl_handshake_init(), called by + * by either mbedtls_ssl_session_reset_int() or mbedtls_ssl_setup(). */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) + ssl->transform = ssl->transform_negotiate; + ssl->transform_in = ssl->transform; + ssl->transform_out = ssl->transform; + ssl->transform_negotiate = NULL; +#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) -#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_CRT 1 -#else -#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_CRT 0 -#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) + prf_func = ssl_tls12prf_from_cs(ssl->session->ciphersuite); + if (prf_func == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) -#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_KEEP_PEER_CRT 1 -#else -#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_KEEP_PEER_CRT 0 -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */ + /* Read random bytes and populate structure */ + if ((size_t) (end - p) < sizeof(ssl->transform->randbytes)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) -#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_CLIENT_TICKET 1 -#else -#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_CLIENT_TICKET 0 -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C && MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */ + ret = ssl_tls12_populate_transform(ssl->transform, + ssl->session->ciphersuite, + ssl->session->master, +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_CBC_ETM) + ssl->session->encrypt_then_mac, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_CBC_ETM */ + prf_func, + p, /* currently pointing to randbytes */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, /* (D)TLS 1.2 is forced */ + ssl->conf->endpoint, + ssl); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ + p += sizeof(ssl->transform->randbytes); -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH) -#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_MFL 1 -#else -#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_MFL 0 -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) + /* Read connection IDs and store them */ + if ((size_t) (end - p) < 1) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC) -#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_TRUNC_HMAC 1 -#else -#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_TRUNC_HMAC 0 -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC */ + ssl->transform->in_cid_len = *p++; -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) -#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_ETM 1 -#else -#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_ETM 0 -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC */ + if ((size_t) (end - p) < ssl->transform->in_cid_len + 1u) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) -#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_TICKET 1 -#else -#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_TICKET 0 -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */ + memcpy(ssl->transform->in_cid, p, ssl->transform->in_cid_len); + p += ssl->transform->in_cid_len; -#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_TIME_BIT 0 -#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_CRT_BIT 1 -#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_CLIENT_TICKET_BIT 2 -#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_MFL_BIT 3 -#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_TRUNC_HMAC_BIT 4 -#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_ETM_BIT 5 -#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_TICKET_BIT 6 -#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_KEEP_PEER_CRT_BIT 7 + ssl->transform->out_cid_len = *p++; -#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_BITFLAG \ - ((uint16_t) ( \ - (SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_TIME << SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_TIME_BIT) | \ - (SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_CRT << SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_CRT_BIT) | \ - (SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_CLIENT_TICKET << \ - SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_CLIENT_TICKET_BIT) | \ - (SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_MFL << SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_MFL_BIT) | \ - (SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_TRUNC_HMAC << \ - SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_TRUNC_HMAC_BIT) | \ - (SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_ETM << SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_ETM_BIT) | \ - (SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_TICKET << SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_TICKET_BIT) | \ - (SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_KEEP_PEER_CRT << \ - SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_KEEP_PEER_CRT_BIT))) + if ((size_t) (end - p) < ssl->transform->out_cid_len) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } -static const unsigned char ssl_serialized_session_header[] = { - MBEDTLS_VERSION_MAJOR, - MBEDTLS_VERSION_MINOR, - MBEDTLS_VERSION_PATCH, - MBEDTLS_BYTE_1(SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_BITFLAG), - MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_BITFLAG), -}; - -/* - * Serialize a session in the following format: - * (in the presentation language of TLS, RFC 8446 section 3) - * - * opaque mbedtls_version[3]; // major, minor, patch - * opaque session_format[2]; // version-specific 16-bit field determining - * // the format of the remaining - * // serialized data. - * - * Note: When updating the format, remember to keep - * these version+format bytes. - * - * // In this version, `session_format` determines - * // the setting of those compile-time - * // configuration options which influence - * // the structure of mbedtls_ssl_session. - * #if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) - * uint64 start_time; - * #endif - * uint8 ciphersuite[2]; // defined by the standard - * uint8 compression; // 0 or 1 - * uint8 session_id_len; // at most 32 - * opaque session_id[32]; - * opaque master[48]; // fixed length in the standard - * uint32 verify_result; - * #if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) - * #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) - * opaque peer_cert<0..2^24-1>; // length 0 means no peer cert - * #else - * uint8 peer_cert_digest_type; - * opaque peer_cert_digest<0..2^8-1> - * #endif - * #endif - * #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) - * opaque ticket<0..2^24-1>; // length 0 means no ticket - * uint32 ticket_lifetime; - * #endif - * #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH) - * uint8 mfl_code; // up to 255 according to standard - * #endif - * #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC) - * uint8 trunc_hmac; // 0 or 1 - * #endif - * #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) - * uint8 encrypt_then_mac; // 0 or 1 - * #endif - * - * The order is the same as in the definition of the structure, except - * verify_result is put before peer_cert so that all mandatory fields come - * together in one block. - */ -MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL -static int ssl_session_save(const mbedtls_ssl_session *session, - unsigned char omit_header, - unsigned char *buf, - size_t buf_len, - size_t *olen) -{ - unsigned char *p = buf; - size_t used = 0; -#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) - uint64_t start; -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) - size_t cert_len; -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ - - - if (!omit_header) { - /* - * Add version identifier - */ - - used += sizeof(ssl_serialized_session_header); - - if (used <= buf_len) { - memcpy(p, ssl_serialized_session_header, - sizeof(ssl_serialized_session_header)); - p += sizeof(ssl_serialized_session_header); - } - } + memcpy(ssl->transform->out_cid, p, ssl->transform->out_cid_len); + p += ssl->transform->out_cid_len; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ /* - * Time + * Saved fields from top-level ssl_context structure */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) - used += 8; + if ((size_t) (end - p) < 4) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } - if (used <= buf_len) { - start = (uint64_t) session->start; + ssl->badmac_seen = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE(p, 0); + p += 4; - MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT64_BE(start, p, 0); - p += 8; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY) + if ((size_t) (end - p) < 16) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME */ - - /* - * Basic mandatory fields - */ - used += 2 /* ciphersuite */ - + 1 /* compression */ - + 1 /* id_len */ - + sizeof(session->id) - + sizeof(session->master) - + 4; /* verify_result */ - if (used <= buf_len) { - MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(session->ciphersuite, p, 0); - p += 2; + ssl->in_window_top = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT64_BE(p, 0); + p += 8; - *p++ = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(session->compression); + ssl->in_window = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT64_BE(p, 0); + p += 8; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY */ - *p++ = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(session->id_len); - memcpy(p, session->id, 32); - p += 32; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if ((size_t) (end - p) < 1) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } - memcpy(p, session->master, 48); - p += 48; + ssl->disable_datagram_packing = *p++; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ - MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE(session->verify_result, p, 0); - p += 4; + if ((size_t) (end - p) < sizeof(ssl->cur_out_ctr)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } + memcpy(ssl->cur_out_ctr, p, sizeof(ssl->cur_out_ctr)); + p += sizeof(ssl->cur_out_ctr); - /* - * Peer's end-entity certificate - */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) - if (session->peer_cert == NULL) { - cert_len = 0; - } else { - cert_len = session->peer_cert->raw.len; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if ((size_t) (end - p) < 2) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } - used += 3 + cert_len; + ssl->mtu = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(p, 0); + p += 2; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ - if (used <= buf_len) { - *p++ = MBEDTLS_BYTE_2(cert_len); - *p++ = MBEDTLS_BYTE_1(cert_len); - *p++ = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(cert_len); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN) + { + uint8_t alpn_len; + const char **cur; - if (session->peer_cert != NULL) { - memcpy(p, session->peer_cert->raw.p, cert_len); - p += cert_len; - } - } -#else /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ - if (session->peer_cert_digest != NULL) { - used += 1 /* type */ + 1 /* length */ + session->peer_cert_digest_len; - if (used <= buf_len) { - *p++ = (unsigned char) session->peer_cert_digest_type; - *p++ = (unsigned char) session->peer_cert_digest_len; - memcpy(p, session->peer_cert_digest, - session->peer_cert_digest_len); - p += session->peer_cert_digest_len; - } - } else { - used += 2; - if (used <= buf_len) { - *p++ = (unsigned char) MBEDTLS_MD_NONE; - *p++ = 0; + if ((size_t) (end - p) < 1) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } - } -#endif /* !MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ - /* - * Session ticket if any, plus associated data - */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) - used += 3 + session->ticket_len + 4; /* len + ticket + lifetime */ + alpn_len = *p++; - if (used <= buf_len) { - *p++ = MBEDTLS_BYTE_2(session->ticket_len); - *p++ = MBEDTLS_BYTE_1(session->ticket_len); - *p++ = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(session->ticket_len); + if (alpn_len != 0 && ssl->conf->alpn_list != NULL) { + /* alpn_chosen should point to an item in the configured list */ + for (cur = ssl->conf->alpn_list; *cur != NULL; cur++) { + if (strlen(*cur) == alpn_len && + memcmp(p, *cur, alpn_len) == 0) { + ssl->alpn_chosen = *cur; + break; + } + } + } - if (session->ticket != NULL) { - memcpy(p, session->ticket, session->ticket_len); - p += session->ticket_len; + /* can only happen on conf mismatch */ + if (alpn_len != 0 && ssl->alpn_chosen == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } - MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE(session->ticket_lifetime, p, 0); - p += 4; + p += alpn_len; } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS && MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN */ /* - * Misc extension-related info + * Forced fields from top-level ssl_context structure + * + * Most of them already set to the correct value by mbedtls_ssl_init() and + * mbedtls_ssl_reset(), so we only need to set the remaining ones. */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH) - used += 1; - - if (used <= buf_len) { - *p++ = session->mfl_code; - } -#endif + ssl->state = MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER; + ssl->tls_version = MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2; -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC) - used += 1; + /* Adjust pointers for header fields of outgoing records to + * the given transform, accounting for explicit IV and CID. */ + mbedtls_ssl_update_out_pointers(ssl, ssl->transform); - if (used <= buf_len) { - *p++ = (unsigned char) ((session->trunc_hmac) & 0xFF); - } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + ssl->in_epoch = 1; #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) - used += 1; - - if (used <= buf_len) { - *p++ = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(session->encrypt_then_mac); + /* mbedtls_ssl_reset() leaves the handshake sub-structure allocated, + * which we don't want - otherwise we'd end up freeing the wrong transform + * by calling mbedtls_ssl_handshake_wrapup_free_hs_transform() + * inappropriately. */ + if (ssl->handshake != NULL) { + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_free(ssl); + mbedtls_free(ssl->handshake); + ssl->handshake = NULL; } -#endif - - /* Done */ - *olen = used; - if (used > buf_len) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + /* + * Done - should have consumed entire buffer + */ + if (p != end) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } return 0; } /* - * Public wrapper for ssl_session_save() + * Deserialize context: public wrapper for error cleaning */ -int mbedtls_ssl_session_save(const mbedtls_ssl_session *session, - unsigned char *buf, - size_t buf_len, - size_t *olen) +int mbedtls_ssl_context_load(mbedtls_ssl_context *context, + const unsigned char *buf, + size_t len) { - return ssl_session_save(session, 0, buf, buf_len, olen); + int ret = ssl_context_load(context, buf, len); + + if (ret != 0) { + mbedtls_ssl_free(context); + } + + return ret; } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CONTEXT_SERIALIZATION */ /* - * Deserialize session, see mbedtls_ssl_session_save() for format. - * - * This internal version is wrapped by a public function that cleans up in - * case of error, and has an extra option omit_header. + * Free an SSL context */ -MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL -static int ssl_session_load(mbedtls_ssl_session *session, - unsigned char omit_header, - const unsigned char *buf, - size_t len) +void mbedtls_ssl_free(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) { - const unsigned char *p = buf; - const unsigned char * const end = buf + len; -#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) - uint64_t start; + if (ssl == NULL) { + return; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> free")); + + if (ssl->out_buf != NULL) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH) + size_t out_buf_len = ssl->out_buf_len; +#else + size_t out_buf_len = MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_BUFFER_LEN; #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) - size_t cert_len; -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ - if (!omit_header) { - /* - * Check version identifier - */ + mbedtls_zeroize_and_free(ssl->out_buf, out_buf_len); + ssl->out_buf = NULL; + } - if ((size_t) (end - p) < sizeof(ssl_serialized_session_header)) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; - } + if (ssl->in_buf != NULL) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH) + size_t in_buf_len = ssl->in_buf_len; +#else + size_t in_buf_len = MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_BUFFER_LEN; +#endif - if (memcmp(p, ssl_serialized_session_header, - sizeof(ssl_serialized_session_header)) != 0) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_VERSION_MISMATCH; - } - p += sizeof(ssl_serialized_session_header); + mbedtls_zeroize_and_free(ssl->in_buf, in_buf_len); + ssl->in_buf = NULL; } - /* - * Time - */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) - if (8 > (size_t) (end - p)) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + if (ssl->transform) { + mbedtls_ssl_transform_free(ssl->transform); + mbedtls_free(ssl->transform); } - start = ((uint64_t) p[0] << 56) | - ((uint64_t) p[1] << 48) | - ((uint64_t) p[2] << 40) | - ((uint64_t) p[3] << 32) | - ((uint64_t) p[4] << 24) | - ((uint64_t) p[5] << 16) | - ((uint64_t) p[6] << 8) | - ((uint64_t) p[7]); - p += 8; + if (ssl->handshake) { + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_free(ssl); + mbedtls_free(ssl->handshake); - session->start = (time_t) start; -#endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) + mbedtls_ssl_transform_free(ssl->transform_negotiate); + mbedtls_free(ssl->transform_negotiate); +#endif - /* - * Basic mandatory fields - */ - if (2 + 1 + 1 + 32 + 48 + 4 > (size_t) (end - p)) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + mbedtls_ssl_session_free(ssl->session_negotiate); + mbedtls_free(ssl->session_negotiate); } - session->ciphersuite = (p[0] << 8) | p[1]; - p += 2; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) + mbedtls_ssl_transform_free(ssl->transform_application); + mbedtls_free(ssl->transform_application); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 */ - session->compression = *p++; + if (ssl->session) { + mbedtls_ssl_session_free(ssl->session); + mbedtls_free(ssl->session); + } - session->id_len = *p++; - memcpy(session->id, p, 32); - p += 32; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) + if (ssl->hostname != NULL) { + mbedtls_zeroize_and_free(ssl->hostname, strlen(ssl->hostname)); + } +#endif - memcpy(session->master, p, 48); - p += 48; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) + mbedtls_free(ssl->cli_id); +#endif - session->verify_result = ((uint32_t) p[0] << 24) | - ((uint32_t) p[1] << 16) | - ((uint32_t) p[2] << 8) | - ((uint32_t) p[3]); - p += 4; + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= free")); - /* Immediately clear invalid pointer values that have been read, in case - * we exit early before we replaced them with valid ones. */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) - session->peer_cert = NULL; -#else - session->peer_cert_digest = NULL; -#endif /* !MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) - session->ticket = NULL; -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS && MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */ + /* Actually clear after last debug message */ + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(ssl, sizeof(mbedtls_ssl_context)); +} - /* - * Peer certificate - */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) - /* Deserialize CRT from the end of the ticket. */ - if (3 > (size_t) (end - p)) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; - } +/* + * Initialize mbedtls_ssl_config + */ +void mbedtls_ssl_config_init(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf) +{ + memset(conf, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_ssl_config)); +} - cert_len = (p[0] << 16) | (p[1] << 8) | p[2]; - p += 3; +/* The selection should be the same as mbedtls_x509_crt_profile_default in + * x509_crt.c, plus Montgomery curves for ECDHE. Here, the order matters: + * curves with a lower resource usage come first. + * See the documentation of mbedtls_ssl_conf_curves() for what we promise + * about this list. + */ +static const uint16_t ssl_preset_default_groups[] = { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_CURVE25519) + MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_X25519, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP256R1) + MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_SECP256R1, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP384R1) + MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_SECP384R1, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_CURVE448) + MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_X448, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP521R1) + MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_SECP521R1, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_BP256R1) + MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_BP256R1, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_BP384R1) + MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_BP384R1, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_BP512R1) + MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_BP512R1, +#endif +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH) + MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_FFDHE2048, + MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_FFDHE3072, + MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_FFDHE4096, + MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_FFDHE6144, + MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_FFDHE8192, +#endif + MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_NONE +}; - if (cert_len != 0) { - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; +static const int ssl_preset_suiteb_ciphersuites[] = { + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, + 0 +}; - if (cert_len > (size_t) (end - p)) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; - } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) - session->peer_cert = mbedtls_calloc(1, sizeof(mbedtls_x509_crt)); +/* NOTICE: + * For ssl_preset_*_sig_algs and ssl_tls12_preset_*_sig_algs, the following + * rules SHOULD be upheld. + * - No duplicate entries. + * - But if there is a good reason, do not change the order of the algorithms. + * - ssl_tls12_preset* is for TLS 1.2 use only. + * - ssl_preset_* is for TLS 1.3 only or hybrid TLS 1.3/1.2 handshakes. + */ +static const uint16_t ssl_preset_default_sig_algs[] = { - if (session->peer_cert == NULL) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED; - } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDSA_CERT_REQ_ANY_ALLOWED_ENABLED) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) && \ + defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256) + MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_ECDSA_SECP256R1_SHA256, + // == MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS12_SIG_AND_HASH_ALG(MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_ECDSA, MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA256) +#endif - mbedtls_x509_crt_init(session->peer_cert); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDSA_CERT_REQ_ANY_ALLOWED_ENABLED) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) && \ + defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_384) + MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_ECDSA_SECP384R1_SHA384, + // == MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS12_SIG_AND_HASH_ALG(MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_ECDSA, MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA384) +#endif - if ((ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der(session->peer_cert, - p, cert_len)) != 0) { - mbedtls_x509_crt_free(session->peer_cert); - mbedtls_free(session->peer_cert); - session->peer_cert = NULL; - return ret; - } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDSA_CERT_REQ_ANY_ALLOWED_ENABLED) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA512) && \ + defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_521) + MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_ECDSA_SECP521R1_SHA512, + // == MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS12_SIG_AND_HASH_ALG(MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_ECDSA, MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA512) +#endif - p += cert_len; - } -#else /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ - /* Deserialize CRT digest from the end of the ticket. */ - if (2 > (size_t) (end - p)) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; - } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT) && defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA512) + MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PSS_RSAE_SHA512, +#endif - session->peer_cert_digest_type = (mbedtls_md_type_t) *p++; - session->peer_cert_digest_len = (size_t) *p++; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT) && defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) + MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PSS_RSAE_SHA384, +#endif - if (session->peer_cert_digest_len != 0) { - const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info = - mbedtls_md_info_from_type(session->peer_cert_digest_type); - if (md_info == NULL) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; - } - if (session->peer_cert_digest_len != mbedtls_md_get_size(md_info)) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; - } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT) && defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) + MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PSS_RSAE_SHA256, +#endif - if (session->peer_cert_digest_len > (size_t) (end - p)) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; - } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA512) + MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PKCS1_SHA512, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C && MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA512 */ - session->peer_cert_digest = - mbedtls_calloc(1, session->peer_cert_digest_len); - if (session->peer_cert_digest == NULL) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED; - } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) + MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PKCS1_SHA384, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C && MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384 */ - memcpy(session->peer_cert_digest, p, - session->peer_cert_digest_len); - p += session->peer_cert_digest_len; - } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) + MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PKCS1_SHA256, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C && MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256 */ - /* - * Session ticket and associated data - */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) - if (3 > (size_t) (end - p)) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; - } + MBEDTLS_TLS_SIG_NONE +}; - session->ticket_len = (p[0] << 16) | (p[1] << 8) | p[2]; - p += 3; +/* NOTICE: see above */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) +static uint16_t ssl_tls12_preset_default_sig_algs[] = { - if (session->ticket_len != 0) { - if (session->ticket_len > (size_t) (end - p)) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; - } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA512) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDSA_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED) + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS12_SIG_AND_HASH_ALG(MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_ECDSA, MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA512), +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT) + MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PSS_RSAE_SHA512, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS12_SIG_AND_HASH_ALG(MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_RSA, MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA512), +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA512 */ - session->ticket = mbedtls_calloc(1, session->ticket_len); - if (session->ticket == NULL) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED; - } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDSA_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED) + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS12_SIG_AND_HASH_ALG(MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_ECDSA, MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA384), +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT) + MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PSS_RSAE_SHA384, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS12_SIG_AND_HASH_ALG(MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_RSA, MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA384), +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384 */ - memcpy(session->ticket, p, session->ticket_len); - p += session->ticket_len; - } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDSA_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED) + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS12_SIG_AND_HASH_ALG(MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_ECDSA, MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA256), +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT) + MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PSS_RSAE_SHA256, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS12_SIG_AND_HASH_ALG(MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_RSA, MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA256), +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256 */ - if (4 > (size_t) (end - p)) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; - } + MBEDTLS_TLS_SIG_NONE +}; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ - session->ticket_lifetime = ((uint32_t) p[0] << 24) | - ((uint32_t) p[1] << 16) | - ((uint32_t) p[2] << 8) | - ((uint32_t) p[3]); - p += 4; -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS && MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */ +/* NOTICE: see above */ +static const uint16_t ssl_preset_suiteb_sig_algs[] = { - /* - * Misc extension-related info - */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH) - if (1 > (size_t) (end - p)) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; - } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDSA_CERT_REQ_ANY_ALLOWED_ENABLED) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP256R1) + MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_ECDSA_SECP256R1_SHA256, + // == MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS12_SIG_AND_HASH_ALG(MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_ECDSA, MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA256) +#endif - session->mfl_code = *p++; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDSA_CERT_REQ_ANY_ALLOWED_ENABLED) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP384R1) + MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_ECDSA_SECP384R1_SHA384, + // == MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS12_SIG_AND_HASH_ALG(MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_ECDSA, MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA384) #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC) - if (1 > (size_t) (end - p)) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; - } + MBEDTLS_TLS_SIG_NONE +}; - session->trunc_hmac = *p++; -#endif +/* NOTICE: see above */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) +static uint16_t ssl_tls12_preset_suiteb_sig_algs[] = { -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) - if (1 > (size_t) (end - p)) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; - } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDSA_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED) + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS12_SIG_AND_HASH_ALG(MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_ECDSA, MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA256), +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256 */ - session->encrypt_then_mac = *p++; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDSA_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED) + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS12_SIG_AND_HASH_ALG(MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_ECDSA, MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA384), #endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384 */ - /* Done, should have consumed entire buffer */ - if (p != end) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; - } + MBEDTLS_TLS_SIG_NONE +}; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ - return 0; -} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */ -/* - * Deserialize session: public wrapper for error cleaning - */ -int mbedtls_ssl_session_load(mbedtls_ssl_session *session, - const unsigned char *buf, - size_t len) +static const uint16_t ssl_preset_suiteb_groups[] = { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP256R1) + MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_SECP256R1, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP384R1) + MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_SECP384R1, +#endif + MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_NONE +}; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) +/* Function for checking `ssl_preset_*_sig_algs` and `ssl_tls12_preset_*_sig_algs` + * to make sure there are no duplicated signature algorithm entries. */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_check_no_sig_alg_duplication(const uint16_t *sig_algs) { - int ret = ssl_session_load(session, 0, buf, len); + size_t i, j; + int ret = 0; - if (ret != 0) { - mbedtls_ssl_session_free(session); + for (i = 0; sig_algs[i] != MBEDTLS_TLS_SIG_NONE; i++) { + for (j = 0; j < i; j++) { + if (sig_algs[i] != sig_algs[j]) { + continue; + } + mbedtls_printf(" entry(%04x,%" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET + ") is duplicated at %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET "\n", + sig_algs[i], j, i); + ret = -1; + } } - return ret; } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C && MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */ + /* - * Perform a single step of the SSL handshake + * Load default in mbedtls_ssl_config */ -int mbedtls_ssl_handshake_step(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +int mbedtls_ssl_config_defaults(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + int endpoint, int transport, int preset) { - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; +#endif - if (ssl == NULL || ssl->conf == NULL) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) + if (ssl_check_no_sig_alg_duplication(ssl_preset_suiteb_sig_algs)) { + mbedtls_printf("ssl_preset_suiteb_sig_algs has duplicated entries\n"); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; } -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) - if (ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT) { - ret = mbedtls_ssl_handshake_client_step(ssl); + if (ssl_check_no_sig_alg_duplication(ssl_preset_default_sig_algs)) { + mbedtls_printf("ssl_preset_default_sig_algs has duplicated entries\n"); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; } -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) - if (ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER) { - ret = mbedtls_ssl_handshake_server_step(ssl); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) + if (ssl_check_no_sig_alg_duplication(ssl_tls12_preset_suiteb_sig_algs)) { + mbedtls_printf("ssl_tls12_preset_suiteb_sig_algs has duplicated entries\n"); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; } -#endif - return ret; -} + if (ssl_check_no_sig_alg_duplication(ssl_tls12_preset_default_sig_algs)) { + mbedtls_printf("ssl_tls12_preset_default_sig_algs has duplicated entries\n"); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C && MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */ -/* - * Perform the SSL handshake - */ -int mbedtls_ssl_handshake(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) -{ - int ret = 0; - - /* Sanity checks */ + /* Use the functions here so that they are covered in tests, + * but otherwise access member directly for efficiency */ + mbedtls_ssl_conf_endpoint(conf, endpoint); + mbedtls_ssl_conf_transport(conf, transport); - if (ssl == NULL || ssl->conf == NULL) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + /* + * Things that are common to all presets + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) + if (endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT) { + conf->authmode = MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_REQUIRED; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) + conf->session_tickets = MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS_ENABLED; +#endif } +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) + conf->encrypt_then_mac = MBEDTLS_SSL_ETM_ENABLED; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET) + conf->extended_ms = MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MS_ENABLED; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) + conf->f_cookie_write = ssl_cookie_write_dummy; + conf->f_cookie_check = ssl_cookie_check_dummy; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY) + conf->anti_replay = MBEDTLS_SSL_ANTI_REPLAY_ENABLED; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) + conf->cert_req_ca_list = MBEDTLS_SSL_CERT_REQ_CA_LIST_ENABLED; + conf->respect_cli_pref = MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_CIPHERSUITE_ORDER_SERVER; +#endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) - if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM && - (ssl->f_set_timer == NULL || ssl->f_get_timer == NULL)) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("You must use " - "mbedtls_ssl_set_timer_cb() for DTLS")); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; - } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ + conf->hs_timeout_min = MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_TIMEOUT_DFL_MIN; + conf->hs_timeout_max = MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_TIMEOUT_DFL_MAX; +#endif - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> handshake")); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) + conf->renego_max_records = MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGO_MAX_RECORDS_DEFAULT; + memset(conf->renego_period, 0x00, 2); + memset(conf->renego_period + 2, 0xFF, 6); +#endif - /* Main handshake loop */ - while (ssl->state != MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER) { - ret = mbedtls_ssl_handshake_step(ssl); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) + if (endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER) { + const unsigned char dhm_p[] = + MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC3526_MODP_2048_P_BIN; + const unsigned char dhm_g[] = + MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC3526_MODP_2048_G_BIN; - if (ret != 0) { - break; + if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_conf_dh_param_bin(conf, + dhm_p, sizeof(dhm_p), + dhm_g, sizeof(dhm_g))) != 0) { + return ret; } } +#endif - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= handshake")); - - return ret; -} +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) + mbedtls_ssl_conf_early_data(conf, MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_DISABLED); #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) -/* - * Write HelloRequest to request renegotiation on server - */ -MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL -static int ssl_write_hello_request(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) -{ - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> write hello request")); + mbedtls_ssl_conf_max_early_data_size(conf, MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_EARLY_DATA_SIZE); +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA */ - ssl->out_msglen = 4; - ssl->out_msgtype = MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE; - ssl->out_msg[0] = MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_HELLO_REQUEST; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) + mbedtls_ssl_conf_new_session_tickets( + conf, MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_DEFAULT_NEW_SESSION_TICKETS); +#endif + /* + * Allow all TLS 1.3 key exchange modes by default. + */ + conf->tls13_kex_modes = MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_ALL; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 */ - if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg(ssl)) != 0) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg", ret); - return ret; + if (transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) + conf->min_tls_version = MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2; + conf->max_tls_version = MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2; +#else + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; +#endif + } else { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) + conf->min_tls_version = MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2; + conf->max_tls_version = MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_3; +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) + conf->min_tls_version = MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_3; + conf->max_tls_version = MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_3; +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) + conf->min_tls_version = MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2; + conf->max_tls_version = MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2; +#else + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; +#endif } - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= write hello request")); + /* + * Preset-specific defaults + */ + switch (preset) { + /* + * NSA Suite B + */ + case MBEDTLS_SSL_PRESET_SUITEB: - return 0; -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ + conf->ciphersuite_list = ssl_preset_suiteb_ciphersuites; -/* - * Actually renegotiate current connection, triggered by either: - * - any side: calling mbedtls_ssl_renegotiate(), - * - client: receiving a HelloRequest during mbedtls_ssl_read(), - * - server: receiving any handshake message on server during mbedtls_ssl_read() after - * the initial handshake is completed. - * If the handshake doesn't complete due to waiting for I/O, it will continue - * during the next calls to mbedtls_ssl_renegotiate() or mbedtls_ssl_read() respectively. - */ -int mbedtls_ssl_start_renegotiation(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) -{ - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) + conf->cert_profile = &mbedtls_x509_crt_profile_suiteb; +#endif - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> renegotiate")); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) + if (mbedtls_ssl_conf_is_tls12_only(conf)) { + conf->sig_algs = ssl_tls12_preset_suiteb_sig_algs; + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ + conf->sig_algs = ssl_preset_suiteb_sig_algs; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */ - if ((ret = ssl_handshake_init(ssl)) != 0) { - return ret; - } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) + conf->curve_list = NULL; +#endif + conf->group_list = ssl_preset_suiteb_groups; + break; - /* RFC 6347 4.2.2: "[...] the HelloRequest will have message_seq = 0 and - * the ServerHello will have message_seq = 1" */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) - if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM && - ssl->renego_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_PENDING) { - if (ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER) { - ssl->handshake->out_msg_seq = 1; - } else { - ssl->handshake->in_msg_seq = 1; - } - } + /* + * Default + */ + default: + + conf->ciphersuite_list = mbedtls_ssl_list_ciphersuites(); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) + conf->cert_profile = &mbedtls_x509_crt_profile_default; #endif - ssl->state = MBEDTLS_SSL_HELLO_REQUEST; - ssl->renego_status = MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_IN_PROGRESS; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) + if (mbedtls_ssl_conf_is_tls12_only(conf)) { + conf->sig_algs = ssl_tls12_preset_default_sig_algs; + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ + conf->sig_algs = ssl_preset_default_sig_algs; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */ - if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_handshake(ssl)) != 0) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_handshake", ret); - return ret; - } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) + conf->curve_list = NULL; +#endif + conf->group_list = ssl_preset_default_groups; - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= renegotiate")); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) + conf->dhm_min_bitlen = 1024; +#endif + } return 0; } /* - * Renegotiate current connection on client, - * or request renegotiation on server + * Free mbedtls_ssl_config */ -int mbedtls_ssl_renegotiate(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +void mbedtls_ssl_config_free(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf) { - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_C) + mbedtls_mpi_free(&conf->dhm_P); + mbedtls_mpi_free(&conf->dhm_G); +#endif - if (ssl == NULL || ssl->conf == NULL) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_PSK_ENABLED) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + if (!mbedtls_svc_key_id_is_null(conf->psk_opaque)) { + conf->psk_opaque = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; } - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) - /* On server, just send the request */ - if (ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER) { - if (ssl->state != MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; - } - - ssl->renego_status = MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_PENDING; - - /* Did we already try/start sending HelloRequest? */ - if (ssl->out_left != 0) { - return mbedtls_ssl_flush_output(ssl); - } - - return ssl_write_hello_request(ssl); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + if (conf->psk != NULL) { + mbedtls_zeroize_and_free(conf->psk, conf->psk_len); + conf->psk = NULL; + conf->psk_len = 0; } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) - /* - * On client, either start the renegotiation process or, - * if already in progress, continue the handshake - */ - if (ssl->renego_status != MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_IN_PROGRESS) { - if (ssl->state != MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; - } - if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_start_renegotiation(ssl)) != 0) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_start_renegotiation", ret); - return ret; - } - } else { - if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_handshake(ssl)) != 0) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_handshake", ret); - return ret; - } + if (conf->psk_identity != NULL) { + mbedtls_zeroize_and_free(conf->psk_identity, conf->psk_identity_len); + conf->psk_identity = NULL; + conf->psk_identity_len = 0; } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */ - - return ret; -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_PSK_ENABLED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) -static void ssl_key_cert_free(mbedtls_ssl_key_cert *key_cert) -{ - mbedtls_ssl_key_cert *cur = key_cert, *next; + ssl_key_cert_free(conf->key_cert); +#endif - while (cur != NULL) { - next = cur->next; - mbedtls_free(cur); - cur = next; - } + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(conf, sizeof(mbedtls_ssl_config)); } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ -void mbedtls_ssl_handshake_free(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_C) && \ + (defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDSA_CERT_REQ_ANY_ALLOWED_ENABLED)) +/* + * Convert between MBEDTLS_PK_XXX and SSL_SIG_XXX + */ +unsigned char mbedtls_ssl_sig_from_pk(mbedtls_pk_context *pk) { - mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *handshake = ssl->handshake; - - if (handshake == NULL) { - return; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) + if (mbedtls_pk_can_do(pk, MBEDTLS_PK_RSA)) { + return MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_RSA; + } +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDSA_CERT_REQ_ANY_ALLOWED_ENABLED) + if (mbedtls_pk_can_do(pk, MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA)) { + return MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_ECDSA; } +#endif + return MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_ANON; +} -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE) - if (ssl->conf->f_async_cancel != NULL && handshake->async_in_progress != 0) { - ssl->conf->f_async_cancel(ssl); - handshake->async_in_progress = 0; +unsigned char mbedtls_ssl_sig_from_pk_alg(mbedtls_pk_type_t type) +{ + switch (type) { + case MBEDTLS_PK_RSA: + return MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_RSA; + case MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA: + case MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY: + return MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_ECDSA; + default: + return MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_ANON; } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE */ +} -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) - mbedtls_md5_free(&handshake->fin_md5); - mbedtls_sha1_free(&handshake->fin_sha1); +mbedtls_pk_type_t mbedtls_ssl_pk_alg_from_sig(unsigned char sig) +{ + switch (sig) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) + case MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_RSA: + return MBEDTLS_PK_RSA; #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) - psa_hash_abort(&handshake->fin_sha256_psa); -#else - mbedtls_sha256_free(&handshake->fin_sha256); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDSA_CERT_REQ_ANY_ALLOWED_ENABLED) + case MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_ECDSA: + return MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA; +#endif + default: + return MBEDTLS_PK_NONE; + } +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_C && + ( MBEDTLS_RSA_C || MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDSA_CERT_REQ_ANY_ALLOWED_ENABLED ) */ + +/* + * Convert from MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_XXX to MBEDTLS_MD_XXX + */ +mbedtls_md_type_t mbedtls_ssl_md_alg_from_hash(unsigned char hash) +{ + switch (hash) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_MD5) + case MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_MD5: + return MBEDTLS_MD_MD5; #endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1) + case MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA1: + return MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1; #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) - psa_hash_abort(&handshake->fin_sha384_psa); -#else - mbedtls_sha512_free(&handshake->fin_sha512); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA224) + case MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA224: + return MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224; #endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) + case MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA256: + return MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256; #endif -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) + case MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA384: + return MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA512) + case MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA512: + return MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512; +#endif + default: + return MBEDTLS_MD_NONE; + } +} -#if defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_C) - mbedtls_dhm_free(&handshake->dhm_ctx); +/* + * Convert from MBEDTLS_MD_XXX to MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_XXX + */ +unsigned char mbedtls_ssl_hash_from_md_alg(int md) +{ + switch (md) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_MD5) + case MBEDTLS_MD_MD5: + return MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_MD5; #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) - mbedtls_ecdh_free(&handshake->ecdh_ctx); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1: + return MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA1; #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) - mbedtls_ecjpake_free(&handshake->ecjpake_ctx); -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) - mbedtls_free(handshake->ecjpake_cache); - handshake->ecjpake_cache = NULL; - handshake->ecjpake_cache_len = 0; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA224) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224: + return MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA224; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256: + return MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA256; #endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384: + return MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA384; #endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) - /* explicit void pointer cast for buggy MS compiler */ - mbedtls_free((void *) handshake->curves); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA512) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512: + return MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA512; #endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED) - if (handshake->psk != NULL) { - mbedtls_platform_zeroize(handshake->psk, handshake->psk_len); - mbedtls_free(handshake->psk); + default: + return MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_NONE; } -#endif +} -#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) && \ - defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) - /* - * Free only the linked list wrapper, not the keys themselves - * since the belong to the SNI callback - */ - if (handshake->sni_key_cert != NULL) { - mbedtls_ssl_key_cert *cur = handshake->sni_key_cert, *next; +/* + * Check if a curve proposed by the peer is in our list. + * Return 0 if we're willing to use it, -1 otherwise. + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_check_curve_tls_id(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, uint16_t tls_id) +{ + const uint16_t *group_list = mbedtls_ssl_get_groups(ssl); - while (cur != NULL) { - next = cur->next; - mbedtls_free(cur); - cur = next; - } + if (group_list == NULL) { + return -1; } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C && MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED) - mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_free(&handshake->ecrs_ctx); - if (handshake->ecrs_peer_cert != NULL) { - mbedtls_x509_crt_free(handshake->ecrs_peer_cert); - mbedtls_free(handshake->ecrs_peer_cert); + for (; *group_list != 0; group_list++) { + if (*group_list == tls_id) { + return 0; + } } -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) && \ - !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) - mbedtls_pk_free(&handshake->peer_pubkey); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C && !MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ + return -1; +} -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) - mbedtls_free(handshake->verify_cookie); - mbedtls_ssl_flight_free(handshake->flight); - mbedtls_ssl_buffering_free(ssl); -#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS) +/* + * Same as mbedtls_ssl_check_curve_tls_id() but with a mbedtls_ecp_group_id. + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_check_curve(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id) +{ + uint16_t tls_id = mbedtls_ssl_get_tls_id_from_ecp_group_id(grp_id); -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) && \ - defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) - psa_destroy_key(handshake->ecdh_psa_privkey); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDH_C && MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + if (tls_id == 0) { + return -1; + } - mbedtls_platform_zeroize(handshake, - sizeof(mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params)); + return mbedtls_ssl_check_curve_tls_id(ssl, tls_id); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH) - /* If the buffers are too big - reallocate. Because of the way Mbed TLS - * processes datagrams and the fact that a datagram is allowed to have - * several records in it, it is possible that the I/O buffers are not - * empty at this stage */ - handle_buffer_resizing(ssl, 1, mbedtls_ssl_get_input_buflen(ssl), - mbedtls_ssl_get_output_buflen(ssl)); +static const struct { + uint16_t tls_id; + mbedtls_ecp_group_id ecp_group_id; + psa_ecc_family_t psa_family; + uint16_t bits; +} tls_id_match_table[] = +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP521R1) + { 25, MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1, 521 }, #endif -} +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_BP512R1) + { 28, MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1, 512 }, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP384R1) + { 24, MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1, 384 }, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_BP384R1) + { 27, MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1, 384 }, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP256R1) + { 23, MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1, 256 }, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP256K1) + { 22, MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1, 256 }, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_BP256R1) + { 26, MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1, 256 }, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP224R1) + { 21, MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1, 224 }, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP224K1) + { 20, MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1, 224 }, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP192R1) + { 19, MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1, 192 }, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP192K1) + { 18, MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1, 192 }, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_CURVE25519) + { 29, MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY, 255 }, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_CURVE448) + { 30, MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY, 448 }, +#endif + { 0, MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE, 0, 0 }, +}; -void mbedtls_ssl_session_free(mbedtls_ssl_session *session) +int mbedtls_ssl_get_psa_curve_info_from_tls_id(uint16_t tls_id, + psa_key_type_t *type, + size_t *bits) { - if (session == NULL) { - return; + for (int i = 0; tls_id_match_table[i].tls_id != 0; i++) { + if (tls_id_match_table[i].tls_id == tls_id) { + if (type != NULL) { + *type = PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(tls_id_match_table[i].psa_family); + } + if (bits != NULL) { + *bits = tls_id_match_table[i].bits; + } + return PSA_SUCCESS; + } } -#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) - ssl_clear_peer_cert(session); -#endif + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; +} -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) - mbedtls_free(session->ticket); -#endif +mbedtls_ecp_group_id mbedtls_ssl_get_ecp_group_id_from_tls_id(uint16_t tls_id) +{ + for (int i = 0; tls_id_match_table[i].tls_id != 0; i++) { + if (tls_id_match_table[i].tls_id == tls_id) { + return tls_id_match_table[i].ecp_group_id; + } + } - mbedtls_platform_zeroize(session, sizeof(mbedtls_ssl_session)); + return MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE; } -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CONTEXT_SERIALIZATION) +uint16_t mbedtls_ssl_get_tls_id_from_ecp_group_id(mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id) +{ + for (int i = 0; tls_id_match_table[i].ecp_group_id != MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE; + i++) { + if (tls_id_match_table[i].ecp_group_id == grp_id) { + return tls_id_match_table[i].tls_id; + } + } -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) -#define SSL_SERIALIZED_CONTEXT_CONFIG_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID 1u -#else -#define SSL_SERIALIZED_CONTEXT_CONFIG_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID 0u -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ + return 0; +} -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_BADMAC_LIMIT) -#define SSL_SERIALIZED_CONTEXT_CONFIG_DTLS_BADMAC_LIMIT 1u -#else -#define SSL_SERIALIZED_CONTEXT_CONFIG_DTLS_BADMAC_LIMIT 0u -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_BADMAC_LIMIT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C) +static const struct { + uint16_t tls_id; + const char *name; +} tls_id_curve_name_table[] = +{ + { MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_SECP521R1, "secp521r1" }, + { MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_BP512R1, "brainpoolP512r1" }, + { MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_SECP384R1, "secp384r1" }, + { MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_BP384R1, "brainpoolP384r1" }, + { MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_SECP256R1, "secp256r1" }, + { MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_SECP256K1, "secp256k1" }, + { MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_BP256R1, "brainpoolP256r1" }, + { MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_SECP224R1, "secp224r1" }, + { MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_SECP224K1, "secp224k1" }, + { MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_SECP192R1, "secp192r1" }, + { MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_SECP192K1, "secp192k1" }, + { MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_X25519, "x25519" }, + { MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_X448, "x448" }, + { 0, NULL }, +}; -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY) -#define SSL_SERIALIZED_CONTEXT_CONFIG_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY 1u -#else -#define SSL_SERIALIZED_CONTEXT_CONFIG_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY 0u -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY */ +const char *mbedtls_ssl_get_curve_name_from_tls_id(uint16_t tls_id) +{ + for (int i = 0; tls_id_curve_name_table[i].tls_id != 0; i++) { + if (tls_id_curve_name_table[i].tls_id == tls_id) { + return tls_id_curve_name_table[i].name; + } + } -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN) -#define SSL_SERIALIZED_CONTEXT_CONFIG_ALPN 1u -#else -#define SSL_SERIALIZED_CONTEXT_CONFIG_ALPN 0u -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN */ + return NULL; +} +#endif -#define SSL_SERIALIZED_CONTEXT_CONFIG_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID_BIT 0 -#define SSL_SERIALIZED_CONTEXT_CONFIG_DTLS_BADMAC_LIMIT_BIT 1 -#define SSL_SERIALIZED_CONTEXT_CONFIG_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY_BIT 2 -#define SSL_SERIALIZED_CONTEXT_CONFIG_ALPN_BIT 3 +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) +int mbedtls_ssl_check_cert_usage(const mbedtls_x509_crt *cert, + const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite, + int cert_endpoint, + uint32_t *flags) +{ + int ret = 0; + unsigned int usage = 0; + const char *ext_oid; + size_t ext_len; -#define SSL_SERIALIZED_CONTEXT_CONFIG_BITFLAG \ - ((uint32_t) ( \ - (SSL_SERIALIZED_CONTEXT_CONFIG_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID << \ - SSL_SERIALIZED_CONTEXT_CONFIG_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID_BIT) | \ - (SSL_SERIALIZED_CONTEXT_CONFIG_DTLS_BADMAC_LIMIT << \ - SSL_SERIALIZED_CONTEXT_CONFIG_DTLS_BADMAC_LIMIT_BIT) | \ - (SSL_SERIALIZED_CONTEXT_CONFIG_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY << \ - SSL_SERIALIZED_CONTEXT_CONFIG_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY_BIT) | \ - (SSL_SERIALIZED_CONTEXT_CONFIG_ALPN << SSL_SERIALIZED_CONTEXT_CONFIG_ALPN_BIT) | \ - 0u)) + if (cert_endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER) { + /* Server part of the key exchange */ + switch (ciphersuite->key_exchange) { + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK: + usage = MBEDTLS_X509_KU_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT; + break; -static const unsigned char ssl_serialized_context_header[] = { - MBEDTLS_VERSION_MAJOR, - MBEDTLS_VERSION_MINOR, - MBEDTLS_VERSION_PATCH, - MBEDTLS_BYTE_1(SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_BITFLAG), - MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_BITFLAG), - MBEDTLS_BYTE_2(SSL_SERIALIZED_CONTEXT_CONFIG_BITFLAG), - MBEDTLS_BYTE_1(SSL_SERIALIZED_CONTEXT_CONFIG_BITFLAG), - MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(SSL_SERIALIZED_CONTEXT_CONFIG_BITFLAG), -}; + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA: + usage = MBEDTLS_X509_KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE; + break; -/* - * Serialize a full SSL context + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA: + usage = MBEDTLS_X509_KU_KEY_AGREEMENT; + break; + + /* Don't use default: we want warnings when adding new values */ + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_NONE: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE: + usage = 0; + } + } else { + /* Client auth: we only implement rsa_sign and mbedtls_ecdsa_sign for now */ + usage = MBEDTLS_X509_KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE; + } + + if (mbedtls_x509_crt_check_key_usage(cert, usage) != 0) { + *flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_KEY_USAGE; + ret = -1; + } + + if (cert_endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER) { + ext_oid = MBEDTLS_OID_SERVER_AUTH; + ext_len = MBEDTLS_OID_SIZE(MBEDTLS_OID_SERVER_AUTH); + } else { + ext_oid = MBEDTLS_OID_CLIENT_AUTH; + ext_len = MBEDTLS_OID_SIZE(MBEDTLS_OID_CLIENT_AUTH); + } + + if (mbedtls_x509_crt_check_extended_key_usage(cert, ext_oid, ext_len) != 0) { + *flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_EXT_KEY_USAGE; + ret = -1; + } + + return ret; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +int mbedtls_ssl_get_handshake_transcript(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const mbedtls_md_type_t md, + unsigned char *dst, + size_t dst_len, + size_t *olen) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_hash_operation_t *hash_operation_to_clone; + psa_hash_operation_t hash_operation = psa_hash_operation_init(); + + *olen = 0; + + switch (md) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384: + hash_operation_to_clone = &ssl->handshake->fin_sha384_psa; + break; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256: + hash_operation_to_clone = &ssl->handshake->fin_sha256_psa; + break; +#endif + + default: + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_hash_clone(hash_operation_to_clone, &hash_operation); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_hash_finish(&hash_operation, dst, dst_len, olen); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + +exit: +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) + (void) ssl; +#endif + return PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); +} +#else /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_get_handshake_transcript_sha384(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *dst, + size_t dst_len, + size_t *olen) +{ + int ret; + mbedtls_md_context_t sha384; + + if (dst_len < 48) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } + + mbedtls_md_init(&sha384); + ret = mbedtls_md_setup(&sha384, mbedtls_md_info_from_type(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384), 0); + if (ret != 0) { + goto exit; + } + ret = mbedtls_md_clone(&sha384, &ssl->handshake->fin_sha384); + if (ret != 0) { + goto exit; + } + + if ((ret = mbedtls_md_finish(&sha384, dst)) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_md_finish", ret); + goto exit; + } + + *olen = 48; + +exit: + + mbedtls_md_free(&sha384); + return ret; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384 */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_get_handshake_transcript_sha256(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *dst, + size_t dst_len, + size_t *olen) +{ + int ret; + mbedtls_md_context_t sha256; + + if (dst_len < 32) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } + + mbedtls_md_init(&sha256); + ret = mbedtls_md_setup(&sha256, mbedtls_md_info_from_type(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256), 0); + if (ret != 0) { + goto exit; + } + ret = mbedtls_md_clone(&sha256, &ssl->handshake->fin_sha256); + if (ret != 0) { + goto exit; + } + + if ((ret = mbedtls_md_finish(&sha256, dst)) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_md_finish", ret); + goto exit; + } + + *olen = 32; + +exit: + + mbedtls_md_free(&sha256); + return ret; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256 */ + +int mbedtls_ssl_get_handshake_transcript(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const mbedtls_md_type_t md, + unsigned char *dst, + size_t dst_len, + size_t *olen) +{ + switch (md) { + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384: + return ssl_get_handshake_transcript_sha384(ssl, dst, dst_len, olen); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384*/ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256: + return ssl_get_handshake_transcript_sha256(ssl, dst, dst_len, olen); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256*/ + + default: +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) + (void) ssl; + (void) dst; + (void) dst_len; + (void) olen; +#endif + break; + } + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; +} + +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) +/* mbedtls_ssl_parse_sig_alg_ext() * - * The format of the serialized data is: - * (in the presentation language of TLS, RFC 8446 section 3) + * The `extension_data` field of signature algorithm contains a `SignatureSchemeList` + * value (TLS 1.3 RFC8446): + * enum { + * .... + * ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256( 0x0403 ), + * ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384( 0x0503 ), + * ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512( 0x0603 ), + * .... + * } SignatureScheme; * - * // header - * opaque mbedtls_version[3]; // major, minor, patch - * opaque context_format[5]; // version-specific field determining - * // the format of the remaining - * // serialized data. - * Note: When updating the format, remember to keep these - * version+format bytes. (We may make their size part of the API.) + * struct { + * SignatureScheme supported_signature_algorithms<2..2^16-2>; + * } SignatureSchemeList; * - * // session sub-structure - * opaque session<1..2^32-1>; // see mbedtls_ssl_session_save() - * // transform sub-structure - * uint8 random[64]; // ServerHello.random+ClientHello.random - * uint8 in_cid<0..2^8-1> // Connection ID: expected incoming value - * uint8 out_cid<0..2^8-1> // Connection ID: outgoing value to use - * // fields from ssl_context - * uint32 badmac_seen; // DTLS: number of records with failing MAC - * uint64 in_window_top; // DTLS: last validated record seq_num - * uint64 in_window; // DTLS: bitmask for replay protection - * uint8 disable_datagram_packing; // DTLS: only one record per datagram - * uint64 cur_out_ctr; // Record layer: outgoing sequence number - * uint16 mtu; // DTLS: path mtu (max outgoing fragment size) - * uint8 alpn_chosen<0..2^8-1> // ALPN: negotiated application protocol + * The `extension_data` field of signature algorithm contains a `SignatureAndHashAlgorithm` + * value (TLS 1.2 RFC5246): + * enum { + * none(0), md5(1), sha1(2), sha224(3), sha256(4), sha384(5), + * sha512(6), (255) + * } HashAlgorithm; * - * Note that many fields of the ssl_context or sub-structures are not - * serialized, as they fall in one of the following categories: + * enum { anonymous(0), rsa(1), dsa(2), ecdsa(3), (255) } + * SignatureAlgorithm; + * + * struct { + * HashAlgorithm hash; + * SignatureAlgorithm signature; + * } SignatureAndHashAlgorithm; + * + * SignatureAndHashAlgorithm + * supported_signature_algorithms<2..2^16-2>; + * + * The TLS 1.3 signature algorithm extension was defined to be a compatible + * generalization of the TLS 1.2 signature algorithm extension. + * `SignatureAndHashAlgorithm` field of TLS 1.2 can be represented by + * `SignatureScheme` field of TLS 1.3 * - * 1. forced value (eg in_left must be 0) - * 2. pointer to dynamically-allocated memory (eg session, transform) - * 3. value can be re-derived from other data (eg session keys from MS) - * 4. value was temporary (eg content of input buffer) - * 5. value will be provided by the user again (eg I/O callbacks and context) */ -int mbedtls_ssl_context_save(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - unsigned char *buf, - size_t buf_len, - size_t *olen) +int mbedtls_ssl_parse_sig_alg_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *buf, + const unsigned char *end) { - unsigned char *p = buf; - size_t used = 0; - size_t session_len; - int ret = 0; + const unsigned char *p = buf; + size_t supported_sig_algs_len = 0; + const unsigned char *supported_sig_algs_end; + uint16_t sig_alg; + uint32_t common_idx = 0; - /* - * Enforce usage restrictions, see "return BAD_INPUT_DATA" in - * this function's documentation. - * - * These are due to assumptions/limitations in the implementation. Some of - * them are likely to stay (no handshake in progress) some might go away - * (only DTLS) but are currently used to simplify the implementation. - */ - /* The initial handshake must be over */ - if (ssl->state != MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("Initial handshake isn't over")); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; - } - if (ssl->handshake != NULL) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("Handshake isn't completed")); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; - } - /* Double-check that sub-structures are indeed ready */ - if (ssl->transform == NULL || ssl->session == NULL) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("Serialised structures aren't ready")); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; - } - /* There must be no pending incoming or outgoing data */ - if (mbedtls_ssl_check_pending(ssl) != 0) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("There is pending incoming data")); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, end, 2); + supported_sig_algs_len = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(p, 0); + p += 2; + + memset(ssl->handshake->received_sig_algs, 0, + sizeof(ssl->handshake->received_sig_algs)); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, end, supported_sig_algs_len); + supported_sig_algs_end = p + supported_sig_algs_len; + while (p < supported_sig_algs_end) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, supported_sig_algs_end, 2); + sig_alg = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(p, 0); + p += 2; + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(4, ("received signature algorithm: 0x%x %s", + sig_alg, + mbedtls_ssl_sig_alg_to_str(sig_alg))); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) + if (ssl->tls_version == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 && + (!(mbedtls_ssl_sig_alg_is_supported(ssl, sig_alg) && + mbedtls_ssl_sig_alg_is_offered(ssl, sig_alg)))) { + continue; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(4, ("valid signature algorithm: %s", + mbedtls_ssl_sig_alg_to_str(sig_alg))); + + if (common_idx + 1 < MBEDTLS_RECEIVED_SIG_ALGS_SIZE) { + ssl->handshake->received_sig_algs[common_idx] = sig_alg; + common_idx += 1; + } } - if (ssl->out_left != 0) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("There is pending outgoing data")); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + /* Check that we consumed all the message. */ + if (p != end) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, + ("Signature algorithms extension length misaligned")); + MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR, + MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; } - /* Protocol must be DTLS, not TLS */ - if (ssl->conf->transport != MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("Only DTLS is supported")); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + + if (common_idx == 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("no signature algorithm in common")); + MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, + MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; } - /* Version must be 1.2 */ - if (ssl->major_ver != MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("Only version 1.2 supported")); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + + ssl->handshake->received_sig_algs[common_idx] = MBEDTLS_TLS_SIG_NONE; + return 0; +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + +static psa_status_t setup_psa_key_derivation(psa_key_derivation_operation_t *derivation, + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const unsigned char *raw_psk, size_t raw_psk_length, + const unsigned char *seed, size_t seed_length, + const unsigned char *label, size_t label_length, + const unsigned char *other_secret, + size_t other_secret_length, + size_t capacity) +{ + psa_status_t status; + + status = psa_key_derivation_setup(derivation, alg); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return status; } - if (ssl->minor_ver != MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("Only version 1.2 supported")); + + if (PSA_ALG_IS_TLS12_PRF(alg) || PSA_ALG_IS_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(alg)) { + status = psa_key_derivation_input_bytes(derivation, + PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SEED, + seed, seed_length); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return status; + } + + if (other_secret != NULL) { + status = psa_key_derivation_input_bytes(derivation, + PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_OTHER_SECRET, + other_secret, other_secret_length); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return status; + } + } + + if (mbedtls_svc_key_id_is_null(key)) { + status = psa_key_derivation_input_bytes( + derivation, PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET, + raw_psk, raw_psk_length); + } else { + status = psa_key_derivation_input_key( + derivation, PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET, key); + } + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return status; + } + + status = psa_key_derivation_input_bytes(derivation, + PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_LABEL, + label, label_length); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return status; + } + } else { + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + } + + status = psa_key_derivation_set_capacity(derivation, capacity); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return status; + } + + return PSA_SUCCESS; +} + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384) || \ + defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int tls_prf_generic(mbedtls_md_type_t md_type, + const unsigned char *secret, size_t slen, + const char *label, + const unsigned char *random, size_t rlen, + unsigned char *dstbuf, size_t dlen) +{ + psa_status_t status; + psa_algorithm_t alg; + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t master_key = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + psa_key_derivation_operation_t derivation = + PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_OPERATION_INIT; + + if (md_type == MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384) { + alg = PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384); + } else { + alg = PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256); + } + + /* Normally a "secret" should be long enough to be impossible to + * find by brute force, and in particular should not be empty. But + * this PRF is also used to derive an IV, in particular in EAP-TLS, + * and for this use case it makes sense to have a 0-length "secret". + * Since the key API doesn't allow importing a key of length 0, + * keep master_key=0, which setup_psa_key_derivation() understands + * to mean a 0-length "secret" input. */ + if (slen != 0) { + psa_key_attributes_t key_attributes = psa_key_attributes_init(); + psa_set_key_usage_flags(&key_attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE); + psa_set_key_algorithm(&key_attributes, alg); + psa_set_key_type(&key_attributes, PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE); + + status = psa_import_key(&key_attributes, secret, slen, &master_key); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED; + } + } + + status = setup_psa_key_derivation(&derivation, + master_key, alg, + NULL, 0, + random, rlen, + (unsigned char const *) label, + (size_t) strlen(label), + NULL, 0, + dlen); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + psa_key_derivation_abort(&derivation); + psa_destroy_key(master_key); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED; + } + + status = psa_key_derivation_output_bytes(&derivation, dstbuf, dlen); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + psa_key_derivation_abort(&derivation); + psa_destroy_key(master_key); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED; + } + + status = psa_key_derivation_abort(&derivation); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + psa_destroy_key(master_key); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED; + } + + if (!mbedtls_svc_key_id_is_null(master_key)) { + status = psa_destroy_key(master_key); + } + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED; + } + + return 0; +} +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256 || PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384 */ +#else /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_C) && \ + (defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384)) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int tls_prf_generic(mbedtls_md_type_t md_type, + const unsigned char *secret, size_t slen, + const char *label, + const unsigned char *random, size_t rlen, + unsigned char *dstbuf, size_t dlen) +{ + size_t nb; + size_t i, j, k, md_len; + unsigned char *tmp; + size_t tmp_len = 0; + unsigned char h_i[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE]; + const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info; + mbedtls_md_context_t md_ctx; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + mbedtls_md_init(&md_ctx); + + if ((md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type(md_type)) == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } + + md_len = mbedtls_md_get_size(md_info); + + tmp_len = md_len + strlen(label) + rlen; + tmp = mbedtls_calloc(1, tmp_len); + if (tmp == NULL) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED; + goto exit; + } + + nb = strlen(label); + memcpy(tmp + md_len, label, nb); + memcpy(tmp + md_len + nb, random, rlen); + nb += rlen; + + /* + * Compute P_(secret, label + random)[0..dlen] + */ + if ((ret = mbedtls_md_setup(&md_ctx, md_info, 1)) != 0) { + goto exit; + } + + ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_starts(&md_ctx, secret, slen); + if (ret != 0) { + goto exit; + } + ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_update(&md_ctx, tmp + md_len, nb); + if (ret != 0) { + goto exit; + } + ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_finish(&md_ctx, tmp); + if (ret != 0) { + goto exit; + } + + for (i = 0; i < dlen; i += md_len) { + ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_reset(&md_ctx); + if (ret != 0) { + goto exit; + } + ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_update(&md_ctx, tmp, md_len + nb); + if (ret != 0) { + goto exit; + } + ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_finish(&md_ctx, h_i); + if (ret != 0) { + goto exit; + } + + ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_reset(&md_ctx); + if (ret != 0) { + goto exit; + } + ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_update(&md_ctx, tmp, md_len); + if (ret != 0) { + goto exit; + } + ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_finish(&md_ctx, tmp); + if (ret != 0) { + goto exit; + } + + k = (i + md_len > dlen) ? dlen % md_len : md_len; + + for (j = 0; j < k; j++) { + dstbuf[i + j] = h_i[j]; + } + } + +exit: + mbedtls_md_free(&md_ctx); + + if (tmp != NULL) { + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(tmp, tmp_len); + } + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(h_i, sizeof(h_i)); + + mbedtls_free(tmp); + + return ret; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_C && ( MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256 || MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384 ) */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int tls_prf_sha256(const unsigned char *secret, size_t slen, + const char *label, + const unsigned char *random, size_t rlen, + unsigned char *dstbuf, size_t dlen) +{ + return tls_prf_generic(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, secret, slen, + label, random, rlen, dstbuf, dlen); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256*/ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int tls_prf_sha384(const unsigned char *secret, size_t slen, + const char *label, + const unsigned char *random, size_t rlen, + unsigned char *dstbuf, size_t dlen) +{ + return tls_prf_generic(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, secret, slen, + label, random, rlen, dstbuf, dlen); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384*/ + +/* + * Set appropriate PRF function and other SSL / TLS1.2 functions + * + * Inputs: + * - hash associated with the ciphersuite (only used by TLS 1.2) + * + * Outputs: + * - the tls_prf, calc_verify and calc_finished members of handshake structure + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_set_handshake_prfs(mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *handshake, + mbedtls_md_type_t hash) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) + if (hash == MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384) { + handshake->tls_prf = tls_prf_sha384; + handshake->calc_verify = ssl_calc_verify_tls_sha384; + handshake->calc_finished = ssl_calc_finished_tls_sha384; + } else +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) + { + (void) hash; + handshake->tls_prf = tls_prf_sha256; + handshake->calc_verify = ssl_calc_verify_tls_sha256; + handshake->calc_finished = ssl_calc_finished_tls_sha256; + } +#else + { + (void) handshake; + (void) hash; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } +#endif + + return 0; +} + +/* + * Compute master secret if needed + * + * Parameters: + * [in/out] handshake + * [in] resume, premaster, extended_ms, calc_verify, tls_prf + * (PSA-PSK) ciphersuite_info, psk_opaque + * [out] premaster (cleared) + * [out] master + * [in] ssl: optionally used for debugging, EMS and PSA-PSK + * debug: conf->f_dbg, conf->p_dbg + * EMS: passed to calc_verify (debug + session_negotiate) + * PSA-PSA: conf + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_compute_master(mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *handshake, + unsigned char *master, + const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + /* cf. RFC 5246, Section 8.1: + * "The master secret is always exactly 48 bytes in length." */ + size_t const master_secret_len = 48; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET) + unsigned char session_hash[48]; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET */ + + /* The label for the KDF used for key expansion. + * This is either "master secret" or "extended master secret" + * depending on whether the Extended Master Secret extension + * is used. */ + char const *lbl = "master secret"; + + /* The seed for the KDF used for key expansion. + * - If the Extended Master Secret extension is not used, + * this is ClientHello.Random + ServerHello.Random + * (see Sect. 8.1 in RFC 5246). + * - If the Extended Master Secret extension is used, + * this is the transcript of the handshake so far. + * (see Sect. 4 in RFC 7627). */ + unsigned char const *seed = handshake->randbytes; + size_t seed_len = 64; + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET) && \ + !(defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED)) + ssl = NULL; /* make sure we don't use it except for those cases */ + (void) ssl; +#endif + + if (handshake->resume != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("no premaster (session resumed)")); + return 0; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET) + if (handshake->extended_ms == MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MS_ENABLED) { + lbl = "extended master secret"; + seed = session_hash; + ret = handshake->calc_verify(ssl, session_hash, &seed_len); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "calc_verify", ret); + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "session hash for extended master secret", + session_hash, seed_len); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED) + if (mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_psk(handshake->ciphersuite_info) == 1) { + /* Perform PSK-to-MS expansion in a single step. */ + psa_status_t status; + psa_algorithm_t alg; + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t psk; + psa_key_derivation_operation_t derivation = + PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_OPERATION_INIT; + mbedtls_md_type_t hash_alg = (mbedtls_md_type_t) handshake->ciphersuite_info->mac; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("perform PSA-based PSK-to-MS expansion")); + + psk = mbedtls_ssl_get_opaque_psk(ssl); + + if (hash_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384) { + alg = PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_384); + } else { + alg = PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256); + } + + size_t other_secret_len = 0; + unsigned char *other_secret = NULL; + + switch (handshake->ciphersuite_info->key_exchange) { + /* Provide other secret. + * Other secret is stored in premaster, where first 2 bytes hold the + * length of the other key. + */ + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK: + /* For RSA-PSK other key length is always 48 bytes. */ + other_secret_len = 48; + other_secret = handshake->premaster + 2; + break; + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK: + other_secret_len = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(handshake->premaster, 0); + other_secret = handshake->premaster + 2; + break; + default: + break; + } + + status = setup_psa_key_derivation(&derivation, psk, alg, + ssl->conf->psk, ssl->conf->psk_len, + seed, seed_len, + (unsigned char const *) lbl, + (size_t) strlen(lbl), + other_secret, other_secret_len, + master_secret_len); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + psa_key_derivation_abort(&derivation); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED; + } + + status = psa_key_derivation_output_bytes(&derivation, + master, + master_secret_len); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + psa_key_derivation_abort(&derivation); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED; + } + + status = psa_key_derivation_abort(&derivation); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED; + } + } else +#endif + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) + if (handshake->ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE) { + psa_status_t status; + psa_algorithm_t alg = PSA_ALG_TLS12_ECJPAKE_TO_PMS; + psa_key_derivation_operation_t derivation = + PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_OPERATION_INIT; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("perform PSA-based PMS KDF for ECJPAKE")); + + handshake->pmslen = PSA_TLS12_ECJPAKE_TO_PMS_DATA_SIZE; + + status = psa_key_derivation_setup(&derivation, alg); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED; + } + + status = psa_key_derivation_set_capacity(&derivation, + PSA_TLS12_ECJPAKE_TO_PMS_DATA_SIZE); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + psa_key_derivation_abort(&derivation); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED; + } + + status = psa_pake_get_implicit_key(&handshake->psa_pake_ctx, + &derivation); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + psa_key_derivation_abort(&derivation); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED; + } + + status = psa_key_derivation_output_bytes(&derivation, + handshake->premaster, + handshake->pmslen); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + psa_key_derivation_abort(&derivation); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED; + } + + status = psa_key_derivation_abort(&derivation); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED; + } + } +#endif + ret = handshake->tls_prf(handshake->premaster, handshake->pmslen, + lbl, seed, seed_len, + master, + master_secret_len); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "prf", ret); + return ret; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "premaster secret", + handshake->premaster, + handshake->pmslen); + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(handshake->premaster, + sizeof(handshake->premaster)); + } + + return 0; +} + +int mbedtls_ssl_derive_keys(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t * const ciphersuite_info = + ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> derive keys")); + + /* Set PRF, calc_verify and calc_finished function pointers */ + ret = ssl_set_handshake_prfs(ssl->handshake, + (mbedtls_md_type_t) ciphersuite_info->mac); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "ssl_set_handshake_prfs", ret); + return ret; + } + + /* Compute master secret if needed */ + ret = ssl_compute_master(ssl->handshake, + ssl->session_negotiate->master, + ssl); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "ssl_compute_master", ret); + return ret; + } + + /* Swap the client and server random values: + * - MS derivation wanted client+server (RFC 5246 8.1) + * - key derivation wants server+client (RFC 5246 6.3) */ + { + unsigned char tmp[64]; + memcpy(tmp, ssl->handshake->randbytes, 64); + memcpy(ssl->handshake->randbytes, tmp + 32, 32); + memcpy(ssl->handshake->randbytes + 32, tmp, 32); + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(tmp, sizeof(tmp)); + } + + /* Populate transform structure */ + ret = ssl_tls12_populate_transform(ssl->transform_negotiate, + ssl->session_negotiate->ciphersuite, + ssl->session_negotiate->master, +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_CBC_ETM) + ssl->session_negotiate->encrypt_then_mac, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_CBC_ETM */ + ssl->handshake->tls_prf, + ssl->handshake->randbytes, + ssl->tls_version, + ssl->conf->endpoint, + ssl); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "ssl_tls12_populate_transform", ret); + return ret; + } + + /* We no longer need Server/ClientHello.random values */ + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(ssl->handshake->randbytes, + sizeof(ssl->handshake->randbytes)); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= derive keys")); + + return 0; +} + +int mbedtls_ssl_set_calc_verify_md(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int md) +{ + switch (md) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) + case MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA384: + ssl->handshake->calc_verify = ssl_calc_verify_tls_sha384; + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) + case MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA256: + ssl->handshake->calc_verify = ssl_calc_verify_tls_sha256; + break; +#endif + default: + return -1; + } +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) + (void) ssl; +#endif + return 0; +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +static int ssl_calc_verify_tls_psa(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const psa_hash_operation_t *hs_op, + size_t buffer_size, + unsigned char *hash, + size_t *hlen) +{ + psa_status_t status; + psa_hash_operation_t cloned_op = psa_hash_operation_init(); + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C) + (void) ssl; +#endif + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> PSA calc verify")); + status = psa_hash_clone(hs_op, &cloned_op); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_hash_finish(&cloned_op, hash, buffer_size, hlen); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "PSA calculated verify result", hash, *hlen); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= PSA calc verify")); + +exit: + psa_hash_abort(&cloned_op); + return mbedtls_md_error_from_psa(status); +} +#else +static int ssl_calc_verify_tls_legacy(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const mbedtls_md_context_t *hs_ctx, + unsigned char *hash, + size_t *hlen) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_md_context_t cloned_ctx; + + mbedtls_md_init(&cloned_ctx); + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C) + (void) ssl; +#endif + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> calc verify")); + + ret = mbedtls_md_setup(&cloned_ctx, mbedtls_md_info_from_ctx(hs_ctx), 0); + if (ret != 0) { + goto exit; + } + ret = mbedtls_md_clone(&cloned_ctx, hs_ctx); + if (ret != 0) { + goto exit; + } + + ret = mbedtls_md_finish(&cloned_ctx, hash); + if (ret != 0) { + goto exit; + } + + *hlen = mbedtls_md_get_size(mbedtls_md_info_from_ctx(hs_ctx)); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "calculated verify result", hash, *hlen); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= calc verify")); + +exit: + mbedtls_md_free(&cloned_ctx); + return ret; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) +int ssl_calc_verify_tls_sha256(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *hash, + size_t *hlen) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + return ssl_calc_verify_tls_psa(ssl, &ssl->handshake->fin_sha256_psa, 32, + hash, hlen); +#else + return ssl_calc_verify_tls_legacy(ssl, &ssl->handshake->fin_sha256, + hash, hlen); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256 */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) +int ssl_calc_verify_tls_sha384(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *hash, + size_t *hlen) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + return ssl_calc_verify_tls_psa(ssl, &ssl->handshake->fin_sha384_psa, 48, + hash, hlen); +#else + return ssl_calc_verify_tls_legacy(ssl, &ssl->handshake->fin_sha384, + hash, hlen); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384 */ + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED) +int mbedtls_ssl_psk_derive_premaster(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, mbedtls_key_exchange_type_t key_ex) +{ + unsigned char *p = ssl->handshake->premaster; + unsigned char *end = p + sizeof(ssl->handshake->premaster); + const unsigned char *psk = NULL; + size_t psk_len = 0; + int psk_ret = mbedtls_ssl_get_psk(ssl, &psk, &psk_len); + + if (psk_ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PRIVATE_KEY_REQUIRED) { + /* + * This should never happen because the existence of a PSK is always + * checked before calling this function. + * + * The exception is opaque DHE-PSK. For DHE-PSK fill premaster with + * the shared secret without PSK. + */ + if (key_ex != MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("should never happen")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } + } + + /* + * PMS = struct { + * opaque other_secret<0..2^16-1>; + * opaque psk<0..2^16-1>; + * }; + * with "other_secret" depending on the particular key exchange + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED) + if (key_ex == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK) { + if (end - p < 2) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(psk_len, p, 0); + p += 2; + + if (end < p || (size_t) (end - p) < psk_len) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + memset(p, 0, psk_len); + p += psk_len; + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED) + if (key_ex == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK) { + /* + * other_secret already set by the ClientKeyExchange message, + * and is 48 bytes long + */ + if (end - p < 2) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + *p++ = 0; + *p++ = 48; + p += 48; + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED) + if (key_ex == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK) { + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t len; + + /* Write length only when we know the actual value */ + if ((ret = mbedtls_dhm_calc_secret(&ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx, + p + 2, (size_t) (end - (p + 2)), &len, + ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng)) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_dhm_calc_secret", ret); + return ret; + } + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(len, p, 0); + p += 2 + len; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MPI(3, "DHM: K ", &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.K); + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED) + if (key_ex == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK) { + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t zlen; + + if ((ret = mbedtls_ecdh_calc_secret(&ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx, &zlen, + p + 2, (size_t) (end - (p + 2)), + ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng)) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ecdh_calc_secret", ret); + return ret; + } + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(zlen, p, 0); + p += 2 + zlen; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ECDH(3, &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx, + MBEDTLS_DEBUG_ECDH_Z); + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED */ + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("should never happen")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } + + /* opaque psk<0..2^16-1>; */ + if (end - p < 2) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(psk_len, p, 0); + p += 2; + + if (end < p || (size_t) (end - p) < psk_len) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } - /* We must be using an AEAD ciphersuite */ - if (mbedtls_ssl_transform_uses_aead(ssl->transform) != 1) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("Only AEAD ciphersuites supported")); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + + memcpy(p, psk, psk_len); + p += psk_len; + + ssl->handshake->pmslen = (size_t) (p - ssl->handshake->premaster); + + return 0; +} +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO && MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_write_hello_request(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) +int mbedtls_ssl_resend_hello_request(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + /* If renegotiation is not enforced, retransmit until we would reach max + * timeout if we were using the usual handshake doubling scheme */ + if (ssl->conf->renego_max_records < 0) { + uint32_t ratio = ssl->conf->hs_timeout_max / ssl->conf->hs_timeout_min + 1; + unsigned char doublings = 1; + + while (ratio != 0) { + ++doublings; + ratio >>= 1; + } + + if (++ssl->renego_records_seen > doublings) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("no longer retransmitting hello request")); + return 0; + } + } + + return ssl_write_hello_request(ssl); +} +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C && MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */ + +/* + * Handshake functions + */ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) +/* No certificate support -> dummy functions */ +int mbedtls_ssl_write_certificate(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info = + ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> write certificate")); + + if (!mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_srv_cert(ciphersuite_info)) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= skip write certificate")); + ssl->state++; + return 0; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("should never happen")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; +} + +int mbedtls_ssl_parse_certificate(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info = + ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> parse certificate")); + + if (!mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_srv_cert(ciphersuite_info)) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= skip parse certificate")); + ssl->state++; + return 0; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("should never happen")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; +} + +#else /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */ +/* Some certificate support -> implement write and parse */ + +int mbedtls_ssl_write_certificate(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + size_t i, n; + const mbedtls_x509_crt *crt; + const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info = + ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> write certificate")); + + if (!mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_srv_cert(ciphersuite_info)) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= skip write certificate")); + ssl->state++; + return 0; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) + if (ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT) { + if (ssl->handshake->client_auth == 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= skip write certificate")); + ssl->state++; + return 0; + } + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) + if (ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER) { + if (mbedtls_ssl_own_cert(ssl) == NULL) { + /* Should never happen because we shouldn't have picked the + * ciphersuite if we don't have a certificate. */ + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } + } +#endif + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_CRT(3, "own certificate", mbedtls_ssl_own_cert(ssl)); + + /* + * 0 . 0 handshake type + * 1 . 3 handshake length + * 4 . 6 length of all certs + * 7 . 9 length of cert. 1 + * 10 . n-1 peer certificate + * n . n+2 length of cert. 2 + * n+3 . ... upper level cert, etc. + */ + i = 7; + crt = mbedtls_ssl_own_cert(ssl); + + while (crt != NULL) { + n = crt->raw.len; + if (n > MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN - 3 - i) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("certificate too large, %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET + " > %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET, + i + 3 + n, (size_t) MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN)); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + } + + ssl->out_msg[i] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_2(n); + ssl->out_msg[i + 1] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_1(n); + ssl->out_msg[i + 2] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(n); + + i += 3; memcpy(ssl->out_msg + i, crt->raw.p, n); + i += n; crt = crt->next; + } + + ssl->out_msg[4] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_2(i - 7); + ssl->out_msg[5] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_1(i - 7); + ssl->out_msg[6] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(i - 7); + + ssl->out_msglen = i; + ssl->out_msgtype = MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE; + ssl->out_msg[0] = MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE; + + ssl->state++; + + if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg(ssl)) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg", ret); + return ret; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= write certificate")); + + return ret; +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_check_peer_crt_unchanged(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *crt_buf, + size_t crt_buf_len) +{ + mbedtls_x509_crt const * const peer_crt = ssl->session->peer_cert; + + if (peer_crt == NULL) { + return -1; + } + + if (peer_crt->raw.len != crt_buf_len) { + return -1; + } + + return memcmp(peer_crt->raw.p, crt_buf, peer_crt->raw.len); +} +#else /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_check_peer_crt_unchanged(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *crt_buf, + size_t crt_buf_len) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char const * const peer_cert_digest = + ssl->session->peer_cert_digest; + mbedtls_md_type_t const peer_cert_digest_type = + ssl->session->peer_cert_digest_type; + mbedtls_md_info_t const * const digest_info = + mbedtls_md_info_from_type(peer_cert_digest_type); + unsigned char tmp_digest[MBEDTLS_SSL_PEER_CERT_DIGEST_MAX_LEN]; + size_t digest_len; + + if (peer_cert_digest == NULL || digest_info == NULL) { + return -1; + } + + digest_len = mbedtls_md_get_size(digest_info); + if (digest_len > MBEDTLS_SSL_PEER_CERT_DIGEST_MAX_LEN) { + return -1; + } + + ret = mbedtls_md(digest_info, crt_buf, crt_buf_len, tmp_digest); + if (ret != 0) { + return -1; + } + + return memcmp(tmp_digest, peer_cert_digest, digest_len); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION && MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */ + +/* + * Once the certificate message is read, parse it into a cert chain and + * perform basic checks, but leave actual verification to the caller + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_parse_certificate_chain(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + mbedtls_x509_crt *chain) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) + int crt_cnt = 0; +#endif + size_t i, n; + uint8_t alert; + + if (ssl->in_msgtype != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad certificate message")); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; + } + + if (ssl->in_msg[0] != MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE) { + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; + } + + if (ssl->in_hslen < mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len(ssl) + 3 + 3) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad certificate message")); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; + } + + i = mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len(ssl); + + /* + * Same message structure as in mbedtls_ssl_write_certificate() + */ + n = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(ssl->in_msg, i + 1); + + if (ssl->in_msg[i] != 0 || + ssl->in_hslen != n + 3 + mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len(ssl)) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad certificate message")); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; + } + + /* Make &ssl->in_msg[i] point to the beginning of the CRT chain. */ + i += 3; + + /* Iterate through and parse the CRTs in the provided chain. */ + while (i < ssl->in_hslen) { + /* Check that there's room for the next CRT's length fields. */ + if (i + 3 > ssl->in_hslen) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad certificate message")); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; + } + /* In theory, the CRT can be up to 2**24 Bytes, but we don't support + * anything beyond 2**16 ~ 64K. */ + if (ssl->in_msg[i] != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad certificate message")); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_CERT); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_CERTIFICATE; + } + + /* Read length of the next CRT in the chain. */ + n = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(ssl->in_msg, i + 1); + i += 3; + + if (n < 128 || i + n > ssl->in_hslen) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad certificate message")); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; + } + + /* Check if we're handling the first CRT in the chain. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) + if (crt_cnt++ == 0 && + ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT && + ssl->renego_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_IN_PROGRESS) { + /* During client-side renegotiation, check that the server's + * end-CRTs hasn't changed compared to the initial handshake, + * mitigating the triple handshake attack. On success, reuse + * the original end-CRT instead of parsing it again. */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("Check that peer CRT hasn't changed during renegotiation")); + if (ssl_check_peer_crt_unchanged(ssl, + &ssl->in_msg[i], + n) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("new server cert during renegotiation")); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ACCESS_DENIED); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_CERTIFICATE; + } + + /* Now we can safely free the original chain. */ + ssl_clear_peer_cert(ssl->session); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION && MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */ + + /* Parse the next certificate in the chain. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) + ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der(chain, ssl->in_msg + i, n); +#else + /* If we don't need to store the CRT chain permanently, parse + * it in-place from the input buffer instead of making a copy. */ + ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der_nocopy(chain, ssl->in_msg + i, n); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ + switch (ret) { + case 0: /*ok*/ + case MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_UNKNOWN_SIG_ALG + MBEDTLS_ERR_OID_NOT_FOUND: + /* Ignore certificate with an unknown algorithm: maybe a + prior certificate was already trusted. */ + break; + + case MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_ALLOC_FAILED: + alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_INTERNAL_ERROR; + goto crt_parse_der_failed; + + case MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_UNKNOWN_VERSION: + alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_CERT; + goto crt_parse_der_failed; + + default: + alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_BAD_CERT; +crt_parse_der_failed: + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, alert); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, " mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der", ret); + return ret; + } + + i += n; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_CRT(3, "peer certificate", chain); + return 0; +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_srv_check_client_no_crt_notification(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + if (ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT) { + return -1; + } + + if (ssl->in_hslen == 3 + mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len(ssl) && + ssl->in_msgtype == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE && + ssl->in_msg[0] == MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE && + memcmp(ssl->in_msg + mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len(ssl), "\0\0\0", 3) == 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("peer has no certificate")); + return 0; + } + return -1; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ + +/* Check if a certificate message is expected. + * Return either + * - SSL_CERTIFICATE_EXPECTED, or + * - SSL_CERTIFICATE_SKIP + * indicating whether a Certificate message is expected or not. + */ +#define SSL_CERTIFICATE_EXPECTED 0 +#define SSL_CERTIFICATE_SKIP 1 +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_parse_certificate_coordinate(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + int authmode) +{ + const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info = + ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info; + + if (!mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_srv_cert(ciphersuite_info)) { + return SSL_CERTIFICATE_SKIP; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) + if (ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER) { + if (ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK) { + return SSL_CERTIFICATE_SKIP; + } + + if (authmode == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_NONE) { + ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result = + MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_SKIP_VERIFY; + return SSL_CERTIFICATE_SKIP; + } + } +#else + ((void) authmode); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ + + return SSL_CERTIFICATE_EXPECTED; +} + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_parse_certificate_verify(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + int authmode, + mbedtls_x509_crt *chain, + void *rs_ctx) +{ + int ret = 0; + const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info = + ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info; + int have_ca_chain = 0; + + int (*f_vrfy)(void *, mbedtls_x509_crt *, int, uint32_t *); + void *p_vrfy; + + if (authmode == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_NONE) { + return 0; + } + + if (ssl->f_vrfy != NULL) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("Use context-specific verification callback")); + f_vrfy = ssl->f_vrfy; + p_vrfy = ssl->p_vrfy; + } else { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("Use configuration-specific verification callback")); + f_vrfy = ssl->conf->f_vrfy; + p_vrfy = ssl->conf->p_vrfy; + } + + /* + * Main check: verify certificate + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK) + if (ssl->conf->f_ca_cb != NULL) { + ((void) rs_ctx); + have_ca_chain = 1; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("use CA callback for X.509 CRT verification")); + ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_with_ca_cb( + chain, + ssl->conf->f_ca_cb, + ssl->conf->p_ca_cb, + ssl->conf->cert_profile, + ssl->hostname, + &ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result, + f_vrfy, p_vrfy); + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK */ + { + mbedtls_x509_crt *ca_chain; + mbedtls_x509_crl *ca_crl; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) + if (ssl->handshake->sni_ca_chain != NULL) { + ca_chain = ssl->handshake->sni_ca_chain; + ca_crl = ssl->handshake->sni_ca_crl; + } else +#endif + { + ca_chain = ssl->conf->ca_chain; + ca_crl = ssl->conf->ca_crl; + } + + if (ca_chain != NULL) { + have_ca_chain = 1; + } + + ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_restartable( + chain, + ca_chain, ca_crl, + ssl->conf->cert_profile, + ssl->hostname, + &ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result, + f_vrfy, p_vrfy, rs_ctx); + } + + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "x509_verify_cert", ret); } - /* Renegotiation must not be enabled */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) - if (ssl->conf->disable_renegotiation != MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("Renegotiation must not be enabled")); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED) + if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS; } #endif /* - * Version and format identifier + * Secondary checks: always done, but change 'ret' only if it was 0 */ - used += sizeof(ssl_serialized_context_header); - if (used <= buf_len) { - memcpy(p, ssl_serialized_context_header, - sizeof(ssl_serialized_context_header)); - p += sizeof(ssl_serialized_context_header); - } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS) + { + const mbedtls_pk_context *pk = &chain->pk; - /* - * Session (length + data) - */ - ret = ssl_session_save(ssl->session, 1, NULL, 0, &session_len); - if (ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) { - return ret; - } + /* If certificate uses an EC key, make sure the curve is OK. + * This is a public key, so it can't be opaque, so can_do() is a good + * enough check to ensure pk_ec() is safe to use here. */ + if (mbedtls_pk_can_do(pk, MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY)) { + /* and in the unlikely case the above assumption no longer holds + * we are making sure that pk_ec() here does not return a NULL + */ + mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id = mbedtls_pk_get_ec_group_id(pk); + if (grp_id == MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("invalid group ID")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } + if (mbedtls_ssl_check_curve(ssl, grp_id) != 0) { + ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result |= + MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_KEY; - used += 4 + session_len; - if (used <= buf_len) { - MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE(session_len, p, 0); - p += 4; + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad certificate (EC key curve)")); + if (ret == 0) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_CERTIFICATE; + } + } + } + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS */ - ret = ssl_session_save(ssl->session, 1, - p, session_len, &session_len); - if (ret != 0) { - return ret; + if (mbedtls_ssl_check_cert_usage(chain, + ciphersuite_info, + !ssl->conf->endpoint, + &ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad certificate (usage extensions)")); + if (ret == 0) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_CERTIFICATE; } + } - p += session_len; + /* mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_with_profile is supposed to report a + * verification failure through MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED, + * with details encoded in the verification flags. All other kinds + * of error codes, including those from the user provided f_vrfy + * functions, are treated as fatal and lead to a failure of + * ssl_parse_certificate even if verification was optional. */ + if (authmode == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_OPTIONAL && + (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED || + ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_CERTIFICATE)) { + ret = 0; } - /* - * Transform - */ - used += sizeof(ssl->transform->randbytes); - if (used <= buf_len) { - memcpy(p, ssl->transform->randbytes, - sizeof(ssl->transform->randbytes)); - p += sizeof(ssl->transform->randbytes); + if (have_ca_chain == 0 && authmode == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_REQUIRED) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("got no CA chain")); + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CA_CHAIN_REQUIRED; } -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) - used += 2 + ssl->transform->in_cid_len + ssl->transform->out_cid_len; - if (used <= buf_len) { - *p++ = ssl->transform->in_cid_len; - memcpy(p, ssl->transform->in_cid, ssl->transform->in_cid_len); - p += ssl->transform->in_cid_len; + if (ret != 0) { + uint8_t alert; - *p++ = ssl->transform->out_cid_len; - memcpy(p, ssl->transform->out_cid, ssl->transform->out_cid_len); - p += ssl->transform->out_cid_len; + /* The certificate may have been rejected for several reasons. + Pick one and send the corresponding alert. Which alert to send + may be a subject of debate in some cases. */ + if (ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result & MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_OTHER) { + alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ACCESS_DENIED; + } else if (ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result & MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_CN_MISMATCH) { + alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_BAD_CERT; + } else if (ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result & MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_KEY_USAGE) { + alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_CERT; + } else if (ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result & MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_EXT_KEY_USAGE) { + alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_CERT; + } else if (ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result & MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_NS_CERT_TYPE) { + alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_CERT; + } else if (ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result & MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_PK) { + alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_CERT; + } else if (ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result & MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_KEY) { + alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_CERT; + } else if (ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result & MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_EXPIRED) { + alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_CERT_EXPIRED; + } else if (ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result & MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_REVOKED) { + alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_CERT_REVOKED; + } else if (ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result & MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_NOT_TRUSTED) { + alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNKNOWN_CA; + } else { + alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_CERT_UNKNOWN; + } + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + alert); } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ - /* - * Saved fields from top-level ssl_context structure - */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_BADMAC_LIMIT) - used += 4; - if (used <= buf_len) { - MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE(ssl->badmac_seen, p, 0); - p += 4; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C) + if (ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("! Certificate verification flags %08x", + (unsigned int) ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result)); + } else { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("Certificate verification flags clear")); } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_BADMAC_LIMIT */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY) - used += 16; - if (used <= buf_len) { - MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT64_BE(ssl->in_window_top, p, 0); - p += 8; + return ret; +} - MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT64_BE(ssl->in_window, p, 0); - p += 8; +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_remember_peer_crt_digest(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *start, size_t len) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + /* Remember digest of the peer's end-CRT. */ + ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert_digest = + mbedtls_calloc(1, MBEDTLS_SSL_PEER_CERT_DIGEST_DFL_LEN); + if (ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert_digest == NULL) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("alloc(%d bytes) failed", + MBEDTLS_SSL_PEER_CERT_DIGEST_DFL_LEN)); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_INTERNAL_ERROR); + + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED; } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) - used += 1; - if (used <= buf_len) { - *p++ = ssl->disable_datagram_packing; + ret = mbedtls_md(mbedtls_md_info_from_type( + MBEDTLS_SSL_PEER_CERT_DIGEST_DFL_TYPE), + start, len, + ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert_digest); + + ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert_digest_type = + MBEDTLS_SSL_PEER_CERT_DIGEST_DFL_TYPE; + ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert_digest_len = + MBEDTLS_SSL_PEER_CERT_DIGEST_DFL_LEN; + + return ret; +} + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_remember_peer_pubkey(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *start, size_t len) +{ + unsigned char *end = start + len; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + /* Make a copy of the peer's raw public key. */ + mbedtls_pk_init(&ssl->handshake->peer_pubkey); + ret = mbedtls_pk_parse_subpubkey(&start, end, + &ssl->handshake->peer_pubkey); + if (ret != 0) { + /* We should have parsed the public key before. */ + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ - used += 8; - if (used <= buf_len) { - memcpy(p, ssl->cur_out_ctr, 8); - p += 8; + return 0; +} +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ + +int mbedtls_ssl_parse_certificate(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + int ret = 0; + int crt_expected; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) + const int authmode = ssl->handshake->sni_authmode != MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_UNSET + ? ssl->handshake->sni_authmode + : ssl->conf->authmode; +#else + const int authmode = ssl->conf->authmode; +#endif + void *rs_ctx = NULL; + mbedtls_x509_crt *chain = NULL; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> parse certificate")); + + crt_expected = ssl_parse_certificate_coordinate(ssl, authmode); + if (crt_expected == SSL_CERTIFICATE_SKIP) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= skip parse certificate")); + goto exit; } -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) - used += 2; - if (used <= buf_len) { - MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(ssl->mtu, p, 0); - p += 2; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED) + if (ssl->handshake->ecrs_enabled && + ssl->handshake->ecrs_state == ssl_ecrs_crt_verify) { + chain = ssl->handshake->ecrs_peer_cert; + ssl->handshake->ecrs_peer_cert = NULL; + goto crt_verify; } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ +#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN) - { - const uint8_t alpn_len = ssl->alpn_chosen - ? (uint8_t) strlen(ssl->alpn_chosen) - : 0; + if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_read_record(ssl, 1)) != 0) { + /* mbedtls_ssl_read_record may have sent an alert already. We + let it decide whether to alert. */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_read_record", ret); + goto exit; + } - used += 1 + alpn_len; - if (used <= buf_len) { - *p++ = alpn_len; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) + if (ssl_srv_check_client_no_crt_notification(ssl) == 0) { + ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result = MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_MISSING; - if (ssl->alpn_chosen != NULL) { - memcpy(p, ssl->alpn_chosen, alpn_len); - p += alpn_len; - } + if (authmode != MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_OPTIONAL) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NO_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE; } + + goto exit; } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ - /* - * Done - */ - *olen = used; + /* Clear existing peer CRT structure in case we tried to + * reuse a session but it failed, and allocate a new one. */ + ssl_clear_peer_cert(ssl->session_negotiate); - if (used > buf_len) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + chain = mbedtls_calloc(1, sizeof(mbedtls_x509_crt)); + if (chain == NULL) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("alloc(%" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET " bytes) failed", + sizeof(mbedtls_x509_crt))); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_INTERNAL_ERROR); + + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED; + goto exit; } + mbedtls_x509_crt_init(chain); - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "saved context", buf, used); + ret = ssl_parse_certificate_chain(ssl, chain); + if (ret != 0) { + goto exit; + } - return mbedtls_ssl_session_reset_int(ssl, 0); -} +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED) + if (ssl->handshake->ecrs_enabled) { + ssl->handshake->ecrs_state = ssl_ecrs_crt_verify; + } -/* - * Helper to get TLS 1.2 PRF from ciphersuite - * (Duplicates bits of logic from ssl_set_handshake_prfs().) - */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) || \ - (defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384)) -typedef int (*tls_prf_fn)(const unsigned char *secret, size_t slen, - const char *label, - const unsigned char *random, size_t rlen, - unsigned char *dstbuf, size_t dlen); -static tls_prf_fn ssl_tls12prf_from_cs(int ciphersuite_id) -{ - const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t * const ciphersuite_info = - mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_from_id(ciphersuite_id); +crt_verify: + if (ssl->handshake->ecrs_enabled) { + rs_ctx = &ssl->handshake->ecrs_ctx; + } +#endif - if (ciphersuite_info == NULL) { - return NULL; + ret = ssl_parse_certificate_verify(ssl, authmode, + chain, rs_ctx); + if (ret != 0) { + goto exit; } -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384) - if (ciphersuite_info->mac == MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384) { - return tls_prf_sha384; - } else -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) { - if (ciphersuite_info->mac == MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256) { - return tls_prf_sha256; - } - } -#endif -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) && \ - (!defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384)) - (void) ciphersuite_info; -#endif - return NULL; -} + unsigned char *crt_start, *pk_start; + size_t crt_len, pk_len; -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C || - (MBEDTLS_SHA512_C && !MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384) */ + /* We parse the CRT chain without copying, so + * these pointers point into the input buffer, + * and are hence still valid after freeing the + * CRT chain. */ -/* - * Deserialize context, see mbedtls_ssl_context_save() for format. - * - * This internal version is wrapped by a public function that cleans up in - * case of error. - */ -MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL -static int ssl_context_load(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - const unsigned char *buf, - size_t len) -{ - const unsigned char *p = buf; - const unsigned char * const end = buf + len; - size_t session_len; - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - tls_prf_fn prf_func = NULL; + crt_start = chain->raw.p; + crt_len = chain->raw.len; - /* - * The context should have been freshly setup or reset. - * Give the user an error in case of obvious misuse. - * (Checking session is useful because it won't be NULL if we're - * renegotiating, or if the user mistakenly loaded a session first.) - */ - if (ssl->state != MBEDTLS_SSL_HELLO_REQUEST || - ssl->session != NULL) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; - } + pk_start = chain->pk_raw.p; + pk_len = chain->pk_raw.len; - /* - * We can't check that the config matches the initial one, but we can at - * least check it matches the requirements for serializing. - */ - if (ssl->conf->transport != MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM || - ssl->conf->max_major_ver < MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3 || - ssl->conf->min_major_ver > MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3 || - ssl->conf->max_minor_ver < MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 || - ssl->conf->min_minor_ver > MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 || -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) - ssl->conf->disable_renegotiation != MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED || -#endif - 0) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; - } + /* Free the CRT structures before computing + * digest and copying the peer's public key. */ + mbedtls_x509_crt_free(chain); + mbedtls_free(chain); + chain = NULL; - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "context to load", buf, len); + ret = ssl_remember_peer_crt_digest(ssl, crt_start, crt_len); + if (ret != 0) { + goto exit; + } - /* - * Check version identifier - */ - if ((size_t) (end - p) < sizeof(ssl_serialized_context_header)) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + ret = ssl_remember_peer_pubkey(ssl, pk_start, pk_len); + if (ret != 0) { + goto exit; + } } +#else /* !MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ + /* Pass ownership to session structure. */ + ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert = chain; + chain = NULL; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ - if (memcmp(p, ssl_serialized_context_header, - sizeof(ssl_serialized_context_header)) != 0) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_VERSION_MISMATCH; + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= parse certificate")); + +exit: + + if (ret == 0) { + ssl->state++; } - p += sizeof(ssl_serialized_context_header); - /* - * Session - */ - if ((size_t) (end - p) < 4) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED) + if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS) { + ssl->handshake->ecrs_peer_cert = chain; + chain = NULL; } +#endif - session_len = ((size_t) p[0] << 24) | - ((size_t) p[1] << 16) | - ((size_t) p[2] << 8) | - ((size_t) p[3]); - p += 4; + if (chain != NULL) { + mbedtls_x509_crt_free(chain); + mbedtls_free(chain); + } - /* This has been allocated by ssl_handshake_init(), called by - * by either mbedtls_ssl_session_reset_int() or mbedtls_ssl_setup(). */ - ssl->session = ssl->session_negotiate; - ssl->session_in = ssl->session; - ssl->session_out = ssl->session; - ssl->session_negotiate = NULL; + return ret; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */ - if ((size_t) (end - p) < session_len) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; - } +static int ssl_calc_finished_tls_generic(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, void *ctx, + unsigned char *padbuf, size_t hlen, + unsigned char *buf, int from) +{ + unsigned int len = 12; + const char *sender; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + psa_status_t status; + psa_hash_operation_t *hs_op = ctx; + psa_hash_operation_t cloned_op = PSA_HASH_OPERATION_INIT; + size_t hash_size; +#else + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_md_context_t *hs_ctx = ctx; + mbedtls_md_context_t cloned_ctx; + mbedtls_md_init(&cloned_ctx); +#endif - ret = ssl_session_load(ssl->session, 1, p, session_len); - if (ret != 0) { - mbedtls_ssl_session_free(ssl->session); - return ret; + mbedtls_ssl_session *session = ssl->session_negotiate; + if (!session) { + session = ssl->session; } - p += session_len; + sender = (from == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT) + ? "client finished" + : "server finished"; - /* - * Transform - */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> calc PSA finished tls")); - /* This has been allocated by ssl_handshake_init(), called by - * by either mbedtls_ssl_session_reset_int() or mbedtls_ssl_setup(). */ - ssl->transform = ssl->transform_negotiate; - ssl->transform_in = ssl->transform; - ssl->transform_out = ssl->transform; - ssl->transform_negotiate = NULL; + status = psa_hash_clone(hs_op, &cloned_op); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } - prf_func = ssl_tls12prf_from_cs(ssl->session->ciphersuite); - if (prf_func == NULL) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + status = psa_hash_finish(&cloned_op, padbuf, hlen, &hash_size); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; } + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "PSA calculated padbuf", padbuf, hlen); +#else + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> calc finished tls")); - /* Read random bytes and populate structure */ - if ((size_t) (end - p) < sizeof(ssl->transform->randbytes)) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + ret = mbedtls_md_setup(&cloned_ctx, mbedtls_md_info_from_ctx(hs_ctx), 0); + if (ret != 0) { + goto exit; + } + ret = mbedtls_md_clone(&cloned_ctx, hs_ctx); + if (ret != 0) { + goto exit; } - ret = ssl_populate_transform(ssl->transform, - ssl->session->ciphersuite, - ssl->session->master, -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_MODES_USE_MAC) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) - ssl->session->encrypt_then_mac, -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC) - ssl->session->trunc_hmac, -#endif -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_MODES_USE_MAC */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT) - ssl->session->compression, -#endif - prf_func, - p, /* currently pointing to randbytes */ - MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, /* (D)TLS 1.2 is forced */ - ssl->conf->endpoint, - ssl); + ret = mbedtls_md_finish(&cloned_ctx, padbuf); if (ret != 0) { - return ret; + goto exit; } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ - p += sizeof(ssl->transform->randbytes); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "finished output", padbuf, hlen); -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) - /* Read connection IDs and store them */ - if ((size_t) (end - p) < 1) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; - } + /* + * TLSv1.2: + * hash = PRF( master, finished_label, + * Hash( handshake ) )[0.11] + */ + ssl->handshake->tls_prf(session->master, 48, sender, + padbuf, hlen, buf, len); - ssl->transform->in_cid_len = *p++; + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "calc finished result", buf, len); - if ((size_t) (end - p) < ssl->transform->in_cid_len + 1u) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; - } + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(padbuf, hlen); - memcpy(ssl->transform->in_cid, p, ssl->transform->in_cid_len); - p += ssl->transform->in_cid_len; + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= calc finished")); - ssl->transform->out_cid_len = *p++; +exit: +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + psa_hash_abort(&cloned_op); + return mbedtls_md_error_from_psa(status); +#else + mbedtls_md_free(&cloned_ctx); + return ret; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ +} - if ((size_t) (end - p) < ssl->transform->out_cid_len) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; - } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) +static int ssl_calc_finished_tls_sha256( + mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char *buf, int from) +{ + unsigned char padbuf[32]; + return ssl_calc_finished_tls_generic(ssl, +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + &ssl->handshake->fin_sha256_psa, +#else + &ssl->handshake->fin_sha256, +#endif + padbuf, sizeof(padbuf), + buf, from); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256*/ - memcpy(ssl->transform->out_cid, p, ssl->transform->out_cid_len); - p += ssl->transform->out_cid_len; -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) +static int ssl_calc_finished_tls_sha384( + mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char *buf, int from) +{ + unsigned char padbuf[48]; + return ssl_calc_finished_tls_generic(ssl, +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + &ssl->handshake->fin_sha384_psa, +#else + &ssl->handshake->fin_sha384, +#endif + padbuf, sizeof(padbuf), + buf, from); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384*/ + +void mbedtls_ssl_handshake_wrapup_free_hs_transform(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("=> handshake wrapup: final free")); /* - * Saved fields from top-level ssl_context structure + * Free our handshake params */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_BADMAC_LIMIT) - if ((size_t) (end - p) < 4) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; - } - - ssl->badmac_seen = ((uint32_t) p[0] << 24) | - ((uint32_t) p[1] << 16) | - ((uint32_t) p[2] << 8) | - ((uint32_t) p[3]); - p += 4; -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_BADMAC_LIMIT */ + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_free(ssl); + mbedtls_free(ssl->handshake); + ssl->handshake = NULL; -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY) - if ((size_t) (end - p) < 16) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + /* + * Free the previous transform and switch in the current one + */ + if (ssl->transform) { + mbedtls_ssl_transform_free(ssl->transform); + mbedtls_free(ssl->transform); } + ssl->transform = ssl->transform_negotiate; + ssl->transform_negotiate = NULL; - ssl->in_window_top = ((uint64_t) p[0] << 56) | - ((uint64_t) p[1] << 48) | - ((uint64_t) p[2] << 40) | - ((uint64_t) p[3] << 32) | - ((uint64_t) p[4] << 24) | - ((uint64_t) p[5] << 16) | - ((uint64_t) p[6] << 8) | - ((uint64_t) p[7]); - p += 8; + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("<= handshake wrapup: final free")); +} - ssl->in_window = ((uint64_t) p[0] << 56) | - ((uint64_t) p[1] << 48) | - ((uint64_t) p[2] << 40) | - ((uint64_t) p[3] << 32) | - ((uint64_t) p[4] << 24) | - ((uint64_t) p[5] << 16) | - ((uint64_t) p[6] << 8) | - ((uint64_t) p[7]); - p += 8; -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY */ +void mbedtls_ssl_handshake_wrapup(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + int resume = ssl->handshake->resume; -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) - if ((size_t) (end - p) < 1) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("=> handshake wrapup")); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) + if (ssl->renego_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_IN_PROGRESS) { + ssl->renego_status = MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_DONE; + ssl->renego_records_seen = 0; } +#endif - ssl->disable_datagram_packing = *p++; -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ + /* + * Free the previous session and switch in the current one + */ + if (ssl->session) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) + /* RFC 7366 3.1: keep the EtM state */ + ssl->session_negotiate->encrypt_then_mac = + ssl->session->encrypt_then_mac; +#endif - if ((size_t) (end - p) < 8) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + mbedtls_ssl_session_free(ssl->session); + mbedtls_free(ssl->session); } + ssl->session = ssl->session_negotiate; + ssl->session_negotiate = NULL; - memcpy(ssl->cur_out_ctr, p, 8); - p += 8; + /* + * Add cache entry + */ + if (ssl->conf->f_set_cache != NULL && + ssl->session->id_len != 0 && + resume == 0) { + if (ssl->conf->f_set_cache(ssl->conf->p_cache, + ssl->session->id, + ssl->session->id_len, + ssl->session) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("cache did not store session")); + } + } #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) - if ((size_t) (end - p) < 2) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; - } + if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM && + ssl->handshake->flight != NULL) { + /* Cancel handshake timer */ + mbedtls_ssl_set_timer(ssl, 0); - ssl->mtu = (p[0] << 8) | p[1]; - p += 2; -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ + /* Keep last flight around in case we need to resend it: + * we need the handshake and transform structures for that */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("skip freeing handshake and transform")); + } else +#endif + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_wrapup_free_hs_transform(ssl); -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN) - { - uint8_t alpn_len; - const char **cur; + ssl->state = MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER; - if ((size_t) (end - p) < 1) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; - } + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("<= handshake wrapup")); +} - alpn_len = *p++; +int mbedtls_ssl_write_finished(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + int ret; + unsigned int hash_len; - if (alpn_len != 0 && ssl->conf->alpn_list != NULL) { - /* alpn_chosen should point to an item in the configured list */ - for (cur = ssl->conf->alpn_list; *cur != NULL; cur++) { - if (strlen(*cur) == alpn_len && - memcmp(p, *cur, alpn_len) == 0) { - ssl->alpn_chosen = *cur; - break; - } - } - } + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> write finished")); - /* can only happen on conf mismatch */ - if (alpn_len != 0 && ssl->alpn_chosen == NULL) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; - } + mbedtls_ssl_update_out_pointers(ssl, ssl->transform_negotiate); - p += alpn_len; + ret = ssl->handshake->calc_finished(ssl, ssl->out_msg + 4, ssl->conf->endpoint); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "calc_finished", ret); } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN */ /* - * Forced fields from top-level ssl_context structure - * - * Most of them already set to the correct value by mbedtls_ssl_init() and - * mbedtls_ssl_reset(), so we only need to set the remaining ones. + * RFC 5246 7.4.9 (Page 63) says 12 is the default length and ciphersuites + * may define some other value. Currently (early 2016), no defined + * ciphersuite does this (and this is unlikely to change as activity has + * moved to TLS 1.3 now) so we can keep the hardcoded 12 here. */ - ssl->state = MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER; + hash_len = 12; - ssl->major_ver = MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3; - ssl->minor_ver = MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) + ssl->verify_data_len = hash_len; + memcpy(ssl->own_verify_data, ssl->out_msg + 4, hash_len); +#endif - /* Adjust pointers for header fields of outgoing records to - * the given transform, accounting for explicit IV and CID. */ - mbedtls_ssl_update_out_pointers(ssl, ssl->transform); + ssl->out_msglen = 4 + hash_len; + ssl->out_msgtype = MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE; + ssl->out_msg[0] = MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_FINISHED; -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) - ssl->in_epoch = 1; + /* + * In case of session resuming, invert the client and server + * ChangeCipherSpec messages order. + */ + if (ssl->handshake->resume != 0) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) + if (ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT) { + ssl->state = MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WRAPUP; + } #endif - - /* mbedtls_ssl_reset() leaves the handshake sub-structure allocated, - * which we don't want - otherwise we'd end up freeing the wrong transform - * by calling mbedtls_ssl_handshake_wrapup_free_hs_transform() - * inappropriately. */ - if (ssl->handshake != NULL) { - mbedtls_ssl_handshake_free(ssl); - mbedtls_free(ssl->handshake); - ssl->handshake = NULL; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) + if (ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER) { + ssl->state = MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC; + } +#endif + } else { + ssl->state++; } /* - * Done - should have consumed entire buffer + * Switch to our negotiated transform and session parameters for outbound + * data. */ - if (p != end) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; - } + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("switching to new transform spec for outbound data")); - return 0; -} +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM) { + unsigned char i; -/* - * Deserialize context: public wrapper for error cleaning - */ -int mbedtls_ssl_context_load(mbedtls_ssl_context *context, - const unsigned char *buf, - size_t len) -{ - int ret = ssl_context_load(context, buf, len); + /* Remember current epoch settings for resending */ + ssl->handshake->alt_transform_out = ssl->transform_out; + memcpy(ssl->handshake->alt_out_ctr, ssl->cur_out_ctr, + sizeof(ssl->handshake->alt_out_ctr)); + + /* Set sequence_number to zero */ + memset(&ssl->cur_out_ctr[2], 0, sizeof(ssl->cur_out_ctr) - 2); + + + /* Increment epoch */ + for (i = 2; i > 0; i--) { + if (++ssl->cur_out_ctr[i - 1] != 0) { + break; + } + } + + /* The loop goes to its end iff the counter is wrapping */ + if (i == 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("DTLS epoch would wrap")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_COUNTER_WRAPPING; + } + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ + memset(ssl->cur_out_ctr, 0, sizeof(ssl->cur_out_ctr)); + + ssl->transform_out = ssl->transform_negotiate; + ssl->session_out = ssl->session_negotiate; - if (ret != 0) { - mbedtls_ssl_free(context); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM) { + mbedtls_ssl_send_flight_completed(ssl); } +#endif - return ret; -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CONTEXT_SERIALIZATION */ + if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg(ssl)) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg", ret); + return ret; + } -/* - * Free an SSL context - */ -void mbedtls_ssl_free(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) -{ - if (ssl == NULL) { - return; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM && + (ret = mbedtls_ssl_flight_transmit(ssl)) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_flight_transmit", ret); + return ret; } +#endif - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> free")); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= write finished")); - if (ssl->out_buf != NULL) { -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH) - size_t out_buf_len = ssl->out_buf_len; -#else - size_t out_buf_len = MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_BUFFER_LEN; -#endif + return 0; +} - mbedtls_platform_zeroize(ssl->out_buf, out_buf_len); - mbedtls_free(ssl->out_buf); - ssl->out_buf = NULL; - } +#define SSL_MAX_HASH_LEN 12 - if (ssl->in_buf != NULL) { -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH) - size_t in_buf_len = ssl->in_buf_len; -#else - size_t in_buf_len = MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_BUFFER_LEN; -#endif +int mbedtls_ssl_parse_finished(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned int hash_len = 12; + unsigned char buf[SSL_MAX_HASH_LEN]; - mbedtls_platform_zeroize(ssl->in_buf, in_buf_len); - mbedtls_free(ssl->in_buf); - ssl->in_buf = NULL; - } + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> parse finished")); -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT) - if (ssl->compress_buf != NULL) { - mbedtls_platform_zeroize(ssl->compress_buf, MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_BUFFER_LEN); - mbedtls_free(ssl->compress_buf); + ret = ssl->handshake->calc_finished(ssl, buf, ssl->conf->endpoint ^ 1); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "calc_finished", ret); } -#endif - if (ssl->transform) { - mbedtls_ssl_transform_free(ssl->transform); - mbedtls_free(ssl->transform); + if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_read_record(ssl, 1)) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_read_record", ret); + goto exit; } - if (ssl->handshake) { - mbedtls_ssl_handshake_free(ssl); - mbedtls_ssl_transform_free(ssl->transform_negotiate); - mbedtls_ssl_session_free(ssl->session_negotiate); + if (ssl->in_msgtype != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad finished message")); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; + goto exit; + } - mbedtls_free(ssl->handshake); - mbedtls_free(ssl->transform_negotiate); - mbedtls_free(ssl->session_negotiate); + if (ssl->in_msg[0] != MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_FINISHED) { + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; + goto exit; } - if (ssl->session) { - mbedtls_ssl_session_free(ssl->session); - mbedtls_free(ssl->session); + if (ssl->in_hslen != mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len(ssl) + hash_len) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad finished message")); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR); + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; + goto exit; } -#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) - if (ssl->hostname != NULL) { - mbedtls_platform_zeroize(ssl->hostname, strlen(ssl->hostname)); - mbedtls_free(ssl->hostname); + if (mbedtls_ct_memcmp(ssl->in_msg + mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len(ssl), + buf, hash_len) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad finished message")); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECRYPT_ERROR); + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; + goto exit; } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) + ssl->verify_data_len = hash_len; + memcpy(ssl->peer_verify_data, buf, hash_len); #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL) - if (mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_finish != NULL) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("going for mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_finish()")); - mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_finish(ssl); - } + if (ssl->handshake->resume != 0) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) + if (ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT) { + ssl->state = MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC; + } +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) + if (ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER) { + ssl->state = MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WRAPUP; + } #endif + } else { + ssl->state++; + } -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) - mbedtls_free(ssl->cli_id); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM) { + mbedtls_ssl_recv_flight_completed(ssl); + } #endif - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= free")); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= parse finished")); - /* Actually clear after last debug message */ - mbedtls_platform_zeroize(ssl, sizeof(mbedtls_ssl_context)); +exit: + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(buf, hash_len); + return ret; } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CONTEXT_SERIALIZATION) /* - * Initialize mbedtls_ssl_config + * Helper to get TLS 1.2 PRF from ciphersuite + * (Duplicates bits of logic from ssl_set_handshake_prfs().) */ -void mbedtls_ssl_config_init(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf) +static tls_prf_fn ssl_tls12prf_from_cs(int ciphersuite_id) { - memset(conf, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_ssl_config)); -} - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) -static const int ssl_preset_default_hashes[] = { -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) - MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512, -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384) - MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) - MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, - MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224, + const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t * const ciphersuite_info = + mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_from_id(ciphersuite_id); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) + if (ciphersuite_info != NULL && ciphersuite_info->mac == MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384) { + return tls_prf_sha384; + } else #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_TLS_DEFAULT_ALLOW_SHA1_IN_KEY_EXCHANGE) - MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) + { + if (ciphersuite_info != NULL && ciphersuite_info->mac == MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256) { + return tls_prf_sha256; + } + } #endif - MBEDTLS_MD_NONE -}; +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) + (void) ciphersuite_info; #endif -static const int ssl_preset_suiteb_ciphersuites[] = { - MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, - MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, - 0 -}; - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) -static const int ssl_preset_suiteb_hashes[] = { - MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, - MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, - MBEDTLS_MD_NONE -}; -#endif + return NULL; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CONTEXT_SERIALIZATION */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) -static const mbedtls_ecp_group_id ssl_preset_suiteb_curves[] = { -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED) - MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1, -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED) - MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1, +static mbedtls_tls_prf_types tls_prf_get_type(mbedtls_ssl_tls_prf_cb *tls_prf) +{ + ((void) tls_prf); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) + if (tls_prf == tls_prf_sha384) { + return MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_PRF_SHA384; + } else #endif - MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE -}; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) + if (tls_prf == tls_prf_sha256) { + return MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_PRF_SHA256; + } else #endif + return MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_PRF_NONE; +} /* - * Load default in mbedtls_ssl_config + * Populate a transform structure with session keys and all the other + * necessary information. + * + * Parameters: + * - [in/out]: transform: structure to populate + * [in] must be just initialised with mbedtls_ssl_transform_init() + * [out] fully populated, ready for use by mbedtls_ssl_{en,de}crypt_buf() + * - [in] ciphersuite + * - [in] master + * - [in] encrypt_then_mac + * - [in] tls_prf: pointer to PRF to use for key derivation + * - [in] randbytes: buffer holding ServerHello.random + ClientHello.random + * - [in] tls_version: TLS version + * - [in] endpoint: client or server + * - [in] ssl: used for: + * - ssl->conf->{f,p}_export_keys + * [in] optionally used for: + * - MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C: ssl->conf->{f,p}_dbg */ -int mbedtls_ssl_config_defaults(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, - int endpoint, int transport, int preset) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls12_populate_transform(mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform, + int ciphersuite, + const unsigned char master[48], +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_CBC_ETM) + int encrypt_then_mac, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_CBC_ETM */ + ssl_tls_prf_t tls_prf, + const unsigned char randbytes[64], + mbedtls_ssl_protocol_version tls_version, + unsigned endpoint, + const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) { -#if defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; -#endif - - /* Use the functions here so that they are covered in tests, - * but otherwise access member directly for efficiency */ - mbedtls_ssl_conf_endpoint(conf, endpoint); - mbedtls_ssl_conf_transport(conf, transport); - - /* - * Things that are common to all presets - */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) - if (endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT) { - conf->authmode = MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_REQUIRED; -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) - conf->session_tickets = MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS_ENABLED; -#endif - } -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARC4_C) - conf->arc4_disabled = MBEDTLS_SSL_ARC4_DISABLED; -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) - conf->encrypt_then_mac = MBEDTLS_SSL_ETM_ENABLED; -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET) - conf->extended_ms = MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MS_ENABLED; -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING) - conf->cbc_record_splitting = MBEDTLS_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING_ENABLED; -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) - conf->f_cookie_write = ssl_cookie_write_dummy; - conf->f_cookie_check = ssl_cookie_check_dummy; -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY) - conf->anti_replay = MBEDTLS_SSL_ANTI_REPLAY_ENABLED; -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) - conf->cert_req_ca_list = MBEDTLS_SSL_CERT_REQ_CA_LIST_ENABLED; -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) - conf->hs_timeout_min = MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_TIMEOUT_DFL_MIN; - conf->hs_timeout_max = MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_TIMEOUT_DFL_MAX; -#endif + int ret = 0; + unsigned char keyblk[256]; + unsigned char *key1; + unsigned char *key2; + unsigned char *mac_enc; + unsigned char *mac_dec; + size_t mac_key_len = 0; + size_t iv_copy_len; + size_t keylen; + const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info; + mbedtls_ssl_mode_t ssl_mode; +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *cipher_info; + const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info; +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) - conf->renego_max_records = MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGO_MAX_RECORDS_DEFAULT; - memset(conf->renego_period, 0x00, 2); - memset(conf->renego_period + 2, 0xFF, 6); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + psa_key_type_t key_type; + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + psa_algorithm_t alg; + psa_algorithm_t mac_alg = 0; + size_t key_bits; + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) - if (endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER) { - const unsigned char dhm_p[] = - MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC3526_MODP_2048_P_BIN; - const unsigned char dhm_g[] = - MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC3526_MODP_2048_G_BIN; + /* + * Some data just needs copying into the structure + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_CBC_ETM) + transform->encrypt_then_mac = encrypt_then_mac; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_CBC_ETM */ + transform->tls_version = tls_version; - if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_conf_dh_param_bin(conf, - dhm_p, sizeof(dhm_p), - dhm_g, sizeof(dhm_g))) != 0) { - return ret; - } - } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CONTEXT_SERIALIZATION) + memcpy(transform->randbytes, randbytes, sizeof(transform->randbytes)); #endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) + if (tls_version == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_3) { + /* At the moment, we keep TLS <= 1.2 and TLS 1.3 transform + * generation separate. This should never happen. */ + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 */ + /* - * Preset-specific defaults + * Get various info structures */ - switch (preset) { - /* - * NSA Suite B - */ - case MBEDTLS_SSL_PRESET_SUITEB: - conf->min_major_ver = MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3; - conf->min_minor_ver = MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3; /* TLS 1.2 */ - conf->max_major_ver = MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_MAJOR_VERSION; - conf->max_minor_ver = MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_MINOR_VERSION; + ciphersuite_info = mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_from_id(ciphersuite); + if (ciphersuite_info == NULL) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("ciphersuite info for %d not found", + ciphersuite)); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } - conf->ciphersuite_list[MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0] = - conf->ciphersuite_list[MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1] = - conf->ciphersuite_list[MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2] = - conf->ciphersuite_list[MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3] = - ssl_preset_suiteb_ciphersuites; + ssl_mode = mbedtls_ssl_get_mode_from_ciphersuite( +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_CBC_ETM) + encrypt_then_mac, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_CBC_ETM */ + ciphersuite_info); -#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) - conf->cert_profile = &mbedtls_x509_crt_profile_suiteb; -#endif + if (ssl_mode == MBEDTLS_SSL_MODE_AEAD) { + transform->taglen = + ciphersuite_info->flags & MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_SHORT_TAG ? 8 : 16; + } -#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) - conf->sig_hashes = ssl_preset_suiteb_hashes; -#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + if ((status = mbedtls_ssl_cipher_to_psa((mbedtls_cipher_type_t) ciphersuite_info->cipher, + transform->taglen, + &alg, + &key_type, + &key_bits)) != PSA_SUCCESS) { + ret = PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_cipher_to_psa", ret); + goto end; + } +#else + cipher_info = mbedtls_cipher_info_from_type((mbedtls_cipher_type_t) ciphersuite_info->cipher); + if (cipher_info == NULL) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("cipher info for %u not found", + ciphersuite_info->cipher)); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) - conf->curve_list = ssl_preset_suiteb_curves; -#endif - break; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + mac_alg = mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type((mbedtls_md_type_t) ciphersuite_info->mac); + if (mac_alg == 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type for %u not found", + (unsigned) ciphersuite_info->mac)); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } +#else + md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type((mbedtls_md_type_t) ciphersuite_info->mac); + if (md_info == NULL) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("mbedtls_md info for %u not found", + (unsigned) ciphersuite_info->mac)); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ - /* - * Default - */ - default: - conf->min_major_ver = (MBEDTLS_SSL_MIN_MAJOR_VERSION > - MBEDTLS_SSL_MIN_VALID_MAJOR_VERSION) ? - MBEDTLS_SSL_MIN_MAJOR_VERSION : - MBEDTLS_SSL_MIN_VALID_MAJOR_VERSION; - conf->min_minor_ver = (MBEDTLS_SSL_MIN_MINOR_VERSION > - MBEDTLS_SSL_MIN_VALID_MINOR_VERSION) ? - MBEDTLS_SSL_MIN_MINOR_VERSION : - MBEDTLS_SSL_MIN_VALID_MINOR_VERSION; - conf->max_major_ver = MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_MAJOR_VERSION; - conf->max_minor_ver = MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_MINOR_VERSION; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) + /* Copy own and peer's CID if the use of the CID + * extension has been negotiated. */ + if (ssl->handshake->cid_in_use == MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_ENABLED) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("Copy CIDs into SSL transform")); -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) - if (transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM) { - conf->min_minor_ver = MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2; - } -#endif + transform->in_cid_len = ssl->own_cid_len; + memcpy(transform->in_cid, ssl->own_cid, ssl->own_cid_len); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "Incoming CID", transform->in_cid, + transform->in_cid_len); - conf->ciphersuite_list[MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0] = - conf->ciphersuite_list[MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1] = - conf->ciphersuite_list[MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2] = - conf->ciphersuite_list[MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3] = - mbedtls_ssl_list_ciphersuites(); + transform->out_cid_len = ssl->handshake->peer_cid_len; + memcpy(transform->out_cid, ssl->handshake->peer_cid, + ssl->handshake->peer_cid_len); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "Outgoing CID", transform->out_cid, + transform->out_cid_len); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) - conf->cert_profile = &mbedtls_x509_crt_profile_default; -#endif + /* + * Compute key block using the PRF + */ + ret = tls_prf(master, 48, "key expansion", randbytes, 64, keyblk, 256); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "prf", ret); + return ret; + } -#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) - conf->sig_hashes = ssl_preset_default_hashes; -#endif + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("ciphersuite = %s", + mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_name(ciphersuite))); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "master secret", master, 48); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "random bytes", randbytes, 64); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "key block", keyblk, 256); -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) - conf->curve_list = mbedtls_ecp_grp_id_list(); -#endif + /* + * Determine the appropriate key, IV and MAC length. + */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) - conf->dhm_min_bitlen = 1024; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + keylen = PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(key_bits); +#else + keylen = mbedtls_cipher_info_get_key_bitlen(cipher_info) / 8; #endif - } - return 0; -} +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_AEAD) + if (ssl_mode == MBEDTLS_SSL_MODE_AEAD) { + size_t explicit_ivlen; -/* - * Free mbedtls_ssl_config - */ -void mbedtls_ssl_config_free(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf) -{ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_C) - mbedtls_mpi_free(&conf->dhm_P); - mbedtls_mpi_free(&conf->dhm_G); -#endif + transform->maclen = 0; + mac_key_len = 0; -#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED) - if (conf->psk != NULL) { - mbedtls_platform_zeroize(conf->psk, conf->psk_len); - mbedtls_free(conf->psk); - conf->psk = NULL; - conf->psk_len = 0; - } + /* All modes haves 96-bit IVs, but the length of the static parts vary + * with mode and version: + * - For GCM and CCM in TLS 1.2, there's a static IV of 4 Bytes + * (to be concatenated with a dynamically chosen IV of 8 Bytes) + * - For ChaChaPoly in TLS 1.2, and all modes in TLS 1.3, there's + * a static IV of 12 Bytes (to be XOR'ed with the 8 Byte record + * sequence number). + */ + transform->ivlen = 12; - if (conf->psk_identity != NULL) { - mbedtls_platform_zeroize(conf->psk_identity, conf->psk_identity_len); - mbedtls_free(conf->psk_identity); - conf->psk_identity = NULL; - conf->psk_identity_len = 0; - } -#endif + int is_chachapoly = 0; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + is_chachapoly = (key_type == PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20); +#else + is_chachapoly = (mbedtls_cipher_info_get_mode(cipher_info) + == MBEDTLS_MODE_CHACHAPOLY); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) - ssl_key_cert_free(conf->key_cert); -#endif + if (is_chachapoly) { + transform->fixed_ivlen = 12; + } else { + transform->fixed_ivlen = 4; + } - mbedtls_platform_zeroize(conf, sizeof(mbedtls_ssl_config)); -} + /* Minimum length of encrypted record */ + explicit_ivlen = transform->ivlen - transform->fixed_ivlen; + transform->minlen = explicit_ivlen + transform->taglen; + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_AEAD */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_MAC) + if (ssl_mode == MBEDTLS_SSL_MODE_STREAM || + ssl_mode == MBEDTLS_SSL_MODE_CBC || + ssl_mode == MBEDTLS_SSL_MODE_CBC_ETM) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + size_t block_size = PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_LENGTH(key_type); +#else + size_t block_size = mbedtls_cipher_info_get_block_size(cipher_info); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_C) && \ - (defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C)) -/* - * Convert between MBEDTLS_PK_XXX and SSL_SIG_XXX - */ -unsigned char mbedtls_ssl_sig_from_pk(mbedtls_pk_context *pk) -{ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) - if (mbedtls_pk_can_do(pk, MBEDTLS_PK_RSA)) { - return MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_RSA; - } -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) - if (mbedtls_pk_can_do(pk, MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA)) { - return MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_ECDSA; - } -#endif - return MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_ANON; -} +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + /* Get MAC length */ + mac_key_len = PSA_HASH_LENGTH(mac_alg); +#else + /* Initialize HMAC contexts */ + if ((ret = mbedtls_md_setup(&transform->md_ctx_enc, md_info, 1)) != 0 || + (ret = mbedtls_md_setup(&transform->md_ctx_dec, md_info, 1)) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_md_setup", ret); + goto end; + } -unsigned char mbedtls_ssl_sig_from_pk_alg(mbedtls_pk_type_t type) -{ - switch (type) { - case MBEDTLS_PK_RSA: - return MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_RSA; - case MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA: - case MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY: - return MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_ECDSA; - default: - return MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_ANON; - } -} + /* Get MAC length */ + mac_key_len = mbedtls_md_get_size(md_info); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + transform->maclen = mac_key_len; -mbedtls_pk_type_t mbedtls_ssl_pk_alg_from_sig(unsigned char sig) -{ - switch (sig) { -#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) - case MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_RSA: - return MBEDTLS_PK_RSA; -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) - case MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_ECDSA: - return MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA; -#endif - default: - return MBEDTLS_PK_NONE; - } -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_C && ( MBEDTLS_RSA_C || MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C ) */ + /* IV length */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + transform->ivlen = PSA_CIPHER_IV_LENGTH(key_type, alg); +#else + transform->ivlen = mbedtls_cipher_info_get_iv_size(cipher_info); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && \ - defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) + /* Minimum length */ + if (ssl_mode == MBEDTLS_SSL_MODE_STREAM) { + transform->minlen = transform->maclen; + } else { + /* + * GenericBlockCipher: + * 1. if EtM is in use: one block plus MAC + * otherwise: * first multiple of blocklen greater than maclen + * 2. IV + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) + if (ssl_mode == MBEDTLS_SSL_MODE_CBC_ETM) { + transform->minlen = transform->maclen + + block_size; + } else +#endif + { + transform->minlen = transform->maclen + + block_size + - transform->maclen % block_size; + } -/* Find an entry in a signature-hash set matching a given hash algorithm. */ -mbedtls_md_type_t mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_find(mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_t *set, - mbedtls_pk_type_t sig_alg) -{ - switch (sig_alg) { - case MBEDTLS_PK_RSA: - return set->rsa; - case MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA: - return set->ecdsa; - default: - return MBEDTLS_MD_NONE; + if (tls_version == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2) { + transform->minlen += transform->ivlen; + } else { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("should never happen")); + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + goto end; + } + } + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_MAC */ + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("should never happen")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; } -} -/* Add a signature-hash-pair to a signature-hash set */ -void mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_add(mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_t *set, - mbedtls_pk_type_t sig_alg, - mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg) -{ - switch (sig_alg) { - case MBEDTLS_PK_RSA: - if (set->rsa == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE) { - set->rsa = md_alg; - } - break; + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("keylen: %u, minlen: %u, ivlen: %u, maclen: %u", + (unsigned) keylen, + (unsigned) transform->minlen, + (unsigned) transform->ivlen, + (unsigned) transform->maclen)); - case MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA: - if (set->ecdsa == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE) { - set->ecdsa = md_alg; - } - break; + /* + * Finally setup the cipher contexts, IVs and MAC secrets. + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) + if (endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT) { + key1 = keyblk + mac_key_len * 2; + key2 = keyblk + mac_key_len * 2 + keylen; - default: - break; - } -} + mac_enc = keyblk; + mac_dec = keyblk + mac_key_len; -/* Allow exactly one hash algorithm for each signature. */ -void mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_const_hash(mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_t *set, - mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg) -{ - set->rsa = md_alg; - set->ecdsa = md_alg; -} + iv_copy_len = (transform->fixed_ivlen) ? + transform->fixed_ivlen : transform->ivlen; + memcpy(transform->iv_enc, key2 + keylen, iv_copy_len); + memcpy(transform->iv_dec, key2 + keylen + iv_copy_len, + iv_copy_len); + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) + if (endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER) { + key1 = keyblk + mac_key_len * 2 + keylen; + key2 = keyblk + mac_key_len * 2; -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && - MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */ + mac_enc = keyblk + mac_key_len; + mac_dec = keyblk; -/* - * Convert from MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_XXX to MBEDTLS_MD_XXX - */ -mbedtls_md_type_t mbedtls_ssl_md_alg_from_hash(unsigned char hash) -{ - switch (hash) { -#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C) - case MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_MD5: - return MBEDTLS_MD_MD5; -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) - case MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA1: - return MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1; -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) - case MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA224: - return MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224; - case MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA256: - return MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256; -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384) - case MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA384: - return MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384; -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) - case MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA512: - return MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512; -#endif - default: - return MBEDTLS_MD_NONE; + iv_copy_len = (transform->fixed_ivlen) ? + transform->fixed_ivlen : transform->ivlen; + memcpy(transform->iv_dec, key1 + keylen, iv_copy_len); + memcpy(transform->iv_enc, key1 + keylen + iv_copy_len, + iv_copy_len); + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("should never happen")); + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + goto end; } -} -/* - * Convert from MBEDTLS_MD_XXX to MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_XXX - */ -unsigned char mbedtls_ssl_hash_from_md_alg(int md) -{ - switch (md) { -#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C) - case MBEDTLS_MD_MD5: - return MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_MD5; -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) - case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1: - return MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA1; -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) - case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224: - return MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA224; - case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256: - return MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA256; -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384) - case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384: - return MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA384; -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) - case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512: - return MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA512; -#endif - default: - return MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_NONE; + if (ssl->f_export_keys != NULL) { + ssl->f_export_keys(ssl->p_export_keys, + MBEDTLS_SSL_KEY_EXPORT_TLS12_MASTER_SECRET, + master, 48, + randbytes + 32, + randbytes, + tls_prf_get_type(tls_prf)); } -} -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) -/* - * Check if a curve proposed by the peer is in our list. - * Return 0 if we're willing to use it, -1 otherwise. - */ -int mbedtls_ssl_check_curve(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id) -{ - const mbedtls_ecp_group_id *gid; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + transform->psa_alg = alg; + + if (alg != MBEDTLS_SSL_NULL_CIPHER) { + psa_set_key_usage_flags(&attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT); + psa_set_key_algorithm(&attributes, alg); + psa_set_key_type(&attributes, key_type); + + if ((status = psa_import_key(&attributes, + key1, + PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(key_bits), + &transform->psa_key_enc)) != PSA_SUCCESS) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(3, "psa_import_key", (int) status); + ret = PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "psa_import_key", ret); + goto end; + } - if (ssl->conf->curve_list == NULL) { - return -1; - } + psa_set_key_usage_flags(&attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT); - for (gid = ssl->conf->curve_list; *gid != MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE; gid++) { - if (*gid == grp_id) { - return 0; + if ((status = psa_import_key(&attributes, + key2, + PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(key_bits), + &transform->psa_key_dec)) != PSA_SUCCESS) { + ret = PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "psa_import_key", ret); + goto end; } } - - return -1; -} - -/* - * Same as mbedtls_ssl_check_curve() but takes a TLS ID for the curve. - */ -int mbedtls_ssl_check_curve_tls_id(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, uint16_t tls_id) -{ - const mbedtls_ecp_curve_info *curve_info = - mbedtls_ecp_curve_info_from_tls_id(tls_id); - if (curve_info == NULL) { - return -1; +#else + if ((ret = mbedtls_cipher_setup(&transform->cipher_ctx_enc, + cipher_info)) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_cipher_setup", ret); + goto end; } - return mbedtls_ssl_check_curve(ssl, curve_info->grp_id); -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) -/* - * Check if a hash proposed by the peer is in our list. - * Return 0 if we're willing to use it, -1 otherwise. - */ -int mbedtls_ssl_check_sig_hash(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - mbedtls_md_type_t md) -{ - const int *cur; - if (ssl->conf->sig_hashes == NULL) { - return -1; + if ((ret = mbedtls_cipher_setup(&transform->cipher_ctx_dec, + cipher_info)) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_cipher_setup", ret); + goto end; } - for (cur = ssl->conf->sig_hashes; *cur != MBEDTLS_MD_NONE; cur++) { - if (*cur == (int) md) { - return 0; - } + if ((ret = mbedtls_cipher_setkey(&transform->cipher_ctx_enc, key1, + (int) mbedtls_cipher_info_get_key_bitlen(cipher_info), + MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT)) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_cipher_setkey", ret); + goto end; } - return -1; -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */ + if ((ret = mbedtls_cipher_setkey(&transform->cipher_ctx_dec, key2, + (int) mbedtls_cipher_info_get_key_bitlen(cipher_info), + MBEDTLS_DECRYPT)) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_cipher_setkey", ret); + goto end; + } -#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) -int mbedtls_ssl_check_cert_usage(const mbedtls_x509_crt *cert, - const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite, - int cert_endpoint, - uint32_t *flags) -{ - int ret = 0; -#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CHECK_KEY_USAGE) - int usage = 0; -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CHECK_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE) - const char *ext_oid; - size_t ext_len; -#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) + if (mbedtls_cipher_info_get_mode(cipher_info) == MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC) { + if ((ret = mbedtls_cipher_set_padding_mode(&transform->cipher_ctx_enc, + MBEDTLS_PADDING_NONE)) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_cipher_set_padding_mode", ret); + goto end; + } -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CHECK_KEY_USAGE) && \ - !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CHECK_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE) - ((void) cert); - ((void) cert_endpoint); - ((void) flags); -#endif + if ((ret = mbedtls_cipher_set_padding_mode(&transform->cipher_ctx_dec, + MBEDTLS_PADDING_NONE)) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_cipher_set_padding_mode", ret); + goto end; + } + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CHECK_KEY_USAGE) - if (cert_endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER) { - /* Server part of the key exchange */ - switch (ciphersuite->key_exchange) { - case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA: - case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK: - usage = MBEDTLS_X509_KU_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT; - break; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_MAC) + /* For HMAC-based ciphersuites, initialize the HMAC transforms. + For AEAD-based ciphersuites, there is nothing to do here. */ + if (mac_key_len != 0) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + transform->psa_mac_alg = PSA_ALG_HMAC(mac_alg); - case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA: - case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA: - case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA: - usage = MBEDTLS_X509_KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE; - break; + psa_set_key_usage_flags(&attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE); + psa_set_key_algorithm(&attributes, PSA_ALG_HMAC(mac_alg)); + psa_set_key_type(&attributes, PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC); - case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA: - case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA: - usage = MBEDTLS_X509_KU_KEY_AGREEMENT; - break; + if ((status = psa_import_key(&attributes, + mac_enc, mac_key_len, + &transform->psa_mac_enc)) != PSA_SUCCESS) { + ret = PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "psa_import_mac_key", ret); + goto end; + } - /* Don't use default: we want warnings when adding new values */ - case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_NONE: - case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK: - case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK: - case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK: - case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE: - usage = 0; + if ((transform->psa_alg == MBEDTLS_SSL_NULL_CIPHER) || + ((transform->psa_alg == PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_CBC_ETM) + && (transform->encrypt_then_mac == MBEDTLS_SSL_ETM_DISABLED) +#endif + )) { + /* mbedtls_ct_hmac() requires the key to be exportable */ + psa_set_key_usage_flags(&attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | + PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH); + } else { + psa_set_key_usage_flags(&attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH); } - } else { - /* Client auth: we only implement rsa_sign and mbedtls_ecdsa_sign for now */ - usage = MBEDTLS_X509_KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE; - } - if (mbedtls_x509_crt_check_key_usage(cert, usage) != 0) { - *flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_KEY_USAGE; - ret = -1; - } + if ((status = psa_import_key(&attributes, + mac_dec, mac_key_len, + &transform->psa_mac_dec)) != PSA_SUCCESS) { + ret = PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "psa_import_mac_key", ret); + goto end; + } #else - ((void) ciphersuite); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CHECK_KEY_USAGE */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CHECK_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE) - if (cert_endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER) { - ext_oid = MBEDTLS_OID_SERVER_AUTH; - ext_len = MBEDTLS_OID_SIZE(MBEDTLS_OID_SERVER_AUTH); - } else { - ext_oid = MBEDTLS_OID_CLIENT_AUTH; - ext_len = MBEDTLS_OID_SIZE(MBEDTLS_OID_CLIENT_AUTH); + ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_starts(&transform->md_ctx_enc, mac_enc, mac_key_len); + if (ret != 0) { + goto end; + } + ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_starts(&transform->md_ctx_dec, mac_dec, mac_key_len); + if (ret != 0) { + goto end; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_MAC */ - if (mbedtls_x509_crt_check_extended_key_usage(cert, ext_oid, ext_len) != 0) { - *flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_EXT_KEY_USAGE; - ret = -1; - } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CHECK_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE */ + ((void) mac_dec); + ((void) mac_enc); +end: + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(keyblk, sizeof(keyblk)); return ret; } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ -int mbedtls_ssl_set_calc_verify_md(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int md) -{ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) - if (ssl->minor_ver != MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_VERIFY_HASH; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +int mbedtls_psa_ecjpake_read_round( + psa_pake_operation_t *pake_ctx, + const unsigned char *buf, + size_t len, mbedtls_ecjpake_rounds_t round) +{ + psa_status_t status; + size_t input_offset = 0; + /* + * At round one repeat the KEY_SHARE, ZK_PUBLIC & ZF_PROOF twice + * At round two perform a single cycle + */ + unsigned int remaining_steps = (round == MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_ROUND_ONE) ? 2 : 1; + + for (; remaining_steps > 0; remaining_steps--) { + for (psa_pake_step_t step = PSA_PAKE_STEP_KEY_SHARE; + step <= PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PROOF; + ++step) { + /* Length is stored at the first byte */ + size_t length = buf[input_offset]; + input_offset += 1; + + if (input_offset + length > len) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; + } + + status = psa_pake_input(pake_ctx, step, + buf + input_offset, length); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + } + + input_offset += length; + } } - switch (md) { -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C) - case MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_MD5: - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_VERIFY_HASH; -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) - case MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA1: - ssl->handshake->calc_verify = ssl_calc_verify_tls; - break; -#endif -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 || MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384) - case MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA384: - ssl->handshake->calc_verify = ssl_calc_verify_tls_sha384; - break; -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) - case MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA256: - ssl->handshake->calc_verify = ssl_calc_verify_tls_sha256; - break; -#endif - default: - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_VERIFY_HASH; + if (input_offset != len) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; } return 0; -#else /* !MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ - (void) ssl; - (void) md; - - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_VERIFY_HASH; -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ } -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) -int mbedtls_ssl_get_key_exchange_md_ssl_tls(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - unsigned char *output, - unsigned char *data, size_t data_len) +int mbedtls_psa_ecjpake_write_round( + psa_pake_operation_t *pake_ctx, + unsigned char *buf, + size_t len, size_t *olen, + mbedtls_ecjpake_rounds_t round) { - int ret = 0; - mbedtls_md5_context mbedtls_md5; - mbedtls_sha1_context mbedtls_sha1; - - mbedtls_md5_init(&mbedtls_md5); - mbedtls_sha1_init(&mbedtls_sha1); - + psa_status_t status; + size_t output_offset = 0; + size_t output_len; /* - * digitally-signed struct { - * opaque md5_hash[16]; - * opaque sha_hash[20]; - * }; - * - * md5_hash - * MD5(ClientHello.random + ServerHello.random - * + ServerParams); - * sha_hash - * SHA(ClientHello.random + ServerHello.random - * + ServerParams); + * At round one repeat the KEY_SHARE, ZK_PUBLIC & ZF_PROOF twice + * At round two perform a single cycle */ - if ((ret = mbedtls_md5_starts_ret(&mbedtls_md5)) != 0) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_md5_starts_ret", ret); - goto exit; - } - if ((ret = mbedtls_md5_update_ret(&mbedtls_md5, - ssl->handshake->randbytes, 64)) != 0) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_md5_update_ret", ret); - goto exit; - } - if ((ret = mbedtls_md5_update_ret(&mbedtls_md5, data, data_len)) != 0) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_md5_update_ret", ret); - goto exit; - } - if ((ret = mbedtls_md5_finish_ret(&mbedtls_md5, output)) != 0) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_md5_finish_ret", ret); - goto exit; - } + unsigned int remaining_steps = (round == MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_ROUND_ONE) ? 2 : 1; - if ((ret = mbedtls_sha1_starts_ret(&mbedtls_sha1)) != 0) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_sha1_starts_ret", ret); - goto exit; - } - if ((ret = mbedtls_sha1_update_ret(&mbedtls_sha1, - ssl->handshake->randbytes, 64)) != 0) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_sha1_update_ret", ret); - goto exit; - } - if ((ret = mbedtls_sha1_update_ret(&mbedtls_sha1, data, - data_len)) != 0) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_sha1_update_ret", ret); - goto exit; - } - if ((ret = mbedtls_sha1_finish_ret(&mbedtls_sha1, - output + 16)) != 0) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_sha1_finish_ret", ret); - goto exit; - } + for (; remaining_steps > 0; remaining_steps--) { + for (psa_pake_step_t step = PSA_PAKE_STEP_KEY_SHARE; + step <= PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PROOF; + ++step) { + /* + * For each step, prepend 1 byte with the length of the data as + * given by psa_pake_output(). + */ + status = psa_pake_output(pake_ctx, step, + buf + output_offset + 1, + len - output_offset - 1, + &output_len); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + } -exit: - mbedtls_md5_free(&mbedtls_md5); - mbedtls_sha1_free(&mbedtls_sha1); + *(buf + output_offset) = (uint8_t) output_len; - if (ret != 0) { - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_INTERNAL_ERROR); + output_offset += output_len + 1; + } } - return ret; + *olen = output_offset; + return 0; } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 || MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 || \ - MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) +#endif //MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED && MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO #if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) int mbedtls_ssl_get_key_exchange_md_tls1_2(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, @@ -7526,7 +9331,7 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_get_key_exchange_md_tls1_2(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, { psa_status_t status; psa_hash_operation_t hash_operation = PSA_HASH_OPERATION_INIT; - psa_algorithm_t hash_alg = mbedtls_psa_translate_md(md_alg); + psa_algorithm_t hash_alg = mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type(md_alg); MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("Perform PSA-based computation of digest of ServerKeyExchange")); @@ -7567,7 +9372,7 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_get_key_exchange_md_tls1_2(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, case PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY: return MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_ALLOC_FAILED; default: - return MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_HW_ACCEL_FAILED; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_HW_ACCEL_FAILED; } } return 0; @@ -7629,7 +9434,489 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_get_key_exchange_md_tls1_2(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, } #endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 || MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 || \ - MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) + +/* Find the preferred hash for a given signature algorithm. */ +unsigned int mbedtls_ssl_tls12_get_preferred_hash_for_sig_alg( + mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned int sig_alg) +{ + unsigned int i; + uint16_t *received_sig_algs = ssl->handshake->received_sig_algs; + + if (sig_alg == MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_ANON) { + return MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_NONE; + } + + for (i = 0; received_sig_algs[i] != MBEDTLS_TLS_SIG_NONE; i++) { + unsigned int hash_alg_received = + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS12_HASH_ALG_FROM_SIG_AND_HASH_ALG( + received_sig_algs[i]); + unsigned int sig_alg_received = + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS12_SIG_ALG_FROM_SIG_AND_HASH_ALG( + received_sig_algs[i]); + + mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg = + mbedtls_ssl_md_alg_from_hash((unsigned char) hash_alg_received); + if (md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE) { + continue; + } + + if (sig_alg == sig_alg_received) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + if (ssl->handshake->key_cert && ssl->handshake->key_cert->key) { + psa_algorithm_t psa_hash_alg = + mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type(md_alg); + + if (sig_alg_received == MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_ECDSA && + !mbedtls_pk_can_do_ext(ssl->handshake->key_cert->key, + PSA_ALG_ECDSA(psa_hash_alg), + PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH)) { + continue; + } + + if (sig_alg_received == MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_RSA && + !mbedtls_pk_can_do_ext(ssl->handshake->key_cert->key, + PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN( + psa_hash_alg), + PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH)) { + continue; + } + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + + return hash_alg_received; + } + } + + return MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_NONE; +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ + +int mbedtls_ssl_validate_ciphersuite( + const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *suite_info, + mbedtls_ssl_protocol_version min_tls_version, + mbedtls_ssl_protocol_version max_tls_version) +{ + (void) ssl; + + if (suite_info == NULL) { + return -1; + } + + if ((suite_info->min_tls_version > max_tls_version) || + (suite_info->max_tls_version < min_tls_version)) { + return -1; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + if (suite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE && + ssl->handshake->psa_pake_ctx_is_ok != 1) +#else + if (suite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE && + mbedtls_ecjpake_check(&ssl->handshake->ecjpake_ctx) != 0) +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + { + return -1; + } +#endif + + /* Don't suggest PSK-based ciphersuite if no PSK is available. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED) + if (mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_psk(suite_info) && + mbedtls_ssl_conf_has_static_psk(ssl->conf) == 0) { + return -1; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ + + return 0; +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) +/* + * Function for writing a signature algorithm extension. + * + * The `extension_data` field of signature algorithm contains a `SignatureSchemeList` + * value (TLS 1.3 RFC8446): + * enum { + * .... + * ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256( 0x0403 ), + * ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384( 0x0503 ), + * ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512( 0x0603 ), + * .... + * } SignatureScheme; + * + * struct { + * SignatureScheme supported_signature_algorithms<2..2^16-2>; + * } SignatureSchemeList; + * + * The `extension_data` field of signature algorithm contains a `SignatureAndHashAlgorithm` + * value (TLS 1.2 RFC5246): + * enum { + * none(0), md5(1), sha1(2), sha224(3), sha256(4), sha384(5), + * sha512(6), (255) + * } HashAlgorithm; + * + * enum { anonymous(0), rsa(1), dsa(2), ecdsa(3), (255) } + * SignatureAlgorithm; + * + * struct { + * HashAlgorithm hash; + * SignatureAlgorithm signature; + * } SignatureAndHashAlgorithm; + * + * SignatureAndHashAlgorithm + * supported_signature_algorithms<2..2^16-2>; + * + * The TLS 1.3 signature algorithm extension was defined to be a compatible + * generalization of the TLS 1.2 signature algorithm extension. + * `SignatureAndHashAlgorithm` field of TLS 1.2 can be represented by + * `SignatureScheme` field of TLS 1.3 + * + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_write_sig_alg_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char *buf, + const unsigned char *end, size_t *out_len) +{ + unsigned char *p = buf; + unsigned char *supported_sig_alg; /* Start of supported_signature_algorithms */ + size_t supported_sig_alg_len = 0; /* Length of supported_signature_algorithms */ + + *out_len = 0; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("adding signature_algorithms extension")); + + /* Check if we have space for header and length field: + * - extension_type (2 bytes) + * - extension_data_length (2 bytes) + * - supported_signature_algorithms_length (2 bytes) + */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR(p, end, 6); + p += 6; + + /* + * Write supported_signature_algorithms + */ + supported_sig_alg = p; + const uint16_t *sig_alg = mbedtls_ssl_get_sig_algs(ssl); + if (sig_alg == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_CONFIG; + } + + for (; *sig_alg != MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_NONE; sig_alg++) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("got signature scheme [%x] %s", + *sig_alg, + mbedtls_ssl_sig_alg_to_str(*sig_alg))); + if (!mbedtls_ssl_sig_alg_is_supported(ssl, *sig_alg)) { + continue; + } + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR(p, end, 2); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(*sig_alg, p, 0); + p += 2; + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("sent signature scheme [%x] %s", + *sig_alg, + mbedtls_ssl_sig_alg_to_str(*sig_alg))); + } + + /* Length of supported_signature_algorithms */ + supported_sig_alg_len = (size_t) (p - supported_sig_alg); + if (supported_sig_alg_len == 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("No signature algorithms defined.")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SIG_ALG, buf, 0); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(supported_sig_alg_len + 2, buf, 2); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(supported_sig_alg_len, buf, 4); + + *out_len = (size_t) (p - buf); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) + mbedtls_ssl_tls13_set_hs_sent_ext_mask(ssl, MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SIG_ALG); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 */ + + return 0; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) +/* + * mbedtls_ssl_parse_server_name_ext + * + * Structure of server_name extension: + * + * enum { + * host_name(0), (255) + * } NameType; + * opaque HostName<1..2^16-1>; + * + * struct { + * NameType name_type; + * select (name_type) { + * case host_name: HostName; + * } name; + * } ServerName; + * struct { + * ServerName server_name_list<1..2^16-1> + * } ServerNameList; + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_parse_server_name_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *buf, + const unsigned char *end) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + const unsigned char *p = buf; + size_t server_name_list_len, hostname_len; + const unsigned char *server_name_list_end; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("parse ServerName extension")); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, end, 2); + server_name_list_len = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(p, 0); + p += 2; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, end, server_name_list_len); + server_name_list_end = p + server_name_list_len; + while (p < server_name_list_end) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, server_name_list_end, 3); + hostname_len = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(p, 1); + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, server_name_list_end, + hostname_len + 3); + + if (p[0] == MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SERVERNAME_HOSTNAME) { + /* sni_name is intended to be used only during the parsing of the + * ClientHello message (it is reset to NULL before the end of + * the message parsing). Thus it is ok to just point to the + * reception buffer and not make a copy of it. + */ + ssl->handshake->sni_name = p + 3; + ssl->handshake->sni_name_len = hostname_len; + if (ssl->conf->f_sni == NULL) { + return 0; + } + ret = ssl->conf->f_sni(ssl->conf->p_sni, + ssl, p + 3, hostname_len); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "ssl_sni_wrapper", ret); + MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME, + MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; + } + return 0; + } + + p += hostname_len + 3; + } + + return 0; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_parse_alpn_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *buf, + const unsigned char *end) +{ + const unsigned char *p = buf; + size_t protocol_name_list_len; + const unsigned char *protocol_name_list; + const unsigned char *protocol_name_list_end; + size_t protocol_name_len; + + /* If ALPN not configured, just ignore the extension */ + if (ssl->conf->alpn_list == NULL) { + return 0; + } + + /* + * RFC7301, section 3.1 + * opaque ProtocolName<1..2^8-1>; + * + * struct { + * ProtocolName protocol_name_list<2..2^16-1> + * } ProtocolNameList; + */ + + /* + * protocol_name_list_len 2 bytes + * protocol_name_len 1 bytes + * protocol_name >=1 byte + */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, end, 4); + + protocol_name_list_len = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(p, 0); + p += 2; + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, end, protocol_name_list_len); + protocol_name_list = p; + protocol_name_list_end = p + protocol_name_list_len; + + /* Validate peer's list (lengths) */ + while (p < protocol_name_list_end) { + protocol_name_len = *p++; + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, protocol_name_list_end, + protocol_name_len); + if (protocol_name_len == 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT( + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, + MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; + } + + p += protocol_name_len; + } + + /* Use our order of preference */ + for (const char **alpn = ssl->conf->alpn_list; *alpn != NULL; alpn++) { + size_t const alpn_len = strlen(*alpn); + p = protocol_name_list; + while (p < protocol_name_list_end) { + protocol_name_len = *p++; + if (protocol_name_len == alpn_len && + memcmp(p, *alpn, alpn_len) == 0) { + ssl->alpn_chosen = *alpn; + return 0; + } + + p += protocol_name_len; + } + } + + /* If we get here, no match was found */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT( + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL, + MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL; +} + +int mbedtls_ssl_write_alpn_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *buf, + unsigned char *end, + size_t *out_len) +{ + unsigned char *p = buf; + size_t protocol_name_len; + *out_len = 0; + + if (ssl->alpn_chosen == NULL) { + return 0; + } + + protocol_name_len = strlen(ssl->alpn_chosen); + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR(p, end, 7 + protocol_name_len); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("server side, adding alpn extension")); + /* + * 0 . 1 ext identifier + * 2 . 3 ext length + * 4 . 5 protocol list length + * 6 . 6 protocol name length + * 7 . 7+n protocol name + */ + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ALPN, p, 0); + + *out_len = 7 + protocol_name_len; + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(protocol_name_len + 3, p, 2); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(protocol_name_len + 1, p, 4); + /* Note: the length of the chosen protocol has been checked to be less + * than 255 bytes in `mbedtls_ssl_conf_alpn_protocols`. + */ + p[6] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(protocol_name_len); + + memcpy(p + 7, ssl->alpn_chosen, protocol_name_len); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) + mbedtls_ssl_tls13_set_hs_sent_ext_mask(ssl, MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ALPN); +#endif + + return 0; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) +int mbedtls_ssl_session_set_hostname(mbedtls_ssl_session *session, + const char *hostname) +{ + /* Initialize to suppress unnecessary compiler warning */ + size_t hostname_len = 0; + + /* Check if new hostname is valid before + * making any change to current one */ + if (hostname != NULL) { + hostname_len = strlen(hostname); + + if (hostname_len > MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_HOST_NAME_LEN) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + } + + /* Now it's clear that we will overwrite the old hostname, + * so we can free it safely */ + if (session->hostname != NULL) { + mbedtls_zeroize_and_free(session->hostname, + strlen(session->hostname)); + } + + /* Passing NULL as hostname shall clear the old one */ + if (hostname == NULL) { + session->hostname = NULL; + } else { + session->hostname = mbedtls_calloc(1, hostname_len + 1); + if (session->hostname == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED; + } + + memcpy(session->hostname, hostname, hostname_len); + } + + return 0; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 && + MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS && + MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION && + MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN) +int mbedtls_ssl_session_set_ticket_alpn(mbedtls_ssl_session *session, + const char *alpn) +{ + size_t alpn_len = 0; + + if (alpn != NULL) { + alpn_len = strlen(alpn); + + if (alpn_len > MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_ALPN_NAME_LEN) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + } + + if (session->ticket_alpn != NULL) { + mbedtls_zeroize_and_free(session->ticket_alpn, + strlen(session->ticket_alpn)); + session->ticket_alpn = NULL; + } + + if (alpn != NULL) { + session->ticket_alpn = mbedtls_calloc(alpn_len + 1, 1); + if (session->ticket_alpn == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED; + } + memcpy(session->ticket_alpn, alpn, alpn_len); + } + return 0; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C && MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA && MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C */ diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ssl_cli.c b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ssl_tls12_client.c similarity index 65% rename from thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ssl_cli.c rename to thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ssl_tls12_client.c index 4fde783d3e72..eac6a3aaddd9 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ssl_cli.c +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ssl_tls12_client.c @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ /* - * SSLv3/TLSv1 client-side functions + * TLS client-side functions * * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later @@ -7,19 +7,31 @@ #include "common.h" -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) #include "mbedtls/platform.h" #include "mbedtls/ssl.h" -#include "mbedtls/ssl_internal.h" -#include "mbedtls/debug.h" +#include "ssl_client.h" +#include "ssl_misc.h" +#include "debug_internal.h" #include "mbedtls/error.h" #include "mbedtls/constant_time.h" #if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) -#include "mbedtls/psa_util.h" +#include "psa_util_internal.h" #include "psa/crypto.h" +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED) +/* Define a local translating function to save code size by not using too many + * arguments in each translating place. */ +static int local_err_translation(psa_status_t status) +{ + return psa_status_to_mbedtls(status, psa_to_ssl_errors, + ARRAY_LENGTH(psa_to_ssl_errors), + psa_generic_status_to_mbedtls); +} +#define PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status) local_err_translation(status) +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ #include @@ -34,119 +46,6 @@ #include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED) -MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL -static int ssl_conf_has_static_psk(mbedtls_ssl_config const *conf) -{ - if (conf->psk_identity == NULL || - conf->psk_identity_len == 0) { - return 0; - } - - if (conf->psk != NULL && conf->psk_len != 0) { - return 1; - } - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) - if (!mbedtls_svc_key_id_is_null(conf->psk_opaque)) { - return 1; - } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ - - return 0; -} - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) -MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL -static int ssl_conf_has_static_raw_psk(mbedtls_ssl_config const *conf) -{ - if (conf->psk_identity == NULL || - conf->psk_identity_len == 0) { - return 0; - } - - if (conf->psk != NULL && conf->psk_len != 0) { - return 1; - } - - return 0; -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ - -#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) -MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL -static int ssl_write_hostname_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - unsigned char *buf, - const unsigned char *end, - size_t *olen) -{ - unsigned char *p = buf; - size_t hostname_len; - - *olen = 0; - - if (ssl->hostname == NULL) { - return 0; - } - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, - ("client hello, adding server name extension: %s", - ssl->hostname)); - - hostname_len = strlen(ssl->hostname); - - MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR(p, end, hostname_len + 9); - - /* - * Sect. 3, RFC 6066 (TLS Extensions Definitions) - * - * In order to provide any of the server names, clients MAY include an - * extension of type "server_name" in the (extended) client hello. The - * "extension_data" field of this extension SHALL contain - * "ServerNameList" where: - * - * struct { - * NameType name_type; - * select (name_type) { - * case host_name: HostName; - * } name; - * } ServerName; - * - * enum { - * host_name(0), (255) - * } NameType; - * - * opaque HostName<1..2^16-1>; - * - * struct { - * ServerName server_name_list<1..2^16-1> - * } ServerNameList; - * - */ - MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SERVERNAME, p, 0); - p += 2; - - MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(hostname_len + 5, p, 0); - p += 2; - - MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(hostname_len + 3, p, 0); - p += 2; - - *p++ = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SERVERNAME_HOSTNAME); - - MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(hostname_len, p, 0); - p += 2; - - memcpy(p, ssl->hostname, hostname_len); - - *olen = hostname_len + 9; - - return 0; -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION */ - #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL static int ssl_write_renegotiation_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, @@ -188,179 +87,9 @@ static int ssl_write_renegotiation_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, } #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */ -/* - * Only if we handle at least one key exchange that needs signatures. - */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && \ - defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) -MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL -static int ssl_write_signature_algorithms_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - unsigned char *buf, - const unsigned char *end, - size_t *olen) -{ - unsigned char *p = buf; - size_t sig_alg_len = 0; - const int *md; - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) - unsigned char *sig_alg_list = buf + 6; -#endif - - *olen = 0; - - if (ssl->conf->max_minor_ver != MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3) { - return 0; - } - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, - ("client hello, adding signature_algorithms extension")); - - if (ssl->conf->sig_hashes == NULL) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_CONFIG; - } - - for (md = ssl->conf->sig_hashes; *md != MBEDTLS_MD_NONE; md++) { -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) - sig_alg_len += 2; -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) - sig_alg_len += 2; -#endif - if (sig_alg_len > MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_SIG_HASH_ALG_LIST_LEN) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, - ("length in bytes of sig-hash-alg extension too big")); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_CONFIG; - } - } - - /* Empty signature algorithms list, this is a configuration error. */ - if (sig_alg_len == 0) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_CONFIG; - } - - MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR(p, end, sig_alg_len + 6); - - /* - * Prepare signature_algorithms extension (TLS 1.2) - */ - sig_alg_len = 0; - - for (md = ssl->conf->sig_hashes; *md != MBEDTLS_MD_NONE; md++) { -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) - sig_alg_list[sig_alg_len++] = mbedtls_ssl_hash_from_md_alg(*md); - sig_alg_list[sig_alg_len++] = MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_ECDSA; -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) - sig_alg_list[sig_alg_len++] = mbedtls_ssl_hash_from_md_alg(*md); - sig_alg_list[sig_alg_len++] = MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_RSA; -#endif - } - - /* - * enum { - * none(0), md5(1), sha1(2), sha224(3), sha256(4), sha384(5), - * sha512(6), (255) - * } HashAlgorithm; - * - * enum { anonymous(0), rsa(1), dsa(2), ecdsa(3), (255) } - * SignatureAlgorithm; - * - * struct { - * HashAlgorithm hash; - * SignatureAlgorithm signature; - * } SignatureAndHashAlgorithm; - * - * SignatureAndHashAlgorithm - * supported_signature_algorithms<2..2^16-2>; - */ - MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SIG_ALG, p, 0); - p += 2; - - MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(sig_alg_len + 2, p, 0); - p += 2; - - MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(sig_alg_len, p, 0); - p += 2; - - *olen = 6 + sig_alg_len; - - return 0; -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 && - MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) || \ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDH_OR_ECDHE_1_2_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDSA_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED) || \ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) -MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL -static int ssl_write_supported_elliptic_curves_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - unsigned char *buf, - const unsigned char *end, - size_t *olen) -{ - unsigned char *p = buf; - unsigned char *elliptic_curve_list = p + 6; - size_t elliptic_curve_len = 0; - const mbedtls_ecp_curve_info *info; - const mbedtls_ecp_group_id *grp_id; - - *olen = 0; - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, - ("client hello, adding supported_elliptic_curves extension")); - - if (ssl->conf->curve_list == NULL) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_CONFIG; - } - - for (grp_id = ssl->conf->curve_list; - *grp_id != MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE; - grp_id++) { - info = mbedtls_ecp_curve_info_from_grp_id(*grp_id); - if (info == NULL) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, - ("invalid curve in ssl configuration")); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_CONFIG; - } - elliptic_curve_len += 2; - - if (elliptic_curve_len > MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CURVE_LIST_LEN) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, - ("malformed supported_elliptic_curves extension in config")); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_CONFIG; - } - } - - /* Empty elliptic curve list, this is a configuration error. */ - if (elliptic_curve_len == 0) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_CONFIG; - } - - MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR(p, end, 6 + elliptic_curve_len); - - elliptic_curve_len = 0; - - for (grp_id = ssl->conf->curve_list; - *grp_id != MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE; - grp_id++) { - info = mbedtls_ecp_curve_info_from_grp_id(*grp_id); - elliptic_curve_list[elliptic_curve_len++] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_1(info->tls_id); - elliptic_curve_list[elliptic_curve_len++] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(info->tls_id); - } - - MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVES, p, 0); - p += 2; - - MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(elliptic_curve_len + 2, p, 0); - p += 2; - - MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(elliptic_curve_len, p, 0); - p += 2; - - *olen = 6 + elliptic_curve_len; - - return 0; -} MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL static int ssl_write_supported_point_formats_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, @@ -390,7 +119,8 @@ static int ssl_write_supported_point_formats_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, return 0; } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDH_C || MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C || +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDH_OR_ECDHE_1_2_ENABLED || + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDSA_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED || MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) @@ -402,14 +132,20 @@ static int ssl_write_ecjpake_kkpp_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; unsigned char *p = buf; - size_t kkpp_len; + size_t kkpp_len = 0; *olen = 0; /* Skip costly extension if we can't use EC J-PAKE anyway */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + if (ssl->handshake->psa_pake_ctx_is_ok != 1) { + return 0; + } +#else if (mbedtls_ecjpake_check(&ssl->handshake->ecjpake_ctx) != 0) { return 0; } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("client hello, adding ecjpake_kkpp extension")); @@ -428,6 +164,17 @@ static int ssl_write_ecjpake_kkpp_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, ssl->handshake->ecjpake_cache_len == 0) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("generating new ecjpake parameters")); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + ret = mbedtls_psa_ecjpake_write_round(&ssl->handshake->psa_pake_ctx, + p + 2, end - p - 2, &kkpp_len, + MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_ROUND_ONE); + if (ret != 0) { + psa_destroy_key(ssl->handshake->psa_pake_password); + psa_pake_abort(&ssl->handshake->psa_pake_ctx); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "psa_pake_output", ret); + return ret; + } +#else ret = mbedtls_ecjpake_write_round_one(&ssl->handshake->ecjpake_ctx, p + 2, end - p - 2, &kkpp_len, ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng); @@ -436,6 +183,7 @@ static int ssl_write_ecjpake_kkpp_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, "mbedtls_ecjpake_write_round_one", ret); return ret; } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ ssl->handshake->ecjpake_cache = mbedtls_calloc(1, kkpp_len); if (ssl->handshake->ecjpake_cache == NULL) { @@ -474,9 +222,6 @@ static int ssl_write_cid_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, size_t ext_len; /* - * Quoting draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-05 - * https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-05 - * * struct { * opaque cid<0..2^8-1>; * } ConnectionId; @@ -543,38 +288,6 @@ static int ssl_write_max_fragment_length_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, } #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC) -MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL -static int ssl_write_truncated_hmac_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - unsigned char *buf, - const unsigned char *end, - size_t *olen) -{ - unsigned char *p = buf; - - *olen = 0; - - if (ssl->conf->trunc_hmac == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNC_HMAC_DISABLED) { - return 0; - } - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, - ("client hello, adding truncated_hmac extension")); - - MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR(p, end, 4); - - MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_TRUNCATED_HMAC, p, 0); - p += 2; - - *p++ = 0x00; - *p++ = 0x00; - - *olen = 4; - - return 0; -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC */ - #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL static int ssl_write_encrypt_then_mac_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, @@ -586,8 +299,7 @@ static int ssl_write_encrypt_then_mac_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, *olen = 0; - if (ssl->conf->encrypt_then_mac == MBEDTLS_SSL_ETM_DISABLED || - ssl->conf->max_minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0) { + if (ssl->conf->encrypt_then_mac == MBEDTLS_SSL_ETM_DISABLED) { return 0; } @@ -619,8 +331,7 @@ static int ssl_write_extended_ms_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, *olen = 0; - if (ssl->conf->extended_ms == MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MS_DISABLED || - ssl->conf->max_minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0) { + if (ssl->conf->extended_ms == MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MS_DISABLED) { return 0; } @@ -686,67 +397,6 @@ static int ssl_write_session_ticket_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, } #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN) -MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL -static int ssl_write_alpn_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - unsigned char *buf, - const unsigned char *end, - size_t *olen) -{ - unsigned char *p = buf; - size_t alpnlen = 0; - const char **cur; - - *olen = 0; - - if (ssl->conf->alpn_list == NULL) { - return 0; - } - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("client hello, adding alpn extension")); - - for (cur = ssl->conf->alpn_list; *cur != NULL; cur++) { - alpnlen += strlen(*cur) + 1; - } - - MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR(p, end, 6 + alpnlen); - - MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ALPN, p, 0); - p += 2; - - /* - * opaque ProtocolName<1..2^8-1>; - * - * struct { - * ProtocolName protocol_name_list<2..2^16-1> - * } ProtocolNameList; - */ - - /* Skip writing extension and list length for now */ - p += 4; - - for (cur = ssl->conf->alpn_list; *cur != NULL; cur++) { - /* - * mbedtls_ssl_conf_set_alpn_protocols() checked that the length of - * protocol names is less than 255. - */ - *p = (unsigned char) strlen(*cur); - memcpy(p + 1, *cur, *p); - p += 1 + *p; - } - - *olen = p - buf; - - /* List length = olen - 2 (ext_type) - 2 (ext_len) - 2 (list_len) */ - MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(*olen - 6, buf, 4); - - /* Extension length = olen - 2 (ext_type) - 2 (ext_len) */ - MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(*olen - 4, buf, 2); - - return 0; -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN */ - #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP) MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL static int ssl_write_use_srtp_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, @@ -859,567 +509,105 @@ static int ssl_write_use_srtp_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, } #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP */ -/* - * Generate random bytes for ClientHello - */ -MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL -static int ssl_generate_random(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +int mbedtls_ssl_tls12_write_client_hello_exts(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *buf, + const unsigned char *end, + int uses_ec, + size_t *out_len) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - unsigned char *p = ssl->handshake->randbytes; -#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) - mbedtls_time_t t; -#endif - - /* - * When responding to a verify request, MUST reuse random (RFC 6347 4.2.1) - */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) - if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM && - ssl->handshake->verify_cookie != NULL) { - return 0; - } -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) - t = mbedtls_time(NULL); - MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE(t, p, 0); - p += 4; - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("client hello, current time: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_LONGLONG, - (long long) t)); -#else - if ((ret = ssl->conf->f_rng(ssl->conf->p_rng, p, 4)) != 0) { - return ret; - } - - p += 4; -#endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME */ - - if ((ret = ssl->conf->f_rng(ssl->conf->p_rng, p, 28)) != 0) { - return ret; - } - - return 0; -} + unsigned char *p = buf; + size_t ext_len = 0; -/** - * \brief Validate cipher suite against config in SSL context. - * - * \param suite_info cipher suite to validate - * \param ssl SSL context - * \param min_minor_ver Minimal minor version to accept a cipher suite - * \param max_minor_ver Maximal minor version to accept a cipher suite - * - * \return 0 if valid, else 1 - */ -MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL -static int ssl_validate_ciphersuite( - const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *suite_info, - const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - int min_minor_ver, int max_minor_ver) -{ (void) ssl; - if (suite_info == NULL) { - return 1; - } - - if (suite_info->min_minor_ver > max_minor_ver || - suite_info->max_minor_ver < min_minor_ver) { - return 1; - } - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) - if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM && - (suite_info->flags & MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_NODTLS)) { - return 1; - } -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARC4_C) - if (ssl->conf->arc4_disabled == MBEDTLS_SSL_ARC4_DISABLED && - suite_info->cipher == MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128) { - return 1; - } -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) - if (suite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE && - mbedtls_ecjpake_check(&ssl->handshake->ecjpake_ctx) != 0) { - return 1; - } -#endif - - /* Don't suggest PSK-based ciphersuite if no PSK is available. */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED) - if (mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_psk(suite_info) && - ssl_conf_has_static_psk(ssl->conf) == 0) { - return 1; - } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED */ - - return 0; -} - -MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL -static int ssl_write_client_hello(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) -{ - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - size_t i, n, olen, ext_len = 0; - - unsigned char *buf; - unsigned char *p, *q; - const unsigned char *end; - - unsigned char offer_compress; - const int *ciphersuites; - const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info; -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) - int uses_ec = 0; -#endif - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> write client hello")); - - if (ssl->conf->f_rng == NULL) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("no RNG provided")); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NO_RNG; - } - - int renegotiating = 0; -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) - if (ssl->renego_status != MBEDTLS_SSL_INITIAL_HANDSHAKE) { - renegotiating = 1; - } -#endif - if (!renegotiating) { - ssl->major_ver = ssl->conf->min_major_ver; - ssl->minor_ver = ssl->conf->min_minor_ver; - } - - if (ssl->conf->max_major_ver == 0) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, - ( - "configured max major version is invalid, consider using mbedtls_ssl_config_defaults()")); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; - } - - buf = ssl->out_msg; - end = buf + MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN; + (void) end; + (void) uses_ec; + (void) ret; + (void) ext_len; - /* - * Check if there's enough space for the first part of the ClientHello - * consisting of the 38 bytes described below, the session identifier (at - * most 32 bytes) and its length (1 byte). - * - * Use static upper bounds instead of the actual values - * to allow the compiler to optimize this away. - */ - MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR(buf, end, 38 + 1 + 32); - - /* - * The 38 first bytes of the ClientHello: - * 0 . 0 handshake type (written later) - * 1 . 3 handshake length (written later) - * 4 . 5 highest version supported - * 6 . 9 current UNIX time - * 10 . 37 random bytes - * - * The current UNIX time (4 bytes) and following 28 random bytes are written - * by ssl_generate_random() into ssl->handshake->randbytes buffer and then - * copied from there into the output buffer. - */ - - p = buf + 4; - mbedtls_ssl_write_version(ssl->conf->max_major_ver, - ssl->conf->max_minor_ver, - ssl->conf->transport, p); - p += 2; - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("client hello, max version: [%d:%d]", - buf[4], buf[5])); - - if ((ret = ssl_generate_random(ssl)) != 0) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "ssl_generate_random", ret); - return ret; - } - - memcpy(p, ssl->handshake->randbytes, 32); - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "client hello, random bytes", p, 32); - p += 32; - - /* - * 38 . 38 session id length - * 39 . 39+n session id - * 39+n . 39+n DTLS only: cookie length (1 byte) - * 40+n . .. DTLS only: cookie - * .. . .. ciphersuitelist length (2 bytes) - * .. . .. ciphersuitelist - * .. . .. compression methods length (1 byte) - * .. . .. compression methods - * .. . .. extensions length (2 bytes) - * .. . .. extensions - */ - n = ssl->session_negotiate->id_len; - - if (n < 16 || n > 32 || -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) - ssl->renego_status != MBEDTLS_SSL_INITIAL_HANDSHAKE || -#endif - ssl->handshake->resume == 0) { - n = 0; - } - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) - /* - * RFC 5077 section 3.4: "When presenting a ticket, the client MAY - * generate and include a Session ID in the TLS ClientHello." - */ - if (!renegotiating) { - if (ssl->session_negotiate->ticket != NULL && - ssl->session_negotiate->ticket_len != 0) { - ret = ssl->conf->f_rng(ssl->conf->p_rng, - ssl->session_negotiate->id, 32); - - if (ret != 0) { - return ret; - } - - ssl->session_negotiate->id_len = n = 32; - } - } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */ - - /* - * The first check of the output buffer size above ( - * MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR( buf, end, 38 + 1 + 32 );) - * has checked that there is enough space in the output buffer for the - * session identifier length byte and the session identifier (n <= 32). - */ - *p++ = (unsigned char) n; - - for (i = 0; i < n; i++) { - *p++ = ssl->session_negotiate->id[i]; - } - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("client hello, session id len.: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET, n)); - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "client hello, session id", buf + 39, n); - - /* - * With 'n' being the length of the session identifier - * - * 39+n . 39+n DTLS only: cookie length (1 byte) - * 40+n . .. DTLS only: cookie - * .. . .. ciphersuitelist length (2 bytes) - * .. . .. ciphersuitelist - * .. . .. compression methods length (1 byte) - * .. . .. compression methods - * .. . .. extensions length (2 bytes) - * .. . .. extensions - */ - - /* - * DTLS cookie - */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) - if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR(p, end, 1); - - if (ssl->handshake->verify_cookie == NULL) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("no verify cookie to send")); - *p++ = 0; - } else { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "client hello, cookie", - ssl->handshake->verify_cookie, - ssl->handshake->verify_cookie_len); - - *p++ = ssl->handshake->verify_cookie_len; - - MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR(p, end, - ssl->handshake->verify_cookie_len); - memcpy(p, ssl->handshake->verify_cookie, - ssl->handshake->verify_cookie_len); - p += ssl->handshake->verify_cookie_len; - } - } -#endif - - /* - * Ciphersuite list - */ - ciphersuites = ssl->conf->ciphersuite_list[ssl->minor_ver]; - - /* Skip writing ciphersuite length for now */ - n = 0; - q = p; - - MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR(p, end, 2); - p += 2; - - for (i = 0; ciphersuites[i] != 0; i++) { - ciphersuite_info = mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_from_id(ciphersuites[i]); - - if (ssl_validate_ciphersuite(ciphersuite_info, ssl, - ssl->conf->min_minor_ver, - ssl->conf->max_minor_ver) != 0) { - continue; - } - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("client hello, add ciphersuite: %#04x (%s)", - (unsigned int) ciphersuites[i], ciphersuite_info->name)); - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) - uses_ec |= mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_ec(ciphersuite_info); -#endif - - MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR(p, end, 2); - - n++; - MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(ciphersuites[i], p, 0); - p += 2; - } - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, - ("client hello, got %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET - " ciphersuites (excluding SCSVs)", n)); - - /* - * Add TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV - */ - if (!renegotiating) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("adding EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV")); - MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR(p, end, 2); - MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(MBEDTLS_SSL_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO, p, 0); - p += 2; - n++; - } - - /* Some versions of OpenSSL don't handle it correctly if not at end */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_FALLBACK_SCSV) - if (ssl->conf->fallback == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_FALLBACK) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("adding FALLBACK_SCSV")); - - MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR(p, end, 2); - MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(MBEDTLS_SSL_FALLBACK_SCSV_VALUE, p, 0); - p += 2; - n++; - } -#endif - - *q++ = (unsigned char) (n >> 7); - *q++ = (unsigned char) (n << 1); - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT) - offer_compress = 1; -#else - offer_compress = 0; -#endif - - /* - * We don't support compression with DTLS right now: if many records come - * in the same datagram, uncompressing one could overwrite the next one. - * We don't want to add complexity for handling that case unless there is - * an actual need for it. - */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) - if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM) { - offer_compress = 0; - } -#endif - - if (offer_compress) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("client hello, compress len.: %d", 2)); - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("client hello, compress alg.: %d %d", - MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_DEFLATE, - MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_NULL)); - - MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR(p, end, 3); - *p++ = 2; - *p++ = MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_DEFLATE; - *p++ = MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_NULL; - } else { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("client hello, compress len.: %d", 1)); - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("client hello, compress alg.: %d", - MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_NULL)); - - MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR(p, end, 2); - *p++ = 1; - *p++ = MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_NULL; - } - - /* First write extensions, then the total length */ - - MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR(p, end, 2); - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) - if ((ret = ssl_write_hostname_ext(ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, - end, &olen)) != 0) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "ssl_write_hostname_ext", ret); - return ret; - } - ext_len += olen; -#endif + *out_len = 0; /* Note that TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV is always added * even if MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION is not defined. */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) - if ((ret = ssl_write_renegotiation_ext(ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, - end, &olen)) != 0) { + if ((ret = ssl_write_renegotiation_ext(ssl, p, end, &ext_len)) != 0) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "ssl_write_renegotiation_ext", ret); return ret; } - ext_len += olen; + p += ext_len; #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && \ - defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) - if ((ret = ssl_write_signature_algorithms_ext(ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, - end, &olen)) != 0) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "ssl_write_signature_algorithms_ext", ret); - return ret; - } - ext_len += olen; -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) || \ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDH_OR_ECDHE_1_2_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDSA_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED) || \ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) if (uses_ec) { - if ((ret = ssl_write_supported_elliptic_curves_ext(ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, - end, &olen)) != 0) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "ssl_write_supported_elliptic_curves_ext", ret); - return ret; - } - ext_len += olen; - - if ((ret = ssl_write_supported_point_formats_ext(ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, - end, &olen)) != 0) { + if ((ret = ssl_write_supported_point_formats_ext(ssl, p, end, + &ext_len)) != 0) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "ssl_write_supported_point_formats_ext", ret); return ret; } - ext_len += olen; + p += ext_len; } #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) - if ((ret = ssl_write_ecjpake_kkpp_ext(ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, - end, &olen)) != 0) { + if ((ret = ssl_write_ecjpake_kkpp_ext(ssl, p, end, &ext_len)) != 0) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "ssl_write_ecjpake_kkpp_ext", ret); return ret; } - ext_len += olen; + p += ext_len; #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) - if ((ret = ssl_write_cid_ext(ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, end, &olen)) != 0) { + if ((ret = ssl_write_cid_ext(ssl, p, end, &ext_len)) != 0) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "ssl_write_cid_ext", ret); return ret; } - ext_len += olen; + p += ext_len; #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH) - if ((ret = ssl_write_max_fragment_length_ext(ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, - end, &olen)) != 0) { + if ((ret = ssl_write_max_fragment_length_ext(ssl, p, end, + &ext_len)) != 0) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "ssl_write_max_fragment_length_ext", ret); return ret; } - ext_len += olen; -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC) - if ((ret = ssl_write_truncated_hmac_ext(ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, - end, &olen)) != 0) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "ssl_write_truncated_hmac_ext", ret); - return ret; - } - ext_len += olen; + p += ext_len; #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) - if ((ret = ssl_write_encrypt_then_mac_ext(ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, - end, &olen)) != 0) { + if ((ret = ssl_write_encrypt_then_mac_ext(ssl, p, end, &ext_len)) != 0) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "ssl_write_encrypt_then_mac_ext", ret); return ret; } - ext_len += olen; + p += ext_len; #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET) - if ((ret = ssl_write_extended_ms_ext(ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, - end, &olen)) != 0) { + if ((ret = ssl_write_extended_ms_ext(ssl, p, end, &ext_len)) != 0) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "ssl_write_extended_ms_ext", ret); return ret; } - ext_len += olen; -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN) - if ((ret = ssl_write_alpn_ext(ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, - end, &olen)) != 0) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "ssl_write_alpn_ext", ret); - return ret; - } - ext_len += olen; + p += ext_len; #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP) - if ((ret = ssl_write_use_srtp_ext(ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, - end, &olen)) != 0) { + if ((ret = ssl_write_use_srtp_ext(ssl, p, end, &ext_len)) != 0) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "ssl_write_use_srtp_ext", ret); return ret; } - ext_len += olen; + p += ext_len; #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) - if ((ret = ssl_write_session_ticket_ext(ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, - end, &olen)) != 0) { + if ((ret = ssl_write_session_ticket_ext(ssl, p, end, &ext_len)) != 0) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "ssl_write_session_ticket_ext", ret); return ret; } - ext_len += olen; -#endif - - /* olen unused if all extensions are disabled */ - ((void) olen); - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("client hello, total extension length: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET, - ext_len)); - - if (ext_len > 0) { - /* No need to check for space here, because the extension - * writing functions already took care of that. */ - MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(ext_len, p, 0); - p += 2 + ext_len; - } - - ssl->out_msglen = p - buf; - ssl->out_msgtype = MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE; - ssl->out_msg[0] = MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CLIENT_HELLO; - - ssl->state++; - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) - if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM) { - mbedtls_ssl_send_flight_completed(ssl); - } + p += ext_len; #endif - if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg(ssl)) != 0) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg", ret); - return ret; - } - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) - if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM && - (ret = mbedtls_ssl_flight_transmit(ssl)) != 0) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_flight_transmit", ret); - return ret; - } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= write client hello")); + *out_len = (size_t) (p - buf); return 0; } @@ -1443,7 +631,7 @@ static int ssl_parse_renegotiation_info(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; } } else #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */ @@ -1455,7 +643,7 @@ static int ssl_parse_renegotiation_info(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; } ssl->secure_renegotiation = MBEDTLS_SSL_SECURE_RENEGOTIATION; @@ -1483,38 +671,13 @@ static int ssl_parse_max_fragment_length_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; } return 0; } #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC) -MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL -static int ssl_parse_truncated_hmac_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - const unsigned char *buf, - size_t len) -{ - if (ssl->conf->trunc_hmac == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNC_HMAC_DISABLED || - len != 0) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, - ("non-matching truncated HMAC extension")); - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( - ssl, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO; - } - - ((void) buf); - - ssl->session_negotiate->trunc_hmac = MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNC_HMAC_ENABLED; - - return 0; -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC */ - #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL static int ssl_parse_cid_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, @@ -1530,14 +693,14 @@ static int ssl_parse_cid_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("CID extension unexpected")); mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_EXT); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION; } if (len == 0) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("CID extension invalid")); mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO; + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; } peer_cid_len = *buf++; @@ -1546,15 +709,15 @@ static int ssl_parse_cid_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, if (peer_cid_len > MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("CID extension invalid")); mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO; + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; } if (len != peer_cid_len) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("CID extension invalid")); mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO; + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; } ssl->handshake->cid_in_use = MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_ENABLED; @@ -1575,7 +738,6 @@ static int ssl_parse_encrypt_then_mac_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, size_t len) { if (ssl->conf->encrypt_then_mac == MBEDTLS_SSL_ETM_DISABLED || - ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 || len != 0) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("non-matching encrypt-then-MAC extension")); @@ -1583,7 +745,7 @@ static int ssl_parse_encrypt_then_mac_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_EXT); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION; } ((void) buf); @@ -1601,7 +763,6 @@ static int ssl_parse_extended_ms_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, size_t len) { if (ssl->conf->extended_ms == MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MS_DISABLED || - ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 || len != 0) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("non-matching extended master secret extension")); @@ -1609,7 +770,7 @@ static int ssl_parse_extended_ms_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_EXT); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION; } ((void) buf); @@ -1634,7 +795,7 @@ static int ssl_parse_session_ticket_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_EXT); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION; } ((void) buf); @@ -1645,7 +806,8 @@ static int ssl_parse_session_ticket_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, } #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) || \ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDH_OR_ECDHE_1_2_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDSA_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED) || \ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL static int ssl_parse_supported_point_formats_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, @@ -1659,20 +821,23 @@ static int ssl_parse_supported_point_formats_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad server hello message")); mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; } list_size = buf[0]; p = buf + 1; while (list_size > 0) { if (p[0] == MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_UNCOMPRESSED || - p[0] == MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_COMPRESSED) { -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) - ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx.point_format = p[0]; -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) - ssl->handshake->ecjpake_ctx.point_format = p[0]; -#endif + p[0] == MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_COMPRESSED) { +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDH_OR_ECDHE_1_2_ENABLED) + ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx.point_format = p[0]; +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO && MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDH_OR_ECDHE_1_2_ENABLED */ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) + mbedtls_ecjpake_set_point_format(&ssl->handshake->ecjpake_ctx, + p[0]); +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO && MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(4, ("point format selected: %d", p[0])); return 0; } @@ -1684,9 +849,10 @@ static int ssl_parse_supported_point_formats_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("no point format in common")); mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDH_C || MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C || +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDH_OR_ECDHE_1_2_ENABLED || + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDSA_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED || MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) @@ -1708,6 +874,23 @@ static int ssl_parse_ecjpake_kkpp(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, ssl->handshake->ecjpake_cache = NULL; ssl->handshake->ecjpake_cache_len = 0; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + if ((ret = mbedtls_psa_ecjpake_read_round( + &ssl->handshake->psa_pake_ctx, buf, len, + MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_ROUND_ONE)) != 0) { + psa_destroy_key(ssl->handshake->psa_pake_password); + psa_pake_abort(&ssl->handshake->psa_pake_ctx); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "psa_pake_input round one", ret); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( + ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); + return ret; + } + + return 0; +#else if ((ret = mbedtls_ecjpake_read_round_one(&ssl->handshake->ecjpake_ctx, buf, len)) != 0) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ecjpake_read_round_one", ret); @@ -1719,6 +902,7 @@ static int ssl_parse_ecjpake_kkpp(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, } return 0; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ } #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */ @@ -1737,7 +921,7 @@ static int ssl_parse_alpn_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_EXT); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION; } /* @@ -1754,21 +938,21 @@ static int ssl_parse_alpn_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, if (len < 4) { mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; } - list_len = (buf[0] << 8) | buf[1]; + list_len = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(buf, 0); if (list_len != len - 2) { mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; } name_len = buf[2]; if (name_len != list_len - 1) { mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; } /* Check that the server chosen protocol was in our list and save it */ @@ -1783,7 +967,7 @@ static int ssl_parse_alpn_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("ALPN extension: no matching protocol")); mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; } #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN */ @@ -1826,7 +1010,7 @@ static int ssl_parse_use_srtp_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, * and optional srtp_mki */ if ((len < 5) || (len != (buf[4] + 5u))) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; } /* @@ -1838,7 +1022,7 @@ static int ssl_parse_use_srtp_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, * one protection profile in server Hello */ if ((buf[0] != 0) || (buf[1] != 2)) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; } server_protection_profile_value = (buf[2] << 8) | buf[3]; @@ -1869,7 +1053,7 @@ static int ssl_parse_use_srtp_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, if (ssl->dtls_srtp_info.chosen_dtls_srtp_profile == MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_UNSET) { mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; } /* If server does not use mki in its reply, make sure the client won't keep @@ -1888,7 +1072,7 @@ static int ssl_parse_use_srtp_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, (memcmp(ssl->dtls_srtp_info.mki_value, &buf[5], mki_len)))) { mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; } #if defined(MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C) if (len > 5) { @@ -1907,9 +1091,15 @@ static int ssl_parse_use_srtp_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL static int ssl_parse_hello_verify_request(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) { + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; const unsigned char *p = ssl->in_msg + mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len(ssl); - int major_ver, minor_ver; - unsigned char cookie_len; + uint16_t dtls_legacy_version; + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) + uint8_t cookie_len; +#else + uint16_t cookie_len; +#endif MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> parse hello verify request")); @@ -1922,7 +1112,7 @@ static int ssl_parse_hello_verify_request(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) ("incoming HelloVerifyRequest message is too short")); mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; } /* @@ -1932,23 +1122,21 @@ static int ssl_parse_hello_verify_request(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) * } HelloVerifyRequest; */ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "server version", p, 2); - mbedtls_ssl_read_version(&major_ver, &minor_ver, ssl->conf->transport, p); + dtls_legacy_version = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(p, 0); p += 2; /* - * Since the RFC is not clear on this point, accept DTLS 1.0 (TLS 1.1) - * even is lower than our min version. + * Since the RFC is not clear on this point, accept DTLS 1.0 (0xfeff) + * The DTLS 1.3 (current draft) renames ProtocolVersion server_version to + * legacy_version and locks the value of legacy_version to 0xfefd (DTLS 1.2) */ - if (major_ver < MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3 || - minor_ver < MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2 || - major_ver > ssl->conf->max_major_ver || - minor_ver > ssl->conf->max_minor_ver) { + if (dtls_legacy_version != 0xfefd && dtls_legacy_version != 0xfeff) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad server version")); mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_PROTOCOL_VERSION); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_PROTOCOL_VERSION; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION; } cookie_len = *p++; @@ -1957,24 +1145,28 @@ static int ssl_parse_hello_verify_request(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) ("cookie length does not match incoming message size")); mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; } MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "cookie", p, cookie_len); - mbedtls_free(ssl->handshake->verify_cookie); + mbedtls_free(ssl->handshake->cookie); - ssl->handshake->verify_cookie = mbedtls_calloc(1, cookie_len); - if (ssl->handshake->verify_cookie == NULL) { + ssl->handshake->cookie = mbedtls_calloc(1, cookie_len); + if (ssl->handshake->cookie == NULL) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("alloc failed (%d bytes)", cookie_len)); return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED; } - memcpy(ssl->handshake->verify_cookie, p, cookie_len); - ssl->handshake->verify_cookie_len = cookie_len; + memcpy(ssl->handshake->cookie, p, cookie_len); + ssl->handshake->cookie_len = cookie_len; /* Start over at ClientHello */ ssl->state = MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_HELLO; - mbedtls_ssl_reset_checksum(ssl); + ret = mbedtls_ssl_reset_checksum(ssl); + if (0 != ret) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, ("mbedtls_ssl_reset_checksum"), ret); + return ret; + } mbedtls_ssl_recv_flight_completed(ssl); @@ -1984,33 +1176,6 @@ static int ssl_parse_hello_verify_request(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) } #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ -static int is_compression_bad(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char comp) -{ - int bad_comp = 0; - - /* Suppress warnings in some configurations */ - (void) ssl; -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT) - /* See comments in ssl_write_client_hello() */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) - if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM && - comp != MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_NULL) { - bad_comp = 1; - } -#endif - - if (comp != MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_NULL && - comp != MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_DEFLATE) { - bad_comp = 1; - } -#else /* MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT */ - if (comp != MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_NULL) { - bad_comp = 1; - } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT */ - return bad_comp; -} - MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL static int ssl_parse_server_hello(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) { @@ -2071,9 +1236,9 @@ static int ssl_parse_server_hello(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) return ssl_parse_hello_verify_request(ssl); } else { /* We made it through the verification process */ - mbedtls_free(ssl->handshake->verify_cookie); - ssl->handshake->verify_cookie = NULL; - ssl->handshake->verify_cookie_len = 0; + mbedtls_free(ssl->handshake->cookie); + ssl->handshake->cookie = NULL; + ssl->handshake->cookie_len = 0; } } #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ @@ -2083,7 +1248,7 @@ static int ssl_parse_server_hello(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad server hello message")); mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; } /* @@ -2099,27 +1264,25 @@ static int ssl_parse_server_hello(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) */ buf += mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len(ssl); - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "server hello, version", buf + 0, 2); - mbedtls_ssl_read_version(&ssl->major_ver, &ssl->minor_ver, - ssl->conf->transport, buf + 0); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "server hello, version", buf, 2); + ssl->tls_version = (mbedtls_ssl_protocol_version) mbedtls_ssl_read_version(buf, + ssl->conf->transport); + ssl->session_negotiate->tls_version = ssl->tls_version; + ssl->session_negotiate->endpoint = ssl->conf->endpoint; - if (ssl->major_ver < ssl->conf->min_major_ver || - ssl->minor_ver < ssl->conf->min_minor_ver || - ssl->major_ver > ssl->conf->max_major_ver || - ssl->minor_ver > ssl->conf->max_minor_ver) { + if (ssl->tls_version < ssl->conf->min_tls_version || + ssl->tls_version > ssl->conf->max_tls_version) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ( - "server version out of bounds - min: [%d:%d], server: [%d:%d], max: [%d:%d]", - ssl->conf->min_major_ver, - ssl->conf->min_minor_ver, - ssl->major_ver, ssl->minor_ver, - ssl->conf->max_major_ver, - ssl->conf->max_minor_ver)); + "server version out of bounds - min: [0x%x], server: [0x%x], max: [0x%x]", + (unsigned) ssl->conf->min_tls_version, + (unsigned) ssl->tls_version, + (unsigned) ssl->conf->max_tls_version)); mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_PROTOCOL_VERSION); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_PROTOCOL_VERSION; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION; } MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("server hello, current time: %lu", @@ -2138,12 +1301,11 @@ static int ssl_parse_server_hello(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad server hello message")); mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; } if (ssl->in_hslen > mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len(ssl) + 39 + n) { - ext_len = ((buf[38 + n] << 8) - | (buf[39 + n])); + ext_len = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(buf, 38 + n); if ((ext_len > 0 && ext_len < 4) || ssl->in_hslen != mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len(ssl) + 40 + n + ext_len) { @@ -2152,7 +1314,7 @@ static int ssl_parse_server_hello(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; } } else if (ssl->in_hslen == mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len(ssl) + 38 + n) { ext_len = 0; @@ -2160,18 +1322,18 @@ static int ssl_parse_server_hello(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad server hello message")); mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; } /* ciphersuite (used later) */ - i = (buf[35 + n] << 8) | buf[36 + n]; + i = (int) MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(buf, n + 35); /* * Read and check compression */ comp = buf[37 + n]; - if (is_compression_bad(ssl, comp)) { + if (comp != MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_NULL) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("server hello, bad compression: %d", comp)); mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( @@ -2206,7 +1368,6 @@ static int ssl_parse_server_hello(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) ssl->renego_status != MBEDTLS_SSL_INITIAL_HANDSHAKE || #endif ssl->session_negotiate->ciphersuite != i || - ssl->session_negotiate->compression != comp || ssl->session_negotiate->id_len != n || memcmp(ssl->session_negotiate->id, buf + 35, n) != 0) { ssl->state++; @@ -2215,7 +1376,6 @@ static int ssl_parse_server_hello(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) ssl->session_negotiate->start = mbedtls_time(NULL); #endif ssl->session_negotiate->ciphersuite = i; - ssl->session_negotiate->compression = comp; ssl->session_negotiate->id_len = n; memcpy(ssl->session_negotiate->id, buf + 35, n); } else { @@ -2234,16 +1394,16 @@ static int ssl_parse_server_hello(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) */ i = 0; while (1) { - if (ssl->conf->ciphersuite_list[ssl->minor_ver][i] == 0) { + if (ssl->conf->ciphersuite_list[i] == 0) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad server hello message")); mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; } - if (ssl->conf->ciphersuite_list[ssl->minor_ver][i++] == + if (ssl->conf->ciphersuite_list[i++] == ssl->session_negotiate->ciphersuite) { break; } @@ -2251,14 +1411,14 @@ static int ssl_parse_server_hello(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) suite_info = mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_from_id( ssl->session_negotiate->ciphersuite); - if (ssl_validate_ciphersuite(suite_info, ssl, ssl->minor_ver, - ssl->minor_ver) != 0) { + if (mbedtls_ssl_validate_ciphersuite(ssl, suite_info, ssl->tls_version, + ssl->tls_version) != 0) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad server hello message")); mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO; + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; } MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, @@ -2266,24 +1426,19 @@ static int ssl_parse_server_hello(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED) if (suite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA && - ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3) { + ssl->tls_version == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2) { ssl->handshake->ecrs_enabled = 1; } #endif - if (comp != MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_NULL -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT) - && comp != MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_DEFLATE -#endif - ) { + if (comp != MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_NULL) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad server hello message")); mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; } - ssl->session_negotiate->compression = comp; ext = buf + 40 + n; @@ -2292,17 +1447,15 @@ static int ssl_parse_server_hello(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) ext_len)); while (ext_len) { - unsigned int ext_id = ((ext[0] << 8) - | (ext[1])); - unsigned int ext_size = ((ext[2] << 8) - | (ext[3])); + unsigned int ext_id = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(ext, 0); + unsigned int ext_size = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(ext, 2); if (ext_size + 4 > ext_len) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad server hello message")); mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; } switch (ext_id) { @@ -2332,18 +1485,6 @@ static int ssl_parse_server_hello(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) break; #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC) - case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_TRUNCATED_HMAC: - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("found truncated_hmac extension")); - - if ((ret = ssl_parse_truncated_hmac_ext(ssl, - ext + 4, ext_size)) != 0) { - return ret; - } - - break; -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC */ - #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_CID: MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("found CID extension")); @@ -2394,7 +1535,8 @@ static int ssl_parse_server_hello(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) break; #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) || \ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDH_OR_ECDHE_1_2_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDSA_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED) || \ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_POINT_FORMATS: MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, @@ -2406,7 +1548,8 @@ static int ssl_parse_server_hello(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) } break; -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDH_C || MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C || +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDH_OR_ECDHE_1_2_ENABLED || + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDSA_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED || MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) @@ -2453,7 +1596,7 @@ static int ssl_parse_server_hello(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) if (ext_len > 0 && ext_len < 4) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad server hello message")); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; } } @@ -2510,7 +1653,7 @@ static int ssl_parse_server_hello(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; } MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= parse server hello")); @@ -2543,12 +1686,12 @@ static int ssl_parse_server_dh_params(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, return ret; } - dhm_actual_bitlen = mbedtls_mpi_bitlen(&ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.P); + dhm_actual_bitlen = mbedtls_dhm_get_bitlen(&ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx); if (dhm_actual_bitlen < ssl->conf->dhm_min_bitlen) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("DHM prime too short: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET " < %u", dhm_actual_bitlen, ssl->conf->dhm_min_bitlen)); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; } MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MPI(3, "DHM: P ", &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.P); @@ -2560,125 +1703,125 @@ static int ssl_parse_server_dh_params(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED || MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED) -MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL -static int ssl_check_server_ecdh_params(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) -{ - const mbedtls_ecp_curve_info *curve_info; - mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id; -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_LEGACY_CONTEXT) - grp_id = ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx.grp.id; -#else - grp_id = ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx.grp_id; -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDH_LEGACY_CONTEXT */ - - curve_info = mbedtls_ecp_curve_info_from_grp_id(grp_id); - if (curve_info == NULL) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("should never happen")); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; - } - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("ECDH curve: %s", curve_info->name)); - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) - if (mbedtls_ssl_check_curve(ssl, grp_id) != 0) { - return -1; - } -#else - if (ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx.grp.nbits < 163 || - ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx.grp.nbits > 521) { - return -1; - } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */ - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ECDH(3, &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx, - MBEDTLS_DEBUG_ECDH_QP); - - return 0; -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED || - MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED || - MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED || - MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED || - MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && \ - (defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED)) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED) MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL -static int ssl_parse_server_ecdh_params_psa(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - unsigned char **p, - unsigned char *end) +static int ssl_parse_server_ecdh_params(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char **p, + unsigned char *end) { uint16_t tls_id; - size_t ecdh_bits = 0; - uint8_t ecpoint_len; + size_t ecpoint_len; mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *handshake = ssl->handshake; + psa_key_type_t key_type = PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE; + size_t ec_bits = 0; /* - * Parse ECC group + * struct { + * ECParameters curve_params; + * ECPoint public; + * } ServerECDHParams; + * + * 1 curve_type (must be "named_curve") + * 2..3 NamedCurve + * 4 ECPoint.len + * 5+ ECPoint contents */ - if (end - *p < 4) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; } /* First byte is curve_type; only named_curve is handled */ if (*(*p)++ != MBEDTLS_ECP_TLS_NAMED_CURVE) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; } /* Next two bytes are the namedcurve value */ - tls_id = *(*p)++; - tls_id <<= 8; - tls_id |= *(*p)++; + tls_id = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(*p, 0); + *p += 2; /* Check it's a curve we offered */ if (mbedtls_ssl_check_curve_tls_id(ssl, tls_id) != 0) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE; + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, + ("bad server key exchange message (ECDHE curve): %u", + (unsigned) tls_id)); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; } - /* Convert EC group to PSA key type. */ - if ((handshake->ecdh_psa_type = - mbedtls_psa_parse_tls_ecc_group(tls_id, &ecdh_bits)) == 0) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE; - } - if (ecdh_bits > 0xffff) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE; + /* Convert EC's TLS ID to PSA key type. */ + if (mbedtls_ssl_get_psa_curve_info_from_tls_id(tls_id, &key_type, + &ec_bits) == PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; } - handshake->ecdh_bits = (uint16_t) ecdh_bits; - - /* - * Put peer's ECDH public key in the format understood by PSA. - */ + handshake->xxdh_psa_type = key_type; + handshake->xxdh_psa_bits = ec_bits; + /* Keep a copy of the peer's public key */ ecpoint_len = *(*p)++; if ((size_t) (end - *p) < ecpoint_len) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; } - if (mbedtls_psa_tls_ecpoint_to_psa_ec( - *p, ecpoint_len, - handshake->ecdh_psa_peerkey, - sizeof(handshake->ecdh_psa_peerkey), - &handshake->ecdh_psa_peerkey_len) != 0) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED; + if (ecpoint_len > sizeof(handshake->xxdh_psa_peerkey)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; } + memcpy(handshake->xxdh_psa_peerkey, *p, ecpoint_len); + handshake->xxdh_psa_peerkey_len = ecpoint_len; *p += ecpoint_len; + return 0; } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO && - ( MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED || - MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED ) */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED || + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED || + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED */ +#else +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_check_server_ecdh_params(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + uint16_t tls_id; + mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_LEGACY_CONTEXT) + grp_id = ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx.grp.id; +#else + grp_id = ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx.grp_id; +#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED) + tls_id = mbedtls_ssl_get_tls_id_from_ecp_group_id(grp_id); + if (tls_id == 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("should never happen")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("ECDH curve: %s", + mbedtls_ssl_get_curve_name_from_tls_id(tls_id))); + + if (mbedtls_ssl_check_curve(ssl, grp_id) != 0) { + return -1; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ECDH(3, &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx, + MBEDTLS_DEBUG_ECDH_QP); + + return 0; +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED || + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED || + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED || + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED || + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED) MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL static int ssl_parse_server_ecdh_params(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char **p, @@ -2708,15 +1851,15 @@ static int ssl_parse_server_ecdh_params(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, if (ssl_check_server_ecdh_params(ssl) != 0) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad server key exchange message (ECDHE curve)")); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; } return ret; } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED || - MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED || - MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED */ - +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED || \ + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED || \ + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED */ +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED) MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL static int ssl_parse_server_psk_hint(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, @@ -2735,15 +1878,15 @@ static int ssl_parse_server_psk_hint(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, if (end - (*p) < 2) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad server key exchange message (psk_identity_hint length)")); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; } - len = (*p)[0] << 8 | (*p)[1]; + len = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(*p, 0); *p += 2; if (end - (*p) < len) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad server key exchange message (psk_identity_hint length)")); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; } /* @@ -2769,7 +1912,7 @@ static int ssl_write_encrypted_pms(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, size_t pms_offset) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - size_t len_bytes = ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 ? 0 : 2; + size_t len_bytes = 2; unsigned char *p = ssl->handshake->premaster + pms_offset; mbedtls_pk_context *peer_pk; @@ -2785,9 +1928,8 @@ static int ssl_write_encrypted_pms(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, * opaque random[46]; * } PreMasterSecret; */ - mbedtls_ssl_write_version(ssl->conf->max_major_ver, - ssl->conf->max_minor_ver, - ssl->conf->transport, p); + mbedtls_ssl_write_version(p, ssl->conf->transport, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2); if ((ret = ssl->conf->f_rng(ssl->conf->p_rng, p + 2, 46)) != 0) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "f_rng", ret); @@ -2824,13 +1966,10 @@ static int ssl_write_encrypted_pms(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, return ret; } -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) if (len_bytes == 2) { MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(*olen, ssl->out_msg, offset); *olen += 2; } -#endif #if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) /* We don't need the peer's public key anymore. Free it. */ @@ -2841,79 +1980,12 @@ static int ssl_write_encrypted_pms(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED || MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED) -MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL -static int ssl_parse_signature_algorithm(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - unsigned char **p, - unsigned char *end, - mbedtls_md_type_t *md_alg, - mbedtls_pk_type_t *pk_alg) -{ - ((void) ssl); - *md_alg = MBEDTLS_MD_NONE; - *pk_alg = MBEDTLS_PK_NONE; - - /* Only in TLS 1.2 */ - if (ssl->minor_ver != MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3) { - return 0; - } - - if ((*p) + 2 > end) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE; - } - - /* - * Get hash algorithm - */ - if ((*md_alg = mbedtls_ssl_md_alg_from_hash((*p)[0])) - == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, - ("Server used unsupported HashAlgorithm %d", *(p)[0])); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE; - } - - /* - * Get signature algorithm - */ - if ((*pk_alg = mbedtls_ssl_pk_alg_from_sig((*p)[1])) - == MBEDTLS_PK_NONE) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, - ("server used unsupported SignatureAlgorithm %d", (*p)[1])); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE; - } - - /* - * Check if the hash is acceptable - */ - if (mbedtls_ssl_check_sig_hash(ssl, *md_alg) != 0) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, - ("server used HashAlgorithm %d that was not offered", *(p)[0])); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE; - } - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("Server used SignatureAlgorithm %d", - (*p)[1])); - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("Server used HashAlgorithm %d", - (*p)[0])); - *p += 2; - - return 0; -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED || - MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED || - MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ - #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED) || \ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED) MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL static int ssl_get_ecdh_params_from_cert(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - const mbedtls_ecp_keypair *peer_key; mbedtls_pk_context *peer_pk; #if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) @@ -2934,8 +2006,53 @@ static int ssl_get_ecdh_params_from_cert(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH; } - peer_key = mbedtls_pk_ec(*peer_pk); +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA) + const mbedtls_ecp_keypair *peer_key = mbedtls_pk_ec_ro(*peer_pk); +#endif /* !defined(MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA) */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + uint16_t tls_id = 0; + psa_key_type_t key_type = PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE; + mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id = mbedtls_pk_get_ec_group_id(peer_pk); + + if (mbedtls_ssl_check_curve(ssl, grp_id) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad server certificate (ECDH curve)")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_CERTIFICATE; + } + + tls_id = mbedtls_ssl_get_tls_id_from_ecp_group_id(grp_id); + if (tls_id == 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("ECC group %u not suported", + grp_id)); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; + } + + /* If the above conversion to TLS ID was fine, then also this one will be, + so there is no need to check the return value here */ + mbedtls_ssl_get_psa_curve_info_from_tls_id(tls_id, &key_type, + &ssl->handshake->xxdh_psa_bits); + ssl->handshake->xxdh_psa_type = key_type; + + /* Store peer's public key in psa format. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA) + memcpy(ssl->handshake->xxdh_psa_peerkey, peer_pk->pub_raw, peer_pk->pub_raw_len); + ssl->handshake->xxdh_psa_peerkey_len = peer_pk->pub_raw_len; + ret = 0; +#else /* MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA */ + size_t olen = 0; + ret = mbedtls_ecp_point_write_binary(&peer_key->grp, &peer_key->Q, + MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_UNCOMPRESSED, &olen, + ssl->handshake->xxdh_psa_peerkey, + sizeof(ssl->handshake->xxdh_psa_peerkey)); + + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, ("mbedtls_ecp_point_write_binary"), ret); + return ret; + } + ssl->handshake->xxdh_psa_peerkey_len = olen; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA */ +#else /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ if ((ret = mbedtls_ecdh_get_params(&ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx, peer_key, MBEDTLS_ECDH_THEIRS)) != 0) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, ("mbedtls_ecdh_get_params"), ret); @@ -2944,9 +2061,9 @@ static int ssl_get_ecdh_params_from_cert(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) if (ssl_check_server_ecdh_params(ssl) != 0) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad server certificate (ECDH curve)")); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_CERTIFICATE; } - +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ #if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) /* We don't need the peer's public key anymore. Free it, * so that more RAM is available for upcoming expensive @@ -3054,7 +2171,7 @@ static int ssl_parse_server_key_exchange(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) #endif p = ssl->in_msg + mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len(ssl); end = ssl->in_msg + ssl->in_hslen; - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "server key exchange", p, end - p); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "server key exchange", p, (size_t) (end - p)); #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED) if (ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK || @@ -3066,8 +2183,8 @@ static int ssl_parse_server_key_exchange(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE; + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; } } /* FALLTHROUGH */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED */ @@ -3090,30 +2207,13 @@ static int ssl_parse_server_key_exchange(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; } } else #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED || MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && \ - (defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED)) - if (ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA || - ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA) { - if (ssl_parse_server_ecdh_params_psa(ssl, &p, end) != 0) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad server key exchange message")); - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( - ssl, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE; - } - } else -#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO && - ( MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED || - MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED ) */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED) || \ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED) || \ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED) if (ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA || ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK || @@ -3124,7 +2224,7 @@ static int ssl_parse_server_key_exchange(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; } } else #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED || @@ -3132,6 +2232,44 @@ static int ssl_parse_server_key_exchange(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) if (ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + /* + * The first 3 bytes are: + * [0] MBEDTLS_ECP_TLS_NAMED_CURVE + * [1, 2] elliptic curve's TLS ID + * + * However since we only support secp256r1 for now, we check only + * that TLS ID here + */ + uint16_t read_tls_id = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(p, 1); + uint16_t exp_tls_id = mbedtls_ssl_get_tls_id_from_ecp_group_id( + MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1); + + if (exp_tls_id == 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + } + + if ((*p != MBEDTLS_ECP_TLS_NAMED_CURVE) || + (read_tls_id != exp_tls_id)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; + } + + p += 3; + + if ((ret = mbedtls_psa_ecjpake_read_round( + &ssl->handshake->psa_pake_ctx, p, end - p, + MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_ROUND_TWO)) != 0) { + psa_destroy_key(ssl->handshake->psa_pake_password); + psa_pake_abort(&ssl->handshake->psa_pake_ctx); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "psa_pake_input round two", ret); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( + ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; + } +#else ret = mbedtls_ecjpake_read_round_two(&ssl->handshake->ecjpake_ctx, p, end - p); if (ret != 0) { @@ -3139,9 +2277,10 @@ static int ssl_parse_server_key_exchange(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE; + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ } else #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */ { @@ -3152,61 +2291,55 @@ static int ssl_parse_server_key_exchange(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE_ENABLED) if (mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_server_signature(ciphersuite_info)) { size_t sig_len, hashlen; -#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) - unsigned char hash[PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE]; -#else unsigned char hash[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE]; -#endif + mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg = MBEDTLS_MD_NONE; mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_alg = MBEDTLS_PK_NONE; unsigned char *params = ssl->in_msg + mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len(ssl); - size_t params_len = p - params; + size_t params_len = (size_t) (p - params); void *rs_ctx = NULL; + uint16_t sig_alg; mbedtls_pk_context *peer_pk; +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) + peer_pk = &ssl->handshake->peer_pubkey; +#else /* !MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ + if (ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert == NULL) { + /* Should never happen */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("should never happen")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } + peer_pk = &ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert->pk; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ + /* * Handle the digitally-signed structure */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) - if (ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3) { - if (ssl_parse_signature_algorithm(ssl, &p, end, - &md_alg, &pk_alg) != 0) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, - ("bad server key exchange message")); - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( - ssl, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE; - } - - if (pk_alg != - mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_sig_pk_alg(ciphersuite_info)) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, - ("bad server key exchange message")); - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( - ssl, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE; - } - } else -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) - if (ssl->minor_ver < MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3) { - pk_alg = mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_sig_pk_alg(ciphersuite_info); - - /* Default hash for ECDSA is SHA-1 */ - if (pk_alg == MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA && md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE) { - md_alg = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1; - } - } else -#endif - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("should never happen")); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, end, 2); + sig_alg = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(p, 0); + if (mbedtls_ssl_get_pk_type_and_md_alg_from_sig_alg( + sig_alg, &pk_alg, &md_alg) != 0 && + !mbedtls_ssl_sig_alg_is_offered(ssl, sig_alg) && + !mbedtls_ssl_sig_alg_is_supported(ssl, sig_alg)) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, + ("bad server key exchange message")); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( + ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; + } + p += 2; + + if (!mbedtls_pk_can_do(peer_pk, pk_alg)) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, + ("bad server key exchange message")); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( + ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; } /* @@ -3219,9 +2352,9 @@ static int ssl_parse_server_key_exchange(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; } - sig_len = (p[0] << 8) | p[1]; + sig_len = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(p, 0); p += 2; if (p != end - sig_len) { @@ -3230,7 +2363,7 @@ static int ssl_parse_server_key_exchange(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; } MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "signature", p, sig_len); @@ -3238,20 +2371,6 @@ static int ssl_parse_server_key_exchange(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) /* * Compute the hash that has been signed */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) - if (md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE) { - hashlen = 36; - ret = mbedtls_ssl_get_key_exchange_md_ssl_tls(ssl, hash, params, - params_len); - if (ret != 0) { - return ret; - } - } else -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 || MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 || \ - MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) if (md_alg != MBEDTLS_MD_NONE) { ret = mbedtls_ssl_get_key_exchange_md_tls1_2(ssl, hash, &hashlen, params, params_len, @@ -3259,27 +2378,13 @@ static int ssl_parse_server_key_exchange(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) if (ret != 0) { return ret; } - } else -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 || MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 || \ - MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ - { + } else { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("should never happen")); return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; } MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "parameters hash", hash, hashlen); -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) - peer_pk = &ssl->handshake->peer_pubkey; -#else /* !MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ - if (ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert == NULL) { - /* Should never happen */ - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("should never happen")); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; - } - peer_pk = &ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert->pk; -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ - /* * Verify signature */ @@ -3296,21 +2401,44 @@ static int ssl_parse_server_key_exchange(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) if (ssl->handshake->ecrs_enabled) { rs_ctx = &ssl->handshake->ecrs_ctx.pk; } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED */ +#endif - if ((ret = mbedtls_pk_verify_restartable(peer_pk, - md_alg, hash, hashlen, p, sig_len, rs_ctx)) != 0) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT) + if (pk_alg == MBEDTLS_PK_RSASSA_PSS) { + mbedtls_pk_rsassa_pss_options rsassa_pss_options; + rsassa_pss_options.mgf1_hash_id = md_alg; + rsassa_pss_options.expected_salt_len = + mbedtls_md_get_size_from_type(md_alg); + if (rsassa_pss_options.expected_salt_len == 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } + + ret = mbedtls_pk_verify_ext(pk_alg, &rsassa_pss_options, + peer_pk, + md_alg, hash, hashlen, + p, sig_len); + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT */ + ret = mbedtls_pk_verify_restartable(peer_pk, + md_alg, hash, hashlen, p, sig_len, rs_ctx); + + if (ret != 0) { + int send_alert_msg = 1; #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED) - if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_pk_verify", ret); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS; + send_alert_msg = (ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS); +#endif + if (send_alert_msg) { + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( + ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECRYPT_ERROR); } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED */ - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( - ssl, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECRYPT_ERROR); MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_pk_verify", ret); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED) + if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS; + } +#endif return ret; } @@ -3359,6 +2487,11 @@ static int ssl_parse_certificate_request(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) size_t cert_type_len = 0, dn_len = 0; const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info = ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info; + size_t sig_alg_len; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C) + unsigned char *sig_alg; + unsigned char *dn; +#endif MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> parse certificate request")); @@ -3383,12 +2516,13 @@ static int ssl_parse_certificate_request(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) } ssl->state++; - ssl->client_auth = (ssl->in_msg[0] == MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST); + ssl->handshake->client_auth = + (ssl->in_msg[0] == MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST); MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("got %s certificate request", - ssl->client_auth ? "a" : "no")); + ssl->handshake->client_auth ? "a" : "no")); - if (ssl->client_auth == 0) { + if (ssl->handshake->client_auth == 0) { /* Current message is probably the ServerHelloDone */ ssl->keep_current_message = 1; goto exit; @@ -3425,7 +2559,7 @@ static int ssl_parse_certificate_request(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad certificate request message")); mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; } cert_type_len = buf[mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len(ssl)]; n = cert_type_len; @@ -3444,66 +2578,81 @@ static int ssl_parse_certificate_request(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad certificate request message")); mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; } /* supported_signature_algorithms */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) - if (ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3) { - size_t sig_alg_len = - ((buf[mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len(ssl) + 1 + n] << 8) - | (buf[mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len(ssl) + 2 + n])); -#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C) - unsigned char *sig_alg; - size_t i; -#endif + sig_alg_len = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(buf, mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len(ssl) + 1 + n); - /* - * The furthest access in buf is in the loop few lines below: - * sig_alg[i + 1], - * where: - * sig_alg = buf + ...hdr_len + 3 + n, - * max(i) = sig_alg_len - 1. - * Therefore the furthest access is: - * buf[...hdr_len + 3 + n + sig_alg_len - 1 + 1], - * which reduces to: - * buf[...hdr_len + 3 + n + sig_alg_len], - * which is one less than we need the buf to be. - */ - if (ssl->in_hslen <= mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len(ssl) - + 3 + n + sig_alg_len) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad certificate request message")); - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( - ssl, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST; - } + /* + * The furthest access in buf is in the loop few lines below: + * sig_alg[i + 1], + * where: + * sig_alg = buf + ...hdr_len + 3 + n, + * max(i) = sig_alg_len - 1. + * Therefore the furthest access is: + * buf[...hdr_len + 3 + n + sig_alg_len - 1 + 1], + * which reduces to: + * buf[...hdr_len + 3 + n + sig_alg_len], + * which is one less than we need the buf to be. + */ + if (ssl->in_hslen <= mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len(ssl) + 3 + n + sig_alg_len) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad certificate request message")); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( + ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; + } #if defined(MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C) - sig_alg = buf + mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len(ssl) + 3 + n; - for (i = 0; i < sig_alg_len; i += 2) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, - ("Supported Signature Algorithm found: %d,%d", - sig_alg[i], sig_alg[i + 1])); - } + sig_alg = buf + mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len(ssl) + 3 + n; + for (size_t i = 0; i < sig_alg_len; i += 2) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, + ("Supported Signature Algorithm found: %02x %02x", + sig_alg[i], sig_alg[i + 1])); + } #endif - n += 2 + sig_alg_len; - } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ + n += 2 + sig_alg_len; /* certificate_authorities */ - dn_len = ((buf[mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len(ssl) + 1 + n] << 8) - | (buf[mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len(ssl) + 2 + n])); + dn_len = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(buf, mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len(ssl) + 1 + n); n += dn_len; if (ssl->in_hslen != mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len(ssl) + 3 + n) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad certificate request message")); mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C) + dn = buf + mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len(ssl) + 3 + n - dn_len; + for (size_t i = 0, dni_len = 0; i < dn_len; i += 2 + dni_len) { + unsigned char *p = dn + i + 2; + mbedtls_x509_name name; + size_t asn1_len; + char s[MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_DN_NAME_SIZE]; + memset(&name, 0, sizeof(name)); + dni_len = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(dn + i, 0); + if (dni_len > dn_len - i - 2 || + mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p, p + dni_len, &asn1_len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE) != 0 || + mbedtls_x509_get_name(&p, p + asn1_len, &name) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad certificate request message")); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( + ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; + } + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, + ("DN hint: %.*s", + mbedtls_x509_dn_gets(s, sizeof(s), &name), s)); + mbedtls_asn1_free_named_data_list_shallow(name.next); } +#endif exit: MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= parse certificate request")); @@ -3534,7 +2683,7 @@ static int ssl_parse_server_hello_done(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad server hello done message")); mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO_DONE; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; } ssl->state++; @@ -3567,13 +2716,13 @@ static int ssl_write_client_key_exchange(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) /* * DHM key exchange -- send G^X mod P */ - content_len = ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.len; + content_len = mbedtls_dhm_get_len(&ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx); MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(content_len, ssl->out_msg, 4); header_len = 6; ret = mbedtls_dhm_make_public(&ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx, - (int) mbedtls_mpi_size(&ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.P), + (int) mbedtls_dhm_get_len(&ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx), &ssl->out_msg[header_len], content_len, ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng); if (ret != 0) { @@ -3596,22 +2745,21 @@ static int ssl_write_client_key_exchange(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MPI(3, "DHM: K ", &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.K); } else #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && \ - (defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED)) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED) if (ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA || - ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA) { + ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA || + ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA || + ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; psa_status_t destruction_status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; psa_key_attributes_t key_attributes; mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *handshake = ssl->handshake; - unsigned char own_pubkey[MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_LENGTH]; - size_t own_pubkey_len; - unsigned char *own_pubkey_ecpoint; - size_t own_pubkey_ecpoint_len; - header_len = 4; MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("Perform PSA-based ECDH computation.")); @@ -3630,71 +2778,54 @@ static int ssl_write_client_key_exchange(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) key_attributes = psa_key_attributes_init(); psa_set_key_usage_flags(&key_attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE); psa_set_key_algorithm(&key_attributes, PSA_ALG_ECDH); - psa_set_key_type(&key_attributes, handshake->ecdh_psa_type); - psa_set_key_bits(&key_attributes, handshake->ecdh_bits); + psa_set_key_type(&key_attributes, handshake->xxdh_psa_type); + psa_set_key_bits(&key_attributes, handshake->xxdh_psa_bits); /* Generate ECDH private key. */ status = psa_generate_key(&key_attributes, - &handshake->ecdh_psa_privkey); + &handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey); if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED; } - /* Export the public part of the ECDH private key from PSA - * and convert it to ECPoint format used in ClientKeyExchange. */ - status = psa_export_public_key(handshake->ecdh_psa_privkey, - own_pubkey, sizeof(own_pubkey), + /* Export the public part of the ECDH private key from PSA. + * The export format is an ECPoint structure as expected by TLS, + * but we just need to add a length byte before that. */ + unsigned char *own_pubkey = ssl->out_msg + header_len + 1; + unsigned char *end = ssl->out_msg + MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN; + size_t own_pubkey_max_len = (size_t) (end - own_pubkey); + size_t own_pubkey_len; + + status = psa_export_public_key(handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey, + own_pubkey, own_pubkey_max_len, &own_pubkey_len); if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { - psa_destroy_key(handshake->ecdh_psa_privkey); - handshake->ecdh_psa_privkey = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED; - } - - if (mbedtls_psa_tls_psa_ec_to_ecpoint(own_pubkey, - own_pubkey_len, - &own_pubkey_ecpoint, - &own_pubkey_ecpoint_len) != 0) { - psa_destroy_key(handshake->ecdh_psa_privkey); - handshake->ecdh_psa_privkey = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + psa_destroy_key(handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey); + handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED; } - /* Copy ECPoint structure to outgoing message buffer. */ - ssl->out_msg[header_len] = (unsigned char) own_pubkey_ecpoint_len; - memcpy(ssl->out_msg + header_len + 1, - own_pubkey_ecpoint, own_pubkey_ecpoint_len); - content_len = own_pubkey_ecpoint_len + 1; + ssl->out_msg[header_len] = (unsigned char) own_pubkey_len; + content_len = own_pubkey_len + 1; /* The ECDH secret is the premaster secret used for key derivation. */ /* Compute ECDH shared secret. */ status = psa_raw_key_agreement(PSA_ALG_ECDH, - handshake->ecdh_psa_privkey, - handshake->ecdh_psa_peerkey, - handshake->ecdh_psa_peerkey_len, + handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey, + handshake->xxdh_psa_peerkey, + handshake->xxdh_psa_peerkey_len, ssl->handshake->premaster, sizeof(ssl->handshake->premaster), &ssl->handshake->pmslen); - destruction_status = psa_destroy_key(handshake->ecdh_psa_privkey); - handshake->ecdh_psa_privkey = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + destruction_status = psa_destroy_key(handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey); + handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; if (status != PSA_SUCCESS || destruction_status != PSA_SUCCESS) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED; } - } else -#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO && - ( MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED || - MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED ) */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED) - if (ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA || - ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA || - ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA || - ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA) { +#else /* * ECDH key exchange -- send client public value */ @@ -3754,17 +2885,144 @@ static int ssl_write_client_key_exchange(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ECDH(3, &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx, MBEDTLS_DEBUG_ECDH_Z); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ } else #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED || MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED || MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED || MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED) + if (ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK) { + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_status_t destruction_status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_attributes_t key_attributes; + + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *handshake = ssl->handshake; + + /* + * opaque psk_identity<0..2^16-1>; + */ + if (mbedtls_ssl_conf_has_static_psk(ssl->conf) == 0) { + /* We don't offer PSK suites if we don't have a PSK, + * and we check that the server's choice is among the + * ciphersuites we offered, so this should never happen. */ + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } + + /* uint16 to store content length */ + const size_t content_len_size = 2; + + header_len = 4; + + if (header_len + content_len_size + ssl->conf->psk_identity_len + > MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, + ("psk identity too long or SSL buffer too short")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + } + + unsigned char *p = ssl->out_msg + header_len; + + *p++ = MBEDTLS_BYTE_1(ssl->conf->psk_identity_len); + *p++ = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(ssl->conf->psk_identity_len); + header_len += content_len_size; + + memcpy(p, ssl->conf->psk_identity, + ssl->conf->psk_identity_len); + p += ssl->conf->psk_identity_len; + + header_len += ssl->conf->psk_identity_len; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("Perform PSA-based ECDH computation.")); + + /* + * Generate EC private key for ECDHE exchange. + */ + + /* The master secret is obtained from the shared ECDH secret by + * applying the TLS 1.2 PRF with a specific salt and label. While + * the PSA Crypto API encourages combining key agreement schemes + * such as ECDH with fixed KDFs such as TLS 1.2 PRF, it does not + * yet support the provisioning of salt + label to the KDF. + * For the time being, we therefore need to split the computation + * of the ECDH secret and the application of the TLS 1.2 PRF. */ + key_attributes = psa_key_attributes_init(); + psa_set_key_usage_flags(&key_attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE); + psa_set_key_algorithm(&key_attributes, PSA_ALG_ECDH); + psa_set_key_type(&key_attributes, handshake->xxdh_psa_type); + psa_set_key_bits(&key_attributes, handshake->xxdh_psa_bits); + + /* Generate ECDH private key. */ + status = psa_generate_key(&key_attributes, + &handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + } + + /* Export the public part of the ECDH private key from PSA. + * The export format is an ECPoint structure as expected by TLS, + * but we just need to add a length byte before that. */ + unsigned char *own_pubkey = p + 1; + unsigned char *end = ssl->out_msg + MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN; + size_t own_pubkey_max_len = (size_t) (end - own_pubkey); + size_t own_pubkey_len = 0; + + status = psa_export_public_key(handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey, + own_pubkey, own_pubkey_max_len, + &own_pubkey_len); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + psa_destroy_key(handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey); + handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + return PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + } + + *p = (unsigned char) own_pubkey_len; + content_len = own_pubkey_len + 1; + + /* As RFC 5489 section 2, the premaster secret is formed as follows: + * - a uint16 containing the length (in octets) of the ECDH computation + * - the octet string produced by the ECDH computation + * - a uint16 containing the length (in octets) of the PSK + * - the PSK itself + */ + unsigned char *pms = ssl->handshake->premaster; + const unsigned char * const pms_end = pms + + sizeof(ssl->handshake->premaster); + /* uint16 to store length (in octets) of the ECDH computation */ + const size_t zlen_size = 2; + size_t zlen = 0; + + /* Perform ECDH computation after the uint16 reserved for the length */ + status = psa_raw_key_agreement(PSA_ALG_ECDH, + handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey, + handshake->xxdh_psa_peerkey, + handshake->xxdh_psa_peerkey_len, + pms + zlen_size, + pms_end - (pms + zlen_size), + &zlen); + + destruction_status = psa_destroy_key(handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey); + handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + } else if (destruction_status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(destruction_status); + } + + /* Write the ECDH computation length before the ECDH computation */ + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(zlen, pms, 0); + pms += zlen_size + zlen; + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO && + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED) if (mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_psk(ciphersuite_info)) { /* * opaque psk_identity<0..2^16-1>; */ - if (ssl_conf_has_static_psk(ssl->conf) == 0) { + if (mbedtls_ssl_conf_has_static_psk(ssl->conf) == 0) { /* We don't offer PSK suites if we don't have a PSK, * and we check that the server's choice is among the * ciphersuites we offered, so this should never happen. */ @@ -3795,14 +3053,6 @@ static int ssl_write_client_key_exchange(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED) if (ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK) { -#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) - /* Opaque PSKs are currently only supported for PSK-only suites. */ - if (ssl_conf_has_static_raw_psk(ssl->conf) == 0) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("opaque PSK not supported with RSA-PSK")); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; - } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ - if ((ret = ssl_write_encrypted_pms(ssl, header_len, &content_len, 2)) != 0) { return ret; @@ -3811,18 +3061,10 @@ static int ssl_write_client_key_exchange(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED) if (ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK) { -#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) - /* Opaque PSKs are currently only supported for PSK-only suites. */ - if (ssl_conf_has_static_raw_psk(ssl->conf) == 0) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("opaque PSK not supported with DHE-PSK")); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; - } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ - /* * ClientDiffieHellmanPublic public (DHM send G^X mod P) */ - content_len = ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.len; + content_len = mbedtls_dhm_get_len(&ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx); if (header_len + 2 + content_len > MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN) { @@ -3835,25 +3077,36 @@ static int ssl_write_client_key_exchange(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) ssl->out_msg[header_len++] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(content_len); ret = mbedtls_dhm_make_public(&ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx, - (int) mbedtls_mpi_size(&ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.P), + (int) mbedtls_dhm_get_len(&ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx), &ssl->out_msg[header_len], content_len, ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng); if (ret != 0) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_dhm_make_public", ret); return ret; } - } else -#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED) - if (ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK) { + #if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) - /* Opaque PSKs are currently only supported for PSK-only suites. */ - if (ssl_conf_has_static_raw_psk(ssl->conf) == 0) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("opaque PSK not supported with ECDHE-PSK")); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + unsigned char *pms = ssl->handshake->premaster; + unsigned char *pms_end = pms + sizeof(ssl->handshake->premaster); + size_t pms_len; + + /* Write length only when we know the actual value */ + if ((ret = mbedtls_dhm_calc_secret(&ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx, + pms + 2, pms_end - (pms + 2), &pms_len, + ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng)) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_dhm_calc_secret", ret); + return ret; } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(pms_len, pms, 0); + pms += 2 + pms_len; + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MPI(3, "DHM: K ", &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.K); +#endif + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED */ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED) + if (ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK) { /* * ClientECDiffieHellmanPublic public; */ @@ -3870,28 +3123,21 @@ static int ssl_write_client_key_exchange(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ECDH(3, &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx, MBEDTLS_DEBUG_ECDH_Q); } else -#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED */ +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO && MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED */ { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("should never happen")); return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; } -#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && \ - defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED) - if (ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK && - ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 && - ssl_conf_has_static_raw_psk(ssl->conf) == 0) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, - ("skip PMS generation for opaque PSK")); - } else -#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO && - MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED */ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_psk_derive_premaster(ssl, - ciphersuite_info->key_exchange)) != 0) { + (mbedtls_key_exchange_type_t) ciphersuite_info-> + key_exchange)) != 0) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_psk_derive_premaster", ret); return ret; } +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ } else #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED) @@ -3907,6 +3153,20 @@ static int ssl_write_client_key_exchange(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) if (ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE) { header_len = 4; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + unsigned char *out_p = ssl->out_msg + header_len; + unsigned char *end_p = ssl->out_msg + MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN - + header_len; + ret = mbedtls_psa_ecjpake_write_round(&ssl->handshake->psa_pake_ctx, + out_p, end_p - out_p, &content_len, + MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_ROUND_TWO); + if (ret != 0) { + psa_destroy_key(ssl->handshake->psa_pake_password); + psa_pake_abort(&ssl->handshake->psa_pake_ctx); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "psa_pake_output", ret); + return ret; + } +#else ret = mbedtls_ecjpake_write_round_two(&ssl->handshake->ecjpake_ctx, ssl->out_msg + header_len, MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN - header_len, @@ -3924,6 +3184,7 @@ static int ssl_write_client_key_exchange(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ecjpake_derive_secret", ret); return ret; } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ } else #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED */ { @@ -3985,6 +3246,11 @@ static int ssl_write_certificate_verify(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg = MBEDTLS_MD_NONE; size_t hashlen; void *rs_ctx = NULL; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH) + size_t out_buf_len = ssl->out_buf_len - (size_t) (ssl->out_msg - ssl->out_buf); +#else + size_t out_buf_len = MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_BUFFER_LEN - (size_t) (ssl->out_msg - ssl->out_buf); +#endif MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> write certificate verify")); @@ -4006,7 +3272,8 @@ static int ssl_write_certificate_verify(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) return 0; } - if (ssl->client_auth == 0 || mbedtls_ssl_own_cert(ssl) == NULL) { + if (ssl->handshake->client_auth == 0 || + mbedtls_ssl_own_cert(ssl) == NULL) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= skip write certificate verify")); ssl->state++; return 0; @@ -4028,72 +3295,40 @@ static int ssl_write_certificate_verify(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) sign: #endif - ssl->handshake->calc_verify(ssl, hash, &hashlen); - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) - if (ssl->minor_ver != MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3) { - /* - * digitally-signed struct { - * opaque md5_hash[16]; - * opaque sha_hash[20]; - * }; - * - * md5_hash - * MD5(handshake_messages); - * - * sha_hash - * SHA(handshake_messages); - */ - md_alg = MBEDTLS_MD_NONE; - - /* - * For ECDSA, default hash is SHA-1 only - */ - if (mbedtls_pk_can_do(mbedtls_ssl_own_key(ssl), MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA)) { - hash_start += 16; - hashlen -= 16; - md_alg = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1; - } - } else -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 || MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 || \ - MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) - if (ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3) { - /* - * digitally-signed struct { - * opaque handshake_messages[handshake_messages_length]; - * }; - * - * Taking shortcut here. We assume that the server always allows the - * PRF Hash function and has sent it in the allowed signature - * algorithms list received in the Certificate Request message. - * - * Until we encounter a server that does not, we will take this - * shortcut. - * - * Reason: Otherwise we should have running hashes for SHA512 and - * SHA224 in order to satisfy 'weird' needs from the server - * side. - */ - if (ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info->mac == MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384) { - md_alg = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384; - ssl->out_msg[4] = MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA384; - } else { - md_alg = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256; - ssl->out_msg[4] = MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA256; - } - ssl->out_msg[5] = mbedtls_ssl_sig_from_pk(mbedtls_ssl_own_key(ssl)); + ret = ssl->handshake->calc_verify(ssl, hash, &hashlen); + if (0 != ret) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, ("calc_verify"), ret); + return ret; + } - /* Info from md_alg will be used instead */ - hashlen = 0; - offset = 2; - } else -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("should never happen")); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + /* + * digitally-signed struct { + * opaque handshake_messages[handshake_messages_length]; + * }; + * + * Taking shortcut here. We assume that the server always allows the + * PRF Hash function and has sent it in the allowed signature + * algorithms list received in the Certificate Request message. + * + * Until we encounter a server that does not, we will take this + * shortcut. + * + * Reason: Otherwise we should have running hashes for SHA512 and + * SHA224 in order to satisfy 'weird' needs from the server + * side. + */ + if (ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info->mac == MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384) { + md_alg = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384; + ssl->out_msg[4] = MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA384; + } else { + md_alg = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256; + ssl->out_msg[4] = MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA256; } + ssl->out_msg[5] = mbedtls_ssl_sig_from_pk(mbedtls_ssl_own_key(ssl)); + + /* Info from md_alg will be used instead */ + hashlen = 0; + offset = 2; #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED) if (ssl->handshake->ecrs_enabled) { @@ -4103,7 +3338,9 @@ static int ssl_write_certificate_verify(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) if ((ret = mbedtls_pk_sign_restartable(mbedtls_ssl_own_key(ssl), md_alg, hash_start, hashlen, - ssl->out_msg + 6 + offset, &n, + ssl->out_msg + 6 + offset, + out_buf_len - 6 - offset, + &n, ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng, rs_ctx)) != 0) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_pk_sign", ret); #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED) @@ -4174,21 +3411,20 @@ static int ssl_parse_new_session_ticket(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad new session ticket message")); mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; } msg = ssl->in_msg + mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len(ssl); - lifetime = (((uint32_t) msg[0]) << 24) | (msg[1] << 16) | - (msg[2] << 8) | (msg[3]); + lifetime = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE(msg, 0); - ticket_len = (msg[4] << 8) | (msg[5]); + ticket_len = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(msg, 4); if (ticket_len + 6 + mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len(ssl) != ssl->in_hslen) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad new session ticket message")); mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; } MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("ticket length: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET, ticket_len)); @@ -4206,16 +3442,14 @@ static int ssl_parse_new_session_ticket(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) } if (ssl->session != NULL && ssl->session->ticket != NULL) { - mbedtls_platform_zeroize(ssl->session->ticket, + mbedtls_zeroize_and_free(ssl->session->ticket, ssl->session->ticket_len); - mbedtls_free(ssl->session->ticket); ssl->session->ticket = NULL; ssl->session->ticket_len = 0; } - mbedtls_platform_zeroize(ssl->session_negotiate->ticket, + mbedtls_zeroize_and_free(ssl->session_negotiate->ticket, ssl->session_negotiate->ticket_len); - mbedtls_free(ssl->session_negotiate->ticket); ssl->session_negotiate->ticket = NULL; ssl->session_negotiate->ticket_len = 0; @@ -4253,31 +3487,12 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_handshake_client_step(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) { int ret = 0; - if (ssl->state == MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER || ssl->handshake == NULL) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; - } - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("client state: %d", ssl->state)); - - if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_flush_output(ssl)) != 0) { - return ret; - } - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) - if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM && - ssl->handshake->retransmit_state == MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_SENDING) { - if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_flight_transmit(ssl)) != 0) { - return ret; - } - } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ - /* Change state now, so that it is right in mbedtls_ssl_read_record(), used * by DTLS for dropping out-of-sequence ChangeCipherSpec records */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) if (ssl->state == MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC && ssl->handshake->new_session_ticket != 0) { - ssl->state = MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NEW_SESSION_TICKET; + ssl->state = MBEDTLS_SSL_NEW_SESSION_TICKET; } #endif @@ -4290,7 +3505,7 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_handshake_client_step(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) * ==> ClientHello */ case MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_HELLO: - ret = ssl_write_client_hello(ssl); + ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_client_hello(ssl); break; /* @@ -4353,7 +3568,7 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_handshake_client_step(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) * Finished */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) - case MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NEW_SESSION_TICKET: + case MBEDTLS_SSL_NEW_SESSION_TICKET: ret = ssl_parse_new_session_ticket(ssl); break; #endif @@ -4382,4 +3597,5 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_handshake_client_step(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) return ret; } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C && MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ssl_srv.c b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ssl_tls12_server.c similarity index 69% rename from thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ssl_srv.c rename to thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ssl_tls12_server.c index 544e50e67531..b49a8ae6a6f7 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ssl_srv.c +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ssl_tls12_server.c @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ /* - * SSLv3/TLSv1 server-side functions + * TLS server-side functions * * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later @@ -7,13 +7,13 @@ #include "common.h" -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) #include "mbedtls/platform.h" #include "mbedtls/ssl.h" -#include "mbedtls/ssl_internal.h" -#include "mbedtls/debug.h" +#include "ssl_misc.h" +#include "debug_internal.h" #include "mbedtls/error.h" #include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" #include "constant_time_internal.h" @@ -21,6 +21,21 @@ #include +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +/* Define a local translating function to save code size by not using too many + * arguments in each translating place. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDH_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDHE_ENABLED) +static int local_err_translation(psa_status_t status) +{ + return psa_status_to_mbedtls(status, psa_to_ssl_errors, + ARRAY_LENGTH(psa_to_ssl_errors), + psa_generic_status_to_mbedtls); +} +#define PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status) local_err_translation(status) +#endif +#endif + #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) #include "mbedtls/ecp.h" #endif @@ -61,69 +76,6 @@ void mbedtls_ssl_conf_dtls_cookies(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, } #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) -MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL -static int ssl_parse_servername_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - const unsigned char *buf, - size_t len) -{ - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - size_t servername_list_size, hostname_len; - const unsigned char *p; - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("parse ServerName extension")); - - if (len < 2) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message")); - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO; - } - servername_list_size = ((buf[0] << 8) | (buf[1])); - if (servername_list_size + 2 != len) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message")); - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO; - } - - p = buf + 2; - while (servername_list_size > 2) { - hostname_len = ((p[1] << 8) | p[2]); - if (hostname_len + 3 > servername_list_size) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message")); - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO; - } - - if (p[0] == MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SERVERNAME_HOSTNAME) { - ret = ssl->conf->f_sni(ssl->conf->p_sni, - ssl, p + 3, hostname_len); - if (ret != 0) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "ssl_sni_wrapper", ret); - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO; - } - return 0; - } - - servername_list_size -= hostname_len + 3; - p += hostname_len + 3; - } - - if (servername_list_size != 0) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message")); - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO; - } - - return 0; -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION */ - #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED) MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL static int ssl_conf_has_psk_or_cb(mbedtls_ssl_config const *conf) @@ -136,9 +88,6 @@ static int ssl_conf_has_psk_or_cb(mbedtls_ssl_config const *conf) return 0; } - if (conf->psk != NULL && conf->psk_len != 0) { - return 1; - } #if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) if (!mbedtls_svc_key_id_is_null(conf->psk_opaque)) { @@ -146,31 +95,12 @@ static int ssl_conf_has_psk_or_cb(mbedtls_ssl_config const *conf) } #endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ - return 0; -} - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) -MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL -static int ssl_use_opaque_psk(mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl) -{ - if (ssl->conf->f_psk != NULL) { - /* If we've used a callback to select the PSK, - * the static configuration is irrelevant. */ - - if (!mbedtls_svc_key_id_is_null(ssl->handshake->psk_opaque)) { - return 1; - } - - return 0; - } - - if (!mbedtls_svc_key_id_is_null(ssl->conf->psk_opaque)) { + if (conf->psk != NULL && conf->psk_len != 0) { return 1; } return 0; } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED */ MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL @@ -188,7 +118,7 @@ static int ssl_parse_renegotiation_info(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("non-matching renegotiation info")); mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; } } else #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */ @@ -197,7 +127,7 @@ static int ssl_parse_renegotiation_info(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("non-zero length renegotiation info")); mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; } ssl->secure_renegotiation = MBEDTLS_SSL_SECURE_RENEGOTIATION; @@ -206,123 +136,77 @@ static int ssl_parse_renegotiation_info(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, return 0; } -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && \ - defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) - +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDH_OR_ECDHE_1_2_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDSA_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) /* - * Status of the implementation of signature-algorithms extension: + * Function for parsing a supported groups (TLS 1.3) or supported elliptic + * curves (TLS 1.2) extension. + * + * The "extension_data" field of a supported groups extension contains a + * "NamedGroupList" value (TLS 1.3 RFC8446): + * enum { + * secp256r1(0x0017), secp384r1(0x0018), secp521r1(0x0019), + * x25519(0x001D), x448(0x001E), + * ffdhe2048(0x0100), ffdhe3072(0x0101), ffdhe4096(0x0102), + * ffdhe6144(0x0103), ffdhe8192(0x0104), + * ffdhe_private_use(0x01FC..0x01FF), + * ecdhe_private_use(0xFE00..0xFEFF), + * (0xFFFF) + * } NamedGroup; + * struct { + * NamedGroup named_group_list<2..2^16-1>; + * } NamedGroupList; * - * Currently, we are only considering the signature-algorithm extension - * to pick a ciphersuite which allows us to send the ServerKeyExchange - * message with a signature-hash combination that the user allows. + * The "extension_data" field of a supported elliptic curves extension contains + * a "NamedCurveList" value (TLS 1.2 RFC 8422): + * enum { + * deprecated(1..22), + * secp256r1 (23), secp384r1 (24), secp521r1 (25), + * x25519(29), x448(30), + * reserved (0xFE00..0xFEFF), + * deprecated(0xFF01..0xFF02), + * (0xFFFF) + * } NamedCurve; + * struct { + * NamedCurve named_curve_list<2..2^16-1> + * } NamedCurveList; * - * We do *not* check whether all certificates in our certificate - * chain are signed with an allowed signature-hash pair. - * This needs to be done at a later stage. + * The TLS 1.3 supported groups extension was defined to be a compatible + * generalization of the TLS 1.2 supported elliptic curves extension. They both + * share the same extension identifier. * */ MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL -static int ssl_parse_signature_algorithms_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - const unsigned char *buf, - size_t len) -{ - size_t sig_alg_list_size; - - const unsigned char *p; - const unsigned char *end = buf + len; - - mbedtls_md_type_t md_cur; - mbedtls_pk_type_t sig_cur; - - if (len < 2) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message")); - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO; - } - sig_alg_list_size = ((buf[0] << 8) | (buf[1])); - if (sig_alg_list_size + 2 != len || - sig_alg_list_size % 2 != 0) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message")); - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO; - } - - /* Currently we only guarantee signing the ServerKeyExchange message according - * to the constraints specified in this extension (see above), so it suffices - * to remember only one suitable hash for each possible signature algorithm. - * - * This will change when we also consider certificate signatures, - * in which case we will need to remember the whole signature-hash - * pair list from the extension. - */ - - for (p = buf + 2; p < end; p += 2) { - /* Silently ignore unknown signature or hash algorithms. */ - - if ((sig_cur = mbedtls_ssl_pk_alg_from_sig(p[1])) == MBEDTLS_PK_NONE) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("client hello v3, signature_algorithm ext" - " unknown sig alg encoding %d", p[1])); - continue; - } - - /* Check if we support the hash the user proposes */ - md_cur = mbedtls_ssl_md_alg_from_hash(p[0]); - if (md_cur == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("client hello v3, signature_algorithm ext:" - " unknown hash alg encoding %d", p[0])); - continue; - } - - if (mbedtls_ssl_check_sig_hash(ssl, md_cur) == 0) { - mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_add(&ssl->handshake->hash_algs, sig_cur, md_cur); - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("client hello v3, signature_algorithm ext:" - " match sig %u and hash %u", - (unsigned) sig_cur, (unsigned) md_cur)); - } else { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("client hello v3, signature_algorithm ext: " - "hash alg %u not supported", (unsigned) md_cur)); - } - } - - return 0; -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 && - MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) -MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL -static int ssl_parse_supported_elliptic_curves(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - const unsigned char *buf, - size_t len) +static int ssl_parse_supported_groups_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *buf, + size_t len) { size_t list_size, our_size; const unsigned char *p; - const mbedtls_ecp_curve_info *curve_info, **curves; + uint16_t *curves_tls_id; if (len < 2) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message")); mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; } - list_size = ((buf[0] << 8) | (buf[1])); + list_size = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(buf, 0); if (list_size + 2 != len || list_size % 2 != 0) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message")); mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; } /* Should never happen unless client duplicates the extension */ - if (ssl->handshake->curves != NULL) { + if (ssl->handshake->curves_tls_id != NULL) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message")); mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO; + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; } /* Don't allow our peer to make us allocate too much memory, @@ -332,20 +216,22 @@ static int ssl_parse_supported_elliptic_curves(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, our_size = MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_MAX; } - if ((curves = mbedtls_calloc(our_size, sizeof(*curves))) == NULL) { + if ((curves_tls_id = mbedtls_calloc(our_size, + sizeof(*curves_tls_id))) == NULL) { mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_INTERNAL_ERROR); return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED; } - ssl->handshake->curves = curves; + ssl->handshake->curves_tls_id = curves_tls_id; p = buf + 2; while (list_size > 0 && our_size > 1) { - curve_info = mbedtls_ecp_curve_info_from_tls_id((p[0] << 8) | p[1]); + uint16_t curr_tls_id = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(p, 0); - if (curve_info != NULL) { - *curves++ = curve_info; + if (mbedtls_ssl_get_ecp_group_id_from_tls_id(curr_tls_id) != + MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE) { + *curves_tls_id++ = curr_tls_id; our_size--; } @@ -368,7 +254,7 @@ static int ssl_parse_supported_point_formats(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message")); mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; } list_size = buf[0]; @@ -376,12 +262,15 @@ static int ssl_parse_supported_point_formats(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, while (list_size > 0) { if (p[0] == MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_UNCOMPRESSED || p[0] == MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_COMPRESSED) { -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDH_OR_ECDHE_1_2_ENABLED) ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx.point_format = p[0]; -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) - ssl->handshake->ecjpake_ctx.point_format = p[0]; -#endif +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO && MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDH_OR_ECDHE_1_2_ENABLED */ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) + mbedtls_ecjpake_set_point_format(&ssl->handshake->ecjpake_ctx, + p[0]); +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO && MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(4, ("point format selected: %d", p[0])); return 0; } @@ -392,7 +281,8 @@ static int ssl_parse_supported_point_formats(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, return 0; } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDH_C || MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C || +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDH_OR_ECDHE_1_2_ENABLED || + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDSA_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED || MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) @@ -403,11 +293,32 @@ static int ssl_parse_ecjpake_kkpp(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - if (mbedtls_ecjpake_check(&ssl->handshake->ecjpake_ctx) != 0) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + if (ssl->handshake->psa_pake_ctx_is_ok != 1) +#else + if (mbedtls_ecjpake_check(&ssl->handshake->ecjpake_ctx) != 0) +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("skip ecjpake kkpp extension")); return 0; } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + if ((ret = mbedtls_psa_ecjpake_read_round( + &ssl->handshake->psa_pake_ctx, buf, len, + MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_ROUND_ONE)) != 0) { + psa_destroy_key(ssl->handshake->psa_pake_password); + psa_pake_abort(&ssl->handshake->psa_pake_ctx); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "psa_pake_input round one", ret); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( + ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); + + return ret; + } +#else if ((ret = mbedtls_ecjpake_read_round_one(&ssl->handshake->ecjpake_ctx, buf, len)) != 0) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ecjpake_read_round_one", ret); @@ -415,6 +326,7 @@ static int ssl_parse_ecjpake_kkpp(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER); return ret; } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ /* Only mark the extension as OK when we're sure it is */ ssl->handshake->cli_exts |= MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ECJPAKE_KKPP_OK; @@ -433,7 +345,7 @@ static int ssl_parse_max_fragment_length_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message")); mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; } ssl->session_negotiate->mfl_code = buf[0]; @@ -455,13 +367,10 @@ static int ssl_parse_cid_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message")); mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; } /* - * Quoting draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-05 - * https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-05 - * * struct { * opaque cid<0..2^8-1>; * } ConnectionId; @@ -470,8 +379,8 @@ static int ssl_parse_cid_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, if (len < 1) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message")); mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO; + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; } peer_cid_len = *buf++; @@ -480,8 +389,8 @@ static int ssl_parse_cid_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, if (len != peer_cid_len) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message")); mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO; + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; } /* Ignore CID if the user has disabled its use. */ @@ -496,7 +405,7 @@ static int ssl_parse_cid_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message")); mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; } ssl->handshake->cid_in_use = MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_ENABLED; @@ -510,29 +419,6 @@ static int ssl_parse_cid_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, } #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC) -MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL -static int ssl_parse_truncated_hmac_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - const unsigned char *buf, - size_t len) -{ - if (len != 0) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message")); - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO; - } - - ((void) buf); - - if (ssl->conf->trunc_hmac == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNC_HMAC_ENABLED) { - ssl->session_negotiate->trunc_hmac = MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNC_HMAC_ENABLED; - } - - return 0; -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC */ - #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL static int ssl_parse_encrypt_then_mac_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, @@ -543,13 +429,12 @@ static int ssl_parse_encrypt_then_mac_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message")); mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; } ((void) buf); - if (ssl->conf->encrypt_then_mac == MBEDTLS_SSL_ETM_ENABLED && - ssl->minor_ver != MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0) { + if (ssl->conf->encrypt_then_mac == MBEDTLS_SSL_ETM_ENABLED) { ssl->session_negotiate->encrypt_then_mac = MBEDTLS_SSL_ETM_ENABLED; } @@ -567,13 +452,12 @@ static int ssl_parse_extended_ms_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message")); mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; } ((void) buf); - if (ssl->conf->extended_ms == MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MS_ENABLED && - ssl->minor_ver != MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0) { + if (ssl->conf->extended_ms == MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MS_ENABLED) { ssl->handshake->extended_ms = MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MS_ENABLED; } @@ -655,88 +539,6 @@ static int ssl_parse_session_ticket_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, } #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN) -MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL -static int ssl_parse_alpn_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - const unsigned char *buf, size_t len) -{ - size_t list_len, cur_len, ours_len; - const unsigned char *theirs, *start, *end; - const char **ours; - - /* If ALPN not configured, just ignore the extension */ - if (ssl->conf->alpn_list == NULL) { - return 0; - } - - /* - * opaque ProtocolName<1..2^8-1>; - * - * struct { - * ProtocolName protocol_name_list<2..2^16-1> - * } ProtocolNameList; - */ - - /* Min length is 2 (list_len) + 1 (name_len) + 1 (name) */ - if (len < 4) { - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO; - } - - list_len = (buf[0] << 8) | buf[1]; - if (list_len != len - 2) { - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO; - } - - /* - * Validate peer's list (lengths) - */ - start = buf + 2; - end = buf + len; - for (theirs = start; theirs != end; theirs += cur_len) { - cur_len = *theirs++; - - /* Current identifier must fit in list */ - if (cur_len > (size_t) (end - theirs)) { - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO; - } - - /* Empty strings MUST NOT be included */ - if (cur_len == 0) { - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO; - } - } - - /* - * Use our order of preference - */ - for (ours = ssl->conf->alpn_list; *ours != NULL; ours++) { - ours_len = strlen(*ours); - for (theirs = start; theirs != end; theirs += cur_len) { - cur_len = *theirs++; - - if (cur_len == ours_len && - memcmp(theirs, *ours, cur_len) == 0) { - ssl->alpn_chosen = *ours; - return 0; - } - } - } - - /* If we get there, no match was found */ - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO; -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN */ - #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP) MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL static int ssl_parse_use_srtp_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, @@ -776,8 +578,8 @@ static int ssl_parse_use_srtp_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, */ if (len < size_of_lengths) { mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO; + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; } ssl->dtls_srtp_info.chosen_dtls_srtp_profile = MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_UNSET; @@ -790,8 +592,8 @@ static int ssl_parse_use_srtp_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, if (profile_length > len - size_of_lengths || profile_length % 2 != 0) { /* profiles are 2 bytes long, so the length must be even */ mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO; + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; } /* * parse the extension list values are defined in @@ -829,8 +631,8 @@ static int ssl_parse_use_srtp_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, if (mki_length > MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_MAX_MKI_LENGTH || mki_length + profile_length + size_of_lengths != len) { mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO; + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; } /* Parse the mki only if present and mki is supported locally */ @@ -856,24 +658,26 @@ static int ssl_parse_use_srtp_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, /* * Return 0 if the given key uses one of the acceptable curves, -1 otherwise */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDSA_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED) MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL static int ssl_check_key_curve(mbedtls_pk_context *pk, - const mbedtls_ecp_curve_info **curves) + uint16_t *curves_tls_id) { - const mbedtls_ecp_curve_info **crv = curves; - mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id = mbedtls_pk_ec(*pk)->grp.id; + uint16_t *curr_tls_id = curves_tls_id; + mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id = mbedtls_pk_get_ec_group_id(pk); + mbedtls_ecp_group_id curr_grp_id; - while (*crv != NULL) { - if ((*crv)->grp_id == grp_id) { + while (*curr_tls_id != 0) { + curr_grp_id = mbedtls_ssl_get_ecp_group_id_from_tls_id(*curr_tls_id); + if (curr_grp_id == grp_id) { return 0; } - crv++; + curr_tls_id++; } return -1; } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDSA_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED */ /* * Try picking a certificate for this ciphersuite, @@ -883,9 +687,16 @@ MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL static int ssl_pick_cert(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info) { - mbedtls_ssl_key_cert *cur, *list, *fallback = NULL; + mbedtls_ssl_key_cert *cur, *list; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + psa_algorithm_t pk_alg = + mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_sig_pk_psa_alg(ciphersuite_info); + psa_key_usage_t pk_usage = + mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_sig_pk_psa_usage(ciphersuite_info); +#else mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_alg = mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_sig_pk_alg(ciphersuite_info); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ uint32_t flags; #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) @@ -895,7 +706,13 @@ static int ssl_pick_cert(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, #endif list = ssl->conf->key_cert; - if (pk_alg == MBEDTLS_PK_NONE) { + int pk_alg_is_none = 0; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + pk_alg_is_none = (pk_alg == PSA_ALG_NONE); +#else + pk_alg_is_none = (pk_alg == MBEDTLS_PK_NONE); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + if (pk_alg_is_none) { return 0; } @@ -911,7 +728,21 @@ static int ssl_pick_cert(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_CRT(3, "candidate certificate chain, certificate", cur->cert); - if (!mbedtls_pk_can_do(&cur->cert->pk, pk_alg)) { + int key_type_matches = 0; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE) + key_type_matches = ((ssl->conf->f_async_sign_start != NULL || + ssl->conf->f_async_decrypt_start != NULL || + mbedtls_pk_can_do_ext(cur->key, pk_alg, pk_usage)) && + mbedtls_pk_can_do_ext(&cur->cert->pk, pk_alg, pk_usage)); +#else + key_type_matches = ( + mbedtls_pk_can_do_ext(cur->key, pk_alg, pk_usage)); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE */ +#else + key_type_matches = mbedtls_pk_can_do(&cur->cert->pk, pk_alg); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + if (!key_type_matches) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("certificate mismatch: key type")); continue; } @@ -931,39 +762,19 @@ static int ssl_pick_cert(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, continue; } -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDSA_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED) if (pk_alg == MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA && - ssl_check_key_curve(&cur->cert->pk, ssl->handshake->curves) != 0) { + ssl_check_key_curve(&cur->cert->pk, + ssl->handshake->curves_tls_id) != 0) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("certificate mismatch: elliptic curve")); continue; } #endif - /* - * Try to select a SHA-1 certificate for pre-1.2 clients, but still - * present them a SHA-higher cert rather than failing if it's the only - * one we got that satisfies the other conditions. - */ - if (ssl->minor_ver < MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 && - cur->cert->sig_md != MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1) { - if (fallback == NULL) { - fallback = cur; - } - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("certificate not preferred: " - "sha-2 with pre-TLS 1.2 client")); - continue; - } - } - /* If we get there, we got a winner */ break; } - if (cur == NULL) { - cur = fallback; - } - /* Do not update ssl->handshake->key_cert unless there is a match */ if (cur != NULL) { ssl->handshake->key_cert = cur; @@ -986,8 +797,7 @@ static int ssl_ciphersuite_match(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int suite_id, { const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *suite_info; -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && \ - defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) mbedtls_pk_type_t sig_type; #endif @@ -1000,27 +810,12 @@ static int ssl_ciphersuite_match(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int suite_id, MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("trying ciphersuite: %#04x (%s)", (unsigned int) suite_id, suite_info->name)); - if (suite_info->min_minor_ver > ssl->minor_ver || - suite_info->max_minor_ver < ssl->minor_ver) { + if (suite_info->min_tls_version > ssl->tls_version || + suite_info->max_tls_version < ssl->tls_version) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("ciphersuite mismatch: version")); return 0; } -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) - if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM && - (suite_info->flags & MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_NODTLS)) { - return 0; - } -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARC4_C) - if (ssl->conf->arc4_disabled == MBEDTLS_SSL_ARC4_DISABLED && - suite_info->cipher == MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("ciphersuite mismatch: rc4")); - return 0; - } -#endif - #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) if (suite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE && (ssl->handshake->cli_exts & MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ECJPAKE_KKPP_OK) == 0) { @@ -1031,10 +826,11 @@ static int ssl_ciphersuite_match(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int suite_id, #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDH_OR_ECDHE_1_2_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDSA_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED) if (mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_ec(suite_info) && - (ssl->handshake->curves == NULL || - ssl->handshake->curves[0] == NULL)) { + (ssl->handshake->curves_tls_id == NULL || + ssl->handshake->curves_tls_id[0] == 0)) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("ciphersuite mismatch: " "no common elliptic curve")); return 0; @@ -1051,24 +847,6 @@ static int ssl_ciphersuite_match(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int suite_id, } #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && \ - defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) - /* If the ciphersuite requires signing, check whether - * a suitable hash algorithm is present. */ - if (ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3) { - sig_type = mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_sig_alg(suite_info); - if (sig_type != MBEDTLS_PK_NONE && - mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_find(&ssl->handshake->hash_algs, - sig_type) == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("ciphersuite mismatch: no suitable hash algorithm " - "for signature algorithm %u", (unsigned) sig_type)); - return 0; - } - } - -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 && - MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */ - #if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) /* * Final check: if ciphersuite requires us to have a @@ -1084,272 +862,23 @@ static int ssl_ciphersuite_match(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int suite_id, } #endif - *ciphersuite_info = suite_info; - return 0; -} - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_SUPPORT_SSLV2_CLIENT_HELLO) -MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL -static int ssl_parse_client_hello_v2(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) -{ - int ret, got_common_suite; - unsigned int i, j; - size_t n; - unsigned int ciph_len, sess_len, chal_len; - unsigned char *buf, *p; - const int *ciphersuites; - const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info; - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> parse client hello v2")); - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) - if (ssl->renego_status != MBEDTLS_SSL_INITIAL_HANDSHAKE) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("client hello v2 illegal for renegotiation")); - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO; - } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */ - - buf = ssl->in_hdr; - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "record header", buf, 5); - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("client hello v2, message type: %d", - buf[2])); - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("client hello v2, message len.: %d", - ((buf[0] & 0x7F) << 8) | buf[1])); - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("client hello v2, max. version: [%d:%d]", - buf[3], buf[4])); - - /* - * SSLv2 Client Hello - * - * Record layer: - * 0 . 1 message length - * - * SSL layer: - * 2 . 2 message type - * 3 . 4 protocol version - */ - if (buf[2] != MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CLIENT_HELLO || - buf[3] != MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message")); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO; - } - - n = ((buf[0] << 8) | buf[1]) & 0x7FFF; - - if (n < 17 || n > 512) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message")); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO; - } - - ssl->major_ver = MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3; - ssl->minor_ver = (buf[4] <= ssl->conf->max_minor_ver) - ? buf[4] : ssl->conf->max_minor_ver; - - if (ssl->minor_ver < ssl->conf->min_minor_ver) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("client only supports ssl smaller than minimum" - " [%d:%d] < [%d:%d]", - ssl->major_ver, ssl->minor_ver, - ssl->conf->min_major_ver, ssl->conf->min_minor_ver)); - - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_PROTOCOL_VERSION); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_PROTOCOL_VERSION; - } - - ssl->handshake->max_major_ver = buf[3]; - ssl->handshake->max_minor_ver = buf[4]; - - if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_fetch_input(ssl, 2 + n)) != 0) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_fetch_input", ret); - return ret; - } - - ssl->handshake->update_checksum(ssl, buf + 2, n); - - buf = ssl->in_msg; - n = ssl->in_left - 5; - - /* - * 0 . 1 ciphersuitelist length - * 2 . 3 session id length - * 4 . 5 challenge length - * 6 . .. ciphersuitelist - * .. . .. session id - * .. . .. challenge - */ - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "record contents", buf, n); - - ciph_len = (buf[0] << 8) | buf[1]; - sess_len = (buf[2] << 8) | buf[3]; - chal_len = (buf[4] << 8) | buf[5]; - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("ciph_len: %u, sess_len: %u, chal_len: %u", - ciph_len, sess_len, chal_len)); - - /* - * Make sure each parameter length is valid - */ - if (ciph_len < 3 || (ciph_len % 3) != 0) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message")); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO; - } - - if (sess_len > 32) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message")); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO; - } - - if (chal_len < 8 || chal_len > 32) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message")); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO; - } - - if (n != 6 + ciph_len + sess_len + chal_len) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message")); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO; - } - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "client hello, ciphersuitelist", - buf + 6, ciph_len); - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "client hello, session id", - buf + 6 + ciph_len, sess_len); - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "client hello, challenge", - buf + 6 + ciph_len + sess_len, chal_len); - - p = buf + 6 + ciph_len; - ssl->session_negotiate->id_len = sess_len; - memset(ssl->session_negotiate->id, 0, - sizeof(ssl->session_negotiate->id)); - memcpy(ssl->session_negotiate->id, p, ssl->session_negotiate->id_len); - - p += sess_len; - memset(ssl->handshake->randbytes, 0, 64); - memcpy(ssl->handshake->randbytes + 32 - chal_len, p, chal_len); - - /* - * Check for TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV - */ - for (i = 0, p = buf + 6; i < ciph_len; i += 3, p += 3) { - if (p[0] == 0 && p[1] == 0 && p[2] == MBEDTLS_SSL_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("received TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO ")); -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) - if (ssl->renego_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_IN_PROGRESS) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("received RENEGOTIATION SCSV " - "during renegotiation")); - - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO; - } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */ - ssl->secure_renegotiation = MBEDTLS_SSL_SECURE_RENEGOTIATION; - break; - } - } - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_FALLBACK_SCSV) - for (i = 0, p = buf + 6; i < ciph_len; i += 3, p += 3) { - if (p[0] == 0 && - MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(p, 1) != MBEDTLS_SSL_FALLBACK_SCSV_VALUE) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("received FALLBACK_SCSV")); - - if (ssl->minor_ver < ssl->conf->max_minor_ver) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("inapropriate fallback")); - - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_INAPROPRIATE_FALLBACK); - - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO; - } - - break; - } - } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_FALLBACK_SCSV */ - - got_common_suite = 0; - ciphersuites = ssl->conf->ciphersuite_list[ssl->minor_ver]; - ciphersuite_info = NULL; -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_RESPECT_CLIENT_PREFERENCE) - for (j = 0, p = buf + 6; j < ciph_len; j += 3, p += 3) { - for (i = 0; ciphersuites[i] != 0; i++) { - if (p[0] != 0 || - MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(p, 1) != ciphersuites[i]) { - continue; - } - - got_common_suite = 1; - - if ((ret = ssl_ciphersuite_match(ssl, ciphersuites[i], - &ciphersuite_info)) != 0) { - return ret; - } - - if (ciphersuite_info != NULL) { - goto have_ciphersuite_v2; - } - } - } -#else - for (i = 0; ciphersuites[i] != 0; i++) { - for (j = 0, p = buf + 6; j < ciph_len; j += 3, p += 3) { - if (p[0] != 0 || - MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(p, 1) != ciphersuites[i]) { - continue; - } - - got_common_suite = 1; - - if ((ret = ssl_ciphersuite_match(ssl, ciphersuites[i], - &ciphersuite_info)) != 0) { - return ret; - } - - if (ciphersuite_info != NULL) { - goto have_ciphersuite_v2; - } - } - } -#endif - - if (got_common_suite) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("got ciphersuites in common, " - "but none of them usable")); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NO_USABLE_CIPHERSUITE; - } else { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("got no ciphersuites in common")); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NO_CIPHER_CHOSEN; - } - -have_ciphersuite_v2: - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("selected ciphersuite: %s", ciphersuite_info->name)); - - ssl->session_negotiate->ciphersuite = ciphersuites[i]; - ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info = ciphersuite_info; - - /* - * SSLv2 Client Hello relevant renegotiation security checks - */ - if (ssl->secure_renegotiation == MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION && - ssl->conf->allow_legacy_renegotiation == MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_BREAK_HANDSHAKE) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("legacy renegotiation, breaking off handshake")); - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) + /* If the ciphersuite requires signing, check whether + * a suitable hash algorithm is present. */ + sig_type = mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_sig_alg(suite_info); + if (sig_type != MBEDTLS_PK_NONE && + mbedtls_ssl_tls12_get_preferred_hash_for_sig_alg( + ssl, mbedtls_ssl_sig_from_pk_alg(sig_type)) == MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_NONE) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("ciphersuite mismatch: no suitable hash algorithm " + "for signature algorithm %u", (unsigned) sig_type)); + return 0; } - ssl->in_left = 0; - ssl->state++; - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= parse client hello v2")); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */ + *ciphersuite_info = suite_info; return 0; } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_SUPPORT_SSLV2_CLIENT_HELLO */ /* This function doesn't alert on errors that happen early during ClientHello parsing because they might indicate that the client is @@ -1371,20 +900,18 @@ static int ssl_parse_client_hello(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) int handshake_failure = 0; const int *ciphersuites; const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info; - int major, minor; /* If there is no signature-algorithm extension present, * we need to fall back to the default values for allowed * signature-hash pairs. */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && \ - defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) int sig_hash_alg_ext_present = 0; -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 && - MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> parse client hello")); - int renegotiating = 0; + int renegotiating; + #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY) read_record_header: #endif @@ -1392,13 +919,15 @@ static int ssl_parse_client_hello(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) * If renegotiating, then the input was read with mbedtls_ssl_read_record(), * otherwise read it ourselves manually in order to support SSLv2 * ClientHello, which doesn't use the same record layer format. + * Otherwise in a scenario of TLS 1.3/TLS 1.2 version negotiation, the + * ClientHello has been already fully fetched by the TLS 1.3 code and the + * flag ssl->keep_current_message is raised. */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) - if (ssl->renego_status != MBEDTLS_SSL_INITIAL_HANDSHAKE) { - renegotiating = 1; - } + renegotiating = 0; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) + renegotiating = (ssl->renego_status != MBEDTLS_SSL_INITIAL_HANDSHAKE); #endif - if (!renegotiating) { + if (!renegotiating && !ssl->keep_current_message) { if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_fetch_input(ssl, 5)) != 0) { /* No alert on a read error. */ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_fetch_input", ret); @@ -1408,24 +937,10 @@ static int ssl_parse_client_hello(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) buf = ssl->in_hdr; -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_SUPPORT_SSLV2_CLIENT_HELLO) - int is_dtls = 0; -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) - if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM) { - is_dtls = 1; - } -#endif - if (!is_dtls) { - if ((buf[0] & 0x80) != 0) { - return ssl_parse_client_hello_v2(ssl); - } - } -#endif - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "record header", buf, mbedtls_ssl_in_hdr_len(ssl)); /* - * SSLv3/TLS Client Hello + * TLS Client Hello * * Record layer: * 0 . 0 message type @@ -1433,31 +948,20 @@ static int ssl_parse_client_hello(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) * 3 . 11 DTLS: epoch + record sequence number * 3 . 4 message length */ - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("client hello v3, message type: %d", + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("client hello, message type: %d", buf[0])); if (buf[0] != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message")); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; } - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("client hello v3, message len.: %d", - (ssl->in_len[0] << 8) | ssl->in_len[1])); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("client hello, message len.: %d", + MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(ssl->in_len, 0))); - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("client hello v3, protocol version: [%d:%d]", + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("client hello, protocol version: [%d:%d]", buf[1], buf[2])); - mbedtls_ssl_read_version(&major, &minor, ssl->conf->transport, buf + 1); - - /* According to RFC 5246 Appendix E.1, the version here is typically - * "{03,00}, the lowest version number supported by the client, [or] the - * value of ClientHello.client_version", so the only meaningful check here - * is the major version shouldn't be less than 3 */ - if (major < MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message")); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO; - } - /* For DTLS if this is the initial handshake, remember the client sequence * number to use it in our next message (RFC 6347 4.2.1) */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) @@ -1469,10 +973,11 @@ static int ssl_parse_client_hello(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) /* Epoch should be 0 for initial handshakes */ if (ssl->in_ctr[0] != 0 || ssl->in_ctr[1] != 0) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message")); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; } - memcpy(ssl->cur_out_ctr + 2, ssl->in_ctr + 2, 6); + memcpy(&ssl->cur_out_ctr[2], ssl->in_ctr + 2, + sizeof(ssl->cur_out_ctr) - 2); #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY) if (mbedtls_ssl_dtls_replay_check(ssl) != 0) { @@ -1488,7 +993,7 @@ static int ssl_parse_client_hello(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) } #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ - msg_len = (ssl->in_len[0] << 8) | ssl->in_len[1]; + msg_len = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(ssl->in_len, 0); #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) if (ssl->renego_status != MBEDTLS_SSL_INITIAL_HANDSHAKE) { @@ -1497,31 +1002,39 @@ static int ssl_parse_client_hello(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) } else #endif { - if (msg_len > MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message")); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO; - } + if (ssl->keep_current_message) { + ssl->keep_current_message = 0; + } else { + if (msg_len > MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; + } - if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_fetch_input(ssl, - mbedtls_ssl_in_hdr_len(ssl) + msg_len)) != 0) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_fetch_input", ret); - return ret; - } + if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_fetch_input(ssl, + mbedtls_ssl_in_hdr_len(ssl) + msg_len)) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_fetch_input", ret); + return ret; + } - /* Done reading this record, get ready for the next one */ + /* Done reading this record, get ready for the next one */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) - if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM) { - ssl->next_record_offset = msg_len + mbedtls_ssl_in_hdr_len(ssl); - } else + if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM) { + ssl->next_record_offset = msg_len + mbedtls_ssl_in_hdr_len(ssl); + } else #endif - ssl->in_left = 0; + ssl->in_left = 0; + } } buf = ssl->in_msg; MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "record contents", buf, msg_len); - ssl->handshake->update_checksum(ssl, buf, msg_len); + ret = ssl->handshake->update_checksum(ssl, buf, msg_len); + if (0 != ret) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, ("update_checksum"), ret); + return ret; + } /* * Handshake layer: @@ -1533,31 +1046,36 @@ static int ssl_parse_client_hello(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) */ if (msg_len < mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len(ssl)) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message")); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; } MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("client hello v3, handshake type: %d", buf[0])); if (buf[0] != MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CLIENT_HELLO) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message")); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; } + { + size_t handshake_len = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT24_BE(buf, 1); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("client hello v3, handshake len.: %u", + (unsigned) handshake_len)); + + /* The record layer has a record size limit of 2^14 - 1 and + * fragmentation is not supported, so buf[1] should be zero. */ + if (buf[1] != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message: %u != 0", + (unsigned) buf[1])); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; + } - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("client hello v3, handshake len.: %d", - (buf[1] << 16) | (buf[2] << 8) | buf[3])); - - if (buf[1] != 0) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message: %u != 0", - (unsigned) buf[1])); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO; - } - /* We don't support fragmentation of ClientHello (yet?) */ - if (msg_len != mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len(ssl) + ((buf[2] << 8) | buf[3])) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message: %u != %u + %u", - (unsigned) msg_len, - (unsigned) mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len(ssl), - (unsigned) (buf[2] << 8) | buf[3])); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO; + /* We don't support fragmentation of ClientHello (yet?) */ + if (msg_len != mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len(ssl) + handshake_len) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message: %u != %u + %u", + (unsigned) msg_len, + (unsigned) mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len(ssl), + (unsigned) handshake_len)); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; + } } #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) @@ -1569,39 +1087,39 @@ static int ssl_parse_client_hello(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) if (ssl->renego_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_IN_PROGRESS) { /* This couldn't be done in ssl_prepare_handshake_record() */ - unsigned int cli_msg_seq = (ssl->in_msg[4] << 8) | - ssl->in_msg[5]; - + unsigned int cli_msg_seq = (unsigned int) MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(ssl->in_msg, 4); if (cli_msg_seq != ssl->handshake->in_msg_seq) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message_seq: " "%u (expected %u)", cli_msg_seq, ssl->handshake->in_msg_seq)); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; } ssl->handshake->in_msg_seq++; } else #endif { - unsigned int cli_msg_seq = (ssl->in_msg[4] << 8) | - ssl->in_msg[5]; + unsigned int cli_msg_seq = (unsigned int) MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(ssl->in_msg, 4); ssl->handshake->out_msg_seq = cli_msg_seq; ssl->handshake->in_msg_seq = cli_msg_seq + 1; } - - /* - * For now we don't support fragmentation, so make sure - * fragment_offset == 0 and fragment_length == length - */ - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( - 4, ("fragment_offset=%u fragment_length=%u length=%u", - (unsigned) (ssl->in_msg[6] << 16 | ssl->in_msg[7] << 8 | ssl->in_msg[8]), - (unsigned) (ssl->in_msg[9] << 16 | ssl->in_msg[10] << 8 | ssl->in_msg[11]), - (unsigned) (ssl->in_msg[1] << 16 | ssl->in_msg[2] << 8 | ssl->in_msg[3]))); - if (ssl->in_msg[6] != 0 || ssl->in_msg[7] != 0 || ssl->in_msg[8] != 0 || - memcmp(ssl->in_msg + 1, ssl->in_msg + 9, 3) != 0) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("ClientHello fragmentation not supported")); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + { + /* + * For now we don't support fragmentation, so make sure + * fragment_offset == 0 and fragment_length == length + */ + size_t fragment_offset, fragment_length, length; + fragment_offset = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT24_BE(ssl->in_msg, 6); + fragment_length = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT24_BE(ssl->in_msg, 9); + length = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT24_BE(ssl->in_msg, 1); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( + 4, ("fragment_offset=%u fragment_length=%u length=%u", + (unsigned) fragment_offset, (unsigned) fragment_length, + (unsigned) length)); + if (fragment_offset != 0 || length != fragment_length) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("ClientHello fragmentation not supported")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + } } } #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ @@ -1610,11 +1128,11 @@ static int ssl_parse_client_hello(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) msg_len -= mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len(ssl); /* - * ClientHello layer: + * ClientHello layout: * 0 . 1 protocol version * 2 . 33 random bytes (starting with 4 bytes of Unix time) - * 34 . 35 session id length (1 byte) - * 35 . 34+x session id + * 34 . 34 session id length (1 byte) + * 35 . 34+x session id, where x = session id length from byte 34 * 35+x . 35+x DTLS only: cookie length (1 byte) * 36+x . .. DTLS only: cookie * .. . .. ciphersuite list length (2 bytes) @@ -1632,7 +1150,7 @@ static int ssl_parse_client_hello(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) */ if (msg_len < 38) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message")); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; } /* @@ -1640,28 +1158,16 @@ static int ssl_parse_client_hello(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) */ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "client hello, version", buf, 2); - mbedtls_ssl_read_version(&ssl->major_ver, &ssl->minor_ver, - ssl->conf->transport, buf); + ssl->tls_version = (mbedtls_ssl_protocol_version) mbedtls_ssl_read_version(buf, + ssl->conf->transport); + ssl->session_negotiate->tls_version = ssl->tls_version; + ssl->session_negotiate->endpoint = ssl->conf->endpoint; - ssl->handshake->max_major_ver = ssl->major_ver; - ssl->handshake->max_minor_ver = ssl->minor_ver; - - if (ssl->major_ver < ssl->conf->min_major_ver || - ssl->minor_ver < ssl->conf->min_minor_ver) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("client only supports ssl smaller than minimum" - " [%d:%d] < [%d:%d]", - ssl->major_ver, ssl->minor_ver, - ssl->conf->min_major_ver, ssl->conf->min_minor_ver)); + if (ssl->tls_version != MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("server only supports TLS 1.2")); mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_PROTOCOL_VERSION); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_PROTOCOL_VERSION; - } - - if (ssl->major_ver > ssl->conf->max_major_ver) { - ssl->major_ver = ssl->conf->max_major_ver; - ssl->minor_ver = ssl->conf->max_minor_ver; - } else if (ssl->minor_ver > ssl->conf->max_minor_ver) { - ssl->minor_ver = ssl->conf->max_minor_ver; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION; } /* @@ -1681,7 +1187,7 @@ static int ssl_parse_client_hello(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message")); mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; } MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "client hello, session id", buf + 35, sess_len); @@ -1703,8 +1209,8 @@ static int ssl_parse_client_hello(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) if (cookie_offset + 1 + cookie_len + 2 > msg_len) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message")); mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_PROTOCOL_VERSION); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO; + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; } MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "client hello, cookie", @@ -1720,10 +1226,10 @@ static int ssl_parse_client_hello(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) buf + cookie_offset + 1, cookie_len, ssl->cli_id, ssl->cli_id_len) != 0) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("cookie verification failed")); - ssl->handshake->verify_cookie_len = 1; + ssl->handshake->cookie_verify_result = 1; } else { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("cookie verification passed")); - ssl->handshake->verify_cookie_len = 0; + ssl->handshake->cookie_verify_result = 0; } } else #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY */ @@ -1732,7 +1238,7 @@ static int ssl_parse_client_hello(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) if (cookie_len != 0) { /* This may be an attacker's probe, so don't send an alert */ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message")); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; } MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("cookie verification skipped")); @@ -1746,8 +1252,7 @@ static int ssl_parse_client_hello(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ ciph_offset = 35 + sess_len; - ciph_len = (buf[ciph_offset + 0] << 8) - | (buf[ciph_offset + 1]); + ciph_len = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(buf, ciph_offset); if (ciph_len < 2 || ciph_len + 2 + ciph_offset + 1 > msg_len || /* 1 for comp. alg. len */ @@ -1755,14 +1260,17 @@ static int ssl_parse_client_hello(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message")); mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; } MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "client hello, ciphersuitelist", buf + ciph_offset + 2, ciph_len); /* - * Check the compression algorithms length and pick one + * Check the compression algorithm's length. + * The list contents are ignored because implementing + * MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_NULL is mandatory and is the only + * option supported by Mbed TLS. */ comp_offset = ciph_offset + 2 + ciph_len; @@ -1774,33 +1282,12 @@ static int ssl_parse_client_hello(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message")); mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; } MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "client hello, compression", buf + comp_offset + 1, comp_len); - ssl->session_negotiate->compression = MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_NULL; -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT) - for (i = 0; i < comp_len; ++i) { - if (buf[comp_offset + 1 + i] == MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_DEFLATE) { - ssl->session_negotiate->compression = MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_DEFLATE; - break; - } - } -#endif - - /* See comments in ssl_write_client_hello() */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) - if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM) { - ssl->session_negotiate->compression = MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_NULL; - } -#endif - - /* Do not parse the extensions if the protocol is SSLv3 */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) - if ((ssl->major_ver != 3) || (ssl->minor_ver != 0)) { -#endif /* * Check the extension length */ @@ -1810,17 +1297,16 @@ static int ssl_parse_client_hello(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message")); mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; } - ext_len = (buf[ext_offset + 0] << 8) - | (buf[ext_offset + 1]); + ext_len = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(buf, ext_offset); if (msg_len != ext_offset + 2 + ext_len) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message")); mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; } } else { ext_len = 0; @@ -1836,26 +1322,23 @@ static int ssl_parse_client_hello(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message")); mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; } - ext_id = ((ext[0] << 8) | (ext[1])); - ext_size = ((ext[2] << 8) | (ext[3])); + ext_id = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(ext, 0); + ext_size = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(ext, 2); if (ext_size + 4 > ext_len) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message")); mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; } switch (ext_id) { #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SERVERNAME: MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("found ServerName extension")); - if (ssl->conf->f_sni == NULL) { - break; - } - - ret = ssl_parse_servername_ext(ssl, ext + 4, ext_size); + ret = mbedtls_ssl_parse_server_name_ext(ssl, ext + 4, + ext + 4 + ext_size); if (ret != 0) { return ret; } @@ -1874,27 +1357,26 @@ static int ssl_parse_client_hello(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) } break; -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && \ - defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SIG_ALG: MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("found signature_algorithms extension")); - ret = ssl_parse_signature_algorithms_ext(ssl, ext + 4, ext_size); + ret = mbedtls_ssl_parse_sig_alg_ext(ssl, ext + 4, ext + 4 + ext_size); if (ret != 0) { return ret; } sig_hash_alg_ext_present = 1; break; -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 && - MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) || \ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDH_OR_ECDHE_1_2_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDSA_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED) || \ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) - case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVES: + case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_GROUPS: MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("found supported elliptic curves extension")); - ret = ssl_parse_supported_elliptic_curves(ssl, ext + 4, ext_size); + ret = ssl_parse_supported_groups_ext(ssl, ext + 4, ext_size); if (ret != 0) { return ret; } @@ -1909,7 +1391,8 @@ static int ssl_parse_client_hello(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) return ret; } break; -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDH_C || MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C || +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDH_OR_ECDHE_1_2_ENABLED || \ + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDSA_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED || MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) @@ -1934,17 +1417,6 @@ static int ssl_parse_client_hello(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) break; #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC) - case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_TRUNCATED_HMAC: - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("found truncated hmac extension")); - - ret = ssl_parse_truncated_hmac_ext(ssl, ext + 4, ext_size); - if (ret != 0) { - return ret; - } - break; -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC */ - #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_CID: MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("found CID extension")); @@ -1954,7 +1426,7 @@ static int ssl_parse_client_hello(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) return ret; } break; -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC: @@ -1993,7 +1465,8 @@ static int ssl_parse_client_hello(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ALPN: MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("found alpn extension")); - ret = ssl_parse_alpn_ext(ssl, ext + 4, ext_size); + ret = mbedtls_ssl_parse_alpn_ext(ssl, ext + 4, + ext + 4 + ext_size); if (ret != 0) { return ret; } @@ -2019,48 +1492,35 @@ static int ssl_parse_client_hello(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) ext_len -= 4 + ext_size; ext += 4 + ext_size; } -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) -} -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_FALLBACK_SCSV) - for (i = 0, p = buf + ciph_offset + 2; i < ciph_len; i += 2, p += 2) { - if (MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(p, 0) == MBEDTLS_SSL_FALLBACK_SCSV_VALUE) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("received FALLBACK_SCSV")); - - if (ssl->minor_ver < ssl->conf->max_minor_ver) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("inapropriate fallback")); - - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_INAPROPRIATE_FALLBACK); - - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO; - } - - break; - } - } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_FALLBACK_SCSV */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && \ - defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) /* * Try to fall back to default hash SHA1 if the client * hasn't provided any preferred signature-hash combinations. */ - if (sig_hash_alg_ext_present == 0) { - mbedtls_md_type_t md_default = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1; + if (!sig_hash_alg_ext_present) { + uint16_t *received_sig_algs = ssl->handshake->received_sig_algs; + const uint16_t default_sig_algs[] = { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDSA_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED) + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS12_SIG_AND_HASH_ALG(MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_ECDSA, + MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA1), +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS12_SIG_AND_HASH_ALG(MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_RSA, + MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA1), +#endif + MBEDTLS_TLS_SIG_NONE + }; - if (mbedtls_ssl_check_sig_hash(ssl, md_default) != 0) { - md_default = MBEDTLS_MD_NONE; - } + MBEDTLS_STATIC_ASSERT(sizeof(default_sig_algs) / sizeof(default_sig_algs[0]) + <= MBEDTLS_RECEIVED_SIG_ALGS_SIZE, + "default_sig_algs is too big"); - mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_const_hash(&ssl->handshake->hash_algs, md_default); + memcpy(received_sig_algs, default_sig_algs, sizeof(default_sig_algs)); } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 && - MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */ /* * Check for TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV @@ -2074,7 +1534,7 @@ static int ssl_parse_client_hello(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) "during renegotiation")); mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; } #endif ssl->secure_renegotiation = MBEDTLS_SSL_SECURE_RENEGOTIATION; @@ -2112,68 +1572,82 @@ static int ssl_parse_client_hello(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) if (handshake_failure == 1) { mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; + } + + /* + * Server certification selection (after processing TLS extensions) + */ + if (ssl->conf->f_cert_cb && (ret = ssl->conf->f_cert_cb(ssl)) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "f_cert_cb", ret); + return ret; } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) + ssl->handshake->sni_name = NULL; + ssl->handshake->sni_name_len = 0; +#endif /* * Search for a matching ciphersuite * (At the end because we need information from the EC-based extensions - * and certificate from the SNI callback triggered by the SNI extension.) + * and certificate from the SNI callback triggered by the SNI extension + * or certificate from server certificate selection callback.) */ got_common_suite = 0; - ciphersuites = ssl->conf->ciphersuite_list[ssl->minor_ver]; + ciphersuites = ssl->conf->ciphersuite_list; ciphersuite_info = NULL; -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_RESPECT_CLIENT_PREFERENCE) - for (j = 0, p = buf + ciph_offset + 2; j < ciph_len; j += 2, p += 2) { - for (i = 0; ciphersuites[i] != 0; i++) { - if (MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(p, 0) != ciphersuites[i]) { - continue; - } - got_common_suite = 1; + if (ssl->conf->respect_cli_pref == MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_CIPHERSUITE_ORDER_CLIENT) { + for (j = 0, p = buf + ciph_offset + 2; j < ciph_len; j += 2, p += 2) { + for (i = 0; ciphersuites[i] != 0; i++) { + if (MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(p, 0) != ciphersuites[i]) { + continue; + } - if ((ret = ssl_ciphersuite_match(ssl, ciphersuites[i], - &ciphersuite_info)) != 0) { - return ret; - } + got_common_suite = 1; - if (ciphersuite_info != NULL) { - goto have_ciphersuite; + if ((ret = ssl_ciphersuite_match(ssl, ciphersuites[i], + &ciphersuite_info)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + + if (ciphersuite_info != NULL) { + goto have_ciphersuite; + } } } - } -#else - for (i = 0; ciphersuites[i] != 0; i++) { - for (j = 0, p = buf + ciph_offset + 2; j < ciph_len; j += 2, p += 2) { - if (MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(p, 0) != ciphersuites[i]) { - continue; - } + } else { + for (i = 0; ciphersuites[i] != 0; i++) { + for (j = 0, p = buf + ciph_offset + 2; j < ciph_len; j += 2, p += 2) { + if (MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(p, 0) != ciphersuites[i]) { + continue; + } - got_common_suite = 1; + got_common_suite = 1; - if ((ret = ssl_ciphersuite_match(ssl, ciphersuites[i], - &ciphersuite_info)) != 0) { - return ret; - } + if ((ret = ssl_ciphersuite_match(ssl, ciphersuites[i], + &ciphersuite_info)) != 0) { + return ret; + } - if (ciphersuite_info != NULL) { - goto have_ciphersuite; + if (ciphersuite_info != NULL) { + goto have_ciphersuite; + } } } } -#endif if (got_common_suite) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("got ciphersuites in common, " "but none of them usable")); mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NO_USABLE_CIPHERSUITE; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; } else { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("got no ciphersuites in common")); mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NO_CIPHER_CHOSEN; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; } have_ciphersuite: @@ -2192,19 +1666,16 @@ static int ssl_parse_client_hello(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) /* Debugging-only output for testsuite */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C) && \ - defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && \ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) - if (ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3) { - mbedtls_pk_type_t sig_alg = mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_sig_alg(ciphersuite_info); - if (sig_alg != MBEDTLS_PK_NONE) { - mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg = mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_find(&ssl->handshake->hash_algs, - sig_alg); - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("client hello v3, signature_algorithm ext: %d", - mbedtls_ssl_hash_from_md_alg(md_alg))); - } else { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("no hash algorithm for signature algorithm " - "%u - should not happen", (unsigned) sig_alg)); - } + mbedtls_pk_type_t sig_alg = mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_sig_alg(ciphersuite_info); + if (sig_alg != MBEDTLS_PK_NONE) { + unsigned int sig_hash = mbedtls_ssl_tls12_get_preferred_hash_for_sig_alg( + ssl, mbedtls_ssl_sig_from_pk_alg(sig_alg)); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("client hello v3, signature_algorithm ext: %u", + sig_hash)); + } else { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("no hash algorithm for signature algorithm " + "%u - should not happen", (unsigned) sig_alg)); } #endif @@ -2213,30 +1684,6 @@ static int ssl_parse_client_hello(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) return 0; } -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC) -static void ssl_write_truncated_hmac_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - unsigned char *buf, - size_t *olen) -{ - unsigned char *p = buf; - - if (ssl->session_negotiate->trunc_hmac == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNC_HMAC_DISABLED) { - *olen = 0; - return; - } - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("server hello, adding truncated hmac extension")); - - MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_TRUNCATED_HMAC, p, 0); - p += 2; - - *p++ = 0x00; - *p++ = 0x00; - - *olen = 4; -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC */ - #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) static void ssl_write_cid_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char *buf, @@ -2264,9 +1711,6 @@ static void ssl_write_cid_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("server hello, adding CID extension")); /* - * Quoting draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-05 - * https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-05 - * * struct { * opaque cid<0..2^8-1>; * } ConnectionId; @@ -2284,18 +1728,13 @@ static void ssl_write_cid_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, } #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_CBC_ETM) static void ssl_write_encrypt_then_mac_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char *buf, size_t *olen) { unsigned char *p = buf; const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *suite = NULL; - const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *cipher = NULL; - - if (ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0) { - ssl->session_negotiate->encrypt_then_mac = MBEDTLS_SSL_ETM_DISABLED; - } /* * RFC 7366: "If a server receives an encrypt-then-MAC request extension @@ -2303,11 +1742,19 @@ static void ssl_write_encrypt_then_mac_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, * with Associated Data (AEAD) ciphersuite, it MUST NOT send an * encrypt-then-MAC response extension back to the client." */ - if ((suite = mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_from_id( - ssl->session_negotiate->ciphersuite)) == NULL || - (cipher = mbedtls_cipher_info_from_type(suite->cipher)) == NULL || - cipher->mode != MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC) { + suite = mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_from_id( + ssl->session_negotiate->ciphersuite); + if (suite == NULL) { ssl->session_negotiate->encrypt_then_mac = MBEDTLS_SSL_ETM_DISABLED; + } else { + mbedtls_ssl_mode_t ssl_mode = + mbedtls_ssl_get_mode_from_ciphersuite( + ssl->session_negotiate->encrypt_then_mac, + suite); + + if (ssl_mode != MBEDTLS_SSL_MODE_CBC_ETM) { + ssl->session_negotiate->encrypt_then_mac = MBEDTLS_SSL_ETM_DISABLED; + } } if (ssl->session_negotiate->encrypt_then_mac == MBEDTLS_SSL_ETM_DISABLED) { @@ -2325,7 +1772,7 @@ static void ssl_write_encrypt_then_mac_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, *olen = 4; } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_CBC_ETM */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET) static void ssl_write_extended_ms_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, @@ -2334,8 +1781,7 @@ static void ssl_write_extended_ms_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, { unsigned char *p = buf; - if (ssl->handshake->extended_ms == MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MS_DISABLED || - ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0) { + if (ssl->handshake->extended_ms == MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MS_DISABLED) { *olen = 0; return; } @@ -2411,7 +1857,7 @@ static void ssl_write_renegotiation_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, *p++ = 0x00; } - *olen = p - buf; + *olen = (size_t) (p - buf); } #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH) @@ -2440,7 +1886,8 @@ static void ssl_write_max_fragment_length_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, } #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) || \ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDH_OR_ECDHE_1_2_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDSA_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED) || \ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) static void ssl_write_supported_point_formats_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char *buf, @@ -2468,7 +1915,9 @@ static void ssl_write_supported_point_formats_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, *olen = 6; } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDH_C || MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C || MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDH_OR_ECDHE_1_2_ENABLED || + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDSA_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED || + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) static void ssl_write_ecjpake_kkpp_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, @@ -2498,13 +1947,25 @@ static void ssl_write_ecjpake_kkpp_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ECJPAKE_KKPP, p, 0); p += 2; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + ret = mbedtls_psa_ecjpake_write_round(&ssl->handshake->psa_pake_ctx, + p + 2, (size_t) (end - p - 2), &kkpp_len, + MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_ROUND_ONE); + if (ret != 0) { + psa_destroy_key(ssl->handshake->psa_pake_password); + psa_pake_abort(&ssl->handshake->psa_pake_ctx); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "psa_pake_output", ret); + return; + } +#else ret = mbedtls_ecjpake_write_round_one(&ssl->handshake->ecjpake_ctx, - p + 2, end - p - 2, &kkpp_len, + p + 2, (size_t) (end - p - 2), &kkpp_len, ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng); if (ret != 0) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ecjpake_write_round_one", ret); return; } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(kkpp_len, p, 0); p += 2; @@ -2513,38 +1974,6 @@ static void ssl_write_ecjpake_kkpp_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, } #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN) -static void ssl_write_alpn_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - unsigned char *buf, size_t *olen) -{ - if (ssl->alpn_chosen == NULL) { - *olen = 0; - return; - } - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("server hello, adding alpn extension")); - - /* - * 0 . 1 ext identifier - * 2 . 3 ext length - * 4 . 5 protocol list length - * 6 . 6 protocol name length - * 7 . 7+n protocol name - */ - MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ALPN, buf, 0); - - *olen = 7 + strlen(ssl->alpn_chosen); - - MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(*olen - 4, buf, 2); - - MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(*olen - 6, buf, 4); - - buf[6] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(*olen - 7); - - memcpy(buf + 7, ssl->alpn_chosen, *olen - 7); -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDH_C || MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C */ - #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) static void ssl_write_use_srtp_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char *buf, @@ -2627,8 +2056,7 @@ static int ssl_write_hello_verify_request(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) /* The RFC is not clear on this point, but sending the actual negotiated * version looks like the most interoperable thing to do. */ - mbedtls_ssl_write_version(ssl->major_ver, ssl->minor_ver, - ssl->conf->transport, p); + mbedtls_ssl_write_version(p, ssl->conf->transport, ssl->tls_version); MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "server version", p, 2); p += 2; @@ -2652,7 +2080,7 @@ static int ssl_write_hello_verify_request(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "cookie sent", cookie_len_byte + 1, *cookie_len_byte); - ssl->out_msglen = p - ssl->out_msg; + ssl->out_msglen = (size_t) (p - ssl->out_msg); ssl->out_msgtype = MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE; ssl->out_msg[0] = MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST; @@ -2702,17 +2130,15 @@ static void ssl_handle_id_based_session_resumption(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) mbedtls_ssl_session_init(&session_tmp); - session_tmp.id_len = session->id_len; - memcpy(session_tmp.id, session->id, session->id_len); - ret = ssl->conf->f_get_cache(ssl->conf->p_cache, + session->id, + session->id_len, &session_tmp); if (ret != 0) { goto exit; } - if (session->ciphersuite != session_tmp.ciphersuite || - session->compression != session_tmp.compression) { + if (session->ciphersuite != session_tmp.ciphersuite) { /* Mismatch between cached and negotiated session */ goto exit; } @@ -2744,7 +2170,7 @@ static int ssl_write_server_hello(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY) if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM && - ssl->handshake->verify_cookie_len != 0) { + ssl->handshake->cookie_verify_result != 0) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("client hello was not authenticated")); MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= write server hello")); @@ -2752,11 +2178,6 @@ static int ssl_write_server_hello(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) } #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY */ - if (ssl->conf->f_rng == NULL) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("no RNG provided")); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NO_RNG; - } - /* * 0 . 0 handshake type * 1 . 3 handshake length @@ -2767,8 +2188,7 @@ static int ssl_write_server_hello(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) buf = ssl->out_msg; p = buf + 4; - mbedtls_ssl_write_version(ssl->major_ver, ssl->minor_ver, - ssl->conf->transport, p); + mbedtls_ssl_write_version(p, ssl->conf->transport, ssl->tls_version); p += 2; MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("server hello, chosen version: [%d:%d]", @@ -2789,11 +2209,37 @@ static int ssl_write_server_hello(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) p += 4; #endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME */ - if ((ret = ssl->conf->f_rng(ssl->conf->p_rng, p, 28)) != 0) { + if ((ret = ssl->conf->f_rng(ssl->conf->p_rng, p, 20)) != 0) { return ret; } + p += 20; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) + /* + * RFC 8446 + * TLS 1.3 has a downgrade protection mechanism embedded in the server's + * random value. TLS 1.3 servers which negotiate TLS 1.2 or below in + * response to a ClientHello MUST set the last 8 bytes of their Random + * value specially in their ServerHello. + */ + if (mbedtls_ssl_conf_is_tls13_enabled(ssl->conf)) { + static const unsigned char magic_tls12_downgrade_string[] = + { 'D', 'O', 'W', 'N', 'G', 'R', 'D', 1 }; - p += 28; + MBEDTLS_STATIC_ASSERT( + sizeof(magic_tls12_downgrade_string) == 8, + "magic_tls12_downgrade_string does not have the expected size"); + + memcpy(p, magic_tls12_downgrade_string, + sizeof(magic_tls12_downgrade_string)); + } else +#endif + { + if ((ret = ssl->conf->f_rng(ssl->conf->p_rng, p, 8)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + } + p += 8; memcpy(ssl->handshake->randbytes + 32, buf + 6, 32); @@ -2857,17 +2303,12 @@ static int ssl_write_server_hello(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(ssl->session_negotiate->ciphersuite, p, 0); p += 2; - *p++ = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(ssl->session_negotiate->compression); + *p++ = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_NULL); MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("server hello, chosen ciphersuite: %s", mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_name(ssl->session_negotiate->ciphersuite))); MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("server hello, compress alg.: 0x%02X", - (unsigned int) ssl->session_negotiate->compression)); - - /* Do not write the extensions if the protocol is SSLv3 */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) - if ((ssl->major_ver != 3) || (ssl->minor_ver != 0)) { -#endif + (unsigned int) MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_NULL)); /* * First write extensions, then the total length @@ -2880,17 +2321,12 @@ static int ssl_write_server_hello(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) ext_len += olen; #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC) - ssl_write_truncated_hmac_ext(ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, &olen); - ext_len += olen; -#endif - #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) ssl_write_cid_ext(ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, &olen); ext_len += olen; #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_CBC_ETM) ssl_write_encrypt_then_mac_ext(ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, &olen); ext_len += olen; #endif @@ -2905,10 +2341,12 @@ static int ssl_write_server_hello(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) ext_len += olen; #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) || \ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDH_OR_ECDHE_1_2_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDSA_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED) || \ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) - if (mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_ec( - mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_from_id(ssl->session_negotiate->ciphersuite))) { + const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *suite = + mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_from_id(ssl->session_negotiate->ciphersuite); + if (suite != NULL && mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_ec(suite)) { ssl_write_supported_point_formats_ext(ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, &olen); ext_len += olen; } @@ -2920,7 +2358,12 @@ static int ssl_write_server_hello(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN) - ssl_write_alpn_ext(ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, &olen); + unsigned char *end = buf + MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN - 4; + if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_alpn_ext(ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, end, &olen)) + != 0) { + return ret; + } + ext_len += olen; #endif @@ -2937,11 +2380,7 @@ static int ssl_write_server_hello(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) p += 2 + ext_len; } -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) -} -#endif - - ssl->out_msglen = p - buf; + ssl->out_msglen = (size_t) (p - buf); ssl->out_msgtype = MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE; ssl->out_msg[0] = MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_SERVER_HELLO; @@ -3027,7 +2466,7 @@ static int ssl_write_certificate_request(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) #if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) p[1 + ct_len++] = MBEDTLS_SSL_CERT_TYPE_RSA_SIGN; #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDSA_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED) p[1 + ct_len++] = MBEDTLS_SSL_CERT_TYPE_ECDSA_SIGN; #endif @@ -3035,7 +2474,7 @@ static int ssl_write_certificate_request(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) p += ct_len; sa_len = 0; -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) + /* * Add signature_algorithms for verify (TLS 1.2) * @@ -3049,34 +2488,33 @@ static int ssl_write_certificate_request(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) * enum { (255) } HashAlgorithm; * enum { (255) } SignatureAlgorithm; */ - if (ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3) { - const int *cur; - - /* - * Supported signature algorithms - */ - for (cur = ssl->conf->sig_hashes; *cur != MBEDTLS_MD_NONE; cur++) { - unsigned char hash = mbedtls_ssl_hash_from_md_alg(*cur); + const uint16_t *sig_alg = mbedtls_ssl_get_sig_algs(ssl); + if (sig_alg == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_CONFIG; + } - if (MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_NONE == hash || mbedtls_ssl_set_calc_verify_md(ssl, hash)) { - continue; - } + for (; *sig_alg != MBEDTLS_TLS_SIG_NONE; sig_alg++) { + unsigned char hash = MBEDTLS_BYTE_1(*sig_alg); -#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) - p[2 + sa_len++] = hash; - p[2 + sa_len++] = MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_RSA; -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) - p[2 + sa_len++] = hash; - p[2 + sa_len++] = MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_ECDSA; -#endif + if (mbedtls_ssl_set_calc_verify_md(ssl, hash)) { + continue; + } + if (!mbedtls_ssl_sig_alg_is_supported(ssl, *sig_alg)) { + continue; } - MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(sa_len, p, 0); + /* Write elements at offsets starting from 1 (offset 0 is for the + * length). Thus the offset of each element is the length of the + * partial list including that element. */ sa_len += 2; - p += sa_len; + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(*sig_alg, p, sa_len); + } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ + + /* Fill in list length. */ + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(sa_len, p, 0); + sa_len += 2; + p += sa_len; /* * DistinguishedName certificate_authorities<0..2^16-1>; @@ -3092,6 +2530,16 @@ static int ssl_write_certificate_request(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) * `mbedtls_ssl_conf_ca_cb()`, then the * CertificateRequest is currently left empty. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) + if (ssl->handshake->dn_hints != NULL) { + crt = ssl->handshake->dn_hints; + } else +#endif + if (ssl->conf->dn_hints != NULL) { + crt = ssl->conf->dn_hints; + } else +#endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) if (ssl->handshake->sni_ca_chain != NULL) { crt = ssl->handshake->sni_ca_chain; @@ -3109,49 +2557,194 @@ static int ssl_write_certificate_request(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) break; } - MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(dn_size, p, 0); - p += 2; - memcpy(p, crt->subject_raw.p, dn_size); - p += dn_size; + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(dn_size, p, 0); + p += 2; + memcpy(p, crt->subject_raw.p, dn_size); + p += dn_size; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "requested DN", p - dn_size, dn_size); + + total_dn_size += (unsigned short) (2 + dn_size); + crt = crt->next; + } + } + + ssl->out_msglen = (size_t) (p - buf); + ssl->out_msgtype = MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE; + ssl->out_msg[0] = MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST; + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(total_dn_size, ssl->out_msg, 4 + ct_len + sa_len); + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg(ssl); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= write certificate request")); + + return ret; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED */ + +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED)) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_get_ecdh_params_from_cert(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_pk_context *pk; + mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_type; + psa_key_attributes_t key_attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + unsigned char buf[PSA_KEY_EXPORT_ECC_KEY_PAIR_MAX_SIZE(PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS)]; + size_t key_len; +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA) + uint16_t tls_id = 0; + psa_key_type_t key_type = PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE; + mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id; + mbedtls_ecp_keypair *key; +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA */ + + pk = mbedtls_ssl_own_key(ssl); + + if (pk == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + pk_type = mbedtls_pk_get_type(pk); + + switch (pk_type) { + case MBEDTLS_PK_OPAQUE: +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA) + case MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY: + case MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY_DH: + case MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA: +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA */ + if (!mbedtls_pk_can_do(pk, MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH; + } + + /* Get the attributes of the key previously parsed by PK module in + * order to extract its type and length (in bits). */ + status = psa_get_key_attributes(pk->priv_id, &key_attributes); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + ret = PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + goto exit; + } + ssl->handshake->xxdh_psa_type = psa_get_key_type(&key_attributes); + ssl->handshake->xxdh_psa_bits = psa_get_key_bits(&key_attributes); + + if (pk_type == MBEDTLS_PK_OPAQUE) { + /* Opaque key is created by the user (externally from Mbed TLS) + * so we assume it already has the right algorithm and flags + * set. Just copy its ID as reference. */ + ssl->handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey = pk->priv_id; + ssl->handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey_is_external = 1; + } else { + /* PK_ECKEY[_DH] and PK_ECDSA instead as parsed from the PK + * module and only have ECDSA capabilities. Since we need + * them for ECDH later, we export and then re-import them with + * proper flags and algorithm. Of course We also set key's type + * and bits that we just got above. */ + key_attributes = psa_key_attributes_init(); + psa_set_key_usage_flags(&key_attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE); + psa_set_key_algorithm(&key_attributes, PSA_ALG_ECDH); + psa_set_key_type(&key_attributes, + PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(ssl->handshake->xxdh_psa_type)); + psa_set_key_bits(&key_attributes, ssl->handshake->xxdh_psa_bits); + + status = psa_export_key(pk->priv_id, buf, sizeof(buf), &key_len); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + ret = PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + goto exit; + } + status = psa_import_key(&key_attributes, buf, key_len, + &ssl->handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + ret = PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + goto exit; + } + + /* Set this key as owned by the TLS library: it will be its duty + * to clear it exit. */ + ssl->handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey_is_external = 0; + } + + ret = 0; + break; +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA) + case MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY: + case MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY_DH: + case MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA: + key = mbedtls_pk_ec_rw(*pk); + grp_id = mbedtls_pk_get_ec_group_id(pk); + if (grp_id == MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + tls_id = mbedtls_ssl_get_tls_id_from_ecp_group_id(grp_id); + if (tls_id == 0) { + /* This elliptic curve is not supported */ + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; + } + + /* If the above conversion to TLS ID was fine, then also this one will + be, so there is no need to check the return value here */ + mbedtls_ssl_get_psa_curve_info_from_tls_id(tls_id, &key_type, + &ssl->handshake->xxdh_psa_bits); + + ssl->handshake->xxdh_psa_type = key_type; - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "requested DN", p - dn_size, dn_size); + key_attributes = psa_key_attributes_init(); + psa_set_key_usage_flags(&key_attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE); + psa_set_key_algorithm(&key_attributes, PSA_ALG_ECDH); + psa_set_key_type(&key_attributes, + PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(ssl->handshake->xxdh_psa_type)); + psa_set_key_bits(&key_attributes, ssl->handshake->xxdh_psa_bits); - total_dn_size += 2 + dn_size; - crt = crt->next; - } - } + ret = mbedtls_ecp_write_key_ext(key, &key_len, buf, sizeof(buf)); + if (ret != 0) { + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(buf, sizeof(buf)); + break; + } - ssl->out_msglen = p - buf; - ssl->out_msgtype = MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE; - ssl->out_msg[0] = MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST; - MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(total_dn_size, ssl->out_msg, 4 + ct_len + sa_len); + status = psa_import_key(&key_attributes, buf, key_len, + &ssl->handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + ret = PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(buf, sizeof(buf)); + break; + } - ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg(ssl); + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(buf, sizeof(buf)); + ret = 0; + break; +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA */ + default: + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH; + } - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= write certificate request")); +exit: + psa_reset_key_attributes(&key_attributes); + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(buf, sizeof(buf)); return ret; } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED) +#else /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL static int ssl_get_ecdh_params_from_cert(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - mbedtls_pk_context *own_key = mbedtls_ssl_own_key(ssl); - /* Check if the key is a transparent ECDH key. - * This also ensures that it is safe to call mbedtls_pk_ec(). */ - if (mbedtls_pk_get_type(own_key) != MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY && - mbedtls_pk_get_type(own_key) != MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY_DH) { + const mbedtls_pk_context *private_key = mbedtls_ssl_own_key(ssl); + if (private_key == NULL) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("got no server private key")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PRIVATE_KEY_REQUIRED; + } + + if (!mbedtls_pk_can_do(private_key, MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY)) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("server key not ECDH capable")); return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH; } if ((ret = mbedtls_ecdh_get_params(&ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx, - mbedtls_pk_ec(*own_key), + mbedtls_pk_ec_ro(*mbedtls_ssl_own_key(ssl)), MBEDTLS_ECDH_OURS)) != 0) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, ("mbedtls_ecdh_get_params"), ret); return ret; @@ -3159,6 +2752,7 @@ static int ssl_get_ecdh_params_from_cert(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) return 0; } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED) || MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED */ @@ -3209,6 +2803,14 @@ static int ssl_prepare_server_key_exchange(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, (void) signature_len; #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE_ENABLED */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE_ENABLED) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH) + size_t out_buf_len = ssl->out_buf_len - (size_t) (ssl->out_msg - ssl->out_buf); +#else + size_t out_buf_len = MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_BUFFER_LEN - (size_t) (ssl->out_msg - ssl->out_buf); +#endif +#endif + ssl->out_msglen = 4; /* header (type:1, length:3) to be written later */ /* @@ -3223,6 +2825,44 @@ static int ssl_prepare_server_key_exchange(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) if (ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + unsigned char *out_p = ssl->out_msg + ssl->out_msglen; + unsigned char *end_p = ssl->out_msg + MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN - + ssl->out_msglen; + size_t output_offset = 0; + size_t output_len = 0; + + /* + * The first 3 bytes are: + * [0] MBEDTLS_ECP_TLS_NAMED_CURVE + * [1, 2] elliptic curve's TLS ID + * + * However since we only support secp256r1 for now, we hardcode its + * TLS ID here + */ + uint16_t tls_id = mbedtls_ssl_get_tls_id_from_ecp_group_id( + MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1); + if (tls_id == 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + } + *out_p = MBEDTLS_ECP_TLS_NAMED_CURVE; + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(tls_id, out_p, 1); + output_offset += 3; + + ret = mbedtls_psa_ecjpake_write_round(&ssl->handshake->psa_pake_ctx, + out_p + output_offset, + end_p - out_p - output_offset, &output_len, + MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_ROUND_TWO); + if (ret != 0) { + psa_destroy_key(ssl->handshake->psa_pake_password); + psa_pake_abort(&ssl->handshake->psa_pake_ctx); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "psa_pake_output", ret); + return ret; + } + + output_offset += output_len; + ssl->out_msglen += output_offset; +#else size_t len = 0; ret = mbedtls_ecjpake_write_round_two( @@ -3236,6 +2876,7 @@ static int ssl_prepare_server_key_exchange(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, } ssl->out_msglen += len; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ } #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */ @@ -3285,7 +2926,7 @@ static int ssl_prepare_server_key_exchange(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, if ((ret = mbedtls_dhm_make_params( &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx, - (int) mbedtls_mpi_size(&ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.P), + (int) mbedtls_dhm_get_len(&ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx), ssl->out_msg + ssl->out_msglen, &len, ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng)) != 0) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_dhm_make_params", ret); @@ -3318,30 +2959,121 @@ static int ssl_prepare_server_key_exchange(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, * ECPoint public; * } ServerECDHParams; */ - const mbedtls_ecp_curve_info **curve = NULL; - const mbedtls_ecp_group_id *gid; + uint16_t *curr_tls_id = ssl->handshake->curves_tls_id; + const uint16_t *group_list = mbedtls_ssl_get_groups(ssl); int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t len = 0; /* Match our preference list against the offered curves */ - for (gid = ssl->conf->curve_list; *gid != MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE; gid++) { - for (curve = ssl->handshake->curves; *curve != NULL; curve++) { - if ((*curve)->grp_id == *gid) { + if ((group_list == NULL) || (curr_tls_id == NULL)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_CONFIG; + } + for (; *group_list != 0; group_list++) { + for (curr_tls_id = ssl->handshake->curves_tls_id; + *curr_tls_id != 0; curr_tls_id++) { + if (*curr_tls_id == *group_list) { goto curve_matching_done; } } } curve_matching_done: - if (curve == NULL || *curve == NULL) { + if (*curr_tls_id == 0) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("no matching curve for ECDHE")); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NO_CIPHER_CHOSEN; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("ECDHE curve: %s", + mbedtls_ssl_get_curve_name_from_tls_id(*curr_tls_id))); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_GENERIC_ERROR; + psa_key_attributes_t key_attributes; + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *handshake = ssl->handshake; + uint8_t *p = ssl->out_msg + ssl->out_msglen; + const size_t header_size = 4; // curve_type(1), namedcurve(2), + // data length(1) + const size_t data_length_size = 1; + psa_key_type_t key_type = PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE; + size_t ec_bits = 0; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("Perform PSA-based ECDH computation.")); + + /* Convert EC's TLS ID to PSA key type. */ + if (mbedtls_ssl_get_psa_curve_info_from_tls_id(*curr_tls_id, + &key_type, + &ec_bits) == PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("Invalid ecc group parse.")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; + } + handshake->xxdh_psa_type = key_type; + handshake->xxdh_psa_bits = ec_bits; + + key_attributes = psa_key_attributes_init(); + psa_set_key_usage_flags(&key_attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE); + psa_set_key_algorithm(&key_attributes, PSA_ALG_ECDH); + psa_set_key_type(&key_attributes, handshake->xxdh_psa_type); + psa_set_key_bits(&key_attributes, handshake->xxdh_psa_bits); + + /* + * ECParameters curve_params + * + * First byte is curve_type, always named_curve + */ + *p++ = MBEDTLS_ECP_TLS_NAMED_CURVE; + + /* + * Next two bytes are the namedcurve value + */ + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(*curr_tls_id, p, 0); + p += 2; + + /* Generate ECDH private key. */ + status = psa_generate_key(&key_attributes, + &handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + ret = PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "psa_generate_key", ret); + return ret; } - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("ECDHE curve: %s", (*curve)->name)); + /* + * ECPoint public + * + * First byte is data length. + * It will be filled later. p holds now the data length location. + */ + + /* Export the public part of the ECDH private key from PSA. + * Make one byte space for the length. + */ + unsigned char *own_pubkey = p + data_length_size; + + size_t own_pubkey_max_len = (size_t) (MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN + - (own_pubkey - ssl->out_msg)); + + status = psa_export_public_key(handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey, + own_pubkey, own_pubkey_max_len, + &len); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + ret = PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "psa_export_public_key", ret); + (void) psa_destroy_key(handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey); + handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + return ret; + } + + /* Store the length of the exported public key. */ + *p = (uint8_t) len; + + /* Determine full message length. */ + len += header_size; +#else + mbedtls_ecp_group_id curr_grp_id = + mbedtls_ssl_get_ecp_group_id_from_tls_id(*curr_tls_id); if ((ret = mbedtls_ecdh_setup(&ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx, - (*curve)->grp_id)) != 0) { + curr_grp_id)) != 0) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ecp_group_load", ret); return ret; } @@ -3355,14 +3087,15 @@ static int ssl_prepare_server_key_exchange(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, return ret; } + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ECDH(3, &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx, + MBEDTLS_DEBUG_ECDH_Q); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE_ENABLED) dig_signed = ssl->out_msg + ssl->out_msglen; #endif ssl->out_msglen += len; - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ECDH(3, &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx, - MBEDTLS_DEBUG_ECDH_Q); } #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDHE_ENABLED */ @@ -3374,53 +3107,39 @@ static int ssl_prepare_server_key_exchange(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE_ENABLED) if (mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_server_signature(ciphersuite_info)) { - size_t dig_signed_len = ssl->out_msg + ssl->out_msglen - dig_signed; + if (dig_signed == NULL) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("should never happen")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } + + size_t dig_signed_len = (size_t) (ssl->out_msg + ssl->out_msglen - dig_signed); size_t hashlen = 0; -#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) - unsigned char hash[PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE]; -#else unsigned char hash[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE]; -#endif + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; /* * 2.1: Choose hash algorithm: - * A: For TLS 1.2, obey signature-hash-algorithm extension - * to choose appropriate hash. - * B: For SSL3, TLS1.0, TLS1.1 and ECDHE_ECDSA, use SHA1 - * (RFC 4492, Sec. 5.4) - * C: Otherwise, use MD5 + SHA1 (RFC 4346, Sec. 7.4.3) + * For TLS 1.2, obey signature-hash-algorithm extension + * to choose appropriate hash. */ - mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg; - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) mbedtls_pk_type_t sig_alg = mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_sig_pk_alg(ciphersuite_info); - if (ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3) { - /* A: For TLS 1.2, obey signature-hash-algorithm extension - * (RFC 5246, Sec. 7.4.1.4.1). */ - if (sig_alg == MBEDTLS_PK_NONE || - (md_alg = mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_find(&ssl->handshake->hash_algs, - sig_alg)) == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("should never happen")); - /* (... because we choose a cipher suite - * only if there is a matching hash.) */ - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; - } - } else -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) - if (ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA) { - /* B: Default hash SHA1 */ - md_alg = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1; - } else -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 || MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 || \ - MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 */ - { - /* C: MD5 + SHA1 */ - md_alg = MBEDTLS_MD_NONE; + + unsigned char sig_hash = + (unsigned char) mbedtls_ssl_tls12_get_preferred_hash_for_sig_alg( + ssl, mbedtls_ssl_sig_from_pk_alg(sig_alg)); + + mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg = mbedtls_ssl_md_alg_from_hash(sig_hash); + + /* For TLS 1.2, obey signature-hash-algorithm extension + * (RFC 5246, Sec. 7.4.1.4.1). */ + if (sig_alg == MBEDTLS_PK_NONE || md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("should never happen")); + /* (... because we choose a cipher suite + * only if there is a matching hash.) */ + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; } MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("pick hash algorithm %u for signing", (unsigned) md_alg)); @@ -3428,21 +3147,6 @@ static int ssl_prepare_server_key_exchange(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, /* * 2.2: Compute the hash to be signed */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) - if (md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE) { - hashlen = 36; - ret = mbedtls_ssl_get_key_exchange_md_ssl_tls(ssl, hash, - dig_signed, - dig_signed_len); - if (ret != 0) { - return ret; - } - } else -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 || MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 || \ - MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) if (md_alg != MBEDTLS_MD_NONE) { ret = mbedtls_ssl_get_key_exchange_md_tls1_2(ssl, hash, &hashlen, dig_signed, @@ -3451,10 +3155,7 @@ static int ssl_prepare_server_key_exchange(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, if (ret != 0) { return ret; } - } else -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 || MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 || \ - MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ - { + } else { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("should never happen")); return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; } @@ -3464,30 +3165,24 @@ static int ssl_prepare_server_key_exchange(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, /* * 2.3: Compute and add the signature */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) - if (ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3) { - /* - * For TLS 1.2, we need to specify signature and hash algorithm - * explicitly through a prefix to the signature. - * - * struct { - * HashAlgorithm hash; - * SignatureAlgorithm signature; - * } SignatureAndHashAlgorithm; - * - * struct { - * SignatureAndHashAlgorithm algorithm; - * opaque signature<0..2^16-1>; - * } DigitallySigned; - * - */ + /* + * We need to specify signature and hash algorithm explicitly through + * a prefix to the signature. + * + * struct { + * HashAlgorithm hash; + * SignatureAlgorithm signature; + * } SignatureAndHashAlgorithm; + * + * struct { + * SignatureAndHashAlgorithm algorithm; + * opaque signature<0..2^16-1>; + * } DigitallySigned; + * + */ - ssl->out_msg[ssl->out_msglen++] = - mbedtls_ssl_hash_from_md_alg(md_alg); - ssl->out_msg[ssl->out_msglen++] = - mbedtls_ssl_sig_from_pk_alg(sig_alg); - } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ + ssl->out_msg[ssl->out_msglen++] = mbedtls_ssl_hash_from_md_alg(md_alg); + ssl->out_msg[ssl->out_msglen++] = mbedtls_ssl_sig_from_pk_alg(sig_alg); #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE) if (ssl->conf->f_async_sign_start != NULL) { @@ -3524,6 +3219,7 @@ static int ssl_prepare_server_key_exchange(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, if ((ret = mbedtls_pk_sign(mbedtls_ssl_own_key(ssl), md_alg, hash, hashlen, ssl->out_msg + ssl->out_msglen + 2, + out_buf_len - ssl->out_msglen - 2, signature_len, ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng)) != 0) { @@ -3687,20 +3383,20 @@ static int ssl_parse_client_dh_public(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char ** */ if (*p + 2 > end) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client key exchange message")); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; } - n = ((*p)[0] << 8) | (*p)[1]; + n = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(*p, 0); *p += 2; if (*p + n > end) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client key exchange message")); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; } if ((ret = mbedtls_dhm_read_public(&ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx, *p, n)) != 0) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_dhm_read_public", ret); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_RP; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; } *p += n; @@ -3765,24 +3461,19 @@ static int ssl_decrypt_encrypted_pms(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, /* * Prepare to decrypt the premaster using own private RSA key */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) - if (ssl->minor_ver != MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0) { - if (p + 2 > end) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client key exchange message")); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE; - } - if (*p++ != MBEDTLS_BYTE_1(len) || - *p++ != MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(len)) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client key exchange message")); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE; - } + if (p + 2 > end) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client key exchange message")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; + } + if (*p++ != MBEDTLS_BYTE_1(len) || + *p++ != MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(len)) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client key exchange message")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; } -#endif if (p + len != end) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client key exchange message")); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; } /* @@ -3834,9 +3525,8 @@ static int ssl_parse_encrypted_pms(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char *pms = ssl->handshake->premaster + pms_offset; unsigned char ver[2]; unsigned char fake_pms[48], peer_pms[48]; - unsigned char mask; - size_t i, peer_pmslen; - unsigned int diff; + size_t peer_pmslen; + mbedtls_ct_condition_t diff; /* In case of a failure in decryption, the decryption may write less than * 2 bytes of output, but we always read the first two bytes. It doesn't @@ -3859,20 +3549,16 @@ static int ssl_parse_encrypted_pms(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, } #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE */ - mbedtls_ssl_write_version(ssl->handshake->max_major_ver, - ssl->handshake->max_minor_ver, - ssl->conf->transport, ver); + mbedtls_ssl_write_version(ver, ssl->conf->transport, + ssl->session_negotiate->tls_version); /* Avoid data-dependent branches while checking for invalid * padding, to protect against timing-based Bleichenbacher-type * attacks. */ - diff = (unsigned int) ret; - diff |= peer_pmslen ^ 48; - diff |= peer_pms[0] ^ ver[0]; - diff |= peer_pms[1] ^ ver[1]; - - /* mask = diff ? 0xff : 0x00 using bit operations to avoid branches */ - mask = mbedtls_ct_uint_mask(diff); + diff = mbedtls_ct_bool(ret); + diff = mbedtls_ct_bool_or(diff, mbedtls_ct_uint_ne(peer_pmslen, 48)); + diff = mbedtls_ct_bool_or(diff, mbedtls_ct_uint_ne(peer_pms[0], ver[0])); + diff = mbedtls_ct_bool_or(diff, mbedtls_ct_uint_ne(peer_pms[1], ver[1])); /* * Protection against Bleichenbacher's attack: invalid PKCS#1 v1.5 padding @@ -3891,7 +3577,7 @@ static int ssl_parse_encrypted_pms(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, } #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ALL) - if (diff != 0) { + if (diff != MBEDTLS_CT_FALSE) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client key exchange message")); } #endif @@ -3905,9 +3591,7 @@ static int ssl_parse_encrypted_pms(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, /* Set pms to either the true or the fake PMS, without * data-dependent branches. */ - for (i = 0; i < ssl->handshake->pmslen; i++) { - pms[i] = (mask & fake_pms[i]) | ((~mask) & peer_pms[i]); - } + mbedtls_ct_memcpy_if(diff, pms, fake_pms, peer_pms, ssl->handshake->pmslen); return 0; } @@ -3932,15 +3616,15 @@ static int ssl_parse_client_psk_identity(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char */ if (end - *p < 2) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client key exchange message")); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; } - n = ((*p)[0] << 8) | (*p)[1]; + n = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(*p, 0); *p += 2; if (n == 0 || n > end - *p) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client key exchange message")); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; } if (ssl->conf->f_psk != NULL) { @@ -4002,12 +3686,12 @@ static int ssl_parse_client_key_exchange(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) if (ssl->in_msgtype != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client key exchange message")); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; } if (ssl->in_msg[0] != MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client key exchange message")); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; } #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED) @@ -4019,7 +3703,7 @@ static int ssl_parse_client_key_exchange(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) if (p != end) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client key exchange")); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; } if ((ret = mbedtls_dhm_calc_secret(&ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx, @@ -4028,7 +3712,7 @@ static int ssl_parse_client_key_exchange(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) &ssl->handshake->pmslen, ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng)) != 0) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_dhm_calc_secret", ret); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_CS; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; } MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MPI(3, "DHM: K ", &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.K); @@ -4042,10 +3726,72 @@ static int ssl_parse_client_key_exchange(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA || ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA || ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + size_t data_len = (size_t) (*p++); + size_t buf_len = (size_t) (end - p); + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_GENERIC_ERROR; + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *handshake = ssl->handshake; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("Read the peer's public key.")); + + /* + * We must have at least two bytes (1 for length, at least 1 for data) + */ + if (buf_len < 2) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("Invalid buffer length: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET, + buf_len)); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; + } + + if (data_len < 1 || data_len > buf_len) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("Invalid data length: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET + " > %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET, + data_len, buf_len)); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; + } + + /* Store peer's ECDH public key. */ + if (data_len > sizeof(handshake->xxdh_psa_peerkey)) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("Invalid public key length: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET + " > %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET, + data_len, + sizeof(handshake->xxdh_psa_peerkey))); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; + } + memcpy(handshake->xxdh_psa_peerkey, p, data_len); + handshake->xxdh_psa_peerkey_len = data_len; + + /* Compute ECDH shared secret. */ + status = psa_raw_key_agreement( + PSA_ALG_ECDH, handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey, + handshake->xxdh_psa_peerkey, handshake->xxdh_psa_peerkey_len, + handshake->premaster, sizeof(handshake->premaster), + &handshake->pmslen); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + ret = PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "psa_raw_key_agreement", ret); + if (handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey_is_external == 0) { + (void) psa_destroy_key(handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey); + } + handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + return ret; + } + + if (handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey_is_external == 0) { + status = psa_destroy_key(handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey); + + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + ret = PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "psa_destroy_key", ret); + return ret; + } + } + handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; +#else if ((ret = mbedtls_ecdh_read_public(&ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx, - p, end - p)) != 0) { + p, (size_t) (end - p))) != 0) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ecdh_read_public", ret); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_RP; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; } MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ECDH(3, &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx, @@ -4057,11 +3803,12 @@ static int ssl_parse_client_key_exchange(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE, ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng)) != 0) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ecdh_calc_secret", ret); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_CS; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; } MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ECDH(3, &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx, MBEDTLS_DEBUG_ECDH_Z); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ } else #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED || MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED || @@ -4076,21 +3823,17 @@ static int ssl_parse_client_key_exchange(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) if (p != end) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client key exchange")); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; } -#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) - /* For opaque PSKs, we perform the PSK-to-MS derivation automatically - * and skip the intermediate PMS. */ - if (ssl_use_opaque_psk(ssl) == 1) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("skip PMS generation for opaque PSK")); - } else -#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_psk_derive_premaster(ssl, - ciphersuite_info->key_exchange)) != 0) { + (mbedtls_key_exchange_type_t) ciphersuite_info-> + key_exchange)) != 0) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_psk_derive_premaster", ret); return ret; } +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ } else #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED) @@ -4111,24 +3854,19 @@ static int ssl_parse_client_key_exchange(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) return ret; } -#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) - /* Opaque PSKs are currently only supported for PSK-only. */ - if (ssl_use_opaque_psk(ssl) == 1) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("opaque PSK not supported with RSA-PSK")); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; - } -#endif - if ((ret = ssl_parse_encrypted_pms(ssl, p, end, 2)) != 0) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, ("ssl_parse_encrypted_pms"), ret); return ret; } +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_psk_derive_premaster(ssl, - ciphersuite_info->key_exchange)) != 0) { + (mbedtls_key_exchange_type_t) ciphersuite_info-> + key_exchange)) != 0) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_psk_derive_premaster", ret); return ret; } +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ } else #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED) @@ -4142,55 +3880,143 @@ static int ssl_parse_client_key_exchange(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) return ret; } -#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) - /* Opaque PSKs are currently only supported for PSK-only. */ - if (ssl_use_opaque_psk(ssl) == 1) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("opaque PSK not supported with DHE-PSK")); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; - } -#endif - if (p != end) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client key exchange")); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + unsigned char *pms = ssl->handshake->premaster; + unsigned char *pms_end = pms + sizeof(ssl->handshake->premaster); + size_t pms_len; + + /* Write length only when we know the actual value */ + if ((ret = mbedtls_dhm_calc_secret(&ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx, + pms + 2, pms_end - (pms + 2), &pms_len, + ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng)) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_dhm_calc_secret", ret); + return ret; } + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(pms_len, pms, 0); + pms += 2 + pms_len; + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MPI(3, "DHM: K ", &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.K); +#else if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_psk_derive_premaster(ssl, - ciphersuite_info->key_exchange)) != 0) { + (mbedtls_key_exchange_type_t) ciphersuite_info-> + key_exchange)) != 0) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_psk_derive_premaster", ret); return ret; } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ } else #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED) if (ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_status_t destruction_status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + uint8_t ecpoint_len; + + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *handshake = ssl->handshake; + if ((ret = ssl_parse_client_psk_identity(ssl, &p, end)) != 0) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, ("ssl_parse_client_psk_identity"), ret); + psa_destroy_key(handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey); + handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; return ret; } - if ((ret = mbedtls_ecdh_read_public(&ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx, - p, end - p)) != 0) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ecdh_read_public", ret); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_RP; + /* Keep a copy of the peer's public key */ + if (p >= end) { + psa_destroy_key(handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey); + handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; } -#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) - /* Opaque PSKs are currently only supported for PSK-only. */ - if (ssl_use_opaque_psk(ssl) == 1) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("opaque PSK not supported with ECDHE-PSK")); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + ecpoint_len = *(p++); + if ((size_t) (end - p) < ecpoint_len) { + psa_destroy_key(handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey); + handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; + } + + /* When FFDH is enabled, the array handshake->xxdh_psa_peer_key size takes into account + the sizes of the FFDH keys which are at least 2048 bits. + The size of the array is thus greater than 256 bytes which is greater than any + possible value of ecpoint_len (type uint8_t) and the check below can be skipped.*/ +#if !defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH) + if (ecpoint_len > sizeof(handshake->xxdh_psa_peerkey)) { + psa_destroy_key(handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey); + handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; } +#else + MBEDTLS_STATIC_ASSERT(sizeof(handshake->xxdh_psa_peerkey) >= UINT8_MAX, + "peer key buffer too small"); #endif + memcpy(handshake->xxdh_psa_peerkey, p, ecpoint_len); + handshake->xxdh_psa_peerkey_len = ecpoint_len; + p += ecpoint_len; + + /* As RFC 5489 section 2, the premaster secret is formed as follows: + * - a uint16 containing the length (in octets) of the ECDH computation + * - the octet string produced by the ECDH computation + * - a uint16 containing the length (in octets) of the PSK + * - the PSK itself + */ + unsigned char *psm = ssl->handshake->premaster; + const unsigned char * const psm_end = + psm + sizeof(ssl->handshake->premaster); + /* uint16 to store length (in octets) of the ECDH computation */ + const size_t zlen_size = 2; + size_t zlen = 0; + + /* Compute ECDH shared secret. */ + status = psa_raw_key_agreement(PSA_ALG_ECDH, + handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey, + handshake->xxdh_psa_peerkey, + handshake->xxdh_psa_peerkey_len, + psm + zlen_size, + psm_end - (psm + zlen_size), + &zlen); + + destruction_status = psa_destroy_key(handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey); + handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + } else if (destruction_status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(destruction_status); + } + + /* Write the ECDH computation length before the ECDH computation */ + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(zlen, psm, 0); + psm += zlen_size + zlen; + +#else /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + if ((ret = ssl_parse_client_psk_identity(ssl, &p, end)) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, ("ssl_parse_client_psk_identity"), ret); + return ret; + } + + if ((ret = mbedtls_ecdh_read_public(&ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx, + p, (size_t) (end - p))) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ecdh_read_public", ret); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; + } + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ECDH(3, &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx, MBEDTLS_DEBUG_ECDH_QP); if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_psk_derive_premaster(ssl, - ciphersuite_info->key_exchange)) != 0) { + (mbedtls_key_exchange_type_t) ciphersuite_info-> + key_exchange)) != 0) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_psk_derive_premaster", ret); return ret; } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ } else #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED) @@ -4203,11 +4029,22 @@ static int ssl_parse_client_key_exchange(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) if (ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + if ((ret = mbedtls_psa_ecjpake_read_round( + &ssl->handshake->psa_pake_ctx, p, (size_t) (end - p), + MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_ROUND_TWO)) != 0) { + psa_destroy_key(ssl->handshake->psa_pake_password); + psa_pake_abort(&ssl->handshake->psa_pake_ctx); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "psa_pake_input round two", ret); + return ret; + } +#else ret = mbedtls_ecjpake_read_round_two(&ssl->handshake->ecjpake_ctx, - p, end - p); + p, (size_t) (end - p)); if (ret != 0) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ecjpake_read_round_two", ret); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; } ret = mbedtls_ecjpake_derive_secret(&ssl->handshake->ecjpake_ctx, @@ -4217,6 +4054,7 @@ static int ssl_parse_client_key_exchange(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ecjpake_derive_secret", ret); return ret; } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ } else #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */ { @@ -4263,9 +4101,7 @@ static int ssl_parse_certificate_verify(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) unsigned char hash[48]; unsigned char *hash_start = hash; size_t hashlen; -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_alg; -#endif mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg; const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info = ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info; @@ -4306,7 +4142,7 @@ static int ssl_parse_certificate_verify(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) if (ssl->in_msgtype != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE || ssl->in_msg[0] != MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad certificate verify message")); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; } i = mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len(ssl); @@ -4327,93 +4163,74 @@ static int ssl_parse_certificate_verify(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) * opaque signature<0..2^16-1>; * } DigitallySigned; */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) - if (ssl->minor_ver != MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3) { - md_alg = MBEDTLS_MD_NONE; - hashlen = 36; - - /* For ECDSA, use SHA-1, not MD-5 + SHA-1 */ - if (mbedtls_pk_can_do(peer_pk, MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA)) { - hash_start += 16; - hashlen -= 16; - md_alg = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1; - } - } else -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 || MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 || - MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) - if (ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3) { - if (i + 2 > ssl->in_hslen) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad certificate verify message")); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY; - } + if (i + 2 > ssl->in_hslen) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad certificate verify message")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; + } - /* - * Hash - */ - md_alg = mbedtls_ssl_md_alg_from_hash(ssl->in_msg[i]); + /* + * Hash + */ + md_alg = mbedtls_ssl_md_alg_from_hash(ssl->in_msg[i]); - if (md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE || mbedtls_ssl_set_calc_verify_md(ssl, ssl->in_msg[i])) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("peer not adhering to requested sig_alg" - " for verify message")); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY; - } + if (md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE || mbedtls_ssl_set_calc_verify_md(ssl, ssl->in_msg[i])) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("peer not adhering to requested sig_alg" + " for verify message")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; + } #if !defined(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1) - if (MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1 == md_alg) { - hash_start += 16; - } + if (MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1 == md_alg) { + hash_start += 16; + } #endif - /* Info from md_alg will be used instead */ - hashlen = 0; - - i++; + /* Info from md_alg will be used instead */ + hashlen = 0; - /* - * Signature - */ - if ((pk_alg = mbedtls_ssl_pk_alg_from_sig(ssl->in_msg[i])) - == MBEDTLS_PK_NONE) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("peer not adhering to requested sig_alg" - " for verify message")); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY; - } + i++; - /* - * Check the certificate's key type matches the signature alg - */ - if (!mbedtls_pk_can_do(peer_pk, pk_alg)) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("sig_alg doesn't match cert key")); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY; - } + /* + * Signature + */ + if ((pk_alg = mbedtls_ssl_pk_alg_from_sig(ssl->in_msg[i])) + == MBEDTLS_PK_NONE) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("peer not adhering to requested sig_alg" + " for verify message")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; + } - i++; - } else -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("should never happen")); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + /* + * Check the certificate's key type matches the signature alg + */ + if (!mbedtls_pk_can_do(peer_pk, pk_alg)) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("sig_alg doesn't match cert key")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; } + i++; + if (i + 2 > ssl->in_hslen) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad certificate verify message")); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; } - sig_len = (ssl->in_msg[i] << 8) | ssl->in_msg[i+1]; + sig_len = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(ssl->in_msg, i); i += 2; if (i + sig_len != ssl->in_hslen) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad certificate verify message")); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; } /* Calculate hash and verify signature */ { size_t dummy_hlen; - ssl->handshake->calc_verify(ssl, hash, &dummy_hlen); + ret = ssl->handshake->calc_verify(ssl, hash, &dummy_hlen); + if (0 != ret) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, ("calc_verify"), ret); + return ret; + } } if ((ret = mbedtls_pk_verify(peer_pk, @@ -4423,7 +4240,11 @@ static int ssl_parse_certificate_verify(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) return ret; } - mbedtls_ssl_update_handshake_status(ssl); + ret = mbedtls_ssl_update_handshake_status(ssl); + if (0 != ret) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, ("mbedtls_ssl_update_handshake_status"), ret); + return ret; + } MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= parse certificate verify")); @@ -4455,6 +4276,9 @@ static int ssl_write_new_session_ticket(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) * 10 . 9+n ticket content */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) + ssl->session_negotiate->ticket_creation_time = mbedtls_ms_time(); +#endif if ((ret = ssl->conf->f_ticket_write(ssl->conf->p_ticket, ssl->session_negotiate, ssl->out_msg + 10, @@ -4492,25 +4316,8 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_handshake_server_step(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) { int ret = 0; - if (ssl->state == MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER || ssl->handshake == NULL) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; - } - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("server state: %d", ssl->state)); - if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_flush_output(ssl)) != 0) { - return ret; - } - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) - if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM && - ssl->handshake->retransmit_state == MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_SENDING) { - if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_flight_transmit(ssl)) != 0) { - return ret; - } - } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ - switch (ssl->state) { case MBEDTLS_SSL_HELLO_REQUEST: ssl->state = MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_HELLO; @@ -4616,4 +4423,10 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_handshake_server_step(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) return ret; } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ + +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_preference_order(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, int order) +{ + conf->respect_cli_pref = order; +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C && MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ssl_tls13_client.c b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ssl_tls13_client.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..7fcc394319f5 --- /dev/null +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ssl_tls13_client.c @@ -0,0 +1,3181 @@ +/* + * TLS 1.3 client-side functions + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) + +#include + +#include "debug_internal.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" + +#include "ssl_misc.h" +#include "ssl_client.h" +#include "ssl_tls13_keys.h" +#include "ssl_debug_helpers.h" +#include "mbedtls/psa_util.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED) +/* Define a local translating function to save code size by not using too many + * arguments in each translating place. */ +static int local_err_translation(psa_status_t status) +{ + return psa_status_to_mbedtls(status, psa_to_ssl_errors, + ARRAY_LENGTH(psa_to_ssl_errors), + psa_generic_status_to_mbedtls); +} +#define PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status) local_err_translation(status) +#endif + +/* Write extensions */ + +/* + * ssl_tls13_write_supported_versions_ext(): + * + * struct { + * ProtocolVersion versions<2..254>; + * } SupportedVersions; + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_write_supported_versions_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *buf, + unsigned char *end, + size_t *out_len) +{ + unsigned char *p = buf; + unsigned char versions_len = (ssl->handshake->min_tls_version <= + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2) ? 4 : 2; + + *out_len = 0; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("client hello, adding supported versions extension")); + + /* Check if we have space to write the extension: + * - extension_type (2 bytes) + * - extension_data_length (2 bytes) + * - versions_length (1 byte ) + * - versions (2 or 4 bytes) + */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR(p, end, 5 + versions_len); + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS, p, 0); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(versions_len + 1, p, 2); + p += 4; + + /* Length of versions */ + *p++ = versions_len; + + /* Write values of supported versions. + * They are defined by the configuration. + * Currently, we advertise only TLS 1.3 or both TLS 1.3 and TLS 1.2. + */ + mbedtls_ssl_write_version(p, MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_STREAM, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_3); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("supported version: [3:4]")); + + + if (ssl->handshake->min_tls_version <= MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2) { + mbedtls_ssl_write_version(p + 2, MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_STREAM, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("supported version: [3:3]")); + } + + *out_len = 5 + versions_len; + + mbedtls_ssl_tls13_set_hs_sent_ext_mask( + ssl, MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS); + + return 0; +} + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_parse_supported_versions_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *buf, + const unsigned char *end) +{ + ((void) ssl); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(buf, end, 2); + if (mbedtls_ssl_read_version(buf, ssl->conf->transport) != + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_3) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("unexpected version")); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, + MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; + } + + if (&buf[2] != end) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( + 1, ("supported_versions ext data length incorrect")); + MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR, + MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; + } + + return 0; +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_parse_alpn_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *buf, size_t len) +{ + const unsigned char *p = buf; + const unsigned char *end = buf + len; + size_t protocol_name_list_len, protocol_name_len; + const unsigned char *protocol_name_list_end; + + /* If we didn't send it, the server shouldn't send it */ + if (ssl->conf->alpn_list == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + /* + * opaque ProtocolName<1..2^8-1>; + * + * struct { + * ProtocolName protocol_name_list<2..2^16-1> + * } ProtocolNameList; + * + * the "ProtocolNameList" MUST contain exactly one "ProtocolName" + */ + + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, end, 2); + protocol_name_list_len = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(p, 0); + p += 2; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, end, protocol_name_list_len); + protocol_name_list_end = p + protocol_name_list_len; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, protocol_name_list_end, 1); + protocol_name_len = *p++; + + /* Check that the server chosen protocol was in our list and save it */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, protocol_name_list_end, protocol_name_len); + for (const char **alpn = ssl->conf->alpn_list; *alpn != NULL; alpn++) { + if (protocol_name_len == strlen(*alpn) && + memcmp(p, *alpn, protocol_name_len) == 0) { + ssl->alpn_chosen = *alpn; + return 0; + } + } + + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN */ + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_reset_key_share(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + uint16_t group_id = ssl->handshake->offered_group_id; + + if (group_id == 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED) + if (mbedtls_ssl_tls13_named_group_is_ecdhe(group_id) || + mbedtls_ssl_tls13_named_group_is_ffdh(group_id)) { + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + /* Destroy generated private key. */ + status = psa_destroy_key(ssl->handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + ret = PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "psa_destroy_key", ret); + return ret; + } + + ssl->handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + return 0; + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED */ + if (0 /* other KEMs? */) { + /* Do something */ + } + + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; +} + +/* + * Functions for writing key_share extension. + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_get_default_group_id(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + uint16_t *group_id) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH) || defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH) + const uint16_t *group_list = mbedtls_ssl_get_groups(ssl); + /* Pick first available ECDHE group compatible with TLS 1.3 */ + if (group_list == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_CONFIG; + } + + for (; *group_list != 0; group_list++) { +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH) + if ((mbedtls_ssl_get_psa_curve_info_from_tls_id( + *group_list, NULL, NULL) == PSA_SUCCESS) && + mbedtls_ssl_tls13_named_group_is_ecdhe(*group_list)) { + *group_id = *group_list; + return 0; + } +#endif +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH) + if (mbedtls_ssl_tls13_named_group_is_ffdh(*group_list)) { + *group_id = *group_list; + return 0; + } +#endif + } +#else + ((void) ssl); + ((void) group_id); +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH || PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH */ + + return ret; +} + +/* + * ssl_tls13_write_key_share_ext + * + * Structure of key_share extension in ClientHello: + * + * struct { + * NamedGroup group; + * opaque key_exchange<1..2^16-1>; + * } KeyShareEntry; + * struct { + * KeyShareEntry client_shares<0..2^16-1>; + * } KeyShareClientHello; + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_write_key_share_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *buf, + unsigned char *end, + size_t *out_len) +{ + unsigned char *p = buf; + unsigned char *client_shares; /* Start of client_shares */ + size_t client_shares_len; /* Length of client_shares */ + uint16_t group_id; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + + *out_len = 0; + + /* Check if we have space for header and length fields: + * - extension_type (2 bytes) + * - extension_data_length (2 bytes) + * - client_shares_length (2 bytes) + */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR(p, end, 6); + p += 6; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("client hello: adding key share extension")); + + /* HRR could already have requested something else. */ + group_id = ssl->handshake->offered_group_id; + if (!mbedtls_ssl_tls13_named_group_is_ecdhe(group_id) && + !mbedtls_ssl_tls13_named_group_is_ffdh(group_id)) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(ssl_tls13_get_default_group_id(ssl, + &group_id)); + } + + /* + * Dispatch to type-specific key generation function. + * + * So far, we're only supporting ECDHE. With the introduction + * of PQC KEMs, we'll want to have multiple branches, one per + * type of KEM, and dispatch to the corresponding crypto. And + * only one key share entry is allowed. + */ + client_shares = p; +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH) || defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH) + if (mbedtls_ssl_tls13_named_group_is_ecdhe(group_id) || + mbedtls_ssl_tls13_named_group_is_ffdh(group_id)) { + /* Pointer to group */ + unsigned char *group = p; + /* Length of key_exchange */ + size_t key_exchange_len = 0; + + /* Check there is space for header of KeyShareEntry + * - group (2 bytes) + * - key_exchange_length (2 bytes) + */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR(p, end, 4); + p += 4; + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_generate_and_write_xxdh_key_exchange( + ssl, group_id, p, end, &key_exchange_len); + p += key_exchange_len; + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + + /* Write group */ + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(group_id, group, 0); + /* Write key_exchange_length */ + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(key_exchange_len, group, 2); + } else +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH || PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH */ + if (0 /* other KEMs? */) { + /* Do something */ + } else { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } + + /* Length of client_shares */ + client_shares_len = p - client_shares; + if (client_shares_len == 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("No key share defined.")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } + /* Write extension_type */ + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_KEY_SHARE, buf, 0); + /* Write extension_data_length */ + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(client_shares_len + 2, buf, 2); + /* Write client_shares_length */ + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(client_shares_len, buf, 4); + + /* Update offered_group_id field */ + ssl->handshake->offered_group_id = group_id; + + /* Output the total length of key_share extension. */ + *out_len = p - buf; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( + 3, "client hello, key_share extension", buf, *out_len); + + mbedtls_ssl_tls13_set_hs_sent_ext_mask(ssl, MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_KEY_SHARE); + +cleanup: + + return ret; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED */ + +/* + * ssl_tls13_parse_hrr_key_share_ext() + * Parse key_share extension in Hello Retry Request + * + * struct { + * NamedGroup selected_group; + * } KeyShareHelloRetryRequest; + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_parse_hrr_key_share_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *buf, + const unsigned char *end) +{ +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH) || defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH) + const unsigned char *p = buf; + int selected_group; + int found = 0; + + const uint16_t *group_list = mbedtls_ssl_get_groups(ssl); + if (group_list == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_CONFIG; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "key_share extension", p, end - buf); + + /* Read selected_group */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, end, 2); + selected_group = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(p, 0); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("selected_group ( %d )", selected_group)); + + /* Upon receipt of this extension in a HelloRetryRequest, the client + * MUST first verify that the selected_group field corresponds to a + * group which was provided in the "supported_groups" extension in the + * original ClientHello. + * The supported_group was based on the info in ssl->conf->group_list. + * + * If the server provided a key share that was not sent in the ClientHello + * then the client MUST abort the handshake with an "illegal_parameter" alert. + */ + for (; *group_list != 0; group_list++) { +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH) + if (mbedtls_ssl_tls13_named_group_is_ecdhe(*group_list)) { + if ((mbedtls_ssl_get_psa_curve_info_from_tls_id( + *group_list, NULL, NULL) == PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED) || + *group_list != selected_group) { + found = 1; + break; + } + } +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH */ +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH) + if (mbedtls_ssl_tls13_named_group_is_ffdh(*group_list)) { + found = 1; + break; + } +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH */ + } + + /* Client MUST verify that the selected_group field does not + * correspond to a group which was provided in the "key_share" + * extension in the original ClientHello. If the server sent an + * HRR message with a key share already provided in the + * ClientHello then the client MUST abort the handshake with + * an "illegal_parameter" alert. + */ + if (found == 0 || selected_group == ssl->handshake->offered_group_id) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("Invalid key share in HRR")); + MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT( + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, + MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; + } + + /* Remember server's preference for next ClientHello */ + ssl->handshake->offered_group_id = selected_group; + + return 0; +#else /* PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH || PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH */ + (void) ssl; + (void) buf; + (void) end; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_CONFIG; +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH || PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH */ +} + +/* + * ssl_tls13_parse_key_share_ext() + * Parse key_share extension in Server Hello + * + * struct { + * KeyShareEntry server_share; + * } KeyShareServerHello; + * struct { + * NamedGroup group; + * opaque key_exchange<1..2^16-1>; + * } KeyShareEntry; + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_parse_key_share_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *buf, + const unsigned char *end) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + const unsigned char *p = buf; + uint16_t group, offered_group; + + /* ... + * NamedGroup group; (2 bytes) + * ... + */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, end, 2); + group = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(p, 0); + p += 2; + + /* Check that the chosen group matches the one we offered. */ + offered_group = ssl->handshake->offered_group_id; + if (offered_group != group) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( + 1, ("Invalid server key share, our group %u, their group %u", + (unsigned) offered_group, (unsigned) group)); + MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, + MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED) + if (mbedtls_ssl_tls13_named_group_is_ecdhe(group) || + mbedtls_ssl_tls13_named_group_is_ffdh(group)) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, + ("DHE group name: %s", mbedtls_ssl_named_group_to_str(group))); + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_read_public_xxdhe_share(ssl, p, end - p); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED */ + if (0 /* other KEMs? */) { + /* Do something */ + } else { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } + + return ret; +} + +/* + * ssl_tls13_parse_cookie_ext() + * Parse cookie extension in Hello Retry Request + * + * struct { + * opaque cookie<1..2^16-1>; + * } Cookie; + * + * When sending a HelloRetryRequest, the server MAY provide a "cookie" + * extension to the client (this is an exception to the usual rule that + * the only extensions that may be sent are those that appear in the + * ClientHello). When sending the new ClientHello, the client MUST copy + * the contents of the extension received in the HelloRetryRequest into + * a "cookie" extension in the new ClientHello. Clients MUST NOT use + * cookies in their initial ClientHello in subsequent connections. + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_parse_cookie_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *buf, + const unsigned char *end) +{ + uint16_t cookie_len; + const unsigned char *p = buf; + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *handshake = ssl->handshake; + + /* Retrieve length field of cookie */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, end, 2); + cookie_len = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(p, 0); + p += 2; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, end, cookie_len); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "cookie extension", p, cookie_len); + + mbedtls_free(handshake->cookie); + handshake->cookie_len = 0; + handshake->cookie = mbedtls_calloc(1, cookie_len); + if (handshake->cookie == NULL) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, + ("alloc failed ( %ud bytes )", + cookie_len)); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED; + } + + memcpy(handshake->cookie, p, cookie_len); + handshake->cookie_len = cookie_len; + + return 0; +} + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_write_cookie_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *buf, + unsigned char *end, + size_t *out_len) +{ + unsigned char *p = buf; + *out_len = 0; + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *handshake = ssl->handshake; + + if (handshake->cookie == NULL) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("no cookie to send; skip extension")); + return 0; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "client hello, cookie", + handshake->cookie, + handshake->cookie_len); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR(p, end, handshake->cookie_len + 6); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("client hello, adding cookie extension")); + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_COOKIE, p, 0); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(handshake->cookie_len + 2, p, 2); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(handshake->cookie_len, p, 4); + p += 6; + + /* Cookie */ + memcpy(p, handshake->cookie, handshake->cookie_len); + + *out_len = handshake->cookie_len + 6; + + mbedtls_ssl_tls13_set_hs_sent_ext_mask(ssl, MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_COOKIE); + + return 0; +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED) +/* + * ssl_tls13_write_psk_key_exchange_modes_ext() structure: + * + * enum { psk_ke( 0 ), psk_dhe_ke( 1 ), ( 255 ) } PskKeyExchangeMode; + * + * struct { + * PskKeyExchangeMode ke_modes<1..255>; + * } PskKeyExchangeModes; + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_write_psk_key_exchange_modes_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *buf, + unsigned char *end, + size_t *out_len) +{ + unsigned char *p = buf; + int ke_modes_len = 0; + + ((void) ke_modes_len); + *out_len = 0; + + /* Skip writing extension if no PSK key exchange mode + * is enabled in the config. + */ + if (!mbedtls_ssl_conf_tls13_is_some_psk_enabled(ssl)) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("skip psk_key_exchange_modes extension")); + return 0; + } + + /* Require 7 bytes of data, otherwise fail, + * even if extension might be shorter. + */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR(p, end, 7); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( + 3, ("client hello, adding psk_key_exchange_modes extension")); + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_PSK_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODES, p, 0); + + /* Skip extension length (2 bytes) and + * ke_modes length (1 byte) for now. + */ + p += 5; + + if (mbedtls_ssl_conf_tls13_is_psk_ephemeral_enabled(ssl)) { + *p++ = MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_PSK_MODE_ECDHE; + ke_modes_len++; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(4, ("Adding PSK-ECDHE key exchange mode")); + } + + if (mbedtls_ssl_conf_tls13_is_psk_enabled(ssl)) { + *p++ = MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_PSK_MODE_PURE; + ke_modes_len++; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(4, ("Adding pure PSK key exchange mode")); + } + + /* Now write the extension and ke_modes length */ + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(ke_modes_len + 1, buf, 2); + buf[4] = ke_modes_len; + + *out_len = p - buf; + + mbedtls_ssl_tls13_set_hs_sent_ext_mask( + ssl, MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_PSK_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODES); + + return 0; +} + +static psa_algorithm_t ssl_tls13_get_ciphersuite_hash_alg(int ciphersuite) +{ + const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info = NULL; + ciphersuite_info = mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_from_id(ciphersuite); + + if (ciphersuite_info != NULL) { + return mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type((mbedtls_md_type_t) ciphersuite_info->mac); + } + + return PSA_ALG_NONE; +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) +static int ssl_tls13_has_configured_ticket(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + mbedtls_ssl_session *session = ssl->session_negotiate; + return ssl->handshake->resume && + session != NULL && session->ticket != NULL && + mbedtls_ssl_conf_tls13_is_kex_mode_enabled( + ssl, mbedtls_ssl_tls13_session_get_ticket_flags( + session, MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_ALL)); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) +static int ssl_tls13_early_data_has_valid_ticket(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + mbedtls_ssl_session *session = ssl->session_negotiate; + return ssl->handshake->resume && + session->tls_version == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_3 && + mbedtls_ssl_tls13_session_ticket_allow_early_data(session) && + mbedtls_ssl_tls13_cipher_suite_is_offered(ssl, session->ciphersuite); +} +#endif + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_ticket_get_identity(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + psa_algorithm_t *hash_alg, + const unsigned char **identity, + size_t *identity_len) +{ + mbedtls_ssl_session *session = ssl->session_negotiate; + + if (!ssl_tls13_has_configured_ticket(ssl)) { + return -1; + } + + *hash_alg = ssl_tls13_get_ciphersuite_hash_alg(session->ciphersuite); + *identity = session->ticket; + *identity_len = session->ticket_len; + return 0; +} + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_ticket_get_psk(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + psa_algorithm_t *hash_alg, + const unsigned char **psk, + size_t *psk_len) +{ + + mbedtls_ssl_session *session = ssl->session_negotiate; + + if (!ssl_tls13_has_configured_ticket(ssl)) { + return -1; + } + + *hash_alg = ssl_tls13_get_ciphersuite_hash_alg(session->ciphersuite); + *psk = session->resumption_key; + *psk_len = session->resumption_key_len; + + return 0; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */ + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_psk_get_identity(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + psa_algorithm_t *hash_alg, + const unsigned char **identity, + size_t *identity_len) +{ + + if (!mbedtls_ssl_conf_has_static_psk(ssl->conf)) { + return -1; + } + + *hash_alg = PSA_ALG_SHA_256; + *identity = ssl->conf->psk_identity; + *identity_len = ssl->conf->psk_identity_len; + return 0; +} + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_psk_get_psk(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + psa_algorithm_t *hash_alg, + const unsigned char **psk, + size_t *psk_len) +{ + + if (!mbedtls_ssl_conf_has_static_psk(ssl->conf)) { + return -1; + } + + *hash_alg = PSA_ALG_SHA_256; + *psk = ssl->conf->psk; + *psk_len = ssl->conf->psk_len; + return 0; +} + +static int ssl_tls13_get_configured_psk_count(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + int configured_psk_count = 0; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) + if (ssl_tls13_has_configured_ticket(ssl)) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("Ticket is configured")); + configured_psk_count++; + } +#endif + if (mbedtls_ssl_conf_has_static_psk(ssl->conf)) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("PSK is configured")); + configured_psk_count++; + } + return configured_psk_count; +} + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_write_identity(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *buf, + unsigned char *end, + const unsigned char *identity, + size_t identity_len, + uint32_t obfuscated_ticket_age, + size_t *out_len) +{ + ((void) ssl); + *out_len = 0; + + /* + * - identity_len (2 bytes) + * - identity (psk_identity_len bytes) + * - obfuscated_ticket_age (4 bytes) + */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR(buf, end, 6 + identity_len); + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(identity_len, buf, 0); + memcpy(buf + 2, identity, identity_len); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE(obfuscated_ticket_age, buf, 2 + identity_len); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "write identity", buf, 6 + identity_len); + + *out_len = 6 + identity_len; + + return 0; +} + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_write_binder(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *buf, + unsigned char *end, + int psk_type, + psa_algorithm_t hash_alg, + const unsigned char *psk, + size_t psk_len, + size_t *out_len) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char binder_len; + unsigned char transcript[MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_MD_MAX_SIZE]; + size_t transcript_len = 0; + + *out_len = 0; + + binder_len = PSA_HASH_LENGTH(hash_alg); + + /* + * - binder_len (1 bytes) + * - binder (binder_len bytes) + */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR(buf, end, 1 + binder_len); + + buf[0] = binder_len; + + /* Get current state of handshake transcript. */ + ret = mbedtls_ssl_get_handshake_transcript( + ssl, mbedtls_md_type_from_psa_alg(hash_alg), + transcript, sizeof(transcript), &transcript_len); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_create_psk_binder(ssl, hash_alg, + psk, psk_len, psk_type, + transcript, buf + 1); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_tls13_create_psk_binder", ret); + return ret; + } + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "write binder", buf, 1 + binder_len); + + *out_len = 1 + binder_len; + + return 0; +} + +/* + * mbedtls_ssl_tls13_write_identities_of_pre_shared_key_ext() structure: + * + * struct { + * opaque identity<1..2^16-1>; + * uint32 obfuscated_ticket_age; + * } PskIdentity; + * + * opaque PskBinderEntry<32..255>; + * + * struct { + * PskIdentity identities<7..2^16-1>; + * PskBinderEntry binders<33..2^16-1>; + * } OfferedPsks; + * + * struct { + * select (Handshake.msg_type) { + * case client_hello: OfferedPsks; + * ... + * }; + * } PreSharedKeyExtension; + * + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_write_identities_of_pre_shared_key_ext( + mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char *buf, unsigned char *end, + size_t *out_len, size_t *binders_len) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + int configured_psk_count = 0; + unsigned char *p = buf; + psa_algorithm_t hash_alg = PSA_ALG_NONE; + const unsigned char *identity; + size_t identity_len; + size_t l_binders_len = 0; + size_t output_len; + + *out_len = 0; + *binders_len = 0; + + /* Check if we have any PSKs to offer. If no, skip pre_shared_key */ + configured_psk_count = ssl_tls13_get_configured_psk_count(ssl); + if (configured_psk_count == 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("skip pre_shared_key extensions")); + return 0; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(4, ("Pre-configured PSK number = %d", + configured_psk_count)); + + /* Check if we have space to write the extension, binders included. + * - extension_type (2 bytes) + * - extension_data_len (2 bytes) + * - identities_len (2 bytes) + */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR(p, end, 6); + p += 6; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) + if (ssl_tls13_ticket_get_identity( + ssl, &hash_alg, &identity, &identity_len) == 0) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) + mbedtls_ms_time_t now = mbedtls_ms_time(); + mbedtls_ssl_session *session = ssl->session_negotiate; + /* The ticket age has been checked to be smaller than the + * `ticket_lifetime` in ssl_prepare_client_hello() which is smaller than + * 7 days (enforced in ssl_tls13_parse_new_session_ticket()) . Thus the + * cast to `uint32_t` of the ticket age is safe. */ + uint32_t obfuscated_ticket_age = + (uint32_t) (now - session->ticket_reception_time); + obfuscated_ticket_age += session->ticket_age_add; + + ret = ssl_tls13_write_identity(ssl, p, end, + identity, identity_len, + obfuscated_ticket_age, + &output_len); +#else + ret = ssl_tls13_write_identity(ssl, p, end, identity, identity_len, + 0, &output_len); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME */ + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + + p += output_len; + l_binders_len += 1 + PSA_HASH_LENGTH(hash_alg); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */ + + if (ssl_tls13_psk_get_identity( + ssl, &hash_alg, &identity, &identity_len) == 0) { + + ret = ssl_tls13_write_identity(ssl, p, end, identity, identity_len, 0, + &output_len); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + + p += output_len; + l_binders_len += 1 + PSA_HASH_LENGTH(hash_alg); + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, + ("client hello, adding pre_shared_key extension, " + "omitting PSK binder list")); + + /* Take into account the two bytes for the length of the binders. */ + l_binders_len += 2; + /* Check if there is enough space for binders */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR(p, end, l_binders_len); + + /* + * - extension_type (2 bytes) + * - extension_data_len (2 bytes) + * - identities_len (2 bytes) + */ + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_PRE_SHARED_KEY, buf, 0); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(p - buf - 4 + l_binders_len, buf, 2); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(p - buf - 6, buf, 4); + + *out_len = (p - buf) + l_binders_len; + *binders_len = l_binders_len; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "pre_shared_key identities", buf, p - buf); + + return 0; +} + +int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_write_binders_of_pre_shared_key_ext( + mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char *buf, unsigned char *end) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char *p = buf; + psa_algorithm_t hash_alg = PSA_ALG_NONE; + const unsigned char *psk; + size_t psk_len; + size_t output_len; + + /* Check if we have space to write binders_len. + * - binders_len (2 bytes) + */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR(p, end, 2); + p += 2; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) + if (ssl_tls13_ticket_get_psk(ssl, &hash_alg, &psk, &psk_len) == 0) { + + ret = ssl_tls13_write_binder(ssl, p, end, + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_PSK_RESUMPTION, + hash_alg, psk, psk_len, + &output_len); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + p += output_len; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */ + + if (ssl_tls13_psk_get_psk(ssl, &hash_alg, &psk, &psk_len) == 0) { + + ret = ssl_tls13_write_binder(ssl, p, end, + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_PSK_EXTERNAL, + hash_alg, psk, psk_len, + &output_len); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + p += output_len; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("client hello, adding PSK binder list.")); + + /* + * - binders_len (2 bytes) + */ + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(p - buf - 2, buf, 0); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "pre_shared_key binders", buf, p - buf); + + mbedtls_ssl_tls13_set_hs_sent_ext_mask( + ssl, MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_PRE_SHARED_KEY); + + return 0; +} + +/* + * struct { + * opaque identity<1..2^16-1>; + * uint32 obfuscated_ticket_age; + * } PskIdentity; + * + * opaque PskBinderEntry<32..255>; + * + * struct { + * + * select (Handshake.msg_type) { + * ... + * case server_hello: uint16 selected_identity; + * }; + * + * } PreSharedKeyExtension; + * + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_parse_server_pre_shared_key_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *buf, + const unsigned char *end) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + int selected_identity; + const unsigned char *psk; + size_t psk_len; + psa_algorithm_t hash_alg; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(buf, end, 2); + selected_identity = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(buf, 0); + ssl->handshake->selected_identity = (uint16_t) selected_identity; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("selected_identity = %d", selected_identity)); + + if (selected_identity >= ssl_tls13_get_configured_psk_count(ssl)) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("Invalid PSK identity.")); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, + MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) + if (selected_identity == 0 && ssl_tls13_has_configured_ticket(ssl)) { + ret = ssl_tls13_ticket_get_psk(ssl, &hash_alg, &psk, &psk_len); + } else +#endif + if (mbedtls_ssl_conf_has_static_psk(ssl->conf)) { + ret = ssl_tls13_psk_get_psk(ssl, &hash_alg, &psk, &psk_len); + } else { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("should never happen")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + + if (mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type((mbedtls_md_type_t) ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info->mac) + != hash_alg) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( + 1, ("Invalid ciphersuite for external psk.")); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, + MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; + } + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_psk(ssl, psk, psk_len); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_psk", ret); + return ret; + } + + return 0; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED */ + +int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_write_client_hello_exts(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *buf, + unsigned char *end, + size_t *out_len) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char *p = buf; + size_t ext_len; + + *out_len = 0; + + /* Write supported_versions extension + * + * Supported Versions Extension is mandatory with TLS 1.3. + */ + ret = ssl_tls13_write_supported_versions_ext(ssl, p, end, &ext_len); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + p += ext_len; + + /* Echo the cookie if the server provided one in its preceding + * HelloRetryRequest message. + */ + ret = ssl_tls13_write_cookie_ext(ssl, p, end, &ext_len); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + p += ext_len; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT) + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_write_record_size_limit_ext( + ssl, p, end, &ext_len); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + p += ext_len; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED) + if (mbedtls_ssl_conf_tls13_is_some_ephemeral_enabled(ssl)) { + ret = ssl_tls13_write_key_share_ext(ssl, p, end, &ext_len); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + p += ext_len; + } +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) + /* In the first ClientHello, write the early data indication extension if + * necessary and update the early data state. + * If an HRR has been received and thus we are currently writing the + * second ClientHello, the second ClientHello must not contain an early + * data extension and the early data state must stay as it is: + * MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATE_NO_IND_SENT or + * MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATE_REJECTED. + */ + if (!ssl->handshake->hello_retry_request_flag) { + if (mbedtls_ssl_conf_tls13_is_some_psk_enabled(ssl) && + ssl_tls13_early_data_has_valid_ticket(ssl) && + ssl->conf->early_data_enabled == MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_ENABLED) { + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_write_early_data_ext( + ssl, 0, p, end, &ext_len); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + p += ext_len; + + ssl->early_data_state = MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATE_IND_SENT; + } else { + ssl->early_data_state = MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATE_NO_IND_SENT; + } + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED) + /* For PSK-based key exchange we need the pre_shared_key extension + * and the psk_key_exchange_modes extension. + * + * The pre_shared_key extension MUST be the last extension in the + * ClientHello. Servers MUST check that it is the last extension and + * otherwise fail the handshake with an "illegal_parameter" alert. + * + * Add the psk_key_exchange_modes extension. + */ + ret = ssl_tls13_write_psk_key_exchange_modes_ext(ssl, p, end, &ext_len); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + p += ext_len; +#endif + + *out_len = p - buf; + + return 0; +} + +int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_finalize_client_hello(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + ((void) ssl); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_algorithm_t hash_alg = PSA_ALG_NONE; + const unsigned char *psk; + size_t psk_len; + const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info; + + if (ssl->early_data_state == MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATE_IND_SENT) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( + 1, ("Set hs psk for early data when writing the first psk")); + + ret = ssl_tls13_ticket_get_psk(ssl, &hash_alg, &psk, &psk_len); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( + 1, "ssl_tls13_ticket_get_psk", ret); + return ret; + } + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_psk(ssl, psk, psk_len); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_psk", ret); + return ret; + } + + /* + * Early data are going to be encrypted using the ciphersuite + * associated with the pre-shared key used for the handshake. + * Note that if the server rejects early data, the handshake + * based on the pre-shared key may complete successfully + * with a selected ciphersuite different from the ciphersuite + * associated with the pre-shared key. Only the hashes of the + * two ciphersuites have to be the same. In that case, the + * encrypted handshake data and application data are + * encrypted using a different ciphersuite than the one used for + * the rejected early data. + */ + ciphersuite_info = mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_from_id( + ssl->session_negotiate->ciphersuite); + ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info = ciphersuite_info; + + /* Enable psk and psk_ephemeral to make stage early happy */ + ssl->handshake->key_exchange_mode = + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_ALL; + + /* Start the TLS 1.3 key schedule: + * Set the PSK and derive early secret. + */ + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_key_schedule_stage_early(ssl); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( + 1, "mbedtls_ssl_tls13_key_schedule_stage_early", ret); + return ret; + } + + /* Derive early data key material */ + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_compute_early_transform(ssl); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( + 1, "mbedtls_ssl_tls13_compute_early_transform", ret); + return ret; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE) + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state( + ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CCS_AFTER_CLIENT_HELLO); +#else + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( + 1, ("Switch to early data keys for outbound traffic")); + mbedtls_ssl_set_outbound_transform( + ssl, ssl->handshake->transform_earlydata); + ssl->early_data_state = MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATE_CAN_WRITE; +#endif + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA */ + return 0; +} +/* + * Functions for parsing and processing Server Hello + */ + +/** + * \brief Detect if the ServerHello contains a supported_versions extension + * or not. + * + * \param[in] ssl SSL context + * \param[in] buf Buffer containing the ServerHello message + * \param[in] end End of the buffer containing the ServerHello message + * + * \return 0 if the ServerHello does not contain a supported_versions extension + * \return 1 if the ServerHello contains a supported_versions extension + * \return A negative value if an error occurred while parsing the ServerHello. + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_is_supported_versions_ext_present( + mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *buf, + const unsigned char *end) +{ + const unsigned char *p = buf; + size_t legacy_session_id_echo_len; + const unsigned char *supported_versions_data; + const unsigned char *supported_versions_data_end; + + /* + * Check there is enough data to access the legacy_session_id_echo vector + * length: + * - legacy_version 2 bytes + * - random MBEDTLS_SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_LEN bytes + * - legacy_session_id_echo length 1 byte + */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, end, MBEDTLS_SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_LEN + 3); + p += MBEDTLS_SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_LEN + 2; + legacy_session_id_echo_len = *p; + + /* + * Jump to the extensions, jumping over: + * - legacy_session_id_echo (legacy_session_id_echo_len + 1) bytes + * - cipher_suite 2 bytes + * - legacy_compression_method 1 byte + */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, end, legacy_session_id_echo_len + 4); + p += legacy_session_id_echo_len + 4; + + return mbedtls_ssl_tls13_is_supported_versions_ext_present_in_exts( + ssl, p, end, + &supported_versions_data, &supported_versions_data_end); +} + +/* Returns a negative value on failure, and otherwise + * - 1 if the last eight bytes of the ServerHello random bytes indicate that + * the server is TLS 1.3 capable but negotiating TLS 1.2 or below. + * - 0 otherwise + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_is_downgrade_negotiation(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *buf, + const unsigned char *end) +{ + /* First seven bytes of the magic downgrade strings, see RFC 8446 4.1.3 */ + static const unsigned char magic_downgrade_string[] = + { 0x44, 0x4F, 0x57, 0x4E, 0x47, 0x52, 0x44 }; + const unsigned char *last_eight_bytes_of_random; + unsigned char last_byte_of_random; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(buf, end, MBEDTLS_SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_LEN + 2); + last_eight_bytes_of_random = buf + 2 + MBEDTLS_SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_LEN - 8; + + if (memcmp(last_eight_bytes_of_random, + magic_downgrade_string, + sizeof(magic_downgrade_string)) == 0) { + last_byte_of_random = last_eight_bytes_of_random[7]; + return last_byte_of_random == 0 || + last_byte_of_random == 1; + } + + return 0; +} + +/* Returns a negative value on failure, and otherwise + * - SSL_SERVER_HELLO or + * - SSL_SERVER_HELLO_HRR + * to indicate which message is expected and to be parsed next. + */ +#define SSL_SERVER_HELLO 0 +#define SSL_SERVER_HELLO_HRR 1 +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_server_hello_is_hrr(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *buf, + const unsigned char *end) +{ + + /* Check whether this message is a HelloRetryRequest ( HRR ) message. + * + * Server Hello and HRR are only distinguished by Random set to the + * special value of the SHA-256 of "HelloRetryRequest". + * + * struct { + * ProtocolVersion legacy_version = 0x0303; + * Random random; + * opaque legacy_session_id_echo<0..32>; + * CipherSuite cipher_suite; + * uint8 legacy_compression_method = 0; + * Extension extensions<6..2^16-1>; + * } ServerHello; + * + */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR( + buf, end, 2 + sizeof(mbedtls_ssl_tls13_hello_retry_request_magic)); + + if (memcmp(buf + 2, mbedtls_ssl_tls13_hello_retry_request_magic, + sizeof(mbedtls_ssl_tls13_hello_retry_request_magic)) == 0) { + return SSL_SERVER_HELLO_HRR; + } + + return SSL_SERVER_HELLO; +} + +/* + * Returns a negative value on failure, and otherwise + * - SSL_SERVER_HELLO or + * - SSL_SERVER_HELLO_HRR or + * - SSL_SERVER_HELLO_TLS1_2 + */ +#define SSL_SERVER_HELLO_TLS1_2 2 +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_preprocess_server_hello(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *buf, + const unsigned char *end) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *handshake = ssl->handshake; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK_NEG(ssl_tls13_is_supported_versions_ext_present( + ssl, buf, end)); + + if (ret == 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK_NEG( + ssl_tls13_is_downgrade_negotiation(ssl, buf, end)); + + /* If the server is negotiating TLS 1.2 or below and: + * . we did not propose TLS 1.2 or + * . the server responded it is TLS 1.3 capable but negotiating a lower + * version of the protocol and thus we are under downgrade attack + * abort the handshake with an "illegal parameter" alert. + */ + if (handshake->min_tls_version > MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 || ret) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, + MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; + } + + /* + * Version 1.2 of the protocol has been negotiated, set the + * ssl->keep_current_message flag for the ServerHello to be kept and + * parsed as a TLS 1.2 ServerHello. We also change ssl->tls_version to + * MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 thus from now on mbedtls_ssl_handshake_step() + * will dispatch to the TLS 1.2 state machine. + */ + ssl->keep_current_message = 1; + ssl->tls_version = MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2; + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(mbedtls_ssl_add_hs_msg_to_checksum( + ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_SERVER_HELLO, + buf, (size_t) (end - buf))); + + if (mbedtls_ssl_conf_tls13_is_some_ephemeral_enabled(ssl)) { + ret = ssl_tls13_reset_key_share(ssl); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + } + + return SSL_SERVER_HELLO_TLS1_2; + } + + ssl->session_negotiate->tls_version = ssl->tls_version; + ssl->session_negotiate->endpoint = ssl->conf->endpoint; + + handshake->received_extensions = MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK_NONE; + + ret = ssl_server_hello_is_hrr(ssl, buf, end); + switch (ret) { + case SSL_SERVER_HELLO: + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("received ServerHello message")); + break; + case SSL_SERVER_HELLO_HRR: + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("received HelloRetryRequest message")); + /* If a client receives a second HelloRetryRequest in the same + * connection (i.e., where the ClientHello was itself in response + * to a HelloRetryRequest), it MUST abort the handshake with an + * "unexpected_message" alert. + */ + if (handshake->hello_retry_request_flag) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("Multiple HRRs received")); + MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT( + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, + MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; + } + /* + * Clients must abort the handshake with an "illegal_parameter" + * alert if the HelloRetryRequest would not result in any change + * in the ClientHello. + * In a PSK only key exchange that what we expect. + */ + if (!mbedtls_ssl_conf_tls13_is_some_ephemeral_enabled(ssl)) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, + ("Unexpected HRR in pure PSK key exchange.")); + MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT( + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, + MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; + } + + handshake->hello_retry_request_flag = 1; + + break; + } + +cleanup: + + return ret; +} + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_check_server_hello_session_id_echo(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char **buf, + const unsigned char *end) +{ + const unsigned char *p = *buf; + size_t legacy_session_id_echo_len; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, end, 1); + legacy_session_id_echo_len = *p++; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, end, legacy_session_id_echo_len); + + /* legacy_session_id_echo */ + if (ssl->session_negotiate->id_len != legacy_session_id_echo_len || + memcmp(ssl->session_negotiate->id, p, legacy_session_id_echo_len) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "Expected Session ID", + ssl->session_negotiate->id, + ssl->session_negotiate->id_len); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "Received Session ID", p, + legacy_session_id_echo_len); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, + MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER); + + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; + } + + p += legacy_session_id_echo_len; + *buf = p; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "Session ID", ssl->session_negotiate->id, + ssl->session_negotiate->id_len); + return 0; +} + +/* Parse ServerHello message and configure context + * + * struct { + * ProtocolVersion legacy_version = 0x0303; // TLS 1.2 + * Random random; + * opaque legacy_session_id_echo<0..32>; + * CipherSuite cipher_suite; + * uint8 legacy_compression_method = 0; + * Extension extensions<6..2^16-1>; + * } ServerHello; + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_parse_server_hello(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *buf, + const unsigned char *end, + int is_hrr) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + const unsigned char *p = buf; + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *handshake = ssl->handshake; + size_t extensions_len; + const unsigned char *extensions_end; + uint16_t cipher_suite; + const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info; + int fatal_alert = 0; + uint32_t allowed_extensions_mask; + int hs_msg_type = is_hrr ? MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_HS_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST : + MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_SERVER_HELLO; + + /* + * Check there is space for minimal fields + * + * - legacy_version ( 2 bytes) + * - random (MBEDTLS_SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_LEN bytes) + * - legacy_session_id_echo ( 1 byte ), minimum size + * - cipher_suite ( 2 bytes) + * - legacy_compression_method ( 1 byte ) + */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, end, MBEDTLS_SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_LEN + 6); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "server hello", p, end - p); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "server hello, version", p, 2); + + /* ... + * ProtocolVersion legacy_version = 0x0303; // TLS 1.2 + * ... + * with ProtocolVersion defined as: + * uint16 ProtocolVersion; + */ + if (mbedtls_ssl_read_version(p, ssl->conf->transport) != + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("Unsupported version of TLS.")); + MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_PROTOCOL_VERSION, + MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION); + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION; + goto cleanup; + } + p += 2; + + /* ... + * Random random; + * ... + * with Random defined as: + * opaque Random[MBEDTLS_SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_LEN]; + */ + if (!is_hrr) { + memcpy(&handshake->randbytes[MBEDTLS_CLIENT_HELLO_RANDOM_LEN], p, + MBEDTLS_SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_LEN); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "server hello, random bytes", + p, MBEDTLS_SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_LEN); + } + p += MBEDTLS_SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_LEN; + + /* ... + * opaque legacy_session_id_echo<0..32>; + * ... + */ + if (ssl_tls13_check_server_hello_session_id_echo(ssl, &p, end) != 0) { + fatal_alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; + goto cleanup; + } + + /* ... + * CipherSuite cipher_suite; + * ... + * with CipherSuite defined as: + * uint8 CipherSuite[2]; + */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, end, 2); + cipher_suite = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(p, 0); + p += 2; + + + ciphersuite_info = mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_from_id(cipher_suite); + /* + * Check whether this ciphersuite is valid and offered. + */ + if ((mbedtls_ssl_validate_ciphersuite(ssl, ciphersuite_info, + ssl->tls_version, + ssl->tls_version) != 0) || + !mbedtls_ssl_tls13_cipher_suite_is_offered(ssl, cipher_suite)) { + fatal_alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; + } + /* + * If we received an HRR before and that the proposed selected + * ciphersuite in this server hello is not the same as the one + * proposed in the HRR, we abort the handshake and send an + * "illegal_parameter" alert. + */ + else if ((!is_hrr) && handshake->hello_retry_request_flag && + (cipher_suite != ssl->session_negotiate->ciphersuite)) { + fatal_alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; + } + + if (fatal_alert == MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("invalid ciphersuite(%04x) parameter", + cipher_suite)); + goto cleanup; + } + + /* Configure ciphersuites */ + mbedtls_ssl_optimize_checksum(ssl, ciphersuite_info); + + handshake->ciphersuite_info = ciphersuite_info; + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("server hello, chosen ciphersuite: ( %04x ) - %s", + cipher_suite, ciphersuite_info->name)); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) + ssl->session_negotiate->start = mbedtls_time(NULL); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME */ + + /* ... + * uint8 legacy_compression_method = 0; + * ... + */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, end, 1); + if (p[0] != MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_NULL) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad legacy compression method")); + fatal_alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; + goto cleanup; + } + p++; + + /* ... + * Extension extensions<6..2^16-1>; + * ... + * struct { + * ExtensionType extension_type; (2 bytes) + * opaque extension_data<0..2^16-1>; + * } Extension; + */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, end, 2); + extensions_len = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(p, 0); + p += 2; + + /* Check extensions do not go beyond the buffer of data. */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, end, extensions_len); + extensions_end = p + extensions_len; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "server hello extensions", p, extensions_len); + + handshake->received_extensions = MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK_NONE; + allowed_extensions_mask = is_hrr ? + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_ALLOWED_EXTS_OF_HRR : + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_ALLOWED_EXTS_OF_SH; + + while (p < extensions_end) { + unsigned int extension_type; + size_t extension_data_len; + const unsigned char *extension_data_end; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, extensions_end, 4); + extension_type = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(p, 0); + extension_data_len = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(p, 2); + p += 4; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, extensions_end, extension_data_len); + extension_data_end = p + extension_data_len; + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_check_received_extension( + ssl, hs_msg_type, extension_type, allowed_extensions_mask); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + + switch (extension_type) { + case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_COOKIE: + + ret = ssl_tls13_parse_cookie_ext(ssl, + p, extension_data_end); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, + "ssl_tls13_parse_cookie_ext", + ret); + goto cleanup; + } + break; + + case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS: + ret = ssl_tls13_parse_supported_versions_ext(ssl, + p, + extension_data_end); + if (ret != 0) { + goto cleanup; + } + break; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED) + case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_PRE_SHARED_KEY: + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("found pre_shared_key extension")); + + if ((ret = ssl_tls13_parse_server_pre_shared_key_ext( + ssl, p, extension_data_end)) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( + 1, ("ssl_tls13_parse_server_pre_shared_key_ext"), ret); + return ret; + } + break; +#endif + + case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_KEY_SHARE: + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("found key_shares extension")); + if (!mbedtls_ssl_conf_tls13_is_some_ephemeral_enabled(ssl)) { + fatal_alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_EXT; + goto cleanup; + } + + if (is_hrr) { + ret = ssl_tls13_parse_hrr_key_share_ext(ssl, + p, extension_data_end); + } else { + ret = ssl_tls13_parse_key_share_ext(ssl, + p, extension_data_end); + } + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, + "ssl_tls13_parse_key_share_ext", + ret); + goto cleanup; + } + break; + + default: + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + goto cleanup; + } + + p += extension_data_len; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PRINT_EXTS(3, hs_msg_type, handshake->received_extensions); + +cleanup: + + if (fatal_alert == MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_EXT) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_EXT, + MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION); + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION; + } else if (fatal_alert == MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, + MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER); + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; + } + return ret; +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C) +static const char *ssl_tls13_get_kex_mode_str(int mode) +{ + switch (mode) { + case MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK: + return "psk"; + case MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL: + return "ephemeral"; + case MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_EPHEMERAL: + return "psk_ephemeral"; + default: + return "unknown mode"; + } +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C */ + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_postprocess_server_hello(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *handshake = ssl->handshake; + + /* Determine the key exchange mode: + * 1) If both the pre_shared_key and key_share extensions were received + * then the key exchange mode is PSK with EPHEMERAL. + * 2) If only the pre_shared_key extension was received then the key + * exchange mode is PSK-only. + * 3) If only the key_share extension was received then the key + * exchange mode is EPHEMERAL-only. + */ + switch (handshake->received_extensions & + (MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(PRE_SHARED_KEY) | + MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(KEY_SHARE))) { + /* Only the pre_shared_key extension was received */ + case MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(PRE_SHARED_KEY): + handshake->key_exchange_mode = + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK; + break; + + /* Only the key_share extension was received */ + case MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(KEY_SHARE): + handshake->key_exchange_mode = + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL; + break; + + /* Both the pre_shared_key and key_share extensions were received */ + case (MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(PRE_SHARED_KEY) | + MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(KEY_SHARE)): + handshake->key_exchange_mode = + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_EPHEMERAL; + break; + + /* Neither pre_shared_key nor key_share extension was received */ + default: + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("Unknown key exchange.")); + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; + goto cleanup; + } + + if (!mbedtls_ssl_conf_tls13_is_kex_mode_enabled( + ssl, handshake->key_exchange_mode)) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( + 2, ("Key exchange mode(%s) is not supported.", + ssl_tls13_get_kex_mode_str(handshake->key_exchange_mode))); + goto cleanup; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( + 3, ("Selected key exchange mode: %s", + ssl_tls13_get_kex_mode_str(handshake->key_exchange_mode))); + + /* Start the TLS 1.3 key scheduling if not already done. + * + * If we proposed early data then we have already derived an + * early secret using the selected PSK and its associated hash. + * It means that if the negotiated key exchange mode is psk or + * psk_ephemeral, we have already correctly computed the + * early secret and thus we do not do it again. In all other + * cases we compute it here. + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) + if (ssl->early_data_state == MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATE_NO_IND_SENT || + handshake->key_exchange_mode == + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL) +#endif + { + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_key_schedule_stage_early(ssl); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( + 1, "mbedtls_ssl_tls13_key_schedule_stage_early", ret); + goto cleanup; + } + } + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_compute_handshake_transform(ssl); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, + "mbedtls_ssl_tls13_compute_handshake_transform", + ret); + goto cleanup; + } + + mbedtls_ssl_set_inbound_transform(ssl, handshake->transform_handshake); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("Switch to handshake keys for inbound traffic")); + ssl->session_in = ssl->session_negotiate; + +cleanup: + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT( + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, + MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); + } + + return ret; +} + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_postprocess_hrr(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + mbedtls_ssl_session_reset_msg_layer(ssl, 0); + + /* + * We are going to re-generate a shared secret corresponding to the group + * selected by the server, which is different from the group for which we + * generated a shared secret in the first client hello. + * Thus, reset the shared secret. + */ + ret = ssl_tls13_reset_key_share(ssl); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + + ssl->session_negotiate->ciphersuite = ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info->id; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) + if (ssl->early_data_state != MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATE_NO_IND_SENT) { + ssl->early_data_state = MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATE_REJECTED; + } +#endif + + return 0; +} + +/* + * Wait and parse ServerHello handshake message. + * Handler for MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_HELLO + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_process_server_hello(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char *buf = NULL; + size_t buf_len = 0; + int is_hrr = 0; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> %s", __func__)); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(mbedtls_ssl_tls13_fetch_handshake_msg( + ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_SERVER_HELLO, &buf, &buf_len)); + + ret = ssl_tls13_preprocess_server_hello(ssl, buf, buf + buf_len); + if (ret < 0) { + goto cleanup; + } else { + is_hrr = (ret == SSL_SERVER_HELLO_HRR); + } + + if (ret == SSL_SERVER_HELLO_TLS1_2) { + ret = 0; + goto cleanup; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(ssl_tls13_parse_server_hello(ssl, buf, + buf + buf_len, + is_hrr)); + if (is_hrr) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(mbedtls_ssl_reset_transcript_for_hrr(ssl)); + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(mbedtls_ssl_add_hs_msg_to_checksum( + ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_SERVER_HELLO, buf, buf_len)); + + if (is_hrr) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(ssl_tls13_postprocess_hrr(ssl)); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE) + /* If not offering early data, the client sends a dummy CCS record + * immediately before its second flight. This may either be before + * its second ClientHello or before its encrypted handshake flight. + */ + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state( + ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CCS_BEFORE_2ND_CLIENT_HELLO); +#else + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_HELLO); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE */ + } else { + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(ssl_tls13_postprocess_server_hello(ssl)); + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS); + } + +cleanup: + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= %s ( %s )", __func__, + is_hrr ? "HelloRetryRequest" : "ServerHello")); + return ret; +} + +/* + * + * Handler for MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS + * + * The EncryptedExtensions message contains any extensions which + * should be protected, i.e., any which are not needed to establish + * the cryptographic context. + */ + +/* Parse EncryptedExtensions message + * struct { + * Extension extensions<0..2^16-1>; + * } EncryptedExtensions; + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_parse_encrypted_extensions(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *buf, + const unsigned char *end) +{ + int ret = 0; + size_t extensions_len; + const unsigned char *p = buf; + const unsigned char *extensions_end; + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *handshake = ssl->handshake; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, end, 2); + extensions_len = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(p, 0); + p += 2; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, end, extensions_len); + extensions_end = p + extensions_len; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "encrypted extensions", p, extensions_len); + + handshake->received_extensions = MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK_NONE; + + while (p < extensions_end) { + unsigned int extension_type; + size_t extension_data_len; + + /* + * struct { + * ExtensionType extension_type; (2 bytes) + * opaque extension_data<0..2^16-1>; + * } Extension; + */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, extensions_end, 4); + extension_type = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(p, 0); + extension_data_len = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(p, 2); + p += 4; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, extensions_end, extension_data_len); + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_check_received_extension( + ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS, extension_type, + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_ALLOWED_EXTS_OF_EE); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + + switch (extension_type) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN) + case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ALPN: + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("found alpn extension")); + + if ((ret = ssl_tls13_parse_alpn_ext( + ssl, p, (size_t) extension_data_len)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + + break; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) + case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_EARLY_DATA: + + if (extension_data_len != 0) { + /* The message must be empty. */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR, + MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; + } + + break; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT) + case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT: + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("found record_size_limit extension")); + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_parse_record_size_limit_ext( + ssl, p, p + extension_data_len); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( + 1, ("mbedtls_ssl_tls13_parse_record_size_limit_ext"), ret); + return ret; + } + break; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT */ + + default: + MBEDTLS_SSL_PRINT_EXT( + 3, MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS, + extension_type, "( ignored )"); + break; + } + + p += extension_data_len; + } + + if ((handshake->received_extensions & MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT)) && + (handshake->received_extensions & MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH))) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, + ( + "Record size limit extension cannot be used with max fragment length extension")); + MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT( + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, + MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PRINT_EXTS(3, MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS, + handshake->received_extensions); + + /* Check that we consumed all the message. */ + if (p != end) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("EncryptedExtension lengths misaligned")); + MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR, + MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; + } + + return ret; +} + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_process_encrypted_extensions(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + int ret; + unsigned char *buf; + size_t buf_len; + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *handshake = ssl->handshake; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> parse encrypted extensions")); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(mbedtls_ssl_tls13_fetch_handshake_msg( + ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS, + &buf, &buf_len)); + + /* Process the message contents */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK( + ssl_tls13_parse_encrypted_extensions(ssl, buf, buf + buf_len)); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) + if (handshake->received_extensions & MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(EARLY_DATA)) { + /* RFC8446 4.2.11 + * If the server supplies an "early_data" extension, the + * client MUST verify that the server's selected_identity + * is 0. If any other value is returned, the client MUST + * abort the handshake with an "illegal_parameter" alert. + * + * RFC 8446 4.2.10 + * In order to accept early data, the server MUST have accepted a PSK + * cipher suite and selected the first key offered in the client's + * "pre_shared_key" extension. In addition, it MUST verify that the + * following values are the same as those associated with the + * selected PSK: + * - The TLS version number + * - The selected cipher suite + * - The selected ALPN [RFC7301] protocol, if any + * + * The server has sent an early data extension in its Encrypted + * Extension message thus accepted to receive early data. We + * check here that the additional constraints on the handshake + * parameters, when early data are exchanged, are met, + * namely: + * - a PSK has been selected for the handshake + * - the selected PSK for the handshake was the first one proposed + * by the client. + * - the selected ciphersuite for the handshake is the ciphersuite + * associated with the selected PSK. + */ + if ((!mbedtls_ssl_tls13_key_exchange_mode_with_psk(ssl)) || + handshake->selected_identity != 0 || + handshake->ciphersuite_info->id != + ssl->session_negotiate->ciphersuite) { + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT( + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, + MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; + } + + ssl->early_data_state = MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATE_ACCEPTED; + } else if (ssl->early_data_state != + MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATE_NO_IND_SENT) { + ssl->early_data_state = MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATE_REJECTED; + } +#endif + + /* + * In case the client has proposed a PSK associated with a ticket, + * `ssl->session_negotiate->ciphersuite` still contains at this point the + * identifier of the ciphersuite associated with the ticket. This is that + * way because, if an exchange of early data is agreed upon, we need + * it to check that the ciphersuite selected for the handshake is the + * ticket ciphersuite (see above). This information is not needed + * anymore thus we can now set it to the identifier of the ciphersuite + * used in this session under negotiation. + */ + ssl->session_negotiate->ciphersuite = handshake->ciphersuite_info->id; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(mbedtls_ssl_add_hs_msg_to_checksum( + ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS, + buf, buf_len)); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED) + if (mbedtls_ssl_tls13_key_exchange_mode_with_psk(ssl)) { + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_FINISHED); + } else { + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST); + } +#else + ((void) ssl); + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_FINISHED); +#endif + +cleanup: + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= parse encrypted extensions")); + return ret; + +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) +/* + * Handler for MBEDTLS_SSL_END_OF_EARLY_DATA + * + * RFC 8446 section 4.5 + * + * struct {} EndOfEarlyData; + * + * If the server sent an "early_data" extension in EncryptedExtensions, the + * client MUST send an EndOfEarlyData message after receiving the server + * Finished. Otherwise, the client MUST NOT send an EndOfEarlyData message. + */ + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_write_end_of_early_data(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char *buf = NULL; + size_t buf_len; + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> write EndOfEarlyData")); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(mbedtls_ssl_start_handshake_msg( + ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_END_OF_EARLY_DATA, + &buf, &buf_len)); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(mbedtls_ssl_add_hs_hdr_to_checksum( + ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_END_OF_EARLY_DATA, 0)); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK( + mbedtls_ssl_finish_handshake_msg(ssl, buf_len, 0)); + + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE); + +cleanup: + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= write EndOfEarlyData")); + return ret; +} + +int mbedtls_ssl_get_early_data_status(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + if ((ssl->conf->endpoint != MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT) || + (!mbedtls_ssl_is_handshake_over(ssl))) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + switch (ssl->early_data_state) { + case MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATE_NO_IND_SENT: + return MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_NOT_INDICATED; + break; + + case MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATE_REJECTED: + return MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_REJECTED; + break; + + case MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATE_SERVER_FINISHED_RECEIVED: + return MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_ACCEPTED; + break; + + default: + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED) +/* + * STATE HANDLING: CertificateRequest + * + */ +#define SSL_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST_EXPECT_REQUEST 0 +#define SSL_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST_SKIP 1 +/* Coordination: + * Deals with the ambiguity of not knowing if a CertificateRequest + * will be sent. Returns a negative code on failure, or + * - SSL_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST_EXPECT_REQUEST + * - SSL_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST_SKIP + * indicating if a Certificate Request is expected or not. + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_certificate_request_coordinate(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_read_record(ssl, 0)) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_read_record", ret); + return ret; + } + ssl->keep_current_message = 1; + + if ((ssl->in_msgtype == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE) && + (ssl->in_msg[0] == MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST)) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("got a certificate request")); + return SSL_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST_EXPECT_REQUEST; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("got no certificate request")); + + return SSL_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST_SKIP; +} + +/* + * ssl_tls13_parse_certificate_request() + * Parse certificate request + * struct { + * opaque certificate_request_context<0..2^8-1>; + * Extension extensions<2..2^16-1>; + * } CertificateRequest; + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_parse_certificate_request(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *buf, + const unsigned char *end) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + const unsigned char *p = buf; + size_t certificate_request_context_len = 0; + size_t extensions_len = 0; + const unsigned char *extensions_end; + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *handshake = ssl->handshake; + + /* ... + * opaque certificate_request_context<0..2^8-1> + * ... + */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, end, 1); + certificate_request_context_len = (size_t) p[0]; + p += 1; + + if (certificate_request_context_len > 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, end, certificate_request_context_len); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "Certificate Request Context", + p, certificate_request_context_len); + + handshake->certificate_request_context = + mbedtls_calloc(1, certificate_request_context_len); + if (handshake->certificate_request_context == NULL) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("buffer too small")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED; + } + memcpy(handshake->certificate_request_context, p, + certificate_request_context_len); + p += certificate_request_context_len; + } + + /* ... + * Extension extensions<2..2^16-1>; + * ... + */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, end, 2); + extensions_len = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(p, 0); + p += 2; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, end, extensions_len); + extensions_end = p + extensions_len; + + handshake->received_extensions = MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK_NONE; + + while (p < extensions_end) { + unsigned int extension_type; + size_t extension_data_len; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, extensions_end, 4); + extension_type = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(p, 0); + extension_data_len = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(p, 2); + p += 4; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, extensions_end, extension_data_len); + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_check_received_extension( + ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, extension_type, + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_ALLOWED_EXTS_OF_CR); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + + switch (extension_type) { + case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SIG_ALG: + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, + ("found signature algorithms extension")); + ret = mbedtls_ssl_parse_sig_alg_ext(ssl, p, + p + extension_data_len); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + + break; + + default: + MBEDTLS_SSL_PRINT_EXT( + 3, MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, + extension_type, "( ignored )"); + break; + } + + p += extension_data_len; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PRINT_EXTS(3, MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, + handshake->received_extensions); + + /* Check that we consumed all the message. */ + if (p != end) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, + ("CertificateRequest misaligned")); + goto decode_error; + } + + /* RFC 8446 section 4.3.2 + * + * The "signature_algorithms" extension MUST be specified + */ + if ((handshake->received_extensions & MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(SIG_ALG)) == 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, + ("no signature algorithms extension found")); + goto decode_error; + } + + ssl->handshake->client_auth = 1; + return 0; + +decode_error: + MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR, + MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; +} + +/* + * Handler for MBEDTLS_SSL_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_process_certificate_request(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> parse certificate request")); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK_NEG(ssl_tls13_certificate_request_coordinate(ssl)); + + if (ret == SSL_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST_EXPECT_REQUEST) { + unsigned char *buf; + size_t buf_len; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(mbedtls_ssl_tls13_fetch_handshake_msg( + ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, + &buf, &buf_len)); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(ssl_tls13_parse_certificate_request( + ssl, buf, buf + buf_len)); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(mbedtls_ssl_add_hs_msg_to_checksum( + ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, + buf, buf_len)); + } else if (ret == SSL_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST_SKIP) { + ret = 0; + } else { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("should never happen")); + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + goto cleanup; + } + + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_CERTIFICATE); + +cleanup: + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= parse certificate request")); + return ret; +} + +/* + * Handler for MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_CERTIFICATE + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_process_server_certificate(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + int ret; + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_process_certificate(ssl); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY); + return 0; +} + +/* + * Handler for MBEDTLS_SSL_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_process_certificate_verify(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + int ret; + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_process_certificate_verify(ssl); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_FINISHED); + return 0; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED */ + +/* + * Handler for MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_FINISHED + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_process_server_finished(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + int ret; + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_process_finished_message(ssl); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_compute_application_transform(ssl); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT( + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, + MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); + return ret; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) + if (ssl->early_data_state == MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATE_ACCEPTED) { + ssl->early_data_state = MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATE_SERVER_FINISHED_RECEIVED; + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_END_OF_EARLY_DATA); + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA */ + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE) + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state( + ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CCS_AFTER_SERVER_FINISHED); +#else + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE */ + } + + return 0; +} + +/* + * Handler for MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_write_client_certificate(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + int non_empty_certificate_msg = 0; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, + ("Switch to handshake traffic keys for outbound traffic")); + mbedtls_ssl_set_outbound_transform(ssl, ssl->handshake->transform_handshake); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED) + if (ssl->handshake->client_auth) { + int ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_write_certificate(ssl); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + + if (mbedtls_ssl_own_cert(ssl) != NULL) { + non_empty_certificate_msg = 1; + } + } else { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("skip write certificate")); + } +#endif + + if (non_empty_certificate_msg) { + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state(ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY); + } else { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("skip write certificate verify")); + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_FINISHED); + } + + return 0; +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED) +/* + * Handler for MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_write_client_certificate_verify(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + int ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_write_certificate_verify(ssl); + + if (ret == 0) { + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_FINISHED); + } + + return ret; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED */ + +/* + * Handler for MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_FINISHED + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_write_client_finished(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + int ret; + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_write_finished_message(ssl); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_compute_resumption_master_secret(ssl); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( + 1, "mbedtls_ssl_tls13_compute_resumption_master_secret ", ret); + return ret; + } + + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_FLUSH_BUFFERS); + return 0; +} + +/* + * Handler for MBEDTLS_SSL_FLUSH_BUFFERS + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_flush_buffers(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("handshake: done")); + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WRAPUP); + return 0; +} + +/* + * Handler for MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WRAPUP + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_handshake_wrapup(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + + mbedtls_ssl_tls13_handshake_wrapup(ssl); + + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER); + return 0; +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) +/* From RFC 8446 section 4.2.10 + * + * struct { + * select (Handshake.msg_type) { + * case new_session_ticket: uint32 max_early_data_size; + * ... + * }; + * } EarlyDataIndication; + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_parse_new_session_ticket_early_data_ext( + mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *buf, + const unsigned char *end) +{ + mbedtls_ssl_session *session = ssl->session; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(buf, end, 4); + + session->max_early_data_size = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE(buf, 0); + mbedtls_ssl_tls13_session_set_ticket_flags( + session, MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_TICKET_ALLOW_EARLY_DATA); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( + 3, ("received max_early_data_size: %u", + (unsigned int) session->max_early_data_size)); + + return 0; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA */ + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_parse_new_session_ticket_exts(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *buf, + const unsigned char *end) +{ + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *handshake = ssl->handshake; + const unsigned char *p = buf; + + + handshake->received_extensions = MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK_NONE; + + while (p < end) { + unsigned int extension_type; + size_t extension_data_len; + int ret; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, end, 4); + extension_type = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(p, 0); + extension_data_len = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(p, 2); + p += 4; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, end, extension_data_len); + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_check_received_extension( + ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, extension_type, + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_ALLOWED_EXTS_OF_NST); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + + switch (extension_type) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) + case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_EARLY_DATA: + ret = ssl_tls13_parse_new_session_ticket_early_data_ext( + ssl, p, p + extension_data_len); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( + 1, "ssl_tls13_parse_new_session_ticket_early_data_ext", + ret); + } + break; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA */ + + default: + MBEDTLS_SSL_PRINT_EXT( + 3, MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, + extension_type, "( ignored )"); + break; + } + + p += extension_data_len; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PRINT_EXTS(3, MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, + handshake->received_extensions); + + return 0; +} + +/* + * From RFC8446, page 74 + * + * struct { + * uint32 ticket_lifetime; + * uint32 ticket_age_add; + * opaque ticket_nonce<0..255>; + * opaque ticket<1..2^16-1>; + * Extension extensions<0..2^16-2>; + * } NewSessionTicket; + * + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_parse_new_session_ticket(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *buf, + unsigned char *end, + unsigned char **ticket_nonce, + size_t *ticket_nonce_len) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char *p = buf; + mbedtls_ssl_session *session = ssl->session; + size_t ticket_len; + unsigned char *ticket; + size_t extensions_len; + + *ticket_nonce = NULL; + *ticket_nonce_len = 0; + /* + * ticket_lifetime 4 bytes + * ticket_age_add 4 bytes + * ticket_nonce_len 1 byte + */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, end, 9); + + session->ticket_lifetime = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE(p, 0); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, + ("ticket_lifetime: %u", + (unsigned int) session->ticket_lifetime)); + if (session->ticket_lifetime > + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_MAX_ALLOWED_TICKET_LIFETIME) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("ticket_lifetime exceeds 7 days.")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; + } + + session->ticket_age_add = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE(p, 4); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, + ("ticket_age_add: %u", + (unsigned int) session->ticket_age_add)); + + *ticket_nonce_len = p[8]; + p += 9; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, end, *ticket_nonce_len); + *ticket_nonce = p; + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "ticket_nonce:", *ticket_nonce, *ticket_nonce_len); + p += *ticket_nonce_len; + + /* Ticket */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, end, 2); + ticket_len = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(p, 0); + p += 2; + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, end, ticket_len); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "received ticket", p, ticket_len); + + /* Check if we previously received a ticket already. */ + if (session->ticket != NULL || session->ticket_len > 0) { + mbedtls_free(session->ticket); + session->ticket = NULL; + session->ticket_len = 0; + } + + if ((ticket = mbedtls_calloc(1, ticket_len)) == NULL) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("ticket alloc failed")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED; + } + memcpy(ticket, p, ticket_len); + p += ticket_len; + session->ticket = ticket; + session->ticket_len = ticket_len; + + /* Clear all flags in ticket_flags */ + mbedtls_ssl_tls13_session_clear_ticket_flags( + session, MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_TICKET_FLAGS_MASK); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, end, 2); + extensions_len = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(p, 0); + p += 2; + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, end, extensions_len); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "ticket extension", p, extensions_len); + + ret = ssl_tls13_parse_new_session_ticket_exts(ssl, p, p + extensions_len); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, + "ssl_tls13_parse_new_session_ticket_exts", + ret); + return ret; + } + + return 0; +} + +/* Non negative return values for ssl_tls13_postprocess_new_session_ticket(). + * - POSTPROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET_SIGNAL, all good, we have to signal the + * application that a valid ticket has been received. + * - POSTPROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET_DISCARD, no fatal error, we keep the + * connection alive but we do not signal the ticket to the application. + */ +#define POSTPROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET_SIGNAL 0 +#define POSTPROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET_DISCARD 1 +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_postprocess_new_session_ticket(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *ticket_nonce, + size_t ticket_nonce_len) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_ssl_session *session = ssl->session; + const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info; + psa_algorithm_t psa_hash_alg; + int hash_length; + + if (session->ticket_lifetime == 0) { + return POSTPROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET_DISCARD; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) + /* Store ticket creation time */ + session->ticket_reception_time = mbedtls_ms_time(); +#endif + + ciphersuite_info = mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_from_id(session->ciphersuite); + if (ciphersuite_info == NULL) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("should never happen")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } + + psa_hash_alg = mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type((mbedtls_md_type_t) ciphersuite_info->mac); + hash_length = PSA_HASH_LENGTH(psa_hash_alg); + if (hash_length == -1 || + (size_t) hash_length > sizeof(session->resumption_key)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } + + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "resumption_master_secret", + session->app_secrets.resumption_master_secret, + hash_length); + + /* Compute resumption key + * + * HKDF-Expand-Label( resumption_master_secret, + * "resumption", ticket_nonce, Hash.length ) + */ + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_hkdf_expand_label( + psa_hash_alg, + session->app_secrets.resumption_master_secret, + hash_length, + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LBL_WITH_LEN(resumption), + ticket_nonce, + ticket_nonce_len, + session->resumption_key, + hash_length); + + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(2, + "Creating the ticket-resumed PSK failed", + ret); + return ret; + } + + session->resumption_key_len = hash_length; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "Ticket-resumed PSK", + session->resumption_key, + session->resumption_key_len); + + /* Set ticket_flags depends on the selected key exchange modes */ + mbedtls_ssl_tls13_session_set_ticket_flags( + session, ssl->conf->tls13_kex_modes); + MBEDTLS_SSL_PRINT_TICKET_FLAGS(4, session->ticket_flags); + + return POSTPROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET_SIGNAL; +} + +/* + * Handler for MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_process_new_session_ticket(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char *buf; + size_t buf_len; + unsigned char *ticket_nonce; + size_t ticket_nonce_len; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> parse new session ticket")); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(mbedtls_ssl_tls13_fetch_handshake_msg( + ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, + &buf, &buf_len)); + + /* + * We are about to update (maybe only partially) ticket data thus block + * any session export for the time being. + */ + ssl->session->exported = 1; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(ssl_tls13_parse_new_session_ticket( + ssl, buf, buf + buf_len, + &ticket_nonce, &ticket_nonce_len)); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK_NEG(ssl_tls13_postprocess_new_session_ticket( + ssl, ticket_nonce, ticket_nonce_len)); + + switch (ret) { + case POSTPROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET_SIGNAL: + /* + * All good, we have received a new valid ticket, session data can + * be exported now and we signal the ticket to the application. + */ + ssl->session->exported = 0; + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_RECEIVED_NEW_SESSION_TICKET; + break; + + case POSTPROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET_DISCARD: + ret = 0; + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("Discard new session ticket")); + break; + + default: + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } + + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER); + +cleanup: + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= parse new session ticket")); + return ret; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */ + +int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_handshake_client_step(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + int ret = 0; + + switch (ssl->state) { + case MBEDTLS_SSL_HELLO_REQUEST: + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_HELLO); + break; + + case MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_HELLO: + ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_client_hello(ssl); + break; + + case MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_HELLO: + ret = ssl_tls13_process_server_hello(ssl); + break; + + case MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS: + ret = ssl_tls13_process_encrypted_extensions(ssl); + break; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED) + case MBEDTLS_SSL_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST: + ret = ssl_tls13_process_certificate_request(ssl); + break; + + case MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_CERTIFICATE: + ret = ssl_tls13_process_server_certificate(ssl); + break; + + case MBEDTLS_SSL_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY: + ret = ssl_tls13_process_certificate_verify(ssl); + break; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED */ + + case MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_FINISHED: + ret = ssl_tls13_process_server_finished(ssl); + break; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) + case MBEDTLS_SSL_END_OF_EARLY_DATA: + ret = ssl_tls13_write_end_of_early_data(ssl); + break; +#endif + + case MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE: + ret = ssl_tls13_write_client_certificate(ssl); + break; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED) + case MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY: + ret = ssl_tls13_write_client_certificate_verify(ssl); + break; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED */ + + case MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_FINISHED: + ret = ssl_tls13_write_client_finished(ssl); + break; + + case MBEDTLS_SSL_FLUSH_BUFFERS: + ret = ssl_tls13_flush_buffers(ssl); + break; + + case MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WRAPUP: + ret = ssl_tls13_handshake_wrapup(ssl); + break; + + /* + * Injection of dummy-CCS's for middlebox compatibility + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE) + case MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CCS_BEFORE_2ND_CLIENT_HELLO: + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_write_change_cipher_spec(ssl); + if (ret != 0) { + break; + } + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_HELLO); + break; + + case MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CCS_AFTER_SERVER_FINISHED: + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_write_change_cipher_spec(ssl); + if (ret != 0) { + break; + } + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE); + break; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) + case MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CCS_AFTER_CLIENT_HELLO: + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_write_change_cipher_spec(ssl); + if (ret == 0) { + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_HELLO); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( + 1, ("Switch to early data keys for outbound traffic")); + mbedtls_ssl_set_outbound_transform( + ssl, ssl->handshake->transform_earlydata); + ssl->early_data_state = MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATE_CAN_WRITE; + } + break; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) + case MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET: + ret = ssl_tls13_process_new_session_ticket(ssl); + break; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */ + + default: + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("invalid state %d", ssl->state)); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + return ret; +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C && MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 */ diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ssl_tls13_generic.c b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ssl_tls13_generic.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..d448a054a91f --- /dev/null +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ssl_tls13_generic.c @@ -0,0 +1,1853 @@ +/* + * TLS 1.3 functionality shared between client and server + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) + +#include + +#include "mbedtls/error.h" +#include "debug_internal.h" +#include "mbedtls/oid.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" +#include "mbedtls/constant_time.h" +#include "psa/crypto.h" +#include "mbedtls/psa_util.h" + +#include "ssl_misc.h" +#include "ssl_tls13_invasive.h" +#include "ssl_tls13_keys.h" +#include "ssl_debug_helpers.h" + +#include "psa/crypto.h" +#include "psa_util_internal.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED) +/* Define a local translating function to save code size by not using too many + * arguments in each translating place. */ +static int local_err_translation(psa_status_t status) +{ + return psa_status_to_mbedtls(status, psa_to_ssl_errors, + ARRAY_LENGTH(psa_to_ssl_errors), + psa_generic_status_to_mbedtls); +} +#define PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status) local_err_translation(status) +#endif + +const uint8_t mbedtls_ssl_tls13_hello_retry_request_magic[ + MBEDTLS_SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_LEN] = +{ 0xCF, 0x21, 0xAD, 0x74, 0xE5, 0x9A, 0x61, 0x11, + 0xBE, 0x1D, 0x8C, 0x02, 0x1E, 0x65, 0xB8, 0x91, + 0xC2, 0xA2, 0x11, 0x16, 0x7A, 0xBB, 0x8C, 0x5E, + 0x07, 0x9E, 0x09, 0xE2, 0xC8, 0xA8, 0x33, 0x9C }; + +int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_fetch_handshake_msg(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned hs_type, + unsigned char **buf, + size_t *buf_len) +{ + int ret; + + if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_read_record(ssl, 0)) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_read_record", ret); + goto cleanup; + } + + if (ssl->in_msgtype != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE || + ssl->in_msg[0] != hs_type) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("Receive unexpected handshake message.")); + MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, + MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; + goto cleanup; + } + + /* + * Jump handshake header (4 bytes, see Section 4 of RFC 8446). + * ... + * HandshakeType msg_type; + * uint24 length; + * ... + */ + *buf = ssl->in_msg + 4; + *buf_len = ssl->in_hslen - 4; + +cleanup: + + return ret; +} + +int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_is_supported_versions_ext_present_in_exts( + mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *buf, const unsigned char *end, + const unsigned char **supported_versions_data, + const unsigned char **supported_versions_data_end) +{ + const unsigned char *p = buf; + size_t extensions_len; + const unsigned char *extensions_end; + + *supported_versions_data = NULL; + *supported_versions_data_end = NULL; + + /* Case of no extension */ + if (p == end) { + return 0; + } + + /* ... + * Extension extensions; + * ... + * struct { + * ExtensionType extension_type; (2 bytes) + * opaque extension_data<0..2^16-1>; + * } Extension; + */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, end, 2); + extensions_len = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(p, 0); + p += 2; + + /* Check extensions do not go beyond the buffer of data. */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, end, extensions_len); + extensions_end = p + extensions_len; + + while (p < extensions_end) { + unsigned int extension_type; + size_t extension_data_len; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, extensions_end, 4); + extension_type = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(p, 0); + extension_data_len = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(p, 2); + p += 4; + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, extensions_end, extension_data_len); + + if (extension_type == MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS) { + *supported_versions_data = p; + *supported_versions_data_end = p + extension_data_len; + return 1; + } + p += extension_data_len; + } + + return 0; +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED) +/* + * STATE HANDLING: Read CertificateVerify + */ +/* Macro to express the maximum length of the verify structure. + * + * The structure is computed per TLS 1.3 specification as: + * - 64 bytes of octet 32, + * - 33 bytes for the context string + * (which is either "TLS 1.3, client CertificateVerify" + * or "TLS 1.3, server CertificateVerify"), + * - 1 byte for the octet 0x0, which serves as a separator, + * - 32 or 48 bytes for the Transcript-Hash(Handshake Context, Certificate) + * (depending on the size of the transcript_hash) + * + * This results in a total size of + * - 130 bytes for a SHA256-based transcript hash, or + * (64 + 33 + 1 + 32 bytes) + * - 146 bytes for a SHA384-based transcript hash. + * (64 + 33 + 1 + 48 bytes) + * + */ +#define SSL_VERIFY_STRUCT_MAX_SIZE (64 + \ + 33 + \ + 1 + \ + MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_MD_MAX_SIZE \ + ) + +/* + * The ssl_tls13_create_verify_structure() creates the verify structure. + * As input, it requires the transcript hash. + * + * The caller has to ensure that the buffer has size at least + * SSL_VERIFY_STRUCT_MAX_SIZE bytes. + */ +static void ssl_tls13_create_verify_structure(const unsigned char *transcript_hash, + size_t transcript_hash_len, + unsigned char *verify_buffer, + size_t *verify_buffer_len, + int from) +{ + size_t idx; + + /* RFC 8446, Section 4.4.3: + * + * The digital signature [in the CertificateVerify message] is then + * computed over the concatenation of: + * - A string that consists of octet 32 (0x20) repeated 64 times + * - The context string + * - A single 0 byte which serves as the separator + * - The content to be signed + */ + memset(verify_buffer, 0x20, 64); + idx = 64; + + if (from == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT) { + memcpy(verify_buffer + idx, MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LBL_WITH_LEN(client_cv)); + idx += MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LBL_LEN(client_cv); + } else { /* from == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER */ + memcpy(verify_buffer + idx, MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LBL_WITH_LEN(server_cv)); + idx += MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LBL_LEN(server_cv); + } + + verify_buffer[idx++] = 0x0; + + memcpy(verify_buffer + idx, transcript_hash, transcript_hash_len); + idx += transcript_hash_len; + + *verify_buffer_len = idx; +} + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_parse_certificate_verify(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *buf, + const unsigned char *end, + const unsigned char *verify_buffer, + size_t verify_buffer_len) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + const unsigned char *p = buf; + uint16_t algorithm; + size_t signature_len; + mbedtls_pk_type_t sig_alg; + mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg; + psa_algorithm_t hash_alg = PSA_ALG_NONE; + unsigned char verify_hash[PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE]; + size_t verify_hash_len; + + void const *options = NULL; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT) + mbedtls_pk_rsassa_pss_options rsassa_pss_options; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT */ + + /* + * struct { + * SignatureScheme algorithm; + * opaque signature<0..2^16-1>; + * } CertificateVerify; + */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, end, 2); + algorithm = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(p, 0); + p += 2; + + /* RFC 8446 section 4.4.3 + * + * If the CertificateVerify message is sent by a server, the signature + * algorithm MUST be one offered in the client's "signature_algorithms" + * extension unless no valid certificate chain can be produced without + * unsupported algorithms + * + * RFC 8446 section 4.4.2.2 + * + * If the client cannot construct an acceptable chain using the provided + * certificates and decides to abort the handshake, then it MUST abort the + * handshake with an appropriate certificate-related alert + * (by default, "unsupported_certificate"). + * + * Check if algorithm is an offered signature algorithm. + */ + if (!mbedtls_ssl_sig_alg_is_offered(ssl, algorithm)) { + /* algorithm not in offered signature algorithms list */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("Received signature algorithm(%04x) is not " + "offered.", + (unsigned int) algorithm)); + goto error; + } + + if (mbedtls_ssl_get_pk_type_and_md_alg_from_sig_alg( + algorithm, &sig_alg, &md_alg) != 0) { + goto error; + } + + hash_alg = mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type(md_alg); + if (hash_alg == 0) { + goto error; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("Certificate Verify: Signature algorithm ( %04x )", + (unsigned int) algorithm)); + + /* + * Check the certificate's key type matches the signature alg + */ + if (!mbedtls_pk_can_do(&ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert->pk, sig_alg)) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("signature algorithm doesn't match cert key")); + goto error; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, end, 2); + signature_len = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(p, 0); + p += 2; + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, end, signature_len); + + status = psa_hash_compute(hash_alg, + verify_buffer, + verify_buffer_len, + verify_hash, + sizeof(verify_hash), + &verify_hash_len); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "hash computation PSA error", status); + goto error; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "verify hash", verify_hash, verify_hash_len); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT) + if (sig_alg == MBEDTLS_PK_RSASSA_PSS) { + rsassa_pss_options.mgf1_hash_id = md_alg; + + rsassa_pss_options.expected_salt_len = PSA_HASH_LENGTH(hash_alg); + options = (const void *) &rsassa_pss_options; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT */ + + if ((ret = mbedtls_pk_verify_ext(sig_alg, options, + &ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert->pk, + md_alg, verify_hash, verify_hash_len, + p, signature_len)) == 0) { + return 0; + } + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_pk_verify_ext", ret); + +error: + /* RFC 8446 section 4.4.3 + * + * If the verification fails, the receiver MUST terminate the handshake + * with a "decrypt_error" alert. + */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECRYPT_ERROR, + MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; + +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED */ + +int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_process_certificate_verify(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED) + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char verify_buffer[SSL_VERIFY_STRUCT_MAX_SIZE]; + size_t verify_buffer_len; + unsigned char transcript[MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_MD_MAX_SIZE]; + size_t transcript_len; + unsigned char *buf; + size_t buf_len; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> parse certificate verify")); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK( + mbedtls_ssl_tls13_fetch_handshake_msg( + ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY, &buf, &buf_len)); + + /* Need to calculate the hash of the transcript first + * before reading the message since otherwise it gets + * included in the transcript + */ + ret = mbedtls_ssl_get_handshake_transcript( + ssl, + (mbedtls_md_type_t) ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info->mac, + transcript, sizeof(transcript), + &transcript_len); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT( + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_INTERNAL_ERROR, + MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return ret; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "handshake hash", transcript, transcript_len); + + /* Create verify structure */ + ssl_tls13_create_verify_structure(transcript, + transcript_len, + verify_buffer, + &verify_buffer_len, + (ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT) ? + MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER : + MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT); + + /* Process the message contents */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(ssl_tls13_parse_certificate_verify( + ssl, buf, buf + buf_len, + verify_buffer, verify_buffer_len)); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(mbedtls_ssl_add_hs_msg_to_checksum( + ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY, + buf, buf_len)); + +cleanup: + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= parse certificate verify")); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_tls13_process_certificate_verify", ret); + return ret; +#else + ((void) ssl); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("should never happen")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED */ +} + +/* + * + * STATE HANDLING: Incoming Certificate. + * + */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) +/* + * Structure of Certificate message: + * + * enum { + * X509(0), + * RawPublicKey(2), + * (255) + * } CertificateType; + * + * struct { + * select (certificate_type) { + * case RawPublicKey: + * * From RFC 7250 ASN.1_subjectPublicKeyInfo * + * opaque ASN1_subjectPublicKeyInfo<1..2^24-1>; + * case X509: + * opaque cert_data<1..2^24-1>; + * }; + * Extension extensions<0..2^16-1>; + * } CertificateEntry; + * + * struct { + * opaque certificate_request_context<0..2^8-1>; + * CertificateEntry certificate_list<0..2^24-1>; + * } Certificate; + * + */ + +/* Parse certificate chain send by the server. */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE +int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_parse_certificate(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *buf, + const unsigned char *end) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t certificate_request_context_len = 0; + size_t certificate_list_len = 0; + const unsigned char *p = buf; + const unsigned char *certificate_list_end; + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *handshake = ssl->handshake; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, end, 4); + certificate_request_context_len = p[0]; + certificate_list_len = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT24_BE(p, 1); + p += 4; + + /* In theory, the certificate list can be up to 2^24 Bytes, but we don't + * support anything beyond 2^16 = 64K. + */ + if ((certificate_request_context_len != 0) || + (certificate_list_len >= 0x10000)) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad certificate message")); + MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR, + MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; + } + + /* In case we tried to reuse a session but it failed */ + if (ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert != NULL) { + mbedtls_x509_crt_free(ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert); + mbedtls_free(ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert); + } + + if (certificate_list_len == 0) { + ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert = NULL; + ret = 0; + goto exit; + } + + if ((ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert = + mbedtls_calloc(1, sizeof(mbedtls_x509_crt))) == NULL) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("alloc( %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET " bytes ) failed", + sizeof(mbedtls_x509_crt))); + MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_INTERNAL_ERROR, + MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED; + } + + mbedtls_x509_crt_init(ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, end, certificate_list_len); + certificate_list_end = p + certificate_list_len; + while (p < certificate_list_end) { + size_t cert_data_len, extensions_len; + const unsigned char *extensions_end; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, certificate_list_end, 3); + cert_data_len = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT24_BE(p, 0); + p += 3; + + /* In theory, the CRT can be up to 2^24 Bytes, but we don't support + * anything beyond 2^16 = 64K. Otherwise as in the TLS 1.2 code, + * check that we have a minimum of 128 bytes of data, this is not + * clear why we need that though. + */ + if ((cert_data_len < 128) || (cert_data_len >= 0x10000)) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad Certificate message")); + MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR, + MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, certificate_list_end, cert_data_len); + ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der(ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert, + p, cert_data_len); + + switch (ret) { + case 0: /*ok*/ + break; + case MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_UNKNOWN_SIG_ALG + MBEDTLS_ERR_OID_NOT_FOUND: + /* Ignore certificate with an unknown algorithm: maybe a + prior certificate was already trusted. */ + break; + + case MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_ALLOC_FAILED: + MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_INTERNAL_ERROR, + MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_ALLOC_FAILED); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, " mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der", ret); + return ret; + + case MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_UNKNOWN_VERSION: + MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_CERT, + MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_UNKNOWN_VERSION); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, " mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der", ret); + return ret; + + default: + MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_BAD_CERT, + ret); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, " mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der", ret); + return ret; + } + + p += cert_data_len; + + /* Certificate extensions length */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, certificate_list_end, 2); + extensions_len = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(p, 0); + p += 2; + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, certificate_list_end, extensions_len); + + extensions_end = p + extensions_len; + handshake->received_extensions = MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK_NONE; + + while (p < extensions_end) { + unsigned int extension_type; + size_t extension_data_len; + + /* + * struct { + * ExtensionType extension_type; (2 bytes) + * opaque extension_data<0..2^16-1>; + * } Extension; + */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, extensions_end, 4); + extension_type = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(p, 0); + extension_data_len = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(p, 2); + p += 4; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, extensions_end, extension_data_len); + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_check_received_extension( + ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE, extension_type, + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_ALLOWED_EXTS_OF_CT); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + + switch (extension_type) { + default: + MBEDTLS_SSL_PRINT_EXT( + 3, MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE, + extension_type, "( ignored )"); + break; + } + + p += extension_data_len; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PRINT_EXTS(3, MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE, + handshake->received_extensions); + } + +exit: + /* Check that all the message is consumed. */ + if (p != end) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad Certificate message")); + MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR, + MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_CRT(3, "peer certificate", + ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert); + + return ret; +} +#else +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE +int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_parse_certificate(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *buf, + const unsigned char *end) +{ + ((void) ssl); + ((void) buf); + ((void) end); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) +/* Validate certificate chain sent by the server. */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_validate_certificate(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + int ret = 0; + int authmode = MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_REQUIRED; + mbedtls_x509_crt *ca_chain; + mbedtls_x509_crl *ca_crl; + const char *ext_oid; + size_t ext_len; + uint32_t verify_result = 0; + + /* If SNI was used, overwrite authentication mode + * from the configuration. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) + if (ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) + if (ssl->handshake->sni_authmode != MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_UNSET) { + authmode = ssl->handshake->sni_authmode; + } else +#endif + authmode = ssl->conf->authmode; + } +#endif + + /* + * If the peer hasn't sent a certificate ( i.e. it sent + * an empty certificate chain ), this is reflected in the peer CRT + * structure being unset. + * Check for that and handle it depending on the + * authentication mode. + */ + if (ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert == NULL) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("peer has no certificate")); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) + if (ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER) { + /* The client was asked for a certificate but didn't send + * one. The client should know what's going on, so we + * don't send an alert. + */ + ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result = MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_MISSING; + if (authmode == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_OPTIONAL) { + return 0; + } else { + MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT( + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_NO_CERT, + MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NO_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NO_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE; + } + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) + if (ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_NO_CERT, + MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FATAL_ALERT_MESSAGE); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FATAL_ALERT_MESSAGE; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */ + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) + if (ssl->handshake->sni_ca_chain != NULL) { + ca_chain = ssl->handshake->sni_ca_chain; + ca_crl = ssl->handshake->sni_ca_crl; + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION */ + { + ca_chain = ssl->conf->ca_chain; + ca_crl = ssl->conf->ca_crl; + } + + /* + * Main check: verify certificate + */ + ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_with_profile( + ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert, + ca_chain, ca_crl, + ssl->conf->cert_profile, + ssl->hostname, + &verify_result, + ssl->conf->f_vrfy, ssl->conf->p_vrfy); + + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "x509_verify_cert", ret); + } + + /* + * Secondary checks: always done, but change 'ret' only if it was 0 + */ + if (ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT) { + ext_oid = MBEDTLS_OID_SERVER_AUTH; + ext_len = MBEDTLS_OID_SIZE(MBEDTLS_OID_SERVER_AUTH); + } else { + ext_oid = MBEDTLS_OID_CLIENT_AUTH; + ext_len = MBEDTLS_OID_SIZE(MBEDTLS_OID_CLIENT_AUTH); + } + + if ((mbedtls_x509_crt_check_key_usage( + ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert, + MBEDTLS_X509_KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE) != 0) || + (mbedtls_x509_crt_check_extended_key_usage( + ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert, + ext_oid, ext_len) != 0)) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad certificate (usage extensions)")); + if (ret == 0) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_CERTIFICATE; + } + } + + /* mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_with_profile is supposed to report a + * verification failure through MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED, + * with details encoded in the verification flags. All other kinds + * of error codes, including those from the user provided f_vrfy + * functions, are treated as fatal and lead to a failure of + * mbedtls_ssl_tls13_parse_certificate even if verification was optional. + */ + if (authmode == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_OPTIONAL && + (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED || + ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_CERTIFICATE)) { + ret = 0; + } + + if (ca_chain == NULL && authmode == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_REQUIRED) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("got no CA chain")); + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CA_CHAIN_REQUIRED; + } + + if (ret != 0) { + /* The certificate may have been rejected for several reasons. + Pick one and send the corresponding alert. Which alert to send + may be a subject of debate in some cases. */ + if (verify_result & MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_OTHER) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT( + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ACCESS_DENIED, ret); + } else if (verify_result & MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_CN_MISMATCH) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_BAD_CERT, ret); + } else if (verify_result & (MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_KEY_USAGE | + MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_EXT_KEY_USAGE | + MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_NS_CERT_TYPE | + MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_PK | + MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_KEY)) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT( + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_CERT, ret); + } else if (verify_result & MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_EXPIRED) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT( + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_CERT_EXPIRED, ret); + } else if (verify_result & MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_REVOKED) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT( + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_CERT_REVOKED, ret); + } else if (verify_result & MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_NOT_TRUSTED) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNKNOWN_CA, ret); + } else { + MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT( + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_CERT_UNKNOWN, ret); + } + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C) + if (verify_result != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("! Certificate verification flags %08x", + (unsigned int) verify_result)); + } else { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("Certificate verification flags clear")); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C */ + + ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result = verify_result; + return ret; +} +#else /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_validate_certificate(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + ((void) ssl); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED */ + +int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_process_certificate(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> parse certificate")); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED) + unsigned char *buf; + size_t buf_len; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(mbedtls_ssl_tls13_fetch_handshake_msg( + ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE, + &buf, &buf_len)); + + /* Parse the certificate chain sent by the peer. */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(mbedtls_ssl_tls13_parse_certificate(ssl, buf, + buf + buf_len)); + /* Validate the certificate chain and set the verification results. */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(ssl_tls13_validate_certificate(ssl)); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(mbedtls_ssl_add_hs_msg_to_checksum( + ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE, buf, buf_len)); + +cleanup: +#else /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED */ + (void) ssl; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED */ + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= parse certificate")); + return ret; +} +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED) +/* + * enum { + * X509(0), + * RawPublicKey(2), + * (255) + * } CertificateType; + * + * struct { + * select (certificate_type) { + * case RawPublicKey: + * // From RFC 7250 ASN.1_subjectPublicKeyInfo + * opaque ASN1_subjectPublicKeyInfo<1..2^24-1>; + * + * case X509: + * opaque cert_data<1..2^24-1>; + * }; + * Extension extensions<0..2^16-1>; + * } CertificateEntry; + * + * struct { + * opaque certificate_request_context<0..2^8-1>; + * CertificateEntry certificate_list<0..2^24-1>; + * } Certificate; + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_write_certificate_body(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *buf, + unsigned char *end, + size_t *out_len) +{ + const mbedtls_x509_crt *crt = mbedtls_ssl_own_cert(ssl); + unsigned char *p = buf; + unsigned char *certificate_request_context = + ssl->handshake->certificate_request_context; + unsigned char certificate_request_context_len = + ssl->handshake->certificate_request_context_len; + unsigned char *p_certificate_list_len; + + + /* ... + * opaque certificate_request_context<0..2^8-1>; + * ... + */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR(p, end, certificate_request_context_len + 1); + *p++ = certificate_request_context_len; + if (certificate_request_context_len > 0) { + memcpy(p, certificate_request_context, certificate_request_context_len); + p += certificate_request_context_len; + } + + /* ... + * CertificateEntry certificate_list<0..2^24-1>; + * ... + */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR(p, end, 3); + p_certificate_list_len = p; + p += 3; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_CRT(3, "own certificate", crt); + + while (crt != NULL) { + size_t cert_data_len = crt->raw.len; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR(p, end, cert_data_len + 3 + 2); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT24_BE(cert_data_len, p, 0); + p += 3; + + memcpy(p, crt->raw.p, cert_data_len); + p += cert_data_len; + crt = crt->next; + + /* Currently, we don't have any certificate extensions defined. + * Hence, we are sending an empty extension with length zero. + */ + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(0, p, 0); + p += 2; + } + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT24_BE(p - p_certificate_list_len - 3, + p_certificate_list_len, 0); + + *out_len = p - buf; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PRINT_EXTS( + 3, MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE, ssl->handshake->sent_extensions); + + return 0; +} + +int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_write_certificate(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + int ret; + unsigned char *buf; + size_t buf_len, msg_len; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> write certificate")); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(mbedtls_ssl_start_handshake_msg( + ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE, &buf, &buf_len)); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(ssl_tls13_write_certificate_body(ssl, + buf, + buf + buf_len, + &msg_len)); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(mbedtls_ssl_add_hs_msg_to_checksum( + ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE, buf, msg_len)); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(mbedtls_ssl_finish_handshake_msg( + ssl, buf_len, msg_len)); +cleanup: + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= write certificate")); + return ret; +} + +/* + * STATE HANDLING: Output Certificate Verify + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_check_sig_alg_cert_key_match(uint16_t sig_alg, + mbedtls_pk_context *key) +{ + mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_type = (mbedtls_pk_type_t) mbedtls_ssl_sig_from_pk(key); + size_t key_size = mbedtls_pk_get_bitlen(key); + + switch (pk_type) { + case MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_ECDSA: + switch (key_size) { + case 256: + return + sig_alg == MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_ECDSA_SECP256R1_SHA256; + + case 384: + return + sig_alg == MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_ECDSA_SECP384R1_SHA384; + + case 521: + return + sig_alg == MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_ECDSA_SECP521R1_SHA512; + default: + break; + } + break; + + case MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_RSA: + switch (sig_alg) { + case MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PSS_RSAE_SHA256: /* Intentional fallthrough */ + case MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PSS_RSAE_SHA384: /* Intentional fallthrough */ + case MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PSS_RSAE_SHA512: + return 1; + + default: + break; + } + break; + + default: + break; + } + + return 0; +} + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_write_certificate_verify_body(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *buf, + unsigned char *end, + size_t *out_len) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char *p = buf; + mbedtls_pk_context *own_key; + + unsigned char handshake_hash[MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_MD_MAX_SIZE]; + size_t handshake_hash_len; + unsigned char verify_buffer[SSL_VERIFY_STRUCT_MAX_SIZE]; + size_t verify_buffer_len; + + uint16_t *sig_alg = ssl->handshake->received_sig_algs; + size_t signature_len = 0; + + *out_len = 0; + + own_key = mbedtls_ssl_own_key(ssl); + if (own_key == NULL) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("should never happen")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_get_handshake_transcript( + ssl, (mbedtls_md_type_t) ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info->mac, + handshake_hash, sizeof(handshake_hash), &handshake_hash_len); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "handshake hash", + handshake_hash, + handshake_hash_len); + + ssl_tls13_create_verify_structure(handshake_hash, handshake_hash_len, + verify_buffer, &verify_buffer_len, + ssl->conf->endpoint); + + /* + * struct { + * SignatureScheme algorithm; + * opaque signature<0..2^16-1>; + * } CertificateVerify; + */ + /* Check there is space for the algorithm identifier (2 bytes) and the + * signature length (2 bytes). + */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR(p, end, 4); + + for (; *sig_alg != MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_NONE; sig_alg++) { + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_type = MBEDTLS_PK_NONE; + mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg = MBEDTLS_MD_NONE; + psa_algorithm_t psa_algorithm = PSA_ALG_NONE; + unsigned char verify_hash[PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE]; + size_t verify_hash_len; + + if (!mbedtls_ssl_sig_alg_is_offered(ssl, *sig_alg)) { + continue; + } + + if (!mbedtls_ssl_tls13_sig_alg_for_cert_verify_is_supported(*sig_alg)) { + continue; + } + + if (!mbedtls_ssl_tls13_check_sig_alg_cert_key_match(*sig_alg, own_key)) { + continue; + } + + if (mbedtls_ssl_get_pk_type_and_md_alg_from_sig_alg( + *sig_alg, &pk_type, &md_alg) != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } + + /* Hash verify buffer with indicated hash function */ + psa_algorithm = mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type(md_alg); + status = psa_hash_compute(psa_algorithm, + verify_buffer, + verify_buffer_len, + verify_hash, sizeof(verify_hash), + &verify_hash_len); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "verify hash", verify_hash, verify_hash_len); + + if ((ret = mbedtls_pk_sign_ext(pk_type, own_key, + md_alg, verify_hash, verify_hash_len, + p + 4, (size_t) (end - (p + 4)), &signature_len, + ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng)) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("CertificateVerify signature failed with %s", + mbedtls_ssl_sig_alg_to_str(*sig_alg))); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(2, "mbedtls_pk_sign_ext", ret); + + /* The signature failed. This is possible if the private key + * was not suitable for the signature operation as purposely we + * did not check its suitability completely. Let's try with + * another signature algorithm. + */ + continue; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("CertificateVerify signature with %s", + mbedtls_ssl_sig_alg_to_str(*sig_alg))); + + break; + } + + if (*sig_alg == MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_NONE) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("no suitable signature algorithm")); + MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, + MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; + } + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(*sig_alg, p, 0); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(signature_len, p, 2); + + *out_len = 4 + signature_len; + + return 0; +} + +int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_write_certificate_verify(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + int ret = 0; + unsigned char *buf; + size_t buf_len, msg_len; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> write certificate verify")); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(mbedtls_ssl_start_handshake_msg( + ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY, + &buf, &buf_len)); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(ssl_tls13_write_certificate_verify_body( + ssl, buf, buf + buf_len, &msg_len)); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(mbedtls_ssl_add_hs_msg_to_checksum( + ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY, + buf, msg_len)); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(mbedtls_ssl_finish_handshake_msg( + ssl, buf_len, msg_len)); + +cleanup: + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= write certificate verify")); + return ret; +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED */ + +/* + * + * STATE HANDLING: Incoming Finished message. + */ +/* + * Implementation + */ + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_preprocess_finished_message(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + int ret; + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_calculate_verify_data( + ssl, + ssl->handshake->state_local.finished_in.digest, + sizeof(ssl->handshake->state_local.finished_in.digest), + &ssl->handshake->state_local.finished_in.digest_len, + ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT ? + MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER : MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_tls13_calculate_verify_data", ret); + return ret; + } + + return 0; +} + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_parse_finished_message(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *buf, + const unsigned char *end) +{ + /* + * struct { + * opaque verify_data[Hash.length]; + * } Finished; + */ + const unsigned char *expected_verify_data = + ssl->handshake->state_local.finished_in.digest; + size_t expected_verify_data_len = + ssl->handshake->state_local.finished_in.digest_len; + /* Structural validation */ + if ((size_t) (end - buf) != expected_verify_data_len) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad finished message")); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR, + MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "verify_data (self-computed):", + expected_verify_data, + expected_verify_data_len); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "verify_data (received message):", buf, + expected_verify_data_len); + + /* Semantic validation */ + if (mbedtls_ct_memcmp(buf, + expected_verify_data, + expected_verify_data_len) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad finished message")); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECRYPT_ERROR, + MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; + } + return 0; +} + +int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_process_finished_message(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char *buf; + size_t buf_len; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> parse finished message")); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(mbedtls_ssl_tls13_fetch_handshake_msg( + ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_FINISHED, &buf, &buf_len)); + + /* Preprocessing step: Compute handshake digest */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(ssl_tls13_preprocess_finished_message(ssl)); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(ssl_tls13_parse_finished_message( + ssl, buf, buf + buf_len)); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(mbedtls_ssl_add_hs_msg_to_checksum( + ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_FINISHED, buf, buf_len)); + +cleanup: + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= parse finished message")); + return ret; +} + +/* + * + * STATE HANDLING: Write and send Finished message. + * + */ +/* + * Implement + */ + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_prepare_finished_message(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + int ret; + + /* Compute transcript of handshake up to now. */ + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_calculate_verify_data(ssl, + ssl->handshake->state_local.finished_out.digest, + sizeof(ssl->handshake->state_local.finished_out. + digest), + &ssl->handshake->state_local.finished_out.digest_len, + ssl->conf->endpoint); + + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "calculate_verify_data failed", ret); + return ret; + } + + return 0; +} + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_write_finished_message_body(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *buf, + unsigned char *end, + size_t *out_len) +{ + size_t verify_data_len = ssl->handshake->state_local.finished_out.digest_len; + /* + * struct { + * opaque verify_data[Hash.length]; + * } Finished; + */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR(buf, end, verify_data_len); + + memcpy(buf, ssl->handshake->state_local.finished_out.digest, + verify_data_len); + + *out_len = verify_data_len; + return 0; +} + +/* Main entry point: orchestrates the other functions */ +int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_write_finished_message(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char *buf; + size_t buf_len, msg_len; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> write finished message")); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(ssl_tls13_prepare_finished_message(ssl)); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(mbedtls_ssl_start_handshake_msg(ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_FINISHED, &buf, &buf_len)); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(ssl_tls13_write_finished_message_body( + ssl, buf, buf + buf_len, &msg_len)); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(mbedtls_ssl_add_hs_msg_to_checksum(ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_FINISHED, buf, msg_len)); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(mbedtls_ssl_finish_handshake_msg( + ssl, buf_len, msg_len)); +cleanup: + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= write finished message")); + return ret; +} + +void mbedtls_ssl_tls13_handshake_wrapup(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("=> handshake wrapup")); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("Switch to application keys for inbound traffic")); + mbedtls_ssl_set_inbound_transform(ssl, ssl->transform_application); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("Switch to application keys for outbound traffic")); + mbedtls_ssl_set_outbound_transform(ssl, ssl->transform_application); + + /* + * Free the previous session and switch to the current one. + */ + if (ssl->session) { + mbedtls_ssl_session_free(ssl->session); + mbedtls_free(ssl->session); + } + ssl->session = ssl->session_negotiate; + ssl->session_negotiate = NULL; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("<= handshake wrapup")); +} + +/* + * + * STATE HANDLING: Write ChangeCipherSpec + * + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_write_change_cipher_spec_body(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *buf, + unsigned char *end, + size_t *olen) +{ + ((void) ssl); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR(buf, end, 1); + buf[0] = 1; + *olen = 1; + + return 0; +} + +int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_write_change_cipher_spec(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> write change cipher spec")); + + /* Only one CCS to send. */ + if (ssl->handshake->ccs_sent) { + ret = 0; + goto cleanup; + } + + /* Write CCS message */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(ssl_tls13_write_change_cipher_spec_body( + ssl, ssl->out_msg, + ssl->out_msg + MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN, + &ssl->out_msglen)); + + ssl->out_msgtype = MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC; + + /* Dispatch message */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(mbedtls_ssl_write_record(ssl, 0)); + + ssl->handshake->ccs_sent = 1; + +cleanup: + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= write change cipher spec")); + return ret; +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE */ + +/* Early Data Indication Extension + * + * struct { + * select ( Handshake.msg_type ) { + * case new_session_ticket: uint32 max_early_data_size; + * case client_hello: Empty; + * case encrypted_extensions: Empty; + * }; + * } EarlyDataIndication; + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) +int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_write_early_data_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + int in_new_session_ticket, + unsigned char *buf, + const unsigned char *end, + size_t *out_len) +{ + unsigned char *p = buf; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) + const size_t needed = in_new_session_ticket ? 8 : 4; +#else + const size_t needed = 4; + ((void) in_new_session_ticket); +#endif + + *out_len = 0; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR(p, end, needed); + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_EARLY_DATA, p, 0); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(needed - 4, p, 2); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) + if (in_new_session_ticket) { + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE(ssl->conf->max_early_data_size, p, 4); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( + 4, ("Sent max_early_data_size=%u", + (unsigned int) ssl->conf->max_early_data_size)); + } +#endif + + *out_len = needed; + + mbedtls_ssl_tls13_set_hs_sent_ext_mask(ssl, MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_EARLY_DATA); + + return 0; +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) +int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_check_early_data_len(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + size_t early_data_len) +{ + /* + * This function should be called only while an handshake is in progress + * and thus a session under negotiation. Add a sanity check to detect a + * misuse. + */ + if (ssl->session_negotiate == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } + + /* RFC 8446 section 4.6.1 + * + * A server receiving more than max_early_data_size bytes of 0-RTT data + * SHOULD terminate the connection with an "unexpected_message" alert. + * Note that if it is still possible to send early_data_len bytes of early + * data, it means that early_data_len is smaller than max_early_data_size + * (type uint32_t) and can fit in an uint32_t. We use this further + * down. + */ + if (early_data_len > + (ssl->session_negotiate->max_early_data_size - + ssl->total_early_data_size)) { + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( + 2, ("EarlyData: Too much early data received, %u + %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET " > %u", + ssl->total_early_data_size, early_data_len, + ssl->session_negotiate->max_early_data_size)); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT( + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, + MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; + } + + /* + * early_data_len has been checked to be less than max_early_data_size + * that is uint32_t. Its cast to an uint32_t below is thus safe. We need + * the cast to appease some compilers. + */ + ssl->total_early_data_size += (uint32_t) early_data_len; + + return 0; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA */ + +/* Reset SSL context and update hash for handling HRR. + * + * Replace Transcript-Hash(X) by + * Transcript-Hash( message_hash || + * 00 00 Hash.length || + * X ) + * A few states of the handshake are preserved, including: + * - session ID + * - session ticket + * - negotiated ciphersuite + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_reset_transcript_for_hrr(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char hash_transcript[PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE + 4]; + size_t hash_len; + const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info = + ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("Reset SSL session for HRR")); + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_get_handshake_transcript(ssl, (mbedtls_md_type_t) ciphersuite_info->mac, + hash_transcript + 4, + PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE, + &hash_len); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_get_handshake_transcript", ret); + return ret; + } + + hash_transcript[0] = MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_MESSAGE_HASH; + hash_transcript[1] = 0; + hash_transcript[2] = 0; + hash_transcript[3] = (unsigned char) hash_len; + + hash_len += 4; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "Truncated handshake transcript", + hash_transcript, hash_len); + + /* Reset running hash and replace it with a hash of the transcript */ + ret = mbedtls_ssl_reset_checksum(ssl); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_reset_checksum", ret); + return ret; + } + ret = ssl->handshake->update_checksum(ssl, hash_transcript, hash_len); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "update_checksum", ret); + return ret; + } + + return ret; +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED) + +int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_read_public_xxdhe_share(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *buf, + size_t buf_len) +{ + uint8_t *p = (uint8_t *) buf; + const uint8_t *end = buf + buf_len; + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *handshake = ssl->handshake; + + /* Get size of the TLS opaque key_exchange field of the KeyShareEntry struct. */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, end, 2); + uint16_t peerkey_len = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(p, 0); + p += 2; + + /* Check if key size is consistent with given buffer length. */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, end, peerkey_len); + + /* Store peer's ECDH/FFDH public key. */ + if (peerkey_len > sizeof(handshake->xxdh_psa_peerkey)) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("Invalid public key length: %u > %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET, + (unsigned) peerkey_len, + sizeof(handshake->xxdh_psa_peerkey))); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; + } + memcpy(handshake->xxdh_psa_peerkey, p, peerkey_len); + handshake->xxdh_psa_peerkey_len = peerkey_len; + + return 0; +} + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH) +static psa_status_t mbedtls_ssl_get_psa_ffdh_info_from_tls_id( + uint16_t tls_id, size_t *bits, psa_key_type_t *key_type) +{ + switch (tls_id) { +#if defined(PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_2048) + case MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_FFDHE2048: + *bits = 2048; + *key_type = PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR(PSA_DH_FAMILY_RFC7919); + return PSA_SUCCESS; +#endif /* PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_2048 */ +#if defined(PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_3072) + case MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_FFDHE3072: + *bits = 3072; + *key_type = PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR(PSA_DH_FAMILY_RFC7919); + return PSA_SUCCESS; +#endif /* PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_3072 */ +#if defined(PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_4096) + case MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_FFDHE4096: + *bits = 4096; + *key_type = PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR(PSA_DH_FAMILY_RFC7919); + return PSA_SUCCESS; +#endif /* PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_4096 */ +#if defined(PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_6144) + case MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_FFDHE6144: + *bits = 6144; + *key_type = PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR(PSA_DH_FAMILY_RFC7919); + return PSA_SUCCESS; +#endif /* PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_6144 */ +#if defined(PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_8192) + case MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_FFDHE8192: + *bits = 8192; + *key_type = PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR(PSA_DH_FAMILY_RFC7919); + return PSA_SUCCESS; +#endif /* PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_8192 */ + default: + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + } +} +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH */ + +int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_generate_and_write_xxdh_key_exchange( + mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + uint16_t named_group, + unsigned char *buf, + unsigned char *end, + size_t *out_len) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_GENERIC_ERROR; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + psa_key_attributes_t key_attributes; + size_t own_pubkey_len; + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *handshake = ssl->handshake; + size_t bits = 0; + psa_key_type_t key_type = PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE; + psa_algorithm_t alg = PSA_ALG_NONE; + size_t buf_size = (size_t) (end - buf); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("Perform PSA-based ECDH/FFDH computation.")); + + /* Convert EC's TLS ID to PSA key type. */ +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH) + if (mbedtls_ssl_get_psa_curve_info_from_tls_id( + named_group, &key_type, &bits) == PSA_SUCCESS) { + alg = PSA_ALG_ECDH; + } +#endif +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH) + if (mbedtls_ssl_get_psa_ffdh_info_from_tls_id(named_group, &bits, + &key_type) == PSA_SUCCESS) { + alg = PSA_ALG_FFDH; + } +#endif + + if (key_type == PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; + } + + if (buf_size < PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(bits)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + } + + handshake->xxdh_psa_type = key_type; + ssl->handshake->xxdh_psa_bits = bits; + + key_attributes = psa_key_attributes_init(); + psa_set_key_usage_flags(&key_attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE); + psa_set_key_algorithm(&key_attributes, alg); + psa_set_key_type(&key_attributes, handshake->xxdh_psa_type); + psa_set_key_bits(&key_attributes, handshake->xxdh_psa_bits); + + /* Generate ECDH/FFDH private key. */ + status = psa_generate_key(&key_attributes, + &handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + ret = PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "psa_generate_key", ret); + return ret; + + } + + /* Export the public part of the ECDH/FFDH private key from PSA. */ + status = psa_export_public_key(handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey, + buf, buf_size, + &own_pubkey_len); + + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + ret = PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "psa_export_public_key", ret); + return ret; + } + + *out_len = own_pubkey_len; + + return 0; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED */ + +/* RFC 8446 section 4.2 + * + * If an implementation receives an extension which it recognizes and which is + * not specified for the message in which it appears, it MUST abort the handshake + * with an "illegal_parameter" alert. + * + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_check_received_extension( + mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + int hs_msg_type, + unsigned int received_extension_type, + uint32_t hs_msg_allowed_extensions_mask) +{ + uint32_t extension_mask = mbedtls_ssl_get_extension_mask( + received_extension_type); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PRINT_EXT( + 3, hs_msg_type, received_extension_type, "received"); + + if ((extension_mask & hs_msg_allowed_extensions_mask) == 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_PRINT_EXT( + 3, hs_msg_type, received_extension_type, "is illegal"); + MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT( + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, + MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; + } + + ssl->handshake->received_extensions |= extension_mask; + /* + * If it is a message containing extension responses, check that we + * previously sent the extension. + */ + switch (hs_msg_type) { + case MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_SERVER_HELLO: + case MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_HS_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST: + case MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS: + case MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE: + /* Check if the received extension is sent by peer message.*/ + if ((ssl->handshake->sent_extensions & extension_mask) != 0) { + return 0; + } + break; + default: + return 0; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PRINT_EXT( + 3, hs_msg_type, received_extension_type, "is unsupported"); + MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT( + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_EXT, + MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION; +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT) + +/* RFC 8449, section 4: + * + * The ExtensionData of the "record_size_limit" extension is + * RecordSizeLimit: + * uint16 RecordSizeLimit; + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_parse_record_size_limit_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *buf, + const unsigned char *end) +{ + const unsigned char *p = buf; + uint16_t record_size_limit; + const size_t extension_data_len = end - buf; + + if (extension_data_len != + MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT_EXTENSION_DATA_LENGTH) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, + ("record_size_limit extension has invalid length: %" + MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET " Bytes", + extension_data_len)); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT( + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, + MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, end, 2); + record_size_limit = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(p, 0); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("RecordSizeLimit: %u Bytes", record_size_limit)); + + /* RFC 8449, section 4: + * + * Endpoints MUST NOT send a "record_size_limit" extension with a value + * smaller than 64. An endpoint MUST treat receipt of a smaller value + * as a fatal error and generate an "illegal_parameter" alert. + */ + if (record_size_limit < MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT_MIN) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("Invalid record size limit : %u Bytes", + record_size_limit)); + MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT( + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, + MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; + } + + ssl->session_negotiate->record_size_limit = record_size_limit; + + return 0; +} + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_write_record_size_limit_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *buf, + const unsigned char *end, + size_t *out_len) +{ + unsigned char *p = buf; + *out_len = 0; + + MBEDTLS_STATIC_ASSERT(MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN >= MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT_MIN, + "MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN is less than the " + "minimum record size limit"); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR(p, end, 6); + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT, p, 0); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT_EXTENSION_DATA_LENGTH, + p, 2); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN, p, 4); + + *out_len = 6; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("Sent RecordSizeLimit: %d Bytes", + MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN)); + + mbedtls_ssl_tls13_set_hs_sent_ext_mask(ssl, MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT); + + return 0; +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C && MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 */ diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ssl_tls13_invasive.h b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ssl_tls13_invasive.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..b4506f71c7ef --- /dev/null +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ssl_tls13_invasive.h @@ -0,0 +1,23 @@ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +#ifndef MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS13_INVASIVE_H +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS13_INVASIVE_H + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) + +#include "psa/crypto.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS) +int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_parse_certificate(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *buf, + const unsigned char *end); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS13_INVASIVE_H */ diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ssl_tls13_keys.c b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ssl_tls13_keys.c index ae7bf10b6f8f..739414ea2fe8 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ssl_tls13_keys.c +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ssl_tls13_keys.c @@ -7,23 +7,37 @@ #include "common.h" -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) + +#include +#include #include "mbedtls/hkdf.h" -#include "mbedtls/ssl_internal.h" +#include "debug_internal.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" + +#include "ssl_misc.h" #include "ssl_tls13_keys.h" -#include "psa/crypto_sizes.h" +#include "ssl_tls13_invasive.h" -#include -#include +#include "psa/crypto.h" +#include "mbedtls/psa_util.h" + +/* Define a local translating function to save code size by not using too many + * arguments in each translating place. */ +static int local_err_translation(psa_status_t status) +{ + return psa_status_to_mbedtls(status, psa_to_ssl_errors, + ARRAY_LENGTH(psa_to_ssl_errors), + psa_generic_status_to_mbedtls); +} +#define PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status) local_err_translation(status) #define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LABEL(name, string) \ .name = string, -#define TLS1_3_EVOLVE_INPUT_SIZE (PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE > PSA_RAW_KEY_AGREEMENT_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE) ? \ - PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE : PSA_RAW_KEY_AGREEMENT_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE - -struct mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_labels_struct const mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_labels = +struct mbedtls_ssl_tls13_labels_struct const mbedtls_ssl_tls13_labels = { /* This seems to work in C, despite the string literal being one * character too long due to the 0-termination. */ @@ -50,24 +64,24 @@ struct mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_labels_struct const mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_labels = * 255 Bytes, so we require `desired_length` to be at most * 255. This allows us to save a few Bytes of code by * hardcoding the writing of the high bytes. - * - (label, llen): label + label length, without "tls13 " prefix - * The label length MUST be less than or equal to - * MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_SCHEDULE_MAX_LABEL_LEN - * It is the caller's responsibility to ensure this. - * All (label, label length) pairs used in TLS 1.3 - * can be obtained via MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LBL_WITH_LEN(). - * - (ctx, clen): context + context length - * The context length MUST be less than or equal to - * MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_SCHEDULE_MAX_CONTEXT_LEN - * It is the caller's responsibility to ensure this. + * - (label, label_len): label + label length, without "tls13 " prefix + * The label length MUST be less than or equal to + * MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_SCHEDULE_MAX_LABEL_LEN + * It is the caller's responsibility to ensure this. + * All (label, label length) pairs used in TLS 1.3 + * can be obtained via MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LBL_WITH_LEN(). + * - (ctx, ctx_len): context + context length + * The context length MUST be less than or equal to + * MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_SCHEDULE_MAX_CONTEXT_LEN + * It is the caller's responsibility to ensure this. * - dst: Target buffer for HkdfLabel structure, * This MUST be a writable buffer of size * at least SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_SCHEDULE_MAX_HKDF_LABEL_LEN Bytes. - * - dlen: Pointer at which to store the actual length of - * the HkdfLabel structure on success. + * - dst_len: Pointer at which to store the actual length of + * the HkdfLabel structure on success. */ -static const char tls1_3_label_prefix[6] = "tls13 "; +static const char tls13_label_prefix[6] = "tls13 "; #define SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_SCHEDULE_HKDF_LABEL_LEN(label_len, context_len) \ (2 /* expansion length */ \ @@ -78,20 +92,20 @@ static const char tls1_3_label_prefix[6] = "tls13 "; #define SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_SCHEDULE_MAX_HKDF_LABEL_LEN \ SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_SCHEDULE_HKDF_LABEL_LEN( \ - sizeof(tls1_3_label_prefix) + \ + sizeof(tls13_label_prefix) + \ MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_SCHEDULE_MAX_LABEL_LEN, \ MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_SCHEDULE_MAX_CONTEXT_LEN) -static void ssl_tls1_3_hkdf_encode_label( +static void ssl_tls13_hkdf_encode_label( size_t desired_length, - const unsigned char *label, size_t llen, - const unsigned char *ctx, size_t clen, - unsigned char *dst, size_t *dlen) + const unsigned char *label, size_t label_len, + const unsigned char *ctx, size_t ctx_len, + unsigned char *dst, size_t *dst_len) { size_t total_label_len = - sizeof(tls1_3_label_prefix) + llen; + sizeof(tls13_label_prefix) + label_len; size_t total_hkdf_lbl_len = - SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_SCHEDULE_HKDF_LABEL_LEN(total_label_len, clen); + SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_SCHEDULE_HKDF_LABEL_LEN(total_label_len, ctx_len); unsigned char *p = dst; @@ -99,7 +113,7 @@ static void ssl_tls1_3_hkdf_encode_label( * We're hardcoding the high byte to 0 here assuming that we never use * TLS 1.3 HKDF key expansion to more than 255 Bytes. */ #if MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_SCHEDULE_MAX_EXPANSION_LEN > 255 -#error "The implementation of ssl_tls1_3_hkdf_encode_label() is not fit for the \ +#error "The implementation of ssl_tls13_hkdf_encode_label() is not fit for the \ value of MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_SCHEDULE_MAX_EXPANSION_LEN" #endif @@ -108,64 +122,127 @@ static void ssl_tls1_3_hkdf_encode_label( /* Add label incl. prefix */ *p++ = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(total_label_len); - memcpy(p, tls1_3_label_prefix, sizeof(tls1_3_label_prefix)); - p += sizeof(tls1_3_label_prefix); - memcpy(p, label, llen); - p += llen; + memcpy(p, tls13_label_prefix, sizeof(tls13_label_prefix)); + p += sizeof(tls13_label_prefix); + memcpy(p, label, label_len); + p += label_len; /* Add context value */ - *p++ = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(clen); - if (clen != 0) { - memcpy(p, ctx, clen); + *p++ = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(ctx_len); + if (ctx_len != 0) { + memcpy(p, ctx, ctx_len); } /* Return total length to the caller. */ - *dlen = total_hkdf_lbl_len; + *dst_len = total_hkdf_lbl_len; } -int mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_hkdf_expand_label( - mbedtls_md_type_t hash_alg, - const unsigned char *secret, size_t slen, - const unsigned char *label, size_t llen, - const unsigned char *ctx, size_t clen, - unsigned char *buf, size_t blen) +int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_hkdf_expand_label( + psa_algorithm_t hash_alg, + const unsigned char *secret, size_t secret_len, + const unsigned char *label, size_t label_len, + const unsigned char *ctx, size_t ctx_len, + unsigned char *buf, size_t buf_len) { - const mbedtls_md_info_t *md; unsigned char hkdf_label[SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_SCHEDULE_MAX_HKDF_LABEL_LEN]; - size_t hkdf_label_len; + size_t hkdf_label_len = 0; + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_status_t abort_status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_derivation_operation_t operation = + PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_OPERATION_INIT; - if (llen > MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_SCHEDULE_MAX_LABEL_LEN) { + if (label_len > MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_SCHEDULE_MAX_LABEL_LEN) { /* Should never happen since this is an internal * function, and we know statically which labels * are allowed. */ return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; } - if (clen > MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_SCHEDULE_MAX_CONTEXT_LEN) { + if (ctx_len > MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_SCHEDULE_MAX_CONTEXT_LEN) { /* Should not happen, as above. */ return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; } - if (blen > MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_SCHEDULE_MAX_EXPANSION_LEN) { + if (buf_len > MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_SCHEDULE_MAX_EXPANSION_LEN) { /* Should not happen, as above. */ return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; } - md = mbedtls_md_info_from_type(hash_alg); - if (md == NULL) { + if (!PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(hash_alg)) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } - ssl_tls1_3_hkdf_encode_label(blen, - label, llen, - ctx, clen, - hkdf_label, - &hkdf_label_len); + ssl_tls13_hkdf_encode_label(buf_len, + label, label_len, + ctx, ctx_len, + hkdf_label, + &hkdf_label_len); + + status = psa_key_derivation_setup(&operation, PSA_ALG_HKDF_EXPAND(hash_alg)); + + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto cleanup; + } + + status = psa_key_derivation_input_bytes(&operation, + PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET, + secret, + secret_len); + + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto cleanup; + } + + status = psa_key_derivation_input_bytes(&operation, + PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_INFO, + hkdf_label, + hkdf_label_len); + + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto cleanup; + } + + status = psa_key_derivation_output_bytes(&operation, + buf, + buf_len); + + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto cleanup; + } + +cleanup: + abort_status = psa_key_derivation_abort(&operation); + status = (status == PSA_SUCCESS ? abort_status : status); + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(hkdf_label, hkdf_label_len); + return PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); +} + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_make_traffic_key( + psa_algorithm_t hash_alg, + const unsigned char *secret, size_t secret_len, + unsigned char *key, size_t key_len, + unsigned char *iv, size_t iv_len) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_hkdf_expand_label( + hash_alg, + secret, secret_len, + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LBL_WITH_LEN(key), + NULL, 0, + key, key_len); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } - return mbedtls_hkdf_expand(md, - secret, slen, - hkdf_label, hkdf_label_len, - buf, blen); + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_hkdf_expand_label( + hash_alg, + secret, secret_len, + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LBL_WITH_LEN(iv), + NULL, 0, + iv, iv_len); + return ret; } /* @@ -184,47 +261,27 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_hkdf_expand_label( * by the function caller. Note that we generate server and client side * keys in a single function call. */ -int mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_make_traffic_keys( - mbedtls_md_type_t hash_alg, +int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_make_traffic_keys( + psa_algorithm_t hash_alg, const unsigned char *client_secret, - const unsigned char *server_secret, - size_t slen, size_t key_len, size_t iv_len, + const unsigned char *server_secret, size_t secret_len, + size_t key_len, size_t iv_len, mbedtls_ssl_key_set *keys) { int ret = 0; - ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_hkdf_expand_label(hash_alg, - client_secret, slen, - MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LBL_WITH_LEN(key), - NULL, 0, - keys->client_write_key, key_len); - if (ret != 0) { - return ret; - } - - ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_hkdf_expand_label(hash_alg, - server_secret, slen, - MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LBL_WITH_LEN(key), - NULL, 0, - keys->server_write_key, key_len); + ret = ssl_tls13_make_traffic_key( + hash_alg, client_secret, secret_len, + keys->client_write_key, key_len, + keys->client_write_iv, iv_len); if (ret != 0) { return ret; } - ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_hkdf_expand_label(hash_alg, - client_secret, slen, - MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LBL_WITH_LEN(iv), - NULL, 0, - keys->client_write_iv, iv_len); - if (ret != 0) { - return ret; - } - - ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_hkdf_expand_label(hash_alg, - server_secret, slen, - MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LBL_WITH_LEN(iv), - NULL, 0, - keys->server_write_iv, iv_len); + ret = ssl_tls13_make_traffic_key( + hash_alg, server_secret, secret_len, + keys->server_write_key, key_len, + keys->server_write_iv, iv_len); if (ret != 0) { return ret; } @@ -235,31 +292,27 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_make_traffic_keys( return 0; } -int mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_derive_secret( - mbedtls_md_type_t hash_alg, - const unsigned char *secret, size_t slen, - const unsigned char *label, size_t llen, - const unsigned char *ctx, size_t clen, +int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_derive_secret( + psa_algorithm_t hash_alg, + const unsigned char *secret, size_t secret_len, + const unsigned char *label, size_t label_len, + const unsigned char *ctx, size_t ctx_len, int ctx_hashed, - unsigned char *dstbuf, size_t buflen) + unsigned char *dstbuf, size_t dstbuf_len) { int ret; - unsigned char hashed_context[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE]; - - const mbedtls_md_info_t *md; - md = mbedtls_md_info_from_type(hash_alg); - if (md == NULL) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; - } - + unsigned char hashed_context[PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE]; if (ctx_hashed == MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_CONTEXT_UNHASHED) { - ret = mbedtls_md(md, ctx, clen, hashed_context); - if (ret != 0) { + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + status = psa_hash_compute(hash_alg, ctx, ctx_len, hashed_context, + PSA_HASH_LENGTH(hash_alg), &ctx_len); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + ret = PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); return ret; } - clen = mbedtls_md_get_size(md); } else { - if (clen > sizeof(hashed_context)) { + if (ctx_len > sizeof(hashed_context)) { /* This should never happen since this function is internal * and the code sets `ctx_hashed` correctly. * Let's double-check nonetheless to not run at the risk @@ -267,39 +320,45 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_derive_secret( return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; } - memcpy(hashed_context, ctx, clen); + memcpy(hashed_context, ctx, ctx_len); } - return mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_hkdf_expand_label(hash_alg, - secret, slen, - label, llen, - hashed_context, clen, - dstbuf, buflen); + return mbedtls_ssl_tls13_hkdf_expand_label(hash_alg, + secret, secret_len, + label, label_len, + hashed_context, ctx_len, + dstbuf, dstbuf_len); + } -int mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_evolve_secret( - mbedtls_md_type_t hash_alg, +int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_evolve_secret( + psa_algorithm_t hash_alg, const unsigned char *secret_old, const unsigned char *input, size_t input_len, unsigned char *secret_new) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; - size_t hlen, ilen; + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_status_t abort_status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t hlen; unsigned char tmp_secret[PSA_MAC_MAX_SIZE] = { 0 }; - unsigned char tmp_input[TLS1_3_EVOLVE_INPUT_SIZE] = { 0 }; + const unsigned char all_zeroes_input[MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_MD_MAX_SIZE] = { 0 }; + const unsigned char *l_input = NULL; + size_t l_input_len; + + psa_key_derivation_operation_t operation = + PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_OPERATION_INIT; - const mbedtls_md_info_t *md; - md = mbedtls_md_info_from_type(hash_alg); - if (md == NULL) { + if (!PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(hash_alg)) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } - hlen = mbedtls_md_get_size(md); + hlen = PSA_HASH_LENGTH(hash_alg); /* For non-initial runs, call Derive-Secret( ., "derived", "") * on the old secret. */ if (secret_old != NULL) { - ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_derive_secret( + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_derive_secret( hash_alg, secret_old, hlen, MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LBL_WITH_LEN(derived), @@ -311,31 +370,1516 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_evolve_secret( } } - if (input != NULL) { - memcpy(tmp_input, input, input_len); - ilen = input_len; + ret = 0; + + if (input != NULL && input_len != 0) { + l_input = input; + l_input_len = input_len; } else { - ilen = hlen; + l_input = all_zeroes_input; + l_input_len = hlen; } - /* HKDF-Extract takes a salt and input key material. - * The salt is the old secret, and the input key material - * is the input secret (PSK / ECDHE). */ - ret = mbedtls_hkdf_extract(md, - tmp_secret, hlen, - tmp_input, ilen, - secret_new); - if (ret != 0) { + status = psa_key_derivation_setup(&operation, + PSA_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT(hash_alg)); + + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { goto cleanup; } - ret = 0; + status = psa_key_derivation_input_bytes(&operation, + PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SALT, + tmp_secret, + hlen); -cleanup: + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto cleanup; + } + + status = psa_key_derivation_input_bytes(&operation, + PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET, + l_input, l_input_len); + + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto cleanup; + } + status = psa_key_derivation_output_bytes(&operation, + secret_new, + PSA_HASH_LENGTH(hash_alg)); + + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto cleanup; + } + +cleanup: + abort_status = psa_key_derivation_abort(&operation); + status = (status == PSA_SUCCESS ? abort_status : status); + ret = (ret == 0 ? PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status) : ret); mbedtls_platform_zeroize(tmp_secret, sizeof(tmp_secret)); - mbedtls_platform_zeroize(tmp_input, sizeof(tmp_input)); return ret; } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL */ +int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_derive_early_secrets( + psa_algorithm_t hash_alg, + unsigned char const *early_secret, + unsigned char const *transcript, size_t transcript_len, + mbedtls_ssl_tls13_early_secrets *derived) +{ + int ret; + size_t const hash_len = PSA_HASH_LENGTH(hash_alg); + + /* We should never call this function with an unknown hash, + * but add an assertion anyway. */ + if (!PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(hash_alg)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } + + /* + * 0 + * | + * v + * PSK -> HKDF-Extract = Early Secret + * | + * +-----> Derive-Secret(., "c e traffic", ClientHello) + * | = client_early_traffic_secret + * | + * +-----> Derive-Secret(., "e exp master", ClientHello) + * | = early_exporter_master_secret + * v + */ + + /* Create client_early_traffic_secret */ + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_derive_secret( + hash_alg, + early_secret, hash_len, + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LBL_WITH_LEN(c_e_traffic), + transcript, transcript_len, + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_CONTEXT_HASHED, + derived->client_early_traffic_secret, + hash_len); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + + /* Create early exporter */ + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_derive_secret( + hash_alg, + early_secret, hash_len, + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LBL_WITH_LEN(e_exp_master), + transcript, transcript_len, + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_CONTEXT_HASHED, + derived->early_exporter_master_secret, + hash_len); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + + return 0; +} + +int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_derive_handshake_secrets( + psa_algorithm_t hash_alg, + unsigned char const *handshake_secret, + unsigned char const *transcript, size_t transcript_len, + mbedtls_ssl_tls13_handshake_secrets *derived) +{ + int ret; + size_t const hash_len = PSA_HASH_LENGTH(hash_alg); + + /* We should never call this function with an unknown hash, + * but add an assertion anyway. */ + if (!PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(hash_alg)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } + + /* + * + * Handshake Secret + * | + * +-----> Derive-Secret( ., "c hs traffic", + * | ClientHello...ServerHello ) + * | = client_handshake_traffic_secret + * | + * +-----> Derive-Secret( ., "s hs traffic", + * | ClientHello...ServerHello ) + * | = server_handshake_traffic_secret + * + */ + + /* + * Compute client_handshake_traffic_secret with + * Derive-Secret( ., "c hs traffic", ClientHello...ServerHello ) + */ + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_derive_secret( + hash_alg, + handshake_secret, hash_len, + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LBL_WITH_LEN(c_hs_traffic), + transcript, transcript_len, + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_CONTEXT_HASHED, + derived->client_handshake_traffic_secret, + hash_len); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + + /* + * Compute server_handshake_traffic_secret with + * Derive-Secret( ., "s hs traffic", ClientHello...ServerHello ) + */ + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_derive_secret( + hash_alg, + handshake_secret, hash_len, + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LBL_WITH_LEN(s_hs_traffic), + transcript, transcript_len, + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_CONTEXT_HASHED, + derived->server_handshake_traffic_secret, + hash_len); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + + return 0; +} + +int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_derive_application_secrets( + psa_algorithm_t hash_alg, + unsigned char const *application_secret, + unsigned char const *transcript, size_t transcript_len, + mbedtls_ssl_tls13_application_secrets *derived) +{ + int ret; + size_t const hash_len = PSA_HASH_LENGTH(hash_alg); + + /* We should never call this function with an unknown hash, + * but add an assertion anyway. */ + if (!PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(hash_alg)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } + + /* Generate {client,server}_application_traffic_secret_0 + * + * Master Secret + * | + * +-----> Derive-Secret( ., "c ap traffic", + * | ClientHello...server Finished ) + * | = client_application_traffic_secret_0 + * | + * +-----> Derive-Secret( ., "s ap traffic", + * | ClientHello...Server Finished ) + * | = server_application_traffic_secret_0 + * | + * +-----> Derive-Secret( ., "exp master", + * | ClientHello...server Finished) + * | = exporter_master_secret + * + */ + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_derive_secret( + hash_alg, + application_secret, hash_len, + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LBL_WITH_LEN(c_ap_traffic), + transcript, transcript_len, + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_CONTEXT_HASHED, + derived->client_application_traffic_secret_N, + hash_len); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_derive_secret( + hash_alg, + application_secret, hash_len, + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LBL_WITH_LEN(s_ap_traffic), + transcript, transcript_len, + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_CONTEXT_HASHED, + derived->server_application_traffic_secret_N, + hash_len); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_derive_secret( + hash_alg, + application_secret, hash_len, + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LBL_WITH_LEN(exp_master), + transcript, transcript_len, + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_CONTEXT_HASHED, + derived->exporter_master_secret, + hash_len); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + + return 0; +} + +/* Generate resumption_master_secret for use with the ticket exchange. + * + * This is not integrated with mbedtls_ssl_tls13_derive_application_secrets() + * because it uses the transcript hash up to and including ClientFinished. */ +int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_derive_resumption_master_secret( + psa_algorithm_t hash_alg, + unsigned char const *application_secret, + unsigned char const *transcript, size_t transcript_len, + mbedtls_ssl_tls13_application_secrets *derived) +{ + int ret; + size_t const hash_len = PSA_HASH_LENGTH(hash_alg); + + /* We should never call this function with an unknown hash, + * but add an assertion anyway. */ + if (!PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(hash_alg)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_derive_secret( + hash_alg, + application_secret, hash_len, + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LBL_WITH_LEN(res_master), + transcript, transcript_len, + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_CONTEXT_HASHED, + derived->resumption_master_secret, + hash_len); + + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + + return 0; +} + +/** + * \brief Transition into application stage of TLS 1.3 key schedule. + * + * The TLS 1.3 key schedule can be viewed as a simple state machine + * with states Initial -> Early -> Handshake -> Application, and + * this function represents the Handshake -> Application transition. + * + * In the handshake stage, ssl_tls13_generate_application_keys() + * can be used to derive the handshake traffic keys. + * + * \param ssl The SSL context to operate on. This must be in key schedule + * stage \c Handshake. + * + * \returns \c 0 on success. + * \returns A negative error code on failure. + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_key_schedule_stage_application(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *handshake = ssl->handshake; + psa_algorithm_t const hash_alg = mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type( + (mbedtls_md_type_t) handshake->ciphersuite_info->mac); + + /* + * Compute MasterSecret + */ + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_evolve_secret( + hash_alg, + handshake->tls13_master_secrets.handshake, + NULL, 0, + handshake->tls13_master_secrets.app); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_tls13_evolve_secret", ret); + return ret; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( + 4, "Master secret", + handshake->tls13_master_secrets.app, PSA_HASH_LENGTH(hash_alg)); + + return 0; +} + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_calc_finished_core(psa_algorithm_t hash_alg, + unsigned char const *base_key, + unsigned char const *transcript, + unsigned char *dst, + size_t *dst_len) +{ + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t hash_len = PSA_HASH_LENGTH(hash_alg); + unsigned char finished_key[PSA_MAC_MAX_SIZE]; + int ret; + psa_algorithm_t alg; + + /* We should never call this function with an unknown hash, + * but add an assertion anyway. */ + if (!PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(hash_alg)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } + + /* TLS 1.3 Finished message + * + * struct { + * opaque verify_data[Hash.length]; + * } Finished; + * + * verify_data = + * HMAC( finished_key, + * Hash( Handshake Context + + * Certificate* + + * CertificateVerify* ) + * ) + * + * finished_key = + * HKDF-Expand-Label( BaseKey, "finished", "", Hash.length ) + */ + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_hkdf_expand_label( + hash_alg, base_key, hash_len, + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LBL_WITH_LEN(finished), + NULL, 0, + finished_key, hash_len); + if (ret != 0) { + goto exit; + } + + alg = PSA_ALG_HMAC(hash_alg); + psa_set_key_usage_flags(&attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE); + psa_set_key_algorithm(&attributes, alg); + psa_set_key_type(&attributes, PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC); + + status = psa_import_key(&attributes, finished_key, hash_len, &key); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + ret = PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_mac_compute(key, alg, transcript, hash_len, + dst, hash_len, dst_len); + ret = PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + +exit: + + status = psa_destroy_key(key); + if (ret == 0) { + ret = PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + } + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(finished_key, sizeof(finished_key)); + + return ret; +} + +int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_calculate_verify_data(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *dst, + size_t dst_len, + size_t *actual_len, + int from) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + unsigned char transcript[MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_MD_MAX_SIZE]; + size_t transcript_len; + + unsigned char *base_key = NULL; + size_t base_key_len = 0; + mbedtls_ssl_tls13_handshake_secrets *tls13_hs_secrets = + &ssl->handshake->tls13_hs_secrets; + + mbedtls_md_type_t const md_type = (mbedtls_md_type_t) ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info->mac; + + psa_algorithm_t hash_alg = mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type( + (mbedtls_md_type_t) ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info->mac); + size_t const hash_len = PSA_HASH_LENGTH(hash_alg); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> mbedtls_ssl_tls13_calculate_verify_data")); + + if (from == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT) { + base_key = tls13_hs_secrets->client_handshake_traffic_secret; + base_key_len = sizeof(tls13_hs_secrets->client_handshake_traffic_secret); + } else { + base_key = tls13_hs_secrets->server_handshake_traffic_secret; + base_key_len = sizeof(tls13_hs_secrets->server_handshake_traffic_secret); + } + + if (dst_len < hash_len) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + goto exit; + } + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_get_handshake_transcript(ssl, md_type, + transcript, sizeof(transcript), + &transcript_len); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_get_handshake_transcript", ret); + goto exit; + } + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "handshake hash", transcript, transcript_len); + + ret = ssl_tls13_calc_finished_core(hash_alg, base_key, + transcript, dst, actual_len); + if (ret != 0) { + goto exit; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "verify_data for finished message", dst, hash_len); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= mbedtls_ssl_tls13_calculate_verify_data")); + +exit: + /* Erase handshake secrets */ + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(base_key, base_key_len); + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(transcript, sizeof(transcript)); + return ret; +} + +int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_create_psk_binder(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const psa_algorithm_t hash_alg, + unsigned char const *psk, size_t psk_len, + int psk_type, + unsigned char const *transcript, + unsigned char *result) +{ + int ret = 0; + unsigned char binder_key[PSA_MAC_MAX_SIZE]; + unsigned char early_secret[PSA_MAC_MAX_SIZE]; + size_t const hash_len = PSA_HASH_LENGTH(hash_alg); + size_t actual_len; + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C) + ssl = NULL; /* make sure we don't use it except for debug */ + ((void) ssl); +#endif + + /* We should never call this function with an unknown hash, + * but add an assertion anyway. */ + if (!PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(hash_alg)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } + + /* + * 0 + * | + * v + * PSK -> HKDF-Extract = Early Secret + * | + * +-----> Derive-Secret(., "ext binder" | "res binder", "") + * | = binder_key + * v + */ + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_evolve_secret(hash_alg, + NULL, /* Old secret */ + psk, psk_len, /* Input */ + early_secret); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_tls13_evolve_secret", ret); + goto exit; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "mbedtls_ssl_tls13_create_psk_binder", + early_secret, hash_len); + + if (psk_type == MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_PSK_RESUMPTION) { + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_derive_secret( + hash_alg, + early_secret, hash_len, + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LBL_WITH_LEN(res_binder), + NULL, 0, MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_CONTEXT_UNHASHED, + binder_key, hash_len); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(4, ("Derive Early Secret with 'res binder'")); + } else { + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_derive_secret( + hash_alg, + early_secret, hash_len, + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LBL_WITH_LEN(ext_binder), + NULL, 0, MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_CONTEXT_UNHASHED, + binder_key, hash_len); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(4, ("Derive Early Secret with 'ext binder'")); + } + + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_tls13_derive_secret", ret); + goto exit; + } + + /* + * The binding_value is computed in the same way as the Finished message + * but with the BaseKey being the binder_key. + */ + + ret = ssl_tls13_calc_finished_core(hash_alg, binder_key, transcript, + result, &actual_len); + if (ret != 0) { + goto exit; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "psk binder", result, actual_len); + +exit: + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(early_secret, sizeof(early_secret)); + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(binder_key, sizeof(binder_key)); + return ret; +} + +int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_populate_transform( + mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform, + int endpoint, int ciphersuite, + mbedtls_ssl_key_set const *traffic_keys, + mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl /* DEBUG ONLY */) +{ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + int ret; + mbedtls_cipher_info_t const *cipher_info; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info; + unsigned char const *key_enc; + unsigned char const *iv_enc; + unsigned char const *key_dec; + unsigned char const *iv_dec; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + psa_key_type_t key_type; + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + psa_algorithm_t alg; + size_t key_bits; + psa_status_t status = PSA_SUCCESS; +#endif + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C) + ssl = NULL; /* make sure we don't use it except for those cases */ + (void) ssl; +#endif + + ciphersuite_info = mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_from_id(ciphersuite); + if (ciphersuite_info == NULL) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("ciphersuite info for %d not found", + ciphersuite)); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + cipher_info = mbedtls_cipher_info_from_type(ciphersuite_info->cipher); + if (cipher_info == NULL) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("cipher info for %u not found", + ciphersuite_info->cipher)); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + /* + * Setup cipher contexts in target transform + */ + if ((ret = mbedtls_cipher_setup(&transform->cipher_ctx_enc, + cipher_info)) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_cipher_setup", ret); + return ret; + } + + if ((ret = mbedtls_cipher_setup(&transform->cipher_ctx_dec, + cipher_info)) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_cipher_setup", ret); + return ret; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) + if (endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER) { + key_enc = traffic_keys->server_write_key; + key_dec = traffic_keys->client_write_key; + iv_enc = traffic_keys->server_write_iv; + iv_dec = traffic_keys->client_write_iv; + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) + if (endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT) { + key_enc = traffic_keys->client_write_key; + key_dec = traffic_keys->server_write_key; + iv_enc = traffic_keys->client_write_iv; + iv_dec = traffic_keys->server_write_iv; + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */ + { + /* should not happen */ + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } + + memcpy(transform->iv_enc, iv_enc, traffic_keys->iv_len); + memcpy(transform->iv_dec, iv_dec, traffic_keys->iv_len); + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + if ((ret = mbedtls_cipher_setkey(&transform->cipher_ctx_enc, + key_enc, (int) mbedtls_cipher_info_get_key_bitlen(cipher_info), + MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT)) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_cipher_setkey", ret); + return ret; + } + + if ((ret = mbedtls_cipher_setkey(&transform->cipher_ctx_dec, + key_dec, (int) mbedtls_cipher_info_get_key_bitlen(cipher_info), + MBEDTLS_DECRYPT)) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_cipher_setkey", ret); + return ret; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + + /* + * Setup other fields in SSL transform + */ + + if ((ciphersuite_info->flags & MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_SHORT_TAG) != 0) { + transform->taglen = 8; + } else { + transform->taglen = 16; + } + + transform->ivlen = traffic_keys->iv_len; + transform->maclen = 0; + transform->fixed_ivlen = transform->ivlen; + transform->tls_version = MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_3; + + /* We add the true record content type (1 Byte) to the plaintext and + * then pad to the configured granularity. The minimum length of the + * type-extended and padded plaintext is therefore the padding + * granularity. */ + transform->minlen = + transform->taglen + MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_TLS1_3_PADDING_GRANULARITY; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + /* + * Setup psa keys and alg + */ + if ((status = mbedtls_ssl_cipher_to_psa((mbedtls_cipher_type_t) ciphersuite_info->cipher, + transform->taglen, + &alg, + &key_type, + &key_bits)) != PSA_SUCCESS) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( + 1, "mbedtls_ssl_cipher_to_psa", PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status)); + return PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + } + + transform->psa_alg = alg; + + if (alg != MBEDTLS_SSL_NULL_CIPHER) { + psa_set_key_usage_flags(&attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT); + psa_set_key_algorithm(&attributes, alg); + psa_set_key_type(&attributes, key_type); + + if ((status = psa_import_key(&attributes, + key_enc, + PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(key_bits), + &transform->psa_key_enc)) != PSA_SUCCESS) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( + 1, "psa_import_key", PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status)); + return PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + } + + psa_set_key_usage_flags(&attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT); + + if ((status = psa_import_key(&attributes, + key_dec, + PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(key_bits), + &transform->psa_key_dec)) != PSA_SUCCESS) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( + 1, "psa_import_key", PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status)); + return PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + } + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + + return 0; +} + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_get_cipher_key_info( + const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info, + size_t *key_len, size_t *iv_len) +{ + psa_key_type_t key_type; + psa_algorithm_t alg; + size_t taglen; + size_t key_bits; + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + if (ciphersuite_info->flags & MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_SHORT_TAG) { + taglen = 8; + } else { + taglen = 16; + } + + status = mbedtls_ssl_cipher_to_psa((mbedtls_cipher_type_t) ciphersuite_info->cipher, taglen, + &alg, &key_type, &key_bits); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + } + + *key_len = PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(key_bits); + + /* TLS 1.3 only have AEAD ciphers, IV length is unconditionally 12 bytes */ + *iv_len = 12; + + return 0; +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) +/* + * ssl_tls13_generate_early_key() generates the key necessary for protecting + * the early application data and handshake messages as described in section 7 + * of RFC 8446. + * + * NOTE: Only one key is generated, the key for the traffic from the client to + * the server. The TLS 1.3 specification does not define a secret and thus + * a key for server early traffic. + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_generate_early_key(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + mbedtls_ssl_key_set *traffic_keys) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_md_type_t md_type; + psa_algorithm_t hash_alg; + size_t hash_len; + unsigned char transcript[MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_MD_MAX_SIZE]; + size_t transcript_len; + size_t key_len = 0; + size_t iv_len = 0; + mbedtls_ssl_tls13_early_secrets tls13_early_secrets; + + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *handshake = ssl->handshake; + const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info = + handshake->ciphersuite_info; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> ssl_tls13_generate_early_key")); + + ret = ssl_tls13_get_cipher_key_info(ciphersuite_info, &key_len, &iv_len); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "ssl_tls13_get_cipher_key_info", ret); + goto cleanup; + } + + md_type = (mbedtls_md_type_t) ciphersuite_info->mac; + + hash_alg = mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type((mbedtls_md_type_t) ciphersuite_info->mac); + hash_len = PSA_HASH_LENGTH(hash_alg); + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_get_handshake_transcript(ssl, md_type, + transcript, + sizeof(transcript), + &transcript_len); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, + "mbedtls_ssl_get_handshake_transcript", + ret); + goto cleanup; + } + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_derive_early_secrets( + hash_alg, handshake->tls13_master_secrets.early, + transcript, transcript_len, &tls13_early_secrets); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( + 1, "mbedtls_ssl_tls13_derive_early_secrets", ret); + goto cleanup; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( + 4, "Client early traffic secret", + tls13_early_secrets.client_early_traffic_secret, hash_len); + + /* + * Export client handshake traffic secret + */ + if (ssl->f_export_keys != NULL) { + ssl->f_export_keys( + ssl->p_export_keys, + MBEDTLS_SSL_KEY_EXPORT_TLS1_3_CLIENT_EARLY_SECRET, + tls13_early_secrets.client_early_traffic_secret, + hash_len, + handshake->randbytes, + handshake->randbytes + MBEDTLS_CLIENT_HELLO_RANDOM_LEN, + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_PRF_NONE /* TODO: FIX! */); + } + + ret = ssl_tls13_make_traffic_key( + hash_alg, + tls13_early_secrets.client_early_traffic_secret, + hash_len, traffic_keys->client_write_key, key_len, + traffic_keys->client_write_iv, iv_len); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "ssl_tls13_make_traffic_key", ret); + goto cleanup; + } + traffic_keys->key_len = key_len; + traffic_keys->iv_len = iv_len; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "client early write_key", + traffic_keys->client_write_key, + traffic_keys->key_len); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "client early write_iv", + traffic_keys->client_write_iv, + traffic_keys->iv_len); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= ssl_tls13_generate_early_key")); + +cleanup: + /* Erase early secrets and transcript */ + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( + &tls13_early_secrets, sizeof(mbedtls_ssl_tls13_early_secrets)); + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(transcript, sizeof(transcript)); + return ret; +} + +int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_compute_early_transform(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_ssl_key_set traffic_keys; + mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform_earlydata = NULL; + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *handshake = ssl->handshake; + + /* Next evolution in key schedule: Establish early_data secret and + * key material. */ + ret = ssl_tls13_generate_early_key(ssl, &traffic_keys); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "ssl_tls13_generate_early_key", + ret); + goto cleanup; + } + + transform_earlydata = mbedtls_calloc(1, sizeof(mbedtls_ssl_transform)); + if (transform_earlydata == NULL) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED; + goto cleanup; + } + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_populate_transform( + transform_earlydata, + ssl->conf->endpoint, + handshake->ciphersuite_info->id, + &traffic_keys, + ssl); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_tls13_populate_transform", ret); + goto cleanup; + } + handshake->transform_earlydata = transform_earlydata; + +cleanup: + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(&traffic_keys, sizeof(traffic_keys)); + if (ret != 0) { + mbedtls_free(transform_earlydata); + } + + return ret; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA */ + +int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_key_schedule_stage_early(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_algorithm_t hash_alg; + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *handshake = ssl->handshake; + unsigned char *psk = NULL; + size_t psk_len = 0; + + if (handshake->ciphersuite_info == NULL) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("cipher suite info not found")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } + + hash_alg = mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type((mbedtls_md_type_t) handshake->ciphersuite_info->mac); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED) + if (mbedtls_ssl_tls13_key_exchange_mode_with_psk(ssl)) { + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_export_handshake_psk(ssl, &psk, &psk_len); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_tls13_export_handshake_psk", + ret); + return ret; + } + } +#endif + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_evolve_secret(hash_alg, NULL, psk, psk_len, + handshake->tls13_master_secrets.early); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED) + mbedtls_free((void *) psk); +#endif + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_tls13_evolve_secret", ret); + return ret; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "mbedtls_ssl_tls13_key_schedule_stage_early", + handshake->tls13_master_secrets.early, + PSA_HASH_LENGTH(hash_alg)); + return 0; +} + +/** + * \brief Compute TLS 1.3 handshake traffic keys. + * + * ssl_tls13_generate_handshake_keys() generates keys necessary for + * protecting the handshake messages, as described in Section 7 of + * RFC 8446. + * + * \param ssl The SSL context to operate on. This must be in + * key schedule stage \c Handshake, see + * ssl_tls13_key_schedule_stage_handshake(). + * \param traffic_keys The address at which to store the handshake traffic + * keys. This must be writable but may be uninitialized. + * + * \returns \c 0 on success. + * \returns A negative error code on failure. + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_generate_handshake_keys(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + mbedtls_ssl_key_set *traffic_keys) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_md_type_t md_type; + psa_algorithm_t hash_alg; + size_t hash_len; + unsigned char transcript[MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_MD_MAX_SIZE]; + size_t transcript_len; + size_t key_len = 0; + size_t iv_len = 0; + + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *handshake = ssl->handshake; + const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info = + handshake->ciphersuite_info; + mbedtls_ssl_tls13_handshake_secrets *tls13_hs_secrets = + &handshake->tls13_hs_secrets; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> ssl_tls13_generate_handshake_keys")); + + ret = ssl_tls13_get_cipher_key_info(ciphersuite_info, &key_len, &iv_len); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "ssl_tls13_get_cipher_key_info", ret); + return ret; + } + + md_type = (mbedtls_md_type_t) ciphersuite_info->mac; + + hash_alg = mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type((mbedtls_md_type_t) ciphersuite_info->mac); + hash_len = PSA_HASH_LENGTH(hash_alg); + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_get_handshake_transcript(ssl, md_type, + transcript, + sizeof(transcript), + &transcript_len); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, + "mbedtls_ssl_get_handshake_transcript", + ret); + return ret; + } + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_derive_handshake_secrets( + hash_alg, handshake->tls13_master_secrets.handshake, + transcript, transcript_len, tls13_hs_secrets); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_tls13_derive_handshake_secrets", + ret); + return ret; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "Client handshake traffic secret", + tls13_hs_secrets->client_handshake_traffic_secret, + hash_len); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "Server handshake traffic secret", + tls13_hs_secrets->server_handshake_traffic_secret, + hash_len); + + /* + * Export client handshake traffic secret + */ + if (ssl->f_export_keys != NULL) { + ssl->f_export_keys( + ssl->p_export_keys, + MBEDTLS_SSL_KEY_EXPORT_TLS1_3_CLIENT_HANDSHAKE_TRAFFIC_SECRET, + tls13_hs_secrets->client_handshake_traffic_secret, + hash_len, + handshake->randbytes, + handshake->randbytes + MBEDTLS_CLIENT_HELLO_RANDOM_LEN, + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_PRF_NONE /* TODO: FIX! */); + + ssl->f_export_keys( + ssl->p_export_keys, + MBEDTLS_SSL_KEY_EXPORT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HANDSHAKE_TRAFFIC_SECRET, + tls13_hs_secrets->server_handshake_traffic_secret, + hash_len, + handshake->randbytes, + handshake->randbytes + MBEDTLS_CLIENT_HELLO_RANDOM_LEN, + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_PRF_NONE /* TODO: FIX! */); + } + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_make_traffic_keys( + hash_alg, + tls13_hs_secrets->client_handshake_traffic_secret, + tls13_hs_secrets->server_handshake_traffic_secret, + hash_len, key_len, iv_len, traffic_keys); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_tls13_make_traffic_keys", ret); + goto exit; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "client_handshake write_key", + traffic_keys->client_write_key, + traffic_keys->key_len); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "server_handshake write_key", + traffic_keys->server_write_key, + traffic_keys->key_len); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "client_handshake write_iv", + traffic_keys->client_write_iv, + traffic_keys->iv_len); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "server_handshake write_iv", + traffic_keys->server_write_iv, + traffic_keys->iv_len); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= ssl_tls13_generate_handshake_keys")); + +exit: + + return ret; +} + +/** + * \brief Transition into handshake stage of TLS 1.3 key schedule. + * + * The TLS 1.3 key schedule can be viewed as a simple state machine + * with states Initial -> Early -> Handshake -> Application, and + * this function represents the Early -> Handshake transition. + * + * In the handshake stage, ssl_tls13_generate_handshake_keys() + * can be used to derive the handshake traffic keys. + * + * \param ssl The SSL context to operate on. This must be in key schedule + * stage \c Early. + * + * \returns \c 0 on success. + * \returns A negative error code on failure. + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_key_schedule_stage_handshake(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *handshake = ssl->handshake; + psa_algorithm_t const hash_alg = mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type( + (mbedtls_md_type_t) handshake->ciphersuite_info->mac); + unsigned char *shared_secret = NULL; + size_t shared_secret_len = 0; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED) + /* + * Compute ECDHE secret used to compute the handshake secret from which + * client_handshake_traffic_secret and server_handshake_traffic_secret + * are derived in the handshake secret derivation stage. + */ + if (mbedtls_ssl_tls13_key_exchange_mode_with_ephemeral(ssl)) { + if (mbedtls_ssl_tls13_named_group_is_ecdhe(handshake->offered_group_id) || + mbedtls_ssl_tls13_named_group_is_ffdh(handshake->offered_group_id)) { +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH) || defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH) + psa_algorithm_t alg = + mbedtls_ssl_tls13_named_group_is_ecdhe(handshake->offered_group_id) ? + PSA_ALG_ECDH : PSA_ALG_FFDH; + + /* Compute ECDH shared secret. */ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_GENERIC_ERROR; + psa_key_attributes_t key_attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + + status = psa_get_key_attributes(handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey, + &key_attributes); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + ret = PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + } + + shared_secret_len = PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES( + psa_get_key_bits(&key_attributes)); + shared_secret = mbedtls_calloc(1, shared_secret_len); + if (shared_secret == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED; + } + + status = psa_raw_key_agreement( + alg, handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey, + handshake->xxdh_psa_peerkey, handshake->xxdh_psa_peerkey_len, + shared_secret, shared_secret_len, &shared_secret_len); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + ret = PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "psa_raw_key_agreement", ret); + goto cleanup; + } + + status = psa_destroy_key(handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + ret = PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "psa_destroy_key", ret); + goto cleanup; + } + + handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH || PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH */ + } else { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("Group not supported.")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + } + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED */ + + /* + * Compute the Handshake Secret + */ + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_evolve_secret( + hash_alg, handshake->tls13_master_secrets.early, + shared_secret, shared_secret_len, + handshake->tls13_master_secrets.handshake); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_tls13_evolve_secret", ret); + goto cleanup; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "Handshake secret", + handshake->tls13_master_secrets.handshake, + PSA_HASH_LENGTH(hash_alg)); + +cleanup: + if (shared_secret != NULL) { + mbedtls_zeroize_and_free(shared_secret, shared_secret_len); + } + + return ret; +} + +/** + * \brief Compute TLS 1.3 application traffic keys. + * + * ssl_tls13_generate_application_keys() generates application traffic + * keys, since any record following a 1-RTT Finished message MUST be + * encrypted under the application traffic key. + * + * \param ssl The SSL context to operate on. This must be in + * key schedule stage \c Application, see + * ssl_tls13_key_schedule_stage_application(). + * \param traffic_keys The address at which to store the application traffic + * keys. This must be writable but may be uninitialized. + * + * \returns \c 0 on success. + * \returns A negative error code on failure. + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_generate_application_keys( + mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + mbedtls_ssl_key_set *traffic_keys) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *handshake = ssl->handshake; + + /* Address at which to store the application secrets */ + mbedtls_ssl_tls13_application_secrets * const app_secrets = + &ssl->session_negotiate->app_secrets; + + /* Holding the transcript up to and including the ServerFinished */ + unsigned char transcript[MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_MD_MAX_SIZE]; + size_t transcript_len; + + /* Variables relating to the hash for the chosen ciphersuite. */ + mbedtls_md_type_t md_type; + + psa_algorithm_t hash_alg; + size_t hash_len; + + /* Variables relating to the cipher for the chosen ciphersuite. */ + size_t key_len = 0, iv_len = 0; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> derive application traffic keys")); + + /* Extract basic information about hash and ciphersuite */ + + ret = ssl_tls13_get_cipher_key_info(handshake->ciphersuite_info, + &key_len, &iv_len); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "ssl_tls13_get_cipher_key_info", ret); + goto cleanup; + } + + md_type = (mbedtls_md_type_t) handshake->ciphersuite_info->mac; + + hash_alg = mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type((mbedtls_md_type_t) handshake->ciphersuite_info->mac); + hash_len = PSA_HASH_LENGTH(hash_alg); + + /* Compute current handshake transcript. It's the caller's responsibility + * to call this at the right time, that is, after the ServerFinished. */ + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_get_handshake_transcript(ssl, md_type, + transcript, sizeof(transcript), + &transcript_len); + if (ret != 0) { + goto cleanup; + } + + /* Compute application secrets from master secret and transcript hash. */ + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_derive_application_secrets( + hash_alg, handshake->tls13_master_secrets.app, + transcript, transcript_len, app_secrets); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( + 1, "mbedtls_ssl_tls13_derive_application_secrets", ret); + goto cleanup; + } + + /* Derive first epoch of IV + Key for application traffic. */ + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_make_traffic_keys( + hash_alg, + app_secrets->client_application_traffic_secret_N, + app_secrets->server_application_traffic_secret_N, + hash_len, key_len, iv_len, traffic_keys); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_tls13_make_traffic_keys", ret); + goto cleanup; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "Client application traffic secret", + app_secrets->client_application_traffic_secret_N, + hash_len); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "Server application traffic secret", + app_secrets->server_application_traffic_secret_N, + hash_len); + + /* + * Export client/server application traffic secret 0 + */ + if (ssl->f_export_keys != NULL) { + ssl->f_export_keys( + ssl->p_export_keys, + MBEDTLS_SSL_KEY_EXPORT_TLS1_3_CLIENT_APPLICATION_TRAFFIC_SECRET, + app_secrets->client_application_traffic_secret_N, hash_len, + handshake->randbytes, + handshake->randbytes + MBEDTLS_CLIENT_HELLO_RANDOM_LEN, + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_PRF_NONE /* TODO: this should be replaced by + a new constant for TLS 1.3! */); + + ssl->f_export_keys( + ssl->p_export_keys, + MBEDTLS_SSL_KEY_EXPORT_TLS1_3_SERVER_APPLICATION_TRAFFIC_SECRET, + app_secrets->server_application_traffic_secret_N, hash_len, + handshake->randbytes, + handshake->randbytes + MBEDTLS_CLIENT_HELLO_RANDOM_LEN, + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_PRF_NONE /* TODO: this should be replaced by + a new constant for TLS 1.3! */); + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "client application_write_key:", + traffic_keys->client_write_key, key_len); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "server application write key", + traffic_keys->server_write_key, key_len); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "client application write IV", + traffic_keys->client_write_iv, iv_len); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "server application write IV", + traffic_keys->server_write_iv, iv_len); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= derive application traffic keys")); + +cleanup: + /* randbytes is not used again */ + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(ssl->handshake->randbytes, + sizeof(ssl->handshake->randbytes)); + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(transcript, sizeof(transcript)); + return ret; +} + +int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_compute_handshake_transform(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_ssl_key_set traffic_keys; + mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform_handshake = NULL; + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *handshake = ssl->handshake; + + /* Compute handshake secret */ + ret = ssl_tls13_key_schedule_stage_handshake(ssl); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_tls13_derive_master_secret", ret); + goto cleanup; + } + + /* Next evolution in key schedule: Establish handshake secret and + * key material. */ + ret = ssl_tls13_generate_handshake_keys(ssl, &traffic_keys); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "ssl_tls13_generate_handshake_keys", + ret); + goto cleanup; + } + + transform_handshake = mbedtls_calloc(1, sizeof(mbedtls_ssl_transform)); + if (transform_handshake == NULL) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED; + goto cleanup; + } + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_populate_transform( + transform_handshake, + ssl->conf->endpoint, + handshake->ciphersuite_info->id, + &traffic_keys, + ssl); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_tls13_populate_transform", ret); + goto cleanup; + } + handshake->transform_handshake = transform_handshake; + +cleanup: + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(&traffic_keys, sizeof(traffic_keys)); + if (ret != 0) { + mbedtls_free(transform_handshake); + } + + return ret; +} + +int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_compute_resumption_master_secret(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_md_type_t md_type; + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *handshake = ssl->handshake; + unsigned char transcript[MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_MD_MAX_SIZE]; + size_t transcript_len; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( + 2, ("=> mbedtls_ssl_tls13_compute_resumption_master_secret")); + + md_type = (mbedtls_md_type_t) handshake->ciphersuite_info->mac; + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_get_handshake_transcript(ssl, md_type, + transcript, sizeof(transcript), + &transcript_len); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_derive_resumption_master_secret( + mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type(md_type), + handshake->tls13_master_secrets.app, + transcript, transcript_len, + &ssl->session_negotiate->app_secrets); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + + /* Erase master secrets */ + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(&handshake->tls13_master_secrets, + sizeof(handshake->tls13_master_secrets)); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( + 4, "Resumption master secret", + ssl->session_negotiate->app_secrets.resumption_master_secret, + PSA_HASH_LENGTH(mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type(md_type))); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( + 2, ("<= mbedtls_ssl_tls13_compute_resumption_master_secret")); + return 0; +} + +int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_compute_application_transform(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_ssl_key_set traffic_keys; + mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform_application = NULL; + + ret = ssl_tls13_key_schedule_stage_application(ssl); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, + "ssl_tls13_key_schedule_stage_application", ret); + goto cleanup; + } + + ret = ssl_tls13_generate_application_keys(ssl, &traffic_keys); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, + "ssl_tls13_generate_application_keys", ret); + goto cleanup; + } + + transform_application = + mbedtls_calloc(1, sizeof(mbedtls_ssl_transform)); + if (transform_application == NULL) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED; + goto cleanup; + } + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_populate_transform( + transform_application, + ssl->conf->endpoint, + ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info->id, + &traffic_keys, + ssl); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_tls13_populate_transform", ret); + goto cleanup; + } + + ssl->transform_application = transform_application; + +cleanup: + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(&traffic_keys, sizeof(traffic_keys)); + if (ret != 0) { + mbedtls_free(transform_application); + } + return ret; +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED) +int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_export_handshake_psk(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char **psk, + size_t *psk_len) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + psa_key_attributes_t key_attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + *psk_len = 0; + *psk = NULL; + + if (mbedtls_svc_key_id_is_null(ssl->handshake->psk_opaque)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } + + status = psa_get_key_attributes(ssl->handshake->psk_opaque, &key_attributes); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + } + + *psk_len = PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(psa_get_key_bits(&key_attributes)); + *psk = mbedtls_calloc(1, *psk_len); + if (*psk == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED; + } + + status = psa_export_key(ssl->handshake->psk_opaque, + (uint8_t *) *psk, *psk_len, psk_len); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + mbedtls_free((void *) *psk); + *psk = NULL; + return PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + } + return 0; +#else + *psk = ssl->handshake->psk; + *psk_len = ssl->handshake->psk_len; + if (*psk == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } + return 0; +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 */ diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ssl_tls13_keys.h b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ssl_tls13_keys.h index ca7413261ded..d3a4c6c9926d 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ssl_tls13_keys.h +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ssl_tls13_keys.h @@ -8,9 +8,9 @@ #define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEYS_H /* This requires MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LABEL( idx, name, string ) to be defined at - * the point of use. See e.g. the definition of mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_labels_union + * the point of use. See e.g. the definition of mbedtls_ssl_tls13_labels_union * below. */ -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LABEL_LIST \ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LABEL_LIST \ MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LABEL(finished, "finished") \ MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LABEL(resumption, "resumption") \ MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LABEL(traffic_upd, "traffic upd") \ @@ -28,76 +28,92 @@ MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LABEL(exp_master, "exp master") \ MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LABEL(ext_binder, "ext binder") \ MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LABEL(res_binder, "res binder") \ - MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LABEL(derived, "derived") + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LABEL(derived, "derived") \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LABEL(client_cv, "TLS 1.3, client CertificateVerify") \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LABEL(server_cv, "TLS 1.3, server CertificateVerify") + +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_CONTEXT_UNHASHED 0 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_CONTEXT_HASHED 1 + +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_PSK_EXTERNAL 0 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_PSK_RESUMPTION 1 + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) #define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LABEL(name, string) \ const unsigned char name [sizeof(string) - 1]; -union mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_labels_union { +union mbedtls_ssl_tls13_labels_union { MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LABEL_LIST }; -struct mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_labels_struct { +struct mbedtls_ssl_tls13_labels_struct { MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LABEL_LIST }; #undef MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LABEL -extern const struct mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_labels_struct mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_labels; +extern const struct mbedtls_ssl_tls13_labels_struct mbedtls_ssl_tls13_labels; + +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LBL_LEN(LABEL) \ + sizeof(mbedtls_ssl_tls13_labels.LABEL) #define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LBL_WITH_LEN(LABEL) \ - mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_labels.LABEL, \ - sizeof(mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_labels.LABEL) + mbedtls_ssl_tls13_labels.LABEL, \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LBL_LEN(LABEL) #define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_SCHEDULE_MAX_LABEL_LEN \ - sizeof(union mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_labels_union) + sizeof(union mbedtls_ssl_tls13_labels_union) /* The maximum length of HKDF contexts used in the TLS 1.3 standard. * Since contexts are always hashes of message transcripts, this can * be approximated from above by the maximum hash size. */ #define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_SCHEDULE_MAX_CONTEXT_LEN \ - MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE + PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE /* Maximum desired length for expanded key material generated * by HKDF-Expand-Label. * * Warning: If this ever needs to be increased, the implementation - * ssl_tls1_3_hkdf_encode_label() in ssl_tls13_keys.c needs to be + * ssl_tls13_hkdf_encode_label() in ssl_tls13_keys.c needs to be * adjusted since it currently assumes that HKDF key expansion * is never used with more than 255 Bytes of output. */ #define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_SCHEDULE_MAX_EXPANSION_LEN 255 /** - * \brief The \c HKDF-Expand-Label function from - * the TLS 1.3 standard RFC 8446. + * \brief The \c HKDF-Expand-Label function from + * the TLS 1.3 standard RFC 8446. * * - * HKDF-Expand-Label( Secret, Label, Context, Length ) = + * HKDF-Expand-Label( Secret, Label, Context, Length ) = * HKDF-Expand( Secret, HkdfLabel, Length ) * * - * \param hash_alg The identifier for the hash algorithm to use. - * \param secret The \c Secret argument to \c HKDF-Expand-Label. - * This must be a readable buffer of length \p slen Bytes. - * \param slen The length of \p secret in Bytes. - * \param label The \c Label argument to \c HKDF-Expand-Label. - * This must be a readable buffer of length \p llen Bytes. - * \param llen The length of \p label in Bytes. - * \param ctx The \c Context argument to \c HKDF-Expand-Label. - * This must be a readable buffer of length \p clen Bytes. - * \param clen The length of \p context in Bytes. - * \param buf The destination buffer to hold the expanded secret. - * This must be a writable buffer of length \p blen Bytes. - * \param blen The desired size of the expanded secret in Bytes. - * - * \returns \c 0 on success. - * \return A negative error code on failure. + * \param hash_alg The identifier for the hash algorithm to use. + * \param secret The \c Secret argument to \c HKDF-Expand-Label. + * This must be a readable buffer of length + * \p secret_len Bytes. + * \param secret_len The length of \p secret in Bytes. + * \param label The \c Label argument to \c HKDF-Expand-Label. + * This must be a readable buffer of length + * \p label_len Bytes. + * \param label_len The length of \p label in Bytes. + * \param ctx The \c Context argument to \c HKDF-Expand-Label. + * This must be a readable buffer of length \p ctx_len Bytes. + * \param ctx_len The length of \p context in Bytes. + * \param buf The destination buffer to hold the expanded secret. + * This must be a writable buffer of length \p buf_len Bytes. + * \param buf_len The desired size of the expanded secret in Bytes. + * + * \returns \c 0 on success. + * \return A negative error code on failure. */ -int mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_hkdf_expand_label( - mbedtls_md_type_t hash_alg, - const unsigned char *secret, size_t slen, - const unsigned char *label, size_t llen, - const unsigned char *ctx, size_t clen, - unsigned char *buf, size_t blen); +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_hkdf_expand_label( + psa_algorithm_t hash_alg, + const unsigned char *secret, size_t secret_len, + const unsigned char *label, size_t label_len, + const unsigned char *ctx, size_t ctx_len, + unsigned char *buf, size_t buf_len); /** * \brief This function is part of the TLS 1.3 key schedule. @@ -114,10 +130,12 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_hkdf_expand_label( * \param hash_alg The identifier for the hash algorithm to be used * for the HKDF-based expansion of the secret. * \param client_secret The client traffic secret. - * This must be a readable buffer of size \p slen Bytes + * This must be a readable buffer of size + * \p secret_len Bytes * \param server_secret The server traffic secret. - * This must be a readable buffer of size \p slen Bytes - * \param slen Length of the secrets \p client_secret and + * This must be a readable buffer of size + * \p secret_len Bytes + * \param secret_len Length of the secrets \p client_secret and * \p server_secret in Bytes. * \param key_len The desired length of the key to be extracted in Bytes. * \param iv_len The desired length of the IV to be extracted in Bytes. @@ -128,17 +146,14 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_hkdf_expand_label( * \returns A negative error code on failure. */ -int mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_make_traffic_keys( - mbedtls_md_type_t hash_alg, +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_make_traffic_keys( + psa_algorithm_t hash_alg, const unsigned char *client_secret, - const unsigned char *server_secret, - size_t slen, size_t key_len, size_t iv_len, + const unsigned char *server_secret, size_t secret_len, + size_t key_len, size_t iv_len, mbedtls_ssl_key_set *keys); - -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_CONTEXT_UNHASHED 0 -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_CONTEXT_HASHED 1 - /** * \brief The \c Derive-Secret function from the TLS 1.3 standard RFC 8446. * @@ -152,15 +167,17 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_make_traffic_keys( * \param hash_alg The identifier for the hash function used for the * applications of HKDF. * \param secret The \c Secret argument to the \c Derive-Secret function. - * This must be a readable buffer of length \p slen Bytes. - * \param slen The length of \p secret in Bytes. + * This must be a readable buffer of length + * \p secret_len Bytes. + * \param secret_len The length of \p secret in Bytes. * \param label The \c Label argument to the \c Derive-Secret function. - * This must be a readable buffer of length \p llen Bytes. - * \param llen The length of \p label in Bytes. + * This must be a readable buffer of length + * \p label_len Bytes. + * \param label_len The length of \p label in Bytes. * \param ctx The hash of the \c Messages argument to the * \c Derive-Secret function, or the \c Messages argument - * itself, depending on \p context_already_hashed. - * \param clen The length of \p hash. + * itself, depending on \p ctx_hashed. + * \param ctx_len The length of \p ctx in Bytes. * \param ctx_hashed This indicates whether the \p ctx contains the hash of * the \c Messages argument in the application of the * \c Derive-Secret function @@ -170,19 +187,197 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_make_traffic_keys( * (value MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_CONTEXT_UNHASHED). * \param dstbuf The target buffer to write the output of * \c Derive-Secret to. This must be a writable buffer of - * size \p buflen Bytes. - * \param buflen The length of \p dstbuf in Bytes. + * size \p dtsbuf_len Bytes. + * \param dstbuf_len The length of \p dstbuf in Bytes. * * \returns \c 0 on success. * \returns A negative error code on failure. */ -int mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_derive_secret( - mbedtls_md_type_t hash_alg, - const unsigned char *secret, size_t slen, - const unsigned char *label, size_t llen, - const unsigned char *ctx, size_t clen, +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_derive_secret( + psa_algorithm_t hash_alg, + const unsigned char *secret, size_t secret_len, + const unsigned char *label, size_t label_len, + const unsigned char *ctx, size_t ctx_len, int ctx_hashed, - unsigned char *dstbuf, size_t buflen); + unsigned char *dstbuf, size_t dstbuf_len); + +/** + * \brief Derive TLS 1.3 early data key material from early secret. + * + * This is a small wrapper invoking mbedtls_ssl_tls13_derive_secret() + * with the appropriate labels. + * + * + * Early Secret + * | + * +-----> Derive-Secret(., "c e traffic", ClientHello) + * | = client_early_traffic_secret + * | + * +-----> Derive-Secret(., "e exp master", ClientHello) + * . = early_exporter_master_secret + * . + * . + * + * + * \note To obtain the actual key and IV for the early data traffic, + * the client secret derived by this function need to be + * further processed by mbedtls_ssl_tls13_make_traffic_keys(). + * + * \note The binder key, which is also generated from the early secret, + * is omitted here. Its calculation is part of the separate routine + * mbedtls_ssl_tls13_create_psk_binder(). + * + * \param hash_alg The hash algorithm associated with the PSK for which + * early data key material is being derived. + * \param early_secret The early secret from which the early data key material + * should be derived. This must be a readable buffer whose + * length is the digest size of the hash algorithm + * represented by \p md_size. + * \param transcript The transcript of the handshake so far, calculated with + * respect to \p hash_alg. This must be a readable buffer + * whose length is the digest size of the hash algorithm + * represented by \p md_size. + * \param derived The address of the structure in which to store + * the early data key material. + * + * \returns \c 0 on success. + * \returns A negative error code on failure. + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_derive_early_secrets( + psa_algorithm_t hash_alg, + unsigned char const *early_secret, + unsigned char const *transcript, size_t transcript_len, + mbedtls_ssl_tls13_early_secrets *derived); + +/** + * \brief Derive TLS 1.3 handshake key material from the handshake secret. + * + * This is a small wrapper invoking mbedtls_ssl_tls13_derive_secret() + * with the appropriate labels from the standard. + * + * + * Handshake Secret + * | + * +-----> Derive-Secret( ., "c hs traffic", + * | ClientHello...ServerHello ) + * | = client_handshake_traffic_secret + * | + * +-----> Derive-Secret( ., "s hs traffic", + * . ClientHello...ServerHello ) + * . = server_handshake_traffic_secret + * . + * + * + * \note To obtain the actual key and IV for the encrypted handshake traffic, + * the client and server secret derived by this function need to be + * further processed by mbedtls_ssl_tls13_make_traffic_keys(). + * + * \param hash_alg The hash algorithm associated with the ciphersuite + * that's being used for the connection. + * \param handshake_secret The handshake secret from which the handshake key + * material should be derived. This must be a readable + * buffer whose length is the digest size of the hash + * algorithm represented by \p md_size. + * \param transcript The transcript of the handshake so far, calculated + * with respect to \p hash_alg. This must be a readable + * buffer whose length is the digest size of the hash + * algorithm represented by \p md_size. + * \param derived The address of the structure in which to + * store the handshake key material. + * + * \returns \c 0 on success. + * \returns A negative error code on failure. + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_derive_handshake_secrets( + psa_algorithm_t hash_alg, + unsigned char const *handshake_secret, + unsigned char const *transcript, size_t transcript_len, + mbedtls_ssl_tls13_handshake_secrets *derived); + +/** + * \brief Derive TLS 1.3 application key material from the master secret. + * + * This is a small wrapper invoking mbedtls_ssl_tls13_derive_secret() + * with the appropriate labels from the standard. + * + * + * Master Secret + * | + * +-----> Derive-Secret( ., "c ap traffic", + * | ClientHello...server Finished ) + * | = client_application_traffic_secret_0 + * | + * +-----> Derive-Secret( ., "s ap traffic", + * | ClientHello...Server Finished ) + * | = server_application_traffic_secret_0 + * | + * +-----> Derive-Secret( ., "exp master", + * . ClientHello...server Finished) + * . = exporter_master_secret + * . + * + * + * \note To obtain the actual key and IV for the (0-th) application traffic, + * the client and server secret derived by this function need to be + * further processed by mbedtls_ssl_tls13_make_traffic_keys(). + * + * \param hash_alg The hash algorithm associated with the ciphersuite + * that's being used for the connection. + * \param master_secret The master secret from which the application key + * material should be derived. This must be a readable + * buffer whose length is the digest size of the hash + * algorithm represented by \p md_size. + * \param transcript The transcript of the handshake up to and including + * the ServerFinished message, calculated with respect + * to \p hash_alg. This must be a readable buffer whose + * length is the digest size of the hash algorithm + * represented by \p hash_alg. + * \param derived The address of the structure in which to + * store the application key material. + * + * \returns \c 0 on success. + * \returns A negative error code on failure. + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_derive_application_secrets( + psa_algorithm_t hash_alg, + unsigned char const *master_secret, + unsigned char const *transcript, size_t transcript_len, + mbedtls_ssl_tls13_application_secrets *derived); + +/** + * \brief Derive TLS 1.3 resumption master secret from the master secret. + * + * This is a small wrapper invoking mbedtls_ssl_tls13_derive_secret() + * with the appropriate labels from the standard. + * + * \param hash_alg The hash algorithm used in the application for which + * key material is being derived. + * \param application_secret The application secret from which the resumption master + * secret should be derived. This must be a readable + * buffer whose length is the digest size of the hash + * algorithm represented by \p md_size. + * \param transcript The transcript of the handshake up to and including + * the ClientFinished message, calculated with respect + * to \p hash_alg. This must be a readable buffer whose + * length is the digest size of the hash algorithm + * represented by \p hash_alg. + * \param transcript_len The length of \p transcript in Bytes. + * \param derived The address of the structure in which to + * store the resumption master secret. + * + * \returns \c 0 on success. + * \returns A negative error code on failure. + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_derive_resumption_master_secret( + psa_algorithm_t hash_alg, + unsigned char const *application_secret, + unsigned char const *transcript, size_t transcript_len, + mbedtls_ssl_tls13_application_secrets *derived); /** * \brief Compute the next secret in the TLS 1.3 key schedule @@ -214,7 +409,7 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_derive_secret( * * Each of the three secrets in turn is the basis for further * key derivations, such as the derivation of traffic keys and IVs; - * see e.g. mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_make_traffic_keys(). + * see e.g. mbedtls_ssl_tls13_make_traffic_keys(). * * This function implements one step in this evolution of secrets: * @@ -251,10 +446,206 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_derive_secret( * \returns A negative error code on failure. */ -int mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_evolve_secret( - mbedtls_md_type_t hash_alg, +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_evolve_secret( + psa_algorithm_t hash_alg, const unsigned char *secret_old, const unsigned char *input, size_t input_len, unsigned char *secret_new); +/** + * \brief Calculate a TLS 1.3 PSK binder. + * + * \param ssl The SSL context. This is used for debugging only and may + * be \c NULL if MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C is disabled. + * \param hash_alg The hash algorithm associated to the PSK \p psk. + * \param psk The buffer holding the PSK for which to create a binder. + * \param psk_len The size of \p psk in bytes. + * \param psk_type This indicates whether the PSK \p psk is externally + * provisioned (#MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_PSK_EXTERNAL) or a + * resumption PSK (#MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_PSK_RESUMPTION). + * \param transcript The handshake transcript up to the point where the + * PSK binder calculation happens. This must be readable, + * and its size must be equal to the digest size of + * the hash algorithm represented by \p hash_alg. + * \param result The address at which to store the PSK binder on success. + * This must be writable, and its size must be equal to the + * digest size of the hash algorithm represented by + * \p hash_alg. + * + * \returns \c 0 on success. + * \returns A negative error code on failure. + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_create_psk_binder(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const psa_algorithm_t hash_alg, + unsigned char const *psk, size_t psk_len, + int psk_type, + unsigned char const *transcript, + unsigned char *result); + +/** + * \bref Setup an SSL transform structure representing the + * record protection mechanism used by TLS 1.3 + * + * \param transform The SSL transform structure to be created. This must have + * been initialized through mbedtls_ssl_transform_init() and + * not used in any other way prior to calling this function. + * In particular, this function does not clean up the + * transform structure prior to installing the new keys. + * \param endpoint Indicates whether the transform is for the client + * (value #MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT) or the server + * (value #MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER). + * \param ciphersuite The numerical identifier for the ciphersuite to use. + * This must be one of the identifiers listed in + * ssl_ciphersuites.h. + * \param traffic_keys The key material to use. No reference is stored in + * the SSL transform being generated, and the caller + * should destroy the key material afterwards. + * \param ssl (Debug-only) The SSL context to use for debug output + * in case of failure. This parameter is only needed if + * #MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C is set, and is ignored otherwise. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. In this case, \p transform is ready to + * be used with mbedtls_ssl_transform_decrypt() and + * mbedtls_ssl_transform_encrypt(). + * \return A negative error code on failure. + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_populate_transform(mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform, + int endpoint, + int ciphersuite, + mbedtls_ssl_key_set const *traffic_keys, + mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); + +/* + * TLS 1.3 key schedule evolutions + * + * Early -> Handshake -> Application + * + * Small wrappers around mbedtls_ssl_tls13_evolve_secret(). + */ + +/** + * \brief Begin TLS 1.3 key schedule by calculating early secret. + * + * The TLS 1.3 key schedule can be viewed as a simple state machine + * with states Initial -> Early -> Handshake -> Application, and + * this function represents the Initial -> Early transition. + * + * \param ssl The SSL context to operate on. + * + * \returns \c 0 on success. + * \returns A negative error code on failure. + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_key_schedule_stage_early(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); + +/** + * \brief Compute TLS 1.3 resumption master secret. + * + * \param ssl The SSL context to operate on. This must be in + * key schedule stage \c Application, see + * mbedtls_ssl_tls13_key_schedule_stage_application(). + * + * \returns \c 0 on success. + * \returns A negative error code on failure. + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_compute_resumption_master_secret(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); + +/** + * \brief Calculate the verify_data value for the client or server TLS 1.3 + * Finished message. + * + * \param ssl The SSL context to operate on. This must be in + * key schedule stage \c Handshake, see + * mbedtls_ssl_tls13_key_schedule_stage_application(). + * \param dst The address at which to write the verify_data value. + * \param dst_len The size of \p dst in bytes. + * \param actual_len The address at which to store the amount of data + * actually written to \p dst upon success. + * \param which The message to calculate the `verify_data` for: + * - #MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT for the Client's Finished message + * - #MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER for the Server's Finished message + * + * \note Both client and server call this function twice, once to + * generate their own Finished message, and once to verify the + * peer's Finished message. + + * \returns \c 0 on success. + * \returns A negative error code on failure. + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_calculate_verify_data(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *dst, + size_t dst_len, + size_t *actual_len, + int which); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) +/** + * \brief Compute TLS 1.3 early transform + * + * \param ssl The SSL context to operate on. + * + * \returns \c 0 on success. + * \returns A negative error code on failure. + * + * \warning The function does not compute the early master secret. Call + * mbedtls_ssl_tls13_key_schedule_stage_early() before to + * call this function to generate the early master secret. + * \note For a client/server endpoint, the function computes only the + * encryption/decryption part of the transform as the decryption/ + * encryption part is not defined by the specification (no early + * traffic from the server to the client). + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_compute_early_transform(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA */ + +/** + * \brief Compute TLS 1.3 handshake transform + * + * \param ssl The SSL context to operate on. The early secret must have been + * computed. + * + * \returns \c 0 on success. + * \returns A negative error code on failure. + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_compute_handshake_transform(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); + +/** + * \brief Compute TLS 1.3 application transform + * + * \param ssl The SSL context to operate on. The early secret must have been + * computed. + * + * \returns \c 0 on success. + * \returns A negative error code on failure. + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_compute_application_transform(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED) +/** + * \brief Export TLS 1.3 PSK from handshake context + * + * \param[in] ssl The SSL context to operate on. + * \param[out] psk PSK output pointer. + * \param[out] psk_len Length of PSK. + * + * \returns \c 0 if there is a configured PSK and it was exported + * successfully. + * \returns A negative error code on failure. + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_export_handshake_psk(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char **psk, + size_t *psk_len); +#endif + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 */ + #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEYS_H */ diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ssl_tls13_server.c b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ssl_tls13_server.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..2760d76a5d5c --- /dev/null +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ssl_tls13_server.c @@ -0,0 +1,3599 @@ +/* + * TLS 1.3 server-side functions + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) + +#include "debug_internal.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" +#include "mbedtls/constant_time.h" +#include "mbedtls/oid.h" +#include "mbedtls/psa_util.h" + +#include "ssl_misc.h" +#include "ssl_tls13_keys.h" +#include "ssl_debug_helpers.h" + + +static const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ssl_tls13_validate_peer_ciphersuite( + mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned int cipher_suite) +{ + const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info; + if (!mbedtls_ssl_tls13_cipher_suite_is_offered(ssl, cipher_suite)) { + return NULL; + } + + ciphersuite_info = mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_from_id(cipher_suite); + if ((mbedtls_ssl_validate_ciphersuite(ssl, ciphersuite_info, + ssl->tls_version, + ssl->tls_version) != 0)) { + return NULL; + } + return ciphersuite_info; +} + +static void ssl_tls13_select_ciphersuite( + mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *cipher_suites, + const unsigned char *cipher_suites_end, + int psk_ciphersuite_id, + psa_algorithm_t psk_hash_alg, + const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t **selected_ciphersuite_info) +{ + *selected_ciphersuite_info = NULL; + + /* + * In a compliant ClientHello the byte-length of the list of ciphersuites + * is even and this function relies on this fact. This should have been + * checked in the main ClientHello parsing function. Double check here. + */ + if ((cipher_suites_end - cipher_suites) & 1) { + return; + } + + for (const unsigned char *p = cipher_suites; + p < cipher_suites_end; p += 2) { + /* + * "cipher_suites_end - p is even" is an invariant of the loop. As + * cipher_suites_end - p > 0, we have cipher_suites_end - p >= 2 and it + * is thus safe to read two bytes. + */ + uint16_t id = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(p, 0); + + const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *info = + ssl_tls13_validate_peer_ciphersuite(ssl, id); + if (info == NULL) { + continue; + } + + /* + * If a valid PSK ciphersuite identifier has been passed in, we want + * an exact match. + */ + if (psk_ciphersuite_id != 0) { + if (id != psk_ciphersuite_id) { + continue; + } + } else if (psk_hash_alg != PSA_ALG_NONE) { + if (mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type((mbedtls_md_type_t) info->mac) != + psk_hash_alg) { + continue; + } + } + + *selected_ciphersuite_info = info; + return; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("No matched ciphersuite, psk_ciphersuite_id=%x, psk_hash_alg=%x", + (unsigned) psk_ciphersuite_id, psk_hash_alg)); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED) +/* From RFC 8446: + * + * enum { psk_ke(0), psk_dhe_ke(1), (255) } PskKeyExchangeMode; + * struct { + * PskKeyExchangeMode ke_modes<1..255>; + * } PskKeyExchangeModes; + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_parse_key_exchange_modes_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *buf, + const unsigned char *end) +{ + const unsigned char *p = buf; + size_t ke_modes_len; + int ke_modes = 0; + + /* Read ke_modes length (1 Byte) */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, end, 1); + ke_modes_len = *p++; + /* Currently, there are only two PSK modes, so even without looking + * at the content, something's wrong if the list has more than 2 items. */ + if (ke_modes_len > 2) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, + MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, end, ke_modes_len); + + while (ke_modes_len-- != 0) { + switch (*p++) { + case MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_PSK_MODE_PURE: + ke_modes |= MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK; + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("Found PSK KEX MODE")); + break; + case MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_PSK_MODE_ECDHE: + ke_modes |= MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_EPHEMERAL; + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("Found PSK_EPHEMERAL KEX MODE")); + break; + default: + MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, + MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; + } + } + + ssl->handshake->tls13_kex_modes = ke_modes; + return 0; +} + +/* + * Non-error return values of + * ssl_tls13_offered_psks_check_identity_match_ticket() and + * ssl_tls13_offered_psks_check_identity_match(). They are positive to + * not collide with error codes that are negative. Zero + * (SSL_TLS1_3_PSK_IDENTITY_MATCH) in case of success as it may be propagated + * up by the callers of this function as a generic success condition. + * + * The return value SSL_TLS1_3_PSK_IDENTITY_MATCH_BUT_PSK_NOT_USABLE means + * that the pre-shared-key identity matches that of a ticket or an externally- + * provisioned pre-shared-key. We have thus been able to retrieve the + * attributes of the pre-shared-key but at least one of them does not meet + * some criteria and the pre-shared-key cannot be used. For example, a ticket + * is expired or its version is not TLS 1.3. Note eventually that the return + * value SSL_TLS1_3_PSK_IDENTITY_MATCH_BUT_PSK_NOT_USABLE does not have + * anything to do with binder check. A binder check is done only when a + * suitable pre-shared-key has been selected and only for that selected + * pre-shared-key: if the binder check fails, we fail the handshake and we do + * not try to find another pre-shared-key for which the binder check would + * succeed as recommended by the specification. + */ +#define SSL_TLS1_3_PSK_IDENTITY_DOES_NOT_MATCH 2 +#define SSL_TLS1_3_PSK_IDENTITY_MATCH_BUT_PSK_NOT_USABLE 1 +#define SSL_TLS1_3_PSK_IDENTITY_MATCH 0 + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_key_exchange_is_psk_available(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_key_exchange_is_psk_ephemeral_available(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_offered_psks_check_identity_match_ticket( + mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *identity, + size_t identity_len, + uint32_t obfuscated_ticket_age, + mbedtls_ssl_session *session) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char *ticket_buffer; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) + mbedtls_ms_time_t now; + mbedtls_ms_time_t server_age; + uint32_t client_age; + mbedtls_ms_time_t age_diff; +#endif + + ((void) obfuscated_ticket_age); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> check_identity_match_ticket")); + + /* Ticket parser is not configured, Skip */ + if (ssl->conf->f_ticket_parse == NULL || identity_len == 0) { + return SSL_TLS1_3_PSK_IDENTITY_DOES_NOT_MATCH; + } + + /* We create a copy of the encrypted ticket since the ticket parsing + * function is allowed to use its input buffer as an output buffer + * (in-place decryption). We do, however, need the original buffer for + * computing the PSK binder value. + */ + ticket_buffer = mbedtls_calloc(1, identity_len); + if (ticket_buffer == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED; + } + memcpy(ticket_buffer, identity, identity_len); + + ret = ssl->conf->f_ticket_parse(ssl->conf->p_ticket, + session, + ticket_buffer, identity_len); + switch (ret) { + case 0: + ret = SSL_TLS1_3_PSK_IDENTITY_MATCH; + break; + + case MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_SESSION_TICKET_EXPIRED: + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("ticket is expired")); + ret = SSL_TLS1_3_PSK_IDENTITY_MATCH_BUT_PSK_NOT_USABLE; + break; + + case MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC: + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("ticket is not authentic")); + ret = SSL_TLS1_3_PSK_IDENTITY_DOES_NOT_MATCH; + break; + + default: + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "ticket_parse", ret); + ret = SSL_TLS1_3_PSK_IDENTITY_DOES_NOT_MATCH; + } + + /* We delete the temporary buffer */ + mbedtls_free(ticket_buffer); + + if (ret != SSL_TLS1_3_PSK_IDENTITY_MATCH) { + goto exit; + } + + /* + * The identity matches that of a ticket. Now check that it has suitable + * attributes and bet it will not be the case. + */ + ret = SSL_TLS1_3_PSK_IDENTITY_MATCH_BUT_PSK_NOT_USABLE; + + if (session->tls_version != MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_3) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("Ticket TLS version is not 1.3.")); + goto exit; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) + now = mbedtls_ms_time(); + + if (now < session->ticket_creation_time) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( + 3, ("Invalid ticket creation time ( now = %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_MS_TIME + ", creation_time = %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_MS_TIME " )", + now, session->ticket_creation_time)); + goto exit; + } + + server_age = now - session->ticket_creation_time; + + /* RFC 8446 section 4.6.1 + * + * Servers MUST NOT use any value greater than 604800 seconds (7 days). + * + * RFC 8446 section 4.2.11.1 + * + * Clients MUST NOT attempt to use tickets which have ages greater than + * the "ticket_lifetime" value which was provided with the ticket. + * + */ + if (server_age > MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_MAX_ALLOWED_TICKET_LIFETIME * 1000) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( + 3, ("Ticket age exceeds limitation ticket_age = %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_MS_TIME, + server_age)); + goto exit; + } + + /* RFC 8446 section 4.2.10 + * + * For PSKs provisioned via NewSessionTicket, a server MUST validate that + * the ticket age for the selected PSK identity (computed by subtracting + * ticket_age_add from PskIdentity.obfuscated_ticket_age modulo 2^32) is + * within a small tolerance of the time since the ticket was issued. + * + * NOTE: The typical accuracy of an RTC crystal is ±100 to ±20 parts per + * million (360 to 72 milliseconds per hour). Default tolerance + * window is 6s, thus in the worst case clients and servers must + * sync up their system time every 6000/360/2~=8 hours. + */ + client_age = obfuscated_ticket_age - session->ticket_age_add; + age_diff = server_age - (mbedtls_ms_time_t) client_age; + if (age_diff < -MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_TICKET_AGE_TOLERANCE || + age_diff > MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_TICKET_AGE_TOLERANCE) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( + 3, ("Ticket age outside tolerance window ( diff = %" + MBEDTLS_PRINTF_MS_TIME ")", + age_diff)); + goto exit; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME */ + + /* + * All good, we have found a suitable ticket. + */ + ret = SSL_TLS1_3_PSK_IDENTITY_MATCH; + +exit: + if (ret != SSL_TLS1_3_PSK_IDENTITY_MATCH) { + mbedtls_ssl_session_free(session); + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= check_identity_match_ticket")); + return ret; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */ + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_offered_psks_check_identity_match( + mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *identity, + size_t identity_len, + uint32_t obfuscated_ticket_age, + int *psk_type, + mbedtls_ssl_session *session) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + ((void) session); + ((void) obfuscated_ticket_age); + *psk_type = MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_PSK_EXTERNAL; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "identity", identity, identity_len); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) + ret = ssl_tls13_offered_psks_check_identity_match_ticket( + ssl, identity, identity_len, obfuscated_ticket_age, session); + if (ret == SSL_TLS1_3_PSK_IDENTITY_MATCH) { + *psk_type = MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_PSK_RESUMPTION; + ret = mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_psk(ssl, + session->resumption_key, + session->resumption_key_len); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_psk", ret); + return ret; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "Ticket-resumed PSK:", + session->resumption_key, + session->resumption_key_len); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(4, ("ticket: obfuscated_ticket_age: %u", + (unsigned) obfuscated_ticket_age)); + return SSL_TLS1_3_PSK_IDENTITY_MATCH; + } else if (ret == SSL_TLS1_3_PSK_IDENTITY_MATCH_BUT_PSK_NOT_USABLE) { + return SSL_TLS1_3_PSK_IDENTITY_MATCH_BUT_PSK_NOT_USABLE; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */ + + /* Check identity with external configured function */ + if (ssl->conf->f_psk != NULL) { + if (ssl->conf->f_psk( + ssl->conf->p_psk, ssl, identity, identity_len) == 0) { + return SSL_TLS1_3_PSK_IDENTITY_MATCH; + } + return SSL_TLS1_3_PSK_IDENTITY_DOES_NOT_MATCH; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(5, "identity", identity, identity_len); + /* Check identity with pre-configured psk */ + if (ssl->conf->psk_identity != NULL && + identity_len == ssl->conf->psk_identity_len && + mbedtls_ct_memcmp(ssl->conf->psk_identity, + identity, identity_len) == 0) { + ret = mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_psk(ssl, ssl->conf->psk, ssl->conf->psk_len); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_psk", ret); + return ret; + } + return SSL_TLS1_3_PSK_IDENTITY_MATCH; + } + + return SSL_TLS1_3_PSK_IDENTITY_DOES_NOT_MATCH; +} + +/* + * Non-error return values of ssl_tls13_offered_psks_check_binder_match(). + * They are positive to not collide with error codes that are negative. Zero + * (SSL_TLS1_3_BINDER_MATCH) in case of success as it may be propagated up + * by the callers of this function as a generic success condition. + */ +#define SSL_TLS1_3_BINDER_DOES_NOT_MATCH 1 +#define SSL_TLS1_3_BINDER_MATCH 0 +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_offered_psks_check_binder_match( + mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *binder, size_t binder_len, + int psk_type, psa_algorithm_t psk_hash_alg) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + unsigned char transcript[PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE]; + size_t transcript_len; + unsigned char *psk; + size_t psk_len; + unsigned char server_computed_binder[PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE]; + + if (binder_len != PSA_HASH_LENGTH(psk_hash_alg)) { + return SSL_TLS1_3_BINDER_DOES_NOT_MATCH; + } + + /* Get current state of handshake transcript. */ + ret = mbedtls_ssl_get_handshake_transcript( + ssl, mbedtls_md_type_from_psa_alg(psk_hash_alg), + transcript, sizeof(transcript), &transcript_len); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_export_handshake_psk(ssl, &psk, &psk_len); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_create_psk_binder(ssl, psk_hash_alg, + psk, psk_len, psk_type, + transcript, + server_computed_binder); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + mbedtls_free((void *) psk); +#endif + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("PSK binder calculation failed.")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "psk binder ( computed ): ", + server_computed_binder, transcript_len); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "psk binder ( received ): ", binder, binder_len); + + if (mbedtls_ct_memcmp(server_computed_binder, + binder, + PSA_HASH_LENGTH(psk_hash_alg)) == 0) { + return SSL_TLS1_3_BINDER_MATCH; + } + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(server_computed_binder, + sizeof(server_computed_binder)); + return SSL_TLS1_3_BINDER_DOES_NOT_MATCH; +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_session_copy_ticket(mbedtls_ssl_session *dst, + const mbedtls_ssl_session *src) +{ + dst->ticket_age_add = src->ticket_age_add; + dst->ticket_flags = src->ticket_flags; + dst->resumption_key_len = src->resumption_key_len; + if (src->resumption_key_len == 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } + memcpy(dst->resumption_key, src->resumption_key, src->resumption_key_len); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) + dst->max_early_data_size = src->max_early_data_size; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN) + int ret = mbedtls_ssl_session_set_ticket_alpn(dst, src->ticket_alpn); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA*/ + + return 0; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */ + +struct psk_attributes { + int type; + int key_exchange_mode; + const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info; +}; +#define PSK_ATTRIBUTES_INIT { 0, 0, NULL } + +/* Parser for pre_shared_key extension in client hello + * struct { + * opaque identity<1..2^16-1>; + * uint32 obfuscated_ticket_age; + * } PskIdentity; + * + * opaque PskBinderEntry<32..255>; + * + * struct { + * PskIdentity identities<7..2^16-1>; + * PskBinderEntry binders<33..2^16-1>; + * } OfferedPsks; + * + * struct { + * select (Handshake.msg_type) { + * case client_hello: OfferedPsks; + * .... + * }; + * } PreSharedKeyExtension; + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_parse_pre_shared_key_ext( + mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *pre_shared_key_ext, + const unsigned char *pre_shared_key_ext_end, + const unsigned char *ciphersuites, + const unsigned char *ciphersuites_end, + struct psk_attributes *psk) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + const unsigned char *identities = pre_shared_key_ext; + const unsigned char *p_identity_len; + size_t identities_len; + const unsigned char *identities_end; + const unsigned char *binders; + const unsigned char *p_binder_len; + size_t binders_len; + const unsigned char *binders_end; + int matched_identity = -1; + int identity_id = -1; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "pre_shared_key extension", + pre_shared_key_ext, + pre_shared_key_ext_end - pre_shared_key_ext); + + /* identities_len 2 bytes + * identities_data >= 7 bytes + */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(identities, pre_shared_key_ext_end, 7 + 2); + identities_len = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(identities, 0); + p_identity_len = identities + 2; + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p_identity_len, pre_shared_key_ext_end, + identities_len); + identities_end = p_identity_len + identities_len; + + /* binders_len 2 bytes + * binders >= 33 bytes + */ + binders = identities_end; + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(binders, pre_shared_key_ext_end, 33 + 2); + binders_len = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(binders, 0); + p_binder_len = binders + 2; + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p_binder_len, pre_shared_key_ext_end, binders_len); + binders_end = p_binder_len + binders_len; + + ret = ssl->handshake->update_checksum(ssl, pre_shared_key_ext, + identities_end - pre_shared_key_ext); + if (0 != ret) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, ("update_checksum"), ret); + return ret; + } + + while (p_identity_len < identities_end && p_binder_len < binders_end) { + const unsigned char *identity; + size_t identity_len; + uint32_t obfuscated_ticket_age; + const unsigned char *binder; + size_t binder_len; + int psk_ciphersuite_id; + psa_algorithm_t psk_hash_alg; + int allowed_key_exchange_modes; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) + mbedtls_ssl_session session; + mbedtls_ssl_session_init(&session); +#endif + + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p_identity_len, identities_end, 2 + 1 + 4); + identity_len = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(p_identity_len, 0); + identity = p_identity_len + 2; + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(identity, identities_end, identity_len + 4); + obfuscated_ticket_age = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE(identity, identity_len); + p_identity_len += identity_len + 6; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p_binder_len, binders_end, 1 + 32); + binder_len = *p_binder_len; + binder = p_binder_len + 1; + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(binder, binders_end, binder_len); + p_binder_len += binder_len + 1; + + identity_id++; + if (matched_identity != -1) { + continue; + } + + ret = ssl_tls13_offered_psks_check_identity_match( + ssl, identity, identity_len, obfuscated_ticket_age, + &psk->type, &session); + if (ret != SSL_TLS1_3_PSK_IDENTITY_MATCH) { + continue; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(4, ("found matched identity")); + + switch (psk->type) { + case MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_PSK_EXTERNAL: + psk_ciphersuite_id = 0; + psk_hash_alg = PSA_ALG_SHA_256; + allowed_key_exchange_modes = + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_ALL; + break; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) + case MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_PSK_RESUMPTION: + psk_ciphersuite_id = session.ciphersuite; + psk_hash_alg = PSA_ALG_NONE; + ssl->session_negotiate->ticket_flags = session.ticket_flags; + allowed_key_exchange_modes = + session.ticket_flags & + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_ALL; + break; +#endif + default: + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } + + psk->key_exchange_mode = MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_NONE; + + if ((allowed_key_exchange_modes & + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_EPHEMERAL) && + ssl_tls13_key_exchange_is_psk_ephemeral_available(ssl)) { + psk->key_exchange_mode = MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_EPHEMERAL; + } else if ((allowed_key_exchange_modes & + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK) && + ssl_tls13_key_exchange_is_psk_available(ssl)) { + psk->key_exchange_mode = MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK; + } + + if (psk->key_exchange_mode == MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_NONE) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("No suitable PSK key exchange mode")); + continue; + } + + ssl_tls13_select_ciphersuite(ssl, ciphersuites, ciphersuites_end, + psk_ciphersuite_id, psk_hash_alg, + &psk->ciphersuite_info); + + if (psk->ciphersuite_info == NULL) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) + mbedtls_ssl_session_free(&session); +#endif + /* + * We consider finding a ciphersuite suitable for the PSK as part + * of the validation of its binder. Thus if we do not find one, we + * abort the handshake with a decrypt_error alert. + */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT( + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECRYPT_ERROR, + MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; + } + + ret = ssl_tls13_offered_psks_check_binder_match( + ssl, binder, binder_len, psk->type, + mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type((mbedtls_md_type_t) psk->ciphersuite_info->mac)); + if (ret != SSL_TLS1_3_BINDER_MATCH) { + /* For security reasons, the handshake should be aborted when we + * fail to validate a binder value. See RFC 8446 section 4.2.11.2 + * and appendix E.6. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) + mbedtls_ssl_session_free(&session); +#endif + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("Invalid binder.")); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( + 1, "ssl_tls13_offered_psks_check_binder_match", ret); + MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT( + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECRYPT_ERROR, + MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); + return ret; + } + + matched_identity = identity_id; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) + if (psk->type == MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_PSK_RESUMPTION) { + ret = ssl_tls13_session_copy_ticket(ssl->session_negotiate, + &session); + mbedtls_ssl_session_free(&session); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */ + } + + if (p_identity_len != identities_end || p_binder_len != binders_end) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("pre_shared_key extension decode error")); + MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR, + MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; + } + + /* Update the handshake transcript with the binder list. */ + ret = ssl->handshake->update_checksum( + ssl, identities_end, (size_t) (binders_end - identities_end)); + if (0 != ret) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, ("update_checksum"), ret); + return ret; + } + if (matched_identity == -1) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("No usable PSK or ticket.")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNKNOWN_IDENTITY; + } + + ssl->handshake->selected_identity = (uint16_t) matched_identity; + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("Pre shared key found")); + + return 0; +} + +/* + * struct { + * select ( Handshake.msg_type ) { + * .... + * case server_hello: + * uint16 selected_identity; + * } + * } PreSharedKeyExtension; + */ +static int ssl_tls13_write_server_pre_shared_key_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *buf, + unsigned char *end, + size_t *olen) +{ + unsigned char *p = (unsigned char *) buf; + + *olen = 0; + + int not_using_psk = 0; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + not_using_psk = (mbedtls_svc_key_id_is_null(ssl->handshake->psk_opaque)); +#else + not_using_psk = (ssl->handshake->psk == NULL); +#endif + if (not_using_psk) { + /* We shouldn't have called this extension writer unless we've + * chosen to use a PSK. */ + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("server hello, adding pre_shared_key extension")); + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR(p, end, 6); + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_PRE_SHARED_KEY, p, 0); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(2, p, 2); + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(ssl->handshake->selected_identity, p, 4); + + *olen = 6; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(4, ("sent selected_identity: %u", + ssl->handshake->selected_identity)); + + mbedtls_ssl_tls13_set_hs_sent_ext_mask(ssl, MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_PRE_SHARED_KEY); + + return 0; +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED */ + +/* From RFC 8446: + * struct { + * ProtocolVersion versions<2..254>; + * } SupportedVersions; + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_parse_supported_versions_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *buf, + const unsigned char *end) +{ + const unsigned char *p = buf; + size_t versions_len; + const unsigned char *versions_end; + uint16_t tls_version; + int found_supported_version = 0; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, end, 1); + versions_len = p[0]; + p += 1; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, end, versions_len); + versions_end = p + versions_len; + while (p < versions_end) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, versions_end, 2); + tls_version = mbedtls_ssl_read_version(p, ssl->conf->transport); + p += 2; + + if (MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_3 == tls_version) { + found_supported_version = 1; + break; + } + + if ((MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 == tls_version) && + mbedtls_ssl_conf_is_tls12_enabled(ssl->conf)) { + found_supported_version = 1; + break; + } + } + + if (!found_supported_version) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("No supported version found.")); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_PROTOCOL_VERSION, + MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("Negotiated version: [%04x]", + (unsigned int) tls_version)); + + return (int) tls_version; +} + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH) || defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH) +/* + * + * From RFC 8446: + * enum { + * ... (0xFFFF) + * } NamedGroup; + * struct { + * NamedGroup named_group_list<2..2^16-1>; + * } NamedGroupList; + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_parse_supported_groups_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *buf, + const unsigned char *end) +{ + const unsigned char *p = buf; + size_t named_group_list_len; + const unsigned char *named_group_list_end; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "supported_groups extension", p, end - buf); + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, end, 2); + named_group_list_len = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(p, 0); + p += 2; + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, end, named_group_list_len); + named_group_list_end = p + named_group_list_len; + ssl->handshake->hrr_selected_group = 0; + + while (p < named_group_list_end) { + uint16_t named_group; + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, named_group_list_end, 2); + named_group = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(p, 0); + p += 2; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, + ("got named group: %s(%04x)", + mbedtls_ssl_named_group_to_str(named_group), + named_group)); + + if (!mbedtls_ssl_named_group_is_offered(ssl, named_group) || + !mbedtls_ssl_named_group_is_supported(named_group) || + ssl->handshake->hrr_selected_group != 0) { + continue; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, + ("add named group %s(%04x) into received list.", + mbedtls_ssl_named_group_to_str(named_group), + named_group)); + + ssl->handshake->hrr_selected_group = named_group; + } + + return 0; + +} +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH || PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH */ + +#define SSL_TLS1_3_PARSE_KEY_SHARES_EXT_NO_MATCH 1 + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED) +/* + * ssl_tls13_parse_key_shares_ext() verifies whether the information in the + * extension is correct and stores the first acceptable key share and its + * associated group. + * + * Possible return values are: + * - 0: Successful processing of the client provided key share extension. + * - SSL_TLS1_3_PARSE_KEY_SHARES_EXT_NO_MATCH: The key shares provided by + * the client does not match a group supported by the server. A + * HelloRetryRequest will be needed. + * - A negative value for fatal errors. + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_parse_key_shares_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *buf, + const unsigned char *end) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char const *p = buf; + unsigned char const *client_shares_end; + size_t client_shares_len; + + /* From RFC 8446: + * + * struct { + * KeyShareEntry client_shares<0..2^16-1>; + * } KeyShareClientHello; + * + */ + + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, end, 2); + client_shares_len = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(p, 0); + p += 2; + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, end, client_shares_len); + + ssl->handshake->offered_group_id = 0; + client_shares_end = p + client_shares_len; + + /* We try to find a suitable key share entry and copy it to the + * handshake context. Later, we have to find out whether we can do + * something with the provided key share or whether we have to + * dismiss it and send a HelloRetryRequest message. + */ + + while (p < client_shares_end) { + uint16_t group; + size_t key_exchange_len; + const unsigned char *key_exchange; + + /* + * struct { + * NamedGroup group; + * opaque key_exchange<1..2^16-1>; + * } KeyShareEntry; + */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, client_shares_end, 4); + group = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(p, 0); + key_exchange_len = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(p, 2); + p += 4; + key_exchange = p; + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, client_shares_end, key_exchange_len); + p += key_exchange_len; + + /* Continue parsing even if we have already found a match, + * for input validation purposes. + */ + if (!mbedtls_ssl_named_group_is_offered(ssl, group) || + !mbedtls_ssl_named_group_is_supported(group) || + ssl->handshake->offered_group_id != 0) { + continue; + } + + /* + * ECDHE and FFDHE groups are supported + */ + if (mbedtls_ssl_tls13_named_group_is_ecdhe(group) || + mbedtls_ssl_tls13_named_group_is_ffdh(group)) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("ECDH/FFDH group: %s (%04x)", + mbedtls_ssl_named_group_to_str(group), + group)); + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_read_public_xxdhe_share( + ssl, key_exchange - 2, key_exchange_len + 2); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + + } else { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(4, ("Unrecognized NamedGroup %u", + (unsigned) group)); + continue; + } + + ssl->handshake->offered_group_id = group; + } + + + if (ssl->handshake->offered_group_id == 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("no matching key share")); + return SSL_TLS1_3_PARSE_KEY_SHARES_EXT_NO_MATCH; + } + return 0; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED */ + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_client_hello_has_exts(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + int exts_mask) +{ + int masked = ssl->handshake->received_extensions & exts_mask; + return masked == exts_mask; +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_client_hello_has_exts_for_ephemeral_key_exchange( + mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + return ssl_tls13_client_hello_has_exts( + ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(SUPPORTED_GROUPS) | + MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(KEY_SHARE) | + MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(SIG_ALG)); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_ENABLED) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_client_hello_has_exts_for_psk_key_exchange( + mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + return ssl_tls13_client_hello_has_exts( + ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(PRE_SHARED_KEY) | + MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(PSK_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODES)); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_client_hello_has_exts_for_psk_ephemeral_key_exchange( + mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + return ssl_tls13_client_hello_has_exts( + ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(SUPPORTED_GROUPS) | + MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(KEY_SHARE) | + MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(PRE_SHARED_KEY) | + MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(PSK_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODES)); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_key_exchange_is_psk_available(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_ENABLED) + return mbedtls_ssl_conf_tls13_is_psk_enabled(ssl) && + mbedtls_ssl_tls13_is_psk_supported(ssl) && + ssl_tls13_client_hello_has_exts_for_psk_key_exchange(ssl); +#else + ((void) ssl); + return 0; +#endif +} + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_key_exchange_is_psk_ephemeral_available(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED) + return mbedtls_ssl_conf_tls13_is_psk_ephemeral_enabled(ssl) && + mbedtls_ssl_tls13_is_psk_ephemeral_supported(ssl) && + ssl_tls13_client_hello_has_exts_for_psk_ephemeral_key_exchange(ssl); +#else + ((void) ssl); + return 0; +#endif +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED */ + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_key_exchange_is_ephemeral_available(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED) + return mbedtls_ssl_conf_tls13_is_ephemeral_enabled(ssl) && + ssl_tls13_client_hello_has_exts_for_ephemeral_key_exchange(ssl); +#else + ((void) ssl); + return 0; +#endif +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED) + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +static psa_algorithm_t ssl_tls13_iana_sig_alg_to_psa_alg(uint16_t sig_alg) +{ + switch (sig_alg) { + case MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_ECDSA_SECP256R1_SHA256: + return PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256); + case MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_ECDSA_SECP384R1_SHA384: + return PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384); + case MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_ECDSA_SECP521R1_SHA512: + return PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512); + case MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PSS_RSAE_SHA256: + return PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256); + case MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PSS_RSAE_SHA384: + return PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_384); + case MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PSS_RSAE_SHA512: + return PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_512); + case MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PKCS1_SHA256: + return PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256); + case MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PKCS1_SHA384: + return PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_384); + case MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PKCS1_SHA512: + return PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_512); + default: + return PSA_ALG_NONE; + } +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + +/* + * Pick best ( private key, certificate chain ) pair based on the signature + * algorithms supported by the client. + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_pick_key_cert(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + mbedtls_ssl_key_cert *key_cert, *key_cert_list; + const uint16_t *sig_alg = ssl->handshake->received_sig_algs; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) + if (ssl->handshake->sni_key_cert != NULL) { + key_cert_list = ssl->handshake->sni_key_cert; + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION */ + key_cert_list = ssl->conf->key_cert; + + if (key_cert_list == NULL) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("server has no certificate")); + return -1; + } + + for (; *sig_alg != MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_NONE; sig_alg++) { + if (!mbedtls_ssl_sig_alg_is_offered(ssl, *sig_alg)) { + continue; + } + + if (!mbedtls_ssl_tls13_sig_alg_for_cert_verify_is_supported(*sig_alg)) { + continue; + } + + for (key_cert = key_cert_list; key_cert != NULL; + key_cert = key_cert->next) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + psa_algorithm_t psa_alg = PSA_ALG_NONE; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_CRT(3, "certificate (chain) candidate", + key_cert->cert); + + /* + * This avoids sending the client a cert it'll reject based on + * keyUsage or other extensions. + */ + if (mbedtls_x509_crt_check_key_usage( + key_cert->cert, MBEDTLS_X509_KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE) != 0 || + mbedtls_x509_crt_check_extended_key_usage( + key_cert->cert, MBEDTLS_OID_SERVER_AUTH, + MBEDTLS_OID_SIZE(MBEDTLS_OID_SERVER_AUTH)) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("certificate mismatch: " + "(extended) key usage extension")); + continue; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, + ("ssl_tls13_pick_key_cert:" + "check signature algorithm %s [%04x]", + mbedtls_ssl_sig_alg_to_str(*sig_alg), + *sig_alg)); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + psa_alg = ssl_tls13_iana_sig_alg_to_psa_alg(*sig_alg); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + + if (mbedtls_ssl_tls13_check_sig_alg_cert_key_match( + *sig_alg, &key_cert->cert->pk) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + && psa_alg != PSA_ALG_NONE && + mbedtls_pk_can_do_ext(&key_cert->cert->pk, psa_alg, + PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH) == 1 +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + ) { + ssl->handshake->key_cert = key_cert; + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, + ("ssl_tls13_pick_key_cert:" + "selected signature algorithm" + " %s [%04x]", + mbedtls_ssl_sig_alg_to_str(*sig_alg), + *sig_alg)); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_CRT( + 3, "selected certificate (chain)", + ssl->handshake->key_cert->cert); + return 0; + } + } + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("ssl_tls13_pick_key_cert:" + "no suitable certificate found")); + return -1; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C && + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED */ + +/* + * + * STATE HANDLING: ClientHello + * + * There are three possible classes of outcomes when parsing the ClientHello: + * + * 1) The ClientHello was well-formed and matched the server's configuration. + * + * In this case, the server progresses to sending its ServerHello. + * + * 2) The ClientHello was well-formed but didn't match the server's + * configuration. + * + * For example, the client might not have offered a key share which + * the server supports, or the server might require a cookie. + * + * In this case, the server sends a HelloRetryRequest. + * + * 3) The ClientHello was ill-formed + * + * In this case, we abort the handshake. + * + */ + +/* + * Structure of this message: + * + * uint16 ProtocolVersion; + * opaque Random[32]; + * uint8 CipherSuite[2]; // Cryptographic suite selector + * + * struct { + * ProtocolVersion legacy_version = 0x0303; // TLS v1.2 + * Random random; + * opaque legacy_session_id<0..32>; + * CipherSuite cipher_suites<2..2^16-2>; + * opaque legacy_compression_methods<1..2^8-1>; + * Extension extensions<8..2^16-1>; + * } ClientHello; + */ + +#define SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_OK 0 +#define SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_HRR_REQUIRED 1 +#define SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_TLS1_2 2 + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_parse_client_hello(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *buf, + const unsigned char *end) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + const unsigned char *p = buf; + const unsigned char *random; + size_t legacy_session_id_len; + const unsigned char *legacy_session_id; + size_t cipher_suites_len; + const unsigned char *cipher_suites; + const unsigned char *cipher_suites_end; + size_t extensions_len; + const unsigned char *extensions_end; + const unsigned char *supported_versions_data; + const unsigned char *supported_versions_data_end; + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *handshake = ssl->handshake; + int hrr_required = 0; + int no_usable_share_for_key_agreement = 0; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED) + int got_psk = 0; + struct psk_attributes psk = PSK_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + const unsigned char *pre_shared_key_ext = NULL; + const unsigned char *pre_shared_key_ext_end = NULL; +#endif + + /* + * ClientHello layout: + * 0 . 1 protocol version + * 2 . 33 random bytes + * 34 . 34 session id length ( 1 byte ) + * 35 . 34+x session id + * .. . .. ciphersuite list length ( 2 bytes ) + * .. . .. ciphersuite list + * .. . .. compression alg. list length ( 1 byte ) + * .. . .. compression alg. list + * .. . .. extensions length ( 2 bytes, optional ) + * .. . .. extensions ( optional ) + */ + + /* + * Minimal length ( with everything empty and extensions omitted ) is + * 2 + 32 + 1 + 2 + 1 = 38 bytes. Check that first, so that we can + * read at least up to session id length without worrying. + */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, end, 38); + + /* ... + * ProtocolVersion legacy_version = 0x0303; // TLS 1.2 + * ... + * with ProtocolVersion defined as: + * uint16 ProtocolVersion; + */ + if (mbedtls_ssl_read_version(p, ssl->conf->transport) != + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("Unsupported version of TLS.")); + MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_PROTOCOL_VERSION, + MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION; + } + p += 2; + + /* ... + * Random random; + * ... + * with Random defined as: + * opaque Random[32]; + */ + random = p; + p += MBEDTLS_CLIENT_HELLO_RANDOM_LEN; + + /* ... + * opaque legacy_session_id<0..32>; + * ... + */ + legacy_session_id_len = *(p++); + legacy_session_id = p; + + /* + * Check we have enough data for the legacy session identifier + * and the ciphersuite list length. + */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, end, legacy_session_id_len + 2); + p += legacy_session_id_len; + + /* ... + * CipherSuite cipher_suites<2..2^16-2>; + * ... + * with CipherSuite defined as: + * uint8 CipherSuite[2]; + */ + cipher_suites_len = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(p, 0); + p += 2; + cipher_suites = p; + + /* + * The length of the ciphersuite list has to be even. + */ + if (cipher_suites_len & 1) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR, + MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; + } + + /* Check we have enough data for the ciphersuite list, the legacy + * compression methods and the length of the extensions. + * + * cipher_suites cipher_suites_len bytes + * legacy_compression_methods 2 bytes + * extensions_len 2 bytes + */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, end, cipher_suites_len + 2 + 2); + p += cipher_suites_len; + cipher_suites_end = p; + + /* + * Search for the supported versions extension and parse it to determine + * if the client supports TLS 1.3. + */ + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_is_supported_versions_ext_present_in_exts( + ssl, p + 2, end, + &supported_versions_data, &supported_versions_data_end); + if (ret < 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, + ("mbedtls_ssl_tls13_is_supported_versions_ext_present_in_exts"), ret); + return ret; + } + + if (ret == 0) { + return SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_TLS1_2; + } + + if (ret == 1) { + ret = ssl_tls13_parse_supported_versions_ext(ssl, + supported_versions_data, + supported_versions_data_end); + if (ret < 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, + ("ssl_tls13_parse_supported_versions_ext"), ret); + return ret; + } + + /* + * The supported versions extension was parsed successfully as the + * value returned by ssl_tls13_parse_supported_versions_ext() is + * positive. The return value is then equal to + * MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 or MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_3, defining + * the TLS version to negotiate. + */ + if (MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 == ret) { + return SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_TLS1_2; + } + } + + /* + * We negotiate TLS 1.3. + */ + ssl->tls_version = MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_3; + ssl->session_negotiate->tls_version = MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_3; + ssl->session_negotiate->endpoint = ssl->conf->endpoint; + + /* + * We are negotiating the version 1.3 of the protocol. Do what we have + * postponed: copy of the client random bytes, copy of the legacy session + * identifier and selection of the TLS 1.3 cipher suite. + */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "client hello, random bytes", + random, MBEDTLS_CLIENT_HELLO_RANDOM_LEN); + memcpy(&handshake->randbytes[0], random, MBEDTLS_CLIENT_HELLO_RANDOM_LEN); + + if (legacy_session_id_len > sizeof(ssl->session_negotiate->id)) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; + } + ssl->session_negotiate->id_len = legacy_session_id_len; + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "client hello, session id", + legacy_session_id, legacy_session_id_len); + memcpy(&ssl->session_negotiate->id[0], + legacy_session_id, legacy_session_id_len); + + /* + * Search for a matching ciphersuite + */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "client hello, list of cipher suites", + cipher_suites, cipher_suites_len); + + ssl_tls13_select_ciphersuite(ssl, cipher_suites, cipher_suites_end, + 0, PSA_ALG_NONE, &handshake->ciphersuite_info); + + if (handshake->ciphersuite_info == NULL) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, + MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; + } + ssl->session_negotiate->ciphersuite = handshake->ciphersuite_info->id; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("selected ciphersuite: %04x - %s", + ((unsigned) handshake->ciphersuite_info->id), + handshake->ciphersuite_info->name)); + + /* ... + * opaque legacy_compression_methods<1..2^8-1>; + * ... + */ + if (p[0] != 1 || p[1] != MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_NULL) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad legacy compression method")); + MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, + MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; + } + p += 2; + + /* ... + * Extension extensions<8..2^16-1>; + * ... + * with Extension defined as: + * struct { + * ExtensionType extension_type; + * opaque extension_data<0..2^16-1>; + * } Extension; + */ + extensions_len = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(p, 0); + p += 2; + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, end, extensions_len); + extensions_end = p + extensions_len; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "client hello extensions", p, extensions_len); + handshake->received_extensions = MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK_NONE; + + while (p < extensions_end) { + unsigned int extension_type; + size_t extension_data_len; + const unsigned char *extension_data_end; + uint32_t allowed_exts = MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_ALLOWED_EXTS_OF_CH; + + if (ssl->handshake->hello_retry_request_flag) { + /* Do not accept early data extension in 2nd ClientHello */ + allowed_exts &= ~MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(EARLY_DATA); + } + + /* RFC 8446, section 4.2.11 + * + * The "pre_shared_key" extension MUST be the last extension in the + * ClientHello (this facilitates implementation as described below). + * Servers MUST check that it is the last extension and otherwise fail + * the handshake with an "illegal_parameter" alert. + */ + if (handshake->received_extensions & MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(PRE_SHARED_KEY)) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( + 3, ("pre_shared_key is not last extension.")); + MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT( + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, + MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, extensions_end, 4); + extension_type = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(p, 0); + extension_data_len = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(p, 2); + p += 4; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, extensions_end, extension_data_len); + extension_data_end = p + extension_data_len; + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_check_received_extension( + ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CLIENT_HELLO, extension_type, + allowed_exts); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + + switch (extension_type) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) + case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SERVERNAME: + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("found ServerName extension")); + ret = mbedtls_ssl_parse_server_name_ext(ssl, p, + extension_data_end); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( + 1, "mbedtls_ssl_parse_servername_ext", ret); + return ret; + } + break; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH) || defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH) + case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_GROUPS: + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("found supported group extension")); + + /* Supported Groups Extension + * + * When sent by the client, the "supported_groups" extension + * indicates the named groups which the client supports, + * ordered from most preferred to least preferred. + */ + ret = ssl_tls13_parse_supported_groups_ext( + ssl, p, extension_data_end); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( + 1, "ssl_tls13_parse_supported_groups_ext", ret); + return ret; + } + + break; +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH || PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH*/ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED) + case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_KEY_SHARE: + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("found key share extension")); + + /* + * Key Share Extension + * + * When sent by the client, the "key_share" extension + * contains the endpoint's cryptographic parameters for + * ECDHE/DHE key establishment methods. + */ + ret = ssl_tls13_parse_key_shares_ext( + ssl, p, extension_data_end); + if (ret == SSL_TLS1_3_PARSE_KEY_SHARES_EXT_NO_MATCH) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("No usable share for key agreement.")); + no_usable_share_for_key_agreement = 1; + } + + if (ret < 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( + 1, "ssl_tls13_parse_key_shares_ext", ret); + return ret; + } + + break; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED */ + + case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS: + /* Already parsed */ + break; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED) + case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_PSK_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODES: + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( + 3, ("found psk key exchange modes extension")); + + ret = ssl_tls13_parse_key_exchange_modes_ext( + ssl, p, extension_data_end); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( + 1, "ssl_tls13_parse_key_exchange_modes_ext", ret); + return ret; + } + + break; +#endif + + case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_PRE_SHARED_KEY: + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("found pre_shared_key extension")); + if ((handshake->received_extensions & + MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(PSK_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODES)) == 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT( + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, + MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; + } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED) + /* Delay processing of the PSK identity once we have + * found out which algorithms to use. We keep a pointer + * to the buffer and the size for later processing. + */ + pre_shared_key_ext = p; + pre_shared_key_ext_end = extension_data_end; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED */ + break; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN) + case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ALPN: + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("found alpn extension")); + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_parse_alpn_ext(ssl, p, extension_data_end); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( + 1, ("mbedtls_ssl_parse_alpn_ext"), ret); + return ret; + } + break; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED) + case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SIG_ALG: + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("found signature_algorithms extension")); + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_parse_sig_alg_ext( + ssl, p, extension_data_end); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( + 1, "mbedtls_ssl_parse_sig_alg_ext", ret); + return ret; + } + break; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT) + case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT: + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("found record_size_limit extension")); + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_parse_record_size_limit_ext( + ssl, p, extension_data_end); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( + 1, ("mbedtls_ssl_tls13_parse_record_size_limit_ext"), ret); + return ret; + } + break; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT */ + + default: + MBEDTLS_SSL_PRINT_EXT( + 3, MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CLIENT_HELLO, + extension_type, "( ignored )"); + break; + } + + p += extension_data_len; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PRINT_EXTS(3, MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CLIENT_HELLO, + handshake->received_extensions); + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_add_hs_hdr_to_checksum(ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CLIENT_HELLO, + p - buf); + if (0 != ret) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, ("mbedtls_ssl_add_hs_hdr_to_checksum"), ret); + return ret; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED) + /* Update checksum with either + * - The entire content of the CH message, if no PSK extension is present + * - The content up to but excluding the PSK extension, if present. + * Always parse the pre-shared-key extension when present in the + * ClientHello even if some pre-requisites for PSK key exchange modes are + * not met. That way we always validate the syntax of the extension. + */ + if (handshake->received_extensions & MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(PRE_SHARED_KEY)) { + ret = handshake->update_checksum(ssl, buf, + pre_shared_key_ext - buf); + if (0 != ret) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, ("update_checksum"), ret); + return ret; + } + ret = ssl_tls13_parse_pre_shared_key_ext(ssl, + pre_shared_key_ext, + pre_shared_key_ext_end, + cipher_suites, + cipher_suites_end, + &psk); + if (ret == 0) { + got_psk = 1; + } else if (ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNKNOWN_IDENTITY) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( + 1, "ssl_tls13_parse_pre_shared_key_ext", ret); + return ret; + } + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED */ + { + ret = handshake->update_checksum(ssl, buf, p - buf); + if (0 != ret) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, ("update_checksum"), ret); + return ret; + } + } + + /* + * Determine the key exchange algorithm to use. + * There are three types of key exchanges supported in TLS 1.3: + * - (EC)DH with ECDSA, + * - (EC)DH with PSK, + * - plain PSK. + * + * The PSK-based key exchanges may additionally be used with 0-RTT. + * + * Our built-in order of preference is + * 1 ) (EC)DHE-PSK Mode ( psk_ephemeral ) + * 2 ) Certificate Mode ( ephemeral ) + * 3 ) Plain PSK Mode ( psk ) + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED) + if (got_psk && (psk.key_exchange_mode == + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_EPHEMERAL)) { + handshake->key_exchange_mode = + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_EPHEMERAL; + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("key exchange mode: psk_ephemeral")); + + } else +#endif + if (ssl_tls13_key_exchange_is_ephemeral_available(ssl)) { + handshake->key_exchange_mode = + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL; + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("key exchange mode: ephemeral")); + + } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED) + else if (got_psk && (psk.key_exchange_mode == + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK)) { + handshake->key_exchange_mode = MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK; + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("key exchange mode: psk")); + } +#endif + else { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( + 1, + ("ClientHello message misses mandatory extensions.")); + MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_MISSING_EXTENSION, + MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED) + if (handshake->key_exchange_mode & + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_ALL) { + handshake->ciphersuite_info = psk.ciphersuite_info; + ssl->session_negotiate->ciphersuite = psk.ciphersuite_info->id; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("Select PSK ciphersuite: %04x - %s", + ((unsigned) psk.ciphersuite_info->id), + psk.ciphersuite_info->name)); + + if (psk.type == MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_PSK_RESUMPTION) { + handshake->resume = 1; + } + } +#endif + + if (handshake->key_exchange_mode != + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK) { + hrr_required = (no_usable_share_for_key_agreement != 0); + } + + mbedtls_ssl_optimize_checksum(ssl, handshake->ciphersuite_info); + + return hrr_required ? SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_HRR_REQUIRED : SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_OK; +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) +static int ssl_tls13_check_early_data_requirements(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *handshake = ssl->handshake; + + if (ssl->conf->early_data_enabled == MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_DISABLED) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( + 1, + ("EarlyData: rejected, feature disabled in server configuration.")); + return -1; + } + + if (!handshake->resume) { + /* We currently support early data only in the case of PSKs established + via a NewSessionTicket message thus in the case of a session + resumption. */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( + 1, ("EarlyData: rejected, not a session resumption.")); + return -1; + } + + /* RFC 8446 4.2.10 + * + * In order to accept early data, the server MUST have accepted a PSK cipher + * suite and selected the first key offered in the client's "pre_shared_key" + * extension. In addition, it MUST verify that the following values are the + * same as those associated with the selected PSK: + * - The TLS version number + * - The selected cipher suite + * - The selected ALPN [RFC7301] protocol, if any + * + * NOTE: + * - The TLS version number is checked in + * ssl_tls13_offered_psks_check_identity_match_ticket(). + */ + + if (handshake->selected_identity != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( + 1, ("EarlyData: rejected, the selected key in " + "`pre_shared_key` is not the first one.")); + return -1; + } + + if (handshake->ciphersuite_info->id != + ssl->session_negotiate->ciphersuite) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( + 1, ("EarlyData: rejected, the selected ciphersuite is not the one " + "of the selected pre-shared key.")); + return -1; + + } + + if (!mbedtls_ssl_tls13_session_ticket_allow_early_data(ssl->session_negotiate)) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( + 1, + ("EarlyData: rejected, early_data not allowed in ticket " + "permission bits.")); + return -1; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN) + const char *alpn = mbedtls_ssl_get_alpn_protocol(ssl); + size_t alpn_len; + + if (alpn == NULL && ssl->session_negotiate->ticket_alpn == NULL) { + return 0; + } + + if (alpn != NULL) { + alpn_len = strlen(alpn); + } + + if (alpn == NULL || + ssl->session_negotiate->ticket_alpn == NULL || + alpn_len != strlen(ssl->session_negotiate->ticket_alpn) || + (memcmp(alpn, ssl->session_negotiate->ticket_alpn, alpn_len) != 0)) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("EarlyData: rejected, the selected ALPN is different " + "from the one associated with the pre-shared key.")); + return -1; + } +#endif + + return 0; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA */ + +/* Update the handshake state machine */ + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_postprocess_client_hello(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + int hrr_required) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + /* + * Server certificate selection + */ + if (ssl->conf->f_cert_cb && (ret = ssl->conf->f_cert_cb(ssl)) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "f_cert_cb", ret); + return ret; + } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) + ssl->handshake->sni_name = NULL; + ssl->handshake->sni_name_len = 0; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION */ + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_key_schedule_stage_early(ssl); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, + "mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_key_schedule_stage_early", ret); + return ret; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) + if (ssl->handshake->received_extensions & MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(EARLY_DATA)) { + ssl->handshake->early_data_accepted = + (!hrr_required) && (ssl_tls13_check_early_data_requirements(ssl) == 0); + + if (ssl->handshake->early_data_accepted) { + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_compute_early_transform(ssl); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( + 1, "mbedtls_ssl_tls13_compute_early_transform", ret); + return ret; + } + } else { + ssl->discard_early_data_record = + hrr_required ? + MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_DISCARD : + MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_TRY_TO_DEPROTECT_AND_DISCARD; + } + } +#else + ((void) hrr_required); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA */ + + return 0; +} + +/* + * Main entry point from the state machine; orchestrates the otherfunctions. + */ + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_process_client_hello(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char *buf = NULL; + size_t buflen = 0; + int parse_client_hello_ret; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> parse client hello")); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(mbedtls_ssl_tls13_fetch_handshake_msg( + ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CLIENT_HELLO, + &buf, &buflen)); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK_NEG(ssl_tls13_parse_client_hello(ssl, buf, + buf + buflen)); + parse_client_hello_ret = ret; /* Store positive return value of + * parse_client_hello, + * as negative error codes are handled + * by MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK_NEG. */ + + /* + * Version 1.2 of the protocol has to be used for the handshake. + * If TLS 1.2 is not supported, abort the handshake. Otherwise, set the + * ssl->keep_current_message flag for the ClientHello to be kept and parsed + * as a TLS 1.2 ClientHello. We also change ssl->tls_version to + * MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 thus from now on mbedtls_ssl_handshake_step() + * will dispatch to the TLS 1.2 state machine. + */ + if (SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_TLS1_2 == parse_client_hello_ret) { + /* Check if server supports TLS 1.2 */ + if (!mbedtls_ssl_conf_is_tls12_enabled(ssl->conf)) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( + 1, ("TLS 1.2 not supported.")); + MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT( + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_PROTOCOL_VERSION, + MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION; + } + ssl->keep_current_message = 1; + ssl->tls_version = MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2; + return 0; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK( + ssl_tls13_postprocess_client_hello(ssl, parse_client_hello_ret == + SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_HRR_REQUIRED)); + + if (SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_OK == parse_client_hello_ret) { + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_HELLO); + } else { + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST); + } + +cleanup: + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= parse client hello")); + return ret; +} + +/* + * Handler for MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_HELLO + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_prepare_server_hello(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char *server_randbytes = + ssl->handshake->randbytes + MBEDTLS_CLIENT_HELLO_RANDOM_LEN; + + if ((ret = ssl->conf->f_rng(ssl->conf->p_rng, server_randbytes, + MBEDTLS_SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_LEN)) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "f_rng", ret); + return ret; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "server hello, random bytes", server_randbytes, + MBEDTLS_SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_LEN); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) + ssl->session_negotiate->start = mbedtls_time(NULL); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME */ + + return ret; +} + +/* + * ssl_tls13_write_server_hello_supported_versions_ext (): + * + * struct { + * ProtocolVersion selected_version; + * } SupportedVersions; + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_write_server_hello_supported_versions_ext( + mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *buf, + unsigned char *end, + size_t *out_len) +{ + *out_len = 0; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("server hello, write selected version")); + + /* Check if we have space to write the extension: + * - extension_type (2 bytes) + * - extension_data_length (2 bytes) + * - selected_version (2 bytes) + */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR(buf, end, 6); + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS, buf, 0); + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(2, buf, 2); + + mbedtls_ssl_write_version(buf + 4, + ssl->conf->transport, + ssl->tls_version); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("supported version: [%04x]", + ssl->tls_version)); + + *out_len = 6; + + mbedtls_ssl_tls13_set_hs_sent_ext_mask( + ssl, MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS); + + return 0; +} + + + +/* Generate and export a single key share. For hybrid KEMs, this can + * be called multiple times with the different components of the hybrid. */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_generate_and_write_key_share(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + uint16_t named_group, + unsigned char *buf, + unsigned char *end, + size_t *out_len) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + *out_len = 0; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED) + if (mbedtls_ssl_tls13_named_group_is_ecdhe(named_group) || + mbedtls_ssl_tls13_named_group_is_ffdh(named_group)) { + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_generate_and_write_xxdh_key_exchange( + ssl, named_group, buf, end, out_len); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( + 1, "mbedtls_ssl_tls13_generate_and_write_xxdh_key_exchange", + ret); + return ret; + } + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED */ + if (0 /* Other kinds of KEMs */) { + } else { + ((void) ssl); + ((void) named_group); + ((void) buf); + ((void) end); + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } + + return ret; +} + +/* + * ssl_tls13_write_key_share_ext + * + * Structure of key_share extension in ServerHello: + * + * struct { + * NamedGroup group; + * opaque key_exchange<1..2^16-1>; + * } KeyShareEntry; + * struct { + * KeyShareEntry server_share; + * } KeyShareServerHello; + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_write_key_share_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *buf, + unsigned char *end, + size_t *out_len) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char *p = buf; + uint16_t group = ssl->handshake->offered_group_id; + unsigned char *server_share = buf + 4; + size_t key_exchange_length; + + *out_len = 0; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("server hello, adding key share extension")); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("server hello, write selected_group: %s (%04x)", + mbedtls_ssl_named_group_to_str(group), + group)); + + /* Check if we have space for header and length fields: + * - extension_type (2 bytes) + * - extension_data_length (2 bytes) + * - group (2 bytes) + * - key_exchange_length (2 bytes) + */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR(p, end, 8); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_KEY_SHARE, p, 0); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(group, server_share, 0); + p += 8; + + /* When we introduce PQC-ECDHE hybrids, we'll want to call this + * function multiple times. */ + ret = ssl_tls13_generate_and_write_key_share( + ssl, group, server_share + 4, end, &key_exchange_length); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + p += key_exchange_length; + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(key_exchange_length, server_share + 2, 0); + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(p - server_share, buf, 2); + + *out_len = p - buf; + + mbedtls_ssl_tls13_set_hs_sent_ext_mask(ssl, MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_KEY_SHARE); + + return 0; +} + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_write_hrr_key_share_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *buf, + unsigned char *end, + size_t *out_len) +{ + uint16_t selected_group = ssl->handshake->hrr_selected_group; + /* key_share Extension + * + * struct { + * select (Handshake.msg_type) { + * ... + * case hello_retry_request: + * NamedGroup selected_group; + * ... + * }; + * } KeyShare; + */ + + *out_len = 0; + + /* + * For a pure PSK key exchange, there is no group to agree upon. The purpose + * of the HRR is then to transmit a cookie to force the client to demonstrate + * reachability at their apparent network address (primarily useful for DTLS). + */ + if (!mbedtls_ssl_tls13_key_exchange_mode_with_ephemeral(ssl)) { + return 0; + } + + /* We should only send the key_share extension if the client's initial + * key share was not acceptable. */ + if (ssl->handshake->offered_group_id != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(4, ("Skip key_share extension in HRR")); + return 0; + } + + if (selected_group == 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("no matching named group found")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; + } + + /* Check if we have enough space: + * - extension_type (2 bytes) + * - extension_data_length (2 bytes) + * - selected_group (2 bytes) + */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR(buf, end, 6); + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_KEY_SHARE, buf, 0); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(2, buf, 2); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(selected_group, buf, 4); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, + ("HRR selected_group: %s (%x)", + mbedtls_ssl_named_group_to_str(selected_group), + selected_group)); + + *out_len = 6; + + mbedtls_ssl_tls13_set_hs_sent_ext_mask(ssl, MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_KEY_SHARE); + + return 0; +} + +/* + * Structure of ServerHello message: + * + * struct { + * ProtocolVersion legacy_version = 0x0303; // TLS v1.2 + * Random random; + * opaque legacy_session_id_echo<0..32>; + * CipherSuite cipher_suite; + * uint8 legacy_compression_method = 0; + * Extension extensions<6..2^16-1>; + * } ServerHello; + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_write_server_hello_body(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *buf, + unsigned char *end, + size_t *out_len, + int is_hrr) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char *p = buf; + unsigned char *p_extensions_len; + size_t output_len; + + *out_len = 0; + ssl->handshake->sent_extensions = MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK_NONE; + + /* ... + * ProtocolVersion legacy_version = 0x0303; // TLS 1.2 + * ... + * with ProtocolVersion defined as: + * uint16 ProtocolVersion; + */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR(p, end, 2); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(0x0303, p, 0); + p += 2; + + /* ... + * Random random; + * ... + * with Random defined as: + * opaque Random[MBEDTLS_SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_LEN]; + */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR(p, end, MBEDTLS_SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_LEN); + if (is_hrr) { + memcpy(p, mbedtls_ssl_tls13_hello_retry_request_magic, + MBEDTLS_SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_LEN); + } else { + memcpy(p, &ssl->handshake->randbytes[MBEDTLS_CLIENT_HELLO_RANDOM_LEN], + MBEDTLS_SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_LEN); + } + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "server hello, random bytes", + p, MBEDTLS_SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_LEN); + p += MBEDTLS_SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_LEN; + + /* ... + * opaque legacy_session_id_echo<0..32>; + * ... + */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR(p, end, 1 + ssl->session_negotiate->id_len); + *p++ = (unsigned char) ssl->session_negotiate->id_len; + if (ssl->session_negotiate->id_len > 0) { + memcpy(p, &ssl->session_negotiate->id[0], + ssl->session_negotiate->id_len); + p += ssl->session_negotiate->id_len; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "session id", ssl->session_negotiate->id, + ssl->session_negotiate->id_len); + } + + /* ... + * CipherSuite cipher_suite; + * ... + * with CipherSuite defined as: + * uint8 CipherSuite[2]; + */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR(p, end, 2); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(ssl->session_negotiate->ciphersuite, p, 0); + p += 2; + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, + ("server hello, chosen ciphersuite: %s ( id=%d )", + mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_name( + ssl->session_negotiate->ciphersuite), + ssl->session_negotiate->ciphersuite)); + + /* ... + * uint8 legacy_compression_method = 0; + * ... + */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR(p, end, 1); + *p++ = MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_NULL; + + /* ... + * Extension extensions<6..2^16-1>; + * ... + * struct { + * ExtensionType extension_type; (2 bytes) + * opaque extension_data<0..2^16-1>; + * } Extension; + */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR(p, end, 2); + p_extensions_len = p; + p += 2; + + if ((ret = ssl_tls13_write_server_hello_supported_versions_ext( + ssl, p, end, &output_len)) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( + 1, "ssl_tls13_write_server_hello_supported_versions_ext", ret); + return ret; + } + p += output_len; + + if (mbedtls_ssl_tls13_key_exchange_mode_with_ephemeral(ssl)) { + if (is_hrr) { + ret = ssl_tls13_write_hrr_key_share_ext(ssl, p, end, &output_len); + } else { + ret = ssl_tls13_write_key_share_ext(ssl, p, end, &output_len); + } + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + p += output_len; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED) + if (!is_hrr && mbedtls_ssl_tls13_key_exchange_mode_with_psk(ssl)) { + ret = ssl_tls13_write_server_pre_shared_key_ext(ssl, p, end, &output_len); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "ssl_tls13_write_server_pre_shared_key_ext", + ret); + return ret; + } + p += output_len; + } +#endif + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(p - p_extensions_len - 2, p_extensions_len, 0); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "server hello extensions", + p_extensions_len, p - p_extensions_len); + + *out_len = p - buf; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "server hello", buf, *out_len); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PRINT_EXTS( + 3, is_hrr ? MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_HS_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST : + MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_SERVER_HELLO, + ssl->handshake->sent_extensions); + + return ret; +} + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_finalize_server_hello(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_compute_handshake_transform(ssl); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, + "mbedtls_ssl_tls13_compute_handshake_transform", + ret); + return ret; + } + + return ret; +} + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_write_server_hello(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char *buf; + size_t buf_len, msg_len; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> write server hello")); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(ssl_tls13_prepare_server_hello(ssl)); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(mbedtls_ssl_start_handshake_msg( + ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_SERVER_HELLO, &buf, &buf_len)); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(ssl_tls13_write_server_hello_body(ssl, buf, + buf + buf_len, + &msg_len, + 0)); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(mbedtls_ssl_add_hs_msg_to_checksum( + ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_SERVER_HELLO, buf, msg_len)); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(mbedtls_ssl_finish_handshake_msg( + ssl, buf_len, msg_len)); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(ssl_tls13_finalize_server_hello(ssl)); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE) + /* The server sends a dummy change_cipher_spec record immediately + * after its first handshake message. This may either be after + * a ServerHello or a HelloRetryRequest. + */ + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state( + ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_CCS_AFTER_SERVER_HELLO); +#else + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE */ + +cleanup: + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= write server hello")); + return ret; +} + + +/* + * Handler for MBEDTLS_SSL_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_prepare_hello_retry_request(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + if (ssl->handshake->hello_retry_request_flag) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("Too many HRRs")); + MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, + MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; + } + + /* + * Create stateless transcript hash for HRR + */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(4, ("Reset transcript for HRR")); + ret = mbedtls_ssl_reset_transcript_for_hrr(ssl); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_reset_transcript_for_hrr", ret); + return ret; + } + mbedtls_ssl_session_reset_msg_layer(ssl, 0); + + return 0; +} + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_write_hello_retry_request(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char *buf; + size_t buf_len, msg_len; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> write hello retry request")); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(ssl_tls13_prepare_hello_retry_request(ssl)); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(mbedtls_ssl_start_handshake_msg( + ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_SERVER_HELLO, + &buf, &buf_len)); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(ssl_tls13_write_server_hello_body(ssl, buf, + buf + buf_len, + &msg_len, + 1)); + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(mbedtls_ssl_add_hs_msg_to_checksum( + ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_SERVER_HELLO, buf, msg_len)); + + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(mbedtls_ssl_finish_handshake_msg(ssl, buf_len, + msg_len)); + + ssl->handshake->hello_retry_request_flag = 1; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE) + /* The server sends a dummy change_cipher_spec record immediately + * after its first handshake message. This may either be after + * a ServerHello or a HelloRetryRequest. + */ + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state( + ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_CCS_AFTER_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST); +#else + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_HELLO); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE */ + +cleanup: + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= write hello retry request")); + return ret; +} + +/* + * Handler for MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS + */ + +/* + * struct { + * Extension extensions<0..2 ^ 16 - 1>; + * } EncryptedExtensions; + * + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_write_encrypted_extensions_body(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *buf, + unsigned char *end, + size_t *out_len) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char *p = buf; + size_t extensions_len = 0; + unsigned char *p_extensions_len; + size_t output_len; + + *out_len = 0; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR(p, end, 2); + p_extensions_len = p; + p += 2; + + ((void) ssl); + ((void) ret); + ((void) output_len); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN) + ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_alpn_ext(ssl, p, end, &output_len); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + p += output_len; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) + if (ssl->handshake->early_data_accepted) { + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_write_early_data_ext( + ssl, 0, p, end, &output_len); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + p += output_len; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT) + if (ssl->handshake->received_extensions & MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT)) { + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_write_record_size_limit_ext( + ssl, p, end, &output_len); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + p += output_len; + } +#endif + + extensions_len = (p - p_extensions_len) - 2; + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(extensions_len, p_extensions_len, 0); + + *out_len = p - buf; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "encrypted extensions", buf, *out_len); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PRINT_EXTS( + 3, MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS, ssl->handshake->sent_extensions); + + return 0; +} + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_write_encrypted_extensions(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char *buf; + size_t buf_len, msg_len; + + mbedtls_ssl_set_outbound_transform(ssl, + ssl->handshake->transform_handshake); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( + 3, ("switching to handshake transform for outbound data")); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> write encrypted extensions")); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(mbedtls_ssl_start_handshake_msg( + ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS, + &buf, &buf_len)); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(ssl_tls13_write_encrypted_extensions_body( + ssl, buf, buf + buf_len, &msg_len)); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(mbedtls_ssl_add_hs_msg_to_checksum( + ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS, + buf, msg_len)); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(mbedtls_ssl_finish_handshake_msg( + ssl, buf_len, msg_len)); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED) + if (mbedtls_ssl_tls13_key_exchange_mode_with_psk(ssl)) { + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_FINISHED); + } else { + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST); + } +#else + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_FINISHED); +#endif + +cleanup: + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= write encrypted extensions")); + return ret; +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED) +#define SSL_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST_SEND_REQUEST 0 +#define SSL_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST_SKIP 1 +/* Coordination: + * Check whether a CertificateRequest message should be written. + * Returns a negative code on failure, or + * - SSL_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST_SEND_REQUEST + * - SSL_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST_SKIP + * indicating if the writing of the CertificateRequest + * should be skipped or not. + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_certificate_request_coordinate(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + int authmode; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) + if (ssl->handshake->sni_authmode != MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_UNSET) { + authmode = ssl->handshake->sni_authmode; + } else +#endif + authmode = ssl->conf->authmode; + + if (authmode == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_NONE) { + ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result = MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_SKIP_VERIFY; + return SSL_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST_SKIP; + } + + ssl->handshake->certificate_request_sent = 1; + + return SSL_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST_SEND_REQUEST; +} + +/* + * struct { + * opaque certificate_request_context<0..2^8-1>; + * Extension extensions<2..2^16-1>; + * } CertificateRequest; + * + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_write_certificate_request_body(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *buf, + const unsigned char *end, + size_t *out_len) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char *p = buf; + size_t output_len = 0; + unsigned char *p_extensions_len; + + *out_len = 0; + + /* Check if we have enough space: + * - certificate_request_context (1 byte) + * - extensions length (2 bytes) + */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR(p, end, 3); + + /* + * Write certificate_request_context + */ + /* + * We use a zero length context for the normal handshake + * messages. For post-authentication handshake messages + * this request context would be set to a non-zero value. + */ + *p++ = 0x0; + + /* + * Write extensions + */ + /* The extensions must contain the signature_algorithms. */ + p_extensions_len = p; + p += 2; + ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_sig_alg_ext(ssl, p, end, &output_len); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + + p += output_len; + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(p - p_extensions_len - 2, p_extensions_len, 0); + + *out_len = p - buf; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PRINT_EXTS( + 3, MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ssl->handshake->sent_extensions); + + return 0; +} + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_write_certificate_request(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> write certificate request")); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK_NEG(ssl_tls13_certificate_request_coordinate(ssl)); + + if (ret == SSL_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST_SEND_REQUEST) { + unsigned char *buf; + size_t buf_len, msg_len; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(mbedtls_ssl_start_handshake_msg( + ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, + &buf, &buf_len)); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(ssl_tls13_write_certificate_request_body( + ssl, buf, buf + buf_len, &msg_len)); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(mbedtls_ssl_add_hs_msg_to_checksum( + ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, + buf, msg_len)); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(mbedtls_ssl_finish_handshake_msg( + ssl, buf_len, msg_len)); + } else if (ret == SSL_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST_SKIP) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= skip write certificate request")); + ret = 0; + } else { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("should never happen")); + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + goto cleanup; + } + + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_CERTIFICATE); +cleanup: + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= write certificate request")); + return ret; +} + +/* + * Handler for MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_CERTIFICATE + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_write_server_certificate(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) + if ((ssl_tls13_pick_key_cert(ssl) != 0) || + mbedtls_ssl_own_cert(ssl) == NULL) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("No certificate available.")); + MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, + MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_write_certificate(ssl); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY); + return 0; +} + +/* + * Handler for MBEDTLS_SSL_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_write_certificate_verify(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + int ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_write_certificate_verify(ssl); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_FINISHED); + return 0; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED */ + +/* + * RFC 8446 section A.2 + * + * | Send ServerHello + * | K_send = handshake + * | Send EncryptedExtensions + * | [Send CertificateRequest] + * Can send | [Send Certificate + CertificateVerify] + * app data | Send Finished + * after --> | K_send = application + * here +--------+--------+ + * No 0-RTT | | 0-RTT + * | | + * K_recv = handshake | | K_recv = early data + * [Skip decrypt errors] | +------> WAIT_EOED -+ + * | | Recv | | Recv EndOfEarlyData + * | | early data | | K_recv = handshake + * | +------------+ | + * | | + * +> WAIT_FLIGHT2 <--------+ + * | + * +--------+--------+ + * No auth | | Client auth + * | | + * | v + * | WAIT_CERT + * | Recv | | Recv Certificate + * | empty | v + * | Certificate | WAIT_CV + * | | | Recv + * | v | CertificateVerify + * +-> WAIT_FINISHED <---+ + * | Recv Finished + * + * + * The following function handles the state changes after WAIT_FLIGHT2 in the + * above diagram. We are not going to receive early data related messages + * anymore, prepare to receive the first handshake message of the client + * second flight. + */ +static void ssl_tls13_prepare_for_handshake_second_flight( + mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + if (ssl->handshake->certificate_request_sent) { + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE); + } else { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("skip parse certificate")); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("skip parse certificate verify")); + + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_FINISHED); + } +} + +/* + * Handler for MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_FINISHED + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_write_server_finished(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_write_finished_message(ssl); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_compute_application_transform(ssl); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT( + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, + MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); + return ret; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) + if (ssl->handshake->early_data_accepted) { + /* See RFC 8446 section A.2 for more information */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( + 1, ("Switch to early keys for inbound traffic. " + "( K_recv = early data )")); + mbedtls_ssl_set_inbound_transform( + ssl, ssl->handshake->transform_earlydata); + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_END_OF_EARLY_DATA); + return 0; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( + 1, ("Switch to handshake keys for inbound traffic " + "( K_recv = handshake )")); + mbedtls_ssl_set_inbound_transform(ssl, ssl->handshake->transform_handshake); + + ssl_tls13_prepare_for_handshake_second_flight(ssl); + + return 0; +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) +/* + * Handler for MBEDTLS_SSL_END_OF_EARLY_DATA + */ +#define SSL_GOT_END_OF_EARLY_DATA 0 +#define SSL_GOT_EARLY_DATA 1 +/* Coordination: + * Deals with the ambiguity of not knowing if the next message is an + * EndOfEarlyData message or an application message containing early data. + * Returns a negative code on failure, or + * - SSL_GOT_END_OF_EARLY_DATA + * - SSL_GOT_EARLY_DATA + * indicating which message is received. + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_end_of_early_data_coordinate(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_read_record(ssl, 0)) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_read_record", ret); + return ret; + } + ssl->keep_current_message = 1; + + if (ssl->in_msgtype == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE && + ssl->in_msg[0] == MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_END_OF_EARLY_DATA) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("Received an end_of_early_data message.")); + return SSL_GOT_END_OF_EARLY_DATA; + } + + if (ssl->in_msgtype == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_APPLICATION_DATA) { + if (ssl->in_offt == NULL) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("Received early data")); + /* Set the reading pointer */ + ssl->in_offt = ssl->in_msg; + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_check_early_data_len(ssl, ssl->in_msglen); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + } + return SSL_GOT_EARLY_DATA; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, + MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; +} + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_parse_end_of_early_data(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *buf, + const unsigned char *end) +{ + /* RFC 8446 section 4.5 + * + * struct {} EndOfEarlyData; + */ + if (buf != end) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR, + MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; + } + return 0; +} + +/* + * RFC 8446 section A.2 + * + * | Send ServerHello + * | K_send = handshake + * | Send EncryptedExtensions + * | [Send CertificateRequest] + * Can send | [Send Certificate + CertificateVerify] + * app data | Send Finished + * after --> | K_send = application + * here +--------+--------+ + * No 0-RTT | | 0-RTT + * | | + * K_recv = handshake | | K_recv = early data + * [Skip decrypt errors] | +------> WAIT_EOED -+ + * | | Recv | | Recv EndOfEarlyData + * | | early data | | K_recv = handshake + * | +------------+ | + * | | + * +> WAIT_FLIGHT2 <--------+ + * | + * +--------+--------+ + * No auth | | Client auth + * | | + * | v + * | WAIT_CERT + * | Recv | | Recv Certificate + * | empty | v + * | Certificate | WAIT_CV + * | | | Recv + * | v | CertificateVerify + * +-> WAIT_FINISHED <---+ + * | Recv Finished + * + * The function handles actions and state changes from 0-RTT to WAIT_FLIGHT2 in + * the above diagram. + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_process_end_of_early_data(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> ssl_tls13_process_end_of_early_data")); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK_NEG(ssl_tls13_end_of_early_data_coordinate(ssl)); + + if (ret == SSL_GOT_END_OF_EARLY_DATA) { + unsigned char *buf; + size_t buf_len; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(mbedtls_ssl_tls13_fetch_handshake_msg( + ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_END_OF_EARLY_DATA, + &buf, &buf_len)); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(ssl_tls13_parse_end_of_early_data( + ssl, buf, buf + buf_len)); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( + 1, ("Switch to handshake keys for inbound traffic" + "( K_recv = handshake )")); + mbedtls_ssl_set_inbound_transform( + ssl, ssl->handshake->transform_handshake); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(mbedtls_ssl_add_hs_msg_to_checksum( + ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_END_OF_EARLY_DATA, + buf, buf_len)); + + ssl_tls13_prepare_for_handshake_second_flight(ssl); + + } else if (ret == SSL_GOT_EARLY_DATA) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_RECEIVED_EARLY_DATA; + goto cleanup; + } else { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("should never happen")); + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + goto cleanup; + } + +cleanup: + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= ssl_tls13_process_end_of_early_data")); + return ret; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA */ + +/* + * Handler for MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_FINISHED + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_process_client_finished(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_process_finished_message(ssl); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_compute_resumption_master_secret(ssl); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( + 1, "mbedtls_ssl_tls13_compute_resumption_master_secret", ret); + } + + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WRAPUP); + return 0; +} + +/* + * Handler for MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WRAPUP + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_handshake_wrapup(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("handshake: done")); + + mbedtls_ssl_tls13_handshake_wrapup(ssl); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED) +/* TODO: Remove the check of SOME_PSK_ENABLED since SESSION_TICKETS requires + * SOME_PSK_ENABLED to be enabled. Here is just to make CI happy. It is + * expected to be resolved with issue#6395. + */ + /* Sent NewSessionTicket message only when client supports PSK */ + if (mbedtls_ssl_tls13_is_some_psk_supported(ssl)) { + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state( + ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET); + } else +#endif + { + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER); + } + return 0; +} + +/* + * Handler for MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET + */ +#define SSL_NEW_SESSION_TICKET_SKIP 0 +#define SSL_NEW_SESSION_TICKET_WRITE 1 +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_write_new_session_ticket_coordinate(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + /* Check whether the use of session tickets is enabled */ + if (ssl->conf->f_ticket_write == NULL) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("NewSessionTicket: disabled," + " callback is not set")); + return SSL_NEW_SESSION_TICKET_SKIP; + } + if (ssl->conf->new_session_tickets_count == 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("NewSessionTicket: disabled," + " configured count is zero")); + return SSL_NEW_SESSION_TICKET_SKIP; + } + + if (ssl->handshake->new_session_tickets_count == 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("NewSessionTicket: all tickets have " + "been sent.")); + return SSL_NEW_SESSION_TICKET_SKIP; + } + + return SSL_NEW_SESSION_TICKET_WRITE; +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_prepare_new_session_ticket(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *ticket_nonce, + size_t ticket_nonce_size) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_ssl_session *session = ssl->session; + mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info; + psa_algorithm_t psa_hash_alg; + int hash_length; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> prepare NewSessionTicket msg")); + + /* Set ticket_flags depends on the advertised psk key exchange mode */ + mbedtls_ssl_tls13_session_clear_ticket_flags( + session, MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_TICKET_FLAGS_MASK); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED) + mbedtls_ssl_tls13_session_set_ticket_flags( + session, ssl->handshake->tls13_kex_modes); +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) + if (ssl->conf->early_data_enabled == MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_ENABLED && + ssl->conf->max_early_data_size > 0) { + mbedtls_ssl_tls13_session_set_ticket_flags( + session, MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_TICKET_ALLOW_EARLY_DATA); + session->max_early_data_size = ssl->conf->max_early_data_size; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA */ + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PRINT_TICKET_FLAGS(4, session->ticket_flags); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN) + if (session->ticket_alpn == NULL) { + ret = mbedtls_ssl_session_set_ticket_alpn(session, ssl->alpn_chosen); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + } +#endif + + /* Generate ticket_age_add */ + if ((ret = ssl->conf->f_rng(ssl->conf->p_rng, + (unsigned char *) &session->ticket_age_add, + sizeof(session->ticket_age_add)) != 0)) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "generate_ticket_age_add", ret); + return ret; + } + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("ticket_age_add: %u", + (unsigned int) session->ticket_age_add)); + + /* Generate ticket_nonce */ + ret = ssl->conf->f_rng(ssl->conf->p_rng, ticket_nonce, ticket_nonce_size); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "generate_ticket_nonce", ret); + return ret; + } + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "ticket_nonce:", + ticket_nonce, ticket_nonce_size); + + ciphersuite_info = + (mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *) ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info; + psa_hash_alg = mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type((mbedtls_md_type_t) ciphersuite_info->mac); + hash_length = PSA_HASH_LENGTH(psa_hash_alg); + if (hash_length == -1 || + (size_t) hash_length > sizeof(session->resumption_key)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } + + /* In this code the psk key length equals the length of the hash */ + session->resumption_key_len = hash_length; + session->ciphersuite = ciphersuite_info->id; + + /* Compute resumption key + * + * HKDF-Expand-Label( resumption_master_secret, + * "resumption", ticket_nonce, Hash.length ) + */ + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_hkdf_expand_label( + psa_hash_alg, + session->app_secrets.resumption_master_secret, + hash_length, + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LBL_WITH_LEN(resumption), + ticket_nonce, + ticket_nonce_size, + session->resumption_key, + hash_length); + + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(2, + "Creating the ticket-resumed PSK failed", + ret); + return ret; + } + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "Ticket-resumed PSK", + session->resumption_key, + session->resumption_key_len); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "resumption_master_secret", + session->app_secrets.resumption_master_secret, + hash_length); + + return 0; +} + +/* This function creates a NewSessionTicket message in the following format: + * + * struct { + * uint32 ticket_lifetime; + * uint32 ticket_age_add; + * opaque ticket_nonce<0..255>; + * opaque ticket<1..2^16-1>; + * Extension extensions<0..2^16-2>; + * } NewSessionTicket; + * + * The ticket inside the NewSessionTicket message is an encrypted container + * carrying the necessary information so that the server is later able to + * re-start the communication. + * + * The following fields are placed inside the ticket by the + * f_ticket_write() function: + * + * - creation time (ticket_creation_time) + * - flags (ticket_flags) + * - age add (ticket_age_add) + * - key (resumption_key) + * - key length (resumption_key_len) + * - ciphersuite (ciphersuite) + * - max_early_data_size (max_early_data_size) + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_write_new_session_ticket_body(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *buf, + unsigned char *end, + size_t *out_len, + unsigned char *ticket_nonce, + size_t ticket_nonce_size) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char *p = buf; + mbedtls_ssl_session *session = ssl->session; + size_t ticket_len; + uint32_t ticket_lifetime; + unsigned char *p_extensions_len; + + *out_len = 0; + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> write NewSessionTicket msg")); + + /* + * ticket_lifetime 4 bytes + * ticket_age_add 4 bytes + * ticket_nonce 1 + ticket_nonce_size bytes + * ticket >=2 bytes + */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR(p, end, 4 + 4 + 1 + ticket_nonce_size + 2); + + /* Generate ticket and ticket_lifetime */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) + session->ticket_creation_time = mbedtls_ms_time(); +#endif + ret = ssl->conf->f_ticket_write(ssl->conf->p_ticket, + session, + p + 9 + ticket_nonce_size + 2, + end, + &ticket_len, + &ticket_lifetime); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "write_ticket", ret); + return ret; + } + + /* RFC 8446 section 4.6.1 + * + * ticket_lifetime: Indicates the lifetime in seconds as a 32-bit + * unsigned integer in network byte order from the time of ticket + * issuance. Servers MUST NOT use any value greater than + * 604800 seconds (7 days) ... + */ + if (ticket_lifetime > MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_MAX_ALLOWED_TICKET_LIFETIME) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( + 1, ("Ticket lifetime (%u) is greater than 7 days.", + (unsigned int) ticket_lifetime)); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE(ticket_lifetime, p, 0); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("ticket_lifetime: %u", + (unsigned int) ticket_lifetime)); + + /* Write ticket_age_add */ + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE(session->ticket_age_add, p, 4); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("ticket_age_add: %u", + (unsigned int) session->ticket_age_add)); + + /* Write ticket_nonce */ + p[8] = (unsigned char) ticket_nonce_size; + if (ticket_nonce_size > 0) { + memcpy(p + 9, ticket_nonce, ticket_nonce_size); + } + p += 9 + ticket_nonce_size; + + /* Write ticket */ + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(ticket_len, p, 0); + p += 2; + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "ticket", p, ticket_len); + p += ticket_len; + + /* Ticket Extensions + * + * Extension extensions<0..2^16-2>; + */ + ssl->handshake->sent_extensions = MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK_NONE; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR(p, end, 2); + p_extensions_len = p; + p += 2; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) + if (mbedtls_ssl_tls13_session_ticket_allow_early_data(session)) { + size_t output_len; + + if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_write_early_data_ext( + ssl, 1, p, end, &output_len)) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( + 1, "mbedtls_ssl_tls13_write_early_data_ext", ret); + return ret; + } + p += output_len; + } else { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( + 4, ("early_data not allowed, " + "skip early_data extension in NewSessionTicket")); + } + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA */ + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(p - p_extensions_len - 2, p_extensions_len, 0); + + *out_len = p - buf; + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "ticket", buf, *out_len); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= write new session ticket")); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PRINT_EXTS( + 3, MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ssl->handshake->sent_extensions); + + return 0; +} + +/* + * Handler for MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET + */ +static int ssl_tls13_write_new_session_ticket(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK_NEG(ssl_tls13_write_new_session_ticket_coordinate(ssl)); + + if (ret == SSL_NEW_SESSION_TICKET_WRITE) { + unsigned char ticket_nonce[MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_TICKET_NONCE_LENGTH]; + unsigned char *buf; + size_t buf_len, msg_len; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(ssl_tls13_prepare_new_session_ticket( + ssl, ticket_nonce, sizeof(ticket_nonce))); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(mbedtls_ssl_start_handshake_msg( + ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, + &buf, &buf_len)); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(ssl_tls13_write_new_session_ticket_body( + ssl, buf, buf + buf_len, &msg_len, + ticket_nonce, sizeof(ticket_nonce))); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(mbedtls_ssl_finish_handshake_msg( + ssl, buf_len, msg_len)); + + /* Limit session tickets count to one when resumption connection. + * + * See document of mbedtls_ssl_conf_new_session_tickets. + */ + if (ssl->handshake->resume == 1) { + ssl->handshake->new_session_tickets_count = 0; + } else { + ssl->handshake->new_session_tickets_count--; + } + + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state( + ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET_FLUSH); + } else { + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER); + } + +cleanup: + + return ret; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */ + +/* + * TLS 1.3 State Machine -- server side + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_handshake_server_step(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + if (ssl->state == MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER || ssl->handshake == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("tls13 server state: %s(%d)", + mbedtls_ssl_states_str((mbedtls_ssl_states) ssl->state), + ssl->state)); + + switch (ssl->state) { + /* start state */ + case MBEDTLS_SSL_HELLO_REQUEST: + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_HELLO); + ret = 0; + break; + + case MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_HELLO: + ret = ssl_tls13_process_client_hello(ssl); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "ssl_tls13_process_client_hello", ret); + } + break; + + case MBEDTLS_SSL_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST: + ret = ssl_tls13_write_hello_retry_request(ssl); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "ssl_tls13_write_hello_retry_request", ret); + return ret; + } + break; + + case MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_HELLO: + ret = ssl_tls13_write_server_hello(ssl); + break; + + case MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS: + ret = ssl_tls13_write_encrypted_extensions(ssl); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "ssl_tls13_write_encrypted_extensions", ret); + return ret; + } + break; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED) + case MBEDTLS_SSL_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST: + ret = ssl_tls13_write_certificate_request(ssl); + break; + + case MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_CERTIFICATE: + ret = ssl_tls13_write_server_certificate(ssl); + break; + + case MBEDTLS_SSL_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY: + ret = ssl_tls13_write_certificate_verify(ssl); + break; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED */ + + /* + * Injection of dummy-CCS's for middlebox compatibility + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE) + case MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_CCS_AFTER_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST: + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_write_change_cipher_spec(ssl); + if (ret == 0) { + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_HELLO); + } + break; + + case MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_CCS_AFTER_SERVER_HELLO: + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_write_change_cipher_spec(ssl); + if (ret != 0) { + break; + } + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS); + break; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE */ + + case MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_FINISHED: + ret = ssl_tls13_write_server_finished(ssl); + break; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) + case MBEDTLS_SSL_END_OF_EARLY_DATA: + ret = ssl_tls13_process_end_of_early_data(ssl); + break; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA */ + + case MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_FINISHED: + ret = ssl_tls13_process_client_finished(ssl); + break; + + case MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WRAPUP: + ret = ssl_tls13_handshake_wrapup(ssl); + break; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED) + case MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE: + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_process_certificate(ssl); + if (ret == 0) { + if (ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert != NULL) { + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state( + ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY); + } else { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("skip parse certificate verify")); + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state( + ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_FINISHED); + } + } + break; + + case MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY: + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_process_certificate_verify(ssl); + if (ret == 0) { + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state( + ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_FINISHED); + } + break; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) + case MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET: + ret = ssl_tls13_write_new_session_ticket(ssl); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, + "ssl_tls13_write_new_session_ticket ", + ret); + } + break; + case MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET_FLUSH: + /* This state is necessary to do the flush of the New Session + * Ticket message written in MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET + * as part of ssl_prepare_handshake_step. + */ + ret = 0; + + if (ssl->handshake->new_session_tickets_count == 0) { + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER); + } else { + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state( + ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET); + } + break; + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */ + + default: + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("invalid state %d", ssl->state)); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + } + + return ret; +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C && MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 */ diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/threading.c b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/threading.c index b03f0cc872e4..85db243f213f 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/threading.c +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/threading.c @@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ /* * Ensure gmtime_r is available even with -std=c99; must be defined before - * config.h, which pulls in glibc's features.h. Harmless on other platforms. + * mbedtls_config.h, which pulls in glibc's features.h. Harmless on other platforms. */ #if !defined(_POSIX_C_SOURCE) #define _POSIX_C_SOURCE 200112L @@ -56,28 +56,27 @@ static void threading_mutex_init_pthread(mbedtls_threading_mutex_t *mutex) return; } - /* A nonzero value of is_valid indicates a successfully initialized - * mutex. This is a workaround for not being able to return an error - * code for this function. The lock/unlock functions return an error - * if is_valid is nonzero. The Mbed TLS unit test code uses this field - * to distinguish more states of the mutex; see - * tests/src/threading_helpers for details. */ - mutex->is_valid = pthread_mutex_init(&mutex->mutex, NULL) == 0; + /* One problem here is that calling lock on a pthread mutex without first + * having initialised it is undefined behaviour. Obviously we cannot check + * this here in a thread safe manner without a significant performance + * hit, so state transitions are checked in tests only via the state + * variable. Please make sure any new mutex that gets added is exercised in + * tests; see tests/src/threading_helpers.c for more details. */ + (void) pthread_mutex_init(&mutex->mutex, NULL); } static void threading_mutex_free_pthread(mbedtls_threading_mutex_t *mutex) { - if (mutex == NULL || !mutex->is_valid) { + if (mutex == NULL) { return; } (void) pthread_mutex_destroy(&mutex->mutex); - mutex->is_valid = 0; } static int threading_mutex_lock_pthread(mbedtls_threading_mutex_t *mutex) { - if (mutex == NULL || !mutex->is_valid) { + if (mutex == NULL) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_THREADING_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } @@ -90,7 +89,7 @@ static int threading_mutex_lock_pthread(mbedtls_threading_mutex_t *mutex) static int threading_mutex_unlock_pthread(mbedtls_threading_mutex_t *mutex) { - if (mutex == NULL || !mutex->is_valid) { + if (mutex == NULL) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_THREADING_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } @@ -149,6 +148,11 @@ void mbedtls_threading_set_alt(void (*mutex_init)(mbedtls_threading_mutex_t *), #if defined(THREADING_USE_GMTIME) mbedtls_mutex_init(&mbedtls_threading_gmtime_mutex); #endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) + mbedtls_mutex_init(&mbedtls_threading_key_slot_mutex); + mbedtls_mutex_init(&mbedtls_threading_psa_globaldata_mutex); + mbedtls_mutex_init(&mbedtls_threading_psa_rngdata_mutex); +#endif } /* @@ -162,6 +166,11 @@ void mbedtls_threading_free_alt(void) #if defined(THREADING_USE_GMTIME) mbedtls_mutex_free(&mbedtls_threading_gmtime_mutex); #endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) + mbedtls_mutex_free(&mbedtls_threading_key_slot_mutex); + mbedtls_mutex_free(&mbedtls_threading_psa_globaldata_mutex); + mbedtls_mutex_free(&mbedtls_threading_psa_rngdata_mutex); +#endif } #endif /* MBEDTLS_THREADING_ALT */ @@ -177,5 +186,10 @@ mbedtls_threading_mutex_t mbedtls_threading_readdir_mutex MUTEX_INIT; #if defined(THREADING_USE_GMTIME) mbedtls_threading_mutex_t mbedtls_threading_gmtime_mutex MUTEX_INIT; #endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) +mbedtls_threading_mutex_t mbedtls_threading_key_slot_mutex MUTEX_INIT; +mbedtls_threading_mutex_t mbedtls_threading_psa_globaldata_mutex MUTEX_INIT; +mbedtls_threading_mutex_t mbedtls_threading_psa_rngdata_mutex MUTEX_INIT; +#endif #endif /* MBEDTLS_THREADING_C */ diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/timing.c b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/timing.c index ec2cff1084dc..58f1c1ec2eba 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/timing.c +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/timing.c @@ -5,12 +5,8 @@ * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later */ -#include - #include "common.h" -#include "mbedtls/platform.h" - #if defined(MBEDTLS_TIMING_C) #include "mbedtls/timing.h" @@ -20,15 +16,9 @@ #if !defined(unix) && !defined(__unix__) && !defined(__unix) && \ !defined(__APPLE__) && !defined(_WIN32) && !defined(__QNXNTO__) && \ !defined(__HAIKU__) && !defined(__midipix__) -#error "This module only works on Unix and Windows, see MBEDTLS_TIMING_C in config.h" +#error "This module only works on Unix and Windows, see MBEDTLS_TIMING_C in mbedtls_config.h" #endif -/* *INDENT-OFF* */ -#ifndef asm -#define asm __asm -#endif -/* *INDENT-ON* */ - #if defined(_WIN32) && !defined(EFIX64) && !defined(EFI32) #include @@ -52,262 +42,64 @@ struct _hr_time { }; #endif /* _WIN32 && !EFIX64 && !EFI32 */ -#if !defined(HAVE_HARDCLOCK) && defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM) && \ - (defined(_MSC_VER) && defined(_M_IX86)) || defined(__WATCOMC__) - -#define HAVE_HARDCLOCK - -unsigned long mbedtls_timing_hardclock(void) -{ - unsigned long tsc; - __asm rdtsc - __asm mov[tsc], eax - return tsc; -} -#endif /* !HAVE_HARDCLOCK && MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM && - ( _MSC_VER && _M_IX86 ) || __WATCOMC__ */ - -/* some versions of mingw-64 have 32-bit longs even on x84_64 */ -#if !defined(HAVE_HARDCLOCK) && defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM) && \ - defined(__GNUC__) && (defined(__i386__) || ( \ - (defined(__amd64__) || defined(__x86_64__)) && __SIZEOF_LONG__ == 4)) - -#define HAVE_HARDCLOCK - -unsigned long mbedtls_timing_hardclock(void) -{ - unsigned long lo, hi; - asm volatile ("rdtsc" : "=a" (lo), "=d" (hi)); - return lo; -} -#endif /* !HAVE_HARDCLOCK && MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM && - __GNUC__ && __i386__ */ - -#if !defined(HAVE_HARDCLOCK) && defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM) && \ - defined(__GNUC__) && (defined(__amd64__) || defined(__x86_64__)) - -#define HAVE_HARDCLOCK - -unsigned long mbedtls_timing_hardclock(void) -{ - unsigned long lo, hi; - asm volatile ("rdtsc" : "=a" (lo), "=d" (hi)); - return lo | (hi << 32); -} -#endif /* !HAVE_HARDCLOCK && MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM && - __GNUC__ && ( __amd64__ || __x86_64__ ) */ - -#if !defined(HAVE_HARDCLOCK) && defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM) && \ - defined(__GNUC__) && (defined(__powerpc__) || defined(__ppc__)) - -#define HAVE_HARDCLOCK - -unsigned long mbedtls_timing_hardclock(void) -{ - unsigned long tbl, tbu0, tbu1; - - do { - asm volatile ("mftbu %0" : "=r" (tbu0)); - asm volatile ("mftb %0" : "=r" (tbl)); - asm volatile ("mftbu %0" : "=r" (tbu1)); - } while (tbu0 != tbu1); - - return tbl; -} -#endif /* !HAVE_HARDCLOCK && MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM && - __GNUC__ && ( __powerpc__ || __ppc__ ) */ - -#if !defined(HAVE_HARDCLOCK) && defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM) && \ - defined(__GNUC__) && defined(__sparc64__) - -#if defined(__OpenBSD__) -#warning OpenBSD does not allow access to tick register using software version instead -#else -#define HAVE_HARDCLOCK - -unsigned long mbedtls_timing_hardclock(void) -{ - unsigned long tick; - asm volatile ("rdpr %%tick, %0;" : "=&r" (tick)); - return tick; -} -#endif /* __OpenBSD__ */ -#endif /* !HAVE_HARDCLOCK && MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM && - __GNUC__ && __sparc64__ */ - -#if !defined(HAVE_HARDCLOCK) && defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM) && \ - defined(__GNUC__) && defined(__sparc__) && !defined(__sparc64__) - -#define HAVE_HARDCLOCK - -unsigned long mbedtls_timing_hardclock(void) -{ - unsigned long tick; - asm volatile (".byte 0x83, 0x41, 0x00, 0x00"); - asm volatile ("mov %%g1, %0" : "=r" (tick)); - return tick; -} -#endif /* !HAVE_HARDCLOCK && MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM && - __GNUC__ && __sparc__ && !__sparc64__ */ - -#if !defined(HAVE_HARDCLOCK) && defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM) && \ - defined(__GNUC__) && defined(__alpha__) - -#define HAVE_HARDCLOCK - -unsigned long mbedtls_timing_hardclock(void) -{ - unsigned long cc; - asm volatile ("rpcc %0" : "=r" (cc)); - return cc & 0xFFFFFFFF; -} -#endif /* !HAVE_HARDCLOCK && MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM && - __GNUC__ && __alpha__ */ - -#if !defined(HAVE_HARDCLOCK) && defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM) && \ - defined(__GNUC__) && defined(__ia64__) - -#define HAVE_HARDCLOCK - -unsigned long mbedtls_timing_hardclock(void) -{ - unsigned long itc; - asm volatile ("mov %0 = ar.itc" : "=r" (itc)); - return itc; -} -#endif /* !HAVE_HARDCLOCK && MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM && - __GNUC__ && __ia64__ */ - -// -- GODOT start -- -#if !defined(HAVE_HARDCLOCK) && defined(_WIN32) && \ - !defined(EFIX64) && !defined(EFI32) -// -- GODOT end -- - -#define HAVE_HARDCLOCK - -unsigned long mbedtls_timing_hardclock(void) -{ - LARGE_INTEGER offset; - - QueryPerformanceCounter(&offset); - - return (unsigned long) (offset.QuadPart); -} -#endif /* !HAVE_HARDCLOCK && _MSC_VER && !EFIX64 && !EFI32 */ - -#if !defined(HAVE_HARDCLOCK) - -#define HAVE_HARDCLOCK - -static int hardclock_init = 0; -static struct timeval tv_init; - -unsigned long mbedtls_timing_hardclock(void) -{ - struct timeval tv_cur; - - if (hardclock_init == 0) { - gettimeofday(&tv_init, NULL); - hardclock_init = 1; - } - - gettimeofday(&tv_cur, NULL); - return (tv_cur.tv_sec - tv_init.tv_sec) * 1000000U - + (tv_cur.tv_usec - tv_init.tv_usec); -} -#endif /* !HAVE_HARDCLOCK */ - -volatile int mbedtls_timing_alarmed = 0; - +/** + * \brief Return the elapsed time in milliseconds + * + * \warning May change without notice + * + * \param val points to a timer structure + * \param reset If 0, query the elapsed time. Otherwise (re)start the timer. + * + * \return Elapsed time since the previous reset in ms. When + * restarting, this is always 0. + * + * \note To initialize a timer, call this function with reset=1. + * + * Determining the elapsed time and resetting the timer is not + * atomic on all platforms, so after the sequence + * `{ get_timer(1); ...; time1 = get_timer(1); ...; time2 = + * get_timer(0) }` the value time1+time2 is only approximately + * the delay since the first reset. + */ #if defined(_WIN32) && !defined(EFIX64) && !defined(EFI32) unsigned long mbedtls_timing_get_timer(struct mbedtls_timing_hr_time *val, int reset) { - struct _hr_time t; + struct _hr_time *t = (struct _hr_time *) val; if (reset) { - QueryPerformanceCounter(&t.start); - memcpy(val, &t, sizeof(struct _hr_time)); + QueryPerformanceCounter(&t->start); return 0; } else { unsigned long delta; LARGE_INTEGER now, hfreq; - /* We can't safely cast val because it may not be aligned, so use memcpy */ - memcpy(&t, val, sizeof(struct _hr_time)); QueryPerformanceCounter(&now); QueryPerformanceFrequency(&hfreq); - delta = (unsigned long) ((now.QuadPart - t.start.QuadPart) * 1000ul + delta = (unsigned long) ((now.QuadPart - t->start.QuadPart) * 1000ul / hfreq.QuadPart); return delta; } } -/* It's OK to use a global because alarm() is supposed to be global anyway */ -static DWORD alarmMs; - -static void TimerProc(void *TimerContext) -{ - (void) TimerContext; - Sleep(alarmMs); - mbedtls_timing_alarmed = 1; - /* _endthread will be called implicitly on return - * That ensures execution of thread function's epilogue */ -} - -void mbedtls_set_alarm(int seconds) -{ - if (seconds == 0) { - /* No need to create a thread for this simple case. - * Also, this shorcut is more reliable at least on MinGW32 */ - mbedtls_timing_alarmed = 1; - return; - } - - mbedtls_timing_alarmed = 0; - alarmMs = seconds * 1000; - (void) _beginthread(TimerProc, 0, NULL); -} - #else /* _WIN32 && !EFIX64 && !EFI32 */ unsigned long mbedtls_timing_get_timer(struct mbedtls_timing_hr_time *val, int reset) { - struct _hr_time t; + struct _hr_time *t = (struct _hr_time *) val; if (reset) { - gettimeofday(&t.start, NULL); - memcpy(val, &t, sizeof(struct _hr_time)); + gettimeofday(&t->start, NULL); return 0; } else { unsigned long delta; struct timeval now; - /* We can't safely cast val because it may not be aligned, so use memcpy */ - memcpy(&t, val, sizeof(struct _hr_time)); gettimeofday(&now, NULL); - delta = (now.tv_sec - t.start.tv_sec) * 1000ul - + (now.tv_usec - t.start.tv_usec) / 1000; + delta = (now.tv_sec - t->start.tv_sec) * 1000ul + + (now.tv_usec - t->start.tv_usec) / 1000; return delta; } } -static void sighandler(int signum) -{ - mbedtls_timing_alarmed = 1; - signal(signum, sighandler); -} - -void mbedtls_set_alarm(int seconds) -{ - mbedtls_timing_alarmed = 0; - signal(SIGALRM, sighandler); - alarm(seconds); - if (seconds == 0) { - /* alarm(0) cancelled any previous pending alarm, but the - handler won't fire, so raise the flag straight away. */ - mbedtls_timing_alarmed = 1; - } -} - #endif /* _WIN32 && !EFIX64 && !EFI32 */ /* @@ -350,178 +142,13 @@ int mbedtls_timing_get_delay(void *data) return 0; } -#endif /* !MBEDTLS_TIMING_ALT */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) /* - * Busy-waits for the given number of milliseconds. - * Used for testing mbedtls_timing_hardclock. + * Get the final delay. */ -static void busy_msleep(unsigned long msec) +uint32_t mbedtls_timing_get_final_delay( + const mbedtls_timing_delay_context *data) { - struct mbedtls_timing_hr_time hires; - unsigned long i = 0; /* for busy-waiting */ - volatile unsigned long j; /* to prevent optimisation */ - - (void) mbedtls_timing_get_timer(&hires, 1); - - while (mbedtls_timing_get_timer(&hires, 0) < msec) { - i++; - } - - j = i; - (void) j; -} - -#define FAIL do \ - { \ - if (verbose != 0) \ - { \ - mbedtls_printf("failed at line %d\n", __LINE__); \ - mbedtls_printf(" cycles=%lu ratio=%lu millisecs=%lu secs=%lu hardfail=%d a=%lu b=%lu\n", \ - cycles, ratio, millisecs, secs, hardfail, \ - (unsigned long) a, (unsigned long) b); \ - mbedtls_printf(" elapsed(hires)=%lu status(ctx)=%d\n", \ - mbedtls_timing_get_timer(&hires, 0), \ - mbedtls_timing_get_delay(&ctx)); \ - } \ - return 1; \ - } while (0) - -/* - * Checkup routine - * - * Warning: this is work in progress, some tests may not be reliable enough - * yet! False positives may happen. - */ -int mbedtls_timing_self_test(int verbose) -{ - unsigned long cycles = 0, ratio = 0; - unsigned long millisecs = 0, secs = 0; - int hardfail = 0; - struct mbedtls_timing_hr_time hires; - uint32_t a = 0, b = 0; - mbedtls_timing_delay_context ctx; - - memset(&ctx, 0, sizeof(ctx)); - if (verbose != 0) { - mbedtls_printf(" TIMING tests note: will take some time!\n"); - } - - if (verbose != 0) { - mbedtls_printf(" TIMING test #1 (set_alarm / get_timer): "); - } - - { - secs = 1; - - (void) mbedtls_timing_get_timer(&hires, 1); - - mbedtls_set_alarm((int) secs); - while (!mbedtls_timing_alarmed) { - ; - } - - millisecs = mbedtls_timing_get_timer(&hires, 0); - - /* For some reason on Windows it looks like alarm has an extra delay - * (maybe related to creating a new thread). Allow some room here. */ - if (millisecs < 800 * secs || millisecs > 1200 * secs + 300) { - FAIL; - } - } - - if (verbose != 0) { - mbedtls_printf("passed\n"); - } - - if (verbose != 0) { - mbedtls_printf(" TIMING test #2 (set/get_delay ): "); - } - - { - a = 800; - b = 400; - mbedtls_timing_set_delay(&ctx, a, a + b); /* T = 0 */ - - busy_msleep(a - a / 4); /* T = a - a/4 */ - if (mbedtls_timing_get_delay(&ctx) != 0) { - FAIL; - } - - busy_msleep(a / 4 + b / 4); /* T = a + b/4 */ - if (mbedtls_timing_get_delay(&ctx) != 1) { - FAIL; - } - - busy_msleep(b); /* T = a + b + b/4 */ - if (mbedtls_timing_get_delay(&ctx) != 2) { - FAIL; - } - } - - mbedtls_timing_set_delay(&ctx, 0, 0); - busy_msleep(200); - if (mbedtls_timing_get_delay(&ctx) != -1) { - FAIL; - } - - if (verbose != 0) { - mbedtls_printf("passed\n"); - } - - if (verbose != 0) { - mbedtls_printf(" TIMING test #3 (hardclock / get_timer): "); - } - - /* - * Allow one failure for possible counter wrapping. - * On a 4Ghz 32-bit machine the cycle counter wraps about once per second; - * since the whole test is about 10ms, it shouldn't happen twice in a row. - */ - -hard_test: - if (hardfail > 1) { - if (verbose != 0) { - mbedtls_printf("failed (ignored)\n"); - } - - goto hard_test_done; - } - - /* Get a reference ratio cycles/ms */ - millisecs = 1; - cycles = mbedtls_timing_hardclock(); - busy_msleep(millisecs); - cycles = mbedtls_timing_hardclock() - cycles; - ratio = cycles / millisecs; - - /* Check that the ratio is mostly constant */ - for (millisecs = 2; millisecs <= 4; millisecs++) { - cycles = mbedtls_timing_hardclock(); - busy_msleep(millisecs); - cycles = mbedtls_timing_hardclock() - cycles; - - /* Allow variation up to 20% */ - if (cycles / millisecs < ratio - ratio / 5 || - cycles / millisecs > ratio + ratio / 5) { - hardfail++; - goto hard_test; - } - } - - if (verbose != 0) { - mbedtls_printf("passed\n"); - } - -hard_test_done: - - if (verbose != 0) { - mbedtls_printf("\n"); - } - - return 0; + return data->fin_ms; } - -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_TIMING_ALT */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_TIMING_C */ diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/version_features.c b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/version_features.c index 6f663b12a730..406161d4c787 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/version_features.c +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/version_features.c @@ -16,839 +16,797 @@ static const char * const features[] = { #if defined(MBEDTLS_VERSION_FEATURES) #if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM) - "MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM", + "HAVE_ASM", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_NO_UDBL_DIVISION) - "MBEDTLS_NO_UDBL_DIVISION", + "NO_UDBL_DIVISION", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_NO_UDBL_DIVISION */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_NO_64BIT_MULTIPLICATION) - "MBEDTLS_NO_64BIT_MULTIPLICATION", + "NO_64BIT_MULTIPLICATION", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_NO_64BIT_MULTIPLICATION */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_SSE2) - "MBEDTLS_HAVE_SSE2", + "HAVE_SSE2", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_SSE2 */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) - "MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME", + "HAVE_TIME", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE) - "MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE", + "HAVE_TIME_DATE", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_MEMORY) - "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_MEMORY", + "PLATFORM_MEMORY", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_MEMORY */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NO_STD_FUNCTIONS) - "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NO_STD_FUNCTIONS", + "PLATFORM_NO_STD_FUNCTIONS", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NO_STD_FUNCTIONS */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SETBUF_ALT) + "PLATFORM_SETBUF_ALT", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SETBUF_ALT */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_EXIT_ALT) - "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_EXIT_ALT", + "PLATFORM_EXIT_ALT", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_EXIT_ALT */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_TIME_ALT) - "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_TIME_ALT", + "PLATFORM_TIME_ALT", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_TIME_ALT */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_FPRINTF_ALT) - "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_FPRINTF_ALT", + "PLATFORM_FPRINTF_ALT", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_FPRINTF_ALT */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_PRINTF_ALT) - "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_PRINTF_ALT", + "PLATFORM_PRINTF_ALT", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_PRINTF_ALT */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SNPRINTF_ALT) - "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SNPRINTF_ALT", + "PLATFORM_SNPRINTF_ALT", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SNPRINTF_ALT */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_VSNPRINTF_ALT) - "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_VSNPRINTF_ALT", + "PLATFORM_VSNPRINTF_ALT", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_VSNPRINTF_ALT */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NV_SEED_ALT) - "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NV_SEED_ALT", + "PLATFORM_NV_SEED_ALT", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NV_SEED_ALT */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SETUP_TEARDOWN_ALT) - "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SETUP_TEARDOWN_ALT", + "PLATFORM_SETUP_TEARDOWN_ALT", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SETUP_TEARDOWN_ALT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_MS_TIME_ALT) + "PLATFORM_MS_TIME_ALT", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_MS_TIME_ALT */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_GMTIME_R_ALT) - "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_GMTIME_R_ALT", + "PLATFORM_GMTIME_R_ALT", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_GMTIME_R_ALT */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_ZEROIZE_ALT) - "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_ZEROIZE_ALT", + "PLATFORM_ZEROIZE_ALT", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_ZEROIZE_ALT */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING) - "MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING", + "DEPRECATED_WARNING", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) - "MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED", + "DEPRECATED_REMOVED", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CHECK_PARAMS) - "MBEDTLS_CHECK_PARAMS", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CHECK_PARAMS */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CHECK_PARAMS_ASSERT) - "MBEDTLS_CHECK_PARAMS_ASSERT", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CHECK_PARAMS_ASSERT */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_TIMING_ALT) - "MBEDTLS_TIMING_ALT", + "TIMING_ALT", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_TIMING_ALT */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ALT) - "MBEDTLS_AES_ALT", + "AES_ALT", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_AES_ALT */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARC4_ALT) - "MBEDTLS_ARC4_ALT", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ARC4_ALT */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_ARIA_ALT) - "MBEDTLS_ARIA_ALT", + "ARIA_ALT", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_ARIA_ALT */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_ALT) - "MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_ALT", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_ALT */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_ALT) - "MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_ALT", + "CAMELLIA_ALT", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_ALT */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_ALT) - "MBEDTLS_CCM_ALT", + "CCM_ALT", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_CCM_ALT */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_ALT) - "MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_ALT", + "CHACHA20_ALT", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_ALT */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_ALT) - "MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_ALT", + "CHACHAPOLY_ALT", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_ALT */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_CMAC_ALT) - "MBEDTLS_CMAC_ALT", + "CMAC_ALT", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_CMAC_ALT */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_DES_ALT) - "MBEDTLS_DES_ALT", + "DES_ALT", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_DES_ALT */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_ALT) - "MBEDTLS_DHM_ALT", + "DHM_ALT", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_DHM_ALT */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_ALT) - "MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_ALT", + "ECJPAKE_ALT", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_ALT */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_ALT) - "MBEDTLS_GCM_ALT", + "GCM_ALT", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_ALT */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_ALT) - "MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_ALT", + "NIST_KW_ALT", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_ALT */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD2_ALT) - "MBEDTLS_MD2_ALT", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD2_ALT */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD4_ALT) - "MBEDTLS_MD4_ALT", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD4_ALT */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_ALT) - "MBEDTLS_MD5_ALT", + "MD5_ALT", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_MD5_ALT */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_POLY1305_ALT) - "MBEDTLS_POLY1305_ALT", + "POLY1305_ALT", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_POLY1305_ALT */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_ALT) - "MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_ALT", + "RIPEMD160_ALT", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_ALT */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_ALT) - "MBEDTLS_RSA_ALT", + "RSA_ALT", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_ALT */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_ALT) - "MBEDTLS_SHA1_ALT", + "SHA1_ALT", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_ALT */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_ALT) - "MBEDTLS_SHA256_ALT", + "SHA256_ALT", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_ALT */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_ALT) - "MBEDTLS_SHA512_ALT", + "SHA512_ALT", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_ALT */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_XTEA_ALT) - "MBEDTLS_XTEA_ALT", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_XTEA_ALT */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_ALT) - "MBEDTLS_ECP_ALT", + "ECP_ALT", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_ALT */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD2_PROCESS_ALT) - "MBEDTLS_MD2_PROCESS_ALT", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD2_PROCESS_ALT */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD4_PROCESS_ALT) - "MBEDTLS_MD4_PROCESS_ALT", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD4_PROCESS_ALT */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_PROCESS_ALT) - "MBEDTLS_MD5_PROCESS_ALT", + "MD5_PROCESS_ALT", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_MD5_PROCESS_ALT */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_PROCESS_ALT) - "MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_PROCESS_ALT", + "RIPEMD160_PROCESS_ALT", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_PROCESS_ALT */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_PROCESS_ALT) - "MBEDTLS_SHA1_PROCESS_ALT", + "SHA1_PROCESS_ALT", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_PROCESS_ALT */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_PROCESS_ALT) - "MBEDTLS_SHA256_PROCESS_ALT", + "SHA256_PROCESS_ALT", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_PROCESS_ALT */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_PROCESS_ALT) - "MBEDTLS_SHA512_PROCESS_ALT", + "SHA512_PROCESS_ALT", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_PROCESS_ALT */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_DES_SETKEY_ALT) - "MBEDTLS_DES_SETKEY_ALT", + "DES_SETKEY_ALT", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_DES_SETKEY_ALT */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_DES_CRYPT_ECB_ALT) - "MBEDTLS_DES_CRYPT_ECB_ALT", + "DES_CRYPT_ECB_ALT", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_DES_CRYPT_ECB_ALT */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_DES3_CRYPT_ECB_ALT) - "MBEDTLS_DES3_CRYPT_ECB_ALT", + "DES3_CRYPT_ECB_ALT", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_DES3_CRYPT_ECB_ALT */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_SETKEY_ENC_ALT) - "MBEDTLS_AES_SETKEY_ENC_ALT", + "AES_SETKEY_ENC_ALT", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_AES_SETKEY_ENC_ALT */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_SETKEY_DEC_ALT) - "MBEDTLS_AES_SETKEY_DEC_ALT", + "AES_SETKEY_DEC_ALT", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_AES_SETKEY_DEC_ALT */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT_ALT) - "MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT_ALT", + "AES_ENCRYPT_ALT", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT_ALT */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT_ALT) - "MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT_ALT", + "AES_DECRYPT_ALT", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT_ALT */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_GEN_PUBLIC_ALT) - "MBEDTLS_ECDH_GEN_PUBLIC_ALT", + "ECDH_GEN_PUBLIC_ALT", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDH_GEN_PUBLIC_ALT */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_COMPUTE_SHARED_ALT) - "MBEDTLS_ECDH_COMPUTE_SHARED_ALT", + "ECDH_COMPUTE_SHARED_ALT", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDH_COMPUTE_SHARED_ALT */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_VERIFY_ALT) - "MBEDTLS_ECDSA_VERIFY_ALT", + "ECDSA_VERIFY_ALT", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_VERIFY_ALT */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_SIGN_ALT) - "MBEDTLS_ECDSA_SIGN_ALT", + "ECDSA_SIGN_ALT", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_SIGN_ALT */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_GENKEY_ALT) - "MBEDTLS_ECDSA_GENKEY_ALT", + "ECDSA_GENKEY_ALT", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_GENKEY_ALT */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT) - "MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT", + "ECP_INTERNAL_ALT", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_FALLBACK) - "MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_FALLBACK", + "ECP_NO_FALLBACK", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_FALLBACK */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RANDOMIZE_JAC_ALT) - "MBEDTLS_ECP_RANDOMIZE_JAC_ALT", + "ECP_RANDOMIZE_JAC_ALT", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RANDOMIZE_JAC_ALT */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_ADD_MIXED_ALT) - "MBEDTLS_ECP_ADD_MIXED_ALT", + "ECP_ADD_MIXED_ALT", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_ADD_MIXED_ALT */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DOUBLE_JAC_ALT) - "MBEDTLS_ECP_DOUBLE_JAC_ALT", + "ECP_DOUBLE_JAC_ALT", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DOUBLE_JAC_ALT */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NORMALIZE_JAC_MANY_ALT) - "MBEDTLS_ECP_NORMALIZE_JAC_MANY_ALT", + "ECP_NORMALIZE_JAC_MANY_ALT", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_NORMALIZE_JAC_MANY_ALT */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NORMALIZE_JAC_ALT) - "MBEDTLS_ECP_NORMALIZE_JAC_ALT", + "ECP_NORMALIZE_JAC_ALT", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_NORMALIZE_JAC_ALT */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DOUBLE_ADD_MXZ_ALT) - "MBEDTLS_ECP_DOUBLE_ADD_MXZ_ALT", + "ECP_DOUBLE_ADD_MXZ_ALT", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DOUBLE_ADD_MXZ_ALT */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RANDOMIZE_MXZ_ALT) - "MBEDTLS_ECP_RANDOMIZE_MXZ_ALT", + "ECP_RANDOMIZE_MXZ_ALT", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RANDOMIZE_MXZ_ALT */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NORMALIZE_MXZ_ALT) - "MBEDTLS_ECP_NORMALIZE_MXZ_ALT", + "ECP_NORMALIZE_MXZ_ALT", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_NORMALIZE_MXZ_ALT */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_NULL_ENTROPY) - "MBEDTLS_TEST_NULL_ENTROPY", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_TEST_NULL_ENTROPY */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_HARDWARE_ALT) - "MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_HARDWARE_ALT", + "ENTROPY_HARDWARE_ALT", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_HARDWARE_ALT */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ROM_TABLES) - "MBEDTLS_AES_ROM_TABLES", + "AES_ROM_TABLES", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_AES_ROM_TABLES */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_FEWER_TABLES) - "MBEDTLS_AES_FEWER_TABLES", + "AES_FEWER_TABLES", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_AES_FEWER_TABLES */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH) + "AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_USE_HARDWARE_ONLY) + "AES_USE_HARDWARE_ONLY", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_AES_USE_HARDWARE_ONLY */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_SMALL_MEMORY) - "MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_SMALL_MEMORY", + "CAMELLIA_SMALL_MEMORY", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_SMALL_MEMORY */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_WARNING) - "MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_WARNING", + "CHECK_RETURN_WARNING", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_WARNING */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) - "MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC", + "CIPHER_MODE_CBC", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB) - "MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB", + "CIPHER_MODE_CFB", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR) - "MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR", + "CIPHER_MODE_CTR", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB) - "MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB", + "CIPHER_MODE_OFB", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS) - "MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS", + "CIPHER_MODE_XTS", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER) - "MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER", + "CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7) - "MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7", + "CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ONE_AND_ZEROS) - "MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ONE_AND_ZEROS", + "CIPHER_PADDING_ONE_AND_ZEROS", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ONE_AND_ZEROS */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ZEROS_AND_LEN) - "MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ZEROS_AND_LEN", + "CIPHER_PADDING_ZEROS_AND_LEN", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ZEROS_AND_LEN */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ZEROS) - "MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ZEROS", + "CIPHER_PADDING_ZEROS", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ZEROS */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY) - "MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY", + "CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ENABLE_WEAK_CIPHERSUITES) - "MBEDTLS_ENABLE_WEAK_CIPHERSUITES", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ENABLE_WEAK_CIPHERSUITES */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_REMOVE_ARC4_CIPHERSUITES) - "MBEDTLS_REMOVE_ARC4_CIPHERSUITES", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_REMOVE_ARC4_CIPHERSUITES */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_REMOVE_3DES_CIPHERSUITES) - "MBEDTLS_REMOVE_3DES_CIPHERSUITES", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_REMOVE_3DES_CIPHERSUITES */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_EVEREST_ENABLED) - "MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_EVEREST_ENABLED", + "ECDH_VARIANT_EVEREST_ENABLED", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_EVEREST_ENABLED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED) - "MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED", + "ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED) - "MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED", + "ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED) - "MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED", + "ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED) - "MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED", + "ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED) - "MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED", + "ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED) - "MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED", + "ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED) - "MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED", + "ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED) - "MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED", + "ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED) - "MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED", + "ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLED) - "MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLED", + "ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLED", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED) - "MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED", + "ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED) - "MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED", + "ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED) - "MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED", + "ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NIST_OPTIM) - "MBEDTLS_ECP_NIST_OPTIM", + "ECP_NIST_OPTIM", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_NIST_OPTIM */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG) - "MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) - "MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE", + "ECP_RESTARTABLE", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_LEGACY_CONTEXT) - "MBEDTLS_ECDH_LEGACY_CONTEXT", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDH_LEGACY_CONTEXT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_WITH_MPI_UINT) + "ECP_WITH_MPI_UINT", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_WITH_MPI_UINT */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC) - "MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC", + "ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED) - "MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED", + "KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED) - "MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED", + "KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED) - "MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED", + "KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED) - "MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED", + "KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED) - "MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED", + "KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED) - "MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED", + "KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED) - "MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED", + "KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED) - "MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED", + "KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED) - "MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED", + "KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED) - "MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED", + "KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) - "MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED", + "KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_EC_EXTENDED) - "MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_EC_EXTENDED", + "PK_PARSE_EC_EXTENDED", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_EC_EXTENDED */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_EC_COMPRESSED) + "PK_PARSE_EC_COMPRESSED", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_EC_COMPRESSED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_ERROR_STRERROR_DUMMY) - "MBEDTLS_ERROR_STRERROR_DUMMY", + "ERROR_STRERROR_DUMMY", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_ERROR_STRERROR_DUMMY */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_GENPRIME) - "MBEDTLS_GENPRIME", + "GENPRIME", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_GENPRIME */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) - "MBEDTLS_FS_IO", + "FS_IO", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_FS_IO */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_NO_DEFAULT_ENTROPY_SOURCES) - "MBEDTLS_NO_DEFAULT_ENTROPY_SOURCES", + "NO_DEFAULT_ENTROPY_SOURCES", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_NO_DEFAULT_ENTROPY_SOURCES */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_NO_PLATFORM_ENTROPY) - "MBEDTLS_NO_PLATFORM_ENTROPY", + "NO_PLATFORM_ENTROPY", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_NO_PLATFORM_ENTROPY */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_FORCE_SHA256) - "MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_FORCE_SHA256", + "ENTROPY_FORCE_SHA256", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_FORCE_SHA256 */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_NV_SEED) - "MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_NV_SEED", + "ENTROPY_NV_SEED", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_NV_SEED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_KEY_ID_ENCODES_OWNER) - "MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_KEY_ID_ENCODES_OWNER", + "PSA_CRYPTO_KEY_ID_ENCODES_OWNER", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_KEY_ID_ENCODES_OWNER */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_DEBUG) - "MBEDTLS_MEMORY_DEBUG", + "MEMORY_DEBUG", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_MEMORY_DEBUG */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BACKTRACE) - "MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BACKTRACE", + "MEMORY_BACKTRACE", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BACKTRACE */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT_SUPPORT) - "MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT_SUPPORT", + "PK_RSA_ALT_SUPPORT", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT_SUPPORT */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15) - "MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15", + "PKCS1_V15", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21) - "MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21", + "PKCS1_V21", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21 */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_BUILTIN_KEYS) - "MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_BUILTIN_KEYS", + "PSA_CRYPTO_BUILTIN_KEYS", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_BUILTIN_KEYS */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT) - "MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT", + "PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVERS) - "MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVERS", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVERS */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG) - "MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG", + "PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SPM) - "MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SPM", + "PSA_CRYPTO_SPM", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SPM */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_P256M_DRIVER_ENABLED) + "PSA_P256M_DRIVER_ENABLED", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_P256M_DRIVER_ENABLED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_INJECT_ENTROPY) - "MBEDTLS_PSA_INJECT_ENTROPY", + "PSA_INJECT_ENTROPY", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_INJECT_ENTROPY */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ASSUME_EXCLUSIVE_BUFFERS) - "MBEDTLS_PSA_ASSUME_EXCLUSIVE_BUFFERS", + "PSA_ASSUME_EXCLUSIVE_BUFFERS", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_ASSUME_EXCLUSIVE_BUFFERS */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT) - "MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT", + "RSA_NO_CRT", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) - "MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST", + "SELF_TEST", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_SMALLER) - "MBEDTLS_SHA256_SMALLER", + "SHA256_SMALLER", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_SMALLER */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_SMALLER) - "MBEDTLS_SHA512_SMALLER", + "SHA512_SMALLER", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_SMALLER */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384) - "MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALL_ALERT_MESSAGES) - "MBEDTLS_SSL_ALL_ALERT_MESSAGES", + "SSL_ALL_ALERT_MESSAGES", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ALL_ALERT_MESSAGES */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_CHECKING) - "MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_CHECKING", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_CHECKING */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) - "MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID", + "SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID_COMPAT) + "SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID_COMPAT", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID_COMPAT */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE) - "MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE", + "SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CONTEXT_SERIALIZATION) - "MBEDTLS_SSL_CONTEXT_SERIALIZATION", + "SSL_CONTEXT_SERIALIZATION", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CONTEXT_SERIALIZATION */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ALL) - "MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ALL", + "SSL_DEBUG_ALL", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ALL */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) - "MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC", + "SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET) - "MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET", + "SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_FALLBACK_SCSV) - "MBEDTLS_SSL_FALLBACK_SCSV", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_FALLBACK_SCSV */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) - "MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE", + "SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL) - "MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING) - "MBEDTLS_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) - "MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION", + "SSL_RENEGOTIATION", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_SUPPORT_SSLV2_CLIENT_HELLO) - "MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_SUPPORT_SSLV2_CLIENT_HELLO", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_SUPPORT_SSLV2_CLIENT_HELLO */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_RESPECT_CLIENT_PREFERENCE) - "MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_RESPECT_CLIENT_PREFERENCE", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_RESPECT_CLIENT_PREFERENCE */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH) - "MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH", + "SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) - "MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) - "MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) - "MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT) + "SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) - "MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2", + "SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL) - "MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) + "SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE) + "SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_ENABLED) + "SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_ENABLED", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_ENABLED */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED) + "SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED) + "SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) + "SSL_EARLY_DATA", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) - "MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS", + "SSL_PROTO_DTLS", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN) - "MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN", + "SSL_ALPN", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY) - "MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY", + "SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY) - "MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY", + "SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP) - "MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP", + "SSL_DTLS_SRTP", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CLIENT_PORT_REUSE) - "MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CLIENT_PORT_REUSE", + "SSL_DTLS_CLIENT_PORT_REUSE", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CLIENT_PORT_REUSE */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_BADMAC_LIMIT) - "MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_BADMAC_LIMIT", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_BADMAC_LIMIT */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) - "MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS", + "SSL_SESSION_TICKETS", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXPORT_KEYS) - "MBEDTLS_SSL_EXPORT_KEYS", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EXPORT_KEYS */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) - "MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION", + "SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC) - "MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC_COMPAT) - "MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC_COMPAT", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC_COMPAT */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH) - "MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH", + "SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_TLS_DEFAULT_ALLOW_SHA1_IN_KEY_EXCHANGE) - "MBEDTLS_TLS_DEFAULT_ALLOW_SHA1_IN_KEY_EXCHANGE", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_TLS_DEFAULT_ALLOW_SHA1_IN_KEY_EXCHANGE */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_CONSTANT_FLOW_MEMSAN) - "MBEDTLS_TEST_CONSTANT_FLOW_MEMSAN", + "TEST_CONSTANT_FLOW_MEMSAN", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_TEST_CONSTANT_FLOW_MEMSAN */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_CONSTANT_FLOW_VALGRIND) - "MBEDTLS_TEST_CONSTANT_FLOW_VALGRIND", + "TEST_CONSTANT_FLOW_VALGRIND", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_TEST_CONSTANT_FLOW_VALGRIND */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS) - "MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS", + "TEST_HOOKS", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_ALT) - "MBEDTLS_THREADING_ALT", + "THREADING_ALT", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_THREADING_ALT */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_PTHREAD) - "MBEDTLS_THREADING_PTHREAD", + "THREADING_PTHREAD", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_THREADING_PTHREAD */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) - "MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO", + "USE_PSA_CRYPTO", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG) - "MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG", + "PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_VERSION_FEATURES) - "MBEDTLS_VERSION_FEATURES", + "VERSION_FEATURES", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_VERSION_FEATURES */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_ALLOW_EXTENSIONS_NON_V3) - "MBEDTLS_X509_ALLOW_EXTENSIONS_NON_V3", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_ALLOW_EXTENSIONS_NON_V3 */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_ALLOW_UNSUPPORTED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION) - "MBEDTLS_X509_ALLOW_UNSUPPORTED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_ALLOW_UNSUPPORTED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK) - "MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK", + "X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CHECK_KEY_USAGE) - "MBEDTLS_X509_CHECK_KEY_USAGE", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CHECK_KEY_USAGE */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CHECK_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE) - "MBEDTLS_X509_CHECK_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CHECK_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_REMOVE_INFO) + "X509_REMOVE_INFO", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_REMOVE_INFO */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT) - "MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT", + "X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT) - "MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_AESNI_C) - "MBEDTLS_AESNI_C", + "AESNI_C", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_AESNI_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AESCE_C) + "AESCE_C", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_AESCE_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) - "MBEDTLS_AES_C", + "AES_C", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_AES_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARC4_C) - "MBEDTLS_ARC4_C", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ARC4_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C) - "MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C", + "ASN1_PARSE_C", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_C) - "MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_C", + "ASN1_WRITE_C", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_BASE64_C) - "MBEDTLS_BASE64_C", + "BASE64_C", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_BASE64_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT) + "BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) - "MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C", + "BIGNUM_C", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C) - "MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C) - "MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C", + "CAMELLIA_C", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_ARIA_C) - "MBEDTLS_ARIA_C", + "ARIA_C", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_ARIA_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C) - "MBEDTLS_CCM_C", + "CCM_C", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_CCM_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CERTS_C) - "MBEDTLS_CERTS_C", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CERTS_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_C) - "MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_C", + "CHACHA20_C", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C) - "MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C", + "CHACHAPOLY_C", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C) - "MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C", + "CIPHER_C", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_CMAC_C) - "MBEDTLS_CMAC_C", + "CMAC_C", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_CMAC_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C) - "MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C", + "CTR_DRBG_C", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C) - "MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C", + "DEBUG_C", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_DES_C) - "MBEDTLS_DES_C", + "DES_C", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_DES_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_C) - "MBEDTLS_DHM_C", + "DHM_C", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_DHM_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) - "MBEDTLS_ECDH_C", + "ECDH_C", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDH_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) - "MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C", + "ECDSA_C", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_C) - "MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_C", + "ECJPAKE_C", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) - "MBEDTLS_ECP_C", + "ECP_C", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C) - "MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C", + "ENTROPY_C", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_ERROR_C) - "MBEDTLS_ERROR_C", + "ERROR_C", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_ERROR_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) - "MBEDTLS_GCM_C", + "GCM_C", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVEGE_C) - "MBEDTLS_HAVEGE_C", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVEGE_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_LARGE_TABLE) + "GCM_LARGE_TABLE", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_LARGE_TABLE */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_HKDF_C) - "MBEDTLS_HKDF_C", + "HKDF_C", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_HKDF_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C) - "MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C", + "HMAC_DRBG_C", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_LMS_C) + "LMS_C", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_LMS_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_LMS_PRIVATE) + "LMS_PRIVATE", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_LMS_PRIVATE */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C) - "MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C", + "NIST_KW_C", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_C) - "MBEDTLS_MD_C", + "MD_C", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD2_C) - "MBEDTLS_MD2_C", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD2_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD4_C) - "MBEDTLS_MD4_C", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD4_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C) - "MBEDTLS_MD5_C", + "MD5_C", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_MD5_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC_C) - "MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC_C", + "MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC_C", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_NET_C) - "MBEDTLS_NET_C", + "NET_C", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_NET_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_OID_C) - "MBEDTLS_OID_C", + "OID_C", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_OID_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_C) - "MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_C", + "PADLOCK_C", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C) - "MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C", + "PEM_PARSE_C", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_WRITE_C) - "MBEDTLS_PEM_WRITE_C", + "PEM_WRITE_C", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_PEM_WRITE_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_C) - "MBEDTLS_PK_C", + "PK_C", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C) - "MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C", + "PK_PARSE_C", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C) - "MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C", + "PK_WRITE_C", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C) - "MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C", + "PKCS5_C", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS11_C) - "MBEDTLS_PKCS11_C", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS11_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS7_C) + "PKCS7_C", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS7_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C) - "MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C", + "PKCS12_C", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) - "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C", + "PLATFORM_C", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_POLY1305_C) - "MBEDTLS_POLY1305_C", + "POLY1305_C", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_POLY1305_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) - "MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C", + "PSA_CRYPTO_C", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C) - "MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C", + "PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C) - "MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C", + "PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ITS_FILE_C) - "MBEDTLS_PSA_ITS_FILE_C", + "PSA_ITS_FILE_C", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_ITS_FILE_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C) - "MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C", + "RIPEMD160_C", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) - "MBEDTLS_RSA_C", + "RSA_C", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) - "MBEDTLS_SHA1_C", + "SHA1_C", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA224_C) + "SHA224_C", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA224_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) - "MBEDTLS_SHA256_C", + "SHA256_C", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_USE_ARMV8_A_CRYPTO_IF_PRESENT) + "SHA256_USE_ARMV8_A_CRYPTO_IF_PRESENT", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_USE_ARMV8_A_CRYPTO_IF_PRESENT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_USE_A64_CRYPTO_IF_PRESENT) + "SHA256_USE_A64_CRYPTO_IF_PRESENT", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_USE_A64_CRYPTO_IF_PRESENT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_USE_ARMV8_A_CRYPTO_ONLY) + "SHA256_USE_ARMV8_A_CRYPTO_ONLY", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_USE_ARMV8_A_CRYPTO_ONLY */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_USE_A64_CRYPTO_ONLY) + "SHA256_USE_A64_CRYPTO_ONLY", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_USE_A64_CRYPTO_ONLY */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C) + "SHA384_C", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA384_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) - "MBEDTLS_SHA512_C", + "SHA512_C", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA3_C) + "SHA3_C", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA3_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_USE_A64_CRYPTO_IF_PRESENT) + "SHA512_USE_A64_CRYPTO_IF_PRESENT", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_USE_A64_CRYPTO_IF_PRESENT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_USE_A64_CRYPTO_ONLY) + "SHA512_USE_A64_CRYPTO_ONLY", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_USE_A64_CRYPTO_ONLY */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_C) - "MBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_C", + "SSL_CACHE_C", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_COOKIE_C) - "MBEDTLS_SSL_COOKIE_C", + "SSL_COOKIE_C", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_COOKIE_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TICKET_C) - "MBEDTLS_SSL_TICKET_C", + "SSL_TICKET_C", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TICKET_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) - "MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C", + "SSL_CLI_C", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) - "MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C", + "SSL_SRV_C", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C) - "MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C", + "SSL_TLS_C", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) - "MBEDTLS_THREADING_C", + "THREADING_C", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_THREADING_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_TIMING_C) - "MBEDTLS_TIMING_C", + "TIMING_C", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_TIMING_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_VERSION_C) - "MBEDTLS_VERSION_C", + "VERSION_C", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_VERSION_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C) - "MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C", + "X509_USE_C", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) - "MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C", + "X509_CRT_PARSE_C", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRL_PARSE_C) - "MBEDTLS_X509_CRL_PARSE_C", + "X509_CRL_PARSE_C", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRL_PARSE_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CSR_PARSE_C) - "MBEDTLS_X509_CSR_PARSE_C", + "X509_CSR_PARSE_C", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CSR_PARSE_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CREATE_C) - "MBEDTLS_X509_CREATE_C", + "X509_CREATE_C", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CREATE_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_WRITE_C) - "MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_WRITE_C", + "X509_CRT_WRITE_C", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_WRITE_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CSR_WRITE_C) - "MBEDTLS_X509_CSR_WRITE_C", + "X509_CSR_WRITE_C", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CSR_WRITE_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_XTEA_C) - "MBEDTLS_XTEA_C", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_XTEA_C */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_VERSION_FEATURES */ NULL }; @@ -865,6 +823,12 @@ int mbedtls_version_check_feature(const char *feature) return -1; } + if (strncmp(feature, "MBEDTLS_", 8)) { + return -1; + } + + feature += 8; + while (*idx != NULL) { if (!strcmp(*idx, feature)) { return 0; diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/x509.c b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/x509.c index 4233e53723b4..f97fb44589ed 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/x509.c +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/x509.c @@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ #if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C) -#include "mbedtls/x509.h" +#include "x509_internal.h" #include "mbedtls/asn1.h" #include "mbedtls/error.h" #include "mbedtls/oid.h" @@ -31,6 +31,8 @@ #include "mbedtls/pem.h" #endif +#include "mbedtls/asn1write.h" + #include "mbedtls/platform.h" #if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) @@ -119,6 +121,51 @@ int mbedtls_x509_get_alg(unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, return 0; } +/* + * Convert md type to string + */ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_REMOVE_INFO) && defined(MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT) + +static inline const char *md_type_to_string(mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg) +{ + switch (md_alg) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_MD5) + case MBEDTLS_MD_MD5: + return "MD5"; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1: + return "SHA1"; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA224) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224: + return "SHA224"; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256: + return "SHA256"; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384: + return "SHA384"; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA512) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512: + return "SHA512"; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_RIPEMD160) + case MBEDTLS_MD_RIPEMD160: + return "RIPEMD160"; +#endif + case MBEDTLS_MD_NONE: + return NULL; + default: + return NULL; + } +} + +#endif /* !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_REMOVE_INFO) && defined(MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT) */ + #if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT) /* * HashAlgorithm ::= AlgorithmIdentifier @@ -455,7 +502,6 @@ int mbedtls_x509_get_name(unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, size_t set_len; const unsigned char *end_set; mbedtls_x509_name *head = cur; - mbedtls_x509_name *prev, *allocated; /* don't use recursion, we'd risk stack overflow if not optimized */ while (1) { @@ -511,132 +557,88 @@ int mbedtls_x509_get_name(unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, error: /* Skip the first element as we did not allocate it */ - allocated = head->next; - - while (allocated != NULL) { - prev = allocated; - allocated = allocated->next; - - mbedtls_platform_zeroize(prev, sizeof(*prev)); - mbedtls_free(prev); - } - - mbedtls_platform_zeroize(head, sizeof(*head)); + mbedtls_asn1_free_named_data_list_shallow(head->next); + head->next = NULL; return ret; } -static int x509_parse_int(unsigned char **p, size_t n, int *res) -{ - *res = 0; - - for (; n > 0; --n) { - if ((**p < '0') || (**p > '9')) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_DATE; - } - - *res *= 10; - *res += (*(*p)++ - '0'); - } - - return 0; -} - static int x509_date_is_valid(const mbedtls_x509_time *t) { - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_DATE; - int month_len; - - CHECK_RANGE(0, 9999, t->year); - CHECK_RANGE(0, 23, t->hour); - CHECK_RANGE(0, 59, t->min); - CHECK_RANGE(0, 59, t->sec); - + unsigned int month_days; + unsigned int year; switch (t->mon) { case 1: case 3: case 5: case 7: case 8: case 10: case 12: - month_len = 31; + month_days = 31; break; case 4: case 6: case 9: case 11: - month_len = 30; + month_days = 30; break; case 2: - if ((!(t->year % 4) && t->year % 100) || - !(t->year % 400)) { - month_len = 29; - } else { - month_len = 28; - } + year = (unsigned int) t->year; + month_days = ((year & 3) || (!(year % 100) + && (year % 400))) + ? 28 : 29; break; default: - return ret; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_DATE; + } + + if ((unsigned int) (t->day - 1) >= month_days || /* (1 - days in month) */ + /* (unsigned int) (t->mon - 1) >= 12 || */ /* (1 - 12) checked above */ + (unsigned int) t->year > 9999 || /* (0 - 9999) */ + (unsigned int) t->hour > 23 || /* (0 - 23) */ + (unsigned int) t->min > 59 || /* (0 - 59) */ + (unsigned int) t->sec > 59) { /* (0 - 59) */ + return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_DATE; } - CHECK_RANGE(1, month_len, t->day); return 0; } +static int x509_parse2_int(const unsigned char *p) +{ + uint32_t d1 = p[0] - '0'; + uint32_t d2 = p[1] - '0'; + return (d1 < 10 && d2 < 10) ? (int) (d1 * 10 + d2) : -1; +} + /* * Parse an ASN1_UTC_TIME (yearlen=2) or ASN1_GENERALIZED_TIME (yearlen=4) * field. */ -static int x509_parse_time(unsigned char **p, size_t len, size_t yearlen, - mbedtls_x509_time *tm) +static int x509_parse_time(const unsigned char *p, mbedtls_x509_time *tm, + size_t yearlen) { - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + int x; /* - * Minimum length is 10 or 12 depending on yearlen + * Parse year, month, day, hour, minute, second */ - if (len < yearlen + 8) { + tm->year = x509_parse2_int(p); + if (tm->year < 0) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_DATE; } - len -= yearlen + 8; - /* - * Parse year, month, day, hour, minute - */ - CHECK(x509_parse_int(p, yearlen, &tm->year)); - if (2 == yearlen) { - if (tm->year < 50) { - tm->year += 100; + if (4 == yearlen) { + x = tm->year * 100; + p += 2; + tm->year = x509_parse2_int(p); + if (tm->year < 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_DATE; } - - tm->year += 1900; - } - - CHECK(x509_parse_int(p, 2, &tm->mon)); - CHECK(x509_parse_int(p, 2, &tm->day)); - CHECK(x509_parse_int(p, 2, &tm->hour)); - CHECK(x509_parse_int(p, 2, &tm->min)); - - /* - * Parse seconds if present - */ - if (len >= 2) { - CHECK(x509_parse_int(p, 2, &tm->sec)); - len -= 2; } else { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_DATE; - } - - /* - * Parse trailing 'Z' if present - */ - if (1 == len && 'Z' == **p) { - (*p)++; - len--; + x = (tm->year < 50) ? 2000 : 1900; } + tm->year += x; - /* - * We should have parsed all characters at this point - */ - if (0 != len) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_DATE; - } - - CHECK(x509_date_is_valid(tm)); + tm->mon = x509_parse2_int(p + 2); + tm->day = x509_parse2_int(p + 4); + tm->hour = x509_parse2_int(p + 6); + tm->min = x509_parse2_int(p + 8); + tm->sec = x509_parse2_int(p + 10); - return 0; + return x509_date_is_valid(tm); } /* @@ -674,7 +676,14 @@ int mbedtls_x509_get_time(unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_DATE, ret); } - return x509_parse_time(p, len, year_len, tm); + /* len is 12 or 14 depending on year_len, plus optional trailing 'Z' */ + if (len != year_len + 10 && + !(len == year_len + 11 && (*p)[(len - 1)] == 'Z')) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_DATE; + } + + (*p) += len; + return x509_parse_time(*p - len, tm, year_len); } int mbedtls_x509_get_sig(unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, mbedtls_x509_buf *sig) @@ -791,6 +800,11 @@ int mbedtls_x509_get_ext(unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, return 0; } +static char nibble_to_hex_digit(int i) +{ + return (i < 10) ? (i + '0') : (i - 10 + 'A'); +} + /* * Store the name in printable form into buf; no more * than size characters will be written @@ -798,11 +812,16 @@ int mbedtls_x509_get_ext(unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, int mbedtls_x509_dn_gets(char *buf, size_t size, const mbedtls_x509_name *dn) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - size_t i, j, n; + size_t i, j, n, asn1_len_size, asn1_tag_size, asn1_tag_len_buf_start; + /* 6 is enough as our asn1 write functions only write one byte for the tag and at most five bytes for the length*/ + unsigned char asn1_tag_len_buf[6]; + unsigned char *asn1_len_p; unsigned char c, merge = 0; const mbedtls_x509_name *name; const char *short_name = NULL; + char lowbits, highbits; char s[MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_DN_NAME_SIZE], *p; + int print_hexstring; memset(s, 0, sizeof(s)); @@ -821,32 +840,91 @@ int mbedtls_x509_dn_gets(char *buf, size_t size, const mbedtls_x509_name *dn) MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; } - ret = mbedtls_oid_get_attr_short_name(&name->oid, &short_name); + print_hexstring = (name->val.tag != MBEDTLS_ASN1_UTF8_STRING) && + (name->val.tag != MBEDTLS_ASN1_PRINTABLE_STRING) && + (name->val.tag != MBEDTLS_ASN1_IA5_STRING); - if (ret == 0) { + if ((ret = mbedtls_oid_get_attr_short_name(&name->oid, &short_name)) == 0) { ret = mbedtls_snprintf(p, n, "%s=", short_name); } else { - ret = mbedtls_snprintf(p, n, "\?\?="); + if ((ret = mbedtls_oid_get_numeric_string(p, n, &name->oid)) > 0) { + n -= ret; + p += ret; + ret = mbedtls_snprintf(p, n, "="); + print_hexstring = 1; + } else if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_OID_BUF_TOO_SMALL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + } else { + ret = mbedtls_snprintf(p, n, "\?\?="); + } } MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; - for (i = 0, j = 0; i < name->val.len; i++, j++) { - if (j >= sizeof(s) - 1) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; - } + if (print_hexstring) { + s[0] = '#'; - c = name->val.p[i]; - // Special characters requiring escaping, RFC 1779 - if (c && strchr(",=+<>#;\"\\", c)) { + asn1_len_p = asn1_tag_len_buf + sizeof(asn1_tag_len_buf); + if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_write_len(&asn1_len_p, asn1_tag_len_buf, name->val.len)) < 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + } + asn1_len_size = ret; + if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_write_tag(&asn1_len_p, asn1_tag_len_buf, name->val.tag)) < 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + } + asn1_tag_size = ret; + asn1_tag_len_buf_start = sizeof(asn1_tag_len_buf) - asn1_len_size - asn1_tag_size; + for (i = 0, j = 1; i < asn1_len_size + asn1_tag_size; i++) { if (j + 1 >= sizeof(s) - 1) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; } - s[j++] = '\\'; + c = asn1_tag_len_buf[asn1_tag_len_buf_start+i]; + lowbits = (c & 0x0F); + highbits = c >> 4; + s[j++] = nibble_to_hex_digit(highbits); + s[j++] = nibble_to_hex_digit(lowbits); } - if (c < 32 || c >= 127) { - s[j] = '?'; - } else { - s[j] = c; + for (i = 0; i < name->val.len; i++) { + if (j + 1 >= sizeof(s) - 1) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + } + c = name->val.p[i]; + lowbits = (c & 0x0F); + highbits = c >> 4; + s[j++] = nibble_to_hex_digit(highbits); + s[j++] = nibble_to_hex_digit(lowbits); + } + } else { + for (i = 0, j = 0; i < name->val.len; i++, j++) { + if (j >= sizeof(s) - 1) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + } + + c = name->val.p[i]; + // Special characters requiring escaping, RFC 4514 Section 2.4 + if (c == '\0') { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_NAME; + } else { + if (strchr(",=+<>;\"\\", c) || + ((i == 0) && strchr("# ", c)) || + ((i == name->val.len-1) && (c == ' '))) { + if (j + 1 >= sizeof(s) - 1) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + } + s[j++] = '\\'; + } + } + if (c < 32 || c >= 127) { + if (j + 3 >= sizeof(s) - 1) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + } + s[j++] = '\\'; + lowbits = (c & 0x0F); + highbits = c >> 4; + s[j++] = nibble_to_hex_digit(highbits); + s[j] = nibble_to_hex_digit(lowbits); + } else { + s[j] = c; + } } } s[j] = '\0'; @@ -894,6 +972,7 @@ int mbedtls_x509_serial_gets(char *buf, size_t size, const mbedtls_x509_buf *ser return (int) (size - n); } +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_REMOVE_INFO) /* * Helper for writing signature algorithms */ @@ -917,16 +996,15 @@ int mbedtls_x509_sig_alg_gets(char *buf, size_t size, const mbedtls_x509_buf *si #if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT) if (pk_alg == MBEDTLS_PK_RSASSA_PSS) { const mbedtls_pk_rsassa_pss_options *pss_opts; - const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info, *mgf_md_info; pss_opts = (const mbedtls_pk_rsassa_pss_options *) sig_opts; - md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type(md_alg); - mgf_md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type(pss_opts->mgf1_hash_id); + const char *name = md_type_to_string(md_alg); + const char *mgf_name = md_type_to_string(pss_opts->mgf1_hash_id); ret = mbedtls_snprintf(p, n, " (%s, MGF1-%s, 0x%02X)", - md_info ? mbedtls_md_get_name(md_info) : "???", - mgf_md_info ? mbedtls_md_get_name(mgf_md_info) : "???", + name ? name : "???", + mgf_name ? mgf_name : "???", (unsigned int) pss_opts->expected_salt_len); MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; } @@ -938,6 +1016,7 @@ int mbedtls_x509_sig_alg_gets(char *buf, size_t size, const mbedtls_x509_buf *si return (int) (size - n); } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_REMOVE_INFO */ /* * Helper for writing "RSA key size", "EC key size", etc @@ -954,81 +1033,45 @@ int mbedtls_x509_key_size_helper(char *buf, size_t buf_size, const char *name) return 0; } -#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE) -/* - * Set the time structure to the current time. - * Return 0 on success, non-zero on failure. - */ -static int x509_get_current_time(mbedtls_x509_time *now) +int mbedtls_x509_time_cmp(const mbedtls_x509_time *t1, + const mbedtls_x509_time *t2) { - struct tm *lt, tm_buf; - mbedtls_time_t tt; - int ret = 0; - - tt = mbedtls_time(NULL); - lt = mbedtls_platform_gmtime_r(&tt, &tm_buf); + int x; - if (lt == NULL) { - ret = -1; - } else { - now->year = lt->tm_year + 1900; - now->mon = lt->tm_mon + 1; - now->day = lt->tm_mday; - now->hour = lt->tm_hour; - now->min = lt->tm_min; - now->sec = lt->tm_sec; + x = (((t1->year << 9) | (t1->mon << 5) | (t1->day)) - + ((t2->year << 9) | (t2->mon << 5) | (t2->day))); + if (x != 0) { + return x; } - return ret; + x = (((t1->hour << 12) | (t1->min << 6) | (t1->sec)) - + ((t2->hour << 12) | (t2->min << 6) | (t2->sec))); + return x; } -/* - * Return 0 if before <= after, 1 otherwise - */ -static int x509_check_time(const mbedtls_x509_time *before, const mbedtls_x509_time *after) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE) +int mbedtls_x509_time_gmtime(mbedtls_time_t tt, mbedtls_x509_time *now) { - if (before->year > after->year) { - return 1; - } - - if (before->year == after->year && - before->mon > after->mon) { - return 1; - } - - if (before->year == after->year && - before->mon == after->mon && - before->day > after->day) { - return 1; - } - - if (before->year == after->year && - before->mon == after->mon && - before->day == after->day && - before->hour > after->hour) { - return 1; - } + struct tm tm; - if (before->year == after->year && - before->mon == after->mon && - before->day == after->day && - before->hour == after->hour && - before->min > after->min) { - return 1; - } - - if (before->year == after->year && - before->mon == after->mon && - before->day == after->day && - before->hour == after->hour && - before->min == after->min && - before->sec > after->sec) { - return 1; + if (mbedtls_platform_gmtime_r(&tt, &tm) == NULL) { + return -1; } + now->year = tm.tm_year + 1900; + now->mon = tm.tm_mon + 1; + now->day = tm.tm_mday; + now->hour = tm.tm_hour; + now->min = tm.tm_min; + now->sec = tm.tm_sec; return 0; } +static int x509_get_current_time(mbedtls_x509_time *now) +{ + return mbedtls_x509_time_gmtime(mbedtls_time(NULL), now); +} + int mbedtls_x509_time_is_past(const mbedtls_x509_time *to) { mbedtls_x509_time now; @@ -1037,7 +1080,7 @@ int mbedtls_x509_time_is_past(const mbedtls_x509_time *to) return 1; } - return x509_check_time(&now, to); + return mbedtls_x509_time_cmp(to, &now) < 0; } int mbedtls_x509_time_is_future(const mbedtls_x509_time *from) @@ -1048,7 +1091,7 @@ int mbedtls_x509_time_is_future(const mbedtls_x509_time *from) return 1; } - return x509_check_time(from, &now); + return mbedtls_x509_time_cmp(from, &now) > 0; } #else /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE */ @@ -1066,75 +1109,668 @@ int mbedtls_x509_time_is_future(const mbedtls_x509_time *from) } #endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) - -#include "mbedtls/x509_crt.h" -#include "mbedtls/certs.h" - +/* Common functions for parsing CRT and CSR. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CSR_PARSE_C) /* - * Checkup routine + * OtherName ::= SEQUENCE { + * type-id OBJECT IDENTIFIER, + * value [0] EXPLICIT ANY DEFINED BY type-id } + * + * HardwareModuleName ::= SEQUENCE { + * hwType OBJECT IDENTIFIER, + * hwSerialNum OCTET STRING } + * + * NOTE: we currently only parse and use otherName of type HwModuleName, + * as defined in RFC 4108. */ -int mbedtls_x509_self_test(int verbose) +static int x509_get_other_name(const mbedtls_x509_buf *subject_alt_name, + mbedtls_x509_san_other_name *other_name) { int ret = 0; -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CERTS_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) - uint32_t flags; - mbedtls_x509_crt cacert; - mbedtls_x509_crt clicert; + size_t len; + unsigned char *p = subject_alt_name->p; + const unsigned char *end = p + subject_alt_name->len; + mbedtls_x509_buf cur_oid; - if (verbose != 0) { - mbedtls_printf(" X.509 certificate load: "); + if ((subject_alt_name->tag & + (MBEDTLS_ASN1_TAG_CLASS_MASK | MBEDTLS_ASN1_TAG_VALUE_MASK)) != + (MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_OTHER_NAME)) { + /* + * The given subject alternative name is not of type "othername". + */ + return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } - mbedtls_x509_crt_init(&cacert); - mbedtls_x509_crt_init(&clicert); + if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p, end, &len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID)) != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret); + } - ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_parse(&clicert, (const unsigned char *) mbedtls_test_cli_crt, - mbedtls_test_cli_crt_len); - if (ret != 0) { - if (verbose != 0) { - mbedtls_printf("failed\n"); - } + cur_oid.tag = MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID; + cur_oid.p = p; + cur_oid.len = len; + + /* + * Only HwModuleName is currently supported. + */ + if (MBEDTLS_OID_CMP(MBEDTLS_OID_ON_HW_MODULE_NAME, &cur_oid) != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + } + other_name->type_id = cur_oid; - goto cleanup; + p += len; + if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p, end, &len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC)) != + 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret); } - ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_parse(&cacert, (const unsigned char *) mbedtls_test_ca_crt, - mbedtls_test_ca_crt_len); - if (ret != 0) { - if (verbose != 0) { - mbedtls_printf("failed\n"); + if (end != p + len) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + } + + if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p, end, &len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)) != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret); + } + + if (end != p + len) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + } + + if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p, end, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID)) != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret); + } + + other_name->value.hardware_module_name.oid.tag = MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID; + other_name->value.hardware_module_name.oid.p = p; + other_name->value.hardware_module_name.oid.len = len; + + p += len; + if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p, end, &len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_OCTET_STRING)) != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret); + } + + other_name->value.hardware_module_name.val.tag = MBEDTLS_ASN1_OCTET_STRING; + other_name->value.hardware_module_name.val.p = p; + other_name->value.hardware_module_name.val.len = len; + p += len; + if (p != end) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + } + return 0; +} + +/* Check mbedtls_x509_get_subject_alt_name for detailed description. + * + * In some cases while parsing subject alternative names the sequence tag is optional + * (e.g. CertSerialNumber). This function is designed to handle such case. + */ +int mbedtls_x509_get_subject_alt_name_ext(unsigned char **p, + const unsigned char *end, + mbedtls_x509_sequence *subject_alt_name) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t tag_len; + mbedtls_asn1_sequence *cur = subject_alt_name; + + while (*p < end) { + mbedtls_x509_subject_alternative_name tmp_san_name; + mbedtls_x509_buf tmp_san_buf; + memset(&tmp_san_name, 0, sizeof(tmp_san_name)); + + tmp_san_buf.tag = **p; + (*p)++; + + if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_len(p, end, &tag_len)) != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret); + } + + tmp_san_buf.p = *p; + tmp_san_buf.len = tag_len; + + if ((tmp_san_buf.tag & MBEDTLS_ASN1_TAG_CLASS_MASK) != + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG); + } + + /* + * Check that the SAN is structured correctly by parsing it. + * The SAN structure is discarded afterwards. + */ + ret = mbedtls_x509_parse_subject_alt_name(&tmp_san_buf, &tmp_san_name); + /* + * In case the extension is malformed, return an error, + * and clear the allocated sequences. + */ + if (ret != 0 && ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE) { + mbedtls_asn1_sequence_free(subject_alt_name->next); + subject_alt_name->next = NULL; + return ret; } - goto cleanup; + mbedtls_x509_free_subject_alt_name(&tmp_san_name); + /* Allocate and assign next pointer */ + if (cur->buf.p != NULL) { + if (cur->next != NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS; + } + + cur->next = mbedtls_calloc(1, sizeof(mbedtls_asn1_sequence)); + + if (cur->next == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_ALLOC_FAILED); + } + + cur = cur->next; + } + + cur->buf = tmp_san_buf; + *p += tmp_san_buf.len; } - if (verbose != 0) { - mbedtls_printf("passed\n X.509 signature verify: "); + /* Set final sequence entry's next pointer to NULL */ + cur->next = NULL; + + if (*p != end) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH); } - ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_verify(&clicert, &cacert, NULL, NULL, &flags, NULL, NULL); - if (ret != 0) { - if (verbose != 0) { - mbedtls_printf("failed\n"); + return 0; +} + +/* + * SubjectAltName ::= GeneralNames + * + * GeneralNames ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF GeneralName + * + * GeneralName ::= CHOICE { + * otherName [0] OtherName, + * rfc822Name [1] IA5String, + * dNSName [2] IA5String, + * x400Address [3] ORAddress, + * directoryName [4] Name, + * ediPartyName [5] EDIPartyName, + * uniformResourceIdentifier [6] IA5String, + * iPAddress [7] OCTET STRING, + * registeredID [8] OBJECT IDENTIFIER } + * + * OtherName ::= SEQUENCE { + * type-id OBJECT IDENTIFIER, + * value [0] EXPLICIT ANY DEFINED BY type-id } + * + * EDIPartyName ::= SEQUENCE { + * nameAssigner [0] DirectoryString OPTIONAL, + * partyName [1] DirectoryString } + * + * We list all types, but use the following GeneralName types from RFC 5280: + * "dnsName", "uniformResourceIdentifier" and "hardware_module_name" + * of type "otherName", as defined in RFC 4108. + */ +int mbedtls_x509_get_subject_alt_name(unsigned char **p, + const unsigned char *end, + mbedtls_x509_sequence *subject_alt_name) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t len; + + /* Get main sequence tag */ + if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(p, end, &len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)) != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret); + } + + if (*p + len != end) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + } + + return mbedtls_x509_get_subject_alt_name_ext(p, end, subject_alt_name); +} + +int mbedtls_x509_get_ns_cert_type(unsigned char **p, + const unsigned char *end, + unsigned char *ns_cert_type) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_x509_bitstring bs = { 0, 0, NULL }; + + if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_bitstring(p, end, &bs)) != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret); + } + + /* A bitstring with no flags set is still technically valid, as it will mean + that the certificate has no designated purpose at the time of creation. */ + if (bs.len == 0) { + *ns_cert_type = 0; + return 0; + } + + if (bs.len != 1) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH); + } + + /* Get actual bitstring */ + *ns_cert_type = *bs.p; + return 0; +} + +int mbedtls_x509_get_key_usage(unsigned char **p, + const unsigned char *end, + unsigned int *key_usage) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t i; + mbedtls_x509_bitstring bs = { 0, 0, NULL }; + + if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_bitstring(p, end, &bs)) != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret); + } + + /* A bitstring with no flags set is still technically valid, as it will mean + that the certificate has no designated purpose at the time of creation. */ + if (bs.len == 0) { + *key_usage = 0; + return 0; + } + + /* Get actual bitstring */ + *key_usage = 0; + for (i = 0; i < bs.len && i < sizeof(unsigned int); i++) { + *key_usage |= (unsigned int) bs.p[i] << (8*i); + } + + return 0; +} + +int mbedtls_x509_parse_subject_alt_name(const mbedtls_x509_buf *san_buf, + mbedtls_x509_subject_alternative_name *san) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + switch (san_buf->tag & + (MBEDTLS_ASN1_TAG_CLASS_MASK | + MBEDTLS_ASN1_TAG_VALUE_MASK)) { + /* + * otherName + */ + case (MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_OTHER_NAME): + { + mbedtls_x509_san_other_name other_name; + + ret = x509_get_other_name(san_buf, &other_name); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + + memset(san, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_x509_subject_alternative_name)); + san->type = MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_OTHER_NAME; + memcpy(&san->san.other_name, + &other_name, sizeof(other_name)); + } + break; + /* + * uniformResourceIdentifier + */ + case (MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_UNIFORM_RESOURCE_IDENTIFIER): + { + memset(san, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_x509_subject_alternative_name)); + san->type = MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_UNIFORM_RESOURCE_IDENTIFIER; - goto cleanup; + memcpy(&san->san.unstructured_name, + san_buf, sizeof(*san_buf)); + + } + break; + /* + * dNSName + */ + case (MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_DNS_NAME): + { + memset(san, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_x509_subject_alternative_name)); + san->type = MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_DNS_NAME; + + memcpy(&san->san.unstructured_name, + san_buf, sizeof(*san_buf)); + } + break; + /* + * IP address + */ + case (MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_IP_ADDRESS): + { + memset(san, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_x509_subject_alternative_name)); + san->type = MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_IP_ADDRESS; + // Only IPv6 (16 bytes) and IPv4 (4 bytes) types are supported + if (san_buf->len == 4 || san_buf->len == 16) { + memcpy(&san->san.unstructured_name, + san_buf, sizeof(*san_buf)); + } else { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + } + break; + /* + * rfc822Name + */ + case (MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_RFC822_NAME): + { + memset(san, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_x509_subject_alternative_name)); + san->type = MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_RFC822_NAME; + memcpy(&san->san.unstructured_name, san_buf, sizeof(*san_buf)); + } + break; + /* + * directoryName + */ + case (MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_DIRECTORY_NAME): + { + size_t name_len; + unsigned char *p = san_buf->p; + memset(san, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_x509_subject_alternative_name)); + san->type = MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_DIRECTORY_NAME; + + ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p, p + san_buf->len, &name_len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE); + + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + + if ((ret = mbedtls_x509_get_name(&p, p + name_len, + &san->san.directory_name)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + } + break; + /* + * Type not supported + */ + default: + return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; } + return 0; +} - if (verbose != 0) { - mbedtls_printf("passed\n\n"); +void mbedtls_x509_free_subject_alt_name(mbedtls_x509_subject_alternative_name *san) +{ + if (san->type == MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_DIRECTORY_NAME) { + mbedtls_asn1_free_named_data_list_shallow(san->san.directory_name.next); } +} -cleanup: - mbedtls_x509_crt_free(&cacert); - mbedtls_x509_crt_free(&clicert); -#else - ((void) verbose); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CERTS_C && MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ - return ret; +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_REMOVE_INFO) +int mbedtls_x509_info_subject_alt_name(char **buf, size_t *size, + const mbedtls_x509_sequence + *subject_alt_name, + const char *prefix) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t i; + size_t n = *size; + char *p = *buf; + const mbedtls_x509_sequence *cur = subject_alt_name; + mbedtls_x509_subject_alternative_name san; + int parse_ret; + + while (cur != NULL) { + memset(&san, 0, sizeof(san)); + parse_ret = mbedtls_x509_parse_subject_alt_name(&cur->buf, &san); + if (parse_ret != 0) { + if (parse_ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE) { + ret = mbedtls_snprintf(p, n, "\n%s ", prefix); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + } else { + ret = mbedtls_snprintf(p, n, "\n%s ", prefix); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + } + cur = cur->next; + continue; + } + + switch (san.type) { + /* + * otherName + */ + case MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_OTHER_NAME: + { + mbedtls_x509_san_other_name *other_name = &san.san.other_name; + + ret = mbedtls_snprintf(p, n, "\n%s otherName :", prefix); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + + if (MBEDTLS_OID_CMP(MBEDTLS_OID_ON_HW_MODULE_NAME, + &other_name->type_id) == 0) { + ret = mbedtls_snprintf(p, n, "\n%s hardware module name :", prefix); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + ret = + mbedtls_snprintf(p, n, "\n%s hardware type : ", prefix); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + + ret = mbedtls_oid_get_numeric_string(p, + n, + &other_name->value.hardware_module_name.oid); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + + ret = + mbedtls_snprintf(p, n, "\n%s hardware serial number : ", prefix); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + + for (i = 0; i < other_name->value.hardware_module_name.val.len; i++) { + ret = mbedtls_snprintf(p, + n, + "%02X", + other_name->value.hardware_module_name.val.p[i]); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + } + }/* MBEDTLS_OID_ON_HW_MODULE_NAME */ + } + break; + /* + * uniformResourceIdentifier + */ + case MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_UNIFORM_RESOURCE_IDENTIFIER: + { + ret = mbedtls_snprintf(p, n, "\n%s uniformResourceIdentifier : ", prefix); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + if (san.san.unstructured_name.len >= n) { + if (n > 0) { + *p = '\0'; + } + return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + } + + memcpy(p, san.san.unstructured_name.p, san.san.unstructured_name.len); + p += san.san.unstructured_name.len; + n -= san.san.unstructured_name.len; + } + break; + /* + * dNSName + * RFC822 Name + */ + case MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_DNS_NAME: + case MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_RFC822_NAME: + { + const char *dns_name = "dNSName"; + const char *rfc822_name = "rfc822Name"; + + ret = mbedtls_snprintf(p, n, + "\n%s %s : ", + prefix, + san.type == + MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_DNS_NAME ? dns_name : rfc822_name); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + if (san.san.unstructured_name.len >= n) { + if (n > 0) { + *p = '\0'; + } + return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + } + + memcpy(p, san.san.unstructured_name.p, san.san.unstructured_name.len); + p += san.san.unstructured_name.len; + n -= san.san.unstructured_name.len; + } + break; + /* + * iPAddress + */ + case MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_IP_ADDRESS: + { + ret = mbedtls_snprintf(p, n, "\n%s %s : ", + prefix, "iPAddress"); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + if (san.san.unstructured_name.len >= n) { + if (n > 0) { + *p = '\0'; + } + return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + } + + unsigned char *ip = san.san.unstructured_name.p; + // Only IPv6 (16 bytes) and IPv4 (4 bytes) types are supported + if (san.san.unstructured_name.len == 4) { + ret = mbedtls_snprintf(p, n, "%u.%u.%u.%u", ip[0], ip[1], ip[2], ip[3]); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + } else if (san.san.unstructured_name.len == 16) { + ret = mbedtls_snprintf(p, n, + "%X%X:%X%X:%X%X:%X%X:%X%X:%X%X:%X%X:%X%X", + ip[0], ip[1], ip[2], ip[3], ip[4], ip[5], ip[6], + ip[7], ip[8], ip[9], ip[10], ip[11], ip[12], ip[13], + ip[14], ip[15]); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + } else { + if (n > 0) { + *p = '\0'; + } + return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + } + break; + /* + * directoryName + */ + case MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_DIRECTORY_NAME: + { + ret = mbedtls_snprintf(p, n, "\n%s directoryName : ", prefix); + if (ret < 0 || (size_t) ret >= n) { + mbedtls_x509_free_subject_alt_name(&san); + } + + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + ret = mbedtls_x509_dn_gets(p, n, &san.san.directory_name); + + if (ret < 0) { + mbedtls_x509_free_subject_alt_name(&san); + if (n > 0) { + *p = '\0'; + } + return ret; + } + + p += ret; + n -= ret; + } + break; + /* + * Type not supported, skip item. + */ + default: + ret = mbedtls_snprintf(p, n, "\n%s ", prefix); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + break; + } + + /* So far memory is freed only in the case of directoryName + * parsing succeeding, as mbedtls_x509_get_name allocates memory. */ + mbedtls_x509_free_subject_alt_name(&san); + cur = cur->next; + } + + *p = '\0'; + + *size = n; + *buf = p; + + return 0; +} + +#define PRINT_ITEM(i) \ + do { \ + ret = mbedtls_snprintf(p, n, "%s" i, sep); \ + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; \ + sep = ", "; \ + } while (0) + +#define CERT_TYPE(type, name) \ + do { \ + if (ns_cert_type & (type)) { \ + PRINT_ITEM(name); \ + } \ + } while (0) + +int mbedtls_x509_info_cert_type(char **buf, size_t *size, + unsigned char ns_cert_type) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t n = *size; + char *p = *buf; + const char *sep = ""; + + CERT_TYPE(MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_SSL_CLIENT, "SSL Client"); + CERT_TYPE(MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_SSL_SERVER, "SSL Server"); + CERT_TYPE(MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_EMAIL, "Email"); + CERT_TYPE(MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_OBJECT_SIGNING, "Object Signing"); + CERT_TYPE(MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_RESERVED, "Reserved"); + CERT_TYPE(MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_SSL_CA, "SSL CA"); + CERT_TYPE(MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_EMAIL_CA, "Email CA"); + CERT_TYPE(MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_OBJECT_SIGNING_CA, "Object Signing CA"); + + *size = n; + *buf = p; + + return 0; } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ +#define KEY_USAGE(code, name) \ + do { \ + if ((key_usage) & (code)) { \ + PRINT_ITEM(name); \ + } \ + } while (0) +int mbedtls_x509_info_key_usage(char **buf, size_t *size, + unsigned int key_usage) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t n = *size; + char *p = *buf; + const char *sep = ""; + + KEY_USAGE(MBEDTLS_X509_KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE, "Digital Signature"); + KEY_USAGE(MBEDTLS_X509_KU_NON_REPUDIATION, "Non Repudiation"); + KEY_USAGE(MBEDTLS_X509_KU_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT, "Key Encipherment"); + KEY_USAGE(MBEDTLS_X509_KU_DATA_ENCIPHERMENT, "Data Encipherment"); + KEY_USAGE(MBEDTLS_X509_KU_KEY_AGREEMENT, "Key Agreement"); + KEY_USAGE(MBEDTLS_X509_KU_KEY_CERT_SIGN, "Key Cert Sign"); + KEY_USAGE(MBEDTLS_X509_KU_CRL_SIGN, "CRL Sign"); + KEY_USAGE(MBEDTLS_X509_KU_ENCIPHER_ONLY, "Encipher Only"); + KEY_USAGE(MBEDTLS_X509_KU_DECIPHER_ONLY, "Decipher Only"); + + *size = n; + *buf = p; + + return 0; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_REMOVE_INFO */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C || MBEDTLS_X509_CSR_PARSE_C */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C */ diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/x509_create.c b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/x509_create.c index 4ffd3b6a8030..839b5df226ff 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/x509_create.c +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/x509_create.c @@ -9,13 +9,17 @@ #if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CREATE_C) -#include "mbedtls/x509.h" +#include "x509_internal.h" #include "mbedtls/asn1write.h" #include "mbedtls/error.h" #include "mbedtls/oid.h" #include +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" + +#include "mbedtls/asn1.h" + /* Structure linking OIDs for X.509 DN AttributeTypes to their * string representations and default string encodings used by Mbed TLS. */ typedef struct { @@ -23,7 +27,8 @@ typedef struct { * "CN" or "emailAddress". */ size_t name_len; /* Length of 'name', without trailing 0 byte. */ const char *oid; /* String representation of OID of AttributeType, - * as per RFC 5280, Appendix A.1. */ + * as per RFC 5280, Appendix A.1. encoded as per + * X.690 */ int default_tag; /* The default character encoding used for the * given attribute type, e.g. * MBEDTLS_ASN1_UTF8_STRING for UTF-8. */ @@ -111,79 +116,261 @@ static const x509_attr_descriptor_t *x509_attr_descr_from_name(const char *name, return cur; } +static int hex_to_int(char c) +{ + return ('0' <= c && c <= '9') ? (c - '0') : + ('a' <= c && c <= 'f') ? (c - 'a' + 10) : + ('A' <= c && c <= 'F') ? (c - 'A' + 10) : -1; +} + +static int hexpair_to_int(const char *hexpair) +{ + int n1 = hex_to_int(*hexpair); + int n2 = hex_to_int(*(hexpair + 1)); + + if (n1 != -1 && n2 != -1) { + return (n1 << 4) | n2; + } else { + return -1; + } +} + +static int parse_attribute_value_string(const char *s, + int len, + unsigned char *data, + size_t *data_len) +{ + const char *c; + const char *end = s + len; + unsigned char *d = data; + int n; + + for (c = s; c < end; c++) { + if (*c == '\\') { + c++; + + /* Check for valid escaped characters as per RFC 4514 Section 3 */ + if (c + 1 < end && (n = hexpair_to_int(c)) != -1) { + if (n == 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_NAME; + } + *(d++) = n; + c++; + } else if (c < end && strchr(" ,=+<>#;\"\\", *c)) { + *(d++) = *c; + } else { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_NAME; + } + } else { + *(d++) = *c; + } + + if (d - data == MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_DN_NAME_SIZE) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_NAME; + } + } + *data_len = (size_t) (d - data); + return 0; +} + +/** Parse a hexstring containing a DER-encoded string. + * + * \param s A string of \p len bytes hexadecimal digits. + * \param len Number of bytes to read from \p s. + * \param data Output buffer of size \p data_size. + * On success, it contains the payload that's DER-encoded + * in the input (content without the tag and length). + * If the DER tag is a string tag, the payload is guaranteed + * not to contain null bytes. + * \param data_size Length of the \p data buffer. + * \param data_len On success, the length of the parsed string. + * It is guaranteed to be less than + * #MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_DN_NAME_SIZE. + * \param tag The ASN.1 tag that the payload in \p data is encoded in. + * + * \retval 0 on success. + * \retval #MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_NAME if \p s does not contain + * a valid hexstring, + * or if the decoded hexstring is not valid DER, + * or if the payload does not fit in \p data, + * or if the payload is more than + * #MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_DN_NAME_SIZE bytes, + * of if \p *tag is an ASN.1 string tag and the payload + * contains a null byte. + * \retval #MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_ALLOC_FAILED on low memory. + */ +static int parse_attribute_value_hex_der_encoded(const char *s, + size_t len, + unsigned char *data, + size_t data_size, + size_t *data_len, + int *tag) +{ + /* Step 1: preliminary length checks. */ + /* Each byte is encoded by exactly two hexadecimal digits. */ + if (len % 2 != 0) { + /* Odd number of hex digits */ + return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_NAME; + } + size_t const der_length = len / 2; + if (der_length > MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_DN_NAME_SIZE + 4) { + /* The payload would be more than MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_DN_NAME_SIZE + * (after subtracting the ASN.1 tag and length). Reject this early + * to avoid allocating a large intermediate buffer. */ + return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_NAME; + } + if (der_length < 1) { + /* Avoid empty-buffer shenanigans. A valid DER encoding is never + * empty. */ + return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_NAME; + } + + /* Step 2: Decode the hex string into an intermediate buffer. */ + unsigned char *der = mbedtls_calloc(1, der_length); + if (der == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_ALLOC_FAILED; + } + /* Beyond this point, der needs to be freed on exit. */ + for (size_t i = 0; i < der_length; i++) { + int c = hexpair_to_int(s + 2 * i); + if (c < 0) { + goto error; + } + der[i] = c; + } + + /* Step 3: decode the DER. */ + /* We've checked that der_length >= 1 above. */ + *tag = der[0]; + { + unsigned char *p = der + 1; + if (mbedtls_asn1_get_len(&p, der + der_length, data_len) != 0) { + goto error; + } + /* Now p points to the first byte of the payload inside der, + * and *data_len is the length of the payload. */ + + /* Step 4: payload validation */ + if (*data_len > MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_DN_NAME_SIZE) { + goto error; + } + /* Strings must not contain null bytes. */ + if (MBEDTLS_ASN1_IS_STRING_TAG(*tag)) { + for (size_t i = 0; i < *data_len; i++) { + if (p[i] == 0) { + goto error; + } + } + } + + /* Step 5: output the payload. */ + if (*data_len > data_size) { + goto error; + } + memcpy(data, p, *data_len); + } + mbedtls_free(der); + + return 0; + +error: + mbedtls_free(der); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_NAME; +} + int mbedtls_x509_string_to_names(mbedtls_asn1_named_data **head, const char *name) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_NAME; + int parse_ret = 0; const char *s = name, *c = s; const char *end = s + strlen(s); - const char *oid = NULL; + mbedtls_asn1_buf oid = { .p = NULL, .len = 0, .tag = MBEDTLS_ASN1_NULL }; const x509_attr_descriptor_t *attr_descr = NULL; - int in_tag = 1; - char data[MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_DN_NAME_SIZE]; - char *d = data; + int in_attr_type = 1; + int tag; + int numericoid = 0; + unsigned char data[MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_DN_NAME_SIZE]; + size_t data_len = 0; /* Clear existing chain if present */ mbedtls_asn1_free_named_data_list(head); while (c <= end) { - if (in_tag && *c == '=') { - if ((attr_descr = x509_attr_descr_from_name(s, c - s)) == NULL) { - ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_UNKNOWN_OID; - goto exit; + if (in_attr_type && *c == '=') { + if ((attr_descr = x509_attr_descr_from_name(s, (size_t) (c - s))) == NULL) { + if ((mbedtls_oid_from_numeric_string(&oid, s, (size_t) (c - s))) != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_NAME; + } else { + numericoid = 1; + } + } else { + oid.len = strlen(attr_descr->oid); + oid.p = mbedtls_calloc(1, oid.len); + memcpy(oid.p, attr_descr->oid, oid.len); + numericoid = 0; } - oid = attr_descr->oid; s = c + 1; - in_tag = 0; - d = data; + in_attr_type = 0; } - if (!in_tag && *c == '\\' && c != end) { - c++; - - /* Check for valid escaped characters */ - if (c == end || *c != ',') { - ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_NAME; - goto exit; + if (!in_attr_type && ((*c == ',' && *(c-1) != '\\') || c == end)) { + if (s == c) { + mbedtls_free(oid.p); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_NAME; + } else if (*s == '#') { + /* We know that c >= s (loop invariant) and c != s (in this + * else branch), hence c - s - 1 >= 0. */ + parse_ret = parse_attribute_value_hex_der_encoded( + s + 1, (size_t) (c - s) - 1, + data, sizeof(data), &data_len, &tag); + if (parse_ret != 0) { + mbedtls_free(oid.p); + return parse_ret; + } + } else { + if (numericoid) { + mbedtls_free(oid.p); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_NAME; + } else { + if ((parse_ret = + parse_attribute_value_string(s, (int) (c - s), data, + &data_len)) != 0) { + mbedtls_free(oid.p); + return parse_ret; + } + tag = attr_descr->default_tag; + } } - } else if (!in_tag && (*c == ',' || c == end)) { + mbedtls_asn1_named_data *cur = - mbedtls_asn1_store_named_data(head, oid, strlen(oid), + mbedtls_asn1_store_named_data(head, (char *) oid.p, oid.len, (unsigned char *) data, - d - data); - + data_len); + mbedtls_free(oid.p); + oid.p = NULL; if (cur == NULL) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_ALLOC_FAILED; } // set tagType - cur->val.tag = attr_descr->default_tag; + cur->val.tag = tag; while (c < end && *(c + 1) == ' ') { c++; } s = c + 1; - in_tag = 1; + in_attr_type = 1; /* Successfully parsed one name, update ret to success */ ret = 0; } - - if (!in_tag && s != c + 1) { - *(d++) = *c; - - if (d - data == MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_DN_NAME_SIZE) { - ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_NAME; - goto exit; - } - } - c++; } - -exit: - + if (oid.p != NULL) { + mbedtls_free(oid.p); + } return ret; } diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/x509_crl.c b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/x509_crl.c index f98c22d704ef..7901992e20d8 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/x509_crl.c +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/x509_crl.c @@ -20,6 +20,7 @@ #if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRL_PARSE_C) #include "mbedtls/x509_crl.h" +#include "x509_internal.h" #include "mbedtls/error.h" #include "mbedtls/oid.h" #include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" @@ -367,7 +368,7 @@ int mbedtls_x509_crl_parse_der(mbedtls_x509_crl *chain, } end = p + len; - crl->tbs.len = end - crl->tbs.p; + crl->tbs.len = (size_t) (end - crl->tbs.p); /* * Version ::= INTEGER OPTIONAL { v1(0), v2(1) } @@ -411,7 +412,7 @@ int mbedtls_x509_crl_parse_der(mbedtls_x509_crl *chain, return ret; } - crl->issuer_raw.len = p - crl->issuer_raw.p; + crl->issuer_raw.len = (size_t) (p - crl->issuer_raw.p); /* * thisUpdate Time @@ -575,13 +576,13 @@ int mbedtls_x509_crl_parse_file(mbedtls_x509_crl *chain, const char *path) ret = mbedtls_x509_crl_parse(chain, buf, n); - mbedtls_platform_zeroize(buf, n); - mbedtls_free(buf); + mbedtls_zeroize_and_free(buf, n); return ret; } #endif /* MBEDTLS_FS_IO */ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_REMOVE_INFO) /* * Return an informational string about the certificate. */ @@ -660,6 +661,7 @@ int mbedtls_x509_crl_info(char *buf, size_t size, const char *prefix, return (int) (size - n); } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_REMOVE_INFO */ /* * Initialize a CRL chain @@ -676,47 +678,28 @@ void mbedtls_x509_crl_free(mbedtls_x509_crl *crl) { mbedtls_x509_crl *crl_cur = crl; mbedtls_x509_crl *crl_prv; - mbedtls_x509_name *name_cur; - mbedtls_x509_name *name_prv; mbedtls_x509_crl_entry *entry_cur; mbedtls_x509_crl_entry *entry_prv; - if (crl == NULL) { - return; - } - - do { + while (crl_cur != NULL) { #if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT) mbedtls_free(crl_cur->sig_opts); #endif - name_cur = crl_cur->issuer.next; - while (name_cur != NULL) { - name_prv = name_cur; - name_cur = name_cur->next; - mbedtls_platform_zeroize(name_prv, sizeof(mbedtls_x509_name)); - mbedtls_free(name_prv); - } + mbedtls_asn1_free_named_data_list_shallow(crl_cur->issuer.next); entry_cur = crl_cur->entry.next; while (entry_cur != NULL) { entry_prv = entry_cur; entry_cur = entry_cur->next; - mbedtls_platform_zeroize(entry_prv, + mbedtls_zeroize_and_free(entry_prv, sizeof(mbedtls_x509_crl_entry)); - mbedtls_free(entry_prv); } if (crl_cur->raw.p != NULL) { - mbedtls_platform_zeroize(crl_cur->raw.p, crl_cur->raw.len); - mbedtls_free(crl_cur->raw.p); + mbedtls_zeroize_and_free(crl_cur->raw.p, crl_cur->raw.len); } - crl_cur = crl_cur->next; - } while (crl_cur != NULL); - - crl_cur = crl; - do { crl_prv = crl_cur; crl_cur = crl_cur->next; @@ -724,7 +707,7 @@ void mbedtls_x509_crl_free(mbedtls_x509_crl *crl) if (crl_prv != crl) { mbedtls_free(crl_prv); } - } while (crl_cur != NULL); + } } #endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRL_PARSE_C */ diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/x509_crt.c b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/x509_crt.c index a3a4525b9478..2fd56fbd79dd 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/x509_crt.c +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/x509_crt.c @@ -22,6 +22,7 @@ #if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) #include "mbedtls/x509_crt.h" +#include "x509_internal.h" #include "mbedtls/error.h" #include "mbedtls/oid.h" #include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" @@ -34,8 +35,10 @@ #if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) #include "psa/crypto.h" +#include "psa_util_internal.h" #include "mbedtls/psa_util.h" -#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ +#include "pk_internal.h" #include "mbedtls/platform.h" @@ -45,6 +48,7 @@ #if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) #if defined(_WIN32) && !defined(EFIX64) && !defined(EFI32) +#define WIN32_LEAN_AND_MEAN #include #else #include @@ -56,7 +60,11 @@ #if !defined(_WIN32) || defined(EFIX64) || defined(EFI32) #include #include +#if defined(__MBED__) +#include +#else #include +#endif /* __MBED__ */ #include #endif /* !_WIN32 || EFIX64 || EFI32 */ #endif @@ -78,28 +86,39 @@ typedef struct { * concerns. */ const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile mbedtls_x509_crt_profile_default = { - /* Only SHA-2 hashes */ - MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224) | + /* Hashes from SHA-256 and above. Note that this selection + * should be aligned with ssl_preset_default_hashes in ssl_tls.c. */ MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256) | MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384) | MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512), 0xFFFFFFF, /* Any PK alg */ - 0xFFFFFFF, /* Any curve */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS) + /* Curves at or above 128-bit security level. Note that this selection + * should be aligned with ssl_preset_default_curves in ssl_tls.c. */ + MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1) | + MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1) | + MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1) | + MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1) | + MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1) | + MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1) | + 0, +#else /* MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS */ + 0, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS */ 2048, }; -/* - * Next-default profile - */ +/* Next-generation profile. Currently identical to the default, but may + * be tightened at any time. */ const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile mbedtls_x509_crt_profile_next = { - /* Hashes from SHA-256 and above */ + /* Hashes from SHA-256 and above. */ MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256) | MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384) | MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512), 0xFFFFFFF, /* Any PK alg */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) - /* Curves at or above 128-bit security level */ + /* Curves at or above 128-bit security level. */ MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1) | MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1) | MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1) | @@ -124,14 +143,25 @@ const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile mbedtls_x509_crt_profile_suiteb = /* Only ECDSA */ MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG(MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA) | MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG(MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY), -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS) /* Only NIST P-256 and P-384 */ MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1) | MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1), -#else +#else /* MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS */ + 0, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS */ + 0, +}; + +/* + * Empty / all-forbidden profile + */ +const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile mbedtls_x509_crt_profile_none = +{ 0, -#endif 0, + 0, + (uint32_t) -1, }; /* @@ -187,13 +217,13 @@ static int x509_profile_check_key(const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile *profile, return -1; } -#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS) if (pk_alg == MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA || pk_alg == MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY || pk_alg == MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY_DH) { - const mbedtls_ecp_group_id gid = mbedtls_pk_ec(*pk)->grp.id; + const mbedtls_ecp_group_id gid = mbedtls_pk_get_ec_group_id(pk); if (gid == MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE) { return -1; @@ -205,7 +235,7 @@ static int x509_profile_check_key(const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile *profile, return -1; } -#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS */ return -1; } @@ -523,113 +553,75 @@ static int x509_get_basic_constraints(unsigned char **p, return 0; } -static int x509_get_ns_cert_type(unsigned char **p, - const unsigned char *end, - unsigned char *ns_cert_type) -{ - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - mbedtls_x509_bitstring bs = { 0, 0, NULL }; - - if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_bitstring(p, end, &bs)) != 0) { - return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret); - } - - if (bs.len != 1) { - return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, - MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH); - } - - /* Get actual bitstring */ - *ns_cert_type = *bs.p; - return 0; -} - -static int x509_get_key_usage(unsigned char **p, - const unsigned char *end, - unsigned int *key_usage) +/* + * ExtKeyUsageSyntax ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF KeyPurposeId + * + * KeyPurposeId ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER + */ +static int x509_get_ext_key_usage(unsigned char **p, + const unsigned char *end, + mbedtls_x509_sequence *ext_key_usage) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - size_t i; - mbedtls_x509_bitstring bs = { 0, 0, NULL }; - if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_bitstring(p, end, &bs)) != 0) { + if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_sequence_of(p, end, ext_key_usage, MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID)) != 0) { return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret); } - if (bs.len < 1) { + /* Sequence length must be >= 1 */ + if (ext_key_usage->buf.p == NULL) { return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH); } - /* Get actual bitstring */ - *key_usage = 0; - for (i = 0; i < bs.len && i < sizeof(unsigned int); i++) { - *key_usage |= (unsigned int) bs.p[i] << (8*i); - } - return 0; } /* - * ExtKeyUsageSyntax ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF KeyPurposeId + * SubjectKeyIdentifier ::= KeyIdentifier * - * KeyPurposeId ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER + * KeyIdentifier ::= OCTET STRING */ -static int x509_get_ext_key_usage(unsigned char **p, - const unsigned char *end, - mbedtls_x509_sequence *ext_key_usage) +static int x509_get_subject_key_id(unsigned char **p, + const unsigned char *end, + mbedtls_x509_buf *subject_key_id) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t len = 0u; - if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_sequence_of(p, end, ext_key_usage, MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID)) != 0) { + if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(p, end, &len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_OCTET_STRING)) != 0) { return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret); } - /* Sequence length must be >= 1 */ - if (ext_key_usage->buf.p == NULL) { + subject_key_id->len = len; + subject_key_id->tag = MBEDTLS_ASN1_OCTET_STRING; + subject_key_id->p = *p; + *p += len; + + if (*p != end) { return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, - MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH); + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH); } return 0; } /* - * SubjectAltName ::= GeneralNames - * - * GeneralNames ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF GeneralName - * - * GeneralName ::= CHOICE { - * otherName [0] OtherName, - * rfc822Name [1] IA5String, - * dNSName [2] IA5String, - * x400Address [3] ORAddress, - * directoryName [4] Name, - * ediPartyName [5] EDIPartyName, - * uniformResourceIdentifier [6] IA5String, - * iPAddress [7] OCTET STRING, - * registeredID [8] OBJECT IDENTIFIER } + * AuthorityKeyIdentifier ::= SEQUENCE { + * keyIdentifier [0] KeyIdentifier OPTIONAL, + * authorityCertIssuer [1] GeneralNames OPTIONAL, + * authorityCertSerialNumber [2] CertificateSerialNumber OPTIONAL } * - * OtherName ::= SEQUENCE { - * type-id OBJECT IDENTIFIER, - * value [0] EXPLICIT ANY DEFINED BY type-id } - * - * EDIPartyName ::= SEQUENCE { - * nameAssigner [0] DirectoryString OPTIONAL, - * partyName [1] DirectoryString } - * - * NOTE: we list all types, but only use dNSName and otherName - * of type HwModuleName, as defined in RFC 4108, at this point. + * KeyIdentifier ::= OCTET STRING */ -static int x509_get_subject_alt_name(unsigned char **p, - const unsigned char *end, - mbedtls_x509_sequence *subject_alt_name) +static int x509_get_authority_key_id(unsigned char **p, + unsigned char *end, + mbedtls_x509_authority *authority_key_id) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - size_t len, tag_len; - mbedtls_asn1_sequence *cur = subject_alt_name; + size_t len = 0u; - /* Get main sequence tag */ if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(p, end, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)) != 0) { return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret); @@ -640,75 +632,54 @@ static int x509_get_subject_alt_name(unsigned char **p, MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH); } - while (*p < end) { - mbedtls_x509_subject_alternative_name dummy_san_buf; - mbedtls_x509_buf tmp_san_buf; - memset(&dummy_san_buf, 0, sizeof(dummy_san_buf)); - - tmp_san_buf.tag = **p; - (*p)++; + ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(p, end, &len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC); - if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_len(p, end, &tag_len)) != 0) { - return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret); - } + /* KeyIdentifier is an OPTIONAL field */ + if (ret == 0) { + authority_key_id->keyIdentifier.len = len; + authority_key_id->keyIdentifier.p = *p; + /* Setting tag of the keyIdentfier intentionally to 0x04. + * Although the .keyIdentfier field is CONTEXT_SPECIFIC ([0] OPTIONAL), + * its tag with the content is the payload of on OCTET STRING primitive */ + authority_key_id->keyIdentifier.tag = MBEDTLS_ASN1_OCTET_STRING; - tmp_san_buf.p = *p; - tmp_san_buf.len = tag_len; + *p += len; + } else if (ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret); + } - if ((tmp_san_buf.tag & MBEDTLS_ASN1_TAG_CLASS_MASK) != - MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC) { - return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, - MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG); + if (*p < end) { + /* Getting authorityCertIssuer using the required specific class tag [1] */ + if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(p, end, &len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | + 1)) != 0) { + /* authorityCertIssuer and authorityCertSerialNumber MUST both + be present or both be absent. At this point we expect to have both. */ + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret); } - - /* - * Check that the SAN is structured correctly. - */ - ret = mbedtls_x509_parse_subject_alt_name(&tmp_san_buf, &dummy_san_buf); - /* - * In case the extension is malformed, return an error, - * and clear the allocated sequences. - */ - if (ret != 0 && ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE) { - mbedtls_x509_sequence *seq_cur = subject_alt_name->next; - mbedtls_x509_sequence *seq_prv; - while (seq_cur != NULL) { - seq_prv = seq_cur; - seq_cur = seq_cur->next; - mbedtls_platform_zeroize(seq_prv, - sizeof(mbedtls_x509_sequence)); - mbedtls_free(seq_prv); - } - subject_alt_name->next = NULL; + /* "end" also includes the CertSerialNumber field so "len" shall be used */ + ret = mbedtls_x509_get_subject_alt_name_ext(p, + (*p+len), + &authority_key_id->authorityCertIssuer); + if (ret != 0) { return ret; } - /* Allocate and assign next pointer */ - if (cur->buf.p != NULL) { - if (cur->next != NULL) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS; - } - - cur->next = mbedtls_calloc(1, sizeof(mbedtls_asn1_sequence)); - - if (cur->next == NULL) { - return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, - MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_ALLOC_FAILED); - } - - cur = cur->next; + /* Getting authorityCertSerialNumber using the required specific class tag [2] */ + if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(p, end, &len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | 2)) != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret); } - - cur->buf = tmp_san_buf; - *p += tmp_san_buf.len; + authority_key_id->authorityCertSerialNumber.len = len; + authority_key_id->authorityCertSerialNumber.p = *p; + authority_key_id->authorityCertSerialNumber.tag = MBEDTLS_ASN1_INTEGER; + *p += len; } - /* Set final sequence entry's next pointer to NULL */ - cur->next = NULL; - if (*p != end) { - return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, - MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS + + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH; } return 0; @@ -821,8 +792,7 @@ static int x509_get_certificate_policies(unsigned char **p, if (MBEDTLS_OID_CMP(MBEDTLS_OID_ANY_POLICY, &policy_oid) != 0) { /* * Set the parsing return code but continue parsing, in case this - * extension is critical and MBEDTLS_X509_ALLOW_UNSUPPORTED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION - * is configured. + * extension is critical. */ parse_ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; } @@ -973,13 +943,11 @@ static int x509_get_crt_ext(unsigned char **p, /* No parser found, skip extension */ *p = end_ext_octet; -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_ALLOW_UNSUPPORTED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION) if (is_critical) { /* Data is marked as critical: fail */ return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG); } -#endif continue; } @@ -1001,8 +969,8 @@ static int x509_get_crt_ext(unsigned char **p, case MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_KEY_USAGE: /* Parse key usage */ - if ((ret = x509_get_key_usage(p, end_ext_octet, - &crt->key_usage)) != 0) { + if ((ret = mbedtls_x509_get_key_usage(p, end_ext_octet, + &crt->key_usage)) != 0) { return ret; } break; @@ -1015,18 +983,35 @@ static int x509_get_crt_ext(unsigned char **p, } break; + case MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_SUBJECT_KEY_IDENTIFIER: + /* Parse subject key identifier */ + if ((ret = x509_get_subject_key_id(p, end_ext_data, + &crt->subject_key_id)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + break; + + case MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_AUTHORITY_KEY_IDENTIFIER: + /* Parse authority key identifier */ + if ((ret = x509_get_authority_key_id(p, end_ext_octet, + &crt->authority_key_id)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + break; case MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_SUBJECT_ALT_NAME: - /* Parse subject alt name */ - if ((ret = x509_get_subject_alt_name(p, end_ext_octet, - &crt->subject_alt_names)) != 0) { + /* Parse subject alt name + * SubjectAltName ::= GeneralNames + */ + if ((ret = mbedtls_x509_get_subject_alt_name(p, end_ext_octet, + &crt->subject_alt_names)) != 0) { return ret; } break; case MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_NS_CERT_TYPE: /* Parse netscape certificate type */ - if ((ret = x509_get_ns_cert_type(p, end_ext_octet, - &crt->ns_cert_type)) != 0) { + if ((ret = mbedtls_x509_get_ns_cert_type(p, end_ext_octet, + &crt->ns_cert_type)) != 0) { return ret; } break; @@ -1043,11 +1028,9 @@ static int x509_get_crt_ext(unsigned char **p, break; } -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_ALLOW_UNSUPPORTED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION) if (is_critical) { return ret; } else -#endif /* * If MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE is returned, then we * cannot interpret or enforce the policy. However, it is up to @@ -1066,12 +1049,11 @@ static int x509_get_crt_ext(unsigned char **p, * supports, but there isn't an x509 parser for it, * skip the extension. */ -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_ALLOW_UNSUPPORTED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION) if (is_critical) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; - } else -#endif - *p = end_ext_octet; + } else { + *p = end_ext_octet; + } } } @@ -1127,7 +1109,7 @@ static int x509_crt_parse_der_core(mbedtls_x509_crt *crt, } end = crt_end = p + len; - crt->raw.len = crt_end - buf; + crt->raw.len = (size_t) (crt_end - buf); if (make_copy != 0) { /* Create and populate a new buffer for the raw field. */ crt->raw.p = p = mbedtls_calloc(1, crt->raw.len); @@ -1157,7 +1139,7 @@ static int x509_crt_parse_der_core(mbedtls_x509_crt *crt, } end = p + len; - crt->tbs.len = end - crt->tbs.p; + crt->tbs.len = (size_t) (end - crt->tbs.p); /* * Version ::= INTEGER { v1(0), v2(1), v3(2) } @@ -1204,7 +1186,7 @@ static int x509_crt_parse_der_core(mbedtls_x509_crt *crt, return ret; } - crt->issuer_raw.len = p - crt->issuer_raw.p; + crt->issuer_raw.len = (size_t) (p - crt->issuer_raw.p); /* * Validity ::= SEQUENCE { @@ -1234,7 +1216,7 @@ static int x509_crt_parse_der_core(mbedtls_x509_crt *crt, return ret; } - crt->subject_raw.len = p - crt->subject_raw.p; + crt->subject_raw.len = (size_t) (p - crt->subject_raw.p); /* * SubjectPublicKeyInfo @@ -1244,7 +1226,7 @@ static int x509_crt_parse_der_core(mbedtls_x509_crt *crt, mbedtls_x509_crt_free(crt); return ret; } - crt->pk_raw.len = p - crt->pk_raw.p; + crt->pk_raw.len = (size_t) (p - crt->pk_raw.p); /* * issuerUniqueID [1] IMPLICIT UniqueIdentifier OPTIONAL, @@ -1270,13 +1252,7 @@ static int x509_crt_parse_der_core(mbedtls_x509_crt *crt, } } - int extensions_allowed = 1; -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_ALLOW_EXTENSIONS_NON_V3) - if (crt->version != 3) { - extensions_allowed = 0; - } -#endif - if (extensions_allowed) { + if (crt->version == 3) { ret = x509_get_crt_ext(&p, end, crt, cb, p_ctx); if (ret != 0) { mbedtls_x509_crt_free(crt); @@ -1539,8 +1515,7 @@ int mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_file(mbedtls_x509_crt *chain, const char *path) ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_parse(chain, buf, n); - mbedtls_platform_zeroize(buf, n); - mbedtls_free(buf); + mbedtls_zeroize_and_free(buf, n); return ret; } @@ -1569,6 +1544,11 @@ int mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_path(mbedtls_x509_crt *chain, const char *path) p = filename + len; filename[len++] = '*'; + /* + * Note this function uses the code page CP_ACP which is the system default + * ANSI codepage. The input string is always described in BYTES and the + * output length is described in WCHARs. + */ w_ret = MultiByteToWideChar(CP_ACP, 0, filename, (int) len, szDir, MAX_PATH - 3); if (w_ret == 0) { @@ -1587,11 +1567,8 @@ int mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_path(mbedtls_x509_crt *chain, const char *path) if (file_data.dwFileAttributes & FILE_ATTRIBUTE_DIRECTORY) { continue; } - w_ret = WideCharToMultiByte(CP_ACP, 0, file_data.cFileName, - -1, - p, (int) len, - NULL, NULL); + -1, p, (int) len, NULL, NULL); if (w_ret == 0) { ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FILE_IO_ERROR; goto cleanup; @@ -1684,323 +1661,28 @@ int mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_path(mbedtls_x509_crt *chain, const char *path) } #endif /* MBEDTLS_FS_IO */ -/* - * OtherName ::= SEQUENCE { - * type-id OBJECT IDENTIFIER, - * value [0] EXPLICIT ANY DEFINED BY type-id } - * - * HardwareModuleName ::= SEQUENCE { - * hwType OBJECT IDENTIFIER, - * hwSerialNum OCTET STRING } - * - * NOTE: we currently only parse and use otherName of type HwModuleName, - * as defined in RFC 4108. - */ -static int x509_get_other_name(const mbedtls_x509_buf *subject_alt_name, - mbedtls_x509_san_other_name *other_name) -{ - int ret = 0; - size_t len; - unsigned char *p = subject_alt_name->p; - const unsigned char *end = p + subject_alt_name->len; - mbedtls_x509_buf cur_oid; - - if ((subject_alt_name->tag & - (MBEDTLS_ASN1_TAG_CLASS_MASK | MBEDTLS_ASN1_TAG_VALUE_MASK)) != - (MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_OTHER_NAME)) { - /* - * The given subject alternative name is not of type "othername". - */ - return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA; - } - - if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p, end, &len, - MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID)) != 0) { - return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret); - } - - cur_oid.tag = MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID; - cur_oid.p = p; - cur_oid.len = len; - - /* - * Only HwModuleName is currently supported. - */ - if (MBEDTLS_OID_CMP(MBEDTLS_OID_ON_HW_MODULE_NAME, &cur_oid) != 0) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; - } - other_name->type_id = cur_oid; - - p += len; - if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p, end, &len, - MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC)) != - 0) { - return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret); - } - - if (end != p + len) { - return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, - MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH); - } - - if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p, end, &len, - MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)) != 0) { - return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret); - } - - if (end != p + len) { - return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, - MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH); - } - - if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p, end, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID)) != 0) { - return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret); - } - - other_name->value.hardware_module_name.oid.tag = MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID; - other_name->value.hardware_module_name.oid.p = p; - other_name->value.hardware_module_name.oid.len = len; - - p += len; - if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p, end, &len, - MBEDTLS_ASN1_OCTET_STRING)) != 0) { - return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret); - } - - other_name->value.hardware_module_name.val.tag = MBEDTLS_ASN1_OCTET_STRING; - other_name->value.hardware_module_name.val.p = p; - other_name->value.hardware_module_name.val.len = len; - p += len; - if (p != end) { - return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, - MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH); - } - return 0; -} - -static int x509_info_subject_alt_name(char **buf, size_t *size, - const mbedtls_x509_sequence - *subject_alt_name, - const char *prefix) -{ - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - size_t i; - size_t n = *size; - char *p = *buf; - const mbedtls_x509_sequence *cur = subject_alt_name; - mbedtls_x509_subject_alternative_name san; - int parse_ret; - - while (cur != NULL) { - memset(&san, 0, sizeof(san)); - parse_ret = mbedtls_x509_parse_subject_alt_name(&cur->buf, &san); - if (parse_ret != 0) { - if (parse_ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE) { - ret = mbedtls_snprintf(p, n, "\n%s ", prefix); - MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; - } else { - ret = mbedtls_snprintf(p, n, "\n%s ", prefix); - MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; - } - cur = cur->next; - continue; - } - - switch (san.type) { - /* - * otherName - */ - case MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_OTHER_NAME: - { - mbedtls_x509_san_other_name *other_name = &san.san.other_name; - - ret = mbedtls_snprintf(p, n, "\n%s otherName :", prefix); - MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; - - if (MBEDTLS_OID_CMP(MBEDTLS_OID_ON_HW_MODULE_NAME, - &other_name->type_id) == 0) { - ret = mbedtls_snprintf(p, n, "\n%s hardware module name :", prefix); - MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; - ret = - mbedtls_snprintf(p, n, "\n%s hardware type : ", prefix); - MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; - - ret = mbedtls_oid_get_numeric_string(p, - n, - &other_name->value.hardware_module_name.oid); - MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; - - ret = - mbedtls_snprintf(p, n, "\n%s hardware serial number : ", prefix); - MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; - - for (i = 0; i < other_name->value.hardware_module_name.val.len; i++) { - ret = mbedtls_snprintf(p, - n, - "%02X", - other_name->value.hardware_module_name.val.p[i]); - MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; - } - }/* MBEDTLS_OID_ON_HW_MODULE_NAME */ - } - break; - - /* - * dNSName - */ - case MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_DNS_NAME: - { - ret = mbedtls_snprintf(p, n, "\n%s dNSName : ", prefix); - MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; - if (san.san.unstructured_name.len >= n) { - *p = '\0'; - return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; - } - - memcpy(p, san.san.unstructured_name.p, san.san.unstructured_name.len); - p += san.san.unstructured_name.len; - n -= san.san.unstructured_name.len; - } - break; - - /* - * Type not supported, skip item. - */ - default: - ret = mbedtls_snprintf(p, n, "\n%s ", prefix); - MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; - break; - } - - cur = cur->next; - } - - *p = '\0'; - - *size = n; - *buf = p; - - return 0; -} - -int mbedtls_x509_parse_subject_alt_name(const mbedtls_x509_buf *san_buf, - mbedtls_x509_subject_alternative_name *san) -{ - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - switch (san_buf->tag & - (MBEDTLS_ASN1_TAG_CLASS_MASK | - MBEDTLS_ASN1_TAG_VALUE_MASK)) { - /* - * otherName - */ - case (MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_OTHER_NAME): - { - mbedtls_x509_san_other_name other_name; - - ret = x509_get_other_name(san_buf, &other_name); - if (ret != 0) { - return ret; - } - - memset(san, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_x509_subject_alternative_name)); - san->type = MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_OTHER_NAME; - memcpy(&san->san.other_name, - &other_name, sizeof(other_name)); - - } - break; - - /* - * dNSName - */ - case (MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_DNS_NAME): - { - memset(san, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_x509_subject_alternative_name)); - san->type = MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_DNS_NAME; - - memcpy(&san->san.unstructured_name, - san_buf, sizeof(*san_buf)); - - } - break; - - /* - * Type not supported - */ - default: - return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; - } - return 0; -} - -#define PRINT_ITEM(i) \ - do { \ - ret = mbedtls_snprintf(p, n, "%s" i, sep); \ - MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; \ - sep = ", "; \ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_REMOVE_INFO) +#define PRINT_ITEM(i) \ + do { \ + ret = mbedtls_snprintf(p, n, "%s" i, sep); \ + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; \ + sep = ", "; \ } while (0) -#define CERT_TYPE(type, name) \ - do { \ - if (ns_cert_type & (type)) { \ - PRINT_ITEM(name); \ - } \ +#define CERT_TYPE(type, name) \ + do { \ + if (ns_cert_type & (type)) { \ + PRINT_ITEM(name); \ + } \ } while (0) -static int x509_info_cert_type(char **buf, size_t *size, - unsigned char ns_cert_type) -{ - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - size_t n = *size; - char *p = *buf; - const char *sep = ""; - - CERT_TYPE(MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_SSL_CLIENT, "SSL Client"); - CERT_TYPE(MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_SSL_SERVER, "SSL Server"); - CERT_TYPE(MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_EMAIL, "Email"); - CERT_TYPE(MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_OBJECT_SIGNING, "Object Signing"); - CERT_TYPE(MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_RESERVED, "Reserved"); - CERT_TYPE(MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_SSL_CA, "SSL CA"); - CERT_TYPE(MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_EMAIL_CA, "Email CA"); - CERT_TYPE(MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_OBJECT_SIGNING_CA, "Object Signing CA"); - - *size = n; - *buf = p; - - return 0; -} - -#define KEY_USAGE(code, name) \ - do { \ - if (key_usage & (code)) { \ - PRINT_ITEM(name); \ - } \ +#define KEY_USAGE(code, name) \ + do { \ + if (key_usage & (code)) { \ + PRINT_ITEM(name); \ + } \ } while (0) -static int x509_info_key_usage(char **buf, size_t *size, - unsigned int key_usage) -{ - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - size_t n = *size; - char *p = *buf; - const char *sep = ""; - - KEY_USAGE(MBEDTLS_X509_KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE, "Digital Signature"); - KEY_USAGE(MBEDTLS_X509_KU_NON_REPUDIATION, "Non Repudiation"); - KEY_USAGE(MBEDTLS_X509_KU_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT, "Key Encipherment"); - KEY_USAGE(MBEDTLS_X509_KU_DATA_ENCIPHERMENT, "Data Encipherment"); - KEY_USAGE(MBEDTLS_X509_KU_KEY_AGREEMENT, "Key Agreement"); - KEY_USAGE(MBEDTLS_X509_KU_KEY_CERT_SIGN, "Key Cert Sign"); - KEY_USAGE(MBEDTLS_X509_KU_CRL_SIGN, "CRL Sign"); - KEY_USAGE(MBEDTLS_X509_KU_ENCIPHER_ONLY, "Encipher Only"); - KEY_USAGE(MBEDTLS_X509_KU_DECIPHER_ONLY, "Decipher Only"); - - *size = n; - *buf = p; - - return 0; -} - static int x509_info_ext_key_usage(char **buf, size_t *size, const mbedtls_x509_sequence *extended_key_usage) { @@ -2152,9 +1834,9 @@ int mbedtls_x509_crt_info(char *buf, size_t size, const char *prefix, ret = mbedtls_snprintf(p, n, "\n%ssubject alt name :", prefix); MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; - if ((ret = x509_info_subject_alt_name(&p, &n, - &crt->subject_alt_names, - prefix)) != 0) { + if ((ret = mbedtls_x509_info_subject_alt_name(&p, &n, + &crt->subject_alt_names, + prefix)) != 0) { return ret; } } @@ -2163,7 +1845,7 @@ int mbedtls_x509_crt_info(char *buf, size_t size, const char *prefix, ret = mbedtls_snprintf(p, n, "\n%scert. type : ", prefix); MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; - if ((ret = x509_info_cert_type(&p, &n, crt->ns_cert_type)) != 0) { + if ((ret = mbedtls_x509_info_cert_type(&p, &n, crt->ns_cert_type)) != 0) { return ret; } } @@ -2172,7 +1854,7 @@ int mbedtls_x509_crt_info(char *buf, size_t size, const char *prefix, ret = mbedtls_snprintf(p, n, "\n%skey usage : ", prefix); MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; - if ((ret = x509_info_key_usage(&p, &n, crt->key_usage)) != 0) { + if ((ret = mbedtls_x509_info_key_usage(&p, &n, crt->key_usage)) != 0) { return ret; } } @@ -2208,35 +1890,12 @@ struct x509_crt_verify_string { const char *string; }; +#define X509_CRT_ERROR_INFO(err, err_str, info) { err, info }, static const struct x509_crt_verify_string x509_crt_verify_strings[] = { - { MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_EXPIRED, "The certificate validity has expired" }, - { MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_REVOKED, "The certificate has been revoked (is on a CRL)" }, - { MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_CN_MISMATCH, - "The certificate Common Name (CN) does not match with the expected CN" }, - { MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_NOT_TRUSTED, - "The certificate is not correctly signed by the trusted CA" }, - { MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_NOT_TRUSTED, "The CRL is not correctly signed by the trusted CA" }, - { MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_EXPIRED, "The CRL is expired" }, - { MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_MISSING, "Certificate was missing" }, - { MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_SKIP_VERIFY, "Certificate verification was skipped" }, - { MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_OTHER, "Other reason (can be used by verify callback)" }, - { MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_FUTURE, "The certificate validity starts in the future" }, - { MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_FUTURE, "The CRL is from the future" }, - { MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_KEY_USAGE, "Usage does not match the keyUsage extension" }, - { MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_EXT_KEY_USAGE, "Usage does not match the extendedKeyUsage extension" }, - { MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_NS_CERT_TYPE, "Usage does not match the nsCertType extension" }, - { MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_MD, "The certificate is signed with an unacceptable hash." }, - { MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_PK, - "The certificate is signed with an unacceptable PK alg (eg RSA vs ECDSA)." }, - { MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_KEY, - "The certificate is signed with an unacceptable key (eg bad curve, RSA too short)." }, - { MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_BAD_MD, "The CRL is signed with an unacceptable hash." }, - { MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_BAD_PK, - "The CRL is signed with an unacceptable PK alg (eg RSA vs ECDSA)." }, - { MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_BAD_KEY, - "The CRL is signed with an unacceptable key (eg bad curve, RSA too short)." }, + MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_ERROR_INFO_LIST { 0, NULL } }; +#undef X509_CRT_ERROR_INFO int mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_info(char *buf, size_t size, const char *prefix, uint32_t flags) @@ -2264,8 +1923,8 @@ int mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_info(char *buf, size_t size, const char *prefix, return (int) (size - n); } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_REMOVE_INFO */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CHECK_KEY_USAGE) int mbedtls_x509_crt_check_key_usage(const mbedtls_x509_crt *crt, unsigned int usage) { @@ -2291,9 +1950,7 @@ int mbedtls_x509_crt_check_key_usage(const mbedtls_x509_crt *crt, return 0; } -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CHECK_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE) int mbedtls_x509_crt_check_extended_key_usage(const mbedtls_x509_crt *crt, const char *usage_oid, size_t usage_len) @@ -2323,7 +1980,6 @@ int mbedtls_x509_crt_check_extended_key_usage(const mbedtls_x509_crt *crt, return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CHECK_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRL_PARSE_C) /* @@ -2351,11 +2007,17 @@ int mbedtls_x509_crt_is_revoked(const mbedtls_x509_crt *crt, const mbedtls_x509_ */ static int x509_crt_verifycrl(mbedtls_x509_crt *crt, mbedtls_x509_crt *ca, mbedtls_x509_crl *crl_list, - const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile *profile) + const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile *profile, + const mbedtls_x509_time *now) { int flags = 0; unsigned char hash[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE]; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + psa_algorithm_t psa_algorithm; +#else const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + size_t hash_length; if (ca == NULL) { return flags; @@ -2371,13 +2033,11 @@ static int x509_crt_verifycrl(mbedtls_x509_crt *crt, mbedtls_x509_crt *ca, /* * Check if the CA is configured to sign CRLs */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CHECK_KEY_USAGE) if (mbedtls_x509_crt_check_key_usage(ca, MBEDTLS_X509_KU_CRL_SIGN) != 0) { flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_NOT_TRUSTED; break; } -#endif /* * Check if CRL is correctly signed by the trusted CA @@ -2390,34 +2050,56 @@ static int x509_crt_verifycrl(mbedtls_x509_crt *crt, mbedtls_x509_crt *ca, flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_BAD_PK; } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + psa_algorithm = mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type(crl_list->sig_md); + if (psa_hash_compute(psa_algorithm, + crl_list->tbs.p, + crl_list->tbs.len, + hash, + sizeof(hash), + &hash_length) != PSA_SUCCESS) { + /* Note: this can't happen except after an internal error */ + flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_NOT_TRUSTED; + break; + } +#else md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type(crl_list->sig_md); - if (mbedtls_md(md_info, crl_list->tbs.p, crl_list->tbs.len, hash) != 0) { + hash_length = mbedtls_md_get_size(md_info); + if (mbedtls_md(md_info, + crl_list->tbs.p, + crl_list->tbs.len, + hash) != 0) { /* Note: this can't happen except after an internal error */ flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_NOT_TRUSTED; break; } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ if (x509_profile_check_key(profile, &ca->pk) != 0) { flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_KEY; } if (mbedtls_pk_verify_ext(crl_list->sig_pk, crl_list->sig_opts, &ca->pk, - crl_list->sig_md, hash, mbedtls_md_get_size(md_info), + crl_list->sig_md, hash, hash_length, crl_list->sig.p, crl_list->sig.len) != 0) { flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_NOT_TRUSTED; break; } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE) /* * Check for validity of CRL (Do not drop out) */ - if (mbedtls_x509_time_is_past(&crl_list->next_update)) { + if (mbedtls_x509_time_cmp(&crl_list->next_update, now) < 0) { flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_EXPIRED; } - if (mbedtls_x509_time_is_future(&crl_list->this_update)) { + if (mbedtls_x509_time_cmp(&crl_list->this_update, now) > 0) { flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_FUTURE; } +#else + ((void) now); +#endif /* * Check if certificate is revoked @@ -2441,8 +2123,8 @@ static int x509_crt_check_signature(const mbedtls_x509_crt *child, mbedtls_x509_crt *parent, mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_ctx *rs_ctx) { - unsigned char hash[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE]; size_t hash_len; + unsigned char hash[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE]; #if !defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info; md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type(child->sig_md); @@ -2453,22 +2135,19 @@ static int x509_crt_check_signature(const mbedtls_x509_crt *child, return -1; } #else - psa_hash_operation_t hash_operation = PSA_HASH_OPERATION_INIT; - psa_algorithm_t hash_alg = mbedtls_psa_translate_md(child->sig_md); + psa_algorithm_t hash_alg = mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type(child->sig_md); + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - if (psa_hash_setup(&hash_operation, hash_alg) != PSA_SUCCESS) { - return -1; - } - - if (psa_hash_update(&hash_operation, child->tbs.p, child->tbs.len) - != PSA_SUCCESS) { - return -1; + status = psa_hash_compute(hash_alg, + child->tbs.p, + child->tbs.len, + hash, + sizeof(hash), + &hash_len); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_HW_ACCEL_FAILED; } - if (psa_hash_finish(&hash_operation, hash, sizeof(hash), &hash_len) - != PSA_SUCCESS) { - return -1; - } #endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ /* Skip expensive computation on obvious mismatch */ if (!mbedtls_pk_can_do(&parent->pk, child->sig_pk)) { @@ -2519,12 +2198,10 @@ static int x509_crt_check_parent(const mbedtls_x509_crt *child, return -1; } -#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CHECK_KEY_USAGE) if (need_ca_bit && mbedtls_x509_crt_check_key_usage(parent, MBEDTLS_X509_KU_KEY_CERT_SIGN) != 0) { return -1; } -#endif return 0; } @@ -2580,7 +2257,8 @@ static int x509_crt_find_parent_in( int top, unsigned path_cnt, unsigned self_cnt, - mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_ctx *rs_ctx) + mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_ctx *rs_ctx, + const mbedtls_x509_time *now) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; mbedtls_x509_crt *parent, *fallback_parent; @@ -2643,9 +2321,10 @@ static int x509_crt_find_parent_in( continue; } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE) /* optional time check */ - if (mbedtls_x509_time_is_past(&parent->valid_to) || - mbedtls_x509_time_is_future(&parent->valid_from)) { + if (mbedtls_x509_time_cmp(&parent->valid_to, now) < 0 || /* past */ + mbedtls_x509_time_cmp(&parent->valid_from, now) > 0) { /* future */ if (fallback_parent == NULL) { fallback_parent = parent; fallback_signature_is_good = signature_is_good; @@ -2653,6 +2332,9 @@ static int x509_crt_find_parent_in( continue; } +#else + ((void) now); +#endif *r_parent = parent; *r_signature_is_good = signature_is_good; @@ -2698,7 +2380,8 @@ static int x509_crt_find_parent( int *signature_is_good, unsigned path_cnt, unsigned self_cnt, - mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_ctx *rs_ctx) + mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_ctx *rs_ctx, + const mbedtls_x509_time *now) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; mbedtls_x509_crt *search_list; @@ -2719,7 +2402,7 @@ static int x509_crt_find_parent( ret = x509_crt_find_parent_in(child, search_list, parent, signature_is_good, *parent_is_trusted, - path_cnt, self_cnt, rs_ctx); + path_cnt, self_cnt, rs_ctx, now); #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) if (rs_ctx != NULL && ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS) { @@ -2840,6 +2523,13 @@ static int x509_crt_verify_chain( int signature_is_good; unsigned self_cnt; mbedtls_x509_crt *cur_trust_ca = NULL; + mbedtls_x509_time now; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE) + if (mbedtls_x509_time_gmtime(mbedtls_time(NULL), &now) != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FATAL_ERROR; + } +#endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) /* resume if we had an operation in progress */ @@ -2870,14 +2560,16 @@ static int x509_crt_verify_chain( ver_chain->len++; flags = &cur->flags; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE) /* Check time-validity (all certificates) */ - if (mbedtls_x509_time_is_past(&child->valid_to)) { + if (mbedtls_x509_time_cmp(&child->valid_to, &now) < 0) { *flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_EXPIRED; } - if (mbedtls_x509_time_is_future(&child->valid_from)) { + if (mbedtls_x509_time_cmp(&child->valid_from, &now) > 0) { *flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_FUTURE; } +#endif /* Stop here for trusted roots (but not for trusted EE certs) */ if (child_is_trusted) { @@ -2928,7 +2620,8 @@ static int x509_crt_verify_chain( /* Look for a parent in trusted CAs or up the chain */ ret = x509_crt_find_parent(child, cur_trust_ca, &parent, &parent_is_trusted, &signature_is_good, - ver_chain->len - 1, self_cnt, rs_ctx); + ver_chain->len - 1, self_cnt, rs_ctx, + &now); #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) if (rs_ctx != NULL && ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS) { @@ -2977,7 +2670,7 @@ static int x509_crt_verify_chain( #if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRL_PARSE_C) /* Check trusted CA's CRL for the given crt */ - *flags |= x509_crt_verifycrl(child, parent, ca_crl, profile); + *flags |= x509_crt_verifycrl(child, parent, ca_crl, profile, &now); #else (void) ca_crl; #endif @@ -2990,6 +2683,202 @@ static int x509_crt_verify_chain( } } +#ifdef _WIN32 +#ifdef _MSC_VER +#pragma comment(lib, "ws2_32.lib") +#include +#include +#elif (defined(__MINGW32__) || defined(__MINGW64__)) && _WIN32_WINNT >= 0x0600 +#include +#include +#else +/* inet_pton() is not supported, fallback to software version */ +#define MBEDTLS_TEST_SW_INET_PTON +#endif +#elif defined(__sun) +/* Solaris requires -lsocket -lnsl for inet_pton() */ +#elif defined(__has_include) +#if __has_include() +#include +#endif +#if __has_include() +#include +#endif +#endif + +/* Use whether or not AF_INET6 is defined to indicate whether or not to use + * the platform inet_pton() or a local implementation (below). The local + * implementation may be used even in cases where the platform provides + * inet_pton(), e.g. when there are different includes required and/or the + * platform implementation requires dependencies on additional libraries. + * Specifically, Windows requires custom includes and additional link + * dependencies, and Solaris requires additional link dependencies. + * Also, as a coarse heuristic, use the local implementation if the compiler + * does not support __has_include(), or if the definition of AF_INET6 is not + * provided by headers included (or not) via __has_include() above. + * MBEDTLS_TEST_SW_INET_PTON is a bypass define to force testing of this code //no-check-names + * despite having a platform that has inet_pton. */ +#if !defined(AF_INET6) || defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_SW_INET_PTON) //no-check-names +/* Definition located further below to possibly reduce compiler inlining */ +static int x509_inet_pton_ipv4(const char *src, void *dst); + +#define li_cton(c, n) \ + (((n) = (c) - '0') <= 9 || (((n) = ((c)&0xdf) - 'A') <= 5 ? ((n) += 10) : 0)) + +static int x509_inet_pton_ipv6(const char *src, void *dst) +{ + const unsigned char *p = (const unsigned char *) src; + int nonzero_groups = 0, num_digits, zero_group_start = -1; + uint16_t addr[8]; + do { + /* note: allows excess leading 0's, e.g. 1:0002:3:... */ + uint16_t group = num_digits = 0; + for (uint8_t digit; num_digits < 4; num_digits++) { + if (li_cton(*p, digit) == 0) { + break; + } + group = (group << 4) | digit; + p++; + } + if (num_digits != 0) { + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(group, addr, nonzero_groups); + nonzero_groups++; + if (*p == '\0') { + break; + } else if (*p == '.') { + /* Don't accept IPv4 too early or late */ + if ((nonzero_groups == 0 && zero_group_start == -1) || + nonzero_groups >= 7) { + break; + } + + /* Walk back to prior ':', then parse as IPv4-mapped */ + int steps = 4; + do { + p--; + steps--; + } while (*p != ':' && steps > 0); + + if (*p != ':') { + break; + } + p++; + nonzero_groups--; + if (x509_inet_pton_ipv4((const char *) p, + addr + nonzero_groups) != 0) { + break; + } + + nonzero_groups += 2; + p = (const unsigned char *) ""; + break; + } else if (*p != ':') { + return -1; + } + } else { + /* Don't accept a second zero group or an invalid delimiter */ + if (zero_group_start != -1 || *p != ':') { + return -1; + } + zero_group_start = nonzero_groups; + + /* Accept a zero group at start, but it has to be a double colon */ + if (zero_group_start == 0 && *++p != ':') { + return -1; + } + + if (p[1] == '\0') { + ++p; + break; + } + } + ++p; + } while (nonzero_groups < 8); + + if (*p != '\0') { + return -1; + } + + if (zero_group_start != -1) { + if (nonzero_groups > 6) { + return -1; + } + int zero_groups = 8 - nonzero_groups; + int groups_after_zero = nonzero_groups - zero_group_start; + + /* Move the non-zero part to after the zeroes */ + if (groups_after_zero) { + memmove(addr + zero_group_start + zero_groups, + addr + zero_group_start, + groups_after_zero * sizeof(*addr)); + } + memset(addr + zero_group_start, 0, zero_groups * sizeof(*addr)); + } else { + if (nonzero_groups != 8) { + return -1; + } + } + memcpy(dst, addr, sizeof(addr)); + return 0; +} + +static int x509_inet_pton_ipv4(const char *src, void *dst) +{ + const unsigned char *p = (const unsigned char *) src; + uint8_t *res = (uint8_t *) dst; + uint8_t digit, num_digits = 0; + uint8_t num_octets = 0; + uint16_t octet; + + do { + octet = num_digits = 0; + do { + digit = *p - '0'; + if (digit > 9) { + break; + } + + /* Don't allow leading zeroes. These might mean octal format, + * which this implementation does not support. */ + if (octet == 0 && num_digits > 0) { + return -1; + } + + octet = octet * 10 + digit; + num_digits++; + p++; + } while (num_digits < 3); + + if (octet >= 256 || num_digits > 3 || num_digits == 0) { + return -1; + } + *res++ = (uint8_t) octet; + num_octets++; + } while (num_octets < 4 && *p++ == '.'); + return num_octets == 4 && *p == '\0' ? 0 : -1; +} + +#else + +static int x509_inet_pton_ipv6(const char *src, void *dst) +{ + return inet_pton(AF_INET6, src, dst) == 1 ? 0 : -1; +} + +static int x509_inet_pton_ipv4(const char *src, void *dst) +{ + return inet_pton(AF_INET, src, dst) == 1 ? 0 : -1; +} + +#endif /* !AF_INET6 || MBEDTLS_TEST_SW_INET_PTON */ //no-check-names + +size_t mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_cn_inet_pton(const char *cn, void *dst) +{ + return strchr(cn, ':') == NULL + ? x509_inet_pton_ipv4(cn, dst) == 0 ? 4 : 0 + : x509_inet_pton_ipv6(cn, dst) == 0 ? 16 : 0; +} + /* * Check for CN match */ @@ -3010,23 +2899,80 @@ static int x509_crt_check_cn(const mbedtls_x509_buf *name, return -1; } +static int x509_crt_check_san_ip(const mbedtls_x509_sequence *san, + const char *cn, size_t cn_len) +{ + uint32_t ip[4]; + cn_len = mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_cn_inet_pton(cn, ip); + if (cn_len == 0) { + return -1; + } + + for (const mbedtls_x509_sequence *cur = san; cur != NULL; cur = cur->next) { + const unsigned char san_type = (unsigned char) cur->buf.tag & + MBEDTLS_ASN1_TAG_VALUE_MASK; + if (san_type == MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_IP_ADDRESS && + cur->buf.len == cn_len && memcmp(cur->buf.p, ip, cn_len) == 0) { + return 0; + } + } + + return -1; +} + +static int x509_crt_check_san_uri(const mbedtls_x509_sequence *san, + const char *cn, size_t cn_len) +{ + for (const mbedtls_x509_sequence *cur = san; cur != NULL; cur = cur->next) { + const unsigned char san_type = (unsigned char) cur->buf.tag & + MBEDTLS_ASN1_TAG_VALUE_MASK; + if (san_type == MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_UNIFORM_RESOURCE_IDENTIFIER && + cur->buf.len == cn_len && memcmp(cur->buf.p, cn, cn_len) == 0) { + return 0; + } + } + + return -1; +} + /* * Check for SAN match, see RFC 5280 Section 4.2.1.6 */ -static int x509_crt_check_san(const mbedtls_x509_buf *name, +static int x509_crt_check_san(const mbedtls_x509_sequence *san, const char *cn, size_t cn_len) { - const unsigned char san_type = (unsigned char) name->tag & - MBEDTLS_ASN1_TAG_VALUE_MASK; - - /* dNSName */ - if (san_type == MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_DNS_NAME) { - return x509_crt_check_cn(name, cn, cn_len); + int san_ip = 0; + int san_uri = 0; + /* Prioritize DNS name over other subtypes due to popularity */ + for (const mbedtls_x509_sequence *cur = san; cur != NULL; cur = cur->next) { + switch ((unsigned char) cur->buf.tag & MBEDTLS_ASN1_TAG_VALUE_MASK) { + case MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_DNS_NAME: + if (x509_crt_check_cn(&cur->buf, cn, cn_len) == 0) { + return 0; + } + break; + case MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_IP_ADDRESS: + san_ip = 1; + break; + case MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_UNIFORM_RESOURCE_IDENTIFIER: + san_uri = 1; + break; + /* (We may handle other types here later.) */ + default: /* Unrecognized type */ + break; + } + } + if (san_ip) { + if (x509_crt_check_san_ip(san, cn, cn_len) == 0) { + return 0; + } + } + if (san_uri) { + if (x509_crt_check_san_uri(san, cn, cn_len) == 0) { + return 0; + } } - /* (We may handle other types here later.) */ - - /* Unrecognized type */ return -1; } @@ -3038,31 +2984,23 @@ static void x509_crt_verify_name(const mbedtls_x509_crt *crt, uint32_t *flags) { const mbedtls_x509_name *name; - const mbedtls_x509_sequence *cur; size_t cn_len = strlen(cn); if (crt->ext_types & MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_SUBJECT_ALT_NAME) { - for (cur = &crt->subject_alt_names; cur != NULL; cur = cur->next) { - if (x509_crt_check_san(&cur->buf, cn, cn_len) == 0) { - break; - } - } - - if (cur == NULL) { - *flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_CN_MISMATCH; + if (x509_crt_check_san(&crt->subject_alt_names, cn, cn_len) == 0) { + return; } } else { for (name = &crt->subject; name != NULL; name = name->next) { if (MBEDTLS_OID_CMP(MBEDTLS_OID_AT_CN, &name->oid) == 0 && x509_crt_check_cn(&name->val, cn, cn_len) == 0) { - break; + return; } } - if (name == NULL) { - *flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_CN_MISMATCH; - } } + + *flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_CN_MISMATCH; } /* @@ -3290,75 +3228,25 @@ void mbedtls_x509_crt_free(mbedtls_x509_crt *crt) { mbedtls_x509_crt *cert_cur = crt; mbedtls_x509_crt *cert_prv; - mbedtls_x509_name *name_cur; - mbedtls_x509_name *name_prv; - mbedtls_x509_sequence *seq_cur; - mbedtls_x509_sequence *seq_prv; - - if (crt == NULL) { - return; - } - do { + while (cert_cur != NULL) { mbedtls_pk_free(&cert_cur->pk); #if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT) mbedtls_free(cert_cur->sig_opts); #endif - name_cur = cert_cur->issuer.next; - while (name_cur != NULL) { - name_prv = name_cur; - name_cur = name_cur->next; - mbedtls_platform_zeroize(name_prv, sizeof(mbedtls_x509_name)); - mbedtls_free(name_prv); - } - - name_cur = cert_cur->subject.next; - while (name_cur != NULL) { - name_prv = name_cur; - name_cur = name_cur->next; - mbedtls_platform_zeroize(name_prv, sizeof(mbedtls_x509_name)); - mbedtls_free(name_prv); - } - - seq_cur = cert_cur->ext_key_usage.next; - while (seq_cur != NULL) { - seq_prv = seq_cur; - seq_cur = seq_cur->next; - mbedtls_platform_zeroize(seq_prv, - sizeof(mbedtls_x509_sequence)); - mbedtls_free(seq_prv); - } - - seq_cur = cert_cur->subject_alt_names.next; - while (seq_cur != NULL) { - seq_prv = seq_cur; - seq_cur = seq_cur->next; - mbedtls_platform_zeroize(seq_prv, - sizeof(mbedtls_x509_sequence)); - mbedtls_free(seq_prv); - } - - seq_cur = cert_cur->certificate_policies.next; - while (seq_cur != NULL) { - seq_prv = seq_cur; - seq_cur = seq_cur->next; - mbedtls_platform_zeroize(seq_prv, - sizeof(mbedtls_x509_sequence)); - mbedtls_free(seq_prv); - } + mbedtls_asn1_free_named_data_list_shallow(cert_cur->issuer.next); + mbedtls_asn1_free_named_data_list_shallow(cert_cur->subject.next); + mbedtls_asn1_sequence_free(cert_cur->ext_key_usage.next); + mbedtls_asn1_sequence_free(cert_cur->subject_alt_names.next); + mbedtls_asn1_sequence_free(cert_cur->certificate_policies.next); + mbedtls_asn1_sequence_free(cert_cur->authority_key_id.authorityCertIssuer.next); if (cert_cur->raw.p != NULL && cert_cur->own_buffer) { - mbedtls_platform_zeroize(cert_cur->raw.p, cert_cur->raw.len); - mbedtls_free(cert_cur->raw.p); + mbedtls_zeroize_and_free(cert_cur->raw.p, cert_cur->raw.len); } - cert_cur = cert_cur->next; - } while (cert_cur != NULL); - - cert_cur = crt; - do { cert_prv = cert_cur; cert_cur = cert_cur->next; @@ -3366,7 +3254,7 @@ void mbedtls_x509_crt_free(mbedtls_x509_crt *crt) if (cert_prv != crt) { mbedtls_free(cert_prv); } - } while (cert_cur != NULL); + } } #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) @@ -3402,4 +3290,12 @@ void mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_free(mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_ctx *ctx) } #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C && MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */ +int mbedtls_x509_crt_get_ca_istrue(const mbedtls_x509_crt *crt) +{ + if ((crt->ext_types & MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS) != 0) { + return crt->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(ca_istrue); + } + return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS; +} + #endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/x509_csr.c b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/x509_csr.c index 095364e5e841..813d64466cc1 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/x509_csr.c +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/x509_csr.c @@ -20,6 +20,7 @@ #if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CSR_PARSE_C) #include "mbedtls/x509_csr.h" +#include "x509_internal.h" #include "mbedtls/error.h" #include "mbedtls/oid.h" #include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" @@ -57,11 +58,214 @@ static int x509_csr_get_version(unsigned char **p, return 0; } +/* + * Parse CSR extension requests in DER format + */ +static int x509_csr_parse_extensions(mbedtls_x509_csr *csr, + unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, + mbedtls_x509_csr_ext_cb_t cb, + void *p_ctx) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t len; + unsigned char *end_ext_data, *end_ext_octet; + + while (*p < end) { + mbedtls_x509_buf extn_oid = { 0, 0, NULL }; + int is_critical = 0; /* DEFAULT FALSE */ + int ext_type = 0; + + /* Read sequence tag */ + if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(p, end, &len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)) != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret); + } + + end_ext_data = *p + len; + + /* Get extension ID */ + if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(p, end_ext_data, &extn_oid.len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID)) != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret); + } + + extn_oid.tag = MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID; + extn_oid.p = *p; + *p += extn_oid.len; + + /* Get optional critical */ + if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_bool(p, end_ext_data, &is_critical)) != 0 && + (ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret); + } + + /* Data should be octet string type */ + if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(p, end_ext_data, &len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_OCTET_STRING)) != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret); + } + + end_ext_octet = *p + len; + + if (end_ext_octet != end_ext_data) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + } + + /* + * Detect supported extensions and skip unsupported extensions + */ + ret = mbedtls_oid_get_x509_ext_type(&extn_oid, &ext_type); + + if (ret != 0) { + /* Give the callback (if any) a chance to handle the extension */ + if (cb != NULL) { + ret = cb(p_ctx, csr, &extn_oid, is_critical, *p, end_ext_octet); + if (ret != 0 && is_critical) { + return ret; + } + *p = end_ext_octet; + continue; + } + + /* No parser found, skip extension */ + *p = end_ext_octet; + + if (is_critical) { + /* Data is marked as critical: fail */ + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG); + } + continue; + } + + /* Forbid repeated extensions */ + if ((csr->ext_types & ext_type) != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_DATA); + } + + csr->ext_types |= ext_type; + + switch (ext_type) { + case MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_KEY_USAGE: + /* Parse key usage */ + if ((ret = mbedtls_x509_get_key_usage(p, end_ext_data, + &csr->key_usage)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + break; + + case MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_SUBJECT_ALT_NAME: + /* Parse subject alt name */ + if ((ret = mbedtls_x509_get_subject_alt_name(p, end_ext_data, + &csr->subject_alt_names)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + break; + + case MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_NS_CERT_TYPE: + /* Parse netscape certificate type */ + if ((ret = mbedtls_x509_get_ns_cert_type(p, end_ext_data, + &csr->ns_cert_type)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + break; + default: + /* + * If this is a non-critical extension, which the oid layer + * supports, but there isn't an x509 parser for it, + * skip the extension. + */ + if (is_critical) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + } else { + *p = end_ext_octet; + } + } + } + + if (*p != end) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + } + + return 0; +} + +/* + * Parse CSR attributes in DER format + */ +static int x509_csr_parse_attributes(mbedtls_x509_csr *csr, + const unsigned char *start, const unsigned char *end, + mbedtls_x509_csr_ext_cb_t cb, + void *p_ctx) +{ + int ret; + size_t len; + unsigned char *end_attr_data; + unsigned char **p = (unsigned char **) &start; + + while (*p < end) { + mbedtls_x509_buf attr_oid = { 0, 0, NULL }; + + if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(p, end, &len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)) != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret); + } + end_attr_data = *p + len; + + /* Get attribute ID */ + if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(p, end_attr_data, &attr_oid.len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID)) != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret); + } + + attr_oid.tag = MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID; + attr_oid.p = *p; + *p += attr_oid.len; + + /* Check that this is an extension-request attribute */ + if (MBEDTLS_OID_CMP(MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS9_CSR_EXT_REQ, &attr_oid) == 0) { + if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(p, end, &len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SET)) != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret); + } + + if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(p, end, &len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)) != + 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret); + } + + if ((ret = x509_csr_parse_extensions(csr, p, *p + len, cb, p_ctx)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + + if (*p != end_attr_data) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + } + } + + *p = end_attr_data; + } + + if (*p != end) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + } + + return 0; +} + /* * Parse a CSR in DER format */ -int mbedtls_x509_csr_parse_der(mbedtls_x509_csr *csr, - const unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen) +static int mbedtls_x509_csr_parse_der_internal(mbedtls_x509_csr *csr, + const unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen, + mbedtls_x509_csr_ext_cb_t cb, + void *p_ctx) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t len; @@ -125,7 +329,7 @@ int mbedtls_x509_csr_parse_der(mbedtls_x509_csr *csr, } end = p + len; - csr->cri.len = end - csr->cri.p; + csr->cri.len = (size_t) (end - csr->cri.p); /* * Version ::= INTEGER { v1(0) } @@ -158,7 +362,7 @@ int mbedtls_x509_csr_parse_der(mbedtls_x509_csr *csr, return ret; } - csr->subject_raw.len = p - csr->subject_raw.p; + csr->subject_raw.len = (size_t) (p - csr->subject_raw.p); /* * subjectPKInfo SubjectPublicKeyInfo @@ -185,6 +389,11 @@ int mbedtls_x509_csr_parse_der(mbedtls_x509_csr *csr, return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT, ret); } + if ((ret = x509_csr_parse_attributes(csr, p, p + len, cb, p_ctx)) != 0) { + mbedtls_x509_csr_free(csr); + return ret; + } + p += len; end = csr->raw.p + csr->raw.len; @@ -219,6 +428,26 @@ int mbedtls_x509_csr_parse_der(mbedtls_x509_csr *csr, return 0; } +/* + * Parse a CSR in DER format + */ +int mbedtls_x509_csr_parse_der(mbedtls_x509_csr *csr, + const unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen) +{ + return mbedtls_x509_csr_parse_der_internal(csr, buf, buflen, NULL, NULL); +} + +/* + * Parse a CSR in DER format with callback for unknown extensions + */ +int mbedtls_x509_csr_parse_der_with_ext_cb(mbedtls_x509_csr *csr, + const unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen, + mbedtls_x509_csr_ext_cb_t cb, + void *p_ctx) +{ + return mbedtls_x509_csr_parse_der_internal(csr, buf, buflen, cb, p_ctx); +} + /* * Parse a CSR, allowing for PEM or raw DER encoding */ @@ -284,13 +513,13 @@ int mbedtls_x509_csr_parse_file(mbedtls_x509_csr *csr, const char *path) ret = mbedtls_x509_csr_parse(csr, buf, n); - mbedtls_platform_zeroize(buf, n); - mbedtls_free(buf); + mbedtls_zeroize_and_free(buf, n); return ret; } #endif /* MBEDTLS_FS_IO */ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_REMOVE_INFO) #define BEFORE_COLON 14 #define BC "14" /* @@ -332,8 +561,47 @@ int mbedtls_x509_csr_info(char *buf, size_t size, const char *prefix, (int) mbedtls_pk_get_bitlen(&csr->pk)); MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + /* + * Optional extensions + */ + + if (csr->ext_types & MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_SUBJECT_ALT_NAME) { + ret = mbedtls_snprintf(p, n, "\n%ssubject alt name :", prefix); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + + if ((ret = mbedtls_x509_info_subject_alt_name(&p, &n, + &csr->subject_alt_names, + prefix)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + } + + if (csr->ext_types & MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_NS_CERT_TYPE) { + ret = mbedtls_snprintf(p, n, "\n%scert. type : ", prefix); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + + if ((ret = mbedtls_x509_info_cert_type(&p, &n, csr->ns_cert_type)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + } + + if (csr->ext_types & MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_KEY_USAGE) { + ret = mbedtls_snprintf(p, n, "\n%skey usage : ", prefix); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + + if ((ret = mbedtls_x509_info_key_usage(&p, &n, csr->key_usage)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + } + + if (csr->ext_types != 0) { + ret = mbedtls_snprintf(p, n, "\n"); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + } + return (int) (size - n); } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_REMOVE_INFO */ /* * Initialize a CSR @@ -348,9 +616,6 @@ void mbedtls_x509_csr_init(mbedtls_x509_csr *csr) */ void mbedtls_x509_csr_free(mbedtls_x509_csr *csr) { - mbedtls_x509_name *name_cur; - mbedtls_x509_name *name_prv; - if (csr == NULL) { return; } @@ -361,17 +626,11 @@ void mbedtls_x509_csr_free(mbedtls_x509_csr *csr) mbedtls_free(csr->sig_opts); #endif - name_cur = csr->subject.next; - while (name_cur != NULL) { - name_prv = name_cur; - name_cur = name_cur->next; - mbedtls_platform_zeroize(name_prv, sizeof(mbedtls_x509_name)); - mbedtls_free(name_prv); - } + mbedtls_asn1_free_named_data_list_shallow(csr->subject.next); + mbedtls_asn1_sequence_free(csr->subject_alt_names.next); if (csr->raw.p != NULL) { - mbedtls_platform_zeroize(csr->raw.p, csr->raw.len); - mbedtls_free(csr->raw.p); + mbedtls_zeroize_and_free(csr->raw.p, csr->raw.len); } mbedtls_platform_zeroize(csr, sizeof(mbedtls_x509_csr)); diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/x509_internal.h b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/x509_internal.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..8a2d2ed0074e --- /dev/null +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/x509_internal.h @@ -0,0 +1,86 @@ +/** + * \file x509.h + * + * \brief Internal part of the public "x509.h". + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ +#ifndef MBEDTLS_X509_INTERNAL_H +#define MBEDTLS_X509_INTERNAL_H +#include "mbedtls/private_access.h" + +#include "mbedtls/build_info.h" + +#include "mbedtls/x509.h" +#include "mbedtls/asn1.h" +#include "pk_internal.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) +#include "mbedtls/rsa.h" +#endif + +int mbedtls_x509_get_name(unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, + mbedtls_x509_name *cur); +int mbedtls_x509_get_alg_null(unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, + mbedtls_x509_buf *alg); +int mbedtls_x509_get_alg(unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, + mbedtls_x509_buf *alg, mbedtls_x509_buf *params); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT) +int mbedtls_x509_get_rsassa_pss_params(const mbedtls_x509_buf *params, + mbedtls_md_type_t *md_alg, mbedtls_md_type_t *mgf_md, + int *salt_len); +#endif +int mbedtls_x509_get_sig(unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, mbedtls_x509_buf *sig); +int mbedtls_x509_get_sig_alg(const mbedtls_x509_buf *sig_oid, const mbedtls_x509_buf *sig_params, + mbedtls_md_type_t *md_alg, mbedtls_pk_type_t *pk_alg, + void **sig_opts); +int mbedtls_x509_get_time(unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, + mbedtls_x509_time *t); +int mbedtls_x509_get_serial(unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, + mbedtls_x509_buf *serial); +int mbedtls_x509_get_ext(unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, + mbedtls_x509_buf *ext, int tag); +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_REMOVE_INFO) +int mbedtls_x509_sig_alg_gets(char *buf, size_t size, const mbedtls_x509_buf *sig_oid, + mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_alg, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + const void *sig_opts); +#endif +int mbedtls_x509_key_size_helper(char *buf, size_t buf_size, const char *name); +int mbedtls_x509_set_extension(mbedtls_asn1_named_data **head, const char *oid, size_t oid_len, + int critical, const unsigned char *val, + size_t val_len); +int mbedtls_x509_write_extensions(unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, + mbedtls_asn1_named_data *first); +int mbedtls_x509_write_names(unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, + mbedtls_asn1_named_data *first); +int mbedtls_x509_write_sig(unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, + const char *oid, size_t oid_len, + unsigned char *sig, size_t size, + mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_alg); +int mbedtls_x509_get_ns_cert_type(unsigned char **p, + const unsigned char *end, + unsigned char *ns_cert_type); +int mbedtls_x509_get_key_usage(unsigned char **p, + const unsigned char *end, + unsigned int *key_usage); +int mbedtls_x509_get_subject_alt_name(unsigned char **p, + const unsigned char *end, + mbedtls_x509_sequence *subject_alt_name); +int mbedtls_x509_get_subject_alt_name_ext(unsigned char **p, + const unsigned char *end, + mbedtls_x509_sequence *subject_alt_name); +int mbedtls_x509_info_subject_alt_name(char **buf, size_t *size, + const mbedtls_x509_sequence + *subject_alt_name, + const char *prefix); +int mbedtls_x509_info_cert_type(char **buf, size_t *size, + unsigned char ns_cert_type); +int mbedtls_x509_info_key_usage(char **buf, size_t *size, + unsigned int key_usage); + +int mbedtls_x509_write_set_san_common(mbedtls_asn1_named_data **extensions, + const mbedtls_x509_san_list *san_list); + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_INTERNAL_H */ diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/x509write.c b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/x509write.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..4704900d3868 --- /dev/null +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/x509write.c @@ -0,0 +1,174 @@ +/* + * X.509 internal, common functions for writing + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ +#include "common.h" +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CSR_WRITE_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_WRITE_C) + +#include "mbedtls/x509_crt.h" +#include "x509_internal.h" +#include "mbedtls/asn1write.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" +#include "mbedtls/oid.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" + +#include +#include + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_WRITE_C) +#include "mbedtls/pem.h" +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PEM_WRITE_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +#include "psa/crypto.h" +#include "mbedtls/psa_util.h" +#include "md_psa.h" +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + +#define CHECK_OVERFLOW_ADD(a, b) \ + do \ + { \ + if (a > SIZE_MAX - (b)) \ + { \ + return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA; \ + } \ + a += b; \ + } while (0) + +int mbedtls_x509_write_set_san_common(mbedtls_asn1_named_data **extensions, + const mbedtls_x509_san_list *san_list) +{ + int ret = 0; + const mbedtls_x509_san_list *cur; + unsigned char *buf; + unsigned char *p; + size_t len; + size_t buflen = 0; + + /* Determine the maximum size of the SubjectAltName list */ + for (cur = san_list; cur != NULL; cur = cur->next) { + /* Calculate size of the required buffer */ + switch (cur->node.type) { + case MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_DNS_NAME: + case MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_UNIFORM_RESOURCE_IDENTIFIER: + case MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_IP_ADDRESS: + case MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_RFC822_NAME: + /* length of value for each name entry, + * maximum 4 bytes for the length field, + * 1 byte for the tag/type. + */ + CHECK_OVERFLOW_ADD(buflen, cur->node.san.unstructured_name.len); + CHECK_OVERFLOW_ADD(buflen, 4 + 1); + break; + case MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_DIRECTORY_NAME: + { + const mbedtls_asn1_named_data *chunk = &cur->node.san.directory_name; + while (chunk != NULL) { + // Max 4 bytes for length, +1 for tag, + // additional 4 max for length, +1 for tag. + // See x509_write_name for more information. + CHECK_OVERFLOW_ADD(buflen, 4 + 1 + 4 + 1); + CHECK_OVERFLOW_ADD(buflen, chunk->oid.len); + CHECK_OVERFLOW_ADD(buflen, chunk->val.len); + chunk = chunk->next; + } + CHECK_OVERFLOW_ADD(buflen, 4 + 1); + break; + } + default: + /* Not supported - return. */ + return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + } + } + + /* Add the extra length field and tag */ + CHECK_OVERFLOW_ADD(buflen, 4 + 1); + + /* Allocate buffer */ + buf = mbedtls_calloc(1, buflen); + if (buf == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_ALLOC_FAILED; + } + p = buf + buflen; + + /* Write ASN.1-based structure */ + cur = san_list; + len = 0; + while (cur != NULL) { + size_t single_san_len = 0; + switch (cur->node.type) { + case MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_DNS_NAME: + case MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_RFC822_NAME: + case MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_UNIFORM_RESOURCE_IDENTIFIER: + case MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_IP_ADDRESS: + { + const unsigned char *unstructured_name = + (const unsigned char *) cur->node.san.unstructured_name.p; + size_t unstructured_name_len = cur->node.san.unstructured_name.len; + + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_CLEANUP_ADD(single_san_len, + mbedtls_asn1_write_raw_buffer( + &p, buf, + unstructured_name, unstructured_name_len)); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_CLEANUP_ADD(single_san_len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len( + &p, buf, unstructured_name_len)); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_CLEANUP_ADD(single_san_len, + mbedtls_asn1_write_tag( + &p, buf, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | cur->node.type)); + } + break; + case MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_DIRECTORY_NAME: + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_CLEANUP_ADD(single_san_len, + mbedtls_x509_write_names(&p, buf, + (mbedtls_asn1_named_data *) & + cur->node + .san.directory_name)); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_CLEANUP_ADD(single_san_len, + mbedtls_asn1_write_len(&p, buf, single_san_len)); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_CLEANUP_ADD(single_san_len, + mbedtls_asn1_write_tag(&p, buf, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | + MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_DIRECTORY_NAME)); + break; + default: + /* Error out on an unsupported SAN */ + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + goto cleanup; + } + cur = cur->next; + /* check for overflow */ + if (len > SIZE_MAX - single_san_len) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + goto cleanup; + } + len += single_san_len; + } + + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_CLEANUP_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len(&p, buf, len)); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_CLEANUP_ADD(len, + mbedtls_asn1_write_tag(&p, buf, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | + MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)); + + ret = mbedtls_x509_set_extension(extensions, + MBEDTLS_OID_SUBJECT_ALT_NAME, + MBEDTLS_OID_SIZE(MBEDTLS_OID_SUBJECT_ALT_NAME), + 0, + buf + buflen - len, len); + + /* If we exceeded the allocated buffer it means that maximum size of the SubjectAltName list + * was incorrectly calculated and memory is corrupted. */ + if (p < buf) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH; + } +cleanup: + mbedtls_free(buf); + return ret; +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CSR_WRITE_C || MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_WRITE_C */ diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/x509write_crt.c b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/x509write_crt.c index 1e16b53b3db0..72f5a10a17b9 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/x509write_crt.c +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/x509write_crt.c @@ -16,30 +16,36 @@ #if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_WRITE_C) #include "mbedtls/x509_crt.h" +#include "x509_internal.h" #include "mbedtls/asn1write.h" #include "mbedtls/error.h" #include "mbedtls/oid.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" #include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" -#include "mbedtls/sha1.h" +#include "mbedtls/md.h" #include +#include #if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_WRITE_C) #include "mbedtls/pem.h" #endif /* MBEDTLS_PEM_WRITE_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +#include "psa/crypto.h" +#include "psa_util_internal.h" +#include "mbedtls/psa_util.h" +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + void mbedtls_x509write_crt_init(mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx) { memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_x509write_cert)); - mbedtls_mpi_init(&ctx->serial); ctx->version = MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_VERSION_3; } void mbedtls_x509write_crt_free(mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx) { - mbedtls_mpi_free(&ctx->serial); - mbedtls_asn1_free_named_data_list(&ctx->subject); mbedtls_asn1_free_named_data_list(&ctx->issuer); mbedtls_asn1_free_named_data_list(&ctx->extensions); @@ -83,21 +89,42 @@ int mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_issuer_name(mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx, return mbedtls_x509_string_to_names(&ctx->issuer, issuer_name); } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) int mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_serial(mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx, const mbedtls_mpi *serial) { - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + int ret; + size_t tmp_len; - if (mbedtls_mpi_size(serial) > MBEDTLS_X509_RFC5280_MAX_SERIAL_LEN) { + /* Ensure that the MPI value fits into the buffer */ + tmp_len = mbedtls_mpi_size(serial); + if (tmp_len > MBEDTLS_X509_RFC5280_MAX_SERIAL_LEN) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } - if ((ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy(&ctx->serial, serial)) != 0) { + ctx->serial_len = tmp_len; + + ret = mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(serial, ctx->serial, tmp_len); + if (ret < 0) { return ret; } return 0; } +#endif // MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C && !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED + +int mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_serial_raw(mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx, + unsigned char *serial, size_t serial_len) +{ + if (serial_len > MBEDTLS_X509_RFC5280_MAX_SERIAL_LEN) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + ctx->serial_len = serial_len; + memcpy(ctx->serial, serial, serial_len); + + return 0; +} int mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_validity(mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx, const char *not_before, @@ -115,6 +142,13 @@ int mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_validity(mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx, return 0; } +int mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_subject_alternative_name(mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx, + const mbedtls_x509_san_list *san_list) +{ + return mbedtls_x509_write_set_san_common(&ctx->extensions, san_list); +} + + int mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_extension(mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx, const char *oid, size_t oid_len, int critical, @@ -157,71 +191,92 @@ int mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_basic_constraints(mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx, is_ca, buf + sizeof(buf) - len, len); } -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) -int mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_subject_key_identifier(mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1) +static int mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_key_identifier(mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx, + int is_ca, + unsigned char tag) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; unsigned char buf[MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE * 2 + 20]; /* tag, length + 2xMPI */ unsigned char *c = buf + sizeof(buf); size_t len = 0; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t hash_length; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf)); MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, - mbedtls_pk_write_pubkey(&c, buf, ctx->subject_key)); - - ret = mbedtls_sha1_ret(buf + sizeof(buf) - len, len, - buf + sizeof(buf) - 20); + mbedtls_pk_write_pubkey(&c, + buf, + is_ca ? + ctx->issuer_key : + ctx->subject_key)); + + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + status = psa_hash_compute(PSA_ALG_SHA_1, + buf + sizeof(buf) - len, + len, + buf + sizeof(buf) - 20, + 20, + &hash_length); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_HW_ACCEL_FAILED; + } +#else + ret = mbedtls_md(mbedtls_md_info_from_type(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1), + buf + sizeof(buf) - len, len, + buf + sizeof(buf) - 20); if (ret != 0) { return ret; } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + c = buf + sizeof(buf) - 20; len = 20; MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len(&c, buf, len)); - MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, - mbedtls_asn1_write_tag(&c, buf, MBEDTLS_ASN1_OCTET_STRING)); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag(&c, buf, tag)); - return mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_extension(ctx, - MBEDTLS_OID_SUBJECT_KEY_IDENTIFIER, - MBEDTLS_OID_SIZE(MBEDTLS_OID_SUBJECT_KEY_IDENTIFIER), - 0, buf + sizeof(buf) - len, len); -} - -int mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_authority_key_identifier(mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx) -{ - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - unsigned char buf[MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE * 2 + 20]; /* tag, length + 2xMPI */ - unsigned char *c = buf + sizeof(buf); - size_t len = 0; - - memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf)); - MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, - mbedtls_pk_write_pubkey(&c, buf, ctx->issuer_key)); - - ret = mbedtls_sha1_ret(buf + sizeof(buf) - len, len, - buf + sizeof(buf) - 20); - if (ret != 0) { - return ret; + if (is_ca) { // writes AuthorityKeyIdentifier sequence + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len(&c, buf, len)); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, + mbedtls_asn1_write_tag(&c, + buf, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | + MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)); } - c = buf + sizeof(buf) - 20; - len = 20; - MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len(&c, buf, len)); - MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, - mbedtls_asn1_write_tag(&c, buf, MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | 0)); + if (is_ca) { + return mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_extension(ctx, + MBEDTLS_OID_AUTHORITY_KEY_IDENTIFIER, + MBEDTLS_OID_SIZE( + MBEDTLS_OID_AUTHORITY_KEY_IDENTIFIER), + 0, buf + sizeof(buf) - len, len); + } else { + return mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_extension(ctx, + MBEDTLS_OID_SUBJECT_KEY_IDENTIFIER, + MBEDTLS_OID_SIZE( + MBEDTLS_OID_SUBJECT_KEY_IDENTIFIER), + 0, buf + sizeof(buf) - len, len); + } +} - MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len(&c, buf, len)); - MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, - mbedtls_asn1_write_tag(&c, buf, - MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | - MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)); +int mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_subject_key_identifier(mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx) +{ + return mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_key_identifier(ctx, + 0, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_OCTET_STRING); +} - return mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_extension( - ctx, MBEDTLS_OID_AUTHORITY_KEY_IDENTIFIER, - MBEDTLS_OID_SIZE(MBEDTLS_OID_AUTHORITY_KEY_IDENTIFIER), - 0, buf + sizeof(buf) - len, len); +int mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_authority_key_identifier(mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx) +{ + return mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_key_identifier(ctx, + 1, + (MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | 0)); } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1 */ int mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_key_usage(mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx, unsigned int key_usage) @@ -264,6 +319,47 @@ int mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_key_usage(mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx, return 0; } +int mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_ext_key_usage(mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx, + const mbedtls_asn1_sequence *exts) +{ + unsigned char buf[256]; + unsigned char *c = buf + sizeof(buf); + int ret; + size_t len = 0; + const mbedtls_asn1_sequence *last_ext = NULL; + const mbedtls_asn1_sequence *ext; + + memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf)); + + /* We need at least one extension: SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF KeyPurposeId */ + if (exts == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + /* Iterate over exts backwards, so we write them out in the requested order */ + while (last_ext != exts) { + for (ext = exts; ext->next != last_ext; ext = ext->next) { + } + if (ext->buf.tag != MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_raw_buffer(&c, buf, ext->buf.p, ext->buf.len)); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len(&c, buf, ext->buf.len)); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag(&c, buf, MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID)); + last_ext = ext; + } + + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len(&c, buf, len)); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, + mbedtls_asn1_write_tag(&c, buf, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)); + + return mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_extension(ctx, + MBEDTLS_OID_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE, + MBEDTLS_OID_SIZE(MBEDTLS_OID_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE), + 1, c, len); +} + int mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_ns_cert_type(mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx, unsigned char ns_cert_type) { @@ -325,8 +421,14 @@ int mbedtls_x509write_crt_der(mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx, const char *sig_oid; size_t sig_oid_len = 0; unsigned char *c, *c2; - unsigned char hash[64]; unsigned char sig[MBEDTLS_PK_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE]; + size_t hash_length = 0; + unsigned char hash[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE]; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_algorithm_t psa_algorithm; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + size_t sub_len = 0, pub_len = 0, sig_and_oid_len = 0, sig_len; size_t len = 0; mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_alg; @@ -380,7 +482,7 @@ int mbedtls_x509write_crt_der(mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx, */ MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(pub_len, mbedtls_pk_write_pubkey_der(ctx->subject_key, - buf, c - buf)); + buf, (size_t) (c - buf))); c -= pub_len; len += pub_len; @@ -439,9 +541,29 @@ int mbedtls_x509write_crt_der(mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx, /* * Serial ::= INTEGER + * + * Written data is: + * - "ctx->serial_len" bytes for the raw serial buffer + * - if MSb of "serial" is 1, then prepend an extra 0x00 byte + * - 1 byte for the length + * - 1 byte for the TAG */ - MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi(&c, buf, - &ctx->serial)); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_raw_buffer(&c, buf, + ctx->serial, ctx->serial_len)); + if (*c & 0x80) { + if (c - buf < 1) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + } + *(--c) = 0x0; + len++; + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len(&c, buf, + ctx->serial_len + 1)); + } else { + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len(&c, buf, + ctx->serial_len)); + } + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag(&c, buf, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_INTEGER)); /* * Version ::= INTEGER { v1(0), v2(1), v3(2) } @@ -471,13 +593,28 @@ int mbedtls_x509write_crt_der(mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx, */ /* Compute hash of CRT. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + psa_algorithm = mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type(ctx->md_alg); + + status = psa_hash_compute(psa_algorithm, + c, + len, + hash, + sizeof(hash), + &hash_length); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_HW_ACCEL_FAILED; + } +#else if ((ret = mbedtls_md(mbedtls_md_info_from_type(ctx->md_alg), c, len, hash)) != 0) { return ret; } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + if ((ret = mbedtls_pk_sign(ctx->issuer_key, ctx->md_alg, - hash, 0, sig, &sig_len, + hash, hash_length, sig, sizeof(sig), &sig_len, f_rng, p_rng)) != 0) { return ret; } diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/x509write_csr.c b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/x509write_csr.c index 3c3ab3a0789e..d3ddbcc03d21 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/x509write_csr.c +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/x509write_csr.c @@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ #if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CSR_WRITE_C) +#include "x509_internal.h" #include "mbedtls/x509_csr.h" #include "mbedtls/asn1write.h" #include "mbedtls/error.h" @@ -22,8 +23,9 @@ #if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) #include "psa/crypto.h" +#include "psa_util_internal.h" #include "mbedtls/psa_util.h" -#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ #include #include @@ -65,10 +67,17 @@ int mbedtls_x509write_csr_set_subject_name(mbedtls_x509write_csr *ctx, int mbedtls_x509write_csr_set_extension(mbedtls_x509write_csr *ctx, const char *oid, size_t oid_len, + int critical, const unsigned char *val, size_t val_len) { return mbedtls_x509_set_extension(&ctx->extensions, oid, oid_len, - 0, val, val_len); + critical, val, val_len); +} + +int mbedtls_x509write_csr_set_subject_alternative_name(mbedtls_x509write_csr *ctx, + const mbedtls_x509_san_list *san_list) +{ + return mbedtls_x509_write_set_san_common(&ctx->extensions, san_list); } int mbedtls_x509write_csr_set_key_usage(mbedtls_x509write_csr *ctx, unsigned char key_usage) @@ -86,7 +95,7 @@ int mbedtls_x509write_csr_set_key_usage(mbedtls_x509write_csr *ctx, unsigned cha ret = mbedtls_x509write_csr_set_extension(ctx, MBEDTLS_OID_KEY_USAGE, MBEDTLS_OID_SIZE(MBEDTLS_OID_KEY_USAGE), - c, (size_t) ret); + 0, c, (size_t) ret); if (ret != 0) { return ret; } @@ -110,7 +119,7 @@ int mbedtls_x509write_csr_set_ns_cert_type(mbedtls_x509write_csr *ctx, ret = mbedtls_x509write_csr_set_extension(ctx, MBEDTLS_OID_NS_CERT_TYPE, MBEDTLS_OID_SIZE(MBEDTLS_OID_NS_CERT_TYPE), - c, (size_t) ret); + 0, c, (size_t) ret); if (ret != 0) { return ret; } @@ -121,7 +130,7 @@ int mbedtls_x509write_csr_set_ns_cert_type(mbedtls_x509write_csr *ctx, static int x509write_csr_der_internal(mbedtls_x509write_csr *ctx, unsigned char *buf, size_t size, - unsigned char *sig, + unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_size, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng) { @@ -129,14 +138,13 @@ static int x509write_csr_der_internal(mbedtls_x509write_csr *ctx, const char *sig_oid; size_t sig_oid_len = 0; unsigned char *c, *c2; - unsigned char hash[64]; + unsigned char hash[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE]; size_t pub_len = 0, sig_and_oid_len = 0, sig_len; size_t len = 0; mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_alg; #if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) - psa_hash_operation_t hash_operation = PSA_HASH_OPERATION_INIT; size_t hash_len; - psa_algorithm_t hash_alg = mbedtls_psa_translate_md(ctx->md_alg); + psa_algorithm_t hash_alg = mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type(ctx->md_alg); #endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ /* Write the CSR backwards starting from the end of buf */ @@ -177,7 +185,7 @@ static int x509write_csr_der_internal(mbedtls_x509write_csr *ctx, MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC)); MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(pub_len, mbedtls_pk_write_pubkey_der(ctx->key, - buf, c - buf)); + buf, (size_t) (c - buf))); c -= pub_len; len += pub_len; @@ -203,17 +211,13 @@ static int x509write_csr_der_internal(mbedtls_x509write_csr *ctx, * Note: hash errors can happen only after an internal error */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) - if (psa_hash_setup(&hash_operation, hash_alg) != PSA_SUCCESS) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FATAL_ERROR; - } - - if (psa_hash_update(&hash_operation, c, len) != PSA_SUCCESS) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FATAL_ERROR; - } - - if (psa_hash_finish(&hash_operation, hash, sizeof(hash), &hash_len) - != PSA_SUCCESS) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FATAL_ERROR; + if (psa_hash_compute(hash_alg, + c, + len, + hash, + sizeof(hash), + &hash_len) != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_HW_ACCEL_FAILED; } #else /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ ret = mbedtls_md(mbedtls_md_info_from_type(ctx->md_alg), c, len, hash); @@ -221,7 +225,8 @@ static int x509write_csr_der_internal(mbedtls_x509write_csr *ctx, return ret; } #endif - if ((ret = mbedtls_pk_sign(ctx->key, ctx->md_alg, hash, 0, sig, &sig_len, + if ((ret = mbedtls_pk_sign(ctx->key, ctx->md_alg, hash, 0, + sig, sig_size, &sig_len, f_rng, p_rng)) != 0) { return ret; } @@ -271,7 +276,7 @@ static int x509write_csr_der_internal(mbedtls_x509write_csr *ctx, MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)); /* Zero the unused bytes at the start of buf */ - memset(buf, 0, c2 - buf); + memset(buf, 0, (size_t) (c2 - buf)); return (int) len; } @@ -288,7 +293,9 @@ int mbedtls_x509write_csr_der(mbedtls_x509write_csr *ctx, unsigned char *buf, return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_ALLOC_FAILED; } - ret = x509write_csr_der_internal(ctx, buf, size, sig, f_rng, p_rng); + ret = x509write_csr_der_internal(ctx, buf, size, + sig, MBEDTLS_PK_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE, + f_rng, p_rng); mbedtls_free(sig); diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/xtea.c b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/xtea.c deleted file mode 100644 index f4aca56c2fdd..000000000000 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/xtea.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,224 +0,0 @@ -/* - * A 32-bit implementation of the XTEA algorithm - * - * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later - */ - -#include "common.h" - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_XTEA_C) - -#include "mbedtls/xtea.h" -#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" - -#include - -#include "mbedtls/platform.h" - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_XTEA_ALT) - -void mbedtls_xtea_init(mbedtls_xtea_context *ctx) -{ - memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_xtea_context)); -} - -void mbedtls_xtea_free(mbedtls_xtea_context *ctx) -{ - if (ctx == NULL) { - return; - } - - mbedtls_platform_zeroize(ctx, sizeof(mbedtls_xtea_context)); -} - -/* - * XTEA key schedule - */ -void mbedtls_xtea_setup(mbedtls_xtea_context *ctx, const unsigned char key[16]) -{ - int i; - - memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_xtea_context)); - - for (i = 0; i < 4; i++) { - ctx->k[i] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE(key, i << 2); - } -} - -/* - * XTEA encrypt function - */ -int mbedtls_xtea_crypt_ecb(mbedtls_xtea_context *ctx, int mode, - const unsigned char input[8], unsigned char output[8]) -{ - uint32_t *k, v0, v1, i; - - k = ctx->k; - - v0 = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE(input, 0); - v1 = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE(input, 4); - - if (mode == MBEDTLS_XTEA_ENCRYPT) { - uint32_t sum = 0, delta = 0x9E3779B9; - - for (i = 0; i < 32; i++) { - v0 += (((v1 << 4) ^ (v1 >> 5)) + v1) ^ (sum + k[sum & 3]); - sum += delta; - v1 += (((v0 << 4) ^ (v0 >> 5)) + v0) ^ (sum + k[(sum>>11) & 3]); - } - } else { /* MBEDTLS_XTEA_DECRYPT */ - uint32_t delta = 0x9E3779B9, sum = delta * 32; - - for (i = 0; i < 32; i++) { - v1 -= (((v0 << 4) ^ (v0 >> 5)) + v0) ^ (sum + k[(sum>>11) & 3]); - sum -= delta; - v0 -= (((v1 << 4) ^ (v1 >> 5)) + v1) ^ (sum + k[sum & 3]); - } - } - - MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE(v0, output, 0); - MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE(v1, output, 4); - - return 0; -} - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) -/* - * XTEA-CBC buffer encryption/decryption - */ -int mbedtls_xtea_crypt_cbc(mbedtls_xtea_context *ctx, int mode, size_t length, - unsigned char iv[8], const unsigned char *input, - unsigned char *output) -{ - int i; - unsigned char temp[8]; - - if (length % 8) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_XTEA_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH; - } - - if (mode == MBEDTLS_XTEA_DECRYPT) { - while (length > 0) { - memcpy(temp, input, 8); - mbedtls_xtea_crypt_ecb(ctx, mode, input, output); - - for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) { - output[i] = (unsigned char) (output[i] ^ iv[i]); - } - - memcpy(iv, temp, 8); - - input += 8; - output += 8; - length -= 8; - } - } else { - while (length > 0) { - for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) { - output[i] = (unsigned char) (input[i] ^ iv[i]); - } - - mbedtls_xtea_crypt_ecb(ctx, mode, output, output); - memcpy(iv, output, 8); - - input += 8; - output += 8; - length -= 8; - } - } - - return 0; -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ -#endif /* !MBEDTLS_XTEA_ALT */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) - -/* - * XTEA tests vectors (non-official) - */ - -static const unsigned char xtea_test_key[6][16] = -{ - { 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, 0x08, 0x09, 0x0a, 0x0b, - 0x0c, 0x0d, 0x0e, 0x0f }, - { 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, 0x08, 0x09, 0x0a, 0x0b, - 0x0c, 0x0d, 0x0e, 0x0f }, - { 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, 0x08, 0x09, 0x0a, 0x0b, - 0x0c, 0x0d, 0x0e, 0x0f }, - { 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 }, - { 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 }, - { 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 } -}; - -static const unsigned char xtea_test_pt[6][8] = -{ - { 0x41, 0x42, 0x43, 0x44, 0x45, 0x46, 0x47, 0x48 }, - { 0x41, 0x41, 0x41, 0x41, 0x41, 0x41, 0x41, 0x41 }, - { 0x5a, 0x5b, 0x6e, 0x27, 0x89, 0x48, 0xd7, 0x7f }, - { 0x41, 0x42, 0x43, 0x44, 0x45, 0x46, 0x47, 0x48 }, - { 0x41, 0x41, 0x41, 0x41, 0x41, 0x41, 0x41, 0x41 }, - { 0x70, 0xe1, 0x22, 0x5d, 0x6e, 0x4e, 0x76, 0x55 } -}; - -static const unsigned char xtea_test_ct[6][8] = -{ - { 0x49, 0x7d, 0xf3, 0xd0, 0x72, 0x61, 0x2c, 0xb5 }, - { 0xe7, 0x8f, 0x2d, 0x13, 0x74, 0x43, 0x41, 0xd8 }, - { 0x41, 0x41, 0x41, 0x41, 0x41, 0x41, 0x41, 0x41 }, - { 0xa0, 0x39, 0x05, 0x89, 0xf8, 0xb8, 0xef, 0xa5 }, - { 0xed, 0x23, 0x37, 0x5a, 0x82, 0x1a, 0x8c, 0x2d }, - { 0x41, 0x41, 0x41, 0x41, 0x41, 0x41, 0x41, 0x41 } -}; - -/* - * Checkup routine - */ -int mbedtls_xtea_self_test(int verbose) -{ - int i, ret = 0; - unsigned char buf[8]; - mbedtls_xtea_context ctx; - - mbedtls_xtea_init(&ctx); - for (i = 0; i < 6; i++) { - if (verbose != 0) { - mbedtls_printf(" XTEA test #%d: ", i + 1); - } - - memcpy(buf, xtea_test_pt[i], 8); - - mbedtls_xtea_setup(&ctx, xtea_test_key[i]); - mbedtls_xtea_crypt_ecb(&ctx, MBEDTLS_XTEA_ENCRYPT, buf, buf); - - if (memcmp(buf, xtea_test_ct[i], 8) != 0) { - if (verbose != 0) { - mbedtls_printf("failed\n"); - } - - ret = 1; - goto exit; - } - - if (verbose != 0) { - mbedtls_printf("passed\n"); - } - } - - if (verbose != 0) { - mbedtls_printf("\n"); - } - -exit: - mbedtls_xtea_free(&ctx); - - return ret; -} - -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ - -#endif /* MBEDTLS_XTEA_C */ diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/patches/no-flexible-arrays.diff b/thirdparty/mbedtls/patches/no-flexible-arrays.diff new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..87fd06f1e3a3 --- /dev/null +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/patches/no-flexible-arrays.diff @@ -0,0 +1,132 @@ +diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto.h b/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto.h +index 7083bd911b..92f9c824e9 100644 +--- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto.h ++++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto.h +@@ -3834,12 +3834,14 @@ psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_output_key( + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ ++#ifndef __cplusplus + psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_output_key_ext( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + psa_key_derivation_operation_t *operation, + const psa_key_production_parameters_t *params, + size_t params_data_length, + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t *key); ++#endif + + /** Compare output data from a key derivation operation to an expected value. + * +@@ -4180,10 +4182,12 @@ psa_status_t psa_generate_key(const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ ++#ifndef __cplusplus + psa_status_t psa_generate_key_ext(const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const psa_key_production_parameters_t *params, + size_t params_data_length, + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t *key); ++#endif + + /**@}*/ + +diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_struct.h b/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_struct.h +index 3913551aa8..e2c227b2eb 100644 +--- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_struct.h ++++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_struct.h +@@ -223,11 +223,13 @@ static inline struct psa_key_derivation_s psa_key_derivation_operation_init( + return v; + } + ++#ifndef __cplusplus + struct psa_key_production_parameters_s { + /* Future versions may add other fields in this structure. */ + uint32_t flags; + uint8_t data[]; + }; ++#endif + + /** The default production parameters for key generation or key derivation. + * +diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_types.h b/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_types.h +index c21bad86cc..a36b6ee65d 100644 +--- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_types.h ++++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_types.h +@@ -477,7 +477,9 @@ typedef uint16_t psa_key_derivation_step_t; + * - Other key types: reserved for future use. \c flags must be 0. + * + */ ++#ifndef __cplusplus + typedef struct psa_key_production_parameters_s psa_key_production_parameters_t; ++#endif + + /**@}*/ + +diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_core.h b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_core.h +index 9462d2e8be..c059162efe 100644 +--- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_core.h ++++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_core.h +@@ -351,9 +351,11 @@ psa_status_t psa_export_public_key_internal( + * \param[in] params The key production parameters to check. + * \param params_data_length Size of `params->data` in bytes. + */ ++#ifndef __cplusplus + int psa_key_production_parameters_are_default( + const psa_key_production_parameters_t *params, + size_t params_data_length); ++#endif + + /** + * \brief Generate a key. +@@ -378,12 +380,14 @@ int psa_key_production_parameters_are_default( + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL + * The size of \p key_buffer is too small. + */ ++#ifndef __cplusplus + psa_status_t psa_generate_key_internal(const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const psa_key_production_parameters_t *params, + size_t params_data_length, + uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, + size_t *key_buffer_length); ++#endif + + /** Sign a message with a private key. For hash-and-sign algorithms, + * this includes the hashing step. +diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_driver_wrappers.h b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_driver_wrappers.h +index ea6aee32eb..6919971aca 100644 +--- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_driver_wrappers.h ++++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_driver_wrappers.h +@@ -728,6 +728,7 @@ static inline psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_get_key_buffer_size_from_key_data( + } + } + ++#ifndef __cplusplus + static inline psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_generate_key( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const psa_key_production_parameters_t *params, size_t params_data_length, +@@ -832,6 +833,7 @@ static inline psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_generate_key( + + return( status ); + } ++#endif + + static inline psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_import_key( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, +diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_rsa.h b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_rsa.h +index ffeef26be1..6d695ddf50 100644 +--- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_rsa.h ++++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_rsa.h +@@ -130,10 +130,12 @@ psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_rsa_export_public_key( + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL + * The size of \p key_buffer is too small. + */ ++#ifndef __cplusplus + psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_rsa_generate_key( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const psa_key_production_parameters_t *params, size_t params_data_length, + uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, size_t *key_buffer_length); ++#endif + + /** Sign an already-calculated hash with an RSA private key. + * diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/patches/windows-arm64-hardclock.diff b/thirdparty/mbedtls/patches/windows-arm64-hardclock.diff deleted file mode 100644 index 2b86bb07a103..000000000000 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/patches/windows-arm64-hardclock.diff +++ /dev/null @@ -1,16 +0,0 @@ -diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/timing.c b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/timing.c -index f2f0a4386b..7ef9f473b5 100644 ---- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/timing.c -+++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/timing.c -@@ -178,8 +178,10 @@ unsigned long mbedtls_timing_hardclock(void) - #endif /* !HAVE_HARDCLOCK && MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM && - __GNUC__ && __ia64__ */ - --#if !defined(HAVE_HARDCLOCK) && defined(_MSC_VER) && \ -+// -- GODOT start -- -+#if !defined(HAVE_HARDCLOCK) && defined(_WIN32) && \ - !defined(EFIX64) && !defined(EFI32) -+// -- GODOT end -- - - #define HAVE_HARDCLOCK - diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/patches/windows-entropy-bcrypt.diff b/thirdparty/mbedtls/patches/windows-entropy-bcrypt.diff deleted file mode 100644 index 2d743c7a15b1..000000000000 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/patches/windows-entropy-bcrypt.diff +++ /dev/null @@ -1,56 +0,0 @@ -Backported from: https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/pull/8047 - -diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/entropy_poll.c b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/entropy_poll.c -index cde49e66a0..4c5184686e 100644 ---- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/entropy_poll.c -+++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/entropy_poll.c -@@ -39,32 +39,34 @@ - - #if defined(_WIN32) && !defined(EFIX64) && !defined(EFI32) - --#if !defined(_WIN32_WINNT) --#define _WIN32_WINNT 0x0400 --#endif - #include --#include -+#include -+#include - - int mbedtls_platform_entropy_poll(void *data, unsigned char *output, size_t len, - size_t *olen) - { -- HCRYPTPROV provider; - ((void) data); - *olen = 0; - -- if (CryptAcquireContext(&provider, NULL, NULL, -- PROV_RSA_FULL, CRYPT_VERIFYCONTEXT) == FALSE) { -- return MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED; -- } -+ /* -+ * BCryptGenRandom takes ULONG for size, which is smaller than size_t on -+ * 64-bit Windows platforms. Extract entropy in chunks of len (dependent -+ * on ULONG_MAX) size. -+ */ -+ while (len != 0) { -+ unsigned long ulong_bytes = -+ (len > ULONG_MAX) ? ULONG_MAX : (unsigned long) len; -+ -+ if (!BCRYPT_SUCCESS(BCryptGenRandom(NULL, output, ulong_bytes, -+ BCRYPT_USE_SYSTEM_PREFERRED_RNG))) { -+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED; -+ } - -- if (CryptGenRandom(provider, (DWORD) len, output) == FALSE) { -- CryptReleaseContext(provider, 0); -- return MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED; -+ *olen += ulong_bytes; -+ len -= ulong_bytes; - } - -- CryptReleaseContext(provider, 0); -- *olen = len; -- - return 0; - } - #else /* _WIN32 && !EFIX64 && !EFI32 */