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Currently in Intel SST driver, some similar IPC/mailbox processing code are used in different platforms (e.g. in baytrail/broadwell). This patch extracts the common code and creates new files (sst-ipc.c/sst-ipc.h) to contain the common code and provide the generic APIs for IPC/mailbox processing. Signed-off-by: Jin Yao <yao.jin@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Jie Yang <yang.jie@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Use the generic IPC/mailbox APIs to replace the original processing code for Baytrail platform. Signed-off-by: Jin Yao <yao.jin@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Jie Yang <yang.jie@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Use the generic IPC/mailbox APIs to replace the original processing code for Broadwell platform. Signed-off-by: Jin Yao <yao.jin@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Jie Yang <yang.jie@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
The returned value of 'get/seq client pool' operation has zeroed value for its client ID, against requested client ID. This commit fix the bug by filling it with index value of referred client object. Signed-off-by: Takashi Sakamoto <o-takashi@sakamocchi.jp> Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
This model uses the same dock port as the previous generation. Signed-off-by: Yves-Alexis Perez <corsac@debian.org> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
When the dock on an E-mu 1010 card is disconnected, all outputs get muted by the hardware. Add logic to detect a disconnect and unmute. Signed-off-by: Michael Gernoth <michael@gernoth.net> Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
…event When event originator doesn't set numerical ID in identical information, the event data includes no numerical ID, thus userspace applications cannot identify the control just by unique ID in event data. This commit fix this bug so as the event data includes all of identical information. Signed-off-by: Takashi Sakamoto <o-takashi@sakamocchi.jp> Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
…tion for userspace controls In operations of SNDRV_CTL_IOCTL_ELEM_INFO, identical information in returned value is cleared. This is not better to userspace application. This commit confirms to return full identical information to the operations. Signed-off-by: Takashi Sakamoto <o-takashi@sakamocchi.jp> Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
…rspace elements currently some members related identical information are not fiiled in returned parameter of SNDRV_CTL_IOCTL_ELEM_ADD. This is not better for userspace application. This commit copies information to returned value. When failing to copy into userspace, the added elements are going to be removed. Then, no applications can lock these elements between adding and removing because these are already locked. Signed-off-by: Takashi Sakamoto <o-takashi@sakamocchi.jp> Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
The optical ports on the E-mu 1010 (and dock) can be configured for ADAT- or S/PDIF-mode, which is currently hardcoded to ADAT. Add two mixer elements to expose this setting. Tested on an E-mu 1010 PCIe with connected Micro Dock. Signed-off-by: Michael Gernoth <michael@gernoth.net> Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
The r-car sound driver only works when CONFIG_OF is set, and after a recent change has a compile-time dependency as well: sound/built-in.o: In function `rsnd_dma_request_channel': :(.text+0x9fb84): undefined reference to `of_dma_request_slave_channel' This could be fixed either by adding a static inline wrapper for the function, or by adding a Kconfig dependency. This implements the second approach, which seems appropriate because the driver in fact has a hard dependency. Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Fixes: 72adc61 ("ASoC: rsnd: 1st DMAC dma-names cares subnode") Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
it's actually shorter that way *and* later we'll want iocb in scope of generic_write_check() caller. Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Way, way back kiocb used to be picked from arrays, so ioctx_alloc() checked for multiplication overflow when calculating the size of such array. By the time fs/aio.c went into the tree (in 2002) they were already allocated one-by-one by kmem_cache_alloc(), so that check had already become pointless. Let's bury it... Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
We check if ->ki_pos is positive. However, by that point we have already done rw_verify_area(), which would have rejected such unless the file had been one of /dev/mem, /dev/kmem and /proc/kcore. All of which do not have vectored rw methods, so we would've bailed out even earlier. This check had been introduced before rw_verify_area() had been added there - in fact, it was a subset of checks done on sync paths by rw_verify_area() (back then the /dev/mem exception didn't exist at all). The rest of checks (mandatory locking, etc.) hadn't been added until later. Unfortunately, by the time the call of rw_verify_area() got added, the /dev/mem exception had already appeared, so it wasn't obvious that the older explicit check downstream had become dead code. It *is* a dead code, though, since the few files for which the exception applies do not have ->aio_{read,write}() or ->{read,write}_iter() and for them we won't reach that check anyway. What's more, even if we ever introduce vectored methods for /dev/mem and friends, they'll have to cope with negative positions anyway, since readv(2) and writev(2) are using the same checks as read(2) and write(2) - i.e. rw_verify_area(). Let's bury it. Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
it's not calling ->write() directly anymore. Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
... instead of open-coding the call of ->read() Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
... and have get_user_pages_fast() mapping fewer pages than requested to generate a short read/write. Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
... and make it loop until it's done Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Don't mess with kmap() - just use ITER_BVEC. Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
just handle it in ->direct_IO() Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
... and make it loop Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
do it in ->direct_IO()... Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
it's almost always equal to current_fsuid(), but there's an exception - if the first writeback fid is opened by non-root *and* that happens before root has done any lookups in /, we end up doing attach for root. The current code leaves the resulting FID owned by root from the server POV and by non-root from the client one. Unfortunately, it means that e.g. massive dcache eviction will leave that user buggered - they'll end up redoing walks from / *and* picking that FID every time. As soon as they try to create something, the things will get nasty. Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
This email address isn't working anymore Signed-off-by: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
The macro BITMAP_LAST_WORD_MASK can be implemented without a conditional, which will generally lead to slightly better generated code (221 bytes saved for allmodconfig-GCOV_KERNEL, ~2k with GCOV_KERNEL). As a small bonus, this also ensures that the nbits parameter is expanded exactly once. In BITMAP_FIRST_WORD_MASK, if start is signed gcc is technically allowed to assume it is positive (or divisible by BITS_PER_LONG), and hence just do the simple mask. It doesn't seem to use this, and even on an architecture like x86 where the shift only depends on the lower 5 or 6 bits, and these bits are not affected by the signedness of the expression, gcc still generates code to compute the C99 mandated value of start % BITS_PER_LONG. So just use a mask explicitly, also for consistency with BITMAP_LAST_WORD_MASK. Signed-off-by: Rasmus Villemoes <linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk> Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: George Spelvin <linux@horizon.com> Cc: Yury Norov <yury.norov@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
The seq_printf return value, because it's frequently misused, will eventually be converted to void. See: commit 1f33c41 ("seq_file: Rename seq_overflow() to seq_has_overflowed() and make public") Signed-off-by: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
The seq_printf return value, because it's frequently misused, will eventually be converted to void. See: commit 1f33c41 ("seq_file: Rename seq_overflow() to seq_has_overflowed() and make public") Signed-off-by: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com> Cc: "Rafael J. Wysocki" <rjw@rjwysocki.net> Cc: Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz> Cc: Len Brown <len.brown@intel.com> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
The seq_printf return value, because it's frequently misused, will eventually be converted to void. See: commit 1f33c41 ("seq_file: Rename seq_overflow() to seq_has_overflowed() and make public") Signed-off-by: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
The seq_printf return value, because it's frequently misused, will eventually be converted to void. See: commit 1f33c41 ("seq_file: Rename seq_overflow() to seq_has_overflowed() and make public") Signed-off-by: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
The seq_printf return value, because it's frequently misused, will eventually be converted to void. See: commit 1f33c41 ("seq_file: Rename seq_overflow() to seq_has_overflowed() and make public") Signed-off-by: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com> Acked-by: Michal Simek <monstr@monstr.eu> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
The seq_printf return value, because it's frequently misused, will eventually be converted to void. See: commit 1f33c41 ("seq_file: Rename seq_overflow() to seq_has_overflowed() and make public") Signed-off-by: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com> Cc: Ley Foon Tan <lftan@altera.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
The seq_printf return value, because it's frequently misused, (as it is here, it doesn't return # of chars emitted) will eventually be converted to void. See: commit 1f33c41 ("seq_file: Rename seq_overflow() to seq_has_overflowed() and make public") Signed-off-by: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com> Cc: Russell King <linux@arm.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
The seq_printf return value, because it's frequently misused, will eventually be converted to void. See: commit 1f33c41 ("seq_file: Rename seq_overflow() to seq_has_overflowed() and make public") Signed-off-by: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com> Cc: Jonas Bonn <jonas@southpole.se> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
The seq_printf return value, because it's frequently misused, will eventually be converted to void. See: commit 1f33c41 ("seq_file: Rename seq_overflow() to seq_has_overflowed() and make public") Signed-off-by: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com> Acked-by: Jesper Nilsson <jesper.nilsson@axis.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
The seq_printf return value, because it's frequently misused, will eventually be converted to void. See: commit 1f33c41 ("seq_file: Rename seq_overflow() to seq_has_overflowed() and make public") Miscellanea: o Coalesce formats, realign arguments Signed-off-by: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com> Cc: Mikael Starvik <starvik@axis.com> Cc: Jesper Nilsson <jesper.nilsson@axis.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
The seq_printf return value, because it's frequently misused, will eventually be converted to void. See: commit 1f33c41 ("seq_file: Rename seq_overflow() to seq_has_overflowed() and make public") Signed-off-by: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com> Acked-by: Sebastian Ott <sebott@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Gerald Schaefer <gerald.schaefer@de.ibm.com> Cc: Peter Oberparleiter <oberpar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com> Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
The seq_printf return value, because it's frequently misused, will eventually be converted to void. See: commit 1f33c41 ("seq_file: Rename seq_overflow() to seq_has_overflowed() and make public") Signed-off-by: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
The seq_printf return value, because it's frequently misused, will eventually be converted to void. See: commit 1f33c41 ("seq_file: Rename seq_overflow() to seq_has_overflowed() and make public") Signed-off-by: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com> Acked-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
The seq_printf return value, because it's frequently misused, will eventually be converted to void. See: commit 1f33c41 ("seq_file: Rename seq_overflow() to seq_has_overflowed() and make public") Miscellanea: o Remove unused return value from trace_lookup_stack Signed-off-by: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com> Acked-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
The seq_printf return value, because it's frequently misused, will eventually be converted to void. See: commit 1f33c41 ("seq_file: Rename seq_overflow() to seq_has_overflowed() and make public") Signed-off-by: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com> Cc: Lars Ellenberg <drbd-dev@lists.linbit.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
The seq_printf return value, because it's frequently misused, will eventually be converted to void. See: commit 1f33c41 ("seq_file: Rename seq_overflow() to seq_has_overflowed() and make public") Signed-off-by: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com> Cc: "James E.J. Bottomley" <jejb@parisc-linux.org> Cc: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Merge second patchbomb from Andrew Morton: - the rest of MM - various misc bits - add ability to run /sbin/reboot at reboot time - printk/vsprintf changes - fiddle with seq_printf() return value * akpm: (114 commits) parisc: remove use of seq_printf return value lru_cache: remove use of seq_printf return value tracing: remove use of seq_printf return value cgroup: remove use of seq_printf return value proc: remove use of seq_printf return value s390: remove use of seq_printf return value cris fasttimer: remove use of seq_printf return value cris: remove use of seq_printf return value openrisc: remove use of seq_printf return value ARM: plat-pxa: remove use of seq_printf return value nios2: cpuinfo: remove use of seq_printf return value microblaze: mb: remove use of seq_printf return value ipc: remove use of seq_printf return value rtc: remove use of seq_printf return value power: wakeup: remove use of seq_printf return value x86: mtrr: if: remove use of seq_printf return value linux/bitmap.h: improve BITMAP_{LAST,FIRST}_WORD_MASK MAINTAINERS: CREDITS: remove Stefano Brivio from B43 .mailmap: add Ricardo Ribalda CREDITS: add Ricardo Ribalda Delgado ...
Commit 9c521a2 ("crypto: api - remove instance when test failed") tried to grab a module reference count before the module was even set. Worse, it then goes on to free the module reference count after it is set so you quickly end up with a negative module reference count which prevents people from using any instances belonging to that module. This patch moves the module initialisation before the reference count. Reported-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
dabrace
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This commit amends my old commit fe35637 ("[media] dvb_frontend: eliminate blocking wait in dvb_unregister_frontend()"), which added kref to struct dvb_frontend_private. It turned out that there are several use-after-free bugs left, which affect the struct dvb_frontend. Protecting it with kref also protects struct dvb_frontend_private, so we can simply move it. This is how the use-after-free looks like in KASAN: BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in string+0x60/0xb1 at addr ffff880033bd9fc0 Read of size 1 by task kworker/0:2/617 CPU: 0 PID: 617 Comm: kworker/0:2 Not tainted 4.8.0-rc1-hosting+ #60 Hardware name: Bochs Bochs, BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011 Workqueue: usb_hub_wq hub_event 0000000000000000 ffff880033757218 ffffffff81394e50 ffff880033bd9fd0 ffff880035c03b00 ffff880033757240 ffffffff811f271d ffff880033bd9fc0 1ffff1000677b3f8 ffffed000677b3f8 ffff8800337572b8 ffffffff811f2afe Call Trace: [...] [<ffffffff813a2d2f>] vsnprintf+0x39d/0x7e9 [<ffffffff813993f9>] add_uevent_var+0x10f/0x1dc [<ffffffff814fe5ca>] rc_dev_uevent+0x55/0x6f [<ffffffff814438f8>] dev_uevent+0x2e1/0x316 [<ffffffff81399744>] kobject_uevent_env+0x27e/0x701 [<ffffffff81399bd2>] kobject_uevent+0xb/0xd [<ffffffff81443445>] device_del+0x322/0x383 [<ffffffff81500c0c>] rc_unregister_device+0x98/0xc3 [<ffffffff81508fb4>] dvb_usb_remote_exit+0x7a/0x90 [<ffffffff81506157>] dvb_usb_exit+0x1d/0xe5 [<ffffffff81506e90>] dvb_usb_device_exit+0x69/0x7d [<ffffffff8150a181>] pctv452e_usb_disconnect+0x7b/0x80 [...] Object at ffff880033bd9fc0, in cache kmalloc-16 size: 16 Allocated: [...] Freed: PID = 617 [...] [<ffffffff811f034c>] kfree+0xd9/0x166 [<ffffffff814fe513>] ir_free_table+0x2f/0x51 [<ffffffff81500bc1>] rc_unregister_device+0x4d/0xc3 [<ffffffff81508fb4>] dvb_usb_remote_exit+0x7a/0x90 [<ffffffff81506157>] dvb_usb_exit+0x1d/0xe5 [<ffffffff81506e90>] dvb_usb_device_exit+0x69/0x7d [<ffffffff8150a181>] pctv452e_usb_disconnect+0x7b/0x80 Another one: BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in do_sys_poll+0x336/0x6b8 at addr ffff88003563fcc0 Read of size 8 by task tuner on fronte/1042 CPU: 1 PID: 1042 Comm: tuner on fronte Tainted: G B 4.8.0-rc1-hosting+ #60 Hardware name: Bochs Bochs, BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011 0000000000000000 ffff88003353f910 ffffffff81394e50 ffff88003563fd80 ffff880035c03200 ffff88003353f938 ffffffff811f271d ffff88003563fc80 1ffff10006ac7f98 ffffed0006ac7f98 ffff88003353f9b0 ffffffff811f2afe Call Trace: [...] [<ffffffff812289b3>] do_sys_poll+0x336/0x6b8 [...] [<ffffffff81228ed9>] SyS_poll+0xa9/0x194 [...] Object at ffff88003563fc80, in cache kmalloc-256 size: 256 Allocated: [...] Freed: PID = 617 [...] [<ffffffff811f034c>] kfree+0xd9/0x166 [<ffffffff814eb60d>] dvb_unregister_device+0xd6/0xe5 [<ffffffff814fa4ed>] dvb_unregister_frontend+0x4b/0x66 [<ffffffff8150810b>] dvb_usb_adapter_frontend_exit+0x69/0xac [<ffffffff8150617d>] dvb_usb_exit+0x43/0xe5 [<ffffffff81506e90>] dvb_usb_device_exit+0x69/0x7d [<ffffffff8150a181>] pctv452e_usb_disconnect+0x7b/0x80 Signed-off-by: Max Kellermann <max.kellermann@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@s-opensource.com>
dabrace
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Mar 6, 2017
SYN processing really was meant to be handled from BH. When I got rid of BH blocking while processing socket backlog in commit 5413d1b ("net: do not block BH while processing socket backlog"), I forgot that a malicious user could transition to TCP_LISTEN from a state that allowed (SYN) packets to be parked in the socket backlog while socket is owned by the thread doing the listen() call. Sure enough syzkaller found this and reported the bug ;) ================================= [ INFO: inconsistent lock state ] 4.10.0+ #60 Not tainted --------------------------------- inconsistent {IN-SOFTIRQ-W} -> {SOFTIRQ-ON-W} usage. syz-executor0/5090 [HC0[0]:SC0[0]:HE1:SE1] takes: (&(&hashinfo->ehash_locks[i])->rlock){+.?...}, at: [<ffffffff83a6a370>] spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:299 [inline] (&(&hashinfo->ehash_locks[i])->rlock){+.?...}, at: [<ffffffff83a6a370>] inet_ehash_insert+0x240/0xad0 net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c:407 {IN-SOFTIRQ-W} state was registered at: mark_irqflags kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2923 [inline] __lock_acquire+0xbcf/0x3270 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3295 lock_acquire+0x241/0x580 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3753 __raw_spin_lock include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:142 [inline] _raw_spin_lock+0x33/0x50 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:151 spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:299 [inline] inet_ehash_insert+0x240/0xad0 net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c:407 reqsk_queue_hash_req net/ipv4/inet_connection_sock.c:753 [inline] inet_csk_reqsk_queue_hash_add+0x1b7/0x2a0 net/ipv4/inet_connection_sock.c:764 tcp_conn_request+0x25cc/0x3310 net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:6399 tcp_v4_conn_request+0x157/0x220 net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c:1262 tcp_rcv_state_process+0x802/0x4130 net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:5889 tcp_v4_do_rcv+0x56b/0x940 net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c:1433 tcp_v4_rcv+0x2e12/0x3210 net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c:1711 ip_local_deliver_finish+0x4ce/0xc40 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:216 NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:257 [inline] ip_local_deliver+0x1ce/0x710 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:257 dst_input include/net/dst.h:492 [inline] ip_rcv_finish+0xb1d/0x2110 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:396 NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:257 [inline] ip_rcv+0xd90/0x19c0 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:487 __netif_receive_skb_core+0x1ad1/0x3400 net/core/dev.c:4179 __netif_receive_skb+0x2a/0x170 net/core/dev.c:4217 netif_receive_skb_internal+0x1d6/0x430 net/core/dev.c:4245 napi_skb_finish net/core/dev.c:4602 [inline] napi_gro_receive+0x4e6/0x680 net/core/dev.c:4636 e1000_receive_skb drivers/net/ethernet/intel/e1000/e1000_main.c:4033 [inline] e1000_clean_rx_irq+0x5e0/0x1490 drivers/net/ethernet/intel/e1000/e1000_main.c:4489 e1000_clean+0xb9a/0x2910 drivers/net/ethernet/intel/e1000/e1000_main.c:3834 napi_poll net/core/dev.c:5171 [inline] net_rx_action+0xe70/0x1900 net/core/dev.c:5236 __do_softirq+0x2fb/0xb7d kernel/softirq.c:284 invoke_softirq kernel/softirq.c:364 [inline] irq_exit+0x19e/0x1d0 kernel/softirq.c:405 exiting_irq arch/x86/include/asm/apic.h:658 [inline] do_IRQ+0x81/0x1a0 arch/x86/kernel/irq.c:250 ret_from_intr+0x0/0x20 native_safe_halt+0x6/0x10 arch/x86/include/asm/irqflags.h:53 arch_safe_halt arch/x86/include/asm/paravirt.h:98 [inline] default_idle+0x8f/0x410 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:271 arch_cpu_idle+0xa/0x10 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:262 default_idle_call+0x36/0x60 kernel/sched/idle.c:96 cpuidle_idle_call kernel/sched/idle.c:154 [inline] do_idle+0x348/0x440 kernel/sched/idle.c:243 cpu_startup_entry+0x18/0x20 kernel/sched/idle.c:345 start_secondary+0x344/0x440 arch/x86/kernel/smpboot.c:272 verify_cpu+0x0/0xfc irq event stamp: 1741 hardirqs last enabled at (1741): [<ffffffff84d49d77>] __raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:160 [inline] hardirqs last enabled at (1741): [<ffffffff84d49d77>] _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0xf7/0x1a0 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:191 hardirqs last disabled at (1740): [<ffffffff84d4a732>] __raw_spin_lock_irqsave include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:108 [inline] hardirqs last disabled at (1740): [<ffffffff84d4a732>] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0xa2/0x110 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:159 softirqs last enabled at (1738): [<ffffffff84d4deff>] __do_softirq+0x7cf/0xb7d kernel/softirq.c:310 softirqs last disabled at (1571): [<ffffffff84d4b92c>] do_softirq_own_stack+0x1c/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:902 other info that might help us debug this: Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 ---- lock(&(&hashinfo->ehash_locks[i])->rlock); <Interrupt> lock(&(&hashinfo->ehash_locks[i])->rlock); *** DEADLOCK *** 1 lock held by syz-executor0/5090: #0: (sk_lock-AF_INET6){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffff83406b43>] lock_sock include/net/sock.h:1460 [inline] #0: (sk_lock-AF_INET6){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffff83406b43>] sock_setsockopt+0x233/0x1e40 net/core/sock.c:683 stack backtrace: CPU: 1 PID: 5090 Comm: syz-executor0 Not tainted 4.10.0+ #60 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:15 [inline] dump_stack+0x292/0x398 lib/dump_stack.c:51 print_usage_bug+0x3ef/0x450 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2387 valid_state kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2400 [inline] mark_lock_irq kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2602 [inline] mark_lock+0xf30/0x1410 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3065 mark_irqflags kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2941 [inline] __lock_acquire+0x6dc/0x3270 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3295 lock_acquire+0x241/0x580 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3753 __raw_spin_lock include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:142 [inline] _raw_spin_lock+0x33/0x50 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:151 spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:299 [inline] inet_ehash_insert+0x240/0xad0 net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c:407 reqsk_queue_hash_req net/ipv4/inet_connection_sock.c:753 [inline] inet_csk_reqsk_queue_hash_add+0x1b7/0x2a0 net/ipv4/inet_connection_sock.c:764 dccp_v6_conn_request+0xada/0x11b0 net/dccp/ipv6.c:380 dccp_rcv_state_process+0x51e/0x1660 net/dccp/input.c:606 dccp_v6_do_rcv+0x213/0x350 net/dccp/ipv6.c:632 sk_backlog_rcv include/net/sock.h:896 [inline] __release_sock+0x127/0x3a0 net/core/sock.c:2052 release_sock+0xa5/0x2b0 net/core/sock.c:2539 sock_setsockopt+0x60f/0x1e40 net/core/sock.c:1016 SYSC_setsockopt net/socket.c:1782 [inline] SyS_setsockopt+0x2fb/0x3a0 net/socket.c:1765 entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0xc2 RIP: 0033:0x4458b9 RSP: 002b:00007fe8b26c2b58 EFLAGS: 00000292 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000036 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000006 RCX: 00000000004458b9 RDX: 000000000000001a RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: 0000000000000006 RBP: 00000000006e2110 R08: 0000000000000010 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 00000000208c3000 R11: 0000000000000292 R12: 0000000000708000 R13: 0000000020000000 R14: 0000000000001000 R15: 0000000000000000 Fixes: 5413d1b ("net: do not block BH while processing socket backlog") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Acked-by: Soheil Hassas Yeganeh <soheil@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
dabrace
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Mar 10, 2017
quarantine_remove_cache() frees all pending objects that belong to the cache, before we destroy the cache itself. However there are currently two possibilities how it can fail to do so. First, another thread can hold some of the objects from the cache in temp list in quarantine_put(). quarantine_put() has a windows of enabled interrupts, and on_each_cpu() in quarantine_remove_cache() can finish right in that window. These objects will be later freed into the destroyed cache. Then, quarantine_reduce() has the same problem. It grabs a batch of objects from the global quarantine, then unlocks quarantine_lock and then frees the batch. quarantine_remove_cache() can finish while some objects from the cache are still in the local to_free list in quarantine_reduce(). Fix the race with quarantine_put() by disabling interrupts for the whole duration of quarantine_put(). In combination with on_each_cpu() in quarantine_remove_cache() it ensures that quarantine_remove_cache() either sees the objects in the per-cpu list or in the global list. Fix the race with quarantine_reduce() by protecting quarantine_reduce() with srcu critical section and then doing synchronize_srcu() at the end of quarantine_remove_cache(). I've done some assessment of how good synchronize_srcu() works in this case. And on a 4 CPU VM I see that it blocks waiting for pending read critical sections in about 2-3% of cases. Which looks good to me. I suspect that these races are the root cause of some GPFs that I episodically hit. Previously I did not have any explanation for them. BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 00000000000000c8 IP: qlist_free_all+0x2e/0xc0 mm/kasan/quarantine.c:155 PGD 6aeea067 PUD 60ed7067 PMD 0 Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN Dumping ftrace buffer: (ftrace buffer empty) Modules linked in: CPU: 0 PID: 13667 Comm: syz-executor2 Not tainted 4.10.0+ #60 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011 task: ffff88005f948040 task.stack: ffff880069818000 RIP: 0010:qlist_free_all+0x2e/0xc0 mm/kasan/quarantine.c:155 RSP: 0018:ffff88006981f298 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: ffffea0000ffff00 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: ffffea0000ffff1f RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffff88003fffc3e0 RDI: 0000000000000000 RBP: ffff88006981f2c0 R08: ffff88002fed7bd8 R09: 00000001001f000d R10: 00000000001f000d R11: ffff88006981f000 R12: ffff88003fffc3e0 R13: ffff88006981f2d0 R14: ffffffff81877fae R15: 0000000080000000 FS: 00007fb911a2d700(0000) GS:ffff88003ec00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00000000000000c8 CR3: 0000000060ed6000 CR4: 00000000000006f0 Call Trace: quarantine_reduce+0x10e/0x120 mm/kasan/quarantine.c:239 kasan_kmalloc+0xca/0xe0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:590 kasan_slab_alloc+0x12/0x20 mm/kasan/kasan.c:544 slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slab.h:456 [inline] slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:2718 [inline] kmem_cache_alloc_node+0x1d3/0x280 mm/slub.c:2754 __alloc_skb+0x10f/0x770 net/core/skbuff.c:219 alloc_skb include/linux/skbuff.h:932 [inline] _sctp_make_chunk+0x3b/0x260 net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c:1388 sctp_make_data net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c:1420 [inline] sctp_make_datafrag_empty+0x208/0x360 net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c:746 sctp_datamsg_from_user+0x7e8/0x11d0 net/sctp/chunk.c:266 sctp_sendmsg+0x2611/0x3970 net/sctp/socket.c:1962 inet_sendmsg+0x164/0x5b0 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:761 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:633 [inline] sock_sendmsg+0xca/0x110 net/socket.c:643 SYSC_sendto+0x660/0x810 net/socket.c:1685 SyS_sendto+0x40/0x50 net/socket.c:1653 I am not sure about backporting. The bug is quite hard to trigger, I've seen it few times during our massive continuous testing (however, it could be cause of some other episodic stray crashes as it leads to memory corruption...). If it is triggered, the consequences are very bad -- almost definite bad memory corruption. The fix is non trivial and has chances of introducing new bugs. I am also not sure how actively people use KASAN on older releases. [dvyukov@google.com: - sorted includes[ Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170309094028.51088-1-dvyukov@google.com Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170308151532.5070-1-dvyukov@google.com Signed-off-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Acked-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Greg Thelen <gthelen@google.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Sep 5, 2017
CBQ can fail on ->init by wrong nl attributes or simply for missing any, f.e. if it's set as a default qdisc then TCA_OPTIONS (opt) will be NULL when it is activated. The first thing init does is parse opt but it will dereference a null pointer if used as a default qdisc, also since init failure at default qdisc invokes ->reset() which cancels all timers then we'll also dereference two more null pointers (timer->base) as they were never initialized. To reproduce: $ sysctl net.core.default_qdisc=cbq $ ip l set ethX up Crash log of the first null ptr deref: [44727.907454] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at (null) [44727.907600] IP: cbq_init+0x27/0x205 [44727.907676] PGD 59ff4067 [44727.907677] P4D 59ff4067 [44727.907742] PUD 59c70067 [44727.907807] PMD 0 [44727.907873] [44727.907982] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP [44727.908054] Modules linked in: [44727.908126] CPU: 1 PID: 21312 Comm: ip Not tainted 4.13.0-rc6+ #60 [44727.908235] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.7.5-20140531_083030-gandalf 04/01/2014 [44727.908477] task: ffff88005ad42700 task.stack: ffff880037214000 [44727.908672] RIP: 0010:cbq_init+0x27/0x205 [44727.908838] RSP: 0018:ffff8800372175f0 EFLAGS: 00010286 [44727.909018] RAX: ffffffff816c3852 RBX: ffff880058c53800 RCX: 0000000000000000 [44727.909222] RDX: 0000000000000004 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffff8800372175f8 [44727.909427] RBP: ffff880037217650 R08: ffffffff81b0f380 R09: 0000000000000000 [44727.909631] R10: ffff880037217660 R11: 0000000000000020 R12: ffffffff822a44c0 [44727.909835] R13: ffff880058b92000 R14: 00000000ffffffff R15: 0000000000000001 [44727.910040] FS: 00007ff8bc583740(0000) GS:ffff88005d880000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [44727.910339] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [44727.910525] CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 00000000371e5000 CR4: 00000000000406e0 [44727.910731] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [44727.910936] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 [44727.911141] Call Trace: [44727.911291] ? lockdep_init_map+0xb6/0x1ba [44727.911461] ? qdisc_alloc+0x14e/0x187 [44727.911626] qdisc_create_dflt+0x7a/0x94 [44727.911794] ? dev_activate+0x129/0x129 [44727.911959] attach_one_default_qdisc+0x36/0x63 [44727.912132] netdev_for_each_tx_queue+0x3d/0x48 [44727.912305] dev_activate+0x4b/0x129 [44727.912468] __dev_open+0xe7/0x104 [44727.912631] __dev_change_flags+0xc6/0x15c [44727.912799] dev_change_flags+0x25/0x59 [44727.912966] do_setlink+0x30c/0xb3f [44727.913129] ? check_chain_key+0xb0/0xfd [44727.913294] ? check_chain_key+0xb0/0xfd [44727.913463] rtnl_newlink+0x3a4/0x729 [44727.913626] ? rtnl_newlink+0x117/0x729 [44727.913801] ? ns_capable_common+0xd/0xb1 [44727.913968] ? ns_capable+0x13/0x15 [44727.914131] rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x188/0x197 [44727.914300] ? rcu_read_unlock+0x3e/0x5f [44727.914465] ? rtnl_newlink+0x729/0x729 [44727.914630] netlink_rcv_skb+0x6c/0xce [44727.914796] rtnetlink_rcv+0x23/0x2a [44727.914956] netlink_unicast+0x103/0x181 [44727.915122] netlink_sendmsg+0x326/0x337 [44727.915291] sock_sendmsg_nosec+0x14/0x3f [44727.915459] sock_sendmsg+0x29/0x2e [44727.915619] ___sys_sendmsg+0x209/0x28b [44727.915784] ? do_raw_spin_unlock+0xcd/0xf8 [44727.915954] ? _raw_spin_unlock+0x27/0x31 [44727.916121] ? __handle_mm_fault+0x651/0xdb1 [44727.916290] ? check_chain_key+0xb0/0xfd [44727.916461] __sys_sendmsg+0x45/0x63 [44727.916626] ? __sys_sendmsg+0x45/0x63 [44727.916792] SyS_sendmsg+0x19/0x1b [44727.916950] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x23/0xc2 [44727.917125] RIP: 0033:0x7ff8bbc96690 [44727.917286] RSP: 002b:00007ffc360991e8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e [44727.917579] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: ffffffff810d278c RCX: 00007ff8bbc96690 [44727.917783] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00007ffc36099230 RDI: 0000000000000003 [44727.917987] RBP: ffff880037217f98 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000003 [44727.918190] R10: 00007ffc36098fb0 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000006 [44727.918393] R13: 000000000066f1a0 R14: 00007ffc360a12e0 R15: 0000000000000000 [44727.918597] ? trace_hardirqs_off_caller+0xa7/0xcf [44727.918774] Code: 41 5f 5d c3 66 66 66 66 90 55 48 8d 56 04 45 31 c9 49 c7 c0 80 f3 b0 81 48 89 e5 41 55 41 54 53 48 89 fb 48 8d 7d a8 48 83 ec 48 <0f> b7 0e be 07 00 00 00 83 e9 04 e8 e6 f7 d8 ff 85 c0 0f 88 bb [44727.919332] RIP: cbq_init+0x27/0x205 RSP: ffff8800372175f0 [44727.919516] CR2: 0000000000000000 Fixes: 0fbbeb1 ("[PKT_SCHED]: Fix missing qdisc_destroy() in qdisc_create_dflt()") Signed-off-by: Nikolay Aleksandrov <nikolay@cumulusnetworks.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
dabrace
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May 29, 2018
commit 8fb472c ("ipmr: improve hash scalability") added a call to rhltable_init() without checking its return value. This problem was then later copied to IPv6 and factorized in commit 0bbbf0e ("ipmr, ip6mr: Unite creation of new mr_table") kasan: CONFIG_KASAN_INLINE enabled kasan: GPF could be caused by NULL-ptr deref or user memory access general protection fault: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN Dumping ftrace buffer: (ftrace buffer empty) Modules linked in: CPU: 1 PID: 31552 Comm: syz-executor7 Not tainted 4.17.0-rc5+ #60 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 RIP: 0010:rht_key_hashfn include/linux/rhashtable.h:277 [inline] RIP: 0010:__rhashtable_lookup include/linux/rhashtable.h:630 [inline] RIP: 0010:rhltable_lookup include/linux/rhashtable.h:716 [inline] RIP: 0010:mr_mfc_find_parent+0x2ad/0xbb0 net/ipv4/ipmr_base.c:63 RSP: 0018:ffff8801826aef70 EFLAGS: 00010203 RAX: 0000000000000001 RBX: 0000000000000001 RCX: ffffc90001ea0000 RDX: 0000000000000079 RSI: ffffffff8661e859 RDI: 000000000000000c RBP: ffff8801826af1c0 R08: ffff8801b2212000 R09: ffffed003b5e46c2 R10: ffffed003b5e46c2 R11: ffff8801daf23613 R12: dffffc0000000000 R13: ffff8801826af198 R14: ffff8801cf8225c0 R15: ffff8801826af658 FS: 00007ff7fa732700(0000) GS:ffff8801daf00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00000003ffffff9c CR3: 00000001b0210000 CR4: 00000000001406e0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: ip6mr_cache_find_parent net/ipv6/ip6mr.c:981 [inline] ip6mr_mfc_delete+0x1fe/0x6b0 net/ipv6/ip6mr.c:1221 ip6_mroute_setsockopt+0x15c6/0x1d70 net/ipv6/ip6mr.c:1698 do_ipv6_setsockopt.isra.9+0x422/0x4660 net/ipv6/ipv6_sockglue.c:163 ipv6_setsockopt+0xbd/0x170 net/ipv6/ipv6_sockglue.c:922 rawv6_setsockopt+0x59/0x140 net/ipv6/raw.c:1060 sock_common_setsockopt+0x9a/0xe0 net/core/sock.c:3039 __sys_setsockopt+0x1bd/0x390 net/socket.c:1903 __do_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:1914 [inline] __se_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:1911 [inline] __x64_sys_setsockopt+0xbe/0x150 net/socket.c:1911 do_syscall_64+0x1b1/0x800 arch/x86/entry/common.c:287 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe Fixes: 8fb472c ("ipmr: improve hash scalability") Fixes: 0bbbf0e ("ipmr, ip6mr: Unite creation of new mr_table") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Nikolay Aleksandrov <nikolay@cumulusnetworks.com> Cc: Yuval Mintz <yuvalm@mellanox.com> Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Acked-by: Nikolay Aleksandrov <nikolay@cumulusnetworks.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
dabrace
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Feb 8, 2019
Since mISDN_close() uses dev->pending to iterate over active timers, there is a chance that one timer got removed from the ->pending list in dev_expire_timer() but that the thread has not called yet wake_up_interruptible() So mISDN_close() could miss this and free dev before completion of at least one dev_expire_timer() syzbot was able to catch this race : BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in register_lock_class+0x140c/0x1bf0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:827 Write of size 8 at addr ffff88809fc18948 by task syz-executor1/24769 CPU: 1 PID: 24769 Comm: syz-executor1 Not tainted 5.0.0-rc5 #60 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Call Trace: <IRQ> __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline] dump_stack+0x172/0x1f0 lib/dump_stack.c:113 print_address_description.cold+0x7c/0x20d mm/kasan/report.c:187 kasan_report.cold+0x1b/0x40 mm/kasan/report.c:317 __asan_report_store8_noabort+0x17/0x20 mm/kasan/generic_report.c:140 register_lock_class+0x140c/0x1bf0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:827 __lock_acquire+0x11f/0x4700 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3224 lock_acquire+0x16f/0x3f0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3841 __raw_spin_lock_irqsave include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:110 [inline] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x95/0xcd kernel/locking/spinlock.c:152 __wake_up_common_lock+0xc7/0x190 kernel/sched/wait.c:120 __wake_up+0xe/0x10 kernel/sched/wait.c:145 dev_expire_timer+0xe4/0x3b0 drivers/isdn/mISDN/timerdev.c:174 call_timer_fn+0x190/0x720 kernel/time/timer.c:1325 protocol 88fb is buggy, dev hsr_slave_0 protocol 88fb is buggy, dev hsr_slave_1 expire_timers kernel/time/timer.c:1362 [inline] __run_timers kernel/time/timer.c:1681 [inline] __run_timers kernel/time/timer.c:1649 [inline] run_timer_softirq+0x652/0x1700 kernel/time/timer.c:1694 __do_softirq+0x266/0x95a kernel/softirq.c:292 invoke_softirq kernel/softirq.c:373 [inline] irq_exit+0x180/0x1d0 kernel/softirq.c:413 exiting_irq arch/x86/include/asm/apic.h:536 [inline] smp_apic_timer_interrupt+0x14a/0x570 arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:1062 apic_timer_interrupt+0xf/0x20 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:807 </IRQ> RIP: 0010:__sanitizer_cov_trace_pc+0x26/0x50 kernel/kcov.c:101 Code: 90 90 90 90 55 48 89 e5 48 8b 75 08 65 48 8b 04 25 40 ee 01 00 65 8b 15 98 12 92 7e 81 e2 00 01 1f 00 75 2b 8b 90 d8 12 00 00 <83> fa 02 75 20 48 8b 88 e0 12 00 00 8b 80 dc 12 00 00 48 8b 11 48 RSP: 0018:ffff8880589b7a60 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffff13 RAX: ffff888087ce25c0 RBX: 0000000000000001 RCX: ffffffff818f8ca3 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffffff818f8b48 RDI: 0000000000000001 RBP: ffff8880589b7a60 R08: ffff888087ce25c0 R09: ffffed1015d25bd0 R10: ffffed1015d25bcf R11: ffff8880ae92de7b R12: ffffea0001ae4680 R13: ffffea0001ae4688 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffffea0001b41648 PageIdle include/linux/page-flags.h:398 [inline] page_is_idle include/linux/page_idle.h:29 [inline] mark_page_accessed+0x618/0x1140 mm/swap.c:398 touch_buffer fs/buffer.c:59 [inline] __find_get_block+0x312/0xcc0 fs/buffer.c:1298 sb_find_get_block include/linux/buffer_head.h:338 [inline] recently_deleted fs/ext4/ialloc.c:682 [inline] find_inode_bit.isra.0+0x202/0x510 fs/ext4/ialloc.c:722 __ext4_new_inode+0x14ad/0x52c0 fs/ext4/ialloc.c:914 ext4_symlink+0x3f8/0xbe0 fs/ext4/namei.c:3096 vfs_symlink fs/namei.c:4126 [inline] vfs_symlink+0x378/0x5d0 fs/namei.c:4112 do_symlinkat+0x22b/0x290 fs/namei.c:4153 __do_sys_symlink fs/namei.c:4172 [inline] __se_sys_symlink fs/namei.c:4170 [inline] __x64_sys_symlink+0x59/0x80 fs/namei.c:4170 do_syscall_64+0x103/0x610 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe RIP: 0033:0x457b67 Code: 0f 1f 00 b8 5c 00 00 00 0f 05 48 3d 01 f0 ff ff 0f 83 6d bb fb ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 66 90 b8 58 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 0f 83 4d bb fb ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 RSP: 002b:00007fff045ce0f8 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000058 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000001 RCX: 0000000000457b67 RDX: 00007fff045ce173 RSI: 00000000004bd63f RDI: 00007fff045ce160 RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000013 R10: 0000000000000075 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 0000000000000001 R14: 000000000000029b R15: 0000000000000001 Allocated by task 24763: save_stack+0x45/0xd0 mm/kasan/common.c:73 set_track mm/kasan/common.c:85 [inline] __kasan_kmalloc mm/kasan/common.c:496 [inline] __kasan_kmalloc.constprop.0+0xcf/0xe0 mm/kasan/common.c:469 kasan_kmalloc+0x9/0x10 mm/kasan/common.c:504 kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x151/0x760 mm/slab.c:3609 kmalloc include/linux/slab.h:545 [inline] mISDN_open+0x9a/0x270 drivers/isdn/mISDN/timerdev.c:59 misc_open+0x398/0x4c0 drivers/char/misc.c:141 chrdev_open+0x247/0x6b0 fs/char_dev.c:417 do_dentry_open+0x47d/0x1130 fs/open.c:771 vfs_open+0xa0/0xd0 fs/open.c:880 do_last fs/namei.c:3418 [inline] path_openat+0x10d7/0x4690 fs/namei.c:3534 do_filp_open+0x1a1/0x280 fs/namei.c:3564 do_sys_open+0x3fe/0x5d0 fs/open.c:1063 __do_sys_openat fs/open.c:1090 [inline] __se_sys_openat fs/open.c:1084 [inline] __x64_sys_openat+0x9d/0x100 fs/open.c:1084 do_syscall_64+0x103/0x610 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe Freed by task 24762: save_stack+0x45/0xd0 mm/kasan/common.c:73 set_track mm/kasan/common.c:85 [inline] __kasan_slab_free+0x102/0x150 mm/kasan/common.c:458 kasan_slab_free+0xe/0x10 mm/kasan/common.c:466 __cache_free mm/slab.c:3487 [inline] kfree+0xcf/0x230 mm/slab.c:3806 mISDN_close+0x2a1/0x390 drivers/isdn/mISDN/timerdev.c:97 __fput+0x2df/0x8d0 fs/file_table.c:278 ____fput+0x16/0x20 fs/file_table.c:309 task_work_run+0x14a/0x1c0 kernel/task_work.c:113 tracehook_notify_resume include/linux/tracehook.h:188 [inline] exit_to_usermode_loop+0x273/0x2c0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:166 prepare_exit_to_usermode arch/x86/entry/common.c:197 [inline] syscall_return_slowpath arch/x86/entry/common.c:268 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x52d/0x610 arch/x86/entry/common.c:293 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88809fc18900 which belongs to the cache kmalloc-192 of size 192 The buggy address is located 72 bytes inside of 192-byte region [ffff88809fc18900, ffff88809fc189c0) The buggy address belongs to the page: page:ffffea00027f0600 count:1 mapcount:0 mapping:ffff88812c3f0040 index:0xffff88809fc18000 flags: 0x1fffc0000000200(slab) raw: 01fffc0000000200 ffffea000269f648 ffffea00029f7408 ffff88812c3f0040 raw: ffff88809fc18000 ffff88809fc18000 000000010000000b 0000000000000000 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected Memory state around the buggy address: ffff88809fc18800: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ffff88809fc18880: 00 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc >ffff88809fc18900: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ^ ffff88809fc18980: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc ffff88809fc18a00: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Karsten Keil <isdn@linux-pingi.de> Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
dabrace
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Jun 18, 2019
This fixes the following data abort: Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address 0000078000000040 Mem abort info: ESR = 0x96000004 Exception class = DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits SET = 0, FnV = 0 EA = 0, S1PTW = 0 Data abort info: ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000004 CM = 0, WnR = 0 user pgtable: 4k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp = (____ptrval____) [0000078000000040] pgd=0000000000000000 Internal error: Oops: 96000004 [#1] PREEMPT SMP Process irq/28-venus (pid: 292, stack limit = 0x(____ptrval____)) CPU: 0 PID: 292 Comm: irq/28-venus Not tainted 5.2.0-rc1+ #60 Hardware name: Qualcomm Technologies, Inc. APQ 8016 SBC (DT) pstate: 60000005 (nZCv daif -PAN -UAO) pc : __memcpy+0x100/0x180 lr : parse_caps+0x94/0xc0 [venus_core] sp : ffff0000114e3990 x29: ffff0000114e3990 x28: ffff80003a7d0148 x27: 00000000000df018 x26: ffff000008bd4618 x25: 0000000000020003 x24: 0000078000000040 x23: 0000000000000002 x22: 0000000000000002 x21: ffff80003b9b8080 x20: 0000000000000008 x19: ffff000010f59000 x18: 0000000000000000 x17: 0000000000000000 x16: ffff80003c0f9b80 x15: 0000000000000000 x14: 0100000100000002 x13: 000000010020100b x12: 000000010000100a x11: 0000100000000040 x10: 0000100000000004 x9 : 0000000000000000 x8 : ffff0000114e3bd8 x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : ffff0000114e39d8 x5 : 0000000000000040 x4 : 0000000000000000 x3 : 0000000000000010 x2 : 0000000000000000 x1 : 0000078000000040 x0 : ffff0000114e39d8 Call trace: __memcpy+0x100/0x180 hfi_parser+0x23c/0x3b8 [venus_core] hfi_session_init_done+0x40/0x60 [venus_core] hfi_process_msg_packet+0xd4/0x1d8 [venus_core] venus_isr_thread+0x1e0/0x230 [venus_core] hfi_isr_thread+0x18/0x20 [venus_core] irq_thread_fn+0x28/0x78 irq_thread+0x124/0x1c0 kthread+0x124/0x128 ret_from_fork+0x10/0x18 Code: d503201f d503201f d503201f d503201f (a8c12027) ---[ end trace fd253ebaeea05ffc ]--- genirq: exiting task "irq/28-venus" (292) is an active IRQ thread (irq 28) by modifying structure members to flexible array members. Fixes: ded7162 media: hfi_parser: don't trick gcc with a wrong expected size Signed-off-by: Stanimir Varbanov <stanimir.varbanov@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+samsung@kernel.org>
dabrace
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Apr 30, 2020
Here's the KASAN report: BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in rsa_pub_done+0x70/0xe8 Read of size 1 at addr ffff000023082014 by task swapper/0/0 CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 5.6.0-rc1-00162-gfcb90d5 #60 Hardware name: LS1046A RDB Board (DT) Call trace: dump_backtrace+0x0/0x260 show_stack+0x14/0x20 dump_stack+0xe8/0x144 print_address_description.isra.11+0x64/0x348 __kasan_report+0x11c/0x230 kasan_report+0xc/0x18 __asan_load1+0x5c/0x68 rsa_pub_done+0x70/0xe8 caam_jr_dequeue+0x390/0x608 tasklet_action_common.isra.13+0x1ec/0x230 tasklet_action+0x24/0x30 efi_header_end+0x1a4/0x370 irq_exit+0x114/0x128 __handle_domain_irq+0x80/0xe0 gic_handle_irq+0x50/0xa0 el1_irq+0xb8/0x180 cpuidle_enter_state+0xa4/0x490 cpuidle_enter+0x48/0x70 call_cpuidle+0x44/0x70 do_idle+0x304/0x338 cpu_startup_entry+0x24/0x40 rest_init+0xf8/0x10c arch_call_rest_init+0xc/0x14 start_kernel+0x774/0x7b4 Allocated by task 263: save_stack+0x24/0xb0 __kasan_kmalloc.isra.10+0xc4/0xe0 kasan_kmalloc+0xc/0x18 __kmalloc+0x178/0x2b8 rsa_edesc_alloc+0x2cc/0xe10 caam_rsa_enc+0x9c/0x5f0 test_akcipher_one+0x78c/0x968 alg_test_akcipher+0x78/0xf8 alg_test.part.44+0x114/0x4a0 alg_test+0x1c/0x60 cryptomgr_test+0x34/0x58 kthread+0x1b8/0x1c0 ret_from_fork+0x10/0x18 Freed by task 0: save_stack+0x24/0xb0 __kasan_slab_free+0x10c/0x188 kasan_slab_free+0x10/0x18 kfree+0x7c/0x298 rsa_pub_done+0x68/0xe8 caam_jr_dequeue+0x390/0x608 tasklet_action_common.isra.13+0x1ec/0x230 tasklet_action+0x24/0x30 efi_header_end+0x1a4/0x370 The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff000023082000 which belongs to the cache dma-kmalloc-256 of size 256 The buggy address is located 20 bytes inside of 256-byte region [ffff000023082000, ffff000023082100) The buggy address belongs to the page: page:fffffe00006c2080 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:ffff00093200c200 index:0x0 compound_mapcount: 0 flags: 0xffff00000010200(slab|head) raw: 0ffff00000010200 dead000000000100 dead000000000122 ffff00093200c200 raw: 0000000000000000 0000000080100010 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected Memory state around the buggy address: ffff000023081f00: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ffff000023081f80: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff >ffff000023082000: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ^ ffff000023082080: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ffff000023082100: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc Fixes: bf53795 ("crypto: caam - add crypto_engine support for RSA algorithms") Signed-off-by: Iuliana Prodan <iuliana.prodan@nxp.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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