P-384/521 fallback to small implementation when OPENSSL_SMALL is set

crypto/ecdh_extra/ecdh_test.cc

@@ -130,12 +130,19 @@ TEST(ECDHTest, TestVectors) {
   });
 }
 
-static int has_uint128_and_not_small() {
+// Returns 1 if the curve defined by |nid| is using Montgomery representation
+// for field elements (based on the build configuration). Returns 0 otherwise.
+static int is_curve_using_mont_felem_impl(int nid) {
+  if (nid == NID_secp224r1) {
 #if defined(BORINGSSL_HAS_UINT128) && !defined(OPENSSL_SMALL)
-  return 1;
-#else
-  return 0;
+    return 0;
+#endif
+  } else if (nid == NID_secp521r1) {
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_SMALL)
+    return 0;
 #endif
+  }
+  return 1;
 }
 
 // The following test is adapted from ECTest.LargeXCoordinateVectors
@@ -170,12 +177,10 @@ TEST(ECDHTest, InvalidPubKeyLargeCoord) {
                                     SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH : len);
 
     ASSERT_TRUE(EC_KEY_set_group(peer_key.get(), group.get()));
-    // The following call converts the point to Montgomery form for P-256/384.
-    // For P-224, when the functions from simple.c are used, i.e. when
-    // group->meth = EC_GFp_nistp224_method, the coordinate representation
-    // is not changed. This is determined based on compile flags in ec.c
-    // that are also used below in has_uint128_and_not_small().
-    // For P-521, the plain non-Motgomery representation is always used.
+
+    // |EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GFp| sets given (x, y) according to the
+    // form the curve is using. If the curve is using Montgomery form, |x| and
+    // |y| will be converted to Montgomery form.
     ASSERT_TRUE(EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GFp(
                   group.get(), pub_key.get(), x.get(), y.get(), nullptr));
     ASSERT_TRUE(EC_KEY_set_public_key(peer_key.get(), pub_key.get()));
@@ -196,19 +201,17 @@ TEST(ECDHTest, InvalidPubKeyLargeCoord) {
     OPENSSL_memset(peer_key.get()->pub_key->raw.Z.bytes, 0, len);
     peer_key.get()->pub_key->raw.Z.bytes[0] = 1;
 
-    // As mentioned, for P-224 and P-521, setting the raw point directly
-    // with the coordinates still passes |EC_KEY_check_fips|.
-    // For P-256 and 384, the failure is due to that the coordinates are
-    // not in Montgomery representation, hence the checks fail earlier in
-    // |EC_KEY_check_key| in the point-on-the-curve calculations, which use
-    // Montgomery arithmetic.
+    // |ECDH_compute_key_fips| calls |EC_KEY_check_fips| that calls
+    // |EC_KEY_check_key| function which checks if the computed key point is on
+    // the curve (among other checks). If the curve uses Montgomery form then
+    // the point-on-curve check will fail because we set the raw point
+    // coordinates in regular form above.
     ret = ECDH_compute_key_fips(shared_key.data(), shared_key.size(),
                                 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(peer_key.get()),
                                 priv_key.get());
 
     int curve_nid = group.get()->curve_name;
-    if ((has_uint128_and_not_small() && (curve_nid == NID_secp224r1)) ||
-        (curve_nid == NID_secp521r1)) {
+    if (!is_curve_using_mont_felem_impl(curve_nid)) {
       ASSERT_TRUE(ret);
     } else {
       ASSERT_FALSE(ret);

crypto/fipsmodule/ec/ec.c

@@ -251,7 +251,12 @@ DEFINE_METHOD_FUNCTION(struct built_in_curves, OPENSSL_built_in_curves) {
   out->curves[0].comment = "NIST P-521";
   out->curves[0].param_len = 66;
   out->curves[0].params = kP521Params;
-  out->curves[0].method = EC_GFp_nistp521_method();
+  out->curves[0].method =
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_SMALL)
+      EC_GFp_nistp521_method();
+#else
+      EC_GFp_mont_method();
+#endif
 
   // 1.3.132.0.34
   static const uint8_t kOIDP384[] = {0x2b, 0x81, 0x04, 0x00, 0x22};
@@ -261,7 +266,12 @@ DEFINE_METHOD_FUNCTION(struct built_in_curves, OPENSSL_built_in_curves) {
   out->curves[1].comment = "NIST P-384";
   out->curves[1].param_len = 48;
   out->curves[1].params = kP384Params;
-  out->curves[1].method = EC_GFp_nistp384_method();
+  out->curves[1].method =
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_SMALL)
+      EC_GFp_nistp384_method();
+#else
+      EC_GFp_mont_method();
+#endif
 
   // 1.2.840.10045.3.1.7
   static const uint8_t kOIDP256[] = {0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0xce,

crypto/fipsmodule/ec/ec_test.cc

@@ -1845,12 +1845,19 @@ static bool HasSuffix(const char *str, const char *suffix) {
   return strcmp(str + str_len - suffix_len, suffix) == 0;
 }
 
-static int has_uint128_and_not_small() {
+// Returns 1 if the curve defined by |nid| is using Montgomery representation
+// for field elements (based on the build configuration). Returns 0 otherwise.
+static int is_curve_using_mont_felem_impl(int nid) {
+  if (nid == NID_secp224r1) {
 #if defined(BORINGSSL_HAS_UINT128) && !defined(OPENSSL_SMALL)
-  return 1;
-#else
-  return 0;
+    return 0;
+#endif
+  } else if (nid == NID_secp521r1) {
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_SMALL)
+    return 0;
 #endif
+  }
+  return 1;
 }
 
 // Test for out-of-range coordinates in public-key validation in
@@ -1881,12 +1888,10 @@ TEST(ECTest, LargeXCoordinateVectors) {
 
     size_t len = BN_num_bytes(&group.get()->field); // Modulus byte-length
     ASSERT_TRUE(EC_KEY_set_group(key.get(), group.get()));
-    // The following call converts the point to Montgomery form for P-256/384.
-    // For P-224, when the functions from simple.c are used, i.e. when
-    // group->meth = EC_GFp_nistp224_method, the coordinate representation
-    // is not changed. This is determined based on compile flags in ec.c
-    // that are also used below in has_uint128_and_not_small().
-    // For P-521, the plain non-Motgomery representation is always used.
+
+    // |EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GFp| sets given (x, y) according to the
+    // form the curve is using. If the curve is using Montgomery form, |x| and
+    // |y| will be converted to Montgomery form.
     ASSERT_TRUE(EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GFp(
                     group.get(), pub_key.get(), x.get(), y.get(), nullptr));
     ASSERT_TRUE(EC_KEY_set_public_key(key.get(), pub_key.get()));
@@ -1901,15 +1906,12 @@ TEST(ECTest, LargeXCoordinateVectors) {
     OPENSSL_memset(key.get()->pub_key->raw.Z.bytes, 0, len);
     key.get()->pub_key->raw.Z.bytes[0] = 1;
 
-    // As mentioned, for P-224 and P-521, setting the raw point directly
-    // with the coordinates still passes |EC_KEY_check_fips|.
-    // For P-256 and 384, the failure is due to that the coordinates are
-    // not in Montgomery representation, hence the checks fail earlier in
-    // |EC_KEY_check_key| in the point-on-the-curve calculations, which use
-    // Montgomery arithmetic.
+    // |EC_KEY_check_fips| first calls the |EC_KEY_check_key| function that
+    // checks if the key point is on the curve (among other checks). If the
+    // curve uses Montgomery form the point-on-curve check will fail because
+    // we set the raw point coordinates in regular form above.
     int curve_nid = group.get()->curve_name;
-    if ((has_uint128_and_not_small() && (curve_nid == NID_secp224r1)) ||
-        (curve_nid == NID_secp521r1)) {
+    if (!is_curve_using_mont_felem_impl(curve_nid)) {
       ASSERT_TRUE(EC_KEY_check_fips(key.get()));
     } else {
       ASSERT_FALSE(EC_KEY_check_fips(key.get()));
@@ -1921,14 +1923,12 @@ TEST(ECTest, LargeXCoordinateVectors) {
     // Now replace the x-coordinate with the larger one, x+p.
     OPENSSL_memcpy(key.get()->pub_key->raw.X.bytes,
                    (const uint8_t *)xpp.get()->d, len);
+    // We expect |EC_KEY_check_fips| to always fail when given key with x > p.
     ASSERT_FALSE(EC_KEY_check_fips(key.get()));
 
-    // |EC_KEY_check_fips| check on coordinate range can only be exercised
-    // for P-224 and P-521 when the coordinates in the raw point are not
-    // in Montgomery representation. For the other curves, they fail
-    // for the same reason as above.
-    if ((has_uint128_and_not_small() && (curve_nid == NID_secp224r1)) ||
-        (curve_nid == NID_secp521r1)) {
+    // But the failure is for different reasons in case of curves using the
+    // Montgomery form versus those that don't, as explained above.
+    if (!is_curve_using_mont_felem_impl(curve_nid)) {
       EXPECT_EQ(EC_R_COORDINATES_OUT_OF_RANGE,
                 ERR_GET_REASON(ERR_peek_last_error_line(&file, &line)));
       EXPECT_PRED2(HasSuffix, file, "ec_key.c"); // within EC_KEY_check_fips

crypto/fipsmodule/ec/p384.c

@@ -15,6 +15,8 @@
 #include "../delocate.h"
 #include "internal.h"
 
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_SMALL)
+
 // We have two implementations of the field arithmetic for P-384 curve:
 //   - Fiat-crypto
 //   - s2n-bignum
@@ -1481,3 +1483,4 @@ DEFINE_METHOD_FUNCTION(EC_METHOD, EC_GFp_nistp384_method) {
 //     a = -0xfffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffc7634d81f4372ddf581a0db248b0a77aecec196accc52973
 // '''
 //
+#endif // !defined(OPENSSL_SMALL)

crypto/fipsmodule/ec/p521.c

@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@
 #include "../delocate.h"
 #include "internal.h"
 
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_SMALL)
 // We have two implementations of the field arithmetic for P-521 curve:
 //   - Fiat-crypto
 //   - s2n-bignum
@@ -32,7 +33,6 @@
 // when Fiat-crypto is used, or as:
 //   #define p521_felem_add(out, in0, in1) bignum_add_p521(out, in0, in1)
 // when s2n-bignum is used.
-//
 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ASM) && \
     (defined(OPENSSL_LINUX) ||  defined(OPENSSL_APPLE)) && \
     (defined(OPENSSL_X86_64) || defined(OPENSSL_AARCH64)) && \
@@ -1095,3 +1095,4 @@ DEFINE_METHOD_FUNCTION(EC_METHOD, EC_GFp_nistp521_method) {
 // ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
 //  Analysis of the doubling case occurrence in the Joye-Tunstall recoding:
 //  see the analysis at the bottom of the |p384.c| file.
+#endif // !defined(OPENSSL_SMALL)