The Malcolm aggregator base operating system uses the harbian-audit benchmarks that target the following guidelines for establishing a secure configuration posture:
- CIS Debian Linux 9/10 Benchmark
- DISA STIG (Security Technical Implementation Guides) for RHEL 7 v2r5 Ubuntu v1r2 adapted for a Debian operating system
- Additional recommendations from cisecurity.org
Currently there are 274 checks to determine compliance with the harbian-audit benchmark.
The Malcolm aggregator base operating system claims exceptions from the recommendations in this benchmark in the following categories:
1.1 Install Updates, Patches and Additional Security Software - When the the Malcolm aggregator appliance software is built, all the latest applicable security patches and updates are included. How future updates are to be handled is still under design.
1.3 Enable verify the signature of local packages - As the base distribution is not using embedded signatures, debsig-verify would reject all packages (see comment in /etc/dpkg/dpkg.cfg). Enabling embedded signatures after installation would disallow any future updates.
2.14 Add nodev option to /run/shm Partition, 2.15 Add nosuid option to /run/shm Partition, 2.16 Add noexec option to /run/shm Partition - The Malcolm aggregator base operating system does not mount /run/shm as a separate partition, so these recommendations do not apply.
2.19 Disable Mounting of freevxfs Filesystems, 2.20 Disable Mounting of jffs2 Filesystems, 2.21 Disable Mounting of hfs Filesystems, 2.22 Disable Mounting of hfsplus Filesystems, 2.23 Disable Mounting of squashfs Filesystems, 2.24 Disable Mounting of udf Filesystems - The Malcolm aggregator base operating system is not compiling a custom Linux kernel, so these filesystems are inherently supported as they are part Debian Linux's default kernel.
3.3 Set Boot Loader Password - As maximizing availability is a system requirement, Malcolm should restart automatically without user intervention to ensure uninterrupted service. A boot loader password is not enabled.
4.8 Disable USB Devices - The ability to ingest data (such as PCAP files) from a mounted USB mass storage device is a requirement of the system.
6.1 Ensure the X Window system is not installed, 6.2 Ensure Avahi Server is not enabled, 6.3 Ensure print server is not enabled - An X Windows session is provided for displaying dashboards. The library packages libavahi-common-data, libavahi-common3, and libcups2 are dependencies of some of the X components used by the Malcolm aggregator base operating system, but the avahi and cups services themselves are disabled.
6.17 Ensure virus scan Server is enabled, 6.18 Ensure virus scan Server update is enabled - As this is a network traffic analysis appliance rather than an end-user device, regular user files will not be created. A virus scan program would impact device performance and would be unnecessary.
7.1.1 Disable IP Forwarding, 7.2.4 Log Suspicious Packets, 7.2.7 Enable RFC-recommended Source Route Validation, 7.4.1 Install TCP Wrappers - As Malcolm may operate as a network traffic capture appliance sniffing packets on a network interface configured in promiscuous mode, these recommendations do not apply.
8.1.1.2 Disable System on Audit Log Full, 8.1.1.3 Keep All Auditing Information, 8.1.1.5 Ensure set remote_server for audit service, 8.1.1.6 Ensure enable_krb5 set to yes for remote audit service, 8.1.1.7 Ensure set action for audit storage volume is fulled, 8.1.1.8 Ensure set action for network failure on remote audit service, 8.1.1.9 Set space left for auditd service, a few other audit-related items under section 8.1, 8.2.4 Configure rsyslog to Send Logs to a Remote Log Host - As maximizing availability is a system requirement, audit processing failures will be logged on the device rather than halting the system. auditd is set up to syslog when its local storage capacity is reached.
8.4.2 Implement Periodic Execution of File Integrity - This functionality is not configured by default, but it can be configured post-install by the end user.
Password-related recommendations under 9.2 and 10.1 - The library package libpam-pwquality is used in favor of libpam-cracklib, which is what the compliance scripts are looking for. Also, as an appliance running Malcolm is intended to be used as an appliance rather than a general user-facing software platform, some exceptions to password enforcement policies are claimed.
9.3.13 Limit Access via SSH - The Malcolm aggregator base operating system does not create multiple regular user accounts: only root and an aggregator service account are used. SSH access for root is disabled. SSH login with a password is also disallowed: only key-based authentication is accepted. The service account accepts no keys by default. As such, the AllowUsers, AllowGroups, DenyUsers, and DenyGroups values in sshd_config do not apply.
9.4 Restrict Access to the su Command - The Malcolm aggregator base operating system does not create multiple regular user accounts: only the root and aggregator service accounts are used.
10.1.6 Remove nopasswd option from the sudoers configuration - A very limited set of operations (a single script used to run the AIDE integrity check as a non-root user) has the NOPASSWD option set to allow it to be run in the background without user intervention.
10.1.10 Set maxlogins for all accounts and 10.5 Set Timeout on ttys - The Malcolm aggregator base operating system does not create multiple regular user accounts: only the root and aggregator service accounts are used.
12.10 Find SUID System Executables, 12.11 Find SGID System Executables - The few files found by these scripts are valid exceptions required by the Malcolm aggregator base operating system's core requirements.
14.1 Defense for NAT Slipstreaming - As Malcolm may operate as a network traffic capture appliance sniffing packets on a network interface configured in promiscuous mode, this recommendation does not apply.
Please review the notes for these additional guidelines. While not claiming an exception, the Malcolm aggregator base operating system may implement these guidelines in a manner different than is described by the CIS Debian Linux 9/10 Benchmark or the hardenedlinux/harbian-audit audit scripts.
4.1 Restrict Core Dumps - The Malcolm aggregator base operating system disables core dumps using a configuration file for ulimit named /etc/security/limits.d/limits.conf. The audit script checking for this does not check the limits.d subdirectory, which is why this is incorrectly flagged as noncompliant.
5.4 Ensure ctrl-alt-del is disabled - The Malcolm aggregator base operating system disables the ctrl+alt+delete key sequence by executing systemctl disable ctrl-alt-del.target during installation and the command systemctl mask ctrl-alt-del.target at boot time.
7.4.4 Create /etc/hosts.deny, 7.7.1 Ensure Firewall is active, 7.7.4.1 Ensure default deny firewall policy, 7.7.4.2 Ensure loopback traffic is configured, 7.7.4.3 Ensure default deny firewall policy, 7.7.4.4 Ensure outbound and established connections are configured - The Malcolm aggregator base operating system is configured with an appropriately locked-down software firewall (managed by "Uncomplicated Firewall" ufw). However, the methods outlined in the CIS benchmark recommendations do not account for this configuration.
8.6 Verifies integrity all packages - The script that verifies package integrity only "fails" because of missing (status ??5?????? displayed by the utility) language ("locale") files, which are removed as part of the Malcolm aggregator base operating system's trimming-down process. All non-locale-related system files pass intergrity checks.