CIP-1694? | A First Step Towards On-Chain Decentralized Governance #380
Conversation
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Please see my proposed legal contribution here: https://forum.cardano.org/t/more-legal-framework-for-cip-1694-the-members-based-organization/110573 |
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Overall I'm very impressed with and happy with the contents, structure, ideas, and work put into the draft CIP-1694. Personally I was considering some similar ideas for governance, however because this isn't my field of expertise my ideas were not nearly as comprehensive. One feature of this CIP that I really like is that there is no mandatory hierarchical structure for how payouts must be made. This leaves funding the future community structure of the (members based organization, professional society, Catalyst startup incubator, whatever outcome of the Cardano constitutional process) entirely flexible. This flexibility is wise and is absolutely necessary for financial (fund/defund) checks-and-balances of future Cardano (organizations/ societies/ companies/ developers/ contractors/ ect). |
Thank you, Michael. Yes, the CIP is deliberately foundational rather than prescribing any specific structure. |
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thanks for all the great suggestions @michaelpj , I've just added a commit, "address comments 20221122", addressing a lot of it. In particular, I'm really glad that you suggested the rationale on the table values, as I found a problem. The AVST was not supposed to be ignored when the constitutional committee does not vote, it is required (which is stronger than diverting the responsibility to the SPOs). So now there is a new column in the table, and explanations. I've added several section to the rationale. I've left some TODO's, one for the potential other acceptance criterion and one to think more about the treasury voting thresholds (taking @michael-liesenfelt 's comments into account). I removed the yes/no ratio remarks that were not correct. I did not yet address any of the comments about the described implementation plan, I will probably need more help understanding those remarks. |
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Hi @JaredCorduan et al, @ltouro suggested that I review your proposal. I’m interested in learning about your CIP. Could you please give me some links where I can read about the background for the idea? Specifically, I am interested in reading about your rationale for the model of government that you propose for Cardano. I began drafting a CIP myself that would involve a model of government based fundamentally on a decentralized autonomous organization (DAO). The draft is available at CIP-x?—I Gave at the Office. Comments are welcome at Cardano Governance #376. I understand some of the challenges associated with creating a stable DAO. For example, see Waves founder: DAOs will never work without fixing governance. I believe that my CIP draft maintains a starting point capable of successfully overcoming such challenges. I have a background in IT as a Technical Writer and Instructional Designer, with a Business Analysis foundation. My graduate research in clinical psychology focussed on investigating social networks within workplaces and organizations using electronic communications, and I hold a related US patent. In response to the concerns expressed by @Kronoshus regarding doing work for free, I believe that such resentment should not be ignored. Have you considered seeking funding for developing the CIP through Project Catalyst? I would be interested in exploring such an avenue myself. I believe that the timing may be good to apply for the next round of funding, with community voting set to start sometime early in 2023, if I recall correctly. I believe that the Project Catalyst application essentially boils down to an estimate and a schedule, which would be important documents to prepare and maintain for a successful project anyway, in my experience. Oliver |
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Hi all, I've just read the CIP-1694 and the comments in this issue. I have some thoughts about them:
I hope these points are useful, or at least they spark some debate. Juan |
CIP-1694/README.md
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| The corresponding incentive mechanisms need to be specified, with the funds probably coming from the per-epoch treasury allocation. | ||
| Performance constraints will also need to be considered since it would be problematic if millions of DReps were expected to vote on each governance action. Some incentive options to ensure a manageable number of DReps include: | ||
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| * Requiring a large deposit when registering oneself as a DRep. |
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I'm not sure this is a great idea. I think it's a good idea in the case of SPOs, since your stake is directly involved in the method of securing the network, but in the case of dReps, that will be voting on issues regarding the future changes to the network, other factors, such as expertise in a given area is IMO more important.
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Right. if we want a layer 1 solution, though, we need some way to limit the DReps.
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Based on economics the number of dReps should be self limiting just based on the tx cost. For most people I'm guessing the rewards of a single vote will be much less than the transaction cost to cast that vote. In this way delegating is incentivized.
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maybe eventually, but at the start there could be a lot of interest that is not financially motivated. and we can't just hope that not too many folks want to vote...
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maybe eventually, but at the start there could be a lot of interest that is not financially motivated. and we can't just hope that not too many folks want to vote...
I do agree with this. But must the threshold be ADA? As you correctly state, there are no guarantees that this will actually limit the number of representatives, if there are other motives than financial. Maybe if there was a social threshold instead? Or some other kind of proof, like proof of competence. Not sure what that would look like though, I'm just thinking out loud here, and I understand such an alternative solution would come with a large iplementation cost/time asociated with it.
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A dynamic threshold sounds dangerous: it means that there's the possibility of you being pushed out of the top N and then your votes don't count anymore. You'd also need some tooling that tells you if you are in the top N or not.
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Yeah, transparency is deceased, I agree with that. If the votes are weighted, that would effectively counteract splitting stakes, even with the hard threshold solution, which was the only real point I had against it.
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Who Chooses N? Should that be one of the items in the constitution? Or should it grow as cardano grows? Should it be a combination of stake pools or producing stake pools and unique active wallets or some other metrics?
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Right. if we want a layer 1 solution, though, we need some way to limit the DReps.
@JaredCorduan Can you please highlight what are the limitations to having an arbitrarily large number of DReps on a layer 1?
ADA holders having to register as a DRep with the deposit intended to be large, reduces the freedom of an ADA holder to register their choices themselves (as in a direct democracy). It would be nice if the governance system could bring in the best of both from direct & representative democracy. Ideally, an ADA holder should have the fundamental right with reasonable restrictions to vote directly or instead delegate to a DRep. Large deposits can make the restrictions unreasonable.
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I completely understand your concerns and I feel the same way. Unfortunately, the physical reality today is that if we were to end up with, say, 10x the number of DReps as SPOs, and there were several governance actions to vote on each epoch, this would start to take up a very non-trivial amount of the total throughput of Cardano. This may not happen, but we have to be prepared for this (at least at the beginning when there are so many unknowns).
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Is there a documented business case for CIP-1694? If so, could someone please post the link? I would like to get up to speed as quickly as possible. If information is still being gathered, such as competitive analysis or benchmark studies to compare the strengths and weaknesses of CPI-1694? with those of Cardano's competitors, then I would like to suggest reviewing the PivX DAO (see also Why and How the PIVX DAO Works, for example). |
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Thank you Oliver. I have considered asking for funding yet I still would like some sort of official support by the community or IOG. There are many that do not see the point in creating legal framework and I would like to hear from them because I only ever hear from people that agree with me. If everyone agrees a need for law is necessary then I will go ahead with making a full manual for tribunals. In addition to the need for punitive legal framework in a governance system, someone will also need to make administrative/business law for non-punitive governance actions such as all these nice ideas we love talking about. I am not very good at making legal code around that but a couple of lawyers have reached out to me for that. They just need to have official support from some entity too before writing the code. If law is not created before the governance proposal is implemented, then there will be many issues in the future or people simply will not use the system, call it broken like what happened with Catalyst, and move on with their lives. V/r, Kevin Mohr |
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In reference to Juan's 3rd point here, He is right. There is no legal procedure to defend oneself if being removed from a committee, thus what incentive would anyone have to do anything once on the committee besides hold power. V/r, Kevin Mohr |
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Thank you @Kronoshus I am going to spend time to read An On-Chain Decentralized Governance Mechanism for Voltaire in detail. Oliver |
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The CIP-50 analysis of actual state of Cardano network decentralization has taught one very powerful lesson so far: High leverage is bad. Applying this lesson to social decentralization and governance it would be wise to limit the voting power of all SPO's to some leverage limit multiple of the SPO's pledge: L. This has a profound effect: there is an added social/governance motivation for pledge. Groups like Binance and Coinbase which do not pledge any ADA would have no voting power. |
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On the topic of pledge and leverage, would it be possible to include time duration for pledge existence? The use of time duration for a pools pledge (i.e. 10 epochs) could prevent pools from updating their pledge to increase vote impact then remove the pledge to keep their ADA in a more liquid state. |
The only analogy I have for it was when schools in the US were forced to admit students from all localities of a city. The only problem being there was not way that a kid from a black neighbourhood could actually (using public transport) get to these schools. On paper, yes they had every chance to attend but in practice, the resources needed to utilise their rights were not provided. This freedom is somewhat meaningless (side point: recurring theme in the US. I’d recommend the reader to look up Scandinavian countries and how they view freedom, eg Sweden).
What evidence does this design decision rely on? I’m going to be very honest. I personally don’t care about KYC-ing myself and although I appreciate the cyberpunk ideals, I don’t share them because their intractable. Hence I’m interested in the latter question. I’m pragmatic. Each design decision should solve a problem. I’m not convinced by any means that a governance system ultimately rooted i a token which is highly liquid, it’s owners are pseudonymous and the power is highly concentrated, is “good” in any meaningful sense. The excuse that this is “Minimum Viable Governance” is not good enough because it is a qualitative decision that is likely to have persistent effects. It’s an anchor. The first design is likely to have a sticky effect, analogous to how incumbents in US senate elections have an incumbency advantage (see Cattaneo, Frandsen & Titiunik, 2012).
I don’t think any efforts to move away from 1c1v will have any effect at this point. But I would like this raise that this design decision should be explicitly stated as a MAJOR point of discussion that should be revisited X months after implementing MVG and that funds should be allocated to enable competing models to have an actual chance to develop and make the case. The asymmetry between a team within Catalyst headed by a CEO with certain preference paying their salary and a bunch of passionate volunteers taking a few hours off their week doesn’t make this a reasonable comparison. Of course the current CIP-1694 will be in better shape, more eloquent and thought-through. With, a few $10k we consult some of the worlds leading political economists, political scientists and political historians, see what they would come up with. That would be the Cardano way. Best, |
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Simon,
I support the idea of an effort of review and renewal for the governance
mechanisms on a consistent, regular cadence.
I think the idea that we devote some funding at set intervals to expressly
review and refresh the state of the art around voting mechanisms is a
useful tool for a system that is to remain flexible and open to change. By
utilizing a challenge category in our existing innovation framework that
also saves from creating too much overhead for the process.
Well done. I encourage others in this conversation to give this particular
proposal a few moments of your time to review.
…On Wed, Jul 5, 2023 at 3:27 AM SimonSallstrom ***@***.***> wrote:
@kenricnelson <https://github.com/kenricnelson> @Quantumplation
<https://github.com/Quantumplation>
1. I think it is true that “the community” broadly defined hasn’t had
a real chance to write an alternative themselves. Why? There was never any
challenge or budget allocated for it.
The only analogy I have for it was when schools in the US were forced to
admit students from all localities of a city. The only problem being there
was not way that a kid from a black neighbourhood could actually (using
public transport) get to these schools. On paper, yes they had every chance
to attend but in practice, the resources needed to utilise their rights
were not provided. This freedom is somewhat meaningless (side point:
recurring theme in the US. I’d recommend the reader to look up Scandinavian
countries and how they view freedom, eg Sweden).
1. I think Cardano has almost by default decided to continue on its
cyberpunk ethos of permissionless pseudonymity. This seem to me to be more
than anything a philosophical decision rather than one informed by a
hypothesis that this leads to the best decision making and optimal path
toward a world in which Cardano is the social and financial backend of the
world.
What evidence does this design decision rely on?
I’m going to be very honest. I personally don’t care about KYC-ing myself
and although I appreciate the cyberpunk ideals, I don’t share them because
their intractable. Hence I’m interested in the latter question. I’m
pragmatic. Each design decision should solve a problem.
I’m not convinced by any means that a governance system ultimately rooted
i a token which is highly liquid, it’s owners are pseudonymous and the
power is highly concentrated, is “good” in any meaningful sense.
The excuse that this is “Minimum Viable Governance” is not good enough
because it is a qualitative decision that is likely to have persistent
effects. It’s an anchor. The first design is likely to have a sticky
effect, analogous to how incumbents in US senate elections have an
incumbency advantage (see Cattaneo, Frandsen & Titiunik, 2012).
1. What I am proposing = explicitly state that this will be revisited
and provide funding to develop alternatives.
I don’t think any efforts to move away from 1c1v will have any effect at
this point.
But I would like this raise that this design decision should be explicitly
stated as a MAJOR point of discussion that should be revisited X months
after implementing MVG and that funds should be allocated to enable
competing models to have an actual chance to develop and make the case. The
asymmetry between a team within Catalyst headed by a CEO with certain
preference paying their salary and a bunch of passionate volunteers taking
a few hours off their week doesn’t make this a reasonable comparison. Of
course the current CIP-1694 will be in better shape, more eloquent and
thought-through.
With, a few $10k we consult some of the worlds leading political
economists, political scientists and political historians, see what they
would come up with. That would be the Cardano way.
Best,
Simon
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Great input @SimonSallstrom ; I hope you can join us today for the ATH discussion. |
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@kenricnelson Unfortunately, I have to work to pay my bills and deliver on the commitments to the hundreds of students I, thanks to the Cardano technology, have committed to help in Kenya and Ethiopia. I am happy to share thoughts asynchronously but the marginal difference/impact my attendance would have on what happens to governance in Cardano is so low that I don’t think this is how I can provide most value to the ecosystem, or the world for that manner I might swing by for a bit though, we’ll see |
This response is disingenuous. The CIP editor process already conflates Open Source maintainer and editor roles. There is no "neutal" maintainer here. CIP editors perform both roles - judge and jury. Your statement is also implicitly self-contradictory. By claiming authority "What any project maintainer, and in this particular context IOG, does with their code bases is up to them" and then also denying it "... A CIP isn't an order or a statement of work" etc. Your defense that there is "no particular "rush" is self-fulfilling as it depends on our good faith that your merge is not an "order or a statement of work". Such good faith is somewhat stretched given the preeminence of code ownership just asserted. Furthermore the availability of a main author is not, in itself, a reason to merge. In fact this circumstance could be precisely a reason not to merge. " ... many months to come forth with a different design and approach. " It has taken several months for a wider consultation to occur on this CIP. And the CF "consultation" has taken the form of workshops that were heavily templated to steer the discussion to the CIP-1694 variables not the overall principles. Many in the community have felt used by this type of shepherding. "A large part of the CIP has already been implemented by IOG .." Such statements again remind us of the performative nature of this consultation and the disingenuousness of "no rush". If there is no rush to merge why defend the merge by citing a mature implementation ? "little chance that the proposal will significantly deviate from the current design unless someone is able to not only propose a new design but also implement it" This appears to be the core of your statement and essentially amounts to "take it or leave it". And pre-empts any possible alternative. It very clear where agency lies in this process. |
Totally agree with all the criticisms raised here. This process feels like a stitch up, because it is a stitch up. |
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Exactly @kieransimkin !! I will give credit to IOG for inviting me to the Scotland Workshop despite my vocal critique. Over the past two years, and two months, I've gone through the following stages:
Cheers, from Edinburgh, Scotland |
This may explain why there haven't been many alternative proposals that have really been fully developed - why bother when it's clear the decision has already been made? Its exactly the same kind of staged public consultation that governments use to make it look like they're listening when really they are not. Also, the "many months to come up with alternative proposals" is total nonsense. There have been only a handful of months, which is not even nearly enough time for unpaid volunteers to properly formulate a proposal. This whole proposal stinks, IOG have a massive attitude problem, and they need to start properly taking on feedback from the community instead of hiding in their ivory towers and ignoring their own community. |
Anyone where free to discuss other topics as well and many solutions where mentioned. In both my workshops quadratic voting and DID solutions where discussed. Most agreed that MVG will not be able to get this in but that it is something we should strive for in the future. I can only speak for the two workshops I did but it was certainly not anything proforma. Yes there was some predetermined suggestions but no they did that did not stop the workshops from discussing a lot of potential solutions. We also saw in Edinburgh we could agree on 3 out of 6 issues and we have more work to do on the 3 others. Just want to mention that I disagree with such strong statements such as Proforma workshops when this is not what I experienced at all. I do however agree with the ambitions of implementing quadratic voting and such voting tools for the right situations where they shine (in particular treasury priorities voting in my opinion). |
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Fair point, and indeed there was a good variety of input from the different workshop hosts. |
…ardano-foundation#380) * A proposal for entering the Voltaire phase We're heading into the age of Voltaire, laying down the foundations for decentralized decision-making. This CIP describes a mechanism for on-chain governance that will underpin the Voltaire phase of Cardano. The document builds on and extends the original Cardano governance scheme that was based on a fixed number of governance keys. It aims to provide a first step that is both valuable and technically achievable in the near term as part of the proposed Voltaire governance system. It also seeks to act as a jumping-off point for continuing community input, including on appropriate threshold settings and other on-chain settings. Subsequent proposals may adapt and extend this proposal to meet emerging governance needs. * updated table modification times after checking merge conflict resolved OK * orphaned or duplicated comment in top level README If referring to CPS statuses, CIP-0001 link is incorrect & should be fixed in a separate PR (keeping this change unique to fixing this PR's conflict without having to rebase) --------- Co-authored-by: Robert Phair <rphair@cosd.com>
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Looks like Optim is the first to start a market for votes: The mechanism is a smart contract. |
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And so ends Cardano's non-attempt at decentralized governance. The corruption isn't the buying of votes but the mispricing of influence. Because Influence grows quadraticly with votes, the differential value is linear. So the votes held by a small holder are worth less than those held by large holder. Therefore, the large holder gains more influence than the small holder losses. Centralization is a guaranteed outcome of the mispricing of influence built into any one coin one vote system. Corporations have always been centralized but they have other mechanisms for accountability. None of those accountability mechanisms apply to a non-identity system that fails catastrophically if decentralization is broken. |
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Interesting. Where can I read your full explanation for the claim that “influence grows Quadratically”?
Best wishes/Vänligen,
Simon
…________________________________
From: Kenric Nelson ***@***.***>
Sent: Sunday, August 20, 2023 11:12:08 PM
To: cardano-foundation/CIPs ***@***.***>
Cc: SimonSallstrom ***@***.***>; Mention ***@***.***>
Subject: Re: [cardano-foundation/CIPs] CIP-1694? | A First Step Towards On-Chain Decentralized Governance (PR #380)
And so ends Cardano's non-attempt at decentralized governance.
The corruption isn't the buying of votes but the mispricing of influence. Because Influence grows quadraticly with votes, the differential value is linear. So the votes held by a small holder are worth less than those held by large holder. Therefore, the large holder gains more influence than the small holder losses.
Centralization is a guaranteed outcome of the mispricing of influence built into any one coin one vote system.
Corporations have always been centralized but they have other mechanisms for accountability. None of those accountability mechanisms apply to a non-identity system that fails catastrophically if decentralization is broken.
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Optim is only the first. There will be many more. |
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@SimonSallstrom the discovery of the nonlinear growth in influence with votes goes back to the 1950s by Penrose, Banzhoff, and others. Here are a few articles. I also sent you an invite to a Zotero literature database we are maintaining on DAO Governance. Feel free to add articles to this. The mathematical properties are reviewed in Dubey, P. & Shapley, L. S. Mathematical Properties of the Banzhaf Power Index. Mathematics of OR 4, 99–131 (1979). Square voting system: Slomczynski, W. & Zyczkowski, K. Penrose voting system and optimal quota. Preprint at http://arxiv.org/abs/physics/0610271 (2006). Glen Weyl and Eric Posner are the inventors of Quadratic Voting. They have many publications, including an excellent book, Radical Markets. This was discusses the history of voting. Posner, E. A. & Weyl, E. G. Voting Squared: Quadratic Voting in Democratic Politics. |
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This paragraph from Posner, E. A. & Weyl, E. G. Voting Squared: Quadratic Voting in Democratic Politics, gives a good description of the dangers of majority rule, including corporate systems were votes are weighted by shares or coins.
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…ardano-foundation#380) * A proposal for entering the Voltaire phase We're heading into the age of Voltaire, laying down the foundations for decentralized decision-making. This CIP describes a mechanism for on-chain governance that will underpin the Voltaire phase of Cardano. The document builds on and extends the original Cardano governance scheme that was based on a fixed number of governance keys. It aims to provide a first step that is both valuable and technically achievable in the near term as part of the proposed Voltaire governance system. It also seeks to act as a jumping-off point for continuing community input, including on appropriate threshold settings and other on-chain settings. Subsequent proposals may adapt and extend this proposal to meet emerging governance needs. * updated table modification times after checking merge conflict resolved OK * orphaned or duplicated comment in top level README If referring to CPS statuses, CIP-0001 link is incorrect & should be fixed in a separate PR (keeping this change unique to fixing this PR's conflict without having to rebase) --------- Co-authored-by: Robert Phair <rphair@cosd.com>
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Hi community. Hope this comment finds you! I am deeply concerned about this. I am an early adopter and I have been with the community a very long time. I love Cardano and its vision. I also love Charles and what he stands for. My main concern is that we go without constitution in the Voltaire-Phase. Sorry, but this looks very, very naive to me. We have a principal’s approach, we have all science-papers peer reviewed, we take our time to program a rock solid blockchain, we use Haskell which was a awful lot of work and we take our time to build a blockchain which could last for ages, and we want to be the financial back bone of the world. Charles himself said “Cardano is a tank”. Are we out of our minds? I am from Switzerland. Our democracy it one of the best, if not the best of the world. And I tell you if you want to democratize the Governance of Cardano you need to have a Constitution in the first step. Not in the second. Yet I read that the Constitution is out of Scope for the first step. So let me get this straight: First, we democratize power and then we vote for how this power will be used and determine what is good use of power. People, this approach will fail! Why are we in such a rush? We should define the Constitution as being part of the first step (in-scope). We are not ready for it! Take more time and define a Constitution as being part of the first step. We vote for: This is how Cardano democratizes, this is who the government bodies are, and this is how they operate. And this is our Constitution on which we abide by. I am a big believer in the Cardano-Eco-System and what it stands for. I care a lot about making the world more fair and the income-streams and wealth more distributed. So that the majority of the world can profit and not just a minority. By going in the next step without a Constitution we are basically handing over the system to a minority which is maybe too self absorbed and do not have the best interest at heart. I want to have a set of rules (a Constitution) which every government body has to follow in the first place as part of CIP 1694. For instance, do not harm the Eco-System, do not take funds and use it selfishly. If an actor or body misbehaves this shall happen. And so on. Charles himself said this will be a fight like a Marine Boot Camp. But this is not what it supposed to be. It should be a discussion on what we think is best for the ecosystem. I voted no! We need more time and we need a Constitution as being in-scope (not out of scope)! Charles has done a phenomenal Job. He can lead this System until the time is right and the Constitution stands. A lot of marines don’t make it in the first training year. Have a wonderful day everyone. |
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Greetings @xenofix9, Above you said the following:
I agree. Charles has decided that much of the governance mechanism must be put in place before a constitution can be written, ratified and enforced. Still, for the protection of the community Charles must move to decentralize leadership. To this end it seems a constitutional committee will be selected to protect this fragile system from ignorance and bad actors in governance until a constitution can be put into place and enforced. It seems at least some of the constitution will be enforced by smart contracts which means there must be some way to translate law into code. I am guessing that research on this matter is being done at the Hoskinson Center for Formal Mathematics. Like so many other Cardano innovations, I feel sure this system will be worth waiting for. In the meantime, we should all post our ideas about what should be included in the constitution. History demonstrates, the greatest danger to our community is the central banking system which uses all manners of deception in order get control of all commodities by tokenizing them and gradually converting the tokens to fiat where they can be stolen at will under full protection of the law. It seems to me that Ethereum is already under the control of the central banks and Bitcoin is likely to fall soon as BlackRock and others pursue their Bitcoin ETFs. I am eager to hear your ideas about what should be defined in our Cardano constitution. |
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Hi, it very positive that you have been thinking about it as well. I see your concern is about the use of funds. In addition we should consider adding what is good and bad behavior (very generally speaking). This is the Swiss Constitution. We have basically "3 wings of power" in place. To be honest I have not given it much thought on how in detail I would define constitutional rules. But that is exactly it. How can we think about going into decentralization without this important document? Are you from IOG or a company or group working IOG? Give them please this feedback about this opinion. I would be interested in this process (establishing a constitution, thinking about politics, the governments structure and "the wings of power"). But it would take up a considerable amount of time. And need to make sure that my family is fed... |
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Greetings @xenofix9
No I am not from IOG. So please continue to share your ideas and participate as your time allows. |
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The main question for me is, if the community agrees with the process / roadmap itself. If this is de-centralized governance the community should vote on the roadmap. Do we want to have a "temperature check" about the roadmap? I strongly suggest that the first step would include the constitution (in-scope). Where can we voice ourselves except here? Does IOG read this posts? |
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It seems there is some confusion going on: the constitution is out of scope for this CIP, but this does not mean that there won't be an initial constitution. Note that the Intersect roadmap says the interim constitution will be published in Q4 this year and lists a series of workshops in 2024 and a constitutional convention. I work at IOG, but my job is to implement this CIP so the constitution is only tangentially relevant for my work. So I can't really tell you where to go if you want to be involved, but people who work on the constitution don't come here. |
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Please join Intersect: https://intersectmbo.org/
This is where ongoing work surrounding the initial Constitution is taking
place.
…On Mon, Dec 11, 2023, 04:44 Andre Knispel ***@***.***> wrote:
It seems there is some confusion going on: the constitution is out of
scope for this CIP, but this does not mean that there won't be an initial
constitution. Note that the Intersect roadmap
<https://www.intersectmbo.org/roadmap> says the interim constitution will
be published in Q4 this year and lists a series of workshops in 2024 and a
constitutional convention.
I work at IOG, but my job is to implement this CIP so the constitution is
only tangentially relevant for my work. So I can't really tell you where to
go if you want to be involved, but people who work on the constitution
don't come here.
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Thank you @WhatisRT and @LloydDuhon for pointing us to https://intersectmbo.org/ This is great news for @xenofix9 and myself. I just joined the Intersect discord which is linked on the website and joined the town hall meeting which takes place at noon EST tomorrow. Much thanks again for the help. |
@kenricnelson I'd be very interested in that database,too. Are you able to share another invite? |
Same here if invites are going round! :) |
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@ubani and @MaxvanRossem I'd be happy to add you to the Zotero database on DAO Governance. Send me your email addresses, kenric.nelson@photrek.io |
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Thank you @kenricnelson email is sent. |
We're heading into the age of Voltaire, laying down the foundations for decentralized decision-making. This CIP describes a mechanism for on-chain governance that will underpin the Voltaire phase of Cardano. The document builds on and extends the original Cardano governance scheme that was based on a fixed number of governance keys. It aims to provide a first step that is both valuable and technically achievable in the near term as part of the proposed Voltaire governance system.
It also seeks to act as a jumping-off point for continuing community input, including on appropriate threshold settings and other on-chain settings. Subsequent proposals may adapt and extend this proposal to meet emerging governance needs.
See rendered version.
2023-06-30 NOTE merged although work will continue on this CIP: see #380 (comment) (continued in #380 (comment))