diff --git a/enhancements/automated-service-ca-rotation.md b/enhancements/automated-service-ca-rotation.md
index 8c0eea815f9..e5c8be48305 100644
--- a/enhancements/automated-service-ca-rotation.md
+++ b/enhancements/automated-service-ca-rotation.md
@@ -92,12 +92,14 @@ and the functionality could be separately extracted for operator reuse.
 
 ## Proposal
 
-- Detect when the current CA certificate has passed 1/2 of its validity bounds
-  (i.e. 6 months has passed of a 1 year validity) and generate a new CA.
+- Detect when the current CA certificate has less than 6 months of validity and
+  generate a new CA.
   - The new CA should have the same `Subject.CommonName` as the current CA to
     ensure that trust chaining is possible.
-  - This provides a 6 month grace period for consumers of serving certs and ca
-    bundles to be refreshed.
+  - Servers using a serving cert provided by the operator will have until 6
+    months after rotation to refresh without breaking trust.
+  - Clients using a ca bundle provided by the operator will have until the
+    original expiry of the pre-rotation CA to refresh without breaking trust.
 
 - Generate an intermediate CA certificate with the same public key as the new CA
   but signed with the private key of the current CA.
@@ -113,6 +115,10 @@ and the functionality could be separately extracted for operator reuse.
     bridge trust between an unrefreshed server (serving with a cert
     generated from the previous CA) and a refreshed client (validating
     trust with the new CA bundle).
+  - If the expiry of the current CA is less than 6 months, the new intermediate
+    certificate should be set to expire 6 months from the time of rotation to
+    ensure that refreshed clients will be able to trust unrefreshed servers for
+    that minimum duration.
 
 - Compare the `AuthorityKeyId` of a serving cert with the `SubjectKeyId` of the
   current CA to determine whether the serving cert was issued by the current CA.
@@ -177,6 +183,22 @@ manual rotation (by deleting the signing secret) could be performed. Manual
 rotation would not be seamless, however, due to the lack of a grace period for
 services and clients to converge on the new trust chain.
 
+- Testing in advance of service CA rotation whether consumers of CA artifacts are
+refreshing in a timely manner is complicated:
+ - Unrefreshed clients and servers would be able to communicate without error
+   with both refreshed and unrefreshed clients and servers until the expiry of
+   the pre-rotation CA.
+ - Detecting clients that do not refresh would require starting a cluster with
+   automatic rotation disabled and provisioned with a near-expiry service
+   CA. This would allow a subsequent forced rotation to flush out the failure of
+   unrefreshed clients when the pre-rotation CA had expired.
+ - Without knowing that a given deployment or replicaset was automatically
+   responding to a serving cert being regenerated or a new ca bundle being
+   injected, a pod that references a serving cert secret or ca bundle configmap
+   could simply be deleted if it was started before the most recent rotation. This
+   would ensure that the pod was restarted with the current state of the service
+   ca artifacts it was consuming.
+
 - Every team should confirm whether any components that interact with service
 serving CAs (either by consuming a service that is signed with one, or by
 offering a service signed with one) properly handle rotation of the serving cert