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Fix CVE-2017-8824, CVE-2017-1000407 in 4.14 #118

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merged 2 commits into from
Dec 5, 2017
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Fix CVE-2017-8824, CVE-2017-1000407 in 4.14 #118

merged 2 commits into from
Dec 5, 2017

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Andrew Honig and others added 2 commits December 5, 2017 12:18
KVM allows guests to directly access I/O port 0x80 on intel hosts.  If
the guest floods this port with writes it generates exceptions and
instability in the host kernel, leading to a crash.  With this change
guest writes to port 0x80 on intel will behave the same as they
currently behave on AMD systems.

Prevent the flooding by removing the code that sets port 0x80 as a
passthrough port.  This is essentially the same as upstream patch
99f85a2, except that patch was
for AMD chipsets and this patch is for intel.

Signed-off-by: Andrew Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Whenever the sock object is in DCCP_CLOSED state, dccp_disconnect()
must free dccps_hc_tx_ccid and dccps_hc_rx_ccid and set to NULL.

Signed-off-by: Mohamed Ghannam <simo.ghannam@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
@bgilbert bgilbert merged commit 7e5e6a6 into coreos:v4.14.3-coreos Dec 5, 2017
@bgilbert bgilbert deleted the v4.14.3-coreos branch December 5, 2017 20:52
coreosbot pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Dec 19, 2017
commit 30bf90c upstream.

Found using DEBUG_ATOMIC_SLEEP while submitting an AIO read operation:

[  100.853642] BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at mm/slab.h:421
[  100.861148] in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 1, pid: 1880, name: python
[  100.867954] 2 locks held by python/1880:
[  100.867961]  #0:  (&epfile->mutex){....}, at: [<f8188627>] ffs_mutex_lock+0x27/0x30 [usb_f_fs]
[  100.868020]  #1:  (&(&ffs->eps_lock)->rlock){....}, at: [<f818ad4b>] ffs_epfile_io.isra.17+0x24b/0x590 [usb_f_fs]
[  100.868076] CPU: 1 PID: 1880 Comm: python Not tainted 4.14.0-edison+ #118
[  100.868085] Hardware name: Intel Corporation Merrifield/BODEGA BAY, BIOS 542 2015.01.21:18.19.48
[  100.868093] Call Trace:
[  100.868122]  dump_stack+0x47/0x62
[  100.868156]  ___might_sleep+0xfd/0x110
[  100.868182]  __might_sleep+0x68/0x70
[  100.868217]  kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x4b/0x200
[  100.868248]  ? dwc3_gadget_ep_alloc_request+0x24/0xe0 [dwc3]
[  100.868302]  dwc3_gadget_ep_alloc_request+0x24/0xe0 [dwc3]
[  100.868343]  usb_ep_alloc_request+0x16/0xc0 [udc_core]
[  100.868386]  ffs_epfile_io.isra.17+0x444/0x590 [usb_f_fs]
[  100.868424]  ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x27/0x40
[  100.868457]  ? kiocb_set_cancel_fn+0x57/0x60
[  100.868477]  ? ffs_ep0_poll+0xc0/0xc0 [usb_f_fs]
[  100.868512]  ffs_epfile_read_iter+0xfe/0x157 [usb_f_fs]
[  100.868551]  ? security_file_permission+0x9c/0xd0
[  100.868587]  ? rw_verify_area+0xac/0x120
[  100.868633]  aio_read+0x9d/0x100
[  100.868692]  ? __fget+0xa2/0xd0
[  100.868727]  ? __might_sleep+0x68/0x70
[  100.868763]  SyS_io_submit+0x471/0x680
[  100.868878]  do_int80_syscall_32+0x4e/0xd0
[  100.868921]  entry_INT80_32+0x2a/0x2a
[  100.868932] EIP: 0xb7fbb676
[  100.868941] EFLAGS: 00000292 CPU: 1
[  100.868951] EAX: ffffffda EBX: b7aa2000 ECX: 00000002 EDX: b7af8368
[  100.868961] ESI: b7fbb660 EDI: b7aab000 EBP: bfb6c658 ESP: bfb6c638
[  100.868973]  DS: 007b ES: 007b FS: 0000 GS: 0033 SS: 007b

Signed-off-by: Vincent Pelletier <plr.vincent@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Felipe Balbi <felipe.balbi@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
dm0- pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Sep 5, 2018
[ Upstream commit 56bc615 ]

The change protects almost the whole body of u_audio_iso_complete()
function by PCM stream lock, this is mainly sufficient to avoid a race
between USB request completion and stream termination, the change
prevents a possibility of invalid memory access in interrupt context
by memcpy():

    Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address 00004e80
    pgd = c0004000
    [00004e80] *pgd=00000000
    Internal error: Oops: 817 [#1] PREEMPT SMP ARM
    CPU: 0 PID: 3 Comm: ksoftirqd/0 Tainted: G         C   3.14.54+ #117
    task: da180b80 ti: da192000 task.ti: da192000
    PC is at memcpy+0x50/0x330
    LR is at 0xcdd92b0e
    pc : [<c029ef30>]    lr : [<cdd92b0e>]    psr: 20000193
    sp : da193ce4  ip : dd86ae26  fp : 0000b180
    r10: daf81680  r9 : 00000000  r8 : d58a01ea
    r7 : 2c0b43e4  r6 : acdfb08b  r5 : 01a271cf  r4 : 87389377
    r3 : 69469782  r2 : 00000020  r1 : daf82fe0  r0 : 00004e80
    Flags: nzCv  IRQs off  FIQs on  Mode SVC_32  ISA ARM  Segment kernel
    Control: 10c5387d  Table: 2b70804a  DAC: 00000015
    Process ksoftirqd/0 (pid: 3, stack limit = 0xda192238)

Also added a check for potential !runtime condition, commonly it is
done by PCM_RUNTIME_CHECK(substream) in the beginning, however this
does not completely prevent from oopses in u_audio_iso_complete(),
because the proper protection scheme must be implemented in PCM
library functions.

An example of *not fixed* oops due to substream->runtime->*
dereference by snd_pcm_running(substream) from
snd_pcm_period_elapsed(), where substream->runtime is gone while
waiting the substream lock:

    Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address 6b6b6b6b
    pgd = db7e4000
    [6b6b6b6b] *pgd=00000000
    CPU: 0 PID: 193 Comm: klogd Tainted: G         C   3.14.54+ #118
    task: db5ac500 ti: db60c000 task.ti: db60c000
    PC is at snd_pcm_period_elapsed+0x48/0xd8 [snd_pcm]
    LR is at snd_pcm_period_elapsed+0x40/0xd8 [snd_pcm]
    pc : [<>]    lr : [<>]    psr: 60000193
    Flags: nZCv  IRQs off  FIQs on  Mode SVC_32  ISA ARM  Segment user
    Control: 10c5387d  Table: 2b7e404a  DAC: 00000015
    Process klogd (pid: 193, stack limit = 0xdb60c238)
    [<>] (snd_pcm_period_elapsed [snd_pcm]) from [<>] (udc_irq+0x500/0xbbc)
    [<>] (udc_irq) from [<>] (ci_irq+0x280/0x304)
    [<>] (ci_irq) from [<>] (handle_irq_event_percpu+0xa4/0x40c)
    [<>] (handle_irq_event_percpu) from [<>] (handle_irq_event+0x3c/0x5c)
    [<>] (handle_irq_event) from [<>] (handle_fasteoi_irq+0xc4/0x110)
    [<>] (handle_fasteoi_irq) from [<>] (generic_handle_irq+0x20/0x30)
    [<>] (generic_handle_irq) from [<>] (handle_IRQ+0x80/0xc0)
    [<>] (handle_IRQ) from [<>] (gic_handle_irq+0x3c/0x60)
    [<>] (gic_handle_irq) from [<>] (__irq_svc+0x44/0x78)

Signed-off-by: Vladimir Zapolskiy <vladimir_zapolskiy@mentor.com>
[erosca: W/o this patch, with minimal instrumentation [1], I can
         consistently reproduce BUG: KASAN: use-after-free [2]]

[1] Instrumentation to reproduce issue [2]:
#  diff --git a/drivers/usb/gadget/function/u_audio.c b/drivers/usb/gadget/function/u_audio.c
#  index a72295c953bb..bd0b308024fe 100644
#  --- a/drivers/usb/gadget/function/u_audio.c
#  +++ b/drivers/usb/gadget/function/u_audio.c
#  @@ -16,6 +16,7 @@
#   #include <sound/core.h>
#   #include <sound/pcm.h>
#   #include <sound/pcm_params.h>
#  +#include <linux/delay.h>
# 
#   #include "u_audio.h"
# 
#  @@ -147,6 +148,8 @@ static void u_audio_iso_complete(struct usb_ep *ep, struct usb_request *req)
# 
# 	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&prm->lock, flags);
# 
#  +	udelay(500); //delay here to increase probability of parallel activities
#  +
# 	/* Pack USB load in ALSA ring buffer */
# 	pending = prm->dma_bytes - hw_ptr;

[2] After applying [1], below BUG occurs on Rcar-H3-Salvator-X board:
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in u_audio_iso_complete+0x24c/0x520 [u_audio]
Read of size 8 at addr ffff8006cafcc248 by task swapper/0/0

CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/0 Tainted: G        WC      4.14.47+ #160
Hardware name: Renesas Salvator-X board based on r8a7795 ES2.0+ (DT)
Call trace:
[<ffff2000080925ac>] dump_backtrace+0x0/0x364
[<ffff200008092924>] show_stack+0x14/0x1c
[<ffff200008f8dbcc>] dump_stack+0x108/0x174
[<ffff2000083c71b8>] print_address_description+0x7c/0x32c
[<ffff2000083c78e8>] kasan_report+0x324/0x354
[<ffff2000083c6114>] __asan_load8+0x24/0x94
[<ffff2000021d1b34>] u_audio_iso_complete+0x24c/0x520 [u_audio]
[<ffff20000152fe50>] usb_gadget_giveback_request+0x480/0x4d0 [udc_core]
[<ffff200001860ab8>] usbhsg_queue_done+0x100/0x130 [renesas_usbhs]
[<ffff20000185f814>] usbhsf_pkt_handler+0x1a4/0x298 [renesas_usbhs]
[<ffff20000185fb38>] usbhsf_irq_ready+0x128/0x178 [renesas_usbhs]
[<ffff200001859cc8>] usbhs_interrupt+0x440/0x490 [renesas_usbhs]
[<ffff2000081a0288>] __handle_irq_event_percpu+0x594/0xa58
[<ffff2000081a07d0>] handle_irq_event_percpu+0x84/0x12c
[<ffff2000081a0928>] handle_irq_event+0xb0/0x10c
[<ffff2000081a8384>] handle_fasteoi_irq+0x1e0/0x2ec
[<ffff20000819e5f8>] generic_handle_irq+0x2c/0x44
[<ffff20000819f0d0>] __handle_domain_irq+0x190/0x194
[<ffff20000808177c>] gic_handle_irq+0x80/0xac
Exception stack(0xffff200009e97c80 to 0xffff200009e97dc0)
7c80: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000003 ffff200008179298
7ca0: ffff20000ae1c180 dfff200000000000 0000000000000000 ffff2000081f9a88
7cc0: ffff200009eb5960 ffff200009e97cf0 0000000000001600 ffff0400041b064b
7ce0: 0000000000000000 0000000000000002 0000000200000001 0000000000000001
7d00: ffff20000842197c 0000ffff958c4970 0000000000000000 ffff8006da0d5b80
7d20: ffff8006d4678498 0000000000000000 000000126bde0a8b ffff8006d4678480
7d40: 0000000000000000 000000126bdbea64 ffff200008fd0000 ffff8006fffff980
7d60: 00000000495f0018 ffff200009e97dc0 ffff200008b6c4ec ffff200009e97dc0
7d80: ffff200008b6c4f0 0000000020000145 ffff8006da0d5b80 ffff8006d4678498
7da0: ffffffffffffffff ffff8006d4678498 ffff200009e97dc0 ffff200008b6c4f0
[<ffff200008084034>] el1_irq+0xb4/0x12c
[<ffff200008b6c4f0>] cpuidle_enter_state+0x818/0x844
[<ffff200008b6c59c>] cpuidle_enter+0x18/0x20
[<ffff20000815f2e4>] call_cpuidle+0x98/0x9c
[<ffff20000815f674>] do_idle+0x214/0x264
[<ffff20000815facc>] cpu_startup_entry+0x20/0x24
[<ffff200008fb09d8>] rest_init+0x30c/0x320
[<ffff2000095f1338>] start_kernel+0x570/0x5b0
---<-snip->---

Fixes: 132fcb4 ("usb: gadget: Add Audio Class 2.0 Driver")
Signed-off-by: Eugeniu Rosca <erosca@de.adit-jv.com>
Signed-off-by: Felipe Balbi <felipe.balbi@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
dm0- pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Feb 12, 2019
[ Upstream commit c8101f7 ]

Creating a macvtap on a DSA-backed interface results in the following
splat when lockdep is enabled:

[   19.638080] IPv6: ADDRCONF(NETDEV_CHANGE): lan0: link becomes ready
[   23.041198] device lan0 entered promiscuous mode
[   23.043445] device eth0 entered promiscuous mode
[   23.049255]
[   23.049557] ============================================
[   23.055021] WARNING: possible recursive locking detected
[   23.060490] 5.0.0-rc3-00013-g56c857a1b8d3 #118 Not tainted
[   23.066132] --------------------------------------------
[   23.071598] ip/2861 is trying to acquire lock:
[   23.076171] 00000000f61990cb (_xmit_ETHER){+...}, at: dev_set_rx_mode+0x1c/0x38
[   23.083693]
[   23.083693] but task is already holding lock:
[   23.089696] 00000000ecf0c3b4 (_xmit_ETHER){+...}, at: dev_uc_add+0x24/0x70
[   23.096774]
[   23.096774] other info that might help us debug this:
[   23.103494]  Possible unsafe locking scenario:
[   23.103494]
[   23.109584]        CPU0
[   23.112093]        ----
[   23.114601]   lock(_xmit_ETHER);
[   23.117917]   lock(_xmit_ETHER);
[   23.121233]
[   23.121233]  *** DEADLOCK ***
[   23.121233]
[   23.127325]  May be due to missing lock nesting notation
[   23.127325]
[   23.134315] 2 locks held by ip/2861:
[   23.137987]  #0: 000000003b766c72 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}, at: rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x338/0x4e0
[   23.146231]  #1: 00000000ecf0c3b4 (_xmit_ETHER){+...}, at: dev_uc_add+0x24/0x70
[   23.153757]
[   23.153757] stack backtrace:
[   23.158243] CPU: 0 PID: 2861 Comm: ip Not tainted 5.0.0-rc3-00013-g56c857a1b8d3 #118
[   23.166212] Hardware name: Globalscale Marvell ESPRESSOBin Board (DT)
[   23.172843] Call trace:
[   23.175358]  dump_backtrace+0x0/0x188
[   23.179116]  show_stack+0x14/0x20
[   23.182524]  dump_stack+0xb4/0xec
[   23.185928]  __lock_acquire+0x123c/0x1860
[   23.190048]  lock_acquire+0xc8/0x248
[   23.193724]  _raw_spin_lock_bh+0x40/0x58
[   23.197755]  dev_set_rx_mode+0x1c/0x38
[   23.201607]  dev_set_promiscuity+0x3c/0x50
[   23.205820]  dsa_slave_change_rx_flags+0x5c/0x70
[   23.210567]  __dev_set_promiscuity+0x148/0x1e0
[   23.215136]  __dev_set_rx_mode+0x74/0x98
[   23.219167]  dev_uc_add+0x54/0x70
[   23.222575]  macvlan_open+0x170/0x1d0
[   23.226336]  __dev_open+0xe0/0x160
[   23.229830]  __dev_change_flags+0x16c/0x1b8
[   23.234132]  dev_change_flags+0x20/0x60
[   23.238074]  do_setlink+0x2d0/0xc50
[   23.241658]  __rtnl_newlink+0x5f8/0x6e8
[   23.245601]  rtnl_newlink+0x50/0x78
[   23.249184]  rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x360/0x4e0
[   23.253397]  netlink_rcv_skb+0xe8/0x130
[   23.257338]  rtnetlink_rcv+0x14/0x20
[   23.261012]  netlink_unicast+0x190/0x210
[   23.265043]  netlink_sendmsg+0x288/0x350
[   23.269075]  sock_sendmsg+0x18/0x30
[   23.272659]  ___sys_sendmsg+0x29c/0x2c8
[   23.276602]  __sys_sendmsg+0x60/0xb8
[   23.280276]  __arm64_sys_sendmsg+0x1c/0x28
[   23.284488]  el0_svc_common+0xd8/0x138
[   23.288340]  el0_svc_handler+0x24/0x80
[   23.292192]  el0_svc+0x8/0xc

This looks fairly harmless (no actual deadlock occurs), and is
fixed in a similar way to c6894de ("bridge: fix lockdep
addr_list_lock false positive splat") by putting the addr_list_lock
in its own lockdep class.

Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Florian Fainelli <f.fainelli@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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