index.bs

<pre class="metadata">
Title: Navigational-Tracking Mitigations
Shortname: nav-tracking-mitigations
Repository: privacycg/nav-tracking-mitigations
URL: https://privacycg.github.io/nav-tracking-mitigations/
Editor: Pete Snyder, w3cid 109401, Brave https://brave.com/, psnyder@brave.com
Editor: Jeffrey Yasskin, w3cid 72192, Google https://google.com/, jyasskin@google.com
Abstract: This specification defines navigational tracking and when and how browsers are required to prevent it from happening.
Status Text: This specification is intended to be migrated to the W3C standards track. It is not a W3C standard.
Text Macro: LICENSE <a href=http://www.w3.org/Consortium/Legal/2015/copyright-software-and-document>W3C Software and Document License</a>
Group: privacycg
Status: CG-DRAFT
Level: None
Complain About: accidental-2119 yes, missing-example-ids yes
Markup Shorthands: markdown yes, css no
Assume Explicit For: yes
Metadata Order: !*, *, This version

!Participate: <a href="https://github.com/[REPOSITORY]">Github Repository</a>
!Participate: <a href="https://github.com/privacycg/meetings/">Privacy CG Meetings</a>
</pre>
<pre class="biblio">
{
    "FSN-2021-Q4": {
        "title": "Firefox Security Newsletter 2021 Q4",
        "href": "https://wiki.mozilla.org/Firefox_Security_Newsletter/FSN-2021-Q4",
        "date": "2022-03-09"
    },
    "MOZILLA-TRACKING-POLICY": {
        "title": "Mozilla Anti Tracking Policy",
        "href": "https://wiki.mozilla.org/Security/Anti_tracking_policy"
    },
    "WEBKIT-TRACKING-PREVENTION": {
        "href": "https://webkit.org/tracking-prevention/",
        "title": "Tracking Prevention in WebKit"
    }
}
</pre>
<pre class="anchors">
spec: HTTP; urlPrefix: https://httpwg.org/specs/rfc7231.html#
    type: dfn; text: HTTP 3xx statuses; url: status.3xx
spec: tracking-dnt; urlPrefix: https://www.w3.org/TR/tracking-dnt/#
    type: dfn; text: tracking; url: dfn-tracking
spec: WEBDRIVER; urlPrefix: https://w3c.github.io/webdriver/
    type: dfn
        text: error code; url: dfn-error-code
        text: unknown error; url: dfn-unknown-error
        text: unsupported operation; url: dfn-unsupported-operation
spec: RFC6265; urlPrefix: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6265/
    type: dfn
        text: cookie store; url: section-5.3
        text: domain-match; url: section-5.1.3
        text: domain attribute; url: section-5.2.3
spec: RFC7234; urlPrefix: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7234/
    type: dfn
        text: network cache; url: section-2
spec: PARTITIONED-COOKIES; urlPrefix: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-cutler-httpbis-partitioned-cookies#
    type: dfn
        text: partitioned cookie; url: section-2.1
        text: partition key; url: section-2.2
</pre>

<section class="non-normative">
<h2 id="intro">Introduction</h2>

<em>This section is non-normative.</em>

Browsers are working to prevent cross-site [=tracking=], which threatens user
privacy. In addition to third-party cookies and storage, other client-side
methods exist that enable cross-site tracking. [=Navigational tracking=]
correlates user identities across sites during navigations between those sites.
[=Navigational tracking=] uses [=link decoration=] to convey information, but
not all [=link decoration=] is tracking. This project attempts to distinguish
tracking from non-tracking navigation and to prevent the tracking without
damaging similar but benign navigations.

</section>

<h2 id="infra">Infrastructure</h2>

This specification depends on the Infra standard. [[!INFRA]]

<h2 id="terminology">Terminology</h2>

<dfn>Link decoration</dfn> is when the source of a [=hyperlink=] "decorates" its [=URL=]
with extra information beyond what's necessary to identify the page a user wants
to navigate to. This information can be placed almost anywhere inside the URL.

<dfn>Navigational tracking</dfn> refers to the general use of one or more
[[HTML#navigating-across-documents|navigations]] to identify that a user on one
site is the same person as a user on another site. Navigations transmit information
cross-site in a few different ways, including in the target URL, which might be
[=link decoration|decorated=], and in the timing of the request.

<div class="example" id="example-link-decoration-tracking">
<style>
#example-link-decoration-tracking code em {background-color: cyan}
</style>

Examples and non-examples of [=link decoration=] and [=navigational tracking=],
with the potential decoration or tracking element emphasized:

: <code>https://publisher.example/page?userId=<em>5789rhkdsaf8urfnsd</em></code>

:: [=Link decoration=], and also [=navigational tracking=].

: <code>https://bookshop.org/a/<em>1122</em>/9780062252074</code>

:: [=Link decoration=] but **not** [=navigational tracking=]: This number
    identifies an affiliate to credit with a book sale. Replacing this with
    another number gets to the same target page.

: <code>https://bookshop.org/a/1122/<em>9780062252074</em></code>

:: **Not** decoration: This number identifies a particular book. Changing it
    yields a different target page.

: <code>https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=<em>1460058</em></code>

:: **Not** decoration: changing the number changes which bug the user sees.

: <code>https://www.google.com/maps/@<em>37.4220328,-122.0847584,17.12z</em></code>

:: Issue(4): Changing the numbers changes what map the user sees, and embedding
    a user ID would not successfully transfer that user ID to the target site,
    but it's hard for an automated system inside a browser to prove
    that, and even hard for humans reading the URL to be confident of it.

: <code>https://publisher.example/unsubscribe?userId=<em>5789rhkdsaf8urfnsd</em></code>

:: Issue(5): The URL identifies an action rather than a page, and the user ID
    might be essential for that action to happen. However, this is also clearly
    a user ID and sufficient to track a user if the source and target
    collaborate.

: <code>https://example.com/auth/callback?token=<em>1234567</em></code>

:: Issue(5): This is probably the same case as the unsubscribe link.

: <code>https://example.com/login?returnto=<em>item/12345</em></code>

:: Assuming a request for this URL shows a login page instead of immediately
    redirecting to `item/12345`, this is a [=link decoration=] but not
    [=navigational tracking=].

</div>

<dfn>Bounce tracking</dfn> refers to the use of redirects in a top-level context
(including [=HTTP 3xx statuses=], <{meta}> elements with
<{meta/http-equiv}>=<{meta/http-equiv/refresh}> attributes, and script-directed
navigation that doesn't wait for user input) along with [=link decoration=] to
join user identities between sites. [=Bounce tracking=] is a subset of
[=navigational tracking=] and can include automated navigation through the same
or different sites from the source or ultimate destination of a link.

<div class="example" id="example-bounce-tracking-to-self">

Tracking via a bounce through an aggregation domain:

1. The content publisher's page (on `publisher.example`) embeds a third-party
    script from `tracker.example`.
1. The third-party script tries to read an already-stored identifier, for
    example one it has set into `publisher.example`'s storage or one read from a
    third-party `tracker.example` <{iframe}>.
1. If it can't, it redirects the top level page to `tracker.example` using
    {{Window/location|window.location}}.
1. During this load `tracker.example` is the first party and can read and write
    its cookie jar.
1. `tracker.example` redirects back to the original page URL, with that URL
    [=link decoration|decorated=] with its user ID in a query parameter.
1. The `tracker.example` user ID is now available on `publisher.example` and can
    be saved into its first-party storage so that future visits don't need to
    bounce.

</div>

<h2 id="threat-model">Threat model</h2>

This section will precisely define the goals and non-goals of this
specification's mitigations. It will define a few classes of actors with the
ability to modify websites in particular ways. Then it will define what
cross-site information each of these actors can or cannot learn.

<h3 id="threat-actors">Threat actors</h2>

TODO

<section class="informative">

<h2 id="alternatives">Considered Alternatives</h2>

<em>This section is non-normative.</em>

So far, the alternative designs consist of mitigations that various browsers
have already deployed.

<h3 id="deployed-mitigations">Deployed Mitigations</h3>

Some browsers have deployed and announced protections against
[=navigational tracking=]. This section is a work in progress to detail what
protections have been shipped and / or are planned. This section is not
comprehensive.

<h4 id="mitigations-safari">Safari</h4>

Safari uses an algorithmic approach to combat [=navigational tracking=]. Safari
classifies a site as having cross-site tracking capabilities if the
[[WEBKIT-TRACKING-PREVENTION#classification-as-having-cross-site-tracking-capabilities|following
criteria]] are met within a particular client:

* The site appears as a third-party resource under enough different
    [=host/registrable domains=].
* The site automatically redirects the user to enough other sites, immediately
    or after a short delay.
* The site redirects to sites that are classified as trackers, recursively.

    <div class="example" id="example-safari-recursive-trackers">

    For example, consider the case of a user clicking on a link on
    `start.example`, which redirects to `second.example`, which redirects to
    `third.example`, which redirects to `end.example`. If Safari has classified
    `third.example` as having tracking capabilities, the above behavior can
    result in Safari classifying `second.example` as having cross-site tracking
    capabilities.

    </div>

If a user navigates or is redirected from a classified tracker with a URL that
includes either query parameters or a URL fragment, the lifetime of client-side
set cookies on the *destination* page is capped at
[[WEBKIT-TRACKING-PREVENTION#detection-of-cross-site-tracking-via-link-decoration|24
hours]].


<h4 id="mitigations-firefox">Firefox</h4>

Firefox uses a list-based approach to combat [=navigational tracking=]. Sites on the
Disconnect list are considered tracking sites. All storage
for tracking sites is cleared after 24 hours, unless the user has interacted
with the site in the first-party context in the last 45 days.

Firefox is also starting to remove query parameters known to be used for
cross-site tracking. ([[FSN-2021-Q4]]) The affected query parameters are chosen
using the criteria on the [[MOZILLA-TRACKING-POLICY inline]], which includes:

* High-entropy parameters that might identify a user or encode user data,
    except:
    * Parameters exclusively identifying specific elements or actions on the
        navigating page (per-click or per-element identifiers), as long as those
        parameters assign a different value to each click or element they are
        identifying.
    * Identifiers necessary to complete a user-initiated task such as logging in
        or submitting a form.
* High-entropy parameters that are broadly included in nearly all outgoing
    navigations from a site, even if the parameters don't uniquely identify a
    user.

As of May 2022, this query-parameter stripping is applied by default in the
Firefox Nightly build, and planned to be enabled in strict <abbr
title="Enhanced Tracking Protection">ETP</abbr> mode and in private browsing.

<h4 id="mitigations-brave">Brave</h4>
Brave uses four list-based approaches to combat [=navigational tracking=].

First, Brave strips query parameters commonly used for [=navigational tracking=]
from URLs on navigation. This list is maintained by Brave.

Second, by default, when i) the user is about to visit a list-identified
bounce-tracking URL, and ii) the current profile does not contain any cookies
or {{WindowLocalStorage/localStorage}} for that site, Brave will create a new, "ephemeral", empty storage
area for the site. This storage area persists as long as the user has
any top-level frames open for the site. As soon as the user has no
top-level frames for the labeled bounce-tracking site, the ephemeral storage
area is deleted.

Third, in the non-default, "aggressive blocking" configuration, Brave uses
popular crowd-sourced filter lists (e.g., EasyList, EasyPrivacy, uBlock Origin)
to identify URLs that are used for bounce tracking, and will preempt the
navigation with an interstitial (similar to Google SafeBrowsing), giving
the user the option to continue the navigation or cancel it.

Fourth, Brave uses a list-based approach for identifying bounce tracking
URLs where the destination URL is present in the URL of the intermediate
tracking URL. In such cases, Brave will skip the intermediate navigation
and request the destination URL instead. For example, if Brave
Browser observes the user about to navigate to the URL
`https://tracker.example/bounce?dest=https://destination.example/`,
the browser might replace the navigation to `tracker.example/bounce`,
with a navigation to `https://destination.example/`. This list
is maintained by Brave, and is drawn from a mix of crowd-sourcing and
existing open-source projects.

</section>

<h2 id="bounce-tracking-mitigations">Bounce Tracking Mitigations</h2>

The content of this section will provide a "monkey patch" specification for bounce tracking
mitigations.  There is a [Chromium-oriented
explainer](https://github.com/privacycg/nav-tracking-mitigations/blob/main/bounce-tracking-explainer.md)
for this work, but the text in this section is intended for adoption across all browsers. This
section is not complete yet, and as the algorithms are developed, they will be specified here and
presented for review.

This spec is written for the case where the following features are enabled:
    * All third-party cookies are blocked.
    * All cookies written by embedded third-party sites are partitioned.
    * All storage written by embedded third-party sites is partitioned.

<p class=note>
The following is a work-in-progress and does not yet reflect any consensus in
the PrivacyCG.
</p>

<h3 id="bounce-tracking-mitigations-data-model">Data Model</h3>

<h4 id="bounce-tracking-mitigations-data-model-global">Global Data</h4>

The user agent holds a <dfn>user activation map</dfn> which is a [=map=] of
[=site=] [=hosts=] to [=moments=].  The [=moments=] represent the most recent
[=wall clock=] time at which the user activated a top-level document on the
associated [=site=] [=host=].

The user agent holds a <dfn>stateful bounce tracking map</dfn> which is a
[=map=] of [=site=] [=hosts=] to [=moments=].  The [=moments=] represent the
first [=wall clock=] time since the last execution of the
[=bounce tracking timer=] at which a page on the given [=site=] [=host=] performed
an action that could indicate stateful bounce tracking took place.  For example,
if [=bounce tracking timer=] ran at time X and bounces occurred at times X-1,
X+1, and X+2, then the map value would be X+1.

Note: Schemeless site is used as the data structure key because by default cookies
are sent to both `http://` and `https://` pages on the same domain.

Note: Hosts are eagerly removed from the [=stateful bounce tracking map=] when
a user activation occurs.  This means that a given host can exist in either the
[=user activation map=] or [=stateful bounce tracking map=], but not both at
the same time.  The maps will have non-overlapping sets of keys.

<h4 id="bounce-tracking-mitigations-data-model-per-tab">Per-Tab Data</h4>

An <dfn>extended navigation</dfn> is a contiguous sequence of navigations within a single [=top-level traversable=],
joined by client-side redirects, which the user agent expects its user to perceive as a single operation.

Each [=top-level traversable=] has an associated
<dfn for="top-level traversable">bounce tracking record</dfn> which is a
[=bounce tracking record=] or null. This stores the data relevant
to bounce tracking enforcement for every [=extended navigation=].
It is non-null during an [=extended navigation=] and returns to null when the UA stops waiting for further
client-side redirects that might extend the current [=extended navigation=].

A <dfn>bounce tracking record</dfn> is a [=struct=] whose items are:
<dl dfn-for="bounce tracking record">
<dt><dfn>initial host</dfn></dt>
<dd>A [=site=]'s [=host=]. The initiator site of the current [=extended navigation=].</dd>
<dt><dfn>final host</dfn></dt>
<dd>A [=site=]'s [=host=] or null. The destination of the current [=extended navigation=]. Updated after every document load.</dd>
<dt><dfn>bounce set</dfn></dt>
<dd>A [=set=] of [=sites=]' [=hosts=]. All server-side and client-side redirects hit during this [=extended navigation=].</dd>
<dt><dfn>storage access set</dfn></dt>
<dd>A [=set=] of [=sites=]' [=hosts=]. All sites which accessed storage during this [=extended navigation=].</dd>
</dl>

<h4 id="bounce-tracking-mitigations-data-model-constants">Constants</h4>

The <dfn>bounce tracking grace period</dfn> is an [=implementation-defined=]
[=duration=] that represents the length of time after a possible bounce tracking
event during which the user agent will wait for an interaction before deleting a
[=site=] [=host=]'s storage.

Note: 1 hour is a reasonable [=bounce tracking grace period=] value.

The <dfn>bounce tracking activation lifetime</dfn> is an
[=implementation-defined=] [=duration=] that represents how long user
activations will protect a [=site=] [=host=] from storage deletion.

Note: 45 days is a reasonable [=bounce tracking activation lifetime=] value.

The <dfn>bounce tracking timer period</dfn> is an [=implementation-defined=]
[=duration=] that represents how often to run the [=bounce tracking timer=]
algorithm.

Note: 1 hour is a reasonable [=bounce tracking timer period=] value.

The <dfn>client bounce detection timer period</dfn> is an [=implementation-defined=]
[=duration=] that represents how long to wait for a client redirect after a navigation ends.
The purpose is to catch all automated page-triggered redirects, which should be appended to
the current [=extended navigation=], with high probability.

Note: 10 seconds is a reasonable [=client bounce detection timer period=] value.

<h3 id="bounce-tracking-mitigations-algorithms">Algorithms</h3>

<h4 id="bounce-tracking-mitigations-activation-monkey-patch">User Activation
Monkey Patch</h4>

<div algorithm>

To <dfn>record a user activation</dfn> given a [=Document=] |document|, perform
the following steps:

1. Let |navigable| be |document|'s [=node navigable=].
1. If |navigable| is null, then abort these steps.
1. Let |topDocument| be |navigable|'s [=top-level traversable=]'s
    [=navigable/active document=].
1. Let |origin| be |topDocument|'s [=Document/origin=].
1. If |origin| is an [=opaque origin=] then abort these steps.
1. Let |site| be the result of running [=obtain a site=] given |origin|.
1. Let |host| be |site|'s [=host=].
1. [=map/Remove=] |host| from the [=stateful bounce tracking map=].
1. Set [=user activation map=][|host|] to |topDocument|'s
    [=relevant settings object=]'s
    [=environment settings object/current wall time=].

</div>

Append the following steps to the <a spec="html">activation notification</a>
steps in the [[HTML#user-activation-processing-model|user activation processing
model]]:

1. Run [=record a user activation=] given <var ignore>document</var>.

<h4 id="bounce-tracking-mitigations-web-authentication-monkey-patch">Web Authentication Monkey Patch</h4>

A successful credential access, using the Web Authentication API, is also treated as a user activation for bounce-tracking purposes.

Add the following argument to {{PublicKeyCredential}}'s {{PublicKeyCredential/[[DiscoverFromExternalSource]]()}} algorithm:

<dl dfn-for="PublicKeyCredential/[[DiscoverFromExternalSource]](origin, options, sameOriginWithAncestors)">
<dt>browsingContext</dt>
<dd>The caller's [=environment's=] [=environment/target browsing context=]</dd>
</dl>

Insert the following steps in the {{PublicKeyCredential/[[DiscoverFromExternalSource]]()}} algorithm
    in step 17, under "If any authenticator indicates success":

1. Run [=process a Web Authentication assertion for bounce tracking mitigations=] given <var ignore>callerOrigin</var> and <var ignore>browsingContext</var>.

<div algorithm>

To <dfn>process a Web Authentication assertion for bounce tracking mitigations</dfn> given
    a [=browsing context=] |browsingContext|, perform the following steps:

1. If |browsingContext| is null, then abort these steps.
1. Let |topDocument| be |browsingContext|'s active document.
1. Let |origin| be |topDocument|'s [=Document/origin=].
1. If |origin| is an [=opaque origin=] then abort these steps.
1. Let |site| be the result of running [=obtain a site=] given |origin|.
1. Let |host| be |site|'s [=host=].
1. Set [=user activation map=][|host|] to |topDocument|'s
    [=relevant settings object=]'s
    [=environment settings object/current wall time=].

</div>

Note: It's also reasonable to treat signin to a browser-integrated account as a user activation for
    bounce-tracking purposes. Such an interaction could be stored in the [=user activation map=]
    for the host of the identity provider and/or the host domain of the account.

<h4 id="bounce-tracking-mitigation-stateful-bounce-detection">Stateful Bounce
Detection</h4>

<h5 id="bounce-tracking-mitigations-nav-start-monkey-patch">Start Navigation
Monkey Patch</h5>

At the start of a navigation, either initialize a new [=bounce tracking record=],
or append a client-side redirect to the current [=bounce tracking record=].

Insert the following steps in the <a spec="html">navigate</a> algorithm before step 8,
"Navigate to a fragment given navigable, url, historyHandling, and navigationId."

1. Run [=process navigation start for bounce tracking=] given
    <var ignore>navigable</var>, <var ignore>sourceDocument</var>, and <var ignore>sourceSnapshotParams</var>.

<div algorithm>

To <dfn>process navigation start for bounce tracking</dfn> given a [=navigable=]
|navigable|, [=Document=] |sourceDocument|, and <a spec="html">source snapshot params</a> |sourceSnapshotParams|, perform the following steps:

1. If |navigable| is not a [=top-level traversable=], then abort these steps.
1. Remove any queued global tasks to [=record stateful bounces for bounce tracking=] from the [=networking task source=].
1. Let |origin| be |sourceDocument|'s [=Document/origin=].
1. If |origin| is an [=opaque origin=], set |initialHost| to [=empty host=].
1. Otherwise,
    1. Let |site| be the result of running [=obtain a site=] given |origin|.
    1. Set |initialHost| to |site|'s [=host=].
1. If |navigable|'s [=top-level traversable/bounce tracking record=] is null:
    1. Set |navigable|'s [=top-level traversable/bounce tracking record=] to a new
        [=bounce tracking record=] with [=bounce tracking record/initial host=]
        set to |initialHost|.

Note: This includes the case where the current navigation was initiated by another navigable, e.g. when opening
    a link in a new tab. In this case, |sourceDocument| is set to the opener Document, and the new bounce tracking
    record has its [=bounce tracking record/initial host=] set to the opener host. This ensures that trackers opened
    in new tabs are detected as distinct from the [=bounce tracking record/initial host=] in the new  [=bounce tracking record=].

1. Otherwise,
    1. If |sourceSnapshotParams|'s <a spec="html">has transient activation</a> is true:
        1. Run [=record stateful bounces for bounce tracking=] given |navigable|'s [=navigable/active document=]'s [=relevant global object=].
        1. Set |navigable|'s [=top-level traversable/bounce tracking record=] to a new [=bounce tracking record=] with
            [=bounce tracking record/initial host=] set to |initialHost|.
    1. Otherwise, add |initialHost| to |navigable|'s [=top-level traversable/bounce tracking record=]'s [=bounce tracking record/bounce set=].

</div>

<h5 id="bounce-tracking-mitigations-network-cookie-write-monkey-patch">Network
Cookie Write Monkey Patch</h5>

Each [=top-level traversable=] maintains a record of which sites it has saved cookies for in the current [=extended navigation=].

Insert the following steps in the <a spec="fetch">HTTP-network fetch</a> algorithm after step 15,
"... run the "set-cookie-string" parsing algorithm (see section 5.2 of [[COOKIES]]) ...":

1. If cookies were stored in the cookie store in the previous step, then
    run [=process a fetch storage access for bounce tracking mitigations=]
    given <var ignore>request</var>.

Note: If the `Set-Cookie` header includes any cookies that the user agent ignores, for example because it's blocking third-party cookies,
    they're not considered "stored in the cookie store" in this algorithm.

<div algorithm>

To <dfn>process a fetch storage access for bounce tracking mitigations</dfn>
given a [=request=] |request|, perform the following steps:

1. Let |origin| be |request|'s [=request/origin=].
1. If |origin| is an [=opaque origin=], then abort these steps.
1. If |request| is a [=subresource request=], then:
    1. If |request|'s [=request/client=] is null, or
        |request|'s [=request/client=]'s [=environment/target browsing context=]
        is null, then abort these steps.
    1. Let |topLevelTraversable| be |request|'s [=request/client=]'s
        [=environment/target browsing context=]'s
        [=browsing context/top-level traversable=].
1. Otherwise,
    1. If |request|'s [=request/reserved client=] is null, or
        |request|'s [=request/reserved client=]'s [=environment/target browsing context=]
        is null, then abort these steps.
    1. Let |topLevelTraversable| be |request|'s [=request/reserved client=]'s
        [=environment/target browsing context=]'s
        [=browsing context/top-level traversable=].
1. If |topLevelTraversable|'s [=top-level traversable/bounce tracking record=]
    is null, abort these steps.
1. Let |site| be the result of running [=obtain a site=] given |origin|.
1. [=set/Append=] |site|'s [=host=] to |topLevelTraversable|'s
    [=top-level traversable/bounce tracking record=]'s
    [=bounce tracking record/storage access set=].

</div>

Note: We currently don't treat cookie reads as stateful, but this would be a
reasonable future change. We could run [=process a fetch storage access for bounce tracking mitigations=]
in the <a spec="fetch">HTTP-network-or-cache fetch</a> algorithm after step 8.21.1.2,
"... [=append=] (`Cookie`, cookies) to httpRequest’s [=header list=]. ..."

<h5 id="bounce-tracking-mitigations-service-worker-activation-monkey-patch">Service Worker Activation Monkey Patch</h5>

Each [=top-level traversable=] maintains a record of which sites have activated service workers in the current [=extended navigation=].

Insert the following steps in the [=Handle Fetch=] algorithm after step 23,
"If the result of running the Run Service Worker algorithm...":

1. Run [=process a fetch storage access for bounce tracking mitigations=] given <var ignore>request</var>.

<h5 id="bounce-tracking-mitigations-storage-access-monkey-patch">Storage Access Monkey Patch</h5>

Each [=top-level traversable=] maintains a record of which sites have accessed storage in the current [=extended navigation=].

Insert the following steps in the <a spec="storage">obtain a storage bottle map</a> algorithm before step 10, "Return <var ignore>proxyMap</var>":

1. Run [=process a general storage access for bounce tracking mitigations=] given <var ignore>environment</var>.

Issue(whatwg/storage#165): This patch has to be run whenever a site accesses non-cookie storage.
<a spec="storage">Obtain a storage bottle map</a> is the intended hook for this, but it does not currently have full coverage across specs that use storage.
So this patch is not comprehensive.</p>

<div algorithm>

To <dfn>process a general storage access for bounce tracking mitigations</dfn>
given an [=environment=] |environment|, perform the following steps:

1. If |environment| is not an [=environment settings object=], then abort these steps.

Note: At time of writing, <a spec="storage">obtain a storage bottle map</a> can only accept an [=environment settings object=] |environment|,
but this will be refactored to support [=service workers=] which attempt to access storage on every navigation, and thus is not considered
when updating the [=bounce tracking record/storage access set=].

2. Let |origin| be |environment|'s [=environment/top-level origin=].
3. If |origin| is null or an [=opaque origin=], then abort these steps.
4. Let |global| be |environment|'s [=environment settings object/realm execution context=]'s [=global object=].
5. Let |navigables| be an [=set/empty=] [=set=] of [=navigables=].
6. If |global| is a [=Window=] object, [=set/append=] |global|'s [=associated document=]'s [=node navigable=] onto |navigables|.
7. Otherwise, if |global| is a {{WorkerGlobalScope}} object,
    1. Let |ownerQueue| be an [=queue/empty=] [=queue=] of [=document=] or {{WorkerGlobalScope}} objects.
    1. [=queue/Enqueue=] |global| onto |ownerQueue|.
    1. [=iteration/While=] |ownerQueue| is not [=queue/empty=],
        1. [=queue/Dequeue=] |owner| from |ownerQueue|.
        1. If |owner| is a [=document=] object, [=set/append=] |owner|'s [=node navigable=] onto |navigables|.
        1. If |owner| is a {{WorkerGlobalScope}} object, then [=set/For each=] |owner| in |global|'s [=WorkerGlobalScope/owner set=],
            [=queue/enqueue=] |owner| onto |ownerQueue|.

Note: Handling {{WorkerGlobalScope}} covers all storage access from a dedicated worker ({{DedicatedWorkerGlobalScope}}) or a shared worker
({{SharedWorkerGlobalScope}}). This doesn't apply to service workers, which rely on [=process a fetch storage access for bounce tracking mitigations=]
during Fetch events and [=process a general storage access for bounce tracking mitigations=] with a [=Window=] object when a service worker is
accessed using navigator.serviceWorker.getRegistration().

8. [=set/For each=] |navigable| in |navigables|:
    1. If |navigable| is not a [=top-level traversable=], then abort these steps.
    1. If |navigable|'s [=top-level traversable/bounce tracking record=] is null, then abort these steps.
    1. Let |site| be the result of running [=obtain a site=] given |origin|.
    1. [=set/Append=] |site|'s [=host=] to |navigable|'s
            [=top-level traversable/bounce tracking record=]'s
            [=bounce tracking record/storage access set=].

</div>

<h5 id="bounce-tracking-mitigations-response-received-monkey-patch">Response Received Monkey
Patch</h5>

When the response is received at the end of a navigation, fill the [=bounce tracking record/bounce set=].

Insert the following steps in the <a spec="html">create navigation params by fetching</a> algorithm, after Step 19.7,
"Wait until either response is non-null...", which is the point that [=response/url list=] becomes available.

1. Run [=process response received for bounce tracking=] given
    <var ignore>navigable</var> and <var ignore>response</var>'s <var ignore>URL list</var>.

<div algorithm>

To <dfn>process response received for bounce tracking</dfn> given a [=navigable=]
|navigable| and a [=list=] of [=URLs=] |URLs|, perform the following steps:

1. If |navigable| is not a [=top-level traversable=], then abort these steps.
1. [=Assert=]: |navigable|'s [=top-level traversable/bounce tracking record=] is not null.
1. Let |global| be |navigable|'s [=navigable/active document=]'s [=relevant global object=].
1. [=Run steps after a timeout=] given:
    <dl>
        <dt><var ignore>global</var></dt>
        <dd>|global|</dd>
        <dt><var ignore>milliseconds</var></dt>
        <dd>[=client bounce detection timer period=]</dd>
        <dt><var ignore>completionSteps</var></dt>
        <dd>[=queue a global task=] on the [=networking task source=] with |global| to [=record stateful bounces for bounce tracking=] given |global|</dd>
    </dl>
1. [=list/For each=] |URL| in |URLs|:
    1. Let |site| be the result of running [=obtain a site=] given |URL|.
    1. Let |host| be the |site|'s [=host=].
    1. [=Insert=] |host| to the |navigable|'s [=top-level traversable/bounce tracking record=]'s [=bounce tracking record/bounce set=].

</div>

<h5 id="bounce-tracking-mitigations-document-load-monkey-patch">Document Loaded Monkey
Patch</h5>

When the document is loaded at the end of a navigation, update the [=bounce tracking record/final host=].

Note: The [=bounce tracking record/final host=] is updated later than [=process response received for bounce tracking=]
to ensure that the [=bounce tracking record/final host=] is a valid user destination. This is the one that has to be
compared against when deciding to exempt a [=host=] in the [=record stateful bounces for bounce tracking=] algorithm.

Insert the following steps in the <a spec="html">load a document</a> algorithm,
before Step 5, "Return null", which is the point that the [=document=] is loaded.

1. Run [=process document load for bounce tracking=] given
    <var ignore>navigable</var> and <var ignore>response</var>'s <var ignore>URL list</var>.

<div algorithm>

To <dfn>process document load for bounce tracking</dfn> given a [=navigable=]
|navigable| and a [=list=] of [=URLs=] |URLs|, perform the following steps:

1. If |navigable| is not a [=top-level traversable=], then abort these steps.
1. [=Assert=]: |navigable|'s [=top-level traversable/bounce tracking record=] is not null.
1. If |URLs| is empty, then abort these steps.
1. Let |finalSite| be the result of running [=obtain a site=] given the last entry in |URLs|.
1. Set the |navigable|'s [=top-level traversable/bounce tracking record=]'s [=bounce tracking record/final host=] to the [=host=] of |finalSite|.

</div>

<h5 id="bounce-tracking-mitigations-navigation-state-diagram">Navigation State Diagram</h5>

<img src="diagrams/navigation_state_diagram.png" alt="Navigation state diagram">

<h4 id="bounce-tracking-mitigations-timers">Timers</h4>

Every [=bounce tracking timer period=] the user agent should run the
[=bounce tracking timer=] algorithm given the [=wall clock=]'s
[=wall clock/unsafe current time=].

Note: Running the deletion algorithm on a global timer has the effect of adding fuzz to the
    delay between stateful bounce and data deletion. This mitigates adversarial leaks of
    interaction and bounce times. (See "Privacy and Security Considerations", below.)

<div algorithm>

To run the <dfn>bounce tracking timer</dfn> algorithm given a [=moment=] on the
[=wall clock=] |now|, perform the following steps:

1. [=map/For each=] |host| -> |activationTime| of [=user activation map=]:
    1. [=Assert=] that [=stateful bounce tracking map=] does not
        [=map/contain=] |host|.
    1. If |activationTime| + [=bounce tracking activation lifetime=] is before
        |now|, then [=map/remove=] |host| from [=user activation map=].
1. [=map/For each=] |host| -> |bounceTime| of [=stateful bounce tracking map=]:
    1. [=Assert=] that [=user activation map=] does not [=map/contain=] |host|.
    1. If |bounceTime| + [=bounce tracking grace period=] is after |now|, then
        [=iteration/continue=].
    1. If there is a [=top-level traversable=] whose
        [=navigable/active document=]'s [=Document/origin=]'s
        [=obtain a site|site=]'s [=host=] equals |host|,
        then [=iteration/continue=].
    1. [=map/Remove=] |host| from [=stateful bounce tracking map=].
    1. [=Clear cookies for host=] given |host|.
    1. [=Clear non-cookie storage for host=] given |host|.
    1. [=Clear cache for host=] given |host|.

<p class=issue>TODO: Consider if we should do anything when the clock is moved
    forward or backward.</p>

</div>

This algorithm is called when detecting the end of an [=extended navigation=]. This could happen
if a user-initiated navigation is detected in [=process navigation start for bounce tracking=],
or if the client bounce detection timer expires after [=process response received for bounce tracking=]
without observing a client redirect.

<div algorithm>

To run the <dfn>record stateful bounces for bounce tracking</dfn> algorithm
given a [=global object=] |global|, perform the following steps:

1. Let |navigable| be |global|'s [=associated document=]'s [=node navigable=].
1. If |navigable| is null, abort these steps.
    This ensures that the global has not been detached from the navigable.
1. Let |topDocument| be |navigable|'s [=navigable/active document=].
1. [=Assert=]: |topDocument| is the same as |global|'s [=associated document=].
1. [=Assert=]: |navigable|'s [=top-level traversable/bounce tracking record=] is not null.
1. [=set/For each=] |host| in |navigable|'s [=top-level traversable/bounce tracking record=]'s [=bounce tracking record/bounce set=]:
    1. If |host| [=host/equals=] |navigable|'s [=top-level traversable/bounce tracking record=]'s [=bounce tracking record/initial host=], [=iteration/continue=].
    1. If |host| [=host/equals=] |navigable|'s [=top-level traversable/bounce tracking record=]'s [=bounce tracking record/final host=], [=iteration/continue=].
    1. If [=user activation map=] [=map/contains=] |host|, [=iteration/continue=].
    1. If [=stateful bounce tracking map=] [=map/contains=] |host|, [=iteration/continue=]. (Only the first bounce time since the
        last execution of the [=bounce tracking timer=] is tracked in the map.)
    1. If |navigable|'s [=top-level traversable/bounce tracking record=]'s
        [=bounce tracking record/storage access set=] does not [=set/contain=] |host|, [=iteration/continue=].
    1. Let |topDocument| be |navigable|'s [=navigable/active document=].
    1. Set [=stateful bounce tracking map=][|host|] to |topDocument|'s
        [=relevant settings object=]'s [=environment settings object/current wall time=].
1. Set |navigable|'s [=top-level traversable/bounce tracking record=] to null.

</div>

<h4 id="bounce-tracking-mitigations-deletion">Deletion</h4>

<p class=note>The cookie and cache clearing algorithms were largely copied from
the [[clear-site-data|Clear Site Data]]
spec.  It would be nice to unify these in the future.</p>

<div algorithm>

To <dfn>clear cookies for host</dfn> given a [=host=] |host|, perform the
following steps:

1. [=Assert=]: |host|'s [=host/registrable domain=] is |host| or null.
1. Let |cookieList| be a set of cookies, initially empty.
1. [=list/For each=] cookie |cookie| in the [=cookie store=]:
    1. If |cookie| is not [=partitioned cookie|partitioned=]:
        1. If |cookie|'s [=domain attribute=] is a [=domain-match=] with |host|, add |cookie| to |cookieList|; otherwise, [=iteration/continue=].
    1. If |cookie| is [=partitioned cookie|partitioned=]:
        1. If the top-level [=site=] in |cookie|'s [=partition key=] is [=same site=] with the [=site=] ("http", |host|), add |cookie| to |cookieList|.
        1. If the top-level [=site=] in |cookie|'s [=partition key=] is [=same site=] with the [=site=] ("https", |host|), add |cookie| to |cookieList|.
        1. Otherwise, [=iteration/continue=].
1. [=list/For each=] |cookie| in |cookieList|:
    1. Remove |cookie| from the [=cookie store=].

</div>

Issue: TODO: Verify that using [=domain-match=] catches all cookies for the
    [=host/registrable domain=].

<div algorithm>
To <dfn>clear non-cookie storage for host</dfn> given a [=host=] |host|, perform
the following steps:

1. For each <a spec=storage>storage shed</a> |shed| held by the user agent or a
    [=traversable navigable=]:
    1. [=map/For each=] |storageKey| -> |storageShelf| of |shed|:
        1. Let |topLevelSite| be |storageKey|'s top-level site.
        1. If |topLevelSite| is an [=opaque origin=], then [=iteration/continue=].
        1. If |topLevelSite|'s [=host=] does not equal |host|, then [=iteration/continue=].
        1. Delete all data stored in |storageShelf|.
        1. [=map/Remove=] |storageKey| from |shed|.

Note: This algorithm is written assuming the implementation of the
    [work-in-progress update](https://github.com/whatwg/storage/pull/144) to
    the [Storage Standard](https://storage.spec.whatwg.org/) to
    <a spec=storage lt="storage key">key</a> storage on both an
    <a spec=storage for="storage key">origin</a> and a top-level site.

</div>

<div algorithm>
To <dfn>clear cache for host</dfn> given a [=host=] |host|, perform the
following steps:

1. Let |cacheList| be the set of entries from the [=network cache=] whose
    target URI [=host=] equals |host|.
1. [=list/For each=] |entry| in |cacheList|:
    1. Remove |entry| from the [=network cache=].

</div>

<h3 id="bounce-tracking-mitigations-automation">User Agent Automation</h3>

For the purposes of user-agent automation and application testing, this
document defines a number of [extension commands] for the [[WebDriver]]
specification.

<h4 id="run-bounce-tracking-mitigations-command">Run Bounce Tracking Mitigations</h4>

<figure id="table-webdriver-run-bounce-tracking-mitigations-command" class="table">
    <table class="data">
        <thead>
            <tr>
                <th>HTTP Method</th>
                <th>URI Template</th>
            </tr>
        </thead>
        <tbody>
            <tr>
                <td>DELETE</td>
                <td>`/session/{session id}/storage/run_bounce_tracking_mitigations`</td>
            </tr>
        </tbody>
    </table>
</figure>

The [=remote end steps=] are:

1. If no Bounce Tracking Mitigation Service is currently running, return a [=error|WebDriver error=] with
    [=error code=] [=unsupported operation=].

1. If the [=stateful bounce tracking map=] contains a malformed host, return a [=error|WebDriver error=] with
    [=error code=] [=unknown error=].

1. Let |list| be a new list of the [=site=] [=hosts=] in the [=stateful bounce tracking map=].

1. Let |temp| be [=bounce tracking grace period=].

1. Set [=bounce tracking grace period=] to 0 seconds.

1. Run the [=bounce tracking timer=] algorithm.

1. Set [=bounce tracking grace period=] to |temp|.

1. Return [=success=] with data |list|.

<h2 id="privacy-and-security-considerations">Privacy and Security Considerations</h2>

This feature stores information about sites that have a user interaction, some amount of view time, or
[engagement](https://www.chromium.org/developers/design-documents/site-engagement/). This information is
not directly exposed to sites, however, it can be indirectly observed.  For example, if `tracker.example`
reports back its oldest existing state to `site1.example`, then `site1.example` could infer that
`tracker.example` has had an interaction.  If it does not report any long-lived state, however, then
`site1.example` could infer that the state was wiped.

In addition, there are potential scenarios where the existence of an interaction could be accessed through
existing XS leaks in the platform.  Consider a scenario where a target site has an existing endpoint that
causes an automatic redirect that triggers the bounce tracking mitigations.  An attacker could use existing
XS leaks to determine if any logged-in state is present on a target site and then look to see if that state
disappears after triggering the bounce.

The information leak from tracker to site does not seem very significant.  At a minimum, the proposed
mitigations do not make the situation worse and without the mitigations there is a greater potential for a
tracker to communicate state to the target site.

The cross-site adversarial information leak is more concerning.  Solutions designed for this effort should
take this threat into account and attempt to mitigate it.  For example, delaying or fuzzing the timing of
storage wiping could lessen the impact of the leak.  Ultimately, though, it may be necessary to weigh the
cost of this 1 bit information leak against the gains in mitigating bounce tracking.

Another threat that should be considered by any solution is the possibility that an attacker will trick a
user into visiting an existing redirect endpoint on a site that they care about and somehow trigger their
storage to be deleted.  The current plan, however, is to already look at signals that a user cares about a
site for legitimate use cases, in order to avoid wiping data they care about.  This threat just puts more
weight on getting these signals correct.

Otherwise this effort does not store or expose any new types of information.  It does not create any new
cross-origin communication or storage capabilities.

There is some implementation complexity to be aware of when wiping storage.  The browser must be careful
not to wipe storage out from under a site actively using it.  This could lead to poor interop and broken
web sites.

<h2 id="acknowledgements" class="no-num">Acknowledgements</h2>

Many thanks to the Privacy Community Group for many good discussions about this proposal.