In this repository you can find semgrep rules that look for patterns of vulnerabilities in smart contracts based on actual DeFi exploits.
Currently semgrep supports Solidity in experimental
mode. Some of the rules may not work until Solidity is in beta
at least.
semgrep + smart-contract-sanctuary = ❤️
$ semgrep --config solidity ~/smart-contract-sanctuary-arbitrum/contracts/mainnet
Each rule is accompanied by an actual vulnerable source code that was targeted by an exploit. Vulnerable lines are marked with // ruleid: ...
In case a rule is not yet supported by semgrep, you will find // todoruleid: ...
Run tests:
$ semgrep --test solidity
Validate rules:
$ semgrep --validate --config solidity
Rule ID | Targets | Description |
---|---|---|
compound-borrowfresh-reentrancy | Compound, Ola Finance, Hundred Finance, Agave | Function borrowFresh() in Compound performs state update after doTransferOut() |
compound-sweeptoken-not-restricted | TUSD, Compound | Function sweepToken is allowed to be called by anyone |
erc20-public-transfer | Creat Future | Custom ERC20 implementation exposes _transfer() as public |
erc20-public-burn | HospoWise | Anyone can burn tokens of other accounts |
erc677-reentrancy | Ola Finance | ERC677 callAfterTransfer() reentrancy |
erc777-reentrancy | Bacon Protocol | ERC777 tokensReceived() reentrancy |
erc721-reentrancy | Hype Bears | ERC721 onERC721Received() reentrancy |
erc721-arbitrary-transferfrom | Distortion Genesis | Custom ERC721 implementation lacks access control checks in _transfer() |
gearbox-tokens-path-confusion | Gearbox | UniswapV3 adapter implemented incorrect extraction of path parameters |
keeper-network-oracle-manipulation | Inverse Finance | Keep3rV2.current() call has high data freshness, but it has low security, an exploiter simply needs to manipulate 2 data points to be able to impact the feed. |
basic-oracle-manipulation | Onering Finance, Deus Finance | getSharePrice() can be manipulated via flashloan |
redacted-cartel-custom-approval-bug | Redacted Cartel | transferFrom() can steal allowance of other accounts |
rigoblock-missing-access-control | RigoBlock | setMultipleAllowances() is missing onlyOwner modifier |
oracle-price-update-not-restricted | Rikkei Finance, Aave | Oracle price data can be submitted by anyone |
superfluid-ctx-injection | Superfluid | A specially crafted calldata may be used to impersonate other accounts |
tecra-coin-burnfrom-bug | Tecra Coin | Parameter "from" is checked at incorrect position in "_allowances" mapping |
arbitrary-low-level-call | Auctus Options, Starstream Finance, BasketDAO, Li Finance | An attacker may perform call() to an arbitrary address with controlled calldata |
sense-missing-oracle-access-control | Sense Finance | Oracle update is not restricted in onSwap(), rule by Arbaz Kiraak |
proxy-storage-collision | Audius | Proxy declares a state var that may override a storage slot of the implementation |
uniswap-callback-not-protected | Generic | Uniswap callback is not protected |
BETA: basic-arithmetic-underflow | Umbrella Network, Remittance Token | Possible arithmetic underflow |
I haven't come up with rules for the following incidents:
- Fantasm (description, contract)
- Paraluni (description, contract)
- Flurry Finance (description, contract)