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BOLT04: Atomic Multi-path Payments [feature 30/31] #658
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@@ -362,3 +362,11 @@ tlvs | |
snprintf | ||
GitHub | ||
IRC | ||
preimages | ||
timelocks | ||
th | ||
atomicity | ||
adaptively | ||
preimages | ||
griefing | ||
decorrelation |
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@@ -248,6 +248,13 @@ This is a more flexible format, which avoids the redundant `short_channel_id` fi | |
1. type: 6 (`short_channel_id`) | ||
2. data: | ||
* [`short_channel_id`:`short_channel_id`] | ||
1. type: 10 (`option_amp`) | ||
2. data: | ||
* [`32*byte`:`payment_id`] | ||
* [`32*byte`:`set_id`] | ||
* [`32*byte`:`share`] | ||
* [`u16`:`child_index`] | ||
* [`u64`:`total_msat`] | ||
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### Requirements | ||
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The requirements for the contents of these fields are specified [above](#legacy-hop_data-payload-format). | ||
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## Atomic Multi-path Payments | ||
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If the final node receives an onion packet with `option_amp` field, | ||
There was a problem hiding this comment. Choose a reason for hiding this commentThe reason will be displayed to describe this comment to others. Learn more. I think having both There was a problem hiding this comment. Choose a reason for hiding this commentThe reason will be displayed to describe this comment to others. Learn more. It might even make sense that this PR mutates in a specification of spontaneous payments (not invoice-based), encompassing both the multi-part aspect and the non multi-part? There was a problem hiding this comment. Choose a reason for hiding this commentThe reason will be displayed to describe this comment to others. Learn more.
I disagree here, the primary goal here is not reuse payment hashes for better privacy:
The spontaneous + recurring pieces are useful side-effects of the sender generating the required randomness. |
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the payment MAY be an atomic multi-path payment. Such atomic multi-path payments | ||
SHOULD use a _distinct_ payment hash for each path. | ||
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The `amt_to_forward` value will be the amount for this partial payment only. The | ||
`option_amp` flag is a promise by the sender that the rest of the payment will | ||
follow in succeeding HTLCs with the same `set_id`; we call these HTLCs, which | ||
share the same `set_id`, an "HTLC set". | ||
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One key distinction with `option_amp` is that the sender generates all | ||
preimages, and only reveals them to the final hop if all partial payments arrive | ||
successfully. As such, the payer _will not_ learn a new preimage as it would in | ||
the regular payment flow. For accounting purposes, however, `option_amp` can be | ||
used to fulfill an invoice akin to the regular payment flow, and also enforce | ||
additional constraints such as amounts and timelocks. | ||
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The writer: | ||
- MUST NOT include `option_amp` for any non-final node. | ||
- if the sender has an invoice and `option_amp` feature was not set in the invoice: | ||
There was a problem hiding this comment. Choose a reason for hiding this commentThe reason will be displayed to describe this comment to others. Learn more. Should specify how this is to be communicated after #656 is merged. |
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- MUST NOT include `option_amp` for the final node. | ||
- otherwise: | ||
- MAY include `option_amp` for the final node. | ||
- if it does include `option_amp`: | ||
- MUST generate a random `set_id` to be used on all HTLCs in the set. | ||
- MAY send more than one HTLC using the same `set_id`. | ||
- MUST set the `share` values of all HTLCs such that their XOR is a random | ||
root seed `r`. | ||
- SHOULD ensure all `share` values are unique and random. | ||
- SHOULD choose a unique child_index_i for each HTLC. | ||
- MUST derive the `payment_hash` for an HTLC using `amp_child(r, child_index_i)`. | ||
- if the invoice specifies a non-zero `amount`: | ||
- MUST set `total_msat` to `amount`. | ||
There was a problem hiding this comment. Choose a reason for hiding this commentThe reason will be displayed to describe this comment to others. Learn more. Shouldn't this allow over-payment (as specified for standard invoice payments)? There was a problem hiding this comment. Choose a reason for hiding this commentThe reason will be displayed to describe this comment to others. Learn more. yes probably, i think it should mirror whatever is finalized in #643 |
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- otherwise: | ||
- MUST set `total_msat` to the amount it wishes to pay. | ||
- MUST ensure the total `amount_to_forward` in the HTLC set which arrives at | ||
the payee is equal to `total_msat`. | ||
- if the sender has an invoice: | ||
- MUST set the `payment_id` of each HTLC to the `payment_hash` in the | ||
invoice. | ||
- otherwise: | ||
- MUST set the `payment_id` of each HTLC to zero. | ||
There was a problem hiding this comment. Choose a reason for hiding this commentThe reason will be displayed to describe this comment to others. Learn more. Or define it as a separate tlv type? There may be some overlap with the random identifier generated by the receiver that was discussed before for regular payments and mpp. Both are ids generated by the receiver and both are not used to lock the htlc onto. |
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The reader: | ||
- if `option_amp` is present: | ||
- MUST fail the HTLC if it is not the final node. | ||
- MUST fail the HTLC as it would otherwise fail a single HTLC of | ||
`amt_to_forward`, `payment_hash`, and `cltv_expiry` without context of the | ||
invoice. | ||
- if the `payment_id` is non-zero: | ||
- MUST fail the HTLC if an invoice for `payment_id` does not exist. | ||
- MUST fail the HTLC if `total_msat` is less than the invoice's `amount`. | ||
- MUST fail the HTLC if `cltv_expiry` does not satisfy the invoice's | ||
`min_final_cltv_expiry`. | ||
- otherwise: | ||
- MUST fail the HTLC if `cltv_expiry` does not satisfy the node's default | ||
`min_final_cltv_expiry` | ||
- MUST fail the entire HTLC set if `total_msat` is not the same for all HTLCs | ||
in the set. | ||
- if the total `amount_to_forward` of the HTLC set is equal `total_msat`: | ||
- MUST reconstructs `r` as the XOR of all `share`s in the HTLC set. | ||
- MUST compute `p_i, h_i = amp_child(r, child_index_i)` for all HTLCs in the | ||
set. | ||
- if any `i-th` HTLC's `payment_hash` differs from `h_i`: | ||
- MUST fail the HTLC set. | ||
- otherwise: | ||
- MAY fulfill the `i-th` HTLC in the set using `p_i`. | ||
- otherwise: | ||
- MUST fail an HTLC in the set if its `cltv_expiry` elapses. | ||
- MAY fail all HTLCs in the set after a reasonable timeout. | ||
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### Atomic Multi-path Payment Derivation | ||
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Let the _root seed_ `r` be a random 32-byte value. A unique _child preimage_ and | ||
_child hash_ can be derived for a given `child_index` using the `amp_child` | ||
function: | ||
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```golang | ||
func amp_child(root_seed [32]byte, child_index uint16) ([32]byte, [32]byte) { | ||
There was a problem hiding this comment. Choose a reason for hiding this commentThe reason will be displayed to describe this comment to others. Learn more. nit: I think this derivation is simple enough to be included as "crypto-math" instead of actual code. There was a problem hiding this comment. Choose a reason for hiding this commentThe reason will be displayed to describe this comment to others. Learn more. i agree it is a little overkill, tho i haven't been able to come up with something that conveys the type information as well the pseudocode. open to suggestions tho :) |
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preimage := SHA256(root_seed || child_index) | ||
hash := SHA256(preimage) | ||
return preimage, hash | ||
} | ||
``` | ||
where `child_index` is serialized using big-endian byte order, and `||` denotes | ||
the concatenation of the left-hand side with the right-hand side. | ||
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The sender will use `amp_child` to derive a child hash for each HTLC it sends | ||
out, and includes the `child_index` used in the derivation in the final hop's | ||
payload. The receiver will use `amp_child` to settle each HTLC with its | ||
corresponding child preimage, and also to verify that the correct child hash was | ||
set by the sender. | ||
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In order to provide cryptographic atomicity over the fulfillment of an HTLC set, | ||
each partial payment `i` also transmits a 32-byte `share`. Each share `s_i` | ||
represents an n-of-n secret sharing of `r`, such that: | ||
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``` | ||
r = s_1 ^ ... ^ s_n | ||
``` | ||
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where `^` denotes the XOR operation. | ||
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If `n` is known upfront, satisfying this equation can be done simply by | ||
generating all `s_i` randomly. | ||
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Otherwise, the sender can generate the shares _adaptively_ by first generating a | ||
random `r`. For all but the last outgoing HTLC, a random `s_i` is generated and | ||
included directly. The final HTLC then computes `s_n` as the XOR of all other | ||
shares and `r`: | ||
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``` | ||
s_n = s_1 ^ ... ^ s_n-1 ^ r | ||
``` | ||
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If a partial payment fails, this process can be applied recursively to generate | ||
There was a problem hiding this comment. Choose a reason for hiding this commentThe reason will be displayed to describe this comment to others. Learn more. Def an underrated feature of this scheme! There was a problem hiding this comment. Choose a reason for hiding this commentThe reason will be displayed to describe this comment to others. Learn more. Is there a problem with the receiver reading the share value, but then canceling the htlc with for example an invalid onion key error? To the sender is looks like a failure that may even have been caused by the second last node, but in reality the receiver has already obtained the root seed. |
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smaller partial payments, at the same time guaranteeing that the XOR of all | ||
shares results in `r`. | ||
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This construction prevents the receiver from learning `r` until all `s_i` have | ||
arrived. If `r` is successfully reconstructed, the receiver can verify the | ||
correctness of child hashes used in the HTLC set, and settle use the child | ||
preimages if they were offered correctly. | ||
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The diagram below depicts the relationship between shares, the root seed, child | ||
preimages, and child hashes in the non-adaptive case. Lowercase variables are | ||
used to signal independent variables, while capital letters are used to describe | ||
dependent variables. All independent variables are chosen upfront by the sender. | ||
``` | ||
s_1 s_2 s_3 SHARES OF ROOT SEED | ||
There was a problem hiding this comment. Choose a reason for hiding this commentThe reason will be displayed to describe this comment to others. Learn more. This ascii art is great, it very neatly summarizes the scheme! You should make a t-shirt of it ;) There was a problem hiding this comment. Choose a reason for hiding this commentThe reason will be displayed to describe this comment to others. Learn more. thank you! time well spent 😁 |
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| | | | ||
└──┐ | ┌──┘ R = s_1 ^ s_2 ^ s_3 | ||
V V V | ||
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R ROOT SEED | ||
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┌──┘ | └──┐ P_i = SHA256(R || child_index_i) | ||
V V V | ||
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P_1 P_2 P_3 CHILD PREIMAGES | ||
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| | | | ||
| | | H_i = SHA256(P_i) | ||
V V V | ||
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H_1 H_2 H_3 CHILD PAYMENT HASHES | ||
``` | ||
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### Rationale | ||
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The inclusion of a `payment_id` in `option_amp` allows the receiver to map an | ||
incoming AMP payment to a particular invoice. The sender should set the | ||
`payment_id` to the `payment_hash` of the invoice they are trying to pay, | ||
permitting the receiver to enforce custom parameters, e.g. CLTV deltas, and | ||
unify tracking of AMP payments with the existing invoicing system. | ||
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At the same time, AMP payments can be made spontaneously (without an invoice), | ||
since the sender generates all of the necessary secrets. To do so, the sender | ||
leaves the `payment_id` blank, which can be used to facilitate secure donations. | ||
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In the event that two payments are made with the same `payment_id`, either to | ||
the same invoice or both are spontaneous, a second identifier is introduced | ||
called the `set_id`. The `set_id` should be unique to each HTLC set sent by the | ||
sender, and allows the receiver to distinguish concurrent payments that collide | ||
on `payment_id`. | ||
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All payments made to the invoice can be tracked as a single subscription or | ||
account, and each payment receives it's own unique `set_id`. Multiple, | ||
concurrent payments can be made to the same invoice and properly reconstructed | ||
using the enclosed `set_id`. Two such use cases might involved "subscription" or | ||
"account" invoices: | ||
* A subscription invoice might be generated as an invoice with the desired | ||
subscription amount, which will be verified each time the user pays. | ||
* An account invoice, e.g. a recurring invoice for funding an exchange, would | ||
use a zero-value invoice, allowing deposits (or withdrawals) of arbitrary | ||
amounts. | ||
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Both the `set_id` and `payment_id` are only known to sender and receiver, | ||
preventing intermediaries from introducing griefing via colliding payment | ||
identifiers with high probability. In addition, the `set_id` allows the receiver | ||
to create "subscription" or "account" invoices that can be paid repeatedly using | ||
different `set_id`s. | ||
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The `child_index` is included in the final payload so that the receiver can | ||
gracefully tolerate reordering of the partial payments. When each `child_index` | ||
is unique, this offers decorrelation of the partial payments, since they bear | ||
different child payment hashes while traversing the network. | ||
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The `total_msat` field is used to determine when all partial payments have been | ||
received. If the AMP is paying an invoice, this also allows the sender to | ||
securely overpay an invoice, for instance, if the invoice's `amount` is | ||
unspecified. If the AMP is spontaneous, this allows the sender to communicate | ||
the exact value to be received in an end-to-end authenticated manner, preventing | ||
certain classes of attacks where intermediaries can steal up to the overpaid | ||
amount. | ||
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The entire payment is contingent on the receiver being able to reconstruct the | ||
root seed `r`, which prevents the receiver from pulling any of the partial | ||
payments until the entirety of the HTLC set arrives. This is enforced by the | ||
n-of-n secret shares provided in the final hop payload of each arriving partial | ||
payment. | ||
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None of the requirements enforce that more than one HTLC is sent, permitting the | ||
base case of 1 HTLC to function as a standalone spontaneous payment. | ||
There was a problem hiding this comment. Choose a reason for hiding this commentThe reason will be displayed to describe this comment to others. Learn more. 👏 I think this is important and this is why I view this work more as a "spontaneous payments" overall feature |
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# Accepting and Forwarding a Payment | ||
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Once a node has decoded the payload it either accepts the payment locally, or forwards it to the peer indicated as the next hop in the payload. | ||
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For recurring payments, the idea with AMP is that
payment_id
can be used as a type of 'deposit box', similar to a traditional bank account number.But this field is also used to prevent multiple people trying to pay to the same invoice simultaneously from disturbing each others sets.
It seems that both uses of the same field are mutually exclusive?
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Ok, clarified offline. That is what
set_id
is for