Skip to content
This repository has been archived by the owner on Sep 3, 2021. It is now read-only.

Latest commit

 

History

History
52 lines (36 loc) · 2.2 KB

Full_Disk_Encryption.md

File metadata and controls

52 lines (36 loc) · 2.2 KB

Full Disk Encryption

Viable solutions exist for Yubikey-based FDE on OSX/Windows that require either a very customized operating system install, or custom reader.

Linux

FDE + Yubikey is going to be fairly straight forward for Linux/(Free/Open)BSD via HMAC-SHA1 or pin+GPG.

TODO: Add in details and links and don't make people google it all

Windows/OSX

In general Windows/OSX are simply not a great option if a high level of security is desired. Being proprietary they can not be easily modified to meet custom requirements.

That said a couple possible paths exist to get some level of security token integration.

VT-d Virtual Machine

There are currently not any known paths to do FDE and then -directly- bootstrap unmodified OSX/Windows kernels which will expect to talk directly to real disk partition. That said, on modern hardware with VT-d support you could pass through a lightweight hypervisor. Then you get to use OSX/Windows in a jailed environment on the other side of an IOMMU where they can't access the memory that holds the passphrase or directly interact with the real disk.

The flow for Windows/OSX would be, boot to tiny bootstrapped linux system (< ~100MB Mem overhead) that maintains FDE then chain-loads windows/OSX into a hypervisor. While a pain to set up initially, this is totally possible on VT-d apable hardware with minimal performance penalty.

A script to bootstrap a Windows qemu guest with VT-d is here for reference: https://github.com/lrvick/dotfiles/blob/master/.local/bin/win

Custom HID reader

If you simply trust OSX/Windows fully or your threat model does not warrant any of the above, you could just use straight up HID via a custom reader.

A simple prototype would entail an Adafruit PN532 NFC Shield + Arduino Uno with a very basic firmware that provides a pre-coded challenge to the NFC hardware token, and then captures a long reply string from the token which it proxies over USB/HID to type in the passphrase as though it was a simply a USB Keyboard.

This is far from ideal or secure but if you were to built a reader that itself uses a secure enclave of some type to protect the challenge you might find a solution that is suitable for use in a very specific environments.