This module allows for execution of transactions that have been approved via a Realitio question for execution. The question asked on Realitio consists of a proposal ID (e.g. an ipfs hash) that can be used to provide more information for the transactions to be executed. And of an array of EIP-712 based transaction hashes that represent the transactions that should be executed.
These two components (proposalId
and txHashes
) uniquely identify a question on the module. While it is possible to ask the same question with different Realitio question parameters, it is only possible to execute transactions related to a specific question once.
Once the question on Realitio has resolved to "yes" that the transactions should be executed, they are submitted to the immutable executor defined in the module. Transactions defined in questions that resolve to "no" or "invalid" cannot be executed by the module.
This module is intended to be used with the Gnosis Safe.
- Submit proposals uniquely identified by a
proposalId
and an array oftxHashes
, to create a Realitio question that validates the execution of the connected transactions. - Proposals can be marked invalid by the
executor
usingmarkProposalInvalid
preventing the execution of the transactions related to that proposal - The Realitio question parameters (
templateId
,timeout
,arbitrator
) are set on the module by the executor - A
minimum bond
can be set that is required to be staked on a Realitio answer before the transactions can be executed - A
cooldown
can be specified representing the minimum time that needs to pass after the Realitio question has been answered before the transactions can be executed
- Create question on Realitio via the
addProposal
method of this module. - Question needs to be answered on Realitio with yes (1) to approve it for execution.
- Once the has a result and the
cooldown
period has passed the transaction(s) can be execute viaexecuteProposal
The nonce
of a transaction makes it possible to have two transactions with the same to
, value
and data
but still generate a different transaction hash. This is important as all hashes in the txHashes
array should be unique. To make sure that this is the case the module will always use the index
of the transaction hash inside the txHashes
array as a nonce. So the first transaction to be executed has the nonce
with the value 0
, the second with the value 1
, and so on.
Therefore we can simplify it to the following statement:
The nonce
of a DAO module transaction is equals to the index
of that transactions hash in the txHashes
array.
There is a chance that a question for a proposal is marked invalid on the oracle (e.g. when it is asked to early). In this case it should be possible to ask the question again. For this we need to be able to generate a new question ID. For this it is possible to provide the next higher nonce
compared to the last invalidated proposal. So in case the first proposal (with the default nonce
of 0
) was marked invalid on the oracle, a new proposal can be submitted with the nonce
of 1
.
The DAO module depends on an oracle to determine if a proposal was expected and was deemed valid. The following assumptions are being made:
- The oracle MUST implement the Realitio contract interface
- It MUST not be possible to ask the same question with the same parameters again
- Once a result is known for a question and it is finalized it MUST not change
- The oracle MUST use the same question ID generation algorithm as this module
The reference oracle implementations are the Realitio contracts. These can be found on
- https://www.npmjs.com/package/@realitio/realitio-contracts
- https://github.com/realitio/realitio-contracts/
It is required that the transactions from a proposal are successful (should not internally revert for any reason). If any of the transactions of a proposal fail it will not be possible to continue with the execution of the following transactions. This is to prevent subsequent transactions being executed in a scenario where earlier transactions failed due to the gas limit being too low or due to other errors.
Transactions that failed will not be marked as executed and therefore can be executed at any later point in time. This is a potential risk and therefore it is recommended to either set an answer expiration time or invalidate the proposal (e.g. via another proposal).
The module can be configured so that positive answers will expire after a certain time. This can be done by calling setAnswerExpiration
with a time duration in seconds. If the transactions related to the proposal are not executed before the answer expires, it will not be possible to execute them. This is useful in the case of transactions that revert and therefore cannot be executed, to prevent that they are unexpectedly executed in the future. Negative answers (no or invalid) cannot expire.
Note: If the expiration time is set to 0
answers will never expire. This also means answers that expired before will become available again. To prevent this, it is recommended to call markProposalWithExpiredAnswerAsInvalid
immediately after any proposal expires (or on all outstanding expired answers prior to setting the expiration date to 0
), this will mark a proposal with an expired answer as invalid. This method can be called by anyone.
EIP-712 is used to generate the hashes for the transactions to be executed. The following EIP-712 domain and types are used.
{
EIP712Domain: [
{ type: "uint256", name: "chainId" },
{ type: "address", name: "verifyingContract" }
]
}
{
Transaction: [
{ type: "address", name: "to" },
{ type: "uint256", name: "value" },
{ type: "bytes", name: "data" },
{ type: "uint8", name: "operation" },
{ type: "uint256", name: "nonce" }
]
}
The contracts have been developed with Solidity 0.8.0 in mind. This version of Solidity made all arithmetic checked by default, therefore eliminating the need for explicit overflow or underflow (or other arithmetic) checks.
Follow our SafeSnap Setup Guide to setup a DAO module and connect it to Snapshot.
An audit has been performed by the G0 group.
All issues and notes of the audit have been addressed in commit 7a5244d0a0a70b023d23af59659e0c055be7cca2.
The audit results are available as a pdf in this repo or on the g0-group repo.