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This should hopefully be useful as orientation for users implementing the key exchange part of BIP324. Conceptually the example is not very different to the ECDH one, so a lot of code/comments are just copied (e.g. context creation, secret key generation, shared secret comparison, console output, cleanup with secret key clearing).
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ecdh_example | ||
ecdsa_example | ||
schnorr_example | ||
ellswift_example | ||
*.exe | ||
*.so | ||
*.a | ||
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/************************************************************************* | ||
* Written in 2024 by Sebastian Falbesoner * | ||
* To the extent possible under law, the author(s) have dedicated all * | ||
* copyright and related and neighboring rights to the software in this * | ||
* file to the public domain worldwide. This software is distributed * | ||
* without any warranty. For the CC0 Public Domain Dedication, see * | ||
* EXAMPLES_COPYING or https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0 * | ||
*************************************************************************/ | ||
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/** This file demonstrates how to use the ElligatorSwift module to perform | ||
* a key exchange according to BIP 324. Additionally, see the documentation | ||
* in include/secp256k1_ellswift.h and doc/ellswift.md. | ||
*/ | ||
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#include <stdio.h> | ||
#include <assert.h> | ||
#include <string.h> | ||
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#include <secp256k1.h> | ||
#include <secp256k1_ellswift.h> | ||
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#include "examples_util.h" | ||
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int main(void) { | ||
secp256k1_context* ctx; | ||
unsigned char randomize[32]; | ||
unsigned char auxrand1[32]; | ||
unsigned char auxrand2[32]; | ||
unsigned char seckey1[32]; | ||
unsigned char seckey2[32]; | ||
unsigned char ellswift_pubkey1[64]; | ||
unsigned char ellswift_pubkey2[64]; | ||
unsigned char shared_secret1[32]; | ||
unsigned char shared_secret2[32]; | ||
int return_val; | ||
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/* Create a secp256k1 context */ | ||
ctx = secp256k1_context_create(SECP256K1_CONTEXT_NONE); | ||
if (!fill_random(randomize, sizeof(randomize))) { | ||
printf("Failed to generate randomness\n"); | ||
return 1; | ||
} | ||
/* Randomizing the context is recommended to protect against side-channel | ||
* leakage. See `secp256k1_context_randomize` in secp256k1.h for more | ||
* information about it. This should never fail. */ | ||
return_val = secp256k1_context_randomize(ctx, randomize); | ||
assert(return_val); | ||
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/*** Generate secret keys ***/ | ||
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/* If the secret key is zero or out of range (bigger than secp256k1's | ||
* order), we try to sample a new key. Note that the probability of this | ||
* happening is negligible. */ | ||
while (1) { | ||
if (!fill_random(seckey1, sizeof(seckey1)) || !fill_random(seckey2, sizeof(seckey2))) { | ||
printf("Failed to generate randomness\n"); | ||
return 1; | ||
} | ||
if (secp256k1_ec_seckey_verify(ctx, seckey1) && secp256k1_ec_seckey_verify(ctx, seckey2)) { | ||
break; | ||
} | ||
} | ||
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/* Generate ElligatorSwift public keys. This should never fail with valid context and | ||
verified secret keys. Note that providing additional randomness (fourth parameter) is | ||
optional, but recommended. */ | ||
if (!fill_random(auxrand1, sizeof(auxrand1)) || !fill_random(auxrand2, sizeof(auxrand2))) { | ||
printf("Failed to generate randomness\n"); | ||
return 1; | ||
} | ||
return_val = secp256k1_ellswift_create(ctx, ellswift_pubkey1, seckey1, auxrand1); | ||
assert(return_val); | ||
return_val = secp256k1_ellswift_create(ctx, ellswift_pubkey2, seckey2, auxrand2); | ||
assert(return_val); | ||
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/*** Create the shared secret on each side ***/ | ||
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/* Perform x-only ECDH with seckey1 and ellswift_pubkey2. Should never fail | ||
* with a verified seckey and valid pubkey. Note that both parties pass both | ||
* EllSwift pubkeys in the same order; the pubkey of the calling party is | ||
* determined by the "party" boolean (sixth parameter). */ | ||
return_val = secp256k1_ellswift_xdh(ctx, shared_secret1, ellswift_pubkey1, ellswift_pubkey2, | ||
seckey1, 0, secp256k1_ellswift_xdh_hash_function_bip324, NULL); | ||
assert(return_val); | ||
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/* Perform x-only ECDH with seckey2 and ellswift_pubkey1. Should never fail | ||
* with a verified seckey and valid pubkey. */ | ||
return_val = secp256k1_ellswift_xdh(ctx, shared_secret2, ellswift_pubkey1, ellswift_pubkey2, | ||
seckey2, 1, secp256k1_ellswift_xdh_hash_function_bip324, NULL); | ||
assert(return_val); | ||
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/* Both parties should end up with the same shared secret */ | ||
return_val = memcmp(shared_secret1, shared_secret2, sizeof(shared_secret1)); | ||
assert(return_val == 0); | ||
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printf( " Secret Key1: "); | ||
print_hex(seckey1, sizeof(seckey1)); | ||
printf( "EllSwift Pubkey1: "); | ||
print_hex(ellswift_pubkey1, sizeof(ellswift_pubkey1)); | ||
printf("\n Secret Key2: "); | ||
print_hex(seckey2, sizeof(seckey2)); | ||
printf( "EllSwift Pubkey2: "); | ||
print_hex(ellswift_pubkey2, sizeof(ellswift_pubkey2)); | ||
printf("\n Shared Secret: "); | ||
print_hex(shared_secret1, sizeof(shared_secret1)); | ||
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/* This will clear everything from the context and free the memory */ | ||
secp256k1_context_destroy(ctx); | ||
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/* It's best practice to try to clear secrets from memory after using them. | ||
* This is done because some bugs can allow an attacker to leak memory, for | ||
* example through "out of bounds" array access (see Heartbleed), or the OS | ||
* swapping them to disk. Hence, we overwrite the secret key buffer with zeros. | ||
* | ||
* Here we are preventing these writes from being optimized out, as any good compiler | ||
* will remove any writes that aren't used. */ | ||
secure_erase(seckey1, sizeof(seckey1)); | ||
secure_erase(seckey2, sizeof(seckey2)); | ||
secure_erase(shared_secret1, sizeof(shared_secret1)); | ||
secure_erase(shared_secret2, sizeof(shared_secret2)); | ||
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return 0; | ||
} |