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GitHub Workflows security hardening #5322
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This pull request is automatically built and testable in CodeSandbox. To see build info of the built libraries, click here or the icon next to each commit SHA. Latest deployment of this branch, based on commit 45ab14c:
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Please let me know if you have any questions. |
permissions: | ||
# for changesets/action | ||
contents: write | ||
pull-requests: write |
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@sashashura this workflow has only one job, couldn't we use only one permissions
definition?
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It is optional, but the reasoning was I wanted to have a safe global default in case someone later adds more jobs. Let me know if you want me to put everything at the global level.
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This PR adds explicit permissions section to workflows. This is a security best practice because by default workflows run with extended set of permissions (except from
on: pull_request
from external forks). By specifying any permission explicitly all others are set to none. By using the principle of least privilege the damage a compromised workflow can do (because of an injection or compromised third party tool or action) is restricted.It is recommended to have most strict permissions on the top level and grant write permissions on job level case by case.