docs: suggest that the risk of high numbers of files in many situations is fine #99
Conversation
This file contains bidirectional Unicode text that may be interpreted or compiled differently than what appears below. To review, open the file in an editor that reveals hidden Unicode characters.
Learn more about bidirectional Unicode characters
michalc
force-pushed
the
docs/keystream-leakage-in-most-cases-acceptable
branch
2 times, most recently
from
b442525 to
89a581b
Compare
…ns is fine https://crypto.stackexchange.com/questions/109293/keystream-reuse-in-aes-256-in-ae-2-encrypted-zips (which is my own question and answer), describes how the chance of leakage due to high number of member file in a ZIP is really low for AES-256. So this adds that in - suggesting that the risk is probably acceptable for all situations other than the most risk averse that also have high numbers of member files in the ZIP. It doesn't put any figure or formulas in - I think people are going to have to investigate and make their own judgement calls. Essentially I think we want enough information for people to either: - "Oh - we are risk adverse, we need to look into this further" - "We are happy with a bit of risk - we're good" Also - this removes the "as most other ZIP writer do" part when referring ot encrypting files with the same password. It I think it's borderline defensive, and not really that helpful here, and slightly muddies the message on risk and high numbers of files. Keeping the focus on what stream-zip does to really keep the most important information. If people want to investigate other ZIP writers, they can.
michalc
force-pushed
the
docs/keystream-leakage-in-most-cases-acceptable
branch
from
89a581b to
b170ce0
Compare
Sign up for free
to join this conversation on GitHub.
Already have an account?
Sign in to comment
Add this suggestion to a batch that can be applied as a single commit.
This suggestion is invalid because no changes were made to the code.
Suggestions cannot be applied while the pull request is closed.
Suggestions cannot be applied while viewing a subset of changes.
Only one suggestion per line can be applied in a batch.
Add this suggestion to a batch that can be applied as a single commit.
Applying suggestions on deleted lines is not supported.
You must change the existing code in this line in order to create a valid suggestion.
Outdated suggestions cannot be applied.
This suggestion has been applied or marked resolved.
Suggestions cannot be applied from pending reviews.
Suggestions cannot be applied on multi-line comments.
Suggestions cannot be applied while the pull request is queued to merge.
Suggestion cannot be applied right now. Please check back later.
https://crypto.stackexchange.com/questions/109293/keystream-reuse-in-aes-256-in-ae-2-encrypted-zips (which is my own question and answer) describes how the chance of leakage due to high number of member file in a ZIP is really low for AES-256.
So this adds that in - suggesting that the risk is probably acceptable for all situations other than the most risk averse that also have high numbers of member files in the ZIP. It doesn't put any figure or formulas in - I think people are going to have to investigate and make their own judgement calls. Essentially I think we want enough information for people to either:
Also - this removes the "as most other ZIP writer do" part when referring ot encrypting files with the same password. It I think it's borderline defensive, and not really that helpful here, and slightly muddies the message on risk and high numbers of files. Keeping the focus on what stream-zip does to really keep the most important information. If people want to investigate other ZIP writers, they can.