GitHub Workflows security hardening #2274
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Signed-off-by: Alex <aleksandrosansan@gmail.com>
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Thanks, I agree that this makes sense. |
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Should this for completeness also be applied to the other workflows? Though I guess they might need a few more permissions, they upload artifacts and CodeQL analysis creates security events. |
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The other workflows run on |
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Ah you are right, thanks for the explanation! |
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Signed-off-by: Alex <aleksandrosansan@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Alex <aleksandrosansan@gmail.com> (cherry picked from commit c33e03b)
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This PR adds explicit permissions section to workflows. This is a security best practice because by default workflows run with extended set of permissions (except from
on: pull_requestfrom external forks). By specifying any permission explicitly all others are set to none. By using the principle of least privilege the damage a compromised workflow can do (because of an injection or compromised third party tool or action) is restricted.It is recommended to have most strict permissions on the top level and grant write permissions on job level case by case.