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chore(docs): add highlight post for secrets in disk buffers
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website/content/en/highlights/2023-10-30-secrets-in-disk-buffers.md
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--- | ||
date: "2023-10-30" | ||
title: "Secrets in Disk Buffers" | ||
description: "" | ||
authors: ["tobz"] | ||
pr_numbers: [18816] | ||
release: "0.34.0" | ||
hide_on_release_notes: false | ||
badges: | ||
type: "announcement" | ||
--- | ||
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Starting with Vector's `0.34.0` release, secrets in events will now be stored in disk buffers. These | ||
secrets are stored **unencrypted**. | ||
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## Event secrets | ||
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For some source components in Vector, such as the Datadog Agent or Splunk HEC sources, these | ||
components have the ability to store the API key received in requests by Vector in order to re-use | ||
the same API key when sending those events back out to a compatible service. This allows users, for | ||
example, to set up Vector as an aggregator for all of their Datadog Agent processes, reusing the | ||
original API key, or keys, as the events are then forwarded to the Datadog API. | ||
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## Disk buffers and event secrets and metadata | ||
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Prior to [#18816](https://github.com/vectordotdev/vector/pull/18816), these event secrets (and other | ||
event metadata) were not stored when using disk buffers. This represented a loss of functionality | ||
when users switched from the default in-memory buffers to disk buffers. In order to bring this | ||
functionality up to par, we added support for storing event secrets/metadata when writing events to | ||
disk buffers. | ||
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Naturally, event secrets represent sensitive data such as API keys and more. However, Vector | ||
currently stores these event secrets **unencrypted** in disk buffers. | ||
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## Do I need to worry about this change? | ||
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Firstly, if you're **not** using disk buffers, then there is no change to Vector's behavior and you can | ||
stop reading here. | ||
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There are two main scenarios where a configuration might now start storing secrets in disk buffers: | ||
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- using a source component which has the ability to store secrets | ||
- using `remap` and adding secrets directly to events | ||
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### Source components that can store secrets | ||
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Some source components will store secrets (specifically, API keys) on an event in order to | ||
facilitate Vector acting similarly to a proxy, using as much of the original request/event data as | ||
possible. Only two sources currently provide such behavior: | ||
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- `datadog_agent` source (stores the `DD-API-KEY` header value; **enabled** by default) | ||
- `splunk_hec` source (stores the `Authorization` header value; **disabled** by default) | ||
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However, for both of these sinks, this behavior can be disabled by setting `store_api_key` to | ||
`false` for the `datadog_agent` source, or setting `store_hec_token` to `false` for the `splunk_hec` | ||
source. | ||
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### Manually-stored secrets via `remap` | ||
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When using the `remap` transform, VRL exposes helper functions to set secrets on events. If your | ||
`remap` usage includes setting secrets, then those secrets would also now in scope for getting | ||
stored in disk buffers. | ||
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## Securing disk buffers | ||
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As mentioned above, secrets will now be stored in disk buffer data files, and will be | ||
**unencrypted**. The data directory that Vector is configured to use should be locked down as | ||
tightly as possible so that only the user/group that the Vector process is run as has read/write | ||
access. | ||
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By default on Unix-based platforms, Vector will attempt to set file permissions for the disk buffer | ||
directory/files to only be readable/writeable by the process user, and only readable by the process | ||
group. This does not occur on Windows. | ||
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## Future improvements to disk buffers and securely buffering events | ||
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This is not the end of the story for storing secrets in disk buffers. We do have tentative plans to | ||
eventually support encrypting secrets in disk buffers, and potentially support encrypting all event | ||
data itself. This work depends on capabilities Vector does not currently have, such as being able to | ||
securely pass a decryption key into the process, and where a long-lived decryption key would live. | ||
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These issues need to be tackled first before we can provide a robust encryption solution for disk | ||
buffers. |