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as set in the default grin-server.toml.
Since this is in units of nanogrin, it expresses a base cost of 1 milli-grin.
This is what you pay for each unit of a transaction weight, which is defined in
as the linear combination 4 * #outputs + 1 * #kernels + (-1) * #inputs, with a minimum of 1.
This means that a typical tx with 2 outputs, 1 input and 1 kernel requires a relay fee of 8 milligrin,
currently worth about 1/3 cent.
We should revisit this base fee and tx weight coefficients to provide a good long term balance
between spam resistance and tx affordability. It would also be nice to make the tx weight coefficients seem less arbitrary.
The text was updated successfully, but these errors were encountered:
Is there some fee structure that could promote privacy preserving output selection? Recall the discussion in #2186 for instance.
For example, what if we could inceltivize 'balanced' transactions? (two inputs spend to two outputs), or some other structure that makes the tx graph better obfuscated.
Yes, we should consider incentivizing privacy enhancing transactions.
A tx with 2 inputs and 2 outputs is already cheaper in fees than a tx with only 1 input and 2 outputs.
The current minimum relay fee rules use
accept_fee_base = 1000000
as set in the default grin-server.toml.
Since this is in units of nanogrin, it expresses a base cost of 1 milli-grin.
This is what you pay for each unit of a transaction weight, which is defined in
grin/core/src/core/transaction.rs
Lines 847 to 856 in 20e5c19
as the linear combination 4 * #outputs + 1 * #kernels + (-1) * #inputs, with a minimum of 1.
This means that a typical tx with 2 outputs, 1 input and 1 kernel requires a relay fee of 8 milligrin,
currently worth about 1/3 cent.
We should revisit this base fee and tx weight coefficients to provide a good long term balance
between spam resistance and tx affordability. It would also be nice to make the tx weight coefficients seem less arbitrary.
The text was updated successfully, but these errors were encountered: