-
-
Notifications
You must be signed in to change notification settings - Fork 91
Simula Scenario Analysis
George Singer edited this page Apr 30, 2018
·
1 revision
Here we analyze Simula from the perspective of an outsider (i.e., an investor). The scenarios proceed from worst case to best case.
- MVP difficulties (or future technical issues) never get solved.
- Team issues cause us to give up.
- Fundraising stagnates
- Immediate competition causes us to give up (unlikely).
- Team pivots to something else (“graceful exit”; also unlikely).
- VR remains too expensive for too long
- Unlikely since AI, crypto-mining, and gaming industries are all pressuring improvements to GPUs
- VR will need a prohibitive amount of technological improvement before it can take off (i.e., headsets need to become significantly less bulky; resolution needs to improve by too large a margin).
- VR ∩ Linux remains fringe
- 2D Apps: Network effects from Windows/Apple/Android platforms will dominate in VR.
- 3D Apps: Windows/Apple/Android will develop 3D work apps before Simula.
- Linux driver support is historically worse than Windows
- Linux ∩ VR is tiny (in 2018); if Simula itself cannot change this, then the monetary value derived solely from products and services using Simula will also be tiny [fn:1]
- VR ∩ Linux takes off, but Simula is out-competed by another entity.
- Simula team lacks execution speed.
- Simula is forkable, and lacks open-source durability.
- Startup competition
- Abandoned projects: Motorcar, Ibex
- New projects: SafeSpaces
- VC backed companies: Magic Leap (appears to be making its own VR OS)
- Windows-based projects: BigScreen, Virtual Desktop, etc.
- Corporate competition
- Microsoft Holographic
- Valve (i.e., SteamVR evolves into a viable VR Desktop environment)
- Facebook/Oculus (i.e., Oculus Desktop)
- Google/Android (i.e., Google Daydream evolves into a viable VR Desktop environment)
- Cannonical (i.e., Cannonical develops a VR window manager for Ubuntu)
- VR ∩ Linux takes off, but Simula is bought by another entity.
[fn:1] David Kraeutmann provides some additional counter-points to this scenario:
- Linux has tighter integration with alternative WMs than Windows
- Power users are more likely to use Linux and Simula, and benefit a lot from the added screen space
- [Simula will foster] more goodwill with the community [being] open source, etc
- Screen real estate. Consumers will get rapidly decreasing gains to marginal utility for increased screen real estate; dual monitors are enough, and the fact that VR Desktop gives a user 10x the screen real estate won’t matter.
- Freedom. Consumers won’t care that working in VR allows them more freedom to (physically) move around while working; VR headset portability won’t matter to them either.
- Immersion. VR’s work focus/immersion factor won’t matter to consumers.
- Headset friction. Headset friction (i.e., the friction of having to mount and unmount an HMD just to access your OS) will prohibit VR Desktops from taking off.
- Text resolution. Good VR text resolution will be too hard to achieve within the next 2-10 years; without good VR text resolution, VR Desktop will fail to take off.
- Simula is successful as a non-fringe software project (with more than 1MM users), but still fails to capture much value.
- High costs. Simula dumps profits into failed future projects, eating away profits. (Ex: Cannonical had $126M in 2017 revenue but -$521K in profit).
- Durability failure. Simula loses to latent competition, despite being a successful project.
- We have specific business model ideas for how to capture value; so this scenario seems unlikely.
- Simula platform is successful, leading to an influx of new Linux VR office apps.
- Simula monetizes by making proprietary apps on its own platform.
- Analogy: Android is free; Google apps are proprietary.
- This scenario assumes we are unable to control an app marketplace.
- Simula becomes successful as a VR platform.
- Simula monetizes by offering a dual license bundle: (i) free license for private usage; (ii) fee-based license for commercial/team usage.
- This causes an antogonistic relationship between Simula and manufacturers/corporate users.
- Fights Simula’s growth engine: manufacturers should be maximally incentivized to install Simula on their HMDs.
- Feels like an outdated business model.
- We don’t plan to do this; it’s hard to see how it’s better than other options.
- Simula becomes successful as a VR platform.
- Simula monetizes by offering paid technical support for large users (i.e., corporations, manufacturers).
- Similar to RedHat (~$2B valuation) business model
- This model incentivizes creating complicated software.
- Service-based business models are also hard to scale.
- We don’t plan to do this; it’s hard to see how it’s better than other options.
- Simula becomes a successful VR platform.
- Simula monetizes via advertising.
- Ex1: Charge businesses for default app status (i.e., JanusVR pays Simula to be the default VR browser).
- Ex2: Show Amazon affiliate links when users search the OS for apps (this is how Cannonical monetizes Ubuntu).
- Ex3: Simula advertises/sells “VR real estate” (see, i.e., Decentraland).
- Simula as a platform is successful, leading to an influx of new Linux VR office apps.
- Simula monetizes by creating a (potentially blockchain-baesed[fn:1]) marketplace for VR apps.
- Simula will start this marketplace by first making its own VR office applications. It will then need a strategy to attract other distributors to its platform.
- If Simula creates a centralized marketplace, stakeholders will take a percentage of all app sales.
- If Simula creates a decentralized marketplace, stakeholders will own tokens that increase in value as the marketplace grows.
- In either case, Simula takes a fraction of the entire VR app market, giving it a valuation upper bound comparable to, i.e., the Android/Apple app stores.
- This is the error scenario, where Simula captures value in unforeseen ways.