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GitHub personal access token leaking into temporary EasyBuild (debug) logs

Critical severity GitHub Reviewed Published Mar 19, 2020 in easybuilders/easybuild-framework • Updated Sep 20, 2024

Package

pip easybuild-framework (pip)

Affected versions

< 4.1.2

Patched versions

4.1.2

Description

Impact

The GitHub Personal Access Token (PAT) used by EasyBuild for the GitHub integration features (like --new-pr, --from-pr, etc.) is shown in plain text in EasyBuild debug log files.

Scope:

  • the log message only appears in the top-level log file, not in the individual software installation logs (see https://easybuild.readthedocs.io/en/latest/Logfiles.html);
    • as a consequence, tokens are not included in the partial log files that are uploaded into a gist when using --upload-test-report in combination with --from-pr, nor in the installation logs that are copied to the software installation directories;
  • the message is only logged when using --debug, so it will not appear when using the default EasyBuild configuration (only info messages are logged by default);
  • the log message is triggered via --from-pr, but also via various other GitHub integration options like --new-pr, --merge-pr, --close-pr, etc., but usually only appears in the temporary log file that is cleaned up automatically as soon as eb completes successfully;
  • you may have several debug log files that include your GitHub token in /tmp (or a different location if you've set the --tmpdir EasyBuild configuration option) on the systems where you use EasyBuild, but they are located in a subdirectory that is only accessible to your account (permissions set to 700);
  • the only way that a log file that may include your token could have been made public is if you shared it yourself, for example by copying the contents of the log file into a gist manually, or by sending a log file to someone;
  • for log files uploaded to GitHub, your token would be revoked automatically when GitHub notices it;

Patches

The issue is fixed with the changes in easybuilders/easybuild-framework#3248.

This fix is included in EasyBuild v4.1.2 (released on Mon Mar 16th 2020), and in the master+ develop branches of the easybuild-framework repository since Mon Mar 16th 2020 (see easybuilders/easybuild-framework#3248 and easybuilders/easybuild-framework#3249 resp.).

Make sure you revoke the existing GitHub tokens you're using with EasyBuild (via https://github.com/settings/tokens), and install new ones using "eb --install-github-token --force" (see also https://easybuild.readthedocs.io/en/latest/Integration_with_GitHub.html#installing-a-github-token-install-github-token).

Workarounds

  • avoid using the GitHub integration features (see https://easybuild.readthedocs.io/en/latest/Integration_with_GitHub.html) with EasyBuild versions older than version 4.1.2;
  • don't share top-level EasyBuild (debug) log files with others, unless you are sure your GitHub token is not included in them;
  • clean up temporary EasyBuild log files in /tmpon the system(s) where you`re using EasyBuild

References

For more information

References

@wpoely86 wpoely86 published to easybuilders/easybuild-framework Mar 19, 2020
Reviewed Mar 19, 2020
Published to the GitHub Advisory Database Mar 19, 2020
Last updated Sep 20, 2024

Severity

Critical

CVSS overall score

This score calculates overall vulnerability severity from 0 to 10 and is based on the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS).
/ 10

CVSS v4 base metrics

Exploitability Metrics
Attack Vector Network
Attack Complexity Low
Attack Requirements None
Privileges Required None
User interaction None
Vulnerable System Impact Metrics
Confidentiality High
Integrity High
Availability None
Subsequent System Impact Metrics
Confidentiality None
Integrity None
Availability None

CVSS v4 base metrics

Exploitability Metrics
Attack Vector: This metric reflects the context by which vulnerability exploitation is possible. This metric value (and consequently the resulting severity) will be larger the more remote (logically, and physically) an attacker can be in order to exploit the vulnerable system. The assumption is that the number of potential attackers for a vulnerability that could be exploited from across a network is larger than the number of potential attackers that could exploit a vulnerability requiring physical access to a device, and therefore warrants a greater severity.
Attack Complexity: This metric captures measurable actions that must be taken by the attacker to actively evade or circumvent existing built-in security-enhancing conditions in order to obtain a working exploit. These are conditions whose primary purpose is to increase security and/or increase exploit engineering complexity. A vulnerability exploitable without a target-specific variable has a lower complexity than a vulnerability that would require non-trivial customization. This metric is meant to capture security mechanisms utilized by the vulnerable system.
Attack Requirements: This metric captures the prerequisite deployment and execution conditions or variables of the vulnerable system that enable the attack. These differ from security-enhancing techniques/technologies (ref Attack Complexity) as the primary purpose of these conditions is not to explicitly mitigate attacks, but rather, emerge naturally as a consequence of the deployment and execution of the vulnerable system.
Privileges Required: This metric describes the level of privileges an attacker must possess prior to successfully exploiting the vulnerability. The method by which the attacker obtains privileged credentials prior to the attack (e.g., free trial accounts), is outside the scope of this metric. Generally, self-service provisioned accounts do not constitute a privilege requirement if the attacker can grant themselves privileges as part of the attack.
User interaction: This metric captures the requirement for a human user, other than the attacker, to participate in the successful compromise of the vulnerable system. This metric determines whether the vulnerability can be exploited solely at the will of the attacker, or whether a separate user (or user-initiated process) must participate in some manner.
Vulnerable System Impact Metrics
Confidentiality: This metric measures the impact to the confidentiality of the information managed by the VULNERABLE SYSTEM due to a successfully exploited vulnerability. Confidentiality refers to limiting information access and disclosure to only authorized users, as well as preventing access by, or disclosure to, unauthorized ones.
Integrity: This metric measures the impact to integrity of a successfully exploited vulnerability. Integrity refers to the trustworthiness and veracity of information. Integrity of the VULNERABLE SYSTEM is impacted when an attacker makes unauthorized modification of system data. Integrity is also impacted when a system user can repudiate critical actions taken in the context of the system (e.g. due to insufficient logging).
Availability: This metric measures the impact to the availability of the VULNERABLE SYSTEM resulting from a successfully exploited vulnerability. While the Confidentiality and Integrity impact metrics apply to the loss of confidentiality or integrity of data (e.g., information, files) used by the system, this metric refers to the loss of availability of the impacted system itself, such as a networked service (e.g., web, database, email). Since availability refers to the accessibility of information resources, attacks that consume network bandwidth, processor cycles, or disk space all impact the availability of a system.
Subsequent System Impact Metrics
Confidentiality: This metric measures the impact to the confidentiality of the information managed by the SUBSEQUENT SYSTEM due to a successfully exploited vulnerability. Confidentiality refers to limiting information access and disclosure to only authorized users, as well as preventing access by, or disclosure to, unauthorized ones.
Integrity: This metric measures the impact to integrity of a successfully exploited vulnerability. Integrity refers to the trustworthiness and veracity of information. Integrity of the SUBSEQUENT SYSTEM is impacted when an attacker makes unauthorized modification of system data. Integrity is also impacted when a system user can repudiate critical actions taken in the context of the system (e.g. due to insufficient logging).
Availability: This metric measures the impact to the availability of the SUBSEQUENT SYSTEM resulting from a successfully exploited vulnerability. While the Confidentiality and Integrity impact metrics apply to the loss of confidentiality or integrity of data (e.g., information, files) used by the system, this metric refers to the loss of availability of the impacted system itself, such as a networked service (e.g., web, database, email). Since availability refers to the accessibility of information resources, attacks that consume network bandwidth, processor cycles, or disk space all impact the availability of a system.
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

EPSS score

0.051%
(21st percentile)

Weaknesses

CVE ID

CVE-2020-5262

GHSA ID

GHSA-2wx6-wc87-rmjm

Source code

Credits

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