diff --git a/lib/tls.js b/lib/tls.js index 765e1658ea9127..11bf0c53f0f4d1 100644 --- a/lib/tls.js +++ b/lib/tls.js @@ -66,134 +66,137 @@ exports.convertALPNProtocols = function(protocols, out) { } }; -exports.checkServerIdentity = function checkServerIdentity(host, cert) { - // Create regexp to much hostnames - function regexpify(host, wildcards) { - // Add trailing dot (make hostnames uniform) - if (!host || !host.endsWith('.')) host += '.'; - - // The same applies to hostname with more than one wildcard, - // if hostname has wildcard when wildcards are not allowed, - // or if there are less than two dots after wildcard (i.e. *.com or *d.com) - // - // also - // - // "The client SHOULD NOT attempt to match a presented identifier in - // which the wildcard character comprises a label other than the - // left-most label (e.g., do not match bar.*.example.net)." - // RFC6125 - if (!wildcards && /\*/.test(host) || /[\.\*].*\*/.test(host) || - /\*/.test(host) && !/\*.*\..+\..+/.test(host)) { - return /$./; - } +function unfqdn(host) { + return host.replace(/[.]$/, ''); +} - // Replace wildcard chars with regexp's wildcard and - // escape all characters that have special meaning in regexps - // (i.e. '.', '[', '{', '*', and others) - var re = host.replace( - /\*([a-z0-9\\-_\.])|[\.,\-\\\^\$+?*\[\]\(\):!\|{}]/g, - function(all, sub) { - if (sub) return '[a-z0-9\\-_]*' + (sub === '-' ? '\\-' : sub); - return '\\' + all; - }); - - return new RegExp('^' + re + '$', 'i'); - } +function splitHost(host) { + // String#toLowerCase() is locale-sensitive so we use + // a conservative version that only lowercases A-Z. + const replacer = (c) => String.fromCharCode(32 + c.charCodeAt(0)); + return unfqdn(host).replace(/[A-Z]/g, replacer).split('.'); +} + +function check(hostParts, pattern, wildcards) { + // Empty strings, null, undefined, etc. never match. + if (!pattern) + return false; + + const patternParts = splitHost(pattern); + + if (hostParts.length !== patternParts.length) + return false; + + // Pattern has empty components, e.g. "bad..example.com". + if (patternParts.includes('')) + return false; + + // RFC 6125 allows IDNA U-labels (Unicode) in names but we have no + // good way to detect their encoding or normalize them so we simply + // reject them. Control characters and blanks are rejected as well + // because nothing good can come from accepting them. + const isBad = (s) => /[^\u0021-\u007F]/u.test(s); + if (patternParts.some(isBad)) + return false; + + // Check host parts from right to left first. + for (let i = hostParts.length - 1; i > 0; i -= 1) + if (hostParts[i] !== patternParts[i]) + return false; + + const hostSubdomain = hostParts[0]; + const patternSubdomain = patternParts[0]; + const patternSubdomainParts = patternSubdomain.split('*'); + + // Short-circuit when the subdomain does not contain a wildcard. + // RFC 6125 does not allow wildcard substitution for components + // containing IDNA A-labels (Punycode) so match those verbatim. + if (patternSubdomainParts.length === 1 || patternSubdomain.includes('xn--')) + return hostSubdomain === patternSubdomain; + + if (!wildcards) + return false; + + // More than one wildcard is always wrong. + if (patternSubdomainParts.length > 2) + return false; + + // *.tld wildcards are not allowed. + if (patternParts.length <= 2) + return false; + + const [prefix, suffix] = patternSubdomainParts; + + if (prefix.length + suffix.length > hostSubdomain.length) + return false; - var dnsNames = []; - var uriNames = []; + if (!hostSubdomain.startsWith(prefix)) + return false; + + if (!hostSubdomain.endsWith(suffix)) + return false; + + return true; +} + +exports.checkServerIdentity = function checkServerIdentity(host, cert) { + const subject = cert.subject; + const altNames = cert.subjectaltname; + const dnsNames = []; + const uriNames = []; const ips = []; - var matchCN = true; - var valid = false; - var reason = 'Unknown reason'; - - // There're several names to perform check against: - // CN and altnames in certificate extension - // (DNS names, IP addresses, and URIs) - // - // Walk through altnames and generate lists of those names - if (cert.subjectaltname) { - cert.subjectaltname.split(/, /g).forEach(function(altname) { - var option = altname.match(/^(DNS|IP Address|URI):(.*)$/); - if (!option) - return; - if (option[1] === 'DNS') { - dnsNames.push(option[2]); - } else if (option[1] === 'IP Address') { - ips.push(option[2]); - } else if (option[1] === 'URI') { - var uri = url.parse(option[2]); - if (uri) uriNames.push(uri.hostname); - } - }); - } - // If hostname is an IP address, it should be present in the list of IP - // addresses. - if (net.isIP(host)) { - valid = ips.some(function(ip) { - return ip === host; - }); - if (!valid) { - reason = `IP: ${host} is not in the cert's list: ${ips.join(', ')}`; - } - } else if (cert.subject) { - // Transform hostname to canonical form - if (!host || !host.endsWith('.')) host += '.'; - - // Otherwise check all DNS/URI records from certificate - // (with allowed wildcards) - dnsNames = dnsNames.map(function(name) { - return regexpify(name, true); - }); - - // Wildcards ain't allowed in URI names - uriNames = uriNames.map(function(name) { - return regexpify(name, false); - }); - - dnsNames = dnsNames.concat(uriNames); - - if (dnsNames.length > 0) matchCN = false; - - // Match against Common Name (CN) only if no supported identifiers are - // present. - // - // "As noted, a client MUST NOT seek a match for a reference identifier - // of CN-ID if the presented identifiers include a DNS-ID, SRV-ID, - // URI-ID, or any application-specific identifier types supported by the - // client." - // RFC6125 - if (matchCN) { - var commonNames = cert.subject.CN; - if (Array.isArray(commonNames)) { - for (var i = 0, k = commonNames.length; i < k; ++i) { - dnsNames.push(regexpify(commonNames[i], true)); - } - } else { - dnsNames.push(regexpify(commonNames, true)); + host = '' + host; + + if (altNames) { + for (const name of altNames.split(', ')) { + if (name.startsWith('DNS:')) { + dnsNames.push(name.slice(4)); + } else if (name.startsWith('URI:')) { + const uri = url.parse(name.slice(4)); + uriNames.push(uri.hostname); // TODO(bnoordhuis) Also use scheme. + } else if (name.startsWith('IP Address:')) { + ips.push(name.slice(11)); } } + } - valid = dnsNames.some(function(re) { - return re.test(host); - }); + let valid = false; + let reason = 'Unknown reason'; - if (!valid) { - if (cert.subjectaltname) { - reason = - `Host: ${host} is not in the cert's altnames: ` + - `${cert.subjectaltname}`; - } else { - reason = `Host: ${host} is not cert's CN: ${cert.subject.CN}`; - } + if (net.isIP(host)) { + valid = ips.includes(host); + if (!valid) + reason = `IP: ${host} is not in the cert's list: ${ips.join(', ')}`; + // TODO(bnoordhuis) Also check URI SANs that are IP addresses. + } else if (subject) { + host = unfqdn(host); // Remove trailing dot for error messages. + const hostParts = splitHost(host); + const wildcard = (pattern) => check(hostParts, pattern, true); + const noWildcard = (pattern) => check(hostParts, pattern, false); + + // Match against Common Name only if no supported identifiers are present. + if (dnsNames.length === 0 && ips.length === 0 && uriNames.length === 0) { + const cn = subject.CN; + + if (Array.isArray(cn)) + valid = cn.some(wildcard); + else if (cn) + valid = wildcard(cn); + + if (!valid) + reason = `Host: ${host}. is not cert's CN: ${cn}`; + } else { + valid = dnsNames.some(wildcard) || uriNames.some(noWildcard); + if (!valid) + reason = `Host: ${host}. is not in the cert's altnames: ${altNames}`; } } else { reason = 'Cert is empty'; } if (!valid) { - var err = new Error( + const err = new Error( `Hostname/IP doesn't match certificate's altnames: "${reason}"`); err.reason = reason; err.host = host; diff --git a/test/parallel/test-tls-check-server-identity.js b/test/parallel/test-tls-check-server-identity.js index c7d0a7ba1606ec..0732ab3c0fcd67 100644 --- a/test/parallel/test-tls-check-server-identity.js +++ b/test/parallel/test-tls-check-server-identity.js @@ -11,6 +11,23 @@ var tls = require('tls'); var tests = [ + // False-y values. + { + host: false, + cert: { subject: { CN: 'a.com' } }, + error: 'Host: false. is not cert\'s CN: a.com' + }, + { + host: null, + cert: { subject: { CN: 'a.com' } }, + error: 'Host: null. is not cert\'s CN: a.com' + }, + { + host: undefined, + cert: { subject: { CN: 'a.com' } }, + error: 'Host: undefined. is not cert\'s CN: a.com' + }, + // Basic CN handling { host: 'a.com', cert: { subject: { CN: 'a.com' } } }, { host: 'a.com', cert: { subject: { CN: 'A.COM' } } }, @@ -20,15 +37,35 @@ var tests = [ error: 'Host: a.com. is not cert\'s CN: b.com' }, { host: 'a.com', cert: { subject: { CN: 'a.com.' } } }, + { + host: 'a.com', + cert: { subject: { CN: '.a.com' } }, + error: 'Host: a.com. is not cert\'s CN: .a.com' + }, // Wildcards in CN { host: 'b.a.com', cert: { subject: { CN: '*.a.com' } } }, + { + host: 'ba.com', + cert: { subject: { CN: '*.a.com' } }, + error: 'Host: ba.com. is not cert\'s CN: *.a.com' + }, + { + host: '\n.b.com', + cert: { subject: { CN: '*n.b.com' } }, + error: 'Host: \n.b.com. is not cert\'s CN: *n.b.com' + }, { host: 'b.a.com', cert: { subjectaltname: 'DNS:omg.com', subject: { CN: '*.a.com' } }, error: 'Host: b.a.com. is not in the cert\'s altnames: ' + 'DNS:omg.com' }, + { + host: 'b.a.com', + cert: { subject: { CN: 'b*b.a.com' } }, + error: 'Host: b.a.com. is not cert\'s CN: b*b.a.com' + }, // Empty Cert { @@ -199,6 +236,20 @@ var tests = [ error: 'Host: localhost. is not in the cert\'s altnames: ' + 'DNS:a.com' }, + // IDNA + { + host: 'xn--bcher-kva.example.com', + cert: { subject: { CN: '*.example.com' } }, + }, + // RFC 6125, section 6.4.3: "[...] the client SHOULD NOT attempt to match + // a presented identifier where the wildcard character is embedded within + // an A-label [...]" + { + host: 'xn--bcher-kva.example.com', + cert: { subject: { CN: 'xn--*.example.com' } }, + error: 'Host: xn--bcher-kva.example.com. is not cert\'s CN: ' + + 'xn--*.example.com', + }, ]; tests.forEach(function(test, i) {