Avoid risks of PATH exploits #5
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Hi,
while trying to fix #4 I looked for environment variable preserving when executing with suid, and found there are actually vulnerabilities when doing system calls in a program with suid.
http://techblog.rosedu.org/exploiting-environment-variables.html
and for a more recent
https://www.hackingarticles.in/linux-privilege-escalation-using-path-variable/
this line https://github.com/shadow-robot/ethercat_grant/blob/kinetic-devel/src/ethercat_grant.cpp#L27 carries the potential risk even if I did not manage to reproduce the exploit (not sure what protects this yet), I think it would not be harmful to change the cp to its full linux path /bin/cp to avoid the PATH exploit