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Playback/Capture can't work on UP^2 #96

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ZhendanYang opened this issue Aug 27, 2018 · 4 comments
Closed

Playback/Capture can't work on UP^2 #96

ZhendanYang opened this issue Aug 27, 2018 · 4 comments

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@ZhendanYang
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Summary:
After booting, there was no error message in dmesg. Then I tried to playback/capture, but playback/capture couldn't work and ipc error occurred.

Environment:
on up^2 with gcc
sof-dev:7481f7af7ac711504ae52fa9ae5cb5c3322ea91f
sof:4aff776d1c290542ded98f8aa22f50d4b9477d37
soft:41861aac373eb1f6978bfdb0bbe97cd882b1785a
tplg:sof-apl-nocodec.tplg
(I tested on sof-dev : c465461 and there was no such issue)

Log:
dmesg-up2.log
rmbox-t-up2.log
rmbox-up2.log

@ghost
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ghost commented Aug 28, 2018

@lgirdwood
I added test code like this below in the function sof_route_load()

	sroute->route.source = kstrdup(route->source, GFP_KERNEL);
	if (!sroute->route.source) {
		dev_err(sdev->dev, "==wzg: route soure malloc fail %s\n",sroute->route.source);
		goto err;
	}

	sroute->route.sink = kstrdup(route->sink, GFP_KERNEL);
	if (!sroute->route.sink) {
		dev_err(sdev->dev, "==wzg: route sink malloc fail %s\n",sroute->route.source);
		kfree(sroute->route.source);
		goto err;
	}

	sroute->route.control = kstrdup(route->control, GFP_KERNEL);
	if (!sroute->route.control) {
		dev_err(sdev->dev, "==wzg: route control malloc fail %s\n",sroute->route.source);
		kfree(sroute->route.source);
		kfree(sroute->route.sink);
		goto err;
	}

I got the log: "route control malloc fail .....".
It is strange. I do not know why this would happen.
It seems it failed many times.

@ghost
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ghost commented Aug 28, 2018

@lgirdwood
I found the root cause of this PR #80
I will send another fix for this issue.

@ghost
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ghost commented Aug 28, 2018

@lgirdwood
The root cause is: the upper function will sometimes set the route->control pointer = NULL.
then in the sof_route_load() function, it will malloc failure. the error will happen. the route is not added
into the list. the IPC error will happen.

@ghost
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ghost commented Aug 28, 2018

fixed by the PR #99

@ghost ghost self-assigned this Aug 29, 2018
plbossart pushed a commit that referenced this issue Mar 5, 2019
… fault

The userspace can ask kprobe to intercept strings at any memory address,
including invalid kernel address. In this case, fetch_store_strlen()
would crash since it uses general usercopy function, and user access
functions are no longer allowed to access kernel memory.

For example, we can crash the kernel by doing something as below:

$ sudo kprobe 'p:do_sys_open +0(+0(%si)):string'

[  103.620391] BUG: GPF in non-whitelisted uaccess (non-canonical address?)
[  103.622104] general protection fault: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI
[  103.623424] CPU: 10 PID: 1046 Comm: cat Not tainted 5.0.0-rc3-00130-gd73aba1-dirty #96
[  103.625321] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.12.0-2-g628b2e6-dirty-20190104_103505-linux 04/01/2014
[  103.628284] RIP: 0010:process_fetch_insn+0x1ab/0x4b0
[  103.629518] Code: 10 83 80 28 2e 00 00 01 31 d2 31 ff 48 8b 74 24 28 eb 0c 81 fa ff 0f 00 00 7f 1c 85 c0 75 18 66 66 90 0f ae e8 48 63
 ca 89 f8 <8a> 0c 31 66 66 90 83 c2 01 84 c9 75 dc 89 54 24 34 89 44 24 28 48
[  103.634032] RSP: 0018:ffff88845eb37ce0 EFLAGS: 00010246
[  103.635312] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff888456c4e5a8 RCX: 0000000000000000
[  103.637057] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 2e646c2f6374652f RDI: 0000000000000000
[  103.638795] RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
[  103.640556] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000000
[  103.642297] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
[  103.644040] FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88846f000000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[  103.646019] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[  103.647436] CR2: 00007ffc79758038 CR3: 0000000463360006 CR4: 0000000000020ee0
[  103.649147] Call Trace:
[  103.649781]  ? sched_clock_cpu+0xc/0xa0
[  103.650747]  ? do_sys_open+0x5/0x220
[  103.651635]  kprobe_trace_func+0x303/0x380
[  103.652645]  ? do_sys_open+0x5/0x220
[  103.653528]  kprobe_dispatcher+0x45/0x50
[  103.654682]  ? do_sys_open+0x1/0x220
[  103.655875]  kprobe_ftrace_handler+0x90/0xf0
[  103.657282]  ftrace_ops_assist_func+0x54/0xf0
[  103.658564]  ? __call_rcu+0x1dc/0x280
[  103.659482]  0xffffffffc00000bf
[  103.660384]  ? __ia32_sys_open+0x20/0x20
[  103.661682]  ? do_sys_open+0x1/0x220
[  103.662863]  do_sys_open+0x5/0x220
[  103.663988]  do_syscall_64+0x60/0x210
[  103.665201]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
[  103.666862] RIP: 0033:0x7fc22fadccdd
[  103.668034] Code: 48 89 54 24 e0 41 83 e2 40 75 32 89 f0 25 00 00 41 00 3d 00 00 41 00 74 24 89 f2 b8 01 01 00 00 48 89 fe bf 9c ff ff
 ff 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 33 f3 c3 66 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 48 8d 44
[  103.674029] RSP: 002b:00007ffc7972c3a8 EFLAGS: 00000287 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000101
[  103.676512] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000562f86147a21 RCX: 00007fc22fadccdd
[  103.678853] RDX: 0000000000080000 RSI: 00007fc22fae1428 RDI: 00000000ffffff9c
[  103.681151] RBP: ffffffffffffffff R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
[  103.683489] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000287 R12: 00007fc22fce90a8
[  103.685774] R13: 0000000000000001 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
[  103.688056] Modules linked in:
[  103.689131] ---[ end trace 43792035c28984a1 ]---

This can be fixed by using probe_mem_read() instead, as it can handle faulting
kernel memory addresses, which kprobes can legitimately do.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190125151051.7381-1-changbin.du@gmail.com

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 9da3f2b ("x86/fault: BUG() when uaccess helpers fault on kernel addresses")
Signed-off-by: Changbin Du <changbin.du@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
cujomalainey pushed a commit to cujomalainey/linux that referenced this issue Apr 15, 2019
… and counting the objects in debugfs

Fixes an issue whereby we may race with the table updates (before the
core takes the struct_mutex) and so risk dereferencing a stale pointer in
the iterator for /debugfs/.../i915_gem_objects. For example,

[ 1524.757545] BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at f53af748
[ 1524.757572] IP: [<c1406982>] per_file_stats+0x12/0x100
[ 1524.757599] *pdpt = 0000000001b13001 *pde = 00000000379fb067 *pte = 80000000353af060
[ 1524.757621] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC
[ 1524.757637] Modules linked in: ctr ccm arc4 ath9k ath9k_common ath9k_hw ath snd_hda_codec_conexant mac80211 snd_hda_codec_generic snd_hda_intel snd_hda_controller snd_hda_codec bnep snd_hwdep rfcomm snd_pcm gpio_ich dell_wmi sparse_keymap snd_seq_midi hid_multitouch uvcvideo snd_seq_midi_event dell_laptop snd_rawmidi dcdbas snd_seq videobuf2_vmalloc videobuf2_memops videobuf2_core usbhid videodev snd_seq_device coretemp snd_timer hid joydev kvm_intel cfg80211 ath3k kvm btusb bluetooth serio_raw snd microcode soundcore lpc_ich wmi mac_hid parport_pc ppdev lp parport psmouse ahci libahci
[ 1524.757825] CPU: 3 PID: 1911 Comm: intel-gpu-overl Tainted: G        W  OE 3.15.0-rc3+ thesofproject#96
[ 1524.757840] Hardware name: Dell Inc. Inspiron 1090/Inspiron 1090, BIOS A06 08/23/2011
[ 1524.757855] task: f52f36c0 ti: f4cbc000 task.ti: f4cbc000
[ 1524.757869] EIP: 0060:[<c1406982>] EFLAGS: 00210202 CPU: 3
[ 1524.757884] EIP is at per_file_stats+0x12/0x100
[ 1524.757896] EAX: 0000002d EBX: 00000000 ECX: f4cbdefc EDX: f53af700
[ 1524.757909] ESI: c1406970 EDI: f53af700 EBP: f4cbde6c ESP: f4cbde5c
[ 1524.757922]  DS: 007b ES: 007b FS: 00d8 GS: 0033 SS: 0068
[ 1524.757934] CR0: 80050033 CR2: f53af748 CR3: 356af000 CR4: 000007f0
[ 1524.757945] Stack:
[ 1524.757957]  f4cbdefc 00000000 c1406970 f53af700 f4cbdea8 c12e5f15 f4cbdefc c1406970
[ 1524.757993]  0000ffff f4cbde90 0000002d f5dc5cd0 e4e80438 c1181d59 f4cbded8 f4d89900
[ 1524.758027]  f5631b40 e5131074 c1903f37 f4cbdf28 c14068e6 f52648a0 c1927748 c1903f37
[ 1524.758062] Call Trace:
[ 1524.758084]  [<c1406970>] ? i915_gem_object_info+0x510/0x510
[ 1524.758106]  [<c12e5f15>] idr_for_each+0xa5/0x100
[ 1524.758126]  [<c1406970>] ? i915_gem_object_info+0x510/0x510
[ 1524.758148]  [<c1181d59>] ? seq_vprintf+0x29/0x50
[ 1524.758168]  [<c14068e6>] i915_gem_object_info+0x486/0x510
[ 1524.758189]  [<c11823a6>] seq_read+0xd6/0x380
[ 1524.758208]  [<c116d11d>] ? final_putname+0x1d/0x40
[ 1524.758227]  [<c11822d0>] ? seq_hlist_next_percpu+0x90/0x90
[ 1524.758246]  [<c1163e52>] vfs_read+0x82/0x150
[ 1524.758265]  [<c11645d6>] SyS_read+0x46/0x90
[ 1524.758285]  [<c16b8d8c>] sysenter_do_call+0x12/0x22
[ 1524.758298] Code: f5 8f 2a 00 83 c4 6c 31 c0 5b 5e 5f 5d c3 8d 74 26 00 8d bc 27 00 00 00 00 55 89 e5 57 56 53 83 ec 04 3e 8d 74 26 00 83 41 04 01 <8b> 42 48 01 41 08 8b 42 4c 89 d7 85 c0 75 07 8b 42 60 85 c0 74
[ 1524.758461] EIP: [<c1406982>] per_file_stats+0x12/0x100 SS:ESP 0068:f4cbde5c
[ 1524.758485] CR2: 00000000f53af748

Reported-by: Sam Jansen <sam.jansen@starleaf.com>
Signed-off-by: Chris Wilson <chris@chris-wilson.co.uk>
Cc: Sam Jansen <sam.jansen@starleaf.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Daniel Vetter <daniel.vetter@ffwll.ch>
Signed-off-by: Jani Nikula <jani.nikula@intel.com>
(cherry picked from commit 5b5ffff)

Conflicts:
   drivers/gpu/drm/i915/i915_debugfs.c

BUG=chromium:950751
TEST=poke at /debugfs/.../i915_gem_objects

Change-Id: I2fe31b29fc0f693fd45408fd7cab9d43e04b09c1
Signed-off-by: Brian Norris <briannorris@chromium.org>
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1562471
Reviewed-by: Stéphane Marchesin <marcheu@chromium.org>
fredoh9 pushed a commit to fredoh9/linux that referenced this issue May 6, 2019
syzbot was able to crash host by sending UDP packets with a 0 payload.

TCP does not have this issue since we do not aggregate packets without
payload.

Since dev_gro_receive() sets gso_size based on skb_gro_len(skb)
it seems not worth trying to cope with padded packets.

BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in skb_gro_receive+0xf5f/0x10e0 net/core/skbuff.c:3826
Read of size 16 at addr ffff88808893fff0 by task syz-executor612/7889

CPU: 0 PID: 7889 Comm: syz-executor612 Not tainted 5.1.0-rc7+ thesofproject#96
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
 __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
 dump_stack+0x172/0x1f0 lib/dump_stack.c:113
 print_address_description.cold+0x7c/0x20d mm/kasan/report.c:187
 kasan_report.cold+0x1b/0x40 mm/kasan/report.c:317
 __asan_report_load16_noabort+0x14/0x20 mm/kasan/generic_report.c:133
 skb_gro_receive+0xf5f/0x10e0 net/core/skbuff.c:3826
 udp_gro_receive_segment net/ipv4/udp_offload.c:382 [inline]
 call_gro_receive include/linux/netdevice.h:2349 [inline]
 udp_gro_receive+0xb61/0xfd0 net/ipv4/udp_offload.c:414
 udp4_gro_receive+0x763/0xeb0 net/ipv4/udp_offload.c:478
 inet_gro_receive+0xe72/0x1110 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:1510
 dev_gro_receive+0x1cd0/0x23c0 net/core/dev.c:5581
 napi_gro_frags+0x36b/0xd10 net/core/dev.c:5843
 tun_get_user+0x2f24/0x3fb0 drivers/net/tun.c:1981
 tun_chr_write_iter+0xbd/0x156 drivers/net/tun.c:2027
 call_write_iter include/linux/fs.h:1866 [inline]
 do_iter_readv_writev+0x5e1/0x8e0 fs/read_write.c:681
 do_iter_write fs/read_write.c:957 [inline]
 do_iter_write+0x184/0x610 fs/read_write.c:938
 vfs_writev+0x1b3/0x2f0 fs/read_write.c:1002
 do_writev+0x15e/0x370 fs/read_write.c:1037
 __do_sys_writev fs/read_write.c:1110 [inline]
 __se_sys_writev fs/read_write.c:1107 [inline]
 __x64_sys_writev+0x75/0xb0 fs/read_write.c:1107
 do_syscall_64+0x103/0x610 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
RIP: 0033:0x441cc0
Code: 05 48 3d 01 f0 ff ff 0f 83 9d 09 fc ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 66 90 83 3d 51 93 29 00 00 75 14 b8 14 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 0f 83 74 09 fc ff c3 48 83 ec 08 e8 ba 2b 00 00
RSP: 002b:00007ffe8c716118 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000014
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007ffe8c716150 RCX: 0000000000441cc0
RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 00007ffe8c716170 RDI: 00000000000000f0
RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 000000000000ffff R09: 0000000000a64668
R10: 0000000020000040 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 000000000000c2d9
R13: 0000000000402b50 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000

Allocated by task 5143:
 save_stack+0x45/0xd0 mm/kasan/common.c:75
 set_track mm/kasan/common.c:87 [inline]
 __kasan_kmalloc mm/kasan/common.c:497 [inline]
 __kasan_kmalloc.constprop.0+0xcf/0xe0 mm/kasan/common.c:470
 kasan_slab_alloc+0xf/0x20 mm/kasan/common.c:505
 slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slab.h:437 [inline]
 slab_alloc mm/slab.c:3393 [inline]
 kmem_cache_alloc+0x11a/0x6f0 mm/slab.c:3555
 mm_alloc+0x1d/0xd0 kernel/fork.c:1030
 bprm_mm_init fs/exec.c:363 [inline]
 __do_execve_file.isra.0+0xaa3/0x23f0 fs/exec.c:1791
 do_execveat_common fs/exec.c:1865 [inline]
 do_execve fs/exec.c:1882 [inline]
 __do_sys_execve fs/exec.c:1958 [inline]
 __se_sys_execve fs/exec.c:1953 [inline]
 __x64_sys_execve+0x8f/0xc0 fs/exec.c:1953
 do_syscall_64+0x103/0x610 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe

Freed by task 5351:
 save_stack+0x45/0xd0 mm/kasan/common.c:75
 set_track mm/kasan/common.c:87 [inline]
 __kasan_slab_free+0x102/0x150 mm/kasan/common.c:459
 kasan_slab_free+0xe/0x10 mm/kasan/common.c:467
 __cache_free mm/slab.c:3499 [inline]
 kmem_cache_free+0x86/0x260 mm/slab.c:3765
 __mmdrop+0x238/0x320 kernel/fork.c:677
 mmdrop include/linux/sched/mm.h:49 [inline]
 finish_task_switch+0x47b/0x780 kernel/sched/core.c:2746
 context_switch kernel/sched/core.c:2880 [inline]
 __schedule+0x81b/0x1cc0 kernel/sched/core.c:3518
 preempt_schedule_irq+0xb5/0x140 kernel/sched/core.c:3745
 retint_kernel+0x1b/0x2d
 arch_local_irq_restore arch/x86/include/asm/paravirt.h:767 [inline]
 kmem_cache_free+0xab/0x260 mm/slab.c:3766
 anon_vma_chain_free mm/rmap.c:134 [inline]
 unlink_anon_vmas+0x2ba/0x870 mm/rmap.c:401
 free_pgtables+0x1af/0x2f0 mm/memory.c:394
 exit_mmap+0x2d1/0x530 mm/mmap.c:3144
 __mmput kernel/fork.c:1046 [inline]
 mmput+0x15f/0x4c0 kernel/fork.c:1067
 exec_mmap fs/exec.c:1046 [inline]
 flush_old_exec+0x8d9/0x1c20 fs/exec.c:1279
 load_elf_binary+0x9bc/0x53f0 fs/binfmt_elf.c:864
 search_binary_handler fs/exec.c:1656 [inline]
 search_binary_handler+0x17f/0x570 fs/exec.c:1634
 exec_binprm fs/exec.c:1698 [inline]
 __do_execve_file.isra.0+0x1394/0x23f0 fs/exec.c:1818
 do_execveat_common fs/exec.c:1865 [inline]
 do_execve fs/exec.c:1882 [inline]
 __do_sys_execve fs/exec.c:1958 [inline]
 __se_sys_execve fs/exec.c:1953 [inline]
 __x64_sys_execve+0x8f/0xc0 fs/exec.c:1953
 do_syscall_64+0x103/0x610 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe

The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88808893f7c0
 which belongs to the cache mm_struct of size 1496
The buggy address is located 600 bytes to the right of
 1496-byte region [ffff88808893f7c0, ffff88808893fd98)
The buggy address belongs to the page:
page:ffffea0002224f80 count:1 mapcount:0 mapping:ffff88821bc40ac0 index:0xffff88808893f7c0 compound_mapcount: 0
flags: 0x1fffc0000010200(slab|head)
raw: 01fffc0000010200 ffffea00025b4f08 ffffea00027b9d08 ffff88821bc40ac0
raw: ffff88808893f7c0 ffff88808893e440 0000000100000001 0000000000000000
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected

Memory state around the buggy address:
 ffff88808893fe80: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
 ffff88808893ff00: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
>ffff88808893ff80: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
                                                             ^
 ffff888088940000: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
 ffff888088940080: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00

Fixes: e20cf8d ("udp: implement GRO for plain UDP sockets.")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
naveen-manohar pushed a commit to naveen-manohar/linux that referenced this issue May 23, 2019
commit f16eb8a upstream.

If SSDT overlay is loaded via ConfigFS and then unloaded the device,
we would like to have OF modalias for, already gone. Thus, acpi_get_name()
returns no allocated buffer for such case and kernel crashes afterwards:

 ACPI: Host-directed Dynamic ACPI Table Unload
 ads7950 spi-PRP0001:00: Dropping the link to regulator.0
 BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000000
 #PF error: [normal kernel read fault]
 PGD 80000000070d6067 P4D 80000000070d6067 PUD 70d0067 PMD 0
 Oops: 0000 [thesofproject#1] SMP PTI
 CPU: 0 PID: 40 Comm: kworker/u4:2 Not tainted 5.0.0+ thesofproject#96
 Hardware name: Intel Corporation Merrifield/BODEGA BAY, BIOS 542 2015.01.21:18.19.48
 Workqueue: kacpi_hotplug acpi_device_del_work_fn
 RIP: 0010:create_of_modalias.isra.1+0x4c/0x150
 Code: 00 00 48 89 44 24 18 31 c0 48 8d 54 24 08 48 c7 44 24 10 00 00 00 00 48 c7 44 24 08 ff ff ff ff e8 7a b0 03 00 48 8b 4c 24 10 <0f> b6 01 84 c0 74 27 48 c7 c7 00 09 f4 a5 0f b6 f0 8d 50 20 f6 04
 RSP: 0000:ffffa51040297c10 EFLAGS: 00010246
 RAX: 0000000000001001 RBX: 0000000000000785 RCX: 0000000000000000
 RDX: 0000000000001001 RSI: 0000000000000286 RDI: ffffa2163dc042e0
 RBP: ffffa216062b1196 R08: 0000000000001001 R09: ffffa21639873000
 R10: ffffffffa606761d R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffffa21639873218
 R13: ffffa2163deb5060 R14: ffffa216063d1010 R15: 0000000000000000
 FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffffa2163e000000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
 CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
 CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 0000000007114000 CR4: 00000000001006f0
 Call Trace:
  __acpi_device_uevent_modalias+0xb0/0x100
  spi_uevent+0xd/0x40

 ...

In order to fix above let create_of_modalias() check the status returned
by acpi_get_name() and bail out in case of failure.

Fixes: 8765c5b ("ACPI / scan: Rework modalias creation when "compatible" is present")
Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=201381
Reported-by: Ferry Toth <fntoth@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Ferry Toth<fntoth@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com>
Cc: 4.1+ <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 4.1+
Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
bardliao pushed a commit that referenced this issue Jun 11, 2019
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1821607

commit f16eb8a upstream.

If SSDT overlay is loaded via ConfigFS and then unloaded the device,
we would like to have OF modalias for, already gone. Thus, acpi_get_name()
returns no allocated buffer for such case and kernel crashes afterwards:

 ACPI: Host-directed Dynamic ACPI Table Unload
 ads7950 spi-PRP0001:00: Dropping the link to regulator.0
 BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000000
 #PF error: [normal kernel read fault]
 PGD 80000000070d6067 P4D 80000000070d6067 PUD 70d0067 PMD 0
 Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI
 CPU: 0 PID: 40 Comm: kworker/u4:2 Not tainted 5.0.0+ #96
 Hardware name: Intel Corporation Merrifield/BODEGA BAY, BIOS 542 2015.01.21:18.19.48
 Workqueue: kacpi_hotplug acpi_device_del_work_fn
 RIP: 0010:create_of_modalias.isra.1+0x4c/0x150
 Code: 00 00 48 89 44 24 18 31 c0 48 8d 54 24 08 48 c7 44 24 10 00 00 00 00 48 c7 44 24 08 ff ff ff ff e8 7a b0 03 00 48 8b 4c 24 10 <0f> b6 01 84 c0 74 27 48 c7 c7 00 09 f4 a5 0f b6 f0 8d 50 20 f6 04
 RSP: 0000:ffffa51040297c10 EFLAGS: 00010246
 RAX: 0000000000001001 RBX: 0000000000000785 RCX: 0000000000000000
 RDX: 0000000000001001 RSI: 0000000000000286 RDI: ffffa2163dc042e0
 RBP: ffffa216062b1196 R08: 0000000000001001 R09: ffffa21639873000
 R10: ffffffffa606761d R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffffa21639873218
 R13: ffffa2163deb5060 R14: ffffa216063d1010 R15: 0000000000000000
 FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffffa2163e000000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
 CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
 CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 0000000007114000 CR4: 00000000001006f0
 Call Trace:
  __acpi_device_uevent_modalias+0xb0/0x100
  spi_uevent+0xd/0x40

 ...

In order to fix above let create_of_modalias() check the status returned
by acpi_get_name() and bail out in case of failure.

Fixes: 8765c5b ("ACPI / scan: Rework modalias creation when "compatible" is present")
Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=201381
Reported-by: Ferry Toth <fntoth@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Ferry Toth<fntoth@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com>
Cc: 4.1+ <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 4.1+
Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

Signed-off-by: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>
bardliao pushed a commit that referenced this issue Jun 11, 2019
syzbot was able to crash host by sending UDP packets with a 0 payload.

TCP does not have this issue since we do not aggregate packets without
payload.

Since dev_gro_receive() sets gso_size based on skb_gro_len(skb)
it seems not worth trying to cope with padded packets.

BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in skb_gro_receive+0xf5f/0x10e0 net/core/skbuff.c:3826
Read of size 16 at addr ffff88808893fff0 by task syz-executor612/7889

CPU: 0 PID: 7889 Comm: syz-executor612 Not tainted 5.1.0-rc7+ #96
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
 __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
 dump_stack+0x172/0x1f0 lib/dump_stack.c:113
 print_address_description.cold+0x7c/0x20d mm/kasan/report.c:187
 kasan_report.cold+0x1b/0x40 mm/kasan/report.c:317
 __asan_report_load16_noabort+0x14/0x20 mm/kasan/generic_report.c:133
 skb_gro_receive+0xf5f/0x10e0 net/core/skbuff.c:3826
 udp_gro_receive_segment net/ipv4/udp_offload.c:382 [inline]
 call_gro_receive include/linux/netdevice.h:2349 [inline]
 udp_gro_receive+0xb61/0xfd0 net/ipv4/udp_offload.c:414
 udp4_gro_receive+0x763/0xeb0 net/ipv4/udp_offload.c:478
 inet_gro_receive+0xe72/0x1110 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:1510
 dev_gro_receive+0x1cd0/0x23c0 net/core/dev.c:5581
 napi_gro_frags+0x36b/0xd10 net/core/dev.c:5843
 tun_get_user+0x2f24/0x3fb0 drivers/net/tun.c:1981
 tun_chr_write_iter+0xbd/0x156 drivers/net/tun.c:2027
 call_write_iter include/linux/fs.h:1866 [inline]
 do_iter_readv_writev+0x5e1/0x8e0 fs/read_write.c:681
 do_iter_write fs/read_write.c:957 [inline]
 do_iter_write+0x184/0x610 fs/read_write.c:938
 vfs_writev+0x1b3/0x2f0 fs/read_write.c:1002
 do_writev+0x15e/0x370 fs/read_write.c:1037
 __do_sys_writev fs/read_write.c:1110 [inline]
 __se_sys_writev fs/read_write.c:1107 [inline]
 __x64_sys_writev+0x75/0xb0 fs/read_write.c:1107
 do_syscall_64+0x103/0x610 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
RIP: 0033:0x441cc0
Code: 05 48 3d 01 f0 ff ff 0f 83 9d 09 fc ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 66 90 83 3d 51 93 29 00 00 75 14 b8 14 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 0f 83 74 09 fc ff c3 48 83 ec 08 e8 ba 2b 00 00
RSP: 002b:00007ffe8c716118 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000014
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007ffe8c716150 RCX: 0000000000441cc0
RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 00007ffe8c716170 RDI: 00000000000000f0
RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 000000000000ffff R09: 0000000000a64668
R10: 0000000020000040 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 000000000000c2d9
R13: 0000000000402b50 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000

Allocated by task 5143:
 save_stack+0x45/0xd0 mm/kasan/common.c:75
 set_track mm/kasan/common.c:87 [inline]
 __kasan_kmalloc mm/kasan/common.c:497 [inline]
 __kasan_kmalloc.constprop.0+0xcf/0xe0 mm/kasan/common.c:470
 kasan_slab_alloc+0xf/0x20 mm/kasan/common.c:505
 slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slab.h:437 [inline]
 slab_alloc mm/slab.c:3393 [inline]
 kmem_cache_alloc+0x11a/0x6f0 mm/slab.c:3555
 mm_alloc+0x1d/0xd0 kernel/fork.c:1030
 bprm_mm_init fs/exec.c:363 [inline]
 __do_execve_file.isra.0+0xaa3/0x23f0 fs/exec.c:1791
 do_execveat_common fs/exec.c:1865 [inline]
 do_execve fs/exec.c:1882 [inline]
 __do_sys_execve fs/exec.c:1958 [inline]
 __se_sys_execve fs/exec.c:1953 [inline]
 __x64_sys_execve+0x8f/0xc0 fs/exec.c:1953
 do_syscall_64+0x103/0x610 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe

Freed by task 5351:
 save_stack+0x45/0xd0 mm/kasan/common.c:75
 set_track mm/kasan/common.c:87 [inline]
 __kasan_slab_free+0x102/0x150 mm/kasan/common.c:459
 kasan_slab_free+0xe/0x10 mm/kasan/common.c:467
 __cache_free mm/slab.c:3499 [inline]
 kmem_cache_free+0x86/0x260 mm/slab.c:3765
 __mmdrop+0x238/0x320 kernel/fork.c:677
 mmdrop include/linux/sched/mm.h:49 [inline]
 finish_task_switch+0x47b/0x780 kernel/sched/core.c:2746
 context_switch kernel/sched/core.c:2880 [inline]
 __schedule+0x81b/0x1cc0 kernel/sched/core.c:3518
 preempt_schedule_irq+0xb5/0x140 kernel/sched/core.c:3745
 retint_kernel+0x1b/0x2d
 arch_local_irq_restore arch/x86/include/asm/paravirt.h:767 [inline]
 kmem_cache_free+0xab/0x260 mm/slab.c:3766
 anon_vma_chain_free mm/rmap.c:134 [inline]
 unlink_anon_vmas+0x2ba/0x870 mm/rmap.c:401
 free_pgtables+0x1af/0x2f0 mm/memory.c:394
 exit_mmap+0x2d1/0x530 mm/mmap.c:3144
 __mmput kernel/fork.c:1046 [inline]
 mmput+0x15f/0x4c0 kernel/fork.c:1067
 exec_mmap fs/exec.c:1046 [inline]
 flush_old_exec+0x8d9/0x1c20 fs/exec.c:1279
 load_elf_binary+0x9bc/0x53f0 fs/binfmt_elf.c:864
 search_binary_handler fs/exec.c:1656 [inline]
 search_binary_handler+0x17f/0x570 fs/exec.c:1634
 exec_binprm fs/exec.c:1698 [inline]
 __do_execve_file.isra.0+0x1394/0x23f0 fs/exec.c:1818
 do_execveat_common fs/exec.c:1865 [inline]
 do_execve fs/exec.c:1882 [inline]
 __do_sys_execve fs/exec.c:1958 [inline]
 __se_sys_execve fs/exec.c:1953 [inline]
 __x64_sys_execve+0x8f/0xc0 fs/exec.c:1953
 do_syscall_64+0x103/0x610 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe

The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88808893f7c0
 which belongs to the cache mm_struct of size 1496
The buggy address is located 600 bytes to the right of
 1496-byte region [ffff88808893f7c0, ffff88808893fd98)
The buggy address belongs to the page:
page:ffffea0002224f80 count:1 mapcount:0 mapping:ffff88821bc40ac0 index:0xffff88808893f7c0 compound_mapcount: 0
flags: 0x1fffc0000010200(slab|head)
raw: 01fffc0000010200 ffffea00025b4f08 ffffea00027b9d08 ffff88821bc40ac0
raw: ffff88808893f7c0 ffff88808893e440 0000000100000001 0000000000000000
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected

Memory state around the buggy address:
 ffff88808893fe80: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
 ffff88808893ff00: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
>ffff88808893ff80: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
                                                             ^
 ffff888088940000: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
 ffff888088940080: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00

Fixes: e20cf8d ("udp: implement GRO for plain UDP sockets.")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

CVE-2019-11683

(cherry picked from commit 4dd2b82)
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Steve Beattie <sbeattie@ubuntu.com>
Acked-by: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com>
plbossart pushed a commit that referenced this issue Nov 11, 2019
Current code doesn't limit the number of nested devices.
Nested devices would be handled recursively and this needs huge stack
memory. So, unlimited nested devices could make stack overflow.

This patch adds upper_level and lower_level, they are common variables
and represent maximum lower/upper depth.
When upper/lower device is attached or dettached,
{lower/upper}_level are updated. and if maximum depth is bigger than 8,
attach routine fails and returns -EMLINK.

In addition, this patch converts recursive routine of
netdev_walk_all_{lower/upper} to iterator routine.

Test commands:
    ip link add dummy0 type dummy
    ip link add link dummy0 name vlan1 type vlan id 1
    ip link set vlan1 up

    for i in {2..55}
    do
	    let A=$i-1

	    ip link add vlan$i link vlan$A type vlan id $i
    done
    ip link del dummy0

Splat looks like:
[  155.513226][  T908] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in __unwind_start+0x71/0x850
[  155.514162][  T908] Write of size 88 at addr ffff8880608a6cc0 by task ip/908
[  155.515048][  T908]
[  155.515333][  T908] CPU: 0 PID: 908 Comm: ip Not tainted 5.4.0-rc3+ #96
[  155.516147][  T908] Hardware name: innotek GmbH VirtualBox/VirtualBox, BIOS VirtualBox 12/01/2006
[  155.517233][  T908] Call Trace:
[  155.517627][  T908]
[  155.517918][  T908] Allocated by task 0:
[  155.518412][  T908] (stack is not available)
[  155.518955][  T908]
[  155.519228][  T908] Freed by task 0:
[  155.519885][  T908] (stack is not available)
[  155.520452][  T908]
[  155.520729][  T908] The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff8880608a6ac0
[  155.520729][  T908]  which belongs to the cache names_cache of size 4096
[  155.522387][  T908] The buggy address is located 512 bytes inside of
[  155.522387][  T908]  4096-byte region [ffff8880608a6ac0, ffff8880608a7ac0)
[  155.523920][  T908] The buggy address belongs to the page:
[  155.524552][  T908] page:ffffea0001822800 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:ffff88806c657cc0 index:0x0 compound_mapcount:0
[  155.525836][  T908] flags: 0x100000000010200(slab|head)
[  155.526445][  T908] raw: 0100000000010200 ffffea0001813808 ffffea0001a26c08 ffff88806c657cc0
[  155.527424][  T908] raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000070007 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000
[  155.528429][  T908] page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
[  155.529158][  T908]
[  155.529410][  T908] Memory state around the buggy address:
[  155.530060][  T908]  ffff8880608a6b80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
[  155.530971][  T908]  ffff8880608a6c00: fb fb fb fb fb f1 f1 f1 f1 00 f2 f2 f2 f3 f3 f3
[  155.531889][  T908] >ffff8880608a6c80: f3 fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
[  155.532806][  T908]                                            ^
[  155.533509][  T908]  ffff8880608a6d00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb f1 f1 f1 f1 00 00 00
[  155.534436][  T908]  ffff8880608a6d80: f2 f3 f3 f3 f3 fb fb fb 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
[ ... ]

Signed-off-by: Taehee Yoo <ap420073@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
plbossart pushed a commit that referenced this issue Nov 11, 2019
The IFF_BONDING means bonding master or bonding slave device.
->ndo_add_slave() sets IFF_BONDING flag and ->ndo_del_slave() unsets
IFF_BONDING flag.

bond0<--bond1

Both bond0 and bond1 are bonding device and these should keep having
IFF_BONDING flag until they are removed.
But bond1 would lose IFF_BONDING at ->ndo_del_slave() because that routine
do not check whether the slave device is the bonding type or not.
This patch adds the interface type check routine before removing
IFF_BONDING flag.

Test commands:
    ip link add bond0 type bond
    ip link add bond1 type bond
    ip link set bond1 master bond0
    ip link set bond1 nomaster
    ip link del bond1 type bond
    ip link add bond1 type bond

Splat looks like:
[  226.665555] proc_dir_entry 'bonding/bond1' already registered
[  226.666440] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 737 at fs/proc/generic.c:361 proc_register+0x2a9/0x3e0
[  226.667571] Modules linked in: bonding af_packet sch_fq_codel ip_tables x_tables unix
[  226.668662] CPU: 0 PID: 737 Comm: ip Not tainted 5.4.0-rc3+ #96
[  226.669508] Hardware name: innotek GmbH VirtualBox/VirtualBox, BIOS VirtualBox 12/01/2006
[  226.670652] RIP: 0010:proc_register+0x2a9/0x3e0
[  226.671612] Code: 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 80 3c 02 00 0f 85 39 01 00 00 48 8b 04 24 48 89 ea 48 c7 c7 a0 0b 14 9f 48 8b b0 e
0 00 00 00 e8 07 e7 88 ff <0f> 0b 48 c7 c7 40 2d a5 9f e8 59 d6 23 01 48 8b 4c 24 10 48 b8 00
[  226.675007] RSP: 0018:ffff888050e17078 EFLAGS: 00010282
[  226.675761] RAX: dffffc0000000008 RBX: ffff88805fdd0f10 RCX: ffffffff9dd344e2
[  226.676757] RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000008 RDI: ffff88806c9f6b8c
[  226.677751] RBP: ffff8880507160f3 R08: ffffed100d940019 R09: ffffed100d940019
[  226.678761] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffffed100d940018 R12: ffff888050716008
[  226.679757] R13: ffff8880507160f2 R14: dffffc0000000000 R15: ffffed100a0e2c1e
[  226.680758] FS:  00007fdc217cc0c0(0000) GS:ffff88806c800000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[  226.681886] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[  226.682719] CR2: 00007f49313424d0 CR3: 0000000050e46001 CR4: 00000000000606f0
[  226.683727] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
[  226.684725] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
[  226.685681] Call Trace:
[  226.687089]  proc_create_seq_private+0xb3/0xf0
[  226.687778]  bond_create_proc_entry+0x1b3/0x3f0 [bonding]
[  226.691458]  bond_netdev_event+0x433/0x970 [bonding]
[  226.692139]  ? __module_text_address+0x13/0x140
[  226.692779]  notifier_call_chain+0x90/0x160
[  226.693401]  register_netdevice+0x9b3/0xd80
[  226.694010]  ? alloc_netdev_mqs+0x854/0xc10
[  226.694629]  ? netdev_change_features+0xa0/0xa0
[  226.695278]  ? rtnl_create_link+0x2ed/0xad0
[  226.695849]  bond_newlink+0x2a/0x60 [bonding]
[  226.696422]  __rtnl_newlink+0xb9f/0x11b0
[  226.696968]  ? rtnl_link_unregister+0x220/0x220
[ ... ]

Fixes: 0b680e7 ("[PATCH] bonding: Add priv_flag to avoid event mishandling")
Signed-off-by: Taehee Yoo <ap420073@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
plbossart pushed a commit that referenced this issue Nov 11, 2019
All bonding device has same lockdep key and subclass is initialized with
nest_level.
But actual nest_level value can be changed when a lower device is attached.
And at this moment, the subclass should be updated but it seems to be
unsafe.
So this patch makes bonding use dynamic lockdep key instead of the
subclass.

Test commands:
    ip link add bond0 type bond

    for i in {1..5}
    do
	    let A=$i-1
	    ip link add bond$i type bond
	    ip link set bond$i master bond$A
    done
    ip link set bond5 master bond0

Splat looks like:
[  307.992912] WARNING: possible recursive locking detected
[  307.993656] 5.4.0-rc3+ #96 Tainted: G        W
[  307.994367] --------------------------------------------
[  307.995092] ip/761 is trying to acquire lock:
[  307.995710] ffff8880513aac60 (&(&bond->stats_lock)->rlock#2/2){+.+.}, at: bond_get_stats+0xb8/0x500 [bonding]
[  307.997045]
	       but task is already holding lock:
[  307.997923] ffff88805fcbac60 (&(&bond->stats_lock)->rlock#2/2){+.+.}, at: bond_get_stats+0xb8/0x500 [bonding]
[  307.999215]
	       other info that might help us debug this:
[  308.000251]  Possible unsafe locking scenario:

[  308.001137]        CPU0
[  308.001533]        ----
[  308.001915]   lock(&(&bond->stats_lock)->rlock#2/2);
[  308.002609]   lock(&(&bond->stats_lock)->rlock#2/2);
[  308.003302]
		*** DEADLOCK ***

[  308.004310]  May be due to missing lock nesting notation

[  308.005319] 3 locks held by ip/761:
[  308.005830]  #0: ffffffff9fcc42b0 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}, at: rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x466/0x8a0
[  308.006894]  #1: ffff88805fcbac60 (&(&bond->stats_lock)->rlock#2/2){+.+.}, at: bond_get_stats+0xb8/0x500 [bonding]
[  308.008243]  #2: ffffffff9f9219c0 (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: bond_get_stats+0x9f/0x500 [bonding]
[  308.009422]
	       stack backtrace:
[  308.010124] CPU: 0 PID: 761 Comm: ip Tainted: G        W         5.4.0-rc3+ #96
[  308.011097] Hardware name: innotek GmbH VirtualBox/VirtualBox, BIOS VirtualBox 12/01/2006
[  308.012179] Call Trace:
[  308.012601]  dump_stack+0x7c/0xbb
[  308.013089]  __lock_acquire+0x269d/0x3de0
[  308.013669]  ? register_lock_class+0x14d0/0x14d0
[  308.014318]  lock_acquire+0x164/0x3b0
[  308.014858]  ? bond_get_stats+0xb8/0x500 [bonding]
[  308.015520]  _raw_spin_lock_nested+0x2e/0x60
[  308.016129]  ? bond_get_stats+0xb8/0x500 [bonding]
[  308.017215]  bond_get_stats+0xb8/0x500 [bonding]
[  308.018454]  ? bond_arp_rcv+0xf10/0xf10 [bonding]
[  308.019710]  ? rcu_read_lock_held+0x90/0xa0
[  308.020605]  ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0xc0/0xc0
[  308.021286]  ? bond_get_stats+0x9f/0x500 [bonding]
[  308.021953]  dev_get_stats+0x1ec/0x270
[  308.022508]  bond_get_stats+0x1d1/0x500 [bonding]

Fixes: d3fff6c ("net: add netdev_lockdep_set_classes() helper")
Signed-off-by: Taehee Yoo <ap420073@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
plbossart pushed a commit that referenced this issue Nov 11, 2019
team interface could be nested and it's lock variable could be nested too.
But this lock uses static lockdep key and there is no nested locking
handling code such as mutex_lock_nested() and so on.
so the Lockdep would warn about the circular locking scenario that
couldn't happen.
In order to fix, this patch makes the team module to use dynamic lock key
instead of static key.

Test commands:
    ip link add team0 type team
    ip link add team1 type team
    ip link set team0 master team1
    ip link set team0 nomaster
    ip link set team1 master team0
    ip link set team1 nomaster

Splat that looks like:
[   40.364352] WARNING: possible recursive locking detected
[   40.364964] 5.4.0-rc3+ #96 Not tainted
[   40.365405] --------------------------------------------
[   40.365973] ip/750 is trying to acquire lock:
[   40.366542] ffff888060b34c40 (&team->lock){+.+.}, at: team_set_mac_address+0x151/0x290 [team]
[   40.367689]
	       but task is already holding lock:
[   40.368729] ffff888051201c40 (&team->lock){+.+.}, at: team_del_slave+0x29/0x60 [team]
[   40.370280]
	       other info that might help us debug this:
[   40.371159]  Possible unsafe locking scenario:

[   40.371942]        CPU0
[   40.372338]        ----
[   40.372673]   lock(&team->lock);
[   40.373115]   lock(&team->lock);
[   40.373549]
	       *** DEADLOCK ***

[   40.374432]  May be due to missing lock nesting notation

[   40.375338] 2 locks held by ip/750:
[   40.375851]  #0: ffffffffabcc42b0 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}, at: rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x466/0x8a0
[   40.376927]  #1: ffff888051201c40 (&team->lock){+.+.}, at: team_del_slave+0x29/0x60 [team]
[   40.377989]
	       stack backtrace:
[   40.378650] CPU: 0 PID: 750 Comm: ip Not tainted 5.4.0-rc3+ #96
[   40.379368] Hardware name: innotek GmbH VirtualBox/VirtualBox, BIOS VirtualBox 12/01/2006
[   40.380574] Call Trace:
[   40.381208]  dump_stack+0x7c/0xbb
[   40.381959]  __lock_acquire+0x269d/0x3de0
[   40.382817]  ? register_lock_class+0x14d0/0x14d0
[   40.383784]  ? check_chain_key+0x236/0x5d0
[   40.384518]  lock_acquire+0x164/0x3b0
[   40.385074]  ? team_set_mac_address+0x151/0x290 [team]
[   40.385805]  __mutex_lock+0x14d/0x14c0
[   40.386371]  ? team_set_mac_address+0x151/0x290 [team]
[   40.387038]  ? team_set_mac_address+0x151/0x290 [team]
[   40.387632]  ? mutex_lock_io_nested+0x1380/0x1380
[   40.388245]  ? team_del_slave+0x60/0x60 [team]
[   40.388752]  ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0x90/0xc0
[   40.389304]  ? rcu_read_lock_bh_held+0xa0/0xa0
[   40.389819]  ? lock_acquire+0x164/0x3b0
[   40.390285]  ? lockdep_rtnl_is_held+0x16/0x20
[   40.390797]  ? team_port_get_rtnl+0x90/0xe0 [team]
[   40.391353]  ? __module_text_address+0x13/0x140
[   40.391886]  ? team_set_mac_address+0x151/0x290 [team]
[   40.392547]  team_set_mac_address+0x151/0x290 [team]
[   40.393111]  dev_set_mac_address+0x1f0/0x3f0
[ ... ]

Fixes: 3d249d4 ("net: introduce ethernet teaming device")
Signed-off-by: Taehee Yoo <ap420073@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
plbossart pushed a commit that referenced this issue Nov 11, 2019
virt_wifi_newlink() calls netdev_upper_dev_link() and it internally
holds reference count of lower interface.

Current code does not release a reference count of the lower interface
when the lower interface is being deleted.
So, reference count leaks occur.

Test commands:
    ip link add dummy0 type dummy
    ip link add vw1 link dummy0 type virt_wifi
    ip link del dummy0

Splat looks like:
[  133.787526][  T788] WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 788 at net/core/dev.c:8274 rollback_registered_many+0x835/0xc80
[  133.788355][  T788] Modules linked in: virt_wifi cfg80211 dummy team af_packet sch_fq_codel ip_tables x_tables unix
[  133.789377][  T788] CPU: 1 PID: 788 Comm: ip Not tainted 5.4.0-rc3+ #96
[  133.790069][  T788] Hardware name: innotek GmbH VirtualBox/VirtualBox, BIOS VirtualBox 12/01/2006
[  133.791167][  T788] RIP: 0010:rollback_registered_many+0x835/0xc80
[  133.791906][  T788] Code: 00 4d 85 ff 0f 84 b5 fd ff ff ba c0 0c 00 00 48 89 de 4c 89 ff e8 9b 58 04 00 48 89 df e8 30
[  133.794317][  T788] RSP: 0018:ffff88805ba3f338 EFLAGS: 00010202
[  133.795080][  T788] RAX: ffff88805e57e801 RBX: ffff88805ba34000 RCX: ffffffffa9294723
[  133.796045][  T788] RDX: 1ffff1100b746816 RSI: 0000000000000008 RDI: ffffffffabcc4240
[  133.797006][  T788] RBP: ffff88805ba3f4c0 R08: fffffbfff5798849 R09: fffffbfff5798849
[  133.797993][  T788] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: fffffbfff5798848 R12: dffffc0000000000
[  133.802514][  T788] R13: ffff88805ba3f440 R14: ffff88805ba3f400 R15: ffff88805ed622c0
[  133.803237][  T788] FS:  00007f2e9608c0c0(0000) GS:ffff88806cc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[  133.804002][  T788] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[  133.804664][  T788] CR2: 00007f2e95610603 CR3: 000000005f68c004 CR4: 00000000000606e0
[  133.805363][  T788] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
[  133.806073][  T788] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
[  133.806787][  T788] Call Trace:
[  133.807069][  T788]  ? generic_xdp_install+0x310/0x310
[  133.807612][  T788]  ? lock_acquire+0x164/0x3b0
[  133.808077][  T788]  ? is_bpf_text_address+0x5/0xf0
[  133.808640][  T788]  ? deref_stack_reg+0x9c/0xd0
[  133.809138][  T788]  ? __nla_validate_parse+0x98/0x1ab0
[  133.809944][  T788]  unregister_netdevice_many.part.122+0x13/0x1b0
[  133.810599][  T788]  rtnl_delete_link+0xbc/0x100
[  133.811073][  T788]  ? rtnl_af_register+0xc0/0xc0
[  133.811672][  T788]  rtnl_dellink+0x30e/0x8a0
[  133.812205][  T788]  ? is_bpf_text_address+0x5/0xf0
[ ... ]

[  144.110530][  T788] unregister_netdevice: waiting for dummy0 to become free. Usage count = 1

This patch adds notifier routine to delete upper interface before deleting
lower interface.

Fixes: c7cdba3 ("mac80211-next: rtnetlink wifi simulation device")
Signed-off-by: Taehee Yoo <ap420073@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
cujomalainey pushed a commit to cujomalainey/linux that referenced this issue Nov 19, 2019
[ Upstream commit 65de65d ]

The IFF_BONDING means bonding master or bonding slave device.
->ndo_add_slave() sets IFF_BONDING flag and ->ndo_del_slave() unsets
IFF_BONDING flag.

bond0<--bond1

Both bond0 and bond1 are bonding device and these should keep having
IFF_BONDING flag until they are removed.
But bond1 would lose IFF_BONDING at ->ndo_del_slave() because that routine
do not check whether the slave device is the bonding type or not.
This patch adds the interface type check routine before removing
IFF_BONDING flag.

Test commands:
    ip link add bond0 type bond
    ip link add bond1 type bond
    ip link set bond1 master bond0
    ip link set bond1 nomaster
    ip link del bond1 type bond
    ip link add bond1 type bond

Splat looks like:
[  226.665555] proc_dir_entry 'bonding/bond1' already registered
[  226.666440] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 737 at fs/proc/generic.c:361 proc_register+0x2a9/0x3e0
[  226.667571] Modules linked in: bonding af_packet sch_fq_codel ip_tables x_tables unix
[  226.668662] CPU: 0 PID: 737 Comm: ip Not tainted 5.4.0-rc3+ thesofproject#96
[  226.669508] Hardware name: innotek GmbH VirtualBox/VirtualBox, BIOS VirtualBox 12/01/2006
[  226.670652] RIP: 0010:proc_register+0x2a9/0x3e0
[  226.671612] Code: 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 80 3c 02 00 0f 85 39 01 00 00 48 8b 04 24 48 89 ea 48 c7 c7 a0 0b 14 9f 48 8b b0 e
0 00 00 00 e8 07 e7 88 ff <0f> 0b 48 c7 c7 40 2d a5 9f e8 59 d6 23 01 48 8b 4c 24 10 48 b8 00
[  226.675007] RSP: 0018:ffff888050e17078 EFLAGS: 00010282
[  226.675761] RAX: dffffc0000000008 RBX: ffff88805fdd0f10 RCX: ffffffff9dd344e2
[  226.676757] RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000008 RDI: ffff88806c9f6b8c
[  226.677751] RBP: ffff8880507160f3 R08: ffffed100d940019 R09: ffffed100d940019
[  226.678761] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffffed100d940018 R12: ffff888050716008
[  226.679757] R13: ffff8880507160f2 R14: dffffc0000000000 R15: ffffed100a0e2c1e
[  226.680758] FS:  00007fdc217cc0c0(0000) GS:ffff88806c800000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[  226.681886] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[  226.682719] CR2: 00007f49313424d0 CR3: 0000000050e46001 CR4: 00000000000606f0
[  226.683727] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
[  226.684725] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
[  226.685681] Call Trace:
[  226.687089]  proc_create_seq_private+0xb3/0xf0
[  226.687778]  bond_create_proc_entry+0x1b3/0x3f0 [bonding]
[  226.691458]  bond_netdev_event+0x433/0x970 [bonding]
[  226.692139]  ? __module_text_address+0x13/0x140
[  226.692779]  notifier_call_chain+0x90/0x160
[  226.693401]  register_netdevice+0x9b3/0xd80
[  226.694010]  ? alloc_netdev_mqs+0x854/0xc10
[  226.694629]  ? netdev_change_features+0xa0/0xa0
[  226.695278]  ? rtnl_create_link+0x2ed/0xad0
[  226.695849]  bond_newlink+0x2a/0x60 [bonding]
[  226.696422]  __rtnl_newlink+0xb9f/0x11b0
[  226.696968]  ? rtnl_link_unregister+0x220/0x220
[ ... ]

Fixes: 0b680e7 ("[PATCH] bonding: Add priv_flag to avoid event mishandling")
Signed-off-by: Taehee Yoo <ap420073@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
aiChaoSONG pushed a commit to aiChaoSONG/linux that referenced this issue May 6, 2021
plbossart pushed a commit that referenced this issue Jun 16, 2023
The ice driver caches next_to_clean value at the beginning of
ice_clean_rx_irq() in order to remember the first buffer that has to be
freed/recycled after main Rx processing loop. The end boundary is
indicated by first descriptor of frame that Rx processing loop has ended
its duties. Note that if mentioned loop ended in the middle of gathering
multi-buffer frame, next_to_clean would be pointing to the descriptor in
the middle of the frame BUT freeing/recycling stage will stop at the
first descriptor. This means that next iteration of ice_clean_rx_irq()
will miss the (first_desc, next_to_clean - 1) entries.

 When running various 9K MTU workloads, such splats were observed:

[  540.780716] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000
[  540.787787] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
[  540.793002] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
[  540.798218] PGD 0 P4D 0
[  540.800801] Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI
[  540.805231] CPU: 18 PID: 3984 Comm: xskxceiver Tainted: G        W          6.3.0-rc7+ #96
[  540.813619] Hardware name: Intel Corporation S2600WFT/S2600WFT, BIOS SE5C620.86B.02.01.0008.031920191559 03/19/2019
[  540.824209] RIP: 0010:ice_clean_rx_irq+0x2b6/0xf00 [ice]
[  540.829678] Code: 74 24 10 e9 aa 00 00 00 8b 55 78 41 31 57 10 41 09 c4 4d 85 ff 0f 84 83 00 00 00 49 8b 57 08 41 8b 4f 1c 65 8b 35 1a fa 4b 3f <48> 8b 02 48 c1 e8 3a 39 c6 0f 85 a2 00 00 00 f6 42 08 02 0f 85 98
[  540.848717] RSP: 0018:ffffc9000f42fc50 EFLAGS: 00010282
[  540.854029] RAX: 0000000000000004 RBX: 0000000000000002 RCX: 000000000000fffe
[  540.861272] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: 00000000ffffffff
[  540.868519] RBP: ffff88984a05ac00 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: dead000000000100
[  540.875760] R10: ffff88983fffcd00 R11: 000000000010f2b8 R12: 0000000000000004
[  540.883008] R13: 0000000000000003 R14: 0000000000000800 R15: ffff889847a10040
[  540.890253] FS:  00007f6ddf7fe640(0000) GS:ffff88afdf800000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[  540.898465] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[  540.904299] CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 000000010d3da001 CR4: 00000000007706e0
[  540.911542] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
[  540.918789] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
[  540.926032] PKRU: 55555554
[  540.928790] Call Trace:
[  540.931276]  <TASK>
[  540.933418]  ice_napi_poll+0x4ca/0x6d0 [ice]
[  540.937804]  ? __pfx_ice_napi_poll+0x10/0x10 [ice]
[  540.942716]  napi_busy_loop+0xd7/0x320
[  540.946537]  xsk_recvmsg+0x143/0x170
[  540.950178]  sock_recvmsg+0x99/0xa0
[  540.953729]  __sys_recvfrom+0xa8/0x120
[  540.957543]  ? do_futex+0xbd/0x1d0
[  540.961008]  ? __x64_sys_futex+0x73/0x1d0
[  540.965083]  __x64_sys_recvfrom+0x20/0x30
[  540.969155]  do_syscall_64+0x38/0x90
[  540.972796]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0xdc
[  540.977934] RIP: 0033:0x7f6de5f27934

To fix this, set cached_ntc to first_desc so that at the end, when
freeing/recycling buffers, descriptors from first to ntc are not missed.

Fixes: 2fba7dc ("ice: Add support for XDP multi-buffer on Rx side")
Signed-off-by: Maciej Fijalkowski <maciej.fijalkowski@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@corigine.com>
Tested-by: Chandan Kumar Rout <chandanx.rout@intel.com> (A Contingent Worker at Intel)
Signed-off-by: Tony Nguyen <anthony.l.nguyen@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230531154457.3216621-1-anthony.l.nguyen@intel.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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