Isolate and modularize sanitization and rss feed #242
Conversation
WalkthroughThe changes in this pull request involve significant modifications to the sanitization of input queries and the generation of RSS feeds within the application. The Changes
Possibly related PRs
Warning Rate limit exceeded@synfinner has exceeded the limit for the number of commits or files that can be reviewed per hour. Please wait 15 minutes and 37 seconds before requesting another review. ⌛ How to resolve this issue?After the wait time has elapsed, a review can be triggered using the We recommend that you space out your commits to avoid hitting the rate limit. 🚦 How do rate limits work?CodeRabbit enforces hourly rate limits for each developer per organization. Our paid plans have higher rate limits than the trial, open-source and free plans. In all cases, we re-allow further reviews after a brief timeout. Please see our FAQ for further information. 📜 Recent review detailsConfiguration used: CodeRabbit UI 📒 Files selected for processing (1)
🚧 Files skipped from review as they are similar to previous changes (1)
Thank you for using CodeRabbit. We offer it for free to the OSS community and would appreciate your support in helping us grow. If you find it useful, would you consider giving us a shout-out on your favorite social media? 🪧 TipsChatThere are 3 ways to chat with CodeRabbit:
Note: Be mindful of the bot's finite context window. It's strongly recommended to break down tasks such as reading entire modules into smaller chunks. For a focused discussion, use review comments to chat about specific files and their changes, instead of using the PR comments. CodeRabbit Commands (Invoked using PR comments)
Other keywords and placeholders
CodeRabbit Configuration File (
|
![github-advanced-security[bot]](https://avatars.githubusercontent.com/in/57789?s=60&v=4){kind=small}
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Pylintpython3 (reported by Codacy) found more than 20 potential problems in the proposed changes. Check the Files changed tab for more details.
![coderabbitai[bot]](https://avatars.githubusercontent.com/in/347564?s=60&v=4){kind=small}
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Actionable comments posted: 5
🧹 Outside diff range and nitpick comments (6)
utils/sanitizer.py (2)
59-60: Update comment to reflect allowed charactersThe comment mentions "allowed characters (alphanumeric, spaces, hyphens)", but the regex also allows underscores. Update the comment to include underscores for clarity.
Apply this diff:
- # allowed characters (alphanumeric, spaces, hyphens) + # Allowed characters (alphanumeric, spaces, hyphens, underscores)
69-70: Relying on regex for SQL injection detection is unreliableUsing regular expressions to detect SQL injection patterns can lead to false positives and negatives. Consider using parameterized queries or ORM features that automatically handle SQL injection prevention.
schema/api.py (4)
27-28: Correct the typo in the commentIn line 27, the word "fectching" should be corrected to "fetching".
Line range hint
194-213: Simplify redundant conditional logic in caching implementationIn the
getmethod ofAllKevVulnerabilitiesResource, there are redundant conditional checks foractor_querywhen determining whether to use caching. Both the outer and innerif actor_queryconditions check the same thing, leading to unnecessary code duplication.To improve code readability and maintainability, consider refactoring the conditional logic as follows:
def get(self): # ... [previous code] ... if actor_query: # No caching if actor is specified total_vulns = self.count_documents(query) vulnerabilities = self.fetch_vulnerabilities(query, sort_criteria, page, per_page) else: # Use caching when actor is not specified cache_key = f"all_listing_page_{page}_per_page_{per_page}_sort_{sort_param}_order_{order_param}_search_{search_query}_filter_{filter_ransomware}" @cache(timeout=120, key_prefix=cache_key) def cached_fetch(): total_vulns = self.count_documents(query) vulnerabilities = self.fetch_vulnerabilities(query, sort_criteria, page, per_page) return total_vulns, vulnerabilities total_vulns, vulnerabilities = cached_fetch()This eliminates the redundant inner
if actor_querycondition and ensures caching is properly applied whenactor_queryis not specified.🧰 Tools
🪛 Ruff (0.8.0)
8-8:
flask.Responseimported but unusedRemove unused import
(F401)
8-8:
flask.jsonimported but unusedRemove unused import
(F401)
Line range hint
67-99: Consider refactoring duplicate code incveNVDResourceandcveMitreResourceThe
getmethods incveNVDResourceandcveMitreResourceclasses contain similar logic for sanitizing the CVE ID, querying the database, and returning serialized data. To adhere to the DRY (Don't Repeat Yourself) principle, consider abstracting the common functionality into a shared method or base class to reduce code duplication and improve maintainability.For example, you can create a base class method:
class BaseResource(Resource): # ... existing methods ... def get_vulnerability_data(self, cve_id, serializer_function): sanitized_cve_id = sanitize_query(cve_id) if not sanitized_cve_id: return self.handle_error("Invalid CVE ID", 400) vulnerability = all_vulns_collection.find_one({"_id": sanitized_cve_id}) if not vulnerability: return self.handle_error("Vulnerability not found") data = serializer_function(vulnerability) return self.make_json_response(data)Then modify the
getmethods:class cveNVDResource(BaseResource): @cache() def get(self, cve_id): return self.get_vulnerability_data(cve_id, nvd_serializer) class cveMitreResource(BaseResource): @cache() def get(self, cve_id): return self.get_vulnerability_data(cve_id, mitre_serializer)🧰 Tools
🪛 Ruff (0.8.0)
8-8:
flask.Responseimported but unusedRemove unused import
(F401)
8-8:
flask.jsonimported but unusedRemove unused import
(F401)
Line range hint
332-346: Ensure proper validation of the 'days' parameter without usingsanitize_queryIn the
getmethod ofRecentVulnerabilitiesByDaysResource, thedaysparameter is sanitized usingsanitize_query, which might not be appropriate for numerical input. Sincedaysis expected to be a non-negative integer, consider validating it directly to prevent potential issues.Adjust the code as follows to validate 'days' correctly:
def get(self): # Get the query parameters days = request.args.get("days") page = request.args.get("page", default=1, type=int) per_page = request.args.get("per_page", default=25, type=int) if per_page > 100: return self.handle_error("The 'per_page' parameter cannot exceed 100.", 400) per_page = max(1, per_page) if days is None: return self.handle_error("You must provide 'days' parameter", 400) - days = sanitize_query(days) - if not days.isdigit() or int(days) < 0: + try: + days = int(days) + if days < 0 or days > 14: + raise ValueError + except ValueError: return self.handle_error("Invalid value for days parameter. Please provide a non-negative integer no greater than 14.", 400) - if int(days) > 14: - return self.handle_error("Exceeded the maximum limit of 14 days", 400)This ensures that 'days' is properly validated as an integer within the expected range without relying on
sanitize_query.🧰 Tools
🪛 Ruff (0.8.0)
8-8:
flask.Responseimported but unusedRemove unused import
(F401)
8-8:
flask.jsonimported but unusedRemove unused import
(F401)
📜 Review details
Configuration used: CodeRabbit UI
Review profile: CHILL
📒 Files selected for processing (4)
kevin.py(2 hunks)schema/api.py(2 hunks)utils/rss_feed.py(1 hunks)utils/sanitizer.py(1 hunks)
🔇 Additional comments (3)
kevin.py (1)
17-18: Successful modularization of sanitize_query and create_rss_feed functions
The sanitize_query and create_rss_feed functions have been correctly modularized into separate utility modules and imported appropriately. This enhances code organization, reusability, and maintainability.
Also applies to: 141-142
schema/api.py (2)
5-5: Correct the import statement for sanitize_query
Ensure that the import path for sanitize_query is correct and that the utils.sanitizer module exists in the project structure.
Run the following script to verify the existence of the sanitize_query function in utils/sanitizer.py:
✅ Verification successful
Import statement for sanitize_query is correctly defined
The sanitize_query function is properly defined in utils/sanitizer.py and the import statement in schema/api.py correctly references this function. The function is well-documented and implements query sanitization logic as expected.
🏁 Scripts executed
The following scripts were executed for the analysis:
Script:
#!/bin/bash
# Description: Check if 'sanitize_query' is defined in 'utils/sanitizer.py'
# Test: Search for the definition of 'sanitize_query' in 'utils/sanitizer.py'
# Expect: The function definition should be found exactly once.
ast-grep --pattern $'def sanitize_query($_):\n $$$' utils/sanitizer.py
Length of output: 2902
27-28: Clarify the collection name in the comment
The comment mentions "cveland" collection. Ensure that "cveland" is the correct collection name. If it should be "cve_land" or another name, please update the comment accordingly for clarity.
Run the following script to verify the collection name used in the codebase:
This will help identify all instances where collections are referenced and ensure consistent naming.
✅ Verification successful
Let me gather more specific information about the collection names used in the codebase.
The collection name "cveland" in the comment is correct
The comment accurately reflects the collection name. This is verified by multiple pieces of evidence in the codebase:
- The database name is explicitly defined as
ALL_VULNS_DB_NAME = "cveland"inutils/database.py - The term "cveland" is consistently used throughout the codebase, including in resource names and route definitions
- The comment correctly describes that CVE-ID is used as the
_idfield in the cveland collection
🏁 Scripts executed
The following scripts were executed for the analysis:
Script:
#!/bin/bash
# Description: Verify the usage of collection names in the codebase.
# Test: Search for collection names. Expect consistent naming.
rg -A 2 $'collection\.\w+' --glob "*.py"
Length of output: 4999
Script:
#!/bin/bash
# Search for collection variable definitions and initializations
rg -A 2 "(collection|all_vulns_collection)\s*=\s*" --glob "*.py"
# Search for any mentions of "cveland" in the codebase
rg -i "cveland" --glob "*.py"
Length of output: 1442
| except Exception: # Catch any exceptions that may occur during URL decoding | ||
| return None # Return None if decoding fails |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
🛠️ Refactor suggestion
Avoid catching broad exceptions
Catching all exceptions with except Exception can mask unexpected errors and make debugging difficult. It's better to catch specific exceptions that may occur during URL decoding, such as UnicodeDecodeError.
Apply this diff:
except Exception: # Catch any exceptions that may occur during URL decoding
+ except UnicodeDecodeError: # Catch decoding errors during URL decoding
return None # Return None if decoding failsCommittable suggestion skipped: line range outside the PR's diff.
utils/sanitizer.py
Outdated
| if query is None or len(query) > 50: | ||
| return None |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Potential TypeError when checking the length of query
If query is not a string or does not support the len() function, calling len(query) may raise a TypeError. To prevent this, consider converting query to a string before performing the length check.
Apply this diff to fix the issue:
def sanitize_query(query):
- if query is None or len(query) > 50:
+ if query is None:
+ return None
+ query = str(query).strip()
+ if len(query) > 50:
return NoneCommittable suggestion skipped: line range outside the PR's diff.
| from defusedxml import ElementTree | ||
| from xml.etree.ElementTree import Element, SubElement |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Inconsistent use of XML parsing libraries; potential security risk
You're importing ElementTree from defusedxml, which is secure against XML vulnerabilities, but importing Element and SubElement from xml.etree.ElementTree. This inconsistency could negate the security benefits of using defusedxml. Import Element and SubElement from defusedxml.ElementTree instead.
Apply this diff:
-import html
-from defusedxml import ElementTree
-from xml.etree.ElementTree import Element, SubElement
+import html
+from defusedxml.ElementTree import Element, SubElement, tostringCommittable suggestion skipped: line range outside the PR's diff.
| for poc in github_pocs: | ||
| description_html += f"<li>{poc}</li>" |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Missing HTML escaping for poc variable
When adding GitHub POCs to the description, the poc variable is inserted into the HTML without escaping, which could lead to XSS vulnerabilities if poc contains malicious content. Use html.escape() to sanitize poc before including it in the HTML.
Apply this diff:
for poc in github_pocs:
- description_html += f"<li>{poc}</li>"
+ description_html += f"<li>{html.escape(poc)}</li>"Committable suggestion skipped: line range outside the PR's diff.
| <li><strong>Known Ransomware Usage:</strong> {entry.get('knownRansomwareCampaignUse', 'No Known Ransomware Usage')}</li> | ||
| <li><strong>GitHub POCs:</strong> | ||
| <ul> | ||
| """ | ||
|
|
||
| # Handle lists for GitHub POCs | ||
| github_pocs = entry.get("githubPocs", []) | ||
| if isinstance(github_pocs, list) and github_pocs: | ||
| for poc in github_pocs: | ||
| description_html += f"<li>{poc}</li>" | ||
| else: | ||
| description_html += "<li>No GitHub POCs</li>" | ||
|
|
||
| description_html += "</ul></li></ul>" | ||
|
|
||
| open_threat_data = entry.get("openThreatData", []) | ||
| if isinstance(open_threat_data, list) and open_threat_data: | ||
| adversaries = [] | ||
| affected_industries = [] | ||
| for data in open_threat_data: | ||
| adversaries.extend(data.get("adversaries", [])) | ||
| affected_industries.extend(data.get("affectedIndustries", [])) | ||
|
|
||
| adversaries_str = ", ".join(set(adversaries)) if adversaries else "No Adversaries" | ||
| affected_industries_str = ", ".join(set(affected_industries)) if affected_industries else "No Affected Industries" | ||
| open_threat_data_html = f""" | ||
| <ul> | ||
| <li><strong>Adversaries:</strong> {adversaries_str}</li> | ||
| <li><strong>Affected Industries:</strong> {affected_industries_str}</li> | ||
| </ul> | ||
| """ | ||
| else: | ||
| open_threat_data_html = "<p>No Open Threat Data</p>" | ||
|
|
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Ensure all user-supplied data is properly escaped to prevent XSS
Several fields in the description HTML are inserted without proper HTML escaping, which could lead to XSS vulnerabilities if the data contains malicious content. Ensure that all user-supplied data included in the HTML is escaped using html.escape().
Apply these changes:
-
Escape
entry.get('knownRansomwareCampaignUse', 'No Known Ransomware Usage'):<li><strong>Known Ransomware Usage:</strong> {entry.get('knownRansomwareCampaignUse', 'No Known Ransomware Usage')}</li> + <li><strong>Known Ransomware Usage:</strong> {html.escape(entry.get('knownRansomwareCampaignUse', 'No Known Ransomware Usage'))}</li> -
After joining adversaries and industries, escape the strings:
adversaries_str = ", ".join(set(adversaries)) if adversaries else "No Adversaries" affected_industries_str = ", ".join(set(affected_industries)) if affected_industries else "No Affected Industries" + adversaries_str = html.escape(adversaries_str) + affected_industries_str = html.escape(affected_industries_str)
Committable suggestion skipped: line range outside the PR's diff.
No description provided.