IPIP-378: Delegated Routing HTTP POST API #378
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Previous work reduced the scope of IPIP-337 to read operations only. The changes here re-introduce the write operations originally written by @guseggert back into IPIP-337. The specification documents the ability to provide Bitswap records over `PUT` requests with advisory TTL. An implementation of the specification is already present in go-libipfs. See: - #370
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PUT to HTTP delegated routing
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Quick first pass with some questions.
Also, please add quick memo to IPIP/ directory based on https://github.com/ipfs/specs/blob/main/IPIP/0000-template.md
It creates space for us to discuss Compatibility with existing nodes (which already create provider records and already sign them for DHT).
| Note that this only supports Peer IDs expressed as identity multihashes. Peer IDs with older key types that exceed 42 bytes are not verifiable since they only contain a hash of the key, not the key itself. | ||
| Normally, if the Peer ID contains only a hash of the key, then the key is obtained out-of-band (e.g. by fetching the block via IPFS). | ||
| If support for these Peer IDs is needed in the future, this spec can be updated to allow the client to provide the key and key type out-of-band by adding optional `PublicKey` and `PublicKeyType` fields, and if the Peer ID is a CID, then the server can verify the public key's authenticity against the CID, and then proceed with the rest of the verification scheme. |
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Any reason why we don't include PublicKey field from the start?
If we make it an optional, opaque bytes field, and say it should be deserialized as the protobuf from libp2p peerid specs, we have both solved RSA problem, and don't need to maintain PublicKeyType registry.
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Alternatively, we could include PublicKey in the peer schema on out-of-band GET to /routing/v1/peers/{peerid} (IPIP-417).
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I'm okay with either of these paths.
@masih are you okay with this suggestion?
| Normally, if the Peer ID contains only a hash of the key, then the key is obtained out-of-band (e.g. by fetching the block via IPFS). | ||
| If support for these Peer IDs is needed in the future, this spec can be updated to allow the client to provide the key and key type out-of-band by adding optional `PublicKey` and `PublicKeyType` fields, and if the Peer ID is a CID, then the server can verify the public key's authenticity against the CID, and then proceed with the rest of the verification scheme. | ||
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| The `Payload` field is a string, not a proper JSON object, to prevent its contents from being accidentally parsed and re-encoded by intermediaries, which may change the order of JSON fields and thus cause the record to fail validation. |
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If we have to mangle Payload JSON anyway, what is the benefit of introducing it as a new struct?
It was probably discussed before elsewhere, but why can't we use exactly the same protobuf and signature DHT uses?
Reusing DHT record payload would save CPU time on IPFS nodes that publish to both DHT and IPNI (signature would be generated only once, not twice).
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what is the benefit of introducing it as a new struct?
I suspect the reason for this is better human readability? The beginning of this document (merged as part of IPIP-337 states "human-readable encodings of types are preferred".
save CPU time on IPFS nodes
We can make the same argument about HTTP delegated routing itself. Unless there is evidence to suggest that we should be heavily optimising this, my vote would be to favour human readability.
@guseggert what are your thoughts?
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@guillaumemichel this is related to #345 – can you point us where up-to-date protobufs related to CID announcements on DHT lives these days? Unsure how feasible it is to reuse the announcement's wire format here.
Could we write down and publish the basic wire format information like protobuf section about ipns record, so this IPIP can refer to spec website, and not some go code 🙏
@masih I think Content-Type reuse similar to what we did #379 would help in some cases, but not a silver bullet here. There is way way more CIDs than IPNS records, so some way of doing bulk PUT is still desired, but it should not be tied to a single protocol.
When IPFS node speaks more than bitswap (we already plan to do HTTP next to bitswap in many places), doing a PUT of the same CIDs once for every protocol duplicates the cost on the client.
I don't think there is anything special about Schema: bitswap-announce, having dedicated PUT for this one protocol feels odd, PUT for HTTP will look exactly the same.
Maybe instead of having Schema: bitswap-announce we should have Schema: provider-announce with Protocols list, which could then have both bitswap and HTTP?
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having dedicated PUT for this one protocol feels odd, PUT for HTTP will look exactly the same
I agree 👍
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| @@ -118,7 +160,7 @@ limits, allowing every site to query the API for results: | |||
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| ```plaintext | |||
| Access-Control-Allow-Origin: * | |||
| Access-Control-Allow-Methods: GET, OPTIONS | |||
| Access-Control-Allow-Methods: GET, PUT, OPTIONS | |||
| ``` | |||
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| ## Known Transfer Protocols | |||
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💭 this section grows way faster than the rest of the spec.
Would it be ok to move "Known Transfer Protocols" to a separate file (KNOWN_TRANSFER_PROTOCOLS.md)?
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I recommend doing this in a separate PR to reduce lines changes what are irrelevant to what this PR is trying to introduce.
If this is not a blocker for this PR, I'd be happy to take this as a TODO and get it done once this PR is merged.
This is to facilitate a place for discussing compatibility with the existing nodes.
Thanks @lidel for the review. I have added a |
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| - `Signature`: a multibase-encoded signature of the sha256 hash of the `Payload` field, signed using the private key of the Peer ID specified in the `Payload` JSON. Signing details for specific key types should follow [libp2p/peerid specs](https://github.com/libp2p/specs/blob/master/peer-ids/peer-ids.md#key-types), unless stated otherwise. | ||
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| - Servers may ignore this field if they do not require signature verification. |
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@masih is cid.contact doing verification of this?
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cid.contact does not support any PUT over http delegated routing.
| "Schema": "bitswap", | ||
| "Signature": "<signature>", | ||
| "Payload": "<payload>" |
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💭 this creates one bitswap schema for GET and the other bitswap for PUT. Both under the same name, but with different fields. Bit nasty and error prone.
@masih is this ossified, or is there still time to fix this and use different schema for PUTs?
| "Schema": "bitswap", | |
| "Signature": "<signature>", | |
| "Payload": "<payload>" | |
| "Schema": "bitswap-announce", | |
| "Signature": "<signature>", | |
| "Payload": "<payload>" |
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There is still time. Changing thanks
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| ```json | ||
| { | ||
| "Keys": ["cid1", "cid2"], |
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@masih what is the max length of this list?
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My thinking is to make the maximum length be derived from whatever the server supports as max request body. A user should be able to find this out via OPTIONS request usually?
If that makes sense I am happy to document this in the spec. Unless you think we need some explicit max length for that array?
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@masih I'm picking up the work here, thank you for your patience, we had some resourcing issues.
- This PR needs to be rebased on top of
./src/routing/http-routing-v1.md - Updated to the latest IPIP template and moved to
./src/ipips/
but that can be done later.
For now, quick questions below 🙏
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| - `Keys` is a list of the CIDs being provided | ||
| - `Timestamp` is the current time |
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What is the format? Unix epoch? What resolution (ms? ns?)
Would ASCII string that follows notation from [rfc3339] (1970-01-01T00:00:00.000000001Z) be less ambiguous?
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Agreed on following standardized format that is easily human-parseable and doesn't have ambiguity.
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| - `Keys` is a list of the CIDs being provided | ||
| - `Timestamp` is the current time | ||
| - `AdvisoryTTL` is the time by which the caller expects the server to keep the record available |
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Is this a timestamp of a duration? If a duration, is it miliseconds?
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If a duration, maybe get that into the name.
Also embed the units in the parameter name so there is no ambiguity?
| - `Timestamp` is the current time | ||
| - `AdvisoryTTL` is the time by which the caller expects the server to keep the record available | ||
| - If this value is unknown, the caller may use a value of 0 | ||
| - `ID` is the peer ID that was used to sign the record |
| Note that this only supports Peer IDs expressed as identity multihashes. Peer IDs with older key types that exceed 42 bytes are not verifiable since they only contain a hash of the key, not the key itself. | ||
| Normally, if the Peer ID contains only a hash of the key, then the key is obtained out-of-band (e.g. by fetching the block via IPFS). | ||
| If support for these Peer IDs is needed in the future, this spec can be updated to allow the client to provide the key and key type out-of-band by adding optional `PublicKey` and `PublicKeyType` fields, and if the Peer ID is a CID, then the server can verify the public key's authenticity against the CID, and then proceed with the rest of the verification scheme. |
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Alternatively, we could include PublicKey in the peer schema on out-of-band GET to /routing/v1/peers/{peerid} (IPIP-417).
| Normally, if the Peer ID contains only a hash of the key, then the key is obtained out-of-band (e.g. by fetching the block via IPFS). | ||
| If support for these Peer IDs is needed in the future, this spec can be updated to allow the client to provide the key and key type out-of-band by adding optional `PublicKey` and `PublicKeyType` fields, and if the Peer ID is a CID, then the server can verify the public key's authenticity against the CID, and then proceed with the rest of the verification scheme. | ||
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| The `Payload` field is a string, not a proper JSON object, to prevent its contents from being accidentally parsed and re-encoded by intermediaries, which may change the order of JSON fields and thus cause the record to fail validation. |
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@guillaumemichel this is related to #345 – can you point us where up-to-date protobufs related to CID announcements on DHT lives these days? Unsure how feasible it is to reuse the announcement's wire format here.
Could we write down and publish the basic wire format information like protobuf section about ipns record, so this IPIP can refer to spec website, and not some go code 🙏
@masih I think Content-Type reuse similar to what we did #379 would help in some cases, but not a silver bullet here. There is way way more CIDs than IPNS records, so some way of doing bulk PUT is still desired, but it should not be tied to a single protocol.
When IPFS node speaks more than bitswap (we already plan to do HTTP next to bitswap in many places), doing a PUT of the same CIDs once for every protocol duplicates the cost on the client.
I don't think there is anything special about Schema: bitswap-announce, having dedicated PUT for this one protocol feels odd, PUT for HTTP will look exactly the same.
Maybe instead of having Schema: bitswap-announce we should have Schema: provider-announce with Protocols list, which could then have both bitswap and HTTP?
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@lidel this PR has aged long enough that it seems it needs to be rewritten, specially to accommodate transport agnostic publication of CIDs. There is the missing DHT record specs issue but i don't think that's a blocker for now while we iterate over this?
If you agree I revise this PR entirely, considering the original was extracted from IPIP-337 written by Gus.
Thoughts?
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| ```json | ||
| { | ||
| "Keys": ["cid1", "cid2"], |
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My thinking is to make the maximum length be derived from whatever the server supports as max request body. A user should be able to find this out via OPTIONS request usually?
If that makes sense I am happy to document this in the spec. Unless you think we need some explicit max length for that array?
| Normally, if the Peer ID contains only a hash of the key, then the key is obtained out-of-band (e.g. by fetching the block via IPFS). | ||
| If support for these Peer IDs is needed in the future, this spec can be updated to allow the client to provide the key and key type out-of-band by adding optional `PublicKey` and `PublicKeyType` fields, and if the Peer ID is a CID, then the server can verify the public key's authenticity against the CID, and then proceed with the rest of the verification scheme. | ||
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| The `Payload` field is a string, not a proper JSON object, to prevent its contents from being accidentally parsed and re-encoded by intermediaries, which may change the order of JSON fields and thus cause the record to fail validation. |
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having dedicated PUT for this one protocol feels odd, PUT for HTTP will look exactly the same
I agree 👍
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@masih yes, fine to revise this 🙏 Either same PR, or close this one and open a new one to start with clean slate if that's easier |
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@masih just checking-in, how does the future of this IPIP look like? (asking in context of ipni/index-provider#403 (comment)) (fwiw we want to support PUTs in |
Yes please. I don't have bandwidth to work on this just now unfortunately. |
src/routing/http-routing-v1.md
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| TODO: is below a sensible limit? | ||
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| There SHOULD be no more than 100 `Providers` per request. |
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this distinction implies we won't want to use this same protocol to sync overall routing tables between nodes - if there are more than 100 known providers for data, would we expect a different protocol to be used?
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We could:
- Raise limit on the server – what would be sensible number per batch?
- Ask client to make multiple PUTs
- or use streaming PUT with
application/x-ndjson(see IPIP-378: Delegated Routing HTTP POST API #378 (comment))
- or use streaming PUT with
src/routing/http-routing-v1.md
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| #### Use in PUT responses | ||
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| Server MAY return additional TTL information if the TTL is not provided in the request, | ||
| or if server policy is to provide TTL different than the requested one. | ||
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| ```json | ||
| { | ||
| "Schema": "announcement", | ||
| "Payload": { | ||
| "TTL": 17280000 | ||
| } | ||
| } | ||
| ``` |
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nit: should we create a separate announcement-response schema, or using announcement is ok? @hacdias what is a smaller headache for implementers?
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@lidel I think it is fine to use the same one, and mention that when getting it as response, there may be an Error field too for https://github.com/ipfs/specs/pull/378/files#r1418770825.
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Ack. Maybe overthinking this IPIP, but I am trying to keep some future doors open.
This IPIP is an opportunity to create a signed routing record convention that could be reused outside of HTTP API. For example, Amino DHT could start accepting signed announcements from this spec in addition to routing puts where PeerID matched one from libp2p connection, allowing light clients to delegate DHT puts.
I think with switch to DAG-CBOR done in 05dceba it is generic enough to use it for both (a signed DAG-CBOR map similar to IPNS).
But for errors, it felt like mixing abstractions, so I've added explicit error schema in ccbc085.
src/routing/http-routing-v1.md
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| - `Signature` is a string with multibase-encoded binary signature that provides integrity and authenticity of the `Payload` field. | ||
| - Signature is created by following below steps: | ||
| 1. Convert `Payload` to deterministic, ordered [DAG-JSON](https://ipld.io/specs/codecs/dag-json/spec/) map notation | ||
| 2. Prefix the DAG-JSON bytes with ASCII string `PUT /routing/v1 announcement:` | ||
| 3. Sign the bytes with the private key of the Peer ID specified in the `Payload.ID`. | ||
| - Signing details for specific key types should follow [libp2p/peerid specs](https://github.com/libp2p/specs/blob/master/peer-ids/peer-ids.md#key-types), unless stated otherwise. |
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By normalizing Payload to DAG-JSON here, as a step in signature generation, we no longer have to have Payload sent as base64-encoded string, and can have human-readable JSON object instead.
I think this is a net positive change, as it makes debugging/tracing easier, payload is no longer obfuscated on the wire.
@willscott @masih @hacdias – any concerns with this change?
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No concerns other than the usual pitfalls of verifying signature of JSON object, which a reference implementation should clarify.
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@lidel what do we do with empty fields? Are they not set? Are they set as null? Are they set as empty value (depending on their value, e.g., empty array)?
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Empty fields should not be present, just to remove ambiguity on the default value.
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I realized going with DAG-JSON introduces inconsistency across specs.
IPNS Records do the same signature dance but normalize key-value map with DAG-CBOR. If we can, we should do the same here.
Let's switch to DAG-CBOR, this way there is no ambiguity, implementers don't try to be clever and reuse JSON strings, and signature does not require JSON representation in non-JSON context.
| - `Signature` is a string with multibase-encoded binary signature that provides integrity and authenticity of the `Payload` field. | |
| - Signature is created by following below steps: | |
| 1. Convert `Payload` to deterministic, ordered [DAG-JSON](https://ipld.io/specs/codecs/dag-json/spec/) map notation | |
| 2. Prefix the DAG-JSON bytes with ASCII string `PUT /routing/v1 announcement:` | |
| 3. Sign the bytes with the private key of the Peer ID specified in the `Payload.ID`. | |
| - Signing details for specific key types should follow [libp2p/peerid specs](https://github.com/libp2p/specs/blob/master/peer-ids/peer-ids.md#key-types), unless stated otherwise. | |
| - `Signature` is a string with multibase-encoded binary signature that provides integrity and authenticity of the `Payload` field. | |
| - Signature is created by following below steps: | |
| 1. Convert `Payload` to deterministic, ordered [DAG-CBOR](https://ipld.io/specs/codecs/dag-cbor/spec/) map notation | |
| - Intention here is to use similar signature normalization as with DAG-CBOR `Data` field in IPNS Records, allowing for partial code and dependency reuse. | |
| 2. Prefix the DAG-CBOR bytes with ASCII string `routing-record:` to avoid signature reuse attacks. | |
| 3. Sign the bytes with the private key of the Peer ID specified in the `Payload.ID`. | |
| - Signing details for specific key types should follow [libp2p/peerid specs](https://github.com/libp2p/specs/blob/master/peer-ids/peer-ids.md#key-types), unless stated otherwise. |
make entry limited to a single CID #378 (comment)
src/routing/http-routing-v1.md
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| - `Payload`: is a DAG-JSON-compatible object with a subset of the below fields | ||
| - `CID` is the CID being provided. | ||
| - This field is not presend when used for `PUT /routing/v1/peers` | ||
| - `Scope` is an optional hint that provides semantic meaning about announced identifies: |
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This field should also not be present for PUT /routing/v1/peers, right?
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yes, do you think it will be less error-prone if we have separate schema for peers?
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I don't think it's necessary. The only potential footgun is the validation and the marshalling: what do we do with empty fields? We should talk about it. This is important for both validation and marshalling, both for requests and responses since we're using the same schema, and the payload is always encoded.
Following suggestion from #378 (comment) Fixed outdated links and statements.
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Co-authored-by: Henrique Dias <hacdias@gmail.com>
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Pushed some editorial changes based on feedback, highlights:
There is wip work on reference implementation in ipfs/boxo#539 |
| The Reframe API was superseded by `/routing/v1`. | ||
| See [IPIP-337/Backwards Compatibility](https://specs.ipfs.tech/ipips/ipip-0337/#backwards-compatibility). | ||
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| #### Forwards Compatibility |
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TODO
As this IPIP is right now, the routing announcement signature is used only for the remote HTTP server to decide if announcement should be accepted or not. This blocks announcing with PeerID that you don't own.
However, when user asks for providers, they won't get original payload+signature back, and won't be able to verify provider records themselves.
We don't have to solve or require it in this IPIP, but we should add section to "Forwards Compatibility" explaining if/how signature type introduced in this IPIP could be stored and returned to end clients when someoneone wants that functionality.
If we don't write it down, we will be having multiple competing conventions, because people who want end-to-end routing integrity will invent something.
Initial thought on this is that we already have a concept of opaque metadata fields for opaque protocols in Peer Schema.
If we reuse it here, this section could hint at doing something like:
{
"Schema": "peer",
"ID": "bafz...",
"Addrs": ["/ip4/..."],
"Protocols": ["transport-bitswap", "signed-routing-v1"],
"signed-routing-v1": {
"Payload": "[mbase64-dag-cbor-blob]",
"Signature": "[mbase64-blob]"
}
}Any concerns @masih @willscott @hacdias ?
This is just for "Forwards Compatibility" section, don't expect this to be implemented by cid.contact any time soon (since storing payload and signatyre will add cost), but if we have it, we could also implement it in someguy, allowing people end-to-end integrity when they self-host own router (e.g. in smaller private swarms).
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No immediate concern on my part 👍
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| Since non-streaming results have to be buffered before sending, | ||
| server SHOULD be no more than 100 `Providers` per `application/json` response. |
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| ```plaintext | |||
| Access-Control-Allow-Origin: * | |||
| Access-Control-Allow-Methods: GET, OPTIONS | |||
| Access-Control-Allow-Methods: GET, POST, PUT, OPTIONS | |||
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| - Signature is created by following below steps: | ||
| 1. Convert `Payload` JSON to deterministic, ordered [DAG-CBOR](https://ipld.io/specs/codecs/dag-cbor/spec/) map notation | ||
| - Specification intention here is to use similar signature normalization as with DAG-CBOR `Data` field in IPNS Records, allowing for partial code and dependency reuse. |
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Are we expecting to interoperate with IPNS records? If not, I'm curious if we should instead use JWS on the JSON payloads instead of this. JWS is more widely used and available than our DAG-CBOR encoding. It's also a well defined standard.
This also has the benefit of simplifying the verification. Minimal work is needed to authenticate the message. Importantly you do not have to parse the message into DAG-CBOR before authenticating the message, which could be a possible attack vector.
If we want to authenticate over more than just the payload we can look at RFC 9421 for a standard on how to sign HTTP messages. But I don't think we need to.
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+1 RFC9421 because it is content-type agnostic. (ActivityPub/Mastodon use this)
And by use JWS do you mean this JSON serialization of it? (iiuc a JSON object with payload and signatures properties)
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc7515#section-7.2.1
+0 that
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Whatever serialization makes the most sense. Why +0 to the idea?
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+0 meaning 'no objection' and '+' because I trust you have more context than I do so I'm happy to defer to what you think is best. But personally it seems like choosing RFC9421 it would provide similar functionality for JSON but also every other media type, and then maybe wouldn't need to do RFC7515 at all.
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Gotcha. I don't have a preference on RFC 7515 or RFC 9421. But I do have a preference for using an IETF standard here instead of the proposed DAG-CBOR solution.
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Thank you for feedback.
Additional context is that in the future, a light client may want to use /routing/v1 POST to delegate announcements of signed records to routing systems like IPNI or Amino DHT, and reuse signature (ideally, client signs once). This means we want to implement a signature type that would be easy to implement and support by Amino DHT nodes as well.
A hesitation around using something like RFC9421 is that it brings more complexity: users of IPFS stack likely already have libp2p crypto due to PeerIDs and dag-cbor due to things like IPNS.
In contrast, the RFC9421 is relatively new and requires custom implementation (not in go yet: golang/go#41046).
It feels we don't want to rush signatures until we have time to work on delegated Amino DHT, making sure we have end-to-end, real world use case for them.
My current thinking is either parking the entire thing, or reducing the scope of this IPIP, moving signatures to separate IPIP, and shipping basic POST here without signatures specified, as a DRAFT. It will still be useful, there are use cases where delegated routing is done in a controlled environment, where signatures introduce unnecessary penalty, but comes with risk of us making something that is then difficult to sign.
Thoughts?
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| Each object in the `Providers` list is a *write provider record* entry. | ||
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| Server SHOULD accept representing writes is [Announcement Schema](#announcement-schema). |
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| Server SHOULD accept representing writes is [Announcement Schema](#announcement-schema). | |
| Server SHOULD accept representing writes as [Announcement Schema](#announcement-schema). |
| - `Timestamp` is the current time, formatted as an ASCII string that follows notation from [rfc3339](https://specs.ipfs.tech/ipns/ipns-record/#ref-rfc3339). | ||
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| - `TTL` is caching and expiration hint informing the server how long to keep the record available, specified as integer in milliseconds. | ||
| - If this value is unknown, the caller may skip this field or set it to 0. The server's default will be used. |
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In this scenario, are we expecting clients to POST all the records they want reprovided after TTL expires?
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| - `TTL` in response is the time at which the server expects itself to drop the record | ||
| - If less than the `TTL` in the request, then the client SHOULD repeat announcement earlier, before the announcement TTL expires and is forgotten by the routing system | ||
| - If greater than the `TTL` in the request, then the server client SHOULD save resources and not repeat announcement until the announcement TTL expires and is forgotten by the routing system |
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| - If greater than the `TTL` in the request, then the server client SHOULD save resources and not repeat announcement until the announcement TTL expires and is forgotten by the routing system | |
| - If greater than the `TTL` in the request, then the client SHOULD save resources and not repeat announcement until the announcement TTL expires and is forgotten by the routing system |
Previous work reduced the scope of IPIP-337 to read operations only. The changes here re-introduce the write operations originally written by @guseggert back into IPIP-337.
The specification documents the ability to provide Bitswap records over
PUTPOSTrequests with advisory TTL. An implementation of the specification is already present ingo-libipfsboxo.See: